Right of an accused Case Digests

1. TATAD v. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report"
with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974,
containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019( Anti graft and corrupt practices)
against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to
"sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that
Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from
the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a
formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1,
1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres.
Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation
and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending
the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio
L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was
already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a
resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the
Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. A motion to quash the
information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due
process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against
him. It was denied hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

Held: YES. Long termination of the preliminary investigation by the tanodbayan violates Due
process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial was violated. Firstly, the complaint
came to life, as it were; only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the
complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to
the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No.
911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the
respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it
can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of
close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the
circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

2. GALMAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his
plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a
bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators
reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then
supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a
communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of
people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice
and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version
stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive
affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that
Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only
difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private
respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while
the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

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Right of an accused Case Digests

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in
the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the
restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply
to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit
a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss
the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from
rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day
period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution
(which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate
the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits
that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become
moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging
that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in
miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the
sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges
against them.

Held: YES. Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of
the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for
the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was
no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he
revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered
by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacaang wanted dismissal
to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacaang
Conference planned a scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the
resolution be revised by categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the
presiding justice, Justice Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A
conference was held in an inner room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal
Assistant Justice Lazaro were with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door
in going to the room where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors
in the reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and
that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I
know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and
from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the
Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under
the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to
resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the
twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a
public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that President
Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his announced theory

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thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration of any suspected
guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better arrangement
because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the
benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other
witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera,
"nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The
assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment
was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice
Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their confinement in a military camp, instead
of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings and developments from Malacaang and by
Malacaang personnel. The partiality of Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That
President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied.
In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential
directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence
presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial
process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as
to the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret
Malacaang conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict.
The courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar
where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial
system is at stake.

3. Alonte v, Savellano

Facts: Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Bian, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion
befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alontes house. The case was brought before the
Regional Trial Court of Bian. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of
venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an
affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue
was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional
Trial Court under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest
of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the
voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would
rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano
sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his
right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were
raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further
deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no
showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be
so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption

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Right of an accused Case Digests

against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous
petitions filed by Alonte.

Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require:

(a) That the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
(b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
(c) That the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
(d) That judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing.

Ruling: The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier
promulgated is nullified.

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

4. People v. Dramayo

Facts: Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito Nogaliza so that he could not testify in
the robbery case where he is an accused. The idea was for Dramayo and Ecubin to ambush
Estelito, who was returning from Sapao. The others were to station themselves nearby. Only
Dramayo and Ecubin were convicted in the RTC for murder. Hence the appeal

Soon the Nogaliza was sighted, Dramayo stopped him with a request for a cigarette. It was
then that Ecubin hit him with a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear.
Dramayo's participation consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as he lay
prostrate from the blow of Ecubin. Dramayo then warned the rest of the group to keep their
mouths sealed as to what had just happened.

Issue: Whether Dramayo and Ecubin should be acquitted inasmuch as the other co-accused
have been acquitted due to reasonable doubt.

Held: NO. It is to be admitted that the starting point is the Presumption of

innocence. So it must be, according to the Constitution. That is a right safeguarded both
appellants. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with
guilt.

The judgment of conviction should not have occasioned any surprise on the part of the two
appellants, as from the evidence deserving of the fullest credence, their guilt had been more
than amply demonstrated. The presumption of innocence could not come to their
rescue as it was more than sufficiently overcome by the proof that was offered by
the prosecution. What would have been a blot on the law is that if, on the facts as
established, no reasonable doubt being entertained, the two appellants would have been
acquitted likewise just because the other five defendants, for the reasons above stated, were
not similarly sentenced. The principal contention raised is thus clearly untenable. It
must be stated likewise that while squarely advanced for the first time, there had been cases
where this Court, notwithstanding a majority of the defendants being acquitted, the element of
conspiracy likewise being allegedly present, did hold the party or parties, responsible for the
offense guilty of the crime charged, a moral certainty having arisen as to their capability.

The fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery, with the deceased as
the offended party. It was understandable then why they would want to do away with the
principal witness against them. There was thus a strong inducement for the appellants to have
committed this crime of murder. With the testimony of record pointing to no other conclusion
except the perpetration of the killing by them, the effort of their counsel, while to be expected
from an advocate zealous in defense of his clients' rights, certainly should not be attended
with success. It suffices to reiterate the well-settled principle that this Court has
invariably respected the findings of facts of a trial judge who was in a position to

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weigh and appraise the testimony before him except when, as was not shown in this
case, circumstances weight or influence were ignored or disregarded by him.

5. Dumlao v. Comelec

Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has already retired from his
office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom.

In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office. Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was
enacted. This law provides, among others, that retirees from public office like Dumlao are
disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed the law averring that it is class legislation
hence unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. These two however have
different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit assailing the
other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the
campaign, and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes from running for
public office as well as the provision that provides that the mere filing of complaints
against them after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from
office.

Issue: Whether BP 52 violates constitutional rights of the petitioners.

Held: Yes. The SC ruled that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for
public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation
would already disqualify them from office as null and void.
The court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption
of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from public office on the ground alone
that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before
one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is
made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom
charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already
convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore,
may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that because the proximity of the
elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering
contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a

judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.

The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is not well taken. The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If
the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and
regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of
age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that
age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily
retirable.

Additional note: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case should
have never been merged. Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate issues.

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Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that itd be eligible for judicial review.
There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review,
namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in
order to decide the case.

In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.

6. Marquez v. Comelec

FACTS: Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition
for certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition
for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal
charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property
was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los
Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,
has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged flight from that country.

Petitioners subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELECs May 8, 1992
resolution was dismissed without prejudice,

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for
cancellation of respondents CoC on account of the candidates disqualification under Sec. 40
(e) of the LGC.

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith,

petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent before
the COMELEC.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy
(and to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a
warrant for his arrest comes within the term fugitive from justice contemplated by Section
40(e) of the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby
ineligible from holding on to, an elective local office.

HELD:
Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a Fugitive from justice in criminal cases
here and abroad are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

"Fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment
but likewise those who, after being charged flee to avoid prosecution.

It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its enforcement
deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corp. vs.
CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity and ambiguity in an
enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An administrative rule or
regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain congruent to
it.

The confinement of the term fugitive from justice in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person who has been convicted by final
judgment is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not
private respondent is in fact a fugitive from justice as such term must be
interpreted and applied in the light of the Courts opinion. The omission is
understandable since the COMELEC outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the

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basis instead of Rule 73 of the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight
Committee. The Court, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case
to the COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual matter.

Ruling: Remanded to the comelec.

7. Corpus v. People

Facts: Petitioner seeks reversal of the lower courts decision finding him guilty for
malversation of public funds. The accused was the acting supervising cashier at the Provincial
Treasurers office. He denied having misused the whole amount of P72,823.08 which was
discovered to be a shortage from the government funds contending that the P50,000.00 was
the unliquidated withdrawal made by their paymaster Pineda thru the 4 checks he issued while
the petitioner was on leave and that he was forced by their Provincial Treasurer Aluning to post
said amount in his cash book despite not actually receiving the amount.

Issue: Whether or not the court erred in observing the presumption of innocence of the
accused of the charge against him

Held: It is held that presumption of innocence of the accused should yield to the positive
findings that he malversed the government funds considering all the evidences presented that
point out to his guilt on the charge imputed against him. Records shows that the checks
issued for the paymaster were duly liquidated to the accused and there were
inconsistent entries on his cash books and that he was not really on leave on the
day the said checks were disbursed by the paymaster.

8. Feeder International v. CA

The M/T "ULU WAI" a foreign vessel of Honduran registry, owned and operated by Feeder
International Shipping Lines of Singapore, left Singapore on 6 May 1986 carrying 1,100 metric
tons of gas oil and 1,000 metric tons of fuel oil consigned to Far East Synergy Corporation of
Zamboanga, Philippines. On 14 May 1986, the vessel anchored at the vicinity of Guiuanon
Island in Iloilo without notifying the Iloilo customs authorities. The presence of the vessel only
came to the knowledge of the Iloilo authorities by information of the civilian informer in the
area. Acting on said information, the Acting District Collector of
Iloilo dispatched a Customs team on 19 May 1986 to verify the report. The Customs team
found out that the vessel did not have on board the required ship and shipping
documents, except for a clearance from the port authorities of Singapore clearing
the vessel for "Zamboan." In view thereof, the vessel and its cargo were held and a Warrant
of Seizure and Detention over the same was issued after due investigation.

In the course of the forfeiture proceedings, the parties, through their respective counsel,
agreed on a stipulation of facts. On 17 March 1987, the District Collector issued his decision,
finding the M/T "ULU WAI" guilty of violating Section 2530 (a) of the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines (PD 1464), as amended, while her cargo of 1,100 M/T Gas Oil and 1,000 M/T
Fuel Oil are found guilty of violating Section 2530 (a), (f), and (1-1) under the same Code and
are hereby forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue: Whether a forfeiture proceeding is penal in nature, and whether the corporation can
invoke the right to be presumed innocent.

Held: A forfeiture proceeding under tariff and customs laws is not penal in nature, contrary to
the argument advanced by Feeder International. In the case of People vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, etc., et al., the Court made an exhaustive analysis of the nature of forfeiture
proceedings, in relation to criminal proceedings, holding therein that "seizure and forfeiture
proceedings under the tariff and customs laws are not criminal in nature as they do not result
in the conviction of the offender nor in the imposition of the penalty provided for in Section
3601 of the Code. As can be gleaned from Section 2533 of the code, seizure proceedings are
purely civil and administrative in character, the main purpose of which is to enforce the

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administrative fines or forfeiture incident to unlawful importation of goods or their deliberate

possession. The penalty in seizure cases is distinct and separate from the criminal liability that
might be imposed against the indicted importer or possessor and both kinds of penalties may
be imposed. Considering, therefore, that proceedings for the forfeiture of goods illegally
imported are not criminal in nature since they do not result in the conviction of the wrongdoer
nor in the imposition upon him of a penalty, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required in
order to justify the forfeiture of the goods. The degree of proof required is merely substantial
evidence which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion.

Further, a corporate entity has no personality to invoke the right to be presumed innocent
which right is available only to an individual who is an accused in a criminal case.

RIGHT TO BE HEARD BY HIMSELF AND COUNSEL

People v. Holgado

Facts: Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with
slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did
"feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in
the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of
her personal liberty. He pleaded guilty (without a counsel) and said that he was just instructed
by Mr. Ocampo, which no evidence was presented to indict the latter.

Issue: Whether or Not there was any irregularity in the proceedings in the trial court.

Held: Yes. Rule 112, section 3 of ROC that : If the defendant appearswithout attorney, he
must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must
be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend
him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. This was violated. Moreso the
guarantees of our Constitution that "no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law", and that all accused "shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel." In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be
given the opportunity to be heard by counsel.

The trial court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualified plea of accused. The
record does not show whether the supposed instructions of Mr. Ocampo was real and whether
it had reference to the commission of the offense or to the making of the plea guilty. No
investigation was opened by the court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there
is now no way of determining whether the supposed instruction is a good defense or may
vitiate the voluntariness of the confession. Apparently the court became satisfied with the
fiscal's information that he had investigated Mr. Ocampo and found that the same had nothing
to do with this case. Such attitude of the court was wrong for the simple reason that a mere
statement of the fiscal was not sufficient to overcome a qualified plea of the accused. But
above all, the court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel especially
because of the qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be
capital by the court.

People v. Agbayani
GR 122770

Facts: The appellant was charged for raping his 14-year old daughter and was found guilty of
the crime of rape. A motion for a new trial was filed before the court by the new counsel of the
accused assailing the irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused invoking
the failure of the court to inform the accused of his right to choose his own counsel and the
violation of the appellants right for a 2 day preparation for trial.

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Issue: Whether or not the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of the right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the judgment
of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial.

Held: It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse conviction. The
reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied with the procedure
prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a presumption can only be
overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it has been held that unless the
contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively proved that the trial court failed to inform
the accused of his right to counsel, it will be presumed that the court of such right informed
the accused.

Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the accused
is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further
time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. Only when so
demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial. Further,
such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the instant case, appellant did not ask for
time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right. It is untenable to believe that
the counsel who represented the appellant was not prepared during the trial as records
showed he was able to cross-examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is
incompetent to represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the
lower court.

Amion v. Judge Chiongson

Facts: This is an administrative matter filed before the court charging the respondent judge
for ignorance of the law and oppression for vehemently insisting of appointing the accused-
appellant counsel de officio despite the appellants opposition because he has his own counsel
of choice in the person of Atty. Depasucat. However, many instances that Atty. Depasucat did
not appear in court which prompted respondent judge to assign Atty. Lao Ong from the PAO to
represent the accused stating on record that his representation is without prejudice to the
appearance of the accused own counsel. This was done in order to avoid delay of the trial since
the complainant already expressed frustration on the so many postponement of the hearing.

Issue: Whether or not there is merit of invoking the right to counsel of his own choice as
asserted by the accused in the case at bar.

Held: The court finds the administrative complaint against respondent judge devoid of
merit. An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the right to counsel,
will show that the "preference in the choice of counsel" pertains more aptly and specifically to
a person under investigation rather than one who is the accused in a criminal prosecution.
Accused-complainant was not, in any way, deprived of his substantive and constitutional right
to due process as he was duly accorded all the opportunities to be heard and to present
evidence to substantiate his defense but he forfeited this right, for not appearing in court
together with his counsel at the scheduled hearings. It was the strategic machination of
delaying the proceeding by the accused that gave rise to the need of appointing him counsel
de officio by the court as delaying further the hearing is prejudicial to speedy disposition of a
case and causes delay in the administration of justice.

People v. Quitlong

Pecho v. People

Facts: The decision of the Supreme Court for convicting the accused for the complex crime of
attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial document was assailed with the
contention of the defense that the accused may not be convicted of the crime for double
jeopardy. The charge against the accused was on violation of RA 3019 of which he was

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acquitted because it only penalizes consummated crime. In the absence of evidence that
shows that the crime was consummated the accused was acquitted but the court held
judgment of prosecuting his conviction for attempted estafa thru falsification of official and
commercial document which is necessarily included in the crime charged. Accused invokes the
defense of double jeopardy since his acquittal from the charge involving RA 3019 is a bar for
prosecution on the crime of attempted estafa thru falsification of official and commercial
document and that the accused was not informed of this charge against him in the filing of the
information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the crime to which
he is convicted

Held: The court presented the objectives of the right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the crime he is charged with as follows:

1. To furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him as will enable
him to make his defense;
2. To avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further
prosecution for the same cause;
3. To inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are
sufficient in law to support a conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be satisfied facts must be stated: not conclusions of law.
The complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to
constitute the crime. What determines the real nature and cause of accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not the caption
or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law. It follows then that an accused
may be convicted of a crime which although not the one charged, is necessarily included in the
latter. It has been shown that the information filed in court is considered as charging for two
offenses which the counsel of the accused failed to object therefore he can be convicted for
both or either of the charges.

However by reviewing the case at bar the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence that would
establish the guilt of the accused as conspirator to the crime of estafa beyond reasonable
doubt, the prior decision of the SC was deemed to be based merely on circumstantial
evidence, thus the accused was acquitted.

Soriano v. Sandiganbayan

Borja v. Mendoza

Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not
arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in
absentia and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was
appealed to the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was
alleged that the failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also
alleged that without any notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit
his memorandum, a decision on the appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General
commented that the decision should be annulled because there was noarraignment.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioners constitutional right was violated when he was not
arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be
informed as to why he was indicted and whatpenal offense he has to face, to be convicted only
on a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove
the evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires anarraignment. It is

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Right of an accused Case Digests

required in the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the
precise charge that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible
loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the
very least then, he must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized
against him. Being arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him.
Also, respondent Judge Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of
an arraignment. With the violation of the constitutional right to be heard by himself and
counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that
the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for being null. The absence of
an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to
ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of
slight physical injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge
Rafael T. Mendoza dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge
Senining, is nullified and set aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the
prosecution of the offense of slight physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the
provisions of the Rules of Court, starting with the arraignment of petitioner.

RIGHT TO SPEED, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL

People v. Tee
GR No. 140546-47

FACTS: Appellant is a Chinese national in his forties, a businessman, and a resident of Baguio
City. A raid conducted by operatives of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and
Philippine National Police Narcotics Command (PNP NARCOM) at premises allegedly leased by
appellant and at his residence yielded huge quantities of marijuana.

Appellant moved to quash the search warrant on the ground that it was too general and that
the NBI had not complied with the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant. The
pendency of said motion, however, did not stop the filing of the appropriate charges against
appellant. In an information dated July 24, 1998, the City Prosecutor of Baguio City charged
Modesto Tee, alias Estoy Tee, with illegal possession of marijuana.

They further contend that the accused was deprived of his right to speedy trial by failure of the
prosecution to produce their witness who failed to appear during the 20 hearing dates thereby
slowing down the trial procedure.

Issue: Whether or not the substantive right of the accused for a speedy trial prejudiced during
the hearing of the case.

Held: The court ruled that the substantive right of the accused for a fair and speedy trial was
not violated. It held that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998 provides that the trial period for the
criminal cases should be in general 180 days. However, in determining the right of an accused
to speedy trial, courts should do more than a mathematical computation of the number of
postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case.

The right to a speedy trial is deemed violated only when: ( V U L )

(1) The proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or
(2) When unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or
(3) When without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without
the party having his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the prosecution exerted efforts in obtaining a warrant to
compel the witness to testify. The concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative where

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Right of an accused Case Digests

several factors are weighed such as the length of time of delay, the reason of such
delay, and conducts of prosecution and the accused and the prejudice and damaged
caused to the accused of such delay. The court did not find the 20 days of delayed hearing
unreasonable length of time as to constitute deprivation of the constitutional rights of the
accused for a speedy trial in addition to the fact that court trial may be always subjected to
postponement for reasonable cause of delay. In the absence of showing that the reason for
delay was capricious or oppressive, the State must not be deprived of reasonable opportunity
in prosecuting the accused.

Flores v. People
GR No. L-25769

FACTS:

Petitioners, Francisco Flores and Francisco Angel, were accused for robbery. They were found
guilty of the crime charged in November 1955. Notice of appeal was file in December 1955. It
was until February 1958 that action was taken by CAa resolution remanding the records of
the case to the lower court for a rehearing of the testimony of a certain witness deemed
material for the disposition of the case. Such resolution was amended dated August 1959
which granted the petitioners to set aside the decision so that evidence for the defense on new
facts may be received and a new decision in lieu of the old one may be rendered. The case
was returned to the lower court but nothing was done for about a year because the offended
party failed to appear despite the 6/7 dates set for such hearing. Furthermore, when the
offended party took the witness stand, his testimony was characterized as a mere fiasco as he
could no longer remember the details of the alleged crime and even failed to identify the 2
accused.

The trial court instead of rendering a decision sent back the records to the appellate
tribunal. 5 more years elapsed without anything being done, petitioners sought dismissal of
the case against them due to inordinate delay in the disposition (from December 1955- May
1965). CA was unresponsive notwithstanding the vigorous plea of the petitioners, its last order
being a denial of a second MR dated January 1966. CAs defense is that the case was not
properly captioned as People of the Philippines and without Court of Appeals being made a
party to the petition.

ISSUE: WON constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated.

HELD: YES. Petition for certiorari was granted. Orders denying Motion to dismiss as Motion to
Reconsideration are set aside and nullified. Criminal Case against petitioners was
dismissed.

Constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive
delays. An accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. He cannot be
oppressed by delaying the commencement of the trial for an unreasonable length of time. The
Constitution does not say that such right may be availed only where the prosecution of a crime
is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases
commenced by private individuals. Where a person is prosecuted criminally, he is
entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in
which it is authorized to be commenced.

Technicalities should give way to the realities of the situation. There should not be too
much significance attached to the procedural defect (refer to CAs defense). CA failed to
accord respect to this particular constitutional right amounting at the very least to a grave
abuse of discretion.

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