Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
April28, 2017
SYLLABUS
I. General Jurisdiction of the Court Over Fee Awards - Statutory Basis for Attorney
Fee Awards
E. Judicial Commentary
A. Fiduciary Duty
B. Declaration of Disclosure
C. Judicial Commentary
Syllabus Page 1 of 1
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
V. Sanctions
C. Judicial Commentary
C. Billing for Paralegal Time: Can You Do It or Can the Other Side Get It As
Party of Their Attorney Fee Request? (B&P 6450 Et. Seq.
D. Judicial Commentary
B. Fees on Appeal
E. Borson Motion
F. Judicial Commentary
Syllabus Page 2 of 2
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
A. DVPA
B. TRO/Civil Harassment
C. Judicial Commentary
A. Subpoenas
C. Depositions
E. Judicial Commentary
X. Settling Fee Issues (The Only Thing More Difficult to Settle Than Spousal
Support!)
D. Taxation of Fees
Syllabus Page 3 of 3
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
A. Historically
E. Judicial Commentary
Syllabus Page 4 of 4
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
April28, 2017
SPEAKERS:
Hon. Mary Greenwood
Hon. James Towery
Tracy Duell-Cazes, CFLS
Matthew J. Rudy, CFLS
Lynne Yates-Carter, CFLS
Attorney's Briefcase
www.atybriefcase.com
info@atybriefcase.com
Phone: 510-836-2743
Fax: 510-465-7348
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
April28, 2017
April28,2017
Although very rarely seen, parties and counsel can be subject to sanctions for failing to
comply with both State Rules of Court and Local Rules of Court. Prior to these sanctions being
ordered the party or attorney must be provided their due process rights of notice and an opportunity
to be heard.
Code of Civil Procedure 575.2 provides the authority for courts to impose sanctions for
violations of local rules that are implemented pursuant to CCP 575.1. A noticed motion must be
filed either by a party or on the Court's own motion. The violation can be by counsel, a represented
party, or a self-represented party. If the non-compliance is the responsibility of counsel and not
the party, then the penalty shall be imposed on counsel and shall not adversely affect the party's
cause of action or defense thereto. The sanctions that may be imposed are ( 1) striking of all or
any portion of a pleading (2) dismissal of the action or proceeding or any part thereof, (3) enter a
default judgment against the non-complying party, (4) impose other penalties of a lesser nature as
otherwise provided by law. The Court may also order that the party or his/her counsel pay the
reasonable expenses in making the motion, including reasonable attorney fees.
Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337 gives direction to a Court for analyzing and
imposing sanctions under CCP 575.2. The following passage
Although authorized to impose sanctions for violation of local rules (Code Civ. Proc.,
575.2, subd. (a)), courts ordinarily should avoid treating a curable violation of local
procedural rules as the basis for crippling a litigant's ability to present his or her
case. As the court declared in Kalivas, supra, 49 Cai.App.4th 1152, in the absence
of a demonstrated history of litigation abuse, "[a]n order based upon a curable
procedural defect [including failure to file a statement required by local rule], which
effectively results in a judgment against a party, is an abuse of discretion." (ld. at
p. 1161.)
This court made a similar point in Mann v. Cracchiolo (1985) 38 Cal.3d 18 [21 0 Cal.
Rptr. 762, 694 P.2d 1134], in which an attorney failed to file opposition to a motion
for summary judgment within the time prescribed by local rules. We concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the tardy opposition. (/d.
at p. 30.)" 'Judges ... generally prefer to avoid acting as automatons and routinely
reject requests by counsel to function solely in a ministerial capacity. Rigid rule
following is not always consistent with a court's function to see that justice is done.
Cognizant of the strong policy favoring the disposition of cases on their merits
California Rules of Court, Rule 5.14 applies to a request for sanctions for violations of rules
of court in family law cases. This rule was enacted effective January 1, 2013. This is the Family
Code version of Rule 2.30. Rule 2.30 only applies to general civil cases - all civil cases except
family law proceedings. (See In reMarriage of Bianco (2013) 221 Cai.App.4th 826.)
Rule 5.14 authorizes a monetary fine or penalty. It may be awarded against "a party, a
party's attorney, a law firm, a witness, or any other individual or entity whose consent is necessary
for the disposition of a case."
(d) Notice and procedure Sanctions must not be imposed under this rule
except on a request for order by the person seeking sanctions or on the
court's own motion after the court has provided notice and an opportunity to
be heard.
(1) A party's request for sanctions must:
(A) State the applicable rule of court that has been violated;
(B) Describe the specific conduct that is alleged to have violated
the rule; and
(C) Identify the party, attorney, law firm, witness, or other person
against whom sanctions are sought.
(2) The court on its own motion may issue an order to show cause that
must:
(A) State the applicable rule of court that has been violated;
(B) Describe the specific conduct that appears to have violated
the rule; and
(C) Direct the attorney, law firm, party, witness, or other person
to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for
violation of the rule.
(e) Award of expenses In addition to the sanctions awardable under this rule,
the court may order the person who has violated an applicable rule of court
to pay to the party aggrieved by the violation that party's reasonable
expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees and costs, incurred in
connection with the motion or request for order for sanctions.
{f) Order A court order awarding sanctions must be in writing and must recite
in detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
April28, 2017
If a party fails to serve either a preliminary declaration of disclosure, unless exempted under
Family Code 211 0, or the final declaration of disclosure, or fails to provide the information required
in the respective declarations with sufficient particularity, the other party can request sanctions, but
only if s/he has served his/her own respective disclosure. The complying party must make the
request for the preparation of the appropriate declaration or request that the noncomplying party
provide "further particularity", but must do so within a reasonable period of time.
If the noncomplying party fails to comply with this request, the complying party then has the
option of (1) filing a motion to compel a further response, (2) file a motion preventing the
noncomplying party from presenting evidence on issues that should have been covered in the
declaration, of (3) file a motion showing good cause for the complying party's voluntary waiver of
receipt of the noncomplying party's preliminary or final declaration of disclosure.
Monetary sanctions under this section can be imposed in addition to any other remedies.
The amount of the sanction shall be in an "amount sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or
comparable conduct" and shall include reasonable attorney's fees, costs incurred, or both. These
sanctions can be avoided if the Court finds that the noncomplying party acted with substantial
justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.
If a judgment is entered without both parties compliance with all of the requirements of the
disclosure statutes, the Court shall set aside the judgment. This means that when the parties
agree to waive the final declaration of disclosure pursuant to Family Code 2105(d), they must
actually have exchanged a properly and fully completed current Income and Expense Declaration
including all of the material facts and information regarding that party's earnings, accumulations,
and expenses. The failure to comply with these requirements is not harmless error. However, if
the Court granted the complying party's request to waive receipt of the noncomplying party's
preliminary declaration of disclosure, the Court shall only set aside the judgment at the request of
the complying party, unless the noncomplying party's motion to set aside is based upon (a) actual
fraud if the defrauded party was kept in ignorance or in some other manner was fraudulently
prevented from fully participating in the proceeding or (b) perjury (per Penal Code 118) in the
preliminary or final disclosures, in the waiver of the final declaration of disclosure or in the current
income and expense declaration.
Upon the set aside motion, the Court may order the parties to provide the preliminary and
final declarations of disclosure that were exchanged. These shall not be filed with the Court unless
it is ordered and shall be returned to the parties. What this means for us is that we need to assure
that we have preserved a copy of the preliminary and the final disclosures that were served. The
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best practice is to scan a full copy of the forms and the attached documents exactly as they were
received from the other party and served on the other party. In your closing letter to your client also
make sure that you tiave advised the client about preserving these copies.
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In re Feldman (2007) 153 Cai.App.4th 1470, Mr. Feldman was ordered to pay a significant
sum of money in sanctions for breaching his fiduciary duties. Mr. Feldman was reluctant to turn
over his financial information. It seemed that he was only turning over the majority of the financial
information only when Mrs. Feldman found out about the information. This case should be required
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reading every time you are dealing with an opponent that doesn't want to disclose and when your
Client is recalcitrant in disclosing his/her financial information. I
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The Feldman case had 13 separate holdings related to the breach of fiduciary duty issue
and sanctions under Family Code 2107(c) for breaching the fiduciary duties under the Family
Code. These holdings are: I
1. The court will apply an abuse of discretion standard to an order for sanctions under FC
2107(c).
2. The moving party is not required to show any harm as a prerequisite to an award of
sanctions. [However, the actual facts of the violation will affect the amount - the more
egregious the actions the higher the sanction amount.]
3. The statute doesn't require the moving party to seek further disclosure or to bring a motion
to either compel further responses or preclude evidence before seeking sanctions.
4. The statutory policy in favor of disclosure contains no exception for debts and assets that
offset each other. The disclosing party must provide a "complete disclosure of all assets
and liabilities".
5. Parties in family law actions are required to respond in good faith to requests for production
of documents by producing all relevant documents and to refrain from giving false answers
in their deposition testimony.
7. A party must comply with their disclosure requirements even if the other party already has
the information.
8. It does not matter how much the undisclosed asset is worth in relation to the entire estate;
its nondisclosure is still a breach of the party's fiduciary duties.
9. A failure to disclose new information immediately, fully and accurately upon a material
change is sanctionable for a delay of several months.
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10. Family Code 2102 does not contain an exception for transactions in the ordinary course
of business".
11. The form of the business matters because the manager-spouse has greater access to
information regarding the business.
12. A party is required to disclose the assets and debts in a company that the party owns, no
matter the form of the business entity.
13. Based on statutory language and the express purpose of Family Code 271, a trial court
may impose 271 sanctions prior to the end of the lawsuit.
PRACTICE POINTER: If it is clear that your client breached his/her fiduciary duty and the
opposing party is requesting sanctions, do everything you can to mitigate the fees/costs incurred
by the opposing party. In the event the issue goes to hearing, you should make all arguments
available to you that the sanction request is not reasonable, it is not necessary, and/or that it is a
financial hardship on your client.
Mr. Tharp misbehaved in many areas, which was exacerbated by the Court's clear bias
against Mrs. Tharp to such an extent that on remand the Appellate Court directed that it be
assigned to another judicial officer. While sanctions are discretionary, the term judicial
discretion implies absence of arbitrary determination, capricious disposition, or whimsical
thinking. It imports the exercise of discriminating judgment within the bounds of reason. To
exercise the power of judicial discretion, all the material facts must be known and
considered together also with the legal principles essential to an informed, intelligent and
just decision. Therefore, the court must examine the entire record in determining whether
the ultimate sanction should be imposed. Section 2107(c) is not aimed at redressing an
actual injury. It requires the court to impose monetary sanctions and an award of attorney
fees if a party fails to comply with his/her fiduciary duties of disclosure. The amount should
be sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct.
Mrs. Fong was awarded $200,000.00 in monetary sanctions under Section 21 07(c) from
Mr. Fong for his failure to comply with his disclosure requirements. The Appellate Court
reversed the sanction because she herself was not in compliance with the section. Only
a complying party (has served the preliminary or final disclosure) is entitled to an award of i
Section 2107(c) monetary sanctions against the other party for his/her failure to comply.
On March 27,2017 the Supreme Court on its own motion extended the review time to June
8, 2017. This case is not yet final. It bears watching!
Reiterates that Section 2107 (c) sanctions are mandated against a party who fails to comply
with their disclosure obligations in an amount sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or
comparable conduct. Lengthy discussion of sanctions and fees available under Section
1101 (h) and 1101 (g)
A preliminary declaration of disclosure must identify all assets in which the party may have
an interest, regardless of the character. It does not matter what the party believes the value
to be - even if there is no value it must be listed. On remand, the trial court was directed
to hear and rule on Wife's motion for FC 21 07(c) sanctions for Husband's failure to disclose
the medical trust (that he claimed had no value so didn't have to disclose).
April28, 2017
V. Sanctions
TDC Family Law
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TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CA.UFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
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I210S. BASCOM AVE., STE. 224
SAN JOSE, CA 95128 E-MAIL: TRACY@TDCFAMILYLAW.COM TELEPHONE: (408) 267-8484
April28, 2017
Sanction requests pursuant to CCP 128.5 and 128.7 are filed in the family law case. They are
not separate actions. They are separate and distinct from FC 271 sanctions. They are not
mutually exclusive.
The Civil Rules apply in family law cases pursuant to Rule 3.10
The Civil Rules apply to all civil cases in the superior courts, including general civil,
family, juvenile, and probate cases, unless otherwise provided by a statute or rule
in the California Rules of Court.
Rule 5.2(d) makes the sanctions we are discussing applicable in Family Court matters
Except as otherwise provided in these rules, all provisions of law applicable to civil
actions generally apply to a proceeding under the Family Code if they would
otherwise apply to such proceeding without reference to this rule. To the extent that
these rules conflict with provisions in other statutes or rules, these rules prevail
Family Code 210 defines what rules of practice and procedure apply in actions under the Family
Code
Except to the extent that any other statute or rules adopted by the Judicial Council
provide applicable rules, the rules of practice and procedure applicable to civil
actions generally, including provisions of Title 3a (commencing with Section 391)
of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, apply to, and constitute the rules of
practice and procedure in proceedings under this code.
Rule 5.92(c) does not require points and authorities to be filed with a Request For Order, unless
required by the Court on a case-by-case basis. However, it is a best practice to include points and
authorities for CCP sanction motions as they are not usual and standard issues in family law cases.
On September 30, 1992 Then Presiding Judge Len Edwards issued a standing order regarding the
Code of Professionalism. It has been adopted as a guide to the Judges in the exercise of their
individual discretion when adjudicating disputes amount attorneys. The Code does not have the
force of law or regulation regarding conduct of attorneys, but does reflect the view of the members
of the Santa Clara County Bar Association and the Court regarding appropriate attorney behavior.
The current revision was issued on October 29, 2015 revision. A copy may be downloaded from:
http://www.sccba.com/default.asp?page=professionalism
Both CCP 128.5 and FC 271 were enacted to provide for relief for wrongs committed. These
two sections are not the same.
Section 271 was intended to specifically apply to family law matters and payment is only
directed to the party in the case. This section is based on the extent to which the conduct
of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlement
of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation
between the parties and attorneys. These sanctions are limited to the attorney fees and
costs incurred related to the sanctionable behavior as clarified in Sagonowsky v. Kekoa
(2016) 6 Cai.App.5th 1142.
Section 128.5 was intended to apply to civil litigation and is focused on misconduct by the
party and/or the party's attorney in prosecuting or defending the litigation. Sanctions under
this section are based solely on the conduct and there is no requirement that the court
consider need or ability to pay.
CCP 128.7 is designed to provide the offending party/attorney sufficient time to cure the defect
without penalty, saving the court and the parties time and money litigating the pleading as well as
the sanctions request.. This section is focused on specific pleadings rather than the actions of a
party or attorney in dealing with the case.
The CCP 128.7 motion filed after service on the opposing counsel/party for the 21-day safe harbor
period must be exactly the same motion that was served. There is no updating, modifying or
augmenting the request. If sanctions are being requested including fees and costs that are
expected to be incurred after the service of the motion, a portion of the attorney declaration must
include (a) expected amounts to be incurred after service of the safe-harbor notice and (b) a
statement that the accurate amount incurred will be submitted at the hearing on the motion.
If the served attorney/party does not cure the complained of pleading, including providing notice,
during the safe harbor period, then the CCP 128.7 motion may be filed on day 22. The motion
is then served with the hearing date and time set forth on the RFO. Notification of the cure after
the motion is filed does not divest the Court of jurisdiction over the sanction issue. The hearing
may take place after the hearing on the underlying motion or any other actions with respect to the
underlying motion.
CCP 128.5, CCP 128.7 and FC 271 are not mutually exclusive sanction requests. Sanctions
under CCP 128.7 must be contained in a separate pleading with no other relief requested. CCP
128.5 and FC 271 can be filed in the same RFO.
In addition to need-based attorney fee awards in Family Law Act cases, sanctions may also be
awarded. This may result in the "bad actor'' party being awarded need-based fees while
simultaneously being ordered to pay sanctions to the party harmed by the sanctionable conduct.
The underlying fee arrangement between the attorney and the party being awarded the sanctions
is not relevant.
An order granting these sanctions must state the findings that the court made to support the order.
This section is currently effective through December 31, 2017. Effective January 1, 2018 another
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version goes into effect unless another statute is enacted before January 1, 2018 extending the
current version. (CCP 128.5(1))
THE CURRENT VERSION OF THIS SECTION DOES NOT APPLY TO DISCLOSURES AND
DISCOVERY REQUESTS. RESPONSES. OBJECTIONS. AND MOTION. fCCP 128.5fe))
Current version
CCP 128.5(a)
to pay:
the reasonable expenses
including attorney fees
CCP 128.5(b)
"frivolous"
totally and completely without merit; or
for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party
CCP 128.5(c)
CCP 128.5(d)
Punitive damages may be awarded against a plaintiff if the court determines that the plaintiffs
action is on maintained by a person convicted of a felony against the person's victim, or the victim's
heirs, relatives, estate, or personal representative, for injuries arising from the acts for which the
person was convicted of a felony, and that the plaintiff is guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice in
maintaining the action.
CCP 128.5(0
Any sanction imposed shall be imposed consistently with the standards, conditions and procedures
set for in CCP 128.7(c), (d), and (h).
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CCP 128.5(gl
The liability imposed is in addition to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within
the purview of this section.
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CCP 128.5(h) I
Filing party must transmit, via email, to the California Research Bureau of the California
State Library
a copy of the file-endorsed caption page of the motion or opposition,
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related notice of appeal or writ petition,
conformed copy of any order issued,
including any order granting or denying the motion.
The party shall also indicate whether a CCP 128. 7 motion was made.
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email for reporting: ab2494@librarv.ca.gov
website for review of reports: https://www.library.ca.gov/crb/frivolous-action/default.aspx
CCP 128.5(a)
to pay:
the reasonable expenses
including attorney fees
CCP 128.5(b)
"frivolous"
totally and completely without merit; or
for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party
CCP 128.5(c)
CCP 128.5(dl
Punitive damages may be awarded against a plaintiff if the court determines that the plaintiff's
action is on maintained by a person convicted of a felony against the person's victim, or the victim's
heirs, relatives, estate, or personal representative, for injuries arising from the acts for which the
person was convicted of a felony, and that the plaintiff is guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice in
maintaining the action.
CCP 128.5(e)
The liability imposed is in addition to any other liability imposed by law for acts or omissions within
the purview of this section.
Shall be signed
At least one attorney of record; or
Unrepresented party
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LAW OFFICES OF TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CCP 128.7(c)
If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that
subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the below conditions,
impose an appropriate sanction for violations of subdivision (b) or are responsible
for the violation upon
the attorneys
lawfirms
parties
in determining what sanctions, if any, should be ordered, the court shall consider
whether a party seeking sanctions has exercised due diligence
per CCP 1010 [requisites of written notice and accompanying
papers to be filed and served]
shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service, or any other period as the court may prescribe,
the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation,
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or denial is not
withdrawn
appropriately corrected
If warranted, the court may award to the prevailing party the reasonable
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expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion
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Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly
responsible for violations committed by its partners, associations, and
employees
CCP 128.7(d)
A sanction imposed for violation of 128.7(b) shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter
repetition of this conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the
limitations in 128.7(d)(1) and (d)(2), the sanction may consist of, or include,
directives of a nonmonetary nature
an order to pay a penalty into court
if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing
A. Historically
E. Judicial Commentary
Syllabus Page 4 of 4
ATTORNEY FEES, COSTS AND SANCTIONS IN FAMILY LAW CASES
April28;2017
V. Sanctions
C. Judicial Commentary
C. Billing for Paralegal Time: Can You Do It or Can the Other Side Get It As
Party of Their Attorney Fee Request? (B&P 6450 Et. Seq.
D. Judicial Commentary
B. Fees on Appeal
E. Borson Motion
F. Judicial Commentary
Syllabus Page 2 of 2
LAW OFFICES OF TRACY DUELL-CAZES
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation
( 1) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented party for a violation
of 128.7(b)(2).
(2) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's own motion unless the court
issues its OSC before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or
against the party that is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
CCP 128.7{e)
When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct determined to
constitute a violation of this section and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
CCP 128.7{0
Punitive damages may be awarded against a plaintiff if the court determines that the
plaintiffs action is on maintained by a person convicted of a felony against the
person's victim, or the victim's heirs, relatives, estate, or personal representative,
for injuries arising from the acts for which the person was convicted of a felony, and
that the plaintiff is guilty of fraud, oppression, or malice in maintaining the action.
CCP 128.7(g)
This shall not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections,
and motions.
CCP 128.7(h)
Intent of Legislature that courts shall vigorously use its sanctions authority to deter
that improper conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.
CCP 128.7(1)
Applies to complaint or petition filed on or after 1/1/1995 and any other pleading,
written notice of motion, or other similar paper filed in that matter.
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LAW OFFICES OF TRACY DUELL-CAZES
FAMILY CODE 271 AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS BASED ON CONDUCT OF
PARTY OR ATTORNEY
the policy of the law to promote settlement of litigation and, where possible, to reduce the cost of l
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litigation by encouraging cooperation between the parties and attorneys. An award of attorney's ~
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fees and costs pursuant to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award pursuant ~
to this section, the court shall take into consideration all evidence concerning the parties' incomes,
assets, and liabilities. The court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes
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an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the sanction is imposed. In order to !
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obtain an award under this section, the party requesting an award of attorney's fees and costs is
not required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.
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(b) An award of attorney's fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to this section shall be imposed (;
only after notice to the party against whom the sanction is proposed to be imposed and opportunity
for that party to be heard.
(c) An award of attorney's fees and costs as a sanction pursuant to this section is payable only from I
the property or income of the party against whom the sanction is imposed, except that the award
may be against the sanctioned party's share of the community property.
Sanctions under 271 are limited to attorney fees and costs. Any "punitive damage" type
of sanctions are prohibited under this section. Sagonowsky v. Kekoa (2016) 6 Cai.App.5th 1142
analyzed this issue. Husband was granted sanctions of $500,000.00 for Wife's conduct in
increasing the cost of litigation and frustrating settlement. He was also awarded $180,000.00 for
the reduction in the sale price of real property awarded to him. He was also awarded $45,000.00
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in interest on his fees bill. The $500,000.00 sanction was overturned because it was not for the
attorney fees and costs Mr. Kekoa incurred due to, even though Ms. Sagonowsky did not dispute
the court's description of her conduct as "unscrupulous", "relentless and culpable", nor the court's
characterization of her behavior as "economic warfare fueled by her wealth, her bitter hatred for
Kekoa, and her complete disregard for the law." She left unchallenged that her conduct warranted
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a sanction under FC 271. Her contention was that the amount awarded was not tethered to the lt
attorney fees and costs incurred by Kekoa. The appellate court agreed.
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Sagonowsky v. Kekoa makes it clear that you can only be awarded your attorney fees and
costs actually incurred, along with any accrued interest, under FC 271. Section 271 sanctions
may only be made payable by a party, even if it is the party's attorney responsible for the "bad
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acts". This is when CCP 128.5 comes in handy. Under 128.5 you are not limited to your actual
fees and costs. The court is authorized to order reasonable expenses, including attorney fees in
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an amount that is sufficient to deter repetition of the conduct or comparable conduct. In addition
CCP 128.5 sanctions can be ordered to be paid by the party, the attorney, or both.
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In reMarriage of Falcone & Fyke (II) (2012) 203 Cai.App.4th 964 discusses the imposition I
of sanctions under 271 and makes it clear that this is not a need-based award so that the
requesting party is not required to demonstrate his/her need for the fees or submit and Income and I
Expense Declaration with the request for the sanctions. The party also is not required to show any
actual injury from the other party's actions. The only requirement is that the sanction must not I
impose an unreasonable financial burden on the party being sanctioned. The best practice is to
provide sufficient information to the Court of the other party's financial situation to show that there
is a source for payment and that the amount requested is not an unreasonable financial burden on
the sanctioned party. There is no requirement that the payment be made in one lump sum -this
may actually be an unreasonable financial burden. In that case it might be a stronger argument
to set forth a reasonable payment plan for the requested sanctions. This might also be the time
to argue that the amount should be off-set against the FC 2030 fees that your client is going to
be ordered to pay due to the relative financial circumstances of the parties.
CCP 128.5
CCP 128.7
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZATION
April28, 2017
CONTEMPT
California Code of Civil Procedure 1218 provides the penalties for a finding of contempt.
Under subsection (a) the Court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000.00 payable to the Court,
imprisonment, and/or, if the contemnor is subject to a court order as a party. reasonable attorney's
fees and costs to the party initiating the contempt in connection with the contempt proceeding. If
the finding of contempt is for a failure to comply with an order under the Family Code, the court
SHALL order the following for each count of contempt on which the contemnor is found guilty:
In ordering the community service and/or incarceration, the court must take into account
the contemnor's employment schedule.
Goold v. Superior Court (2006) 145 Cai.App.4th 1 held that a contemnor may be ordered
to pay the initiating party's reasonable attorney's fees and costs under subdivision (a) in addition
to imposition of community service and/or incarceration under subdivision (c). The award of
attorney's fees under subdivision (a) is intended to reimburse the initiating party for expenses
incurred in prosecuting the contempt, thereby making that party whole, and is not intended to
punish the contemnor. The Court specifically did not determine whether or not the subdivision (a)
fine could be ordered in addition to the subdivision (c) community service and/or incarceration time.
Based upon this statement by the Court, the order for fees is not a sanction order. This ~
means that the moving party must also file a current Income and Expense Declaration pursuant t
to the Rules of Court and our Local Rules in order to be awarded fees.
A contemnor may also be subject to a fine under Code of Civil Procedure 177.5 in addition
to the punishment under Section 1218. Due Process requires that the contemnor be provided
notice and an opportunity to be heard on this issue.
Code of Civil Procedure 177.5 gives the Court the authority to order reasonable monetary
sanctions not to exceed $1,500.00 for any violation of a lawful court order by a person, without
good cause or substantial justification. This sanctions is payable to the Court and not to any of the
parties. It is not limited to the parties. Counsel and witnesses are also subject to this sanction.
The notice of this sanction must be contained in a party's moving or responding papers, or own the
court's own motion. In essence- the person is afforded their due process rights of notice and an
opportunity to be heard. The order imposing the sanction shall be in writing and shall recite in
detail the conduct or circumstances justifying the order.
If an attorney is sanctioned under this section, it cannot be for advocacy of counsel before
the court. In addition, should the sanction amount exceed $1,000.00 the sanctioned attorney is
required to self-report to the State Bar pursuant to B&P 6068(o)(3). Scott C. Moody. Inc. V. Staar
Surgical Co. (2011) 195 Cai.App.4th 1043 is instructive reading.
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
OTHER PARTY:
2. I am asking the court to order that (check all that apply): D petitioner/plaintiff D respondent/defendant
Dother party (specify): pay for my attorney's fees and costs in this legal proceeding as follows:
a. D Fees: $
b. D Costs: $
4. Have attorney's fees and costs been ordered in this case before?
a. D
No.
b. D
Yes. If so, describe the order:
(1) The D
petitioner/plaintiff D
respondent/defendant D other party must pay: $
for attorney's fees and costs.
(a) This order was made on (date):
(b) From the payment sources of (if known):
(c) The payments D have been made D have not been made D have been made in part
since the date of the order.
(2) D Additional information (specify):
5. Along with this Request form, you must complete, file and serve:
a. A current Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150). It is considered current if you have completed form FL-150 within
the past three months and no facts have changed since the time of completion; and
Page 1 of2
Form Approved for Optional Use Family Code, 270,2030,2032,3121,3557,
Judicial Council of California REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 7605; Cal. "Rules of Court, rules 5.425, 5.93
FL-319 [New January 1, 2012] www.courts.ca.gov
COSTS ATTACHMENT
(Family Law)
MATERIALS PAGE 000020
FL-319
1- PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: CASE NUMBER:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
OTHER PARTY:
5. b. A personal declaration in support of your request for attorney's fees and costs that explains why you need an award of
attorney's fees and costs (either Supporting Declaration for Attorney's Fees and Costs Attachment (form FL-158) or a
comparable declaration that addresses the factors covered in form FL-158).
6. The party requesting attorney's fees and costs must provide the court with sufficient information about the following factors:
a. The attorney's hourly billing rate;
b. The nature of the litigation, its difficulty, and skill required and employed in handing the litigation;
c. Fees and costs incurred until now; anticipated attorney's fees and costs; and why the fees and costs are just, necessary,
and reasonable;
d. The attorney's experience in the particular type of work demanded; and
e. If it is a limited scope fee arrangement, the scope of representation.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information contained on all pages of this form and
any attachments is true and correct.
Date:
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
OTHER PARTY:
2. I request that the court D grant 0 grant in part 0 deny the request for attorney's fees and costs.
3. I am providing the following information D in support of D in opposition to the request for attorney's fees and costs.
b. The attorney's fees and costs can be paid from the following sources:
c. The court should consider the following facts in deciding whether to grant, grant in part, or deny the request for attorney's fees
and costs (describe):
0 See Attachment 3c.
d. If appropriate, describe the reasons why a non-spouse party or domestic partner is involved in the case and whether he or she
should or should not pay attorney's fees and costs:
D See Attachment 3d.
Page 1 of2
Form Approved for Optional Use SUPPORTING DECLARATION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Family Code, 270,
Judicial Council of California 2030, 2032, 3121, 3557,
FL-158 [New January 1, 2012) IQ) r.tartin~an's AND COSTS ATTACHMENT 4320, 7605; Cal. Rules of
Court, rules 5.425, 5.93
~ ESSENTIAL fORMS'"' (Family Law) MATERIALS PAGE 000022 www.courts.ca.gov
FL-158
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: CASE NUMBER:
I--
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
OTHER PARTY:
4. Has an order already been made for payment of child support in this case?
a. 0No.
b. DYes. If so, describe the order:
(1) The D
petitioner/plaintiff D
respondenVdefendant D
other party must pay: $
per month for child support.
(a) This order has been in effect since (date):
(b) The payments D
have been made D
have not been made D
have been made in part
since the date of the order.
(2) 0Additional information (specify):
5. Has an order already been made for payment of spousal, partner, or family support in this case?
a. 0No.
b. DYes. If so, describe the order:
(1) The D
petitioner/plaintiff D
respondenVdefendant D
other party must pay:$
per month for D
spousal support D
partner support D
family support.
(a) This order has been in effect since (date):
(b) The payments D
have been made Dhave not been made D
have been made in part
since the date of the order.
(2) 0Additional information (specify):
6. If you are or were married to, or in a domestic partnership with, the person you are seeking fees from, the court must consider the
factors in Family Code section 4320 in determining whether it is just and reasonable under the relative circumstances to award
attorney's fees and costs. Complete and attach Spousal or Partner Support Declaration Attachment (form FL-157) or a
comparable declaration to provide the court with information about the factors described in section 4320.
7. You must complete, file, and serve a current Income and Expense Declaration (form FL-150). It is considered current if you have
completed form FL-150 within the past three months and no facts have changed since the time of completion.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the information contained on all pages of this form and
any attachments is true and correct.
Date:
FL-158 [New January 1, 2012] SUPPORTING DECLARATION FOR ATTORNEYs FEES Page 2 of2
AND COSTS ATTACHMENT
(QJ Martin.Dtan~ MATERIALS PAGE 000023
(Family Law)
l!;:J EsSENTIAl fORMS"'
FL-157
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: CASE NUMBER:
t--
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
OTHER PARTY:
1. Spousal or domestic partner support. I request that the court (check all that apply):
a. 0
Enter a judgment for spousal or domestic partner support for D
Petitioner D
Respondent.
b. 0
Modify the judgment for spousal or domestic partner support for D
Petitioner I:J
Respondent.
c. D
Deny the request to modify the judgment for spousal or domestic partner support.
d. D
Terminate jurisdiction to award spousal or domestic partner support to 0Petitioner Respondent.I:J
2. D Attorney fees and costs. I request that the court (check one):
a. D Order my attorney fees and costs to be paid by I:J my spouse or domestic partner I:J a joined party (specify):
b. D Deny the request for attorney fees and costs.
(2) The current job market for the job skills of the supported party described in item 3a(1) is:
(3) The supported party would need the following time and expense to acquire the education or training to develop the job
skills described in item 3a(1 ):
(4) To develop other, more marketable job skills or employment, the supported party would need the following retraining
or education:
Page 1 of4
SPOUSAL OR PARTNERSHIP SUPPORT
F~~'!li~~r~~~~Jf~P8~~~~~~se
Family Code, 270, 2030, 2032, 4320,
MATERIALS PAGE 000024 www.c~~~:~~;~v
FL-157 [New January 1, 2012] ~ BSE;;MnfORMSno DECLARATION ATTACHMENT
FL-157
PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF: CASE NUMBER:
~
RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:
OTHER PARTY:
3. Facts in support of request.
b. Family Code section 4320(a)(2)
Provide any facts that indicate the supported party's earning ability is, or is not, lower than it might be if he or she had not had
periods of unemployment because of the time needed to attend to domestic duties (explain):
(2) The supporting party's current gross income from employment or self-employment is (specify):
(3) The supporting party's current income from investments, retirement, other sources is (specify):
(4) The supporting party's current assets and their values and balances are (specify):
(5) The supporting party's standard of living is (describe, for example, type and frequency of vacations, value of home and
other real estate, value of investments, type of vehicles owned, credit card use or nonuse):
FL-157 [New January 1, 2012] ~ MartlnDt'an~ SPOUSAL OR PARTNERSHIP SUPPORT Page 2 of4
(2) The supporting party's assets and obligations, including separate property, are (list values and balances):
Describe below any additional information that will assist the court in considering the above factors:
10
have lectured extensively on this issue. My resume is
11
attached, marked Exhibit '1 A" and incorporated herein by
12
reference.
13
FEES INCURRED BY RESPONDENT
14
3. I was retained by said client in this matter in
15
May 2009. I will be representing him in this motion.
16
Since that time I have performed the services outlined in
17
my billing statements and ~ncorporated herein by
18
reference. A copy of these statements will be delivered
19
to opposing counsel and made available to the Court, if
20
requested. Said services and costs.were necessary to the
21
preparation and prosecution of my client's case.
22
4. Under the terms of my retainer agreement with my
23
client, he agreed to pay $450.00 per hour attorney's
24
fees, $275.00 per hour associate fees and $175.00 per
25
hour paralegal charges, and actual costs, as incurred. He
26
paid me a retainer of $5,000, but I do not believe that
27
will cover his total fees for this motion.
28
LYNNE YATES-CARTER
ATTORNEY AT tAW
111 WESTST. JOHNSTEEET, $VITE300
SAN JOSE. CA 05113
In RE Marriage of Doe 106FL133470 MATERIALSPAGE000029
DECLARATION OF LYNNE YATES-CARTER RE FEES AND COSTS
2
7. I am requesting that the court order the
3
opposing party to pay to me the amount of $20,000 for
4
fees and costs pursuant to Family Code Section 271 for
5
16
presently is not working in that position. She has moved
27
28
L YNNI:i Y ATl'.S-CARTER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
111 WEST ST. JOHN STEEET. SUI1l: 300
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
In RE Marriage Of Doe 106FL1334 70 MATERIALS PAGE 000031
("08)~ DECLARATION OF LYNNE YATES-CARTER RE FEES AND COSTS
P"ACSIIIII I' (401) ,.._1~'~
1 I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is
6
LYNNE YATES-CARTER
7 Attorney for Respondent
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LYNNE YATES-CARTHR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
111 WEST ST. JOHN STEEET, SI,KT'E 300 In RE Marriage of Doe 106FL133470 MATERIALS PAGE 000032 5
SAN JOSE, CA &5113
(40$),... .... DECLARATION OF LYNNE YATES-CARTER RE FEES AND COSTS
,AC$1Mtl,. (Q)ll5ot111:'4
1 LYNNE YATES-CARTER, SBN 73252
Attorney at Law
2 111 West St. John Street, Suite 300
San Jose, CA 95113
3 Telephone: (408) 294-9544
4 Attorney for JANE DOE
9
10 In re the Marriage of ) Case No. llOFLOOOO
)
11 Petitioner: JOHN DOE )
) Declaration of Lynne
12 vs. ) Yates-Carter In Support
) of Motion, Request for
13 ) Arrearage Determination,
Respondent: JANE DOE ) and for Attorneys Fees and
14 ) Costs
)
15 )
16
APJ: Hon. R. Hiyashi #72
17
2 Exhibit 11
A".
3 2. I was retained by my client on May 13, 2015. I charged
4
her a retainer of $5,000. I bill against this at $450 hour for
5
myself and $275 per hour for my associate. Costs such as
6
filing fees, processing serving, overnight night mail and
7
similar litigation expenses are charged to the client.
8
3. I do not believe my client's retainer will cover her
9
10
bill. I will spend approximately two hours on this motion,
15
understand, Mr. Bridges' income has increased from $10,000 per
16
month ($120,000 per year) to $250,000 per year ($20,833 per
17
month). His new pay seems to have been in effect since June 1,
18
2014. This means that a Smith/Ostler on $10,833.33 of his
19
additional wages has not been paid from June 1, 2014 to
20
24 about his raise, income and any benefits. I will run the
25 actual calculations when I receive the response to my subpena.
26
Anyway you look at it, my client is entitled to back support
27
and I request that the court calculate the arrearages and
28
LYNN~ YATES-CARTER
ATT"ORNEY AT LAW
In RE Marriage of Doe 110FL00000 2
111 WEST ST. JOHtl STEEET, SUITE 300
SAN JOSE, CA 85113
Declaration of Lynne Yates-Carter re Arrear~ALS~~1~ees
~~OI)llto1-s&M
'AC11Ml P' (<tOII,..,I<fl4
order him to pay them to my client forthwith. Her support,
12 11, 2017.
13
14
15
LYNNE YATES-CARTER
Attorney for Respondent
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
LVNNE YATES-CARTER
AiTORNEY AT LAW
In RE Marriage of Doe 110FLOOOOO 3
111 WEST ST. JOHN STEEET, SUITE 300
SAN JOSE, CA 95113
Declaration of Lynne Yates-Carter re Arrear~~~L~~~~Fees
(oiOe)~
l'~l'{o101)""'14~4
TDC Family Law
TRACY DUELL-GAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CALJFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPBCIALIZII170N
TRAPSFORTHEUNWARY
You should make sure that your actions avoid sanctionable conflict with the opposing party
or opposing counsel.
"We conclude by reminding members of the Bar that their responsibilities as officers of the
court include professional courtesy to the court and opposing counsel .... The legal profession has
already suffered a loss of stature and of public respect. This is more easily understood when the
public perspective of the profession is shaped by cases such as this where lawyers await the
slightest provocation to turn upon each other. Lawyers and judges should work to improve and
enhance the rule of law, not allow a return to the law of the jungle." (See Capotosto v. Collins
(1991) 235 Cai.App.3d 1439, 1443, citing Lossing v. Superior Court (1989) 207 Cai.App.3d 635,
641.)
Section 21 of the Santa Clara County Bar Association's Code of Professionalism states in
part: "In addition to other applicable sections of this Code, in family Jaw proceedings, a lawyer
should seek to reduce emotional tension and trauma and encourage the parties and lawyers to
interact in a cooperative atmosphere, and keep the best interest of the children in mind."
The County Bar and State Bar codes of professionalism are not enforceable laws, however,
not complying with these codes may be factors that can be considered in the award of sanctions
to the other side by either you or your client.
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CAUFORNTA BOARD OF LE0.4L SPBC/AlJZATJON
April28,2017
MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
Unrepresented opposing party
There may be times when you are handling a case where the opposing party is
unrepresented by counsel. In these cases, the Court may be giving greater latitude to the
unrepresented party to present their case. It is a good idea to allow some latitude so that the
unrepresented party's due process rights are preserved. If these rights are not preserved, it could
result in the Court of Appeal reversing the orders or judgment. However, this latitude has limits.
Your client also has due process rights. In the event that a Court appears to be providing more
latitude than you feel is appropriate, you may want to point out the following to the Court:
While this Court is entitled to provide some leeway to an unrepresented party to ensure that
due process requirements are met, the Court should not go so far as to infringe on the due process
rights of the represented party.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Kathey's contempt motion nor
did it abuse its discretion in imposing a total of $ 64,500 in sanctions against her.
The trial court found that Kathey's motions were reckless, baseless and frivolous.
Such conduct is an abuse of the legal system that is "not fair to the opposing litigant
who is victimized by such tactics." (National Secretarial Service, Inc. v. Froehlich
(1989) 210 Cai.App.3d 510, 526 [258 Cal. Rptr. 506]; see also In reMarriage of
Economou (1990) 223 Cai.App.3d 97, 106 [272 Cal. Rptr. 673].) Furthermore,
whether the abuse involves the trial courts or the Courts of Appeal, other litigants
are prejudiced by the useless diversion ofthe courts' attention. (Pollock v. University
of Southern California (2003) 112 Cai.App.4th 1416, 1433 [6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122].)
And the judicial system and the taxpayers are damaged by what amounts to a
waste of the court's time and resources. (Ibid.; see also In reMarriage of Gong &
Kwong (2008) 163 Cai.App.4th 510 [77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 540].) Kathey's status as a
self-represented litigant is no excuse. Although she is entitled to represent herself
in propria persona (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cai.App.4th 1229, 1246-1247 [19
Cal. Rptr. 3d 416]), self-represented parties are entitled to no greater consideration
than other litigants and attorneys (id. at p. 1247). (In reMarriage of Falcone & Fyke
(2008) 164 Cai.App.4th 814, 830 [79 Cai.Rptr.3d 588].)
Request for fees at regular hourly rate rather than reduced amount charged to client
In Marriage of Ward (1992) 3 Cai.App.4th 618, 4 Cai.Rptr.2d 365, the court allowed a legal
services organization providing pro bono legal services to the wife to recover reasonable attorney's
fees and costs. The court stated:
Given "the economic realities of legal representation in these days and the maturing
recognition of the morality and the social utility of legal assistance for those
financially unable to retain counsel" [Citation omitted], the cited public policy
considerations underlying the award of fees justify such shifting without regard to
whether the party originally assumed the financial burden of representation and thus
whether the services are provided by a publicly-funded legal services organization
or a privately-funded law fjrm. {Marriage of Ward, supra, 3 Cai.App.4th at 624, 4
Cai.Rptr.2d at 368.)
The court later in the opinion agreed with the majority of other jurisdictions and found that I
"there exists no reason to distinguish between publicly-funded legal services organizations and
privately-funded legal entities in awarding attorney's fees in matrimonial matters. (Marriage of
Ward, supra, 3 Cai.App.4th at 626, 4 Cai.Rptr.2d at 370.)
I
I
Family Code sections 2030-2032 nor case law require that the party seeking an award of
attorney's fees and costs has to establish an underlying private obligation to pay attorney's fees
in order to obtain such award. These sections "make no distinction between parties who are
represented by private counsel for a fee or those qualified by reason of indigency for representation
by a legal services organization or a pro bono attorney without a fee." (Marriage of Ward, supra,
3 Cai.App.4th at 627, 4 Cai.Rptr.2d at 371.)
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
11/E STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZA170N
April28, 2017
In Marriage of Sherman (1984) 162 Cai.App.3d 1 132, the parties entered into a Marital
Settlement Agreement that included the following provision: "In the event that either party shall be
required to bring any action or proceeding to enforce any provision contained in this Agreement,
or to enforce any judgment or order made by a court in connection with this Agreement, the party
prevailing in such action or proceeding shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees and
costs .... " Husband attempted to modify a non-modifiable spousal support order and lost. Wife
requested attorney's fees which were granted pursuant to Civil Code 1717.
If fees are awarded under Civil Code 1717 to the prevailing party, the requesting party
does not need to show financial need or the other party's ability to pay. Fees under this section are
an element of the costs of suit and emanate from the contractual relationship of the parties, not
from their relationship under the Family Law Act. Reasonable attorney's fees shall be fixed by the
court, upon notice and motion by a party. In order to obtain fees under this provision, the request
must be specifically plead in the moving papers. These fees cannot be recovered solely based
upon a memorandum of costs.
Prevailing party attorney's fees are reciprocal under the statute. If one party is granted
prevailing party fees, then both parties are allowed to recover prevailing party fees. If the contract
provides the "prevailing party" shall recover from the other attorney fees incurred in litigation to
enforce the contract, whichever party is determined to have "prevailed" in an action on the contract
(breach of contract litigation or other proceeding to enforce the contract) is entitled to recover
"reasonable" attorney fees as costs of suit--whether or not that party is expressly named in the
contract as being entitled to a fee award. (See Hogeboom & King, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE: FAMILY
LAW (The Rutter Group 2016, 14:276).
California Rules of Court, rule 3. 1702 sets forth the procedures for claiming prevailing party
attorney's fees under Civil Code 1717. This rule states:
(a) Application
Except as otherwise provided by statute, this rule applies in civil cases to claims for statutory
attorney's fees and claims for attorney's fees provided for in a contract. Subdivisions (b) and (c)
apply when the court determines entitlement to the fees, the amount of the fees, or both, whether
the court makes that determination because the statute or contract refers to "reasonable" fees,
because it requires a determination of the prevailing party, or for other reasons.
A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees for services up to and including the rendition of judgment
in the trial court-including attorney's fees on an appeal before the rendition of judgment in the trial
court-must be served and filed within the time for filing a notice of appeal under rules 8.104 and
8.108 in an unlimited civil case or under rules 8.822 and 8.823 in a limited civil case.
The parties may, by stipulation filed before the expiration of the time allowed under (b)(1 ), extend
the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees:
(A) Until60 days after the expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal in an unlimited civil case
or 30 days after the expiration of the time in a limited civil case; or
(B) If a notice of appeal is filed, until the time within which a memorandum of costs must be served
and filed under rule 8.278(c) in an unlimited civil case or under rule 8.891(c)(1) in a limited civil
case.
A notice of motion to claim attorney's fees on appeal-other than the attorney's fees on appeal
claimed under (b)-under a statute or contract requiring the court to determine entitlement to the
fees, the amount of the fees, or both, must be served and filed within the time for serving and filing
the memorandum of costs under rule 8.278(c)(1) in an unlimited civil case or under rule 8.891 (c)(1)
in a limited civil case.
The parties may by stipulation filed before the expiration of the time allowed under (c)(1) extend
the time for filing the motion up to an additional 60 days in an unlimited civil case or 30 days in a
limited civil case.
(d) Extensions
For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney's fees in the
absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation.
If a party is entitled to statutory or contractual attorney's fees that are fixed without the necessity
of a court determination, the fees must be claimed in the memorandum of costs.
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CAUFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPECIALIZA110N
In the event that your client does not have sufficient resources to pay your attorney's fees
and costs, you can request that a lien be placed on any real property owned by your client. Since
this situation raises a conflict of interest between you and your client, you must comply fully with
the provisions of Family Code 2033 and Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-300.
Family Code 2033 allows either party (dissolution, legal separation or nullity action only)
to encumber his/her interest in any community real property. A FLARPL is not available post..final
judgment. It is only available while the case is pending trial or final judgment.
I
f
The notice of the lien must either be personally served on the opposing party or the other I
party's attorney of record at least 15 days prior to recording the lien. The notice must contain the
following, under penalty of perjury:.
b. Your client's belief concerning the fair market value of the property and
documentation supporting that belief;
d. A list of the community assets and liabilities and their estimated values as of the
date of the declaration;
If the non..encumbering party objects to the lien, that party must file an ex parte objection
with the Court. This objection must include a request to stay the recording of the lien until further
order of the court and must contain a copy of the notice received. The objection must also include
the following, in a declaration signed under penalty of perjury:
a. Specific objections to the family law attorney's real property lien and to the specific
items in the notice;
b. The objector's belief concerning the appropriate items or value and any
documentation supporting the belief; and
Except as otherwise provided in FC 2033, the general procedural rules regarding ex parte
motions apply. This means that the objecting party must give the requesting party notice of the
ex parte motion prior to filing it with the Court. Because FC 2033 requires the ex parte objection
to include a request to stay the recordation of the FLARPL until further notice of the Court, notice
must be given to the other party. The objection also must contain a copy of the FLARPL notice
received.
The Court may deny the lien based upon a finding that the encumbrance would likely resut
in an unequal division of property because it would impair the encumbering party's ability to meet
his/her fair share of the community obligations or would otherwise be unjust under the
circumstances. For good cause, the Court may limit the amount of the lien, however, this limitation
is not to be construed as a determination of the reasonable attorney's fees.
Upon an objection, the Court may on its own motion, determine whether the case involves
complex or substantial issues of fact or law related to property rights, visitation, custody, or support.
If the Court makes this finding, it may direct implementation of a case management plan to allocate
attorney's fees, court costs, expert fees, and consultant fees equitably between the parties.
The Court retains jurisdiction to resolve any dispute arising from the existence of the
FLARPL. This jurisdiction remains in effect until the FLARPL is extinguished.
The use of FLARPLs fell out of favor when the real estate market imploded. Now that the
market has rebounded, many of our clients now have sufficient community property equity in the
family residence (or other parcels of real property) to justify the time and expense of utilizing the
FLARPL procedures. You should also make sure that you are monitoring the status of your client's
outstanding balance and will be willing to forego collection if the property is no longer available for
enforcement of your lien. This is an effective tool to secure your fees while a Client is on a monthly
payment plan if the bill cannot be paid in full each month.
The FLARPL is a statutory lien rather than a judicial lien. In re Scott. Jr. (2009) 400 B.R.
257 discusses how a party's bankruptcy action is affected by the other party's FLARPL recorded
prior to the property being awarded to the non-encumbering party prior to the filing of his/her
bankruptcy. (See further explanation in the Attorney's Briefcase attachment.)
A FLARPL remains enforceable after judgment, even if the property is awarded to the other
spouse. Once the attorney records the FLARPL s/he is an indispensable party and is required to
be provided notification of any hearings related to the FLARPL. (In reMarriage of Ramirez (2011)
198 Cai.App.4th 336. See also Attorney's Briefcase attachment.)
In reMarriage ofTurkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cai.App.4th 332 discusses the Court's ability
to expunge a recorded FLARPL. The recording attorney must have notice. The Court is not
required to issue a Statement of Decision on a motion to expunge a FLARPL. (See Attorney's
Briefcase attachment.)
Included with these materials are exemplars of the various documents which should be
completed to properly effectuate your FLARPL. They are:
1. An explanation letter to your client with a copy of Family Code 2033, 2034 and
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3-300.
2. County Recorder's Cover Page and Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien. This
must contain a description of the property. It is the document that is recorded with
the County Recorder's office with the mandatory separate cover page.
3. Notice of Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien. This is the pleading that is
served on the opposing party/counsel and filed with the Court.
4. Release of Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien. This is the document that
must be recorded (with the mandatory cover page) at the time you are required to
release the lien.
5. Sample escrow demand letter. This has several provisions based on potential
documents that may exist with respect to your security interest in the property.
FLARPL, a "statutory" not "judicial" lien, attached solely toW's c/p interest in marital
home prior to its award to H in disso, and was not avoidable by H as impairing his
homestead exemption.
In re Scott (2009) 400 B.R. 257
Riblet, Bankr. J. BankrCt
FACTS: Chapter 7 debtor (H) moved to avoid/expunge Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien
(FLARPL) acquired per CA law by law firm representing estranged W in divorce. Lien was recorded
against W's community interest in family residence, which was awarded to H in divorce, subject to
encumbrances. Bankr. ct. denied H's petition.
HELD: FLARPL, a "statutory" not 'judicial" lien, attached solely to W's c/p interest in marital
home prior to its award to H in disso, and was not avoidable by H as impairing his homestead
exemption.
The FLARPL lien attached solely to W's community interest in marital home prior to its award to
debtor, and was not avoidable by H as impairing his homestead exemption:
Bankr. ct. noted the circumstances of this case akin to those of Farrey v. Sanderfoot (1991) 500
U.S. 291, wherein the lien never encumbered debtor's pre-existing undivided 1/2 interest. Here, the
FLARPL never encumbered H's pre-existing community property (c/p) interest because it attached
only to the encumbering party's (W's) interest in the c/p. (Pam. Code 2033.) As in Farrey, H here took
his interest and the lien together, as if he purchased an already encumbered estate from a 3rd party.
Since H never possessed his new fee simple interest before the lien fixed, 11 U.S.C. 522 (f) not
available to void the lien.
Moreover, under unambiguous language of section 2033, the FLARPL could attach only toW's
community interest. Simply because H had a community interest in the community real property did
not mean the lien attached to his community interest in the property. Rather, the lien attached to
W's community interest only. Because the FLARPL did not fix on an interest ofH in the residence at
the time it was recorded, H could not utilize 11 U.S.C. 522 (f)(l) to avoid the lien.
FLARPL was "statutory lien" not subject to avoidance on exemption-impairment grounds:
Bankr. ct. noted no cases determining whether a CA FLARPL is a statutory lien or a judicial lien.
Court looked to cases regarding other state atty liens and found they were interpreted as statutory.
"A Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien created under [Cal. Fam. Code 2033] falls squarely
within the definition of a statutory lien. A 'statutory lien' is a lien 'arising solely by force of a statute on
specified circumstances or conditions, ... but does not include security interest or judicial lien.' [II
U.S.C. 101 (53).] On the other hand, a judicial lien' is 'obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration, or
other legal or equitable process or proceeding.' [ll U.S.C. 101 (36).]" (In re Scott, supra, 400 B.R.
265.)
A Calif. FLARPL is described by statute, and absolutely no intervention is required by family law
court to create a valid family law attorney's lien in community real property. The statute sets forth a
procedure for challenging such a lien by the nonencumbering party.
H here unsuccessfully challenged the FLARPL. Fam. ct denied his motion to expunge the lien and
ordered that the lien remain in full force and effect. State court did not create the lien, nor did it
transform the lien into a judicial lien pterely by determining that the lien remained in full force and
effect. Since FLARPL is a statutory lien, H could not use I1 U.S.C. 522 (f)(1) to avoid it.
2016 Attorney's Briefcase, Inc. Page 1 of 2
Bank 163.00
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f
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AtFe 768.00
Order vacating FLARPL was void where W's former atty was not joined as an
indispensable party, or notified of the proceeding, and thus could not be compelled to
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give up her interest in the FLARPL. t
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il
In reMarriage ofRamirez (2011) 198 Cai.App.4th 336, 132 Cal.Rptr.3d 41
McConnell, P.J. DCA4
I
FACTS: W executed a $60,000 family law attorney's real property lien [FLARPL] (Fam. Code 2033 I
(a)) recorded against c/p residence as security for fees in FIL action. Deed of trust recorded after notice
to H. Matter settled in 2009 with residence awarded to H, subject to all encumbrances, which he (
I
agreed to pay. Each party agreed to pay own attorney fees. A withdrew from case.
H later filed action to force A and W to remove deed of trust from residence, claiming he had no
notice of it. A not joined and not served. Trial judge #1 ordered FLARPL removed. Order not served
I
on A. ~
A later sued W for unpaid fees and learned for first time about FLARPL order. She moved to be
joined and to set aside order. H and W opposed her requests. Trial judge #2 ordered A joined, but
I
refused to set aside previous order, stating he had no authority to overrule another superior court judge.
A ordered to release lien.
Court of Appeal stayed order and then reversed.
HELD: Order vacating FLARPL was void where W' s former atty was not joined as an
indispensable party, or notified of the proceeding, and thus could not be compelled to give up her
interest in the FLARPL.
A was an indispensable party to H's motion for an order vacating the FLARPL, and thus joinder
was required before A's rights under the FLARPL could be adjudicated. (Code Civ. Proc. 389; Rules
of Court rule 5.150 [now Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.24]; Glade v. Glade (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441,
1451, card B{PrBT 559.00}.)
At the hearing, the court should have found the order vacating the FLARPL was void because A
was not joined as an indispensable party, or even notified of the proceeding, and thus could not be
compelled to give up her interest in the FLARPL. As a result, A was deprived of the opportunity to
rebut the arguments H made to obtain the vacatur of the FLARPL.
Court noted second judge's belief he lacked authority to rectify original judge's order was
mistaken. "An order rendered without an indispensable party is void as to that party." (In re Marriage
of Ramirez, supra, 198 Cai.App.4th at p. 345.)
Card Notes:
AtFe767.00
I
Encumbering Without Consent
I
FC 2034(c) permits trial court to expunge FLARPLs when a dispute arises as to their r
propriety after the FLARPLs have been recorded.
In reMarriage ofTurkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 498 Il
Flier, J. DCA2 i
FACTS: Former attorneys for W (As) appealed from trial ct.'s order granting H's motion to expunge
As' "family law attorney's real property liens" (FLARPLs) on W's interest in 1234 N. Bundy Drive
residence. (Fam. Code 2033 (a).) As recorded these FLARPLs to secure fees and costs when they
represented W during first phase of dissolution trial [setting the value at DOM of a closely held
II
corporation formed by H prior to marriage (valuation trial)]. Court ultimately awarded H the 1234 N.
I
Bundy Drive property.
As contended the court erred in granting H's motion to expunge because the relevant sections of the
Family Code do not permit the court to expunge duly noticed and recorded FLARPLs. Court of
Appeal affirmed.
HELD: FC 2034(c) permits trial court to expunge FLARPLs when a dispute arises as to their
propriety after the FLARPLs have been recorded.
I
H contended the trial ct. did not err in expunging the FLARPLs because W had no remaining
interest in 1234 Bundy to which the FLARPLs could attach, and additionally, the relevant Farn. Code
statute permitted the court to expunge the FLARPLs at any time upon application of either party.
-Court of Appeal found the lien, "once validly attached to the property, follows the property
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pursuant to [Fam. Code 916] and does not automatically disappear because the court awards the
property to the nonencumbering spouse." (Id. at p. 349.) Here, at the time the FLARPLs were created,
1234 N. Bundy was presumptive c/p. (Fam. Code 760; In reMarriage of Mix (1975) 14 CalJd 604,
610-611, card B{CmPr 050.00}.) Further, Wand As complied with the statutory requirements ofFam.
Code 2033 for attaching the FLARPLs. They gave notice to H, he consented to the FLARPLs against
W's 1/2 community interest in 1234 N. Bundy, and As duly recorded the DOTs. Award of 1234 N.
Bundy to H as his s/p did not automatically extinguish the liens.
-Court of Appeal found "[t]he true crux of this matter is whether [Fam. Code 2033] or [Fam.
Code 2034] permits the court to expunge FLARPL's when a dispute arises as to their propriety after
the FLARPL's have been recorded .... [Section 2034(c)] so permits the court." (In reMarriage of
Turkanis & Price, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 350.)
"If the encumbering party can seek to avoid a FLARPL's enforcement after 'improvidently'
executing it [Fam. Code 2034(a), Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide Family Law (Rutter Group
20 11) 1:296], we see no reason why the nonencumbering party cannot attempt to do the same."
Section 2034(c) gives the trial court jurisdiction to revisit the propriety of a FLARPL at any time.
Holding rests on the plain language of the statute. If the prerecordation, ex parte objection process is
the only time when parties may contest the propriety of a FLARPL, it is the task of the Legislature and
not the courts to make such an amendment to section 2034.
FC 2034(c) permits trial court to expunge FLARPLs when a dispute arises as to their propriety after
the FLARPLs have been recorded. Court noted that its holding made taking FLARPLs risky:
"While our holding engenders some risk for attorneys who accept FLARPL's, trial courts routinely
adjudicate the propriety and reasonableness of fee awards under the Family Code and have broad
discretion to do so, and attorneys are thus routinely taking the risk that the court will not reimburse all
2016 Attorney's Briefcase, Inc. Pagel of 2
FaRe293.01
Trial court did not err in taking into account atty.'s litigation conduct when reducing fee
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award to $39,000 as court based the award on the totality of the circumstances, and did
not arbitrarily reduce the award as a sanction. I~
In reMarriage ofTurkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, I 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 498
1'-
Flier, J. DCA2 I
FACTS: See Facts discussed on card B{FaRe 293.00}. Attorneys (As) appealed from order on AI 'sIn
reMarriage of Borson (I974) 37 Cal.App.3d 632, card B{AtFe 045.00} motion for attorney fees, in
which court ordered H to pay $39,000 to AI for W's fees. AI had sought fees from H of$273,000. As
II
contended the court erred in offsetting the fee award for unreasonable litigation conduct under Pam.
Code 27I. Court of Appeal affirmed both orders. i.
As argued the ct. erred because it could not award Fam. Code 27I sanctions as an offset; instead,
H had to comply with due process requirements by properly noticing a section 271 motion. I
I'
Trial ct. did not err. Although the court's order discussed section 271 and determined that AI 's
conduct warranted such sanctions, it was "clear from the court's thorough discussion that it based the
award on the totality of the circumstances, and did not arbitrarily reduce the award to $39,000 as a
sanction." (Id. at p. 355.)
Court noted the factors considered to arrive at the award amount were proper here [Fam. Code
j
2030], and that consideration of AI 's litigation conduct and a reduction for fees attributable to the !
unreasonable conduct was proper, even without reference to section 271. The award clearly considered i
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parties' respective incomes and expenses, their assets and liabilities, their earning capacities, the I
substantial amount that H still owed his own attorneys and would owe based on the pending appeals,
the fact that H was supporting the parties' daughter, and the fact that, after this award, he would have
paid approximately $164,000 ofCl 's fees and costs.
I!
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NOTES: H first contended that AI did not timely appeal from the Borson order because the notice of
appeal identified W as the sole appellant. Court of Appeal noted that while true, appellants' briefs
were timely filed on behalf of W and A I.
Card Notes:
AtFe 812.00
IRMO Ramirez did not require trial court to join attys. to proceedings before the
motion to expunge their FLARPLs where transcript clear that neither court nor H
thought the FLARPLs were expunged by the judgment.
In reMarriage ofTurkanis & Price (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 332, 152 Cal.Rptr.3d 498
Flier, J. DCA2
FACTS: See Facts discussed on card B{AtFe 812.00}. Relying on In reMarriage of Ramirez (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 336, card B{PrAT 452.00} attorneys (As) maintained the trial ct. erred in failing to
join them to the action before entering a judgment that extinguished their FLARPLs.
Court of Appeal found Ramirez inapposite. As were parties to the motion to expunge proceedings.
Trial ct. did not expunge the FLARPLs in their absence and thereby violate due process. As contended
the court did do so when the judgment stated H was taking 1234 N. Bundy free of any encumbrances
(except a lien for delinquent taxes). Thus, they claimed to be indispensable parties to the allocation
trial leading up to the judgment. Court noted the transcript was clear that neither the court nor H
thought the FLARPLs were expunged by the judgment. That was why the court ordered H to bring a
separate motion to expunge and to notice As with the motion. Ramirez did not require the trial court to
join them to the proceedings before the motion to expunge.
Card Notes:
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AtFe 817.00
PrAT499.00
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CAUFORNIA BOARD OF LEGAL SPECMUZATION
Dear XXX:
In order for my law firm to take a security interest in the real property owned by you and
your spouse as a means of securing payment of attorney's fees owed and/or to be owed
to my law office for past and future fees, it is necessary that I comply with Family Code
2033 and 2034, which in turn requires that I comply with Rule 3-300 of the Rules of
Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California. I have included a copy of that rule
here for your benefit. The rule requires that I disclose the terms of the transaction to you
in writing.
This letter therefore constitutes written memorialization of what I have already orally told
you during your office consultation (i.e., that in order for my law firm to continue to
represent you in this case it is necessary that either you pay the requested retainer
replenishment to my law office up front or that fees be secured so that some time in the
future my law firm will be paid the attorney's fees you will owe it pursuant to the retainer
agreement you signed, a copy of which you have already been provided).
You informed me that you did not have enough money to pay in full the retainer
replenishment I requested, and could not borrow or otherwise obtain sufficient sums from
friends or family or other sources at this time. I therefore explained to you that an available
alternative methodology, albeit not the preferred methodology, was for my law office to
record a deed of trust securing a promissory note you would sign in favor of Tracy Dueii-
Cazes. Said promissory note would come due on a specific date (i.e., the entire principal
and all interest, if any, would come due on that specified date.) In the event of non-
payment by you on or before that specified date of the entire then-due amount, I would
then have the technical right to cause a foreclosure on whatever property(s) secures that
note. Fortunately, up until this time I have never required to actually foreclose upon any
client's property. Rather, I have always been paid from either the proceeds from the sale
of [typically] the family residence or from another source. I would intend to and hope that
I would be able to do the same in your case, presuming that the lien is satisfied in a
reasonable period of time. However, you do need to be aware that my law firm would have
Page 2 of 2
a theoretical right to foreclose on the secured real property pursuant to the deed of trust
and promissory note, and that should, for whatever reason, you be unable to pay off the
entire amount owed on the promissory note within a reasonable period of time, I do
expressly reserve the right to commence and, if necessary, complete, foreclosure
proceedings so that any and all moneys due my law office are in fact paid.
I am further required to advise you that you may seek the advice of an independent
attorney of your choice on this issue and that my law office must allow you a reasonable
period of time to do the same. In that I have previously advised you of this right, I hope you
have already done so if you are so inclined. If you have not done so but desire to do so,
please do so immediately. I believe I have fully explained this transaction and that all
terms are fair and reasonable to you. However, if you have any doubts or if you need a
further explanation or second opinion, please feel free to contact another attorney so that
you may obtain a fuller and/or second opinion concerning the terms of this transaction.
If you have any questions about any aspect of this matter, please contact me. If I do not
hear from you in the near future, I will presume you fully understood and agreed to the
particulars of the proposed Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien, and will proceed to
cause the Deed of Trust to be recorded.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the office.
Sincerely,
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
TDC:td
Encl. CA Family Code 2033 and 2034
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3-300
(a) Either party may encumber his or her interest in community real property to pay reasonable attorney's fees
in order to retain or maintain legal counsel in a proceeding for dissolution of marriage, for nullity of
marriage, or for legal separation of the parties. This encumbrance shall be known as a "family law attorney's
real property lien" and attaches only to the encumbering party's interest in the community real property.
(b) Notice of a family law attorney's real property lien shall be served either personally or on the other party's
attorney ofrecord at least 15 days before the encumbrance is recorded. This notice shall contain a declaration
signed under penalty of perjury containing all of the following:
(2) The party's belief as to the fair market value of the property and documentation supporting that belief.
(4) A list of community assets and liabilities and their estimated values as of the date of the declaration.
(c) The nonencumbering party may file an ex parte objection to the family law attorney's real property lien.
The objection shall include a request to stay the recordation until further notice of the court and shall contain
a copy of the notice received. The objection shall also include a declaration signed under penalty of perjury
as to all of the following:
(1) Specific objections to the family law attorney's real property lien and to the specific items in the notice.
(2) The objector's belief as to the appropriate items or value and any documentation supporting that belief.
(3) A declaration specifically stating why recordation of the encumbrance at this time would likely result in
an unequal division of property or would otherwise be unjust under the circumstances of the case.
(d) Except as otherwise provided by this section, general procedural rules regarding ex parte motions apply.
(e) An attorney for whom a family law attorney's real property lien is obtained shall comply with Rule 3- 300
of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California.
2034. Denial or limitation of family law attorney's real property lien; Implementation of case management
plan
(a) On application of either party, the court may deny the family law attorney's real property lien described
in Section 203 3 based on a finding that the encumbrance would likely result in an unequal division of
property because it would impair the encumbering party's ability to meet his or her fair share of the
community obligations or would otherwise be unjust under the circumstances of the case. The court may also
for good cause limit the amount of the family law attorney's real property lien. A limitation by the court is
not to be construed as a determination of reasonable attorney's fees.
(b) On receiving an objection to the establishment of a family law attorney's real property lien, the court may
on its own motion determine whether the case involves complex or substantial issues of fact or law related
to property rights, visitation, custody, or support. If the court finds that the case involves one or more ofthese
complex or substantial issues, the court may direct the implementation of a case management plan as
provided in subdivision (d) of Section 2032.
(c) The court has jurisdiction to resolve any dispute arising from the existence of a family law attorney's real
property lien.
(A) The transaction or acquisition and its terms are fair and reasonable to the client and are fully
disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in a manner which should reasonably have been
understood by the client; and
(B) The client is advised in writing that the client may seek the advice of an independent lawyer of
the client's choice and is given a reasonable opportunity to seek that advice; and
(C) The client thereafter consents in writing to the terms of the transaction or the terms of the
acquisition.
Discussion:
Rule 3-300 is not intended to apply to the agreement by which the member is retained by the client,
unless the agreement confers on the member an ownership, possessory, security, or other
pecuniary interest adverse to the client. Such an agreement is governed, in part, by rule 4-200.
Rule 3-300 is not intended to apply where the member and client each make an investment on
terms offered to the general public or a significant portion thereof. For example, rule 3-300 is not
intended to apply where A, a member, invests in a limited partnership syndicated by a third party.
8, A's client, makes the same investment. Although A and B are each investing in the same
business, A did not enter into the transaction "with" B for the purposes of the rule.
~ou~: - -- -- -- - - - -- - - - - - -
CITYISTATE/ZlP: - ---------------
(DOCUMENT TITLE)
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11 In re Marriage of: CASE NO.
APJ:
12 PETITIONER: XXX
FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY'S REAL
13 PROPERTY LIEN
14 vs.
15 RESPONDENT:XXX
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17 The [Petitioner/Respondent], XXX hereby grants to TRACY DUELL-CAZES, Attorney at
18 Law, a Family Law Attorney's Real Property Lien pursuant to the provisions of California Family
20 to a fee agreement between Respondent and the above-named attorney dated XXX.
21 This lien shall attach to the following described Real Property in the City of XXX, County
23 [[LEGAL DESCRIPTION]]
25 DATED: _ _ __
[[CLIENT'S NAME]]
26
27
28 PAGE 1 of 1
FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY'S REAL PROPERTY LIEN
T:\TDCWPDOCS\LEGAL\FLARPL\IFLARPL.y,pd
ATTORNEY FOR
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7 I
8 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA I
9
10
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA
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11
12
In re Marriage of:
PETITIONER:,
CASE NO.
APJ:
RELEASE OF FAMILY LAW
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14
vs.
RESPONDENT:,
ATTORNEY'S REAL PROPERTY LIEN
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16 TRACY DUELL-CAZES, Attorney at Law, hereby releases the Family Law Attorney's
17 Real Property Lien granted by XXXX pursuant to the provisions of California Family Code
18 2033. Said lien was recorded XXXX in the Office of the County Recorder of Santa Clara
19 County as Document No. XXXXX.
20 This lien attached to the following described Real Property in the City of XXX,
21 County of Santa Clara, State of California:
22 [[[INSERT LEGAL DESCRIPTION]]]
23 DATED: _______
TRACY DOELL-GAZES
24
25
26
27
28 PAGE 1 of 1
RELEASE OF FAMILY LAW ATTORNEY'S REAL PROPERTY LIEN
T:\TDCWPDOCS\LEGAL\FLARPL\!Release of FLARPL.wpd
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNM BOARD OF LEGAL SPECLfL/ZATJON
[[DATE]]
[[TITLE COMPANY]]
[[ADDRESS]]
[[ADDRESS]]
I, Tracy Dueii-Cazes, creditor and beneficiary of the Court Order awarding this office
fees payable to the Seller, hereby demand payment in full on the following encumbrances:
***opposing party**** became personally and jointly liable for this debt
through the Order of the court (case# [[CASE NO]]) dated [[DATE]].
Enclosed herewith, in addition to said original Promissory Note and original Deed
of Trust, is this duly executed BENEFICIARY DEMAND and SUBSTITUTION OF
TRUSTEE AND FULL RECONVEYANCE to be held by you until close of escrow. You are
authorized to record said SUBSTITUTION, BUT ONLY UPON PAYMENT IN FULL TO
TRACY DUELL-GAZES in the above-indicated amount (together with interest at the rate
of ten percent (10/o) per annum until date of payment). Obviously, if escrow does not
close, I respectfully request return of said original PROMISSORY NOTE, said original
DEED OF TRUST, said BENEFICIARY DEMAND, and said SUBSTITUTION OF
TRUSTEE AND FULL RECONVEYANCE.
If you have any questions, please feel free to contact the office.
Sincerely,
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
TDC:td
Encl.
CC: Client (w/encl)
T:\TDCWPDOCS\LEGAL\FLARPL\EscrowDemand Latter.wpd
TRACY DUELL-CAZES
CERTIFIED FAMILY LAW SPECIALIST
71JE STA7E BAR OF CAUFORNIA BOARD OF LEXJAL SPEC/AUZATION
BORSON MOTION
Family Code 272 provides the Court with the authority to make an attorney fees award
payable directly to the party's attorney. Thereafter, the attorney may enforce the order in his/her
own name, subject only to subsection (c).
(a) Where the court orders one of the parties to pay attorney's fees and costs for
the benefit of the other party, the fees and costs may, in the discretion of the court,
be made payable in whole or in part to the attorney entitled thereto.
(b) Subject to subdivision (c), the order providing for payment of the attorney's fees
and costs may be enforced directly by the attorney in the attorney's own name or
by the party in whose behalf the order was made.
(c) If the attorney has ceased to be the attorney for the party in whose behalf the
order was made, the attorney may enforce the order only if it appears of record that
the attorney has given to the former client or successor counsel 10 days' written
notice of the application for enforcement of the order. During the 10-day period, the
client may file in the proceeding a motion directed to the former attorney for partial
or total reallocation of fees and costs to cover the services and cost of successor
counsel. On the filing of the motion, the enforcement of the order by the former
attorney shall be stayed until the court has resolved the motion.
The Borson motion must be filed BEFORE the Substitution of Attorney is filed with the
Court. The moving attorney must still be the attorney of record for the client at the time the motion
is filed. If you are making this request, make sure that your motion is filed before the Substitution
of Attorney is filed. The hearing may be held after the filing of the Substitution.
This motion is a request that the opposing party pay some or all of your attorney's fees
and costs on your client's behalf.
An attorney who has been discharged may, with the former client's consent, file the motion
on the former client's behalf requesting that the Court set the fee amount and determine how it is
to be paid.
If a prior attorney's request for Borson fees and costs is reserved or continued, that attorney
I
is entitled to notice of any hearings, orders, and/or settlements related to the attorney's fees and
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costs. Without such notice and opportunity to participate, any subsequent fees motion may be
voidable. I
Suggested language for the order on a Borson motion.
1.
2.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees and costs to [[[FORMER
ATTORNEY NAME]]] for services rendered and costs incurred in the within case.
The parties and their current attorneys shall notify [[[FORMER ATTORNEY NAME]]]
of all hearings, conferences and trials wherein attorneys fees and costs are in issue.
I
3. No settlement, agreement or judgment shall be approved without [[[FORMER
ATTORNEY NAME]]] having the opportunity to be heard with respect to [his/her]
fees to assure that [his/her] fees are not circumvented or in any way defeated.
Attached are 5 Attorney's Briefcase pages providing further information on four key cases.
These should be read for further information prior to the need to file a Borson motion to protect
your ability to obtain fees and costs payable by the other party in addition to your Client.
Meadow v. Superior Court (Beilenson. Meyer. Rosenfeld & Susman) (1963) 59 Cal.2d 610
In reMarriage of Borson (1974) 37 Cai.App.3d 632
In reMarriage of Kelso (1998) 67 Cai.App.4th 374
In reMarriage of Read (2002) 97 Cal.app.4th 476
NOTES: (1) Supreme Ct. specifically referred to former Civil Code sections 137.3 and 137.5, which
were later incorporated into former Civil Code section 43 70; all references above to former Civil Code
section 4370 appear in opinion as Civil Code sections 137.3 and 137.5. Fam. Code 2030 and Fam.
Code 2031 continue subdivs. (a) and (b) offormerCivil Code section 4370, cited above, without
substantive change. Civil Code section 4370 was repealed effective 1/1/94.
(2) Compare In reMarriage of Borson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 632, 112 Cal.Rptr. 432 (this subtopic).
Borson distinguished Meadow because in Borson, at the time A filed motion, W had no dispute that H
should pay her fees. It was only later, after H and W settled and agreed to split A's fees, that W
objected. Borson held that as W's attorneys of record, A could make the motion on her behalf,
especially since she signed earlier petition and motion asking that H be ordered to pay her fees.
(3) See generally DiGrandi v. DiGrandi (1951) 102 Cal.App.2d 442,227 P.2d 841, wherein, on a
different issue, court stated:
''Notwithstanding that the fees may now be made directly payable to the attorney, they are granted
to the wife for her benefit, and the right of the attorney is derived from the client, and he has no greater
right than the client would have." (Id. at pp. 443-444.)
Card Notes:
AtFe 046.01
W's attorneys properly moved for fees from H after they were discharged by W but
prior to formal change.
II
In reMarriage of Borson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 632, 112 Cal.Rptr. 432
Cobey, Acting P.J. DCA2 I
FACTS: W hired attorneys (As) to represent her in dissolution. In her petition, W requested court
award her fees and costs. W filed OSC requesting H pay fees on account. H ordered to pay $3,250. As I
performed extensive discovery. When As told her they needed more time to complete discovery due to
irregularities, W verbally discharged them. Prior to formal change of representation, As, without I
obtaining W's express authority, filed motion requesting that H pay their fees. Court retained
jurisdiction over motion until case concluded. W's new attorneys settled case using discovery
performed by As. H and W agreed to split whatever awarded As.
I
Court awarded As $7,500 fees and $1,027 costs. H appealed, but Court of Appeal affirmed. H
alleged that upon being discharged, As' authority to request fees from H terminated.
"We disagree. We think that the attorney-client relationship by [wife] and her first attorneys
terminated upon their discharge ... for all purposes except the winding-up of the relationship. Such
winding-up .. in this case involved the doing of two things-(1) the making of the motion on her
behalf that [husband] pay additional fees and costs to her attorneys, and (2) the formal change in
[wife's] representation in the proceeding. In the interval between the discharge and the substitution of
representation, [wife's] attorneys, as her attorneys of record, alone could appear in court for her and
continued as her only attorneys in the proceeding. [Citation.][~ We hold that, notwithstanding
[wife's] discharge of these attorneys, they, as her agents, had the implied authority to file thereafter the
motion on her behalf that [husband] pay these additional sums." (Emphasis in original.) {ld. at p. 637.)
Court of Appeal amended judgment to state that fee motion was W's rather than As'.
COMMENTS: The key point to remember in a Borson motion is that it must be made prior to the
signing of the substitution of attorneys. Afterwards, the authority to do so is lost. Compare Meadow v.
Superior Court (Beilenson, Meyer, Rosenfeld & Susman) (1963) 59 Cal.2d 610,30 Cal.Rptr. 824, 381
P.2d 648 (this subtopic).
Card Notes:
AtFe 045.00
Judge should not have relied on Commiss' findings re attorney fees, made after
Commiss recused himself and without affording attorney opportunity to be heard per
Borson order.
In reMarriage ofKelso (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 374, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 39
Vogel (C.S.), P.J. DCA2
FACTS: Attorney (A) formerly represented Win marital dissolution. Prior to substituting out, she
obtained In reMarriage of Borson (1974) 37 Cai.App.3d 632, 112 Cal.Rptr. 432, card B{AtFe 045.00}
order reserving court's jurisdiction to award attorney fees and costs for her prior services.
Commissioner (Com.) hearing matter disqualified himself from determining that issue on ground he
was biased against A. In proceedings of which A had no notice and was excluded, Com. nevertheless
determined that during time W was represented by A, the W made totally unfounded allegations of
child abuse against H; Com. ordered W to pay H $5,000 as sanction under Fam. Code 271, and
allowed $5,000 toW's subsequent attorney, payable by H.
A requested neutral judge hold hearing on attorney fees, free of Com.'s "findings." Judge (J)
refused to set hearing, concluding hearing would be futile, because in light ofCom.'s findings, W
obviously not entitled to any award of attorney fees and costs. Court of Appeal reversed.
HELD: Judge should not have relied on Com's findings re attorney fees, made after Com. recused
himself and w/out affording attorney opportunity to be heard per Borson order.
Borson order signed by Com. provided that A be given notice of "all hearings, conferences and
trials wherein attorneys fees and costs are in issue," and that no judgment be approved without
opportunity for A to be heard regarding her fees. Com. recused himself from hearing matter of A's
attorney fees pursuant to Borson motion.
Court of Appeal noted all parties apparently assumed that Com.'s disqualification to rule on A's
motion did not preclude him from ruling "against Wife," as distinguished from ruling against A
"personally." According to Borson itself, motion is made on behalf of party, not attorney, because the
right to the award is party's, not attorney's. (Borson, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at pp. 638 & fn. 5, 640.)
This implies that a judicial officer disqualified from ruling on motion because of bias against attorney
cannot rule on motion indirectly by ruling against party as issues are too intertwined to permit such
splitting of the disqualification.
COMMENT:An attorney who prevails in a Borson motion and whose fees will be set in the future
should include in the order that s/he receive notice of all future proceedings and that s/he be a
necessary signatory to any settlements in the case. This prevents futur~ counsel, or the parties without
counsel in the future, from trying or settling the case without including the fee order called for in the
Borson order. It is best, of course, to request that the court set your fees at the time the Borson motion
is ruled upon, but often the court (sometimes for good reasons) will want to wait until trial or final
settlement to face this issue.
Card Notes:
AtFe 527.01
Remedy of fired attorney was separate action against client rather than a motion in
pending family proceeding.
In reMarriage of Read (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 476, 118 Cal.Rptr.2d 497
Epstein, Acting P.J. DCA2
FACTS: W filed for legal separation in 2000. In 2/01, W's first attorney (A1) filed Borson motion for
fees and costs (In reMarriage of Borson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 632, 112 Cai.Rptr. 432, card B{AtFe
045.00}.) Same day, second law finn (A2) filed association of counsel on W's behalf. In declaration re
fee motion, A 1 explained her finn no longer going to represent W and A l's firm substituted out.
A2 represented W at a hearing on OSC re fees and costs. Private judge took issue under
submission. At hearing, W learned that A2 had told H's attorneys that they planned to challenge
prenuptial agreement, contrary to W's instructions. W ordered A2 to withdraw OSC before ruling. W
discharged A2 and ordered firm to cease all work on her behalf. A2 confirmed this conversation in a
letter to W. W faxed a substitution of attorney form to A2, removing them from case and substituting
herself in propria persona. She faxed substitution form to judge with a cover letter informing judge she
would be representing herself. She included notice that she was withdrawing her OSC re fees and costs
and the Borson motion.
On 4/3/01, judge directed H to pay A2 $12,500 without prejudice to further award. Same day, A2
signed substitution of attorney form, and W again wrote to A2, reiterating that she had frred them. She
instructed finn to stop communicating with court on her behalf and warned that any effort to act
further on her behalf would be contrary to her instructions. W demanded substitution of attorney be
signed and returned to her that day. Same day, A2 wrote to W, confirming that all work on her behalf
had ceased and substitution of attorney sent to court for filing.
Despite this correspondence, 4/4/01, A2 sent judge an order reflecting award of fees, characterized
themselves as counsel for W. While there was a blank line for H's signature, no signature line for W
included.
On 4/8/01, Judge faxed H a notice advising him to forward any objections to A2's order on the fee
award by 4/11/01. H and W faxed joint letter to judge on 4/10/01 objecting to proposed order from A2
on ground A2 was not a party to the proceeding. They cited judge's April 2nd order inviting ..the
parties to prepare an order. Judge was infonned A2 no longer represented W, had not represented her
since 3/30/01, and that finn had no right to file proposed order. Wand H said neither of them
requested or authorized preparation of the order and asked the judge to disregard it.
Next day,judge signed the order. She wrote toW and H, explaining A2 had right to prepare a
formal order and she forwarded copy of 4/10/0 I letter to A2 as it appeared H and W had not copied
A2. H appealed and Court of Appeal reversed.
HELD: Remedy of fired attorney is a separate action against client rather than a motion in pending
family proceeding. A2 Judge erred in signing order awarding A2 fees to be paid by H. A2s remedy
was action against W for fees.
A2 relied on In reMarriage of Borson, supra, card B{AtFe 045.00} [W's attorneys properly moved
for fees from H after discharged by W but prior to formal change]. Court of Appeal distinguished
Borson, as here, W filed notice with court withdrawing fee request. She also specifically objected to
judge's signing order for fees prepared by A2. In Borson, W had requested fees in petition, and court
held her attorneys reasonably believed that, notwithstanding their discharge, they, as her attorneys of
0 2016 Attorney's Briefcase, Inc. Page I of 2
COMMENT: Attorneys should use Borson motions with care in this situation. Refusing to sign a
Substitution of Attorneys form after being discharged can effectively leave a client without
representation for an extended period of time while the motion is pending, the decision is being
rendered and the order signed. This can result in prejudice to the client and a violation of the Rules of
Professional Responsibility by the attorney.
Card Notes:
AtFe 600.00
D Check here if there are additional protected persons. List them on an attached sheet of paper and write,
"DV -130, Additional Protected Persons," as a title.
Expiration Date
The orders, except as noted below, end on
I (date): at (time): _ _ _ __ _ _ Da.m. Op.m. or D midnight
If no date is written, the restraining order ends three years after the date ofthe hearing in item @(a).
If no time is written, the restraining order ends at midnight on the expiration date.
Note: Custody, visitation, child support, and spousal support orders remain in effect after the restraining order
ends. Custody, visitation, and child support orders usually end when the child is 18.
The court orders are on pages 2, 3, 4, and 5 and attachment pages (if any).
This order complies with VAWA and shall be enforced throughout the United States. See page 5.
This is a Court Order.
Judicial Council of California, www.courts.ca.gov
Revised July 1, 2016, Mandatory Form Restraining Order After Hearing (CLETS-OAH) DV-130, Page 1 of 1
Family Code, 6200 et seq. Approved by DOJ (Order Of Protection) MATERIALS PAGE 000071 ~
Essential (Domestic Violence Prevention)
rnForms-
Case Number:
0 Hearings
a. The hearing was on (date): with (name ofjudicial officer):
b. These people were at the hearing (check all that apply):
D The person in G) D The lawyer for the person in G) (name):
D The person in D The lawyer for the person in (name):
c. The people in G) and must return to Dept. of the court on (date):
at (time): D a.m. D p.m. to review (specify issues):
To the person in 0 :
The court has granted the orders checked below. Item @is also an order. If you do not obey
these orders, you can be arrested and charged with a crime. You may be sent to jail for up to one
year, pay a fine of up to $1,000, or both.
0 D Personal Conduct Orders
a. The person in must not do the following things to the protected people in G) and @ :
D Harass, attack, strike, threaten, assault (sexually or otherwise), hit, follow, stalk, molest, destroy personal
property, disturb the peace, keep under surveillance, impersonate (on the Internet, electronically or
otherwise), or block movements.
D Contact, either directly or indirectly, by any means, including, but not limited to, by telephone, mail,
e-mail, or other electronic means.
D Take any action, directly or through others, to obtain the addresses or locations of any protected persons.
(If this item is not checked, the court has found good cause not to make this order.)
b. Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or process server or another person for service of legal papers
related to a court case is allowed and does not violate this order.
c. D Exceptions: Brief and peaceful contact with the person in G), and peaceful contact with children in@, as
required for court-ordered visitation of children, is allowed unless a criminal protective order says
otherwise.
0 D Stay-Away Order
a. The person in must stay at least (specify): yards away from (check all that apply):
D The person in G) D School of person in G)
D Home of person in G) D The persons in @
D The job or workplace of person in G) D The child(ren)' s school or child care
D Vehicle of person in G) D Other ( s p e c i f y ) : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
b. D Exceptions: Brief and peaceful contact with the person in G) , and peaceful contact with children in @,
as required for court-ordered visitation of children, is allowed unless a criminal protective order says
otherwise.
G) D Move-Out Order
The person in must move out immediately from (address): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
~ CJ Spousal Support
Spousal support is ordered on the attached Form FL-343, Spousal, Partner, or Family Support Order
Attachment or (specify other form):
8 CJ Rights to Mobile Device and Wireless Phone Account
a. C]Property Control of Mobile Device and Wireless Phone Account
Only the person in G) can use, control, and possess the following property:
Mobile device (describe) and account (phone number):
Mobile device (describe) nd account (phone number):
C]Check here if you need more space. Attach a sheet of paper and write "DV-130 Rights to Mobile Device and
Wireless Phone Account" as a title.
b. C]Debt Payment
The person in must make these payments until this order ends:
Pay to (wireless service provider): Amount: $_ _ _ _ _ _D....,ue date: _ _ _ _ __
c. C]Transfer of Wireless Phone Account
The court has made an order transferring one or more wireless service accounts from the person in @ to the
person in G) . These orders are contained in a separate order (Form DV -900).
8 CJ Insurance
CJ The person in G) CJ the person in is ordered NOT to cash, borrow against, cancel, transfer, dispose
of, or change the beneficiaries of any insurance or coverage held for the benefit of the parties, or their child(ren),
if any, for whom support may be ordered, or both.
CJ Lawyer's Fees and Costs
The person in must pay the following lawyer's fees and costs:
Pay to: For: Amount: $ Due date: _ _ _ _ _ __
Pay to: For: Amount: $ Due date: _ _ _ _ _ __
CJ Payments for Costs and Services
The person in must pay the following:
Pay to: For: _ __ _ _ _ _ Amount: $_ _ _ _ _ _ Due date: _ _ _ _ _ __
Pay to: For: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Amount:$ Due date: _ _ _ _ _ __
Pay to: For: _ _ _ _ _ __ Amount:$ Due date: _ _ _ _ _ __
CJ Check here if more payments are ordered. List them on an attached sheet of paper and write "DV-130,
Payments for Costs and Services" as a title.
@ CJ Batterer Intervention Program
The person in must go to and pay for a 52-week batterer intervention program and show written proof of
completion to the court. This program must be approved by the probation department under Penal Code
1203.097. The person in must enroll by (date): or if no date is listed, must enroll within
30 days after the order is made. The person in must complete, file and serve Form 805, Proof of Enrollment
for Batterer Intervention Program.
@ CJ Other Orders
Other orders (specify):
@Service
a. DThe people in CD and were at the hearing or agreed in writing to this order. No other proof of service is
needed.
b. DThe person in CDwas at the hearing on the request for original orders. The person in was not present.
(1) DProof of service of Form DV-109 and Form DV-110 (if issued) was presented to the court. The
judge's orders in this form are the same as in Form DV-110 except for the end date. The person in
must be served. This order can be served by mail.
(2) D Proof of service of Form DV-109 and Form DV -110 (if issued) was presented to the court. The
judge's orders in this form are different from the orders in Form DV-110, or Form DV-110 was not
issued. The person in must be personally "served" (given) a copy of this order.
c. DProof of service of Form FL-300 to modify the orders in Form DV -130 was presented to the court.
(1) 0The people in CDand were at the hearing or agreed in writing to this order. No other proof of
service is needed.
(2) 0 The person in 0 CD
D was not at the hearing and must be personally "served" (given) a copy
of this amended order.
@D Criminal Protective Order
a. DForm CR-160, Criminal Protective Order-Domestic Violence, is in effect.
Case Number: County: Expiration Date:
b. OOther Criminal Protective Order in effect (specify): _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ __ __ __
Case Number: County: Expiration Date:
(List other orders on an attached sheet of paper. Write "DV -130, Other Criminal Protective Orders" as a title.)
c. 0No information has been provided to the judge about a criminal protective order.
@ DAttached pages are orders.
Number of pages attached to this seven-page form:
All of the attached pages are part of this order.
Attachments include (check all that apply):
DDV-140 D DV-145 DDV-150 DFL-342 D FL-343 D DV-900
D Other (specify):
Date:
Judge (or Judicial Officer)
Certificate of Compliance With VAW A
This restraining (protective) order meets all "full faith and credit" requirements of the Violence Against Women Act,
18 U.S.C. 2265 (1994) (VAWA) upon notice of the restrained person. This court has jurisdiction over the parties
and the subject matter; the restrained person has been or will be afforded notice and a timely opportunity to be heard
as provided by the laws of this jurisdiction. This order is valid and entitled to enforcement in each jurisdiction
throughout the 50 states of the United States, the District of Columbia, all tribal lands, and all U.S. territories,
commonwealths, and possessions and shall be enforced as if it were an order of that jurisdiction.
b. Your Address (If you have a lawyer, give your lawyer's information. Fill in court name and street address:
If you do not have a lawyer and want to keep your home address
private, you may give a different mailing address instead. You do not Superior Court of California, County of
have to give telephone, fax, or e-mail.):
Address:
City: State: _Zip: _ _ _ _ __
Telephone: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Fax:
E-Mail Address: Court fills in case number when form is filed.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - DYes DNo
D Check here if there are additional persons. List them on an attached sheet of paper and write "Attachment 3-
Additional Protected Persons" as a title. You may use form MC-025, Attachment.
0 Expiration Date
This Order, except for any award of lawyer's fees, expires at:
I Time: Oa.m. Qp.m. Omidnighton(date):
If no expiration date is written here, this Order expires three years from the date of issuance.
0 Hearing
a. There was a hearing on (date): _ _ _ _ _ __ at (time): _____ in Dept.: _ _ _ Room: _ __
(Name ofjudicial officer): _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ made the orders at the hearing.
b. These people were at the hearing:
(1) 0 The person in G) (3) 0 The lawyer for the person in G)(name): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
(2) 0 The person in (4) 0 The lawyer for the person in @(name): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
0 Additional persons present are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 5.
c. 0 The hearing is continued. The parties must return to court on (date): _ _ _ _ _ _ at (time): _ _ __
To the Person in f) :
The court has granted the orders checked below. If you do not obey these orders, you can be
arrested and cflarged with a crime. You may be sent to jail for up to one year, pay a fine of up
to $1 ,000, or both.
b. Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or process server or other person for service of legal papers related to
a court case is allowed and does not violate this Order.
0 D Stay-Away Orders
a. You must stay at least ____ yards away from (check all that apply):
( 1) D The person in G) (7) D The place of c!J.i!d care of the children of
(2) D Each person in @ the person in \.!)
(3) D The home of the person in CD
(8) D The vehicle of the person in G)
(4) D The job or workplace of the person (9) D Other (specify):
in G)
(5) D The school of the person inCD
(6) D The sc~oo* the children of the
person m \!)
b. This stay-away order does not prevent you from going to or from your home or place of employment.
D Additional items and amounts are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 9.
b. 0 The person in must stay at least yards away from, and not take, sell, transfer, encumber, conceal,
molest, attack, strike, threaten, harm, or otherwise dispose of, the animals listed above.
D Additional orders are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 11.
To the Person in 0 :
@ Mandatory Entry of Order Into CARPOS Through CLETS
This Order must be entered into the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS) through the
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). (Check one):
a. D The clerk will enter this Order and its proof-of-service form into CARPOS.
b. D The clerk will transmit this Order and its proof-of-service form to a law enforcement agency to be entered
into CARPOS.
c. D By the close of business on the date that this Order is made, the person in G) or his or her lawyer should
deliver a copy of the Order and its proof-of-service form to the law enforcement agency listed below to
enter into CARPOS:
Name of Law Enforcement Agency Address (City, State, Zip)
D Additional law enforcement agencies are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 12.
Date:
Judicial Officer
Notice/Proof of Service
The law enforcement agency must first determine if the restrained person had notice of the order. Consider the restrained
person "served" (given notice) if (Pen. Code, 836(c)(2)):
The officer sees a copy of the Proof of Service or confirms that the Proof of Service is on file; or
The restrained person was at the restraining order hearing or was informed of the order by an officer.
An officer can obtain information about the contents of the order and proof of service in CARPOS. If proof of service on
the restrained person cannot be verified and the restrained person was not present at the court hearing, the agency must
advise the restrained person of the terms of the order and then enforce it.
Description:
Sex: 0 M 0 F Height: _ _ _ __ Weight: _ __ _ _ Date of Birth: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Hair Color: Eye Color: Age: Race: ___________________
Home Address (if known):
City: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ State: _ _ _ _ _ Zip: _________
Relationship to Employee: _________________________ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
0 Expiration Date
This Order, except for any award of lawyer's fees, expires at:
If no expiration date is written here, this Order expires three years from the date of issuance.
0 Hearing
a. There was a hearing on (date): _ _ _ _ _ _ _ at (time): _ _ ___ in Dept.: _ _ Room: _ __
(Name ofjudicial officer): _ __ _ _ __ _ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ made the orders at the hearing.
To the Respondent:
The court has granted the orders checked below. If you do not obey these orders, you can be
arrested and charged with a crime. You may be sent to jail for up to one year, pay a fine of up
to $1,000, or both.
b. Peaceful written contact through a lawyer or a process server or other person for service of legal papers related
to a court case is allowed and does not violate this order.
b. This stay-away order does not prevent you from going to or from your home or place of employment.
@ocosts
You must pay the following amounts for costs to the petitioner:
Item Amount Amount
$ _ _ _ __ $
- - - - - - - - - - - -- $ $
$ $
0 Additional amounts are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 10.
0 Additional orders are attached at the end of this Order on Attachment 11.
This is a Court Order.
Revised January 1, 2017
Workplace Violence Restraining Order WV-130, Page 3 of 6
Essential
mForms
After Hearing (CLETS-WHO} +
(Workplace Violence Prevention) MATERIALS PAGE 000086
ICase Number:
To the Person in 0 :
@ Mandatory Entry of Order Into CARPOS Through CLETS
This Order must be entered into the California Restraining and Protective Order System (CARPOS) through the
California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS). (Check one):
a. D The clerk will enter this Order and its proof-of-service form into CARPOS.
b. D The clerk will transmit this Order and its proof-of-service form to a law enforcement agency to be entered
into CARPOS.
c. D By the close of business on the date that this Order is made, the petitioner or the petitioner's lawyer should
deliver a copy of the Order and its proof-of-service form to the law enforcement agency listed below to
enter into CARPOS:
Narne of Law Enforcement Agency Address (City, State, Zip)
D Additional law enforcement agencies are listed at the end of this Order on Attachment 12.
Date:
~ Judicial Officer
I certify that this Workplace Violence Restraining Order After Hearing is a true
and correct copy of the original on file in the court.
X. Settling Fee Issues (The Only Thing More Difficult to Settle Than Spousal
Support!)