Wright V Beck Answering Brief

Case: 16-55239, 04/19/2017, ID: 10403445, DktEntry: 22, Page 1 of 46
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Nos. 16-55239 & 16-55984

_____________________________
WAYNE WILLIAM WRIGHT

Plaintiff/Appellant
v.
CHARLES L. BECK, et al.,

Defendants/Appellees
_________________________________
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
(District Court Case No. CV 15-05805-R-PJW)
HONORABLE MANUEL REAL
ANSWERING BRIEF
OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES
MICHAEL N. FEUER, City Attorney

THOMAS H. PETERS, Chief Assistant City Attorney (SBN 163388)
GABRIEL S. DERMER, Assistant City Attorney (SBN 229424)
ERIC BROWN, Deputy City Attorney (SBN 170410)
200 North Main Street, Room 675
Los Angeles, California, 90012-4130
Telephone (213) 978-7559
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

CHARLES L. BECK, MICHAEL N. FEUER,
CITY OF LOS ANGELES; HEATHER AUBRY;
RICHARD TOMPKINS; and JAMES EDWARD
CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES
Interested entities or parties are listed below:
Name of Interested Entity or Person Nature of Interest

Wayne William Wright Plaintiff-Appellant
Charles L. Beck Defendant-Appellee
Michael N. Feuer Defendant-Appellee
Heather Aubry Defendant-Appellee
Richard Tompkins Defendant-Appellee
James Edwards Defendant-Appellee
City of Los Angeles Defendant-Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... ii
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ..1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 1
OUTCOME OF RELATED CASE ...... 4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 4
STANDARD OF REVIEW .. ....6
ARGUMENT 7
I. Wright omits pages from the Citys motion to dismiss which
are important to deciding the issues on appeal . 7
A. Wright conceals that the guidelines for deciding
a motion to dismiss were put before the
district court ........................................................................7
B. Wright omits the proper timeline of actions by the
criminal court and supports his argument with
an alternative timeline in which his conviction
was invalid . 10
II. The full record reveals that the district court properly
dismissed Wrights federal action. 11
A. Grounds for res judicata appeared both on the face of
Wrights pleading and from the documents which were
judicially noticeable 12
B. Other grounds for dismissing the action appeared both
on the face of Wrights pleading and from the documents
which were judicially noticeable......17
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Contd)
1. Heck v. Humphrey ...17

2. Various statutes of limitations......19
3. No facts pleaded inferred any individuals
liability......22
III. Wrights argument on implied findings relies on sophistry
rather than legal support or logic.....27
A. The entire argument is a red herring....27
B. Wright misapplies the doctrine.....29
IV. Wright cannot complain of supposed errors which he invited...30
V. The district court was within its discretion when it denied the
motion for indicative ruling....32
CONCLUSION..34
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES 37
BRIEF FORMAT CERTIFICATION ..38
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
Abreu v. Ramirez,
284 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (C.D. Cal. 2003) ................................................... 20
Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90 (1980)...15
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 176 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009)23
Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino,

501 U.S. 104 (1991)....................................................................................8
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544 (2007).23
Buller v. Buechler,
706 F.2d 844 (8th Cir.1983).26
City of LA v. Superior Court (Davenport),

96 Cal. App. 4th 255 (2002) .................................................................... 15
City of West Covina v. Perkins,

525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678, 142 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999).22
Deland v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co.,

758 F.2d 1331 (9th Cir. 1985).30
F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins,

869 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1989)..26
Garcia v. Superior Court (City of Santa Ana),

42 Cal. 4th 63 (2007)....16
Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994)18, 19
iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Contd)
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 2 v. Vista

Inn Management Co.,
393 F. Supp. 2d 972 (N.D. Cal. 2005) ........................................................8
Hudson v. Palmer,
468 U.S. 517 (1984)..24
Hudson v. Wylie,
242 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1957)30
Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co.,

881 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1989).7, 17
Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159 (1985).23
Lennefelt v. Cranston,
231 Cal. App. 2d 171 (1964)....30
Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors,

798 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1986) ....................................................................8
McCue v. S. Fork Union Elementary School,

766 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (E.D. Cal. 2011)..8
Medrano v. Caliber Homes Loans, Inc.,

2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177576 (C.D. Cal. 2014)....19
Morales v. City of Los Angeles,

214 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000)..19
Pearson v. Callahan,
555 U.S. 223 (2009).25
Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (H.

Coster Enterprises),
107 Cal. App. 3d 496 (1980) ................................................................... 16
Reynaga v. Monterey County District Attorney's Office,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31432 (N.D. Cal. 2014).14, 24
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Contd)
Reynolds v. Superior Court of County of Los Angeles,

64 Cal. 372 (1883)..16
Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

58 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1995)..7
Schick v. Lerner,
193 Cal. App. 3d 1321 (1987).25
Stevens v. Rifkin,
608 F. Supp. 710 (1984)..25
Trigeros v. Adams,
658 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2011).....7, 8
Statutes
28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1)...31
42 U.S.C. 198318
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 340 ........................................................................... 20
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1003...28, 30, 33

Cal. Govt Code 911.2(a)....21
Cal. Penal Code 3387522

Code of Civil Procedure 335.1. ............................................................. 20
Code of Civil Procedure 342...21
Code of Civil Procedure 1008.22
v
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Defendants/Appellees (hereinafter, collectively, the City)
agree with the statement of jurisdiction presented by Appellant Wayne
Wright (Wright).
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether a judicially-noticeable record of state court proceedings
allowed the district court the discretion to decide that Wrights
arguments for gun ownership had been heard and denied by the
criminal court.
2. Whether grounds in addition to res judicata appear in the record to
uphold the judgment of the lower court.
3. Whether the record of proceedings below provided the district court
with a basis for exercising its discretion on the side of denying
Wrights motion for indicative ruling.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Wright got the attention of LAPD officers at a gun show when he
bought, offered to buy, and offered to sell firearms illegally, all within
the earshot and plain view of the officers. Appellees Excerpts of Record
(AER) 24-30. Attention led to investigation, which resulted in Wright
illegally selling a rifle to an undercover officer, having 400 guns seized
from his properties pursuant to warrants, and receiving felony charges.
1
AER 33. Two years after his arrest, Wright pleaded guilty to one count of
illegal possession of an assault rifle. Id.
Wright claimed ownership of the guns seized but as to most of them,
he was never able to prove it. Wrights Excerpts of Record (ER) 106-
107,123-124, AER 34. The criminal court twice four years apart
reviewed his motions for return of the 400 guns, including his evidence
of ownership, and denied his requests. ER 110, 171-172. Nearly 10 years
after their seizure, the City obtained court permission to dispose of those
guns. ER 174-176.
Wright brought a federal case alleging that his civil rights were
violated when the guns were destroyed. His original pleading (Dkt. 1)
scarcely acknowledged that courts were involved in the gun seizure. The
pleading was 60 pages long but managed to use the word motion not even
once: the complaint mentioned the January 17, 2007 motion for return of
property hearing with wording that concealed its true nature (Dkt 1 37);
the pleading omitted the even more critical motion for return of property
hearing on September 29, 2011, instead offering the gloss that [i]n
September 2011, Plaintiff sought the release of his property and
requested that the property be released directly to him instead of to a
licensed firearm dealer, implying that this request had been made to the
LAPD directly instead of to the criminal court (Dkt 1 62).
2
But once again, Wrights shifty behavior got the Citys attention.
His complaints vague reference to court proceedings led to investigation,
which uncovered the long history of court involvement in the gun seizure
at issue here. That record led to the Citys motion to dismiss the initial
complaint (Dkt 18), which then resulted in a first amended complaint
with few real changes, and the new motion to dismiss at issue here. The
amended complaint was dismissed on December 14, 2015. ER 17.
Wright filed a motion for clarification under Rule 60 on January 11,
2016 but did not mention that he was blindsided by any argument the
City made on reply. Dkt. 29. Rule 60 also allows for reconsideration of a
ruling based upon fraud or surprise, which Wright now appears to be
arguing occurred during the motion to dismiss proceeding; however,
Wright made no such claim in the motion he brought just one month after
the dismissal.
Wright then filed a state court action on the theory that the judgment
obtained against him in the federal action was based on
misrepresentations made by the City in the criminal proceeding and in
the federal action. See Dkt 35-5. While the state action was pending,
Wright brought a motion in the federal action, requesting that the district
court find that the City had committed fraud during the 12(b)(6)
proceeding and that the Honorable Manuel Real had been misled by that
3
fraud. At no time while either action was pending did Wright go to the
criminal court and seek to augment or settle the record there. (He has
since done so. See Citys Outcome of Related Case, following this
section.)
Ultimately, Wrights post-dismissal federal court motion (for an
indicative ruling) was denied, and his state court action was dismissed by
way of an anti-SLAPP motion by the City. Wright now appeals dismissal
of the federal action and denial of his motion for an indicative ruling. (In
state court, he appeals the granting of the anti-SLAPP motion.)
OUTCOME OF RELATED CASE
Wright advised this Court that he had filed a new motion for return
of property, set to be heard originally on December 21, 2016 in Ventura
County case number 2005042520. The motion was opposed by the
Ventura County District Attorney on December 16, 2016.
The motion was heard on March 9, 2017, taken under submission,
and denied on April 5, 2017. The denial was by Judge Ryan Wright, who
issued the October 17, 2011 order discussed herein.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Wright wants to tell a narrative about an illegal seizure of guns that
had no justification, no due process, and no court involvement. His
original pleading (Dkt. 1) scarcely acknowledged that courts were
4
involved in the gun seizure issue. Most of Wrights no-court-involvement
narrative remained in the first amended complaint.
That narrative is exposed as fiction by the record of criminal court
proceedings which the district court judicially noticed. Wright put his
purported proof of ownership before the criminal court and that court did
not find it convincing. The district court looked at the criminal court
proceedings and correctly determined that Wright needed to show both
that the process he received somehow violated his rights and that he
exhausted his state remedies. He showed neither, and his federal action
was properly dismissed.
Wrights indignant assertions that a misapplication of the principle
of implied findings has led to the dismissal of his case is a misdirection.
The Citys first (and still primary) argument was that when Wrights
2011 motion for return of property is read in conjunction with the Citys
opposition, Wrights reply, and the criminal courts ruling, it is clear on
the face of that record that the criminal court ruled against Wrights
assertions and proof of ownership. When Wright opposed the motion to
dismiss, he made statements to the effect that nothing in the criminal
courts October 17, 2011 order could be construed as a ruling on any
guns other than the 26 explicitly mentioned in the order. The implied
findings principle then came up as the natural reply and refutation of that
5
erroneous construction of a court order. As a matter of law, whatever
findings are necessary to support the order attacked must be deemed to
have been made by the court which issued the ruling. It must be
presumed that the criminal court reviewed Wrights evidence and did not
find it convincing. However, we need not assume that the criminal court
reviewed and rejected Wrights evidence: the order itself says that the
court reviewed both Wrights motion and his opposition, and the ruling
was to not give him what he requested.
Without the implied findings distraction, the record shows that the
motion to dismiss was granted on proper ground. Other grounds argued
by the City could have been used to dismiss the action.
The motion for indicative ruling was also rightfully denied. That
motion was based on Wrights argument that he was defeated by the
Citys motion to dismiss only because the City misled the trial court. But
Wright did not lose the motion to dismiss because of fraud. He lost it
because the City properly led the district court to the record of
proceedings in the criminal court. The district court merely applied the
law to the record and properly denied the motion.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In addition to the standards of review articulated by Wright, the City
adds the following.
6
A court may take judicial notice a fact not subject to reasonable
dispute. Fed. R. Evid. 201. State court documents directly related to the
issues in the federal proceeding are a proper subject of judicial notice.
Trigeros v. Adams, 658 F.3d 938, 987 (9th Cir. 2011). Factual findings
made pursuant to a request for judicial notice are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 58 F.3d 454, 458 (9th Cir.
1995).
The Ninth Circuit may affirm on any grounds finding support in the
record. Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643 (9th
Cir. 1989).
ARGUMENT
I. Wright omits pages from the Citys motion to dismiss which

are important to deciding the issues on appeal.
Briefs generally are not included in excerpts of record, unless
necessary to the resolution of an issue on appeal, and shall include
only those pages necessary therefor. Cir. R. 30-1.5. Had Wright
adhered to that standard, he would have included pages 3 through 6 of
the Citys motion to dismiss.
A. Wright conceals that the guidelines for deciding a motion

to dismiss were put before the district court.
Wright leaves out of his excerpts of record the pages from the
Citys motion to dismiss which discussed the standards for deciding
7
that motion. The pages in question are included in the Citys excerpts
of record at AER 31- 32. The first paragraph of those standards cited
the principal that a court is not required to accept as true unsupported
conclusions and unwarranted inferences. Id.; see also McCue v. S.
Fork Union Elementary School, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (E.D.
Cal. 2011). The final paragraph of those standards cited the principle
that a court may take judicial notice of public matters without
converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment. AER 33; see also Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, 798
F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986) abrogated on unrelated ground
Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
110-113 (1991).
The Citys request for judicial notice (RJN), which Wright
includes in his excerpts (at ER 88-92) but does not acknowledge in his
brief, provided more pointed authority. The RJN cited Trigeros v.
Adams, 658 F.3d 938, 987 (9th Cir. 2011) for the proposition that a
court can take judicial notice of state court documents directly related
to matters at issue. ER 91. The RJN also sought judicial notice on the
grounds that the state court records were pertinent documents upon
which Wright relied when framing his pleading but failed to disclose.
Id. That grounds for judicial notice cited to, among other cases, Hotel
8
Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 2 v. Vista Inn
Management Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
Wrights opening brief refuses to acknowledge both these
authorities and the fact that the City and the district court were aware
of them. By doing so, Wright can pretend that the argument he makes
to this Court starting on page 32 of his brief has merit.
That argument claims that the district court made an improper
factual finding on a motion to dismiss. However, the better view
because it is the view actually supported by the record is that the
district court disregarded Wrights unsupported conclusions and
unwarranted inferences, after reviewing the court records whose
authenticity Wright never challenged. Wright filed an objection to
only two of the documents included in the RJN. Dkt 24. But even as
to those two, Wright did not dispute that the documents were what
they purported to be. The request for judicial notice of all of the
documents submitted by the City was unopposed and, as they were
court records, the fact of the proceedings that they represented was a
proper subject of judicial notice. Fed. R. Evid. 201. Those records
were pertinent to the Citys argument on the motion to dismiss that
Wright knew the criminal court rulings were problematic to his
claims, so he carefully pleaded a set of alternative facts in which his
9
harm occurred without court involvement. ER 83-84.
Wrights argument that the district court made an improper
finding of fact on a motion to dismiss is not only unsupported by the
record, it is affirmatively contradicted by it. The argument should be
disregarded.
B. Wright omits the proper timeline of actions by the

criminal court and supports his argument with an
alternative timeline in which his conviction was invalid.
Wright also leaves out of his excerpts of record the pages from
the Citys motion to dismiss which set out a straightforward timeline
of the events in the criminal court. The pages in question are included
in the Citys excerpts of record at AER 33-34 (Wright includes only
the last page of the timeline at ER 78). This inclusion is important to
clarify issues on appeal made murky by Wrights presentation of the
timeline. His timeline includes argument from his pleading such as
an attack on the validity of his prosecution and conviction
(Appellants Brief (AB) 3) and does not confine itself to events
which actually happened.
The City believes its timeline should have been included in the
record as a concise statement of events in the criminal proceeding.
The district court had this timeline before it to flesh out some of the
purposely obscured statements in the first amended complaint. See,
10
e.g., ER 256 at 52 (Wrights pleading leaving out the fact that he
put his evidence of purported ownership before the criminal court in
his second motion for return of property and, after reviewing that
evidence, the court denied his motion).
II. The full record reveals that the district court properly
dismissed Wrights federal action.
In the first amended complaint, Wright makes the following primary
allegations:
He was wrongfully targeted by the LAPD (ER 239-240);
He did not sell a firearm illegally to undercover officer James
Edwards (ER 240-241);
He was not doing anything wrong by having the assault rifle,
silencer, and grenade that the Ventura district attorney charged him
with possessing (ER 241; cf. ER 133);
The LAPD policy of requesting proof of ownership which the
criminal court apparently found persuasive when denying Wrights
motion for return of property, and with which Wright decided to
try to comply from 2007 through 2012 was illegal (ER 243); and
Having grown frustrated with the LAPDs delays over the last
four years, Wright brought his second motion for return of
property in September of 2011 (ER 256).
11
These allegations, and the remainder of the first amended complaint,
demonstrate both why it was proper to dismiss the action on the ground on
which the district court did so, and why it would have been proper to
dismiss it on any of several other available grounds.
A. Grounds for res judicata appeared both on the face of

Wrights pleading and from the documents which were
judicially noticeable.
The documents for which the City requested judicial notice (Dkt 21-
2 21-14) demonstrated that Wrights allegations had no basis in fact.
The request was inspired by the original complaints refusal to
acknowledge any court involvement in the gun seizure, and worked
equally well against Wrights implications in the amended complaint that
the guns were held by the LAPD without court authority. The warrant
application (Dkt 21-2) from which Wright excludes the affidavit which
explained why the LAPD conducted a sting on Wright (see ER 93-95 and
AER 24-30) countered Wrights unsupported conclusion (at ER 240)
that the LAPD did not observe any behavior at gun shows that would
lead them to believe Plaintiff was selling a large number of firearms such
that he might be properly considered an unlicensed dealer least of all a
gun trafficker to gangs and terrorists. The return to the warrant (Dkt 21-
3, the first page of which is included at AER 23) showed that the guns
seized were held pursuant to the authority of the Los Angeles Superior
12
Court, revealing Wrights claim that the Los Angeles Superior Court had
no authority over the firearms (ER 242) to be an unsupported conclusion.
The criminal court docket showed that Wright pled guilty to possessing
the assault rifle (Dkt 21-4 at 8, included at AER 12-22), and showed
Wrights dispute of that admitted fact (ER 241) to be yet another
unsupported conclusion.
The remaining judicially-noticeable documents established that the
state court made rulings which Wright could not simply ignore before
seeking relief from the federal courts. Wright received considerable due
process from the criminal court (Dkt 21-7 21-13), even though the
process did not result in victory for him. The issue in both motion for
return of property proceedings was whether Wright could establish
ownership of the guns. Wright himself made sure the issue was litigated
more fully in the second proceeding, when he submitted what he
considered his proof of ownership to the criminal court and sought the
courts ruling on that evidence. ER 136-168. As a counter to Wrights
evidence, the criminal court also had evidence from the LAPD of its
independent investigation of what guns Wright could be said to own, and
problems encountered in trying to attribute ownership of the remaining
guns to Wright. ER 123-126 and AER 7-9. With two evidentiary paths to
choose from or reject, the criminal court chose the one provided by the
13
City. ER 171-172. Thus, the gun ownership issue was squarely decided
against Wright. Then, long after the time for appealing the criminal court
ruling had expired, the Officer Edwards obtained permission to destroy
the firearms from the judge who had issued the search warrant and under
whose authority the firearms were retained. ER 174-176.
On such a record, the district court was correct to find that Wright
had not stated a federal claim. Wright presented his evidence of
ownership to the criminal court, and that court did not find his evidence
convincing. Now Wright was faced with the question of how to present
to the federal court a picture of the state court process not meeting the
constitutional minimum. Clearly, he decided he might pull off a win with
a pleaded narrative in which the LAPD operated without court sanction.
But once that narrative was shown to be false by the record of
proceedings in the criminal court, Wrights pleaded basis for federal
court involvement went away. See, e.g., Reynaga v. Monterey County
District Attorney's Office, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31432 (N.D. Cal.
2014) (refusal to return property lawfully seized does not constitute a
Fourth Amendment violation, and no Fifth Amendment claim lies where
state law remedies provide for post-deprivation relief). Dismissal of his
action was then proper: There is, in short, no reason to believe that
Congress intended to provide a person claiming a federal right an
14
unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already decided in state
court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he
would rather not have been engaged at all. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S.
90, 104 (1980).
One of Wrights primary arguments against the application of res
judicata both here (AB 18-20) and below (ER 75) is that the LAPD sued
on this appeal is not the same party to whom the motions were
directed. Factually, the parties are the same, which is why Wright sued
Tompkins and Edwards, who provided declarations in support of the
Citys oppositions to Wrights motions for return of property, and Aubry,
who filed the legal briefs opposing Wright. Wright even filed a reply to
the LAPDs opposition in 2011 and referred to the LAPD as the real
party in interest, suggesting that Wright actually understood the LAPD
to be a party to the motion proceeding and the ownership determinations.
ER 128-169. Legally, the parties are also the same. The LAPD can be
both the agency prosecuting a criminal defendant and, at the same
time, a different actor in the same case. See City of LA v. Superior Court
(Davenport), 96 Cal. App. 4th 255, 258, 263-264 (2002) (LAPD was both
the agency investigating the defendant and assisting the district attorney
in the prosecution, and the custodial agency maintaining peace officer
personnel records for non-prosecutorial purposes) disapproved on
15
unrelated ground Garcia v. Superior Court (City of Santa Ana), 42 Cal.
4th 63, 77 (2007).
But it is really immaterial who argued against Wrights motion for
return of property, the district attorney or the LAPD, concerning Wrights
failure to comply with the LAPD proof of ownership policy. Wright
acknowledged that the criminal court ordered that his property could not
be returned until he presented proof sufficient to satisfy the LAPDs
proof of ownership policy. ER 114. He could have argued against the
policy being a limitation at all, or he could have appealed the criminal
courts order that the LAPD policy be a hurdle which he had to pass. He
did neither. When he tried to get the criminal court to order that his
purported proof satisfied that policy and failed, the issue of his ownership
was decided against him. He had 60 days to bring a writ of
mandate. Reynolds v. Superior Court of County of Los Angeles, 64 Cal.
372 (1883); see also Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior
Court (H. Coster Enterprises), 107 Cal. App. 3d 496, 499 (1980). At
most he had 180 days to appeal. Cal. Rule of Court 8.104. His last day to
do so was April 12, 2012. Having failed to do anything, the decision
against him became final. Res judicata was then in full effect.
16
B. Other grounds for dismissing the action appeared both on

the face of Wrights pleading and from the documents
which were judicially noticeable.
In reviewing decisions of the district court, we may affirm on any
ground finding support in the record. Jackson v. Southern California
Gas Co., 881 F.2d 638, 643 (9th Cir. 1989). If the decision below is
correct, it must be affirmed, even if the district court relied on the wrong
grounds or wrong reasoning. Id.
Several other grounds for dismissing Wrights federal action were
available on this record. If not on the grounds of res judicata, then the
dismissal should be affirmed on one of these other grounds.
1. Heck v. Humphrey
Wright attacked the validity of his conviction in both his original
and amended complaints. He also attacks it here on appeal (see AB 3), 13
years after his arrest and 11 years after his plea. The federal case he
intends to put on is not merely one about a right to gun ownership, it is
one of vindication and reversal of everything that happened to him in the
criminal court. He pleads the following:
These sting operations are true fishing expeditions. [W]hat these

sting operations tend to reveal are that participants are law-abiding
firearms collectors. So undercover Gun Unit detectives will then
engage in entrapment schemes to then get purported justification to
arrest a gun collector and seize his or her property. ER 239.
The number of collectible firearms Plaintiff would occasionally sell

17
was low; maybe a few a year. Under no definition of the term

dealer state, federal or common sense would Plaintiff be
classified as a dealer of firearms and certainly could not ever
credibly be characterized as a gun trafficker. Notwithstanding
Plaintiffs status as a collector, LAPDs Gun Unit became aware of
Plaintiffs collection, targeted Plaintiff and began surveilling him at
gun shows under the auspices that he was an unlicensed dealer and
gun trafficker. ER 240.
Nonetheless, in 2004, LAPD decided to conduct a sting on

Plaintiff, and in the process committed a blatant act of entrapment as
a pretext to seize Plaintiffs collection. ER 240.
Given how badly the sting was conducted, on information and

belief, LAPDs purpose in conducting the sting in the first instance
was not to get good faith evidence of an illegal firearms sale
occurring in Los Angeles County, but was to instead get enough
evidence to justify issuance of a warrant to get at Plaintiffs
voluminous firearms collection located in Ventura County. ER 241.
A plaintiff cannot use a civil suit to undermine a criminal conviction
through collateral attack. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-486
(1994). A suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 does not necessarily mean a
plaintiff is alleging his or her conviction was unlawful. Id. at 487 n. 7.
But here, Wright is telling the world that he plans to argue that the
conviction was unlawful, because it was based on the possession of an
assault weapon and silencer that he simultaneously had no idea he
possessed and good reasons to possess (ER 241), and which were fruit of
the poisonous tree because the prosecution would not have known about
them in the first place if the LAPD had not illegally seized his guns (see
18
bullet points above). If this case goes to trial, Wright will argue factual
innocence. See Medrano v. Caliber Homes Loans, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 177576 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (the purpose of the complaint is to give
the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which
it rests) (internal quotes and punctuation omitted), quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That argument of factual
innocence will run afoul of Heck. Accordingly, this case could be
properly dismissed as an attack on the validity of Wrights conviction.
2. Various statutes of limitations.
A claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of
the injury. Morales v. City of Los Angeles, 214 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2000).
[T]he proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon
the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful. Id.
at 1154 (citations and internal quotes omitted). As the City argued below
(Dkt 21 at 10-12, excluded from Wrights record, but shown elsewhere in
the record as recounted below), multiple dates compete to start the clock
running on when Wrights civil rights claim accrued:
ER 110 January 17, 2007 Wright asked the criminal court either
to return the guns to him or transfer them to a federal firearms
licensee, and was denied.
Dkt 1 (Complaint 48) October 11, 2007 Wright was told the
19
LAPD would not be releasing his firearms.
ER 253-254 July 29, 2009 Wright knew the LAPD did not find
his proof of ownership satisfactory and planned to destroy the guns
seized from his property.
ER 255-256 September 28, 2010 The LAPD informed Wright
his proof of ownership did not meet its standards.
ER 113-117, 256-257 September 29, 2011 It was clear to Wright
that he had to seek the intervention of the courts to get the firearms
back.
ER 171-172 October 17, 2011 The criminal court reviewed
Wrights evidence of ownership and decided not to return the guns
to him.
Wright knew or had reason to know that his claim to ownership of
the guns was interfered with first when the LAPD seized them, and
subsequently interfered with at every critical date cited above. The statute
of limitations on his claim began to run as early as October 11, 2007,
when the LAPD informed him they would not release the guns to him.
Certainly his claim had accrued by October 17, 2011, when his requests
in the criminal court for return of the firearms ended adversely to him.
The Ninth Circuit applies the personal injury statute of limitations
found in Code of Civil Procedure 335.1 to civil rights claims. Abreu v.

20
Ramirez, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1255 (C.D. Cal. 2003). That section
provides a two-year limitations period. So even going by the latest date
by which Wrights action would have accrued, October 17, 2011, this
case was filed nearly two years late.
Under state law, Wright has run afoul of several additional
limitations periods.
An action against a government officer for seizure of property or
injury to that property is one year. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 340.
Under Code of Civil Procedure 342, any action against a
government entity for which a claim need be presented must be
commenced within the time frames outlined in Government Code
945.6, i.e. either six months or two years, depending on whether the
claim was rejected in writing within 45 days of its presentation. The
claim form itself must be presented within six months after the accrual of
the cause of action, if the action is for injury to personal property. Cal.
Govt Code 911.2(a). Six months after October 17, 2011 was April 17,
2012. Assuming the City had not timely rejected his claim in writing, he
would have had to bring this suit by April 17, 2014, which he did not.
On the facts that Wright pleaded, the LAPD could destroy the guns
180 days after Wrights ownership claim was denied:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no law enforcement
21
agency or court shall be required to retain a firearm for more than

180 days after the owner of the firearm has been notified by the
court or law enforcement agency that the firearm has been made
available for return. An unclaimed firearm may be disposed of
after the 180-day period has expired.
Cal. Penal Code 33875. Wrights claim to the guns ended on October
17, 2011 when the criminal court ruled against him. 180 days later was
April 12, 2012. The LAPD was legally entitled to destroy the guns on
that day, as nowhere does 33875 require additional notice to an
unsuccessful gun claimant. Nor does federal law require a government
entity to detail for a claimant how to get his or her property back, so long
as there are state laws or regulations telling the claimant of the available
remedies. City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 119 S. Ct. 678,
142 L. Ed. 2d 636 (1999). Wright could have moved for reconsideration
(Code of Civil Procedure 1008) or sought a writ of mandate (Code of
Civil Procedure 1085). The gist of his pleaded allegations is that,
instead of pursuing either remedy, he hoped the LAPD eventually would
change its mind, and decide that the proof that both the police and the
criminal judge had found inadequate was suddenly sufficient. Hoping for
some sudden transformation rather than pursuing his legal remedies was
a poor choice, and his deadlines have all run.
3. No facts pleaded inferred any individuals liability.
Wright sued City Attorney Mike Feuer, an elected official, without

22
providing any facts as to how Feuer personally directed any action which
could have caused Wrights harm. Wrights allegations against Feuer
were conclusions, not facts. ER 262-263, 279, 283. Similarly, Wright
sued Charlie Beck, the Chief of the LAPD, with only conclusory
allegations. ER 267-268, 279, 283. Stating conclusions without pleaded
facts does not meet the federal pleading standard. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 176 L. Ed. 2d 868
(2009). The amended complaint was even more deficient because both
Feuer and Beck were sued only in their official capacities. ER 247. A suit
against an employee in his or her official capacity is really just a suit
against the public entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-166
(1985). There was no reason for Wright to sue Feuer or Beck when a)
Wright already had the City as a defendant, and b) Wright had no facts to
plead against Feuer or Beck individually.
Similarly, Wright had no facts to plead against Deputy City Attorney
Heather Aubry justifying his Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
claims against her. In his original complaint, Wright hid the fact that
criminal court orders prevented the return of the guns to him. He
continued such allegations in the amended complaint, claiming that the
initially-lawful seizure became unlawful when the LAPD unlawfully
23
denied his request to return the guns after he became eligible as a
matter of law to sell or possess the firearms again, provided proof of
ownership pursuant to LAPD policy and state law, [and] demanded the
release or return of the firearms. ER 274. But Wright had neither
become eligible as a matter of law to sell or possess the firearms, since
he never complied with the criminal courts order that he present proof of
ownership in accordance with LAPD policy, and he never obtained an
order that the guns could be returned to him. Accordingly, the gun
seizure always remained lawful. See, e.g., Reynaga, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 31432 at 4-5 (governments refusal to return property whose
seizure was unchallenged and already completed did not constitute a new
seizure). Wright has no Fourth Amendment claim against Aubry.
The pleaded facts, read in conjunction with the judicially-noticeable
record and applicable law, eliminate the possibility of a Fifth
Amendment claim against Aubry. The state provided several pre- and
post-deprivation remedies for Wrights loss of the firearms (preliminary
hearing, return-of-firearms hearing, appeal, replevin action, Government
Claims Act action) at any of which Wright could have challenged the
appropriateness of the gun seizure. He either did not make or did not
succeed in such challenges, eliminating the possibility of a Fifth
Amendment claim. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). Further,
24
it is unclear how Aubry fits into the Fifth Amendment claim, as an
attorney arguing for her client against Wrights position, and winning in
the judicial forum, generally does not constitute a Fifth Amendment
violation. Schick v. Lerner, 193 Cal. App. 3d 1321, 1330 (1987) (attorney
owes no duty to anyone but her client); Stevens v. Rifkin, 608 F. Supp.
710, 730 (1984) (an attorney must knowingly violate a clearly established
constitutional or statutory right of another before a 1983 claim may be
made against her). Wright had no clearly established right to the guns in
light of the rulings from the criminal court, eliminating an element of his
claim against Aubry, and providing her with qualified immunity.
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-244 (2009). Wright also did not
plead any facts as to how Aubry could be responsible for bailment
decisions made by the LAPD. See ER 85-86.
Nor was Aubrys behavior in defeating Wright in court a pattern of
criminal activity for RICO purposes. The criminal courts 2011 order
denying Wright the return of the firearms ended his ownership claims.
No actions by Aubry thereafter altered the fact that the LAPD was
retaining the guns pursuant to a courts authority after notice and a
hearing. See ER 86-87.
Aubry did nothing wrong by dealing with Wright at arms length as
an opposing party. He pleads nothing to support an inference otherwise.
25
All of the reasons that the case against Aubry should have been
dismissed also applied to Tompkins and Edwards. Both men articulated
reasons in the criminal proceedings for believing that it would be
improper to return the guns to Wright. AER 10-11, ER 87. Wright
pleaded no facts raising an inference that either man consciously
disregarded Wrights clear right to own the guns, which would be the
standard Wright would have to meet. See, e.g., Buller v. Buechler, 706
F.2d 844, 852-853 (8th Cir.1983); F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins, 869 F.2d
1312, 1316 (9th Cir. 1989) (property claim rising to the constitutional
level requires proof that interference with property rights was irrational
or arbitrary). The criminal courts denial of Wrights request for the
guns meant he had no clear right to the guns, and prevents him from
being able to plead the necessary standard against Tompkins or Edwards.
Wright was never going to be able to withstand the multiplicity of
doctrines which required his case be dismissed. Clearly he knew that,
which was why his initial pleading concealed, and his amended pleading
downplayed, the criminal courts orders denying him the return of the
guns. Because dismissing the case would have been the correct result
however it was reached, the district courts order should be affirmed.
26
III. Wrights argument on implied findings relies on sophistry

rather than legal support or logic.
A. The entire argument is a red herring.
The heart of Wrights appeal is the argument that the October 17,
2011 order of the criminal court only concerned 26 guns. AB 27 and
passim. To make that argument, Wright has to focus on the wording of
the order in isolation from the context in which it was decided: Wrights
2011 motion for return of property sought return of all 400 of the
firearms; the City opposed that motion but agreed 26 of the firearms were
registered to Wright and could be returned; the criminal court ruled in
favor of the Citys argument that the 26 could be returned, and against
Wrights argument that all 400 could be returned; the October 17, 2011
order stated that the court received and considered Defendant Wayne
William Wrights Motion to Return Property, the Opposition of Real
Party in Interest Los Angeles Police Department and Reply thereto, and
having heard and considered the arguments of parties and counsel,
found good cause to only return the 26 guns conceded by the LAPD. ER
171-172.
When the 2011 order is read in the context in which it was issued, it
is explicit not implied that the order was a pronouncement on all the
guns, which was the subject of the hearing, and not merely a discussion
27
of the 26 guns which the LAPD agreed to release. The criminal courts
order was a ruling on a motion. A motion is an application for an order.
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1003. A court order is the written ruling on the
application made by the moving party. Id. Wright was the moving party
in the criminal court, so the order was the ruling on his request which
was for all 400 guns. In order for his argument on appeal to be correct,
the LAPD would have had to have been the moving party; but even then,
Wrights argument would fail, because the LAPDs opposition still
discussed all 400 guns. ER 123-124.
The implied findings doctrine only came up after Wright pressed the
issue of whether the obvious subject matter of the 2011 order was
actually obvious, by stating that construing the courts silence on the
issue of ownership as an affirmative finding of Plaintiff having no
ownership interest in the firearms would be anathema to what the court
was asked to rule upon and what it then actually ordered. AER 6
(omitted from Wrights record between ER 70 and 71). If Wright truly
was blindsided by the resulting recitation of basic and long-standing law,
he could have asked for further briefing in the motion he brought to
clarify the basis of the dismissal of his action. Dkt 29. Or, he could have
added to that motion a request for reconsideration based on surprise
under the rule he was already citing, Rule 60. He did not, because he was
28
not surprised, because the law was basic and clear and he knew the
criminal courts ruling concerned all 400 guns.
B. Wright misapplies the doctrine.
Wright quotes case law correctly explaining implied findings as
those necessary to support the judgment. AB 26. Everything he writes
after that, though, is wrong.
He takes the 2011 order out of context, and assumes that the orders
discussion of the 26 firearms conceded by the LAPD means that the other
375 or so guns were not considered at the September 2011 hearing. AB
27. That assumption is factually wrong, because the 2011 motion
proceeding did in fact concern all 400 guns. (See discussion in the
section immediately preceding.) But running with that wrong assumption,
he argues that it would not be necessary to imply any findings about
any of the other guns, if the order only concerned 26.
The correct application of the doctrine to the context here is to imply
any findings necessary to support the 2011 order in light of the full
circumstances under which it was issued. When one does that, it is clear
that the criminal court must have read Wrights motion, the Citys
opposition, and Wrights reply, and then made a decision. In fact, those
findings need not be implied, because the criminal court explicitly told us
that that is exactly what it did. ER 171-172.
29
IV. Wright cannot complain of supposed errors which he invited.
Parties must abide by the consequences of their own acts and
cannot seek a reversal of a case upon appeal for errors which they had
committed or invited. . . . [] One may not on review complain of issues,
proof, and variance where such errors were committed or invited by
complainant, nor where the objection is inconsistent with the position
taken below. Hudson v. Wylie, 242 F.2d 435, 448-449 (9th Cir. 1957)
(internal quotes and citations omitted); see also Deland v. Old Republic
Life Insurance Co., 758 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir. 1985). Here, Wright
invites at least two sets of errors.
The first invited error concerns the 2011 order of the criminal court.
Wright admits that his own attorney for the criminal proceeding, Joseph
Silvoso, discussed all 400 of the firearms at the September 29, 2011
hearing, and that his attorney reviewed the order resulting from that
hearing before it was submitted to Judge Wright for his signature. ER 36-
37. That written order was the order of the court. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code
1003. Wright may not have known the legal effect of presenting his proof
of ownership to the criminal court, having the court rule against his
ownership interests, and then not appealing that ruling. But
understanding the facts and not the legal effect of the facts is not grounds
for a court to reverse a judgment. Lennefelt v. Cranston, 231 Cal. App. 2d
30
171, 175, 177 (1964); 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1) (state criminal court
judgments are presumed to have been decided correctly). To the extent
Wrights appeal of either the dismissal of his federal case or the denial of
his Rule 62.1 motion are based on alleged misrepresentations by the
City of what the criminal courts order was in 2011, Wright cannot
complain of any vagueness he finds in the 2011 order. Wright himself
had the opportunity to draft an order which comported with his
understanding of the facts, but did not submit any objection to Judge
Wright regarding the terms of the [order]. ER 37.
The next set of invited error concerns Wrights failure to disclose to
the district court the involvement of the criminal court in the 2007 and
2011 gun disposition hearings. Wrights original complaint did not
mention that he had made two requests to have the guns returned to him
and that both had been denied. Dkt 1 37, 62. That led to a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, around which Wright amended. Dkts 18, 19.
The amended complaint still was not very forthcoming about the two gun
return hearings, prompting a new motion to dismiss supported by the
record of the gun return hearings in the criminal court. To the extent that
Wright seems to be arguing that the district court should not have
reviewed the record in the criminal court (i.e. AB 32-36), Wright invited
the district courts doing so by taking the position that his gun return
31
interactions were with the LAPD directly, and by pleading statements
which were not supported by the written record. Cf. ER 256-257 with ER
91-92, AER 33-34 and ER 78.
V. The district court was within its discretion when it denied the
motion for indicative ruling.
As Wright concedes, whether or not to grant a Rule 62.1 motion is
within the district courts discretion. AB 13. The district court clearly
articulated its grounds for exercising its discretion to deny the motion.
The court read Wrights pleadings, compared the pleaded allegations to
what was judicially noticeable, then reached a decision: Plaintiff did not
allege facts or issues separate from the decisions determined by the state
court in 2011 and therefore, there is no contrary conclusion that can be
reasonably drawn from the evidence about the ownership of the disputed
guns. ER 2. The analysis here was simple and appropriate. The district
court saw that Wrights pleading presumed an ownership status which the
criminal court did not give him. The district court looked for a federal
interest in the criminal court proceeding and correctly found that Wright
alleged none. ER 2, 3.
Wrights argument on appeal tries to make the issue more
convoluted. He tries to use personal attacks on the City as a distraction
from the fact that if there was any error here, it occurred when Wright
32
and his counsel Silvoso invited it by approving the written order which
the criminal court signed. (See Argument section IV, above.) In light of
the evidence, it was within the district courts discretion to find that no
misrepresentation appeared on the record of the motion to dismiss
proceeding.
Alternatively, the district court had the discretion to disregard
Wrights evidence from Silvoso entirely. Silvosos declaration attempted
to create a record of proceedings in the criminal court from years before,
even though Wright had not procured a reporters transcript, agreed
statement, or settled statement. See Cal. Rules of Court 8.134, 8.137. The
criminal courts October 17, 2011 order was a ruling upon the evidence
that Wright submitted to establish his ownership of the seized guns. Cal.
Civ. Proc. Code 1003; ER 171-172. In its opposition to the Rule 62.1
motion, the City argued that Wrights time to challenge the ruling had
expired years before Wright filed his civil suit. Dkt 38 at 4-5, repeating
arguments from Dkt 21 at 17-21 (internal motion pages 10-14).
Accordingly, the time to create a record for that challenge had also
expired, and Silvosos declaration was improper in trying to do so.
Wright argues that the Silvoso declaration should be accepted as the
record of the criminal court proceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of
Evidence 1004. AB 30 n. 4. Rule 1004 is the Best Evidence Rule, which
33
discusses when a copy of a document may or may not be introduced in
the place of the original. That is an entirely separate inquiry from the
question of what events transpired in a lower court, so that a higher (or at
least later, in the case of collateral attack) court can review the
proceedings. It is the second inquiry which is relevant here, and Wrights
Rule 1004 argument is completely off that point. It must be disregarded
entirely. Wrights attempts to create a self-serving, unilateral record
through improper procedures were challenged below. AER 1-5. They are
opposed just as fervently here.
CONCLUSION
Litigation is a many-front war, usually waged on a battlefield of
defined topography. On appeal, the legal landscape over which the
parties arguments advance, retreat, get bogged down or hold their
ground is comprised of what did and did not happen in the court below.
But usually, whether or not there is a landscape is not the issue. And
usually, there are things such as noncombatants. But Wright does not
fight in the usual way.
Wright does not simply argue over the record; he does not simply
present those portions of the record which aid him; he does not simply
ignore those portions of the record which do not aid him. However
extreme and unwise, even pretending that the unhelpful portions of the
34
record were not there would be just within the borders of normalcy in
scorch-the-earth combat. Wright goes even farther. He presents those
portions of the record which aid him, seemingly actively excises from
documents those portions which hurt him, and asserts a unilateral record
where it helps him. Then, if he can work it in, he will accuse his
opponents of malfeasance/misconduct/incompetence/criminality for
actions which the portions of the record that he himself removed show
those opponents did not engage in. (For example, as the City
demonstrated in its brief, Wright omits from his record the standards for
judicial notice cited by the City, does not discuss in his brief any of the
authorities cited in the Citys request for judicial notice, and then berates
Judge Real for granting judicial notice pursuant to the standards Wright
pretends were not cited.) Wrights filings are rife with allegations against
anyone who touched a case in which he was opposed, whether he had the
facts to meet the pleading standards or not.
Of course, combat is only a metaphor for describing litigation.
Wrights attack capabilities are not unlimited. He is subject to pleading
standards, proof standards, appeal deadlines, doctrines of comity,
requirements for presenting an accurate and complete record, the need to
show error, and many other constrictions. He is confined to the Courts
landscape. And this Court should halt his advance.
35
Wright has not established a grounds for reversing the dismissal of
his action by the district court. Because that dismissal was proper, the
denial of his motion for indicative ruling was also proper. Accordingly,
the City respectfully requests that the district courts orders dismissing
his case and denying his Rule 62.1 motion be affirmed.
DATED: April 19, 2017 MICHAEL N. FEUER, City Attorney

THOMAS H. PETERS, Chief Asst. City Atty.
GABRIEL DERMER, Asst. City Attorney
ERIC BROWN, Deputy City Attorney
By: /s/ Eric Brown

ERIC BROWN
Deputy City Attorney
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; HEATHER
AUBRY; RICHARD TOMPKINS; and
JAMES EDWARD
36
STATEMENT OF RELATED CASES
This appeal is related to the following cases:
Wayne William Wright v. City of Los Angeles

California Court of Appeal, 2nd District Case No B277062;
appeal from the Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet, Dept. 50, Superior
Court Case No. BC 606993
People v. Wayne William Wright

Ventura Superior Court Case No. 2005042520
s/ Eric Brown____
Eric Brown
37
BRIEF FORMAT CERTIFICATION
The foregoing brief is Times Roman, size 14 font, and the word-
counting facility indicates that it contains 8,210 words, and thus all brief
format requirements are met.
s/ Eric Brown
Eric Brown
38
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 19, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing
with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system.
I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and
that service will be accomplished by the appellate CM/ECF system.
___s/ Terry Lee____

Terry Lee
39

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Case: 16-55239, 04/19/2017, ID: 10403445, DktEntry: 22, Page 1 of 46

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Nos. 16-55239 & 16-55984

WAYNE WILLIAM WRIGHT

CHARLES L. BECK, et al.,

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MICHAEL N. FEUER, City Attorney

Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees

CERTIFICATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES

Interested entities or parties are listed below:

Name of Interested Entity or Person Nature of Interest

Charles L. Beck Defendant-Appellee

Michael N. Feuer Defendant-Appellee

Heather Aubry Defendant-Appellee

Richard Tompkins Defendant-Appellee

James Edwards Defendant-Appellee

City of Los Angeles Defendant-Appellee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ..... ii

STANDARD OF REVIEW .. ....6

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Contd)

1. Heck v. Humphrey ...17

Astoria Fed. Savings & Loan Association v. Solimino,

City of LA v. Superior Court (Davenport),

City of West Covina v. Perkins,

Deland v. Old Republic Life Insurance Co.,

F.E. Trotter, Inc. v. Watkins,

Garcia v. Superior Court (City of Santa Ana),

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Contd)

Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Local 2 v. Vista

Jackson v. Southern California Gas Co.,

Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors,

McCue v. S. Fork Union Elementary School,

Medrano v. Caliber Homes Loans, Inc.,

Morales v. City of Los Angeles,

Popelka, Allard, McCowan & Jones v. Superior Court (H.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (Contd)

Reynolds v. Superior Court of County of Los Angeles,

Ritter v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 1003...28, 30, 33

Cal. Penal Code 3387522

Code of Civil Procedure 342...21

Code of Civil Procedure 1008.22

The Defendants/Appellees (hereinafter, collectively, the City)

agree with the statement of jurisdiction presented by Appellant Wayne

1. Whether a judicially-noticeable record of state court proceedings

allowed the district court the discretion to decide that Wrights

2. Whether grounds in addition to res judicata appear in the record to

uphold the judgment of the lower court.

3. Whether the record of proceedings below provided the district court

with a basis for exercising its discretion on the side of denying

Wrights motion for indicative ruling.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Wright got the attention of LAPD officers at a gun show when he

(AER) 24-30. Attention led to investigation, which resulted in Wright

illegally selling a rifle to an undercover officer, having 400 guns seized

from his properties pursuant to warrants, and receiving felony charges.

illegal possession of an assault rifle. Id.

Wright claimed ownership of the guns seized but as to most of them,

of ownership, and denied his requests. ER 110, 171-172. Nearly 10 years

September 2011, Plaintiff sought the release of his property and

requested that the property be released directly to him instead of to a

LAPD directly instead of to the criminal court (Dkt 1 62).

His complaints vague reference to court proceedings led to investigation,