Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted
digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
Oxford University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Monist
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Schopenhauer's Laughter
1. Laughter
Schopenhauer's theory of laughter is initially presented as part of his
theory of concepts in Book I of The World as Will and Representation
(henceforth, WWR)2 and is developed at greater length in Supplementary
Essay No. VIII in Volume 2 of the second edition of WWR. Here are two
representative passages:
In every case, laughter results from nothing but the suddenly perceived in
congruity between a concept an the real object that had been thought through
it in some relation; and laughter itself is just the expression of this incon
gruity. ... All laughter therefore is occasioned by a paradoxical, and hence
unexpected, subsumption, it matters not whether this is expressed in words
or deeds ( WWR I, p. 59).
... the origin of the ludicrous is always the paradoxical, and thus unexpect
ed, subsumption of an object under a concept that is in all other respects
heterogeneous to it. Accordingly, the phenomenon of laughter always
signifies the sudden apprehension of an incongruity between such a concept
and the real object thought through it, and hence between what is abstract
and what is perceptive. The greater and more unexpected this incongruity in
the apprehension of the person laughing, the more violent will be the
laughter (WWR II, p. 91).
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 37
that every case of laughter results from the sudden apprehension or per
ception of some kind of incongruity. The familiar counter-examples are
laughter brought on by tickling or by inhaling nitrous oxide.
In a late essay on philosophy and natural science,3 Schopenhauer
comments on the physiology of laughter and, in doing so, mentions laughter
as a result of tickling.4 He does not, however, consider this case in relation
to his theory of laughter. It is possible that he doesn't regard it as a problem
for his theory because he thinks of such laughter as being "excited entirely
physically," whereas normally laughter has a mental cause ("stimulus
mentalis"). But even restricting Schopenhauer's theory to cases of "men
talistic" laughter would not save the theory, for laughter from nervousness,
embarrassment and hysteria have mental causes, through not necessarily
perception of incongruity.
What tends to happen at this point in discussions of Schopenhauer's
theory is that his theory is interpreted as a theory of humorous laughter;
that is, laughter as the expression of amusement at something humorous.
According to this version of the theory, it is the sudden perception of in
congruity which amuses and in certain cases results in laughter. However,
I believe that such a rescue mission requires giving up on Schopenhauer's
theory too quickly. It seems to me that the phenomenon Schopenhauer is
interested in is what might be called intentional laughter. By this I do not
mean deliberate or voluntary laughter, but rather laughter that is directed
at something or other. Schopenhauer's theory is that in all cases what in
tentional laughter is directed at is a perceived incongruity. This interpretation
does differentiate the subject of Schopenhauer's theory from hysterical or
nervous or embarrassed laughter, for in these sorts of cases the laughter is
not directed at anything but is simply a manifestation or symptom of the
emotional or nervous condition. If you laugh nervously on being intro
duced to the queen, you are not laughing at the queen or the dignity of the
occasion: you are not laughing at anything?it is just that your nervous
ness emerges in the form of laughing. In some cases of hysteria, you might
be laughing hysterically at something or other, or become hysterical through
laughing at something: but these are not counter-examples to Schopen
hauer's theory.
As a theory of intentional laughter, Schopenhauer's theory is meant
to extend to cases of laughter beyond humorous laughter. One of Schopen
hauer's examples is "our own bitter laughter when the terrible truth by
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
38 PETER . LEWIS
2. Incongruity
The distinctive feature of Schopenhauer's theory of laughter is the
claim that it depends on "perceived incongruity between a concept and the
real object that had been thought through it in some relation" (WWR, I, p.
59); or, as he puts it in the second edition, the apprehension of "the para
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 39
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
40 PETER . LEWIS
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 41
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
42 PETER . LEWIS
3. Metaphysics
Schopenhauer's emphasis on subsumption under a concept constricts
his version of the Incongruity Theory. As Scruton rightly observes, the
language of concept and object is "no more than an attempt to squeeze his
analysis [of incongruity] into the brave metaphysical system of which it is
designed to form a part."18 This is seen most clearly in Schopenhauer's ex
planation of the pleasure normally expressed through laughter, viz., "the
triumph of the knowledge of perception over thought" (WWR II, p. 98).
What we laugh at is an incongruity between a perceived object and a
concept. Concepts are the work of the faculty of reason (WWR I, p. 39)
whose exercise involves exertion and which is opposed to the immediacy
of perception and desire. Hence, Schopenhauer argues, it is "delightful for
us to see this strict, untiring, and most troublesome governess, our faculty
of reason, for once convicted of inadequacy" (loc cit.). Here Schopen
hauer's metaphysics is engaged to account for the cause of, as opposed to
the reason for, laughter; an explanation which anticipates the relief from
restraint theories of humour to be found in Spencer and Freud. One
obvious drawback that Schopenhauer notices is that not all cases of in
congruity involve perception of an object; in many witticisms, "instead of
a real object of perception, a species-concept appears that is subordinate
to the higher or genus-concept" (WWR II, p. 92). Anice example is Woody
Aliens' comment on bisexuality, that it immediately doubles your chances
of getting a date on Saturday night. What is supposed to happen in such
cases is that the imagination supplies an image of the species concept?
"a representative of perception"?and a conflict is noticed between this
perceptual token and the higher-order concepts. If it is far-fetched to propose
that in the course of appreciating Woody Allen's witticism we visualize
bisexual individuals on the look out for Saturday night dates, the implau
sibility derives as much from the inadequacy of Schopenhauer's theory of
language as from his determination to preserve his theory of laughter.
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 43
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
44 PETER . LEWIS
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 45
always be a lack of perfect fit, so that there will always be the possibility
of perceiving an incongruity that can provoke laughter. That is, everything
in the world of perception can be the subject of laughter.
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
46 PETER . LEWIS
5. The Humorous
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 47
protests that this should be resisted, for "the word humour is borrowed
from the English, in order to single out and denote a quite peculiar species
of the ludicrous which ... is even akin to the sublime. [I]t is not meant to
be used as a title for any jest and buffoonery" (loc. cit.).
According to Schopenhauer, humour depends on "a special kind of
mood or frame of mind," "... a subjective yet serious and sublime mood,
which is involuntarily in conflict with a common external world very
different from itself (WWR II, p. 100). Samples of Hamlet's melancholy
wit are quoted in illustration. Furthermore, Schopenhauer says, "every
poetical or artistic presentation of a comic, or even a farcical scene,
through which a serious thought yet gleams as its concealed background,
is a product of humour, and thus is humorous" (WWR II, pp. 100 f.). The
humorous frame of mind is, then, to be distinguished from cheap and
frivolous vulgarity by the seriousness of the thought which it expresses,
but it is unclear from what has so far been said how it is supposed to be
akin to the sublime. I suggest that the kinship between the humorous and
the sublime derives from the fact that in both states there is a conflict with
the external world.
Whereas the aesthetic experience of beauty is one of calm contem
plation, the experience of the sublime is troubled and turbulent. Due to the
objects of attention?tempestuous nature, vast empty spaces of deserts or
the night sky?the perceiver feels a constant threat of danger to himself
and to his sense of identity. For this reason, the experience of the sublime
is liable to collapse into, be reduced to, one of sheer anxiety (WWR I, p.
202). The maintenance of the experience of the sublime requires strain or
struggle. Consequently, the experience of the sublime involves a kind of
reflexiveness or self-awareness foreign to the experience of beauty.
The humorous mood, as Schopenhauer describes it, also derives
from a conflict with the external world. Instead of pursuing his desires and
projects along with everyone else, the humorist finds himself struck by the
incongruity, the absurdity and the folly, in the lives of his fellows. And, as
in the experience of the sublime, the maintenance of the humorous mood
requires some strain or struggle, for it is in constant danger of collapsing
into sheer bitterness or anger, on the one hand, or into mere triviality and
silliness, on the other. Like the experience of the sublime, the humorous
mood involves a self-consciousness and reflexiveness that distinguishes it
from the consoling pleasures of more familiar aesthetic experiences of
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
48 PETER . LEWIS
6. Comedy
Like all the arts in Schopenhauer's aesthetic, with the exception of
music, comedy presents the eternal structure lying beneath or behind the
surface appearance of the phenomenal world. Specifically, comedy reveals
the Form or Idea of humanity, the essence of human life. However, it is
the function of the art of tragedy also to reveal the essential nature of human
existence. But whereas comedy inspires amusement and laughter, tragedy
excites pity and fear. How is it that two art forms which reveal the nature
of human life can result in such different responses? Schopenhauer's
answer is that comedy and tragedy present the drama of human life from
different points of view.
Seen as a whole, an individual's life "is really a tragedy"?he is born,
he suffers, and he dies: "that's all, that's all, that's all, that's all."23 Seen in
detail, an individual's life "has the character of a comedy. For the doings
and worries of the day, the restless mockeries of the moment, the desires
and fears of the weak, the mishaps of the hour, are all brought about by
chance that is bent on some mischievous trick; they are nothing but scenes
from a comedy" (WWR I, p. 322). Such mundane events are, we might
say, life's little incongruities (taking 'incongruity' here in its broadest
sense), and they reflect the underlying conflict between the demands of
the species and the desires of the individual (WWR II, pp. 553-54). This
is the serious thought expressed when these kinds of event are presented
in the smiling mask of comedy.
And yet, of course, these little incongruities are no laughing matter
for the individual who lives through them: they are rather the source of
frustration and misery. What makes it possible for us to laugh at them
rather than to weep is the manner of their presentation. In a comedy, we
do not have the opportunity to dwell on the pain and misery of daily
disasters, for "it exhibits them as fleeting" and "hastens to drop the curtain
at the moment of delight" (WWR II, p. 438). As someone once said, farce
is tragedy speeded up.
Whereas tragedy prepares us for the renunciation of life, comedy, by
bringing out "the inexhaustible material for laughter with which life . . .
[is] filled," tends to keep us in a good mood and "declares that life on the
whole is quite good" (loc cit.). Wisdom, for Schopenhauer, consists in
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER'S LAUGHTER 49
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
50 peter ?. lewis
Notes
1. An honourable exception is T. L. S. Sprigge, "Schopenhauer and Bergson on
Laughter," Comparative Criticism, 10, (1988), 39-65.
2. The Word as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1969).
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
SCHOPENHAUER' S LAUGHTER 51
This content downloaded from 130.113.111.210 on Sat, 14 May 2016 15:22:26 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms