-.

DCSOPS

German into English

Katherine A Mull

IMALTSVERZEICHNIS

0F
THE MUSSOLINI

 THS RESCUE OP .It

i
TABLE_O|^C0r^12.

I To 'pp 206=214

II Main Situation.in Summer of

\ U (Is July 25th9 19l^3 -'Situation in Italy

\ 11 *2
The Unknown Residence of Mussolini 37-51

s9
Maddal@na'? 52-56

; 111 9 1
Strength and Organisation of the Italian Military Forces

': 11 T 3> in Maddalena . 57- "

German Troop Situation in Sardinia and Corsica (kug

T.<i

I I 7x 'A
/ Estimate of the Situation*, The Plan.

: 11 T '*. Final Plan for Operation "Maddalena" . 113128

Statue of Preparations up to 2?,843

Execution of the Operation Progress of the. Last --Reeon

I.TI96
Authorisation of the Offensive Measures* Discussion in

:iitl@r9s Field fieadquartera* . . .

IV.
"Great Sa?is?99 Time between ?fMaddalenaf? and "Great Sassf% .
149-180

28.8.I943 - 8.9.1943-. .Further Discussions.

IV,1.
8 Sep 1943 .

IV*2.
9 Sep 19-+3 '
215-220

XV,3.
Plan for the Freedom Action of "'Jreat Sasso"
221-234

IV,4.
Mussolini Family . '
234=240

T 'S*
"JO Sf-iate^be^ 1Q4^ 24X252

T ' f i
1 1 tve<ni5r^rti-1hP'r lQ4' a ?S"?<=>284

IV-7*
12 SeDtetber
Maps

\.

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I 2

INDEX OF MAPS

Ajaccof ls5OOOOO EUROPE (Air) N.E. W 6

Maddalena 1:500*000 Enlargement of M 1.

M 3s Operational outline map

Naval movements bearing on Plan s!Maddalena" (from memory) Is20,000

M ki

Topography for land operation during Plan "Maddalena"< 1:2500 (apprx9)

IBs Maps for Operation "Gran Sasso"

Rome and Chieti, li250000 ITALY, Sheet 23 & 29, First Edition,

Aquili dAbruzzi and Teramo, lslOOO.000 ITALY Sheet 139 &

for the 12 Sept 19^3 PXan^ with the approach route of the mountain

force and the approach route of the valley force. ls25OOOO

for the 12 Sept 19^3 Plan^ Valley of Assergi, enlarged to 1:50.000

Operational outline map for Plan "Gran Sasso" (from memory)

61
-Operational
j j - _ _ - - outline
^ ^ 400map
0' of(Operation
i )
"GRAH SASSO" 12,Sept

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DRAFT . i
I
At that tim5 Germany found itself on the defensive on all fronts* On j
I
several of the front teeters there were distinct signs of withdrawals of rear 1

troops which wer supposed to have held ground until the end of the war o |

Tk Bast front, after the big blow at Stalingrad just a half year earlier, j

had, to a certain extent, settled down againo It appeared to e^ery unprejudiced I

observer, however, that the great offensive.was eompletely ended by the Russian |

Army* Other offensive results were produced by isolated German divisions and j

corps which nevertheless eould sot get beyond the initial phase9 The great. de~ j

fensive successes which were doubtlessly.produced, especially the great losses to I

the enemy f men-and 'materiel, were mostly o^erratedo' The Operations Staff eoi {

puted facts based on the exhausted appearaaee of the Russian Arayo In the same

way, they hoped that the great manpower reserve of. Russia would be similarly sx- |

f the US 0 Lend-Lease program t Russia did not advocate accurate

numbers-of materiel^ as report thereon were incomplete* The reports concerned

exclusively the supplies which were transported over the Iranian railroads^

When the Front was only several hundred kilometers east of the German

border, the fixed recoil of the front lines was being threatened as early as the

first part of 19^2o Particularly threatening at that time, howevere was the fact

that although the front lines were propitiously situated and ^ery strong, they

could not keep ground against the counterattacks of the Russian Array And a

s!Oable War Command Headquarters in Russia was unavoidable0 This required, howev

er, considerably more troops, particularly Reserves, as a defense for well-

Th African campaign was almost lost After Rommel's advance to Egypt was

shattered, every offensive hope in the Mediterranean seemed an illusion It

possible, though that a mor defensive war could be furthered in this campaign*

And. then troop deployment was accelerated by the Allied landings in Africa,

opening of the second front, and neither the number of troops nor reinforcements

was increased.'' The Air Fore alon could not close the keypo.int at Malta and

first invasion of the Allies in Europe had already shown that the same results

would take plaee ithr against the Italian mainland itself or against one of its

camps on Sardinia - and the latter took place in June 19^3 (Pantellaria) and

July 19^3 (Sicily).

As a result of talks with various members of the Armed Forces Operations

Staff and the General Staff, I learned then that this development was not gener- |

ally a.feoped-frone and brought about the premature break-up of the-German-RussoJ

war. Many high-ranking posts were against Hitler's point of iriew in 19^-0 and *fl j

that first the re@ strength of the 'Mediterranean problem area should be i

cleared - eompletely s@ The fall of Egypt, Palestine and Syria had'swung Turkj |

to the 8ide f the Axis Powers and presented the possibility that Russia sould !'

b@ attacked not only from the western but ale from the |

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 REGISTRY NUS88ER PAGE NUMBER

area in 19^1 and with it required a further postponement of the deployment of

troops to Russia for at least one year* .' ; .

The isucce'sses of the German war at sea, which resulted almost "exclusively

from; the U-boatsf were only slight in 19^-3 The Allies had had evident successes

through the improvement of defense measures, through their convoy system and the

continued improvement of their air traffic control services The development f

a new U-boat type was put off for some unknown reason*, Perhaps mostly to have

some success against the convoy system, German air reconnaissance penetrated the

American waters zone* For this purpose there were only two types German air-

t available for duty - the HE-177 SLnd th JU-29Qd The former was an out*and

failure and was almost abandoned - by. the pilots The JU-29O. which was

rd@red as the second^type to reach the necessary maximum range, was available n

in BO small a number that a true cover of the reconnaissance area was impes

A separate problem occurred at the same tine - that of the accuracy life

f the motor - ;a material problem which was unsolvable for Germany0

The air position also began to become critical. Our flyers were forced to

g into battle with almost 1939/^0 types aircraft Fighter aircraft of the

Messerschmidt type were still of equal footing with the Allied fighter aircraft,

perhaps even somewhat superior The bomber types of 1939* however9 were held

back and were bj no means sufficient They could not justifyv either numberwise

r armament-wise, the tasks and demands which were placed on them*,

The fixed offensive war staff of the Russian Army Staff could keep ground

against the German Army only through stronger air supporto The attack on English

war industry was also filled with casualty. Because of this split-up,, more and

more completely insufficient number of aircraft were made available for duty in

the Mediterranean area*, This was sure to lead to reverses directly on this

theater of war in the long run*. The failure of a German strategic Air Fore

became more and more perceptible

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 PAGE UUMBSM

II* 1. 2$ July 19;+3 ..Situation :inVltaly*..- . ' j

On Monday*'26th July 19^3at approximately r':3O a.m** the first reports' . j.

came into Italy that sme government ehaages were actually taking place* The re j

ports were mostly scanty and confused* At 7 asso<9 the German radio brought to thef

public the news of the successful government reformation in Italy,, II Duce was tog

be removed, the King had again taken state affairs into his own hands and Marshall

Badog'li was charged with the governments King and Badolgio, further backed the f

Axis and had issued an official declaration that the war would be continued and

that Italy would fight on until Tie&ory side by side with the Axis might.

The question* which Mussolini's cabinet could so quietly discharge* concern

ing this turn of vents* was abo^e all still a mystery. It was well known that

Mnesolini had received a false vote at a noting of the Great Fascist Council by

which, he had assumed power without any further ado The assumption took place

without any kind of ceremonies* Great differences must have appeared within the.

highest Fascist circles Ciano had authoritatively a share in the plan of the

Manifesto which had shaped the foundations for that false vote, and also agreed

in the Council t the vote agaiast his father-in-law* For the German circles.

particularly for the average body of officers, this development came as a com-

S far as I myself could gain information of the situation9 the German

political foreign news service had for quite some time given reports to the Ger

man command of the actual situation in Italy, reports of the evident strength

situationo Despite th@s th@r existed optimism in the headquarters positions

against the developments in Italy and there was pen propaganda carried right

through the high posts of the German Armed Forcese The question still remained

open* however* as to how the military security of this optimism was furthered in

the knowledge f the actual circumstances which had been intentionally managed

Broadcast from foreign news services had reported that the interpolitieal

i Italy had several causes<, In 19^-0 Italy entered the war o The popula

neither prepared tor this entry into war nor inspired over it. Neither

were industry nor the oonomj in Italy prepared for war nor for the situation

without special help from without (imports f raw material and coal) 9 in impres

sive manners or numbers to undertake warfareo The war was unpopular to most f

The political groups which w@r gathered around the Kisg*s household itself

bhat of the Crown Priac0 were already adversaries of war, th latter group

being set up as Yen politically strong anti-German* Through necessity* troops,

and more troops had to be placed in the apparent bottomless barrell of th

Russian theater of war* thus making morale considerably worse * Then came the big

in dead &n& also the blam@ for- a further depression in the beginning s

I of the retreat of the fallen army of Romrae11 which followed immediately |

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short order, one position after the other was lost in North Africa, But even so e

it must no be. 'overlooked that just a few years earlier a hard war had been fought

in Abyssinia* A large number of Italian officers and troops, as well as members

f other services were still in Abyssinia Even their situation was uncertain

in that the Colonies,, at a distance from the motherland, which was now. at'war,

were"completely shut off from her Another especially strong 9 pronounced family

trait of the Italian peopl lay in the long separation which the even stronger

after-effects of these events had on the morale and war fatigue of the people

The Italian economy itself was adjusted to an effective support of the colonial

polities - even for th decline of the warlike engagements in the colonies. The

if a modern technical war didn't grow so easily

German reverses in North Africa followed shortly after the Allied land-

Ings on Pantellaria and then on Sicily e With this there was an immediate threat

to the Italian mainland and the disinclination of the Italian people for th al

ways unpopular war and their fear of the coming events was even greater* From

within, there same more and more noticeable distrust toward Germany and there

were outward expressions against the German Armed Forces* The original cause of

the disaster was sought for in Germany and Hitler and in Mussolini's weak reli

;hese* One indeed forgot, or overlooked, the fact that Italy's entrance

war in 19^*0 resulted not only from Italian and German publicity but also

from, th surprising and unwelcome German high commands* . And Italy's downfall in

Albania and Greece was extremely disagreeable to the German leadership Italy*-s

entranc into the war cam at the very end of the victorious and world-surprising

quick end f the German campaign in Franceo The above described developments f

the war and surprisingly unfavorable effects on the morale of the Italian popu

lace only made it possible for the powers over the Italian palace and the Crown

Prince to successfully shape their endeavors toward the procurement of an ever

ig following f a would-be Crown Prince faction* Above all, this influence

accessible in the circles of the higher and middle class mobility, military

as well as social, of the leading economical and industrial circles*, Thus a

continuing weakness of FaBcism was already quit advanced in 19^1/^2 so that

through the influence of the Crown Prince and his followers * it overlapped the

Fascist loyal following of Mussolini personally. The fact that Count

Ciano, Mussolini's son-in-law 9 longstanding Foreign Minister belonged to

this movement, was an open seerets 19^3 found this growth so developed that a l

ready some leading Fascists joined th@ movement either openly or secretly* Be-

cane f this the political situation of. Fascism was so definitely weakened that

these eirel^s needed t.o wait only for the appropriate moment to bargain, and for

the Italians this was an'especially untimely growth of the military situation in

This opportunity appeared following the Allied landing on

Ther was a growing spirit of low moral in

Ir t the time of the'landings, so much so that it proved to

through his own fault that Germany became anti-Italian and
forfeited his personal credit in Germanyo Even so, h

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*-..*j)*1*y.TytwK-*g-ct-fftjg-' tf. p t
7

ing as to the military situation* (For the rest*

Mussolini himself at that time - perhaps through the fall of Pantellaria - had

by his generals*) The greatest part of these

bj the published diary of Count Ciano, just as

ther was adequate authority published by those who were explicity concerned with

The above described developments I received as information predominantly on

the occasion of Mussolinies resignation through the political foreign news ser

vice and then later through the Italian news service, since I hadn't concerned

myself with such problems before* Part f the new was given to me on the oc

casion f my instructions on the operations in Italy, through officers in Hitler E

field'headquarters* Moreover, it wasn't unknown to th German military intelli

gence service that authoritative circles in the neighborhood of the King and the

Crown Prince endeavored, abroad in neutral terrltotj^ to meet the Allies in a

arranged in the center of the country, even in

neutral territory, namely the Vatican* Th Itali

3iano How far these negotiations had pro

gressed, or else which- plans had already been agreed upon for the future, was not

known by the military intelligence services *

As already pointed out* after the first news of Mussolini's resignation and

after the first loud announcements over the German radio of the reorganization of

the Italian government, no later details were experienced* Reports from Italy

were very contradictory, some coming'from the Ambassador^ some from military

or some from, foreign news service channels in the hands of the high corn-

First of all 9 it was clear only that Mussolini had received a vote of

no confidence from the main Fascist council. Besides, he had tendered his resig

nation to the King himself and he had had an audience with the King at the filla

Savoy<;, which th latter had since already abandoned, and from this moment on

failed him on every eeasioxie In addition, the official statement of the King

Badogllo over their continued faithful alliance to th Axis became known

After 12 Sep *3 Mussolini himself told me about the sequence of events of

meeting* First the King heaped upon Mussolini the heaviest reproaches - he

driven Italy into the war and would have to answer for the ultimate fall of

Mussolini thereupon retorted that the.recovery and prosperity of Italy,

the creation f the "Empire was an intrinsic gain of the Fascist governments This

was certainly not to be thanked for it*

made the position of the royal house firm through these

politic, and it was still the historical merit of Fascism and the'March on Rome,

that fee had prevented & slip to the radical Leftist side and therefore removed

The Kinggp.v@ in and acknoifledged the merits of 11 Due to Italy and th

Mussolini forever as his eousin* He would never forget the successful work which

Lni had accomplished for the Italian people and the Statee (The designa

, "cousin", on the king's part was offered to all holders of the General

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 INTEU.IGENCE TRMVSIATION RESiSTft NUBSBER PAGE NUMBER

H 7563 8
- t all those who were spoken of as "cousin" by the Italian king*)

Mussolini described this t me in conversation - it took place in; the morning

hours of 13 September 19^3 in the Imperial Hotel in Vienna - especially the initia

excitement of the king, who ran around the audience room and emphasized his words

I . ' . - .. .

jvery stronglye Quite suddenly, then, hie voice changed and the dismissal was out

spokenly hearty, although the king certainly knew what fate awaited II Duce after

the lattervs exit from the audience room

Outside the rooff, Mussolini was already awaited by more earabinieri (police)

officers* These .explained to him that he must follow them without resistance, as

they had orders to bring him-to the police barracks*. Mussolini had regretted

so he continued in his talk with me, that he had not followed the advice of

friends, crusted ones, to forego the farewell audience with the king without

vitn'-jsaes* He followed the officers unresistingly and was brought to

ic@ barracks in a sanitation van which bore the Red Cross insignia* There

he was kepi under strict guard for severalcfeys in a room on the first flooro This

description also coincided almost exactly with our findings in Home, when we tried

to find out Mussolini's place of arrest * Even the location of the room was known

to us,, but w@ barely knew it when Mussolini was taken off to his second place of

On the occasion of these talks on 13 Sep 19^3 Mussolini also spoke about his

plais'for. the future, which he thought over well during his captivity and during

tho night following his release * He no longer desired9 after his return to Italy,

to establish a "Republican-Fascist Party", since he could no longer even dream of

a. higher coi/imand in the Fascist Party, which had been smashed through the change

in the government*. He indicated that his greatest political error was that hefl

an'i therefore Fascism, had concluded a compromise with the House of Savoy and that

.ht?-h&& stopped the Fascist downfall of the royal house* He regretted especially

ithr.t he had presented the belief to the King and the Crown Prince of his fixed

la&ser{;ion regarding their loyalty and cooperation toward the Fascist Regime* And

r$Q'M hi and the Italian people had to gay the bill for this lightheartednesso The

ilast nnd optimum moment for the downfall of the royal house was victoriously em

plet/d Abbysinian campaign and it seemed that this point was- unexplainably wasted

Mussolini gave this explanation without any noticeable bitterness ver

hi? fate as being a pure report of facts*, Th German embassy'in Rome had sought,

trrough its official Italian position (perhaps through Badoglio and the Crown

learn f Mussolini9s whereabout since the 25th July 19^3 a ^d the

still had no success, as the answers reference the loea

in government in' Italy my area duties

Whatever the consequences for my

The 26th Jul 19V5 as well as the next day went by

normal daily duties of troop service in the 21.' Even the

seemed to suffer no other consequences from their changed

could well have been traced back, first of all, to the

and very unclear report's were submitted, but I also traced it f

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back to the statement of the then Office of Foreign Defense (military news ser

vice) under Admiral Ganariso The latter gave9 as I later learned, a comparative

ly thoroughly depressing estimate of the situation to the Armed Forces Operations

Staffe' And there was a feeling,, too, that the remaining Italians in the Axis

Alliance would be safe also under the new government, and no sort of weakness of

the Italian was potential was expected in any way through the collapse of Fascisms

Completely surprised, I received the command, on 26 Jul 19^3 in the after

noon around 1500 hours, to come by air to Hitler's field headquarters at once* Asa

immediate reason for this command wasn't giveno Since this was the first time

that I had been called t the field headquarters, this order case unexpectedly

and surprisingly* A special purpose plane, a JU 52$ stood ready for me at the

Tsmplehof field at 1700 hourse Inwardly, I already believed in a connection with

the morning events in Italy4 but the role that ray unit was to play in this was

completely obscure,, To one of my officers, who brought me to the airport, I care

-fully gave the ord^ to put the 5Q2& Rifle Battalion on the alerte

It might be neeessary to mention here that this battalion was on its initial

assignment and at that time had a strength of around 120 men available for duty

Toward 2000 hours-I arrived in the plane.at an airfield near Rastehburg

(East Prussia)* whieh at that time was the location of Hitler's field headquar

ters <> I was taken from there in a personnel carrier and brought through various

barriers to the innermost, blockadeo In a so-called teahouse, I was introduced to

5 officers of various branches of service These, too, had not been informed as

.to the purpose of their presence at headquarterso Shortly after the introduction^

we were ordered together before the presence of Adolf Hitlere For me, this was

the first meeting with the German head of the nationo Each of us 0 in brief state

ments , had to describe our careerso I was the only Austrian from the 6 officers

presents Also, I was the only one who had come by private journey from Italyo

The Fuehrer asked rr. the following question; What is your attitude toward Italy

and the Italian people?

My reply sounded something like thiss "I'm an Austrian*, Our attitude to

ward Italy has already been described through events of the earlier World War and

through South Tyrol*!V

Thereupon, the other 5 officers were dismissed and I was detained by Hitlero

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H 7563 10
The Plan* Commands Given by Adolf Hitler.

In the short conference which followed with Hitler, which took place under

k eyes, he'-fjirst' shoved some lack of confidence in the House of Savoy! The gist

Hitler's worde were something like thiss - .

"This House of Savoy has betrayed tis this time,, too Although I was assured

by all officials of German posts in Rome that there was no thought as yet of any

Italian abandonment of the Axis, I felt I was deceived by this position by the

Italians themselves and I couldn't see the true position e A kingdom which shows

itself so ungrateful to the rescuer of its Italian state and people, and even

rs i t 9 ean't hold the loyalty of a country to which it is bound by another

But I wanted to have Mussolini's loyalty and never conceded that he

surrender to the Allies at the very end*" Then, in impressionable words,

Hitler gave a picture of his friendfi Mussolini o

" I I Duce i s , in my eyes, one of the last of the Romans, he is certainly the

last remaining symbol of a proud Rome which onee ruled the world* His life, his

rise and his deeds ar@ equalled only by a few f the old Roman rulers * II Due

is"also more than jnst an ally, more than the representative and promoter of the

befriended Italian Fascism;'he came to le as a man, and, as with only a few men

up t nw $ he is still my great friendo And I never leave friends in trouble*"

"The Skorgenys were to liberate my friend, Mussolini but the terrible fate

which our enemies intended for him was turned aside. They were dispersed b y the

Air Force and scattered by General Student*"

"Only one thing causes me great sorrow and that is the discontinuance of the

German posts in Rome The German embassy heeds only the monarchy And one b@

lieves everything which comes from this side*, They've become soft in the south

era sun, they've even become half Italian. Even Kesselring believes what is told

by the Italian Crown Prince and others in that circle* And I know that the

is going to betray Germany a second time a This must be met at

Horn dared not be lost, or the southern front will collapse Genera

19

and his troops must be especially alert for thiso

m to-free II Duce must be held Top Secret. I have commanded and

most explicit order that only a total of 5 peopl dare know

General Student and you are included in this groupo In no event

Even Field Marshal Kesselring and

his staff must under no circumstances know of this 0 The 3 men, who must help

must choose yourselves, but don't

Besides General Student is also

just as much about .it"

friend'Mussolini back her again - I know you'll do your utmost

ay hand and 1 was dismissed He had spoken to me with sue!

that in that moment'I didn't think of the danger or impossi

"to find and free a man, whose place of confinement was kept

an abolished government* On the contrary, I had the ab-

that the plan must be carried out and must be successfulo

8 -FEB. 6 (CONTINUATION SHEET)

 Adolf Hitler's personality, as I?ve already mentioned, through this first be-I

casion to observe and speak with him, made a very great impression on me. His art|

1 of .speaking effected sueh a strong conviction and confidence, that~aH. thoughts |

1 that they aroused in me were simple to suggest* I even believed in my missiono I

sThis belief in the completion of the order -was- also necessary to eliminate any j

loomiag doubts or restrictions * Certainly, a sounder meaning of the truth couldnHj

[be missing - to recognise and charge those in the plan that they were in dangero \

j ' ' ' ?

I Following this conversation, I was again escorted back, to the so-ealled \

("teahouse." General of the Air Force Student also ease there and I was introduced!

I to ^him. Next, we spoke of the method of my appointment in the framework of the |

111 Air Force Then i mt the aatioaal&S Chief, H@inrich Himmler, and took part in f

I ' - . . . . . J

{their conversationso TTe gave us a detailed lecture on the political situation in |

1 I

Italy, at least in so far as it'-seemed to be to himo Almost in each sentence he j

named some Italian political figure, and forbade us in -the strongest terms to raak

any kind of notes on th:.so ile, too., like the Fuehrer, was convinced that the

Royal House and the Badoglia'-government-would shortly be separated from the Axis

Alliance and go over to the Allied -side6 This surely could no longer be pr@vent

ed*, although we had to be warned a&d be prepared for t The important supply hub

of Rome eould? under no-circumstances, be lost to the German war effort* This

therefore resulted in tha shift.of the XI Air Force from the air channels over

southern France to the space over Rome in Italy This consisted of two'parachute i

divisionso These two divisions were the only ones* explained Himmler, that were

available quickly and were the only ones lfto This strength must be sufficient

,to fulfill the assigned missiono He further explained that under no circumstances

jwere we to let ourselves be influenced by the opinion about the present situation

iin Italy, especially in the south, an opinion dominated by the German Embassy as

jwell as by the st&'U of Fild Marshal General von Kesselringo These circles were

|of the opinion tha', the recent event of the government change in Italy would have

an unfavorable effect on the German war situation* One believed that because of

this situation repeated assurances were given at random from the circles of the

Crowp Prince and the Royal House as.well as from the circles within the high

Italian General Staff that until now Italy remained in the war on the side of the

Hi:nmler then again named a great number of Italian generals and

who in his opinion were ready to go over to the Allied side and

[whom he therefore considered a particularly dangerous,

just as with Hitler, for the first time on this occasione The

[complete impression, that I got through this was that he seemed to be very nervous

[and. obviously attributed essentially more significance to the events in Italy than

actually wanted to. 'It was rather difficult not to let this nervousness

tagiousa It was almost midnight and bth General Student and I still had a

rather broad work plan to accomplisho A large number of telephone conversations

, had to be completedo The task force had to be furnished \

The paratroopers of the XI Air Fore had to be redeployed

from southernFrance to Italy and predominantly placed in the air ehannels My

to be kept on the alert without my direction and would receive no further

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These were to leave soon by type JB52 plane on the morning of 27 July 19*4-3

at 7 a.me from %e airstrip at Berlin and brought to Italy by way of southern

France, In the ensuing hours, then, I gave all the necessary orders and instruct

ions to my Adjutant in Berlin, then 1st Lt in the Reserve, Karl Radl* The latter

had waited since afternoon lor orders in my Berlin headquarters,

I commanded that about 12 officers, 5 of whom I mentioned by name, and some

25 men in ray unit should leave Berlin in the first transport* The selection of

the rest of the officers and enl-isted personnel I left to my administrative offi

cer in Berlin. I ordered only that men with a fluency in the Italian language be

brought along* The remainder, to be used as paratroopers, would be plain infantry

men. and average engineer troops* All those who were to belong to the commandos

were to "be uniformly dressed in paratroop uniforms, the basic order given by Hit

ler to me as well as to the officers and enlisted men of the Air Force (Paratroop

And so the paratroopers were standardised in tropical outfits The combined

equipment plan had to ba well thought out, all eventualities &ad to be considered

eventualities which hsdn9t been foreseen even up to this point* Especially, it

B
still wasn t known where Mussolini was located, whether in Rome or someplace els@

r in.some prison or in a more neutral place under the strictest close guard, etc

All telephonic and teleprint orders wer dispatched throughout that night At

30 a o m e ? all f the m@n who had been selected for the undertaking were ready to

take off, together with the required equipment, from the airstrip. Around 20 men

remained in Berlin on the alert for they would be called to Italy within the com

ing weeks, s tnat the total strength of personnel directly under me ? most of

jbame from my o^n battalion, consisted of approximately 50 men. General Student

land I took'of from the Rastendorf Airfield around 8 a,m o @n 27 July 19^+7 (Trans

jlator^s note? should b 19^3) and landed after a non-stop flight, around noon 0

at Pratiea Mare airfield near Rme<>

FU3. (CONTINUATION SHEET)

 PASS NUHSSE
7565 13
1.1 o of Mussolini
Following his disappearance without a trace,^Command headquarters handled

I Mussolini's matterso'

I It is understandable that the Top Secret disappearance of II Duce caused an

| active sensation and interested all the German and Italian public, even all the

I Italians serving in the German Army, as well as any others in German high command

I positions* Thus various of these positions began, without being authorized^

I making inquiries aa to Mussolinies immediate residence? It is quite clear that

] some of these positions were authorized to make such a careful investigation by

I the German high commando

The German TTabassy in Rome naturally immediately directed the aforementioned

e Italian capital and inquired into the vanished Mussolini9s

feign to government reign These steps wmse definitely

developed during the new Badoglio governmento The answers, however, were evaded

and never were near the truth And therefore most were informed that the Duce

was well and still no one knew where his residence was locatedo

Concerning this,.there were naturally various spots in the. German Embassy

that tried to find9 through private sources in the inner circle of the first

Italian Partye some clues about Mussolini5 hiding place and about his intended

fate0 Despite the part the very narrow personality relation among the Italian

specially Roman - company*, played, there still had to be found some successful

and practicable way t discover Mussolini9s location On the contrary, all

guesses and clues turned out to b false ones. In part, they had to contend her

with some clever steps at concealment and deliberate misdirections Behind thes

false clues and misdirections stood the excellently functioning Italian military

intelligence service*, t .

Mussolini's birthday in August seemed to offer an opportunity to discover

the exact whereabouts of II 'Due* The Fuehrer had ordered a deluxe edition of

Nietzsche as a personal gift for ?4ussolini The German Embassy in Rome was to in-J

I duce an agreement with the Italian government that this personal gift from Hitler

I to Muesolini on trie latterBs birthday was to be presented personally by Field

Marshal General K@sselringe At first it seemed that the Italian government had

the desire to carry out this wish and the Crown Prinee promised Field'Marshal

General Kesselring to personally speak up for him that the German government

would be granted this wisha However, as the birthday date arrived, the Italian

posts became more careful and stated finally that Mussolini's whereabouts was

unknown even to . them, and that because of this triev unfortunately could give no

help, Badogli himself stated to Field Marshal General Kesselring that he had

not been informed about the hidden location of Mussolini.

Shortly after his freedora, I learned from Mussolini himself that the books

had beenv..presehted to him in St o ?4addalena TC@ had expressed the desire to thank

the Fuehrer for this through a personal letter9 but this wish was refused As

far as I can tell or recall, he had recorded this deed in his'diary

T maintain, the services of the German posts for German control over Musso

fate, since German control appeared to b strengthened, in the sight of

(CONTINUATION SHEET)
 NUMBER PAGE NUMBER

H 7563

this, it became an intensive thought.to the masses that Mussolini must have

played into the hands of the Allies, Hitler had feared Mussolini's extradition

to the West even fram the very beginning* He believed that this surrender made

up a part of the p?ice for a separate peace between the Allies and Italy9 a price

which the Royal House was ready to pay0 Even the Allies, as Hitler opined, were

responsible for ^he release of II Due as a stipulation for surrender terms,.

The personal services of Field Marshal Kesselring were also fruitless at the

Italian Royal touse, as were repeated @fforts by high Italian officials, to obtai

clues as to the secret residence of Mussolini The replies were in most

cases evasive' and? according to the evidence deliberately misleadingo

Naturally, th@ military intelligence service, through the "Foreign Office

Military fecurity" of.the High Command and of the Armed Forces, under Admiral

Ganarisf #as also kept busy about Mussolini's person and the events in Italyo

Between the AA,W0 (Foreign Office, Military Security) and the Italian

Securit; Service* there was^ to my knowledge, an agreement that both services

waived mutual rights to the military intelligence service work performed by the

other in the homeland of the other ally0 As a result of this agreement, there

existed in Italy at this time no completed nets of agents and V-personnel (secret

service personnel),-so that no support could be expected from this sideo

I myaelf, since the time of my assigned commission, had no sort of connect

ion with this planned action of the Foreign Office of Military Security, or of

any office waich was related to this office in Italy, and no suggestion was made

to me from any side to 'make use of such a connection,, Because of this, the

Foreign Office of Military Security wasn't connected with me. This office, how-

in not a very favorable or fortunate

I sould not etimate to what extent there was a connection between Admiral

the leading positions of the Italian Security Serviceo

with the more confined collaboration circle of Admiral

C@r-tainXy it was interesting to note in just what way the Service worked and

the German high command appeared through the Military Security Servicec The

'.Foreign Office Military Security provided the German high command with periodic-

illy revealed instructions and estimates of the situatione These were determined

by military control right down to detailed staff and Generals Corps, of both the

estimates of the general military as well as the political .situations.^ and as

s^ch were: to be treated as "Secret military documentso!t So, for example, in

August 19^3 there appeared such an estimate of. the situation in Italy which

claimed in it that after the fall of -Mussolini the political situation in Italy

had been confirmed as being absolutely in favor of Germany Through the taking

over of governmental deals and the widening control of the war by the King and

Badoglio, Italian politics $?er placed on an essentially solid basis0 There was

no doubt that the King and Bado^lio kept their given promise - to remain faith

ful to the Axis and to continue the war to a victorious endo Any breaking off

from the.Axis was not obtainable* This type of report was obviously believed in

(CONTINUATION SHEET*
 PAGE NUMBER
H7563
various political and military chief posts in the German Reicho This was

known through numerous talks with German officers and various other measures

Nothing more than this could be accomplished, not even through prearranged meas

ures o This was perhaps the greatest danger point with a view toward corang

events in Italy after 25. July-.-19^3 and above all those following the going over

of the Italians to the Allies, on,8 Sep 19^3* It should be noted here that the-

Chief of the German Military Security, Admiral Canaris*, together with the then-

ColoFAel von Lahous@n9 toward the end of -Aug. 19^3 met secretly with the Italian

General Am e @ and Italian Colonel Helfferich in Hotel Daniel in Venediao It has

now been proven that at that time, on the part of the German' Security Service9

(and. it was the same from both leaders) that the most important classified Itali

an matters were handed over..to. both high ranking Italian officers* Undoubtedly

the German Security Service generally was itself not'very well informed about

this<, BO that only through .efficient subordinate positions a greater danger w&s

averted for German control in. .Italye In a later chapter - in the section '*Madda<

te
Xna. = we'll speak more of thise (Se pages l 4 3 ~ l ^ in text - page herein) o

After all the knowledge and previously described truths, it is assumed that

the Italian Security Service had furnished the information to its German' col~

ieagn@s9 or had it furnished through a middle person who seemed acceptable to

concealing the Mussolini affair and the coming events from the German leaders

From this sort of thing is also explained the completely - deliberate or not

deliberate - (that is, self-deceived) rversd view of the situation in Italy as I

it was mentioned in the- estimatec situation of August 19^3

Only Hitler hinself and. a few7 of the men in his close circle dared to believ^

so about this estimate of the situation in limited quantities9 I cowld already

have foreseen this split opinion at the time f the assignment of my mission on

26 July 19^-3 in Hitler's headquarters in the field. That is .probably also why

x
it could be traced back that :Hitlei 's ensuing order of secrecy were expressly

limited to 5 isa the circle f trained personnel*

This split concept of the situation and the later developments in Italy and

the consequent unreliability of the various political and military posts became

noticeably unpleasant and disadvantageous during the preparations and planning

t cite a situation which took place during the des

cribed developmentso

During th@ time when we wer still in intensive preliminary work for- Opera=

tion Maddalena, 1 suddenly received an order from Hitler's headquarters to pre=

pare for a .paraehute jumping, sorti on an island near the island of Elba e Th@

alert for readiness of action was set for within 72 hours* Groundwork: for this

rder was appasently &m@ incorrect information of Hitler's- that Mussolini

could b found at the referenced iirae as a ?0W on this islando And this was at a |

tin when we knesi to an almost 100% certainty that Mussolini could not b found |

-thre under any ci^cuG?.8tanc@.so A check of bhe place and region also confirmed |

OUT fies*. . For us this was a confirmation that headquarters was being furnished

with incorrect information^, which was 'deliberately launched and relayed in good

FOR INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION

. 56 (CONTINUATION SHEET)
 TRANSLATION PAGE NUMBER
H 7563 16
faith either from the Italian side or the Military Intelligence Office deliber

ately relayed incorrect information^, This sortie was, from a technical viewpoint

1 of a parachute jumping.operation, particularly dangerous and wasteful in that the

I ' ' '

1 terrain was so irregular that the majority of the leading jumpers would end in

1 the.seao and most of these, in full paratroop combat outfits9 would end by drown

I ing to deatho Since the operation, in our viewpoint, must undoubtedly fail,

I . f

j since s far as we knew Mussolini was not located on the island, no thought was i

i . ' ' ' I

I even given at that time to a later, a second action,, demonstrated as so useless |

I ' " : f

I an operation by a combined exposee in public, in itself deterred any further |

! : f

| jeopardizede
similar action,.
And Likewise, the that
so it seemed overall plan,,
at the even
last in its
moment it lowest scale,
would be was also
possible for i
\

us still to receive a countermand of these orderso I

p .

1
!

(CONTINUATION SHEET)
 iWTELUGi&iCE TRANSLATION ' I EESISTHV NUMBER I PAGE NUMBER
H 7563 ' T

Toward the end of August 19^3.it became even easier to recognize that Badog~

liols Italian government had the idea of coming, to an armistice with the Allies

and to'pull out of the A^is Allianceo This development of a fundamental position

f the new government against a tie with Germany became oven stronger through the

general withdrawal deployment on all fronts0 and especially for Italy through the

significance f the setback in Sicily and the continuous allied air attacks on

Italian cities including Romeo

It was known to us that Count Sforza was in Portugal allegedly negotiating

with the Allies over the terms for an armisticeo The disappearance of several of

the .former leading Italian personalities from Rome, who were always well hidden

during the official govez-nrnent period^ gave additional hints, as to this trans

action0 Particularly interesting in this connection is the fact that the depart

ure of the one-time Fascist leader and Minister Dino Grandi from his alleged

Italian post was not noticed (this based on our sure basic knowledge)9 and the

fact that he had taken the road across Spain toward Portugal for the negotiations,

Count'Galeazzo Ciano sat as Italian Ambassador at the Vatican and set up 9 as he

had out plan which was based on good new$ the necessary platform for these talks

We presumed that one of th@ main conditions for the armistice would be the

deliverance of Mussolini to the Alliese Too 9 time was very urgent Hitler's

order t save'Mussclini^ still to be carried outq had to be accomplished soono

Alsop the ever increasing-reinforcement of Italian troops in and around Rome* the

construction of artillery positions,, the emplacement of antitank ditches and ob

staelesg the ever'intensive growing control f all military vehicles"by Italian

traffic control, disclosed the increased preparations of the Italians<> Through j

the facts .that the Italian traffic patrols picked up information on German ve j

| hides,, on eviry-German vehicle number9 unit and name of any scheduled authorized I

travel9 it was easy to learn from this sort of identification the composition f g

German strength and personnel. Since the disappearance of'Mussolini9 we most (

| carefully pursued all traces which were held close concerning his place of resi

(denceo 1'n spite of thise his location^ surely impeded by the search, was changed

1 every 1-2 weeks, and we always succeeded*, after a comparatively short time, in

|locating new clues* After the Duce had been brought away from the island of

| Ponza in the Gulf f Gaeta by an Italian warship, in the beginning of August<,

the next clue on him was missingo From Hitler's headquarters the alleged most de*

pend&ble information given to us was completely useless and falseo Somewhere '

around the middle of August the trace led to the area of Sardinia,, It was then

not clear if Mussolini could be found on Sardinia itself or on one of the n@igh~ I

boring islandso Th news was concentrated9 however<,'on the northern corner of |

Sardinia a It was known that a number f former Fascists were located in camp on j

-fIthe isle
brought
of Porco9 a very small islando Rven so, captured Fascists were to be

to Caprera*. Some hints even indicated that Mussolini was on the island

of Caprera, Intensive research work and finally9 by accident, the clues led

definitely to the small island of Maddalena* This island was almost at the north

ACS* row !3A DISSEMINATION FORM FOR INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION

i (CONTiNUAHOft SHEET)
INTELLIGENCE REGISTRY NUMBER PAGE NUMBER
H 7563 18
point of Sardinia, extending beyond and opposite the Palau harbor, Island and

Gulf of Waddalena together made up an excellent sea fortress*

On 17'"August, this clue proved to be so accurate, that direct establishment

on Maddalena itself could be begun* Some of my officers, disguised as simple

seamens were detailed to a joinfe naval staff in Maddalena harbor. Cautious sight

seeing harbor tours and photographs from air and ship were made. Technical naval

statistics were gathered from the harbor commandant* The picture of the situation

the end of August 19^3 was as shown in the following section*

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FEB. 5 (CONHNUATION SHEET*
 REGISTRY NUMBER PAGE NU61BE8
H.75^3 19

XXX0 1; Strength and Organisation, of the Italian Forces.on Maddalena (approxi*

It was established that Mussolini was located on Maddalena under a strong

police (carabinieri) guard He was brought to a small villa some 500 meters west

of the'city of La Maddalena*-' The guard company was about 150 men in strength*

They were quartered on the property which surrounded the villa o The property,

along the street,, about 2^0 meters wide and about ^00 meters long, rising along

a mountain ridge0 was completely surrounded by a wall approximately 2 meters

high. Approximately in the middle of the street front of the property stood

the huge iron~forgd entrance gate* The garden climbed like a stratiform,, es

pecially in the western half, and was interspersed by walls within in several

spots c, The Villa itself was located on one=-third of the property and a terrace

faced the west and easto The house was one-storied with about 15 rooms* In the

garden*- toward the city, located on about the same height as the villa, was a

gardenhouse, to which a part of the guard company was broughto The garden con

sisted of trees*, one street leading from the entry gate toward the villa, circ

ling the separated terraces and walls, and thus divided the property in two

halveso The garden was, for a time*'planted with vineyardso

Day and night a double post of carabinieri patrolled the street in front of

the houseo A second double post was stationed right at the entry gateo In the

garden itself there even appeared to be posted some roving sentries> Exact con

firmations in this connection were not possible to determine,, Even so, we had

no knowledge about the guard directly located within the house itselfo In any

case, we had to contend with a comparatively strong police reserve on the prop

erty0 The guns9 which could be safely carried by us,, consisted of rifles and

Italian machine guns,, However9. it was definitely fenderstood that one had to

count on machine guns within the property itself0 Several telephone lines led

into the villa, probably set in there by the Italian post commander to make con~

tact with the duty stations * The exact number (lines) could not be definitely

ascertained,? It was also possible at any moment that we*d have to deal with some

telephonic - and very rapid - alarm systemo- At one of the last personal recon

naissances on 27'August 19*09th@ night before the planned day of action, I-dis

covered more new field cables, which hadnt been taken into account before0 This

revealed there was a separate0 direct line from thes probably to Italian quar*

ters located on the nearby shores At these quarters, there were several barracks

containing something like 150=200 Italian soldierso It couldn't be unquestionably

determined whether these barracks held midshipmen - so ran one report - or Ital

ian Air Force personnel - so.another soure reported*. The quarters were con

nected directly with the ground floor, where Mussolini was held captive * and0

through a narrow shore streete led into the main street whieh ran through the

city of La Maddalenae A reserve force of Italians also had to be taken into

account*, Th guns of this unit couldn't be taken over<> Thereforee infantry

'weapons and at least light machine guns had to be acquired. On the shore 0 some

20 meters distance from th barracks a small breakwater was located which mad

a landing place even for larger boats, possible

ISA DISSEMINATION. FORM FOR INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION

(CONHNUATHON SHEET}
 .coast-.was generally very rocky', and dropped off rather steeply Between

2 smallei^ro^kgMprojections9 about 1 km westward from the already mentioned troop

barracks,; there was a small bay,'.which' sloped about 10 meters and which ran level

a smooth^ slippery roky surface under sea level9 which allowed for a land-

Between both these 2 small land projections and the barracks,

were 2 Italian seaplanes of the "Savoy" type which observed us constantly

in between an Italian sea^rescue aircraft, painted white and bearing a Red

circled overhead. The reports about the purpose of the seaplane were con^

One report said that the aircraft were readied for any emergency

eva@uation f Mussolinii another that Mussolini at certain intervals, was flown

to a doctor at a'military hospital since he was very ill; and yet another that

the presence of the s@a-rescue plane was connected with the visit of Mussolini9s.

physician, who was quite concerned about his (Mussolinis) physical con-

although Mussolini was absolutely well up to-this timeo In any event,

w had to consider an eventual interference of these aircraft in the development

of the plan t fr@ Mussolini from *!addalenao "e had to consider the danger of

the appropriately timed passing of Mussolini through these planes for the success

@ mm action as well as the eventual interference to a successful release which

might- be caused foy actual engagement - and direct air attack - or pursuit of

Mussolini's route and alerting of Italian posts on the mainland (Navy, Air Foree)<

Therefore, thr@ were just these 3 aircraft observed continuously and. our first

look was applied to -all harbor visitors, harbor tours and9 above all0 flights

into the harbor b-

On the heights of Mad&alena Island itself, on the snail island between Sar

dinia and-Maddalena, as well-as on Sardinia.on the southern shores of the 3ulf

of Maddalena to the east and on passing points of land, Italian flack batteries

were in plae@ as AA. defenses against eneay air attacks on the ocean-fortress.

From the favored high altitude position, these flack batteries <eould dangerously

rake the harbor itself with fire as well as a, considerable distance out towards

larbor rang of the ocean fortress lay practically in ran^e of

These 'flaek batteries, too, had to be considered in the plano

A radio station was located on the heights above (north westerly) the eity of

was to put it out of coa-iission, s that in ease of any

out of order,, it would render any pursuit difficulto

The harbor entrance t Maddalena was protected by coast artillery guns and

The 3sit from the harbor (following any successful

in an extraordinary wayo This danger, too., had

Besides, th@ harbor entrance was blocked at night by a chain

barrier which was moved by a fighter patrol boato For this hindrance a special,

separate small operation had to- be planned*

One part of Mussolini*s'carabinieri guard were stationed in quarter in

'Maddalena itself. Besides, these there, were, other smaller numbers of naval units

located in the harbor, s that in eas of an alert at any rate the flank was pro

tected by something like 300 Italian soldiers

 On Sardinia itself, Italian divisions were located near the German troops

However^ with exception of the Italian Air Force these could be left alonee

sine an advance in case of-an alert could follow inopportunelyo Because of this<

an Italian Air For@ alarm had to be reckoned with* The Vieno Fiorita air base9

near -Olbia, was located about 80 km distance .away, consisting of Serbian and Ital

ian unl^s, although the air base itself was under Italian control Other air

bases w@re strictly Italians At Vieno Fiorita there were predominantly Italian

fighter echelons whose exact strength could.hot be ascertained But it could be

assumed*, through the distance of the air base from Maddalena0 through the early

-morning hour of the planned operation,, and the speed with which an aiarm could

be carried dirt, that the operation itself could b jeopardised* On the open sea

we couldn't reckon with the impressive strength of fighter planes, ie* with any

direct attackse The .whole Mediterranean Sea was a zone of hostile fighter planes

and it was k&own that the Italian fighters didn't go out too far into the sea0

Nevertheless9 we had to reckon with.a pursuit'of our. .trail by retreat through re

-eonnaiasanee planes &ad therefore with enemy alertso In summary, the.situation

The tO'beollberated.Duce was confined as a prisoner in a strongly guarded

city of Maddalena, but within the sea fortress of I4addalena

fortifiedo It was expected that the guard squad would receive

ease of a flight or & release attempt ~ or already had such an

the prisonero The interference of an Italian unit was expected*

Just the the impresssii-m strength of fla@k and oast were defensive in na

was connected with the Italian commando post by several inde<

telephone connection lines Adequate aiar-ri notices and alarm

Interference of the flack batteries, the coast artillery and torpedo defenses

e^uld probably be expected during the retreat with the released Duce over the

waterway9 when .an alarm would be broadcast The same defense, however9 could also

b eatpeete'd if a battle actually took pla@ in the vicinity of the villa and a

fir alarm were aoundedo The action, therefore, must b developed on a possible

silent @3ce@utiosio Therefore, the surprise moment was the next most important

etepo The fighter patrol boat in the harbor entrance9 too0 had to. be taken

.quietly and effectively9-.to avoid a premature, alarm prior-.to the beginning of the

actino The radio station could relay the alarm to the mainland and so call

naval and air support0 That is why the radio station couldn't be put out of

a@tla with jamming and attacks until the mainland was considered after a success*

ful pr&tio&9 The three seaplanes in the harbor could at once take up the pur~

auit in such & case and establish goammieations with the Italian posts on

mainlando Therefor they0 too0 had to be put out of action*,

 Situation of the German troops in Sardinia and Corsica in August 194$.

.we're available for duty for the mission. - ^

On Sardinia Corsica, after the 3d Allied theater of war had opened in

(Italian),, we also had to reckon with enemy landings0 Since the hi^h com

mand in Germany estimated neither the fighting power nor the fighting morale of

the Italian troops too highly, we had to reckon with serious practical defenses

of only those German troops stationed right thereo Since the strength of these

relevant troops -could not be ascertained, a long-lasting opjosition didn't have

to be counted upon, Tnis untimely situation became worse in that an adequate

maintenance-of-the island through naval forces wasn't effective enough* Although

there was sufficient supply area available0 there still wasn't suitable protecti

through use of any marine combat units The Italian fleet was not yet completely

in the war.-.with the escccsption of a few U-bdat tactical units and ,so.ne special

combat units f the "XeMA$rt type and showed no signs of letting itself be drawn

into any sea campaigns* The Seraaii 'Tavy. was much too weak nunber-wise, consist

ing of only a few U-boat (submarine) chasers, submarines, minesweepers and tcrjsdo

and thes, at that time, were tied up either in the Sicilian theater of

or'were in flight,' ut off by the Allied control of-the Mediterranean between

North Africa,, over Sicily* - up. to Naples*

Our view-of; the situation was clear, . #e believed in the correctness of the

reports about the secret peace negotiations .(armistice terms) of the Italians

the Allies and saw that the termination of these negotiations lay directly

On the other .hand*.- we saw the imperfect battle moral of the Italian \

with a few special exceptions - in comparison with the difficult

tion of the German control in Italy* 'Ve saw the general, war fatigue f the

Italian populace0 We saw the complete disappearance of Fascism Even so ? we

recognized the aim of. .the Italian government, which steered toward-an armistice

iad still essentially been a mild failure, as

Later events proved us correct, just ae with the

1*he disappearance of the Fascist Party was clearly recognised, although the

of'the. formr.Fascist after they were removed from the leading posi~

was not understandable 0' This we. could, explain through the great shock

which suddenly hit many. Fascists who tednet expected it wen up to now,-, caused

by Mussolini8e @llaps@o But it was interesting that the absolutely onvineed

t 9fi
C di@=liard ) Fascists, who were the moat faithful supporter f Mussolini0 seemed

utterly disabled and showed n kind of inclination for any political power. Even!

an Aehill Muti - who at the end of August was shot on the street ?= and Seor&a

remained conpletely reserved and trained the new government toward strong

Loyalist lines. Only & few until now confessed, especially .the earlier forces

of former Fascists,, that they were still very much interested in. the person and

after our arrival in the country (Italy), sought contact

this contact after a short time* This, meant dealing

a smaller group, consisting mainly of officersfl who had really known th

 Lto This group endeavored to find out Musso

place of confinement in rdr to plan a liberating action around it. But

they worked without a plan* Neither did they have any connection with any kind

of troops with thloh they could have been able to successfully complete, such an

a later date* Since the work of this group could become dangerous for

plans, we concerned ourselves in learning only about their further plans in

this a^@a instead f trying to develop the information based on the results of

their search, s that no disadvantageous overlapping or double work:, which is al

ways a danger point in 'itself, could be encountered Even more, there had to be

presupposed that eventual parallel running plans for a release action would b

How we could state this, however was in n ease related to this

was developed in &. later aimed plan* (S@ page of tesst)

on Sardinia were a German Pauses .Rifle Division and Air Force units

Tfte former consisted of th 90th Panser Rifle Division^, and the so-called

'"Sardinian Ais8 Fore C@raitand" made up the Air Force elementso Tb.@ Army units

were - located mainly in the south and were not quie&ly aobile due to ba# roads

German antiaircraft were located mainly in the neighborhood of the mixed Italian

and German occupied air base of Vieno Fiorita9 and another section-(battalion)

was. ia the -kills south of Palan* 3?his base was assigned along with- the Italian

AAA operations ares, in the region of Maddalena to defend it afaisist enemy aerial

which was the chief supply depot for Serbian troops on

fh German Air Fore units on Vien Fiorita were there mainly for

purposes and there was never & question of actual battle

There -were some -German fighter.- squadrons n the air base and

these still flew si&gie-se&i fighters which* until now^ were decidedly on the

In !4addalena itself ther was located only one 'lerraan liaison officer to the

Italian harbor-and fortress coa.nanders, a frigat captain .of the German Navy., and

he had a very ssa&ll staff

On- Corsica9 a French possession before the war, ther was stationed a combat

unit of SS troops * Tfe@y were generally known as' t'le'"SS-attack brigade of Cor

sica*" They were <empletely mobilized .and' had an anti-aircraft unit located at

the southern tip in'Kbsikas,'overlooking Bonifacio harbor,o Conditions on Corsica

i-became chaotico The.interior of the very mountainous island was Interspersed

with numerous partisan groups, which in part had no military characteristics at

Certain parts of the island were definitely partisan-

Only French tricolor flags flew in'.Ajacco .and intelligence

both English and American boats landed n this western part of

the island and placed supplies in parts of it- Above all the supplies of weapon

and ammunition for the partisans went this. - way6 too'e In-spite of the French tri

there., the going legal tender in Ajaeco was tho dollar and the

. The remaining Italians on the island openly sympathised .with the

aas so long as these were not strongly anti-Italian^ sold them their'arms

and pushed a lively trad witti the foreign exchange0 T'hey vere

partly in a professed alllAnGe withi..the sands....

these bands sometimes wore Italian Array uniforms bought from their friends, it

was often difficult to distinguish between friend and enemy* These bands atta@k

d all who came in their vicinity and immediately seised whatever booty (captured

materiel), whether it was German or Italian vehicles. Only the eastern part of

the island, in'the area around Bonifacio (Southern point) across Porto Vecchio

toward Bastia, was to some degree safe* There, too, were located soae Gerauan

naval units* The western part of the island was also scarcely penetrable for any

Italians due to th Italian aniaosity of the completely French or French-disposed

population. Sine the German naval unite were the predominant users of the

supplies fro* the mainland to Sardinia, as well as the defenders of these sup

plies, these units had practically no combat value. In the harbor of i:astia, on

the northeast of the island, anti-aircrait artillery, a e-tb.'oarine fleet and a

ftine-s-dreepcr unit v/ere located*

One of the torpedo boat divisions pulled fro-i t^e '-egeau area, .viiich ,/ere

now layingin this area of the Mediterranean, displayed the only combat strength

-augmentation which supplied that area in Aug 19^3

These forces were to play a leading role in the subsequent plan to free

 ,o Estimate of the Situation ._

Although conditions in Italy in August 19^3 constantly pointed towards the

ultimate collapse of the Axis*.the German high eomnarad "didn't seem-to be ready*

without undo .eomnent* t end this situation and even .in itself .to. bring about

this collapsec Perhaps som werealready determined in principle toward this

steps'but sided, with the execution of;either an eventual erueial Italian step or

anticipated .one .for Germany-at.the appropriate momenta Thus all the German post

in Italy were giving-utmost..care to the Italian positions versus actual duty

Mussolini8s release9 r at least,an attempt at it e therefore had to be

reckoned with, so. that, with it..the Italians eould effect a collapse, of tne Axis

all&B?@ through Germany Italy had remained fcru to' the-.ne'j? official order of

the Axis even after Mussolini's-resignation and had even promised participation.

as a war partner until the final victory Therefor, a military action carried

out by official German positions * even if its result was completely free, of

blod^h@d9 'and on which, li-^ht have as its aim or result *'tae annulment of a.-le^al

and neeessary measure promulgated and carried out by the King and the ne4j govern

ment? had t be regarded as an hostile act* Through this, the Italian government

of the exact - location- of the collapse of the Axis alliance,, 3r

bhe blame before the entire world populaeefor the eollaps of

the alliancet .an. act which-could only be fully welcomed by the Italian.government.

This doubtlessly-, caused the be forewent toned strength of morale f t;i@ enemy and

a&vers effect-on th@-. German troops on all fronts^ particularly in. Russia* where

a constant withdrawal of the German front was underway*

Sin<@ Husso-lifti's plae of' eonfinement on Maddalena was with -^reat probabil

ity an established, fact strength and type of guard,constituted no.special

problem i'or^the.-p.lan* iPhrou^h a lucky surprise act and full,exploitation* no

strong diserepai?.sy at. the "noaiejit of terror" need be reckoned with* Any ...relief

attempt fro.& the conntrj euld easily be protected and sr&rded of through the

favorable terrain^ The problem lay in another region* 4ow would the-, approach >

tak placeffi -aAd:.how:rould the-personnel get away from the pl&ee with the freed

infantry^type'-approach-from land was prohibited on the. island

mdvane of any troops was definitely impossible,. The

unsuitable for an airborne landing or for parachute

n the rocks*: where ....they

terrain were.accomplished, still e^l&s9i av@id setting off an

In any ase ? the point was Italian flako Any-elimination.-of the

artillery near Palace, had triggered an uati^aely alarm

*2ore 'difficult or .practically impossible* Besides9 we.

us and above all 9 without opening an^. military: .6pera<

to carry out operation successfully*

rejiained to - serve as irach ior t te approach as ;vell as

for the departureo Through its use as many as possible of the smaller and quick

er units were &%>! to be successful As fast ships, there were some speedboats

and minesweepers available for use o These were considered as nmeh for their

speed as well a (particularly in this case) for their maneuverability, over.-other

As -protective.from aerial attacks in case of pursuit they had for use

antiaircraft 2 em guns and soae torpedoes in case of an assault* During an

aetiv sortie^'they could .-give - good fire support Through available secondary

equipment, even aaor certain protection could be affordeds Nevertheless, we'had

to. reckon'with'active .-Italian-anti-aircraft artillery. This (the AAA) could

practically safely-'control the whole area ot the' sea fortress and the harbor

ThereforeV"we- had.to;-adapt our plan at this point so that the Italian'flaek posi

tions would -be denied": any knowledge of the situation, or, as much as possible9

would pe. postponed so' a later tisae so that any alarm would actually be given too

late." For' this reason, the speed of the boats a.t our disposal played a big role*

In an emergency, -enemy anti-aircraft 'and naval batteries were put under fire and

neutralized'" by --Oerman flack-in''case they drew fireo An attraction-of flack from

the CorsiMui SS Assault---Brigade'located on Corsica was never a point in..question

when considering the great rangeo' They could merely furnish fire protection t

ships tfhieh would return-from Bonifacio after any successful actions

Another difficulty lay in the fact that I had a unit of merely 50 sen in

These'were located'at1--"the Pratica de Mare airfield9 near Rome and could

scarcely be .ordered inconspicuously t ither Sardinia or Corsica0 so that I had

to make up my mind t do. without their employmenta Because of this,, I had t@

r@ly VL-p&n the efforts of a part of the Corsimun SS Assault Brigade, and the few

marine .complement which were located there to protect the few boats and at most

23 of my w.n ffieepso ' An additional technical question was the' dispatching f

the approximately 10CV120 men of the Corslcan Assault Brigade attached to me0

These'couldnt'-be taken1, through-by torpedo boat since there was too little room

on these The-approach of--these- men had to be carried out almost unnoticed?'

that is t 3LJC> it. .had to appear that they couldn't be seen aboard any shipso

?o for merely this.. purposef the flat and very slow flare-barges had to be appr^

priate^ The disadvantageof these was their slow speed, but their advantage for

just this action was that win.:? to their very flat and broad bow and their s

draught, they war appropriate for a laad maneuver Landing and re-loading: of

these-boats., which would take place'on thea, could therefore be very quickly

A last',- anticipated, .difficulty'was the Jiarbor barrier, constructed of

floating c'.iains and'- blockade-:8hips-'. I -said, "last anticipated dif f iculty" s

definitely, sine not all-'-difficulties encountered in such as operation- e&n he

foreseen'*'-'.Too,*-chance plays: an important role here It was al.vaisrs" shortly be

fo're such' an operation, or -during the course of the sa!ae9 that-new,' not hereto

fore-though-of 'difficulties were met 0 which only with th most rapid decision

a.nd through- the beet preparation of'all, could be masteredo The. choice of offi

cers'and enlisted personnel, therefore, had t be made with special carao

for' qualifications'-could- not be based solely on the good education

 7563 .
27
and earlier military service of the' average German soldier. Special, intelligence

and assured decisiveness of each member were required just as much as ready -in

dication of courage and fighting spirit', .calm, reasoning, and steady, "nerves, . In

the selections9 howeverfl we also had to consider unity and cooperation in the

unit fen in a small force such as this group (9 ^n)o This selection ..seemed, to

be present'In-'the troops of - the "-Corsica SS Assault' Brigade" . . .

The harbor 'barriers also had t be considered in the beginning of the..opera-)

tionc and then these were u-nnoticedo A surprise attack operation should have.

this as a goal Knowledge'of this operation should be passed to only a very few

peopleia who had to have adequate naval technical knowledge to use both in'a.sur

prise attack oh-the blockade emplacements as well as .in the overall operation

Due'to'the military situation.and our opinion as to the quickly approaching

changes in'the ~ Mediterranean area, the resolution was made to carry out the plan

quickly* "Also, the fact that Mussolini's place of confinement wouldn't be

changed'any more in .'the short time remaining^ forced our action* particularly

since he'd" been there' on Nfaddalena-for almost two^feeks now. Two different

places of his confinement were known to us up to this point* Firsts the Caserne

in Home and then the island of Ponsa, south from Gata, . . .

.'^e'also-hoped that -approval-of the execution of the operation would also be

given*, Very shortly after the approval we hit upon some completely unexpected

The chief German'headquarters was controlled, by'intelligence personnel,

reported once that Mussolini was not located on Maddalena but later, after

a report from the mainland, he was reported as on an Italian warship, and, after

other reports reported*.as being on various islandso This resulted immediately

in an opposite order. - for us not to take any further action concerning Madda

lenao (See pp 15 and lS) On the other hand, we were informed through the top

military leaders that we should take off on the approved Maddalena operation

only after we were 1009a certain that Mussolini was present there Such certain

ty wasn't.-easy .to attain, but it was also a far step from likelihood . Besides,

the military 'regime seemed to occupy itself more with the problem of the failure

f the Axis .alliance .through'-Germany than in the event of this operation (see

pg 17), and. it 'was.- made known to us that .in the event of failure of the opera

tion* or in case insufficient reconnaissance concerning Mussolini'* actual place

of confinement - drew-a blankQ. we would have to bear the full blame., for any.re

sulting developmentso The German government had to disclaim us in such an event

and the.action- had to be-attributed to-some, irresponsible elements0 It meant

that Captain Otto Skorseny.and-1st Lt Karl Radl would be branded before the pub

lic at large as the instigators-of this thoughtless act Vs! naturally were

aware f the consequences:. and results of a failure and were prepared to answer

any charges resulting in a. military discharge, but for the reality .of the action

w were under orders to free Mussolini - orders giv<s& to. me personally by

Hitler, the:.head. of .the state and Commander-in-chief of all Arraed Fox^ces - and

these orders, were sufficiently legitimate ones. Any denial before the general

public would therefore-b@ .in conflict with this. This reality was in.no.. way

ACSSF0EM ISA .OSSSmiNATION FORM-FOR INTELLIGENCE TRANSLATION

8 FEB . S S <CONTSNUA,T!OM SHEET)

 hadn't told the other officers of this reality, so that

any additional nervous stress had to be born by only me and my Adjutanto

a very cautious and level-headed officer0 endorsed my pass

olded any sudden decisions and demanded of u&q tob 0 that each

plan b worked out completely.beforehand Since the officers of the general staff

of the. Comsaandb Corps, of the XI Air Force weren't of the same opinion, the entire

pre-planning of the reports and the news items9 as" well, as the usual orientation

of the military intelligence work and of the possible results and plans, were

left from the rrj start in von Radl's and my hands $e both were also almost

daily,<sometimes-even'-more-often, lectured in private by General Student Regu

larly,-the report as., to the exact location of Mussolini were such that, they were

never 100i e@rtaia Personal, knowledge and exact notices, such as .ffere normally

obtained at the front lines themselves through patrol and- shock troop operations,

weren't possible t attain in this smse* But any direct reconnaissance- was for

bidden by the strong security orderse Ve - i o e. General Student, -3adl and I

therefore often reaeh@d conclusions and decisions, which in themselves were more

or ls developed.as the result of reconnaissance trips Thus the very nature.of

our operation was inevitably (and completely new and unaccustomed for us soldiers)1

'sixrmbuhted''.with-a rather very/strong optimism*

A brief explanation of the reconnaissance trip until the very day .of'the

planned Maddalena action and various resulting consequences follows

Around 7^10 August (the exact date cannot be reconstructed without the

'*givenu'p-for-lost"'-operation), Mussolini was picked up by trie Italian Wed Cross

fro^r the island of Pohza, and, after an unknown elapse of time, .vas- brought to an

unknown spot'*. 7ho, news itself was definite, aj<d was confirmed by Italian naval

-sour&es.as well.as from private sources -froa 3aeta, As the next clue, 'tie desti

nation of the warship had ..to be ascertained* A. few days later ?fi;& .ilex* - informed

us, via radio message.froa Hitler's-field headquarters, that Mussolini tfas locate

on an Italian warship w-Viich.- lay in aachor in La Spezia harbor Concurrently came

b-is order- to te@ the Dus from this war-ship and carry through aeeordiBg to a

Ignored i^as the .fact that we knew at this point that -Mussolini}

n the warehip9 and in ho ease in La Spezia - : the latter was'

unobjectionably- an -established fact - and it was definitelypuzzling to us feow

anyone coa-24 - possibly, overpower a warship without s@nsatio.no #@ considered only

tiie advantages 'thereof, if such ah action could- be suecessfully carried out and

how, without remotely thinking't>f. the carrying out of these orders * Our full

6
effort was concentrated on-further inquiry into Mussolini s actual plage of eon-

Some days.. later, through the com-.and headquarters of. the Sernan Navy

i, we learned that a''report, of the German

ttated that ther@ were vari?i vailitary typ changes, such; as strengthening* of

nearby inland - evidently on Isoia de Vorco (e pp 1? & 18)

 o who' spoke - perfect Italian*, t seek out the necessary

in Maddalen. itself* I flew with him on 18 August from the- airfield.

at Pratiea d@ Mare to Sardinia 'We landed on the lieno Fiorita airfield at Olbia

th rather difficult mount

F&lauV At the command post of the command

was made to have &

The latter should not

in the existing schemeo 1 held him to be an officer of the

With "the mission of furnishing the military regime with an almost"

of the

a-s reported

In this connection, 'the--rumor ..about' Mussolini^ and ais alleged'stop' there,

rather than not being h@l& without interest9 was certainly not obvious*- The ?

ing with the lsarb3? commander also followed according to .plans0 HQ again reported

'sVents-and. rumors-*, gave a very exact description of the situ

ation,- mainly of'the strengthening &i@s between the 5eroah and Italian units

Likewise*'feeexplained "the existing chain of eoimnd there the limit of his

f ;th@ Italian commandant < neither was there any definite

point as to. the plae of *4ussolini''s confinemento 'Three

different versions about this business appeared - among many others, less signifi^

ant --to be most interesting,, On- concerned .the report thai the"Duee'was held ia

o9: catstured Fascists' were *'- S

was @nfir2ied9 as far as I could ^eollectg by the-battery -comnander M

allegedly ^ery sick for quite so'ae time already and yras to be found

medical attendance in a monastery9 which at the sawie tiaie was a hospital0

Santa Maria,' a small village abut'l^ fca south fro^n Palau on Palau01bia

The. th'trd and most probable report stated that Mussolini was bein^ held

in the area very aear the city of Kaddalena in a villa, under endurable''~circum

far as'I eould re-^ie.nber, this villa had a German-sounding-nane,

? like'Korn or''Horn, - and was supposedly t!ie private estate-'of a former

diplomat who was supposed to have married an Kn<?lish wo-nan - or the other

fnio first @f these 3 reports was tno least.to b ch'eeke'd'over,'''since

it rather uhllicely to be able t get into a penal colony on land and

any r@@onnaisas@ thereo For the @eond reports spoke the fact that

was when arrested? beside.s^ it was noted that

Z naval attack aircraft f the- 'Savoy" typ and a white

9 so by the -leraan

9 with an attack

away again* These'

to his place of confi&eme'nt in -Villa Korn* ' X ther.e

took the last ''reports' as more' truly realistic and didn*t concern myself

 plansi ^EliiriLffeofea^I^^miraslaado' However 9 T took advantage ofli

round^trip with th harbor commander around this island and in both in

iw photographs f it ' Incidentally* X !aade the same : "oy^trip

and took th sara photography by boat .from the villa ia ?4addalenao This' asle-v

certain difficulties'!, n& the photographs had to be developed; in secret under

'e in'order to avoid being-conspicuouso.. It was therefore agreed upon with the

harbor eoooan^er - that Li War'ger -would'.remain in Maddalenae to engage in additional

Investigationso larger was to occupy-himself- temporarily as an interpreter for

the harbor commander and9- in order-'to exclude'any suspicion and establish * liaison.

ttith the eivilia population, was dressed iu the uniform of a simple, bluejackete

larger 8 s instructions wer pinpointed? he was to locate as his first goal<> I

Mussolini's, actual place of confinement as aeoiirs-teXy as possiblea Th nest goal

required lose reconnaissance of the-lands, the buildings in which Mussolini was

-located, %h adjacent buildings0 the guard squad, the strength and armament of
the latter- telephone communications etc o VJarger was also provided with suffi

cient mnY$ @igartt@ and alcohol to enable him to make contact with all'circles

of *the civilia-n population is inns and other pleasure spots'o He was to stimulate

the people there .throughial&s of Mussolini' death9 about whleh h@ had the' meat

positive information,.-; through eontradietions and through giving out tha news about

'ltu8'Solini0s plae of confinement and state of'healths- Additionally 9 he-was to ,

bear is mind th reports in reference'to Santa Maria and to learn any information

'about thi&o (Actual plaee of confinement was to b most welcome inforasation for

tli l@@ati@E and lauds there s@naed dowaright strident and appropriate

harbor comssanderi' I left 7/argr in Palau and returned to 'the" Vieno Fiorita

via a personnel arriero I had in mind to fly.in th same HIS 111 which

had'brought m to Sardinia9 froM there'to Corsica9 where I had agreed upon-a. meet

ing with the cominander of the SS Assault- Brigade0 fSGorsieatJ During the flight

'therip I intended-to fly'bver Maddalena and would try?, with ay Leica^ to talcs

photographs of the Villa and of the east in the neighboring region*. The aireraft

took off shortly after my"arrival at"the alrbase .and it took a'course to the north

over T^ddalena'o I had given Instructions'to fly ftt rather high altitude* Th

-Haddalena' seetor was also approacshed at about ^000 meterso ''% had9- however9 not

yet'reached the' island^ but were just a'little out'over 01bias when the radio

pe^at^ ga^@. sti@e of nmj aircraft'in the".vicinity Tha pilot seemed to want

ic5 tak@ iover in low pressure !u&@ as 1 enddaly becaaa^ awar that'the. aircraft

the handle'of 'the' aiiw&ft gmn when the. plane', hit hard in', the watero Through !

the'"$plintering of the gl^@@ turrets 'thm impact and the onrush'of ^at@r<, I lost

for. a few e@m!so One i the erew pulled m<& tfom th shattered

and we were able to get out of the water-filled aircraft tta>ugh the air

As if by aseids&ts the aircraft broke through the urfao of the water

 31

a few more"' secondo ' This made it possible for the the:? members of '

the @rw located in the rear compartments of the aircraft to'fe saileda They

racing speed,-we .were still able t inflate a life raft And at th

| same'tirae I was able to salvage mj map equipment from the nose' isorapartiuent

I ' ' '

I Shortly thereafter9 the HE 111 sank* The iif raft was further inflated and the

lon-swia.iiers were put into it Th rest of the crew and I remained swimming

the boato -.swa.ii toward a roeky reef<8O2e 500 at@rs away9 and 'we .reached

I it safelye I was the only one of the group who was injured, and at that only

| slightly*' It was the only case in a hundred where an lift 111 crashed into the

j sa without loss of aay of its erw Several hours later9 by-using a flare gun

| which-we had oil hand, we-were able to signal an Italian.wareraft which then

I took us to land9 toward.Glbia*. It was through this crash that my meeting with

j the eoorsandfr of the SS stormbrigade "Corsica" was impeded* I rode in a per-

I .sonnel carrier toward. Pulau again, made & long-distanc request of the ?$ritan

| harbor coa-'iandsr ~ to put some kind-of boat of a smaller type at. ay disposal for

over to Corsica, a request which he readily fulfilled. Meanwhile9

night earn aari tfe@r w@r & series of difficulties t overeo'ne

the (grossing eould b@ undertaken* Sine the harbor barrier was normally

only <in.-daylight hour ~ and this was'an entirely Italian affair - the Italian

to gi@ sufficient reasons for the trip9 etc* Then @vea after

ing t-he approval of the Italian harbor adoinisteatlve authorities we-still

.cbuntersd difficulties-with the bloekade patrol boats e The exact same diffi

ulties confronted in when *ve tried to enter Bonifacio harboro Long after mid-

Bight we reached -Bosifacio barbor Fro.it there then'in the .arly corning. hoursy

I- was able to send qv first radio message to Fraseati, where T had been expected

t return bh aft@rp.v^an before. Thre -the aircraft had actually been reported

as overdue sines the flight crew hadn't been able, to .send a report yet After J

f? {
I Bom tiate spent in searching* I finally met the com-iiander of the Coraiea ' bri

They were to be ready i.i full combat equipment within two days iii the vicinity

f Bonifacio and &r@ io await further order there* A fer days later9 I was

again from Bastia air'bis hj an HB 111.to. Ciasapin airbase a@ar Frascatie Be~

fre I took my departiir of the 'Sermaa harbor com-nander in 'Haddalena0 I had a

few more definite final words with him, so. that with th@ instructions he coul

% adjutant9 Fadl^ had immediately* upn receivin'g news'of the fall of my

aircraft *' assumed -jhat the entire erw was lostq and'held private - conference

with individual < cor lenders and at the Corps headquarters -of the XI Air Corpse

Sine the event of an Italian break fr-.i the Axis circle was already foreseen as

measuri* *n.j unit was to be ready to undertake a series of part of the

-reparations for'fchis* and to follow through with parts of there This inf.or- j

ivas passe? on to. Ra&L in sueh a. for-a that he* in. ease I were lost in the

' " i

could imrsf?diateiy etep into ay plaeeo

. . . . . , ; , ' , . . . . . .
i!
 In Fraseativ, we met (Radl and I) General Student, who had in the meantime

given us a rBgorjb of the situation* Immediately, I made the suggestion to 3adl

that Ied fly again to Sardinia within a few days and there, in "taddallena^v as in

Corsica, Id meet with the leaders of the military circles, just as soon as .ve

had definite new as to Mussolinis stopping place. General Student agreed, and

on 23S**3 2adl and I flew to Sardinia-Vieno Firorita and drove from there to

Palau in a cargo truck* In Palau the harbor commander and our assigned observers

us up, using a submarine

Warger confirmed for us that in all probability Mussolini was still located

in this aforementioned vilLa6 He himself had seen him in the distance on the

balcony, since he recognized him from his stature and white uniform* Despite

this v/ remained, sojoewhat cautious, so that we would be absolutely .certain about

his stopping place9 At the same time we were sure that this effective recon

naissance meant that we had definitely achieved this probability as to his loea

Also 9 the esouting trips with details of the local areas were well carried

decided then that the harbor commander, unless there was special approv

al 'longer be- instructed in. bur daily plans, while .Vargers who until

3 a part of the plan 0 namely to inquire as to the

place of- the Duee@ would b@ completely informed <> Another round trip

in the 'I-poat .to study the terrain as closely as possible p.

we went t Bonifacio via an M-boat* Here, the commander

(a 1st Lt, Dieaenreuther) turned over to urn a <gmbat=

as, previously ordered for us by the Fuehrer* This unit consist

ted' of the best, well-selected personnel For the most part they were eombat

informed of the operation on the very day of action, and above all, the

-iSras standing by for embarkation at.any time from Portoveeehi harbor

there was the possibility of s@me sorties taking place against the SS

aft artillery unit stationed on the southern tip of the island of Gor

discussed with the com-na.nder9 After the return-to Maddalena, there

the inevitable -operation against the German ack-ack in ease of inter-

of Italia flack and coasta.1 .batteries. The final details were to be

the day before the operation by the high eosmnd itself. The de

by.fiadl and myself, were included in the overall

la the afternoon of 24o8o^3 we fie back t Fraseatl

be so based on-a report

.point0 it was already clear to ne that I would be able to take at the most

grounds, and this was inevitable9 although not

me On side, I had 3 speedboats, 5 minesweepers, and 3

me
on 2*to8{t3.we ^ with General Student and

 made the following definite plans for the operation on

Illofr: Final. Plan for Operation Maddalena9 Status of the Preparations up to

2?o819^3 (Map outline Ml-1*) ' '

All technical aaval personnel were requested of and approved by the command

er of the Speedboat Division9 Corvette Captain Schuls* - .

The following navy units were made ready: 3 speedboats9 3 minesweepers

whieh could do about the same speed, an& 3 flack barges

The 3 flack badges left Haddalena the day before X-day and made anchor in

Port Veeehio harbor .on Corsica Likewiset the day before X~&ay$ the 3 mine

sweepers entered Porto'Vecohig harbor. The 8O9O selected personnel.of the Cor

sica SS brigade wr@ billeted'.-on'.the flack barges o These sea had t go on board

in small.-groups and remained below deck until the actual beginning of the @per&

..tion-.itself o Th 3 flask barges-ran out of Porto Veechio under, convoy'guard of

the 3 minesweepers during- the..night before- Xday The exact moment of the sail

ing'was given hj my adjutants who himself had hauled off the boat in Porto .

V@@@hi@ and brought it t Mad.daleaao The boats were yet t reach the Italian* " '

harbor barrier in the'nighto The. unusual'time of arrival v#aa announced to the

Italian harbor authorities earlier and justified the particularly important car

go of the crafts tor .Sardinia,, On this basis 0 the boats didn6t anchor in

lena harbor but In Palau* , .

Likewise9 on the day before Xday, the 3 speedboats were transferred

Nettunia9 a harbor saith of - fie'Albaner Mt@9 to Maddalenao They were to-put

ashore 0n the breakwaters of Sto Maddalena early in the afternoon of 27<j80'i>3o

justification for -the.'.r trip and the visit to th nearby Italians: training

trip On board these speedboats were the commander of the speedboat .division?.

Corvett Captain 3ehulB;.i!iy adjutant, 1st Lt Sadl? a Lt Grieake of my unit (he

was killed.during th \llied bombing attacks on Frascati oza 8p919^3)? a^d my

self - w mt b@f@r setting off for Maddalena '

The boats vere bs-.sically equipped for combats including torpedos9.-and

carried special aiequa^e smoke and screen ammunition which were to be used for

the eventual dangry.f. return tripo

By @arly dawa3s light on X-day (28,8#^3) at the e^act time previously set

(but I eanet recall :'.t at th moment) 9 all 9 boats9 ready for action^ left their

berths and prepared .or sailing, an action which the Italians themselves were not

exactly sure of on .fhat following day* Designations of the boats for''the'opera

tion: Speedboats"S.l* S2 t S3? minesweepers Rl 9 RS 9 R3; flack barges Fl 0 F2 F3?

the.entire crews f the boats probably followed this plan:

The 3 'minesweepers lay at a .distance of some 80*1000 meters froa the coast

Bl'furnished 9 in emArgenuys fire protection with its 2era twin anti-aircraft can

nons aimed toward the barracks (described earlier) on the shore southwest of the

villa | (in Plan M-">/** showa ,-as qpot marke-d lfp) and controlled simultaneously the

bs-aeh &n& beach road to the left of the Barracks ft2 andRj took over fire -pro*

-tectioh'"to-.the right o:f these barracks up to th small town of tladdalsna Open

ing of fire was unobjectionable only against known enemy objects and only upon

fire18 order. c> J;fee C/a@d@r@ <Corve.fete Captain 5@JEUlg> on th' S3).

/ o

 3-speedboats took their position as shown on map lfM3'* at Y-time 31 lay about I

, ' . : - . ' . i

200 meters, goj|y^he landing place and could hold out in case of eraer^ej|C^..with

I its own fire power in the danger areao In case S2 were put out of eonra&ib.&.,

| SI would take over its position* The 32, shortly after the Fl and F2 had landed

the troops (the landing could easily be accomplished due to the shallow con

struction there and the good fortune to find a suitable beach landing directly on

8ho'x*e)? would join one of the barges and from there take the liberated Duee on

boardo 'Here* too, the open fire order would be only on the order of the comao

dore* 5>o with the comno'dore,, is. to take position about 6OO8O@ meters from the

shore in'order to have the most favorable vieiv possible0 It is-also the thought

to use it at the.same time as a reserve ship in case of unforeseen incidents

"Open fire'* order for this boat would first.be given by the Com-nodore if heavy

<gmbat were to t'a'^e place on land and even then only if the liberation action _y/e.xe

endangered on the return trip by enemy attack

A small commando team of 3 men should, during the action, be put out from

the S3 on a rubber boat and as silently as possible and unnoticed aprroach the 3 f

Italian seaplanes. On ach pontoon of each aircraft a leak is to be made to

hinder-the planes from "taking off and offset their'effectiveness.-as observers

The 3 flack barges** with the 3 squads of 9 men (approximately) below deck,

the following instructions: Exactly at Y-time9 the 3 barges areto lay to at

the prescribed spots The personnel leave the boats in groups 'and take the. desig

nated positions."-'3'selected officers,'responsible directly to the Fuehrer$; are

responsible for the carrying out of the orders. to the exact letter* he company

ccmiander is' assigned to the F2 The entire S3 company, is made up of 3 .platoons

t each 3 squads0 each 9 uen in strength* Kach platoon is on a flack, barge and

is to be directed bj an officer as platoon leader Each squ^d is, arraed v/ith Z

light m&chihegunsv the' rest carry the 10-round automatic paratrooper fighter

weapo&o Two men of each squad are assigned as engineer demolition squads to

j detonate unforeseen obstacles-or enemy resistance* Platoon leaders squad lead^

j, er&j technical sergeants and other NCp*s have- additional pistols0 Hteel helmets,

| tropical uniforms9.assault light equipment, and emergency rations for 3 days

| . There are-telescopic-silencers available for the normal earbinesf the

1 tion of which wasn't too familiar -to anyone^ since special a inanition of a slower

1 propellant charge is usede. . (At the time 'the 'excellent English silencer

j . A few -minutes. hfr Y-tia^ the. Fl is to,approach the barracks (shown on

I. map. M-3/% hj the letter K) 9 piit:'th garrison there out of action by making full

I BS @f the .surprise moment and disarm th@m At least 1 squad of this platoon is

up the hill t take a position above the' barracks^ and from there likewise.

streets t the west so that the villa' is well observed The squad has as

main.mission to eo^er.the 3 platoons going toward the villa, and at the same

Q if necessary to-screen "the left flank* This cover and screening. tiust be

xpeven after the successful completion of the .-main action* Only after

 35
S2 takes off can the first platoon be brought back.

F2 ? with the company commander on hoard $ at exactly .time, approaches an

exactly designated position in a small inlet (se mp M-3A)o Exactly above the

landing place there i a-small hill, to be reached unnoticed by Z squads of the

2d platoon., and these will take up positions there A squad will give support to

the east, that ia0 toward th right flank side'of Maddalena Cityi the other squad

will tak a frontline position against the Villa, to give protection to the main

action frora the ast'* The 3d squad is regaining in action as an active reserve

for the eooi$aiiy coa-iander, to give protection for the eventual withdrawal and

with th 3d platoon, stood ready for action at my disposal- The plant

leadership this platoon will inarch on the street t th Villa in the

pen under evasive. action of th hostilities * This open march, first of all,.is

to surprise the sentries &n& to as&ke it possible to achieve this close touch with*

out battlec Any further action &$&&e& on the situation at the moment and n

the reaction f the guard company* Our only goal is, as quickly as possible and

under evasive aetia -of hostilities, to .push forward to the captured Puce, with

th view toward reaching him still alive (we counted on the guard company having

the order to kill Mussolini in the event a successful attempt were made.- for his

freedom) A'small signal detachment is detailed to F2 and immediately'after the

landing f F2-is to destroy the telephone cables, which locations were definitely

known an, which led from the Villa to the city and the barrackSo

After a successful liberation* the Due is to be brought t sreedboat S2 as

quickly as possible the personnel of the F2 and F3 barges and.the 3d platoon

| are t provide protection for this boato Then 51, "2 arid S3 are to settle in a

Y-formation with "fastest boat in front" and start in the direction<of- the harbor

HI and H3 flank this formation, and R3 settles itseli as the rear pro-

If there 'is no-action,.-then this .maneuver will be brought to a close

with utmost speed without assoufiag. However,_ if any action occurs during the

sion* or if Italian flack action begins9 the raft are to lay a sHQke

Uo make sure-that the Ssarbor barriers are open, a separatev small operation

is Bet up9 which should bring us control' over the Italian patrol boato Some

Gferman sailors* speaking perfect Italian, stORe* ia a boat near the patrol craft

some time-before I-timc They appeared to be a group of drunken sailors, who had

the intent, to' celebrate further with'the few personnel aboard the Italian patrol

craft and-approached this patrol boato At a signal from speedboat S3, the con

trol f the patrol boat.would be taken over by the German sailors and the harbor

barrier open@d The SS eopany9 under protection of the coastline, is to with

draw back'to Palais n the barge as soon after the completion f the mission as

The Gsraaa M battaliss in Falau received the order to make a small change

>@?iiin. From the new position, th Italian -A.A batteries on Maddaietta .and

.small island t the south,of it can some under direct fire* (See .Map M3)..

AA battallsm had- the order to be on stand-by on Xaay Firing upon the

Italian battery can foe opened only if Italian artillery opens fire during the

mission on the S-boats, R-bbats'oi<AA barges. If the Italians open fire first9

then, on tb&G$rmB.n boats, when the latter have passed the harbor Barrd^, or are

passing through,, and are at a comparatively approximate distance where the smoke-

screening'of the boat is still to be considered, then only fire from the German

side will definitely not be''opened

Should firing between the Italian and German AA open* then a German battery

is to put a known Italian radio station located on the hill of Maddalena Island

under fire and place it put of corm&ssion. (See Map H5) The AA battery of the

Corsica SS brigade is also on stand-by alert for X-day It has the special mis

sion of guarding the routes froa Bonifacio and the movements of the vessels from

there* Should the S- and ifcboats in any way become involved in a sea battle on

their way back r put under aerial attack* then the batteries of the AA battalion,

at a'given light signal from the S-boats, will open fire In case of attack by

aircraft9. fire is to be opened without any further signal, since the C>~ and *<

boats have only 2 twin AA guns available which are appropriate only for elose

coiabato This plan appeared strange to every normal line officer, even a sorae^

what careless :ne-c This held true above all for the plan to approach the Villa

in open approach marh9 Such special operations aren't calculated in the usual

Nor ean they be calculated and planned in the smallest details

, certain events and the attainment of the surprise

definitely play an important role in such a eotanando operation Above

all, the comjandtng officer of such an action, as each officer and NCO must be

in this situation, must seek to bring the situation to* an end as quick as lighte

ning and nitride If--be -responsible for ay changes in carrying out the plan*, Iroa

discipline and so If-control are necessary above all things, -.vhen, as in this in

stance, the individual order to q^en fire is. not to be given under any circu<3stan$

'?hon all these requirements are.'*3et one still needed so.ne ''G.I*"- luck ior

success of the operation*, without which success is at the best slightly diffi

cult to attain*,

The possibility of an unhindered approach on the Villa #&s naturally talked

'about'aiong the initiated personnelt as'well'as with "?adl9 Corvette "Captain

Scjtiu'lZf General Student and myself0 3ev@ral suggestions were discussed,,, for

example9 oae was that the 3d platoon should wear English steel helmets -.vith their

Grerman uniform sines they were characteristic and conspicuous -in their shape.

into first appearance by th patrolling double

an the gate eventually wer to be sailed back

an armistice between th Italians and the Allies in the Italian language

we

A final decision or* this point of the plan

t happen at an'officer critique shortly before Y-1

ice' at that time perhaps some additional reconnais

information not foreseen up to that cogent could bo. brought i'ortho

.critique never did take

 Execution of the Operationo Nature of the Last Reconnaissance and Can

cellation of the Piano

The plan was approved in the proposed form by General Student, even to nam

ing 23 August 19*8-3 as Xday<> General Student again hinted to me at that time that

1 oust be ready to be officially disclaimed by the German high coaiahd. This

official denial,. in any cas@9 would surely t&&@ place if the operation nisearried

e t result in a vacuum* Because of thi@9 ther ?#as still a last personal

B t me and my adjutant the night bejfor Xday The situation was '

more us&pleaeasi t us siu@# th high com-sand headquarters- was very, skepti

eal these days' about our report ver Mussolini's plaee -of confinement0 since

other q oontradietos'y reportse- were submitted from other sources <>

At this time9 besides General Student, Radl and. I?, there w@r only the Gerp

man. harbor eomsander of Maddalena and sines''26o8*43 the commander of th

speedboat &ivii@a in the 'Mediterranean9 Corvette Capto Schul80 knowledgeable of

| the pian& The Germa naval control group in Italy, the Corsica SS brigade0- the

AA battalion on Corsica and those in Sardinia near Palau0 wre informed only that

a successful completion of an important order of the Fuehrer could be accomplish^

@& only through d@finit@ preparations using special methodso X wa3. responsible:

for th joint*control of th operation0 and Corvattd Captain Schuls for all teeh

natterso Stand-by alert was F&$pe& for the AA battalion on Corsica

3 Th @mmaind@r reported the successful completion of the change in

a . .
and that all \sas in readiness for actiono Likewise the AA battalion

. .

j om. Corsica was put a stand-by alert on 2?o8o^3 and reported combat'readiness

I status.o The BS company.'received orders to move to Porto TTeeehio, to make contact

a ' .

I with the commanders of .th"Rboats and th AA barges there on 2? August and to be

| in alert status and ready'for action n the afternoon of 27 August? Additional

I '

i orders w3?e pr^oaally brought v@rbally by my adjutant 1st Lt Radl9 who was to

| a@empaay th Fl ^nd th 1st p!at& in the action on land, and who was t direct

<gg>@2sing a^tiea as well as the act of liberation and th ensuing withdrawal

1 On Z?oBok3^ around 1100 hours 0 I l e f t th harbor a t Jlettun v/ith 2

1 '

I boats9 together with Gowett Captain .Sehuls9 Radl and Lt Grinke0 with Haddalena

1 a the g@mlo The'3d speedboat'was already waiting ^ust utsid Maddalegiae Dur-

I ing the stormy crossings the additional details were discussed with Corvette Gap&

i|| aln Setmls*. Bue to th unexpected heavy str which b3?ught about the breakdown
I of an agin n the eeeond Sb@ate the crossing ^as delayed several hours* '$&

published the report on board and reported the situation unehang

moreover9'that fro-a the terrace-of a nearby house h@ had- seen

the Due himself on the terrace f the Villa and recognised him0 A double guard

of ar&bijaieri patrolled both day and night th roadway in front of the premises<

S uraly It was b^@sss t m that nly on of the ombafc seaplanes was anohored at

| the as a&l spot9 wfeil th@ S@MI coiibat es*&t and the rescue alsk.eraft
r

were

 determined to 'carry out the personal* last reconnaissance *Je took off our

of officers rank and put on plain navy shirts I myself went with Lt s

laJ^L/gith Lt Grienke, last in line with respect to the piaime^.^^ding

aees of Fl f to find out the exaet particulars on the general terrain* and

to listen to th latest news from the native populace and the Italian

W&rger and I went right past the Villae where there was nothing eg

ally striking not^ie The double guard was on duty as alwayso

Only a new cable ^ a plain field telephone cable - which led into the house

had not been reported up to now was obvious to ae<> From the terras of the

neighboring house (shown.on map M3 by the letter MN") to which we were driven as

buyers for our boat, one had an excellent view over the premises of the

From a email hill directly behind the house0 one could see even better

into the garden and the Villa itselfo Terrace steps and walls, whose lo

already known, but which I actually noticed for the first tiaec

proTiised definite difficulties in case.of complications and any action But they

already considered' in the plan* t noticed that soldiers and guards were

informally on the terrace and wer drinking0 .Vhen I returned to the

I found /'arger in conversation with a carabinieri who happened to //ant to

I broke into thi conversation and claimed <- just, by ehaace^ to

the Duce, due to an illness which kept him bedridden for quite

died a short while ago* The expected contradiction of the Italian

5
sn t I03?: in being expressed* He related openly that he himself belonged to

guard 6ismp&ny and described in the smallest dot ail how they had escorted

ihl 'early this very morning from the Villa to the mooring place of the sea-

o' The' Due was then placed on the white air rescue plane 9 As previously

rraaged in a. meeting with the German harbor commander, Maddalena^ the take-off

aircraft was justified to the Italians by the German high comnand as a

sea rssu# emergency0 All hopes of accomplishing ay mission seemed to

?ith a view to Mussolini's supposed bad physi-

I still entertained the hope that he was only being taken to a

consultation and eventually, either that same night or the next day*

&ek* Continuing the guard personnel on duty seemed to confirm

I decided then to support both the troops and the orders by

mi&ing the first stage of th alert* Returning to the ship, uy adjutant was

He informed me that Mussolini was no longer in the Villa,

been taken away by a naval air rescue

received 'this infraiat'ioa from one of the carabinieri o'f the

opened up a conversation while in his barraeks9~

it was decided to call off (counter

the mission for the'time being - the double guard, too9 was to be sailed in

evening and were- t zaaic it appear to the Italian garrison that arrangements

re being made for a general- departure - although the S- and 'S-boats were to re

in readiness for several days*; The -tertian harbor comsander was to relay any

instructions and orders by radioo A'special*code was drawn up for this

se' Radl and I fle:v back to 3OOLG on 23 39^-5 in an HE 111 which stood ready

 <Vieno' Fiorita airfield for all emergencies ; ,

XXIQ 6s Approval of the Steps Taken by General Students Conference in Hitler's

After the return to Rome9 General Student was given.the report on all vents

and of the-steps takene He-approved'of the temporary continuation'of the plan

and the preparation takea for'the action-on Maddalena .Lto Warger and Qrienke

remained behi&d n Maddalen* n my orders to carry,on with continued observations

and investigationso They w@re to inform the German harbor comsander in ease of

any aigaificaiit observations; he would send this Information to Fraseati through

agreed upon way is @&@o- The situation in Rome in August was developing-more

more to the detriment'of conduct f German operationso Almost daily the IC9

XI Air Force, @ u M identify Italian troop relaforeeaentsv this being SoQ.oPo f@r

every'of ficer a-nd -''so Idler Ideated in the vieiaity of fcome to report on immediate

lyo Th@s 'troop.'concentrations'were-especially strong particularly in the out

skirts and the nearby environ of the. city0 But even.in the remote outskirts

there were reports of..a gmiliar nature This took place at the same time as dis-

cushions over ih statement about ^aie as an "open city" reached its high point

B.@au R@m@ itself9 its railraods an'd apen & buildings- in the city were fre

quently bombed hy theATliea* the German high eomand agreed to decisr* Sora an

op@n city* From ih. on a combat elements were permitted in the township9 even

in t!t@@ areas occupied'by the German sideo Just as unf^v'orsJble as "this was th@

military situation of'the" German troops outside R&me% resulting; in the ever in

creas'ing streugt'i f the ''Italians The .Italian high eomaand justified these

collections bf troops with th@ military developments a the southern front and

with the resultant necessity* of prearranged and foreseen measures for the defense

of @iath@rn Italy and as-'a combat''defense against-'an eventual possible landing

of-the. Allies near.Somep H@w@ver9 this resulted in the billeting of troops and

consolidation of pet in*'.such a way that it clearly pointed to preparations

beia^ made in eas of'a military "disagreement" with the Serma'n troopso 'Ahtitank

obstacle's9 Antitank'"mines"'and ditches were set at strategic points 5 machine gun

and artillery-emplacements'-were constructed' Within a few weeks- these posts were

quipped with the a@e@s8ary weapon and ordnance^ items o . Their emplacement caused

mostly all of the arterial roads of Some as well as the auxiliary roads t be

closed often.in'between two German parachute Jumpercompanies or battalions so

that a complete. staggla@rationf? of German and Italian troops were joined, in.

which'the Italians-deflniteiy'were smmeridally superioro

-'.-Tdward the* end of"'August,'-then* the Italians introduced-an ever tightening

net'of' traffic patrols .to" control all - even the German .- motor vehicles". Tnis

was o'$ive the Italians plainly accurate information concerning the strength of

the 3'ofrman 'troops Th lerman headquarters set up similar i-Treasures on the-ir

part9" so'that there was '&-rather clear'picture by the I.C, of the 'proportionate.

I strength of Germ&a and Italian troops* On 25 August 19^5? too 9 all orspleliedl

Italian gua emplacements9 "especially those pointing towards Ostia

primary concentration''points of -'lerraan troops .were occupied and practically

for battle o Thes@ general developments in the vicinity of ome.9 the

description.p .which can only be briefly outlined here, seemed to confirm our

concept that Qiae wag jus;f:. getting ready for the Italian side to start arguing

with the <M:md^, l:-'QOVBo, who. had' to defend our. concept against the soon-tovtak:

place fall of the Italians free the Axis group and the end Of an" interim armistios

of, the. Italians \aiadthe; Allies . . . . .. .

view ".toward tbm situation, well understood on the part f the

prearranged countermeasures were drawn up and plans pre*>

itself as well as the whole province, even for the protection of

. , there were only some very small German craft available @ 'namely, ex

eluslve'craft of the XI Air 'fforee,-which replaced some divisions transferred from

Germany to Italy, destined, for Rome9 where they hadn't y^t arrived* Their timely

arrival was scarcely considered* These craft of tbe. 3CJ Air'"Force were sufficient

to carry out.the essential mission made by Hitler to General Student, ioo',- to

prolong the 'expected-'fall of the Italians as' long as possible9 to at least soften

any direct compliance,.and thus to accomplish tho collapse which in'this" case was

to be hindered by completely cutting off the southern front from the northo "

Shortly after our return from iteddalena* we discovered that the nominal

Italian government had put forth definite ideas about Germany concerning an al-

in Romeo This coup was to result, on 28.?8^3 - this 'to he ex*

ate ^ from the combined German troops and the Fascist ' ;

ircles gathered around the nvirons of Rome* Goal.of the action was to bring

Fascism back into, p@w@r again. Since we'had' heard similar indications, during the.

vening of 2?g8o^5 trip, to Maddale'nae we assumed that perhaps this .could possibly

be a cause for. the re.moviBii Of. Mussolini from Haddalenao Also to be 'can-sldered;

^as the possibility that the Puce was only being flown.:..for a medical consultation

and perhaps would b@ brbii^ht" bacjo^ a further hope for a'return to Maddalenab . Jffl

for'instance^ were the Badogli government to see that an action, which supposed

ly was upheld by it* not take., .place, then this would furnish thea with A basis

for concealing any plan, for taking Mussolini to.another place* Since our .prepa

rations ..for Maddalena were, known :to the Italians*,- they were co:ipletely excludedb

A. return.of Mussolini to Maddalena was therefore-also in the scope, of a possi

bility', especially if the supposed events in ?.ome did, not happen*"

How far; these specific military preparations Of the XI Air ^oree would g@ in

ease of the failure of the.Axis, alliance and the.resultant partial recognition'by

the Italian, armed, f r@ &n& government posts, of . the .already' -mentioned eoinsidesssi

of-.the German 'and Italian intelligence chiefs meeting in Hotel Daniele in Vene

f listed in-.text) in connection, with this, cannot h&

'foraer -General of .the 'German Armed' Forces*

;
h<, a's- well as Admiral Canarisfl had at- that-, time fbrward

Forces Chief information concerning, the alleged plann^ci

oand o , Only iierr lAhousen himself' @r

give information on this (See'earlier'aecountsv.)

to . us-.and-proven facts - namely, that Mussolini

on
Italian action of 28,3 was not planned *

 simaraK^KRssB^ajri

primarily the maintenance of our preparations in iM&ddalena* Therefore

w@ were'supposed'to hear of. a report irom Hitl@r8 headquarters in th@ field con

cerning Mussolini's supposed location, whiefe was exactly opposite to our findings,

According.'td "some alleged definite authority, a stated in this report, Mussolini

could be found in captivity on a very small island in the.vicinity of the island

of Elba| the' name of this island has in the meantime slipped my memory and I can

not recall ite Siae this report was received a few days before 28 August, our

findings therefor had to b wrong Combined with the report was the order to

prepare for a ..parachute jump mission immediately on this island, to report to

Hitlers headquarters when ready for astion in the shortest timo This meant,,

according to our views9 a definite jump into th unknown,, not counting the hoped-

for"goal of the surrendered victim to us through a j&ip on the small island I

endear!4 el $ then, together with General Student, t hold e. confer#ae in Hitler's

field headquarters' and could ejepeet to be su&fflosed there at least on short not too

This order dld'eoiae ami w@ fie?/ on one f the last day in August, or on one of

the first September day - I can't recollect it anymore - to Hitler's field head-

after our' arrival in 3as&nburg, we were sailed to give our report

t the Fuehrero" In Hitler's "work room'1, at a round table by the fireplace,

| b@si&3 Hitlerfoisrolf,thr@ were assembled Chief Marshall Herman Goertngt Field

I Marshall General Keitel; the 3ommander~n~Chie of the SJavy, Admiral of the Fleet

| Doenit2'$ the SSHChief'Marshall, Himaler; the Reich Foreign Minister, Vo.Ribben

| trops and General Jodl*

I 1 was requested' to give the report about our findings and investigations & I

I r@port@d in about a 'half-hour long speech on our work and had proof that Mussolini

1 himself9 n the early morning of Z7 August9 was still to be found on Maddalesa<>

I . . ' . - . . . ' ' - . . . - .

I Therefore,. I eostismed0 tne report; of Mussolini's presence on the small island

| near Elba was without doubt either false information or a misunderstanding, and I

prayed 'for the revocation*of the rders in this eonnectioa^ After the end of ay

Hifcieif 'stood vp, shook my hand and said something to this effects "I'll

longer believe a Skorzeny. and . I tak back my promulgated order 'what sort of

''I' therefore explained the situation and the unified plan for Ma&dalena with

| the aid f a sketch Hitler said he agreedv directed the Admiral of the JJavy to

I pla@@ the @p@@dbit division at ray disposal, for this missionc and ordered action

| to h started immediately for the return of Mussolini froa Maddalena At this

| pointc Hitler explained' t me personally that he had to deny knowledge of me undes

1 the cir@umstaneaae The government of the Heich had to explain9 under the cir

I cumstane'es, that 1 had acted on my own respnsibilityo #ith this rather .unclear

I explanation," General Student and I left East Prussia and again returned to Roraeo

I General Student.had again r@e@iv@d an order to exercise special care with a

| view'toward'tn'e: vrry "unstable situation in Italy The preparations for st&ttila"

i (this ^as the eo^e' word' for Italy breaking away r*i the A.Kis alliaaae) were t

! '

I be completed with a l l speedQ since the @nt ft Attila TS could take placs any day*
 IV "Gran Sass" \ ' '

Time< between "MaddaXena" and "Gran Sasso" (38o8 - 89<A3) O Further Recon=

Immediately after the return to Maddalena, the flight to Hitler9s field

headquarters took place@ this having been described in the previous sections

Although w@ 0 as mentioned before had dared to hope that Mussolini would re

turn to Mad&alena and we had prepared for this event0 immediately after our r#

turn to Fraseati on 28 O 8 O ^3 on that very day, intensive pains were taken to find

another clue as to the location of the again-disappeared Mussolinio Once again

we started the ss&eting and taxing small job9 the gathering of the least bit of

informations even if it didn't have anything to do with Mussolini directlyo

.$ven from troop identifications like the I.Co* would we get clues which could

possibly turn out to be of significance ' \

Th by-far greatest number of reports were 9 however9 picked up from authen

tic sources 'These definite reports came from high posts in the governments from

Italian armed fr@@@ circles9 individual identifications through conversations

with Italian soldiers9- news reported by Italian civilians9 e t c This information

had t be evaluated pie by piece This was particularly difficult, to.do in

| vi@w of the.-mentality f the Italians and their attitude toward war* t.o Fascism,,. '

% to Hussolini personally or'to Germany and the German Army in' Italye It was @x !

trers@ly difficult to determine those reports which were based on absolute-firsts :

gee those in which the alleged source was based merely on a rumor9

those which were believed to be only a definite southern fantasy of truth,;,

reported as sucho It &a@ certainly clear that a proportionately large number

thes reports dita9t correspond with the facts 0 Errors0 as well as known

, were thought, to eoiae from-the Italians0 through which these misleads9

h&&& on paras^al intentions to blame the Germans,.depended on a definite

controlling through Italian official posts o ' Nothing else remained than to put

th-s reports together in several groups - each according to its probability

to build something like a mosaic out of each group, from which9 then an

3iL& be given as to true facts It is certainly clear that we our

selves euld be -subjected to errors, which appropriately might lead to false

These time-consuming minor tasks wer exclusively carried on by my adjutant

le personally a^ni bgna ittmediately up@n our arrival in Italy a 2? 0 ? 0 Th#

degree f- th ordered'secrecy iner^astd the difficulties to a large degree9 .

so that we'had to take practically'every possibility, even.asking Germans-in high

positions B.B to the probable location of Mussolini9 since in such a manner each

question"'could psaifelj lead to something f interest*- So we were known only to

a trj small perBoaal group with whom w@ (even thoygh they wanted-to-know &@~

tails about us.and till sonldn't ask questions of us about our mission) assoei

ui*3@Xes with n Roae'o Ther wr -Only two persons, in Geriian positions in

who worlced for is ? in that they furnished us with all interesting news re

ports'^ without- actually knowing of th xast plan -in detailo However9 tjhey were

after my arrival in. Italy9 that I had a special mission in

'connection*' with Mussolini himself and that because of this all tren the smallest

and simplest@ of reports that had any connection with this individual in any way,,

w@ wanted at our disposal* And so reports ov@r the last hours before Mussolini's

abdication^, as" well as reports on the Fascist Party and significant personalities

of the same,-, about the treatment and the location of Mussolini and about the

.political'situation in Italy were received* Therefore,, fro-a the %?@ry onset, we

informed' them ;.toat w wanted no party polities* national socialist-conceived or

evaluated repeats* but pure, unbiased^ factual findings* These two individualsfl

on pi whom helng$. t@ the irele of the German embassy9 the other known t o n s

of. the German colony in 'Rome9 learned from UII that definite military

ans from. 6he kx&. - ia ^hich connection we were supposed, to have been-assigned*

I fully -i.hstrue.ted"no f the tfcr about my direst mission in search of Mussolini.

Both ger.tlemsifc had a larg@ group of special acquaintances in Rom with whom they

offi@ie.ily and privately held very go@d and absolutely trustworthy relations*

Thus ttiey could advise us both as to what news to seise and forward as well ae t

the evaluation of the credibility and genuineness .of it* .

Only -two-three days after Mussolini's flight frosi Maddalena0 we were in

possession of the first reports that dealt with the present probable location f

'Mussolini/ From 'the abundance f reports X picked out a few of them which 1

still renisabe'r. ' They were first processed by wy adjutant'*'while'I stayed at

Hitlerfs field headquarters with General Student9

Reports' earn daily from Maddalena ~ reports which stated that 'lussolini

would rat be brought back* One report from a very reliable source stated that

Mussolini could be found in a sanatorium in Rome, where he would be undergoing

an operation* Since it concerned a storaaefe disorder, he was being treated by

' Hi>> permanent.* personal physician., 'i check this reportv w found a man from

tbd-German colony who al@ suffered from-a stomach disorder* He w@nt for a en~

''fultatiozi to the doctor in question and declared that he was mor@ disturbed than

v@r over his disorder sine he knew that the Duee's ailment had beeoae worse

and this caused him great concern In the course of his conversation with the

doctor5 this ' .German*) who k&ew the doctor personally, was to bring ut & through

clever ..means & i@a@ti@n from the doctor9 who .-certainly. muat. know MussoliniQs

state of hea'ith* This took place promptly* He brought us- confirmation that the

Dut*J state of ...health w^g definitely good at the rao&ent9 that a rect for a time

in n sanatoriusi wasa9t even'under eonsideraiioao Indeed0 the doctor couldn't

gits any: ihforraatioa as t the ."present location of Mussolini * or else he dared

not or didn't-want t gi^ such information*

Another report brought the hope that Mussolini was to be found for a t.im

in the Villa Savoy''in '3oxaeo (The king at thistiiae was a& his summer location

while the' Crown Prince and his family lately were living, not in the Villa Savoy

but i the ^uirinal). ."e * Radl and I - went to the Villa lavoy. our

and found It not to be guarded, in any manner outsider & sign that it was

unoccupied at'the ia@at9 sine in-, ofther in$t.n&&& meaiberis of the king fs guard

posted in - definite, intervals a the street*.alang the outer walls* On of

 our most trusted Men also entered the Villa and was definitely able to determine

tik&t Mussolini was not to be found there,

| One rep%x*ts sine it earns from a man who was extraordinarily reliable, seemed

{particularly-interesting t us. In itself the report sounded very improbable* It

I onsisted in this - that th@ Duce was located at this time in a district south of

I -' ' . . ' .

Perugia^Chieti line and no doubt south of Lake Trasimenero The man couldn't

us an exact location? He proved a good source? however9 in that the Perugia

Ghieti lin played an important role in connection with military security 'Ve

then thought that perhaps the man euli have mixed up Chieti with the city Chiusi*

a battalion of "M19 division was then .located there - the former bodyguard unit of

I Mussolinio So,-, w took it to mean that the report perhaps meant a location south

. ' - . !

the Perugia-Chiusi line, a location ^hieh also connected with Lake Trasimenero i

we further assumed,, Mussolini was already taken away in a seaplane and was

land either la the wat@r near the seacoast or. on a lakeo Our' man set out to :

one f th@ first-days in September^ there occurred a terrible auto acei

.e:nt-in. which two high Italian officers * I believe there was a Colonel and a Lt<

olbnel - were seriously'injured^. Both were police authorities* The Colonel died

hortly after the accident, Through closer examination it turned out that both..

f?ffleers'belonged to the;"Mussolini Escort Detachment'1, or at least had an offi-

I iial connection with ito -Since'the. very-seriously wounded officer belonged to

I C ' . I

i| ^h circle- of' acquaintances' of : pur man from the embassy, a visit was ?sade to the

ii j_ i H ^ h g hospital ,. whereby an attempt was made to ascertain the travel route

| ft the two 'i?ra aud p@rhap also to find out the purpose of their duty travel*

t> .Even (before our agent had returned with the results of this visit9 we r=>

:
j @@iv@d a radi message which me through the Department of the Interior* This

] message, which definitely was issued bj the Minister of the Interior9 announced

by a man aa.m@a Cueli*-reported that security measures in the Gran Sasso area had

been'completedo An inquiry showed also that Cueli? so-called Inspector general

.(in'German als something.like an Inspector General), was responsible in-the De

partment ' of .the Interior for Mussolinis'safetyo He. held the rank of a Brigadier

General This radio message supposedly was delivered in Isolae Isola is .a small

tillage @a the northern slope of the Italian Gran Sassoo

The outcome of the questioning of the' seriously injured officer revaale.d tha

men were'n duty travel from 'Aquila t Chieti and Home (or on the return

1 jiarny -'I canst 'remember exactly-any .aore). /The city of Chieti appeared now

| twice In a- report Th earlier cite4. report concerning "Perugia-Chiusi15 actually

f dealt with definite identification' of the bearer of the reports Oio? assumption

I that he was mistaken and aeazrfc Ghiusi was w o n g and also, as it turned out later,

I &w? BLBBumptton that Mussolini had land@d on .Lake. Trasimener was a false con-

up gave us the best - clue as to

Mussolinies whereabouts in a .not-too-extensive territory, namely that of th@

I'-nearby region of the Italian Gran ^asso. The town .of Isola seemed .to be of par-<

I ticular, interest, A second place of iBterest was Aguila, thestagting or feea&iaa!

 ^W-^^^

point f the. TBY trip -of both officers connected with the'escort detachment of

Measure., as Italian e?as seat to the town

This fellow .was'an absolutely thorough young naa.who gave us positive

Army.were allegedly being hold in the vicinity f Isola, while in reality

activity-concerned, as far'as possible, a formation of Italian units to'-be

perhaps for. the d@ey plasic> "Attllao1* Tfe man drove off in an Italian per-

the same day, an Italian-who spoke perfect Geraas was sent'to Aqul'la and

in a-personnel-carriero Plans to look for a.family, Rossi, in- Assergi,

Tills supposedly was a family from 'Some, who had-fled .to Assergi because of the

bombings, and^air raidso Assergi was a small mountain ^illa^e near

, ._.,,_ a t th ^ t t^. m@ beginning point of cable railways to 3an $ass The

was/to send a message to the Rossi family - HtQ Rossi was to return to :

also the Rossi daughter was"to be given a personal letter from me -. whreby

|-our.messenger-would definitely infers us of anything odd* After it turned out

3ssi family0 for whom the man searched, was -no longer there, we concluded

jesais on hi @wa Initiative- would report to us a mush information as pos-*

| than t TOakn the-unfavorable impression which could result from., the non-fulfill<

{ meat of. ..his isis@i@&o

i - -

m a n ^ o a Isola returned the n<kr,i morning and could give a information

I serving a a &%n& of peli@e post for the neighboring eoimtrysid0 As training

| exercises were taking plae@c thr were, till n hand in the vicinity sotae Itall

| .an troop .unlt8e' Even'in .the higher located parts of AbKu^zj.. such .events weren*t

|.-reportedb Only a foot path ^rhich was very difficult to tracers led to the

i The courier^ srlio-had returned from Aquila .and Assergi reported that he had not

|. found a family..named Rossi in /Issergi - that in the last few months no.one fr&m

| . . . "

I the vicinity'of. Do.se, had-arrived there0 But @serthless h did ha^e some other

| perhaps tr>j sigaifiean^^ information t gi^e,, The^e wer very .nany carabinieri

| billeted in the -Immediate vicinity of Assergio Some Italiasi divisions were lo-

J atea ia the region of Aquila itself.. Th@r@ iyer@ very strong traffic controls

I in.-effect o At the ,j*m@tion of the main highway.-from Aveszan to Aquila, which

% - '

| led-to Assergi, near the town of Ortes Basean9 a barrier was 'erectedq -at which

|--vehicle and e^ery pernon wh wanted t go to'Assergi,-.were-thoroughly'cnec&edo

I In @iilian eircles they pk about the fact that' Mussolini was located in the.

| neighborhood| the eis&sfc plae euldn9t be revealed, although m&ny people were of

I the piai@n that he was ia the area of the Italian Graa Sasso and specifically

j in the big.winter sports hot@l9 "O&mp lisperatore" (named after the famoua skiing!

j area of the sasi naa@ aad upon which - the .hote'l was built )

j Although"we had'no proof of'this information, we w@re certaiji that.Massollni

as?aijri b e

to General Student and on 5 or 6 September all preparations reference Maddalena

were terminated and both of raj officers ordered back

The iro?e task to locate Mussolinifs place, of confinement was their^greatly

intensifieda Above all, naturally9 the reconnaissance work of the Gran Sasso

and the surrounding area had priority* Nevertheless, all other reports still

eame to us and. were carefully tested and followed up0 Yet the other reports

seemed to ene@ntrat@ predominantly on the Gran Sasso areao Thus we received an

interesting report from .the labor groups,, the trade union groups, that all kit

chen and hotel employees of the Canpo Xmperatore Hotel on Gran Sasso had been

dismissed,. They had h@n sent home without any further reason* Therefore9 the

rumored ^xpres^ion was tied to this, that Mussolini was quartered in this hotel

now9 and in contrast- to such service, this Fascist couldn't possibly foe located

there Another report stated that &h cable railway up the Gran Sasso was stop

pedo Only some Italian police9 and only those belonging to a special unit dared

to use the cable railway9 th@ running of it. was kept up by the police, and

At the sane time ae we started the intensive pursuit of this report we

also'began to carefully gather data for an eventual sortie on Gran Sass< Hext '

we tried t 0t topographical maps -from specialised shops in Home showing the

Aforussi and especially the area of the Gran Sassoa It turned out that in all i

of Rome @wu from the smallest suburban bookstores' all map material had dia> :

appearedo I* was evn explained that these maps were not to be obtained any~

whe're. Evidently, a confiscation of .this map material had been conducted by the

Ministry .of the Interior9 but. at least a rather adequate sales restriction with

an implicit ly heavy duty had been proclaimed Our next attempt was to procure

tourist @&3>s and, traveling guides mainly in sports stores The Italian police

had thought ahead even in this field The. same failure was encountered when we. ;

tried t get advertising booklets and hotel-prospect! from travel bureaus and

travel associations n the- Aquila region, and Gran Sasso Then a requisition for

muh prospect! was suecessful when I requested it of the Central Europe Travel ;

Bureau ia Berlin - through .radio message t my unit which forwarded my request<?

Ia it (the prospectus) were all the details about the. Camp laperatore Hotel and

even had an xact pistur f !t 9 as well as! some pictures of the skiing area9

Gamp Xaper<itore Drawn-to-scale cutouts of the topographic maps were not there9

Too, .the fsw photographic pictures showed a snow scene of about 2-3 meters snow

fall and. vjgrnst at all suitable for. our purpose .in aid-sumiier, since terrain

diffrenews couldn't b@ identified* . Besides ^ the photos were very smalls In

rder to obtain more details on the Gran Sasso region after additional useless-.. !

attempts(. we finally r@c@ied a.book from the Geographic Institute of the

sity f *!Otte,. a geographic and geological work on the Abruzziso. But even this

.work disappointed urn and was absolutely us@lesso

Aft attempt, to @btais aerial photographs.'of the German Air Foree was also

unsuccessfal. There na a aerial photography available- on the ar@a fr@m Rom

to that d? the Gran Sa^s@o Reasons ia botfe instances it concerned Italian

prohibited. a!r mn - then an all!ed .'Country. - and no aerial photographic ilig.

 had been made on this basise

After further considerations9 we reached the decision that we wouldnt carry

out any more aerial photography flights over the Gran $asso (For alternate plan

'A^tila", there was finally carried out a onetime aerial photography flight over

isart of Rai@9 particularly t obtain an aerial photograph of the ^uirinalo

den't^,. at that moment a cloud hovered over the uirinalQ so that the J.uiri

nal'.couldn't be seen on the aerial photographs*, Another mission would not be

:.te aerial photography flight was set tor ? September ^ 5 * Xn those days, w

made contaet with the.small group of Italians who theoselves<were concerned

with the problem of Mussolini9s captivity and.who had the intention of freeing

hiffio (See Part IXX2O) I myself had a discussion with so'-ne of these officers in

|a private home* We therefore depended on this group to .acquire bits of iuforma

jtion about Mussolini5a supposed or actual place of confinement; secondly through

I '

JOUTFknowledge -of thai? plan and our enta.cts9 which influenced them*, we eould

I neutral is any &@tin a their part Cur knowledgec. through conversation $?ifeh I

i . . ' I

?
them* clearly showed.that they had absolutely no hypotheses for the ae<3.npli@fe

sent of their plan - thes* than their good intentions for it. Thirdlye we intend-;

&d t take, along on of these - officers-in uniform and on our id is an--eventual I

.' - . ''' - 1

relaaa attempte Tteis -wodld --fore the surprise moraente, put the. Italian-guards im |

doubt'and In the" dark0 if they were personally to see Italian @fi<e@rs in uni<ori

in iToxit :of th^m and were to-'hear .them converse with thea&.iii their owsi Italian

pf
language = particularly if'in GGlo" language An agreement was made - that this

gr-^p-po through am@ complicated way9. would a@t..passively between Germany and Italy

snAc, at -some-designated'high post^ would- lea^e word-'where."we eouid raaeh them

This particular' group . had -absolutely- no knowledge of''our. real purpose c

QIQ,'k or 5:-.SpteMbr ^3$ 1 aeesmpanied"'Sea.ral Student by-ear dn'an'inspection

&& lake; Brae las o There-were" mixed Italian-^ernian. seaplanes ther60 The

^aaa airfield eomraand@r meatioaed.3 " during ^^s eon^rsatiGas9 that the ^e

rfield personnel'were now alternating on-stand-by duty with the Italians,

:jwent -lai'-t1 the underground'shelters'and'who served..as flight srew support unitsu

fThis tsok plaee 'for the'first'tlane on 27o8ov. sinee-at the time of sin aerial alert

1 all'"Ges:; mh troops--of the airfield so implement were la trie under ground -shelters and

i]tae Italians .-.alone took'o^er' the'alert and air'defense 'ijeaGuresc

' * - - ' '
The -.date?' 27o^

;
;j as -sstablis-h'ed' by the. a i r f i e l d corriiianderB no^ t.uafc 1 tl.ii.a. t back on it'V could per- |
| haps DB connected." ;vith .the bringing of Mus3iiai;'frrfi Haddalena *: Tho--officer-tan
'I further related t h a t ' a t t l ie'end " of t:iis alert.*.aa I t a l i a n riea-^rdscue plane as in
if the -harbor1, Wiich'hadn't bsen noticed - before . Upon ay question as to-virhether or
;| . . , * , '
i mot ha; fead heard, rmraorwis about thi sea-^reseue plane 9 the of f ieer replied that |
;i osatM.ag had beeii' said about i t 9' that Miisselini had arrived ' n ito Junior also !
thad i'fe., s'saiid I t a l i a n ' s o l d i e r s 9 that -this : usrson (Mussolini) ??as saen debsrkiji?? I
J
i] ' ' . ' . " : ' I
jaffcer the ^ea landing of t h i s airc?aft and-thsa was taken a^ray in aja ambulaaeso J
:
i ' "' - ' ' - !

j] Tha Italian had also giB the a e r i a l a l e r t zlgnal bj sedeo' T@ the questioii^ wiiv|
1 had he &t reported-this9'th'ffi@e.? answered that these fasts seemed i n s i g n i f i - |
leant to -Bisu FF the pMFps of ^.r in^estig;aition9 a report in t h i s connection
 H 7563 ^8

would have been immensely significant, foj* at that time we could Have followed up

on this clue and would not have had to go off to another spot in useless inquiry

1 ("wild goose chase o ") Besides, this report again confirmed our assumption tiat

1 Mussolini's airplane had landed on Lake Trasimeno - in connection with the first

j mentioned report - Perugia-Chieti- as an absolutely false conclusion* The situ-

I ation in and around Horse developed more and more at this time in our disfavor

The continuous bombings and aerial attacks resulted in an increased nervousness

araong the tfoman civilian population. The airfields in the vicinity of Some were

constantly under attack* In the city limits of Rome itself, ever*increasing and

stronger night street controls were carried out. After nightfall, cars were not

permitted to travel vd-thout special authorisation. Italian street barricades

consisted oi 3-10 men who also used firearms if cars didn't stop immediately on

1 call. Thus - still in August - the wiie of the Turkish ambassador, who failed

I ' - '

J to stop when she-.did, not hear the order - as she was returning home at nightfall

in her car - was - shot and killed* . ,,.,. . ,

Xf we had not .yet had complete, positive proof as to Mussolini's stopping

place on the GracSasso* then fchese facts i-juatt mentioned convinced us and .focused

our attention completely in planning :&n, action in tiis area. I)ue to the impossi

bility oX acquiring mapping material pn,||ie Oran Sassp, we intended to send a

harmless :nountaifl clinbing group up the highest mountain peak of the \bbruz25i

ran*e. They were t be accompanied by our interpreter, who Lt "ar^er had al

ready mentioned in the Maddalena H a n - and who i3 a well--tnown Central uropean

mountain climbera -fe were nevertheless warned at the right time, through a

directive, that at this time of the year no one undertook a mountain trip in this

area and those who did had t be prepared for arrest when they arrived at this

high Alpine area* So this plan, top, had to be dropped* A member of th# Gerrsan

embassy could briefly talk with us and.even give us a detailed description of

the Gran Sass and Caapo.-Imperatore, since he had once been skiing there9 but

this description, vas .-interesting'to- u s

0 n l y (for the plan itself it appeared rath*

r useless), because it gave information as to the relationship of the condition

f the soil through several meters of layers of snow and the problem of the con~

dition of the ground in summer when it was completely free of-snow. Another

completely unsolved * question, was .that, of'nihe ^rarm, air .currents n .this area* ones

which would be deoi$@&ly crucial Cor\ &n eventual aerial operation.

A After; the .preliminary, discussions |o^.:,a '*<>ran Sasso" Plan among General Stu

dent, Kadi and myself9 the following was clearly decided: A grand operation,

approaching from tfee valley% was hopeless from either side, since a surprise ap

proach because of the terrain and the supposed security measures0 seemed out of

the question, Th@ only approach way, then* was from the air; Tiis was possible

hy three methodas first, through a landing with helicopters; second, through a

landing with trjop*carrying gliders; third, through a paratroop operation., The

first method ..seemed to offer us- the most successv since ah almost vertical land

ing with slow landing speed..- and this in a very restricted area - and a similar

take-off were possible because- pf the difficult and unfamiliar terrain. General

Student then sent some..of .his General Staff officers to Germany with the

 k9

possibility of bringing back an adequate number of helicopters and to test the

usage of the same in high mount&inous areaso The result was negative - bringing

the machines her from Erfurt was supposedly not possible! besides0 they hadn't

yet b@& tested conclusively for a mountain operation* So there remained now

only the two other possibilities* A decision would be made shortly before the

operation that both operations were to be considered as possibilities in future

to the general development of the situation and the possibility that my

twit would eventually have to b quickly available , I transferred the unit, which

because of low supplies was about 50 men in strength , from the Fratica di Mare

airfield, #her it haS'beon located since 280809 directly to Fraseati* f'ais tools

place around the 4th ar 5th of September On ? August, an aerial photographic

flight over the Gr&B ftasso was planned for 8 aofflo, since the TO of XI Air v orce

was to be carried cut together with Radl and me* The takeoff had to be post

poned at the last moment^ however, since there was no photo aircraft available

equipped With an aerial eamersu This presumably had to be brought first from

southern *rkne@o The? flight was therefore postponed for one day o

On the afternoon f ?o8 we decided^ at a conference with General Student,

to try nee Again9 to attain exaet facts as to Mussolini's probable stopping

place on dkripo laperatore; And we determined to send the headquarters medical

officer, 'a'1st Lt* in the Medical Corps, without bringing hia in on the secrete,

to th@ Gtein Basso II also had orders to drive to Assergl9 and from there to

ta:te tb* cable ear up to the Oran Sasso Up there, h was to put in at the Caapo

Iaper9 4ore Hotel and demand a consultation with the Italian medical officer on

duty* (It sheuld ^@ noted here that shortly before0 even before Mussolini had

been brou.^kt up the <5ran < Sasso, Italian convalescent oldiers could be found re-*

cup'-Tating at the Canjp Inperatore Hotel)o He was to.explain to the doctor,

ihm* that he eame on a mission from the Commanding Generals of the XI Air Force

to forward the request as t the possibility for a limited number of German .

wko were convalescing from malaria fever to be -allowed to recuperate

This Would be profitable not only in the sense of aiding the soldiers

needing eda'irale.seence, but also in the sense of deepening German-Italian friend-

It Was impressed upon the doctor that he was to eeek9 at all events^ per-

lor his own admission to the hotel and wasnt to let any pretense prevent

him from getting no In case the cable car wasn't in bperation for some reason

or-othero he Was to atte.npt,.at all events, to telephone the doctor at the Camp

Imperatore"' Hotel

Otar assumption wasfl then9 tfiat the doctor probably wouldn't reach the hotel*

However, he was to' bring us definite information about this; wiiy and in *hat

he was turned back, and probably could ven bring us reports as to what h events

ually would observe and hear durin-; th trip in the vicinity of Asser<gi* Perhaps

fro-Ti this ther-might be a later conclusion as to Mussolini's stopping plac

If the doctor was actually able to get into the hotel, this would be a clear

that Mussolini was not, on th ^raa '5A-SSO and eventually it would follow that

there would actually be @om @onvalescing possibilities for those requiring

 recuperation<> The doctor's departure was to take place very early in the morning

of 8o9o Since the outcome of his trip would have to be known in a conference in

Rom, it w||^|^*'ed that the doctor, upon, his return from AsBergi,V!ra|||^,meet ma

and Radl in an appointed house in Rome, to advise us of the outcomeo

"Radl and I were to accomplish the aerial photography flight with the IC that

morning, in order to attain exact data for the plan*

1. 8 September-.'1943.' -.

8.9<A5'.'we took off from the Iratica die :iare airfield with an

photographic--'plane. Above all, they depended on us to obtain from this

suf 1'1'cien.t detailed photographs @f the cableway from Assergi up the Gran

Sasso,: .as well as'of the mountain station, the hotel and the very close surround

ing apa<, The decision, -then', .if a par a troop assault was possible or if only a'

J eargo-carrying glider operation was possible, would be based on these pictureso

I However,-'wre. hoped we could'also produce "mosaic pictures", from which we could

I obtain, through ..special technical facilities, plastic pictures with very exact

I vert-ic'al off slats The aircraft was I to be brought that evening from Nancy,

| before the'take-off, we were informed by the IC that the installed strip*

| samera unfortunately wasnet functioning. -Se here explained the handling of the

Sj hand c&nera'. This had tofoeused in such a.way that'we couldn't be observed

I ing photographse~ That is, we didn't dar ake the shots from the tail-gun

f
s turret but froaa the opened entry hatch at the bottom of the

And thus it was that one of us two had to lay on the floor to take pie-

from "the plane with, the hand camera,' while the other had to hold his legs

| to. prevent 'the'former fr@m slipping out." The IC then climbed into the nos

!
I i ..- . . .

and read through our instructions quickly* It was noticed here that we

completely blameless for any aerial photographs which, because of our handi~

| cap due t the danger of inexperience, would be useless,. -The flight crew of the

j plan v'ere to'have n knowledge of the real plan of our photographic mission..

| The plane kept exactly on course' and maintained cruising altitude* The pri

f'fflary'target of the flight was"to obtain aerial photographs of Italian airfields

I-oh the Adriatic Therefore we flew at a'height of 5000 msters from Fratica di@

J-
.: Kare on a eours over Pescara-Anc@naRiaini almost to 3avenna0 From there, th

|: sdme stretch- back t Peseara-Pr&tiea. -In both'courses, the flight plan was so

but' that it took .us. exactly over the top'of the Italian Gran S'assoe Sino

suits were available for us'and we were flying in short-sleeved tropi

uniforms, 'we Cladl and I) "'had to'--tolerate''the* cold.''Since* it was still morn

ing,'at this height the reading was'several degrees below freezing point, the re

wind was more than 300 kmh9 and the truth of the matter was that #e had to

it pen bubble with bare arms out- in the pen* On the flight up<,

the pictures, with '^iadl holdin'g", and on the return'flight 'fiadl did the

and' I held'him. In t-his way\\both" bf us naturally tried to per

sonally observe, anything-that would be of significance for"our'plan* Th entire

Gran Sas@ mountain range showed'us a grandiose, deeply fissured rocky terrain

eousitle^g high peaks, deep valleys and filled with ravines* Even at the

 51

first glance of the high,, mountainous t^Tain with sharp and steep, rocky cliffs

we knew that there i?as no question of the possibility of a parachute jump opera

tion here* But all these considerations were eliminated when we flew directly

over the Campo Imperat.ore Hotelo 'He attempted to take as many shots as possible

with the hand camera ia the hope that we could possibly use some of theme *ie

s
dida t have.auch confidence in our technical knowledge in this area The .flight

took place during the best flying weather and in an absolutely cloudless, and mist

free sky0 the sight of which was excellent Something which' couldn't be known I

from this great height was the difference in elevation,. The difficulty of the I

&ra0 because of the steep rocks and the deep ravines was easily recognized^ but

could not be cjosely evaluatedo As far as we could observe <, the 'Hotel seemed to

he located on a hilly plateau* The green surface - as'well as the? Alpine meadow

soil - seesiei almost.to melt right into the area'surrounding the hotel like a

natural ca?*duflageo 'Particularly noticeable to us was tii interconnected appearing

surfaeo (it was somewhat in a trapezoid shape with small buildings dotted here

l r

and tber^o #e assumed that it actually was an Alpine meadow, as ifc_ddn.._t create

an iaprission that the surface could be very steepe In g@n@ral9 our observation

of ths territory \@e already supported by the previously mentioned description of

a <d& wixo had been skiing at Camp Imperatore in the wintero

f . The flight there and back went smoothly and toward noon we again reached the

I open sem by Praties die (fare* As we looked in the direction of Frascati while we

''mmlanding9 we saw countless huge billows of smoke rising thereo Shortly before0

the small city had been under heavy bombing attack by the Allied Air Forcesa The

sight from th Pratica airfield already showed that very heavy damages must have

occurredo Since the C.nmanderinChief of the South, as well as the Cc5H.niinding

General of the 2d 4ir Division and the XI.Air Force were located there9 we had

actually anticipated this attack for quite some time 0 Our immediate concern was

applied now to -the members of my unit9. who were protecting our living e.nd office

quarters, as well s to both officers- whose reeall from Maddale-na was momentarily

expected-.todays and the orders which awaited us at our quarters in the Villa

Tuculum II a Besidesfl of course9 our concern for our official and private belong

ings , writing materials, maps and documentsQ In addition, we wer also worried

about the other surrenders and the danger which arose through the fall of the

military governmento Just then the situation in the-south -_landing of the Allies

on the mainland and the imminently beginning offensive was ^ery troublesome0

A <e&3? brought u close to Frascati and on the route we met .nany bewildered

and even soue.wounded fugitives of the Italian civilian population In the vil

lages near Frascati, the town of.Grotta Ferrata was particularly heavily bombedo

Frora there on in 9 auto travel was no longer possible T-is streets were almost

torn up 9 and collapsed h o w e s and trees as .well as bomb craters blocked all ap~ .

proachese After we had covered tho distance to Tusculum II hy foot0 we found only

j a couple of walls of it left tandizigo The Villa had received 3 direct bomb hits,

2 additional un@xploded bo.-nbs :vere in the-cellar9 any approaches'were forbidden

since'it was perilous and endangered life* The b.crabing was so severe tiiat in

several places even the landscape itself was changedo At the entrance to the

garden of Hilla Tuseulum, we met one of our officers who was in the Villa during

th attack*. As though by a miracle, no one inside was injured,, Ale, the two

officers hsNJ|iiiirn@d from Maddalena but nothing further had been heai*i|Mf them

since the time -of the attack on the city* Shortly afterwards, larger returned and

informed'us'that Lt, Grienke had been buried alive by one of the f.filing bo-nbe in

the'neighborhood.'of the villa* He had been taken to an emergency military hospi

tal. I looked for him there. - h@ was seriously injured and was quickly, taken by

ambulance to.3bae He died there during the next day* Te immediately be.gan. sal

vaging our buried things.from Villa Tuseulum, and tried to get everything.out of

the heap of ruins tfe-now arranged-our-stay at a distance beyond the city, lo

cated at Villa Pusmet, where the officers' quarters for the General Staff of the

'XI Aif Torse was located*, There were comparatively few military .offices destroyed

-there9 The signal communications had suffered heavy damages9. although relief had

been quickly achieved through improvisation. The general headquarters of the XI

Air Force had suffered no dajaage whatever I informed the Commanding General

ur photographic flight. The photographic office of the XI Air Force had

heavlly'boobed and therefore our aerial photos could not be developed there,,

It was, feTO@r9 possible to take the photographs to one of the nearby located

fr@ntlin reconnaissance patrols9 where they could be developed, undoubtedly with

a delay of a whole day, In 'ray report/I described to. General Student our obser>

vations of the territory, and to his question as to the possibility of a parachute

in this territory,- I firmly vetoed it I was a representative of the concept

one of the .selected missions could possibly be successfully carried outo

I
received-the..order'from the Commanding General to draw up a detailed operation

plati in the next few hours before evening and to present it to him then* In any

ias@^ General Student would order, the procurement of-the troop-earrying gliders

of theDFS-23O'fcype and their transport from southern France, The order to south

ern France ^as to be put ut immediately after the rev-air o the communications

Two things I regarded as tstill absolutely neeesuary to 00 -.plete.tne .plan:

first, the e'ffect of .the- reco'ni.a. Jssauce of the medical officer ilst Lto), and

secondly, the preparation'for; movement'of the already mentioned group of Italian

officers, in order to-.be able to take along a unit. of Italians in. uniform on this

operation. Hadl and I ..therefore went to 3ome late in the afternoono An eventaal

meeting with the Air Fore doctor in a house in Rome was agreed-upon, or at least

t leave behind for-us the rosulta of his services* While on the road to 3ome,

it was already obvious to us that all completed and armed posts of the Italians

were werj busy* Pack and ordnance artillery seemed to be in aetioiio vven the

ifehiele control was stricter - German vehicle with transportation orders couldn't

g any further0 The overall impression was that all the Italians had dedicated

I an increased attentiveness. Something "lay Ln the winde" i'erhaps

this, als n&B connected with the grand-scale air'attack on Fraeeati

Ciaispin airfield - the latter being heavily attacked.

I wante'd oalj with one of our'informants9 t look for one 1* the th@r of

the'Italian officer group in:his hoae 1 intended to take one .of the most

 :-snaaE3Bi:.o

we still couldn't na*ne

e ;
Mussolini s stopping place". " T wanted to make it clear t hiss that it had been

provided in-our plan to take in ..with us one. or more Italian officers who9 if pos

sible, would be f the higher gradeso- These were, at the approach of an Italian

security guard or else at any meeting with any ..kind of Italian soldiers who flight

question them, "to give an exact, fixed.reply. In this:way,- the Italian soldiers

would b@ deceived'-and would be transferred in the belief that it concerned an

official transfer of the Italian government or something similar In this-way,

if it resulted in hostilities, the onset, at least, could be postponed to a pos

sible later/date or''tine, that is, to a time when the'actual purrose eventually

were .to b@ .fcriown.. Unfortunately, our search was fruitless, the homes of those .

.concerned were cut- off and no-one could get to them* 1st V U 3adl took off to a

well-'ttiown.all night restaurant, to wait there for me,.while I still attempted to

get aome- netfa of meeting the doctor. The latter,' however, had still not arrived

at the agree/ifcupoh place* After I. had waited for him for about an hour0 I went

to the restaurant where Hadl was waiting for rae0 Even during our meeting, in Rome,

and later etn more @ we -encountered heavy pedestrian traffic in the streets and

in the plafcad' of-Some* A general nervousness seemed to have grasped the people

JPhere was particular activity on Via emeto in and btwe@n the e@e@ houses , the

embasay, I learned that at 1900 hour the Italian radio would release an important

Shortly after 1900 hours, I-want to the agreed~up@za restaurant.-:-1 had no .

to listen to1 the radio announcement - and-observed the populace was quit

excited. Many troops were milling around on the streets, people were embracing

-and kissing each-other, screaming, crying, laughing, presenting a ..rather indescri

bable picture. .Amid all..th noise and screams there was alwaya one phrase heardV

?
Arai@ii<B@! the war is over!'8 FTOIE aome'polioe, we got an anawer .to our_ ques

tion, that the Italian had signed an armistice with "the Allies* Detailed parti

culars were.not available*:. My adjutant, who had heard the news, given directly

hj TfershaX.Badoglio-himself,.-, on the. radio, informed me abut the report* "e. de

cided t leave, oiae immediately after the meal, since very shortly we'd have to

reckon with the military personnel who perhaps.would, be withdrawing .from aome.

It was just at'aunset. By going down some quiiefc side streets - we had acquired

a very escaet knowledge of the street layout f Rome - we left the heart of the

cityo It ^as impossible to g@ around an Italian barricade and control point in

the ^i^inity of'.Give Citta* Although we could have been held there on some pre

'text, juat then.at this spot, pack, artillery, tank, eto. ware, getting-ready

to detonate atreat position^ and a ware able to.pass unhindered. Evidently,

n@ orders had yet. been passed on to the tropso .

. To ua,. however, it was clear'that the heavy bombing attae.ss on Frascati in

the afternoon had more or less given us an indication of an armiatioa. As a r*

ault, til entir German regine in Italy waa coaipletelj cut off from "all signal

oonaunicatibna with Germany and the 3uthera fronto 3 hadn't even contemplated

n tha afternoon'ainoa w had estimated siaeh an offensive for quite some

 5k

tim@ o Such a concentration of high ranking officials and practically all of their

combined signals equipment and facilities could not have been unknown to the enemy

and had to^obrput to the test some day by these enemies? who could put^mWt- of it

@ut 'of action with one blow* . ' .

During the afternoon, however9 a large part of the telephone communications

was again in operation* By putting in a new telephone channel link, eoranunica

ticm were 0 t@ a great extent, again operating'

la Fraseati, there was a great deal of activity going on aaong the various

German.command posts in preparation for action* Phase "Attila'' had begun* How

ever, certainly not according to the plan prepared by tho high com-nand since the

n& of July* Preparations for phase "Attila" were so made that the German high

command, shortly before the actual fall of the Italians,-could take the initia

tive Evenfefe@@had to;be approved by unobjectionable decisions of the German

Secret Serviee. The unfortunate role played by the most important of these ser

vices . !*<, the Office of Foreign Counterintelligence, has already been des

cribed* (See Part II..3*) Besides, in Hitler's field headquarters no united

views existed about the political situation and of any further development in ItaJ

is that neither timely.nor- appropriate directives were put out by the German

high eora&aiid in .Italy*- .So. too, did they overlook th Italian initiative, v/hich

naturally was a serious drawback to the German military command* The German eoa

aaad had at .the -onset only a few hours to wait to diagnose the situation and re

cognise.any further intentions of the Italians, and could .handle these accordingly*

First of all.- they also had to .see how they could bring about negotiations

for surrender and disarmament for the Italian troops located in the immodiate

vicinity This.'then..made it clear to the German 'hi?h coatiand that first of all

any possible.danger...of opening of active combat had to be eliminated* Now we

awaited only the nesst step of-. the Italians after the armistice on that would be

a d@elar.sti@n of war against .ler-many* Therefore, the disarming of the Italian

Armj was-the order.-.of .the momento A'e could possibly expect* too. in perhaps only

a. few instances* an ath of- loyalty from various Italian units,' who actually wer

ready, to .continue--fighting.the .var against fche Allies* Before anything else-B

however Some.would, have, to com into German hands sins this concerned th vital

question of German suppliea and other rearward connections Also, the chief Army

telephone'exchange...was in Rome*.'- (HV Rome)* Ilthough there were no pure Italian

troops in Frascati itself* a doubt in the Immediate vicinity there was a s~

called "Arabian Legion*f( These soldiers made an excellent impression zn& in cas

of hostilities were .tc.be reckoned with as relevantly difficult troops There*

fre suitable. e@@OTity. measures were ordered ia effect immediately* Du'ring' that

same ni^fet^ through xtremely circumspect discussions, some Captains of the XI

Air Free, wh@ were-sent t this unit, obtained the surrender and disarming of

Legion*". In this way, the imne'diate ' critical point for Frascati

overall.situation, and the ratio of military strength between'Italians

and Gerrans was such, that so.netliisig like t^o German par.atroop divisions, which

were dispersed n a wide-area, but w r e stationed mainly in the vicinity of the

Pratiea di Mare airfield and Ostia, optosed at' least 5~6 Italian divisions of war

strength in Rome and in the in-nediate vicinity Due to the general development

of the situation, on 5 September a paratrooper battalion (instruction battalion)

and my small unit were transferred directly to Frascati* By chance, I had my unit

again but of the city On 7 Septembers raoving it. to a small wooded area on the

'southeastern shores of tlie Albanian Sea Their former quartering area, in the

garden of Villa Borghese9 was very heavily bombedo Liaison.with the command head

quarters there and with the paratroopers located at Pratica di Mare and Ostia was

not disturbed during the latest developments since no Italian troops of any kind

were deployed along the routes over Albano-So Faloaba toward Pratica9 so they

couldn't endanger-the'situation-'in-', any way* Parts of the Italian liacenza divi

sion were located in the '''Albano-Ariccia area therefore,, these routes were also

not to be atL

fhe next step'-of-the-German high conun&nd was the disarming, also,-of the

Italian units is the'nearby environs., Jith the disarming of the parts .of the

Pi'acenasa Division found in the'San Harin6-Albano-Ariecia-Genano de itoma area,

the -instructor battalion-'was--^placed under eo&iiand of Major MOTBO It was to com

jmeace "the disarming action on' the morning f 99>*tft &&y resistance to. be broken

forceo in the framework-of this action, a*y co$-*and, too, was to be. em-

in conjunction with any action in which'a part of the instructor para-- .

trooper battalion were'to be used*,

Another parachute battalion W M S to cojnuence a jump operation in the early

morning of 9o9^3 n the Italian headquarters at :4onte 3ofcndf and if this

'-wasn't, possible, these were at least to render uselsss the normal functioning and

giving of. ooanands of the Italian high command through this surprise attack.

The German paratroop units located in southern part of Rome, in the Pratica

and Ostia'area, were to engage Any nearby located Italian troops-in combat <, so

that th connecting routes.to Iraseati could be kept open Besides, the Pratiea

di Mare airfield was t fee protected against any action whatsoever Cia-apin

airfield was definitely in dermaa handso These, however^ had nothing to do with

the plans and measures which were ta!<ten by command headquarters .of the XI Air

Force and with ay activity, other than the small part takea ia the- framework of

the instructor battalion* It appeared necessary, however9 that it would shortly

be B@de@sary to describe this day with an understanding of all the developments*

At night, I want- to my small unit 'to give them approximate instructions for

the next day's action-and to inform them'of the tactical reason for th i:saediJftte

action itself-to be'taken under the paratroop instruction battaliono 1st I*t

Nensel:was detailed as con*nasider of my small group* -I myself9 together with

of the ^ernan embassy staff in.. So.-ne arrived in a

long aotor column, &lso various other official Ser'iian.-higli officials came, from

Frascati and passed through the area* They reported on the situation in $oae

Evidently the .Italian government .was absolutely master of the situation in floae.

and'Italian.trpops .controlled the city completely without aaywhere meeting any

German opt-ofltitioii, since this couldnt yet have been orderedo

 H 7563

In any event, that night the doctor who had been sent to Assergi reached

Frascatio le reported that unfortunately he had had no success with his mission.

It was a b s e H ^ T ^ impossible to reach the Gran Sasso or even to telephone, the

Camp tmperatore Hotel To be sure, though, he probably had some sensational ne.vs

to bring us 0 He had heard from the circle of the Italian civilian population, thai

Mussolini was located & the Gran Sasso? all signs - which already were known to

us ad already described - spoke for %he correctness of this information. 3o this,

9 was -one more stone in &r mosaic, although we still didn't have, the much-

tor knowledge of Mussolini's exact stopping plac@ on the Gran Sassoi,

During that same night, both our informants also arrived in Fraseati from

They were led to our quarters, .'iith them came a nan of our Itallian offi

cer circle t place.himself available to us for duty.

A further result of the reconnaissance brought us the report from A.ssergi

that there stood,.directly in front of the valley station of the cable railway, an

Italian police-radio; ca.ro This also was confirmed through questioning of our head

physician (1st Lto). Opportunity for sleep this night wasn't afforded any of us;

events were under way*

That same evening, it also became clear that now.at least for the next 2 to

3 days, our r@al galQ that of'/freeing the Duoe9 must be postponed^ at least until

the military situation became so clear and the initiative of the German troops s

, that actual action could be carried outo

 The authors of this historical patent en- j

j
gineer, Ott , and th former Major, Reserve, 'Karl RADL wishQ with a

When we were requested by the Historical Division^ E17C0M, in October

to eoapile this oefntr ibu';on to. the ..History of world iVar II, we weren't quite

sure of the setesit of.the finished worfe, as are had .never written a work of this

sort*. .Besides, *e had n pp@rtunitj to speak with other -Crerzaaa officers who up

.to: this time had already been wor.king tor . two years on''the compilation of the war

and .who eoulu give us advice and any f-uiowledge At their disposal. Addi=?

we.had th; disadvantage that'pertinent documents and already completed

works were.not at -sur disposal to use as memory refresheners<> 'Specific records0

especially9 were not .available0. FortunatelyQ we were able to request information

.through concreta questions, in writing The answers to these, from Heusta&t

were really qu;e inadequate* There still remained.the possibility that the;..other

g@ntlmn ir. Keust&dt, whq..always mutually consulted each other, would help pro*

duc@ a very broad work basis .'Ve ask only that all these circumstances be taken

int '.conr iteration when evaluation is made of this effort a There wasn't availab

t@ UB &'/iih@r a war diary (intelligence log)'of the German high eoamand, nor per

Social iiary of the Serbian Gom<mn&&ra$ nor original instructions0 luminaries or

photostats, .nor some e@rt f report r order at &nat une@rtair& time The only

pr>f was our m&morj This ai@mry was, and has been at American hands for &k

yr-trs,--i.n part under strict confinement and undeserving treatinent, and jgeVerely

b y a lean and_. vit<amindeficiej^_diet* Nevertheless, we are-.grateful-to

:S10M? -FfUCOM for the excellent treatment we received for the time

are have Been under their protection and still are* The accommodations, particu

larly, including messing and personal treatment, are without, doubt superior and

in a short time have already brough.physical and intellectual recuperationo At

any. rate long periods have flown by-since 19^3 and strong memory gaps have been

filled in.by the events of the last few years* But we have done oiir utmost to

reconstruct each individual detail as exactly as possible*- 1st Tjte Sioraeny him

self has been. hindered 'from working on ...this for quite some time now due. to a

severe head injury (base of..the skull break,..disability grade III)*

joajp - material raust be enlarged in part from maps Is500o000 to

as Well.as t th 200-fold sealeo In part insofar as it concerns de-

maps have to be drawn and sketched purely itom memory It is als

that we .have- no aerial photographs of I4a&dalena or of trie Gran

S&ss of Italy at ur disposal* All of this has essentially delayed the progress

of this work* Thrcugh lack of the *ie-Ationed resords? there arises a definite in

accuracy and a permanent "toue'-iing up and improvement will b required*

This is. als th explanation as to ^riy the foregoing taslc isn*t a finished

work but only a rongk draft It'was planned li.e'that hj us and was in reality

drawn up first t establish our documentary proof for the final drafto There

fore, th foregoing work is also written "in the first person* (fff-IfS and."we" fon

 H.7565

It was our purpose to write the final draft in pure, unbiased descriptions, evad

ing the use of the "Inform* ' . -.

:e re^s^fPextreoely-'-that we cannot ourselves follow through the completion

of th work at Che HISTORICAL .DIVISION Ve would pay any price if we could possi

bly obtain9 through EUC/Jtf HEAD#JA3TFRS, permission to carry out this work to the

@n& o.urs.elvffSo v@ were always accustomed to working only according to the exact

outline* In the foregoing instance9 such an exacting work is doubly necessary9

since it deals with a contribution to an historical work which nust'. exist perma

nently as a history for the'cooing generations,, a'e are well acquainted with the

responsibility this entails* We have also done justice to -this responsibility

during the time, at @ur disposal and with the means placed at- our disposal*

.A furthe'r difficulty, is in the translation* ;-fe know how difficult it is to. *

translate from. German into English* Xt is essential here to really translate'' I

e&eh #ord precisely'and appropriately" Certain expressions and words can be-made

undrstandable only through the .aost exact, translation* IIere9 too^ is the fact

'that it concerns a rough draft a strong handicap* We intended, in the final

draft9 to make changes relating to style and to raak& shorter sentences (for

easier translation), at the same time attempting to improve on them to add to

their -understanding-by readers* This, however, had to be l@ft undone0

r,ven though both of us do not have a com.iand of the .English language9 we

still bel'isT '# have sufficient knowledge of it to judge a true-- and accurate

translation and so to recognise any subsequent -errors which arise through, -false

or 4rr.oneou@ understanding-of-the translator* "Te therefore'request'that-we'be

permitted to receive-a'translation-of this rough draft to give-an expression-Of

opinion "and our remarks before"* the final .'work is turned over to the archives of

It is - unimportant t us-..personally just where re can carry out a touching-

the'.translation f the.rough draff into either a final draft form-or into

'.?&'could do this while in captivity or after release, in

^at9 at'home eV ?/e'are interested solely and only in a correct and exact present*

To @nslud the''foreword9 we. dare 'to .coae up with 'so'me explanations whieh

given to us before we started the work as -well as by Mr o EDWARDS and a

'Cai'tain (whose name momentarily is-no longer remembered) and-soaewhat later by

Caistain HE.^IKGTON of the HISTORICAL DIViniOK. 7'e believe these explanations,

as follow. can'sura'it up briefly; ,

This'work'jras tp-. have, been completed exclusively for the-War; Department tor

the purpose of study and for research in connection with "?rl& -Var IIo Special

parts :- at the discretion .of .-the U 0 C. "ar I)apartment we're'to be used later fof

the production'and ^publication-of a book h^ the Var Department on '.lorld "sr II 0

. It-was determined that this work would be ^illustrated-as the br'a'in-ehild of

both authors uni that any'copyrights were explicitly reserved for theeu Any

publication-through newspapers either in the original .or in revision 'or in -3c

eerpt, any publication in book form in the original or revision (except if hj

v7ar Department itself), any elaboration .for radio or iilzs,, would eease with

our explicit agreement*. This applied to the completed .vjork as well as to any part

of it inraaterial && to what language it is believed may be used

JJ^,.A** 9 September 19^5o. Situation for Plan Gran $assoo

km a result of the armistice between the Italians and the Allies, Italy was

n longer an ally'of the AXQ0 . The' to-be-disarmed Italian army was9 since .it

didn't lay d o m arms willingly* considered as an enemy force* The plan for action

could also be Annulled since-.it could be charged to enemy resistance* This opened

up on one* sifts'an- essentially-clear';;picture of the changes to gain something

through Plan Maddalenao .On..the other side it -indicated a complication which dust

be taken into.consideration which would result in a very hasty opening - of fire and

with it losses on ur sid.0 The necessity i&r a surprise content also remained9

only .the basis for this was in the Maddalena Plan tatting into neesssary consider

at ion the A&is alliance and the avoiding of higher casualties in.' the Gran

The results of the doctor9s reconnaissance brought nothing especially new?

it was objectively recognised not to be suitable for bringing definite confirms*

tion as to. Mussolinifs-stopping place on the Gran Sassoo For ourselves9 however,

it was l@a'r that Mussolini himself - at least on 89^3 -was located at Campo

Xraperatore. Events of O9 naturally.- also left open an increased- danger for

Mussolini* It was rather certain for us that Mussolini's delivery to the--Allies

indicated a pledge for the.granting of. the armistice0 It was also-with a greater

probability that'we should count/an attempt by * the'Italian government9- or surely

by a part -of the Italian Armya..t0 bring Mussolini away from Gran S&sso, or at

least .to protect the resting place,, as-.strongly as possible* loweYe-r^- final set

tlement of the"disarmament action in the iteme sector wasnut reckoned with in the

aceomp'lish'nient of the liberating-, aetlone

The- action ordered .for-9*9''+3 .in the towns.of the Albanian Mountains went

according to piano Only-in' a ver.y i'ew of the towns was there any Italian resist

ance earrie'a out9 resistance - which':could'be quickly broken down through the

special' parachute battalion employed there, whereby both sides received' casualties

Toward aon these actions.. #ere. terminated, comple-tely and totally e My own small

unite which was attached., to this: special battalion^ had-'to. be part of this action

by disarming the artillery-regiment- of the Piaeenza Division located outside

Qen'gano di -^ottia* This led .shortly to Lto varger9s skillfully directed

Less favorable were the report concerning the paratroop operation on the

Italian headquarters on Monte 4otondo The battalion, no doubt9 could take Monte

Rotondo after-short, intense'--fighting, .although the Headquarters and the Joint

^sneral Staff were ready beforehand &nd evacuated,, tlvea upon arriving there^

there were nly a. few.aircraft (J0-52) shot down'by the Italians* besides the

Italian headquartersi the government and royal families together <*ent -to -southern

Italy during that last ni^hto The battalion w"-as t'hen uad@r very heavy Italian

shell attack in the area around Monte Rotondo and had suffered very n.e&w$ :

 7565: 60

casualties through obstinate defenses, After lengthy discussions the rest of

the battalion decided on an arade honorable retreat, so that the Italians would

ftcknowledgjitf^M^special courage of the German troopso '$$?<$?.&&'

South from Home, the situation was obscure. The arterial roads in the dir

ection of Ostta and toward the southeast were heavily invaded and in a state of

defenses Only a very snail number of parts of Italian troops in the Immediate

vicinity of German units laid down their arms and went hoiae From this combined

picture of the situation, the Italian Army seemed to be scattered around* Only

the troops in-Rome'showed any/sighs of a firm military comnando Since the German

raeasures vrhibh. were planted for the disarming and capitulation of the Italian

troops in. Rome had not yet been startede it was comparatively quiet in 3ome and

its ini^ediat outskirts on'9o9o^3 ' ; ' ' /

1 1
In tlie late afternoon hours of 9..9 >3* we also received copies of our aerial

photographs^ Only 3 or ^ exposures were usable r but these were rather good ones.,

:;@ at least had enough exact proof about the topography and the surface and

length measurements of the terrain- Unfortunately^ overlays ('slanting" pic

tures) werenet available,<ao that we couldn't identify specific altitude differ

ences in the topography and we were guided* in view of this 9 by ur personal

observations during that flight* On the basis of the photos and all documents

y our labor9 1st Lt f j*adl andl/we're able to put together- an operations

exactly as possible . It was completely clear to us that besides this llttl

docunentary proof all other conditions which -normally are considered in a aiili

tary plan of action and ar to be dealt with siuiply9 were not determinable Ve

therefore had to stay rather flexible in issuing orders and taking possible

action* It was essential that both of us, i possible, be at the scene of the

aetioft"'early~ to look over the situation on the spot and to handle it securely^

and so b in a position to give appropriate orders in the immediate situationo

-XAte in the eveKing of 9oy^3 w i^adl and! } went to General Student at

coaraand headquarters9 to present ur final plan (Gee map Gl->6) For this,

without being able to pinpoint an exact day for S-day and for Y~day* we had

 61

g
5. Plan' for the Liberating Action on Gran 5assoe

SLSL.
The operation v/as to be accomplished through a glide landing with gliders of

the BFS~23>Q type* Thelanding, 'in our pinion, should take place on the slightly

slanted9 trapesoid&l meadow above the Campo X&peratore Hotela There were 12 gli

ders participating in the operation! flight crew of each was 10 men (9 combat

troop men and 1 pilot)e The flight <rew of both of the first 2 aircraft (1 and 2

on the chart) would land a@ originally planned and immediately proceed to the

landing point or by utilisation of any available terrain, taice a position in the

nearest vicinity to this spot* They must give emergency covering fire during the

landing of the, ..other 10 aircraft while advancing on the hotelo The next 2 planes

(3 and k) were to be occupied by men from ray unit9 #3 under ay costBand, P* under

command of 1st. Lto. Radio Both aircraft would be assigned the mission of the

same liberating action^ They are both to be plaeed under my personal comuando

In both of those aircraft<> if possible, 1 to 2 Italian officers are to be taken

along After the landing, the crew of both aircraft are to take the shortest

route toward the hotel*, By taking along both the officers and through quiek~as

lightning action, any action (actual combat) an be avoided, if possible. On

the hotel* ,ven before an effective alarm can be sounded, the guard posts

to be removed to avoid any resistance The crew- of aircraft #5 as* to follow

immediatelyo by the fastest route, as reinforcements, to the hotel9 The crew of

aircraft #6:.are-.to land immediately^ without regard to the eveats at the hotel9

at the landing; field at the mountain station of the cable railway At the same

ti'mei this er@w has to occupy th@ tunnel-like- way which leads directly from the

cable rail station to the hotel, and safeguard ito Aircraft #7<a 8* 9 a< 10 are

to land in order according to their number* The crew are to proceed directly be

hind those of ?3o ^ and 5 to the.hotel* They are to serve as reserves and rein

foreeiaents in case of resistance.. The company eo;nzander of tho parachute com

pa'nys 1st Lto von 'Berlep8ch will be flying in aircraft 4*7 Aircraft fll and. 12

will carry Heavy weaponso i<>o 2 heavy machine guns9 2 medium-mortars, and 2

light parachutists rifleso This group is to take its position inmediatelY upon

landing and is to be used only at my special order0 All of the assembled groups

will havestrict orders not to'open fire under- any circumstances, in order to in-.

sure th full exploitation of the surprise moment* "Open-fire" will be given by

us of a s@d flare sigaalo The flare signal is- to b@ given specifically to one .

of the sel@<sted mn of mj unit at the moment when I myself fire the first shot*

But in eas Io. together with ay nsne aa Inside'the hotel and the situation out

side beeo^a critical0 we will give th "open fire" coaaiand through the company

coni'nander of th para troop cupany, ts?h then als will take over coiitnand outside

The n@?sy situation wasn't known to us in detail* We knew that the guard

detail consisted of police (csarsibini^ri) andrnastgin-the interest of precaution,

assume that it is oade up of some selected.-operational type soldiers The se

curity of the hotel ean only fee presumedo 7'e suppose there are some individual

strong sentry posts (see sap-35)* besides-perhaps9 some patrols^ so-ae special

occupation parties in the mountain station of -the cable railway, and various

fixed posts at specified points such as at the entry and exit points directly in

 62
the hotel.
. , , <
. . '
."'..
' ' . .

'X-daj must still be establishede once the military situation is such as to

allow it. 'TOSn^i/b still will have t be done on short notice sinee"^'v%i^fc|iour is

precious Therefor, plan and preparations must be finished even to the smallest

As Y-tima>, 6 ao.m. was proposed At this time the capacity for reaction of

the guards is usually at a minimum, even when it comes to general attentiveness

Besides., at this hour the warm air currents also would be most favorable to the

aerial operation, sinee at night a general adjustment of temperatures takes place

for all altitudes, as compared to the strong difference in the exceedingly >iot

.radiations n the suanyside slopes of the perfectly bare mountain*

r . ' ' . . .

So'nucn for the-action'on the 3ran Sas.so Protection in the Assergi valley

must also b@ thought about6 The entrance'to this valley.meant the only possible

j retreat route for. the assigned troops Moreover9 it is required for the evacua

tion -of the liberated Duce..-- Besides9 through this valley any eventual reorgani

sation-of the Italian division located in the vicinity of Aquila would be kindered

either by an approach of aircraft and the ensuing action on the mountain which

would be'noticed from the valley9- or through the radio from the mountain station'^

from which-* call for help would be sent out

The special paratroop battalion under direction of Major Mors was assigned

this taste* It is its mission to reach Assergi Valley-at'the end of a night march*

Therefore, the valley station of the cabl railway in Assergi- must be occupied

j exactly at Y-'time* There were 3 possibilities for the evacuation of Mussolini

as follow - the 3 were prearranged and foreseen: .........

1) After the successful' liberation, all of the men stationed on the mountain

would teaye there,.' after disarming the Italians, and would go up the Gran Sass

on the cable railway0 The cable railway, after the mountain and valley stations

| are occupied? will, only be put into operation following *ny explicit orders. The

disarmed Italians tay in the hotel* Officers will be taken along as prisoners

to insure the.evacuation. The special paratroop battalion in the meantime is

-to.'prepare, for a aareh for an additional mission* Since 'the altitude and condi

tion f the Italian division located in the vicinity of Aquila arent known and

negotiations for laying down of arms there weren't-yet carried through, an emer

gency, forceful.-occupation of the AquiXa. airbase must be considered Measures

for this brief delay are to be taken by the special battalion. During the occu

pation of the Aquila airbase9 which will be reported to Rome by radio, 3 HtJ-111's

will take off from Rome, fly over Aquila airbas.and will, land there only upon an

agreed flare signal. The liberated Due will leave the airbase in one of these

three aircraft and will be brought to Germany in a direct.-flight. And; both of

the other H-lll9s leave at the same time and take a course toward Germany, to

make any pursuit by air difficult. After this action.,, the. sp&cial battalion will..;

withdraw with the forces assigned to. the mountain areas avoiding'any'actual a<st

ion &s far as possible* first in a'.westerly, direction .and- then to Rome0 The TQ-

treat can always be altered according to the situation0 |

In <sae of infeasibility- of 1) due to the enemy situation or eventual j

 H 7563 63

increase in larger numbers of casualties9. the following plan is to take the place

of l)s

A liaison aircraft (Fieseler-Storeh) is to land at Y-time plus 20 minutes in

the closest proximity possible to the Assergi valley stations It will take the

Ducee liberated from the mountain station by cable railway, aboard and fly him,,

together with Sk:orKny9 to Pratiea de Mare airbase and assuredly9 by low-level

flight (he&%e-hopping), to impede and prevent any possible enemy actiono At

Pratiea, there will be aircraft ready for the flight to Germany*

3) In case 1) and 2) are impossible, then the following plan is ready to

be carried out!

A liaison aircraft (Fieeeler-Storch), piloted by a specially tested and

security-checked pilot - for this the personal pilot of General Student,, Captain

Gerlaeh, was selected - will try to land, following a special flare signal9 at

soae approachable place as close as possible in the neighborhood of the Caapo

Ifflperatore rlotelo ^he F-S aircraft is to fly over the hotel at Y<*time plus 20

&&utes and is to wait for this flare signal Under protective cover and safety

by personnel assigned to the mountain unit* he is to take off in the shortest

possible tittie with Mussolini and okoraeny to Fratica di Mare, where additional

aircraft will be standing ready for the flight to Germany In case it is impossi

ble to take off again from up there9 then the 0torch will be blown up and Captain

Gerlach will turn back to Rome with the special paratroop battalion,. If this

last possibility should fail,, Mussolinis evacuation must be improvised by some

other raethodo These proposals were proposed in a longer0 exhaustive discussion

with General Student and the final preparations were ordered. The 12th September

was proposed as probable X-day? Details of the plan still were to be worked

in detail by 1st Lt Radl and 3ieo Above all 0 armament and equipment must be

pinpointed in detail*, The most ctoct calculation of the importance of the per~

sonnel and the 'equipment of the D?3 230 with its load capacity and proportionate

space utilisation, was requireda It was equally important to compute the exact

I marching time for the special battalion and the flying time for t^ie gliders9 in

order to injure an absolutely certain adherence to Y^time on the mountain and in

the valleyo Up to this point, through General student9 various officers of his

headquarters who until now had had no knowledge of the scheme to free

were "read in" and were charged with the technical aspects of the

planning This 9 however9 concerned only a -very siaall circle of the close General

Staff-o.

During the nighty a very unpleasant report reached me o An allied radio

transmitter (probably a North African transmitter Tunis?) brought the news that

the Due arrived on the African coast on 99oV5 on board an Italian warship and

was to be surrendered by the Italians according to an agreement with the Allies

This news was naturally very significant for us, Could the report be a bonafide

one or was it a deception nanouver of the 3er/3an high coraiandV Our reasons were

as follows On the afternoon of B<>3, Mussolini In all probability vrau'still on

the Grnn '"aeso. All results of the rocomviissance indicated thiso Any transfer

of r-Iussollhi' over a secondary route diagonally across Central Italy during night

time must be called for at least by early on 99 Therefore, any arrival "on""the

African mainland during the course of 9<>9 by sea route wasn't at all possible or

at least v6olfejft$&iprobableo Moreover there was additional information^tjsifcfc the

Italian wa^r flaet had moved out of La Spezie during the night of 89 to 9<*99 and

La Spesie itself was invaded by German troops on 9*9* It was hardly to be assumed

that a single $ swift warship had remained behind and had taken the Duce on board

somewhere along the Central Italian Mediterranean coast This would have had to

h&@ been pre~arra&gd in detail several days beforeo Therefore, it appeared to

us that the Bad&gllo government had no reason for such an act* The entire armis

tice action was s pre-arranged by the Italian high com.n*ind that the German high

eofrnand in the south could have been cut off from their rear lines0 Therefore9.

Central Italy was used for the raost part as the Italian main cosrtond area? thus

there existed little motive to take the Duse from the Gran Sasao prematurely and

to face the danger of hasty exposure of the plan Besides0 Caiapo Imperatore had

to serve as an absolutely-safe-post for the Italian high com "and,, according to

hutaan opinion,, against any sudden attack from opposing sides o

S we considered this information as an utterly impossible one-purpose re

ports This- lf& no $ay slowed down our confidence - after all B it was all carefully

thought lit and planned - and convinced us e at the same tlmeQ that any extreme

haste was not in order, It was also agreed upon that the information ouldnt be

disseminated or discussed furtherfl precluding any unpleasant growing rumors*>

Likewise9 @n 9o9 a se@nd plaa9 to liberate the Mussolini family0 was discussed'

and the preparations for it were orderedo

_ _ _ The Mussolini Family

Shortly after our arrival in Italy, we received the order to concern our

selves also with the Du@9s family and above all to protect his wife from any

enemy action^ Should sh be deprived of her personal freedom9 she was likewise

to be freed from this situation*. To this placeg too9 the remaining next f kin

of the Bu<s@ were to omen Madame Mussolini Donna Rachels, lived with the two

minor children'^ Romano and Anna Maria, at the time of the Duce9s arrest9 at a

sumsiorplace in rtoecadella Caminate near Rialni. While we were still searching

0
for Mussolini hiding place9 around the middle of Augusts we also had assistance

in the search from a married eouple in Rome associated with Donna 3aehele who

uld put us in touch with her. The wife ;7as to look for both of Mussolini9s

daughtersinlaw9 the widow of the Duce's son who was killed in action Bruno9

--and the wife of his son Vittorlo who until now e was located in Germany Up to

this point we still.didnt know the whereabouts of Donna Raehele's stopping

place9 but we were to discover this on the occasion of''this search9 " It was

therefore decided to establish contact with Donna Rachel at onceo This was Q how^

ever9 ut of the question momentarilyQ sine there was a strong guard of some

police around the houses Alone9 the daughter-in-law didnt dare look for Donna

I?aehei^9 s infrequently was she allowed to leave the houseo Too.they were

also confined according to the rules'9 These relatives didn have any exact i~

formation about Musaslini himself9 although they had definitely heard about his

alleged stopiping place in JMteddalana9 but received- no confirmation of this newso

the reonnaissane@ trips were carried out,by Captain Mandl of my unit under ex

ploitatio'n of the possibility that this information was already received from

the- mentioned familye

Bdda9' Mussolini's daughter and wife of Count Caleazso Ciano lived with her

children in a hov^e i Homeo Ciano had already laaneuvered himself for quite some

9
time out f Hur4olini s government - fie was one of the chief conspirators of the

Fascist line and formerly cov/orker of Mussolini and authoritatively concerned in

the draft *nd" drawing up of the Manifesto which led to the downfall of Mussolini

at the b'*g Fascist council meeting on.25o7o^3 - and became in the meantime

Italia-r Ambassador to the Vatican Re actually lived in/, the Vatican itself,

newer left it and was protected against any possible act of revenge. It was

sur-ly attributed^ to the most part9 to his function as diplomat to the Vatican^

Bi
tdt the armistice negotiations ran so smoothlyo Toward the end of August f3.,

wife requested the German government to rjjrant asylum for herself and her

.children*. This was accorded her 0 Shortly thereafter, she sought the same pro

J
tection for Wr 'husband and free escort to Germany and this0 too, was grantedo

Cnly then did Ciano leave the Vatican^ resigned as Italian Ambassador and shortly

thereafter was taken to Bavaria with his family.

Through Bdda Ciano9 an attempt '//as also made to discover something as to

Mussolini0s stopping place0 without her knowledge that such a reconnaissance was

taking - place o An informant who as an .'Italian personality9 could make the most

out of a-private business association with Edda 0 was allowed to interrogate Sdda

on &&y$ asking her if she knew anything about har fathers stopping place* Basis

 <?as that it was knows to us that ";dda had written a letter

SO2S6 multiple interesting things in this questionili^:i#:lo If

spoke th* truth in this instancefl could we also use her n this way as a I

I genuine informant? (Slnoe she had already written a letter to ^addalena she

I - , ' . '

lifiust assert iereelf in this instance )D 2, Did E&da Rave reliable informatics

1 '

$r father's stopping place and question of future political status?

omthingg perhapso from hex husband which would Gome out of the Vatican) o I

sr did Sdda stand with aer father? . (To asiewer this9 sh@ was to be approached|

definitely .concrete questions at a farble moment) 0 ho Th important!

question for'usz Is Mussolini in Maddalena? (An affirmative answer would signifyj

j
proof to us' th?.t IVB was there and not .where the information out of Hitler9s field j

ffaported,) someplace els& At leasts in ease of the affirmative there

:& likelihood that the Duees stopping place would be assumed to

3 if on tor the sake ofprecaution takes 'Into account that this

onfirmati$a @mld fee superseded in theraea&iiiseby a resulting additional change

f the DueeK Ta@ answer t this question ale - where her father is-

a; w$ pw

result- was interestingo T@ the question9 if Edda had any information at

as JO h^r father<, fe replied? (something like this) t?My father is in "adda

himeeHf desired this r^mtlng place for the past fead had aosse connection

1 wrote to him there .just a fw days ago and am waiting for an

Sdia answjer@d question 3 something'liice thi^s "oo^'-first of a.llo Im the mother

m d moreover t

as her father

o was elearly established^ So mu<sk BO for Mussolinisfamily

family
o 0-
Aft

After itl

*jas ale determined that Donna Seichele was interned in strict. isolation. ia Rocea

? ' "

|dell Caminat'e with her two minor @hildren<. Captain Mo established contact with

I- '

I the coasiandant of n<& of the German airbases located nearby a'nd ensured his suppoj

1naissanee ia Recac urgent 0 spe@ial'case

and ^irEini ^s a. result
.a small0 special of t
mission thefree
outcome
DonnaofRachele
th recon

and

the ehildr@u was prepared tor tfa earn Xday and .-=time planned for Mussolini8 s

liberation fiction* The villa in 3oeea' was constantly guarded by 810 earabinieri

and any additional safety me&aux0. #@r@ not. known o Captain Maadl-also received

ith 68 men of my unit0 the night before Xday9 to pla@

I these iaen at the. disposition of. the German .airbass eoanmnd@ro Ytime would be I

I ' ' -' '

a to Mo befoaf hi departure By this; time0 Donna ^aehele and both, of her v,

I hildren were to ka^ ben brought safely'to the airfield^ avoiding as isch of the!

|-aetion aa possible o ' The^ details of the aetion were determined .on the spot aeord=|

| ing to the situation hj Captain M,g wh was .'fully responsible for all of'thiso I

I After the liberation, the family tms to fly immediately t Geriaanyo They w.ere to I

I'be'accompanied hj Captain Mo The actual landing placig in ^erns&ny would be given |

 H 67

IV o 5: 10 September -19^3

Disarmament a@tions were'quite advanced on 10 September 19^3 Only the area

of the'city of Rome itself together with its environs, was still in Italian hands.

At the sous t h e m entrance into Some 9 particularly along the road from Ostia

t Rofflee heavy combat was taking place9 which lasted the entire dayo The stubborn

defense of the enemy could scarcely be overcomeo. The entry into Roue was to be

forced during the night of ll9o' After the withdrawal of the "higher" German

officials from Rdine -- these had left Rome the evening of. So9 in their cars and

in special trains <*<=. the personnel, the "little" people were left behindo Noth

ing was known ;of their fat.eo It was a question primarily of the embassy personnel

the eignal^edramunieations women of the array handling itome telephone central and

lesser employees and soldiers of the German supply and maintenance serviceso

From Upper Italy, .seyoral German divisions had now been in an advance march

for many days'** It consisted mostly of the armored infantry rifleman division0

"Great Qeratiin Chafctpion" $ the; SS bodyguard of Adolf Hitler; and one or two Panzer

(tank) divisions* Up to this pointQ they had occupied the area of Upper Italy

down to La 5pesi&o A tank division was definitely advancing toward Home and

should reach Xoae somewhere around 9 02* 10.Sept However0 they were some place

In Central Italy . evidently, in the vicinity of Lake Trasimene..^ halted in their

march and b^d not yet reashed Home the'evening of 10 o 9* This essentially compli

cated the situation in Boae? since the locations would now have to be subdued

keavy<> .scattered forces of the XI Air Force alonee (The statements from

Q as to which c?ivision was involved9 indicated one time it was the 3d

Itenser Division <, another time the 26th Panaer Division) o Opening of the avenue

to %or} must also be accomplished<, without which the arrival of the awaited

Division couldn't OCCIL?*

^he spdCial paratroop battalion^ after carrying out the disarmament mission

in ^he area of the Albanian tiountains9 had again been billeted in Frascati<> in

th epresd-ont olive gardens of Villa Borghese<> Even my small command' was also

transferred th@reo Toward noon of 10 3ept O9 there occurred a very acute and re*

grettaHe argument between the oma&n&er of the'.Orecial Battalion - the Special

Battalion eotiLqander ^as ill and not in Italy - assumed by Major Mors, and the

officer of my eomaaftndos_ I was informed of this and immediately drove to

Borghese with ray adjutante- A detailed survey of the situation compelled m

to energetically take the part of my officero -Major Mors had9 in such a manner?>

r^-oeived an e^der from hifl9. felt it. was in no way justifiedQ ignored itfl and only

't'im severest interposing on my part prevented a disaster0 .Thenfl after several

telephone attempts by officers of the XX Air Force to convince Mors of the tin-

tenability'of h'is steps I even offered, to Ppl the intervention of General student

personally^ there finally was forced a compromise or at least a yielding by Mftjor

Mors6 These events must'be mentioned here while the growing tension regained as

was and very linfavorabl^ for our 'additional plans snd preparations9 as well as

for the operation itself and even later were unfavorable as- to, the resiilts of the

bpera'tiono Th squadron which s/as requisitioned as troopcarrying gliders from

southern France0 for our operation0 had taken off* They had to make the flight

 in-several stages (hops),, sin@ they consisted of some less^than-serviceable Ger

man machines. However9 we> ounted on their arrival at the latest by 11 Septo0 to

enable us tt^ &rep' the appointment' of our selected Y-time on 12 5eptV';'^lfe

With a view toward our plan of operation, it was urgent for us to restore our

association wit$ our circle of Italian officers One smn from this group had al

|ready appeared in Fraseati on 8 Sept* and lived with us But he was a civilian

and there wasn't a-question as to his sympathies.. It was currently scarcely ad

visable for a German to go;to Home. My adjutant therefore took this Italian^

during the.course of the'afternoon'of 10 Septo9 equipped with a basket of tomatoes

and fruit9 t the vicinity'of th outskirts of Rome and let him out there tin

notie@do This was the only way of sending &men@ to Tiorag since the Italians

I allowed people into th city who brought in foods particularly vegetables and

fruito This was all checked out very carefully4 This man was to look only for

his friends3 was t arrange with them that one or two of them would be needed

within th next few days for action in Home* Then, immediately after the occupa

tion of Some'by the Gersan troops, they were to inform us of their location

through a particular fellow in the Embassy

During the ours of the day9 I had additional discussions with the General

Staff officers of the.XI Air Fore concerning the technical details of our pera=>

tlpnal preparationso I was met with a very skeptical reception^ even to a partial

refusalo Tlw entire operation was labeled as impracticableo They tried to eon

vince- tm that a landing at this altitude by gliders of th DFS-230 type was

practically impossible and besides had not yet been tested0 The landing speeds

at this altitude w@r@, because of th thin air 9 mueh too fast and the vertical

dive'arresting gear (paraehut brakes) would b@om almost ineffective at this'

altitude for a precision landing9 so that a rack-up -of'the majority of the air- .

-craft would, have t be reckoned witho Moreover9 thermal conditions and streaas

| in this r@gi& wr practically unknown* They made a seeur and automatic land

ing practically impossible* A landing at places not well known and recognised

particularly at this altitude - couldn't be carried off and meant suicideo These

1
statements were aade-to me by the A*>1 (Air)v a major on the General Staff (with

the parachute troops there were two A~les<, the'Al Ops I &&d A-l Ops-II one of

them.for air and'one for ground operations) This offleer9 wh@ was one of th

best experts and &nrelj must'understand th@s^ things9 explained to me that in

as of the .execution of th plsm,-, if 8C5 of all th used aircraft and personnel

were a total loss9 this would be as a result of th landing operation and could

not he asso@iated with any engagemento He rebuked us also for the improbability

of a landing on-the very slightly inclined mountain pastures acquired by us o

Sueh bjeetives naturally isade a very great impression n a flying specialist

like mo Particularly so sine this man hlmA&lf had already had such a combat

aiission behind h$M9 'namely'the aerial ssission on-the Belgian Fort Bben Smaelo

This mission was prpSL%'& quit some time ago - I believe over a quarter of a

year ag >* th praetic operations were tried out on a ttue-tolife constructed

training area t enable them, to be carried out.more practically latero. First of

all,-, the objective was located practically in the oeean and several good meadows

 H 7563 69

were Indicated'as landing'goals; This officer explained to me, in conclusionv

that he had spoken out against the success of this operation to his commanding

The @<nd Operations (la) officer also expressed the same views to m@

w@n more objections* He held the opinion that the proposed strength (namely <,

12 x 9'nAh 108 align)?, particularly in view of the expected heavy fatalities dur

ing landing, wouldn-t be enougho A surprise moment was not to be taken into con

* sin-se through the truth of the matter that a vertical dive was

impossible at this altitude - the Italians would give the alarm at the

first glider landing as well as when they caught sight of the first aircraft and,

if there were enough time 0 the surprise would be lost* He 0 too, explained to me

that he had protested the plan in a speech to the commanding general,

I talked over all these arguments with my adjutant and we had to express and

acknowledge these as coming from experienced expertso First of all, we had to re

gard the predicted loss figures as too high9 especially since I felt that we had

the best available and sharpest pilots that could be found But 9 based on the re

connoitered positions,) there was absolutely no other possible way of successfully

carrying out the liberation order All possibilities were discussed by us to the

smallest detailo An operation from the valley here, by land, also had less than

1% chang of success* Certainly, the military acceptance of such a place as

e
Campo Iniperator isn t impossible <, However9 this required selected mountain

troops completely armed; moreover9 such a military undertaking would bring very

havy losses9 daily and weekly, losses by the enemy whieh9 all terrain advantages

taken into consideration9 must be reckoned with* During the duration of such an

action lasting only 1 to 2 days - in our eas@ - the Italians would have enough

time t evacuate the Duee up some rocky trail in any direction9 since two r thr@

mountain divisions would be needed to block off the areao Besides9 the Italians

could also have killed the Bu@e for which, the' order existed9 in case an attempt

at his liberation wr% to turn up later on

X also had the choice of voluntarily scrapping the whole plan and to inform

the Fuehrer of the impossibility of carrying out his order'0 or to try to oppose

the professional advic and objections of the General Staff officers by causing

the Gominan&ing General to give the order to carry out the mission. Then, since

chances for a euecsssful operation with few losses existed9 there were no doubts

on our parto I was of the opinion that an'officer must at least attempt to carry

out a military order of his Supreme Comsmnder of the Armed Forces*, whether the

prospects for suecese were gre&t or only slighto Above all, the officer who be

liev<d in-the successful completion of such a difiicult operation had the obliga

tion to inarch at the head of his troop* Also 9 he dare not force any of his

artieipateo' Only those soldiers9 Mho volunteered^ who had

difficulty of arrying out the operation9 could be assignedo

3 to take effect0 above all, if appropriate to the operation^,

Qn the waning of 10 3epto0 Genaral Student told me. that he had also received

bjections t the arrying out of this operation iron officers of his staffo He

himself was reserving the right of the deeisionQ Preparations were to be continu

@do I presented General Student with the results of all the previous

 70

I'had'had in discussions with my adjutant and implored him to give the order for

carrying out the mission at ail events9 particularly since there was no other

p@gsibilit^/&#^e"~arry out in due tin the rder given at Hitler s ^

quarterso

In the evening hours of 10 September 19^3 the offensive of the German para

troops became increasingly strong on Via Ostia- toward Home?, the head columns had

pierced the southern suburbso During the course of the night the l*st of the

Italian resistance was broken and the entry into Rome v/as force do By the rsorn

ing hours the meat important points in 3ome were in German hands; the main

telephone and telegraph office9 the Department of the Interior0 and the German

Embassy* The safe entry into Rome was from the direction of Via Cstia* The areas

outside these 3 points and the barricading of those located in the city quarter

were comparatively qui@t9 but not under control of German troops The arterial

road to the norths west and east had not been securedo The effects of the re

connaissances gave d@finit reports that the Italian troops had deserted their

dugln positions - from the heights from Frascati one eoiald observe through field

glasses a movement of Italian troops among the only sections remaining of their

defensive districto Particularly easy to observe in the bright sun before noon

of Ilo9 was. the region f the sain arterial roads leading to Frascati in the

vicinity of Give Cittao The nois of battle was no longer heard0 only occasional

single ^shot fdire which plainly came from the cityo

In the first hours of the morning of Ilo9 as the battle of Rotie drew to a

close9 both of our informants were on'their way to Rome after agreement with the

CoaLsanding General that they were taking responsibility for themselveso It was

agreed that I would send an officer of. ray unit to the German embassy before noon,,

with whom the informants would discuss further steps to be taken*

Thi development meant for us the possibility that we could change the plan

for freeing Mussolini actually t the intended time as set fortho Firsts however,,

it wasrfortfiwhile tor us. to look for the Italian officers la Horn who were to

worte' with us in our- operation* They were to be ready in uniform at a specified

time to take control without having previous Isarned the exact details.

Antfer very important question was whether or not Mussolini was still on

the &r&.n Sasso Tfeer oould hav been another change in the last 3 days o There

foreg it had to be learned, frooi soae official Italian person^ as to authentic

information of this 0 Sine the Department of the Interior was strongly in Geriaan

hands0 ve concluded that the Minister of the Interior as well a the police presi

dent could- supply the appropriate informationo Th6y siuut' be located in the

occupied Department of the Interior buildings since they had been working there

steadily in the last *fS hours,, Besides^ the Police Chief0 General Senise9 who

was considered as a special .:$iend of Hisimler ould be counted O K for this

question^ This m&n was 9 definitely and basically% ir oar opinion^ a -lore

dangerous servant of both, or von of 3, aides It was known that he passed on

eonfidsntial information t the Geriaan as well as to the 3adogli governmentsd

We therefore were of the opinion that if knowledge concerning"Mussolini didnet

come willingly from this fellow9 it could be obtained without too much trouble

through definite courses of action and movement.

.".e then decided on 11<>9 in the morning, to clear up both of these questions

in Rome itself before noono 1st Lto Hadl received orders to try to reach Rose

from Frascati9 without using the secured approach roads from 0stia9 and go direct

ly to the German Embassyo He had at his fingertips a very good local and street

knowledge of 3om$o Since the situation in this part of the city wasnt well de

fined as yet * h@ took along 5 selected Tien of our unit as cover and started out

around 11 affio toward Home in a heavy Italian towing trucko Before starting the

trip3 Hadl warned his men to keep utmost silenceo An attempt must be sought to

reach the embassy completely undiscoveredo Too9 in ease the comnando group were

to be shot at by the Italian populace or bombarded with stones0 no shot was to be

fired without his order The heavy .armament that was taken aionge served only to

enable them to break out of a particularly difficult situation Since none of the

men had ever been in Roue - even the driver didn9t know Rome - Radl explained the

xaet rout of the m&reho The primary target was to reach the embassy9 to clear uj

important questions there.and then to return safely to Frascatio The trip went

smoothly aheadQ Severe difficulties weren't evidenced0 The attitude of the civil*

ian population9while they passed through the professed working-class district was

hostile but no incident occurred**

The embassy was safely reached Radl wanted to drive directly to the riinistag

Interior after consultation with our informants who had arrived safely

the lines,, so that he could immediately talk with either General Student

or the Minis%wm of the Interior This wasa e t possible right away0 In Homee mean

while0 there was a German City Comaandant who reserved for himself the carrying

out. of any official discussion with any of the Italian posts whatever9 and such a

discussion depended on his own personal permission It took some time until Radl

ould explain his special purpose t ths Co^rsand&nt - a Major General in the Air

Forego A flat refusal followedo Radl could have aade my mission known9 and the

eoa-'iandant. would then b concerned with carrying it dut For this, even Radl

didnt have the authority^ since the special secret order was still in effect

:3adl called attention to the fact that although it was a matter of a military

secret9 it was one again rejected* Then^ with reference to the direct order of

the Fuehrer and the rather effective consequences of a further refusal and under

intervention of. a fw of our informants9 approval was obtained to look for either

General Senise er the Minister of the Interior Both of our informants were.taken

along to the Department of the Interior0 Arrived there, an officer of the para

troop battalione which had occupied the Department of the Interior9 explained that

neither th@ Minister of the Interior9 General Senise nor anyone else of the De

.partaent of the Interior was there to be spoken fcoo Someone had "driven thes

awayp" In spite of the long discussions with the Oity Goaraandant, it appeared

that there was absolutely-no more hope of learning anything about our well-known

Italian'officerso Even the courier ordered out by J?adl the day before had been

and still was siissing. Therefore,, this nission of 3adls also seemed to be a

 7563

completely negative n@ o Just as Radl and his companions were preparing to leave

the Department of the Interior* they noticed a civilian in rather excited conver

sation witf^iome German officers and soldierse Prom his gestures^ it c t & d only

be concluded "that'it had to do with an Italian*. Considering the extremely alert

cordoning and control exercised by the paratroopersQ it must concern a permanent

personality of the government or theltalian Armed Forces, since any sntry of this

[..place had been emphatically denied to any Italianso <7e decidedq then9 to send

[.one'of our men to this group to look on from the side and observe any further

developments unnoticed A a matter of fact it turned out that this civilians

tirade concerned an Italian General by the name of Soleti. The latter9. a Cavalry

GeneralQ was sorah@w the oaassndant of the c&rabinieri and/or of the police of thi

ity of Romo At the moment of this situation,, he appeared to be the only seis-

able Italian general wh was concerned with poli@like functionso After the

identity of the man was explained^, Hadl ordered-the informant to talk with this

General and to ask him point blank where Mussolini could be foundo At the same

time9 he was t 6tress that h@ was ordered to find this out by the highest German

military authorities in Italy. Whether the man refused or wasnt willing to tell,

he .couldn't' threatie& hins further with arrest or other measures9 The General was

ready to talk when k hard that this was to b followed through by order of the

German Commanding General* He answered to the concrete question0 "Where is Muss=

lini loe&ted siow?v% w^ry -briefly0 "That0 X dat knowofl To an additional0 more

sp<t@ifie.' question^ Geaeral Soleti answered that h truly knew nothing about

.Mussolini s whereabouts* But he eould say where Mussolini had been located three

days ag@ Kame'3Qr Cto tSs, appropriate question).- ia Hotel Camp I?ttperatore on

'the Graa Sass of JtaXjo T@ further q.ustioa@ eonGersaing any elues as to the

credibility of th's 9 the General xplaiaed that he definitely knew that Mussolini

was still at Camyo- Imperatore on 8 September-, He himself0 Soleti0 had sent a

small reinforeeAent 'to-the-earabinierl and some mountain supplies up there on tha^

:
day0 sine h !iad ^omsthing to do with this matter in the-line of duty & Abov

all9 due-to. th &i eoisbat and developments of the last 3 days 0 no sort of n@ws

son in ';her and all @nnetion was broken off Neither could he guarantee

the Duee .-was .at this "moment still oa the Gran Sasrso, HOP had there been

measure as to his removal forthcoming from Romeo With this most favosable out

come Radl turned baek to Frascati early in the afternoon of Ilo9

Toward nocn9 I looked for my special commando unit in the garden of Villa

2brghes* and had all the m&n line up in .rankso I explained to them that a most

difficult special paratroop operation was set up for sme of them for the next

day is? the ours of carrying out a'direct personal order from the Fuehrero I

furtbdr explained that it was predicted by experts that there would be very

losseso vea up to 8G$ O I emphasised that I myself was ready to carry out

I pereonalljr, I wanted to take along only volunteers, Any man,,

officer or'enlisted rankg had the opportunity to step baek nowQ I

h. mind9 or any th@r personal reasons whieh would be disqualifying to carrying

mission gc@@sfully or in such a manner that heavy losses .eould be

_ __ L r________3_73S3____ {' ,. 1 73

expectedo I would personally understand the reasoning of any man who was to step

baakc The fact that he had stepped back would not be used against him or be made

known outside of here I experienced the great joy then that to a man9 without

exception,,' all volunteered9 declaring themselves ready for the missiono

Now I designated the 26 officers9 NCjsfO9s and enlisted men who were to carry

out the action on Gran Sisso with ae> Unfortunately,, I had to leave a group of

these men behind later on, since for my commando unit the distribution in 2 gli

ders was limited to 1 officer9 1 KCO and 2 enlisted mon9 detailed for action in

the valley station? 2 officers and 6 EM under the command of Captain Mandl were

to carry out the liberation of Doana Raehele and Mussolini's youngest children

from Roeca della Caminateo Even up to now not all officers were informed as to

the Plan0' since secrecy-to the highest degree had to be carried out right up to

immediately before" departure for the airbase*

Shortly thereafter I was ordered to report t General Studento The latter

informed me that with the arrival of the glider pilot detachment on Ilo9 prob

ably nothing more could'.be eosjputedo It was also- to be decided just when a new

X^day and new Y-tis could be fixedo The most favorable times4 from operational~

technical grounds,, were they .to be delayed Zk hours9 could be set up on 13<\9-^3

for 6 a,naio 'Sinee, however9 measures by the Italians with respect to Mussolini

were to b feared9 and even sueh schemes were made known through Allied radio

a-ewa reports the day before9 every hour was costly

I therefore set the postponement ahead 8 hours, to ikQO aours on the same

X-dayo. We preferred to take the bad thermal conditions into the bargain0 as

though to lose even more lost tiae In the meantime, almost 3 days had <*one by

ainc.e the announcement of the armistice o General Student concurred and even

ordered the action for 12 September 19'*3 Ytime 1^00 hours for the mountain and

valley station action^, in ease the gliders actually weren't able to get there

any more The final decision should come about in the afternoon. Ho longer could

eaeh detail be diseussed point for point andphe final decision was fixedo In this

conversation with General Student, my adjutant9 toward the end, also took parto

He had just returned from loiae* He brought ua at once the very disappointing in

formation, that the important circle of Italian officers who were necessary for

the success, of our plan eouldnt be locatedo- It wa^then attempted again, during

the afternoon to find at least one of themo But it'seemed'appropriate to consides

that any help @n th@ir part was n longer, to be.foundo Besides, 1st Lt Radl re

ported the tacticalQ entirely wrong steps taken by th Battalion in' the. Depart

ment of the Interior0 of all of the civil servants who had been chased out of the

building by the Chief.of the Police/ instead of being held for the upkeep of pea@e

and rdr in Rmeo In.various spots in Rome it had already reached a stage, be

tween looting and small riots which the Roman police were powerless to subdue,

since the police and Depart .lent of the Interior no longer were functioningo He

spoke further of General-'Soleti's questionings who also had for the first time

officially onfirmed.our findings about the Gran Sasspo The uncertainty as to

whether or not Mussolini had been taken away from there during the course of the

last 3 days was also a risk on our parto During the course of further discussions

ISA DISSe^HAIION fGRM FOR JNTaUGSNCE

 H 7563

a to the problems which had occurred during the search for our Italian,, Radl

suddenly made the suggestion to take General Soleti along up the Gran Sasso

7/hen the B^frtfisFr was chief of the Military Police (Guard Force )9 by tlte ^4ry natuza

of his position it was at least known to him (already made clear through his des

cription) that th Guard was at the most surprised about his knowledge of the

liberation and probably also heeded him<> If the General didnt want to ta*e part

in it f then one could simply "take him along", Hadl meant. General Student'sen

thuslasiB over this suggestion v?asn*t very great* But we reached an agreement

through exhaustive discussions that these measures could eventually definitely

| be carried out by avoidance of any combat activity and therefore elimination and

avoidance ..-of any additional losses on ur sideo We therefore resolved that R&dl

would nc again travel immediately to Home and make @ae last effort to bring'1

or 2 of the Italian officers in uniform to Frasea'tl for a "special saission^"

Should this again be unsuccessful* then Radl was to present himself to General

Soleti as a Staff Officer from General Student and request him to a@company him

to Frascati to take part in an important discussion with the "Conroanding General

of all German troops stationed in and around Roie," Radl should so arrange it

that he would arrive at the general command headquarters in Villa Dusaet with the

General approximately after the approach' of darkness* General Student would then

talk over some military problems with General Soleti, with a view toward learning

the conditions in Rome, and then he would invite the General to suppero If it

impossible -to &i through Rome and the city limits after nightfall because of

and police patrols9 plundering Italianse etc*, then Soleti should be re

quested to remain in Frascati overnight0 since a return journey at this time

would be too dangerouso Then<, the next mornings General Soleti was to be inform

ed of the accomplished facts0 so that he could be numbered among the selected

one to contribute to the a@omplishment during the night of th issued order<, to

free Mussolinio With this mission 3adl. left for Romeo Since nothing more was

said of any eventual necessary changes in action9 Radl still was of the same

opinion* that neither the day nor time of the mission had been changedo tfe hoped

tooQ that somehow the arrival of the gliders would be. in in the evening f Ilo9*

In the meantime^ the immediate preparations and discussions for the mission

The operation plan for the action at the valley station was to be

Sine there were still heavy concentrations of Italian units in

tha vicinity of Tivoli who fean9t yet 8urrenAe*ea"f -it &&*&& appropriate to- s**

lect an approach route for this group that would eliminate any eorabat action on

the part of the Italians as well as avoid othor problems such as continuous re

porting on observations of the direction of ?nove*nent, etco Therefore Via Tiftur

tinaQ over.Tivoli, was not selected as the approach route9 but the other detour

It. was thereupon established that the wareh column-, would probably be started

up in the direction toward the southern front and hence no suspicion would be

formed by the Italian side'. The streets themselves were excellent, the greater

part of the way could be retraced.at night0 immaterial as to whether Y-tiffie was

set for 6 or lh hours--. For th rest, the decision was made in the afternoon

Since the aircraft were abl'j to reach Pratica d& Hare only in the corning of

12(5 99 the operation was set for Y-time at 1'+ hours 0 -Vith this, there was a de

parture time for the valley team set for approximately midnight* The most im

portant thing was now t& plan both the movements by land and by air so exactingly

that suddenlye at Ik femurs exactly, both the goal would be reached and its success

would be guaranteedo Under no circumstances could it dare seem that a post were

being established n the mountain or in the valley that could give timely warning

to the otherso Hi^ht up to the entry Into the valley from Assergi there would

have to be a single march @Xumno Then a small advance group0 extra strong0

hand-picked and armed soldiers on motorcycle and in personnel carriers would

precisely reae'i the valley station of the cable railway in Assergi by forced

:aarch9'occupy it and safeguard it from destruction,, This group necessarily would

have to fight independently along the way and must,, through other incidents9 und<

@r no - cirenttstanees allow any concentration of Italian troops in the vicinity or

other similar things to keep them from their most important task; namely0 at the

stroke of 1^ hours to seize the valley stationo Beginning around 50 km before

Aquilag small9 mobile signal troops were to step into the action and jam all

Risible telephone cables since here9 too 0 eventual telephonic warnings from any

people alrng the march route had to be made impossible to accomplisho I had

hoped th"*t.after the unpleasant ineidents with Major ?tors concerning the assign~

3en't of the leadership of the paratroop battalion^ I -would be given other airemf

at my disposal to carry out our actiono General Student explained to me in the

afternoonof1XO9 that he had no other choice owing to the military situation

t'hf.'A to order the paratroop battalion for this action He could understand the

b&d: psychological effect.which could result from this realitye But he was con-

r'^icsd that from now on, since it was a matter of such a big operation0 it might

*>@ possible to have mutual support of good 'will from both sides He therefore

proposed that Major Mors direct the action in the valley station and I that on

tfe mountain stationo For the sortie on /the mountain9 Major Mors must detail

the best of his company cor.^ianders 1st Lt von Berlepsh0 with selected nen o

After all details were plotted^ General Student gave me the task of looking for

Ttajor Mors and now to tell him of this plan as an order from the XI Mr Force

and tfe instruct him very exactly about it<?

And the last details for the mountain action were also settled during this

discussion and final orders were givene In the same way, the plan for liberat

ing Donna Rachel and both her children was settled*

A radio message was transmitted to my adjutant in Some,, that he shouldnH

bring General Soleti on this night but only the following morningo He himself

was to return to Fraseatisnd call for General student ,iaa Roase the next mornings

I immediately #ent to the garden o f Villa Eorghese-to meet Major Mors and-

to forward the orders from General Student to hias0 At the same time0 I explain^

e.d t hin msk the smallest detail all the worked out plans and measures0 It.

was at this moment that I^jor Mors reeeivedg for the first time - and this from

se - the word about the Fuehrer-directed mission to General Student and to $e of

ar Mnsaolni'A This eonfi.naa.tion is necessarv on historical groundso There

 ?6

v?ill be iaore about this in the epilogueo Up until this very moment he had had no

part in the :plonnisgo The instructions for the operation were already worked out

in detallo*'s This pertained even to the exact approach route0 I also requested

Ilajor More to : lnsf^et 9 outside the individual company commanders, none of the

officers and men until immediately before reaching the operation area o The march

preparations should be begun immediatelyo General Student wanted to give Major

ilors'some personal instructions in the afternoon or evening I presented myself

at -this time to 1st Lt von Berlepseho He e .too 9 was to be informed about the plan

Von Berlepseh received the mission to select 90 of his best officers NCO'ft and

enlisted nn, all who would be volunteers only. During the selecting period0 no

one was to be informed of the exact nission. Instructions would be given immedi~

ately before the start o.f the operations at the Pratica di Mare airfield Out of

the 90 men 9 10 who fitted well together wore to be set up together as one aircraft

crew. I again emphas^ed here the absolute necessity of a precise take-off

since out of the efficient us of a surprise moment in all likelihood greater

numbers of casualties could be avoided I then asked for completely trustworthy

cooperation and .geve my guarantee as to the obvious departure time for the Ber

lepseh. groups which still was to be announced by the XI Air Force0

I joined vp with my unit 9 again instructed Captain Mandl thoroughly In his

missione particularly emphasising that in the action in Rocca he was to try to

avoid any bloodshed and t keep Ytiae schedule at 14 hours at all events * A.

short time later9 this group w a s the first to put into effect the big joint piano

If9 in th late hours of the night9 the valley unit was to set out on its march,

the dice w<;uld finally be cast and then the operation on the mountain must also

take plac corns what may*

?feaawhile.v my adjutant 3adl, was again all afternoon in Rome in search of

the Italian officerso Vhen this proved still unsuccessful by late afternoon* it

was given up-. 3adl nw went to look for General Soletl to inform him of General

Student's invitation fox* a conference in Frascatio Above all, it also concerned

the faet that che General was usually in uniform as an active reservist, but this

afternoon was to wear civilian slothese After a long search and many telephone

calls TiB.dt /ound the General at a 'Stiwtv&gg &it'fife :&'.;$tfl&Qft ibsannBtf^s -$& IteSBd -

Solcti was requested by phone to co;ne to the Department of the Interior as a per=>

sonal message from the German Cojamanding General was to be delivered to him by a

messenger, The fact that 5'oletl had just conducted a swearing in of some police

attested that he. would be in uniform.- A.s a matter of fact 9 he soon thereafter

appeared in a large limousineo i&a&l explained to him then after he had presented

hi?uli as a 3taff''Officer9 that he had the honor of requesting General Soletl to

attend an important military conference in Frascati of the Commanding Generals of

all the German forces located in and around lciieo General "oleti lmraealately

corsentodo It -Jas agreed upoii that. Radl v/ould pick hia up at the Department of

the Interior at a definite tira? - namely just around nightfall* It appeared^

too, that "oleti would really be in uniform* -\s a companion^ he took an interpre

ter - s. policeman from the crinr -'ustria-Hungnrlan monarchy who same from

Poland - as well as takingalon.-j; ^ ear^biniejfio Kadi rode with General Soleti in

i.he latter*s ear*. Purins the journey, Ltadl gave the Italian - General another des

cription of General Students personality and also informed CSoleti of some sig

nifioant military data. Arrived in Fraseati9 Radl reported immediately to General

Student to inform him ot General 3oleties arrival and presence.. General Student

and his staff i?ere ve?y olarmed since they had telephoned to Home to notify J3adl

to pick up the "& General only'the next morningo This telephone message hadn't

for sorse unknown reasono

After a shori conference between Radl and General Student' - at this time I

was someplace ovtside Krascatl - it was agreed to delay the conference because of

the matter of t.n interpretero I?adl then introduced both Generals General Studen

then apologised, during the conversation for having to ^ut off the. actual military

conference an* 11 the next day Because of the'Importance 'of the problem, he could

hold this meeting only if he had available an absolutely reliable and dependable

translator Unfortunately, this one man was busy with the surrender negotiations

in Sivoli - this accidentally was true and happened so appropriately and would-

nt be ' >>acfc-b-ei'-jre laidnighto To him, General Student, tills postponement ^ 3 very

unfort^sate^ but he couldn't request that General Soleti wait so longo He there

for asked the General .to Join him'and the staff of the XI Air Force for supper

ari to drink a glass ofraisea Ills Staff officer0 ^adl 9 .^rould then, tak@ General

safely back to "^oa and pick, him up again the nest morningb: General Soleti

eoapl^te understanding* In the meantime9 however9-.X had also turned ba@k

and had .my oeal with the Staff in Villa Dusmeto Around 2.55Q hoursft Radl received

the task of oscorting General Soleti *s care with a side-car rootorcycle - with ap

pr^priate armament9 since in the meantime independent firing? could again be hoai-Q.

1 " - '

}
litk the suburbs - to give him personal protection and escorto The next morning^ at

. ' ' . ' '

1-07309 ladl was to again pick up General Soleti at the Department of the Interioro

I General Soleti wouldn't have to use his own vehicle, Radl'assured:hia9. for-he,

Hadl 9 would.come .in his own car pud would himself_return General Soleti to Rome*

(Thistfasjtfdone so th-E.t the s.a$>^6xiduct of- General Soleti, if not already impeded

could'be carried out ;?ith the least hindrance possible)* After aidni&ht.,. I^adl re

turned to Fraseatio

I again sat down alone- with Radl in. a secluded corner, of Borghese garden to

redisduss everythin^o ",'e had slept only a few- hours sine 8 September neverthe

less9 tbe enpriftous strain allowed.ua to have no feeling or desire for sleep today

two of UB know'of the wery slim chances for the.success.of the mission* But

we saade up our jainds to watch out for the slightest chance- and to rely on ju3t

plain soldier9s luck for the rest - for success requires any big risk and in this

ease a.lot depended - on.lucko

Kven more thaa this 0 however9 every one of us was concerned with th ques-*

tlonss '^ould we find Mussolini on the Gran O P S S O ^t nil? "Vhnt .vould happen if 9

in the meantime9 he hnd already been taken away? Vould they put the blame on us?

Uight from the s-/cart9 we v/ere to proceed only if we had definite proof as to his

plee of confinemento At leastf thats what they meant at desk level* In prac

tice, howeverfl it looked differento a ny definite nrocf in this instance just

never be given- If liussolini is. still on the Gran 3asso 9 could we- possibly

 be fast enough to prevent the directed killing (of Mussolini) in case of an ?*t~

tempt made to free him? The first question9 if Mussolini was still up there,

could neitJ^^,*$p. answered nor did we have any influence in supplying..^an.vJinswero

To prevent his murder would be possible only by quick-as-lightning handling and j

completely steady9 iron nerveso And we relied completely on this* To carry out

the mission without bloodshed was our main desire9 but also our biggest worryo

Particularly in case the Duce really 1&&M wasn 9 t on the Gran Sassc No personnel

should be sacrificed in vain! And for this the plan with Soleti was our main

hope., He only had to be along,-, so we hoped? that he ould win over most of them

to avoid a battle tfe then discussed some other personal things concerning our

next-ofkiu9 things we had to think about in ease one of us was not to co^ns b?.cko

If 8085 of u9 as was forecast, were to be totally lost even without combat<, then j

8 owfe of 10 wouldnt returno

For the rest9 the Chief of Staff of the XI Air Force had onco again tried in

the evening of 11 September to obtain a cancellation of the operation^ since he ]

pointed out tp General Student in the name of *11 staff members of the General j

Staff9 the expected high casualtieso ?

Still barely past midnight9 the personnel for the valley station took off <, j

and with this the operation was practically rolling along-, Even on the trip to

Pratiea di Mare airfield.on the morning of 12 September, also a. few hours before

the mission,, ist&ff members of the. XI Air Force still tried to convince individual

officers of my unit as to tiie infeasibility of the ope rat ion9 a very unfriendly

syad a rather contradictory military intelligence way of acting* That anyone

would disseour&g soldiers just before the onset of an ordered and n=more~to-be~

foa&ged operation moreover0 even officers at that - through swearing as to the

infeasibility of it 9 was still is to us today9 incoaiprehensibleo

After our private conference9 3adl and I departed to spend the night before

the operation with out meno In this ;\ray0 additional informal1 instructions and

directions could be-gif/ene And still9 outside of the two of us and three other

$:Cieers9 no ode knew .what kind, of an operation it wasjt b@ and why it wan really I

going to- worke We spent one more wonderful9 southe-rn^starlit night in the Br J

& Garden and finally got just a very short sleep in the early morning hours |

 12/September 19^3 . -.

After a short sleep in the tent, there is a general reveille early in the

morning* Everything is ready for the departure to Pr&ti@& di Hare* My adjutant,

Radio is ready for his trip to Rome, to pick up General Goletio Lto larger is

going $$/pfd with him in order to have a better understanding with the Generalo

Warger'speaks perfect Italiano 3adl has a difficult mission in this* He has to

ask the General not to accompany hint to general command headquarters in Fraseati

but to coae-to Pr&tiea di Mare airfieldo This may evoke lack of confidence on

the part of General foleti Pratica di Mare is a completely German airfield*

From there a number of Italian personalities were flown away without-knowledge of

their goyernnento (From Ciarapino airfield also)* These two airfields, in view

fb'thlSfi Cuidxiei have a very good name on the part of Italian personalities*

Vittorlo Mussolinig Pavolini, Farinaeei, the Ciano family, are some of the names

of well-known Italians who started off in the last fe-jr .weeks'and months from

these airfields unnoticed and without authority* They are now in Germany* The

Italians didn't know tftat all of these had taken off at their own desires*

Shouldn't General.Soleti -be a..little.mistrustful? Yesterday, the "conference5

was postponed? today9 from the normally used conference place of a Commanding

General - his -com&and headquarters - the conference was transferred to an air fie Is

and above all q to Pr&iicsa di Mare* It is left to Lt Hadl to explain this change

credibly in whatever way he can to General Soleti* Because of this he must have

an interpreter along*

I talk once more-with Radi before he takes a course out of Rome* To both

I of us it is clear that we must have the General alongo Right now he appeared to

us rather friendly9 rauch more so than the first eared-for officers* Firsts he's

a general* Second, his e&rabinieri will recognise'him-'immediately - even if not

all 'personnel^ at least 30.1& of them who had seeii hia once someplace or the

other* And ..in every case9 the officers - they have to recognize him* His appear?

once.-on the scene will at first be a surprise and this9 so we-hoped, would pre~

;, vent the opening--of hostilities* At least there would be 0 aside from the avoid

anee of active-engagement, as tsueh tidie won for use to be ready to be "shoulder

to shoulder?? oont&et with the enemy at the critical /flomento

e still had this to considers tjo will Soleti behave upon the news of his

task? Probably he will be interested in not committing himself to any side* The

Duce was a deposed had of a government0 Soleti had also served the f'newfl govern

ment o These were now on the side of the enemy* Further developments weren't

perceivable at the aomento It probably was'"also advantageous to hiai not to choesa

any side o No one knew what was yet to comet ;Ve, must leave open all possibili

tieao In any events whether it was froia a personal motive or out of a sense of

responsibility toward his native land, the fellow would do his duty* F-ven Radl,

since I had evaded any profascist conversation with the General the night- be

fore9 believed this o Kor was there any reason for this since according to our

concepts* apart from this a reconstruction of Fascism would definitely be termed

false* Me therefore believed that if. someone were to step in and explained some

what diplomatically the proposal for his cooperation in the liberation of the

 80

captive former government h@ad9 he probably wouldn't refuse9 especially if the

idea of Mussolini6s reappointment were not realized In any other case 9 he v?ould

just be sil^S^ t?taken alongo" The suggestion could be well presented ^ % l l dip==>

loaacy and are but in spite of this, any approach would appear favorable and a

refusal as rather hopeless6 This 9 of course, came up in the course of the conver

satio.no Therefore the General's action in any case would publicly be a possible

justification before the Italians.

In' any event9 however9 it must be avoided that General 3oleti hear before

time the nature of the operation and its dangero If so 9 his cooperation would be

less probablo In any ease0 after the mission conference9 I wanted to put him in

my personal ear * apart from this, lie was already scheduled for the flight in ay

aircraft. - to protest him fro& any danger which might arise from his personal Con

duct o The conference in Iratiea dl.Mare was set for 10 amP Had! must also pre

vent a-large convoy of Italians frov joining'-and if this vQp&n9t possible0 then

hed -have to worry abut making sur that only Soleti0 accompanied by no more than

brie escort9 ccuae to the conference in tiie siaall, store airport administrative

'buildings There General Soleti was to give his consent to his participation

?f
s that unnecessary bloodshed could be avoided.." He was to give this promise in

the presence of General Stitdento .

.3adl,'too9 went to Romeo The deployed personnel of von BerXepgeh's eonpany

and say 18 m e n are on the way to Pratica'di infers * There are radio messages that

the transport aircraft are taking off on schedule and will land at Pratlea between

10 and lie Then there would'be just enough time for the operation conference be

fore the start0 At Tratica the last preparations for the operation are being

carried outo Supplies weapons and ammunition checkedo Nations ttrere to be given

0 11
out for 3 days "j-uaj- rations '0 a very definitely highly concentrated ration set.

The personnel were gathered together I explained in a fear words the purpose9

the method and the execution of the missiono The z&en knew of the danger and in

spite o.f this 9 their eyes glistened^ since it concerned a "dasi\ing thing*" fit

last the long9 unsolved 'py&z\e is solved^ there are no longer any sec.ret^' as to

our pldnso . Tais v^as a joy to my menL.*.7ho hsd xp&at the entire time in Italy

feigning the secret which I never revealed and which they hadn't known of sooner.

They no longer believed -strongly in a missions "nothing will come of it*fS they

aid5 "one day we'll be going back hoae'again and we911. still not have raised'-a

finger<>rf For. those of my men v.?h could not take part, in it e this was a' big dis

appointmento They had all 'volunteeredo Next 0 announcement of the mission eon~

tinned to.be made to the meno v&ch aircraft'would definitely hold 9 men^, the

r of their particular track,, the E&se of tkeir responsible leader f*iven to

The leaders of these groups and their appointed deputies, and fdr all

eventualities, even one H02&substitute,.were added and included iauthe operational

instructions^ The leaders of these groups then have a last-ainute discussion of

the operation with the piltso I have still .one more discussion with the IoCo

of- the XI Air Force o lie had ma^l the photo reconnaissance flight with us (Ra&l

and JOB) on'8 Septo He knew the approach routes and the target area o He was to

lead (point maa)^ in an aircraft without a glider in tow9 the entire flight group

 Suddenly, there appears an Italian 1st Lt close to :*adl and General 3oleti and'he

shout 2 ".a;&om&m> disaraatoo!" ("we are disarmed" )<> The bad luck Jj$,Jiappened*

None of us knew frosi where the man came* A'h&t use of any reproach to the two

"watchers?" Soleti's'.reaction is prompt and expected: "oo it is an impossibili

ty^ it is unbelievable, I must remain here<, I can't come tfith you now 9 o" The

interpreter is on hand*, Hadl 2t3 an ideag speaks quietly something like thiss

ooo General the measures take'n. here are a scandal., I myself heard only yester

day ^ how the Corani&nding General not only forbade any disarming action against the

policcs but on the contrary, had ordered that the police be strengthened and be

supported in every s-aja It e s case here of an arbitrary act of the local com*

isaader, who will be held responsible for this o General Student has already been

informed of this incident The rectification of this-matter will be one of the

siain points of your- .conference with General Student, It all .concerns-the sesuri~

ty of your capital itjs resides,- General .Student requests, since he h.?,s waited (.

for over two hours sow ip fraseatl, that you noB$jj&j$b accompany me to Pratlea di

Mareb' The Coat-Banding general had a very pressing operational conference there

concerning measures ^ safeguard Woffle against any danger of invasion,, an act

which he could m longer keep from happening" Because of this 0 I requested him ta

come with me i%aiediately, in the interest of Itoae and the Italians*. There are

already aati** ac * or y orders underway concerning tie disarming of his police 00 o

Goleti spates and says hes ready to drive to Pratiea with us o But he wants'to

take hi*' adjutant a long9 ^adl urges departure, Sole ti insists on his adjutant

joes into the Ministry of the Interior t talk with the commander of the

;e battalin0 The latter is in a conferenceo Sadl should return around

0
| i* o cloek! Kadi demanded of the Batallion Adjutant to know where the Italian

| c Colonel Vase 1110. is o Answer: *ro'ohQv wfeor ,ju.st put In prison.-.ff ;iadl demanded

| his immediate release Only the comiuamder can authorize this 9 he is in a very

conference* 3a Id should come back again at 12 H9elocko Upon appeal on the

personal orders of the Fuehrer ^ he succeeded the in having Colonel Vase 111

brought out ur the- cellar whore the poli.ee off leers were locked up o The latter

sought his own personal pistol - it should be laying in -a pile of confiscated

plstc'lse I&ca minute is costly5 finally Had! persuades him to come along right

away9 gives him another pistol Outside9 his general is waiting0 There are stil]

just a few minutes of conversation doura by the cars It's mostly about the young

mother niid child ftald premises to give the General some, sauce0 butter<, skoco=

late &n& baeon ^en some canned milk at Pratica to take with him He 8 s happy

and drives offa f&dl leads the way in his car 0 behind coaes General Soleti He

insisted upon driving with his o.-/n car ;7ith him9 in the o-passe'nder limousine^

are the adjutante'largerfl k carabinieri and the Italian driver Radl is to atop

a ways from the airport administration -building aa& then escort Soleti and Colonel

7aselli to- tho stone houseo The earabinieri must remain in the car- Finally9

they arrive ith suefe lateness9 I had almost given up hopeo And Soleti is tbeni

The two officers were taken to the agreed upon roosa by r?adle Then General.

Student arrives :.s --rset both ''oleti &polor;iZ3s for the delayo Colonel Vase I'

ll was reqiieuted to wait briefly at.the entrance, so that General Soleti eould b

 to that operations area at the command of the commnding generale He knew the

landaar-ts in these fissured mountains and would find the way ^accurately* The

pilots of the towing aircraft and the gliders didn9t have this knowledge* So

dangerous loss of time due to search was safely avoided. In the meantime, 1st Lt

Radl is in Home*, At exactly 7s3O he entered the Ministry of the Interior* There

was great excitement there* In front of the building, there stood hundreds and

hundreds of Italian police of the City Police They talked wildly together,

gesticulating and shoutingo What is happening? The batallion which had disabled

the Ministry of the Interior and "put it out of commission^' had disarmed the

entire Homan City Police force in the early raorning hourso The only guaranteeors

for the maintenance of peace and order on the part of the Italians who still

managed to be operational had been disarmedo :hat resulted can not be overlot>lae&

1 And at the iioaent* it wasn't very interesting for Radio For him* only one

question mattered; where is General Soleti? The latter was not at the scheduled

place'of appointment* No trace of him could be found. Telephoning to various

police stations is without success? the telephone k his hoste isn't answered0

Has he perhaps deliberated? Had he received word of the disarming f his polls?

Then such a deliberation was the logical thing for him*. Had he perhaps left

3oae because of this or had he taken himself out of a danger gone? The lives of

many soldiers on both Italian and German sides now depended on him*, ..7hat would

happen if Sadl didat bring him along? He would be made responsible - he must

find him now! On hur passed by, 1% hours and 2 hours - no trace of General

Soleti o The operational siseting 1st to begin in a short tiraeo fta&l is also sup^

posed to be thereo He,fcoo^had a specific task on the Gran Sasso? He was

awaited at Pratis di 'Mare with impatience KG is almost an hour JSoverdue0?s

Gould there be ai evil star watching over the operation? Very many small and

large difficulties of both material and personal types had taken place in the

last days and hourso The Commanding General asks me whore Sadl is, but I donet

But I know he'll cosse*. If only he brings Soleti along!

The situation at the Ministry of the Interior is starting to b costly for

If r.oleti doesnt coae in in & few minutes9 he 11 have to drive to Prati

<sa without him*. He had stationed Lt Varger and the driver on both ends o the

roof of the.Ministry of the Interior* They imst prevent Soleti - if he still

doss come - fr& diseo\?@ring that his polie are disarmedo This would probably

make him change his decision., He must per'iaps stay in Rom then and on his part

request a delay of the conference And thsn it must still be made perfectly

believable and eli>ar to hisa that'it. will take place in Pratica and not in Fras

satio fAl$l a<> Italian aiuefc accompany hia. Then a large Lancia-lianousihe

turns the aimr<, Radl recognizes it? it is General r'olcti in uniform, Thank

GodS Two hours late!

3adl hurries to rtoleti, the latter juiQps out of the car, he gives orders

in Swiss excuses -hiuiself in very excited tones s his sister gave birth to a

child that mornings no doctor, no medication* no food* chocolate &n<L milk v/ero

not to be had0 no butter oo! therefore tiie ^enerff.1 had to help* And thus the

dalayo Thanks be to God he cLoesn't appeax^o know anything about the disarming!

 H 75^3 83

given a brief notice which is only for him personally* Vaselli acquiesces to the

request very politelyo (Moreover*, he is a giant in size),. General Student-ex-

I '

I plains* in the presence of mefl 3adl and the interpreter, Lt Varger0 to the Italian

I ' ' ' '

I General, that the Fuehrer had ordered the very urgently seeming liberation of Mus

aolini from prison to be carried out* General loletl already had the kindness

9
yesterday of .'confirming Mussolini s place of confinement on the Gran Sasso9 for

ihieh he thanks him sincerely* The Fuehrer now personally requests General Soleti

t take part in this liberating action*, Through thisoaetive combat can be avoidec

on both sides r at least to cut down on active measures<> Soleti listens very

arefully9f he evidently understands the significance of each word and immediately

declares himself ready by shaking handso It is an extremely lightening feeling

(sensation)0 that this man*, too 9 volunteers to take parto He must now send

Qolonel Vaselli to Rome but under no circumstances to say a word to him of the

planned operation* Soleti promises this and keeps his word In the presence of

me and Rsi&lc, H@ dismisses Vaselli tells him that the conference will probably

stretch out into the night hourso *s is to take along a package for Soleti9s

eistero In Horn he 9 s also supposed to check into the police matter and pick up

Soleti again toward evening in Praticao Hadl leaves the area with Vaselli9 to

place the order for the promised provisions &n& shortly thereafter Radl takes him

to. his car,-, and hQ together with the entire earabinieri garrison^ drives off in

th<s direction of Romeo

In the'".meantime, '/larger is alone with General Soleti;. hell be relieved

shortly by Radio I go over the flight plan with General Student9 ^ust prior to

passing oa the information to the glider crews9 V/ can see the invasion of the

station from th house* The noise dies away and one glider after another lands o

I All come 'in smoothly, there are 12 altogethero 16 aircraft started from France?

k were lost hy the time Pratica di Hare was reached0 00 that w li&ve now just

the first mentioned number available at our disposalo It's then Immediately made

slear that the starting time and flight time must be reeheckedo At 13 hours 9 the

aireraft must be airborne .

General Soleti also views tits* aircraft -invading from the window f the room

in which he and-Radl were just eating breakfasto Until now he has no idea what

jbhe nature of the'Ouce's liberation is to be* Perhaps he believes that we'll be

flying to Aquila and will "take off" from there He sees only the landing, shows

a great interest is ito Meanwhile, the pilots of the gliders como in o Radl s&tfa

f
to, {ssneral "oleti completely unexpectedly:. ' .owe fly in those aircraftpoo"

The' latter is. surprised,.'he'doesnt'believe it* For some time now, r?Air Said'

has be&n announced0 % enemy bomb flights are reported? they^re coming from North

Africao Ratfeer larg distans between the two The sirens go off - the first

flight is here.o. Everything hurries in preparation and the flak is already flying

and the flight Is still hcreo It drops only a few bombsQ doesnt hit our place

a. ne.a?by abandoned plaeo This happens so often that the ones at Pratica are

For us it's- a climax to the exeiteaento Hoat are laying someplace

completely dried up grass^scarred area'of the field*, After 10 to 15

C| this exeiteoient is endedo If the bombers had met our gliders! Shouldn't

'm $m

 H 7563 I 83
a brief notice which is only for him personally Vaselli acquiesces.-to the

request very politelyy (Moreover,, he is a giant in size)o General Student-ex

| plains, in the presence of mefl Radl and the interpreter, Lt larger0 to the Italian

f General, that the Fuehrer had ordered the very urgently seeming liberation of Mus

| solini from prison to be carried outo General Soleti already had the kindness

yesterday of confirming Mussolinis place of confinement on the Gran Saseo9 for

i?hich he thanks hi9 sincerelyn The Fuehrer now personally requests General Soleti

Ifctake part in this liberating actiono Through thisoa<etive combat can be avoidec

I on both sides or at least to cut down on active measureso Soleti listens very

1 carefully^; he evidently understands the significance of each word and immediately

declares himself ready by shaking hands0 It is an extremely lightening feeling

j (sensation},, th^t this man<, too*, volunteers to take pa.rto He must now send

Colonel Vaselli to Some but under no circumstances to say a word to him of the

planned operation* Soleti promises this and keeps his word In the presence of

me and Ra&lg lie dismisses Vaselli0 tells him that the conference will probably

stretch out into the night hourso " is to take along a package for Soleti*s

j sistero In Horn he9s also supposed to check into the police matter and pick up

I Soleti again toward evening in Pratieao Hadl leaves the area with Vaselli9 to

I place the order for the promised provisions &n& shortly thereafter Hadl takes

to. his car9 and hc> together with the entire earabinierl garrison*, drives off In

th<s direction -of Romeo

! In the meantime0 larger is alone with General Soleti;. hell be relieved

shortly by Radio I go over the flight, plaa with General Student9 just prior to

passing oa the information to the glider crews? Vie can see the invasion of the

station from the house* The noise dies away and one glider after another lands

| All come in smoothly9 there are 12 altogether0 16 aircraft started from France

k were lost by the time Pratica di Hare was reached0 so that re have now.-just

the first mentioned number available at our disposalo It's then lime diately mad

clear that the starting time and flight time must be recheckedo At 13 hours9 the

aircraft must be airborneo

'General .Soleti also views ths* aircraft invading from the window f the room

in Which he and Radl were just eating breakfasto Until now he has no idea what

the nature of the Puces liberation is to beo Perhaps he believes that w@ll be

flying to Aquila and will "take off" from there 0 Fie sees only the landing, shows

a great Interest in ito Meanwhile, the pilots of the gliders come ino Radl smys

to, General Soleti completely unexpectedly! ".owe fly in those aircraftoo"

j The latter is surpris'ed,.'he' doesnt'believe it For some time. now,. ?fAir Said'*

I has been announced0 2 enemy bomb flights are reported? they0re coming from Korth

lAfricao Rather larg distance between the twbo The sirens go off - the first

I flight is hereo Everything hurries in preparation and the flak is already flying

Sand the flight is still hereo It drops only a few bombs doesnt hit our place

|but a nearby abandoned pla@eo This happens so often that the ones at Pratica are

fused to ito For us its a climax to the exeiteaento Most are laying someplace-

fiat on the completely dried up grass^searred area'of the fields After 10 to 15

minutes9 this exelteaieni is endedo If the bombers had met our gliders! Shouldnt

ASS! mi m DISSEMI^TiOS FORM fOS

 - I *~~m.~mm- **~~. TfB^l^isSSrTT

Large groups of clouds are coming up9 although no cloud ceiling is formingo This

ii favorable just now9 since in this way our takeoff can e t be observed so exactly

from the valley a Toot, no one will pay too much attention to us 9 since there is az

air raid alert all over the area0 at least there is aerial danger for places at a

Ve sit pressed close together in our transport glider, one in the -diddle,

the others along the sides 0 General Soleti.sits in front of me and in front of

hia.g Lt Sckwerdto Morale is high'9 th men eat a part of their jump ration * the

hoeolate first of all* Beneath us ? through the large holes in the clouds, the

Italian landscape is seen, just as itedl and I already got to know it from our

reconnaissance flight-

Then my pilot informstfiethat his tow pilot (in the formation) has just in~

formed him that the single lead aircraft, with the I0C0* along v^ith air crafts 1

andi 2 9 the first who are to fly the planned route and also the first who are to

land55 arent in sight,, He cannot orient thea<, either0 since he doesn^t know this

stretcho I look at my map and recognise some known landmarks beneath raeo It is

1335 hours o Since the other aircraft are no longer to be seen9 I take over eo3~

mand of the formation*. The group must close up s for through a belly hole0 which

is somewhat enlarged by using side arms,, I can observe below very well 5 the course

is true and my pilot gives orders by throat microphone up forward to his tower 0

Far below us an aircraft with a glider in tow appears 9j at least at **00 meters

altitude o , 'vVe.eant tell if it e s the number 1 or number 2 plane - or even some

thing els@o A glan@ backwards satisfied me that aircraft #k is behind me o I

know that I can rely on the commander of ;#f - its 1st Lt Radl! The other air*

X'-caaH gee at all* We gradually go higher <, the altimeter shows 3300=3^00

Left and right* here and there mountain tops plunge up out of the holes

in the clouds? they seem to be about 2000 meters higho It is 1330 hourso Only

lO.'.jnore minutes and the decision is over! .There0-beneath us is the valley en

trance to Aguila, at the s?aall village of Baaaano? :"e fly alon* the valley, it

is elose to l^f hours - then I see down below on the road,, an aafeo coluzan driving

in the direction of Assergi and just past Assergi9 on the winding road to the

valley -station9 a smaller unit is driving to this spoto It can only be the val

ley unit saen! And there0 now9 through a hole in the eloads.9 our target is

directly beiies.th us': Gampo Ir.iperatore! It is 1358 hours* Orders Prepare to

land! It-.is.--followed silently,, we are still above and between clouds - and then

w wing fr@ . the motor aircraft fly offo "7e soar through the first turnfl I

see Campo Imperatore something like 1^001500 asters beneath tae look for our

selected landing pot, the trapezoidal meadow northwest from the hotels I ean9t

find the f9littl@ used madowfV and then I see that we have erred terribly! Cur

aerial photograph had deceived us! Instead.of.a somewhat 10 -sloped meadow with

knollsg it is a-flatter of something like a *f5@~inelined9 fissured intrench^

area with a tableland spoto There'is no time for deliberation! I yell 0

fallftas close to-the hotel as possibleo" And Lt Meyer tilts the glider <,

against the express order given by the Commanding General that rapid fall and

target jumping are forbidden! And behind us glider #** is already tilting! All

 ling tightly to the struts9 roky pinnacles shoot by and then Meyer.-callss

"Hang o n J ^ ^ n ^ h snaps up the tilting plane (glider) with the parachute brake

a shoeko a^las'n0 we lose ur eyes for a-fraction of a second* And We'*fi' landed!

On the groundo fresh air streams in9 we jump out of the aircraft and we0re stand

ing in front of the hotel! Lt Meyer has set the aircraft down 15 meters from the

hotel! The gliders ean9t glide since the boundaries are strongly circled with

barbed wire* There8 a mass, already in position behind the machine gun; the

Keckmaehlne' gun of the aircraft is set up immediately by Lt Meyer, The rest of

the personnel of my raft go toward the hotelo General Soleti is in the raldst of

us*, there's an Italian posto Hes called over by his General,, and spoken to in

his native tongues f*Dont shoot!" The guard doesnt mover, ','e leave him alone

and fall into the hotelo An op& door leads into the radio room. An Italian is

handling the radio equipment he hasnt yet noticed anything. A call pulls him

from his "chair*- with o&$ two hits with the butt of a pistol,, the apparatus is

put out of commissions But no-door leads from this liar room up into the

hotel 3ack--out! ' go-around the corner <, along the porch Another guard0

agsin his Italian General says* <sNon abagliare" ("dont shoot") and this guards

tooc remains quiet and does absolutely nothing! He is motionless with terrorn

SJOtif -only something like a 2meter-high wall interferes I limb up on the

ahoul-ders of one of ay men^ the others are pulled up after me 0 and were standing

'on the- terrace before the main entrance to the hotels First of all9 I see the

-rocky and stonecovered high surface close by in which a second aircraft has just

crashed.- its been only about l}i> minutes since #e landedo And there the air

craft is landing*, only 100 aeters away from uso It is Noo kl And we can already

see 1st Lt 3adl Hensel and his men climbing outo And just then a window on the

first floor of the hotel is raised and at the windows Mussolini! And he fleets

us and nods!

I call to him*. "Ducev away from the window'% since I fear either onset of

action or eventually a well-aimed shot toward the windowo The Duee steps back

the window a Had! strides toward the hotel with-.his men a nly -Menzel* the

'second 1st Lt<> reiaains laying in tho air@rafto lie had broken his ankle o; -.Ve

'hLvent time to waito Even before Radl had entered the hotels I entered th^

vestibule by force-.with Lt S@hwerdto Just then the arabiniori begin coming out

of the hotelo Th^yv just had their aftern'ooh rest and are almost completely

bewilderedo so-that they almost fall all over each other getting out through the

.oor k few blows with th butt-end and a'few pokes in the ribs .-,and the road

is freej I'm alone with Lt Schwerdt on the hotel porche e ds.sh up the stairs

the door must be someplace her$o I tear the door open and have chosen correctly*

Inside stands Mussoliniv near him are 2 officers in uniform and a aan in civilian

clotheso These are immediately pulled out, in order to avoid any eventualities6

there already aprear two of my NC0s9 CJfaeHer and Glaesner; they had

up one floor by use of a ladder and now take over the securing of the

I inform the Du@ "Duee9 the Fuehrer sends us to set you free.,1* Just

as I finish^ the door flies Q-pen and 3ad'l and Varger also aro in the roomc Frotsi

window we can see more gliders landingo Tho personnel of one aircraft are

 H 7563 87

now running to the hotel* The Duee is very moved9 he can answer only: ftI knew

that the Fuehrer wouldn't leave me in the lurcho" He squeezes my hand and em

braces me, also Hadl Sehwerdt and larger& I send for the Italian commander,, He

appears, a Colonels I request his immediate surrender and state that'any resist

ance is useless, there are additional reinforcements on the way, &he valley sta

tion is already in our controls He requests time to talk it over with the General

He means the,-van in .civilian clothes^, whoa we later learn is General Cueli e whose

wireless message to the Ministry of the Interior we had interceptedo I give the

Colonel a couple of minutes and turn toward outside Someone is shooting out

thereo Nobody knows whyo And no ^ e is hit$ as it later turns out* It is just

rather difficult for daring soldiers not to fire at all during an operatione

f9
ur answer 9 n
I @ay to the cousnandant He goes out of the room is ba@k in a

I go downstairs with the Colonel,$ he gives the appropriate orderso The

Italian soldiers stack their weapons in one spot in front of the hotel and gather

in the large dining room of the hotel* Lt larger takes over the rest of the

capitulation acts The Italian officers retain their weaponse

During the landings of the rest of the gliders9 we lose one when it crashes

into a very steep, roeky slope and can be seen smashed there* Through binoculars

it can be &e@n that at least some of the men are alive9 but they appear to be

badly wounded? At the aoa&ntt they.canH be helped at all, since the spot seemed

rather difficult to reaeho Their fescue must be delayed Gliders are landed

one is laying on the rocky slopeo Even 1st Lt von Berlepseh is here now and the

hotel can be,completely aecuredU

The main part of the operation is. therefore successful*, Without combat

ation0 without loss of life9 if one doesnet include the loss of life of those

in that one.glidero How there remains only the last act of the operation^ to

take the Duee away from Gran Sass and bring him to Germany*

1st Lt von Berlepsch announces that the hotel and the mountain station are

definitely secured<> There are telephone tie-line's *ith the valley station From

v before

there too9 things 'take, a good turn^Ln that news is received that shortly/tfte ap

proach had b^en captured after a brief resistance? The station itself and the

eableway a.?-6. J*ot destroyed and are in working condition^, The road barricade to

the valley station entrance was run down by some of the dispersed advanced troop

and put out of csom^issiono

For the dcp?jrture, I Imaediately order a wireless message to ^ome: "Await

new time for Plan :Bo" 25y this was meant the time at which the HE 111 was to

appear over the Aquila airfields After a short decision I give the order 10

minutes later to send the new Ytime% 5Sl65O hours" to Koae

Now-X ean concern-ayself again with my personnelo Only 8 aircraft have

landed and of these one is losto There is no clue whatever of the other glider

airera-ft .and-of the leading aircraft with the IoCo Soise first aidfl mountain

limbers are on their way to the downed aircrafto But theyll not be back be=>

fore 2-3 hourso v or all.the other0 a very hard landing results only in insig

nificant injurieso

 Then I received the report from the valley station that the first wireless

message to Rome<, which announced the success of the action9 was received and had

been ace^Sii^oyfullye, The second message*, that of the new Y-timeg coij&dnH |

have gotten through since no more wireless traffic was possible Communications0

up to now3 eouldnt yet be repairedo Now<> it is necessary that Plan Aquila be

given upo Then^ over the hotels Captain Gerlaeh appears with the Storch plane0

Because of the removal of the rough rocks* a slight possibility of landing is

createdo Gerlach lands smoothly*

In the meantime I return to Mussolini in the room and find him in heated

conversation with my adjutant who has-the-assignment of remaining with the Duee

constantly and to protect his life* General Cueli is in the room,, too* whom I

no longer would acknowledge as being there; and moreover General Soleti is there

and I had completely forgotten him in the meanwhile * The Italian commandant '<

brings red wine and offers .it to me with the words; ''The victor*,'* ;e drink to

this and he doesno.t seem to be so unhappy any more with the outcome as he seemed

to be at. the onset0 The Due declares that his delivery to the Allies had been

prepared for for several days now<> But it hadnt yet coue to that0 because he

had delayed it by attempting suieideo A Lieutenant of his guard personnel had

promised to leave him a pistol0 Moreover0 ae relates$ there was a standing

to kill him on-the^spot ia the event of any attempt at his release0 But the sur<

prise was evidently too sudden and we had reached the hotel room, in an unbeli$v

ably short time after larlingo

I talk it over with Capt Gerlaefe again9 first in another room and then in

front of the hotel All those present are removed from the Duces rooia9 only

HadI remains alone with hiau We are now seeking only a possibility for making a

taksoff with the Strhe. First0 however9 the other possibility of taking off

in-the Storh9 which has landed in the vicinity of the valley station^, must be

firmly establishedo Qna an l@ok right into the Storch down there in the valley

by us of bin<^Uars<> /?e ask. by'telephone about take-off conditions and-receive

the reply that at the- iioment taw is no ehaja?'for a take-off since damage had

been suffered to the driving frame during the landing* So this second possibili

ty is ale shut off! Most of the pilots located there n the mountain and

among these are.th^ baste most daring pilots * xxegats the possibility of a take<=

'off o A few of th@Bi Are skeptical stating that the takeoff isnt iapoesible0

The taxi strip must be completely cleared f stones and rockso It must be taxied

(the Storch) downhill, and the path is very short and uneven., I order the prepa

ration of the take'-of dbrip for 1600 hourso There are cow still other measures

to be taken for the taking away of Mussolini0 Mussolini requests that the

Italian soldiers not; be turned over to the POW camp but to leave them behind at

Carapo Imperator@o Ihis fits in9 to0 with our intentlono It is determined that

ur personnel are to be transported;aay by aeans of'the cable railwayo All

eomeiunieations lines which lead from.the mountain station into the valley are

1 put 01i t -of esoaoiis 3 Ion so' that t h e return .march cannot b endaiageredo Both j
\ g@aerxls a r e to fo e taken along% t o Romeo During the departure of the personnelo
I1 w@ mm st &e carefu1 that iin. Itsiliai i officer aceoaipany each @abLe s a r " until the
 last !aan is taken away * to make any kind of act of sabotage improbable The

long returnraarefeto Roue is carried out during active combat participation*

Sufficient transportation from the special batallion is taken along to transport

the personnel and the wounded^ as called for in the plan

Around 1530 hours Captain Gerlach informs us that the Storeh and the take

off strip are ready for the take-offo He is very surprised when I tell him that

Im flying ale.ago He emphasizes that this additional load is extremely disadvan^

tageottV.even under normal conditions and explains to me that because of my in

sistence the take~off will.be an extremely difficult task* I reply that this is

quite clear ...to.me* However, since the take-off of the Duce from Gran Sasso is u

pon .ay'order9 I tell him therefore that I am also responsible for ito If the

take-off do#snt su@@eed and Mussolini should lose his life because of it, then

nothing else -.remains for me to do than to place a bullet through my heado Ther=

fore,' its aor favoaable for me to take the risk of. the- take-off myself and,

in'case of an accident,' to go on down with ito 'Bo- greater risk can be taken on

?ay part a "Qer.lach agrees to this o For this decision, I. receive later, from

General Student as well as from Hecihsaarshal Hermann Goering9 vehement reproaches

The ' jDucevhiaself is definitely enthused about the flight from the mountain.

He is a pilot himself, knows the Storeh aircraft and knows the terraino He

would rattier, he: tells Radl<> drive .to.Rocca della Caminate first ahd pick up

something -there before he turns himself over to the Fuehrer. There is no one

;
left'in:oe.ea9'.-Radl replies o.o "your wife and your children are now already in

Munich and wait there for you, Duce^'9 *. But still he would prefer to go to

'.Roeca firsto- H tells me this - I say .to hims "The Fuehrer desires that I

bring you to him immediatelyoo'9 Then Mussolini agrees reluctantly*, His trunk

are packed* But he can take along only a very small hand case with toilet .

^ article's ,$inoe. th@r isnt r@om for aore in the Storeh0 3adl takes it upon him

self to personally guarantee the - safekeeping of the trunks and to bring them

' along'himself, to Borneo In the meantime, the Duce is prepared for the journey

Take-off is set for 1550 hours* Around 1535 hours*, Major Mora arrives at Csapo

Imperatore .with ay officer, 1st <'Lt-Schulso. Just then Mussolini leaves the Hotel

with his -escort and finds himself .put in the open f/here numerous soldiers with

cameras h&dvbeesi'waiting for this moment Major Hora requests me to present him

to the Du@ ? This takes pla@e. The whole- scene lasts about 5 minutes, the

Duee exchanges' some words with Major itorso This conversation is photographed hj

war correspondent, Lt 'won .Kayser^ and is presented some 3 weeks later in the

offieial-<3erV2&& illustrated, the ".'illustrated Observer", in the form of a. purs

historieal falsifieatioa with, pictiures and text in misrepresented form of

Only a-few- brief iastrutions and then the'take-offo A few minutes later9

the'Stbrch starts/taxiing, w roll down the slightly inclined runway, picking

tap 9. tail wind* over the un@ven<, stony groundo Toward the end f the take-off

trip there ruas a small dried up ditch, oblique t the runway_ Capt Gerlaeh

now tries to take--off fr@m the geoundo' H@ definitely clears the'ditch, but the

aircraft X S & E balance and shoots over the steep ro@ky slope to the plain 9: after

 first hitting the ground again with the left wheel of the frame* The precipice

is our deliverancea Because of the free fail we gain enough speed and Cap to Cier=

la@h can again eateh the glidero 7e9re airborne! '.Ve look at each ther^and are

glad for rewinning our lives0 Mussolini had even anticipated the unprecedented

danger0 but he shows no emotion* He speaks to us about the landscape lying be

neath us whi@h lie nows in detail , the Gran Sasso having been his place of rest

denee for all winter sportsa We fly very low and soon Fras@ati is in sight9 then

and now even Pratisa &i Mare airbase is in sighta The landing is carried ou

particular caution, for Gerlagh fears that the framework is possibly damaged

due to that hard blow @n the left wheel. The landing is smooth and waiting on

the field are the & llles which are to take us to Vienna., The one in which we

ourselves ar t fly0 the other two with various flying speeds in order to cut

off any danger f pursuit through their deceptive nan@uverso

later we again meet the second 3torch which had landed in the vicinity of

J the valley station and in which were both the Italian generals9 Sole'tl and Culi

The 3torch was again sa&e airborne and Radl sent both of them (the generals) to

Pratica di Mar since they are not to'participate in the return flight, The

HE lll*s take off around 1700 hours9 they fly about the same course - as protect

later take various other flight directions -. as deception

We attempt to establish radio ?nta@fc with the Visnna-Aspern

airbase to- obtain landing instructionso Traffi re@e/pti@n is and is not su<

S3 m bad9 it beginning to rain and twilight is slowly com

leather onditions become increasingly wo^seo vl'e even lose radio contact

with, both escort aircraft and still no contact with Viennao Fuel9 according to

the calculations of the cretf^ is enough for k3 minutes zaore and we should be over

Vienna-noeientarily* Because of the mountains, we must fly at about 1500 meters

altitude and'wetty soon ther perhaps faces us the necessity of an especially

As w later find out * both of the other aircraft have to make

Through a hole in the cloudsQ I se something glitteringo

A..large ar?ao if head downwards through the eloud ceiling that must be Lake

Keusiedler9. southwest of Vienna And it is! Now a steep turn9 first to the nor

until the Banube* thea upstream froa the Danube to Vienna<, In complete darkness

and with almost the last liter of gase we land at the Aspern airfieldo

Itafc morning we fly with a JU5-2 to Munich-9 where we meet Donna 3ach$le and

the ehiVdreno And even this plan is smoothly carried out without incident <

On 15 September 19^3 we fly again to Hitlers field headquarters in East

Prussia-, where I gi^s a detailed report concerning the carrying out of the orders

given to joe<> <

SSI BU

 H 7563 . ! 91

Vs Epilogue (Concluding Remarks)

The draft is completed in its original form with 330 pages (without the

number of pages of this epilogue) Since it was the original intent of the auth

or to revise this rough draft before an ensuing publication is made to the War

Department0 not all chapters are written in chronological sequence of the devel~

praent of the ventso The pages are continuously numbered,, corresponding to the

progress of the work in rough drafto S<> it must be explained also that the Pre~

fa*, which only came later some time after the beginning of the work 0 was put

in the draft* but from pageis $m 57.to 59 (pages 206 to 2l4 in draft text)*

At this.--$oint it must also be stated that Lt Colonel Skorzeny and Major

Radl are both the only persons who are truly acquainted with even the most detail

@d parts since they9ve personally gone along with this work froai the preliminary

work of the.-news, release through the plan itself

As one ojf.. the individuals who was in on the beginning of the plan 0 there is

still the matter of General Student, as he was informed by the Fuehrer himself ,9

II. is absolutely the only expert on the joint development9 at least in so far as

the XI Air. ..Force is sheeted with ito Concerning the preliminary work$ which

had to. d with it 0 fee is less informed sin@ he was'eonfid*d in by us only as to

the results of the aain points

Als@ toward the beginning of the work - pages 10-11 (pages 27-28 of ri~

ginal draft) . it e s mentioned that also the commander ~in~<ghief, South9 at that tijfe

Field Marshal General, von.Kesselringg wasn't dared to be made knowledgeable<>' The

disadvantages that aecrued to us because of this* that the highest military

positions had to be put out of circuit9 were self^evidneto But even for these

positions th@iaa@lves? these facts had disagreeable situations as consequences*.

So it must also be stated that on the same day &s we freed Mussolini from Gran

Sass^ and in&eed with troops which the Commander~in~Chief South held - and sent

forth by the tame Comaiander-in-Chief* relative to his service post0 a radio mes

sage to the-troops in Sardinia, (at. that time the first evacuation of troops of

the German-.Army frea Sardinia had begtasa)9 immediately requested that the Italian-

held Dues in Maddalena be set free by the German troops*

In spits of the very small circle of knowledgeable persons9 there have been

many wh have written about, this chapter in political and war writingso At times

ailed for5 at-others usaealled foro Therefore* there exist very many incorrect-

ions and very many untruths* There .-is no reasone as it is firaly established

for this rough draft not to be considered as the only completely authentic

of all tfae details of the Mussolini operationo

1st Lt.. Hadl had written a fev/ days after 12 September 19^3 0 still by pure

a detailed report for publication to the Fuehrer^ which we then revised

and provided-a eojy of it to-Adolf Hitler under my signaturea The report was

completed .-in. three copies One of.. these goes to-the Fuehrer (it also is to be

included in the icts pfthe Fuehrer8s headquarters0 the Army General Staff and in

histories of Hitler9 headquarters This precaution was taken to protect the

copies9 of whieh this work is almost a duplicate) The second copy goes to

General Stwl@nt at the XI Air Force $ the third stays in ray possession 9 was

 H 75S3 92

through an order of ay General ^taff and was destroyed for security

reasons in the days of the breaking up of the R@ich Even Mussolini has

his story in the press , and this was in a long interview with some Spanish newsps*

per* whieh then brought out a series of articles on it ilis portrayal didnt

correspond In all points to the actual facts9 since he had changed,things which

h hadnt.. experienced himself but knew only from hearsay? This hearsay9 together

with his own experience and meaning* di&nH give an exactly true picture which

'described his downfall in the abcve^raentioned news article

Early JUa^October 19^3 there appeared in the "Illustrated Observer"9 the

-official illustrated party paper, a series of artieles with pictures9 forwarded

by the war correspondent $ Lt von Kayser* In this account9 the sequence of events

were pictured in snh a misrepresented fashion that I was obliged to - lodge tha

sharpest protest to the authoritative offices against a consciously notod false

historical report

So Lto Kayser finished it off by showing in the first article covering the

entire frost"pagea a huge picture of the heads of tha Duce 9 Major Mors and 1st Lto

Sehulzo. This picture aras taken just before the departure time of the cable car

up on the oo'untain whan I introduced Major Mors - at his special request - to the

Unee (See report*, y>ag 89)0 .Under.the picture stood the text 1 (approximately)

"A few iJiinutee afte? the liberation The Duee in conversation with hi libera

tor o-11. Kadi and I had thereupon^ on a radio broadcast which took place on the

evening'of ay protest over all the raajor German networks9. described the requested

iiifcroduction of !-3ors to TIuspollul and so at least attained.a true presentstiorjof

events in this way, (The records which were made of our radio sending are per

haps a possible eqnparison which can be obtained by the Historical Division)*

3v& the-weekly filmed newscasts shown in theaters in Gernsany didnt show

the factso They were taken for the aost part one week after the Gran Sasso

operationo of the re-saining severely damaged gliders and for this purpose9 of

the sieobere of the yaratroop units As the s&rae Lt o Kayser took off with two

otherra-aiaberi;of'trie XI Lr Force9 to give cover to the msabers of ny unit and

to conceal this ^T'ollow-up Hoporting18, Radl w a s ^ n an adjoining room and was an

eye and ear witness of their conversations.. Even Marshall Badaglio had changed

his story of tho operation both officially and unofficially,* By thisfl according

to reliable reports0 he had maintained that I had bee.n in Italy -vith otror* a

thousand men hnd had spread a "Gestapo^ITet'1 over all of-. Italy with this groupo

The opposite is historically stated as a fact9 that ay unit9 which I meanwhile

could state say and write consisted of 49 aen e This can be proved iit any tiae

la all, th^re were 80 wen o& the aountairi station9 actioa~anxious soldiers

fco begin tie landing by gliders.*. From, thesee. altogc^Ser only the crew of the

thre aircraft as well as 30 mem survived the first phase f the operation*

Also, -2 crews, namely those of<aircrafts 3 and k* with 20 ian, successfully

ried out the .assault on the hotel* Cf these 20 tmn^ 1& men belonged to my unit5

<e> the pilots, were members .of the Air i:'orde<> All othx reported assertions

e/.ther errors or known, false hoods

from certain $&$&& of the subject a false report

 H 7563 * ,. -,

the loss - of' life and with it received heavy indignation of the German peopleo

and I were supposed even to have pretended to speak about the heavy losses

over the ra&io This could have been aeant to be only the report of the German

radio on 12 or 13 September 19^3 with words something like this? "Ooo-.a third

of the deployed men have fallen in the mountains or are missing; heavy losses

nnst therefore be .counted*o<"- This report has the following causes:

As I, at 1550 hours9 took off from Gran Sasso with the Duce 9 ther had ar

rived only 8 of the 12 gliders which had shared in the take-off from Pratica di

?1D.?@ airfield Of'.these9 I had personally seen one of them0 with ray own eyes,

crash into a/steep, rocky slope and break up o Since the mountain climbing -per

sonnel had not returned up to the tiae of my take-off9 I could not know if they

were knotfn to be dead for sureg although the possibility certainly was there*.

Exactly one third, of the aircraft were missinge I hadnt received any report

about their reiaaiiaing in Pratiea while I was in flight to Hitler's' field head

quarters*.' Later I received a truthful and exact rep6rt as to the situation after

r-iy take^oif namely % 1/3 had landed \ 1/3 had crashed or were missings and no

inforrasLtion- as to deaths or how many woundedo As it was later determined,, no one

had lost his life during- the loss of aircraft and no one knew whether the missing

aircraft had zsade emergency landings or perhaps h&da9t evaa gained altitude on

taking off - and this tooQ without loss of life? this information was also sent

. forward4 Just the same0 this fact was clearly announced in the master text writ"

ten-by Hadl* for which-I have counter signed as being also responsiblee '-E-hy no

correction followed on the. German radio9 I @annot judge

In no @as did I receive any kind of reproaches concerning this big sacrifice

either oftieially.r privately On the contrary,, I received thousands upon

thousands of congratulatory messages, gifts -. shared with the men-of the XI A.ir

Force.-. and requests for aufpgraphso

iioisr t4a.j.or IZarald MOSSfl too 0 had pretended to aiake a report of this operation

for his- "Fas&ly Chronicle o:" He had publicly brought out copies of this family

chronicle,and had endeavored to bring those to ihe Historical Division0 . The te^t

cf this report lsn-t eraetly known by 3adi and ?ae0

^?he !lChronlcle;f is easily distinguishable-in that it. does away with th

"personal'vanity .and the sickly - or morbid - arabifciojs -of 14a jor Mors to express

himself -7e both opposed giving approval of the detailso Sine ae had to count

n a copy of., the text o this : pamphlet'.la the Historical Division^ there is

$ indispensable position to be quoted which does honor to the truth<? There is

ly any spot in this paper which lsnt grossly nlsrcpros.ented9 falsified9

and tfor the aost part 9 pure inventiono

ThQ fact isfl above all9- that y-Jajor lor&9 on ths afternoon of 11 ;>eptember

1>V>9 also just 12 hours before his .take-off for the operation^ was let in on all

the details by me and given the definite order placing him in charge of the XI.

Air Foreeo Before this pointy he had no idea as to which plan had to do with the

liberating of Mussolinio Just the. saae 0 he eould either know or'guess whet

T
Atltfli" I itler had ordered General' Student and'me on 26o?o^3o T'oo9 he had,not

taken part in 9 for even one second9 in the notice of the coapjgted order9 in any

Sof the actual planning, discussions or suchq including the fira decision of his

I laareh route over Frassinpaeo After the action in the valley station, carried out

I according tfr*$le'arranged plan without hie cooperation^, and smoothly completed he

I had to wait in the valley station only for further directions from the mountain

I station*, whieh I then permitted to bare 1st Lt von Berlepach telephone fo him

I Then something-like 1 hour and 35 minutes laters after the ensuing delivernaee,

| - immediately upon tak-off0 he earn tip the mountain by the cable a? and was

1 introduced to the Due at his own personal request and this took, place in the

in front of the hotels asjthe Due was OJG his way to the Storeh aircrafte

The following pages give brief extracts out of this paper and in parentheses

after these appear Radls and my comments or referen@eso

ooo written by the bat&llion colander <, as the responsible leader.-of the

action at that time*<of' (Mo was not, the commander9 but was charged with the eom=

isand during the illness of the comstander of the Special Batalliono .Responsible

leader pure .inventiono)' . ,

"oo General Student <> at his request <> from the SS leader and head of the

German police9- Keinrich Himmler9 a coooando unit made up of specialists -in'track

ing under the leadership of Group Leader Skrsenyo.Vp

C^o knew absolutely nothing of the events in Hitler*s-field headquarters on.

26o7o43o General student had definitely given a orders to the 53 Chiefo .Hy .

fighter, ba'tallion* of which I was the commander0 was a purely 35-weapons unit as

well as branch f the armed services Rone of these soldiers were members of the

Gestapoo the criminal police or of the SB or of any other "specialists ia track

ing", unitso Only my adjutant had formerly belonged to the BorderPolice (Pass

. uooo when General Student ordered me before hia toward 15 hours and gave me

&h@ order that without delays and immediately <, without digression^ to bring the

Duee down from the Gran Sass the next morning at 7s15 hours 0 and "dead or alive

to bring him to Romeooo.oo Student suggested that with 2 companiesoo oo to land

with paratroops. eOleft me .-still some tiae to think things over for making joy own

suggestionoooot0'(pure, fietibn'a absoulte fraud)o

"oo after examination of the available laaps aerial photographs - and

reconnaissance materials, 'I'made the following estimate of the situaticfioo.oooo'8

(pur invention^ Mo 'had absolutely no'criticism to give:but preparations for

carrying out the already. decided upon'and knovrh^to-hiai orders,, He had never seen

aerial photographs'and reeonnaissan matrial o )

rt

odo when"! first ras able to pl&c the Buee ii&a^diately under guard? se

ondly*. if my batallion was strong enough to break up all resistance (opposition)

with ara&^d forceo< e.f*. (freely devised and boastfulo In Aquila9 there afas located

an'-Italian division? "Altogether at one time* these wreat strong enough? only

sould-the action be carried outo)

3koraeny9 whose mission was concluded' with the reconnaissance of

'8 l@atln<, requested the General for permission to take part in. the ;

operation and take soa@ people along aoO' was-attached t aie0 his 17 aes assigned

&s reinforcements t 1st Lt von Berlepslu ooa but Skorseny was to escort the Bus

 the aircraft to the Fuehrerg which reduced the value on my part of the urgent

ly needed paratroop offierooo ,* (a shameless falsification<>)

, the original planQ the wide roads over Tivoli to Pescaraooo I had to

at the last saoraentooe I had received information at the right time froaa

> street oiabat thereo<> German garrisons for the most part aptur& 000

Italian tanks drove" through the cityoo people in open revoltooo I.determinedoOOe

quite a detour.ooooe"' (All plainly made up o Detour had already been set exactly

*in'the plan btg@aus this ja$ was safero See pages ' 7 ^ 7 6 ) o

'oc*o the' ountrysi&a teemed with the demobilised and escaped*oo Italian

soldiersooe and also sev@!QJa thousand Anglo-American war prisonersQ who had re

grained their freedomQ' loafed in the Neighborhood around hereoo.e" (can only

be labeled as an halucination)'o

.f'r>;w* .t teew only in part about the landing of the gliddrs0o*o less than

100 steters away from the valley station*, o<> observed this****." (Observation

-frba the valley station was/at all possible) . '

?
'oooo I drove at high speed to the valley stationoo'*oo got into the abl

with 20 .'hastily lleeted men of ay; staff ooo* assembled some 25 minutes after

, o o o the St@2--eh (FI-1%) had just sad a difficult landing maneuver

-o o o o a r> o .
o Completely Imaginary or falsified 1) hy personnel ''hastily oH~

U " where things were already settled"? 2.) Gable car holds only 1012 pers

3) 1 h e w 35 minutes after the landing^ not 25 minuteso; k) Storeh had al

ready landed 1)4 hours ag! 0 o)

".iooo ths paratroopers were out of the arieraft in split second

the assigned men were diffused in the building0 captured the unsuspecting

dor''guards . in front, of the Duees room and freed, the unsuspecting captives Oo.

because of the noise he was cautiously.approaching the windowfooooo" ( 1) these

were the flight (grew of "3 .md-.*k9 also of ay unito 2)"I forced ay: way intd'

- hotel'togG.ther with my offieerfi Lt Sehwerdto 3) there was absolutely no eorri

guard thereforeq also no .one unmsspe ting - before''the Ducee door h)

was .already, at the, window when 2 was still in v.ox-ot the hot elo I had

even Galled to him to step SLway0 which he dido As I stepped into the roosi as

the first.-persona- lie was definitely at the- door and awaited our entraneeo)

(See page f!&)o .

"oooo I presented myself to Mussolini as the responsible representative of

the Fuehrer is .this operation-and'asjbhe cojiaandero-o* whereupon-we talkedo.o

the Du@ aaked ae not to hold captive the approximate SO^man strong ^uard force

if
o(1.,oftS h@ n^svered ay requests P@ with me what you &ille* ooooo" (all

plete . fietip:io Sheer falsehoodo' see'page 89o Ifejor Mors had, in the e

12 Septeiaber 4 j 9 in Assergi9 requested 1st Lt 3?adl to tell him how the action

was progrs;ing and was very interested in the detailso Radl had readily a~

iplished ihia re^uestp .Ma^r Mors eant bring home the point here that he ha

lie xiivj exQctly9 through -Radio how the action ran off,, and so its a

matter of 7>ure falsification hero o ) "oooo that just then my batallion had

o o o o o

had aeeoaitanied. t in those"' days oo' dlep tou.^h of luk for a few.minutes to b
 COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KS

G O eoacerned with world ewntSo O o 9 o f f (no comment)

r9

o <><?<> a the .agitation of German mothers waQnt long to bfc expected following

a stupid''saission of their sons (based on my supposed false reporting of

.losseso Author-0s st@so)oo specially no one in Ger&smy was ready to essentially

be the sacrifice "of German bl@od for an Italian* be it the Chief of State hira

self 9o ,o" .(compare middle of page 95 to the end; otherwiseQ no commento)

a.oeo.o. begak the'campaign.'of afyoooo that the-. Fuehreroeo sent from Group

Xeador SkorzAny to the SS-leader,, to bestow on him the Knight s Cross of the Xr&>

Cross (Skorze'ny didnt even'have the Iron Cross II) and marked hlmQ by thia 0 as

the hero of the missionaoo of0 (no comment\ only fjL @oxsf irmation of the

f8
S!torseny'wore the Iron Cross II since 19^1) oooo I had .to lay down

apprehension ot a Michael Kohlhas nowad&ys ^ould result in liqulda

offhand aeansooooo'5 Cno comoients)o

Is 1 hadnt ever thought of itoo 0 0 that it could bring tm the

9
Knight s .Cros8*oooooo my. officers and soldiers thought otherwise0ooo To them it

was completely clear.that the responsibility for carrying out the mission lay

with aie0 and 'exclusively with aeSooo and that I would also have to carry, the

effects'of the mission^ooo So my soldisrs eouldooo wh held their eom<aander so

highlyo oo not get v.er the .insult0 whish lay her^ 0 that the fGuestft of the &?> ha

received..the Knight Cross and their ecsusanderooV-. only a lowly commendation

ts
thereoft>], o o o, after -the paradeooo argumentsoo. to appease the "boiling soldiers0

Significant and'unusual war events were always carried out with dangerq and

weakened or distorted through better knowledge,, ritieism or envy without knowl

edge of the true factso' .

This work was unfortunately only in draft based on pure factso It was

attemptedo through insertion of details and episodes to work out all contexts

for this historical writing in a clearly recognisable mannerA

We., thank the personnel of tat BUC0M-HIST03ICAL DIVISION wh have 9 in such a

-generous,wayo given us the opportunity to.present an historical9 truly factual

description ,of this portion of '-"orld "'ar 3EI>

/a/ Oipl.o Xngo von Skorseny

/&/ Karl^ladl
formerly Reserves