CHAPTER 16: NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
DEBT
GEORGE H. GANAWAY, petitioner, vs. J. W.
QUILLEN, Warden of Bilibid Prison
FACTS: The petitioner in this original action in
habeas corpus asks that he be released from
Bilibid Prison because of imprisonment for debt in
a civil cause growing out if a contract. The return
of the Attorney-General alleges as the reason for
petitioner's incarceration in Bilibid Prison an order
of the Hon. George R. Harvey, judge of First
Instance of the city of Manila, issued under
authority of Chapter XVII of the code if Civil
Procedures. As standing alone the petition for
habeas corpus was fatally defective in its
allegations, this court on its motion, ordered
before it the record of the lower court in the case
entitled Thomas Casey et al. vs. George H.
Ganaway.
The complaint in the civil case last mentioned is
grounded on a contract, and asks in effect for an
accounting. That this is true is shown by the
phraseology of the complaint which repeatedly
speaks of an agreement entered into by the
plaintiffs and the defendants, by Exhibit A,
relating to the publication of a book named
"Forbes' Memoirs," and which describes itself as
"this contract," by the receipt attached to Exhibit
A, which mentions "the contract," and by the
order of the trial judge on demurrer which says
that "the plaintiffs allege a contract with the
defendant and a breach of the contract by the
defendant.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE OF NON-IMPRISONMENT OF DEBT
WAS VIOLATED.
RULING: The "debt" intended to be covered by the
constitutional guaranty has a well-defined
meaning. Organic provisions relieving from
imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent
the commitment for debtors to prison for liabilities
arising from actions ex contractu. The inhibition
was never meant to conclude damages arising in
actions ex delicto, for the reason that the
damages recoverable therein do not arise from
any contract entered into between the parties, but
are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he
has done and are considered as a punishment
therefor,
nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts
in criminal proceedings as punishments for crime.
It is clear that the action ending in the Court of
First Instance of the city of Manila in which
Thomas Casey et al. are plaintiffs and George H.
Ganaway is the defendant, is one predicated on
an obligation arising upon a contract.
Consequently, the imprisonment of the petitioner
is in contravention of organic law. It is for us in the
Philippine Islands to let no obstacle interfere with
a reasonable enforcement of the enlightened
principle of free government relating to
imprisonment for debt. It may, however, be
appropriate to remark that our holding need not
be taken as going to the extent of finding Chapter
XVII of the Code of Civil Procedure invalid and
should be understood as limited to the facts
before us and as circumscribed by the various
exception to the constitutional prohibition.
This court has, heretofore, in a minute order,
directed the discharge from imprisonment of the
petitioner and this decision is in explanation
thereof. The minute order will therefore, stand as
the authoritative adjudication of the court. Costs
de officio. So ordered.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG
Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness
for P1500 Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal
secretary and his wife Corazon Mendoza and
therefore an estafa case was filed against her.
Complainant admitted complaint. Now
complainant filed a case against respondent Judge
for not dismissing the case and issuing a warrant
of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple
indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not
present. Further she contended that no person
should be imprisoned for non-payment of a loan of
a sum of money. Two months after respondent
dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed
gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant
desisted case was pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation
committed by the judge when it ordered the
imprisonment of plaintiff for non-payment of debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any
offense as, his debt is considered a simple loan
granted by her friends to her. There is no
collateral or security because complainant was an
old friend of the spouses who lent the money and
that when they wrote her a letter of demand she
promised to pay them and said that if she failed to
keep her promise, they could get her valuable
things at her home. Under the Constitution she is
protected. Judge therefore in admitting such a
"criminal complaint" that was plainly civil in
aspects from the very face of the complaint and
the "evidence" presented, and issuing on the
same day the warrant of arrest upon his utterly
baseless finding "that the accused is probably
guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly
failed to perform his duties properly.
SURA v. MARTIN
Facts:
Vicente S. Martin, Sr. was ordered by the CFI
Negros Occidental to recognize his natural son
and to provide support at P100 per month. Martin
appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
court affirmed said decision. A writ of execution
was issued but it was returned unsatisfied. The
Sheriff's return of service stated: "The judgment
debtor is jobless, and is residing in the dwelling
house and in the company of his widowed mother,
at Tanjay, this province. Debtor has no leviable
property; he is even supported by his mother.
Hereto attached is the certificate of insolvency
issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Tanjay,
Negros Oriental, where debtor legally resides." For
failure to satisfy the writ of execution, plaintiff's
counsel prayed that defendant be adjudged guilty
of contempt of court. The trial court granted the
prayer and ordered the arrest and imprisonment
of Martin.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the orders of arrest and
imprisonment of Martin for contempt of court for
failure to satisfy the decision requiring him to
support his natural son due to insolvency were
violative of his constitutional right against
imprisonment for debt.
2. Whether or not Martin's failure to satisfy the
judgment amounts to disobedience to be
considered indirect contempt.
Held:
1. The sheriff's return shows that the judgment
debtor was insolvent. Hence, the orders for his
arrest and imprisonment for failure to satisfy the
judgment in effect, authorized his imprisonment
for debt in violation of the Constitution.
2. The orders for the arrest and imprisonment of
defendant for contempt for failure to satisfy a
judgment to pay past and future support are
illegal because such judgment is a final disposition
of the case and is declaratory of the rights or
obligations of the parties. Under Section 3(b), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court, the disobedience to a
judgment considered as indirect contempt refers
to a special judgment which is defined in Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, as that which
requires the performance of any other act than
the payment of money, or sale or delivery of real
or personal property which must be enforced by
proper contempt proceedings.
Morever, the writ of execution issued on the
judgment required "the sheriff or other proper
officer" to whom it was directed to satisfy the
amount out of all property, real and personal, of
the judgment debtor. The writ of execution was,
therefore, a direct order to the sheriff or other
proper officer to whom it was directed, and not an
order to the judgment debtor. In view thereof, the
judgment debtor could not, in the very nature of
things, have committed disobedience to the writ.
CRIME
LOZANO v. MARTINEZ
Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check
Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The petitions
arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses
under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs. RTC Judge
Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-
63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC Executive
Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch
V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and Susan Datuin
vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch
LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar Violago vs. RTC Judge
Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR
74524-25, Elinor Abad vs. RTC Judge
Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR
75122-49, Amable and Sylvia Aguiluz vs. Presiding
Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812- 13, Luis
M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge Senen Penaranda
[Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and
People vs. RTC Judge David Nitafan [Manila,
Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789].
Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago, Abad, Aguiluz,
Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash
the informations on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute
being unconstitutional. The motions were denied
by the trial courts, except in one case, which is
the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan),
wherein the trial court declared the law
unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The
parties adversely affected have come to the
Supreme Court for relief.
Issue: Whether BP 22 is contrary to the
constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt.Held: The constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved
gradually during the early part of the nineteenth
century in the various states of the American
Union as a result of the people's revulsion at the
cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by
common law, which permitted creditors to cause
the incarceration of debtors who could not pay
their debts. At common law, money judgments
arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or
for damages from breach of a contract could be
enforced against the person or body of the debtor
by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of
this writ, a debtor could be seized and imprisoned
at the instance of the creditor until he makes the
satisfaction awarded. As a consequence of the
popular ground swell against such a barbarous not the non-payment of an obligation which the
practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for law punishes, nor is it intended or designed to
debt came to be generally enshrined in the coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Although the
constitutions of various states of the Union. This effect of the law may be to coerce payment of an
humanitarian provision was transported to our obligation, it is intended to banish a practice (i.e.
shores by the Americans at the turn of the century the issuance of worthless checks) considered
and embodied in Philippine organic laws. Later, harmful to public welfare.
the Philippine fundamental law outlawed not only
imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous POLL TAX
practice, native to our shore, of throwing people in
jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. It PEOPLE v. LINSANGAN
may be constitutionally impermissible to penalize
Facts: Ambrosio Linsagan was prosecuted for
a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu.
nonpayment of the cedula or poll tax under
Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment
section 1439, in connection with section 2718, of
for debt were intended to prevent commitment of
the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial,
debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions
he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for 5
ex contractu. The inhibition was never meant to
days, and to pay the costs. The case was tried and
include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for
decided in the trial court before the
the reason that damages recoverable therein do
not arise from any contract entered into between Constitution of the Philippines took effect. But
the parties but are imposed while the appeal was pending, the said
Constitution became effective, and section 1,
upon the defendant for the wrong he has done
clause 12, of Article III thereof provides that "no
and are considered as punishment, nor to fines
person shall be imprisoned for debt or
and penalties imposed by the courts in criminal
nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsagan appealed,
proceedings as punishments for crime. Herein, the
alleging that the trial court erred in not declaring
thrust of the law (BP 22) is to prohibit, under pain
said sections 1439 and 2718 of the Revised
of penal sanctions, the making of worthless
Administrative Code unconstitutional and void, as
checks and putting them in circulation. The law
the judgment of conviction violates the provision
punishes the act not as an offense against
of the Philippine Autonomy Act interdicting
property, but an offense against public order. It is
imprisonment for debt.
Issue: Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of
Article III of the Constitution, the judgment of
conviction against Linsagan can stand.
Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution,
provides that "All laws of the Philippine Islands
shall continue in force until the inauguration of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such
laws shall remain operative, unless inconsistent
with this Constitution, until amended, altered,
modified, or repealed by the National Assembly,
and all references in such laws to the Government
or officials of the Philippine Islands shall be
construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to the
Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution." Section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1,
clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that,
while the former authorizes imprisonment for
nonpayment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter
forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of
the Government of the Commonwealth, said
section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code
became inoperative, and no judgment of
conviction can be based thereon. It results that
the judgment appealed from must be reversed,
and the case dismissed with costs de oficio.