RODRIGUEZ v.
COMELEC o COMELEC: quo warranto dismissed
GR No. 120099/ JULY 24, 1996/ FRANCISCO, J./ LOC GOV
Disqualification/RLAurellano
NATURE Special Civil Action in the SC (Certiorari)
PETITIONER Eduardo T. Rodriguez
RESPONDENTS Commission on Elections and Bienvenido Marquez, Jr.
SUMMARY. This case revolves around the meaning of fugitive from
justice as a ground for disqualification under LGC 40(e). Rodriguez won
against Marquez for Quezon Gov. Marquez filed a quo warranto petition,
saying that Rodriguez should be disqualified, as he was a fugitive from
justice. It appears that there are charges and a warrant of arrest against
Rodriguez in an LA (as in Lakers) court. When that case reached the SC,
the SC defined fugitive from justice as includes not only those who flee
after conviction to avoid punishment but also those who after being
charged, flee to avoid prosecution, and remanded the case to COMELEC.
The next election cycle began without the case being resolved so there
were disqualification petitions again, and somewhere in the middle,
COMELEC held that Rodriguez was a fugitive from justice, which led to the
suspension of Rodriguezs proclamation as Quezons Gov. Rodriguez
protested this, and he ultimately won in the COMELEC but the COMELEC
bitched about the definition of fugitive from justice in the earlier SC case,
saying that intent to evade should not be an element in being a fugitive
from justice which is why this case is long as shit because the SC
defended its definition, holding that intent to evade is necessary in
becoming a fugitive from justice.
DOCTRINE. Fugitive from justice includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but also those who after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution
This definition indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction.
o There can only be intent to evade when there is knowledge of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction
Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established
by proof that there has already been a conviction or at least, a charge
has already been filed, at the time of flight.
FACTS.
This case is about the meaning of fugitive from justice as a ground for
disqualification/ ineligibility under LGC 40(e)
Petitioner Rodriguez and private respondent Marquez are candidates for
governor of Quezon
May 1992 elections: Rodriguez won. Marquez challenged this victory via
quo warranto before the COMELEC
o Marquez says that Rodriguez left the US when he was charged with
fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft
before the LA Municipal Court, making him a fugitive from justice 1
1 Warrant of arrest was issued in Nov 1985
o SC (elevated via petition for certiorari): Remanded to COMELEC, to
determine WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice with the given
definition. Fugitive from justice defined as: includes not only
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but
likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution.
Lets call this the Marquez v. COMELEC definition
o Rodriguez tried to present a certification that he left the US 5 mos
before he was charged.2 The MR was denied
May 1995 elections: Rodriguez vs. Marquez for Quezon governor again.
Marquez files a petition for disqualification against Rodriguez, saying that
he is a fugitive from justice
o Before the COMELEC, Marquez presented the ff evidence:
An authenticated copy of the warrant of arrest issued by the LA court
An authenticated copy of the felony complaint
o Rodriguez walked out of the hearing because his motion for
postponement was denied
In his Answer, he claims that he was not aware of the filling of the
charge; therefore, he cannot be considered a fugitive from justice,
because how can he be running from justice if he does not know that
he was supposed to run
o COMELEC: Remanded decision and petition for disqualification
consolidated. Rodriguez considered as fugitive from justice; therefore,
he was disqualified
Marquezs evidence considered unrebutted, because Rodriguez was
deemed to have waived his right to resent evidence because he
walked out
COMELEC considered the outstanding warrant as proof that
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice
Rodriguezs claim in his Answer was not supported by any attached
document stating that he left the US before he was charged
Rodriguezs wife was apparently arrested in the US. COMELEC
interpreted this to mean that there is no way that Rodriguez did not
know about the charge
o Rodriguez won the May 1995 elections
Marquez filed an urgent motion to suspend Rodriguezs proclamation
with the COMELEC. Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Rodriguez anyway.
COMELEC granted Marquezs motion
Rodriguez filed this petition as against the COMELECs suspension of his
proclamation (as motioned for by Marquez)
o Rodriguez included COMELECs disqualification of him as well in this
petition
SC: COMELEC directed to receive Rodriguezs evidence (which were not
received because he walked out right) and Marquezs addtl evidence, if
any, and present an Evaluation
2 The certification stated that Rodriguez left the US on June 1985
Rodriguez then presented the Bureau of Immigrations certifications 3
indicating that he arrived in the PH on June 25 85. The felony complaint
in the LA Court was filed on Nov 12 85
Marquez submitted a voluminous copy of the investigation report on
Rodriguez, arguing that it is impossible for Rodriguez to not have known
an investigation of such magnitude
COMELEC again (Evaluation): Rodriguez NOT a fugitive from justice. Intent
to evade is a material element of the Marquez v. COMELEC definition.
Such intent being absent, as proven by the certification Rodriguez
presented, he cannot be a fugitive from justice
o But check it out yo, in the body of its decision, the COMELEC opined
that the SC got the definition of fugitive from justice wrong
o Citing a heap of cases, the COMELEC said that it is enough that 1) a
person was charged with a crime, or committed a crime; then 2) he/she
left the jurisdiction where the crime was committed, to be considered a
fugitive from justice
o From the COMELEC evaluation: Filing of charges prior to flight is not
always an antecedent requirement to label one a fugitive from justice.
Mere commission of a crime without charges filed and flight
subsequent thereto sufficiently meet the definition.
ISSUES & RATIO.
1. WON Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice NO
Marquez v. COMELEC definition: it includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but also those who after being charged,
flee to avoid prosecution
This definition indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling
factor that animates ones flight from a particular jurisdiction.
o There can only be intent to evade when there is knowledge of an
already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction
In this case, it is clear that Rodriguez did not have an intent to
evade to charges.
As shown by the certifications, it was clearly impossible for Rodriguez
to have kn0wn about the felony complaint and the arrest warrant at
the time he left the US. What prosecution could he have possible been
running away from?
Re: Marquezs contention that it is impossible for Rodriguez to not have
known about the charges against him, considering that scope of the
investigations: DOES NOT PROVE THAT RODRIGUEZ KNEW ABOUT THE
CHARGES
o Investigations of this nature, no matter how extensive or prolonged,
are shrouded with utmost secrecy to afford law enforcers the
advantage of surprise and effect the arrest of those who would be
charged. Otherwise, the indiscreet conduct of the investigation would
3 Dated Apr 27 and Jun 26, 95
be nothing short of a well-publicized announcement to the
perpetrators of the imminent filing of charges against them 4
Rodriguez was serving the country
o He participated vigorously in the political campaigns against Marcos,
then he served in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Quezon, then he
became Quezon Gov
o When, in good faith, a person leaves the territory of a state not his
own, homeward bound, and learns subsequently of charges filed
against him while in the relative peace and service of his own
country, the fact that he does not subject himself to the jurisdiction
of the former state does not qualify him outright as a fugitive from
justice.
There is no justifiable reason to curtail Rodriguezs right to return
home, in the absence of intent to evade the laws of the US
o It is not Rodriguezs fault that he had left when the US sought to
subject him to its criminal process, which is confined in the USs
territorial jurisdiction
There is no law that requires Rodriguez to return to the US after he had
learned of the charges against it
o Moral uprightness is not a standard too far-reaching as to demand of
political candidate the performance of duties and obligations that are
supererogatory in nature.
o Rodriguez had every reason to devote utmost priority to service of
his Office, as he was elected as Gov immediately after his return
from the US
2. WON the Court should expand the definition of fugitive from
justice to include leaving a jurisdiction where a charge is
pending against a person, regardless of WON the charge had
been filed NO
Cases cited by COMELEC are mainly US vintage
Law of the case doctrine prevents the Court from expanding the
Marquez v. COMELEC definition
o Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a
former appeal. Whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the
same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on
general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision
was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court
o As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same case is
held to be the law of the case whether that decision is right or wrong,
the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved being to seek a
rehearing
o As applied: Same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez). Same issue (WON
Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice). This case is an appeal from quo
warranto petition (Marquez v. COMELEC is also an appeal from the
same quo warranto petition)
4 Quoted from the last COMELEC evaluation
 To redefine fugitive from justice would only foment instability in our
jurisprudence when hardly the ink has dried in Marquez v. COMELEC)
CONCLUSION: Marquez v. COMELEC definition of fugitive from justice
upheld. Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore
be established by proof that there has already been a conviction
or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.5
DECISION.
Petition granted. COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguezs proclamation
set aside.
VITUG DISSENT
[MAIN] Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice
SolGen: Evidence (authenticated copy of warrants + complaint) is
insufficient to prove that there was intent on Rodriguez part to evade
prosecution.
Vitug: That assumes intent to evade is a necessary element. He then cites
several US cases pointing out to the following doctrines that a person is a
fugitive from justice when:
A person, having committed a crime, is called to answer the charges
against him, and that he has left the jurisdiction of the court and is
found in the territory of another (Roberts v. Reilly)
A person found in another jurisdiction is demanded to surrender to the
foreign courts jurisdiction to answer the charges against him
(Appleyard v. Massachusetts)
While the rulings cannot be controlling, it is in Vitugs view that Congress,
not having provided otherwise, intended that the ordinary connotation of
the term must prevail. As such, the term fugitive from justice refers
to one who, having committed or being accused of having
committed a crime in one jurisdiction, cannot be found therein or
is absent for any reason from that jurisdiction that thereby
forestalls criminal justice from taking its due course. While intent to
evade (animus fugere) may be significant, it is not essential and what
matters is the fact that he leaves and NOT why he left, for it should not be
unreasonable to assume that he was not unaware of his own prior deeds or
misdeeds.
LGC 40(e) did not qualify the term fugitive from justice by
providing any proviso or any saving clauses. As such, the Court
should not be at liberty to question the wisdom of the law, detract from it,
or itself legislate material parameters when none existed.
5 Quoted in DGs book
Vitug noted that its true that the LGC IRR 73,6 in restricting the term
fugitive from justice by referring to a person convicted by final judgment,
was an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law. As such, in
the Marquez decision, it then carved the meaning that it includes both
those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment and those who after
being charged, flees to avoid prosecution. So why did the Court interpreted
its own definition as an exclusive one when the reason for its expansion
was that Sec. 40(e) never considered such restriction? (Both as to Art. 73
of the LGC IRR and the Marquez decision)
[PROCEDURAL] Marquez did not forum shop
Rodriguez: COMELEC should not have entertained the DQ case since there
was already a pending quo warranto petition against him.
Vitug: This is wrong because there is a difference in the issues submitted
for resolution. The quo warranto case pertains to Rodriguez term in 1992-
1995 while the disqualification case pertains to Rodriguez term in 1995-
1998.
LGC 40(e) is not an ex post facto law/bill of attainder
Vitug: Irrelevant. Also, considering that the LGC took effect 1 Jan. 1992 and
the disqualification pertains to the May 1992 and May 1995 elections.
TORRES SEP. OP.(copy pasted this from A2016 na I have given up on life)
First gave on why the disqualification was placed. He cited Senator
Pimentels book stating that the provision was placed as a camaraderie
provision because a congressman before wanted to run for governor and
this congressman reportedly fled from the US. He then gave a detailed
account of how the COMELEC report went, citing testimonial evidence of
several politicians on where Rodriguez was at particular points of the year
and concluding that Rodriguez was in the PH already when charges were
made against him.
He also pointed out that the Marquez decision already expanded the
restrictive definition provided in Art. 73 of the LGC IRR which limited it to
a person who has been convicted by final judgment.
6 This prov. was NEVER mentioned in the main decision. It states: Art. 73.
Disqualifications.The following persons shall be disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) x x x x x x x x x
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad. Fugitive
from justice refers to a person who has been convicted by final judgment.
(Emphasis supplied.)