Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
_______
In the
Supreme Court of the United States
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Takings Clause permits a state to
statutorily redefine an entire coastline of privately
owned dry beach parcels as a public trust area open
for public use, without just compensation?
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTION PRESENTED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI . . . . . . . . 1
OPINIONS BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AT ISSUE . . . . 2
STATUTES AT ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. The Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
B. The Nies Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1. The Nature and Scope of
the Nies Beachfront Lot . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2. The Towns Initial Attempt
To Take the Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
C. The Town Passes Ordinances
Declaring Private Dry Beaches
To Be Public Trust Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1. The Town Authorizes
Public Driving on Private
Dry Beach Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2. The Town Imposes a
Twenty-Foot Town Vehicle
Lane on the Nies Property . . . . . . . . 12
D. Procedural Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued
Page
1. The Initial Suit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2. The Appellate Court Decision . . . . . . 14
a. The Appellate Court Holds
That N.C.G.S. 77-20 Imposes
the Public Trust Doctrine and
Related Public Use Rights on
Privately Owned Dry Beaches . . 15
b. The Appellate Court Concludes
That the Town Did Not
Unconstitutionally Take the
Nies Dry Beach Property in
Permitting Public and
Government Use of the Land . . . 17
c. The North Carolina Supreme
Court Grants Review and Then
Dismisses the Case Without
Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT . . . . . . . 19
I. THE DECISION BELOW RAISES
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUES OF
FAR-REACHING AND CRITICAL
IMPORTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
A. The Decision Below Suddenly and
Drastically Eviscerates the Property
Rights of Thousands of North Carolina
Dry Beach Owners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued
Page
1. Under State Common Law,
Private Dry Beaches Have Never
Been Subject to Public Trust Uses . . 21
2. Under the Decision Below,
N.C.G.S. 77-20 Destroys
Common Law Property Rights
So As To Create Public Trust
Rights on Private Beaches . . . . . . . . . 22
II. THE LOWER COURTS CONCLUSION
THAT N.C.G.S. 77-20 IS NOT A
TAKING CONFLICTS WITH THIS
COURTS PRECEDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
A. The Lower Courts Decision
That N.C.G.S. 77-20 Is Not a
Physical Taking Conflicts with
This Courts Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1. Physical Takings Law . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2. N.C.G.S. 77-20 Is a
Physical Taking under Nollan
and Related Precedent . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
B. The Decision Below Conflicts
with Takings Cases Limiting
the Legislative Redefinition of
Common Law Property Rights . . . . . . . . 30
III. THE LOWER COURTS DECISION THAT
N.C.G.S. 77-20 IS NOT A TAKING
CONFLICTS WITH THE DECISIONS
OF OTHER COASTAL STATES . . . . . . . . . . 32
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
v
TABLE OF CONTENTSContinued
Page
APPENDIX
Decision, Court of Appeals of North Carolina,
filed Nov. 17, 2015 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-1
Order, Supreme Court of North Carolina,
filed Dec. 14, 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . B-1
Order, State of North Carolina,
County of Carteret Superior Court,
filed Aug. 26, 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C-1
vi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168 (Me. 1989) . . . 34
Borax Consolidated v. City of Los Angeles,
296 U.S. 10 (1935) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Carolina Beach Fishing Pier, Inc. v.
Town of Carolina Beach,
177 S.E.2d 513 (N.C. 1970) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8, 21
Cooper v. United States,
779 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.C. 1991) . . . . . . . . . 6, 21
Dickinson v. Pake,
201 S.E.2d 897 (N.C. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Dolan v. City of Tigard,
512 U.S. 374 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Fabrikant v. Currituck County,
621 S.E.2d 19 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) . . . . . . . 15, 24
Friends of Hatteras Island Natl Historic
Maritime Forest Land Trust for Pres. v.
Coastal Res. Commn,
452 S.E.2d 337 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) . . . . . . . . . 15
Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58 (Mich. 2005) . . . . . 7
Gwathmey v. State Through Dept of Envt,
Health, & Nat. Res. Through Cobey,
464 S.E.2d 674 (N.C. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . 4, 6, 21, 31
Hildebrand v. S. Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
14 S.E.2d 252 (N.C. 1941) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois,
146 U.S. 387 (1892) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 6
vii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued
Page
Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 164 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 28
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc.,
544 U.S. 528 (2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) . . . . . . . . . 27-28
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division v.
Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Metcalf v. Black Dog Realty, LLC,
684 S.E.2d 709 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . 9
Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle,
780 S.E.2d 187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . 1
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Commn,
483 U.S. 825 (1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27-29, 34
Opinion of the Justices,
313 N.E.2d 561 (Mass. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,
484 U.S. 469 (1988) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 32
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
524 U.S. 156 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30-31
Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1 (1990) . . . . . . . . . . . 29
viii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued
Page
Purdie v. Attorney General,
732 A.2d 442 (N.H. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33-34
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head,
724 F.3d 533 (4th Cir. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Severance v. Patterson,
370 S.W.3d 705 (Tex. 2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) . . . . . . . . 21-22
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,
510 U.S. 1207 (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept of Environmental
Protection, 560 U.S. 702 (2010) . . . . . . . 25, 30-31
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State
Lands Commn, 466 U.S. 198 (1984) . . . . . . . . . 26
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,
535 U.S. 302 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Webbs Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980) . . . . . . . . . 5, 30, 34
West v. Slick,
326 S.E.2d 601 (N.C. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8-9, 21
Winder v. Blake,
49 N.C. (4 Jones) 332 (1857) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Constitution
U.S. Const. amend. V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2
ix
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued
Page
Statutes
28 U.S.C. 1331 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
42 U.S.C. 1983 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
N.C.G.S. 77-20(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 8
77-20(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3, 23
77-20(e) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-3
Town Code 5-1 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5-1 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
5-19 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5-19(a) (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
5-19(b) (2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
5-21(a) (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5-60 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
5-61 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11-12
5-60 - 5-66 (2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5-102(a) (2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Miscellaneous
3 Powell, Richard R.,
Powell on Real Property (1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Archer, Jack H. & Stone, Terrance W.,
The Interaction of the Public Trust
Doctrine and the Takings Doctrines:
Protecting Wetlands and Critical Coastal
Areas, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 81 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
x
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued
Page
Bederman, David J., The Curious Resurrection
of Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings,
96 Colum. L. Rev. 1375 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Callies, David L. & Breemer, J. David, Selected
Legal and Policy Trends in Takings Law:
Background Principles, Custom and Public
Trust Exceptions and the (Mis) Use of
Investment-Backed Expectations,
36 Val. U. L. Rev. 339 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Echeverria, John D., The Public Trust Doctrine as
a Background Principles Defense in Takings
Litigation, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 931 (2012) . . . 30
Kalo, Joseph J. & Schiavinato, Lisa, Customary
Right of Use: Potential Impacts of Current
Litigation to Public Use of North Carolinas
Beaches, 6 Sea Grant L. & Poly J. 26 (2014) . . . 20
Kalo, Joseph J., The Changing Face
of the Shoreline: Public and Private
Rights to the Natural and Nourished
Dry Sand Beaches of North Carolina,
78 N.C. L. Rev. 1869 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 23
Morris, Sean T., Taking Stock in the Public
Trust Doctrine: Can States Provide for
Public Beach Access Without Running Afoul
of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence?,
52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1015 (2003) . . . . . . . . . . 29-30
xi
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESContinued
Page
NOAA Office for Coastal Mgmt.,
Shoreline Mileage Of the United States,
https://coast.noaa.gov/data/docs/
states/shorelines.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Pagano, Celeste, Wheres the Beach?
Coastal Access in the Age of Rising Tides,
42 Sw. L. Rev. 1 (2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Rasband, James R., Equitable Compensation
for Public Trust Takings,
69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 331 (1998) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1
OPINIONS BELOW
The published opinion of the North Carolina
Court of Appeals issued on November 17, 2015. It is
available at Nies v. Town of Emerald Isle, 780 S.E.2d
187 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). The opinion is attached here
as Appendix A.
The North Carolina Supreme Court issued its
order dismissing the Nies appeal from the lower court
judgment on December 14, 2016.1 It is attached as
Appendix B. The order of the North Carolina Superior
Court, Carteret County, is attached as Appendix C.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
1331, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution.
1
On February 15, 2017, the Chief Justice granted Petitioners
application to extend the time to file this Petition to, and
including, April 28, 2017.
2
CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS AT ISSUE
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides: [N]or shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
STATUTES AT ISSUE
North Carolina General Statutes 77-20(d) & (e)
states:
(d) The public having made frequent,
uninterrupted, and unobstructed use of the
full width and breadth of the ocean beaches
of this State from time immemorial, this
section shall not be construed to impair the
right of the people to the customary free use
and enjoyment of the ocean beaches, which
rights remain reserved to the people of this
State under the common law and are a part
of the common heritage of the State
recognized by Article XIV, Section 5 of the
Constitution of North Carolina. These public
trust rights in the ocean beaches are
established in the common law as
interpreted and applied by the courts of this
State.
(e) . . . [O]cean beaches means the area
adjacent to the ocean and ocean inlets that is
subject to public trust rights. This area is in
constant flux due to the action of wind,
waves, tides, and storms and includes the
wet sand area of the beach that is subject to
3
INTRODUCTION
This case raises an important Takings Clause
issue concerning whether a state, here North Carolina,
can legislatively classify an entire coastline of private
dry beach parcels as a public trust area subject to
public and government access, without paying just
compensation. The North Carolina courts concluded
that North Carolina could, and in fact, did so under
N.C.G.S. 77-20(d) & (e).2 See Pet. App. A-14 to A-19.
The state court held that N.C.G.S. 77-20 extends the
public trust doctrine to privately owned dry beach
lands, id. at A-14 to A-22, in derogation of a common
law tradition limits the public trust doctrine to the
state-owned wet beach. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892) (explaining that a
states title to tidelands is held in trust for the
people of the state for fishing, navigation and
commerce). In so doing, the statute has taken private
2
For brevity, Petitioners will refer to N.C.G.S. 77-20(d) & (e) as
simply N.C.G.S. 77-20 throughout this Petition.
4
4
Glass v. Goeckel, 703 N.W.2d 58, 68 (Mich. 2005) (In applying
the public trust doctrine to the oceans, courts have traditionally
held that rights . . . extend from the waters themselves and the
lands beneath them to a point on the shore called the ordinary
high water mark.); see also Celeste Pagano, Wheres the Beach?
Coastal Access in the Age of Rising Tides, 42 Sw. L. Rev. 1, 10
(2012) (explaining that most states recognize the public trust to
the mean high water mark, some limit it to moreseaward low
water mark, and that New Jersey alone applies the public trust
doctrine to so-called dry beach above the high tide line).
8
5
The lower court suggested the Nies conceded dry beach driving
lawfully existed at the time of purchase. Pet. App. A-6 to A-8. This
is false. The Nies unrebutted record testimony showed that no dry
sand driving occurred at the time of, or in the immediate years
after, their purchase of the property. (R pp 245-248.)
6
The foreshore is a term that refers, under state law, to the area
of beach lying between open water and the mean high water mark.
See West, 326 S.E.2d at 617.
7
The lower courts statement that the record does not contain the
[pre-2001 (1980)] Carteret County Beach Vehicular Ordinance is
not true. Pet. App. A-5. The ordinance is in the Record on Appeal
at page 526. The courts statement that a later (2004) Ordinance
allowing driving primarily on hardpacked sand accurately
reflects the defined permitted driving area from the time Plaintiffs
purchased the Property in June of 2001 is also wrong. Pet. App.
A-5 to A-6.
8
As in other states, people can acquire access to particular tracts
of private property by proving the existence of a prescriptive
(adverse possession) easement the land. This is a fact issue, in
which the claimant bears the burden to prove that all the factual
elements of prescription are present. West, 326 S.E.2d at 610-11.
Prescriptive easements, by their nature, can be utilized only on
a tract-by-tract basis, and thus cannot be applied to all beaches
within a state. 3 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property
34.11[6], at 34-171 (1994). Individual tracts may also be
dedicated to the public upon judicial proof of the elements of a
dedication. Metcalf v. Black Dog Realty, LLC, 684 S.E.2d 709, 723
(N.C. Ct. App. 2009). The Town neither pled or argued these
(continued...)
10
8
(...continued)
doctrines with respect to the Nies property or any other dry beach
lands.
11
9
The relevant law states: the public trust beach area, [] defined
by G.S. 77-20, and includes all land and water area between
the Atlantic Ocean and the base of the frontal dunes. Town Code
5-1.
12
10
The court noted that public trust rights are those rights held
in trust by the State for the use and benefit of the people of the
State in common. . . . They include, but are not limited to, the
right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish and enjoy all recreational
activities in the watercourses of the State and the right to freely
use and enjoy the States ocean and estuarine beaches . . . . Pet.
App. A-11 to A-12 (quoting Friends of Hatteras Island Natl
Historic Maritime Forest Land Trust for Pres. v. Coastal Res.
Commn, 452 S.E.2d 337, 348 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995)).
16
11
The court below also referred briefly to public consciousness,
to what the majority of North Carolinians understand as a public
beach, and to the Nies out-of-state origin, in recognizing public
trust rights on private dry beaches. Pet. App. A-19. Of course,
since neither naked (purported) public opinion or parochialism are
a source of state property law, the courts decision necessarily and
explicitly rests on N.C.G.S. 77-20. Id. at A-19 to A-21.
17
I
THE DECISION BELOW RAISES
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS ISSUES
OF FAR-REACHING AND
CRITICAL IMPORTANCE
A. The Decision Below Suddenly
and Drastically Eviscerates the
Property Rights of Thousands of
North Carolina Dry Beach Owners
As the following shows, N.C.G.S. 77-20
jettisoned a standard, established common law
framework under which the public trust doctrine
applies to tidelands below the mean high water mark,
so as to subject all private dry beaches to public and
government access. In denying that the owners have a
constitutional right to compensation, the decision
below dramatically and unfairly effects a great transfer
of real property from private to public hands. These are
highly important developments that will effect the
nature and status of the coastline now and in the
future. Joseph J. Kalo & Lisa Schiavinato, Customary
Right of Use: Potential Impacts of Current Litigation to
Public Use of North Carolinas Beaches, 6 Sea Grant L.
& Poly J. 26, 52 (2014) (Whether the public has the
. . . right to use the States dry sand beaches and, if
that right exists, how will that affect the rights of
oceanfront property owners[,] are critical questions
that will shape the character and economy of coastal
North Carolina.).
21
13
In the state appellate proceedings, the Town and certain amici
occasionally referred to the English doctrine of customary law as
a potential source of inherent public rights in dry beaches. See
generally, David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of
Custom: Beach Access and Judicial Takings, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
1375 (1996). The North Carolina Supreme Court has, however,
specifically rejected customary law as a source of state property
rules. Winder v. Blake, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 332 (1857). Moreover, the
Town declined to raise customary law as a defense in the trial
court, (R pp 116-117, 119), or to argue it in the appellate court,
and the decision below did not rely on custom; it relied on N.C.G.S.
77-20.
23
14
See supra, footnote 8.
15
The Town has pointed out that people have been on and around
the North Carolina shore for a long time. But the presence of
people does not create public rights under the public trust
doctrine. Such rights flow exclusively from the States title to
tidelands. Indeed, a mere public presence cannot even create an
easement by prescription. Dickinson v. Pake, 201 S.E.2d 897, 900
(N.C. 1974) (public use of private land is presumed to be
permissive or with the owners consent and does not alone create
rights).
16
The text of the law states: public trust rights in the ocean
beaches are established in the common law as interpreted and
applied by the courts of this State. N.C.G.S. 77-20(d) (emphasis
added).
24
17
In the past, local coastal governments have used eminent
domain proceedings to acquire access to private dry beaches for re-
nourishment of adjacent state beaches, providing due process and,
potentially, compensation to affected owners. This is now unlikely
to occur, as N.C.G.S. 77-20 secures the desired government
access to private dry beaches by legislative fiat.
18
In Emerald Isle, site of the Nies property, the Town permits the
public to engage in the following activities on public trust areas:
vehicle parking and driving, public alcohol consumption, and
horseback riding. It decides when and under what conditions such
activities may occur. Town Code 5-60 - 5-66. Conversely, the
Town code bars people, such as property owners, from selling
anything on public trust lands. Town Code 5-21(a). It bars
owners from leaving personal property on the public trust land
they own. See Town Code 5-19.
25
19
Because of its centrality to the concept of private property, the
right to exclude strangers is itself a fundamental property right
that may not be destroyed without compensation. Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 180.
26
20
Commentators have long noted that the interaction between the
public trust doctrine and the Takings Clause in the coastal
property rights context raises important and controversial issues.
See David L. Callies & J. David Breemer, Selected Legal and
Policy Trends in Takings Law: Background Principles, Custom
and Public Trust Exceptions and the (Mis) Use of
Investment-Backed Expectations, 36 Val. U. L. Rev. 339 (2002);
Sean T. Morris, Taking Stock in the Public Trust Doctrine: Can
States Provide for Public Beach Access Without Running Afoul of
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence?, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1015
(continued...)
30
20
(...continued)
(2003); James R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public
Trust Takings, 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 331 (1998); John D. Echeverria,
The Public Trust Doctrine as a Background Principles Defense in
Takings Litigation, 45 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 931 (2012); Jack H.
Archer & Terrance W. Stone, The Interaction of the Public Trust
Doctrine and the Takings Doctrines: Protecting Wetlands and
Critical Coastal Areas, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 81 (1995).
31
21
Although states may generally have power to define the scope
public trust rights in tidal areas acquired at statehood, Phillips,
484 U.S. at 484, this Court has never held that states may expand
the geographic reach of the public trust doctrine from tidelands
acquired at statehood to private inland areas, without paying just
compensation.
22
The case should then be remanded to the state courts to
reconsider whether the Towns actions against the Nies property
cause a taking warranting compensation.
33
23
See also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 176-78 (Me. 1989)
(a statute expanding the nature of permitted public trust rights on
private shore lands caused a taking).
35
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be
granted.
DATED: April, 2017.
Respectfully submitted,
KEITH P. ANTHONY J. DAVID BREEMER
Of Counsel Counsel of Record
Morningstar Law Group Pacific Legal Foundation
630 Davis Drive, Suite 200 930 G Street
Morrisville, N.C. 27560 Sacramento, CA 95814
Telephone: (919) 590-0385 Telephone: (916) 419-7111
E-mail: kanthony@morning Facsimile: (916) 419-7747
starlawgroup.com E-mail: jdb@pacificlegal.org
Counsel for Petitioners
Appendix A1
I.
Generally speaking, state law defines property
interests[.] Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v.
Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection, 560 U.S.
702, 707-08, 177 L. Ed. 2d 184, 192 (2010) (citations
omitted). North Carolinas ocean beaches are made up
of different sections, the delineation of which are
important to our decision. Fabrikant v. Currituck Cty.,
174 N.C. App. 30, 33, 621 S.E.2d 19, 22 (2005). The
foreshore, or wet sand beach, is the portion of the
beach covered and uncovered, diurnally, by the regular
movement of the tides. Id. The landward boundary of
the foreshore is the mean high water mark. Mean
high water mark is not defined by statute in North
Carolina, but our Supreme Court has cited to a
decision of the United States Supreme Court in
discussing the meaning of the mean or average
high-tide. Fishing Pier, Inc. v. Town of Carolina
Beach, 277 N.C. 297, 303, 177 S.E.2d 513, 516 (1970).
The United States Supreme Court decision cited by
Fishing Pier defined mean high tide as the average of
all high tides over a period of 18.6 years. Borax Consol.
v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27, 80 L. Ed. 9,
20 (1935).1
The dry sand beach is the portion of the beach
landward of the mean high water mark and continuing
to the high water mark of the storm tide. Fabrikant,
174 N.C. App. at 33, 621 S.E.2d at 22. The landward
boundary of the dry sand beach will generally be the
foot of the most seaward dunes, if dunes are present;
the regular natural vegetation line, if natural
1
This time period is used because there is a periodic variation
in the rise of water above sea level having a period of 18.6
years[.] Id.
Appendix A3
II.
Plaintiffs sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
the Town because the contested ordinances effected a
taking of the Property in violation of the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In support of their
argument, Plaintiffs contend that the dry sand ocean
beach portion of their property is not subject to public
trust rights.
Summary judgment is appropriate when
the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. N.C.G.S.
1A1, Rule 56(c) (2013). We review de novo
an order granting summary judgment.
Falk v. Fannie Mae, 367 N.C. 594, 599, 766 S.E.2d 271,
275 (2014) (citation omitted). We affirm the ruling of
the trial court.
III.
Plaintiffs first argue that privately owned dry
sand beaches in North Carolina are not subject to the
public trust doctrine. We disagree.
Our Supreme Court has noted that the law
involving the public trust doctrine has been recognized
. . . as having become unnecessarily complex and at
times conflicting. Gwathmey v. State of North
Carolina, 342 N.C. 287, 311, 464 S.E.2d 674, 688
(1995). The public trust doctrine is a creation of
common law. Fabrikant, 174 N.C. App. at 41, 621
Appendix A10
2
Though the issue of historical right of public access to the dry
sand beaches was not fully argued below, and is not extensively
argued on appeal, it is unchallenged that the Town had allowed
public access on privately-owned dry sand beaches since its
incorporation. The statement of our General Assembly that the
public ha[s] made frequent, uninterrupted, and unobstructed use
of the full width and breadth of the ocean beaches of this State
from time immemorial, N.C. Gen. Stat. 77-20(d), is also
uncontested by Plaintiffs. See also N.C. Gen. Stat. 113A-134.1(b);
N.C. Gen. Stat. 146-6(f).
Appendix A18
A.
Plaintiffs cannot establish that the contested
beach driving ordinances4 constitute physical invasion
of the Property for purposes of the Takings Clause. The
majority of Plaintiffs argument is predicated on
Plaintiffs contention that the dry sand portion of the
Property is not encumbered by public trust rights. We
have held that the dry sand portion of the Property is
so encumbered. Because public beach driving across
the Property is permissible pursuant to public trust
rights, regulation of this behavior by the Town does not
constitute a taking.
Plaintiffs have never, since they purchased the
Property in 2001, had the right to exclude public
traffic, whether pedestrian or vehicular, from the
public trust dry sand beach portions of the Property.
The Town has the authority to both ensure public
access to its ocean beaches, and to impose appropriate
regulations pursuant to its police power. See
Fabrikant, 174 N.C. App. at 41, 621 S.E.2d at 27; see
also Kirby v. N.C. Dept of Transp., __ N.C. App. __, __,
769 S.E.2d 218, 230 (2015), disc. rev. allowed, __ N.C.
__, 775 S.E.2d 829 (2015); Slavin v. Town of Oak
Island, 160 N.C. App. 57, 584 S.E.2d 100 (2003). The
contested beach driving portions of the Ordinances do
not create a right of the public relative to the Property;
they regulate a right that the public already enjoyed.
See also, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. 160A-308 (2013) (A
municipality may by ordinance regulate, restrict and
prohibit the use of dune or beach buggies, jeeps,
motorcycles, cars, trucks, or any other form of power-
driven vehicle specified by the governing body of the
4
Sections 5-21 through 5-32 of the 2010 Ordinances, and Sections
5-1 and 5-60 through 5-64 of the 2013 Ordinances.
Appendix A24
5
We will analyze Section 5-19 of the 2013 Ordinances, but our
analysis applies to Section 5-102 of the 2010 Ordinances as well.
Appendix A26
14 December 2016
*********
ORDER
Appeal dismissed ex mero motu by order of the
Court in Conference, this the 14th day of December
2016.
s/ Ervin, J.
For the Court