Ivler vs. San Pedro G.R. No.

172716 November 17, 2010

Bill of Rights
Ivler vs. San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses:
(1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by
respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C.
Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner
pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public
censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second
delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless
imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in
criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of

punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional
fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365
defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined
and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of
such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its
various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally

impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they
 are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48,
but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more
serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article
365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most
severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether
penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept
of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
M o n d a y, J u n e 2 9 , 2 0 1 5

Consti II case digest: IVLER VS MODESTO-SAN PEDRO

Double jeopardy: requisites
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner herein, Jason Ivler was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig with two separate offenses:

1. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries

2. Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property

Petitioner pleaded guilty for the first charge, but moved to quash the second charge invoking
double jeopardy having been convicted for the previous offense.

MeTC however, refused quashal finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner's conviction in the first offense charged, bars his prosecution in the
second offense charged.

HELD:
Reckless imprudence is a Single Crime, its consequences on persons and property are
material only to determine the penalty.

The two charges against the petitioner, arising from the same facts were prosecuted under
the same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi
offenses.

The proposition (inferred from Art 3 of the RPC) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in
itself but simple a way of committing it.

Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the
same quasi offense.

The Court thru Justice JB Reyes: Reason and precedent both coincide in that ones convicted or
acquitted to a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again
for that same act. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determined
the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of an offense.

Tests to determine double jeopardy:

1. Whether or not the second offense charged necessarily includes or is necessarily included in
the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
2.Whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the
facts alleged in the first if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge
and vice versa; or whether the crime is an ingredient of the other
Jason Ivler y Aguilar v Peralta Abad et al GR No. 172716, Nov. 17, 2010
Facts:

Petitioner Ivler was charged before the MTC for two separate offenses: Reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) and reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide and damage of property (Criminal Case No. 82366). The first offense for
the injuries suffered by herein respondent and the second offense for the death of her
husband and damage to the spouses vehicle. Ivler pleaded guilty on the first offense and
meted public censure as penalty. He invokes this conviction as a ground in his motion to
quash the information for the second offense contending it places him in double jeopardy for
the same offense of reckless imprudence. MTC refused quashal of the information thus
petitioners motion for certiorari was elevated before the RTC while moving for the suspension
of the criminal case before the MTC pending resolution of the prejudicial question as subject
of his motion for reconsideration at the RTC. MTC however proceeded with the criminal
proceeding. The non-appearance of Ivler to the proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his
bail and order of his arrest was issued. By virtue of this arrest order, respondent filed a motion
to dismiss the motion for certiorari filed by Ivler on ground that he loss standing to maintain
suit. RTC dismissed said petition on this ground thus this petition to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner loses his standing to maintain suit?

Whether or not the petitioners right against double jeopardy a bar to another prosecution on
the second offense charged on Criminal Case No. 82366?

Ruling:

The court held that petitioner did not lose his standing to maintain his petition. The lower
court based its ruling from Rule 124, Section 8, second par. that provides that an appeal may
be dismissed when an appellant escapes from custody or violates the terms of his bail bond.
The appeal contemplated in this section is applicable on a suit to review judgment of
conviction. No judgment has yet been rendered against the petitioner. Section 21, Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendants absence in a proceeding
merely renders his bondman liable, subjecting the bond to cancellation if it fails to produce
defendant before the court within 30 days. This does not ipso facto convert the standing of an
accused as a fugitive to lose his standing before the court. Moreover, the court observed that
contrary to the lower court contention that petitioner failed to attend the hearing without
justified reason it failed to appreciate the fact that there is a pending motion for
reconsideration filed by the petitioner which was left unresolved by the lower court.

On the issue on double jeopardy, the two charges were prosecuted by the court under the
provision of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes quasi-offenses such as
negligence. What this provision contemplates in quasi-offenses of criminal negligence is
punishing the act of negligence that if intentionally done will constitute a criminal offense.
Thus, the law punishes the negligent act and not the result thereof. It takes into account the
gravity of the offenses in determining the penalty but not to qualify the substance of the
offense. It treats a negligent act as single whether the injurious result affects one or several
persons. The offense of criminal negligence remains as one and cannot be split into different
crimes and prosecutions. The contention of the lower court to invoke Article 48 where light
offenses such as slight physical injuries cannot be complexed with grave or less grave felony
such as homicide that the court is compelled to separate both charges is untenable in this
case. The principle of prosecuting quasi offenses remain intact in the case thus the petitioner
cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of similar charges on reckless imprudence. His
prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for the second offense by virtue
of the principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower
court.

People v. Ojeda (2004)

FACTS: Cora Abella Ojeda used to buy fabrics(telas) from complainant Ruby Chua. For the
threeyears approximately she transacted business with Chua,appellant used postdated
checks to pay for the fabricsshe bought. On November 5, 1983, appellant purchasedfrom
Chua various fabrics and textile materials worthP228,306 for which she issued 22 postdated
checksbearing different dates and amounts.The 22 checks were all dishonored. Demandswere
allegedly made to make good the dishonoredchecks, to no avail. Estafa and BP 22 charges
werethereafter filed against Ojeda. The trial courtconvicted appellant of the crime of estafa as
definedand penalized under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 ofthe Revised Penal Code (RPC),
and sentenced her toreclusion perpetua. The trial court also convictedappellant of violation of
BP 22 for issuing bouncingchecks. However, the court a quo held her guilty ofonly 14 counts
out of the 22 bouncing checks issued.

HELD: Under paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 ofthe RPC, as amended by RA 4885, 20 the
elements ofestafa are: (1) a check is postdated or issued inpayment of an obligation
contracted at the time it isissued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; (3)
damage to the payee thereof. Deceit anddamage are essential elements of the offense and
mustbe established by satisfactory proof to warrantconviction. Thus, the drawer of the
dishonored check isgiven three days from receipt of the notice of dishonorto cover the
amount of the check. Otherwise a primafacie presumption of deceit arises.The prosecution
failed to prove deceit in thiscase. The prima facie presumption of deceit wassuccessfully
rebutted by appellant's evidence of goodfaith, a defense in estafa by postdating a check.
Goodfaith may be demonstrated, for instance, by a debtor'soffer to arrange a payment
scheme with his creditor. Inthis case, the debtor not only made arrangements forpayment; as
complainant herself categorically stated,the debtor-appellant fully paid the entire amount
ofthe dishonored checks.It must be noted that our Revised Penal Codewas enacted to penalize
unlawful acts accompanied byevil intent denominated as crimes mala in se. Theprincipal
consideration is the existence of maliciousintent. There is a concurrence of freedom,
intelligenceand intent which together make up the "criminal mind"behind the "criminal act."
Thus, to constitute a crime,the act must, generally and in most cases, beaccompanied by a
criminal intent. Actus non facitreum, nisi mens sit rea. No crime is committed if themind of
the person performing the act complained of isinnocent. As we held in Tabuena vs.
Sandiganbayan:XXXThe rule was reiterated in People v. Pacana,although this case involved
falsification of publicdocuments and estafa:"Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with anunlawful
act for there to be a crime. Actus non facitreum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime
whenthe criminal mind is wanting."American jurisprudence echoes the sameprinciple. It
adheres to the view that criminal intent inembezzlement is not based on technical mistakes
as tothe legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into,and there can be no embezzlement
if the mind of theperson doing the act is innocent or if there is nowrongful purpose.The
accused may thus prove that he acted ingood faith and that he had no intention to convert
themoney or goods for his personal benefit. We areconvinced that appellant was able to prove
the absenceof criminal intent in her transactions with Chua. Hadher intention been tainted
with malice and deceit,appellant would not have exerted extraordinary effortto pay the
complainant, given her own business andfinancial reverses

CHUA-BURCE V. CA (possession by a bank teller is possession of the bank itself; mere

custodian)

FACTS:
Ramon Rocamora, manager of Metrobank, requested FructuosoPenaflor, Assistant Cashier, to
conduct a physical bundle count of cash inside the vault, which should total to P4 million.
They found out that there was a shortage of P150,000. After 4 investigations conducted by
the bank and NBI, the reports concluded that Cristeta Chua-Burce, Cash Custodian, was
primary responsible for the shortage. Unable to explain the shortage, the services of the
accused was terminated.

Chua-Burce, together with her husband Antonio Burce, were charged with the crime of estafa.
A civil case was also instituted. The accused prayed for suspension of criminal case due to a
prejudicial question. It was first granted but denied by the CA. The CRIMINAL and CIVIL cases
continued.

The CRIMINAL CASE ruled that she was guilty of estafa. CIVIL CASE also found her liable for
the shortage of P150,000. She appealed both rulings to the CA but the court affirmed the two
TC rulings.
Hence this case.

ISSUE:
(1) W/N there was a valid trial
(2) W/N the elements of estafa were proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:

(1) Yes, there was a valid trial.

The accused allege that the public prosecutor did not intervene with the case (violation of Sec
5 RULE 110 ) and did not present evidence for the criminal case (no evidence for the accused
to be convicted).
But the fact showed that the public prosecutor actively participated with the criminal case.
And both parties, during the pre-trial, agreed to adopt their respective evidences in the CIVIL
CASE to the CRIMINAL CASE. The agreement was reduced into writing, inconformity with the
Rules of Court. Being bound by the pre-trial agreement, it is now too late in the day to
challenge its contents.

(2) No, the crime of estafa was not proven.

The elements of Estafa, ART. 315 (1) (b), are the following:
a) The personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration, or any other
circumstances, with the duty return.
b) There is a conversion/diversion of such property or denial that he received it.
c) Such conversion/diversion is to the injury of another
d) There is demand for such property

The 1st element is absent. The 1st element gives the tranferee both material and juridical
possession of the personal property. Juridical possession means the transferee has a right
over the thing which he may even set up against the owner.The possession of the accused of
the money had no juridical possession. Being a cash custodian, her possession is akin to that
of a bank teller. And possession of a bank teller is possession of the bank. she was a mere
custodian.

*She should have been charged with qualified theft, but double jeopardy is already in play.
*Difference between an agent and teller. TELLER payment to the teller is a payment to the
bank, he is a mere custodian. AGENT he can assert his independent, autonomous right to
retain money, even against the owner.