RULE 130 SECTION 33 CONFESSION tucked it in his waistline; he was served with a beer and after he and the
tucked it in his waistline; he was served with a beer and after he and the victim consumed about two bottles of beer, they went out to buy
1 People vs. Agustin 240 S 541 SUPRA part 12
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 89823 June 19, 1991
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information filed by the Asst. City Prosecutor of Caloocan City on 27 February 1989 with Branch 131 of the Regional Trial Court (Caloocan
City) of the National Capital Judicial Region, accused-appellant was charged for violation of Presidential Decree 1866, as amended, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 24th day of February 1989 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without any lawful motive or purpose, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control one .38 cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham with SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without authority of law, which
firearm was used with treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused death. 1
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15 March 1989.2 Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial court received the
evidence for the parties.
In a decision promulgated on 30 June 1989,3 the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the court finds the accused EUTROPIO TIOZON y ACID guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of P.D. 1866 and Murder qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Leonardo Bolima the sum of P30,000.00; to reimburse the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 as reasonable expenses for
the wake and burial expenses and to pay the costs.
According to the trial court, were it not for its abolition, "the death penalty, the sentence imposable under 2nd pa., Section 1 of P.D. 1866, as
amended", should have been imposed.
On 5 July 1989 Accused-appellant filed a motion to reconsider the decision 4 which, however, was denied by the court in its order of 16 August
1989.5 On 17 August accused-appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.6 Hence, the case is now before Us.
The facts as found by the court a quo are as follows:
That at around 11:00 o'clock in the evening of February 24, 1989, while she and her husband were sleeping inside their house, they were
awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her husband opened the door and they saw that the person who was knocking was their
"Pareng Troping", accused herein; her husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very drunk, to come inside their house; once inside
their house, accused sat down and the two (accused and victim) exchanged pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her
husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps away from the two,
however, when she looked back to the place where her husband and the accused was, she found out that the two had already left; five
minutes later and/or after she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused knocking at their door and at the same time informing
her that he accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya" she got scared by the appearance of
the accused who was full of bloodstains so she pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister-in-law Marilyn Bolima and
both of them proceeded to the house of the accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with his face up; she took her husband's pulse and
when she still felt some warmth on his body, she sought help that her husband be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by
helping them in carrying the victim towards the main road, however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down the victim;
accused reasoned out that the victim was already dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's help, they were able to reach
the main road; afterwhich, some of her neighbors arrived bringing with them lights; thereafter, Kalookan policemen arrived and so she
caused the arrest of the accused; she spent about P100,000.00 in connection with burial and wake of her husband.
Pat. Orlando Valencia of the Kalookan Police Force on the witness stand testified that on February 24, 1989 in line with his duty as
policemen, a shooting incident was reported to him; he responded to the said report by proceeding to the crime scene, thereat, he saw the
lifeless body of the victim as well as the accused whose clothing was full of bloodstains; the cadaver of the victim was referred to the
Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) while the person of the accused was turned over to the Homicide Section of the Kalookan
City Police Station; the day after, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and upon instruction of Pfc. Alilam he together with some Kalookan
policemen accompanied the accused in retrieving the firearm (Exh. "F") whom the accused threw at the grassy area particularly at the back
of the latter's house; aside from the firearm they also recovered two (2) spent bullets (Exh. G-6 and G-7) and three live ammunitions (Exh. G-
12, G-13 and G-14).
NBI Ballistician Ernie Magtibay testified that he has been a ballistician of the NBI since 1984; that pertinent to this case, he happened to
examine a caliber .38 Squires Bingham with serial number 180169 (Exh. "F"); that as per his findings the evidence shells (Exhs. G-6 and G-
7) were fired from the gun, subject matter of this case.
Forensic chemist from the NBI Edwin Purificando testified that the paraffin test he conducted on the dorsal aspect of the left and light hands,
that is, from the wristbones to the fingertips, of the deceased, gave negative result on the presence of nitrates (Exh. "I"). Likewise, the
paraffin test he conducted on the dorsal aspects of the left hand and right hand of the accused yielded negative results on the presence of
nitrates (Exh. "J").
On the other hand, the version of the defense as testified to by the accused is as follows:
That at about 11:30 in the evening of February 24, 1989 accused on his way home, after coming from his work, passed by the house of his
Pareng Nardo, the victim herein; while passing infront of the said house, his Pareng Nardo called him up; when he was about to enter the
door of the house of the victim, the latter, from the back of the door, poked a gun at him; he grabbed the gun from his Pareng Nardo and at
that instance, Rosalina Bolima emerging from her room, saw him holding the gun; he returned the gun to his Pareng Nardo and the latter
some more; after they were able to buy some more bottles of beer, victim carried the same and left ahead of the accused; accused was left
behind to answer the call of nature; while in the act of urinating, he heard two successive gunshots; he followed the victim and he saw the
latter already sprawled on the ground; he inquired from his Pareng Nardo as to what had happened to him, "Pareng Nardo, ano ang nangyari
sa iyo? and the victim's replied (sic) was "Pare, binaril ako", he further inquired as to who shot him but the victim who was gasping for breath
could no longer talk; thereafter, he saw a gun near the body of his Pareng Nardo; moved by his desire to bring the said gun to the wife of the
victim, he picked the same, but after he got hold of the gun, he suddenly realized that the policemen might see him holding it, so he threw
the very same gun to the grassy area; he then ran towards the house of the victim and he informed the wife of the latter that his Pareng
Nardo was shot to death; he returned to the place where he left the body of the victim but the body of the latter was no longer there; he later
found out that townspeople carried the body of the victim towards the main road; when the policemen arrived he was ordered to go with them
at the Kalookan Police Headquarters; when he was asked by the policemen as to who shoot (sic) the victim, his answer was, he did not see
the actual shooting incident; never did he declare nor utter before her Mareng Lina or before any police authorities that he accidentally shoot
(sic) the victim. However, he admitted that it was him who accompanied the policemen in retrieving the fatal gun at the grassy area at the
back of his house.
In holding the accused-appellant guilty as above-stated, the court a quo relied on circumstantial evidence because the prosecution failed to present
an eyewitness who could give an account as to the actual shooting incident. It considered the following circumstances which it deemed sufficient to
convict the accused-appellant pursuant to Rule 133, Section 5, of the Revised Rules of Court:
The following are among the circumstances which points to the culpability of the accused.
1) That the widow of the victim saw the accused holding a gun immediately before shooting incident happened;
2) That accused was the last person seen in the company of the victim immediately before the latter was shot to death;
3) That it was the accused who purposely went to the house of the victim on that fatal evening; The testimony of the accused that he
was merely passing in front of the house of the victim when the latter who was standing at the window of his house called him up is less
credible than the testimony of the widow of the victim, that they were already aslept (sic) inside their house when or the aforesaid time
accused knocked at their door.
4) That it was the accused who guided the policemen as to the place where the fatal gun was recovered. Here the Court believes that
the gun was purposely hid at the grassy area at the back portion of accused's house. The story of the accused that he picked the gun
for the purpose of bringing it to the widow of the victim but for fear that the policemen might see him holding the gun, he then decided to
throw it to the place where it was recovered, was too flimsy to merit belief. Firstly, what is his reason for bringing it to the widow of the
victim when he surely knew fully well that it will be the policemen who will investigate the case. Secondly, he knew for a fact, that the
said gun could lead as to the identity of the assailant of the victim, why then he threw it at the grassy area when he could easily leave
the same to the place where he picked it up.
5) The testimony of the wife that after hearing two successive gunshots, accused went back to her house and informed there (sic) that
he accidentally shot her husband deserves merit, Besides, the Court sees no reason for the wife to concoct such story that would point
to the accused as the culprit specially so that had not the accused became (sic) the prime suspect in this case, he would be the best
person to be used as a prosecution witness, with more reason that from the evidence presented, it appears that the widow of the victim
harbours no ill-feeling towards the accused otherwise, she would have prevented accused accused's entry in her house on that fatal
evening.
6) The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately after the shooting incident took place admitted to her having accidentally shoot
(sic) the victim is admissible evidence against the accused declarant since this is covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Part of the res gestae Statement made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior tor (sic)
subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstance thereof, may be given in evidence as a part of res gestae . . . (Sec. 36, Rule
130, Revised Rules of Court, as amended).
7) The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and that it is but (sic) the accused (sic) who owns the same and in fact
the latter even tucked it in his waistline immediately before the shooting incident happened is improbable, for, how come then that the
assailant was able to drew (sic) the gun from the waistline of the victim and fired (sic) the same towards the back portion of the victim's
body. Is it not that the natural reaction of a person was to face the person who suddenly and without permission drew something from
one's waistline. (sic)
While there is no eyewitness who testified to having seen accused shoot (sic) the victim, yet all the foregoing circumstances meet the criteria
set by Sec. 5, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, and therefore points (sic) to the accused as the person who unlawfully
owns the fatal gun as well as the same person who shoot (sic) to death the victim. "Circumstantial (sic) evidence is admissible in the
absence of an eyewitness to the commission of the crime" (People vs. Albofera, 152 SCRA 125 [1983]).
The Court does not give credence to the denial of the accused that he was not the one who shoot (sic) the victim as he was some distance
away from the victim answering the call of nature when the victim was killed. Instead, the Court gives credence to the testimony of the widow
that it was the accused whom he saw in possession of the gun, that it was the accused who was the last person seen in the company of the
victim shortly before the latter died and it was the same accused who lead (sic) the policemen in retrieving the fatal gun.
Admittedly, as per findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist, the accused's right and left hand yielded negative result to the test of nitrates.
However, the same witness testified that even when a person fired gun, it does not necessarily follows (sic) that his hand would be positive
to the test of nitrates, as there are still several factors which affects the presence or absence of nitrates in the hands of a person.
xxx xxx xxx
1
 Although the fact of death of the victim (Exh. "E") is undisputed, still the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and evident
premeditation being alleged in the Information, must be proven like the crime itself.
To properly appreciate evident premeditation it is necessary to establish with proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a
sufficient lapse of time to reflect upon the consequence of his act (People vs. Lorenzo, 132 SCRA 17 (1984); People vs. Obengue, 147
SCRA 1987). Although alleged in the Information, the record of this case is bereft of any indication that evident premeditation attended the
killing of the victim.
However, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is appreciated in this case since its presence could be established by the position/location
of the wound of the victim, that is at the back portion of his torso which necessarily imply that he was treacherously shot by his assailant. 7
Accused-appellant assigns only one error in this appeal:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF ILLEGAL POSSESSION WITH
MURDER AS DEFINED UNDER SECTION 1 OF P.D. 1866. THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCES RELIED UPON BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN ITS JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ARE INSUFFICIENT
TO PROVE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THE GUILT OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.8
and prays that the decision appealed from be reversed and another be entered acquitting him.
In support of the assigned error accused-appellant submits that:
(a) Contrary to the conclusion of the trial court, he was not the one holding the gun immediately before the shooting incident, for as admitted by the
victim's wife, her husband also "toyed or played with the gun; 9
(b) The testimony of the victim's wife that he was the last person seen in the company of the victim is unrealiable because she was left in the house
when the victim and accused-appellant went out to the store which is about 145 to 150 meters away;
(c) That the accused-appellant pointed the place where the gun allegedly used in the killing was recovered, should not create the unfavorable
inference that he purposely hid the gun and should not be taken against him, for knowing the reputation of police authorities, what he did was
dictated by the instinct of self-preservation rather than guilt;
(d) The testimony of the wife of the victim that after hearing two successive gunshots accused-appellant went back to her house and informed her
that he accidentally shot her husband, should not have been considered by the trial court as part of the res gestae; and
(e) The "raciocination" of the trial court regarding the improbability of the testimony of accused-appellant that he does not own the gun but that it
was the deceased who owned it which the latter tucked in his waistline before the shooting incident is baseless as the records show that the
deceased was walking ahead of the accused-appellant who was left behind to answer a call of nature; therefore, it is not highly improbable that
some other person whom the deceased might have met in the street could have taken the gun from the waistline and shot him with it. It would not
also be highly improbable that a person from whose waistline a gun was grabbed could not face his assailant especially when he is carrying
something with his both hands, like the deceased who was carrying one case of Gold Eagle beer when he was shot at. Moreover, accused-
appellant was found negative for nitrates when a paraffin test was conducted on him by a forensic chemist of the NBI. 10
The People, in its Brief filed by the Solicitor General on 18 April 1990, disagrees with the accused-appellant, maintains that the prosecution was
able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and prays that subject decision be affirmed in toto. It stresses that accused-appellant himself
admitted and confirmed that he and the victim went out together to buy some more bottles of beer; he was with the victim after they bought the
beer, and they separated only when he had the urge to urinate seconds before the incident. The widow did not testify that she saw what happened
in the street; what she testified was that the accused and the victim went out together and five minutes later she heard two shots. There was,
therefore, nothing improbable about her testimony.
Appellee likewise contends that the conclusion of the trial court on the hiding of the gun was based on the evidence on record; the accused himself
testified that he threw the gun on a grassy area. It further argues that the conclusion of the court on the improbability of appellant's testimony
concerning the ownership of the gun is not baseless; on the contrary, it is the theory of the appellant that it is probable that another person may
have grabbed the gun from the victim that is highly improbable. Since appellant was behind the victim he could have seen a third person grabbing
the gun. He did not testify that he saw one. The negative result of the paraffin test cannot be singled out to absolve the accused-appellant from
liability.11
No Reply-Brief was filed.
We are now called upon to determine whether, on the basis of the evidence adduced, the judgment appealed from should be affirmed or the
accused-appellant be acquitted.
We shall first focus our attention on the law under which accused-appellant is indicted.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 imposes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua "upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition." It goes further by providing that "if homicide or murder is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which increases the
penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous absurdity results whereby a
more serious crime defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The
rationale for the qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine
then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of Section 1 of P.D. No.
1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to
the other; or, stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the second,
homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
In People vs. Domiguez,12 We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act
may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or
element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the
other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no
obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other.13
In People vs. Bacolod, supra., from the act of firing a shot from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the people present and
physical injuries to one, informations for physical injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public disturbance were filed. Accused
pleaded guilty and was convicted in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense. A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of law
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offense the first against a person and the second against public peace and order one cannot be
pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy.
However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 because of the resulting crime of homicide or murder,
the prosecution must allege in the information and prove by the quantum of evidence required for conviction violation of said section and, more
specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the commission of homicide or murder. In this regard, the information in this case is sufficient in
form and substance. It alleges illegal possession of a firearm and of murder, The latter is covered by the clause "which firearm was used with
treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused his death.
We agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a quo that more than one circumstantial evidence were duly proved and that these
circumstances point, beyond reasonable doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot and killed the deceased Leonardo Bolima y Mesia.
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to convict an accused, it is necessary that the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) there must be
more than one circumstance, (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is
such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.14 Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial
evidence can be upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person, 15 i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each other,
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty.16
The first to the sixth circumstances mentioned by the trial court were duly established and constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellant, and no other else, shot and killed the victim. We do not, however, agree with the additional
observation of the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of the victim
immediately after the shooting incident that he accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule
in the instant case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness "can testify only to
those facts which he knows of or his own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perceptions. 17 Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as
to what he heard other persons say about the facts in dispute cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence. There are, however, exceptions
to this rule. One of them is statements as part of the res gestae under Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The exceptions
assume that the testimony offered is in fact hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence. Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be
deemed as part of the res gestae if they are made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. Statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it a legal significance
may also be received as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what the accused-appellant told her,
not what any other party, who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-appellant's statement was an "oral confession", not a part of res
gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true, which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107,116-117, We declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the accused to Natalia Macaraeg that "we
killed him" (referring to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated in her testimony in open court was merely an "oral confession" and
not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-appellant is hearsay, the latter is
barred from questioning its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time the testimony was given. The transcript of the stenographic
notes of the testimony of Rosalina Magat vda. de Bolima, wife of the victim, clearly shows the absence of an objection, thus:
Atty. Villano:
You said when you turned your back after taking a few steps and when you turned your back, they were no longer there, will you please tell what happened after
that?
A And that was when they left it was 11:30 and when he came back 11:35 he was already knocking (referring to the person of the accused) telling me while he
was knocking: "Mare, mare nabaril ko si pare, hindi ko sinasadya."
Q By the way Mrs. Witness, who is that "pare" you are telling us?
A Troping, sir (as the witness pointed to).
Q The same Troping here, is your "kumpare"?
A Yes, sir.
(TSN, April 18,1989, p. 13).
The seventh circumstance mentioned by the court below is haphazardly formulated. Something is wrong with the opening clause reading:
2
 The testimony of the accused that he does not own the gun and that it is but the accused who owns the same and in fact the latter
even tucked it.
The words but the accused should have been the deceased.
Two more basic issues are left for determination, to wit: whether the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is
liable for illegal possession of firearms and whether the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
as alleged in the information.
Our painstaking review of the records and the evidence fails to disclose that the prosecution presented any evidence to prove that the accused-
appellant was not authorized to possess the firearm alleged in the information. And, contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no sufficient
evidence to prove the presence of treachery.
It must be stated, however, that had illegal possession of firearms been duly proven as alleged, it would not have mattered whether the killing was
simple homicide or murder since Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 expressly provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
which penalty, however, had been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of the abolition of the death penalty.18
The issue concerning the failure of the prosecution to prove that he had no authority to possess the firearm has not been raised in this appeal.
Interestingly, accused-appellant raised it in his motion to reconsider the decision of the trial court. 19 In its resolution denying the motion, the trial
court admitted, in effect, that the prosecution did not offer any evidence to prove that the accused-appellant had no license to possess or carry the
firearm in question; it however, threw the burden on the accused-appellant to prove that he has that authority. Thus, it ruled:
Where accused relies as a matter of defense on an exception in a statute which is not in the enacting clause by which the offense is
described and forbidden, he has the burden of proving that he is within the exception.
Where the subject matter of a negative averment in the information, or a fact relied upon by defendant as a justification or excuse, relates to
him personally or otherwise lie peculiarly within his knowledge, the general rule is that the burden of proof of such averment or fact is on him
(16 C.J. sec. 998, p. 530). An illustrative case of this rule may be found in prosecution for exercising a trade or profession, or doing other
acts, without a license. In such cases, it would greatly inconvenience the prosecution to prove that the defendant had no license, whereas
the defendant could easily prove that he did have one.
In cases of illegal possession of firearms, the burden of proof as to the negative averments in the information to the effect that the accused
possesses the firearms without the corresponding license is on the defense. It is the accused who is called upon to prove that he possesses
the license. In other words, the fact relied upon by the accused as a justification or excuse being one that is related to him personally or
otherwise within his peculiar knowledge, "the general rule is that the burden of proof as to such averment or fact is on the accused"
(Francisco, Handbook on Evidence, pp. 379-380, 1984 Ed., citing cases). 20
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 reads:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended
to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part of
firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
xxx xxx xxx
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall carry any licensed firearm outside his residence without legal
authority therefor.
Undoubtedly, there is unlawful possession under the foregoing section if one does not have the license to possess the firearm. Even if he has the
license, he cannot carry the firearm outside his residence without legal authority therefor. It follows then that the lack or absence of a license is an
essential ingredient of the offense which the prosecution must allege and prove. Every element of the crime must be alleged and proved. 21
22
In People vs. Pajenado, L-27680-81, 27 February 1970, We said:
It is true that People vs. Lubo, 101 Phil. 179 and People vs. Ramos, 8 SCRA 758 could be invoked to support the view that it is incumbent
upon a person charged with illegal possession of a firearm to prove the issuance to him of a license to possess the firearm, but we are of the
considered opinion that under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provide that in criminal cases the burden of
proof as to the offense charged lies on the prosecution and that a negative fact alleged by the prosecution must be proven if "it is an
essential ingredient of the offense charged", the burden of proof was with the prosecution in to case to prove that the firearm used by
appellant in committing the offense charged was not properly licensed.
It cannot be denied that the lack or absence of a license is an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of a firearm. The
information filed against appellant in Criminal Case No. 3558 of the lower court (now G.R. No. 27681) specifically alleged that he had no
"license or permit to possess" the .45 caliber pistol mentioned therein. Thus it seems clear that it was the prosecution's duty not merely to
allege that negative fact but to prove it. This view is supported by similar adjudicated cases. In U.S. vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, the accused was
charged with "having criminally inscribed himself as a voter knowing that he had none of the qualifications required to be a voter. It was there
held that the negative fact of lack of qualification to be a voter was an essential element of the crime charged and should be proved by the
prosecution. In another case (People vs. Quebral, 68 Phil. 564) where the accused was charged with illegal practice of medicine because he
had diagnosed, treated and prescribed for certain diseases suffered by certain patients from whom he received monetary compensation,
without having previously obtained the proper certificate of registration from the Board of Medical Examiners, as provided in Section 770 of
the Administrative Code, this Court held that if the subject of the negative averment like, for instance, the act of voting without the
qualifications provided by law is an essential ingredient of the offense charged, the prosecution has the burden of proving the same,
although in view of the difficulty of proving a negative allegation, the prosecution, under such circumstance, need only establish a prima
facie case from the best evidence obtainable. In the case before Us, both appellant and the Solicitor General agree that there was not even
a prima facie case upon which to hold appellant guilty of the illegal possession of a firearm. Former Chief Justice Moran upholds this view as
follows:
The mere fact that the adverse party has the control of the better means of proof of the fact alleged, should not relieve the party
making the averment of the burden of proving it. This is so, because a party who alleges a fact must be assumed to have acquired
some knowledge thereof, otherwise he could not have alleged it. Familiar instance of this is the case of a person prosecuted for doing
an act or carrying on a business, such as, the sale of liquor without a license. How could the prosecution aver the want of a license if it
had acquired no knowledge of that fact? Accordingly, although proof of the existence or non-existence of such license can, with more
facility, be adduced by the defendant, it is nevertheless, incumbent upon the party alleging the want of the license to prove the
allegation. Naturally, as the subject matter of the averment is one which lies peculiarly within the control or knowledge of the
accused prima facie evidence thereof on the part of the prosecution shall suffice to cast the onus upon him. (6 Moran, Comments on
the Rules of Court, 1963 edition, p. 8).
There being no proof that accused-appellant had no license to possess the firearm in question, he could not be convicted for illegal possession of a
firearm. The trial court then committed an error in holding the accused-appellant guilty thereof. However, as above-stated, the accused-appellant
did not touch this issue in his Brief. Be that as it may, the rule is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and
this includes the review of the penalty, indemnity and the damages involved. 23
In People vs. Borbano, 76 Phil. 702, 708, We ruled:
. . . In a criminal case, an appeal to the Supreme Court throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the duty of the Court to
correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from, whether they are made the subjects of assignments of error or not.
(People vs. Ofindo, 47 Phil. 1).
Accordingly, it is proper for this Court to consider in favor of the accused-appellant the absence of proof of illegal possession of a firearm. But, may
accused-appellant be convicted for murder under the information for which he was tried? The answer is in the affirmative since, as We stated
earlier, the information sufficiently alleges the commission of murder; hence, a conviction for murder, if warranted by the facts, can be had under the
information.24 If murder is not proved by reason of the absence of any qualifying circumstance, conviction for the lesser crime of homicide is also
proper.25
We are also unable to agree with the trial court that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was duly established.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make, which
means that no opportunity was given to the latter to do so. 26 It cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as
conclusively as the killing itself.27 For, as held in U.S. vs. Perdon28 where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression was
made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it can in no way be established from mere suppositions, drawn
from circumstances prior to the very moment of the aggression, that an accused perpetrated the killing with treachery. 29 Accordingly, treachery
cannot be considered where the lone witness did not see the commencement of the assault. 30
In People vs. Manalo, supra, We ruled:
The fact that the fatal wounds were found at the back of the deceased does not, by itself, compel a finding of treachery. Such a finding must
be based on some positive proof and not merely an inference drawn more or less logically from hypothetical facts. This Court has ruled that
the suddenness of an attack is not, of itself, enough to constitute treachery when the method of the killing does not positively show that the
assailant thereby knowingly intended to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose without risk to himself from any defense which the victim
might put up. In other words, to sustain a finding of treachery, the means, method or form of attack must be shown to have been deliberately
adopted by the appellant. (citing People vs. Carsano, 95 SCRA 146; People vs. Cabiling, 74 SCRA 185; People vs. Satone, 74 SCRA 106;
People vs. Bongo, 55 SCRA 547).
In People vs. Ablao, 183 SCRA 65, 669, We said:
There being no direct evidence on how the shooting was committed, treachery cannot be appreciated.
In the instant case, no witness who could have seen how the deceased was shot was presented.1wphi1 Absent the quantum of evidence required
to prove it, treachery cannot be considered against the accused-appellant.
Accordingly, accused-appellant could only be liable for HOMICIDE, which is punished by RECLUSION TEMPORAL. It shall be imposed in its
medium period, whose duration is from 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months, since neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstances had been proved.31
The Indeterminate Sentence Law benefits the accused-appellant. Applying it in this case, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
of eight years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
The civil indemnity imposed by the trial court should be increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 conformably with our ruling in People vs. Sison,
G.R. No. 86455, 14 September 1990 and in People vs. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684, 18 September 1990.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered MODIFYING the subject decision of the trial court, and as Modified, FINDING the accused-appellant
EUTROPIO TIOZON Y ACID guilty beyond all reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, for the killing of Leonardo Bolima, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby SENTENCED to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from EIGHT YEARS AND ONE DAY of prision mayor, as Minimum, to FOURTEEN YEARS, EIGHT
MONTHS AND ONE DAY of reclusion temporal as Maximum, with the accessory penalties therefor, to INDEMNIFY the heirs of Leonardo Bolima in
3
the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to REIMBURSE said heirs in the the amount of P180.00, Philippine Currency, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said Rolando Abellana y Fabroa and in such
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as reasonable expenses for the wake and burial of Leonardo Bolima. amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.
Accused-appellant shall be given full credit for the period of his preventive imprisonment.
Costs against accused-appellant. SO ORDERED. CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 2)

Upon arraignment, accused-appellant and Ernesto Parola entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter trial on the merits ensued.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOVITO TUJON y TAPEL, ERNESTO PAROLA y CORTINA, AND CESAR PAREDES @ There is no eyewitness for the prosecution. To establish the case against the accused, the prosecution relied mainly on the extra-judicial
Cesar (at large), accused JOVITO TUJON y TAPEL, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 66034 November 13, 1992 confessions of the former taken down by Det. Armando Estrada.

BIDIN, J.: The extra-judicial confession of Ernesto Parola y Cortina (Exhibit "A" Original Records) reads:

This is an appeal interposed by the accused-appellant Jovito Tujon from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial MALAYA AT KUSANG LOOB NA SALAYSAY NI ERNESTO PAROLA Y CORTINA NA KINUHA NI DET. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA DITO SA
District, Quezon City, Branch XVII, in Criminal Case No. Q-8808 finding him and Ernesto Parola guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION, STATION 1, NPD, MPF NGAYON ALAS 10:15 NG UMAGA, 23 NG NOVEMBER, 1977 SA HARAP
defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and sentencing them to suffer the penalty NG MGA SAKSI . . . .
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law.

xxx xxx xxx

The dispositive of the said decision reads:

01 Tanong: Bago kita siyasatin ay gusto kong malaman mo ang inyong mga karapatan at gusto kong malaman mo na ikaw ay
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding Jovito Tujon and Ernesto Parola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of sinisiyasat sa salang pagpatay ng tao na may kasamang pagnanakaw. Gusto kong maunawaan mo na ang inyong mga
Robbery with Homicide, described and penalized under Article 294, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended. There being no karapatan ay ang mga sumusunod:
modifying circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the said accused are sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, to pay jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Rolando Abellana the amounts of P18,000.00
representing indemnification for death and P180.00 representing the money stolen, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency 1. Na ikaw ay may karapatan manatiling tahimik sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
and to pay the proportionate cost.

2. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng inyong sariling abogado para tulungan ka sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
IT IS ORDERED. (Rollo., p. 9)

3. Na ikaw ay may karapatang pagkalooban ng abogado kung ikaw ay walang ikakayang kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado.
The aforesaid judgment as to accused Ernesto Parola has not yet been promulgated by the court a quo since the said accused escaped after
arraignment and has not been re-arrested to date. Accused Cesar Paredes, on the other hand, remains at large and does not appear to have been
arraigned before the trial court. 4. Na ang lahat ng sasabihin mo rito ay maaring gamitin laban o panig sa yo sa alin mang hukuman sa Pilipinas. Naunawaan
mo ba ang iyong mga karapatan at handa ka pa rin bang magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay na hindi ka
tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya?
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

SAGOT: Opo. (SGD) ERNESTO PAROL Y CORTINA

On November 3, 1977, the dead body of Rolando Abellana, a taxi driver, was found at Doa Faustina Village, Quezon City, with stab wounds. Dr.
Rolando Madrid, Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, conducted an autopsy on the corpse and found that the cause of death is hemorrhage, acute,
profuse, secondary to multiple stab wounds on the chest and neck. 02 T: Ikaw ba ay marunong bumasa at umintindi ng wikang tagalog?

On November 23, 1977, accused Jovito Tujon and Ernesto Parola were arrested by the police and turned over to the Criminal Investigation S: Opo.
Division, Quezon City Police Department, where they allegedly confessed to the commission of the crime.

03 T: Ano ang pinakamataas na naabot mo sa iyong pagaaral?

On December 1, 1977, an information was filed by Assistant Fiscal Jesus T. Baldonado before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Seventh Judicial
District, Quezon City, charging the accused of robbery with homicide having been committed as follows:
S: Grade six lang po.

That on or about the 3rd day of November, 1977 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, with intent of gain, by the use of 04 T: Ano ang inyong pangalan at iba pang bagay na may kinalaman sa iyoong pagkatao?
violence and intimidation, conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping one another, with co-accused, ANTONIO MENA Y
BALDESIMO, a minor who is also charged with the same offense in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Quezon City, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one ROLANDO ABELLANA Y FABROA, a taxi driver of EH taxi in the following manner, to wit: on S: ERNESTO PAROLA Y CORTINA, 18 na taong gulang, binata, pahinante sa PIER 8, tubo sa Macrohon, Southern Leyte at naninirahan sa No. 3377 Mithi
the date and in the place aforementioned, said accused pursuant to their conspiracy boarded the taxicab and thereafter, the above-named St., Tondo, Manila.
accused, armed with a (sic) knives and pointed their knives to the said victim, who struggled and in the course of struggle was stabbed at the
chest and neck, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death; that
after the said attack upon said Rolando Abellano y Fabroa, said accused, did then and there take, rob and carry away his day's earning in 05 T: Ano ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?

4
S: Dahil sa hinuli po kami ng mga pulis na hindi ko kilala na sila raw taga YOUTH AID BUREAU at kami po ay ibinigay dito sa Criminal Investigation Division, S: Ako po ang humawak sa kamay niya at pagkatapos po ay sinaksak ko rin siya
Station 1, NPD, MPF dahil sa salang pagpapatay at pagholdup.

16 T: Ano naman ang partisipasyon noong mga kasama mo?

06 T: Kailan ba kayo nahuli ng mga pulis?

S: Si CESAR PAREDES ang humawak sa ulo at pagkatapos ay sinaksak niya, si JUNIOR ay sumaksak din, si JOVITO TUJON ay sumaksak din, at si
S: Noon pong mga alas 3:00 ng hapon, Linggo, 20 ng November, 1977 doon po sa Mithi St., Tondo, Manila. ANTONIO MENA ay sumaksak din.

07 T: Ipinapakita ko sa iyo ang isang litrato, ano ang masasabi mo sa taong ito at natandaan mo ba ang taong ito? (Affiant being shown the picture of one 17 T: Ano ang ginamit mo sa pagsaksak doon sa taxi driver?
ROLANDO ABELLANA Y FABROA, 27 years old, married, EH TAXI driver, native of Davao Del Sur and residing at No. 188 Sauyo Road, Novaliches, Quezon
city who was killed after having been held up and the body of which (sic) was dumped at Tandang Sora, Quezon City.
S: Isang kutsilyong stainless at ang aking mga kasama ay balisong at ice pick ang kanilang ginamit.

S: Opo. Nakilala ko po yan. Yan po ang taong hinoldup namin at aming pinatay at pagkatapos po ay itinapon namin doon sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City
subalit hindi ko po matiyak and exaktong lugar. 18 T: Nasaan ngayon ang kutsilyong pinangsaksak mo?

08 T: Kailan at saan ninyo hinoldup itong taong ito? S: Naki JUNIOR po at ang lahat ng kutsilyong ginamit namin ay sa kanya.

S: Hindi ko po matandaan kung kailan subalit natatandaan ko po na sa unang linggo ng November, 1977 doon po sa Moriones, Tondo, Manila subalit dinala 19 T: Nasaan naman ang mga kasama mong binanggit mo?
namin siya sa Balintawak, Quezon City doon po sa may highway na hindi ko masyadong matiyak ang lugar at doon namin siya sinaksak at kinunan ng pera at
nang siya ay patay na ay isinakay namin uli sa taxi at dinala namin sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City at doon namin itinapon.

S: Ang dalawa na sina JOVITA TUJON at si ANTONIO MENA ay kasama kong nahuli subalit sila CESAR at si JUNIOR ay nakatakas at sila ngayon ay
nagtatago.
09 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang pagkatao ng taong yan sa sinasabi mong pinatay ninyo at itinapon sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City?

20 T: Maari bang ilarawan mo yong taxi driver na pinatay niyo matapos niyong kunin ang kanyang kita at itinapon niyo sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City?
S: Siya po ay driver ng TAXI na hindi ko natatandaan ang pangalan na ang kulay po ng taxi ay kulay pula na may guhit na dilaw sa katawan.

S: Siya po ay mahabang buhok, katamtamang lang ang katawan, mga 27 na taong gulang, may kaunting biguti, kayumanggi ang kulay.
10 T: Maari bang isalaysay mo sa akin kung papano ninyo hinoldup ang taong yan?

21 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ilan nang tao ang pinapatay niyo dahil sa holdup?
S: Noon pong mga alas 10:00 ng gabi, linggo, 20 November, 1977 pinara po namin ang taxing minamaneho nitong taong ito (affiant referring to the picture of
ROLANDO ABELLANA) at kami ay sumakay at pagkatapos ay dinala namin sa Balintawak, Quezon City. Pagdating po namin doon ay pinahinto po namin ang
taxi at pagkatapos ay kinuha namin ang kanyang pera at pagkatapos ay nakatakbo. Nang tumakbo siya ay hinabul namin at nang inabutan namin ay sinaksak
namin. Nang siya ay patay na ay isinakay namin uli sa taxi at pagkatapos ay tinapon namin doon sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City. Pakatapos naming itapon ay S: Isa lang ang napatay na kasama po ako.
dinala namin ang taxi at ang nagmaneho ng taxi ay si CESAR PAREDES na nakatira sa Mithi St., Tondo, Manila. Pagkatapos po ay ipinagbili po nila ang
metro ng taxi. Hindi ko po alam kung magkano nila ibinenta at kung saan nila ibinenta sapagkat hindi na po ako kasama noon, pero binigyan po ako ng
P20.00. Ako po noon ay nagpaiwan na dito sa may Blumentrit, (palengke) at sila ay dala pa rin nila ang taxi. 22 T: Alin yong napatay niyo na kasama ka?

11 T: Hindi mo ba alam kung saan nila dinala yong taxi? S: Yong pong itinapon namin sa Tandang Sora, Quezon City.

S: Hindi ko po alam, sir. 23 T: Bakit niyo pinatay ang taong ito?

12 T: Magkano naman ang nakuha niyong pera doon sa driver na pinatay niyo? S: Sapagkat sinabi po ni CESAR at saka ni JUNIOR na patayin daw namin kaya po namin pinatay.

S: Ang sabi po ni CESAR PAREDES at saka si JUNIOR ay P180.00. 24 T: Ilang beses ka nakasama sa panghoholdup?

13 T: Magkano naman ang ibinigay sa yo bilang parte mo doon sa perang naholdup niyo? S: Apat na beses na po ako nakasama sa kanila. Dalawang jeep at saka dalawang taxi. Nakalimutan ko na po ang pangalan nang mga taxi.

S: Binigyan po kami ng P20.00. Ang sabi po ni CESAR at saka ni JUNIOR ay tama na raw ang parte naming P20.00. 25 T: Sabihin mo kung saan at kung kailan niyo hinoldup ang binanggit mo?

14 T: Sino-sino ba ang mga kasama mo sa pagholdup dito sa taxi driver na ito? S: Yon pong dalawang jeep ay doon sa Novaliches, Quezon City at yong isang taxi ay sa Balintawak, Quezon City at yong isa ay sa Novaliches, Quezon City.

S: Sina CESAR PAREDES na nakatira sa Mithi St., Tondo, Manila, si JUNIOR na taga Mithi din, si JOVITO TUJON na taga Mithi St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila 26 T: Ilan bang grupo ang sinasamahan mo?
at saka si ANTONIO MENA na taga Mithi St. din at saka ako.

S: Ang sinasamahan ko lang ay ang grupo ni CESAR at saka ni JUNIOR.

15 T: Ano ang partisipasyon mo sa pagpatay doon sa taxi driver (ROLANDO ABELLANA)?

5
27 T: Maliban sa pagholdup ng taxi ay umakyat din ba kayo ng bahay para magnakaw? Statement taken by:
Det. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA
Investigator, H & A Sec.
S: Opo. Umaakyat din po kami ng bahay para magnakaw.

MGA SAKSI SA PAGLAGDA:

28 T: Ilang beses na kayo umakyat sa bahay?

1. (SGD) 2. (SGD)
Det. Enrico Larga Augusto Perlada
S: Dalawang beses po yong nasamahan ko sa kanila na umakyat kami ng bahay.

29 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung saan bahay yong inakyat ninyo? On the other hand, the extra-judicial confession of appellant Jovito Tujon y Tapel, likewise taken by Det. Armando B. Estrada on November 23,
1977 (Exhibit "B", Original Records), reads:

S: Hindi ko po alam sabihin ang lugar subalit alam ko po kung pupuntahan ko.
MALAYA AT KUSANG LOOB NA SALAYSAY NI JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL NA KINUHA NI DET. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA DITO SA CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DIVISION, STATION 1, NPD, MPF NGAYONG ALAS 1:45 NG HAPON, 23 NG NOVEMBER, 1977 SA HARAP NG MGA SAKSI
30 T: Ano-ano ang mga bagay na nakuha niyo nang kayo'y umakyat sa bahay?

xxx xxx xxx

S: Ang nakuha po namin ay PHONO, RADIO, SAPATOS, DAMIT, CALDERO, KALAN NA BUMBA.

01. Tanong: Bago kita tanongin ay gusto kong malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng ating bagong saligang batas na ikaw ay:
31 T: Saan ninyo ibinebenta ang mga ninakaw niyo?

S: Ibinebenta namin doon din sa Mithi St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila.

1. May karapatang manatiling tahimik sa pagsisiyasat na ito.

32 T: Magkano ninyo ibinenta yong PHONO at saka yong RADIO? 2. May karapatang kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado para tulungan ka sa pagsisiyasat na ito.

S: Yon pong PHONO ay P150.00 at yong radio ay P125.00. 3. May karapatang pagkalooban ng abogado kung ikaw ay walang ikakayang kumuha ng iyong sariling abogado.

33 T: Yong bang grupo ninyo nina CESAR, JUNIOR, JOVITO, at si ANTONIO ay mayroon bang baril? 4. Ang lahat ng sasabihin mo rito ay maaaring gamitin laban o panig sa yo sa alin mang hukuman sa Pilipinas.

S: Si CESAR po ay may baril na .22 caliber. Si JUNIOR ay Parolee. Gusto ko ring malaman mong ikaw ay sinisiyasat sa kasong pagpatay ng tao na may kasamang pagnananakaw. Ikaw ba ay handa pa ring
magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay na hindi ka tinakot, sinaktan o pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya o kaluwagan sa
katawan?
34 T: Yong mga metro ng taxi na kinuha ninyo, saan ninyo ibinibenta?

Sagot: Opo. (SGD) JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL

S: Hindi ko po alam kung saan nila ibinibenta. Ang nakakaalam ay si CESAR, si JUNIOR at si JOVITO.

35 T: Wala na akong itatanong sayo, mayroon ka bang nais bawasin o idagdag sa salaysay mong ito? 02 T: Ikaw ba ay marunong bumasa at umintindi ng wikang tagalog?

S: Wala na po. S: Opo.

36 T: Lalagdaan mo ba ang salaysay mong ito bilang patunay na ang mga sinabi mo rito ay pawang katotohanan? 03 T: Ano ang pinakamataas na inabot mo sa iyong pag-aaral?

S: Opo. S: Grade six lang po.

37 T: Ang paglagda mong ito ay hindi kita tinakot, sinaktan at pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya o kaluwagan sa buhay?
04 T: Ano ang iyong pangalan at iba pang bagay na may kinalaman sa iyong pagkatao?

S: Opo.
S: JOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL, 22 na taong gulang, binata, trabahador, tubo sa Ogbong Biga, Catanduanes at naninirahan sa No. ____ Mithi
St., Moriones, Tondo, Manila.
(SGD) ERNESTO PAROLA
Y CORTINA
Nagsalaysay 05 T: Ano ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?

6
S: Dahil po sa pagpatay doon po sa taxi driver na hindi ko po nakikilala. S: P30.00 po ang ibinigay sa akin ni CESAR.

06 T: Nalalaman mo ba kung anong taxi ang minamaneho noong taong pinatay niyo? 15 T: Maari bang ilarawan mo sa akin ang itsura noon taong taxi driver na hinoldup ninyo?

S: Hindi ko na natandaan yong pangalan ng taxi subalit ang natatandaan ko po ay kulay blue at mayroon pang ibang kulay na hindi ko po S: Ang edad po noong driver ay mga 27 o 28 na taong gulang, mga 5'1" and taas, payat po, kayumanggi po may biguti, hindi po masyadong
natandaan. mahaba ang buhok, medyo maliit ang mukha na mabuto at kung makikita ko ang litrato po niya ay makikilala ko po.

07 T: Kailan at saan niyo pinatay ang driver ng taxi na yan? 16 T: Ipinapakita ko sayo ngayon ang isang litrato, natatandaan mo ba kung naririto yong taxi driver na hinoldup ninyo?

S: Hindi ko po natandaan ang petsa pero unang linggo ng November, 1977 doon po sa pagpuntang Sta. Maria, Bulacan at nang patay na ay S: Ito po yong taong hinoldup po namin at aming pinatay doon po sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan. (Affiant pointing to the picture of the one
dinala po namin doon po sa may Tandang Sora, Novaliches, Quezon City. ROLANDO ABELLANA Y FABROA, an EH TAXI driver who was discovered lifeless along Charles Conrad St. near Alan Beam St., Doa
Faustina Subdivision, Bo. Culiat, Tandang Sora, Quezon City as he was shown by this investigator).

08 T: Papano niyo pinatay ang taxi driver na ito?

17 T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang suot noong driver na pinatay niyo doon sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan?

S: Sinaksak po namin.
S: Hindi ko na po natandaan ang kulay ng kanyang pantalon subalit natandaan ko po na ang kanyang polo shirt ay kulay abo (gray).

09 T: Anong uri ng patalim ang ginamit niyo sa pagsaksak sa kanya?

18 T: Isa-isahin mo nga kung sino-sino yong mga kasama mo doon sa holdup at pagpatay doon sa taxi driver na yon?

S: Kutsilyo po na pangkusina na stainless na may ganito kahaba po. (Affiant demonstrating a length of about 8- inch) Yong mga kasama
ko po ay talagang dagger at yong iba naman po ice pick. S: Si CESAR PAREDES, si JUNIOR, ERNESTO PAROLA (NESTOR-alias), at si ANTONIO MENA na lahat ay taga Mithi St., Moriones,
Tondo, Manila (Squatter's Area).

10 T: Ilang beses mo sinaksak ang taong ito?

19 T: Ano-ano ang mga armas na dala ninyo noon nang hinoldup ninyo itong taxi driver na ito?

S: Dalawa po.
S: Ang may baril po ay si CESAR (.45 caliber), si JUNIOR ay may .22 caliber revolver, at lahat na kami ay puro kutsilyo na. Pero maliban
doon sa baril ni CESAR at ni JUNIOR ay mayroon pa po silang panaksak.
11 T: Mayroon ka bang nalalamang dahilan kung bakit niyo sinaksak ang taong ito?

20 T: Nasaan ngayon yong mga panaksak na ginamit niyo sa pagpatay doon sa taxi driver?
S: Hinoldup po namin pagkatapos po ay pinatay po namin.

S: Dala po ni JUNIOR at saka si CESAR pati yong baril po ay nasa kanila.

12 T: Magkano namang pera ang nakuha ninyo sa kanya?

21 T: Ilang beses ka na pumatay ng tao?

S: P180.00 na perang cash ang nakuha namin sa kanya.

S: Dalawa na po na kasama po ako.

13 T: Maari bang isalaysay mo sa akin kung papano ninyo hinoldup at pinatay yung tao na taxi driver?

22 T: iwanagin mo nga kung saang lugar at kung kailan?

S: Noon pong mga alas 9:00 ng gabi, hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa subalit natatandaan ko po na unang linggo ng November, 1977
kami po ay sumakay sa taxi na hindi ko po matandaan ang pangalan at pagkatapos po ay dinala po namin siya sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
Pagdating po namin doon ay tinutukan po namin ng kutsilyo at tinutukan namin ni CESAR ng baril at pagkatapos ay ibinalik namin doon sa S: Ang una po ay October, 1977, hindi ko na po matandaan ang petsa pero pinatay po namin doon sa Novaliches, Quezon City at iniwan
may tulay doon din sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan at pagkatapos po ay pinahinto po namin doon sa may tulay at pagkatapos po ay kinuha namin lang po namin doon. Yong pangalawa po ay yong taxi driver po na hinoldup po namin ay pinatay namin sa Sta. Maria, Bulacan.
ang kanyang pera. Pagkatapos po niyang iyabot yong pera ay parang natakot yong driver at biglang tumakbo at pagkatapos po ay hinabul
namin. Ngayon po ay inabutan ng aking mga kasama at pagkatapos po ay ibinalik po namin doon sa may taxi at pagkatapos po ay nagtaas
ng kamay yong driver at pagkatapos po ay sinaksak na ni CESAR. Pagkatapos po ay sinaksak ni NESTOR (Real name is ERNESTO 23 T: Sigurado ka bang patay din yong unang sinaksak niyong iniwan ninyo sa Novaliches, Quezon City?
PAROLA). Pagkatapos po ay itinulak po ni CESAR sa akin at sinabing saksakin mo rin kaya ko po sinaksak din. Pagkatapos po ay
naghihingalo na po yong driver ay isinakay po namin siya sa taxi niya at pagkatapos po ay dinala namin doon sa may Tandang Sora,
Novaliches, Quezon City at doon namin itinapon. Ang lugar na pinag tapunan po namin ay canal. Pagkatapos po noon ay sumakay na S: Hindi po namin alam kung namatay yon o hindi.
naman po kami doon sa kanyang taxi at kami po ay nagtuloy sa may MORIONES, Tondo, Manila. Kami po ni ANTONIO MENA at si
ERNESTO PAROLA ay nagpaiwan na po doon sa Moriones, Tondo, Manila. Kami pong tatlo ay umuwi na subalit sina CESAR at si JUNIOR
ay dinala nila yong taxi at hindi ko po alam kung saan nila dinala yong taxi. 24 T: Maari bang ilarawan mo sa akin kung ano ang isura ni CESAR at saka si JUNIOR?

14 T: Magkano naman ang parte mo doon sa perang hinoldup ninyo doon sa taxi driver?

7
S: Siya po ay mga 19 na taong gulang, mga 5'3" ang taas, malaki ang katawan, maputi, hindi masyadong mahaba ang buhok, medyo bilog
ang mukha at matangos ang ilong, medyo guapo, ang buhok ay may hati sa kanan, medyo kuba kung lumakad, mayroong kaunting biguti at
ang hinlalaki ng kaliwang paa ay parang pataas. Si CESAR ay may tatlong SPUTNIK sa kanang likod. Si JUNIOR naman ay mga 25 taong
gulang, mga 5'1" ang taas, medyo maliit ang katawan, maputi, maiksi po ang buhok dahil sa siya ay nagpakalbo, may pagkaguapo na
medyo matangos ang kanyang ilong, may manipis na biguti, may tattoo sa tiyan.
25 T: Maliban sa pangholdup, kayo ba ay umaakyat din ng bahay?
S: Opo. Umaakyat din po kami ng bahay doon po sa Novaliches, Quezon City.
26 T: Ilang beses na kayo umakyat ng bahay?
S: Sa Novaliches ay dalawang beses na po umakyat ng bahay at diyan lang po kami umakyat ng bahay.
27 T: Ano-anong mga bagay ang mga nakuha ninyo nang kayo umakyat ng bahay?
S: Isang RADIO PHONO, pantalon, damit, kalan na di bumba, gitara. Ito ay isang bahay lang sa Novaliches, Quezon City. Doon sa isang
bahay ay mayroon po kaming kinuhang pantalon, damit, television (dalawa) kaserola, alak, Shellane na kalan, caldero, wala na po.
28 T: Ilang lahat ang bahay na inakyat ninyo?
S: Lima pong bahay. Hindi ko po alam ang address subalit alam po naming puntahan.
29 T: Saan ninyo ibinibenta ang mga ninanakaw ninyo?
S: Doon po sa Mithi St., Moriones, St., Tondo, Manila. Yong television ay ibenenta namin sa Pasay City sa Tia ni Cesar. Naibenta po namin
ng P400.00.
30 T: Magkano ang parte mo rito sa lahat ng nanakaw ninyong ito?
S: P400:00 ang parte ko po.
31 T: Ang mga metro ng taxi na ninanakaw niyo, saan niyo ibinibenta?
S: Sa Moriones po namin ibinibenta yong iba at yong iba naman ay sa Marikina. Ang kasama po naming nagbenta ay si JUNIOR.
32 T: Ilang metro na ang naibenta niyo?
S: Mga walong (8) metro na po. Tatlo (3) ang naibenta sa Marikina at lima naman sa Moriones.
33 T: Ilang taxi at ilang jeep ang inyong naholup?
S: Dalawang jeep at tatlong taxi ang tinutukan namin.
34 T: Saang lugar ninyo ninakaw ang mga taxi meter na ito?
S: Sa PIER 12 ay dalawa, sa Pier 10, tatlo, sa Moriones tatlo po.
35 T: Saan natin makukuha itong si CESAR at saka si JUNIOR?
S: Si JUNIOR ay maaring sa PIER 8 si CESAR ay hindi ko po alam.
36 T: Pansamantala ay wala na akong itanong sayo, mayroon ka bang nais bawasin o idagdag sa salaysay mong ito?
S: Wala na po.
37 T: Lalagdaan mo ba ang salaysay mong ito bilang patunay na ang mga sinabi mo rito ay pawang katotohanan na hindi ka tinakot,
sinaktan o pinangakuan ng ano mang pabuya o kaluwagan sa katawan?
S: Opo.
STATEMENT TAKEN BY:
DET. ARMANDO B. ESTRADA
NILAGDAAN SA HARAP NG MGA SAKSI:
1. (SGD) 2. (SGD)
Det. Enrico Larga Cpl. Augusto Perlata
(SGD) SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS 30 DAY OF NOV. 1977 HERE IN QUEZON CITY,
PHILIPPINES.
In addition, the prosecution presented the following witness, whose testimonies are as follows:
Det. Armando B. Estrada, a police detective of the Northern Police District, Criminal Investigation Division, Station I, Quezon City, identified the
extra-judicial confessions and testified that he was the officer who received custody of the accused from the members of the Youth Aid Bureau for
investigation on November 23, 1977 (TSN, June 21, 1978, p. 1-2), and declared that before he took the extra-judicial confessions of the accused-
appellants, he advised them of their constitutional rights to remain silent, to secure the services of a counsel to assist them and if they can not
afford to secure the services of counsel, they will be provided with one, and that everything they will say may be used for or against them in any
court of the Philippines (TSN, June 21, 1978, pp. 2-3). Immediately thereafter, he asked them if after knowing their rights, they were still willing to
give their statements freely and voluntarily. Both accused-appellants answered in the affirmative (TSN, June 21, 1978, pp. 3-4). Appellants allegedly
further declared that they will give their statements even without the assistance of counsel, considering that what they will state therein would only
be the truth. Accordingly, he took the statements of the accused without a lawyer, and both signed their confessions in his presence (TSN, June 21,
1978, pp. 4-7).
Dr. Romulo Madrid, resident physician of the Polymedic, Mandaluyong, testified that on November 3, 1977, he was the one who conducted an
autopsy on the corpse of one Roland Abellana at Funeraria Popular, one of the official morgues of the National Bureau of Investigation and issued
Necropsy Report No. N-77-1779 (Exhibit "D", Rollo). His findings revealed that the victim died of hemorrhage secondary to multiple stab wounds on
the chest and neck and that the probable weapon used in inflicting said stab wounds on the victim was a sharp-pointed bladed instrument (TSN,
November 7, 1979, pp. 2-4).
Fiscal Jesus T. Baldonado, of the Quezon City Fiscal's Office, was presented as a rebuttal witness of the prosecution. He testified that on
November 23, 1977, the accused Jovito Tujon and Ernesto Parola accompanied by policemen were brought to his office for investigation; that
before he proceeded with the said investigation, he apprised first the accused of their constitutional rights, which was his standard operating
procedure; that he asked both accused if the statements they executed before the police were freely given, which was answered in the affirmative
by the accused; that he left them affix anew their respective signatures on the said statements in his presence. He further stated that during the
said investigation, both accused did not in any way complain that they had been maltreated by the policemen nor did he notice any sign of injury on
their persons. He declared that it was likewise his standard operating procedure that should he notice any sign of injury on the persons of the
accused, he would readily refer them to the City Health Office for medical treatment (TSN, February 26, 1982, pp. 1-5).
8
After the presentation of the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its case.
During the pendency of this case, accused Ernesto Parola escaped from the Quezon City Jail; consequently the defense presented only accused
Jovito Tujon as its lone witness, who vehemently denied the accusation against him.
Jovito Tujon testified that he arrived in Manila only on November 2, 1977 and that he came from the province of Catanduanes. He came to Manila
to look for a job and while in Manila, he stayed with his uncle named Alberto Ubal in Tondo, Manila. He was in his uncle's house on November 3,
1977, helping him do some odd jobs. Two weeks after his arrival, he was arrested for unknown reasons. He also testified that he did not know his
other co-accused, namely: Ernesto Parola, Cesar Paredes and Antonio Mena. He came to know the other accused Ernesto Parola only at the
police precinct when they were arrested.
Accused-appellant Tujon further testified that while he was at the police precinct, he was made to face the wall and was kicked from behind for
which reason he fell on the floor in a sitting position. He was then brought to a room where he was given fist blows. Then he was asked to lie on a
bench with his hands tied behind him. A rag was placed inside his mouth and water was poured in his nose while his stomach was being boxed,
causing him to vomit. He further testified that the policemen asked him to admit his participation in the crime and if not, they would box him again.
The policemen asked him to sign a paper the contents of which he did not know. He did not have a chance to read the said piece of paper
considering that all parts of his body were painful as a result of the said mauling. Neither did he have a chance to receive medical attention (TSN,
February 24, 1982, pp. 1-2)
He further declared that he did not know that accused Ernesto Parola implicated him in the alleged robbery holdup of a certain Rolando Abellana.
He had nothing to do with the offense charged against him and that he could not remember having been investigated by Det. Armando Estrada
regarding this case (TSN, February 24, 1982, pp. 2-3).
The trial court gave more with to the evidence of the prosecution consisting mainly of the extra-judicial confessions of the accused, and, as earlier
stated, found both accused Ernesto Parola and Jovito Tujon, guilty as charged.
Hence, this appeal.
On March 18, 1987, accused-appellant Jovito Tujon filed an urgent motion to withdraw appeal (Rollo, p. 110) but counsel for appellant in his
comment on the motion, prayed that the said urgent motion to withdraw appeal filed by Tujon be disregarded, as it was merely a by-product of
misjudgment. The motion to withdraw appeal was then denied by this Court.
Among others, counsel for appellant contends that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the two accused of the crime charged by relying
heavily on their respective extra-judicial confessions, which are clearly not admissible in evidence in the instant case.
The Solicitor General agrees with counsel for appellant that the evidence presented is not sufficient to sustain conviction. He correctly observed
that it was not even shown by the evidence how appellant came to be suspected of the robbery and killing and subsequently arrested. The
evidence against the accused consists solely of their extra-judicial confessions. There is no eyewitness and not even a single circumstantial
evidence pointing to the accused as the perpetrators of the crime (Rollo, pp. 89-90). Compared with the evidence of the prosecution, the claim of
Tujon that he has just arrived in Manila to look for a job when he was arrested by the police for unknown reason, is more persuasive.
Furthermore, it was observed that the extra-judicial confessions are not even consistent with each other nor credible. In the extra-judicial
confessions of Ernesto Parola y Cortina, the victim was killed in Quezon City and his body was dumped at Tandang Sora, Quezon City while in the
extra-judicial confession of Jovito Tujon y Tapel, the victim was killed in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Similarly, in the former, it was stated that the killing
occurred on November 20, 1977, while in the latter, the killing was supposed to have taken place in the first week of November, 1977. Notably, the
body was found on November 3, 1977. Still further, Parola stated that the color of the taxi is red while according to Tujon, the color is blue (Rollo,
pp. 90-96). It is, therefore, evident that the veracity of aforesaid confessions is not acceptable.
But more importantly, while it is clear from the records that the accused were informed of two (2) constitutional, rights, namely: (1) the right to
remain silent and (2) the-right to be assisted by counsel of their own choice, it is not clear that they were actually offered the services of a lawyer
and they refused. In any event, it is undisputed that the waiver of the accused of their right to counsel was made without the assistance of counsel.
This Court has ruled that the right of a person under custodial interrogation to be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, implies a correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain and contemplate an effective communication that results in an understanding of what is conveyed. Short
of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the accused has been "informed" of his right (People v. Newman, 163 SCRA 496, [1988]). When
the Constitution requires a person under investigation to be informed to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle (People v. Flores, 165 SCRA 71 [1981]). It is the duty of the police officer to explain their practical effects (People v. Nicandro, 141 SCRA
289 [1986]). Thus, it would not suffice for a police officer just to report to the person under investigation the provision of Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution (now Art. III, Section 12, 1987 ConstitutionJOVITO TUJON Y TAPEL
; People v. Flores, supra,).
As pointed out by this Court in People vs. Nicandro, supra:
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation "to be informed" of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be
presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the
provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty-bound to tell the person the rights to which the latter is entitled; he
must also explain their effects in practical terms . . . In other words, the right of a person under interrogation "to be informed" implies a
correlative obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been "informed" of
his rights. Now, since the right "to be informed" implies comprehension, the degree of explanation required will necessarily vary, depending
upon the education, intelligence and other relevant personal circumstances of person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and
more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.
In the case at bar, and in the testimony of the police officer, it is undeniable that no serious effort was shown to have been exerted by the
investigators to explain the consequences of the investigation. On the investigator is reposed the duty to explain the effects of the constitutional
rights practical terms (People v. Duhan, 142 SCRA 100 [1986]).
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that waiver of right to counsel to be valid, must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. Extra-
judicial confessions taken without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence (People v. Albofera, 152 SCRA 123 [1987]). Hence, while
the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and made in the presence of the accused's
lawyer. If the records do not show that the accused was assisted by counsel in making his waiver, this defect nullifies and renders inadmissible in
evidence his confession (People v. Nolasco, 163 SCRA 623, [1988]. In the case of People v. Hizon, 163 SCRA 760 (1988), this Court, citing the
procedure laid down in the case of People v. Galit, 135 SCRA 465 [1985]), ruled that the suspect must be informed that he has a right to the
assistance of counsel and assured that he will be provided with one for free. While he may choose to waive the right, such waiver must be a
knowing and intelligence one and in any case must be made only with the assistance of counsel. Any waiver made without observance of these
requirements is null and void. Thus:
At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown
the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might
make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses
by the most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his
behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement
obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
evidence. (Morales, Jr. v. Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).
Indeed, the ban against uncounseled confessions is even more pronounced under Sec. 12, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution which states that:
Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this . . . shall be inadmissible in evidence against him. (See also People v. Nicolas,
204 SCRA 191 [1991]).
9
It is a matter of record that the interrogation was made in the absence of counsel de parte or de oficio and the waiver of counsel, if made at all, was
not made with the assistance of counsel as required. Under the circumstances, there is no question that proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt has
not been established. As ruled by this Court, when the evidence for the prosecution and the evidence for the accused are weighed, the scales must
be tipped in favor of the latter. This is because of the constitutional presumption of innocence the accused enjoys as a counterfoil to the awesome
authority of the State that is prosecuting him. Undoubtedly, if a life is taken, justice demands that the wrong be redressed, but the same justice that
calls for retribution cannot convict the prisoner at bar whose guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The element of doubt, if
reasonable as in this case, must operate against the inference of guilt the prosecution would draw from its evidence (People v. Pecardal, 145 SCRA
647-648 [1986]).
As aforesaid, no promulgation of judgment was rendered with respect to Ernesto Parola who managed to escape from jail shortly after arraignment.
Considering, however, that the crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt and the disposition herein arrived at is favorable to
accused Ernesto Parola, he shall benefit from the judgment of this Court which is acquittal despite the fact that he jumped bail. In this
regard, apropos is the pronouncement of this Court in People vs. Fernandez (186 SCRA 834 [1990]), viz.:
While, in effect, committed an act of defiance of the law by escaping, we are not without other prior incidents where such undesirable
conduct, which should not be condoned, has sometimes been ascribed to a sense of desperation of those who believe they are guiltless but
fear that they cannot prove their innocence. While we castigate and reprove his jumping bail and remaining at large up to now, we have to
concede, however, that our disquisition in this case is applicable and favorable to him, hence, he is affected by and shall benefit from the
acquittal that we hand down in this appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and both accused are hereby ACQUITTED. SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGUSTIN LADAO y LORETO, ALEX DE GUZMAN y MAGAT, HENRY PONSECA y
SORIANO, ANTONIO PANGANIBAN y AQUINO, VICTORIO EUGENIO y ROQUE, John Doe, Peter Doe and Charlie Doe, accused. HENRY
PONSECA y SORIANO, accused-appellant. [G.R. Nos. 100940-41. November 27, 2001]
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Accused-appellant Henry Ponseca y Soriano appeals from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, convicting him and
his four co-accused[2] of the crime of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the
victim the amounts of P30,000.00, as civil indemnity and P10,500.00, as burial and wake expenses.
The information against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about the 29th day of January, 1990 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence employed upon the person of ALFONSO DELA
CRUZ Y QUIAMBAO, that is, by tying the latters both hands and feet and subsequently dumping his body at the estero in Tanigue St., Dagat-Dagatan, this city,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away undetermined amount, belonging to the said complainant, to the damage and
prejudice of the latter in undetermined amount; and as a result of aforesaid force and violence employed to said victim, the latter drowned at the estero which
incident directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.[3]
Upon arraignment on February 19, 1990, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.
The records show that accused-appellant was among those apprehended by the Caloocan Police on the night of February 9, 1990, in connection with the
rampant robbery and hold-up incidents in Caloocan. In the ensuing investigation conducted by Police Inspector Antonio Paras and Ricardo Concepcion, accused-
appellant and his co-accused executed, with the assistance of Atty. Juanito R. Crisostomo of the Public Attorneys Office, Caloocan City, their extra-judicial
confession admitting authorship of the crime of robbery with homicide.
In his extra-judicial confession, accused-appellant declared that he and his four co-accused, together with three others who were able to escape, held up
the passenger jeepney driven by the victim. He further stated that they tied the hands and feet of the victim and threw him into the estero not knowing that the
place was filled with water. Using the jeepney of the victim, they plied the Recto-Caloocan route and picked up passengers whom they likewise
robbed. Thereafter, they abandoned the jeepney somewhere in the corner of P. Sevilla Street and 10th Avenue.
The full text of accused-appellants extra-judicial confession states:
PAUNAWA: Ikaw, Henry Ponseca ay nasa ilalim ng pagsisiyasat ng tanggapang ito hinggil sa kasong panghohold-up na may kasamang pagpatay, dahil dito, nais kong malaman mo na sa
ilalim ng ating umiiral na Bagong Saligang-Batas, Ikaw ay may mga karapatang katulad ng mga sumusunod:
1 - Karapatang manatiling tahimik o tumangging magbigay ng salaysay; nauunawan mo ba ito?
SAGOT: OPO.
2 - Karapatan mong malaman ang reklamo laban sa iyo, nauunawan mo ba ito?
SAGOT: OPO.
3 - Karapatan mong kumuha ng ayuda ng abogadong sariling pili mo at kung hindi mo kaya ito ay bibigyan ka ng ating pamahalaan para umayuda sa iyo, nauunawaan mo ito?
SAGOT: OPO.
4 - At anumang sasabihin mo'y maaring gamiting laban sa iyo sa alin mang hukuman ng pag-uusig, nauunawan mo ba ito?
SAGOT: OPO.
TANONG: Matapos mong malaman at maunawaan ang iyong mga karapatan bilang isang taong nasa ilalim ng pagsisiyasat, ikaw bay nakahandang magbigay ng malaya at kusang loob
na salaysay na ang sasabihin moy pawang katutuhanan lamang?
SAGOT: Opo, magbibigay po ako ng salaysay at aayudahan ako ni Atty. Juanito Crisostomo ng Caloocan Public Assistance Office.
02. T: Kung gayon, sabihin mong muli ang pangalan mot mga bagay-bagay na lubos na pagkikilanlan sa iyong pagkatao?
S: HENRY PONSECA y SORIANO, 30 taong gulang, may-asawa, walang trabaho at kasalukuyang naninirahan sa 2741-G Santos St., Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila.
03. T: Marunong ka bang sumulat, bumasa at umintindi ng salitang Tagalog?
S: Marunong po.
04. T: Inaakusahan ka Henry Ponseca ng Pangho-HOLD-UP na may kasamang pagpatay, na naganap nuong petsa-29 ng Enero 1990, mga bandang alas-10 ng gabi duon sa Tanigue St.,
Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City, ano ang masasbi mo rito?
S: Tutuo po iyun, kasama po ako.
05. T: Nakikilala mo ba kung sino ang namatay sa insidenteng nabanggit?
S: Ang namatay po duon dahil nalunod ay ang driver ng pampasaherong jeep na aming na-HOLD-UP at dito po sa opisina ninyo ay nakilala ko sa pangalang: Alfredo dela Cruz y
Quiambao.
06. T: Ano ba mismong naging partisipasyon mo dito sa nasabing kaso?
S: Ako po ang umupo sa dulo ng jeep, lumimas sa mga gamit at pera ng mga pasahero at gumapos at naghulog doon sa driver ng jeep sa may estero duon sa Dagat-Dagatan na hindi ko
alam ay may tubig pala kayat nalunod itong driver.
07. T: May mga kasama ka ba dito sa pangyayaring ito?
S: Mayruon po, sila po ang ilan (Affiant at this juncture is pointing and referring to the persons who are presently inside the investigation room and who when asked gave their names as:
VICTORIO EUGENIO y ROQUE @ Itoy, AGUSTIN LADAO y LORETO @ Agustin, ALEX DE GUZMAN y MAGAT @ Alex and ANTONIO PANGANIBAN y AQUINO @Tony)
kasama pa rin po namin [sina] BAYANI @ Onse, REY at ROWELL na taga-Caloocan din pero nakatakas.
08. T: Isalaysay mo nga ang mga pangyayaring may kinalaman sa hold-up na may kasamang pagpatay na ito?
S: Nagkita-kita po kaming magkakasama sa Letre at duon ay nagplano kaming mangho-HOLD-UP nga. Sumakay po kami ng jeep at nagpunta kami ng Malinta, Valenzuela. Pagdating
duon, bale walo (8) kaming magkakasama ay muli kaming sumakay ng jeep patungong Monumento naman at itong jeep nga ay minamaneho ng napatay namin. Ako po ay
pumuesto sa dulo ng jeep, itong sina Bayani at Alex ay lumagay naman sa harapan ng jeep, katabi ng driver si Alex. Ang ibang mga kasama namin ay pawang nasa loob ng
jeep. Bale anim (6) po ang pasahero ng jeep at pagdating duon sa may Del Monte ay nag-anounce na kami ng hold-up at inilabas na rin ni Agustin itong baril na dala
niya. Pinakanan po namin ang jeep sa Del Monte, diretso ng Acacia at tuloy ng Caloocan. Nuon po namin nilimas ang mga gamit at pera ng mga pasahero at saka ibinaba sila
sa ilang na lugar sa Caloocan. Ang orihinal na driver naman po ay iginapos namin at itong si Bayani ang nagmaneho. Pinadapa po namin ang driver na sa kalaunan ngay
nakilala kong si Alfredo dela Cruz sa loob mismo ng jeep at pagdating duon sa Tanigue St. Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan, ay ibinaba namin siya, pinalakad ng inut-inot patungong
estero at lima (5) kami nina Bayani, Alex, Rowel, at Rey na bumuhat sa kanya at naglaglag sa estero, na hindi namin alam na may tubig kayat namatay itong driver sa
pagkalunod. Sumakay kaming muli sa jeep at bumiyahe pa kami na si Bayani pa rin ang driver at mula sa Recto patungong Monumento ay hinold-up namin itong mga pasahero
namin sa bandang Manuguit at nang matapos namin silang pababain ay inabandona namin ang jeep sa may P. Sevilla, 10 th Ave., Calookan City.
09. T: Anu-ano ba ang mga na-hold-up ninyo sa unang banat ng gabing iyun?
S: Halu-halo na po, relo, alahas, pera, at iba pa at pumarte po ako ng halos P170.00 lamang.
10. T: Sinong nagparte ng mga nahold-up ninyo?
S: Kami-kami na rin po.
11. T: Saan kayo nag parte-parte?
S: Duon na po sa Letre.
12. T: Saan mismo sa Letre?
S: Duon po sa Caltex Gasoline Station.
13. T: Duon ba ang tagpuan ninyo?
S: Opo.
14 T: Paanong nasakote ng mga alagad ng batas ang grupo ninyo?
S: Kasi po ay nagtipon-tipon kami sa Letre uli para manghold-up sa Malolos pero may naghudas pala na kasama namin kaya't nasakote kami.
15. T: Sinong naghudas sa inyo?
S: Hindi po namin alam.
16. T: Ano ang mga armas na ginamit ninyo sa nasabing hold-up na may kasamang pagpatay?
S: Puro matalas po maliban kay Alex at Agustin na kapwa may baril.
17. T: Ano ba ang masasabi mo sa mga baril na nasa ibabaw ng aking mesa ngayon?
S: Iyan po mismo ang kargada nina Alex at Agustin. Iyun pong .38 ay kay Alex at .22 naman ang kay Agustin. (Affiant at this juncture is pointing and referring to the handguns on top of
this investigator's table particularly described as one (1) .38 cal rev marked Squires Bingham with SN-1102937 loaded w/ four live ammos in its cylinder and one (1) .22 cal rev.
marked Commanche Chief with SN-105818 with four live ammos in its cylinder.)
18. T: Pansamantala ay wala muna akong itatanong sa iyo, may nais ka bang sabihin pa?
S: Wala na po.
19. T: Lalagdaan mo ba ang salaysay mong ito bilang patunay sa lahat ng nasasaad dito?
S: Opo. (End of Statement, 6:00 p.m./10 February 1990)[4]
Prosecution witness Hilda Castro, a public school teacher and a victim in one of the hold-up incidents staged by accused-appellant and his cohorts on the
night of January 29, 1990, testified that at about 10:00 in the evening of January 29, 1990, she boarded a passenger jeepney in Blumentritt bound for Sta. Cruz,
Manila. As they approached Tayuman Street, the culprits declared a hold-up and divested them of their personal belongings. Aside from the hold-uppers, there
were four passengers, including her. Hilda pointed to accused Eugenio as the one who announced the hold-up; accused-appellant Ponseca as the one who divested
her of her bag, and accused Ladao and de Guzman as the persons who took their jewelries. The following day, she reported the incident to the police.[5]
On January 30, 1990, Dominga dela Cruz, widow of the victim, informed the authorities that her husband was missing. On the same day, the police were
able to locate the abandoned jeepney of the victim. Recovered therefrom was Hilda Castros bag containing her address and telephone number.
On January 31, 1990, the cadaver of the victim was found in Dagat-Dagatan, Caloocan City. The Certificate of Post Mortem Examination issued by Dr.
Valentin Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation revealed that the cause of death of the victim was Asphyxia by Drowning. [6]
For his defense, accused-appellant testified that on February 9, 1990, while he was in an eatery in Caloocan, he was arrested by armed Caloocan
policemen. Prior to his arrest, accused-appellant declared that he did not know his four co-accused. He denied participation in the commission of the crime and
claimed that he was tortured and forced to sign an extra-judicial confession. Accused-appellant insisted that he does not know Atty. Juanito Crisostomo and that he
was never assisted by him during the custodial investigation.
Relying on accused-appellant and his co-accuseds extra-judicial confession, as well as on circumstantial evidence, the trial court rendered the instant
judgment of conviction. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused ALEX DE GUZMAN y MAGAT, AGUSTIN LADAO y LORETO, HENRY PONSECA y SORIANO, ANTONIO
PANGANIBAN y AQUINO and VICTORIO EUGENIO y ROQUE having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby adjudged them GUILTY for
the crime of Robbery with Homicide sentences them to suffer RECLUSION PERPETUA; to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfonso dela Cruz the sum of
Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos; and to pay the sum of Ten Thousand Five Hundred (P10,500.00) Pesos representing expenses for the wake and burial of
herein victim.
10
In addition, accused AGUSTIN LADAO y LORETO is likewise adjudged GUILTY for having violated Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended and hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Only Henry Ponseca appealed the trial courts decision, raising the following errors:
I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE THE SIGNED CONFESSION OF MR. PONSECA AS THE SAME WAS OBTAINED BY
FORCE, TORTURE AND DURESS.
II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING IN EVIDENCE THE CONFESSION ALLEGEDLY SIGNED BY MR. PONSECA, AS THE SAME WAS
EXTRACTED WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL AND WITHOUT THE ACCUSED BEING INFORMED OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. [8]
The contentions are without merit. Settled is the rule that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement
on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession was involuntary and
untrue. The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency.[9]
In the case at bar, aside from his bare allegations, accused-appellant failed to present any proof that force and violence were employed to coerce him to
sign the extra-judicial confession. He did not submit himself to an examination by a physician to bolster his claim. Neither did he complain of the alleged torture
to his relatives or to Prosecutor Neptali Aliposa when he swore to the truth of his statement. Likewise, he filed no criminal complaint or administrative charge
against the police officers concerned. As similarly held in People v. Fabro,[10] citing People v. Pia,[11] all the foregoing circumstances sufficiently show that no
force or violence was employed on accused-appellant and that his confession was in fact given on his own volition.
Moreover, this Court agrees with the Solicitor General, that the language of the confession and the details thereof, could only come from a participant in
the commission of the crime. Every aspect thereof jibes with the sworn statements given by his co-accused. His confession reflects the manner in which the crime
was committed; the kind of weapon used; the place where they boarded the victims jeepney; the role of each accused; and their relative positions inside the
jeep. Furthermore, accused-appellant's admission that they threw the victim in an estero filled with water confirms the result of the post mortem examination
indicating that the victim drowned to death.
Accused-appellant contends that the extra-judicial confession is unworthy of belief because it allegedly accepts full responsibility for the crime
charged. A guilty person, accused-appellant argued, seldom admits his guilt fully and completely and has the tendency to explain or minimize his fault. A reading
of accused-appellants confession, however, discloses that, indeed, he tried to limit his liability by implying that he had no intention to kill the victim as he was not
aware that the estero where they threw the victim was filled with water. The exculpatory tone of accused-appellants confession is demonstrative of its
voluntariness rather than compulsion.[12]
Accused-appellants allegation that he and his co-accused were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is belied by the affidavit
executed by Atty. Crisostomo attesting to the voluntariness of accused-appellants confession and the legal assistance he rendered during the
investigation.Moreover, Atty. Crisostomo testified that he informed accused-appellant and his co-accused of their constitutional rights and assisted them during the
custodial investigation.
Having been obtained without infringing the Constitutional safeguards, accused-appellants confession constitutes evidence of the highest order since it is
backed up by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his
conscience.[13]
It bears stressing that apart from the extra-judicial confession, the instant judgment of conviction is supported by other competent evidence. Hilda Castros
testimony, positively identifying accused-appellant and his co-accused as the persons who robbed them between Tayuman and Blumentritt, is on all fours with the
confession of accused-appellant and that of his co-accused that after dumping the victim in the estero, they used the latters jeepney and robbed the passengers they
picked up in the Recto-Caloocan route and vice-versa. In fact, Hilda Castros bag was recovered from the abandoned jeepney of the victim, which shows that
accused-appellant and his companions were the same persons who took away the jeepney of the victim and killed him, and thereafter staged another hold-up
where Hilda Castro happened to be one of the victims.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, we find no reason to alter the trial court's judgment of conviction. We agree with the court a quo that accused-
appellant's denial of his participation in the crime is unconvincing. The assessment of a witness credibility is the sole province of the trial court. [14] Being in the
best position to observe the deportment and demeanor of accused-appellant on the witness stand, the Court accords full faith and credence to its findings and
conclusions.
Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed on accused-appellant.
With respect to accused-appellants civil liability, the Court has consistently ruled that actual or compensatory damages must be duly proved and
established with reasonable degree of certainty, and courts cannot rely on conjecture or guesswork on the fact and extent of damages. [15] Upon examination of the
records, we find that the award of P10,500.00 as burial and wake expenses is without basis, and should therefore be deleted. As to the indemnity for the death of
the victim, the award should be increased to P50,000.00 consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. [16]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 131, finding accused-appellant Henry Ponseca y Soriano guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the indemnity to the heirs of the victim should be increased to P50,000.00. The P10,500.00 awarded by the trial court for wake and burial
expenses is DELETED for lack of basis. SO ORDERED.
Confession
Facts:
1. The accused-appellant Ladao was among those apprehended by the Caloocan Police on the night of February 9, 1990, in connection with the rampant robbery
and hold-up incidents in Caloocan. In the ensuing investigation conducted by Police Inspector Antonio Paras and Ricardo Concepcion, accused-appellant and his
co-accused executed, with the assistance of Atty. Juanito R. Crisostomo of the Public Attorney's Office, Caloocan City, their extra-judicial confession admitting
authorship of the crime of robbery with homicide.
2. In his extra-judicial confession, accused-appellant declared that he and his four co-accused, together with three others who were able to escape, held up the
passenger jeepney driven by the victim. He further stated that they tied the hands and feet of the victim and threw him into the estero not knowing that the place
was filled with water. Using the jeepney of the victim, they plied the Recto-Caloocan route and picked up passengers whom they likewise robbed. Thereafter, they
abandoned the jeepney somewhere.
3. Accused-appellant Henry Soriano appeals from the lower court's decision convicting him and his four co-accused of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Issue: W/N the extrajudicial confession is admissible against the accused
YES. Settled is the rule that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a
confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession was involuntary and untrue. The burden is on the accused
to destroy this presumption. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or
promise of reward or leniency. The exculpatory tone of accused-appellants confession is demonstrative of its voluntariness rather than compulsion.
Accused-appellant failed to present any proof that force and violence were employed to coerce him to sign the extra-judicial confession. He did not submit
himself to an examination by a physician to bolster his claim. Neither did he complain of the alleged torture to his relatives or to Prosecutor Neptali Aliposa when
he swore to the truth of his statement. Likewise, he filed no criminal complaint or administrative charge against the police officers concerned.
Moreover, the language of the confession and the details in it could only come from a participant in the commission of the crime. Every aspect thereof jibes with
the sworn statements given by his co-accused. His confession reflects the manner in which the crime was committed; the kind of weapon used; the place where
they boarded the victims jeepney; the role of each accused; and their relative positions inside the jeep. Furthermore, accused-appellant's admission that they
threw the victim in an estero filled with water confirms the result of the post mortem examination indicating that the victim drowned to death.
Valid confession
Accused-appellants allegation that he and his co-accused were not assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation is belied by the affidavit executed by
Atty. Crisostomo attesting to the voluntariness of accused-appellants confession and the legal assistance he rendered during the investigation. Moreover, Atty.
Crisostomo testified that he informed accused-appellant and his co-accused of their constitutional rights and assisted them during the custodial investigation. As
such, his confession constitutes evidence of the highest order since it is backed up by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately
and knowingly confess to a crime unless he is prompted by truth and his conscience.
Note that apart from the extra-judicial confession, the conviction is supported by other competent evidence. Hilda Castros testimony, positively identifying
accused-appellant and his co-accused as the persons who robbed them between Tayuman and Blumentritt, is on all fours with the confession of accused-appellant
and that of his co-accused that after dumping the victim in the estero, they used the latters jeepney and robbed the passengers they picked up in the Recto-
Caloocan route and vice-versa. In fact, Hilda Castros bag was recovered from the abandoned jeepney of the victim, which shows that accused-appellant and his
companions were the same persons who took away the jeepney of the victim and killed him, and thereafter staged another hold-up where Hilda Castro happened
to be one of the victims.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO MANATAD, JESUS RUBIO, RUDY LUMARDA,
JOSE CABAGERAN, EDDIE DE LA PE;A, CRIS RAMIREZ, and JESUS or JOHN DOE, accused, BRIGIDO ENCIPIDO, CHARLITO
MANATAD, and EDDIE DE LA PE;A accused-appellants. G.R. No. 70091 December 29, 1986
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
On March 30, 1982, Jose Lacumbes (hereinafter referred to as the DECEASED), a resident of Barangay Mabini in the Municipality of Tubajon,
Surigao del Norte, was found killed by his wife and children near the hut in their farm in Sitio Capacohan in the same barangay. Post Mortem
findings performed the following morning were:
l) Incised wound of the neck.
2) Eight [8] multiple stab wounds at the back; one [1] inch in length and two and a half [2] inches in depth.
3) Removed right external ear.
11
 4) Contusions left lumbar region. and did not leave the place. He further testified that he did not know the DECEASED nor the Station Commander, nor the Municipal Mayor except
when he surrendered his .45 caliber pistol to the latter on May 2, 1982 after which he was arrested. He decided to surrender his pistol because he
was afraid he might be apprehended for having an unlicensed firearm. MANATAD and DE LA PENA were also placed in jail with him. Thereafter,
5) Both hands tied at the back with rattan. with seven others, he was taken to PC head- quarters at Surigao City where they were severely maltreated and he was forced to sign an affidavit
admitting that he is "Commander Tanga" responsible for the killing of the DECEASED and other persons. He denied having admitted to the Station
Commander and to the Municipal Mayor his Identi ty as "Commander Tanga" or that he had killed the DECEASED and other persons besides.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, severe, secondary to incised wounds of the neck and multiple stab wounds at the back.

On February 2, 1983, in Criminal Case No. 14 of the Regional Trial Court, 10th Judicial Region, Branch 32 (the CASE BELOW), the following eight
(8) persons: (1) Brigido ENCIPIDO (2) Charlito MANATAD, (3) Eddie DE LA PENA (hereinafter referred to as APPELLANTS), (4) Jesus Rubio, (5)
Rudy Lumarda, (6) Jose CABAGERAN (7) Cris Ramirez, and (8) Jesus or John Doe were charged with Murder for the death of the DECEASED.
Only fly APPELLANTS were tried, the other five accused having remained at large.
A review of the prosecution evidence presented in the CASE BELOW can begin with the testimony of Felicisimo Alciso. This witness narrated that
he went to the hut of the DECEASED in the afternoon of March 30, 1982, in order to get some chickens which the latter had promised him but that,
before reaching the hut, he heard a gunshot. He stopped and saw that the DECEASED was being tied and subjected to fist blows. There were
three persons who mauled the DECEASED, while others stayed at a distance. Then, somebody struck the DECEASED with the butt of a gun
causing the latter to fall to the ground. He described that the hands of the DECEASED were tied at the back, ENCIPIDO was behind the
DECEASED, while MANATAD and DE LA PE;A were on the sides. 1On orders of ENCIPIDO also known as "Commander Tanga," DE LA PE;A,
also called "Agosto de la Pena struck the Deceased's neck with a bolo which almost I severed the latter's head. Frightened, witness Alciso fled from
the scene.
After learning from friends and neighbors that those who had killed the DECEASED were detained, Alciso went to the jail to find out for himself if
they were among the group responsible for the death of the DECEASED, and because "I was afraid that I will be the next one to be killed by them."
He recognized APPELLANTS as among the suspects. When he asked DE LA PENA why he was in jail, the latter answered that it was because
they were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED. Alciso was unable to talk to ENCIPIDO and MANATAD.
MANATAD, for his part, also denied all imputations against him, stating that he only came to know ENCIPIDO in jail; that he did not know the
DECEASED nor who killed him that during the whole day of March 30, 1982, he was plowing the field tenanted by his mother-in-law at Barangay
Malinao; that he started plowing early in the morning and stopped at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. after which he stayed home. Barangay Captain Sergio
Peniones partially corroborated MANATAD's testimony by stating that he saw MANATAD plowing the i field in the morning of March 30, 1982.
MANATAD's wife, Bienvenida Edusma also testified that her husband stayed home after 5:00 o'clock P.M. of that day as he was tired after the day's
work; that, in fact, she quarreled with her husband because he refused to accompany her in bringing their sick child to Tubajon on so that she went
alone carrying the child even though she was then seven months pregnant.
In a Decision promulgated by the Trial Court on December 5, 1984, APPELLANTS were found guilty of Murder and sen tenced to reclusion
perpetua to pay damages to the heirs of the DECEASED in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay 3/8 of the costs.
On behalf of APPELLANTS, counsel de officio filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the Trial Court on December 26, 1984, which the latter
denied for having been filed more than fifteen (5) days after the promulgation date of December 5, 1984. A Notice of Appeal filed before the then
Intermediate Appellate Court was allowed as an appeal not from the judgment but from the Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. The
penalty imposed by the Trial Court being reclusion perpetual the appeal was indorsed to this instance, which we accepted in the interest of
substantial justice.
APPELLANTS raise the following Assignments of Error:

Before Alciso there was another prosecution witness presented, Armando Bagacay whose testimony turned out to be hearsay but which A
nevertheless is reproduced here to complete the evidence for the prosecution. He testified that while he was massaging one of the accused, Rudy
Lainarda on March 10, 1982, the latter told him that his ailment was caused by witchcraft of the victim, Jose Lacumbes, and that he would seek the
aid of the rebels to cut Lacumbes' head. Four days later, Bagacay met one of those originally indicted, Jesus Rubio, who confided to him that they The lower Court erred in giving credence to the hearsay testimonies of prosecution witnesses Mariano Espina and George Ortega basing therefrom its findings of
conviction;
would cut Lacumbes' neck for making Lumarda sick and for being responsible for all i the witchcraft in the community. Subsequently, witness
Bagacay heard of the death of Lacumbes at the hands of the rebels.
B

Two other prosecution witnesses supported testimony Alciso Jorge Ortega, INP Station Commander of Loreto, Agusan del Norte, testified that when
he had just arrived from Surigao City at about 2:30 o'clock P.M. of May 1, 1982, and while still at the wharf, he was met by ENCIPIDO who The lower Court erred in giving credence to the incredible and hearsay testimony of Felicisimo Alciso the alleged eyewitness;
introduced himself as "Commander Tanga," invited him (Ortega) for a drink so he could talk to the latter personally. Having ac cepted the invitation,
the two proceeded to a store where ENCIPIDOs fourteen companions were already waiting. They introduced themselves as rebels and offered to
help the municipal government. In the course of the conversation, ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A disclosed to the Station Commander that they C
were the ones who had beheaded the DECEASED, killed a certain Benny and one Balaba, and who were responsible for all the killings in Dinagat
Island.
The lower Court erred in appreciating the so-called judicial admission of accused Eddie de la Pena as against his co-accused Brigido ENCIPIDO and Charlito Manatad;

The other prosecution witness, Mariano Espina, the Municipal Mayor of Loreto, testified that in the evening of that same day of May 1, 1982, Station
Commander Jorge Ortega informed him that Commander Tanga" and his men wanted to pay him a courtesy call. They arrived at about 8:00 in the D
evening at his house. They introduced themselves and placed their sidearms on a table as a sign of goodwill. At the time, there were about 2
policemen and 3 CHDF men outside the house but no arrests were made, nor were firearms confiscated, as a sign of reciprocal goodwill
The lower Court erred in convicting appellants Brigido ENCIPIDO and Charlito Manatad;
"Commander Tanga" then confided to the Mayor his mission to cooperate with his administration as they had heard that he was a good Mayor. He
also informed the Mayor that he had been a member of the NPA since he was 13 years old; that he had already killed many people, including the
DECEASED, so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. For his part, DE LA PE;A brought out a sharp-pointed knife
E
and tried to test its sharpness, admitted having cut the neck of the DECEASED, and even showed the latter's ear, dried by that time.

The lower Court erred in refusing to give due course to appellants' motion for reconsideration holding that it was filed out of time when its judgment accordingly has
The foregoing testimonies were buttressed from a most unexpected source. DE LA PE;A, to the surprise of APPELLANT APPELLANTS' common become final;
counsel testified in open Court that, although he belonged to the group of "Commander Tanga," the latter, MANATAD and a third individual merely
forced him to join, threatening to kill him if he refused; that he was with the group from March 28, 1982; that he was present on March 30, 1982
when "Commander Tanga" and MANATAD killed the DECEASED but that he was merely standing by; that the duo were the first ones F
apprehended, and after them he was also arrested by the CHDF.

The lower Court erred in convicting appellant Eddie de la Pe;a.

In their defense, ENCIPIDO and MANATAD denied having I killed the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. ENCIPIDO claimed that on March
30, 1982, he was sawing lumber from morning till 3:00 P.M. at Barangay Boa for a certain Norberto Bukid. After working he rested in Bukid's house

12
The evidence against APPELLANTS, taken en conjunto" justifies the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
1. Eyewitness Felicisimo Alciso positively Identified APPELLANT as among the group who led the DECEASED out of his hut, with his hands tied
behind his back, and thereafter mauled him and hacked his neck in the afternoon of March 30, 1982. The autopsy findings, particularly, the "incised
wound of the neck," "contusions left lumbar region" and "both hands tied at the back with rattan" confirm his description of what he had witnessed.
The defense contents, however, that said witness could not have recognized APPELLANTS.
It is true that at the start of his testimony, he had stated that he did not recognize the assailants. Thus:
Q. Who were the persons who mauled Jose Lacumbes during that time?
A. I saw that there were three of them but I could not recognize them; and there were some other persons who were staying from a
distance. 2
That testimony, however, referred to the early stage of the incident when the victim was being mauled. Subsequently, in respect of the killing itself,
the witness declared:
Fiscal Sandangal: Could you not recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes?
Witness:I could recognize the three persons who killed Jose Lacumbes. 3 Apparently, for the prosecution, it was not important or necessary to bolster up its case.
Then he described specifically:
Q. What else did you see, if any?
A. I saw that somebody was beating Jose Lacumbes with the use of a gun, and when Jose Lacumbes fell down, Commander Tanga
commanded Eddie de la Pena to cut the head of the victim but the head was not severed from the body. 4
After pointing to the APPELLANTS in the Courtroom and replying to a question by the Court, Alciso further explained:
Court (addressing to the witness) When did you know the accused by their names?
WITNESS: In the jail your Honor. Before I met them in the jail I already recognized their faces but I just do not know their names. Later on, I
already know their names. 5
The defense further claims that Alciso could not have recognized the assailants because he was at a distance of 80 to 90 meters away from the
scene of, the crime. In another instance, however, he said that the place of the killing was about "20 arms length" from the hut of the DECEASED,
while he was also about the same distance from the hut at that time. The distances stated were merely his estimates and can be moderately exact
or moderately inexact specially with provincial folk. The important fact is that even from where he was, he witnessed the incident and his description
of it was corroborated by the admission of APPELLANTS, themselves and supported by the autopsy findings on the cadaver. As this Court ruled
in People vs. Hamtig et al., 6 the credibility of the testimony of a witness is not affected by some flaws and inconsistencies in minor details, if as
regards the main incident, the Identities of the malefactors, the testimonies appear to be consistent with each other."
And although it was admittedly the first time that Alciso saw the malefactors, it does not necessarily follow that he could not have recognized their
faces. Persons observing a startling occurrence would strive to know the ones involved specially where as in this case the DECEASED was not
unknown to Alciso.
Next, it is argued that Alcisos testimony that he went to i the jail to verify the Identity of the malefactors is not worthy of credence. Concededly, that
actuation was unusual However, as the witness explained he did so because he feared that he may be the next one to be Killed And the fact that he
asked DE LA PE;A why the latter was in jail does not necessarily lead to the conclusion, as alleged, that he had not witnessed the occurrence. A
friendly question was more likely to evoke candid answer.
There is nothing strange either in Alcisos not having mentioned the culprits by name in his sworn statement taken more than three months after the
incident, having referred to them merely as "five persons." As is wen known "an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself Omissions and
misunderstanding . are not infrequent, particularly under circumstances of hurry and impatience." 7
ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A verbally acknowledged their guilt before Station Commander Ortega and Municipal Mayor Espina when they
individually boasted that they had killed the DECEASED so that the latter could no longer harm other people with his witchcraft. They admitted that
they had beheaded the DECEASED. DE LA PE;A even showed the Mayor the DECEASED's dried ear which he had severed, Further, while I i in
jail, DE LA PE;A also admitted to Alciso when the latter I asked him the reason for their confinement, that it was because they were the ones who
had beheaded the DE CEASED. These oral confessions indicating complicity in the commission of the crime with which they are charged are
admissible in evidence against the declarants ENCIPIDO and DE LA PE;A pursuant to Sections 22 8 and 29 9 of the Rules of Court. It is the fact
that admissions were made by APPELLANTS and against their own interest which gives them their evidentiary value. 10
It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS' extra-judicial confessions were independently made without collusion, are Identical with each other in their
material respects and confirmatory of the other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused implicated
therein to show the probability of the latter's actual participation in the commission of the crime. 11 They are also admissible as corroborative
evidence against the others, it being clear from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants themselves
participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. 12 They are what is commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an
exception to the general rule that extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants thereof.
And while it may be that ENCIPIDOS written statement before the PC on May 6, 1982 confessing to the killing of the DECEASED was not
presented at the trial no presumption of wilful suppression of evidence may be levelled against the prosecution on account of its non-production.
The argument that the testimonies of Station Commander Ortega, Mayor Espina, and Alciso as to the extrajudicial admissions made to them
respectively by ENCIPIDO and/or DE LA PE;A constitute hearsay, and thus inadmissible, is not well taken. Oral confessions may be proved by
any competent witness by whom they were heard, the same as any other fact:
The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what
he heard if he heard and understood an of it. An oral confession need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its
substance. (23 C.J.S. 196).
Proof of the contents of an oral extrajudicial confession may be made by the testimony of a person who testifies that he was present, heard,
understood, and remembers the substance of the conversation or statement made by the accused. (Underhill's Criminal Evidence, 4th Ed.,
Niblack, sec. 278, p. 551). 13
ENCIPIDOS and DE LA PE;A's extrajudicial acknowledgments of guilt to the Municipal Mayor and the INP Station Commander are not
necessarily incredible for, in their minds, they were not "confessing" but bragging of their exploits" in the belief that they were saving the community
from the witchcraft of the DECEASED and the evil doings of some people. There is no proof whatsoever that the extrajudicial admissions in
question were coerced or concocted by those officials, who are responsible public officers and presumed to have regularly performed their functions
and against whose impartiality nothing has been proven. The fact that no arrest were made by them immediately after the disclosures do not
necessarily belie their testimonies since the spirit of "reciprocal goodwill" pervaded the encounters. Arrests were made, however, the day after, or
on May 2, 1982.
APPELLANTS had the opportunity during the trial to refute their verbal admissions as in fact, they denied having made them, but their denials do
not ring with truth in the face of other inculpating evidence.
3. The additional incriminating evidence was furnished by DE LA PE;A who, in open Court, under oath, testified that he belonged to "Commander
Tanga's" group, was with them since two days before the incident, and that he was with ENCIPIDO and MANATAD when they killed the
DECEASED. DE LA PE;AS declaration confirms the existence of the group, their responsibility for the killing and, at the very least, his presence
during the commission of the crime.
True, DE LA PE;A exculpated himself by stating that he was only forced to join the group and was merely standing by when the killing occurred. A
statement involving guilt does not, however, lose its character as a confession from the fact that it was accompanied by statements of an
13
exculpatory nature, 14 it being "the natural tendency of every transgressor, with perhaps very rare exceptions, to acquit himself while he can do so
from all liability that might arise from his act, or at least mitigate it in the eyes of the law and those of his fellowmen". 15 Like other evidence, it must
be weighed, believed, or disbelieved in whole or in part, as reason may decide. Herein, the exculpatory statement has been proven false by Alcisos
credible account that upon ENCIPIDOS orders, DE LA PE;A hacked the DECEASED's neck with a bolo which almost severed the latter's head,
which testimony is confirmed by the autopsy finding of "incised wound on the neck." It was likewise proven false by DE LA PE;As own extrajudicial
admission to the Municipal Mayor that he had hacked the DECEASED's neck and severed his ear, which is buttressed by the post mortem finding
of "removed right external ear."
DE LA PE;AS judicial admission is admissible not only against him but against his co-accused ENCIPIDO and MANATAD as well. The general
rule that the confession of an accused may be given in evidence against him but that it is not competent evidence against his co-accused, admits of
exceptions. Thus, this Court has held that where several accused are tried together for the same complaint, the testimony lawfully given by one
during the trial implicating the others is competent evidence against the latter. 16 "The extrajudicial admission or confession of a co-conspirator out
of court is different from the testimony given by a co-accused during trial. The first is admissible against the declarant alone, but the second is
perfectly admissible against his co-accused," 17 who had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. In this case, counsel de
officio had such opportunity to cross-examine DE LA PE;A but did not avail of it because in his own words:
Atty Moleta: I would like to inform the Honorable Court that I am in quandary It is my duty as counsel-de-oficio to be candid to this Honorable
Court. The witness has not actually followed what I intimated to him to be the nature of his testimony. 18
In other words, the reason counsel refrained from cross examination was not because he was not given the opportunity to do so but because DE
LA PE;A did not follow counsel's bidding as to the nature of his testimony. The coached testimony failed but the truth prevailed. Besides, defense
counsel could have presented rebuttal evidence to overcome DE LA PE;A's testimony if he had chosen to do so but did not.
Thus, MANATAD's direct participation in the commission of the crime with which he is charged has been established by DE LA PE;A's declaration
in open Court that "Commander Tanga and Charlito Manatad killed a certain person," and the corroborative testimony of Alciso who categorically
testified that MANATAD was on one side of the DECEASED, DE LA PE;A on the other and ENCIPIDO at the back when they perpetrated the
offense with which they are changed. In MANATAD's respect, therefore, it is not necessary to invoke conspiracy" to support his conviction.
The defense of alibi separately interposed by ENCIPIDO and MANATAD cannot prevail over their positive Identification by eyewitness Also by
ENCIPIDOS verbal acknowledgments of guilt, and by DE LA PE;A's judicial and extra- i judicial admission/confession, which are interlocking and
ad-missible as against themselves and as against the others whom they also implicated. Neither were ENCIPIDO and MANATAD able to prove that
they were at some place for such a period of time that it was impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission. Barangay Boa where ENCIPIDO was allegedly sawing lumber was approximately 60 kilometers away, 19 and Barangay Malinao where
MANATAD was supposedly plowing the field, about 12 kilometers, 20 from Barangay Mabini, Tubajon, Surigao where the incident occurred.
In the last analysis, the core issue addresses itself to the credibility of witnesses, a matter that the Trial Court had unequalled competence to
consider and decide since it was in a vantage position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses of both sides while testifying, an
opportunity not afforded to Appellate Courts. Its findings as to credibility should not be disturbed and are entitled to great weight unless there is
some fact of record that has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued, 21 which exceptions we find absent herein.
The last assigned error delving on the refusal of the Trial Court to give due course to appellants' Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the
judgment had become final is no longer of any consequence since all the grounds therefor have been elevated to and considered by this Court on
appeal.
In fine, the threads of evidence woven together establish APPELLANTS' guilt to a moral certainty.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed except as to the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00 in
accordance with recent jurisprudence. With proportionate costs. SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
YAP, J., dissenting:
I disagree with the majority opinion. This dissent will not alter the results, but there are two points I wish to stress.
Firstly, it was prejudicial error for the trial court, in a joint trial of the accused, to use the testimony of one of the accused against the other accused,
where the latter had no opportunity to cross-examine the former because all of the accused were represented by one and the same counsel de
oficio.
In the instant case, Eddie de la Pe;a one of the co-accused, testified in court that, under threat of being killed, he was forced to join the group of
the accused Brigido Encepido alias Commander Tanga, on March 28, 1982; that the group forcibly took him along with them; and that he was
present when they killed Jose Lacumbes on March 30, 1982. The trial court held that the testimony of De la Pe;a was admissible not only against
him, but also against the other co-accused. The court cited the doctrine that "if a defendant testifies as a witness in a joint trial against him and his
co-accused and admits his guilt and at the same time implicating the co-accused, the testimony is admissible against the latter who may cross-
examine him (U.S. v. Macamay, 36 Phil. 893; People v. Nakpil, 52 Phil. 985; People v. Tundia L-2576, May 25, 1951)."
The trial court, in the first place, erred in applying the above doctrine since the accused Eddie de la Pe;a in his testimony, did not admit his guilt. In
other words, his declaration was not i an admission against interest, but is merely an exculpatory statement. It was purely a self-serving statement,
throwing the blame for the offense on the other co-accused; hence, it should not have been admitted as evidence against them.
Moreover, under the doctrine cited by the trial court, the testimony of an accused is admissible against his co-accused who may cross-examine him.
In the case at bar, the other co-accused, Brigido Encepido and Charlito Manatad did not have the opportunity to cross-examine Eddie de la Pe;a.
They were all represented by the same lawyer de oficio. Counsel de oficio could not and did not cross-examine his own client, Eddie de la Pe;a
who was not a mere witness but also an accused testifying in his own behalf. Thus, when it became apparent that the interest of one accused was
in conflict with the interest of the other two co-accused, it should have been immediately obvious to the trial court that the three accused could not
be represented by one and the same counsel. The trial court should have suspended the trial and appointed another counsel de oficio to represent
the accused de la Pe;a or the other co-accused in order to provide the latter the opportunity to cross-examine the former. Unfortunately, this was
not done. Hence, for the trial court to have considered the testimony of De la Pe;a against his co-accused was a serious prejudicial error.
Furthermore, the version of the killing given by De la Pe;a did not jibe with the version given by the principal prosecution witness, Felicisimo Alciso
who claimed that he saw the killing, nor with the autopsy report. Testifying on cross-examination, De la Pe;a stated: 1
Q: How did they kin him?
A: They beat him; Commander Tanga kicked him then they shot him.
But the autopsy report 2 showed that the deceased had no bullet wounds but only stab wounds and incised wounds.
Secondly, it was grave error for the trial court to consider as evidence against the accused the supposed extrajudicial oral confession or admission
of guilt by the accused, where there were vital discrepancies in the testimonies of the witnesses who were presented by the prosecution to establish
the same. Police Commander Jorge Ortega testified that Brigido Encepido told him that he was the one who beheaded Jose Lacumbes. 3 Mayor
Mariano Espina, on the other hand, testified that Eddie de la Pe;a told him that he was the one who beheaded the deceased Jose
Lacumbes. 4 There was, therefore, a conflict between the version of Espina and that of Ortega on the oral confession of the accused. Apparently,
the trial court did not notice this vital discrepancy. In fact, the court also overlooked another obviously untrue statement of Mayor Espina when he
testified categorically that the accused Eddie de la Pe;a not only admitted to him that he cut off the two ears of the deceased and, in fact, showed
him the two ears, already dried up, which he carried in his pocket. 5 This testimony is obviously false because the autopsy showed that only one ear
of the deceased was cut off. The autopsy also showed that the neck of the deceased was hacked with a bolo, and yet, Mayor Espina, in his
testimony, recounted vividly how, in his presence, Eddie de la Pe;a brought out a sharp pointed knife which according to him he used in cutting
"little by little" the neck of the deceased. 6 These material discrepancies in the testimonies of Mayor Espina, as wen as the conflicting versions
between his testimony and that of Police Commander Ortega, were simply overlooked by the trial court. These discrepancies cast a serious doubt
on their testimonies that the accused orally confessed or admitted their guilt to them. Such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Without the testimonies of Mayor Espina and Police Commander Jorge Ortega and that of the accused Eddie de la Pe;a the only testimony that
remains to support the judgment of the trial court is that of Felicisimo Alciso who claimed to have witnessed the killing However, the testimony of
this witness suffers from some serious flaws which raise grave doubts as to its value. Hence, his testimony alone cannot be used as the sole basis
for convicting the accused.
(1) In this testimony, Felicisimo Alciso at first said that he could not recognize the person who killed the deceased Jose Lacumbes, but later, upon
prodding by the prosecutor, he changed his testimony and said he could recognize three of them and pointed to the three accused who were
present in court and who were the only ones in custody, the other accused being at large and were never tried.
14
(2) He testified that he came to know the names of the killers when he visited them in jail after they were caught on May 2, 1982. His testimony
regarding this visit strains one's credulity. According to him, he asked Eddie de la Pe;a why he was inside the jail; and the latter answered that he
was inside the jail because they were the ones who beheaded Jose Lacumbes. Why De la Pe;a should volunteer to confess Ms crime to a perfect
stranger is incredible. It is also rather hard to believe that Felicisimo Alciso after being supposedly told by a friend that he would be the next one to
be killed by the accused, would have the temerity to visit them in jail.
(3) Felicisimo Alciso executed an affidavit on July 13, 1982 in which he declared that he witnessed the killing of Jose Lacumbes on March 30, 1982,
but did not Identify who the killers were, although at the time when he executed the affidavit, he was already supposed to know who the killers
were, having visited them in jail shortly after their apprehension on May 2, 1982.
In the light of all the above, it cannot be said that the evidence presented by the prosecution is convincing enough and sufficient to establish the
guilt of the accused with moral certainty.
It is true that the accused Encepido and Manatad relying on alibi as their defense, may have a weak case. But their conviction should rest on the
strength of the evidence of the prosecution, and not on the weakness of the defense.
According to Elmer Andales, the bus conductor, he immediately became wary of the two men, because, even if they got on the bus together, the two
sat away from each other one sat two seats behind the driver, while the other sat at the back of the bus. At the time, there were only 15 passengers inside the bus.
He also noticed that the eyes of one of the men were reddish. When he approached the person near the driver and asked him whether he was paying for two
passengers, the latter looked dumb struck by the question. He then stuttered and said he was paying for two and gave PhP20. Andales grew more concerned when
the other man seated at the back also paid for both passengers. At this point, Andales said he became more certain that the two were up to no good, and that there
might be a holdup.
Afterwards, Andales said he became more suspicious because both men kept on asking him if the bus was going to stop at Ayala Avenue. The
witness also noticed that the man at the back appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view
as if he was tinkering with something. When Andales would get near the man, the latter would glare at him. Andales admitted, however, that he did not report the
suspicious characters to the police.
As soon as the bus reached the stoplight at the corner of Ayala Avenue and EDSA, the two men insisted on getting off the bus. According to
Andales, the bus driver initially did not want to let them off the bus, because a Makati ordinance prohibited unloading anywhere except at designated bus stops.
Eventually, the bus driver gave in and allowed the two passengers to alight. The two immediately got off the bus and ran towards Ayala Avenue. Moments after,
Andales felt an explosion. He then saw fire quickly engulfing the bus. He ran out of the bus towards a nearby mall. After a while, he went back to where the bus
was. He saw their bus passengers either lying on the ground or looking traumatized. A few hours after, he made a statement before the Makati Police Station
narrating the whole incident.

The accused should, therefore, be acquitted since their guilt has not been established beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution presented documents furnished by the Department of Justice, confirming that shortly before the explosion, the spokesperson of the
Abu Sayyaf Group Abu Solaiman announced over radio station DZBB that the group had a Valentines Day gift for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
After the bombing, he again went on radio and warned of more bomb attacks.

As stipulated during pretrial, accused Trinidad gave ABS-CBN News Network an exclusive interview some time after the incident, confessing his
participation in the Valentines Day bombing incident. In another exclusive interview on the network, accused Baharan likewise admitted his role in the bombing
incident. Finally, accused Asali gave a television interview, confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices for the 14 February 2005 bombing. The bus
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 188314
conductor identified the accused Baharan and Trinidad, and confirmed that they were the two men who had entered the RRCG bus on the evening of 14 February.
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Members of the Abu Sayyaf Group namely Khaddafy Janjalani, Gamal B. Baharan, Angelo Trinidad, Gappal Bannah Asali, Jainal Asali, Rohmat
- versus Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky, and other John and Jane Does were then charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Only Baharan,
Trinidad, Asali, and Rohmat were arrested, while the other accused remain at-large.

KHADDAFY JANJALANI, GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Present: On their arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the
Abu Khalil, GAPPAL BANNAH ASALI a.k.a. Maidan or Negro, JAINAL SALI a.k.a. Abu other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused Trinidad and Baharan
Solaiman, ROHMAT ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Jackie or Zaky, and other JOHN and JANE DOES,
CARPIO MORALES, J., pled not guilty. Rohmat pled not guilty to both charges. During the pretrial hearing, the parties stipulated the following:
Chairperson, 1.) The jurisdiction of this court over the offenses charged.
BRION, 2.) That all three accused namely alias Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted knowing one another before February 14, 2005.
BERSAMIN, 3.) All the same three accused likewise admitted that a bomb exploded in the RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA
route fronting the MRT terminal which is in front of the Makati Commercial Center.
VILLARAMA, JR., and
4.) Accused Asali admitted knowing the other accused alias Rohmat whom he claims taught him how to make explosive devices.
SERENO, JJ. 5.) The accused Trinidad also admitted knowing Rohmat before the February 14 bombing incident.
6.) The accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali all admitted to causing the bomb explosion inside the RRCG bus which left four
Accused, people dead and more or less forty persons injured.
7.) Both Baharan and Trinidad agreed to stipulate that within the period March 20-24 each gave separate interviews to the ABS-
CBN news network admitting their participation in the commission of the said crimes, subject of these cases.
GAMAL B. BAHARAN a.k.a. Tapay, ANGELO TRINIDAD a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and ROHMAT 8.) Accused Trinidad and Baharan also admitted to pleading guilty to these crimes, because they were guilt-stricken after seeing
ABDURROHIM a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky,
Promulgated: a man carrying a child in the first bus that they had entered.
9.) Accused Asali likewise admitted that in the middle of March 2005 he gave a television news interview in which he admitted
that he supplied the explosive devices which resulted in this explosion inside the RRCG bus and which resulted in the filing of these
January 10, 2011
charges.
Accused-Appellants. 10.) Finally, accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Asali admitted that they are members of the Abu Sayyaf. [1]
SERENO, J.:
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional In the light of the pretrial stipulations, the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas
Trial Court of Makati City in Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision convicted the three accused-appellants namely, to the charge of multiple frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge of multiple murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in
Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky of the complex crime of multiple murder their pleas. Defense counsel conferred with accused Baharan and Trinidad and explained to them the consequences of the pleas. The two accused acknowledged
and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua as the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge
required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death Penalty). of multiple frustrated murder.[2]

Statement of Facts After being discharged as state witness, accused Asali testified that while under training with the Abu Sayyaf in 2004, Rohmat, a.k.a Abu Jackie or
Zaky, and two other persons taught him how to make bombs and explosives. The trainees were told that they were to wage battles against the government in the
The pertinent facts, as determined by the trial court, are as follows: city, and that their first mission was to plant bombs in malls, the Light Railway Transit (LRT), and other parts of Metro Manila.

On 14 February 2005, an RRCG bus was plying its usual southbound route, from its Navotas bus terminal towards its Alabang bus terminal via As found by the trial court, Asali, after his training, was required by the Abu Sayyaf leadership, specifically Abu Solaiman and Rohmat, to secure
Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA). Around 6:30 to 7:30 in the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus stop, the eight kilos of TNT, a soldering gun, aluminum powder, a tester, and Christmas lights, all of which he knew would be used to make a bomb. He then recalled that
bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in. sometime in November to December 2004, Trinidad asked him for a total of 4 kilos of TNT that is, 2 kilos on two separate occasions. Rohmat allegedly called

15
Asali to confirm that Trinidad would get TNT from Asali and use it for their first mission. The TNT was allegedly placed in two buses sometime in December
2004, but neither one of them exploded.
Asali then testified that the night before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad and Baharan got another two kilos of TNT from him. Late in the
evening of 14 February, he received a call from Abu Solaiman. The latter told Asali not to leave home or go to crowded areas, since the TNT taken by Baharan and
Trinidad had already been exploded in Makati. Thirty minutes later, Trinidad called Asali, repeating the warning of Abu Solaiman. The next day, Asali allegedly
received a call from accused Rohmat, congratulating the former on the success of the mission. [3] According to Asali, Abu Zaky specifically said, Sa wakas nag
success din yung tinuro ko sayo.
Assignment of Errors
Accused-appellants raise the following assignment of errors:
I. The trial court gravely erred in accepting accused-appellants plea of guilt despite insufficiency of searching inquiry
into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the said plea.
II. The trial court gravely erred in finding that the guilt of accused-appellants for the crimes charged had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.[4]
First Assignment of Error
Accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad argue that the trial court did not conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty.
The transcript of stenographic notes during the 18 April 2005 re-arraignment before the Makati Regional Trial Court is reproduced below:
COURT : Anyway, I think what we should have to do, considering the stipulations that were agreed upon during the last hearing, is
to address this matter of pleas of not guilty entered for the frustrated murder charges by the two
accused, Mr. Trinidad and Mr. Baharan, because if you will recall they entered pleas of guilty
to the multiple murder charges, but then earlier pleas of not guilty for the frustrated multiple
murder charges remain [I]s that not inconsistent considering the stipulations that were entered
into during the initial pretrial of this case? [If] you will recall, they admitted to have caused the
bomb explosion that led to the death of at least four people and injury of about forty other
persons and so under the circumstances, Atty Pea, have you discussed this matter with your
clients?
ATTY. PEA : Then we should be given enough time to talk with them. I havent conferred with them about this with regard to
the multiple murder case.
COURT : Okay. So let us proceed now. Atty. Pea, can you assist the two accused because if they are interested in withdrawing their
[pleas], I want to hear it from your lips.
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor.
(At this juncture, Atty. Pea confers with the two accused, namely Trinidad and Baharan)
I have talked to them, your Honor, and I have explained to them the consequence of their pleas, your Honor, and that the plea of
guilt to the murder case and plea of not guilty to the frustrated multiple murder actually are
inconsistent with their pleas.
COURT : With matters that they stipulated upon?
ATTY. PEA : Yes, your Honor. So, they are now, since they already plead guilt to the murder case, then they are now changing their
pleas, your Honor, from not guilty to the one of guilt. They are now ready, your Honor, for re-
arraignment.
INTERPRETER: (Read again that portion [of the information] and translated it in Filipino in a clearer way and asked both accused
what their pleas are).
Your Honor, both accused are entering separate pleas of guilt to the crime charged.
COURT : All right. So after the information was re-read to the accused, they have withdrawn their pleas of not guilty and changed it
to the pleas of guilty to the charge of frustrated murder. Thank you. Are there any matters you
need to address at pretrial now? If there are none, then I will terminate pretrial and
accommodate[5]
As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of
guilty, for while justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he
understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction. [6]Thus, trial court judges are required to observe the following procedure
under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.
(Emphasis supplied)
The requirement to conduct a searching inquiry applies more so in cases of re-arraignment. In People v. Galvez, the Court noted that since accused-appellant's
original plea was not guilty, the trial court should have exerted careful effort in inquiring into why he changed his plea to guilty. [7] According to the Court:
The stringent procedure governing the reception of a plea of guilt, especially in a case involving the death penalty, is imposed upon
the trial judge in order to leave no room for doubt on the possibility that the accused might have misunderstood the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea.[8]
Likewise, the requirement to conduct a searching inquiry should not be deemed satisfied in cases in which it was the defense counsel who explained the
consequences of a guilty plea to the accused, as it appears in this case. In People v. Alborida, this Court found that there was still an improvident plea of guilty,
even if the accused had already signified in open court that his counsel had explained the consequences of the guilty plea; that he understood the explanation of his
counsel; that the accused understood that the penalty of death would still be meted out to him; and that he had not been intimidated, bribed, or threatened. [9]
We have reiterated in a long line of cases that the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the rules to
satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress; mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and
consequences of their guilty plea.[10] This requirement is stringent and mandatory.[11]
Nevertheless, we are not unmindful of the context under which the re-arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of
guilt against the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty to another charge multiple murder based on the same act
relied upon in the multiple frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made
two other confessions of guilt one through an extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews, as stipulated by both accused during pretrial), and the other
via judicial admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in
this instance. Remanding the case for re-arraignment is not warranted, as the accuseds plea of guilt was not the sole basis of the condemnatory judgment under
consideration.[12]
Second Assignment of Error
In People v. Oden, the Court declared that even if the requirement of conducting a searching inquiry was not complied with, [t]he manner by which
the plea of guilt is made loses much of great significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence proving the commission by the person
accused of the offense charged.[13] Thus, in People v. Nadera, the Court stated:
Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial
courtrelied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be sustained , because then it is
predicated not merely on the guilty plea of the accused but on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged. [14] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In their second assignment of error, accused-appellants assert that guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. They pointed out that the testimony of the
conductor was merely circumstantial, while that of Asali as to the conspiracy was insufficient.
Insofar as accused-appellants Baharan and Trinidad are concerned, the evidence for the prosecution, in addition to that which can be drawn from
the stipulation of facts, primarily consisted of the testimonies of the bus conductor, Elmer Andales, and of the accused-turned-state-witness, Asali. Andales
positively identified accused Baharan and Trinidad as the two men who had acted suspiciously while inside the bus; who had insisted on getting off the bus in
violation of a Makati ordinance; and who had scampered away from the bus moments before the bomb exploded. On the other hand, Asali testified that he had
given accused Baharan and Trinidad the TNT used in the bombing incident in Makati City. The guilt of the accused Baharan and Trinidad was sufficiently
established by these corroborating testimonies, coupled with their respective judicial admissions (pretrial stipulations) and extrajudicial confessions (exclusive
television interviews, as they both stipulated during pretrial) that they were indeed the perpetrators of the Valentines Day bombing. [15] Accordingly, the Court
upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Anent accused Rohmat, the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of accused-turned-state-witness Asali. Below is a reproduction
of the transcript of stenographic notes on the state prosecutors direct examination of state-witness Asali during the 26 May 2005 trial:
Q : You stated that Zaky trained you and Trinidad. Under what circumstances did he train you, Mr. Witness, to assemble those explosives, you and Trinidad?
A : Abu Zaky, Abu Solaiman, Khadaffy Janjalani, the three of them, that Angelo Trinidad and myself be the one to be trained to make an explosive, sir.
Q : Mr. witness, how long that training, or how long did it take that training?
A : If I am not mistaken, we were thought to make bomb about one month and two weeks.
Q : Now, speaking of that mission, Mr. witness, while you were still in training at Mr. Cararao, is there any mission that you undertook, if any, with respect to
that mission?
A : Our first mission was to plant a bomb in the malls, LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila, sir.[16]
The witness then testified that he kept eight kilos of TNT for accused Baharan and Trinidad.
Q : Now, going back to the bomb. Mr. witness, did you know what happened to the 2 kilos of bomb that Trinidad and Tapay took from you sometime in
November 2004?
A : That was the explosive that he planted in the G-liner, which did not explode.
Q : How did you know, Mr. witness?
A : He was the one who told me, Mr. Angelo Trinidad, sir.
Q : What happened next, Mr. witness, when the bomb did not explode, as told to you by Trinidad?
A : On December 29, Angelo Trinidad got 2 more kilos of TNT bombs.
Q : Did Trinidad tell you why he needed another amount of explosive on that date, December 29, 2004? Will you kindly tell us the reason why?
A : He told me that Abu Solaiman instructed me to get the TNT so that he could detonate a bomb
Q : Were there any other person, besides Abu Solaiman, who called you up, with respect to the taking of the explosives from you?
A : There is, sir Abu Zaky, sir, called up also.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you when he called you up?
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 A : He told me that this is your first mission. confirmation that Trinidad would be getting TNT from Asali as part of their mission prove the finding that Rohmats co-inducement was the determining cause of
Q : Please enlighten the Honorable Court. What is that mission you are referring to? the commission of the crime.[21] Such command or advice [was] of such nature that, without it, the crime would not have materialized. [22]
A : That is the first mission where we can show our anger towards the Christians.
Q : The second time that he got a bomb from you, Mr. witness, do you know if the bomb explode?
A : I did not know what happened to the next 2 kilos taken by Angelo Trinidad from me until after I was caught, because I was told by the policeman that Further, the inducement was so influential in producing the criminal act that without it, the act would not have been performed. [23] In People v.
interviewed me after I was arrested that the 2 kilos were planted in a bus, which also did not explode. Sanchez, et al., the Court ruled that, notwithstanding the fact that Mayor Sanchez was not at the crime scene, evidence proved that he was the mastermind of the
Q : So besides these two incidents, were there any other incidents that Angelo Trinidad and Tapay get an explosive for you, Mr. witness? criminal act or the principal by inducement. Thus, because Mayor Sanchez was a co-principal and co-conspirator, and because the act of one conspirator is the act
A : If I am not mistaken, sir, on February 13, 2005 at 6:30 p.m. of all, the mayor was rendered liable for all the resulting crimes. [24] The same finding must be applied to the case at bar.
Q : Who got from you the explosive Mr. witness?
A : Its Angelo Trinidad and Tapay, sir.
Q : How many explosives did they get from you, Mr. witness, at that time? The Court also affirms the finding of the existence of conspiracy involving accused Baharan, Trinidad, and Rohmat. Conspiracy was clearly
A : They got 2 kilos TNT bomb, sir. established from the collective acts of the accused-appellants before, during and after the commission of the crime. As correctly declared by the trial court in its
Q : Did they tell you, Mr. witness, where are they going to use that explosive? Omnibus Decision:
A : No, sir.
Q : Do you know, Mr. witness, what happened to the third batch of explosives, which were taken from you by Trinidad and Tapay?
A : That is the bomb that exploded in Makati, sir. Asalis clear and categorical testimony, which remains unrebutted on its major points, coupled with the judicial
Q : Why did you know, Mr. witness? admissions freely and voluntarily given by the two other accused, are sufficient to prove the existence of a conspiracy hatched
A : Because I was called in the evening of February 14 by Abu Solaiman. He told me not to leave the house because the explosive that were taken by Tapay between and among the four accused, all members of the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, to wreak chaos and mayhem in the metropolis
and Angelo Trinidad exploded. by indiscriminately killing and injuring civilian victims by utilizing bombs and other similar destructive explosive devices.
Q : Was there any other call during that time, Mr. Witness?
A : I was told by Angelo Trinidad not to leave the house because the explosive that he took exploded already, sir.
Q : How sure were you, Mr. witness, at that time, that indeed, the bomb exploded at Makati, beside the call of Abu Solaiman and Trinidad? While said conspiracy involving the four malefactors has not been expressly admitted by accused Baharan, Angelo
A : It was told by Abu Solaiman that the bombing in Makati should coincide with the bombing in General Santos. Trinidad, and Rohmat, more specifically with respect to the latters participation in the commission of the crimes, nonetheless it has
A : He told it to me, sir I cannot remember the date anymore, but I know it was sometime in February 2005. been established by virtue of the aforementioned evidence, which established the existence of the conspiracy itself and the
Q : Any other call, Mr. witness, from Abu Solaiman and Trinidad after the bombing exploded in Makati, any other call? indispensable participation of accused Rohmat in seeing to it that the conspirators criminal design would be realized.
A : There is, sir The call came from Abu Zaky.
Q : What did Abu Zaky tell you, Mr. witness?
A : He just greeted us congratulations, because we have a successful mission. It is well-established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused, which clearly manifests a
A : He told me that sa wakas, nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo. concurrence of wills, a common intent or design to commit a crime ( People v. Lenantud, 352 SCRA 544). Hence, where acts of the
Q : By the way, Mr. witness, I would just like to clarify this. You stated that Abu Zaky called you up the following day, that was February 15, and accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the accomplishment of the same
congratulating you for the success of the mission. My question to you, Mr. witness, if you know what is the unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident and all the perpetrators will be held liable as principals (People v. Ellado, 353 SCRA 643).
relation of that mission, wherein you were congratulated by Abu Zaky, to the mission, which have been [25]
indoctrinated to you, while you were in Mt. Cararao, Mr. witness?
A : They are connected, sir.
Q : Connected in what sense, Mr. witness? In People v. Geronimo, the Court pronounced that it would be justified in concluding that the defendants therein were engaged in a conspiracy
A : Because when we were undergoing training, we were told that the Abu Sayyaf should not wage war to the forest, but also wage our battles in the city. when the defendants by their acts aimed at the same object, one performing one part and the other performing another part so as to complete it, with a view to the
Q : Wage the battle against who, Mr. witness? attainment of the same object; and their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association,
A : The government, sir.[17] concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. [26]
What can be culled from the testimony of Asali is that the Abu Sayyaf Group was determined to sow terror in Metro Manila, so that they could
Accused contend that the testimony of Asali is inadmissible pursuant to Sec. 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. It is true that under the rule,
show their anger towards the Christians. [18] It can also be seen that Rohmat, together with Janjalani and Abu Solaiman, had carefully planned the Valentines Day
statements made by a conspirator against a co-conspirator are admissible only when made during the existence of the conspiracy. However, as the Court ruled
bombing incident, months before it happened. Rohmat had trained Asali and Trinidad to make bombs and explosives. While in training, Asali and others were told
in People v. Buntag, if the declarant repeats the statement in court, his extrajudicial confession becomes a judicial admission, making the testimony admissible as
that their mission was to plant bombs in malls, the LRT, and other parts of Metro Manila. According to Asali, Rohmat called him on 29 December 2004 to confirm
to both conspirators.[27] Thus, in People v. Palijon, the Court held the following:
that Trinidad would get two kilos of TNT from Asali, as they were about to commence their first mission. [19] They made two separate attempts to bomb a bus in
Metro Manila, but to no avail. The day before the Valentines Day bombing, Trinidad got another two kilos of TNT from Asali. On Valentines Day, the Abu Sayyaf
[W]e must make a distinction between extrajudicial and judicial confessions. An extrajudicial confession may be given in evidence
Group announced that they had a gift for the former President, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. On their third try, their plan finally succeeded. Right after the bomb
against the confessant but not against his co-accused as they are deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine him. A judicial
exploded, the Abu Sayyaf Group declared that there would be more bombings in the future. Asali then received a call from Rohmat, praising the former: Sa wakas
confession is admissible against the declarants co-accused since the latter are afforded opportunity to cross-examine the
nag success din yung tinuro ko sayo.[20]
former. Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court applies only to extrajudicial acts or admissions and not to testimony at
trial where the party adversely affected has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant . Mercenes admission implicating
In the light of the foregoing evidence, the Court upholds the finding of guilt against Rohmat. Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
his co-accused was given on the witness stand. It is admissible in evidence against appellant Palijon. Moreover, where several
accused are tried together for the same offense, the testimony of a co-accused implicating his co-accused is competent evidence
Art. 17. Principals. The following are considered principals:
against the latter.[28]
1. Those who take a direct part in the execution of the act
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is
2. Those who directly force or induce others to commit it
hereby AFFIRMED.
3. Those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished
SO ORDERED.
Accused Rohmat is criminally responsible under the second paragraph, or the provision on principal by inducement. The instructions and training
he had given Asali on how to make bombs coupled with their careful planning and persistent attempts to bomb different areas in Metro Manila and Rohmats

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