PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs.
COURT OF APPEALS The principle about "the last clear" chance, would call for application in a suit between the owners and drivers of the two colliding
106 SCRA 391
Facts: Private respondent Jesus Samson flew as co-pilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi with Captain Delfin
Bustamante in a plane belonging to petitioner PAL. The airplane crash-landed beyond the runway due to the slow reaction and
poor judgment of said captain, when it did not maintain the required pressure on the brakes and notwithstanding the diligent
efforts of Samson. The jolt caused injuries to Samson. And instead of PAL giving Samson expert and proper medical treatment it
referred him to a general medical practitioner. Now, on grounds of physical disability Samson was discharged from PALs employ,
which caused him to file a complaint for damages. PAL denied liability on the ground of fortuitous event, and that the physical
headaches and dizziness experience by Samson were due to emotional disturbance over his inability to pass the required
upgrading course given by PAL. Judgement was rendered in favor of Samson in the lower court which was affirmed by CA with
some modification, by imposing legal rate of interest on the unearned income of Samson. Hence the instant petition.
Issue: Is there a causal connection between the injuries suffered by private respondent during the accident and the subsequent
periodic dizziness, headache and general debility allegedly caused by the accident and private respondents discharge from
employment, which further warrants the award of damages?
Held: Yes. The dizziness, headaches and general debility of private respondent were after-effects of the crash-landing. Doctors
presented by PAL even admit the vital facts about Samsons brain injury.
There was also gross negligence by PAL for allowing Capt. Bustamante to fly on the that fateful day of the accident,
even if he was sick, having tumor on his nose. No one will certify the fitness to fly a plane of one suffering from the disease. One
month prior to the crash-landing, when the pilot was preparing to land in Daet, private respondent warned him that they were not
in the vicinity of Daet but above the town of Ligao. The plane hit outside the airstrip. In another instance, the pilot would hit the
Mayon Volcano had not the plaintiff warned him. These more than prove what private respondent had complained of. Disregard
thereof by PAL is condemnable.
Having affirmed the gross negligence and casual connection of the after-effects of the accident, the award of
damages was likewise affirmed. The grant of compensatory damages[P204,000] by computing the basic salary per annum at
P750.00 a month and P300.00 a month for extra pay for extra flying time including bonus every year is justified. The grant of moral
damages[P50,000] was also justified, having considered the bad faith of PAL. The negligence of PAL is clearly a quasi-delict and
therefore Art. 2219(2) is applicable, justifying the recovery of moral damages. Even from the standpoint of the petitioner that there
is an employee-employer relationship between it and private respondent arising from the contract of employment, private
respondent is still entitled to moral damages in view of the finding of bad faith or malice, applying the provisions of Article 2220.
DOCTRINES
Phil. Rabbit Bus Lines vs. IAC
vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual obligations. For it
would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence."
It is the rule under the substantial factor test that if the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or the manner in which it occurred does not
prevent him from being liable. The bus driver's conduct is not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to the passengers of the
jeepney. It cannot be said that the bus was travelling at a fast speed when the accident occurred because the speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hour, assuming such calculation to be correct, is yet within the speed limit allowed in highways.
Bustamante vs. CA
The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant
where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to
the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a
person's own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to recovery. As
the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of
last clear chance as between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding
vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles.
Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
Lara vs. Valencia
The owner and driver of a vehicle owes to accommodation passengers or invited guests merely the duty to exercise reasonable
care so that they may be transported safely to their destination. Thus, "The rule is established by weight of authority that the
owner or operator of an automobile owes the duty to an invited guest to exercise reasonable care in its operation, and not
unreasonably to expose him to danger and injury by increasing the hazard of travel. The owner of the vehicle in the case at bar is
only required to observe ordinary care, and is not in duty bound to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by our law.
A passenger must observe the diligence of a father of a family to avoid injury to himself which means that if the injury to the
passenger has been proximately caused by his own negligence, the carrier cannot be held liable.
Necessito vs. Paras
While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it should nevertheless be held to answer for the laws its
equipment if such flaws were at all discoverable. In this connection, the manufacturer of the defective appliance is considered in
law the agent of the carrier, and the good repute of the manufacturer will not relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
carrier's liability is the fact that the passenger has no privity with the manufacturer of the defective equipment; hence, he has no
remedy against him, while the carrier usually has.
Japan Airlines vs. CA
Accordingly, there is no question that when a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of "force majeure," the general rule is
that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-performance. Corollarily, when JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to
Manila due to the effects of Mt. Pinatubo eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of hotel and meal expenses the
stranded passengers incurred, cannot be charged to JAL. Yet it is undeniable that JAL assumed the hotel expenses of
respondents for their unexpected overnight stay on June 15, 1991.
It has been held that airline passengers must take such risks incident to the mode of travel. In this regard, adverse weather
conditions or extreme climatic changes are some of the perils involved in air travel, the consequences of which the passenger
must assume or expect.
While JAL was no longer required to defray private respondents' living expenses during their stay in Narita on account of the
fortuitous event, JAL had the duty to make the necessary arrangements to transport private respondents on the first available
connecting flight to Manila. Petitioner JAL reneged on its obligation to look after the comfort and convenience of its passengers
when it declassified private respondents from "transit passengers" to "new passengers" as a result of which private respondents
were obliged to make the necessary arrangements themselves for the next flight to Manila.
Layugan vs. IAC
Res ipsa loquitur is a doctrine which states thus: "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from
want of care. The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that
prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.
Whether the cargo truck was parked along the road or on half the shoulder of the right side of the road would be of no
moment taking into account the warning device consisting of the lighted kerosene lamp placed three or four meters from the back
of the truck. But despite this warning which we rule as sufficient, the Isuzu truck driven by Daniel Serrano, an employee of the
private respondent, still bumped the rear of the parked cargo truck. As a direct consequence of such accident the petitioner
sustained injuries on his left forearm and left foot. It is clear therefore that the absence or want of care of Daniel Serrano has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. It follows that the doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable, making the employer
of the driver liable for the negligence of his employee.
La Mallorca vs. CA
The liability of the carrier for the child, who was already led by the father to a place about 5 meters away from the bus for her
safety under the contract of carriage, persists. The relation of carrier and passenger does not necessarily cease where the latter,
after alighting from the car, aids the carrier's servant or employee in removing his baggage from the car.
It has been recognized as a rule that the relation of carrier and passenger does not cease at the moment the passenger alights
from the carrier's vehicle at a place selected by the carrier at the point of destination, but continues until the passenger has had a
reasonable time or a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's premises. And, what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay
within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances.
Aboitiz Shipping Co. vs. CA
The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been landed at the port of destination and
has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. Once created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has,
after reaching his destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to leave the carrier's
premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers,
and what is a reasonable time or a reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. The carrier-passenger relationship is not terminated
merely by the fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the
carrier's premises to claim his baggage.
When the accident occurred, the victim was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from
petitioner's vessel. Even if he had already disembarked an hour earlier, his presence in petitioner's premises was not without
cause. The victim had to claim his baggage which was possible only one hour after the vessel arrived since it was admittedly
standard procedure in the case of petitioner's vessels that the unloading operations shall start only after that time.
Mallari Sr. vs. CA
Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of a passenger of the jeepney, was the sole negligence of the
driver of the passenger jeepney, petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr., who recklessly operated and drove his jeepney in a lane where
overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed
that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation.
Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art.
1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of the same Code, it is
liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees. This liability of the
common carrier does not cease upon proof that it exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its
employees.
Bayasen vs. CA
It is a well known physical tact that cars may skid on greasy or slippery roads, as in the instant case, without fault on account of
the manner of handling the car. Skidding means partial or complete loss of control of the car under circumstances not necessarily
implying negligence. It may occur without fault.
Under the particular circumstances of the instant case, the petitioner- driver who skidded could not be regarded as negligent, the
skidding being an unforeseen event, so that the petitioner had a valid excuse for his departure from his regular course.
Cervantes vs. CA
Since the PAL agents are not privy to the said Agreement and petitioner knew that a written request to the legal counsel of PAL
was necessary, he cannot use what the PAL agents did to his advantage. The said agents, acted without authority when they
confirmed the flights of the petitioner. Under Article 1989 of the New Civil Code, the acts of an agent beyond the scope of his
authority do not bind the principal, unless the latter ratifies the same expressly or impliedly. Furthermore, when the third person
(herein petitioner) knows that the agent was acting beyond his power or authority, the principal cannot be held liable for the acts of
the agent. If the said third person is aware of such limits of authority, he is to blame, and is not entitled to recover damages from
the agent, unless the latter undertook to secure the principal's ratification.
Calalas vs. CA
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver.
The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of contract. The
doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. In such a case, the
obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties
themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as
contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to
passengers.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have been
at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
The driver of jeepney did not carry safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755. First, the jeepney was not
properly parked, its rear portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle
of the highway in a diagonal angle. The petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney. These are violations of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Therefore, there is no assumption of risk by the
passenger.
Pestao vs. Sumayang
In the case at bar, Pestao, as a professional driver operating a public transport bus, should have anticipated that overtaking at a
junction was a perilous maneuver and should thus have exercised extreme caution.
Under Articles 2180 and 2176 of the Civil Code, owners and managers are responsible for damages caused by their employees.
When an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or an employee, the master or employer is presumed to be negligent
either in the selection or in the supervision of that employee. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing
that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its
employee.
Gillaco vs. Manila Railroad
While a passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the carrier or its agents or employees, since the contract of
transportation obligates the carrier to transport a passenger safely to his destination, the responsibility of the carrier extends only
to those acts that the carrier could foresee or avoid through the exercise of the degree of care and diligence required of it. In the
present case, the act of the train guard of the Manila Railroad Company in shooting the passenger (because of a personal grudge
nurtured against the latter since the Japanese occupation) was entirely unforseeable by the Manila Railroad Co. The latter had no
means to ascertain or anticipate that the two would meet, nor could it reasonably forsee every personal rancor that might exist
between each one of its many employees and any one of the thousands of eventual passengers riding in its trains. The shooting
in question was therefore "caso fortuito" within the definition of Art. 1105 of the old Civil Code (which is the law applicable), being
both unforeseeable and inevitable under the given circumstances; and pursuant to established doctrine, the resulting breach of
the company's contract of safe carriage with the deceased was excused thereby.
Maranan vs. Perez
The basis of the common carrier's liability under NCC for assaults on passengers committed by its drivers rests either on (1) the
doctrine of respondeat superior or (2) the principle that it is the carrier's implied duty to transport the passenger safely.
Under the first, which is the minority view, the carrier is liable only when the act of the employee is within the scope of his authority
and duty. It is not sufficient that the act be within the course of employment only. Under the second view, upheld by the majority
and also by the later cases, it is enough that the assault happens within the course of the employee's duty. It is no defense for the
carrier that the act was done in excess of authority or in disobedience of the carrier's orders. The carrier's liability here is absolute
in the sense that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own employees. Art. 1759, evidently follows
the rule based on the second view.
Accordingly, it is the carrier's strict obligation to select its drivers and similar employees with due regard not only to their technical
competence and physical ability, but also, no less important, to their total personality, including their patterns of behavior, moral
fibers, and social attitude.
PNR vs. CA
When a train boarded by the deceased passenger was so over-crowded that he and many other passengers had no choice but to
sit on the open platforms between the coaches of the train, the common carrier is negligent.
Likewise when the train did not even slow down when it approached the Iyam Bridge which was under repair at the time, neither
did the train stop, despite the alarm raised by other passengers that a person had fallen off the train at lyam Bridge, there was
negligence. The petitioner has the obligation to transport its passengers to their destinations and to observe extraordinary
diligence in doing so. Death or any injury suffered by any of its passengers gives rise to the presumption that it was negligent in
the performance of its obligation under the contract of carriage.
But while petitioner failed to exercise extraordinary diligence as required by law, it appears that the deceased was chargeable with
contributory negligence. Since he opted to sit on the open platform between the coaches of the train, he should have held tightly
and tenaciously on the upright metal bar found at the side of said platform to avoid falling off from the speeding train.
Isaac vs. A.L. Ammen Trans. Co.
If the carriers employee is confronted with a sudden emergency, he is not held to the same degree of care he would otherwise, be
required in the absence of such emergency.
By placing his left arm on the window, petitioner is guilty of contributory negligence. It cannot however relieve the carrier but can
only reduce its liability (ART. 1762). It is a prevailing rule that it is negligence per se for passengers on a railroad to protrude any
part of his body and that no recovery can be had for an injury.
Bachelor Express Inc vs. CA
The running amuck of the passenger was the proximate cause of the incident as it triggered off a commotion and panic among the
passengers such that the passengers started running to the sole exit shoving each other resulting in the falling off the bus by
passengers Beter and Rautraut causing them fatal injuries. The sudden act of the passenger who stabbed another passenger in
the bus is within the context of force majeure. However, in order that a common carrier may be absolved from liability in case of
force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by force majeure. The common carrier must still prove that it was not
negligent in causing the injuries resulting from such accident. In this case, Bachelor was negligent.
Considering the factual findings of the Court of Appeals-the bus driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height
of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while
the bus was still running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had already fallen off the bus; and the bus was
not properly equipped with doors in accordance with law.