PEOPLE V BELLAFLOR 233 SCRA 196

FACTS: Private respondent Reuben Albao, the accused was charged with the
crime of arson before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, then presided
by Judge Willelmo C. Fortun asassisting judge. Upon arraignment, private respondent
pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued and the parties rested their
case before Judge Fortun. It appears that on February 4, 1991, Judge Fortun was
designated as Assisting Judge for the Regional Trial Court in the National Capital Judicial
Region, to hold office in theOffice of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court in
Manila dated February 12, 1991, designating Judge Fortun to assist Judge Ricardo Diaz
of RTC, Br. 27, NCJR, and to hold office thereat.

On March 13, 1991, respondent judge Rodolfo M. Bellaflor was assigned as

replacement of Judge Fortun and
assisting judge of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue, Branch 28, wherein the criminal
case against private respondent was pending.

On May 3, 1991, Judge Fortun promulgated his decision dated February 6, 1991,
convicting private respondent of the crime of arson. At the time of promulgation of
Judge Fortuns decision, respondent judge was already presiding as assisting judge of
Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaue City. On May 9, 1991 private
respondent moved for the reconsideration of the said decision. On June 26, 1991,
respondent judge issued a resolution referred to above granting private respondents
motion for reconsideration and acquitted the latter of the crime charged.

In the same resolution, the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was declared null
and void for having been promulgated after said judge had vacated his office and after
being assigned to the Office of the Court Administrator in Manila. On August 1, 1991,
petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. In the instant
petition, petitioner claims that
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting themotion for
reconsideration of private respondent and acquitting the latter. On the other hand,
private respondent argues that the resolution acquitting him of the offense charged has
become final and executory and are consideration thereof would place him under
double jeopardy.

ISSUE: WON Private Respondent was placed in a double jeopardy

HELD: In order that a defendant may successfully allege former jeopardy, it is

necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or (2) acquitted, or (3)
in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case
against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information, and after the defendant has pleaded to the charge.

Generally, protection against double jeopardy is not available where the

dismissal of the case was effected at the instance of the accused. And there are only
two instances where double jeopardy will attach notwithstanding the fact the case was
dismissed with the express consent of the accused. The first is where the ground for the
dismissal is insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution and the second is where
the criminal proceedings have been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the
accuseds right to a speedy trial. Admittedly, private respondent had moved for the
dismissal of the criminal case filed against him and therefore, the protective mantle of
double jeopardy does not cover him.

FRANCISCO GUERRERO V. COURT OF APPEALS

[G.R. No. 107211. June 28, 1996]

FACTS: Francisco Guerrero is a pilot who allegedly through his negligence causes
theimproper emergency landing which resulted to the instant death of 3 passengers. The
incident happened May 1969, due to several postponement, all filed the petitioner
the petitioner was able to finally able to start presenting its evidence on sept. 1972
and he pleaded not guilty.
On January 1979 Judge Pardo ordered to file their memorandum; However the
petitioner filed his memorandum December 1979.March 1990 the case was re-raffled to
Judge Aquino and ordered the parties to complete transcript of stenographic notes but
the same was found incomplete and needs re-talking of testimonies. On Nov 1990
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that his right to speedy trial was violated.
Issue: Whether or not the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Whether the accused can validly raise the defense of the re-hearing
would place him in double jeopardy.
Held: The right to speedy trial is violated only where there is unreasonable,
vexatious and oppressive delay without the participation or fault of the accused or
when the unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the trial for unreasonable
lengths of time. In the present case, there is no question that the petitioner raised
the violation against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial Judge
reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have just continued to sleep on
his right-a situation amounting to laches-had the respondent judge not taken the
initiative of determining the non-completion of the records and of ordering the remedy
precisely so he could dispose the case.
It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the following
requisites must concur: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second
jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
to commit the same or is a frustration thereof (citations omitted).

And legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c ) after arraignment; (d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
the accused (citation omitted).[11]
 In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth
element - dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the
accused - is not present. Moreover, measured against the aforequoted standard, the
retaking of testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy. Hence, it
is beyond dispute that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is utterly without basis.

CUDIA V CA

Facts: Renato Cudia was arrested on June 28, 1989 in Mabalacat, Pampanga for the crime of
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. He was brought to Sto. Domingo, Angeles City which a
preliminary investigation was conducted and as a result the City Prosecutor filed an information against
him.
The case against him was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City. Upon
his arraignment, the court called the attention of the parties and contrary to the information, Renatio Cudia
had committed the offense in Mabalacat and not in Angeles City. Thus the judge ordered that the case
should be assigned to a court involving crimes committed outside Angeles City consequently it was
assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
However, the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga filed an information charging Renato Cudio with
the same crime and it was likewise assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC which resulted into
two Information filed woth the same crime. This prompted the City Prosecutor to file a Motion to Dismiss/
Withdraw the Information which the trial court granted.
Renato filed a Motion to Quash the criminal case filed by the Provincial Prosecutor on the ground
that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for
which he had been arraigned in the first criminal case, and which had been dismissed despite his
opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense.
The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the
ground that the petition could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was
defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it found that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City did not have the authority to file the first information.

Ruling: No. It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no
authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the Municipality
of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to
Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of all
penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the conduct of such investigations he or his
assistants shall receive the sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena
for the purpose.

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information, when
required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. It must be exhibited or
presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire
jurisdiction.

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information
would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. As the first information was fatally defective for
lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the
requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.

Thus Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.