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Assessing The Limitations
Of Arc Flash Hazard Tables
By Albert Marroquin
C ommunicating the dangers associated with energized
electrical equipment is one of the core elements of any
workplace electrical safety program. One of the most vital
steps of that process is classifying various tasks according to
the Hazard/Risk Category levels listed in NFPA 70E, Stan-
dard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace. Understanding
these tables is imperative, particularly in Canada, because the
forthcoming CSA Z462 Workplace Electrical Safety Stan-
dard will be technically harmonized with NFPA 70E.
NFPA 70E Table 130.7(C)(11) uses five Hazard/Risk Cate-
gory levels for various tasks. These levels range from zero to
four. In the CSA Z462 Consensus Draft, dated April 2, 2008,
the equivalent table is referred to as Table 5.
As important as it is to understand these tables, its equally
important to understand the limitations of these tables. If these
limitations are not considered in your arc flash hazard evalua-
tion, it may lead to selecting an incorrect level of arc flash rated
Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), thus jeopardizing the
safety of the electrical worker.
Two Alternate Methods To Determine PPE
The most challenging step of an arc flash hazard evaluation
is determining how to classify tasks for different electrical
equipment types operating at varying voltage levels. Two
alternate methods are available for classifying the arc flash
Hazard/Risk Category level associated with a particular task.
The first method is to use Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), a lookup
table that lists different tasks on energized equipment and
their associated Hazard/Risk Category levels. In the CSA
Z462 Consensus Draft the equivalent table is referred to as
Table 4. Although some question the use of Table
130.7(C)(9)(a), there are many situations which require the
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14 Electrical Safety Measures - Summer 2008

use of this table, which we will discuss in this article.

The second method is to have a Professional Engineer in
Canada use power system analysis software to conduct a
more thorough arc flash hazard analysis. In this case, we rec-
ommend using the more rigorous calculation guidelines pro-
vided by IEEE 1584-2002 Standard and/or NFPA 70E-2004
Annex D, also Annex D in CSA Z462.

When to Use Table 130.7(C)(9)(a)

As mentioned previously, there are situations which require
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), for example, when its necessary to per-
form emergency work on energized electrical equipment that
does not have proper arc flash hazard labels. The table is also
useful for determining the required PPE for electrical equipment
inspection, such as when an arc flash hazard analysis is neces-
sary and you have to collect electrical equipment nameplate data.
The tables may also be used as part of a simplified electrical Figure 1. Arc flash simulation for a typical MCC
safety program for smaller facilities. Take, for example, facili-
Ibf Main Breaker Incident
ties that use simple radial systems with fewer than 20 buses. Case ID
at Fault Fault Clearing
Working
Distance
Energy at Hazard/Risk
Location Time MCC-1 Category
Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) lists and classifies tasks involving (kA) (sec)
(inch) (cal/cm )
such equipment as switchboards, panelboards, Motor Control Case 1 23.3 0.300 24 11.9 3
Case 2 23.3 0.300 18 13.81 3
Centres (MCCs), switchgear and motor starters. For example, Case 3 64.8 0.300 24 24.31 3
the table classifies the insertion or removal of individual Case 4 64.8 0.330 18 38.98 4
Note: Ibf denotes a bolted 3-phase short-circuit current
starter buckets from MCC (600V class) as a task with Haz-
ard/Risk Category 3 (8 < cal/cm2 < 25). Table 1. Incident Energy for a fault at MCC-1 for different working distances
According to footnote 4 of the table, the maximum avail-
able bolted short-circuit current limit is 65kA. In addition, the Whats lacking in the NFPA 70E table is the working distance
footnote indicates that the maximum fault clearing time (arc- one of the most dominant factors in the calculation. Even if
ing time) should be about 0.33 seconds or 20 cycles. the available bolted fault current and the fault clearing time stays
within the noted limits, the results listed in the table may not pro-
Validate Results With Power System Analysis Software vide sufficient protection. Because the table results are general-
You can use power system analysis software to validate the ized, and not specific to a particular system, it is not wise to
Hazard/Risk Category level the table provides. For example, solely rely on the table to recommend PPE levels on MCCs.
Figure 1, which uses IEEE 1584-2002, displays a typical MCC Lets look at another example for a common task, like
configuration with an arc fault simulation at bus MCC-1. energized work on metal clad switchgear above 1kV. Accord-
According to IEEE 1584, the simulation uses typical values ing to Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), PPE rated for Category 4 is rec-
for gaps (distances between energized bare conductors in mm). ommended for the insertion or removal of circuit breakers
Working distance is estimated to be 24 inches (conversely, the from cubicles with the doors open.
NFPA 70E table doesnt provide arc flash protection boundary In this case, we can take a 4.16kV switchgear with typical
or working distances). The MCC has a maximum available working distance and conductor gaps based on IEEE 1584 2002
bolted short-circuit current of 25kA. (WD =36 inches and Gap =102mm). Figure 2 exhibits a one-
According to the displayed results on the one-line diagram line diagram for typical medium voltage switchgear and the sim-
in Figure 1, the program determined a Hazard/Risk Category ulated arc flash results for two locations within the equipment.
Level 3 for the faulted location (MCC-1). In this case, the Haz- Incident energy has been calculated for two cubicles. One
ard/Risk Category level agrees with the one listed in the table. is a load CB cubicle, which indicates incident energy within
Hazard/Risk Category 3 limits. Yet the Main CB cubicle
Analysis Software Takes Safety To Next Level shows a potential incident energy release almost beyond that
Using power system analysis software, you can perform a of Hazard /Risk Category 4.
different simulation for the same MCC, only this time using Although these results are in agreement with those recom-
the maximum available bolted short-circuit current of 65kA. mended by Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), any variation in the clearing
As you can see from the results in Table 1, the incident energy time or bolted short circuit current may cause the incident
level could easily reach Hazard/Risk Category 4 or higher energy to exceed the levels of Hazard/Risk Category 4. Clearly,
simply by using the maximum values of short circuit current. the table fails to establish the limits for the bolted fault current.
The results of Table 1 illustrate that the PPE rating suggested
by NFPA 70E, Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) may not be adequate for the NFPA 70E Tables vs. A Thorough Analysis
task. According to IEEE 1584-2002, the typical working dis- The potential differences between the PPE rating recom-
tance is 18 inches for a 0.480V MCC. Yet Case 4 shows that the mended by Table 130.7(C)(9)(a), versus those recommended by
incident energy level for an 18-inch working distance almost the more thorough arc flash hazard analysis, are significant.
exceeds the limit of Hazard/risk Category 4 (40 cal/cm2). Table 2 summarizes comparisons made between the NFPA 70E
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16 Electrical Safety Measures - Summer 2008
Figure 2. Arc flash simulation for a typical MV switchgear
table categories against those obtained by
the IEEE 1584-2002 method. Please note
that this table is not comprehensive and
only illustrates a brief summary of a few
of the comparisons made for tasks at dif-
ferent voltage levels.
The Hazard/Risk Categories obtained
using Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) may be less
conservative for tasks expected to be
within Hazard/Risk Category 3 and 4
levels. It may be possible to use the
table for tasks involving Hazard/risk
Categories 0, 1 and 2, as long as the
available bolted short-circuit current
and arcing time are within the limits
specified in the table footnotes.
The comparisons presented in Table 2
demonstrate why performing a thor-
ough arc flash hazard analysis instead of
solely relying on Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) is
recommended.
Checking TCC Curves
Regardless of the expected task Haz-
ard/Risk Category level, you should
always perform a thorough check of the
Task
Equipment
Type
Removal of bolted covers (to expose
Panelboard
bare energized parts)
Work on energized parts, including Panelboard
voltage testing
Switchboard
insertion or removal of individual
starter buckets from MCC MCC
inserting or removal (racking) of CB
from cubicles, doors open2
Switchgear
inserting or removal (racking) of CB Switchgear
from cubicles, doors open1
Note: The IEEE 1584 2002 results were obtained using only typical gaps and working distances for the type of
equipment being modeled. The maximum bolted fault current and clearing times are taken from notes 1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.
Note 1: 36 inch working distance. Note 2: 24 inch working distance
Table 2. Summary of comparisons made between Table 130.7(C)(9)(a) and IEEE 1584 results
Operation Technology, Inc.
Page 16
Figure 3. Incident Energy curves for typical LV MCC and Switchgear
Time Current Characteristic curves bolted fault current and corresponding
(TCCs) of the protective device expected arcing time combination that yields 25
to clear the arc fault. Variations in the cal/cm2 (onset of hazard/risk Category 4
short circuit current levels and clearing level). An overcurrent relay curve is
times may result in higher arc flash ener- shown below the incident energy curves.
gies. Figure 3 depicts a quick method to The bolted fault current is shown
check if a combination of bolted fault below as an arrow. As long as the fault
current and arcing time yield incident current and the TCC curve are below the
energy levels below the PPE rating. incident energy curve, then the incident
Purple and green curves in the TCC energy should be less than the allowable
view of Figure 3 represent an incident limit. A set of curves of this type can be
energy level of 25 cal/cm2 for 600V developed for each of the types of equip-
class MCCs and switchgear. The curves ment listed in Table 130.7(C)(9)(a).
were generated using typical working
distances of 24 and 18 inches. To yield Conclusion
more conservative results, make sure Although its still necessary to con-
the example assumes the systems are tinue the use of NFPA 70E tables under
ungrounded. some circumstances, care must be taken
The curves show the relationship to ensure it is only applied under the con-
between bolted fault current and fault ditions and limitations stated in the table
clearing time. If the bolted fault current footnotes. Careful consideration must be
increases, the required clearing time given to the effect of variables not listed
should be less to ensure it doesnt in the table(s), such as working distances
exceed the incident energy level. and equipment configuration (grounding
According to Figure 3, the right side and gaps between conductors).
end of the curves represents the maximum These parameter variations may cause
the incident energy exposure to be much
NFPA 70E IEEE 1584
2002
Max Ibf
at Fault
Fault
Clearing
larger than the level suggested by the
Table
Voltage
Level
130.7(C)(9)(a)
Calculated
Hazard /
Location
(kA)
Time
(sec)
table. Thats why the best approach for
Hazard/Risk
Category
Risk
Category
determining the arc rating of PPE is by
< 240 1 0 25 0.03
having a detailed engineering-based arc
flash hazard analysis study completed.
> 240 2 0 &1 25 0.03
< 600 3 3, 4, & >4 65 0.330
Albert Marroquin is a senior electrical
< 600 3 3, 4, & >4 65 1.000 engineer and testing manager for Opera-
> 1000 4 3, 4, & >4 25 1.05 tion Technology, Inc., developer of ETAP
Arc Flash analysis software. For more
information, visit etap.com.
Circle 89 on Reader Service Card