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Josh White

CPT Wyatt Bayless

MSC 3033

04 December 2016

The Battle of COP Keating

Several days prior General Stanley McChrystal would authorize a

deliberate withdrawal of 2 small observation posts located in the

Nuristan province. COP (Command Observation Post) Keating had

been established in June 2006 and was a vital checkpoint for U.S.

forces to monitor insurgent traffic near the border of Pakistan. OP

Fritsche would serve as an over watch approximately 200 meters away

from COP Keating. At the time of the battle of Keating, COP Keating was

manned by 53 U.S. troops and 20 Afghanistan National Army service

members while, OP Fritsche, the smaller of the 2 was manned by 10

U.S. service members and 10 more from the ANA. On October 3, 2009,

insurgent forces would conduct a complex simultaneous assault on

COP Keating and OP Fritsche. Through research and analysis of The

Battle of Keating, I will develop the decisive point of this almost 24

hour operation between coalition forces and Afghan insurgent forces.

Days leading up to this attack, several meetings between

insurgents and local village elders occurred. The insurgents had

essentially given U.S. militants 24 hours to abandon their area of

operations. The final warning came on October 2, 2009 and at

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approximately 0530, Afghanistan local time, insurgents began moving

into positions to completely surround COP Keating and OP Fritsche.

Once they were all in place, the insurgents conducted an attack

simultaneously on both locations. The ECP (Entry Control Point) mostly

consisted of soldiers in the Afghanistan National Army. Reports later

stated that those forces were immediately overwhelmed and they fled

giving up their positions with little resistance to the enemy assault.

Hours of fighting continued with coalition forces giving ground. With

over 300 Taliban insurgents assaulting, Coalition forces were forced

deeper into COP Keating in efforts to strengthen the defensive

perimeter. It was not until the decisive point of this battle when F-15s

and AH-64 Apaches arrived on site. With close air support, U.S. forces

began regaining the ground they had temporarily given up. At this

point in the battle, the majority of the buildings at COP Keating were in

flames with the exception of the aid station. The soldiers were sitting

ducks, said Larry Mace, the father of Army Specialist Stephan Mace, a

soldier killed during the battle. With the location isolated from

surrounding support, this battle drew similarly comparisons to that of

Wanat located approximately 20 miles away. The battle of Wanat

occurred just 15 months prior in nearby Kunar province. The battle of

Kamdesh would end up being the bloodiest battle since Wanat. 8 U.S.

troops were killed in action while another 23 were wounded with 20 of

the 23 later returning to duty. However, it was the support from above
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that allowed for the U.S. to regain the ability to maneuver thus,

returning to the offensive. QRF (Quick Reaction Forces) arrived at COP

Keating via foot patrol after dismounting UH-60s at OP Fritsche. The

QRF of air support and ground troops enabled the forces at COP

Keating to eventually defeat the Taliban forces during the battle of

Keating. Immediately after the intense battle Gen. McChrystal ordered

the withdrawal of COP Keating. Due to the hasty departure U.S. forces

left ammunition, cameras, equipment, as well as, other sensitive items.

Days later, on October 6, a B-12 bomber bombed COP Keating and OP

Fritsche to prevent further looting of ammo, equipment, and sensitive

items that were left behind during the hasty withdrawal by U.S. forces.

In conclusion this battle was very similar to the battle of Wanat in

many aspects. The military times published an article Kamdesh

ambush played out like Wanat battle furthermore, posing the question

of how could this happen twice?. With over 150 OP/COPs throughout

Afghanistan these battles were common due to the locations of the

small bases. Being in such remote areas on enemy territory promoted

the attacks by insurgents. With little surrounding support and

increased QRF response times, the Taliban viewed such attacks as an

ideal opportunity and often acted accordingly.

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Works Cited

The Battle of COP Keating. Youtube, July-Aug. 2012. Web.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylUzySZb3L8>.

"Kamdesh Ambush Played out like Wanat Battle." Military Times. N.p.,

27 Mar. 2013. Web. 30 Nov. 2016.

<http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/archives/2013/03/27/kam

desh-ambush-played-out-like-wanat-battle/78533652/>.