A Different View Into The Existing

A Different View Into The Existing
Stefano Bigi
this manuscript presents a different view into the existing

a simple example is summarised in the following picture
first part
words: 7.002, characters with spaces: 41.335, characters without spaces: 34.395
figures: 9; tables: 2, in appendix
second part
figures: 15 figures; tables: 17, within the text (that in fact contain 50% of the words)
NOTE TO THE READER

this manuscript is mostly about pictures, and as it happens with
pictures, it can be read in either ways, from the first one to the last
taken, and viceversa: by reading the pages in reversed order, one may
get the conclusion of what is questioned by just following the reading
author can be reached at stbigi@yahoo.it, or at the current postal address: largo vessella 31, 00199 roma, italy,
or at the all-time postal address: via bellini, 71, 33064 fontanafredda, pn, italy
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a different view into the existing
when you have a slide rule and somebody comes along with grand
ideas or grand assertions, you say: “wait a moment, please! we shall
first calculate the limit of error and the probable value of all this!”
robert musil, the man without qualities. 1931
philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to

its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be
true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these
questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our
intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which
closes the mind against speculation; but above all because, through
the greatness of the universe which philosophy contemplates, the mind
also is rendered great, and becomes capable of that union with the
universe which constitutes its highest good
bertrand russell, the problems of philosophy. 1912
it’s life and life only

bob dylan, it’s all right ma’. 1965
to g. means of life
to beloved which is all there will ever be
to time which no one travelled through
to all living in this hilbert space
(or banach space either)
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First Part
Index
1 ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................................5
2 INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................................................6
3 VOCABULARY.............................................................................................................................8
4 A VIEW INTO THE EXISTING....................................................................................................8
4.1 A First Model of the Existing ...............................................................................................10
4.2 Is the Obtained Model Meaningful? .....................................................................................12
4.3 A Better Model of the Existing .............................................................................................12
5 A 107 ACTOR WORLD ..............................................................................................................13
5.1 Obtaining a First View into the Existing...............................................................................14
5.2 Model Exploration ................................................................................................................15
5.3 The Big Picture .....................................................................................................................15
5.4 Regions of the Existing.........................................................................................................16
6 SOME NICE RESULTS...............................................................................................................19
6.1 Few Simple Shapes With Linear Complexity .......................................................................19
6.2 A Meaningful Space .............................................................................................................20
6.3 A Glimpse into a Flux of Knowledge ...................................................................................20
7 CONCLUSIONS ..........................................................................................................................22
8 APPENDIX...................................................................................................................................23
9 NOTES .........................................................................................................................................26
Index of Tables
Table 1: A 5 Layer System Identification Algorithm ...........................................................................11
Table 2: Model Regions and Actors .....................................................................................................23
Table 3: Basic Vocabulary....................................................................................................................25
Index of Figures
Figure 1: A 107 Actor World................................................................................................................27
Figure 2: Starting Point.........................................................................................................................28
Figure 3: The First Model (a solution to Problem 1) ............................................................................29
Figure 4: A Better Model (a solution to Problem 2) .............................................................................30
Figure 5: The Big Picture......................................................................................................................31
Figure 6: Regions from 1 to 5 ...............................................................................................................32
Figure 7: Regions from 6 to 16 .............................................................................................................33
Figure 8: Systems Complexity..............................................................................................................34
Figure 9: 3x3 Quadrant Modularity ......................................................................................................35
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Second Part
Index
A1 ACTORS AND SYSTEMS IN THE REGIONS OF THE EXISTING ............................38
A1.1 The Big Picture....................................................................................................38
A1.2 Inner World .........................................................................................................39
A1.3 Near Outer World................................................................................................39
A1.4 What Happens .....................................................................................................40
A1.5 Our Knowledge ...................................................................................................41
A1.6 Inner Ourself .......................................................................................................42
A1.7 Inner Outer World ...............................................................................................44
A1.8 Far Outer World ..................................................................................................45
A1.9 Universe ..............................................................................................................46
A1.10 Far Ourself ..........................................................................................................47
A1.11 Learning Process .................................................................................................48
A1.11.1 What We Know ..........................................................................................48
A1.11.2 By What Means ..........................................................................................49
A1.11.3 How We Know ...........................................................................................50
A1.11.4 Why We Know ...........................................................................................50
A1.11.5 Learning Algoritm ......................................................................................51
A2 GLOSSARY......................................................................................................................53
A3 NOTES..............................................................................................................................54
One picture of each region is given from page 55 to 71, respectively
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1 ABSTRACT
“Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?”, or,
in other words, “what is the existing?”. Many have discussed those basic questions of our life ever
since, and have brought forward many deep insights into the very nature of the existing. Driven by the
same questions, mainly the second one, we propose a novel approach to carry out the discussion that
results by applying methodologies coming from System Theory1 and the Unified Modeling
Language2. We do not discuss the existing with words and by arguing about some issues that arise
along the way, but rather we represent it by means of some “model elements”3. In such a way, those
elements can, for instance, be placed, as objects in space, into schemes, indeed coloured pictures
where little symbols lay in circles, squares and triangles. One such a scheme, which we call {A 107
Actor World}, is depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: A 107 Actor World
In our methodology, those schemes represent different views into the “model of the existing” we are
constructing, as if they were maps that may guide us into our process of learning, leading to some
increasing of our, let’s say, epistemological knowledge. In this way, we will not be concerned with
some discussion on the meaning of what we encounter along the way, rather, we will mostly
concentrate in building new and new “models” with increasing complexity, as some “tools” that
enlighten our view into the existing and its understanding. First, we briefly propose how such a
methodology could be set up, then, a first “system identification experiment” is carried out to show
how the methodology can be applied in practice, and to test the validity of the proposed approach with
the obtained “model”. We give illustration of how such a first “model” is obtained, how it can be read,
and some conclusions one may infer from the strange positioning of all the things displaced. The
interesting fact, as we will show, is that the obtained view summarises into a main scheme, the {A 107
Actor World} we mentioned, that indeed seems to bring us some more knowledge, enlightening
aspects that were not actually present before constructing the “model”, and that is striking and
fascinating for its simplicity and meaningfulness, with its construction geared toward some nice
numerical properties. We consider these results as to support some evidence of the validity of the
proposed approach.
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2 INTRODUCTION
We humans have been living for long, but it seems it is yet to come the time when we may figure out
what is the very place we are living in, what we are, and what is the very happening of the all-around.
The attention to our understanding has always been profound among philosophy scholars, while we
had to wait the XX Century to see that discussion contaminated by contributions coming from
scholars in other fields, to the point that all major sciences and disciplines have today something to
say to the uncovered quest. Despite the use of formal languages in philosophical discussions have
been common for a long time, it appears that contributions of views coming from two disciplines
firmly evolved during the past 60 years or so are still missing in the chorus, and the present
contribution seems to be the first one to propose to the quest of the human understanding the point of
views of some specific methodologies coming from System Theory and the Unified Modeling
Language. The first one was introduced in the first half of the last century by N.Wiener (1949),
A.Kolmogorov (1941), L.vonBertalanffy, (1962), H.W.Bode and C.E.Shannon (1950) and has spread
the fuel to the modern “Information Age” all along the way to date (see Note 1). The latter one was
introduced by G.Booch, I.Jacobson and J.Rumbaugh in 1998 for the sake of “Software Application
Development”, and it is becoming a standard language for that field (see Note 2). In this way, we will
mostly concentrate in building new and new ‘models’ with increasing complexity, rather then
discussing the essence of the elements that we understand to form the existing. In particular, and this
is the key contribution on which our discussion is geared towards, described in Section 4, we propose
a possible way to construct a “best model” of the existing, that is to say our “best” understanding to
date, that would help us getting some further understanding that we could not yet get before having
the ‘model’ at our disposal. Again, when we use the world “best”, we mean it in System Theory
terms, that are based on a mathematical and probabilistic nature, and so we will rather investigate
whether we would actually be able to build a simple “system identification algorithm” that produces
an apparently “epistemological better knowledge” than the one we had at disposal before applying it
(see Note 3). Since a “system identification algorithm” is after experimental knowledge, we will also
propose a possible “experiment set-up” to be realised in practice to validate the obtained methodology
and to possibly produce better ‘models’. It is worth mentioning that we do not mean by this to look for
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an automatic, or artificial, way to obtain some understanding, while on the contrary, we assume that
human understanding and choices remain fundamental in the process of learning, constituting a very
basic ingredient of the methods. Rather, the methodology is to be seen as some “tool” that enlightens
our view into the existing and its understanding. By considering only a very introductory application
of the proposed methodologies, a first experiment is then carried out in Section 5, and the interesting
fact, as we will show, is that the obtained view summarises into a main scheme (i.e. a ‘model’), the {A
107 Actor World} depicted in Figure 1, that indeed brings us some more knowledge, enlightening
aspects that were not actually present before constructing the “model”, and that is striking and
fascinating for its simplicity and meaningfulness, and with its construction all geared toward some
nice numerical properties. To apply the proposed methodology to a simple situation, and to draw more
attention on the methodology rather than on the validity of the obtained ‘model’, we have of course
not tried to apply it to our best “epistemological understanding of the existing” whatsoever. On the
contrary, we have chosen a much simpler and partial setting, that considers a one man point of view,
dramatically updated and evolved by more than one hundred years of further studies. In so doing, we
will in fact have at disposal all the knowledge lately developed to discuss the ‘model validation’ and
the improvements towards a “better model”. So, we will assume that our epistemological knowledge
corresponds to the one that was brought forward by Bertrand Russell in 1912 in “The Problems of
Philosophy”4. His conclusions represent a very good starting point in our quest of knowing, since he
finely identifies all the terms needed into the discussion about the existing, describes in details aspects
and relations among them and compares his thoughts to the results obtained by man in history at that
point of time, so that his Theory of Knowledge appears to be indeed a “non trivial” starting point to
get a resembling ‘model’ of our reality. Said in words of ‘System Theory”, that means that Bertrand
Russell’s discussion represents a meaningful set of data from which obtaining a meaningful
‘approximate model’ of the existing. Since we are claiming that the application of this type of
methodologies will help us in the quest for understanding, the contribution finally discusses in Section
6 whether the final scheme brings us some knowledge, by presenting some possible useful insights
that may be inferred from it. In fact, the scheme {A 107 Actor World} seems to have some
importance on its own as well, since it turns out to be actually meaningfully “read” in a way barely
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found in the source of the ideas, and to show several nice numerical properties. We consider these
results as to support some evidence of the validity of the proposed approach.
3 VOCABULARY
From now one, the discussion that follows is mostly not carried out neither in words nor by arguing
about issues that arise along the way, but rather by presenting some basic algorithms and schemes
obtained by applying, in a very introductory way, methodologies coming from the fields of ‘System
Theory’ and the ‘Unified Modelling Language’ (see notes 1 and 2). The involved formalism is a very
basic one and no previous knowledge of the fields is actually required to follow the discussion. For
ease of the reader, however, all terms that constitute our basic terminology are recognised being
between ‘…’ within the text, and a brief explanation of some of them is given in the Appendix.
4 A VIEW INTO THE EXISTING
Any person feels confident that s\he exists, and that other many people exist as well, that there is a
planet earth where we all live, that there is a universe around, that events and actions take place, that
there is a clock of time when things happen. On the other hand, almost no-one would doubt that to a
closer analysis, as for instance philosophers and scientists have shown, that what we directly see and
feel hides a much more complicated and vague scenario for our life. We take all this as our
justification that there is indeed the “existing” and that “something” exists as well, and a valid reason
to pursue the quest for more and more answers. We call such a discussion “The Philosophical
Problem”, and we carry it on in words of “System Theory”, so that we may consider as what we are
willing to do as talking about three basic elements, as depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Starting Point
We may well be considering that two elements show to exist at first, and these are indeed “us” and the
“existing”, indicated in the bottom part of Figure 2. We will call them ‘the true system’. Despite it is
only ‘the true system’ that what makes it worthwhile engaging us in the present discussion, and that
on which we are willing to get some clues, from now on we will just mention that element from time
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to time and we will almost forget it. Rather, we are going to concentrate our attention to the third
element, which we call the ‘model’, depicted in the upper part of Figure 2. In this way, “the
Philosophical Problem” may be restated as follows:
The Philosophical Problem (Problem 0):
We are seeking to obtain the ‘best model’ to ‘the true system’, according to a ‘criterion’ to be
later defined. The search for ‘models’ is done in the ‘sufficient order case’, so to say the case
that we know in advance that our ‘model set’ would never perfectly resemble the ‘true
system’, and no ‘model’ can be found to exactly correspond to it.
Again, we mean to discuss “The Philosophical Problem” with ‘System Theory’ methods, so, to
proceed further, we do not attack this very problem at once, but we confine to much simpler problems.
For instance, it is worthwhile investigating whether some ‘system identification algorithm’ would
possibly be found at all, being able to produce, at least, “better models”. In return, despite paying
attention to such limited arguments, the methodology will, as we will show, enlighten unforeseen
aspects pertaining in fact to “The Philosophical Problem”. In our search, we will then be considering
the following two problems:
The First Model (Problem 1):
We are seeking to obtain a ‘model’, the first one, of ‘the true system’, based on a specific
‘system identification algorithm’ which takes data from available knowledge at present time,
and to investigate whether the ‘model’ brings more knowledge to us than what we had before.
A Better Model (Problem 2);
Let’s assume that we would be able to solve Problem 1, we are then seeking to obtain a better
‘model’ of the ‘true system’ based on the ‘models’ we have obtained as solution of Problem
1 at the previous step, and on a specific ‘system identification algorithm’.
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In the sequel, we address Problem 1 as to propose a possible solution for it, illustrated in Section 4.1.
Regarding Problem 2, we suggest in Section 4.2 a possible “experiment set-up” that could be carried
out in practice to help us in finding a solution.
4.1 A First Model of the Existing
Here we present a possible solution to Problem 1, that is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The First Model (a solution to Problem 1)
At the left of Figure 3 we are at time zero, so to say now, and we have at disposal some
epistemological knowledge in form of words, discussions and various formal languages. Let’s say, to
start with, we have at disposal a set of meaningful ideas described in a manuscript. We can therefore
consider that set as our view into the “existing”, so as to say, in fact, to constitute our ‘set of data’.
Having data, we can then conduct an experiment at time one, so to obtain as the result at time two a
‘model’, that is the coloured picture at the left of Figure 3, and see whether we can get from it some
‘epistemological better knowledge’ than what we had at disposal before. In this case, one experiment
consists in passing that set of data through a certain ‘system identification algorithm’, the blue box
depicted in the centre of Figure 3. The ‘system identification algorithm’ we propose is a five layered
process of activities, numbered from one to five in Figure 3 and described in Table 1 below.
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Table 1: A 5 Layer System Identification Algorithm
nr layer description
The list of the terms identified by the source as ‘actors’ (we call an
1 Source Actor List ‘actor’ that what appears to exist, and that constitutes our basic ‘model
element’)
The set of all the ‘systems’ into which the ‘actors’ are grouped
2 Systems List
according to some ‘system rules’ (e.g. basic logical principles)
Some new ‘actors’ may be added to the initial collection given by the
3 Model Actor List source, or definitions may be changed and refined, to give a more unity
and completeness to the ‘model’, so as to reach a longer list of ‘actors’
Colours and simple geometrical shapes are chosen to represent
4 Shapes and Colours ‘systems’, and similar shapes are used for ‘systems’ with same ‘system
type’ (e.g. the number of contained ‘actors’)
The ‘systems’ obtained are disposed into a given space (e.g. a
5 System Positioning rectangular surface) following some ‘model rules’ (e.g. some basic
principles of symmetry, logic and, let’s say, some fantasy)
It is to be recalled that the experiment should be repeated for a certain number of iterations, using the
same set of data, as, at each iteration, not all ‘actors’ and ‘systems’ may be able to find a final
configuration. Obviously, the observer, or say the persons conducting the experiment, may also
influence the final result, so that it might be useful to consider repeated experiments with some
different observers. Such an iterative process is also part of System Identification methods.
Having found data and a possible ‘system identification algorithm’, what is last to be defined is the
‘criterion’ with which a certain obtained ‘model’ is judged good or not. At the end, of course, only an
epistemological examination would be giving us some reasonable answers. One may however want to
limit the judgements only to some objective aspects, and still consider the obtained results as
reasonable. For instance we suggest to consider a criterion constituted by the following different
facets of the obtained ‘model’: correctness of identification of ‘source’s actors’, correctness of new
‘actors’ and ‘actor’s definitions’, meaningfulness of obtained systems, adherence to ‘model rules’,
limited number of possible choices when applying ‘model rules’. At this point, a rather defined
‘model’, or a very restricted set of them, is finally obtained on which evaluate whether we have
actually got some ‘epistemological better knowledge’ than what we had at disposal before applying it.
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4.2 Is the Obtained Model Meaningful?
We have been able, in the previous section, to obtain a ‘model’ from some data at disposal and a
suggested ‘system identification algorithm’, and we should now define how we will judge whether the
obtained ‘model’ actually adds or not some more knowledge to our understanding. The same as we
said before applies, and here we suggest to consider a criterion constituted by the following different
facets of the obtained ‘model’: existence in the ‘model’ of ‘actors’ and ‘systems’ not mentioned by the
source, existence in the ‘model’ of definitions of ‘actors’ different from the source, exploration of the
obtained schemes lead by the ‘model’ rather than by the source’s flow of ideas, simplicity of
comprehension of the original ideas and of the ‘model’, the degree of articulation of the obtained
positioning of elements, as its meaningfulness, the symmetry and modularity, the existence of some
numerical properties in the underlying structure.
4.3 A Better Model of the Existing
Here we introduce a possible way toward finding a solution to Problem 2, that it is shown in Figure 4
Figure 4: A Better Model (a solution to Problem 2)
At the left of Figure 4 we are again at time zero, so to say now, and we dispose, as before, of some
‘epistemological knowledge’ represented by the upper pink box, in form of words, discussions and
various formal languages, and some knowledge pertaining to ‘System Theory’ and the ‘Unified
Modeling Language’, represented by the lower blue box. Moving in the right direction of Figure 4, at
time one, we use the ‘system identification algorithm’ described in the previous Section, indicated by
the green box called “Model 1”, to obtain the first generation of ‘models’, constituted by a set of “n”
epistemological ideas, each one of them giving us some ‘epistemological better knowledge’ than the
one we had at disposal at time zero. In Figure 4 the ‘models’ are represented by their ‘source actor
list’, i.e. the boxes S1, S2, Sn, and the complete ‘model’, i.e. the boxes M1.1, M1.2, M1.n. After this
first experiment, what we have obtained in the end it is some sort of knowledge we did not have
before, as some further views into our ideas, so that we can proceed at time 2, by considering the
green box called “Model 2”. At this stage, in fact, we would certainly be able to construct a new
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method to carry out a second experiment, so that, as a second generation, we obtain a new set of
‘models’, i.e. the boxes M2.1, M2.2, M2.m, that we expect to carry on again some further knowledge
to us, so that, at time 2, we could say to have got more ‘epistemological knowledge’ than what we had
at time 1 and time 0, respectively. It is worth noting that, strangely, we have today at disposal some
technological means, as Internet and the advent of Digital Information, that may allow us to actually
carry out some experiments on other sets of ideas and to see in practice whether the methodology
shows useful or not to our understanding. For instance, while the theories hereby applied were all
consolidated some thirty years ago or so, until recent times that sort of experiment would have taken
such a worth of effort to be unlikely affordable. To construct new ‘models’ by considering further
sources of ideas and by involving more, say, observers within the research community represents in
fact the natural continuation of the present work.
5 A 107 ACTOR WORLD
To show how the methodology described in Section 4 can be applied in practice, and to describe the
type of insights the obtained ‘model’ may give to our understanding, in this Section we carry out a
first ‘system identification experiment’. To apply the proposed methodology to a simple situation, and
to draw more attention on the methodology rather than on the validity of the obtained ‘model’, we
have not considered the latest results obtained in Epistemology and related fields, that is to say to our
best epistemological understanding of the existing whatsoever, but only an updated and partial view,
namely the one that was brought forward by Bertrand Russell in 1912 in “The Problems of
Philosophy”. Due to space constraints, the way ‘actors’ are identified through Russell’s flow of
thoughts, and the discussion on their meaning, are left out of the scope of this contribution. For ease of
the reader, however, the names of ‘actors’ are recognized being between <…> within the text, while
the list of considered ‘actors’, complemented by the reference to the first page were to find them in the
edition of “The Problems of Philosophy” printed on 1980 by Oxford University Press, OPUS (ISBN
0-19-888018-9, British Library) and the position in which they appear in the chain of thoughts, is
summarised in Table 2 in the Appendix.
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5.1 Obtaining a First View into the Existing
We assume that Bernard Russell’s ideas expressed in “The Problems of Philosophy” of 1912 may
resemble a rather acceptable understanding of the existing, and we will consider them as the basis of
ours. To start our journey into the existing, i.e. the ‘system identification algorithm’, we then depart
from Bertrand Russell’s words, and as he says, no much is needed: “It seems to me that I am now
sitting in a chair, at a table of a certain shape, on which I see sheets of paper with writing or print. …
Here we have already the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most trouble in philosophy -
the distinction between “appearance” and “reality”, between what things seem to be and what they are
(pp. 1-4)”. We call ‘actors’ those elements that show to exist and we will represent them with a
symbol taken from the ‘Unified Modeling Language’. Bernard Russell facilitates us in finding what
‘actors’ he meant to exist, as, from the very beginning, he feels the need of defining a series of terms
that represent the original meaning of his thought, as, he himself says “it will help us in considering
these questions to have a few simple terms of which the meaning is definite and clear (p. 4)”.
To obtain our ‘model’ as described in Section 4.1, we then start from Layer 1 of our ‘system
identification algorithm’, so that the first exercise has been to list all the terms identified by Bernard
Russell, an exercise that he did not actually do himself, which have resulted to be eighty seven. As
for Layer 2 and Layer 3, by successive grouping those ‘actors’ into ‘systems’ according to basic
logical principles, some new ‘actors’ have then been added to the collection to give a more unity and
completeness to the theory, so as to reach a list of one hundred and five ‘actors’, all combined in a
series of ‘systems’. Colours and simple geometrical shapes, as circles, squares and triangles, have then
be chosen to represent ‘systems’, and as for Layer 4, similar shapes have been used for ‘systems’ with
same ‘system type’. Colours have been used for ‘main systems’, circles for ‘systems’ that contain only
‘actors’, the other shapes for ‘systems’ that also contain other ‘systems’. At this point, at Layer 5, all
those shapes have been disposed into a rectangular surface following basic principles of symmetry,
logic and, let’s say, some fantasy, constituting the following ‘model rules’. The ‘actors’ that are more
evident to us have been put in the centre of the picture, disguised along the middle vertical axis. All
the others have then been posed into the scheme taking into account both the belonging to a certain
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‘main system’ and the degree of abstraction our thinking must undergo to understand the given
‘actor’. In this way, ‘actors’ that requires some abstract thinking to be understood are put far away
from the centre. The actual positioning of the ‘model elements’ follows some main axis by taking
into account ‘relations’ among them at a very simple level, e.g. without distinguishing different type
of ‘relations’ as cause, affinity, contrary, etc. To firstly maintain the level of abstraction to such a
simple and intuitive level is part of the ‘Unified Modeling Language’. The overall scheme obtained is
called {A 107 Actor World} and is depicted in Figure 1. In this way, all the existing is represented by
its very constituents as if it were something physical, and it is noted by M1.1.v1. The latter suffix
indicates that the presented results constitute the outcome of our very first experiment, and that,
obviously, repeated experiments or some ‘model validation’ activities would certainly refine the final
scheme obtainable as M1.1.vn.
5.2 Model Exploration
In this Section the process of getting to know all the 107 ‘actors’ is briefly described, together with
that of finding a way through the positioning of the ‘systems’. This is done in a series of steps, and we
say that in each step we will explore a ‘region’ of the picture. For ease of the reader, the names of
‘regions’ are recognised being between {…} within the text. The interesting fact is indeed that the
flow of exploration does not follow Bertrand Russell’s chain of thoughts, but rather follows a quite
different pattern that is derived directly from the positioning of the various ‘actors’ and ‘systems’
within the picture. You may recall that we suggested this to be a sign of having obtained some
‘epistemological better knowledge’ than the one we had at disposal before. The exploration of
obtained scheme is illustrated at the first level of detail by the help of two maps, represented in Figure
6 and Figure 7, respectively, limited to the sequence in which ‘regions’ are encountered in the
discovery path. For completeness, in Table 2 in the Appendix, we have provided the list of the ‘actors’
occurring in each ‘region’. A further exploration of the model to the system and actor level is given in
Part 2.
5.3 The Big Picture
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To carry out the exploration of the view into the existing represented by Figure 1, we start from the
upper right corner of the picture, as illustrated in Figure 5.
Figure 5: The Big Picture
Here we encounter the first ‘region’, which we call {The Big Picture}, that constitutes the main
legenda for the whole picture, and where those ‘systems’ that contain any other further existing
‘actors’ are placed. Those ‘systems’ are called ‘main systems’ and are distinguished by a different
background ‘colour’, so that ‘actors’ placed in a different background ‘colour’ belong to different
‘main systems’. They turn out to be four, and, by observing the final scheme, to be interconnected into
a typical ‘systems’ configuration encountered in nature, depicted in the left lower part of Figure 5,
where <theory of knowledge> plays the role of the ‘model’ that describes the ‘true system’,
constituted by <ourself>, <outer world> and <channel>. It is worth mentioning that <theory of
knowledge> results to be the only ‘main system’ only constituted by abstract elements, while all the
others also include some physical elements. We may say that we have already reached at this point
some more knowledge that what we had at the Starting Point, see Figure 2, since the existing, i.e. ‘the
true system’ consists of four elements instead of two.
5.4 Regions of the Existing
The exploration of the existing continues as in Figure 6, where the path of discovering the first five
regions is depicted.
Figure 6: Regions from 1 to 5
From the upper right corner of Figure 6 we make our second step into the existing moving to the very
centre of the picture, in the yellow circle n.2. Here we discover what is more directly known to us, not
strangely related to all the ‘main systems’ with some physical content we are in direct contact with,
and we call this region {Inner World}. Next, as step n.3 in Figure 6, from the centre of the picture we
move to the upper middle part. After discovering the existence of the {Inner World}, we discover
soon that many differences occurs all around, in the sort that there are some different <arguments> we
are talking about. We call this ‘region’ {Near Outer World}. With step n.4 in Figure 6, from the upper
middle part of the picture we move left to the upper left corner. We have already got to know many
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things – ‘actors’ – to exist, that we have well come to the point of getting the sense that something is
happening all around, which, strangely, comes at the same time with the feeling of indeed willing to
know what it is, and what is the meaning of all of it. We call this region {What Happens}. What
actually we do here, it is entering the ‘main system’ of <theory of knowledge>, by encountering the
first very essence of it, namely <knowledge>, that precise ‘actor’ that, at last, gives us our
understanding of <what happens>. Finally, we make step n.5 in Figure 6, by embracing the bottom
left corner of the picture. We are certainly able to get clues on {What Happens}, since up to this point
we have got to know some ‘regions’ of the existing, so that we have indeed got some <knowledge>,
then there must be something that constitutes it and that render it possible to make it evolve and,
possibly, increase. We call this region {Our Knowledge}, where firstly we find a pile of elements. In
fact there must be something that we are able to know, which we call <what we know>, some means
that let us get what we know, which we call <by what means>, a way those means work, which we
call <how do we know>, a reason for them to work, which we call <why do we know> and, finally,
something as an algorithm, which we indeed call <learning algorithm>, which, while time goes by,
elaborates present knowledge into future knowledge, and that makes <knowledge> actually evolve. It
seems as if the pile of ‘actors’ we found were acting as the alimenting process of <knowledge>,
giving us the very view on <what happens>. Second, in order for that process to flow, we find at the
bottom of the ‘region’ that the process is alimented by some source, which we call <source of
knowledge>. Next, the exploration of the existing continues as in Figure 7, where the path of
discovering all other regions is depicted.
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Figure 7: Regions from 6 to 16
From the bottom left corner of Figure 7, we make our step n.6 in the existing, jumping back to the
centre of the picture, in the pink area at the bottom of the part already encountered at the second step
as {Inner World}. We eventually find out that <mind> is not the only thing we see so evidently
constituting <ourself>, so that we encounter the region we call {Inner Ourself}. The same occurs for
<outer world> in step n.7 in Figure 7, moving up to the opposite side of <channel>, to the blue area in
the upper centre of the picture. Here we find {Inner Outer World}, that turns out to be perfectly
symmetrical to {Inner Ourself}. To make step n.8 in Figure 7, we move right to the middle right of the
picture. Now our sight can go further in the <outer world>, where we find some other ‘actors’, as for
instance <others’ minds>, that group into three different ‘systems’. We call this region {Far Outer
World}. Next, at step n.9 in Figure 7, moving down to the right bottom corner of the picture, we
finally arrive to the part of <outer world> farthest from <channel>, to the ‘region’ we call {Universe}.
With step n.10 in Figure 7, we return to <ourself> by moving left to the bottom middle of the picture.
Here we find that part of <ourself> that it is more difficult to get in touch with, and that contains our
very basic knowledge. We call this region {Far Ourself}, that appears to fall close to both {universe}
and the <source of knowledge>, which gives us some sense, that appears almost natural indeed. To
complete our journey, we move to the left middle of the picture with step n.11 in Figure 7, were we
find the last piece left uncovered of <theory of knowledge>, that forms the core part of what allows us
to know <what happens>, by possibly transforming the <source of knowledge> in an increasing
<knowledge>. We call this region {Learning Process}, constituted by an ordered pile of ‘no-named
systems’ with an amazing simple and symmetrical structure: four ‘regions’ contain two systems, so as
to say that show a dual alternative to the process, while the one at the top, three, to constitute what is a
more refined outcome. In the last steps, from n.12 to n.16, we finally find each one of those systems
as ‘regions’ named after the corresponding ‘actor’ of {Our Knowledge}, as to represent a more
detailed description for that part of the ‘region’.
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6 SOME NICE RESULTS
A fundamental point of the reasoning carried out in the previous sections is that we would actually be
able to obtain meaningful ‘models’ that are able to give us some more “epistemological knowledge”
than what we had at disposal before constructing the ‘model’. Despite we have only investigated a
partial understanding of reality and considered a very simple ‘model’ to represent it, still the use of the
methodology results into a main scheme, {A 107 Actor World} depicted in Figure 1, that strikes and
fascinates for its simplicity, symmetry and meaningfulness. In particular, it appears evident that it
gives us insights that were barely present in the source, i.e. in Bertrand Russell’s ideas, providing us
with a much more coherent and simple view into the existing than the one he was able to obtain. In
this Section, some aspects are commented as possible further insights into the very strange and regular
obtained structure, that results to be geared towards some nice numerical properties as if those existing
constituents could be meaningfully arranged in space as Leonardo’s human body elements in scripted
into a circle, or as atoms in a molecule. We consider these results as to support some evidence of the
validity of the proposed methodology.
6.1 Few Simple Shapes With Linear Complexity
‘Actors’ can be displaced into only very few different ‘shapes’ with some defined ‘system type’.
Those ‘shapes’ are very regular, so that we see that besides ‘system type’, some ‘system class’ exists
as well, were similar ‘ system types’ may be grouped together. Further, drawing the attention to the
distribution of ‘actors’ inside ‘systems’, the increasing of complexity of various ‘systems’ is as well
apparent, so that some have one or few ‘actors’, others many. Consider the following Figure 8, where
‘system types’ are positioned according to the number of elements they contain, and to the ‘system
class’ they belong to.
Figure 8: Systems Complexity
It is indeed very interesting as the increasing of complexity proceeds with a very rigorous order,
actually the most linear one! ‘Systems’ complexity starts from the simplest ‘system’ conceivable, i.e.
the one with only one ‘actor’, indicated in Figure 8 as ‘system type’ N.1. It can belong to only one
- Page 19 of 71-
‘system class’, namely the one that has ‘named systems’ and ‘systems’ that do not contain other
‘systems’ but only ‘actors’, i.e. the one in the middle layer in Figure 8. The next step in ‘system’
complexity, i.e. the next ‘system type’, are ‘systems’ that contain two ‘actors’, and we find two
possible versions of it, namely the ‘system class’ that contains only ‘actors’, the ‘type of system’ N. 2
in the top layer in Figure 8 and the other that also contains ‘systems’, the ‘type of system’ N. 9 in the
bottom layer in Figure 8. It is worth mentioning that a ‘named system’ with two elements would not
make much sense , so that such ‘type of system’ is not contemplated as one possible. Next ‘systems’
complexity steps follow uniformly among all the three classes, so that up to complexity of four
‘actors’ all the possibilities are contemplated. Next, the complexity keeps going linearly, with each
class showing an increasing numerosity of ‘ system types’.
6.2 A Meaningful Space
The variety of ‘shapes’ turns out to be arranged in space with extraordinary simplicity and modularity,
so to resemble some inside symmetry and, most of all, meaningfulness of the ‘systems’ positioning.
For instance, <theory of knowledge> shows clearly to play the role of the ‘model’ that describes the
‘true system’, constituted by <ourself>, <outer world> and <channel>, so to say the existing.
Moreover, we note:
• The picture has a centre constituted by <channel>, that looks like a kind of “gravitational centre”
for all the elements displayed,
• The symmetry of the central ‘region’, the {inner world} is striking. The square is divided into six
sectors, where the two in the vertical axis are exactly specular. Six ‘actors’, one in each sector,
form a first circular layer, then all other ‘actors’ dispose into a similar tree-structure, encountered
nowhere else into the scheme,
• The top and the bottom parts of the picture are mostly constituted by ‘systems’ with the same
‘type of system’,
• The left and the right parts of the picture shows a sort of ordered pile with amazing similarities.
6.3 A Glimpse into a Flux of Knowledge
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Despite the numerosity of ‘model elements’, as ‘actors’, ‘systems’ and ‘system types’, their
positioning turns out to be based onto an extremely simple structure composed by nine quadrants,
which are obtained by the intersection of three orthogonal stripes as indicated in Figure 9.
Figure 9: 3x3 Quadrant Modularity
The stripes fall into very particular positions. On the vertical axis, they shape <theory of knowledge>
in three main different components, namely <what happens>, the {Learning Process} and the <source
of knowledge>. That distinction drives a respective grouping of the other ‘main systems’. On the
horizontal axis they instead correspond to the three vertical columns formed by the natural shape
arrangement into the division among ‘main systems’. The first on the left is the <theory of
knowledge> itself, then the one formed by <ourself> and the closest part to us of <outer world>, then
the remaining part of the <outer world>, the one farther from <channel>. In this way, the strange
positioning of the ‘actors’ and ‘systems’ highlighted seems to illustrate a double fold flux of
<knowledge>, that can be taken as the leading mechanism that makes up our understanding of the
‘existence’. There is one flux going from the bottom to the top of the various columns, which goes
from the <source of knowledge> to <what happens> and the understanding we have of it. In the
middle column the same flux leads our {Far Ourself}, that contains our elementary <knowledge>, to
<arguments>, that constitute the <knowledge> existing at that point of time; and in the right column
the {Universe}, by definition the possible <knowledge> ever existing, to {The Big Picture}, that
eventually constitutes the <knowledge> we have reached in the present discussion. The other flux
goes from the right to the left, and comes from {universe} and our reality made of <other’s mind> and
<facts>, and, filtered through <ourself> and <arguments>, transforms the existing into <theory of
knowledge>, that what finally makes our epistemological knowledge exist and evolve.
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7 CONCLUSIONS
“Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man could doubt it?”, or,
in other words, “what is the existing?”. Driven by those questions, mainly the second one, we propose
a novel approach to carry out the discussion that results by applying methodologies coming from
“System Theory” (see note 1) and the “Unified Modeling Language” (see note 2). The interesting fact,
as we have shown, is that by considering only a very introductory application of the methodologies,
the obtained view summarises into a main scheme, the {A 107 Actor World} depicted in Figure 1, that
brings us insights that were barely present before applying the methodology, providing us with a
much more coherent and simple view into the existing than the one given by the raw data, i.e. the
ideas expressed by the considered source. The scheme turns out to be striking and fascinating for its
simplicity and meaningfulness, and with its construction all geared toward some nice numerical
properties. We consider these results as to support some evidence of the validity of the proposed
approach. We briefly propose how such a methodology could be set up, then a first “system
identification experiment” is carried out to show how the methodology can be applied in practice, and
to test the validity of the proposed approach with the obtained ‘model’. As the attempt to obtain a first
view into the existing, we have considered only a very introductory application of the methodology,
and in this first instance we have applied it to the ideas that Bertrand Russell expresses in “The
Problems of Philosophy” of 1912. We give illustration of how such a first “model” is obtained, how it
can be read, and some conclusions one may infer from the strange positioning of all the things
displaced. Finally, a possible experiment to be carried out in practice is proposed, so to get some new
‘models’ with the aid of some other fresh data, i.e. by discussing later achievements in Epistemology
and the kind or some other set of epistemological ideas. With those ‘models’ we could further discuss
the usefulness of the proposed methodology and to progress further in the construction of new
‘models’ represents, in fact, the natural continuation of the present work.
- Page 22 of 71-
8 APPENDIX
Table 2: Model Regions and Actors
regions actors encountered in each region BR’s reference

nr. region’s name nr. actor’s name page nr.
1 {the big picture} 1 <ourself> 8,26 7
2 <outer world> model model
3 <channel> model model
4 <theory of knowledge> 19 14
2 {inner world} 5 <mind> 27 23
6 <sensations> 4 4
7 <sense data> 4 3
8 <physical objects> 4 5
9 <matter> 4 6
10 <outer sense> 28 26
11 <inner sense> 28 27
12 <our body> 15 11
13 <physical space> 15 12
3 {near outer world} 14 <arguments> model model
15 <ethical values> 42 36
16 <logic> 43 39
17 <spacetime> model model
18 <mathematics > 43 38
19 <geometry> 43 40
20 <other arguments> model model
4 {what happens} 21 <what happens> model model
22 <theory of truth> 69,76 74
23 <knowledge> 76,77 73
24 <error> 63 54
25 <probable opinion> 81 80
5 {our knowledge} 26 <what we know> model model
27 <by what means> model model
28 <how do we know> model model
29 <why do we know> model model
30 <learning algorithm> model model
31 <source of knowledge> model model
32 <world of existence> 55,56 44
33 <world of being> 55,56 45
34 <knowledge of things> 23 16
35 <knowledge of truths> 23 15
36 <knowledge by acquaintance> 25 17
37 <knowledge by description> 23 18
38 <particulars> 53 43
39 <universals> (28),52 42
6 {inner ourself} 40 <introspection> 26,27 21
41 <self-consciousness> 27 22
42 <mental things> 27 24
43 <mental facts > 79 78
44 <memory> 26 19
45 <past data> 28 20
46 <logical inference> 78 76
47 <psychological inference> 78 75
48 <emotional inference> model model
Table continues next page
- Page 23 of 71-
Regions actors encountered in each region BR’s reference

nr. region’s name nr. actor’s name page nr.
7 {Inner outer world} 49 <relations> 15,16 13
50 <subject > 73 64
51 <object > 73 65
52 <constituents> 73 66
53 <order> 73 67
54 <complex> 74 69
55 <general principles> 33, 39 30
56 <logical principles> 39,4 31
57 <laws of thought> 40 32
58 <principle of induction> 37 29
59 <principle of deduction> 43,44 41
8 {Far Outer World} 60 <other's mind> 27 25
61 <facts> 74,78 72
62 <sensible qualities> 58 46
63 <common beliefs> 64 56
64 <public space> 14 10
65 <private space > 14 9
9 {Universe} 66 <uniformity of nature> 33-35 28
67 <coherence> 71 63
68 <appearance> 2 1
69 <reality> 2 2
70 <life> model model
71 <point of attraction> model model
10 {Far Ourself} 72 <empirical knowledge > 41 34
73 <pure empirical knowledge > 86 85
74 <a-priori knowledge> 41 33
75 <pure a-priori knowledge> 86 86
76 <hypothetical knowledge> 42 35
11 {Learning Process} N/A It contains only no-named systems
12 {What We Know} 77 <true > 74 70
78 <falsehood> 74 71
79 <degree of self evidence> 67 62
13 {By What Means} 80 <self-evidence> 65 55
81 <self-evident in strict sense> 79 77
82 <self-evidence of second sort> 80 79
83 <relation maps> model model
84 <spacetime relations> 58,59 47
85 <resemblance and similarity > 59 48
86 <grater than> 59 49
14 {How We Know} 87 <immediate knowledge> 62 50
88 <instinctive belief> 7,11 8
89 <intuitive knowledge> 63 52
90 <derivative knowledge> 62 51
15 {Why We Know} 91 <self-evident truths> 63 53
92 <truth of perception > 65 58
93 <truth of memory> 66,67 61
94 <truth of general principles> model 57
95 <act of judgement> 73 68
96 <judgement of perception> 65 59
97 <judgement of memory> 66 60
98 <desirability of things> 42 37
16 {Learning Algorithm} 99 <knowledge of what it is > 86 83
100 <knowledge of what may be> 86 84
101 <point of activity> model model
102 <body of individually probable 81 82
opinions>
103 <criterion> 81 81
104 <risk of error> 88 87
105 <initial condition> model model
106 <calcolo> model model
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Table 3: Basic Vocabulary
Term Description
A ‘system’ is a portion of reality under study, and identifies the situation at hand.
‘Systems’, i.e. the situations at hand, are then described by means of some formal
language (e.g. mathematics, probability theory, computer programs, bonding graphs,
‘systems’ and ‘models’
etc.) leading to an abstract object called ‘model’. ‘Systems’ and ‘models’ are here used
to describe our existing, and are represented by colours or simple shapes as circles,
squares, and triangles.
When talking about ‘systems’ and ‘models’, it arises naturally the questions of how
‘models’ can be obtained and when a ‘model’ can be said to be good or not. In the past
six decades, automatic methods for ‘model’ building have received ever growing
‘system identification
interest. In this way, ‘models’ are firstly described in mathematical terms, that are then
algorithm’
obtained on the basis of the observation of some variables that characterise the situation
under study, through a so called ‘System Identification Algorithm’, in an automatic
manner.
The concept of ‘actors’ we are using mainly pertains to ‘Unified Modeling Language’,
where by ‘actor’ we mean all the terms that must be clear and definite when speaking
about our existing and that identify what can be believed to exist at the “bottom line” of
our world; said in other words, that all that is exiting can be traced back to one or more
‘actors’ ‘actor’. These ‘actors’ are represented by means of a symbol, where the name of the
‘actor’ they represent is given at the bottom of the symbol, so to distinguish one from
another. ‘Actors’ are then grouped together into ‘systems’, so that ‘actors’ belonging to
the same ‘system’ have something in common. ‘Actors’ that do not have any similar
other ‘actor’ to be placed with into a ‘system’, form a ‘system’ by themselves.
‘Systems’ are not all equal, and may be distinguished by having a certain hierarchy or
similarity. For instance, one ‘system’ may belong to another ‘system’, or one may
appear to have the same number of ‘actors’ as others. Therefore, we will use similar
forms to represent similar characteristics of ‘systems’, so that all forms of the same kind
‘shapes’ and ‘colours’ have something in common. Also, there will be ‘systems’ that are at the highest level of
hierarchy, so that no other ‘system’ contains them, and they contain all the other. These
‘systems’ are called ‘main systems’ and are distinguished by a different background
‘colour’, so that ‘actors’ in a different background ‘colour’ belong to different ‘main
systems’
As long as ‘systems’ may be either different or similar to another, so as to have a similar
or different shape, we distinguish them by having a certain ‘system type’, for instance
that distinguishes whether a ‘system’ contains only one ‘actor’ or two. Also, ‘systems’
may have their own name, in which case they are also an ‘actor’, and are said ‘named
‘system types’ and ‘actors
systems’, or be only a shape containing some ‘actors’ without any name to identify it. In
type’
the latter case are said ‘no named systems’. ‘Actors’ also have an ‘actor type’, since
they may be representing a precise element in itself, as it would be the case for an
‘actor’ called [this contribution] or an infinite number, as would be the case for an
‘actor’ called [all contributions in the present subject].
‘true system’ The name given to the situation under studying
The set of ‘models’ we are considering, and that we have at disposal to describe the
‘model set’
True System
The way a model is judged to be a good description, or understanding, of the ‘true
‘criterion’
system’
The model among all the models we can think of in a given ‘model class’ that best
‘best model’ represents the ‘true system’ according to a given ‘criterion’. It is also known as the
‘optimal model’
A model that is not the ‘optimal model’, but still it is close to it. Sometimes, it is meant
‘approximate model’ a ‘model’ that is optimal for some other simplified ‘criterion’, for instance one that is
only applied to a simpler ‘model class’ than the one considered
The case when in the ‘model class’ no ‘model’ can be found to exactly correspond to
‘sufficient order case’
the ‘true system’
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9 NOTES
1
System Theory was prompted forward in the forties of last Century by the application of statistical ideas to
filtering problems encountered in the engineering field. Built on solid theoretical foundations, that way of
reasoning leads to such an entity called a “model”, i.e. a formal, logical, analytical, mathematical
construction that resembles reality under observation. In System Identification, such models are obtained on
the basis of the observation of some variables that characterise the situation under study, in an automatic
manner. In Digital Filtering, such models and descriptions are obtained by algorithms that process data in the
form of numbers. Just to name few people that have left the milestones in the field are: (in the 1940-50’s)
N.Wiener, A.Kolmogorov, L.vonBertalanffy, H.W.Bode, C.E.Shannon; (in the 1970’s) K.J.Astrom,
P.Eykhoff, T.Kailath, S.L.Fagin, G.C.Goodwin, R.L.Payne, B.D.O.Andersson, J.B.Moore; (in the 1980-90’s)
J.D.Cadzow, A.V.Oppenheim, R.W.Schafer, L.Ljung, T.Glad, T.Soderstrom, P.Stoica, J.C.Willems,
T.Bohlin, P.A.Regalia.
2
The Unified Modeling Language is a formal, graphical language introduced by G.Booch, I.Jacobson and
J.Rumbaugh in 1998 for visualising, specifying, constructing and documenting artefacts of a software-
intensive systems. Refer to www.uml.org for the state of the art in the field.
3
This discussion mainly falls within ideas brought forward in recent years, as the advent of the Philosophy of
Information, the use of “models” in reasoning, and the search for a detailed ontology of (portion of) the
existing. Much older is the debate on whether mathematics and, say, logic, could ever bring up any further
knowledge at all, being just a rough simplification that forces us to think simple and not more rightfully as
we could do differently. We indeed apply mathematics, and, as in many other cases in our life, it shows to
definitely bring up some interesting knowledge. We do not want to say that this is always the case, while we
keep in mind all the occurrences when its application has dramatically changed the course of human
thoughts.
4
The Problems of Philosophy. Oxford University Press, OPUS. Edition printed on 1980. ISBN 0-19-
888018-9, British Library.
- Page 26 of 71-
other
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13
of second sort
logical
by what costituents
self
and similarity maps
grater
then principles
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
outer sense
intuitive laws of
facts common
14
knowledge
11

sensible
instinctive
beliefs
qualities
mental things
15 inner sense
what
self
t r u t h o f

t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
m e m o r y
we know
6
p
t
e
r
r
u
c
t
e
h
p t
o
i
f
o n
judgement of
private
mind space
16 knowledge of
what it is
knowledge of
what may be
criterion risk of
error mental public
learning
facts space
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
5
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
knowledge of
truth
knowledge by
description
10 pure a-priori
knowledge
9 uniformity
of nature
figure 7: regions 6-16

number of elements contained into a systems
1 2 3 4 some infinite
systems that do not contain
systems, but only actors
2 3 4
1 5 6 7 8
contain systems
systems that
9 10 11 12
NAMED SYSTEM NO NAMED SYSTEM
figure 8: systems complexity

other
arguments
ourself channel
1 what
happens
knowledge
theory of
error mathematics geometry
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
outer sense
intuitive laws of
facts common
2
knowledge


sensible
instinctive
beliefs
qualities
mental things
inner sense
what
self
t r u t h o f

t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
m e m o r y
we know
p
t
e
r
r
u
c
t
e
h
p t
o
i
f
o n
judgement of
private
mind space
knowledge of
what it is
knowledge of
what may be
criterion risk of
error mental public
learning facts space
algorihtm point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
3 source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
A B C
figure 9: 3x3 quadrant modularity

A Different View Into The Existing
Second Part
Stefano Bigi
this manuscript presents a different view into the existing

a simple example is summarised in the following picture
first part
figures: 9; tables: 2, in appendix
second part
figures: 15 figures; tables: 17, within the text (that in fact contain 50% of the words)
NOTE TO THE READER

this manuscript is mostly about pictures, and as it happens with
pictures, it can be read in either ways, from the first one to the last
taken, and viceversa: by reading the pages in reversed order, one may
get the conclusion of what is questioned by just following the reading
author can be reached at stbigi@yahoo.it, or at the current postal address: largo vessella 31, 00199 roma, italy,
or at the all-time postal address: via bellini, 71, 33064 fontanafredda, pn, italy
A1 ACTORS AND SYSTEMS IN THE REGIONS OF THE EXISTING ........................................................38

A1.1 The Big Picture......................................................................................................................................38
A1.2 Inner World ...........................................................................................................................................39
A1.3 Near Outer World..................................................................................................................................39
A1.4 What Happens .......................................................................................................................................40
A1.5 Our Knowledge .....................................................................................................................................41
A1.6 Inner Ourself..........................................................................................................................................42
A1.7 Inner Outer World .................................................................................................................................44
A1.8 Far Outer World ....................................................................................................................................45
A1.9 Universe.................................................................................................................................................46
A1.10 Far Ourself.............................................................................................................................................47
A1.11 Learning Process ...................................................................................................................................48
A1.11.1 What We Know .............................................................................................................................48
A1.11.2 By What Means .............................................................................................................................49
A1.11.3 How We Know..............................................................................................................................50
A1.11.4 Why We Know..............................................................................................................................50
A1.11.5 Learning Algoritm .........................................................................................................................51
A2 GLOSSARY..................................................................................................................................................53
A3 NOTES ..........................................................................................................................................................54
One Picture of each region and the actors therein is given from 55 to 71, respectively.
- Page 37 of 71 -
A1 ACTORS AND SYSTEMS IN THE REGIONS OF THE EXISTING
In Section 5, the process of finding a way through the positioning of the ‘systems’ and ‘actors’ in {A 107 Actor
World} depicted in Figure 1, has been described at a first level of attention, limited to the sequence in which
‘regions’ show up in our exploration. In this Section, we proceed further in the exploration by examining a more
detailed view, and we briefly describe the process of getting to know the other elements, namely the 107 ‘actors’,
the ‘systems’ in which they are grouped and the ‘system types’ that differentiate them.
One Subsection is dedicated to each ‘region’ encountered in the exploration carried out in Section 6.4, see Figures 6
and 7 and Table 2, whereas for each ‘region’, the enlarged picture of it is also given in Figures A2 to A16
respectively.
The list of the considered ‘actors’ given in Table 2 is now complemented by a short description given in the
following tables, mostly taken from Bernard Russell (that is the text between “…” that you find at the page
indicated). Bertrand Russell’s ‘actors’ do not always maintain the definition he gives them, and in some cases their
meaning has been refined by the author. As we mentioned before, ‘actors’ are not only those indicated by Bertrand
Russell, but include some more ‘actor’ indicated by the ‘model’ itself. This is recognised under the column “page”
of the following tables, and by the name in red in the figures.
Since we are using a formal language, this involves that some terminology and terms have formal definitions. A list
of them is given in the glossary in Section A2. To distinguish the various types of the terms we are using, we also
recall that these are recognised among the text with the aid of brackets of different forms, as for the following list:
• ‘…’, this is a term that is given in the glossary and that constitutes the basic terminology
• <…>, this is a name of an ‘actor’
• {…}, this is a name of a ‘region’
• “…”, this is a quote from Bertrand Russell or words with some particular meaning within the text
• […], this is a precise element that apparently exists, and that leads us to the existence of something else
A1.1 The Big Picture
We start the exploration of the picture given in Figure 1 from the upper right corner as in Figure 5, see Section 5.3.
Figure A1: The Big Picture
Here we find the main legenda for the whole picture, which we call <big picture>1, where those ‘systems’ that
cointain any other further existing ‘actors’ are placed. These four systems are called ‘main systems’ and are
distinguished by a different background ‘colour’, so that ‘actors’ placed in a different background ‘colour’ belong
to different ‘main systems’. As we said, ‘actors’ that do not have any similar other ‘actor’ to be placed with into a
‘system’, form a ‘system’ by themselves. This ‘region’ is made only by ‘actors’ of this kind, which turn out to be
four, namely
Bertrand Russell’s
actors encountered in this region reference
progressive progressive
actor’s name definition page
number number
We that have feelings and thoughts, and that includes all the parts that form us
1 <ourself> 8,26 7
in our completeness.
2 <outer world> What is outside us and is existing independently of us. model
The part that makes <ourself> in direct contact with the <outer world>, and
3 <channel> through which we get to know by acquaintance both <outer world> and model
<ourself>.
While ‘BR’ means "the discussion of the conditions which things must satisfy
<theory of
4 in order that we may be able to know them”, for us will be the actual 19 14
knowledge>
understanding whatsoever and the way it is obtained.
While the reason to distinguish three of them derives by basic intuition, we put <channel>, that probably belongs to
<ourself>, as a separate ‘system’, following Communication Engineeering schemes.
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Here we also encounter the first two ‘type of system’, i.e. the type of the four ‘main systems’, that identifies those
‘systems’ with only one ‘actor’, and that are ‘actors’ themselves, and the container of them with light blue
background colour which we have called <big picture>, that identifies those ‘systems’ that contain four ‘systems’.
We recall that, since the latter contains ‘systems’, it is represented by a square instead of a circle.
A1.2 Inner World
From the upper right corner we make our first step in the existing moving to the very centre of the picture
Figure A2: Inner World
Here we discover what is more directly known to us, not strangely related to all the ‘main systems’ with some
physical content we are in direct contact with: <ourself>, <channel> and <outer world>. In this ‘region’ we find all
the ‘actors’ encountered in Bertrand Russell’s first chain of thoughts. The ‘actors’ we find here are
number number
“Despite it is hard to disentangle from other things, there are some reasons
5 <mind> for thinking that we are also acquainted with the I, that is to say to that which 27 23
sees this <sense data>, and we call that part <mind>."
6 <sensations> "The experience of being immediately aware of <sense data>." 4 4
"What is seeing or felt by us regarding <outer world>, and that is
7 <sense data> 4 3
immediately known to us, as [colours], [dimensions], [shapes], etc."
"The real [table], if it exists, which emits the <sense data>, and it is different
8 <physical objects> 4 5
from them."
9 <matter> "The collection of all <physical objects>." 4 6
In order the get acquaintance with <sense data>, <mind>, <memory> and
<introspection>, there must be some senses that are able to receive and
10 <outer sense> collect those things. Since we must distinguish whether senses receives those 28 26
things from <outer world> or from <ourself>, we shall call those senses
<outer sense> and <inner sense>, respectively.
In order the get acquaintance with <sense data>, <mind>, <memory> and
<introspection>, there must be some senses that are able to receive and
11 <inner sense> collect those things. Since we must distinguish whether senses receives those 28 27
things from <outer world> or from <ourself>, we shall call those senses
<outer sense> and <inner sense>, respectively.
12 <our body> The part for which we are made up of bones, tissues, and molecules. 15 11
"As science and common sense assume, there is one public all-embracing
13 <physical space> 15 12
physical space in which <physical objects> are."
In this region we also encounter a new ‘type of system’, i.e. the one as <channel>, that is a ‘system’ that contains
‘actors’ and not ‘systems’ as <this picture>, in this case again four, and a new ‘type of actor’, i.e. ‘actors’ that are
not ‘systems’.
A1.3 Near Outer World
From the centre of the picture we make our second step in the existing, moving up to upper middle part.
Figure A3: Near Outer World
After discovering the existence of the {Inner World}, we discover soon that many differences occurs all around, in
the sort that there are some different <arguments> we are talking about. These <arguments> have been the very first
<common belief> humans have developed, and they represent all available knowledge existing at a certain point in
time. It took ages for humans to get knowledgeable, and even aware, of which arguments were existing2. Apes,
man’s nearest cousins certainly already had some sense of <ethical values>, probably shared by other animals as
well, while we had to wait until the pre-Neanderthal time, some five hundred thousand years ago, to gain the sense
of what we call now <spacetime> and of a primordial use of <logic>. Historical time led us to know <mathematics>
and <geometry> and extremely progressed us in <logic>. Also, people developed knowledge on certain precise
<arguments> common to the daily leaving activities, as agriculture, navigation, war, civil engineering, art, religion,
etc; so that it could be recognised that some <other arguments> were existing as well. It is only with the advent of
ancient Greeks that humans got the sense of the <arguments> themselves and their articulation, with the advent of
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philosophy. From that moment on, humans have found a way into the discovering that got to always new and new
<arguments>, and we now well know that there are an infinite number of <arguments>, many of which we are not
even aware of. All those <arguments>, including philosophy, still go as ‘no named actors’ under <other
arguments>. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
14 <arguments> Main subjects in which <knowledge> is distinguished. model
15 <ethical values> "The value referred to the <desirability of things>.” 42 36
That <argument> for which we perceive that “if A is <true>“ and “A and B
16 <logic> 43 39
are <true>“, also “B must be <true>“.
17 <spacetime> That for which we perceive a four dimensional world. model
That <argument> for which two and two are four, and that deals with
18 <mathematics > 43 38
numbers.
19 <geometry> That <argument> which deals with shapes and spaces. 43 40
<Arguments> different from the very basic ones, that are explicitly listed
20 <other arguments> model
among ‘actors’.
In this region we also encounter a new ‘type of system’, i.e. the one as <arguments> is a ‘system’ that contains an
infinite number of ‘actors’, and a new ‘type of actor’, i.e. <other arguments> is an ‘actor’ that represents an infinite
number of other ‘actors’, and not as, e.g. <sense data> that represents that precise ‘actor’ in itself.
A1.4 What Happens
From the upper middle part of the picture we make our third step in the existing, moving left to the upper left
corner.
Figure A4: What Happens
We have got to know many things – ‘actors’ – to exist, that we have well come to the point of getting the sense that
something is happening all around, which, strangely, comes at the same time with the feeling of indeed willing to
know what it is, and what is the meaning of all of it. What actually we do here, it is entering the ‘main system’ of
<theory of knowledge>, by encountering the first very essence of it, namely <knowledge>, that precise ‘actor’ that,
at last, will gives us our understanding of <what happens>. ‘BR’ explains that to have <knowledge>, there must
also be a <theory of truth>, of which only three facets exist, namely: <knowledge>, <error> and <probable
opinion>. In summary, the ‘actors’ we then find here are
number number
21 <what happens> What is happening all around. model
“The question as to what we mean by truth and falsehood, which we considered
previously, is of much less interest than the question as to how we can know
22 <theory of truth> what is true and what is false. There can be no doubt that some of our belief are 69,76 74
erroneous; thus we are led to inquire what certainty we can ever have that such
and such belief is not erroneous."
"We note that <knowledge> is not related to true act of judgement, so as when
what we believe is true, it might be supposed that we had achieved a
knowledge of what we believe. For instance, if [a man believes that the late
prime minister’s last name began with a “B”], he believes what is <true>, since
the late prime minister was sir Henry Campbell Bannerman. But if believes that
[Mr. Balfour was the late prime minister], despite the belief [the late prime
minister’s last name began with a “B”] being <true>, would not be thought to
constitute <knowledge>. If [a newspaper, by an intelligent anticipation,
23 <knowledge> 76,77 73
announces the result of a battle before any telegram giving the result has been
received], it may by good fortune announce what afterwards turns out to be
<true>, and it may produce <belief> in some of its experienced readers. But in
spite of the truth of their belief, they cannot be said to have <knowledge>. In
like a manner, a true belief cannot be called <knowledge> when it is deduced
by a fallacious process of reasoning, even if the premises from which it is
deduced are true. If I know that [all Greeks are men] and that [Socrates was a
man], I cannot be said to <know> that [Socrates was a Greek], because,
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although my premises and my conclusion are true, the conclusion does not
follow from the premises.…<Knowledge> is what is validly deduced from
known premises. It is a circular definition because it assumes that we already
know what is meant by “known premises”."
"As a matter of fact, some of our beliefs turn out to be erroneous, and therefore
24 <error> it becomes necessary to consider how, if at all, we can distinguish knowledge 63 54
from error.”
"What we firmly believe, if it is neither <knowledge> nor <error>, and also
<probable
25 what we believe hesitatingly because it is, or is derived from, something which 81 80
opinion>
has not the highest <degree of self-evidence>.”
In this region we also encounter a new ‘type of system’, i.e. the one as <theory of truth> is a ‘system’ that contains
three ‘actors’, and it is itself an ‘actor’, so that it has a name.
A1.5 Our Knowledge
From the upper left corner we make our fourth step in the existing, by embracing the bottom left corner of the
picture.
Figure A5: Our Knowledge
We understand <spacetime> so that we can easily see that <knowledge> is dynamic, it does not stay at the same
level, ma rather changes and evolves, as for instance we are now rather un-doubtful that our planet is round, and not
flat as it was asserted until five hundred years ago. In turn, there must be something that we must be able to know,
which we call <what we know>, some means that let us get what we know, which we call <by what means>, a way
those means work, which we call <how do we know>, and a reason for them to work, which we call <why we
know>. Finally, there must be something as an algorithm, that we call indeed <learning algorithm>, which, while
time goes by, elaborates present knowledge into future knowledge, and that makes <knowledge> actually evolve. It
seems as if the pile of ‘actors’ we found were acting as the alimenting process of <knowledge>, giving us the very
view on <what happens>. In order for that process to flow, it must be alimented by some source, which we call
indeed <source of knowledge>. ‘BR’ lists eight elemements that constitute such a source, which can then be
grouped into four different systems to which no name is assigned to. The ‘actors’ we then find here are
number number
It is indeed what we can got to know, which in turn results in three different
26 <what we know> things, namely that something is either <true>, <false> or has a <degree of model
selfevidence>.
27 <by what means> These are the means that let us get <what we know>. model
28 <how do we know> The way the means, i.e. <by what means>, work. model
It is the reason for which the means we have work, and we finally get some
29 <why we know> model
more <knowledge>.
<learning
30 That which makes <knowledge> evolving with time. model
algorithm>
<source of That which gives us <knowledge>, and that aliments the [learning process];
31 model
knowledge> in a certain sense it is what that may in turn be seen as the ultimate existing.
“Consider such a proposition as [Edinburgh is north of London]. When we
come to know that true, we merely apprehend a fact which was there before
we knew it, we do not create that truth, since it has only to do with
Edinburgh and London. Here, two different things occur: my knowing that
Edinburgh is north of London, which is a particular and is related to us and
<world of our sensation, and the relation [at the north of], which is a universal. We
32 55,56 44
existence> shall now find convenient only to speak of things “existing” when they are in
time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist. Thus
[thoughts and feelings], mind and physical objects “exist”. Obviously,
universals do not exist in this sense, and we shall say that they “have being”.
At this point we can then distinguish between two worlds, <world of
existence> and <world of being>.”
“Consider such a proposition as [Edinburgh is north of London]. When we
come to know that true, we merely apprehend a fact which was there before
we knew it, we do not create that truth, since it has only to do with
33 <world of being> 55,56 45
Edinburgh and London. Here, two different things occur: my knowing that
Edinburgh is north of London, which is a particular and is related to us and
our sensation, and the relation [at the north of], which is a universal. We
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shall now find convenient only to speak of things “existing” when they are in
time, that is to say, when we can point to some time at which they exist. Thus
[thoughts and feelings], mind and physical objects “exist”. Obviously,
universals do not exist in this sense, and we shall say that they “have being”.
At this point we can then distinguish between two worlds <world of
existence> and <world of being>.”
<knowledge of
34 "The sense in which we know <sense data>." 23 16
things>
"The sort of <knowledge> which is opposed to <error>, the sense in which
<knowledge of what we know is <true>, the sense which applies to our beliefs and
35 23 15
truths> convictions, i.e. to what are called judgements. In this sense of the word we
know that something is the case."
“We shall say we have acquaintance with anything of which we are directly
aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any
knowledge of truths. Thus in the presence of my [table] I am acquainted with
the <sense data> that make up the <appearance> of my [table], its colour,
shape, hardness, smoothness; all these are the things of which I am
immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching the [table]. We do not
doubt that the [table] may be brown, rather then dark, and so on. But such
<knowledge by
36 statements, though they make me know truths about the colour, do not make 25 17
acquaintance>
me know the colour itself any better than I did before: so far as concerns
<knowledge> of the colour itself, as opposed to <knowledge of truths> about
it, I know the colour perfectly and completely when I see it, and no further
<knowledge> of itself is even theoretical possible. ... In this way,
<knowledge by acquaintance> is the simplest form of <knowledge> we have,
which is immediately known to us just as it is, so simpler than <knowledge
of truths>, and logically independent from <knowledge of truths>."
"Let’s think, for instance, to [the Emperor of China]. Are we really sure he
do actually exists? “I have not the honour to be acquainted with [the Emperor
of China], so that I can not see his <sense data>, but I truly judge that he
exists. It may be said, of course that I judge this because of other’s people
acquaintance with him. This however would be an irrelevant retort, since, if
the principle were true, I could not know that any one else is acquainted with
<knowledge by
37 him. But further: there is no reason why I should not know of the existence 23 18
description>
of something with which nobody is acquainted. If I am acquainted with a
thing which exists, my acquaintance gives me knowledge that it exists. But
whenever I can know that a thing of a certain sort exists, I or some one else
must be acquainted with the thing. What happens, in cases where I have true
judgement without acquaintance, is the thing is known to me by
<description>.”
"Whatever is given in <sensation>, or is of the same nature, so that a
38 <particulars> 53 43
<universal> will be anything which may be shared by many <particulars>.”
“This world has been important to philosophers for many years, indeed it is a
very old one, since it was brought into discovery by Plato and his “theory of
ideas” is one of the most successful attempts hitherto made to get to know it.
Let us consider, say, such a notion as [justice]. If we ask ourselves what
justice is, it is natural to proceed by considering this, that, and the other just
act, with the view to discovering what they have in common. They must all,
in some sense, partake of a common nature, which will be found in whatever
39 <universals> is just and in nothing else. This common nature, in virtue of which they are (28),52 42
all just, will be [justice] itself, the pure essence, what Plato calls an “idea” or
“form”. The “idea” [justice] is not identical with anything that is just: it is
something other than particular things, which particular things partake of.
Not being particular, it cannot exist in itself in the world of sense. Moreover,
it is not fleeting or changeable like the things of sense: it is eternally itself,
immutable and indestructible. We will use the word <universal> to describe
what Plato meant."
In this region we also encounter a new ‘type of system’, i.e. those ‘systems’ with two ‘actors’ and that have no
name. We note that in this case ‘actors’ take on an alternative sense, as they were escluding choices of <truth>,
actually ones that indicated different facets of the same ‘system’, such that, for instance, <world of being> is
something different from <world of existence>, and in a quite opposite way, still the two represent the overall world
where our existence takes its being.
A1.6 Inner Ourself
From the bottom left corner we make our fifth step in the existing, jumping back to the centre of the picture, in the
pink area at the bottom of the part already encountered at the second step as {Inner World}.
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Figure A6: Inner Ourself

In {Inner World} we got the sense of <ourself>, of our <mind> and of <channel> in direct contact with both <outer
world> and <ourself>. It is indeed through <channel> that we eventually find out that <mind> is not the only thing
we see so evidently constituting <ourself>. ‘BR’ shows that there are indeed two more elements that constitute the
part of <ourself> with which we are in most direct touch through the <channel>, namely <introspection> and
<memory>. These ‘actors’ appear in somewhat different sectors of <ourself> than the <mind>, indeed in an
opposite position, as one deals with the past time, while the other deals with the present and the future. In the left,
we find the ‘system’ which contains <introspection>, in the other to the right, the one which contains <memory>.
The three ‘actors’ form a first circular layer at an equal degree of contact to <channel>, where <mind> seems to
play the role of the ‘actor’ related to a, say, all-time dimension similar to the one <universals> have. Both
<introspection> and <memory> further involve existence of some other ‘actors’, that are then placed in the
respective systems according. Also in the ‘system’ containg <mind> other ‘actors’ find place, namely those that
connect <mind> with all other ‘actors’. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
"We are not only aware of things, but we are often aware of being aware of
40 <introspection> 26,27 21
them."
"When [I see the sun], I am often aware of my seeing the sun, thus my seeing
<self- the sun is an object with which I have acquaintance. This kind of
41 27 22
consciousness> acquaintance, that may be called <self-consciousness>, is the source of
knowledge of all <mental things>."
"<Self-consciousness>is not, of course, consciousness of <ourself>: it is just
consciousness of particular thoughts and feelings. In fact, when we try to
42 <mental things> look in <ourselves> we always seem to come upon particular thoughts and 27 24
feelings, and not upon the I which has the thoughts and feelings”. Those we
call <mental things>.
43 <mental facts > <Mental facts> are facts that involve <mental things>. 79 78
“We said we have <knowledge by acquaintance> with <sense-data>, but is
there something else we are acquainted with? In fact, if it were the sole
example, our <knowledge> would be very much more restricted than it is.
We should only know what is now present to our senses: we could not know
anything about the past, not even that there was a past, nor could we know
any truths about <sense data> for all <knowledge of truths>, as we shall
show, demands acquaintance with things which are of an essential different
44 <memory> 26 19
character from <sense data>. The first extension beyond <sense data> to be
considered is acquaintance by <memory>. It is obvious that we often
remember what we have seen or heard or had otherwise present to our senses,
and that in such cases we are still immediately aware of what we remember,
in spite of the fact that it appears as past and not as present. This immediate
knowledge <by memory> is the source of all knowledge concerning the
past."
"Things which have been data either of the <outer senses> or of the <inner
45 <past data> 28 20
sense>."
The way we pass from one belief to another provided there is a valid logical
46 <logical inference> 78 76
connexion, according to some <general principle>.
"Take, for example, the beliefs produced by reading. If [the newspapers
announce the death of the King], we are fairly well justified in believing that
the King is dead, since this is the sort of announcement which would not be
made if it were false. But here the intuitive knowledge upon which our belief
is based is knowledge of the existence of <sense data> derived from looking
at the print which gives the news. This knowledge scarcely rises into
consciousness, except in a person who cannot read easily. A child may be
aware of the shapes of the letters, and pass gradually and painfully to a
<psychological realization of their meaning. But anybody accustomed to reading passes at
47 78 75
inference> once to what the letters mean, and is not aware, except on reflection, that he
has derived this knowledge from the <sense data> called seeing the printed
letters. Thus although a valid inference from the letters to their meaning is
possible, and could be performed by the reader, it is not in fact performed,
since he does not in fact perform any operation which can be called <logical
inference>. Yet it would be absurd to say that the reader does not know that
the newspaper announces the King’s death. There are in fact many ways,
besides logical inference, by which we pass from one belief to another: the
passage from the print to its meaning illustrates these ways. These ways may
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be called “psychological inference”."

<emotional
48 The way we pass from one belief to another moved by feelings and emotions. model
inference>
In this region we also encounter two new ‘types of system’, i.e. one the square that is divided into triangular sectors,
and the other the triangular sectors themselves. Previous ‘systems’, represented by circles, contained somewhat
paritetical ‘actors’, as they were escluding choices of <truth>. Now, in turn, we find not escluding ‘actors’ that are
also related by some kind of hierarchy, with the first three forming a circular layer in contact with the center, while
the others are all implied by the previous three, as background elements displaced along a three structure.
A1.7 Inner Outer World
From the pink area in the centre, we make our sixth step in the existing, moving up to the opposite side of
<channel>, to the blue area in the upper centre of the picture.
Figure A7: Inner Outer World
Here we find that also something different than <physical objects> exists in the part of <outer world> in direct
contact with <outer sense>. BR lists two other ‘actors’, namely <relations> and <general principles> that, as it was
the case for the {Inner Ourself}, appear to be placed into two opposite sectors, and to be of the same nature as those
in <ourself>. We note in fact that <general principles>, that to be understood and applied need some stored data
from the past, are in fact close to <memory>, while <relations>, that constantly form and disappear in the present
and in the future time, are close to <introspection>, which indeed deal with the same <spacetime> dimension. Also
all other ‘actors’, involved, actually inferred from, with <relations> and <general principles> find symmetrical
positions in the respective systems along the same structure encountered in {Inner Ourself}. This gives to the
complete {Inner World} encountered at step one a strange and nice symmetrical structure. The ‘actors’ we then find
here are:
number number
“Assuming that there is <physical space>, and thus corresponds to <private
spaces>, what can we know about it? We can know only what is required to
secure the correspondence. That is to say, we can know nothing of what is
like in itself, but we can know the sort of arrangement of <physical objects>
49 <relations> which results from their spatial relations. We can know for example that the 15,16 13
earth and the moon and the sun are in one [straight line] during an eclipse,
though we cannot know what a physical [straight line] is. Thus we come to
know much more about the relations of distances in <physical space> than
about distances themselves.”
It is a part of a <relation>, e.g. "When [Othello judges that Desdemona loves
50 <subject > 73 64
Cassio], Othello is the <subject>.”
It is a part of a <relation>, e.g. "When [Othello judges that Desdemona loves
51 <object > 73 65
Cassio], the <object> is Desdemona, and loving, and Cassio.
The <subject> and the <object> together are called <constituents> of the
52 <constituents> 73 66
<relation>.”
“The <relation> has what is called a ‘sense”, namely, <objects> must be put
53 <order> in a certain order. For instance, [Othello]’s judgement that [Cassio loves 73 67
Desdemona] differs from his judgement that [Desdemona loves Cassio].”
“Whenever a <relation> holds between two or more terms, it unites the terms
54 <complex> into a complex whole, which we will call a <complex>. If [Othello loves 74 69
Desdemona], there is such a complex [Othello’s love for Desdemona].”
“If we are to extend our <knowledge> beyond the sphere of our private
experience, and so to our acquaintance, and we are, for instance, to know of
the existence of <matter>, of other people, of the past before our individual
<memory> begins, or of the future, we must know some <general principles>
of some kind by means of which we can draw inferences from our
<general <knowledge by acquaintance>. It must be known to us that the existence of
55 33, 39 30
principles> some one sort of thing, A, is a sign of the existence of some other sort of
thing, B, either at the same time as A or at some earlier time, as, for example,
[thunder] is a sign of earlier existence of [lightning]. … In all our knowledge
of <general principles>, what actually happens is that first of all we realize
some particular application of the principle, and then we realize the
particularity is irrelevant, and that there is a generality which may equally
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truly be affirmed.”
“Suppose that [two men are discussing what day of the month it is]. One of
them says “at least you will admit that if yesterday was the 15th to-day must
be the 16th. “Yes,” says the other, “I admit that.” “And you know,” the first
continues, “that yesterday was the 15th, because you dined with Jones, and
your diary tell you that was the 15th.” “Yes,” says the second; “therefore to-
<logical
56 day is the 16th”. The fact that is lying behind the example is a very <general 39,4 31
principles>
principle>, which we call <logical principle>. It can be stated as follows:
Suppose it is known that if “this is true”, than “that is true”. Suppose it is
also known that “this is true”, than it follows that “that is true””. In other
words, it is to say that “anything implied by a true proposition is true”, or
“whatever follows from a true proposition is true”.”
“The law of identity: whatever is, is; the law of contradiction: nothing can
57 <laws of thought> both be and not be; the law of excluded middle: everything must either be or 40 32
not be.”
“The <principle of induction> claims two different truths and may be stated
as follows: First truth: when a thing of a certain sort A has been found to be
associated with a thing of a certain other sort B, and has never been found
dissociated from a thing of the sort B, the greater the number of cases in
<principle of
58 which A and B have been associated, the greater is the probability that they 37 29
induction>
will be associated in a fresh case in which one of them is known to be
present; Second truth: under the same circumstances, a sufficient number of
cases of association will make the probability of a fresh association nearly a
certainty, and will make it approach certainty without limit.”
“Let’s take the <knowledge> about a simple generalization [all men are
mortal]. It is plain that we believe this proposition, in the first place, because
there is no known instance of men living beyond a certain age, and in the
second place because there seem to be physiological grounds for thinking
that an organism such as a man’s body must sooner or later wear out.
Neglecting the second ground, and considering merely our experience of
men’s mortality, it is plain that we should not be content with one quite
clearly understood instance of a man dying, whereas, in the case of [two and
two are four], only one instance does suffice to persuade us that the same
<principle of must happen in any other instance. Moreover, we are also able to imagine a
59 43,44 41
deduction> world were indeed [man are not mortal], as Swift invites us to consider with
the race of Struldbrugs who never die. But a world where [two and two make
five] seems quite on a different level …. The fact is that in the case of [two
and two make four], we can know the general proposition without inferring it
from instances, although some instance is usually necessary to make clear to
us what the general proposition means. This is why there is a real utility in
the application of <general principles> as the <principle of induction>
(which goes from the particular to the particular, and from the particular to
the genera) previously known, or as the <principle of deduction>, which
goes from the general to the general and from the general to the particular.”
A1.8 Far Outer World
From the part above the <channel>, we make our seventh step in the existing, moving right to the middle right of
the picture.
Figure A8: Far Outer World
Now our sight can go further in the <outer world>, where we find some new ‘actors’, all mentioned by ‘BR’, that
group into three different ‘systems’. First, soon we understand we are not alone, and that other people exist as well,
different from <physical objects>, in the sense that also <others’ mind> exist. Still <outer world> is not complete,
since there must also be that which is indeed <true>, or which is at least mostly believed to be so, as are <facts>,
<sensible qualities> and <common beliefs>. Finally, ‘BR’ notes that <ourself> deals in fact with two different
spaces, namely the <private space>, e.g. that which a blind man can understand as it is the [wave motion], the
knowledge of which can be acquired by the sense of touch or by a sea voyage, and the <public space>, as it is
[light] as the thing which seeing people experience and blind people do not. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
60 <other’s mind> “What goes on in the minds of others and that it is known to us through our 27 25
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perception of their bodies, that is, the <sense data> in us which are associated
with their bodies.”
“We call this occurrence, so the fact that there is a corresponding complex to
the complex involved by the <act of judging>, <fact>, corresponding to the
belief. … If [you know the hour of the sunset], you can at that hour know the
61 <facts> fact that [the sun is setting]: this is knowledge of the fact by way of 74,78 72
<knowledge of truths>; but you can also, if the whether is fine, look to the
west and actually see the setting sun: you then know the same fact by the
way of <knowledge of things>.”
“What <universals> we know by acquaintance, hence by direct experience?
To begin with, it is obvious that we are acquainted with such universals as
[white], [red], [black], [sweet], [sour], [loud], [hard], i.e. with qualities which
62 <sensible qualities> are exemplified in <sense data>. We shall call these types of <universals>, 58 46
<sensible qualities>. They can be apprehended with less effort of abstraction
than any others, and they seem less removed from <particulars> than any
other <universals>.”
Those things that we regard as commonly known to everybody, as for
63 <common beliefs> instance “no one would disagree that it takes about eight minutes for the 64 56
sun’s light to reach us.”
“It is well known that [light] is a form of [wave motion], but this is
misleading, for the [light] which immediately see, which we know directly
by means of our sense, is not a form of [wave motion], but something quite
different, something which we all know if we are not blind, tough we can not
describe it so as to convey our knowledge to a man who is blind. When it is
64 <public space> 14 10
said that [light] is waves, what is really meant is that waves are the physical
cause of our <sensations> of light. But [light] itself, the thing which seeing
people experience and blind people do not, … must stay in one public all-
embracing physical space in which <physical objects> are … and that it is
independent of us and our sense.”
“A [wave motion], on the contrary to [light], could quite well be described to
a blind man, since he can acquire the knowledge of space by the sense of
touch; and he can experience a [wave motion] by a sea voyage almost as well
65 <private space > 14 9
as we can. But this, which a blind man can understand, is not what we mean
by [light], i.e. the <public space>: we mean by [light] just that which a blind
man can never understand, and which we can never describe to him.”
In this region we also encounter a new ‘type of system’, i.e. the one with three ‘actors’ without being a ‘named
system’
A1.9 Universe
From the right middle, we make our eighth step in the existing, moving down to the right bottom corner of the
picture.
Figure A9: Universe
We have finally arrived to the part of <outer world> farthest from <channel>: the ‘region’ we call {Universe}. Here
we find three different ‘systems’. One that contains those <actors> that form, in some sense, the static part of it, that
‘BR’ names to be <uniformity of nature> and <coherence>. The other that contains those <actors> that form, in the
same sense, the dynamical part of it: <life>, as the <fact> that for instance we are alive and dead, and the <point of
attraction>, that determines at what point of the existing <life> is taking place, for instance whether it is at 10^(-20)
meters as it happens for neutrinos and quarks or at one meter as it happens for us. Finally, of both parts we get two
different views, as we must distinguish between <appearance>, the colour of the table we see, and <reality>, the
“table which emits the <sense data>, if it exists”. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
“We are all convinced that [the sun will rise tomorrow]. Why? … To this
question, we shall naturally answer “because it always has risen every day”.
We have a firm belief that it will rise in the future, because it has risen in the
<uniformity of past. If we are challenged as to why we believe that it will continue to rise as
66 33-35 28
nature> heretofore, we may appeal to the laws of motion: the earth, we shall say, is a
freely rotating body, and such bodies do not cease to rotate unless something
interferes from outside, and there is nothing outside to interfere with the earth
between now and tomorrow. The interesting doubt here is as to whether the
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laws of motion will remain in operation until tomorrow. That is to say, whether
any number of cases of a law being fulfilled in the past affords evidence that it
will be fulfilled in the future… As a matter of fact, the mere fact that something
has happened a certain number of times causes animals and men to expect that
it will happen again. The problem we have to discuss is then whether there is
any reason for believing in what we call <the uniformity of nature>, the belief
that everything that has happened or will happen is an instance of some general
law to which there are no exceptions. … For instance, [domestic animals
expect food when they see the person who usually feeds them]. We know that
all these rather crude expectations of uniformity are liable to be misleading.
The men who has fed the chicken every day throughout its life at the last
wrings its neck instead, showing that more refined views as to the <the
uniformity of nature> would have been useful to the chicken.”
“Two propositions are <coherent> when both may be <true>, and are
incoherent when one at least must be false. For example, the two propositions,
“this tree is a beech” and “this tree is not a beech”, are not coherent. In order to
67 <coherence> 71 63
know whether two propositions can both be <true>, we must know such truths
as the law of contradiction, which is part of the <laws of thought>.” In such a
way we recognised that every human face has two eyes.
The knowledge that is directly perceived by us when considering a certain
subject, as are <sense data> of a [table] for the distracted observer. <Sense
68 <appearance> data> are in fact "the beginning of one of the distinctions that cause most 2 1
trouble in philosophy -- the distinction between <appearance> and <reality>,
between what things seem to be and what they are."
69 <reality> What happens behind <sense data>. 2 2
70 <life> That for which we are, for instance, alive or dead. model
It defines at what point in the existing life takes place, for instance whether it is
<point of
71 at 10^(-20) meters as it happens for neutrinos and quarks or at one meter as it model
attraction>
happens for us
A1.10 Far Ourself
From the right bottom corner, we make our ninth step in the existing, moving left to the bottom middle of the
picture.
Figure A10: Far Ourself
We have returned to <ourself>, where we find that part of <ourself> that it is more difficult to get in touch with,
and, as ‘BR’ says, that has constituted “One of the great historic controversies in philosophy, the controversy
between the two schools called respectively empiricists and rationalists (p. 41)”. Here, there are the ‘systems’ that
contain the basic knowledge we actually posses, that ‘BR’ lists to be three, namely <a-priori knowledge>,
<hypothetical knowledge> and <empirical knowledge>. It appears that <far ourself> falls close to both <universe>
and the <source of knowledge>, which gives us some sense, that appears almost natural indeed. The ‘actors’ we
then find here are:
number number
“One of the great historic controversies in philosophy is the controversy
between the two schools called respectively “empiricists” and “rationalists” .
The first one holds that all our <knowledge> is derived from experience,
<empirical
72 called <empirical knowledge>, the second instead maintains that, in addition 41 34
knowledge >
to what we know by experience, there are some “innate ideas” and “innate
principles”, which we know independently of experience, which are called
<a-priori knowledge>". We consider both kinds to exist.
<pure empirical "Which tells us of the existence and some of the properties of particular
73 86 85
knowledge > things with which we are <acquainted>."
“One of the great historic controversies in philosophy is the controversy
between the two schools called respectively “empiricists” and “rationalists” .
The first one holds that all our <knowledge> is derived from experience,
<a-priori
74 called <empirical knowledge>, the second instead maintains that, in addition 41 33
knowledge>
to what we know by experience, there are some “innate ideas” and “innate
principles”, which we know independently of experience, which are called
<a-priori knowledge>". We consider both kinds to exist.
<pure a-priori "Which gives us connexions between <universals>, and enables us to draw
75 86 86
knowledge> inferences from particular facts given in <empirical knowledge>.” This
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knowledge has no connections at all with experience.

"When anything is known immediately, as in case of <knowledge by
acquaintance>, its existence is known by experience alone; when anything is
<hypothetical proved to exist, without being known immediately, both experience and a-
76 42 35
knowledge> priori principles must be required in the proof. In this way we come upon ...
<hypothetical knowledge>, only giving connexions among things that exist
or may exist, but not giving actual existence."
In this region we also encounter a new ‘type of system’, i.e. those with two ‘actors’ were one of them is more
representative than the other, so to name the ‘system’ as well. These ‘systems’ are not distinguished by those with
two ‘actors’ and no name.
A1.11 Learning Process
To complete our journey, we make our tenth step in the existing, moving from the bottom middle to the left middle
of the picture.
Figure A11: Learning Process
Here we find the last piece left uncovered of <theory of knowledge>, that forms the core part of what allows us to
know <what happens>, by possibly transforming the <source of knowledge> in an increasing <knowledge>. The
pile of systems we found at step four, that seems to act as the alimenting process of <knowledge>, is indeed detailed
in each one of the five steps, with <actors> almost all listed by ‘BR’, despite he couldn’t know the tight progression
of the process, since ‘System Theory’ was not introduced yet at that time. The ordered pile of ‘no-named systems’ is
constituted by an amazing simple and symmetrical structure: four ‘regions’ contain two systems, so as to say that
show a dual alternative to the process, while the one at the top, three, to constitute what is a more refined outcome.
We have now encountered, to say, a new level of detail of the exploration of the existing, as the first one was <the
big picture>, with the ‘main systems’, and the second were all the previous ‘regions’ and ‘systems’, belonging to
the ‘main systems’. This, is belonging to a ‘region’. We proceed further to explore each ‘system’ in each of the
following subsections.
A1.11.1 What We Know
At the top of the systems we find <what we know>.

Figure A12: What We Know
This ‘system’ contains the three very things we can actually know, namely <true>, <false> and the <degree of
selfevidence>, where fall all those things that are neither <true> nor <false>. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
"Our act of believing is <true>, when the complex which is believed
corresponds to a certain associated complex, <false> when it does not. Thus,
to be true that [Desdemona loves Cassio], there must then be the complex
unit [Desdemona’s love for Cassio]. We all know that such a complex does
77 <true > 74 70
not exist, indeed, so that the act of believing is false. By observing that it is
clear that [Desdemona’s love for Cassio] is independent of [Othello], we may
say that a <mind>, which believes truly when there is a corresponding
<complex> not involving the <mind>, but only its <objects>."
"Our act of believing is <true>, when the complex which is believed
corresponds to a certain associated complex, <false> when it does not. Thus,
to be true that [Desdemona loves Cassio], there must then be the complex
unit [Desdemona’s love for Cassio]. We all know that such a complex does
78 <false> 74 71
not exist, indeed, so that the act of believing is false. By observing that it is
clear that [Desdemona’s love for Cassio] is independent of [Othello], we may
say that a <mind>, which believes truly when there is a corresponding
<complex> not involving the <mind>, but only its <objects>."
“With <judgement of memory>, we find back something that remind us of
<degree of self
79 <error>. In fact, going backward over the day, I find things of which I am 67 62
evidence>
quite certain, other things of which I am almost certain, other things of which
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I can become certain by thought and by calling up attendant circumstances,

and some things of which I am by no means certain. While I am quite certain
that [I ate my breakfast this morning], as to the [conversation at breakfast] I
can recall some of it easily, some with an effort, some only with a large
element of doubt, and some not at all. Thus there is a continual gradation in
what we call the <degree of selfevidence> of what I remember, and a
corresponding gradation in the trustworthiness of my <memory>. …
Therefore, <selfevidence> has degrees, it is not a quality which is simply
present or absent, but a quality which may be more or less present, in
gradations ranging from absolute certainty down to an almost imperceptible
faintness."
A1.11.2 By What Means
From the top of the pile of ‘systems’ we move down one step, where we find <by what means>.
Figure A13: By What Means
This ‘system’ contains the two different tools with which we get to know <what we know>. The first is
<selfevidence>, that is to say that “indisputable sense of <truth> that is evident to us”, as are <sense data> of our
table. The second are <relation maps>, that are the maps on which we apply <general principles> and that hold as
long as the <uniformity of nature> stays as it is, as for instance it is a car map, which is able to drive us from our
departure to a final destination were we have never gone before. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
The sense of “an indisputable sense of <truth> that is evident to us”, for
80 <self-evidence> instance the one given by <knowledge by acquaintance>, or by the use of 65 55
some <general principles>.
"We may say that a <truth> is <self-evident in strict sense>, when we have
<acquaintance with the <fact> which corresponds to the <truth>. We saw as
when [Othello judges that Desdemona loves Cassio], the corresponding
<fact>, if his belief were true, would be when [Desdemona’s love for
<self-evident in Cassio]. This would be a <fact> with which no one could have acquaintance
81 79 77
strict sense> except [Desdemona]; hence, in the sense of <selfevidence> that we are
considering, the truth that [Desdemona loves Cassio] could only be
<selfevident in strict sense> to [Desdemona]. We say that if some
<knowledge> is <self-evident in strict sense>, it is known with an absolute
guarantee of truth”.
“The <self-evidence of second sort> will be that which belongs to the so
called judgements in the first instance, and it is not derived from direct
perception of a <fact> as a single <complex> whole. This second kind of
<self-evidence> will have degrees, from the very highest degree of certainty
down to a bare inclination in favour of the belief. Take, for example, the case
of a [horse trotting away from us along a hard road]. At first, our certainty
that [we hear the hoofs] is complete, so it is <self-evident in strict sense>.
Gradually, if we listen intently, there comes a moment when we think
perhaps it was imagination or the blind upstairs or our own heartbeats, so that
now we have come to a <self-evident of second sort> knowledge; at last we
<self-evidence of become doubtful whether there was any noise at all; then we think we [no
82 80 79
second sort> longer hear anything], and at last we know [no longer hear anything] as a
<self-evident in strict sense> knowledge. In this process, there is a continual
gradation of <self-evidence>, from the highest degree to the least, not in the
<sense-data> themselves, but in the <judgements> based on them. Or again:
suppose we are [comparing two shades of colour, one blue and one green].
We can be quite sure they are different shades of colour; but if the [green
colour is gradually altered to be more and more like the blue], becoming first
a blue-green, than a greeny-blue, then blue, there will come a moment when
we know that we cannot see any difference. Thus <self-evidence of second
sort> is a matter of <degree>; and it seems plain that the higher degrees are
more to be trusted than the lower degrees."
The maps on which we apply <general principles> and that hold as long as
<uniformity of nature> stays as it is, as it is, for instance, a car map, which is
83 <relation maps> model
able to drive us from our departure to a final destination were we have never
gone before.
84 <spacetime "The easiest <relations> to apprehend are those which hold between the 58,59 47
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relations> different parts of a single complex sensedatum. For example, I can see at a
glance the whole of [this page on which I’m writing]; thus the whole page is
included in one sensedatum. But I perceive that some parts of the page are [to
the left] of other parts, and some parts are [above] other parts. These, we call
space relations. In like manner, I become aware of the relation of [before]
and [after] in time. Suppose I hear a [chime of bells]: when the last bell of the
chime sounds, I can retain the whole chime before my mind, and I can
perceive that the earliest bell came before the later ones. Also in memory I
perceive that what I am remembering came before the present time. These,
we call time relations.” Despite <relations> may refer to time or space, we
will call them <space-time relations>.
“Another relation with which we become acquainted in much the same way
is <resemblance and similarity>. If we see simultaneously [two shades of
<resemblance and
85 green], I can see that they resemble each other; if I also see [a shades of red] 59 48
similarity >
at the same time, I can see that the two greens have more resemblance to each
other than either has to the red.”
"<Resemblance and similarity> is also tied to another relation, namely
86 <grater than> 59 49
<grater than>.”
In this region we also encounter two new ‘type of system’, i.e. the one as <self elvidence>, with three ‘actors’, one
of which is also the name of the ‘system’, and the one as <relation maps>, where three ‘actors’ are listed other than
the name, but it is not excluded that there could well be some other, so that some free room is left in the ‘system’.
A1.11.3 How We Know
From the top of the pile of ‘systems’ we move down two steps, where we find <how we know>.
Figure A14: How We Know
This ‘system’ contains the two different ways we get to know <what we know> when using the two different tools
we found in the previous step, namely <immediate knowledge> and <derivative knowledge >. The ‘actors’ we then
find here are:
number number
It is the form of <knowledge> which is directly known to us without use of
<immediate
87 any other <knowledge> whatsoever, through the only intervention of 62 50
knowledge>
<channel>.
"Although we are doubting the physical existence of the [table], we are not
doubting the existence of the <sense data> which made us think there was a
[table]; we are not doubting that, while we look, a certain colour and shape
88 <instinctive belief> 7,11 8
appear to us, and while we press, a certain sensation of hardness is
experienced by us. ... We find this belief ready in ourselves as soon as we
begin to reflect: it is what may be called an <instinctive belief>"
<intuitive "Our immediate knowledge of truths may be called <intuitive knowledge>,
89 63 52
knowledge> and the truths so known may be called <self-evident truths>.”
It is the form of <knowledge> which is not directly known to us as it is
<derivative
90 <immediate knowledge>, to gain which we need to use some other 62 51
knowledge>
<knowledge>, e.g. some <knowledge of truth>.
A1.11.4 Why We Know
From the top of the pile of ‘systems’ we move down three steps, where we find <why we know>.
Figure A15: Why We Know
This system contains the two different reasons for which the two ways we use the two different tools we have really
work. The first is <selfevident truths>, the second is <act of judging>. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
91 <self-evident “Among these <self-evident truths> are included those which merely [state 63 53
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truths> what is given in sense], some [abstract logical and mathematical principles],
and, with less certainty, some [ethical propositions]."
<truth of
92 "<Self-evident truths> immediately derived from <sensations>.” 65 58
perception >
"Another class of intuitive judgements, analogous to those of sense and yet
quite distinct from them, are <judgements of memory>. ... If the house next
door was struck by lightning half a minute ago, my memory of what I saw
93 <truth of memory> and heard will be so reliable that it would be preposterous to doubt whether 66,67 61
there had been a flash at all. And the same applies to less vivid experiences,
so long as they are recent. I am absolutely certain that half a minute ago I
was sitting in the same chair in which I am sitting now."
"The <principle of induction> is constantly used in our reasoning, sometimes
consciously, sometimes unconsciously; but there is no reasoning which,
starting from some simpler self-evident principle, leads us to the principle of
<truth of general
94 induction as its conclusion. And the same holds for other logical principles. model 57
principles>
Their truth is evident to us, and we employ them in constructing
demonstrations; but they themselves, or at least some of them, are incapable
of demonstration."
"The <act of judgement> is the occurrence between certain terms at some
95 <act of judgement> particular time, therefore a <relation> that involves a <mind> which judges, 73 68
and the terms concerning which it judges."
<judgement of
96 "The judgements expressing <truth of perception>.” 65 59
perception>
<judgement of <Self-evident truths> immediately derived from <memory>, “as I am quite
97 66 60
memory> certain that [I ate my breakfast this morning]."
"What is useful in its own account not merely because it is useful for some
<desirability of
98 further end. We judge, for example, that [happiness] is more desirable than 42 37
things>
[misery], [knowledge] than [ignorance], [goodwill] than [hatred], and so on.”
A1.11.5 Learning Algoritm
From the top of the pile of ‘systems’ we move down four steps, where we find the bottom step, the <learning
algorithm>, that is directly alimented by the <source of knowledge>.
Figure A16: Learning Algorithm
This final ‘system’ contains the two different elements that very move <knowledge> through time. The first one
represents the <initial conditions> of the algorithm, that result to be composed by three ‘actors’: a <point of
activity>, the <knowledge of what it is>, and <knowledge of what may be>. The second is the <calcolo>,
composed again by three ‘actors’: the <body of individually probable opinion>, which constitutes our oracle, the
<criterion>, with which we inquiry the oracle, and the <risk of error>, the credibility we give to the various
answers. The ‘actors’ we then find here are:
number number
<knowledge of The actual state of <theory of truth> at that <point of activity>, that is to say
99 86 83
what it is > the present understanding of <what happens>
<knowledge of
100 Some <probable opinion> we are testing at that <point of activity> 86 84
what may be>
That which determines to what the <learning algorithm> is applied, and that
101 <point of activity> constitutes our attention in that moment, so to distinguish whether we apply model
our attention to the [table] or to the [the Emperor of China]
Our oracle. “It is actually by means of <bodies of individually probable
opinions> that many [scientific hypotheses acquire their probability]. They
fit into a <coherent> system of <probable opinions>, and thus they become
<body of
more probable than they would be in isolation. Also, this applies to such
102 individually 81 82
matters as the [distinction between dreams and waking life]. If [our dreams],
probable opinions>
night after night, were as <coherent one with another as our days, we should
hardly know whether to believe the dreams or the waking life. As it is, the
<test of coherence condemns the dreams and confirm the waking life.”
That with which we inquiry the oracle. For instance, “in regard to probable
opinion, we can derive great assistance from <coherence>, which is of course
103 <criterion> 81 81
not to be used as a definition of <truth>, but it may often be used as a
<criterion>.”
104 <risk of error> Since human beings are fallible, and knowledge limited, what we get to 88 87
- Page 51 of 71 -
know is known with a certain <degree of confidence>.

105 <initial conditions> model
106 <calcolo> model
- Page 52 of 71 -
A2 GLOSSARY
The terms that constitute the basic terminology we are using are identified within the text with ‘….’, and are briefly
summarised in alphabetical order in the following Table A1:
Table A1: Glossary
Term Description
'actor' the concept of ‘actors’ we are using mainly pertains to ‘Unified Modeling Language’, where by ‘actor’ we
mean all the terms that must be clear and definite when speaking about our existing and that identify what can
be believed to exist at the “bottom line” of our world; said in other words, that all that is exiting can be traced
back to one or more ‘actor’
'actor type' ‘actors’ are not all equal, since for instance they may be representing a precise element in itself, as it would be
the case for an ‘actor’ called [this contribution] or an infinite number, as would be the case for an ‘actor’
called [all contributions in the present subject]
'actors level' the main scheme as it is seen when considering only the ‘actors’
'approximate model' a model that is not the ‘optimal model’, but that is close to it
‘best model’ it is the model among all the models we can think of in a given ‘model set’ that best represents ‘the true
system’ according to a given ‘criterion’. It is also known as the ‘optimal model’
'BR' Bertrand Russell
'Bertrand Russell’s actors' <actors> mentioned by Bertrand Russell in ‘The Problems of Philosophy’ of 1912 (see note 4)
'calculus' for instance a differential equation or a stochastic process
'colour' different colours identify different ‘main systems’
‘criterion’ the way a model is judged to be a good description, or understanding, of the ‘true system’
'initial condition' depending on the initial condition, a calculus may have a solution rather than another
'main system' ‘systems’ may belong to other ‘systems’, so there are some that are at the highest level of hierarchy, and we
call them ‘main systems’. No other ‘system’ contains them, and they contain all the others
'model' abstract objects that describe a situation at hand by means of some formal language (e.g. mathematics,
probability theory, computer programs, bonding graphs, etc.)
'model actors' all encountered <actors>, with possibly some not mentioned by the considered source, in our case Bertrand
Russell’s ideas in “The Problems of Philosophy” of 1912, and added to give a more unity and completeness to
the obtained ‘model’
‘model elements’ the model is constituted by a series of precise elements and by a certain semantic
‘model set’ the set of models we are considering
'no named actors' ‘actors’ that are not named in the scheme, but we know that exist, as it is for instance “philosophy”, a ‘no
named actor’ which goes under the ‘actor’ <other arguments>
'region' the set of ‘actors’ and ‘systems’ encountered in a step of the main scheme exploration
'shapes' represent the different ‘systems’ and are chosen among the simplest geometrical shapes, as circles, squares and
triangles
‘source actor list’ all the terms identified by the considered source as what is existing
'suboptimal model' a model that is not the ‘optimal model’, so it is an ‘approximate model’, but that is optimal for some other
related ‘criterion’, for instance one that is only applied to a ‘model class’ simpler than the one considered
‘sufficient order case’ the case when in the ‘model class’ no ‘model’ can be found to exactly correspond to the ‘true system’
'system' a portion of reality under study, and identifies the situation at hand
'system class' a group of similar ‘type of systems’, as, for instance, the one with ‘systems’ containing only ‘actors’
'system identification a method to obtain ‘models’ on the basis of the observation of some variables that characterise the situation
algorithm' under study, in an automatic manner
'system list' the set of all the ‘systems’ in which ‘actors’ are grouped together
'system theory' the formal language to cope with reality (see note 1)
'system type' ‘systems’ are not all equal, since for instance they may contain only one ‘actor’ or ‘two’, and this fact is
distinguished by the ‘system type’
'systems level' the main scheme as it is seen when considering only the ‘systems’
‘true system’ the name given to the situation under studying, the final truth existing underlying our observation
- Page 53 of 71 -
A3 NOTES
1
<This picture>, despite not being listed among the ‘actors’, is indeed an ‘actor’ itself, so that is indicated among
<…>. In fact, we could not carry on any discussion at all without <this picture>, and this seems to be a good reason
to believe that it must exist. However, not to dedicate too much attention on it, it has been left apart from the others,
and it has been numbered as the number zero. That is why the last ‘actor’ encountered, <risk of error>, is the
number 104, while the whole picture is named “107 Actor World”.
2
S. Goudsmit, R. Claiborne, Time. Life Science Library of Time-Life Books, New York, 1966; D.Morris, The
Naked Ape. Morris and Cape, London. 1967.
- Page 54 of 71 -
other
arguments
region number 1
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
probable
opinion
logic
etichal values
spacetime
theory of
knowledge
outer
world we call it “the big picture”
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
outer sense
intuitive laws of
knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
beliefs sensible
qualities
mental things
inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
m e m o r y
consciousness
t r u t h o f
p e r c e p t i o n
perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
ourself channel
theory of outer
knowledge world
figure A1 - the big picture

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
outer sense
intuitive laws of
knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
beliefs sensible
qualities
mental things
inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
m e m o r y
consciousness
t r u t h o f
p e r c e p t i o n
perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions

algorihtm
point of
activity
world of
universals
object space
complex
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
principle of
source of
knowledge
induction
a-priori
sense data
uniformity
object
pure a-priori
logical
truth description
knowledge
general principle
outer sense
laws of
order thought
sensation ourself
our body
body
mental things
inner sense
self past data
consciousness
mind
mental
facts
psycological emotional
inference inference
figure A2 – inner world

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
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intuitive laws of
knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
beliefs sensible
qualities
mental things
inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
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past data
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p e r c e p t i o n
perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
other
arguments
mathematics geometry
arguments
logic spacetime
etichal values
figure A3 – near outer world

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
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sense data
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of second sort
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by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
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knowledge
facts common
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what
t r u t h o f
self
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past data
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t r u t h o f
p e r c e p t i o n
perception
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mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
knowledge error
what theory of
happens truth
probable
opinion
figure A4 – what happens

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
what
we know
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
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mind
induction
sense data
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of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
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in strict sense
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knowledge
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by what
we know instinctive
sensation our body
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introspection
inner sense
memory means
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
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perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
world of
existence
universals
appearance point of
how
we know
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
why
we know
learning
algorihtm
universals
world of
existence
word of
being particulars
source of
knowledge
knowledge of knowledge by
things acquaintance
knowledge of knowledge by
truth description
figure A5 – our knowledge

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
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sense data
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of second sort
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by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
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in strict sense
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qualities
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what
t r u t h o f
self
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perception
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mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
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intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
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knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
outer sense
sensation our body
mental things
inner sense
self past data
consciousness
mind
mental
facts
psycological logical emotional
figure A6 – inner ourself

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
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sense data
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of second sort
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by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
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in strict sense
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knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
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t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
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perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
object space
uniformity
complex
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
principle of
induction
object sense data
logical
general principle
outer sense
laws of
order thought
sensation our body
mental things
inner sense
self past data
consciousness
mind
mental
facts
psycological logical emotional
figure A7 – inner outer world

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
outer sense
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knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
beliefs sensible
qualities
mental things
inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
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consciousness
t r u t h o f
p e r c e p t i o n
perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
what may be
others’
what it is error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
mind
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
facts common
beliefs
sensible
qualities
private
space
public
space
figure A8 – far outer world

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
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in strict sense
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knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
beliefs sensible
qualities
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what
t r u t h o f
self
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past data
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consciousness
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perception
private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
public
error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
appearance point of
attraction
reality
life
coherence
uniformity
of nature
figure A9 – universe
other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
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sense data
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of second sort
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by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
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in strict sense
spacetime
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knowledge
facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
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qualities
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inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
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past data
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mind space
mental
criterion risk of
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error
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intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge

knowledge knowledge knowledge
a-priori
knowledge
pure a-priori
knowledge
figure A10 – far ourself

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
outer sense
intuitive laws of
knowledge
facts common

degree of
instinctive
beliefs sensible
mental things
qualities
true false
selfevidence
inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
m e m o r y
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t r u t h o f
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private
mind space
mental
criterion risk of
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error
learning
intial
calcolo
facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
existence
appearance point of
attraction
selfevidence
knowledge
word of
knowledge knowledge
reality
of second sort
source of
self
resemblance relation
knowledge
a-priori
evidence grater
and similarity maps
then
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge selfevidence spacetime
in strict sense relations
intuitive
knowledge
knowledge knowledge
instinctive
beliefs
selfevident act of judgement of

truth of truth of desirability
truth judging
general principles memory of things memory
truth of judgement of
perception perception

error
intial
conditions calcolo
point of
probable opinions
activity
figure A11 – learning process

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
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false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
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of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
grater
means
selfevidence
in strict sense
spacetime
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facts common
we know instinctive
sensation our body
beliefs sensible
qualities
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inner sense
what
t r u t h o f
self
t r u t h o f
t r u t h
past data
m e m o r y
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mind space
mental
criterion risk of
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error
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intial
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facts space
conditions
algorihtm
point of
activity
universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
what true
degree of
false
selfevidence
we know
figure A12 – what we know

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
selfevidence
false
complex others’
principle of
mind
induction
sense data
selfevidence
of second sort
object logical
by what
self
and similarity maps
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means
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in strict sense
spacetime
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we know instinctive
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what
t r u t h o f
self
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intial
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algorihtm
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universals
world of
knowledge knowledge
word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
selfevidence
of second sort
by what self
evidence resemblance relation grater
means and similarity maps then
selfevidence spacetime
in strict sense relations
figure A13 – by what means

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
truth arguments
logic spacetime
theory of outer
why true
degree of
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false
complex others’
principle of
mind
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self
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in strict sense
spacetime
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what
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algorihtm
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word of reality
source of
knowledge
a-priori
uniformity
pure a-priori
truth description
knowledge
intuitive
knowledge
how immediate derivative

knowledge knowledge
we know
instinctive
beliefs
figure A14 – how we know

other
arguments
ourself channel
what
happens theory of
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logic spacetime
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complex others’
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selfevident
why truth of truth
truth of desirability act of judgement of
judging
general principles memory of things memory
we know
truth of judgement of
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figure A15 – why we know

other
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figure A16 – learning algorithm

other
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a different view into the existing, stefano bigi, 2004
why true
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a 107 actor world

A Different View Into The Existing

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A Different View Into The Existing

this manuscript presents a different view into the existing

NOTE TO THE READER

philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to

it’s life and life only

One picture of each region is given from page 55 to 71, respectively

Actor World}, is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: A 107 Actor World

results as to support some evidence of the validity of the proposed approach.

4 A VIEW INTO THE EXISTING

willing to do as talking about three basic elements, as depicted in Figure 2.

Figure 2: Starting Point

Philosophical Problem” may be restated as follows:

The Philosophical Problem (Problem 0):

system’, and no ‘model’ can be found to exactly correspond to it.

the following two problems:

The First Model (Problem 1):

A Better Model (Problem 2);

1 at the previous step, and on a specific ‘system identification algorithm’.

out in practice to help us in finding a solution.

4.1 A First Model of the Existing

Here we present a possible solution to Problem 1, that is shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3: The First Model (a solution to Problem 1)

Table 1: A 5 Layer System Identification Algorithm

4.2 Is the Obtained Model Meaningful?

numerical properties in the underlying structure.

4.3 A Better Model of the Existing

Figure 4: A Better Model (a solution to Problem 2)

fact the natural continuation of the present work.

5 A 107 ACTOR WORLD

summarised in Table 2 in the Appendix.

5.1 Obtaining a First View into the Existing

scheme obtainable as M1.1.vn.

5.2 Model Exploration

5.3 The Big Picture

upper right corner of the picture, as illustrated in Figure 5.

Figure 5: The Big Picture

true system’ consists of four elements instead of two.

5.4 Regions of the Existing

Figure 6: Regions from 1 to 5

discovering all other regions is depicted.

Figure 7: Regions from 6 to 16

to know <what happens>, by possibly transforming the <source of knowledge> in an increasing

detailed description for that part of the ‘region’.

6 SOME NICE RESULTS

validity of the proposed methodology.

6.1 Few Simple Shapes With Linear Complexity

class’ they belong to.

Figure 8: Systems Complexity

class showing an increasing numerosity of ‘ system types’.

6.2 A Meaningful Space

for all the elements displayed,

nowhere else into the scheme,

6.3 A Glimpse into a Flux of Knowledge

Figure 9: 3x3 Quadrant Modularity

‘models’ represents, in fact, the natural continuation of the present work.

Table 2: Model Regions and Actors

regions actors encountered in each region BR’s reference

Table continues next page

Regions actors encountered in each region BR’s reference

Table 3: Basic Vocabulary

N.Wiener, A.Kolmogorov, L.vonBertalanffy, H.W.Bode, C.E.Shannon; (in the 1970’s) K.J.Astrom,