Stormy Waters: The Quest for

ASEAN Centrality in the South

China Sea

Richard J Heydarian
 Outline
China Peripheral Diplomacy

The South China Sea Dilemma

Duterte Shock
 China Dreams, Asian Gains?
We should strive to "promote China's political
relationship with peripheral countries, solidify
economic bonds, deepen security cooperation
and intensify cultural exchanges between
China and peripheral countries- Chinese
President Xi Jinping in a keynote speech in
2013.
 Chinese Sweeteners

ASEAN-China 2+7 Framework

Maritime Silk Road Initiative

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

FTAAP
 End of Charm-offensive?
In 2 years, China reclaiming 17 times more than that of all other
claimant states combined in 40 years

Chinas fishermen-cum-militia peoples war at sea

encroachment into ASEAN claimant states traditional waters

China deployment of para-military patrols and large-scale naval

drills close to disputed waters

China deployment of oil rig into Vietnamese-claimed waters

China threatening imposition of ADIZ after building sprawling

network of dual purpose bases
 Transient Backlash
Philippines was forced to file -- and sweepingly won -- arbitration
case nullifying the historic rights doctrine

Vietnam normalized relations with US, threatened arbitration, and

opening up Cam Ranh Bay to foreign navies

Malaysia is revisiting its keep it quiet diplomacy and bulking up

naval footprint in Sarawak

Indonesia has de facto abandoned neutrality, ramped up presence

in Natuna, threatened arbitration, and adopted a vessel sinking
policy

Singapore gave permanent access to US Littoral Combat Ships, and

stepped up diplomatic criticism (albeit indirectly) of China

ASEAN snub of China press conference in Kunming in 2016.

 Taking ASEAN for a Ride?
Talk and Take Strategy China expands footprint,
then calls for dialogue!

"China believes that there should be no rush [on

establishing a CoC]. Certain countries are hoping that
the CoC can be agreed on overnight. These countries
are having unrealistic expectations," Foreign Minister
Wang Yi said in early August,2013 dashing hopes of a
speedy resolution of the ongoing disputes at the
upcoming meeting in Beijing. "The CoC concerns the
interests of various parties and its formulation
demands a heavy load of coordination work ... No
individual countries should impose their will on others."
So wazzup with ASEAN?
1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation

Art. 2 (e): Renunciation of the threat or use

of force.

Art. 14: To settle disputes through regional

processes
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties
2002
Paragraph V: The Parties undertake to
exercise self-restraint in the conduct of
activities that would complicate or escalate
disputes and affect peace and stability
including, among others, refraining from
action of inhabiting on the presently
uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and
other features and to handle their differences
in a constructive manner.
 2012 Six-Point Principles
III. the early conclusion of a Regional Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea;

IV. the full respect of the universally recognized

principles of International Law, including the
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS);

V. the continued exercise of self-restraint and

non-use of force by all parties; and
As for ASEAN Centrality
 Sunnylands Statement 2016
Paragraph VII: Shared commitment to peaceful
resolution of disputes, including full respect for
legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting
to the threat or use of force in accordance with
universally recognized principles of international
law and the 1982 United Nations Convention of
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS);

This was reiterated in paragraph II of the Joint

Communiqu of 47th AMM
South China Sea: Eternal Dialogue
* Took Seven Years
1995 Mischief Reef Crisis
2002 DOC is signed

* DOC expected to be followed by a COC

2011 Guidelines, shut down ZoPFFC proposal
2012 Not even discussion of SCS
2013 Suzhou high-level meeting, COC negos to start.
2014-present - China changes tone, back to DOC
implementation
14 years of deadlock with no breakthorugh in site.
 ASEAN vs. ASEAN?
Three-way banana split:

1. Doves calling for ASEAN non-interference in

South China Sea disputes

2. Fence-sitter calling for dialogue and conciliation

3. Hawks calling unity and cohesion to stand up to

China
 Institutional Deficit
Consensus-based as unanimous voting: Gives
veto power to (pro-China) doves.

DOC repeatedly violated by both China and

ASEAN members

The cult of dialogue and COC foot-dragging

strategy by China?
 Way Forward
ASEAN wavering between Sunnylands statement and expression
of serious concern of lowest common denominator (LCD) and
total silence both sub-optimal.

ASEAN has no explicit statement on the Hague verdict at all, but

Japan, Australia and US had.

One member calling PH arbitration as political conspiracy against

China not getting any unanimity unless,

ASEAN broke new ground in Kunming, Yunnan: Retracted a (critical)

joint statement

If COC to be negotiated: Who drafts it? What is composition of the

commission? What are compliance enforcement mechanism?
otherwise just a refurbished DOC
ASEAN Minilateralism: Way Forward?
ASEAN should adopt Qualified Majority (QM) voting
or ASEAN Minus X formula in politico-security realm

Triple Action Plan: Call for immediate reclamation

freeze, establishment of CBMs, hotlines, discuss joint
patrols, and reiterate compliance with DOC/UNCLOS.

Revive Quadrilateral Talks: Time for likeminded ASEAN

states, with direct or indirect stakes, to form an
informal coalition within and coordinate policy vis--
vis South China Sea

Constrainment strategy important that key ASEAN

members are on board
 Options after The Hague Verdict
Aggrieved claimants have the options:

1. Call upon FONOPS by US, Japan, and other powers to

enforce The Hague verdict.

2. Legal multiplier: Vietnam and others can file similar

compulsory arbitration cases

3. Philippines can seek International Seabed Authority to

suspend Chinese contract if it fails to comply, and/or sue
Chinese energy companies if they drill in its EEZ

4. Philippines can extend American access to its bases,

particularly Subic and Clark under the EDCA
 Duterte (burgeoning) Strategy
Paradigm Shift: Pursuit of independent foreign
policy

Tactical shift: Re-open communication channels

w/China, focus on economic relations

Modus vivendi: Scarborough;

non-ADIZ in Spratlys, tamed EDCA, infra
Investments.