G.R. No.

174759 September 7, 2011

DENIS B. HABAWEL and ALEXIS F. MEDINA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, FIRST DIVISION, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Found guilty of direct contempt by the First Division of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA First Division), and sanctioned with imprisonment for a period
of ten days and a fine of P2,000.00, the petitioners have come to the Court for
relief through certiorari, claiming that the CTA First Divisions finding and
sentence were made in grave abuse of its discretion because the language they
used in their motion for reconsideration as the attorneys for a party was
contumacious. Specifically, they assail the resolution dated May 16,
2006,1 whereby the CTA First Division disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds Attorneys Denis B.

Habawel and Alexis F. Medina of the Ponce Enrile Reyes and Manalastas Law
Offices guilty of DIRECT CONTEMPT. Each counsel is

hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER

IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.

SO ORDERED.2

and the resolution dated July 26, 2006,3 whereby the CTA First Division
denied their motion for reconsideration and reiterated the penalties.

Antecedents

The petitioners were the counsel of Surfield Development Corporation

(Surfield), which sought from the Office of the City Treasurer of Mandaluyong
City the refund of excess realty taxes paid from 1995 until 2000.4 After the
City Government of Mandaluyong City denied its claim for refund,5 Surfield
initiated a special civil action for mandamus in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
in Mandaluyong City, which was docketed as SCA No. MC03-2142 entitled
Surfield Development Corporation v. Hon. City Treasurer of Mandaluyong
City, and Hon. City Assessor of Mandaluyong City, and assigned to Branch
214.6 Surfield later amended its petition to include its claim for refund of the
excess taxes paid from 2001 until 2003.7

On October 15, 2004, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
period to file the claim had already prescribed and that Surfield had failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The RTC ruled that the grant of a tax refund
was not a ministerial duty compellable by writ of mandamus.8

Surfield, represented by the petitioners, elevated the dismissal to the CTA via
petition for review (CTA AC No. 5 entitled Surfield Development Corporation
v. Hon. City Treasurer and Hon. City Assessor, Mandaluyong City).9The appeal
was assigned to the First Division, composed of Presiding Justice Ernesto D.
Acosta, Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista and Associate Justice Caesar A.
Casanova.

In its decision dated January 5, 2006,10 the CTA First Division denied the
petition for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to exhaust the remedies
provided under Section 25311 and Section 22612 of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code).

Undeterred, the petitioners sought reconsideration in behalf of

Surfield,13 insisting that the CTA had jurisdiction pursuant to Section 7(a)(3)
of Republic Act No. 9282;14 and arguing that the CTA First Division manifested
its "lack of understanding or respect" for the doctrine of stare decisis in not
applying the ruling in Ty v. Trampe (G.R. No. 117577, December 1, 1995, 250
SCRA 500), to the effect that there was no need to file an appeal before the
Local Board of Assessment Appeals pursuant to Section 22 of Republic Act No.
7160.

On March 15, 2006, the CTA First Division denied Surfields motion for
reconsideration. On the issue of jurisdiction, the CTA First Division explained
that the jurisdiction conferred by Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 1125, as
amended by Republic Act No. 9282, referred to appeals from the decisions,
orders, or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases and did not include the
real property tax, an ad valorem tax, the refund of excess payment of which
Surfield was claiming. Accordingly, the CTA First Division ruled that the
jurisdiction of the CTA concerning real property tax cases fell under a
different section of Republic Act No. 9282 and under a separate book of
Republic Act No. 7160.
In addition, the CTA First Division, taking notice of the language the
petitioners employed in the motion for reconsideration, required them to
explain within five days from receipt why they should not be liable for indirect
contempt or be made subject to disciplinary action, thusly:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is

hereby DENIED for lack of merit. And insofar as the merits of the case are
concerned let this Resolution be considered as the final decision on the
matter.

However, this Court finds the statements of petitioners counsel that "it is
gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has no
jurisdiction over this instant petition; the grossness of this Honorable Courts
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this
Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case" and "this Court lacked
the understanding and respect for the doctrine of "stare decisis" as
derogatory, offensive and disrespectful. Lawyers are charged with the basic
duty to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers;" they vow solemnly to conduct themselves "with all good
fidelityto the courts." As a matter of fact, the first canon of legal ethics
enjoins them "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its superior importance." Therefore, petitioners counsel is hereby
ORDERED to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why
he should not be held for indirect contempt and/or subject to disciplinary
action.

SO ORDERED.15

The petitioners submitted a compliance dated March 27, 2006,16 in which they
appeared to apologize but nonetheless justified their language as, among
others, "necessary to bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the
grievousness of the error by calling a spade by spade."17

In its first assailed resolution, the CTA First Division found the petitioners
apology wanting in sincerity and humility, observing that they chose words
that were "so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor and integrity"
for brazenly pointing to "the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of
discretion," to wit:
In their Compliance, the Court finds no sincerity and humility when counsels
Denis B. Habawel and Alexis F. Medina asked for apology. In fact, the counsels
brazenly pointed the Courts alleged ignorance and grave abuse of discretion.
Their chosen words are so strong, which brings disrepute the Courts honor
and integrity. We quote:

a) "Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not

endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to
bluntly call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the
error by calling a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong
articulation of the gravity of the error of the Honorable Court in
avoiding the substantial and transcendental issues by the simple
expedient of dismissing the petition for alleged lack of jurisdiction, in
violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution, which requires
that the Decision must express clearly and distinctly the facts and the
law on which the Decision was based" (par. 3 of the Compliance; docket,
p. 349);

b) "Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5) and it

totally ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that
"(U)ndoubtedly, appeals of the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial
Court concerning real property taxes evidently do not fall within the
jurisdiction of the CTA," the undersigned counsel formed a perception
that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or ignorant of the new
provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence, the statements that it was gross
ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has not
[sic] jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts
ignorance of the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of
this Honorable Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest
and frank articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was
influenced by its failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally
ignored Section 7(a)(3) in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction" (par. 10 of
the Compliance; docket, p. 353);18

Accordingly, the CTA First Division adjudged both of the petitioners guilty of
direct contempt of court for failing to uphold their duty of preserving the
integrity and respect due to the courts, sentencing each to suffer
imprisonment of ten days and to pay P2,000.00 as fine.
Seeking reconsideration,19 the petitioners submitted that they could not be
held guilty of direct contempt because: (a) the phrase gross ignorance of the
law was used in its legal sense to describe the error of judgment and was not
directed to the character or competence of the decision makers; (b) there was
no "unfounded accusation or allegation," or "scandalous, offensive or
menacing," "intemperate, abusive, abrasive or threatening," or "vile, rude and
repulsive" statements or words contained in their motion for reconsideration;
(c) there was no statement in their motion for reconsideration that brought
the authority of the CTA and the administration of the law into disrepute; and
(d) they had repeatedly offered their apology in their compliance.20

Their submissions did not convince and move the CTA First Division to
reconsider, which declared through its second assailed resolution that:

The tone of an irate lawyer would almost always reveal the sarcasm in the
phrases used. The scurrilous attacks made in the guise of pointing out errors
of judgment almost always result to the destruction of the high esteem and
regard towards the Court.21

and disposed thusly:

WHEREFORE, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for

lack of merit. Each counsel is hereby ORDERED TO PAY a fine of Two
Thousand Pesos and to SUFFER IMPRISONMENT for a period of ten (10) days.

SO, ORDERED.22

Issues

Arguing that they were merely prompted by their "(z)ealous advocacy and an
appalling error" committed by the CTA First Division to frankly describe such
error as gross ignorance of the law, the petitioners now attribute grave abuse
of discretion to the CTA First Division in finding that:

THE PETITIONERS LANGUAGE IN THE SUBJECT MOTION AND

COMPLIANCE WAS CONTUMACIOUS;

II
 THE PETITIONERS WERE NOT SINCERE IN THEIR APOLOGY AND
WERE ARROGANT;

III

THE EXERCISE OF CONTEMPT POWER WAS WITHIN THE LIMITS SET

BY THE SUPREME COURT; AND

IV

THE PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF

DIRECT CONTEMPT.

The petitioners continue to posit that the phrase gross ignorance of the law
was used in its strict legal sense to emphasize the gravity of the error of law
committed by the CTA First Division; and that the statements described by the
CTA First Division as "abrasive, offensive, derogatory, offensive and
disrespectful" should be viewed within the context of the general tone and
language of their motion for reconsideration; that their overall language was
"tempered, restrained and respectful" and should not be construed as a
display of contumacious attitude or as "a flouting or arrogant belligerence in
defiance of the court" to be penalized as direct contempt; that the CTA First
Division did not appreciate the sincerity of their apology; and that they merely
pointed out the error in the decision of the CTA First Division.

For its part, the CTA First Division contends that a reading of the motion for
reconsideration and the character of the words used therein by the
petitioners indicated that their statements reflected no humility, nor were
they "expressive of a contrite heart;" and that their submissions instead
"reflected arrogance and sarcasm, that they even took the opportunity to
again deride the public respondent on the manner of how it wrote the
decision."23

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opines that submitting a pleading
containing derogatory, offensive and malicious statements to the same court
or judge in which the proceedings are pending constitutes direct contempt;
and that the CTA First Division did not abuse its discretion in finding the
petitioners liable for direct contempt under Section 1, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court.24
 Ruling

We dismiss the petition for certiorari, and declare that the CTA First Division
did not abuse its discretion, least of all gravely, in finding that the petitioners
committed direct contempt of court.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all attorneys to

observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
to insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility specifically enjoins all attorneys thus:

Rule 11.03. A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing

language or behavior before the Courts.

It is conceded that an attorney or any other person may be critical of the

courts and their judges provided the criticism is made in respectful terms and
through legitimate channels. In that regard, we have long adhered to the
sentiment aptly given expression to in the leading case of In re: Almacen:25

xxx every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of
public officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is
aimed at a judicial authority, or that it is articulated by a lawyer. Such right is
especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,
because then the courts actuation are thrown open to public consumption.

xxx

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical
evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative
branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished
by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the

court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.xxx

xxx

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." xxx

xxx

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. (emphasis supplied)26

The test for criticizing a judges decision is, therefore, whether or not the
criticism is bona fide or done in good faith, and does not spill over the walls of
decency and propriety.

Here, the petitioners motion for reconsideration contained the following

statements, to wit: (a) "[i]t is gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable
Court to have held that it has no jurisdiction over the instant petition;"27 (b)
"[t]he grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of the law is matched only
by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable Courts jurisdiction;"28 and
(c) the "Honorable Courts lack of understanding or respect for the doctrine of
stare decisis."29

The CTA First Division held the statements to constitute direct contempt of
court meriting prompt penalty.

We agree.

By such statements, the petitioners clearly and definitely overstepped the

bounds of propriety as attorneys, and disregarded their sworn duty to respect
the courts. An imputation in a pleading of gross ignorance against a court or
its judge, especially in the absence of any evidence, is a serious
allegation,30 and constitutes direct contempt of court. It is settled that
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements contained in pleadings or
written submissions presented to the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending are treated as direct contempt because they are
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.31 This is true, even if the
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements are not read in open
court.32 Indeed, in Dantes v. Judge Ramon S. Caguioa,33 where the petitioners
motion for clarification stated that the respondent judges decision
constituted gross negligence and ignorance of the rules, and was pure
chicanery and sophistry, the Court held that "a pleading containing
derogatory, offensive or malicious statements when submitted before a court
or judge in which the proceedings are pending is direct contempt because it is
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice."34

In his dissent, Justice Del Castillo, although conceding that the petitioners
statements were "strong, tactless and hurtful,"35 regards the statements not
contemptuous, or not necessarily assuming the level of contempt for being
explanations of their position "in a case under consideration" and because "an
unfavorable decision usually incites bitter feelings."36

Such contempt of court cannot be condoned or be simply ignored and set

aside, however, for the characterization that the statements were "strong,
tactless and hurtful," although obviously correct, provides no ground to be
lenient towards the petitioners, even assuming that such "strong, tactless and
hurtful" statements were used to explain their clients position in the
case.37 The statements manifested a disrespect towards the CTA and the
members of its First Division approaching disdain. Nor was the offensiveness
of their "strong, tactless and hurtful" language minimized on the basis that
"snide remarks or sarcastic innuendos made by counsels are not considered
contemptuous considering that unfavorable decision usually incite bitter
feelings."38 By branding the CTA and the members of its First Division as
"totally unaware or ignorant" of Section 7(a)(3) of Republic Act No. 9282, and
making the other equally harsh statements, the petitioners plainly assailed the
legal learning of the members of the CTA First Division. To hold such language
as reflective of a very deliberate move on the part of the petitioners to
denigrate the CTA and the members of its First Division is not altogether
unwarranted.

The petitioners disdain towards the members of the CTA First Division for
ruling against their side found firm confirmation in their compliance, in which
they unrepentantly emphasized such disdain in the following telling words:

3. Admittedly, the language of the Motion for Reconsideration was not

endearing. However, the undersigned counsel found it necessary to bluntly
call the Honorable Courts attention to the grievousness of the error by calling
a spade a spade. The advocacy needed a strong articulation of the gravity of
the error of the Honorable Court in avoiding the substantial and
transcendental issues by the simple expedient of dismissing the petition for
alleged lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which requires that the Decision must express clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which the Decision was based.

xxx

10. Since the Honorable Court simply quoted Section 7(a)(5), and it totally
ignored Section 7(a)(3), to perfunctorily find that "(U)ndoubtedly, appeals of
the decisions or rulings of the Regional Trial Court concerning real property
taxes evidently do not fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA," the undersigned
counsel formed a perception that the Honorable Court was totally unaware or
ignorant of the new provision, Section 7(a)(3). Hence the statements that it
was gross ignorance of the law for the Honorable Court to have held that it has
no jurisdiction, as well as, the grossness of the Honorable Courts ignorance of
the law is matched only by the unequivocal expression of this Honorable
Courts jurisdiction over the instant case were an honest and frank
articulation of undersigned counsels perception that was influenced by its
failure to understand why the Honorable Court totally ignored Section 7(a)(3)
in ruling on its lack of jurisdiction. (emphasis supplied)39

We might have been more understanding of the milieu in which the

petitioners made the statements had they convinced us that the CTA First
Division truly erred in holding itself bereft of jurisdiction over the appeal of
their client. But our review of the text of the legal provisions involved reveals
that the error was committed by them, not by the CTA First Division. This
result became immediately evident from a reading of Section 7(a)(3) and
Section 7(a)(5) of Republic Act No. 9282, the former being the anchor for their
claim that the CTA really had jurisdiction, to wit:

Section 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx
(3) Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction; (emphasis supplied)

xxx

(5) Decisions of the Central Board of Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the assessment and taxation of real
property originally decided by the provincial or city board of assessment
appeals; (emphasis supplied)

xxx

As can be read and seen, Section 7(a)(3) covers only appeals of the
"(d)ecisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or
appellate jurisdiction." The provision is clearly limited to local tax disputes
decided by the Regional Trial Courts. In contrast, Section 7(a)(5) grants the
CTA cognizance of appeals of the "(d)ecisions of the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property originally decided by
the provincial or city board of assessment appeals." In its resolution of March
15, 2006, therefore, the CTA First Division forthrightly explained why,
contrary to the petitioners urging, Section 7(a)(3) was not applicable by
clarifying that a real property tax, being an ad valorem tax, could not be
treated as a local tax.40

It would have been ethically better for the petitioners to have then retreated
and simply admitted their blatant error upon being so informed by the CTA
First Division about the untenability of their legal position on the matter, but
they still persisted by going on in their compliance dated March 27, 2006 to
also blame the CTA First Division for their "perception" about the CTA First
Divisions "being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3)" due to "the terseness of
the Decision dated 05 January 2006," viz:

12. Undersigned counsel regrets having bluntly argued that this Honorable
Court was grossly ignorant of Section 7(a)(3) because from the terseness of
the Decision dated 05 January 2006, the undersigned counsel perceived the
Honorable Court as being totally oblivious of Section 7(a)(3). Had the reasons
discussed in the Resolution dated 15 March 2006 been articulated in the 05
January 2006 decision, there would have been no basis for undersigned
counsels to have formed the above-mentioned perception.41 (emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1

The foregoing circumstances do not give cause for the Court to excuse the
petitioners contemptuous and offensive language. No attorney, no matter his
great fame or high prestige, should ever brand a court or judge as grossly
ignorant of the law, especially if there was no sincere or legitimate reason for
doing so. Every attorney must use only fair and temperate language in arguing
a worthy position on the law, and must eschew harsh and intemperate
language that has no place in the educated ranks of the Legal Profession.
Truly, the Bar should strive to win arguments through civility and fairness,
not by "heated and acrimonious tone," as the Court aptly instructed in Slade
Perkins v. Perkins,42 to wit:

The court notices with considerable regret the heated and acrimonious tone of
the remarks of the counsel for appellant, in his brief, in speaking of the action
of the trial judge. We desire to express our opinion that excessive language
weakens rather than strengthens the persuasive force of legal reasoning. We
have noticed a growing tendency to use language that experience has shown
not to be conducive to the orderly and proper administration of justice. We
therefore bespeak the attorneys of this court to desist from such practices,
and to treat their opposing attorneys, and the judges who have decided their
cases in the lower court adversely to their contentions with that courtesy all
have a right to expect. (emphasis supplied)

We do not hesitate to punish the petitioners for the direct contempt of

court.1wphi1 They threw out self-restraint and courtesy, traits that in the
most trying occasions equate to rare virtues that all members of the Legal
Profession should possess and cherish. They shunted aside the nobility of
their profession. They wittingly banished the ideal that even the highest
degree of zealousness in defending the causes of clients did not permit them
to cross the line between liberty and license.43 Indeed, the Court has not
lacked in frequently reminding the Bar that language, though forceful, must
still be dignified; and though emphatic, must remain respectful as befitting
advocates and in keeping with the dignity of the Legal Profession.44 It is
always worthwhile to bear in mind, too, that the language vehicle did not run
short of expressions that were emphatic, yet respectful; convincing, yet not
derogatory; and illuminating, yet not offensive.45 No attorney worthy of the
title should forget that his first and foremost status as an officer of the Court
calls upon him to be respectful and restrained in his dealings with a court or
its judge. Clearly, the petitioners criticism of the CTA First Division was not
bona fide or done in good faith, and spilled over the walls of propriety.

The power to punish contempt of court is exercised on the preservative and

not on the vindictive principle, and only occasionally should a court invoke its
inherent power to punish contempt of court in order to retain that respect
without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.46 We reiterate
that the sanction the CTA First Division has visited upon the petitioners was
preservative, for the sanction maintained and promoted the proper respect
that attorneys and their clients should bear towards the courts of justice.

Inasmuch as the circumstances indicate that the petitioners tone of apology

was probably feigned, for they did not relent but continued to justify their
contemptuous language, they do not merit any leniency. Nonetheless, the
penalty of imprisonment for ten days and a fine of P2,000.00 is excessive
punishment of the direct contempt of court for using contemptuous and
offensive language and verges on the vindictive. The Court foregoes the
imprisonment.

The Courts treatment of contemptuous and offensive language used by

counsel in pleadings and other written submissions to the courts of law,
including this Court, has not been uniform. The treatment has dealt with
contemptuous and offensive language either as contempt of court or
administrative or ethical misconduct, or as both. The sanction has ranged
from a warning (to be more circumspect), a reprimand with stern warning
against a repetition of the misconduct, a fine of P2,000.00, a fine of P5,000.00,
and even indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

The sanction has usually been set depending on whether the offensive
language is viewed as contempt of court or as ethical misconduct. In Re: Letter
Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,47 the errant lawyer who
made baseless accusations of manipulation in his letters and compliance to
this Court was indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Although he
was further declared guilty of contempt of court, the Court prescribed no
separate penalty on him, notwithstanding that he evinced no remorse and did
not apologize for his actions that resulted from cases that were decided
against his clients for valid reasons. In Re: Conviction of Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles,48 the complaining State Prosecutor, despite his strong statements to
support his position not being considered as direct contempt of court, was
warned to be more circumspect in language. In contrast, Judge Angeles was
reprimanded and handed a stern warning for the disrespectful language she
used in her pleadings filed in this Court, which declared such language to be
below the standard expected of a judicial officer. In Nuez v. Atty. Arturo B.
Astorga,49 Atty. Astorga was meted a P2,000.00 fine for conduct unbecoming
of a lawyer for hurling insulting language against the opposing counsel.
Obviously, the language was dealt with administratively, not as contempt of
court. In Ng v. Atty. Benjamin C. Alar,50 the Court prescribed a higher fine
of P5,000.00 coupled with a stern warning against Atty. Alar who, in his
motion for reconsideration and to inhibit, cast insults and diatribes against
the NLRC First Division and its members. Yet again, the fine was a disciplinary
sanction.

Despite having earlier directed the petitioners through its resolution of March
15, 2006 that they should "explain within five (5) days from receipt of this
Resolution why (they) should not be held for indirect contempt and/or
subject to disciplinary action,"51 the CTA First Division was content with
punishing them for direct contempt under Section 1,52 Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, and did not anymore pursue the disciplinary aspect. The Court concurs
with the offended courts treatment of the offensive language as direct
contempt. Thus, we impose on each of them a fine of P2,000.00, the maximum
imposable fine under Section 1 of Rule 71, taking into consideration the fact
that the CTA is a superior court of the same level as the Court of Appeals, the
second highest court of the land. The penalty of imprisonment, as earlier
clarified, is deleted. Yet, they are warned against using offensive or
intemperate language towards a court or its judge in the future, for they may
not be as lightly treated as they now are.

ACCORDINGLY, we DISMISS the petition for certiorari; UPHOLD the

resolutions dated May 16, 2006 and July 26, 2006; and MODIFY the penalty
imposed on Attorney Denis B. Habawel and Attorney Alexis F. Medina by
deleting the penalty of imprisonment and sentencing them only to pay the fine
of P2,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366 [Formerly OCA IPI No. 11-3740-RTJ], February 04,
2015

JILL M. TORMIS, Complainant, v. JUDGE MEINRADO P.

PAREDES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

For consideration is the Report and Recommendation1 of Justice Maria Elisa

Sempio Diy (Justice Diy), Court of Appeals, Cebu City, submitted to this Court
pursuant to its January 14, 2013 Resolution,2referring the complaint filed by
Jill M. Tormis (Jill) against respondent Judge Meinrado P. Paredes (Judge
Paredes), Presiding Judge, Branch 13, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City,
for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Facts

In her Affidavit/Complaint,3 dated September 5, 2011, Jill charged Judge

Paredes with grave misconduct. Jill was a student of Judge Paredes in Political
Law Review during the first semester of school year 2010-2011 at the
Southwestern University, Cebu City. She averred that sometime in August
2010, in his class discussions, Judge Paredes named her mother, Judge
Rosabella Tormis (Judge Tormis), then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as one of the judges involved in the
marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that
Judge Tormis was abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of
the law.

Jill added that Judge Paredes included Judge Tormis in his discussions not only
once but several times. In one session, Judge Paredes was even said to have
included in his discussion Francis Mondragon Tormis (Francis), son of Judge
Tormis, stating that he was a court-noted addict.4 She was absent from class
at that time, but one of her classmates who was present, Rhoda L.
Litang (Rhoda), informed her about the inclusion of her brother. To avoid
humiliation in school, Jill decided to drop the class under Judge Paredes and
transfer to another law school in Tacloban City.

Jill also disclosed that in the case entitled Trinidad O. Lachica v. Judge
Tormis5(Lachica v. Tormis), her mother was suspended from the service for
six (6) months for allegedly receiving payment of a cash bail bond for the
temporary release of an accused for the warrant she had issued in a case then
pending before her sala. Judge Paredes was the one who reviewed the
findings conducted therein and he recommended that the penalty be reduced
to severe reprimand.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than
that committed by her mother. She averred that on March 13, 2011, Judge
Paredes accepted a cash bail bond in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos
(P6,000.00) for the temporary release of one Lita Guioguio in a case entitled,
People of the Philippines v. Lita Guioguio, docketed as Criminal Case No.
148434-R,6 then pending before Branch 8, MTCC, Cebu City (Guioguio case).

Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively sanctioned for his
actuations.

Comment of Judge Paredes

In his Comment,7 dated October 28, 2011, Judge Paredes denied the
accusations of Jill. He stated that Judge Tormis had several administrative
cases, some of which he had investigated; that as a result of the investigations,
he recommended sanctions against Judge Tormis; that Judge Tormis used Jill,
her daughter, to get back at him; that he discussed in his class the case
of Lachica v. Tormis, but never Judge Tormis involvement in the marriage
scams nor her sanctions as a result of the investigation conducted by the
Court; that he never personally attacked Judge Tormis dignity and credibility;
that the marriage scams in Cebu City constituted a negative experience for all
the judges and should be discussed so that other judges, court employees and
aspiring lawyers would not emulate such misdeeds; that the marriage scams
were also discussed during meetings of RTC judges and in schools where
remedial law and legal ethics were taught; that he talked about past and
resolved cases, but not the negative tendencies of Judge Tormis; that there
was nothing wrong in discussing the administrative cases involving Judge
Tormis because these cases were known to the legal community and some
were even published in the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and
other legal publications; and that when he was the executive judge tasked to
investigate Judge Tormis, he told her to mend her ways, but she resented his
advice.
Judge Paredes further stated that when Jill was still his student, she did not
complain about or dispute his discussions in class regarding the
administrative liabilities of her mother; that the matter was not also brought
to the attention of the Dean of Southwestern University or of the local
authorities; that he admitted saying that Judge Tormis had a son named
Francis who was a drug addict and that drug dependents had no place in the
judiciary; and that he suggested that Francis should be removed from the
judiciary.

He denied, however, having stated that Francis was appointed as court

employee as a result of the influence of Judge Tormis. She is not an influential
person and it is the Supreme Court who determines the persons to be
appointed as court employees. Judge Tormis, however, allowed her drug
dependent son to apply for a position in the judiciary.

Regarding the specific act being complained of, Judge Paredes admitted that
he personally accepted a cash bail bond of P6,000.00 for the temporary
release of Lita Guioguio on March 13, 2011. He claimed though that the
approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M.
No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to act on petitions for bail and
other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. Judge
Paredes explained that he merely followed the procedure. As Executive Judge,
he issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, a Monday, he
instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the Clerk of
Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and
issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the Clerk of Court
acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only in the afternoon of March 21,
2011.

Lastly, Judge Paredes averred that the discussions relative to the

administrative cases of Judge Tormis could not be the subject of an
administrative complaint because it was not done in the performance of his
judicial duties.

Reply of the Complainant

In her Verified-Reply,8 dated November 23, 2011, Jill countered that her
mother had nothing to do with the filing of the present complaint; that she
was forced to leave her family in Cebu City to continue her law studies
elsewhere because she could no longer bear the discriminating and
judgmental eyes of her classmates brought about by Judge Paredes frequent
discussions in class of her mothers administrative cases; that her mother was
indeed one of the judges implicated in the marriage scams, but when Judge
Paredes discussed the matter in his classes, the case of her mother was not yet
resolved by the Court and, thus, in 2010, it was still premature; and that Judge
Paredes was aware that administrative cases were confidential in nature.

Jill claimed that the intention to humiliate her family was evident when Judge
Paredes branded her brother, Francis, as a drug addict.

Rejoinder of Judge Paredes

In his Rejoinder,9 dated December 2, 2011, Judge Paredes asserted that it was
not premature to discuss the marriage scams in class because the scandal was
already disclosed by Atty. Rullyn Garcia and was also written in many legal
publications, and that the drug addiction of Francis was known in the Palace
of Justice of Cebu City.

In its Report,10 dated September 12, 2012, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) stated that the conflicting allegations by the parties
presented factual issues that could not be resolved based on the evidence on
record then. Considering the gravity and the sensitive nature of the charges, a
full-blown investigation should be conducted by the CA.

On January 14, 2013, pursuant to the recommendation of the OCA, the Court
referred the administrative complaint to the Executive Justice of the CA, Cebu
Station, for investigation, report and recommendation within sixty (60) days
from receipt of the records.11chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On March 26, 2013, the case was raffled to, and the records were received by,
Justice Diy. Thereafter, the appropriate notices were issued and the
confidential hearings were conducted. Afterwards, Justice Diy received the
respective memoranda of the parties.

In her memorandum,12 Jill contended that Judge Paredes act of discussing

Judge Tormis cases in class where she was present was an open display of
insensitivity, impropriety and lack of delicadeza bordering on oppressive and
abusive conduct, which fell short of the exacting standards of behavior
demanded of magistrates. She asserted that the defense of Judge Paredes that
he could not be made administratively liable as the act was not made in the
performance of his official duties did not hold water because a judge should
be the embodiment of what was just and fair not only in the performance of
his official duties but also in his everyday life.

Jill also averred that Judge Paredes violated the subjudice rule when he
discussed the marriage scam involving Judge Tormis in 2010 because at that
time, the case was still being investigated; that the administrative case relative
to the marriage scam was decided only on April 2, 2013; that Judge Paredes
was not the Executive Judge of the MTCC when he received the cash bail bond
in the Guiguio case; that he could not prove that the executive judge of the
MTCC was unavailable before accepting the cash bail bond; and that the
assertion of Judge Paredes of his being an anti-corruption judge and a lone
nominee of the IBP Cebu City Chapter to the Foundation of Judicial Excellence
did not exculpate him from committing the acts complained of.

In his Reply-Memorandum,13 Judge Paredes reiterated the allegations

contained in his previous pleadings. He added that the marriage scams
scandalized the Judiciary and became public knowledge when Atty. Rullyn
Garcia of the OCA held a press conference on the matter; that, hence, every
citizen, including him, may comment thereon; that in the hierarchy of rights,
freedom of speech and expression ranked high; that Judge Tormis never
intervened in the present case; that if he indeed made derogatory remarks
against Judge Tormis, she should have filed a criminal action for oral
defamation; and that calling for the ouster of drug addicts could not be
considered an abuse, but was meant for the protection of the
Judiciary.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her Report and Recommendation, Justice Diy found Judge Paredes guilty of
conduct unbecoming of a judge. She opined that his use of intemperate
language during class discussions was inappropriate. His statements in class,
tending to project Judge Tormis as corrupt and ignorant of the laws and
procedure, were obviously and clearly insensitive and inexcusable.

Justice Diy disregarded the defense of Judge Paredes that his discussions of
the administrative case of Judge Tormis in class was an exercise of his right to
freedom of expression. She cited the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary15 which urged members of the Judiciary to be models of
propriety at all times. She quoted with emphasis Section 6 which stated that
Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief,
association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always
conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial
office and the impartiality and independence of the
judiciary.16chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Justice Diy likewise rejected Judge Paredes position that he could not be held
administratively liable for his comments against Judge Tormis and Francis as
these were uttered while he was not in the exercise of his judicial
functions. Jurisprudence,17 as well as the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
required that he conduct himself beyond reproach, not only in the discharge
of his judicial functions, but also in his other professional endeavors and
everyday activities.

Justice Diy found merit in Jills allegation that Judge Paredes violated
the subjudice rule when the latter discussed the marriage scams involving
Judge Tormis in 2010 when the said issue was still being investigated. She
cited, as basis for Judge Paredes liability, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code
of Judicial Conduct.

As regards Judge Paredes receipt of the cash bail bond in relation to

the Guioguio case, Justice Diy absolved him of any liability as the charge of
grave misconduct was not supported by sufficient evidence. She accepted
Judge Paredes explanation that he merely followed the procedure laid down
in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC when he approved the bail
bond.

Based on these findings, Justice Diy came up with the following

recommendations, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The undersigned Investigating Justice finds that indeed Judge Paredes is guilty
of conduct unbecoming of a judge. Conduct unbecoming of a judge is
classified as a light offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of
Court, penalized under Section 11 (c) thereof by any of the following: (1) a
Fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3)
Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.
Inasmuch as this is Judge Paredes first offense and considering the factual
milieu and the peculiar circumstances attendant thereto, it is respectfully
recommended that Judge Paredes be meted out with the penalty
of REPRIMAND with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar
offense will be dealt with more severely.18

The Courts Ruling

The Court adopts the findings and recommendations of Justice Diy except as
to the penalty.

Misconduct is defined as a transgression of some established and definite rule

of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules,
which must be established by substantial evidence. As distinguished from
simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law,
or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave
misconduct. Corruption, as an element of grave misconduct, consists in the act
of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his
station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person,
contrary to duty and the rights of others.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

To constitute misconduct, the act or acts must have a direct relation to and be
connected with the performance of his official duties.20 Considering that the
acts complained of, the remarks against Judge Tormis and Francis, were made
by Judge Paredes in his class discussions, they cannot be considered as
misconduct. They are simply not related to the discharge of his official
functions as a judge. Thus, Judge Paredes cannot be held liable for
misconduct, much less for grave misconduct.

Discussion of a subjudice matter, however, is another thing.

On subjudice matters, Section 4, Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 3

IMPARTIALITY
SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect
the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that
might affect the fair trial of any person or issue. (Emphasis supplied)

The subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the

judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice.21 The rationale for the rule
was spelled out in Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. Sanchez,22 where it was stated that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and
juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence produced in
court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies.23chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Notably, when Judge Paredes discussed the marriage scams involving Judge
Tormis in 2010, the investigation relative to the said case had not yet been
concluded. In fact, the decision on the case was promulgated by the Court
only on April 2, 2013.24 In 2010, he still could not make comments on the
administrative case to prevent any undue influence in its
resolution. Commenting on the marriage scams, where Judge Tormis was one
of the judges involved, was in contravention of the subjudice rule. Justice Diy
was, therefore, correct in finding that Judge Paredes violated Section 4, Canon
3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

The Court shares the view of Justice Diy that although the reasons of Judge
Paredes for discussing the marriage scams in his classes seemed noble, his
objectives were carried out insensitively and in bad taste. The pendency of
the administrative case of Judge Tormis and the publicity of the marriage
scams did not give Judge Paredes unrestrained license to criticize Judge
Tormis in his class discussions. The publicity given to the investigation of the
said scams and the fact that it was widely discussed in legal circles let people
expressed critical opinions on the issue. There was no need for Judge Paredes
to rub salt to the wound,25 as Justice Diy put it.

Judge Paredes in using intemperate language and unnecessary comments

tending to project Judge Tormis as a corrupt and ignorant judge in his class
discussions, was correctly found guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge by
Justice Dy.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires
judges to exemplify propriety at all times. Canon 4
instructs:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 4

PROPRIETY

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.

xxx

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the
dignity, independence and respect for himself, the Court and the Judiciary as a
whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint. He should choose his words and exercise more caution and
control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge should possess the
virtue of gravitas. Furthermore, a magistrate should not descend to the level
of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering harsh words, snide
remarks and sarcastic comments. He is required to always be temperate,
patient and courteous, both in conduct and in
language.26chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In this case, records show that Judge Paredes failed to observe the propriety
required by the Code and to use temperate and courteous language befitting a
magistrate. Indeed, Judge Paredes demonstrated conduct unbecoming of a
judge.

When Judge Paredes failed to restrain himself and included Francis, whose
condition and personal circumstances, as properly observed by Justice Diy,
had no relevance to the topic that was then being discussed in class, it strongly
indicated his intention to taint their reputations.

The inclusion of Judge Tormis and Francis in his class discussions was never
denied by Judge Paredes who merely justified his action by invoking his right
to freedom of expression. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom
of expression. Such right, however, is not without limitation. Section 6, Canon
4 of the Code also imposes a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise
of their freedom of expression, they should always conduct themselves in a
manner that preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality
and independence of the Judiciary. In the exercise of his right to freedom of
expression, Judge Paredes should uphold the good image of the Judiciary of
which he is a part. He should have avoided unnecessary and uncalled for
remarks in his discussions and should have been more circumspect in his
language. Being a judge, he is expected to act with greater circumspection and
to speak with self-restraint. Verily, Judge Paredes fell short of this standard.

The Court cannot sustain the assertion of Judge Paredes that he cannot be
held administratively liable for his negative portrayal of Judge Tormis and
Francis in his class discussions. Judge Paredes should be reminded of the
ethical conduct expected of him as a judge not only in the performance of his
judicial duties, but in his professional and private activities as well. Sections 1
and 2, Canon 2 of the Code mandates:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 2

INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial

office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.

SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples
faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but
must also be seen to be done.
(Emphases supplied)

Any impropriety on the part of Judge Paredes, whether committed in or out of

the court, should not be tolerated for he is not a judge only occasionally. It
should be emphasized that the Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the
conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect
to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside
his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality, a
public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. A judges official life
cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus,
being a subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the
ordinary citizen. He should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest
public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion.27chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Regarding the act of receiving the cash bail bond in the Guioguio case, Justice
Diy correctly found that it cannot be regarded as grave misconduct. The Court
finds merit in the position of Judge Paredes that the approval, as well as the
receipt, of the cash bail bond, was in accordance with the
rules. Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Finally, the Investigating Officer disagrees with Jills allegation that Judge
Paredes committed grave misconduct when he personally received cash bail
bond in relation to the Guioguio case. Judge Paredes justified his action by
stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14,
Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on
petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 oclock in the afternoon, Sundays,
official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the
accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall acknowledge receipt of the
cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering
that Judge Paredes merely followed said procedure, he cannot be held
administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond in
the Guioguio case.
Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under
Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Under
said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case
is pending, or with any Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or
with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of
the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive
judges are authorized to exercise other powers and prerogatives which are
necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to
court administration. In the instant case, Judge Paredes was merely
exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he
was the only judge available when Lita Guioguio posted bail. Notably, Lita
Guioguios payment for cash bail bond was made on a Sunday. In addition, the
judge assigned to the court where the Guioguio case was then pending and the
executive judge of the MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail
bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for
one judge to be present on Saturdays. However, there was no judge assigned
for duty during Sundays.

Relative to the matter above-discussed, the insinuation made by complainant

Jill of any irregularity reflected in the issuance of the two (2) orders of release
of different dates is not backed up by sufficient evidence.28

Conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light offense under Section

10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court and penalized under Section 11(C) thereof
by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less than P1,000.00 but not exceeding
P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand; and (4) Admonition with warning.

Considering that this is the first offense of Judge Paredes, the appropriate
penalty under the circumstances is admonition.chanrobleslaw

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Meinrado P. Paredes, Presiding Judge of

Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, administratively liable for
conduct unbecoming of a judge and ADMONISHES him therefor.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
 A.C. No. 7158, March 09, 2015

YOLANDA A. ANDRES, MINETTE A. MERCADO, AND ELITO P.

ANDRES , Complainants, v. ATTY. SALIMATHAR V. NAMBI, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This is a Complaint for Disbarment1 filed against then Labor Arbiter

Salimathar V. Nambi (respondent) on the ground of gross ignorance of the law
in issuing an Amended Alias Writ of Execution against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc.
and its incorporators, the herein complainants, who are not parties to the
case.

Factual Antecedents

On December 10, 2003, respondent rendered a Decision2 in a consolidated

labor case3 against M.A. Mercado Construction and spouses Maximo and Aida
Mercado (spouses Mercado), the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering

respondents, M.A. Mercado Construction and Maximo and Aida Mercado to
reinstate the complainants to their former position[s] without loss of seniority
rights and to pay jointly and severally, their full backwages from October 28,
2000 up to the date of this decision plus ten (10%) percent attorneys fees of
the total monetary award. The Research and Information Unit of this Office is
hereby directed to compute complainants[] monetary award which shall form
part of this decision. The complaint for damages is dismissed. The complaint
against Shoemart, Inc., is likewise DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. 4

The respondents in the labor case, namely the Spouses Mercado, doing
business under the name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction, interposed
an appeal which was dismissed for failure to post an appeal bond. Thus, an
Alias Writ of Execution was issued to implement the Decision. Thereafter, the
complainants in the labor case filed an Ex Parte Motion for Amendment of an
Alias Writ of Execution.5 They claimed that they could hardly collect the
judgment award from M.A. Mercado Construction because it allegedly
transferred its assets to M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. They thus prayed that the Alias
Writ of Execution be amended to include M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators/stockholders6 as additional entity/personalities against which
the writ of execution shall be enforced. In an Order7 dated February 10, 2006,
respondent granted the motion to amend the alias writ of
execution. Accordingly, on February 17, 2006 an Amended Alias Writ of
Execution was issued to enforce the monetary judgment amounting to
P19,527,623.55 against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its incorporators. By
way of special appearance, M.A. Blocks Work, Inc., together with three of its
stockholders who are the complainants in this administrative case, namely
Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and Elito P. Andres, filed an Urgent
Motion to Quash8 the Amended Alias Writ of Execution, contending that they
are not bound by the judgment as they were not parties to the labor case. In
an Order9 dated March 13, 2006, however, respondent denied the Urgent
Motion to Quash. Aggrieved, herein complainants filed the instant Complaint
for Disbarment, which we referred to the IBP on March 4, 2007 for
investigation, report and recommendation.10

IBPs Report and Recommendation

In his Report and Recommendation11 dated September 6, 2010, the

Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the
law and recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of six months. This was adopted and approved with modification by
the IBP Board of Governors in an April 12, 2011 Resolution, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

RESOLUTION NO. XIX-2011-110 Adm. Case No. 7158 Yolanda A. Andres,

et al. vs. Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED

and APPROVED, with modification the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules,
considering respondent[s] contumacious disregard of the lawful Order of
Supreme Court and the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, and for his
failure to appear despite due notices, Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.12(Emphasis
in the original).
 Issue

Whether respondent is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Our Ruling

At the outset, it must be emphasized that in this administrative proceeding,

our discussion should be limited only on the issue of whether respondent
acted in gross ignorance of the law when he granted the motion to amend the
alias writ of execution; when he issued an Amended Alias Writ of Execution to
enforce the monetary judgment against M.A. Blocks Work, Inc. and all its
incorporators; and when he denied complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. As
a rule, for one to be held administratively accountable for gross ignorance of
the law, there must be a showing that the error was gross and patent as to
support a conclusion that the actor was so moved with malice, bad faith,
corruption, fraud, and dishonesty. As such, our discussion should be focused
primarily on whether respondent grossly erred in issuing the above orders as
to amount to malice, bad faith, corruption, fraud and dishonesty. On the other
hand, we need not delve into the issue of whether there is an apparent
misapplication of the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction when
respondent issued the Amended Alias Writ of Execution. For one, it is outside
the ambit of this administrative proceeding. Moreover, the issue of whether
the doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction applies is the subject of an
appeal brought by complainants before the National Labor Relations
Commission and eventually to the Court of Appeals.13 We perused the records
of the case particularly respondents Order14 dated March 13, 2006 denying
complainants Urgent Motion to Quash. Therein, we note that respondents
ruling was not arrived at arbitrarily; on the contrary, he cited grounds based
on his personal assessment of the facts at hand, viz:
As culled from the case record, there is substantial evidence that respondents
Maximo A. Mercado and Aida A. Mercado, who are doing business under the
name and style of M.A. Mercado Construction put up a corporation in the
name of M.A. Block Works, Inc. where individual movants are one of the
incorporators. We give credence to the argument of the complainants that the
incorporators therein are relatives of Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado
as shown by the Articles of Incorporation adduced by the former. The
incorporators listed have similar family names of the Mercados and the
Andreses and common address at Gen. Hizon, Quezon City and 50 Daisy St.,
Quezon City, and Maximo A. Mercado is the biggest stockholder. Aside from
the Articles of Incorporation, complainants also submitted a Letter of
Intent/Notice To Proceed where respondents, despite their representation
that they have already ceased their business operation, are still continuing
their business operation. The documents submitted by the complainants were
corroborated by certification issued by Maggie T. Jao, AVP-Assistant
Controller of SM Prime Holdings, Inc. that based on their records, an amount
of P3,291,300.00 representing a sum total of all goods, effects, money and
credit that was garnished belong to M.A. Mercado Construction and/or
Maximo Mercado and/or Aida Mercado and/or M.A. Block Works, Inc. and/or
Gertrudes Casilda A. Mercado, Yolanda A. Andres, Minette A. Mercado and/or
Elito P. Andres. This Office has therefore, enough reason to conclude that
respondents Maximo A. Mercado and Aida Mercado and the movants herein
are one and the same. Movants are alter egos or business conduits to defraud
the complainants and to consequently evade payment of judgment award. x x
x As respondents are duly notified and aware of the execution proceedings,
the argument of denial of due process is untenable.15
It is apparent from the foregoing disquisition that respondents conclusion
had some bases and was not plucked from thin air, so to speak. Clearly,
respondent did not act whimsically or arbitrarily; his ruling could not in any
manner be characterized as imbued with malice, fraud or bad faith. To
reiterate what we have already stated above, we are not here to judge in this
present administrative proceeding whether respondents ratiocination on the
application of the piercing of corporate veil is correct; our only concern here is
to decide whether respondents error was so gross as to amount to fraud and
dishonesty. Based on the above-quoted disquisition, it cannot be said, by any
stretch of imagination, that respondents error, if any, was so gross or that he
was actuated by malice when he issued the above orders. His conclusion was
reached after an examination of the documents presented and evaluation and
assessment of the arguments raised by the parties. He did not capriciously
rule on the issues presented; on the contrary, he exerted efforts to weigh the
positions of the contending parties. In any event, we hold that respondent
should not be held accountable for committing an honest mistake or an error
in the appreciation of the facts of the case before him. Otherwise every labor
arbiter or any judicial or quasi-judicial officer for that matter, would be
continually plagued with the possibility of being administratively sanctioned
for every honest mistake or error he commits. For sure, this would not augur
well to the administration of justice as a whole. Pertinently, the Court ruled
in Andrada v. Judge Banzon,16viz:
Well-settled is the rule that unless the acts were committed with fraud,
dishonesty, corruption, malice or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do
an injustice, respondent judge may not be held administratively liable for
gross misconduct, ignorance of the law or incompetence of official acts in the
exercise of judicial functions and duties, particularly in the adjudication of
cases. Further, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every
erroneous rule or decision he renders would be nothing short of harassment
and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be
to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the facts or
interpret the law in the process of the administration of justice can be
infallible in his judgment.17
Based on the foregoing, we have no basis to hold respondent administratively
liable for gross ignorance of the law. However, we note that respondent had
consistently and obstinately disregarded the Courts and IBPs orders. It is on
record that respondent totally ignored the Courts June 7, 2006
Resolution18 directing him to file his Comment. He also failed to attend the
mandatory conference before the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline despite
notice.19 Neither did he file his Position Paper. As a former Labor Arbiter,
respondent should know that orders of the court are not mere requests but
directives which should have been complied with promptly and
completely.20 He disregarded the oath he took when he was accepted to the
legal profession to obey the laws and the legal orders of the duly constituted
legal authorities. x x x His conduct was unbecoming of a lawyer who is called
upon to obey court orders and processes and is expected to stand foremost in
complying with court directives as an officer of the court.21 Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
(Emphasis supplied)

Considering that this appears to be respondents first infraction, we find it

proper to impose on him the penalty of reprimand with warning that
commission of the same or similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

WHEREFORE, the Court REPRIMANDS respondent Atty. Salimathar V. Nambi

for obstinately and unjustifiably refusing to obey lawful orders of the Court
and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar act or offense shall be dealt with more severely. Let copies
of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and noted in
Atty. Nambis record as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

OCA IPI NO. 14-220-CA-J, March 17, 2015

RE: COMPLAINT DATED JANUARY 28, 2014 OF WENEFREDO

PARREO, ET AL., AGAINST HON. CELIA C. LIBREA-LEAGOGO, HON. ELIHU
A. YBAEZ AND HON. AMY C. LAZARO-JAVIER, ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP NO. 108807

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

We hereby resolve the administrative complaint1 brought against Court of

Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Associate Justice Elihu
A. Ybaez and Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier for their undue delay in
rendering the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 entitled Susan Enriquez and
Alma Rodriguez v. Wenefredo Parreno, Ronnie Cuevas and Joseph Denamarca.

Antecedents

Complainants Wenefredo Parreo and Ronnie Cuevas, with Joseph

Denamarca, filed a protest in the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources of the National Capital Region (DENR-NCR) against the issuance of
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 14391 and TCT No. 14188 in favor of
Susan Enriquez and Alma Rodriguez covering two lots inside the Signal
Village, Taguig.2 The DENR-NCR dismissed the protest,3 but the dismissal was
subsequently reversed by the DENR.4 Aggrieved, Enriquez and Rodriguez
appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which denied their appeal.5 With
their motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied,6 Enriquez and
Rodriguez appealed to the CA by petition for review,7 and it is such appeal
from which this administrative complaint arose.

It appears that on June 26, 2012, the Special Sixteenth (16th) Division of the CA
issued its resolution submitting C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 for
decision.8 However, the complainants lament that from the issuance of the
resolution until the filing of their complaint on February 8, 2014, the
respondents, who comprised the Special 16th Division of the CA, had not
rendered the decision, which the complainants insist was in patent violation
of the mandatory period within which the respondents should decide under
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.9cralawred

The Court required the respondents to submit their comments on the

administrative complaint.

In her comment,10 Justice Librea-Leagogo narrated that she became the

Chairperson of the CA 16thDivision effective June 4, 2012 conformably with CA
Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and she served as such until July 5, 2012 in
accordance with the successive reorganizations implemented in the CA under
CA Office Order No. 198-12-ABR11 and CA Office Order No. 220-12-
ABR,12 respectively. Citing Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 Internal Rules of the
Court of Appeals (2009 IRCA),13 Justice Librea-Leagogo denied liability for
incurring any undue delay because of her short stint as the Chairperson of the
16th Division, and considering further that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 followed
Justice Ybaez as the assigned ponente in his transfer to the Fourteenth (14th)
Division pursuant to CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR, and eventually to the
Thirteenth (13th) Division, the Division that ultimately promulgated the
awaited decision on February 28, 2014.14cralawred

Justice Ybaez admitted in his comment15 that C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was
part of his initial caseload following his transfer to Manila in December 2009.
He stated that he had conscientiously complied with the Zero Backlog Project
(ZBP) initiated by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. by giving utmost
priority to the older cases assigned to him; that he had already assigned C.A.-
G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of his legal staff, but the latter had meanwhile
fallen seriously ill; that due to lack of personnel and a heavy caseload, he had
hired a contractual-lawyer who later resigned upon being offered a
permanent position in another agency of the Government; that after disposing
of the older cases assigned to him, he had rendered the decision in C.A.-G.R. SP
No. 108807 on February 28, 2014 before becoming aware of the
administrative complaint; and that he had not been remiss in his duty and
responsibility to promptly administer justice by virtue of his disposing a
monthly average of 15 cases.16cralawred

Justice Lazaro-Javier explained her participation in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 as

limited to the adoption and promulgation on June 26, 2012 of the resolution
submitting the case for decision because only filled in the brief vacancy
occasioned by the temporary absence of Justice Victoria Isabel Paredes, then
the regular Member of the 16th Division. She pointed out, however, that she
had nothing more to do with the case upon the return of Justice Paredes;
hence, she could not be administratively liable for any delay in deciding the
case.17cralawred

Issue

Are the respondents liable for undue delay in deciding C.A.-G.R. SP No.
108807?

Ruling

The administrative complaint is without merit.

The Constitution mandates a lower collegiate court like the CA to resolve a

case within 12 months from the submission of the last required pleading or as
set by the court itself. This is clear from paragraphs (1) and (2), Section 15 of
Article VIII of the Constitution, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four months from
date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all lower courts.

(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution

upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself.chanrobleslaw

x x x x cralawlawlibrary

Did the respondents incur any administrative liability for the delay?

Although C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 was submitted for decision by the Special
16th Division on June 26, 2012 after the parties did not file their
memoranda,18 it was the 13th Division of the CA (composed of Justice Ybaez
as the ponente, Justice Japar B. Dimaampao as the Chairman, and Justice
Melchor Quirino C. Sadang) that promulgated the decision on February 28,
2014, or nearly 20 months later. Accordingly, the Court answers the query in
the negative, for, pursuant to Section 1, Rule VI of the 2009 IRCA, the
adjudication of cases was the responsibility of the assigned Justice and the
Members of the Division to which he or she then belonged. Determining who
should be administratively accountable must consider the specific role each of
the respondents played leading to the resolution of C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807.
Under the applicable rule of the 2009 IRCA, the liability for undue delay in
resolving C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 might devolve only on the Members of the
13thDivision who actually promulgated the decision.

Justice Librea-Leagogo and Justice Lazaro-Javier were not accountable for the
delay in rendering the judgment. Justice Librea-Leagogo had a limited
participation in respect of C.A.- G.R. SP No. 108807 because the reorganization
of the CA ensuing after the promulgation of the resolution by the Special
16th Division on June 26, 2012 caused her transfer to the 15th Division through
CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR,19 terminating her responsibility in C.A.- G.R.
SP No. 108807. Justice Lazaro-Javier should also be exculpated because her
participation was limited to her acting as a special Member of the 16th Division
in lieu of Justice Paredes. Such substitution prevented a vacuum in the regular
16th Division, and conformed to the procedure stated in Section 6(d), Rule I of
the 2009 IRCA.20 The constitution of the Special 16th Division was by virtue of
CA Office Order No. 220-12-ABR.21cralawred

Justice Ybaez, as the ponente for C.A. G.R. SP No. 108807, carried the case
with him when he was transferred to the 13th Division. But whether or not he
was administratively liable for the delay of eight months should depend on
the relevant circumstances. Although often holding that a heavy caseload is
insufficient reason to excuse a Judge from disposing his cases within the
reglementary period,22 the Court has applied this rule by considering the
causes of the delay. In Marquez v. Manigbas,23 the Court relieved the
respondent judge from liability because the delay had been caused by the
sudden deluge of cases brought about by the expansion of the jurisdiction of
the municipal trial courts. In Santos v. Lorenzo,24 the Court held that a delay of
seven months in deciding a case could be excused because of the heavy
caseload of the trial courts in the National Capital Judicial Region. In Lubaton
v. Lazaro,25 the Court, in sparing the respondent from the sanctions earlier
imposed for undue delay, cited the good faith of the judge, the motivation of
the complainant for bringing the charge, and the excessively heavy caseload of
3,500 cases, 1,800 of which involved detainees, leaving her only Fridays for
the study of her cases and the resolution of pending incidents and issuance of
the proper orders. The Court, in reversing the sanctions, observed that "it
would be unkind and inconsiderate on the part of the Court to disregard
respondent Judge's limitations and exact a rigid and literal compliance with
the rule."26cralawred

The delay in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 could not be said to have been incurred
by Justice Ybaez with malice or deliberate attempt to impede the
dispensation of justice. He assigned C.A.-G.R. SP No. 108807 to a member of
his legal staff, but the latter had fallen seriously ill in the meantime, forcing
him to hire a contractual-lawyer for the purpose. The latter subsequently
joined another agency of the Government on a permanent basis. Thus, Justice
Ybaez could promulgate the decision only on February 28, 2014. His
explanation for the delay, being entirely plausible, is accepted.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES for lack of merit the administrative

complaint against Justice Celia C. Librea-Leagogo, Justice Elihu A. Ybanez and
Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290 November 18, 2014

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-2954-RTJ]

MARILOU T. RIVERA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE JAIME C. BLANCAFLOR, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 26,
STA. CRUZ, LAGUNA, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is the administrative matter that stemmed from the
complaint-affidavit1 filed on July 16, 2008 by Marilou T. Rivera (Rivera) with
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor
[Judge Blancaflor, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz, Laguna]
with Bribery, Gross Misconduct, Immorality and violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act [Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019].

The Antecedents

The facts as set out in the final report and recommendation2 of Associate
Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando (Justice Fernando) of the Court of
Appeals are summarized below.3

Rivera alleged that she had been engaged in assisting litigants to obtain
judicial bonds since year 2000. Sometime in February 2008, she asked her
daughter Shiela T. De Mata (De Mata), who was also a bondsman, to help her
secure a bail bond for accused Ricardo Catuday (Catuday). Catuday was
charged of violating Section 11 of R. A. No. 9165 (the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (OPP)
of Laguna.

On February 27, 2008, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dan B. Rodrigo

(Prosecutor Rodrigo) recommended a bail of 200,000.00 for Catuday who
moved to reduce his bail to120,000.00 before the Office of the Executive
Judge, RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. De Mata brought a copy of the motion to
Prosecutor Rodrigo who did not object to the motion and who signified his
conformity by writing "no objection" and affixing his signature and the date
"4/14/08" on the face of the motion.4

De Mata thereafter brought the document to the Office of the Clerk of Court
(OCC), RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna for the approval of Judge Blancaflor who was
then the Executive Judge. De Mata failed to see Judge Blancaflor; she was told
by Dennis Trinidad (Trinidad), a member of the OCC staff, that Judge
Blancaflor was not in the court. Trinidad volunteered to bring the motion to
Judge Blancaflor at Tagpuan Restaurant(in Pila, Laguna that the judge
allegedly owned) for the judges approval. Trinidad, however, returned
without securing the requested approval. De Mata was told to come back the
next day.

De Mata went back to the OCC the following morning and was advised this
time by Gemma Gallardo (Gemma), another OCC personnel, to personally
approach Judge Blancaflor about Catudays motion. De Mata acted as advised,
but Judge Blancaflor simply told De Mata that it was not her job to ask for the
motions approval and that she should return it to the OCC. De Mata at that
point approached a Kuya Moring, the process server of Branch 27, about her
predicament. Kuya Moring introduced her to Judge Blancaflors driver who
tried to help, but the judge still refused to act on the motion. De Mata next
approached Manuel Bugain (Bugain), a court employee at Branch 26. Bugain
offered to bring the motion to Judge Blancaflor who was then in Barangay
Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna. When Bugain returned, he told De Mata that
Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion because it did not bear the
signature of Prosecutor Rodrigo.

De Mata went back to Branch 26, together with Councilor Cecil Magana
(Magana), whose assistance she sought upon Bugains advice, to secure the
requested approval. Whilethe motion was being handed to Judge Blancaflor,
he blurted out: "Hindi granted yan! Magbayad siya ng P200,000.00. Ayaw ko
ng drugs! Hindi granted yan!" Frustrated by the turn of events, De Mata
returned the unapproved motion to Rivera.

On May 27, 2008, Rivera brought the motion to Branch 91, RTC, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna as Judge Blancaflor was then out on a seminar. The following day,
Judge Divinagracia Ongkeko (Judge Ongkeko), the Presiding Judge of Branch
91 and Vice-Executive Judge of RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, issued an order
granting Catudays motion to reduce bond. Rivera immediately secured a bail
bond for Catuday from the Industrial Insurance Company and presented it to
Branch 26 for Catudays provisional release.

Still, Judge Blancaflor refused to issue a release order, saying that he never
approved Catudays reduced bailbond of P120,000.00. Rivera then learned
from one Teresa Mirasol (Mirasol) that Judge Blancaflor refused to approve
Catudays motion because it was Rivera who was working for it. According to
Mirasol, the information was given to her over the phone by Noralyn Villamar
(Villamar), a.k.a.Macky, allegedly Judge Blancaflors live-in partner.

Rivera further alleged that she experienced the same treatment from Judge
Blancaflor when she worked for the approval of the bail of Roel Namplata
(Namplata) who was charged with violation of Section 15 of R.A. No. 9165,
also by the OPP, Laguna. Namplatas recommended bail was P60,000.00. After
securing Prosecutor Rodrigos consent and with the help of Gemma, she
succeeded in securing Judge Blancaflors approval with the handwritten
notation: "Approved P40,000.00 for surety bond. 3-27-08 (SGD.) Judge
Blancaflor."

After obtaining a bail bond for Namplata, Rivera tried to secure a release
order from Judge Blancaflor who refused to honor the bond as it had been
belatedly filed. He even brought back the cost of the bond to P60,000.00. In
the afternoon of June 12, 2008, Rivera learned that Judge Blancaflor declared
that he would not release Namplata unless a criminal case is filed against her
by Rina Tranilla (Tranilla), a sister of Namplata. True enough, Tranilla filed a
complaint for estafa5 against Rivera at around 4:00 oclock that afternoon. The
following day, Judge Blancaflors order6 was issued, dated June 10, 2008, for
Namplatas release.

Explaining her difficulties with Judge Blancaflor in relation with her work as a
bondsman, Rivera claimed that the judge harbored ill will against her because
of her involvement in Special Proceeding No. 4605 entitled Arsenio S. Leron,
et al. v. Benjamin S. Leron, et al.,then pending before Judge Blancaflors sala.
Rivera alleged that she was the attorney-in-fact of one of the defendants in the
case, Dr. Emelita R. Leron (Dr. Leron) who filed on March 2, 2007 a motion for
inhibition against Judge Blancaflor.7 The motion allegedly recited in detail
Judge Blancaflors misdeeds and gross misconduct, manifest partiality and
indiscretion in fraternizing with clients and litigants in connection with the
case.

Rivera further alleged that Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the case
after she executed an affidavit attesting to (1) the judges recommendation to
the plaintiff, Normita Leron, to secure the services of Atty. Ricardo Pilares, Jr.
(Atty. Pilares); (2) the rigging of the raffle of the case to Judge Blancaflor; and
(3) the irregular service of summons to the defendants in the case. Moreover,
her son Byron Torres (Byron) and son-inlaw Ricel De Mata (Ricel)) also
executed a joint affidavit8 stating that Judge Blancaflor "bribed" them not to
testify in connection with the motion for inhibition.

Lastly, Rivera maintained that Judge Blancaflor should be charged with

immorality for maintaining an illicit relationship with Villamar, who is not his
wife.

In a Supplemental Affidavit,9 dated July 29, 2008, Rivera reiterated her charge
that Judge Blancaflor committed gross misconduct in (1) fraternizing with
litigants;(2) maintaining an illicit affair with a woman not his wife; and (3)
exhibiting personal bias and prejudice against her in her efforts to obtain bail
bonds for Catuday and Namplata.

Judge Blancaflors Comment

In his Comment10 dated August 26, 2008, Judge Blancaflor denied Riveras
accusations and dismissed them as "mere concoctions" of her "fertile
imagination."

Judge Blancaflor claimed that neither Rivera nor her daughter approached
him regarding Catudays and Namplatas bail bonds. Even assuming that they
did, he refused their requests because they were not authorized bondsmen or
agents of any duly accredited surety company. They were acting as fixers, he
explained; thus, he was justified in denying their requests. Further, Judge
Blancaflor claimed that he strictly observes a policy of refusing to reduce the
required bail in drug-related cases even if approval is recommended by the
investigating prosecutor. He could not also order Catudays release because it
was Judge Ongkeko who granted his motion to reduce bail; in his view, Judge
Ongkeko should also order Catudays release.

Judge Blancaflor considered as "fantastic" Riveras account that she and De

Mata brought the motions to reduce bail of Catuday and Namplata to Tagpuan
Restaurant in Pila, Laguna for his approval. He maintained that Riveras
account was simply untrue because as a matter of policy, he does not allow
court personnel orany other person for thatmatter, to bring the case records
or any part thereof outsidethe court premises. Moreover, he does not own a
restaurant in Pila, Laguna, nor a house, chapel and resort in Pagsanjan,
Laguna.
In the Leron case, Judge Blancaflor recalled that Rivera asked him to extend
assistance to her boss, Dr. Leron, a defendant in the case. He denied her
request and since then, she started harassing and blackmailing him and even
filed an administrative case against him.

Shortly thereafter, the Lerons (defendants in Special Proceeding No. 4605),

with Riveras active participation, started circulating stories against him,
which culminated in the filing ofa letter-complaint before Executive Judge
Mary Ann E. Corpus-Maalac (Judge Corpus-Maalac) accusing him of bias,
partiality and bribery. The Lerons however eventually withdrew the
complaint after being enlightened aboutthe raffle of cases. Also, he had
absolutely no involvement in the engagement of Atty. Pilares as a lawyer in
the case as he does not entertain fixers.

Judge Blancaflor brushed off the immorality charge against him. He branded it
as malicious and a mere fabrication of Rivera. He alleged that Rivera even
hired a Solomon Ondevilla (Ondevilla) to execute an affidavit against
him,[11]] but Ondevilla subsequently denied that he executed and signed the
affidavit.12

Judge Blancaflor questioned Riveras credibility, claiming that she is known

for filing fabricated charges and malicious complaints against lawyers, judges
and other public officials, among them, an Atty. Cayetano Santos.13Further, she
has also been charged with numerous criminal offenses, mostly swindling or
estafa cases and violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and is known to have an
illicit relationship withdifferent men.

In his Comment14 to Riveras supplemental affidavit,15 Judge Blancaflor

reiterated his denial of Riveras charges against him. In particular, he took
exception to Annex "B"16 of the supplemental affidavit, which referred to
Namplatas motion to reduce bail bond and which allegedly carried his
marginal note of approval. Judge Blancaflor claimed that the document was
manufactured and was not on file with the court. He added that the marginal
note approving a reduced bail of P40,000.00 was forged; even assuming that it
was genuine, it was not a formal order and he still had the discretion on
whether toreduce the P60,000.00 recommended bail. By way of a reply-
affidavit,17 Rivera countered that she is a legitimate bondsman as she is an
agent of Genric Insurance and that she is also a swimming instructor and in
business through her "Rivera Swimming Lessons." With respect to Tagpuan
Restaurant, she clarified that the property is registered in the name of
Villamar, Judge Blancaflors live-in partner, and that the two also purchased
and co-owned several parcels of land in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna.

Rivera also claimed that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit relating Judge
Blancaflors illicit relationship with Villamar because the two of them
threatened to file a case against him and would have him imprisoned. She
stressed that Judge Blancaflors attack on her person has nothing to do with
the case she filed against him.

Justice Fernandos Investigation/Findings/Recommendation

In compliance with the Courts resolution of August 17, 2011,18 Justice

Fernando conducted a thorough investigation of the complaint, in the course
of which, she conducted several hearings, received affidavits and
documentary evidence, heard testimonies of witnesses, and even conducted
an ocular inspection.19

Justice Fernando found Judge Blancaflor guilty of (1) bribery, gross

misconduct and violation of R.A. 3019; and (2) immorality. She recommended
that the judge be dismissed from the service, with prejudice to his
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, and likewise recommended
the forfeiture of the judges retirement benefits, if any.

The OCA Report and Recommendation

On July 24, 2013, the Court referred Justice Fernandos final report to the OCA
for evaluation, report and recommendation.20 In its memorandum21 of
February 25, 2014, the OCA submitted its report to the Court, adopting the
findings and recommendations of Justice Fernando.

The Courts Ruling

After considering Justice Fernandos report and the records of the case, we
note that she conducted a very thorough investigation. We uphold her
findings and recommendation as we find sufficient basis to dismiss
respondent Judge Blancaflor from the service.

Re: charge of bribery, gross misconduct

and violation of R.A. No. 3019
The first count against Judge Blancaflor regarding this charge involved his
alleged: (1) refusal to approve Catudays motion to reduce bail bond, despite a
"no objection" from the prosecutor; (2) refusal to order Catudays release,
despite Judge Ongkekos grant of the motion; (3) refusal to order Namplatas
release, despitehis own approval of the motion to reduce bail bond; and (4)
offer of money to Byron and Ricel to prevent them from testifying in the
motion for his inhibition in the Leron case.

While Judge Blancaflor has the discretion to approve or disapprove a motion

to reduce bail, it appears from the records that he abused this prerogative in
the cases of Catuday and Namplata. Through Judge Blancaflors inaccessibility
(he was usually not in the court in the afternoon)22 and refusal to take action
on their pleas for provisional liberty, Catuday and Namplata and the people
working for the approval of their motions (Rivera and De Mata) suffered
inordinate delay and frustrations in securing the motions approval. In more
ways than one, Judge Blancaflor gave De Mata and Riveraa run-around in
Catudays and Namplatas cases for no plausible reason other than the judges
strong antipathy towards Rivera.

This is serious misconduct and a violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary23 which mandates that "judges shall perform their
judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice,"24 and that they "shall ensure
that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the
confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality
of the judge and of the judiciary."25

For instance, when De Mata learned that Judge Blancaflor said that he did not
approve Catudays motion for reduction of his bail because Prosecutor
Rodrigo was against the motion, she went to see the prosecutor about it.
Prosecutor Rodrigo told her that there was no problem with the motion, so he
signed it, but he did not know why Judge Blancaflor would not approve the
motion. De Mata then asked the help of Magana, yet even with Maganas
intercession, Judge Blancaflor refused to sign the motion, saying that he did
not like drugs. Magana wondered why Catudays motion was not approved
when all the other surety bonds were approved. The following testimony of
De Mata confirmed the difficulties De Mata and her mother experienced in
their work as bondsmen in Judge Blancaflors sala:

xxxx
 Q: After Mr. Bugain told you that Judge Blancaflor refuses to sign for the
reason that Fiscal Rodrigo also does not approve of the said motion,
what did you do?

A. I went to Fiscal Rodrigo and asked him what was the problem with
the motion?

Q: What did Fiscal Rodrigo [tell] you?

A: He said there was really no problem with the motion so he signed it.
He did not know why the motion of Catuday was left pending.

xxxx

Q: During this time, this Mayora was also in branch 26?

A: Yes, mam, and she was also wondering why our application cannot
be approved while all the other surety bonds were approved.

Q: Can you tell us who this Mayora is, what is her occupation?

A: She was a councilor, the wife of the previous mayor. If there are
people who cannot afford to pay bail, they ask her for help and she helps
people.26

xxxx

Judge Blancaflor denied the allegations, contending that Catudays motion was
not filed with the OCC and never reached him.27 Justice Fernando found
otherwise, citing the Order28 dated May 28, 2008 of Judge Ongkeko, Vice-
Executive Judge of the RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, granting the motion when Judge
Blancaflor was attending a seminar in Tagaytay City. Judge Ongkeko could not
have issued the order had it not been filed with the OCC. But what was more
surprising was Judge Blancaflors refusal to acknowledge and to act on the
order of approval. This belies Judge Blancaflors excuses for not acting on
Catudays motion and lends credence to Riveras submission that the judges
refusal was to spite her.

The same thing happened when Rivera processed Namplatas bail bond. As
the records show, Judge Blancaflor approved Namplatas motion for reduction
of bail. The judge admitted his approval during the investigation. When he
was asked: "Do you clearly remember Judge that you reduced it as shown by
your signature from P60,000,00 to P40,000.00 bail?," he answered: "That is
correct sir, that day," referring to March 27, 2008.29 Yet, he refused to approve
Namplatas temporary release. In fact, in his Comment to Riveras
supplemental complaint,30 he disowned the marginal note he made on a copy
of Namplatas motion reducing his bail bond to P40,000.00.

The following exchanges during the investigation further indicate that Judge
Blancaflor overstepped and abused his authority as a judge when he took time
to release Namplata, despite his approval of Namplatas bail bond at its
original amount which he earlier reduced to P40.000.00:

J. Fernando:

But you admit you issued a March 27 Order reducing it to P40,000.00?

Judge Blancaflor:

The marginal note I admit, Your Honor.

J. Fernando:

Yes, thats fine.

Atty. Aguirre (Riveras, counsel):

Q: The reason Judge Blancaflor why you did not anymore honor your
marginal note reducing the amount from 60 to 40 is that you came to
know that it was Waling, the complainant, and her daughter Shiela who
was (sic) following it up with you?

A: That is not correct, sir. What you claim that I did not honor the
original marginal note is because I did not see it in the original file of the
case.

Q: But the more important reason Judge is that you came to know that it
was the complainant and her daughter who were following up this bail
bond case and when you came to know that follow up of the
complainant and her daughter, you wanted it returned back to 60
because you said it was too long in coming, the P40,000.00 bond, is that
correct?
 A: That is not correct sir:

Q: And another condition of yours before the bail could be approved by

you is that the sister or Namplata must file a case of estafa against the
complainant which she did and one day after, the case against the
complainant for estafa was filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor,
you issued the Order of Release, is that correct?

A: That is not correct. That is your own language, sir.

Q: That is the testimony of the witnesses.31

In an effort to justify his errors and omissions in relation to Catudays and

Namplatas motions, Judge Blancaflor argued that he refused to act on the
motions because he hates drugs and,in the case of Namplata, there was a delay
in the processing of the bail bond.

We are not at all convinced by Judge Blancaflors explanations. His excuses

which were marked by inconsistencies and typified by his initial denial that he
approved Namplatas motion, only to admit the approval before Justice
Fernando cannotjustify his failure to act. Action by the judge was clearly
called for by the urgency of the matter before him the plea for provisional
liberty of Catuday and Namplata who enjoy the right to bail despite the
serious offenses they were charged with. His unexplained refusal in these
cases can only support Riveras claim that his inaction was due to Riveras
intervention in the approval of the motions, a clear sign of his personal bias
and prejudice against her. This, in our view, ispatently a gross misconduct on
the part of Judge Blancaflor.

It appears from the records that Judge Blancaflors antipathy towards Rivera
arose from her involvement in the Leron case when she testified against the
judge in a motion for his inhibition from the case. The motion must have
caused considerable anxiety and concern for the judge so that he even exerted
efforts to neutralize Rivera, to the extent of offering cash to Byron (Riveras
son) and Ricel (Riveras son-in-law) who executed a joint Affidavit32 that Judge
Blancaflor and Villamar offered them P10,000.00 each and even warned them
not to testify atthe hearing on the motion. The two showed the cash to Rivera
and they had the incident entered in the police blotter.33 In this regard, Torres
and Ricel deposed:
 xxxx

1. x x x Kami ay namamasukan kay Armando Q. Torres ("ARMANDO") na

tatay ni BYRON at biyenan na lalaki ni RICEL. Kami ay laging
nagkakaroon ng komunikasyon kay Noralyn M. Villamar a.k.a. Macky
("Macky") dahil may mga transaksiyon silang pinag-uusapan ng aming
tatay na si Armando.

2. Noong ika-02 Marso 2007, araw ng Biyernes, mga 5:00 5:30 ng

hapon, tumawag si Macky kay Byron at sinabi na gusto daw siya
makausap nito tungkol sa pagtetestigo nila laban kay Judge Jaime C.
Blancaflor ("Judge Blancaflor"), at sinabihan na pumunta sa bahay nila.

3. Pagdating ni Byron sa bahay nila Macky at Judge Blancaflor sa Brgy.

Layugan ng mga bandang 6:00 ng gabi, tinanong ni Macky si Byron
"Bakit natin kailangang maglaban?"Nagkunwari akong walang alam at
tumahimik na lang ako.

4. Nilapitan ako (Byron) ni Judge Blancflor at sinabi na: "Byron, ayaw ko

tayong mag-kabanggaan. Kung lilitaw kayo sa hearing sa petsa 6 ay
ipapakulongko kayo. Ito ang ten thousand (P10,000.00), ito ay hindi
suhol. Wag ka lang tumistigo. Kung tetestigo ka, mapipilitan kaming
lumaban. Kayang-kaya kitang gawan ng kaso tulad ng rape at anumang
kaso na puwedeng isaksak sa iyo.

5. Pinahabol pa ni Macky na: "Kahit patayan pwede kami."

6. Noong 03 ng Marso 2007, araw ng Sabado, bandang 5:10 ng hapon,

pumunta si Macky at si Guillen Almonte sa bahay ng tatay namin na si
Armando sa Brgy. Duhat kung saan kami ay nagtratrabaho.

7. Galit na galit si Macky at sinabi nito kay Armando ngunit nakatingin

sa amin: "Pare, bakit ganito? Ano ang ginawa ng mga bata? Kayong
dalawa, tinanggap namin kayo nang maayos sa Layugan."

8. Hindi na kami umimik at hinayaan naming magsalita na lamang si

Macky.
 9. Sinabi pa ni Macky na: "Huwag na nating patagalin ito. Ayaw kong
tayo ang magkabanggaan. Kung lalaban kayo, lalaban kami hanggang
patayan."

10. Nagtangkang umalis si Byron kaya sumigaw si Macky na: "Byron!

Huwag kang umiwas. Problema natin to. Huwag kang umalis!"

11. Nag-isip si Byron ng dahilan upang maka-alis. Bago siya nakaalis,

pahabol na sinabi ni Macky na: "Mag-aabot ako ng tulong, huwag lang
kayong sumali."

12. Nang nakaalis na si Byron mga bandang 6:00 pm, naglabas ng pera si
Macky at inaabot ito kay Ricel, ngunit hindi niya ito kinuha. Kaya ang
ginawa ni Macky ay kinausap si Armando at inilagay ang pera sa mesa at
sinabi na: "Pare, kung ayaw magtiwala ng anak mo sa amin, ito
ang P20,000.00 para kay Byron at para kay Ricel. Ikaw na ang bahala.
Meron pang kasunod yan kung pipirma sila ng Affidavit of Desistance."34

In his comment35 on Riveras complaint, Judge Blancaflor denied the alleged

offer, claiming that the alleged sums did not come from him but from
Armando Torres (Torres) and were "given as support to his son Byron and
son-in-law Ricel." When Rivera saw the P20,000.00, she grabbed it from
Byron and proceeded to the police station and made a false story of bribery
against him.36 Judge Blancaflor offered in evidence two affidavits Armando
executed37 dated March 6, 2007 and August 22, 2008.

Again, the explanation fails to persuade us. Armando is Riveras estranged

husband. Their union produced Byron and De Mata, the wife of Ricel. Rivera
and Armando separated in 1983. It was a case of a marriage turned sour
where the spouses filed cases against one another, as Armando himself stated
in his affidavit of August 22, 2008.38 We should not be too quick therefore to
admit Armandos statements as unvarnished truth, especially when he did not
even appear during the investigation to affirm the statements attributed to
him, despite several subpoenas for him to testify, the last one being on
December 6, 2012.39

On the other hand, Rivera and Byron reported the bribery incident to the
police. The following exchanges on what transpired in the police station
significantly shed light on this incident and bolstered Riveras claim that Judge
Blancaflor committed a serious misconduct in relation with the Leron case,
thus:

Q: Now, do you remember what thisis all about, the incident reported by
Byron Torres?

A: It was a threat.

Q. Will you please read it again to refresh your memory?

(Witness reading the blotter)

Q: What you read, the entry in the blotter is in your handwriting?

A. Yes sir.

Q: What do you remember about this P10,000.00?

J. Fernando: 10 or 20?

A: P10,000.00

J. Fernando: 10 lang?

A: Yes, P10,000.00.

Wag siyang aatend sa hearing saa-sais kung hindi sila ang

magkakabangga ni Judge Blancaflor. Q: What is that P10,000.00 there?

A: Ang akin pong pagkakaintindi ito ay suhol dahil nakalagay dito hindi
ito suhol. Wag kang tumestigo dahil kung tetestigo ka ay mapipilitan
lumaban gawan ka ng kaso. Pag tumestigo siya gagawa siya ng kaso.

Translation:

If he testified, he would have a case filed against him.

xxxx

Q: But the signature here of Byron, did he sign it in your presence?

A: Yes sir.
 Q: And the witness also signed it in your presence?

A: Yes, sir, in my presence.40

The root cause of the Leron case, as Justice Fernando established and stressed,
was the irregular assignment of the case which was directly brought to Judge
Blancaflors sala without going through a raffle. Atty. Arthur Trinidad, Jr. (Atty.
Trinidad), then RTC Clerk of Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, testified that the case,
Special Proceeding No. 4605, which was filed on November 15, 2006 was not
included in the schedule of raffle of cases for the period November 10 to 30,
2006 and was brought to the judges sala even before the case was supposed
tobe raffled on November 30, 2006 because he was made to understand,
based on the judges letter to him, that the case a settlement of estate
dispute belonged to the Family Court then handled by Judge
Blancaflor.41 Due to the judges letter, he assumed that the case was within the
jurisdiction of the Family Court so that it was his ministerial duty to forward
the case to Judge Blancaflors sala.42

Not only does it appear that Judge Blancaflor intervened in the assignment of
the Leron case, he also had a hand in ensuring who would represent the
disputants, by suggesting, in the presence of and with the active participation
of Villamar, that the lawyers for the parties would be Atty. Pilares for the
plaintiffs43 and Atty. Stephen David (Atty. David) for the defendants.44 He even
went to the extent of voicing out how the case should turn out.

Thus, Dr. Leron deposed: "Tinanong ko si Judge Blancaflor kung matatalo ako
kahit sabihin ko na wala naman talaga ang lahat ng hinahanap nila. Sagot ni
Judge Blancaflor Pwede, depende sa presentasyon ng abogado mo. Tinanong
ko kung sino yong abogado na sinasabi ni Macky. Sagot ni Judge Blancaflor[,]
si [Atty. David] at dinagdag pa niya kumpare ko yan,magaling yan, at taga-
Tektite, madali nating maayos ang kaso. Nabanggit din niya na kumpare ni
Atty. David si

Atty. Pilares. Sinabi niya pa mas lamang kayo kasi mas alam niyo nangyayari
kaysa sa kabila."45

Also, Ricel, Riveras son-in-law, stated under oath that he saw Judge Blancaflor
and plaintiff Gilbert Leron (Gilbert) during the blessing of the chapel inside
the compound of the judges house on January 16, 2007 and he overheard
Judge Blancaflor assuring Gilbert not to worry about the case saying: "Pare
wag na kayo mag-alala, ayos na ang kaso nyo nina Dr. Leron," while they were
drinking beer.46

Judge Blancaflor argued that he had no interest whatsoever in the Leron case
as it was forwarded to Branch 26 in the ordinary course of business since
cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court are directly
forwarded to Branch26, his branch. His letter to Atty. Trinidad should not be
considered against him because he was then a new family court judge. He
further argued that he did not refer Atty. Pilares to the plaintiffs; he even
dismissed the case for prematurity and inhibited himself from the case after it
was re-raffled.47

We do not find Judge Blancaflors explanations convincing.The circumstances

of the Leron case left Judge Blancaflor no other recourse but to inhibit. As
Justice Fernando aptly observed, it was more prudent for the judge to inhibit
than to be placed under a cloud of distrust by the parties. On the matter of the
parties legal representation alone, we find credible the statements of Rivera,
Dr. Leron and Ricel that not only did Judge Blancaflor refer lawyers to the
parties but, more seriously, he gave them hints that they would prevail in the
case.

Judge Blancaflors interference in the case in the way just described is not only
gross misconduct; it also constitutes a violation of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, particularly Section 3(e) which provides: "In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful: x x x Causing any undue injury to any
party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative
or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence x x x."

To be sure, even if Judge Blancaflor inhibited himself from the Leron case, he
cannot extricate himself from the legal mess he brought upon himself. His
interference in the case caused an undue injury to the party who should have
prevailed had the case pushed through; and an unwarranted benefit to the
party who should have lost had the case been decided on the merits. Worse,
he exhibited evident bad faith when he gave both parties expectations of
winning the case. Thus, there is every reason to find probable cause against
him for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
It is unfortunate that Judge Blancaflor lost sight of the exacting standards
demanded of the office of a judge in the Leroncase. Time and again, judges
have been reminded thatas magistrates, they must comport themselves in
such a manner that their conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most
searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to them as the epitome of
integrity and justice.48 Sad to state, Judge Blancaflor failed to pass this
"searching scrutiny."

Re: charge of immorality

On the charge of immorality for allegedly maintaining an illicit relationship

with Villamar who is nothis wife Justice Fernando aptly observed that Judge
Blancaflor offered no evidence, except general denials to disprove his moral
indiscretion, which appeared to be widely known in the community at the
time material to the case. As the records show, statements made here and
there by witnesses and personalities drawn into the case confirm the special
relationship between Judge Blancaflor and Villamar such that Villamar had no
hesitation in speaking for the judge on matters concerning him and his work.

The community, it seemed, had accepted them as man and wife, given that
they stayed in Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna and owned Tagpuan Restaurant in
Pila, Laguna. This restaurant, incidentally, even became Judge Blancaflors
extension office, usually in the afternoons, as deposed by Rivera, De Mata,
Byron, Ricel and Judge Blancaflors staff whose assistance Rivera and De Mata
sought in their effort to secure the provisional liberty for their clients Catuday
and Namplata. The depositions were backed up by pictures of (1) the places
where Tagpuan Restaurant used to stand and where the two were residing,
and (2) the events in the life of the live-in partners. Notably, Exhs. "N," "N-1,"
and "N-2"49 were separate camera shots of the place where Tagpuan
Restaurant used to stand; Exh. "A-15-C"50 was a picture of Gilbert, a party in
the Leron case, attending the blessing of the chapel inside the compound of
Judge Blancaflors house; Exh. "E"51 was a picture of Judge Blancaflor and
Villamar together in a hut located inside the compound of their house in
Layugan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, apparently relaxing; and Exhs. "F," "G," and "H"
were pictures of Villamar picking up Judge Blancaflor from his office at the
RTC, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, using her Pajero with plate no. XHF 887.52

Judge Blancaflor belittled the immorality charge, dismissing it as merely a

fabrication and a product of Riveras fertile imagination. To substantiate his
claim, he cited the withdrawal of Ondevillas affidavit confirming Riveras
charge that he was maintaining an illicit liaison with Villamar.53

Again, we are not persuaded by the judges response. Given the fact that Judge
Blancaflor is a person of authority and his involvement in the "bribery"
incident (as revealed by Byron and Ricel whom the judge even threatened if
they would testify against him), we find more credibility in Riveras
submission that Ondevilla withdrew his affidavit on the immorality charge
because the judge likewise threatened him.

The confluence of the statements of Rivera and the others (Byron, De Mata,
Ricel and Mirasol), the information provided by Judge Blancaflors staff, and
the exhibits described above, constitute more than enough support for the
immorality charge against Judge Blancaflor. These interwoven pieces of
evidence pointing to the relationship between the judge and Villamar, several
of which materialized over a period of time, could not conceivably have been
the result of Riveras fabrications. As De Mata testified during the
investigation:

ATTY. SHALIM:

Q: Ms. Witness, you mentioned that Noralyn Villamar is the live-in

partner of Judge Blancaflor. How do you know this?

A: Because Tita Macky herself was the one who told me that Judge
Blancaflor is her live-in partner.

xxxx

J. FERNANDO:

Q: If you know, how long have JudgeBlancaflor and Noralyn been living
together as live-in partners?

A: 2006, your Honor.

Q: So they started as live-in partners since 2006?

A: June of 2006, Your Honor, because that was when I came back from
Manila.
 Q: As far as you are concerned, you only learned about it in 2006?

A. Yes , Your Honor.

Q: Have you seen them really living together as live-in partners?

A: No, Your Honor. It was my husband because they were still at

Layugan because my husband was the driver of my father at that time.

xxxx

Q: Are you saying that Judge and Macky are living in Layugan?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

Q: Are you sure that Macky told you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in
partner?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: How did she tell you?

A: It was just in a casual way that she told me that Judge is her current
live-in partner because previously it was a Colonel.

Q: So despite the fact that you are not close to Macky, Macky intimidated
(sic) to you that Judge Blancaflor is her live-in-partner?

A: Yes, Your Honor.54

Justice Fernando stressed that Judge Blancaflor did not categorically deny the
allegations of an illicit relationship with Villamar. While he stated that his
marriage to his wife NoraLopez was already annulled, the annulment became
final only on July 18, 2012 by virtue of an entry of judgment from the RTC, Br.
199, Las Pias City. Thus, he was still a married man at the time of his liaison
with Villamar.55

For maintaining a relationship with Villamar, Judge Blancaflor crossed the line
of a proper and acceptable conduct as a magistrate and a private person. In
Re: Complaint of Mrs. Rotilla A. Marcos and her children against Judge
Ferdinand J. Marcos,56 we said: "x x x The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates
that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with
respect to his performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior
outside his sala and as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality:
a public official is also judged by his private morals. The code dictates that a
judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. x x x."

In sum, we find substantial evidence to hold Judge Blancaflor guilty as

charged. This conclusion, as correctly observed by Justice Fernando:

x x x jibes with the affidavits and testimonies of complainant Rivera and her
witnesses. His acts of fraternizing with lawyers and litigants, his partiality in
the performance of his duties, his act of giving bribe money to two (2)
witnesses to a case in order for them to withdraw, and maintaining an illicit
affair with a woman not his wife tarnished the image of the judiciary.
Respondent judge demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity x x x
He is therefore unfit to remain in office and discharge his functions and duties
as judge.57 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, as observed by the OCA, it has been established that "[t]he findings of
investigating magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great
weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified."58

Gross misconduct, bribery, violation of R.A. No. 3019 and immorality, all of
them constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct,59 are serious
charges under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court punishable under
Section 11 of the same Rule by any of the following: (1) dismissal from the
service, forfeiture of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations; forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) months but
not exceeding six (6) months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not
exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the gravity of theoffenses committed by Judge Blancaflor, we
approve and adopt the recommendations of Justice Fernando and the OCA for
his dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Presiding Judge Jaime C. Blancaflor,

Branch 26, Regional Trial Court, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, is found GUILTY of gross
misconduct, violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) and immorality, constituting serious violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct under Section 8,Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

Judge Blancaflor is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of his

retirement and other monetary benefits, except accrued leave credits. He is
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or controlled corporations.

This ruling shall be without prejudiceto any disciplinary action that may be
brought against Judge Blancaflor as a lawyer under A.M. No. 02-9-02-
SC.60 Accordingly, Judge Blancaflor is directed to COMMENT within ten (10)
days from receipt of this decision and to show cause why heshould not alsobe
suspended, disbarred or otherwise disciplinarily sanctioned as a member of
the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200 April 2, 2014

(formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2834-RTJ)

ANTONIO M. LORENZANA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MA. CECILIA I. AUSTRIA, Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Batangas
City, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve in this Decision the administrative complaints1 filed by Antonio M.

Lorenzana (complainant) against Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria (respondent),
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 2, Batangas City.
The records show that the administrative complaints arose from the case "In
the Matter of the Petition to have Steel Corporation of the Philippines Placed
under Corporate Rehabilitation with Prayer for the Approval of the Proposed
Rehabilitation Plan," docketed as SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, where the respondent
was the presiding judge. The complainant was the Executive Vice President
and Chief Operating Officer of Steel Corporation of the Philippines (SCP), a
company then under rehabilitation proceedings.

i. Complaint

In his verified complaint dated January 21, 2008, the complainant alleged that
in the course of SP. Proc. No. 06-7993, the respondent committed Gross
Ignorance of the Law, Grave Abuse of Authority, Gross Misconduct, Grave
Incompetence, Irregularity in the Performance of Duty, Grave Bias and
Partiality, Lack of Circumspection, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, Failure to
Observe the Reglementary Period and Violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as shown by the following instances:

1. The respondent appointed Atty. Santiago T. Gabionza, Jr. as

rehabilitation receiver over SCPs objections and despite serious conflict
of interest in being the duly appointed rehabilitation receiver for SCP
and, at the same time, the external legal counsel of most of SCPs
creditors; he is also a partner of the law firm that he engaged as legal
adviser.

2. The respondent conducted informal meetings (which she termed as

"consultative meetings" in her Order2 dated May 11, 2007) in places
outside her official jurisdiction (i.e., a first class golf club, a hotel and
sports club facilities in Metro Manila) and where she arbitrarily dictated
the terms, parameters and features of the rehabilitation plan she
wanted to approve for SCP. She also announced in the meetings that she
would prepare the rehabilitation plan for SCP.

3. The modified rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza is a

replica of what the respondent dictated to him. Thus, the respondent
exceeded the limits of her authority and effectively usurped and pre-
empted the rehabilitation receivers exercise of functions.
4. The respondent ordered that the proceedings of the informal
meetings be off-record so that there would be no record that she had
favored Equitable-PCI Bank (EPCIB).

5. The respondent had secret meetings and communications with EPCIB

to discuss the case without the knowledge and presence of SCP and its
creditors.

6. The respondent appointed Gerardo Anonas (Anonas) as Atty.

Gabionzas financial adviser and, at the same time, as her financial
adviser to guide her in the formulation and development of the
rehabilitation plan, for a fee of P3.5M at SCPs expense. Anonas is also
the cousin-in-law of the managing partner of Atty. Gabionzas law firm.

7. The respondent encouraged EPCIB to raise complaints or accusations

against SCP, leading to EPCIBs filing of a motion to create a
management committee.

8. When requested to conduct an evidentiary meeting and to issue a

subpoena (so that SCP could confront EPCIBs witnesses to prove the
allegation that there was a need for the creation of a management
committee), the respondent denied SCPs requests and delayed the
issuance of the order until the last minute.

9. At the hearing of September 14, 2007, the respondent intimidated

SCPs counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio; blocked his every attempt to
speak; refused to recognize his appearances in court; and made
condescending and snide remarks.

10. The respondent failed to observe the reglementary period

prescribed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation (Rules). She approved the rehabilitation plan beyond the
180 days given to her in the Rules, without asking for permission to
extend the period from the Supreme Court (SC).

11. The respondent erroneously interpreted and applied Section 23,

Rule 4 of the Rules (the courts power to approve the rehabilitation
plan) to include the power to amend, modify and alter it.
 12. The respondent took a personal interest and commitment to decide
the matter in EPCIBs favor and made comments and rulings in the
proceedings that raised concerns regarding her impartiality.

13. The respondent adamantly refused to inhibit herself and showed

special interest and personal involvement in the case.

ii. Supplemental Complaint

The complainant likewise filed a supplemental complaint3 dated April 14,

2008 where he alleged that the respondent committed an act of impropriety
when she displayed her photographs in a social networking website called
"Friendster" and posted her personal details as an RTC Judge, allegedly for the
purpose of finding a compatible partner. She also posed with her upper body
barely covered by a shawl, allegedly suggesting that nothing was worn
underneath except probably a brassiere.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in its 1st Indorsement4 dated
March 18, 2008, referred the complaints to the respondent for comment.

a. Comment to January 21, 2008 Complaint

The respondent vehemently denied the allegations against her. While she
admitted that she crafted a workable, feasible rehabilitation plan best suited
for SCP, she maintained that she did so only to render fairness and equity to
all the parties to the rehabilitation proceedings. She also submitted that if
indeed she erred in modifying the rehabilitation plan, hers was a mere error
of judgment that does not call for an administrative disciplinary action.
Accordingly, she claimed that the administrative complaints were premature
because judicial remedies were still available.5

The respondent also argued that the rules do not prohibit informal meetings
and conferences. On the contrary, she argued that informal meetings are even
encouraged in view of the summary and non-adversarial nature of
rehabilitation proceedings. Since Section 21, Rule 4 of the Rules6 gives the
rehabilitation receiver the power to meet with the creditors, then there is all
the more reason for the rehabilitation judge, who has the authority to approve
the plan, to call and hold meetings with the parties. She also pointed out that it
was SCP which suggested that informal meetings be called and that she only
agreed to hold these meetings on the condition that all the parties would
attend.

As to her alleged failure to observe the reglementary period, she contended

that she approved the rehabilitation plan within the period prescribed by law.
She argued that the matter of granting extension of time under Section 11,
Rule 4 of the Rules7 pertains not to the SC, but to the rehabilitation court.

The respondent likewise refuted the allegations of bias and partiality. First,
she claimed that her denial of the complainants motion for inhibition was not
due to any bias or prejudice on her part but due to lack of basis. Second, she
argued that her decision was not orchestrated to favor EPCIB, as evidenced by
the fact that EPCIP itself (as some other creditors did) promptly appealed her
decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). Third, she did not remove Atty.
Gabionza as SCPs rehabilitation receiver because she disagreed that the
grounds the complainant raised warranted his removal.

She also found no merit to the allegation of conflict of interest. Lastly, she
maintained that the rest of the complainants allegations were not
substantiated and corroborated by evidence.

The respondent further alleged that she did not gravely abuse her authority in
not issuing a subpoena as Section 1, Rule 3 of the Interim Rules on Corporate
Rehabilitation of the Rules specifically states that the court may decide
matters on the basis of affidavits and other documentary evidence.

On the allegation of conflict of interest, she maintained that the allegations

were not proven and substantiated by evidence. Finally, the respondent also
believed that there was nothing improper in expressing her ideas during the
informal meetings.

b. Comment to April 14, 2008 Supplemental Complaint

In her comment8 on the supplemental complaint, the respondent submitted

that the photos she posted in the social networking website "Friendster" could
hardly be considered vulgar or lewd. She added that an "off-shouldered" attire
is an acceptable social outfit under contemporary standards and is not
forbidden. She further stated that there is no prohibition against attractive
ladies being judges; she is proud of her photo for having been aesthetically
made. Lastly, she submitted that the ruling of the Court in the case of Impao v.
Judge Makilala9 should not be applied to her case since the facts are different.

On July 4, 2008, the complainant filed a reply,10 insisting that the respondents
acts of posting "seductive" pictures and maintaining a "Friendster" account
constituted acts of impropriety, in violation of Rules 2.01,11 2.0212 and
2.03,13 Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

In a Resolution14 dated September 9, 2009, the Court re-docketed the

complaints as regular administrative matters, and referred them to the CA for
investigation, report and recommendation.

The CAs Report and Recommendation

On November 13, 2009, Justice Marlene Gonzales-Sison, the Investigating

Justice, conducted a hearing, followed by the submission of memoranda by
both parties. In her January 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation,15 Justice
Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complaints were partly meritorious. She found
that the issues raised were judicial in nature since these involved the
respondents appreciation of evidence.

She also added that while the CA resolved to set aside the respondents
decision in the rehabilitation proceedings, it was not by reason of her
ignorance of the law or abuse of authority, but because the rehabilitation plan
could no longer be implemented in view of SCPs financial predicament.

On the allegation of grave bias and partiality in handling the rehabilitation

proceedings, Justice Gonzales-Sison ruled that the complainant failed to
present any clear and convincing proof that the respondent intentionally and
deliberately acted against SCPs interests; the complaint merely relied on his
opinions and surmises.

On the matter of the respondents inhibition, she noted that in cases not
covered by the rule on mandatory inhibition, the decision to inhibit lies within
the discretion of the sitting judge and is primarily a matter of conscience.

With respect to the respondents informal meetings, Justice Gonzales-Sison

found nothing irregular despite the out-of-court meetings as these were
agreed upon by all the parties, including SCPs creditors. She also found
satisfactory the respondents explanation in approving the rehabilitation plan
beyond the 180-day period prescribed by the Rules.

The foregoing notwithstanding, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the respondents

unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel and ruled that her exchanges
and utterances were reflective of arrogance and superiority. In the words of
the Justice Gonzales-Sison:

Rather than rule on the manifestations of counsels, she instead brushed off the
matter with what would appear to be a conceited show of a prerogative of her
office, a conduct that falls below the standard of decorum expected of a judge.
Her statements appear to be done recklessly and were uncalled for. xxx.
Section 6[,] Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary states that: judges shall maintain order and decorum in all
proceedings before the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in
relation to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and others whom the judge deals in an
official capacity. Judicial decorum requires judges to be temperate in their
language at all times. Failure on this regard amounts to a conduct unbecoming
of a judge, for which Judge Austria should be held liable.16

On the respondents Friendster account, she believes that her act of

maintaining a personal social networking account (displaying photos of
herself and disclosing personal details as a magistrate in the account) even
during these changing times when social networking websites seem to be the
trend constitutes an act of impropriety which cannot be legally justified by
the publics acceptance of this type of conduct. She explained that propriety
and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge and that judges shall conduct themselves in a manner
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

Finally, Justice Gonzales-Sison noted the CAs May 16, 2006 Decision17 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 100941 finding that the respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the creation of a management committee without first
conducting an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the procedures
prescribed under the Rules. She ruled that such professional incompetence
was tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and procedure, and
recommended a fine of P20,000.00. She also recommended that the
respondent be admonished for failing to observe strict propriety and judicial
decorum required by her office.
The Action and Recommendation of the OCA

In its Memorandum18 dated September 4, 2013, the OCA recommended the

following:

RECOMMENDATION: It is respectfully recommended for the consideration of

the Honorable Court that:

1) the Report dated January 4, 2010 of Investigating Justice Marlene

Gonzales-Sison be NOTED;

2) respondent Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria, Branch 2, Regional Trial

Court, Batangas City, Batangas, be found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming
a judge and for violation of Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct;

3) respondent Judge Austria be FINED in the amount of Twenty

Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00); and

4) respondent Judge Austria be ADMONISHED to refrain from further

acts of impropriety with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
any similar act will be dealt with more severely.19

In arriving at its recommendation the OCA found that the respondent was not
guilty of gross ignorance of the law as the complainant failed to prove that her
orders were motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

The OCA also found that the charges of bias and partiality in handling the
rehabilitation proceedings were not supported by evidence. It accepted the
respondents explanation in the charge of failure to observe the reglementary
period.

Lastly, the OCA maintained that the allegations of grave abuse of authority and
gross incompetence are judicial in nature, hence, they should not be the
subject of disciplinary action. On the other hand, on allegations of conduct
unbecoming of a judge, violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(Code), lack of circumspection and impropriety, the OCA shared Justice
Gonzales-Sisons observations that the respondents act of posting seductive
photos in her Friendster account contravened the standard of propriety set
forth by the Code.
 The Courts Ruling

We agree with the recommendation of both Justice Gonzales-Sison and the

OCA for the imposition of a fine on the respondent but modify the amount as
indicated below. We sustain Justice Gonzales-Sisons finding of gross
ignorance of the law in so far as the respondent ordered the creation of a
management committee without conducting an evidentiary hearing. The
absence of a hearing was a matter of basic due process that no magistrate
should be forgetful or careless about.

On the Charges of Grave Abuse of Authority;

Irregularity in the Performance of Duty; Grave
Bias and Partiality; and Lack of Circumspection

It is well settled that in administrative cases, the complainant bears the onus
of proving the averments of his complaint by substantial evidence.20 In the
present case, the allegations of grave abuse of authority, irregularity in the
performance of duty, grave bias and partiality, and lack of circumspection are
devoid of merit because the complainant failed to establish the respondents
bad faith, malice or ill will. The complainant merely pointed to circumstances
based on mere conjectures and suppositions. These, by themselves, however,
are not sufficient to prove the accusations. "[M]ere allegation is not evidence
and is not equivalent to proof."21

"[U]nless the acts were committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption, malice
or ill-will, bad faith, or deliberate intent to do an injustice, [the] respondent
judge may not be held administratively liable for gross misconduct, ignorance
of the law or incompetence of official acts in the exercise of judicial functions
and duties, particularly in the adjudication of cases."22

Even granting that the respondent indeed erred in the exercise of her judicial
functions, these are, at best, legal errors correctible not by a disciplinary
action, but by judicial remedies that are readily available to the complainant.
"An administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every
irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial
remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration or an
appeal."23Errors committed by him/her in the exercise of adjudicative
functions cannot be corrected through administrative proceedings but should
be assailed instead through judicial remedies.24
On the Charges of Grave Bias and Partiality

We likewise find the allegations of bias and partiality on the part of the
respondent baseless. The truth about the respondents alleged partiality
cannot be determined by simply relying on the complainants verified
complaint. Bias and prejudice cannot be presumed, in light especially of a
judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without
respect to the person, and to give equal right to the poor and rich.25 There
should be clear and convincing evidence to prove the charge; mere suspicion
of partiality is not enough.26

In the present case, aside from being speculative and judicial in character, the
circumstances cited by the complainant were grounded on mere opinion and
surmises. The complainant, too, failed to adduce proof indicating the
respondents predisposition to decide the case in favor of one party. This kind
of evidence would have helped its cause. The bare allegations of the
complainant cannot overturn the presumption that the respondent acted
regularly and impartially. We thus conclude that due to the complainants
failure to establish with clear, solid, and convincing proof, the allegations of
bias and partiality must fail.

On the Charges of Grave Incompetence

and Gross Ignorance of the Law

We agree with the findings of the OCA that not every error or mistake of a
judge in the performance of his official duties renders him liable.27 "[A]s a
matter of policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a
judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though
such acts are erroneous."28

In the present case, what was involved was the respondents application of
Section 23, Rule 4 of the Rules, which provides:

Sec. 23. Approval of the Rehabilitation Plan. - The court may approve a
rehabilitation plan even over the opposition of creditors holding a majority of
the total liabilities of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the
debtor is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable.29
The respondent approved the rehabilitation plan submitted by Atty. Gabionza,
subject to the modifications she found necessary to make the plan viable. The
complainant alleged that in modifying the plan, she exceeded her authority
and effectively usurped the functions of a rehabilitation receiver. We find,
however, that in failing to show that the respondent was motivated by bad
faith or ill motives in rendering the assailed decision, the charge of gross
ignorance of the law against her should be dismissed. "To [rule] otherwise
would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try the
facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be
infallible in his judgment."30

To constitute gross ignorance of the law, it is not enough that the decision,
order or actuation of the judge in the performance of his official duties is
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence. It must also be proven that he was
moved by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption31 or had committed an
error so egregious that it amounted to bad faith.

In the present case, nothing in the records suggests that the respondent was
motivated by bad faith, fraud, corruption, dishonesty or egregious error in
rendering her decision approving the modified rehabilitation plan. Besides his
bare accusations, the complainant failed to substantiate his allegations with
competent proof. Bad faith cannot be presumed32 and this Court cannot
conclude that bad faith intervened when none was actually proven.

With respect to the action of the respondent in ordering the creation of a

management committee without first conducting an evidentiary hearing for
the purpose, however, we find the error to be so egregious as to amount to
bad faith, leading to the conclusion of gross ignorance of the law, as charged.

Due process and fair play are basic requirements that no less than the
Constitution demands. In rehabilitation proceedings, the parties must first be
given an opportunity to prove (or disprove) the existence of an imminent
danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of the debtor-companys
assets and properties that are or may be prejudicial to the interest of minority
stockholders, parties-litigants or the general public.33 The rehabilitation court
should hear both sides, allow them to present proof and conscientiously
deliberate, based on their submissions, on whether the appointment of a
management receiver is justified. This is a very basic requirement in every
adversarial proceeding that no judge or magistrate can disregard.
In SCPs rehabilitation proceedings, SCP was not given at all the opportunity to
present its evidence, nor to confront the EPCIB witnesses. Significantly, the
CA, in its May 16, 2006 decision, found that the respondents act of denying
SCP the opportunity to disprove the grounds for the appointment of a
management committee was tantamount to grave abuse of discretion. As aptly
observed by Justice Gonzales-Sison:

[T]he acts of the respondent judge (Judge Austria) in creating a MANCOM

without observing the procedures prescribed under the IRPGICC clearly
constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.34

Indeed, while a judge may not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law for
every erroneous order that he renders, this does not mean that a judge need
not observe due care in the performance of his/her official functions.35 When
a basic principle of law is involved and when an error is so gross and patent,
error can produce an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross
ignorance of the law.36 On this basis, we conclude that the respondents act of
promptly ordering the creation of a management committee, without the
benefit of a hearing and despite the demand for one, was tantamount to
punishable professional incompetence and gross ignorance of the law.

On the Ground of Failure to Observe

the Reglementary Period

On the respondents failure to observe the reglementary period prescribed by

the Rules, we find the respondents explanation to be satisfactory.

Section 11, Rule 4 of the previous Rules provides:

Sec. 11. Period of the Stay Order. xxx

The petition shall be dismissed if no rehabilitation plan is approved by the

court upon the lapse of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the
initial hearing. The court may grant an extension beyond this period only if it
appears by convincing and compelling evidence that the debtor may
successfully be rehabilitated. In no instance, however, shall the period for
approving or disapproving a rehabilitation plan exceed eighteen (18) months
from the date of filing of the petition.37
Under this provision, the matter of who would grant the extension beyond the
180-day period carried a good measure of ambiguity as it did not indicate
with particularity whether the rehabilitation court could act by itself or
whether Supreme Court approval was still required. Only recently was this
uncertainty clarified when A.M. No. 00-8-10-SC, the 2008 Rules of Procedure
on Corporate Rehabilitation, took effect.

Section 12, Rule 4 of the Rules provides:

Section 12. Period to Decide Petition. - The court shall decide the petition
within one (1) year from the date of filing of the petition, unless the court, for
good cause shown, is able to secure an extension of the period from the
Supreme Court.38

Since the new Rules only took effect on January 16, 2009 (long after the
respondents approval of the rehabilitation plan on December 3, 2007), we
find no basis to hold the respondent liable for the extension she granted and
for the consequent delay.

On the Ground of Conduct

Unbecoming of a Judge

On the allegation of conduct unbecoming of a judge, Section 6, Canon 6 of the

New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 6. Judges shall maintain order and decorum in all proceedings before
the court and be patient, dignified and courteous in relation to litigants,
witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official
capacity. Judges shall require similar conduct of legal representatives, court
staff and others subject to their influence, direction or control.39

A judge should always conduct himself in a manner that would preserve the
dignity, independence and respect for himself/herself, the Court and the
Judiciary as a whole. He must exhibit the hallmark judicial temperament of
utmost sobriety and self-restraint.40 He should choose his words and exercise
more caution and control in expressing himself. In other words, a judge
should possess the virtue of gravitas.41

As held in De la Cruz (Concerned Citizen of Legazpi City) v. Judge Carretas,42 a

judge should be considerate, courteous and civil to all persons who come to
his court; he should always keep his passion guarded. He can never allow it to
run loose and overcome his reason. Furthermore, a magistrate should not
descend to the level of a sharp-tongued, ill-mannered petty tyrant by uttering
harsh words, snide remarks and sarcastic comments.

Similarly in Attys. Guanzon and Montesino v. Judge Rufon,43 the Court

declared that "although respondent judge may attribute his intemperate
language to human frailty, his noble position in the bench nevertheless
demands from him courteous speech in and out of court.

Judges are required to always be temperate, patient and courteous, both in

conduct and in language."

Accordingly, the respondents unnecessary bickering with SCPs legal counsel,

her expressions of exasperation over trivial procedural and negligible lapses,
her snide remarks, as well as her condescending attitude, are conduct that the
Court cannot allow. They are displays of arrogance and air of superiority that
the Code abhors.

Records and transcripts of the proceedings bear out that the respondent failed
to observe judicial temperament and to conduct herself irreproachably. She
also failed to maintain the decorum required by the Code and to use
temperate language befitting a magistrate. "As a judge, [she] should ensure
that [her] conduct is always above reproach and perceived to be so by a
reasonable observer. [She] must never show conceit or even an appearance
thereof, or any kind of impropriety."44

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that:

SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

In these lights, the respondent exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge and

thus violated Section 6, Canon 6 and Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

On the Ground of Impropriety

We are not unaware of the increasing prevalence of social networking sites in

the Internet a new medium through which more and more Filipinos
communicate with each other.45 While judges are not prohibited from
becoming members of and from taking part in social networking activities, we
remind them that they do not thereby shed off their status as judges. They
carry with them in cyberspace the same ethical responsibilities and duties
that every judge is expected to follow in his/her everyday activities. It is in
this light that we judge the respondent in the charge of impropriety when she
posted her pictures in a manner viewable by the public.

Lest this rule be misunderstood, the New Code of Judicial Conduct does not
prohibit a judge from joining or maintaining an account in a social networking
site such as Friendster. Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
recognizes that judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of
expression. This right "includes the freedom to hold opinions without
interference and impart information and ideas through any media regardless
of frontiers."46 Joining a social networking site is an exercise of ones freedom
of expression. The respondent judges act of joining Friendster is, therefore,
per se not violative of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Section 6, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, however, also imposes
a correlative restriction on judges: in the exercise of their freedom of
expression, they should always conduct themselves in a manner that
preserves the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and
independence of the Judiciary.

This rule reflects the general principle of propriety expected of judges in all of
their activities, whether it be in the course of their judicial office or in their
personal lives. In particular, Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 4 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct prohibit impropriety and even the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities:

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety

in all of their activities.

SECTION 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept

personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.
Based on this provision, we hold that the respondent disregarded the
propriety and appearance of propriety required of her when she posted
Friendster photos of herself wearing an "off-shouldered" suggestive dress and
made this available for public viewing.

To restate the rule: in communicating and socializing through social networks,

judges must bear in mind that what they communicate regardless of
whether it is a personal matter or part of his or her judicial duties creates
and contributes to the peoples opinion not just of the judge but of the entire
Judiciary of which he or she is a part. This is especially true when the posts the
judge makes are viewable not only by his or her family and close friends, but
by acquaintances and the general public.

Thus, it may be acceptable for the respondent to show a picture of herself in

the attire she wore to her family and close friends, but when she made this
picture available for public consumption, she placed herself in a situation
where she, and the status she holds as a judge, may be the object of the
publics criticism and ridicule. The nature of cyber communications,
particularly its speedy and wide-scale character, renders this rule necessary.

We are not also unaware that the respondents act of posting her photos
would seem harmless and inoffensive had this act been done by an ordinary
member of the public. As the visible personification of law and justice,
however, judges are held to higher standards of conduct and thus must
accordingly comport themselves.47

This exacting standard applies both to acts involving the judicial office and
personal matters.1wphi1 The very nature of their functions requires
behavior under exacting standards of morality, decency and propriety; both in
the performance of their duties and their daily personal lives, they should be
beyond reproach.48 Judges necessarily accept this standard of conduct when
they take their oath of office as magistrates.

Imposable Penalty

Under Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious
charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, a serious charge merits any of
the following sanctions:
 1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as
the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations; provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3), but not exceeding six (6), months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00, but not exceeding P40,000.00.

On the other hand, conduct unbecoming of a judge is classified as a light

offense under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. It is penalized under
Section 11(C) thereof by any of the following: (1) A fine of not less
than P1,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; (2) Censure; (3) Reprimand;
and ( 4) Admonition with warning.

Judge Austria's record shows that she had never been administratively
charged or found liable for any wrongdoing in the past. Since this is her first
offense, the Court finds it fair and proper to temper the penalty for her
offenses.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Ma. Cecilia I. Austria guilty of GROSS
IGNORANCE OF THE LAW for which she is FINED Twenty-One Thousand
Pesos (P21,000,00). Judge Austria is likewise hereby ADMONISHED to refrain
from further acts of IMPROPRIETY and to refrain from CONDUCT
UNBECOMING OF A JUDGE, with the STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426 [Formerly A.M. No. 05-3-83-MTC], June 16, 2015

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Complainant, v. JUDGE

ALEXANDER BALUT, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
On October 9, 2007, the Court partially resolved this case by disposing it as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE the Court finds and declares:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. Judge Alexander S. Balut GUILTY of undue delay in deciding 33 cases
submitted for decision and in failing to resolve 101 motions within the 90-day
reglementary period. He is FINED twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00), with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely.

2. Judith En. Salimpade GUILTY of gross neglect of duty, dishonesty and grave
misconduct. She is DISMISSED from the service. She
is DIRECTED to RESTITUTE the amount of P1,817,378.59 representing the
amount of shortages in her collections. Her withheld salaries are to be applied
to her accountabilities. The Office of Administrative Services, OCA
is DIRECTED to compute Ms. Salimpade's leave credits and forward the same
to the Finance Division, Fiscal Management Office-OCA which shall compute
the money value of the same, the amount to be deducted from the shortages to
be restituted.

3. Eduardo Esconde GUILTY of gross neglect of duty. He is DISMISSED from

the service. He is also ORDERED to restitute his accountabilities in the
amount of P58,100.00

4. Lydia O. Ramos GUILTY of neglect of duty. She is FINED P5,000, which

should be deducted from her retirement benefits.

The Office of the Court Administrator Legal Office is DIRECTED to file

appropriate criminal charges against Judge Alexander Balut, Judith En.
Salimpade and Eduardo Esconde.

SO ORDERED.
As stated in the October 9, 2007 Resolution, the facts of the case are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On May 3, 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a
judicial audit and physical inventory of cases at the Municipal Trial Courts
(MTCs) of Bayombong and Solano, Nueva Vizcaya. Judge Alexander S. Balut
was the acting presiding judge in both courts.
xxx xxx xxx

Aside from the judicial audit, a financial audit was also conducted in the MTCs
of Bayombong and Solano as well as the MCTC of Aritao-Sta. Fe.

In the MTC, Bayombong, where Judith En. Salimpade was Clerk of Court II, the
audit team found an unremitted amount of P18,702.00 representing the
court's collection from August 3, 2003 to August 18, 2003. Said amount was
deposited only on August 18, 2003, upon advise by the audit team, in the Land
Bank of the Philippines account. Furthermore, 31 booklets of accountable
forms issued to Ms. Salimpade by the Property Division, SC and OCA were not
accounted for. Also, the court had a total Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)
collection of P348,993.60 from January 1990 to August 2003. However, only
P186,330.98 was remitted by Ms. Salimpade leaving a balance of P162,662.62;
the total Clerk of Court General Fund (CCGF) collections from January 1996 to
August 2003 (audit scope) showed an unremitted amount of P30,411.70; and
as of August 31, 2003 the Fiduciary Fund had a total cash shortage of
P1,864,304.27 which covered the collections from 1995 to August 2003.

In sum, the shortages in the various funds incurred by Salimpade as of August

31, 2003 totalled P2,057,378.59.

Salimpade, when asked about the shortages, explained that Judge Balut,
since 1995 had been getting money from the JDF collections. She had
given in to the requests of Judge Balut out of fear of him. She also admitted
that she lent her co-employees money which she took from her collections.

Parenthetically, in September 2003, Judge Balut turned over P240,000.00

to Salimpade and the latter issued a certification stating that the former
had completely settled his monetary accountability to the MTC,
Bayombong. Judge Balut delivered to the Fiscal Monitoring Division, Court
Management Office (CMO) OCA the certification and deposit slip evidencing
the turnover of the P240,000.00.

The audit team also found that Salimpade failed to regularly submit her
monthly report of collections, as required in Supreme Court Circular No. 32-
93. Consequently, Salimpade's salaries were withheld effective August 2003 to
the present.
In the MTC, Solano, the spot cash count on the court's collection disclosed that
Eduardo Esconde, Clerk of Court, had an unremitted/undeposited cash on
hand amounting to P59,545.00. However, the Official Receipts issued to cover
said amounts were not accounted for. The said cash amount was deposited on
August 21, 2003 to Land Bank JDF Account No. 0591-0116-34.

A review of the receipts on file from May 2001 to July 2003 also showed a
total cash shortage of P106,527.80. However, on August 29, 2003, Esconde
deposited in the CCGF and JDF bank accounts sums corresponding to the said
shortage. Esconde explained to the audit team that Judge Balut
borrowed various amounts from the collections. He stated that Judge Balut
started borrowing funds when the former was still the Clerk of Court of MCTC,
Aritao-Sta. Fe. He transferred to MTC, Solano, to get out of the shadow of
Judge Balut. But, much to his dismay, Judge Balut was designated Acting
Presiding Judge of MTC, Solano and continued the practice of borrowing
money from the collections of the court.

In the MCTC, Aritao-Sta. Fe, the audit team found that Lydia Ramos, Clerk of
Court, succeeded Eduardo S. Esconde on July 16, 2000, without proper
turnover of accountabilities. The team also found that the amount of P540.00,
part of the JDF collections from August 1, 2003 to August 21, 2003, remained
undeposited at the time of audit. Said amount was remitted to the Chief
Accountant, Supreme Court on September 10, 2003. Also, Mrs. Ramos opened
an account at the Rural Bank of Aritao, Inc. for the Fiduciary Fund of the court
instead of maintaining an account with Landbank. Said account was closed on
September 11, 2003 and an account was opened at Landbank, Bambang, on
the same date. A comparison of the court's CCGF collections and remittances
for the period of November 1995 to July 2003 revealed a shortage of P510.00.
Mr. Esconde incurred during his incumbency a cash shortage of P430.00 while
Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of P80.00 as of July 31, 2003. From August
2003 to June 5, 2004, Mrs. Ramos incurred a shortage of P430.00. She
deposited the amount of P400.00 on August 23, 2004 leaving a shortage of
P30.00. Withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account on various dates,
totalling P243,900.00 for the refund and return of cash bonds to 20 litigants,
were not supported by any official court orders. Of the 20 litigants 15 did not
acknowledge receipt of the amount refunded. The Fiduciary Fund collection of
the court from April 1996 to August 31, 2003 amounted to P2,064,978.00. As
of August 31, 2003, however, the amount of P846,710.00 was unaccounted for
by Mr. Esconde and Mrs. Ramos. Both denied that the shortages incurred were
of their own doing and they instead pointed to Judge Balut as the offender.

Ramos related to the audit team the constant requests/orders of Judge

Balut to hand over to him money from the Fiduciary Fund collections. In
these instances, she requested Judge Balut to affix his signature at the back
portion of the withdrawal slips as the cash recipient. However, not all of the
transactions were evidenced by an acknowledgement receipt. Ramos further
stated that Judge Balut also collected the money through Salvador
Briones, Court Interpreter of MCTC-Aritao-Sta. Fe, whose signature also
appeared at the back portion of withdrawal slips as cash recipient. The total
withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund Account given to Judge Balut, as
evidenced by withdrawal slips bearing the signatures of Judge Balut and
Briones, for the benefit of the former, as cash recipients, amounted to
P193,500.00.

Aside from these, withdrawals from the Fiduciary Fund account totalling
P90,500.00 were also given to Judge Balut. On the face of the slips of this
class of withdrawals were notations such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by
Judge xxx" and "given to Judge" written by Ramos.

On May 9, 2002, Judge Balut issued a Certification stating that his

accountability with the Fiduciary Fund collection of MCTC Aritao-Sta. Fe
as of April 2002 amounted to P207,774.42.

However, before the final report on the court's shortages was completed,
various amounts totalling P802,299.82 were deposited by Judge Balut,
Esconde and Ramos in the court's LBP Account No. 3251-0544-51,
as restitution/payment of part of the shortage of P846,710.00.

As of August, 2004, Ramos had fully settled the balance of her accountability.
On the other hand, Esconde still had a balance of accountability in MCTC,
Aritao-Sta. Fe of P58,100.00 which, as of the time this case was submitted by
the OCA for the Court's consideration, has remained unsettled. (Emphases
supplied)
In its Resolution,1 the Court ordered Respondent Judge Alexander Balut (Judge
Balut) to pay a fine for his failure to decide 33 cases and 101 motions without
properly requesting for an extension. The Court, however, did not rule on the
administrative liability of Judge Balut with respect to the result of the financial
audit for the reason that he was not given a chance to present his side on the
matter.

Consequently, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its

Memorandum,2 sought reconsideration of the Court's decision stating that
although Judge Balut was not formally required to comment on the findings of
the audit team regarding the shortage in the court collections, he was not
denied due process of law. The OCA explained that Judge Balut was able to
present his side in his Letter3 to OCA, dated December 9, 2006. The OCA, thus,
asked for the re-opening of the case or in the alternative, that Judge Balut be
required to comment on the findings of the financial audit.

In its Resolution,4 dated December 16, 2008, the Court directed Judge Balut to
comment on the audit report and, upon the recommendation5 of the OCA,
referred the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and
recommendation.6chanrobleslaw

Thereafter, the CA, in its Report and Recommendation, recommended the

dismissal of the charges against Judge Balut for failure of the OCA to clearly
substantiate and prove the participation of Judge Balut in the financial
transactions of the courts. On his admission that he borrowed money from the
judiciary fund, the CA opined that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized as
he was previously fined by the Court in its October 9, 2007 Resolution.

The Court finds itself unable to agree with the recommendation of the CA.

In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary is substantial

evidence or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.7 The standard of substantial evidence is
justified when there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent is
responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or even preponderant.8chanrobleslaw

A review of the records shows that Judge Balut actually messed with the court
collections. The three clerks of court of MTC Bayombong, MTC Solano and
MCTC Aritao-Sta Fe categorically stated that Judge Balut borrowed money
from the court funds and executed certifications to that effect. They
separately reported that Judge Balut had been borrowing money from the
various funds of the court collections. In fact, Lydia Ramos (Ramos), the Clerk
of Court of MCTC-Antao-Sta. Fe, presented several withdrawal slips9where
the back portions were signed either by Judge Balut or his court
interpreter, Salvador Briones, as the recipient of the cash withdrawn from
the funds of the court. These withdrawal slips likewise bore the notations of
Ramos such as "Judge," "for Judge," "taken by Judge," and "given to Judge" to
serve as her reminder that the money withdrawn were given to Judge Balut.

Significantly, Judge Balut himself issued the Certification10stating that his

cash accountability as of April 2002 with the Fiduciary Fund was
P207,774.42 and there were certifications issued by the clerks of court
attesting that he had settled his accountabilities with the court funds.

The CA opinion that Judge Balut could no longer be penalized for his
admission that he had borrowed money from the judiciary fund because the
Court already fined him in its October 9, 2007 resolution is erroneous. In the
said resolution, the Court categorically stated that Judge Balut was fined for
undue delay in deciding 33 cases submitted for decision and for failing to
resolve 101 motions within the 90-day reglementary period.

Once again, the Court stresses that judges must adhere to the highest tenets of
judicial conduct.11Because of the sensitivity of his position, a judge is required
to exhibit, at all times, the highest degree of honesty and integrity and to
observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence.12 He should
adhere to the highest standards of public accountability lest his action erode
the public faith in the Judiciary.13chanrobleslaw

Judge Balut fell short of this standard for borrowing money from the
collections of the court. He knowingly and deliberately made the clerks of
court violate the circulars on the proper administration of court funds.14 He
miserably failed to become a role model of his staff and other court personnel
in the observance of the standards of morality and decency, both in his official
and personal conduct.

The act of misappropriating court funds constitutes dishonesty and grave

misconduct, punishable by dismissal from the service even on the first
offense.15 For said reason, the respondent deserves a penalty no lighter than
dismissal. This Court has never tolerated and will never condone any conduct
which violates the norms of public accountability, and diminish, or even tend
to diminish, the faith of the people in the justice system.16chanrobleslaw
The Court has considered the recommendation of imposing the penalty of
suspension. That, however, would be unfair to Clerk of Court Judith En.
Salimpade, Municipal Trial Courts of Bayombong and Solano; and Clerk of
Court Eduardo Esconde of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Arita-Sta. Fe, who
were both dismissed from the service for the same offense. Clerk of Court
Lydia Ramos was fined but only because she had already retired from the
service. And it would send a wrong message to the public that the Court has
different standards - one for the magistrates and another for the rank-and-file.

The fact that Judge Balut fully paid his cash liabilities will not shield him from
the consequences of his wrongdoings. His unwarranted interference in the
Court collections deserves administrative sanction and not even the full
payment of his accountabilities will exempt him from liability. "It matters not
that these personal borrowings were paid as what counts is the fact that
these funds were used outside of official business."17chanrobleslaw

Similarly, his nearly 22 years in the service would not serve to mitigate his
liability. His offense was not a single or isolated act but it constituted a series
of acts committed in a span of several years. In other words, he was
a repeated offender, perpetrating his misdeeds with impunity not once,
not twice, but several times in three (3) different stations. In the case of In
Re: Report on the Judicial and Financial Audit Conducted in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Koronadal City,18 it was written:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For misappropriating court funds in concert with Ines, Judge Sardido has been
charged with grave misconduct. Admitting that he indeed "borrowed" money
from court funds, the latter recounted that on four occasions in 1994, he had
borrowed P130,000 to be able to purchase a car and thereafter borrowed
intermittently through the years, for reasons ranging from the schooling
needs of his children to the illness of his parents. That he intended to repay
the amounts "borrowed" is immaterial. These funds should never be used
outside of official business. Rule 5.04 of Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"A judge or any immediate member of the family shall not accept a gift,
bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law."
Time and time again, this Court has emphasized that "the judge is the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly, of justice. It is from him that
the people draw their will and awareness to obey the law. For the judge to
return that regard, he must be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for others to follow."
Sadly, the foregoing facts clearly show that Judge Sardido has not only
miserably failed to present himself as an example to his staff and to others,
but has also shown no compunction in violating the law, as well as the rules
and regulations. His dishonesty, gross misconduct, and gross ignorance of the
law tarnish the image of the judiciary and would have warranted the maximum
penalty of dismissal, were it not for the fact that he had already been
dismissed from the service in another administrative case. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, finding Judge Alexander Balut GUILTY of gross misconduct, the

Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service,
with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment
in any branch of the government, including government-owned and controlled
corporations, except the money value of accrued earned leave credits.

Judge Balut is hereby ORDERED to cease and desist immediately from

rendering any order or decision, or from continuing any proceedings, in any
case whatsoever, effective upon receipt of a copy of this resolution.

This disposition is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

The Office of the Court Administrator shall see to it that a copy of this
resolution be immediately served on the respondent.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON

COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after

investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The
investigation was conducted motu proprio pursuant to the Court's power of
administrative supervision over members of the Judiciary.1

Factual Antecedents

In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of
government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork
barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development
Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and
Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country.
In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee),
the names of certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer.
These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted
with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years
with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who
accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about
Mrs. Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was
issued by the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-
blowers for them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one
receiving and distributing the money.

Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:

32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed
several personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests
during our parties and other special occasions. 33. These personalities
who would either visit our office or join our events and affairs are:
 Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and family, Senator
Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene Villa,
Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut,
DAR Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline
Labayen, Jen Corpuz (Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque,
Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong, x x x.

34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told
us that that case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin
niyo munang ma-clear pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan
ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa
Sandiganbayan.

35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI,

Janet Lim Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn
my back on her, that we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos
lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na
ang TRO ko."

xxxx

38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were

asked by the NBI. He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si
Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro wala naman kayong sama ng loob
kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya ang nag-utos at saka
sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera."3(Emphasis supplied.)

The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by
Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice"
showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of
the main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs.
Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who
quickly denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was
probably taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who
is his longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the
ongoing pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context;
nevertheless, he insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and
further denied he was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in
connection with the Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a
Division of the Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the
then Acting Presiding Justice.4

On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay

"5 wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn
statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:

63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may

petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita
mong bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o
special occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na
kinabibilangan ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga
katungkulan sa gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga
bawat pagkakataon na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?

S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita

ko po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:

xxxx

w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa

office sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni
Madam JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.

x x x x6

In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26,
2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.

Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.

Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.

THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page

MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po

THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph
which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in
connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth
Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but
acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of
Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely
not in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the
circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from
posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his
association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:

(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any
party or social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she
had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our
court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in
his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)

As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to
have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article
itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo L.
Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. He
stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan,
acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision.
Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such
that even without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did
so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an
institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."

On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court,
citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles,
Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other
perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory
S. Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:

SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi
napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?

xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.

MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan

SEN. ANGARA. Okay.

xxxx

THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at
sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si
Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxxx

MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.

THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.

MS. SULA. Opo.

THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?

MS. SULA. Opo.

Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an
investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative
supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal
profession (referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely
left their specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles
to facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs]
involved in the scam).9

Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required
respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court
with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court
received respondent's Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any
irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to
Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.

On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal
knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs.
Napoles at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs.
Napoles merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based
purely on hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement,
respondent believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of
the pork barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a
looming criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later
before the Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula
and others involved in their business operation that she would not leave or
abandon them and that she would do all that she can to help them just so they
would not turn their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if
Mrs. Napoles made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her
"connection", she only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-
employees that the cases to be filed against them would be "fixed."

As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time

visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the
conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator
Estrada where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged
him in a casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of
the robe or clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When
Mrs. Napoles told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's
parish priest, he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon.
Eventually, respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was
undergoing treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission
and was able to drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief
moment over his body and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or
exposed to the holy image, which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe
any ailing part of his body in order to receive healing. Because of such favor,
respondent out of courtesy went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank
her. Respondent stressed that that was the single occasion Sula was talking
about in her supplemental affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking
with Mrs. Napoles at the conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.

Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to
have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her,
considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his
knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even
until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court
duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the
Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.

This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible

transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent.
Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative

matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under
Oath at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26,
2013 against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS
the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days
from notice hereof.

The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty.
Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated
December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to
transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other
reports on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal
Case Nos. 26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice

Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court,

submitted her report with the following findings and conclusions:

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

1. THE KEVLAR CASE

Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 -
Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal
Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged
were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees
including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco
(now deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie
Dulguime, and her (Napoles') three employees.

These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is
the same - the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine
Marine Corps in the amount of P3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or
companies owned by Napoles.

The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy,
released the payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar
helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the
helmets were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.

Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two
Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.

Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for
the lesser crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1
day of prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent
probation.

Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in
both cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the
transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14
checks were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy
in the crimes charged x x x."

xxxx

THE INVESTIGATION

xxxx

I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second
cousins. After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002,
he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles'
personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal
funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government
transactions of the corporation and kept records of its daily business
activities.

In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles

mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying
she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.

When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the
Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:

Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I
quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to
refresh your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun
po yung lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to
both of you this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na
iyon kasi napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers
kung nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do
you remember that question being asked from you?

xxxx

A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon
Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was
this connect you were talking about, if you remember?

Witness Luy

A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.

Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles
at the Sandiganbayan?

A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So
kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga
cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na
nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay
si Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each
other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in
her favor:

Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was
promulgated?

A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.

Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?

A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam
(Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po
sila ni Justice Gregory Ong.

Q That was after the decision was promulgated?

A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-

uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles.
Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms.
Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told
Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect"
in the Sandiganbayan:

"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon

(Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."

Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya
sa Sandiganbayan."

On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a
ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the
sum of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such
amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only P3.8
million. She explained that she gave various amounts to different people
during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the
decision in the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent
but she did not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.

Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while
ago, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain
before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you
mean by that "inayos"?

A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng

nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay
Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng
kaso ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So,
mahigit one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman
po si sir Justice Gregory Ong ...

xxx

Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?

A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si ...
kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako,
nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng
pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx

Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?

A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).

Q To you?

A Yes, madam.

Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?

A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po

si Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa
Kevlar case.

xxx

Justice Gutierrez

Continue counsel.

Witness Luy

Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang

nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa
halagang P3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100
million na ang nagastos mo?"

Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How
was it spent?

A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi

parang staggered. May P5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito
naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.

Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?

A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po

siya kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent
went twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue,
Ortigas, Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur
and her other employees.

Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles
has so much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13%
interest annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would
like to avail of such interest for his BDO check of P25.5 million. To arrange
this, Napoles informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's P25.5
million in her personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to
respondent in advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to P282,000.00 as
monthly interest, or a total of P3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon
Justice Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur
prepared the corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:

Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there
was any?

Witness Luy

A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of
Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang
office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles,
may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI
po ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang
nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong
magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa
po namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?

A Opo.

Q So he could get 13% interest?

A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa

kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang
checke. So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi
yun. Ang sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory
Ong. Sa, BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?

A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay P25.5 million ang amount noong
BDO check na inissue ...

Q That belongs to Justice Ong?

A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13%
interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok
na lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna
for the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong
yung interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, P25.5 million times 13%
interest, tapos divided by 12, lumalabas P282,000.00 or P283,000.00
or P281,000.00 po madam kasi naground off kami sa P282,000.00. So, ang
ginawa ni Madam, baga monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin.
Kung hindi po ako nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga
po ang nagsulat at saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po
namin. x x x So, pumunta na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice
Gregory Ong. Noong bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa
records namin ni Ms. Napoles na pumasok ang P25.5 million na amount sa
kanyang account at the same time nag-issue siya ng checke na P282,000.00 na
eleven checks. Nagstart kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or
mga ganoong buwan po. Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos
na.

Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was
deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles,
and actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to
Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?

A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung P25.5 million ipinasok sa

personal account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.

On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in

conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is
his (respondent's) favorite.

On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the

NBI, he did not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit
filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued P282,000.00 (the
amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of
the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew
that the checks were issued to respondent.

II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN
Corporation. Her duties included the formation of corporations by making use
of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of
cars, and others.

Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of

Napoles twice sometime in 2012.

Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee
during the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:

The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)

Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?

xxx

Ms. Sula

Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.

The Chairman

Gregory Ong?

Ms. Sula

Opo.

The Chairman

Sa Sandiganbayan?

Ms. Sula
Opo.

The Chairman

Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the
hearing.

Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be
issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion
PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and
the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the
Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:

Q Not the illegal detention case?

Witness Sula

A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Okay, again?

A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years,

so hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para
maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa
Sandiganbayan.

Q Yung PDAF?

A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?

A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam

tungkol sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South
Garden Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa
lawmakers, dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya,
"Huwag kayong mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi
niyang ganoon sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.

Q Is that in your affidavit?

A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman,
pero hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam
namin kilala niya si Justice Ong.

Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?

A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.

Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other
employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case.
Sula's testimony is as follows:

Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi
niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar
case niya.

Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she
will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in
jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay
huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."

xxxx

III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave
him the photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.

When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:

Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the
members of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity
why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to
practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a
lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an event
where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should
not be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent
to "get his side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office
and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must
have been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy
Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles
because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that
such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest
would like to pose with celebrities or public figures.

xxxx

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against

him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles

at the Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the
pendency of the Kevlar case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar

case, respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the
Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other
members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice
Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not
be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money

from Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar
case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur was attempting to
tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for
him to have received money from Napoles considering that her mother,
brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in

March 2012, after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in
2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so, thus:

At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012,

Napoles approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual
conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent
replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court
found enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted. She
talked about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building
churches and chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He
was not interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the
name of Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.

Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy

Black Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez
has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if
one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he
can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself
and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with
Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for
about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of
cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a
great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and
thanked her. That was his first visit.

Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but
he kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might
think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about
30 minutes and had coffee.

5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced

interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of P282,000.00 each
and that he issued to her his BDO check of P25.5 million which she deposited
in her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not
intend to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited
there. Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles
could not have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced
interest. He further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI,
an investor can only make an initial deposit of P30,000.00 every quarter or
Pl20,000.00 per year. The limit or ceiling is P3 million with an interest of 15%
or 16% per annum.

6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack

credibility. While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to
approach respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed
with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both
whistle blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was
insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the
Kevlar case was decided;

2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;

3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and

4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the
Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and
without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about
legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the
case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on her
behalf.

EVALUATION

xxxx

It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur
initially testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she
has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula
corroborated Benhur's testimony.

Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal.

The witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are
subjected to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly
intelligent and knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And
they can easily detect whether a person under investigation is telling the truth
or not. Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably
improbable that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against
respondent.

Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a
candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were
instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.

In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent

with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During
cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the
two whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias
and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.

The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that

Benhur and Sula were lying.

. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the

Kevlar case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were
convicted.

Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-
preservation. Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be
exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his Division
are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.

xxxx

With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of

Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the
inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the
consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of
expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the
Sandiganbayan during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to
ten years; and that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined
sum of money.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure
hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:

Justice Ong

Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and
according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always
their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only told
to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the truth
will come out? If. ..

xxxx
Justice Gutierrez

That is your prerogative.

Justice Ong

I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of

Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be
hung.

xxxx

Atty. Geronilla

I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)

Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.

However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the
undersigned's suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the
testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider
that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr.
Ramirez and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role
which enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.

x x xx

Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the

Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting
money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

xxxx

That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles
handed to respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that
this charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or
concoct his story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events,
concluding that actually Napoles gave respondent P3, 102,000.00 as advanced
interest.

According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles
for making it possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even
assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit,
respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should
Napoles pay respondent an advanced interest of P3,102,000.0 with her own
money if it were not a consideration for a favor?

Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation

to his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is
unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the
Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore,
respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money
from Napoles.

Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code

providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach
and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.

Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.

xxxx

...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles
twice in her office considering that the visits took place long after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.

Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross

misconduct in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1
provides that judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all of their activities .

. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in
making it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
Instead of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by
simply calling her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may
think he is an unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen
by the whistle blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily
confirmed that he was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he
"fixed" the decision in the Kevlar case.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds.
Being aptly perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a
personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful
observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.

xxxx

On the photograph showing respondent

with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.

xxxx

This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety

and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from
judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.

In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a

ground for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1)
on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she
was not present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar
case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation
lacks merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did
not appear personally for arraignment.

Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent
has been charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill
Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez
and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found
respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised
Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in
hearing criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a
collegial body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a
different procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson
of the Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt
with more severely.

xxxx

...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of
Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the
Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the
questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-
payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt
act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The
Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the
processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the
helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to P3,864,310.00 as payment for the
helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank
Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.

Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed

respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle
blowers were telling the truth.

xxxx

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for

consideration of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong
be found GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in
violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and
be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all
retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to
reemployment to any government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.

xxxx
 The Court's Ruling

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the

Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.

Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice
formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:

1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar

case while it was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division
wherein he is the Chairman;

2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the

Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal;

3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from

Napoles prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case
thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her acquittal; 4. Respondent visited
Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven (ll) checks, each
amounting to P282,000.00 or a total of P3,102,000.00, as advanced
interest for his P25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal
account; and

5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with

Senator Estrada and Napoles.11

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and

corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety
on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in
the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26,
2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her
office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any
social event hosted by her.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a

forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior; while "gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of
the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross
misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or
bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial

evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.13

The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact
with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As
Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her
daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of
developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a
"connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case
involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely
observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even
prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were
convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was
earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles
told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount.
There was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep
a ledger detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00
million. Napoles' information about her association with respondent was
confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw
respondent visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in
2012.

Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as
they have no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which
were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of
Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact
persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other
individuals, not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially
since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at
the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly
said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a
public officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of
official duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present
received.14 Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case
before the court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned
such act in the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been
committed by one charged with the responsibility of administering the law
and rendering justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the
courts.15

An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The

complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an
accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge
connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to
sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy
and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from
Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided
to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the

respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after
the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the
circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt
inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the
decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two
occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was
rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as
evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph
of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the
context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy,
made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in
the present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light
of the public revelations of what they know of that government corruption
controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.

The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest
because of their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in
her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork
Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the
"challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first
testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify
against the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and
categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these
are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they never
wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.

It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally

given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his
association with Napoles.

Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that

whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and
Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned,
it was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have
initially contacted some persons to get to respondent, and also because they
have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles
made statements regarding the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the
other employees of JLN Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's
testimony on direct examination, where she even hinted at their expected
outcome of the Kevlar case:

Atty. Benipayo

Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles
regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to
address the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?

Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na
binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos,
sa kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa
Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya
po ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron
din pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga
empleyado niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at
sister-in-law ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay
sasagot din sa kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa
kaso.

Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one
brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will
be acquitted, is that right?

A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung
mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol,
meron silang probation period.

xxxx

Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?

A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi

niya na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case
niya.

x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)

As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations
while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser
charge of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal,
Napoles helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our
earlier resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar
case as the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.

Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two

occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities.

A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and
that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence
in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.21

In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:

Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety.

They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should
have kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.

xxxx

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a
price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond
which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial
duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must
conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis
supplied.)

On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid

association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their
court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court did
not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his lawyer-
friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989
when they were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both
resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to
Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.

In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers
open to lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and
complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are
witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He
also admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but
only to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila.
He, however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating
and drinking together in public places.

We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on
this point was insufficient, viz.:

"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public
functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been
in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives
lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to
which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the table
transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty.
Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever
they meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any
manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:

'30. Social relations

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges

should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the
reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they
continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue
their interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge
should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be
scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the
suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an
element in determining his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case
because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a
former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by
respondent and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What
respondent perhaps want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or
prospective litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion
on their partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his
Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was
still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted
Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with
respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had
already been terminated.

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover
only pending and prospective litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25

... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of
possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live
in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments
permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in
such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and
objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before
them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that
may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry
relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess
proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that
would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges'
competence, integrity and independence.

In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when
improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under
constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public
criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As
what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has
unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which
initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles'
much-flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot,
by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.

During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics

and its serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from
the Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez

What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it

not be possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest
there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?

Justice Ong

You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got
near the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make
the proper request. Why did you not do that?

Justice Ong

I don't know, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and
that you are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the
Office of the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the
Black Nazarene?

Justice Ong

Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles
during that conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin.
Had I known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.

Justice Gutierrez

Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you
should have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not
have been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was an
accused before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could
have relayed to her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her
assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the
Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her
office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San Antonio
in Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the
public with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.

Justice Ong

I will heed to that advice, your honor.

Justice Gutierrez

Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries
Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you
know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before me." You
admitted that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you
learned that kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a
member of the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the
first time? That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada
who was accused before of plunder?

Justice Ong

Your honor, talking about ....

Justice Gutierrez

Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?

Justice Ong

A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)

In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported

reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles
and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her
suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony
on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent
denied having issued a BDO check for P25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and
asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI.
Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as
previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their
office were shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam"
controversy came out.

Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282,000.00

supposed advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were
given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar
case.1wphi1 Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles
spent a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the
circumstances, it is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office
the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles
at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit,
tends to support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles
regarding advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably
arises as to why would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent
if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondent's
controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the
media speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.

Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to
doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the
integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the
commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than
candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having
attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that
he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we
find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It
was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the
"contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only
one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was
talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x."27).

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even
before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is
guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;

untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."28 Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act
that has no place in the Judiciary.29

Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty
of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:

SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of

the following sanctions may be imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as

the Court may determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including governmentowned or -
controlled corporations. Provided, however, that the forfeiture of
benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than three (3) but not exceeding six (6) months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Considering that respondent is not a first time offender and the charges
 of gross misconduct and dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his
unfitness to remain as a magistrate of the special graft court, we deem it
proper to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice

Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and
IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of
the government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.

This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]

EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24,
BIAN, LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE
OF THE CLERK OF COURT, BIAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM :

Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court
employees. This case emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and
those within its employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety
that the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel require when dealing with parties in pending cases.

Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the

sala of respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding.1 Complainant filed a petition for
letters of administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon
A. Barias. This was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.2

The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-

Barias.3 Evelyn Tanael, the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a
property inventory report that included not only the properties of Romelias
Almeda-Barias but also properties forming part of the estate of complainants
late husband.4

The third case is a civil action5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance
of real properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn
Tanael, against complainant, among others.6

In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-510712 and part of the estate of complainants husband was involved.7

Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in
the petition for issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then
informed by her brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaa,
the daughter of his good friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.8

Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison,
Jr.,9 met with respondent Pecaa on February 20, 2010.10 During this meeting,
complainant informed respondent Pecaa of the delay in the publication of
the notice in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then
asked respondent Pecaa to check the status of the publication of the
notice.11 Respondent Pecaa asked for complainants number so that she
could inform her as soon as any development takes place in the
case.12 Enrique13 and Perlito14executed affidavits to corroborate these
allegations.

Respondent Pecaa asked complainant to meet her again at her house in

Bian, Laguna.15 Complainant went there with Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaa
then informed complainant that she could no longer assist her since
respondent Judge Rubia had already given administration of the properties to
Evelyn Tanael.17
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration
to Tanael because these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law,
Romelias Almeda-Barias.18 She was only concerned with the administration of
the properties of her late husband, to which respondent Pecaa replied, "Ah
ganun ba? Iba pala ung kaso mo."19

Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaa sent her a text message on

March 2, 201020 asking complainant to call her. Complainant called
respondent Pecaa who informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to
talk to her.21 Complainant agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over
dinner, on the condition that respondent Pecaa would be present as well.22

On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent

Pecaa at 6750 Ayala Avenuein Makati City. They proceeded to Caf Juanita in
The Fort, Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaa said that respondent Judge
Rubia would arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting
held at the Mandarin Hotel.24

Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Caf Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the
dinner meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate
questions. Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still
connected with Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that
time.25 Complainant was then informed that respondent Judge Rubia knew of
this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of Romelias Almeda-Barias.26 This
disclosure surprised complainant,as she was under the impression that
opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no business discussing
matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.27

Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her
supposed involvement with another man and other accusations made by
Romelias Almeda-Barias.28 She was asked about the hospital where she
brought her husband at the time of his cardiac arrest.29

These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the

pleadings or in the course of the trial.30Thus, she inferred that respondent
Judge Rubia had been talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters
outside of the court proceedings.31 The impression of complainant was that
respondent Judge Rubia was actively taking a position in favor of Atty.
Zarate.32
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just
talk to Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person.
Complainant was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] Why will I talk to
him? Judge di ko yata kaya gawin un."33

After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left,
she alleged that respondent Judge Rubia had made insinuations that she was
awaiting the company of another man.34

From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or
meet outside the courtroom until August 8, 2010.

In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a

manner that showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties,
namely, Romelias Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their
counsel, Atty. Noe Zarate.35

On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a
motion for consolidation filed by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias,
despite the date of the hearing on such motion being set on June 18,
2010.36 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia did not even
consider the comment/opposition to the motion for consolidation filed by her
counsel, which stated that since two of these cases were special proceedings,
they could not be consolidated with an ordinary civil action. Respondent
Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the totality of the different issues involved
in the three distinct cases under one court proceeding.37 As such, complainant
alleged that the main issues of the special proceedings were consolidated with
matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil
action.38 Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue
Orders39 that would have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special
administrator of her late husbands estate.40 This included the order to
conduct an inventory of the properties, rights, and credits of the deceased,
subject to the authority of the administrator.

In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant

her request for subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum that she had
prayed for to compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the
accrued rentals of the parcel of land belonging toher late husband.41 As such,
complainant raised that respondent Judge Rubias refusal emboldened Evelyn
Tanael and oppositor Romelias Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management
of the estate of complainants late husband.42 Because of this refusal, she
asserted that respondent Judge Rubia failed to adhere to the duty of the court
to ensure a proper inventory of the estate.43

Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the

part of respondent Judge Rubia. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia
failed to require a timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn
Tanael and Romelias Almeda-Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four
(4) separate pre-trials that were postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias were
not declared in default.44 She also alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated
that the burden to prove ownership of the property was on complainant,
when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and Almeda-Barias, who had the
burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently transferred to her late
husband.45

Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner
meeting she had with respondents.46 It was Enrique who allegedly told
complainants lawyers about it when he went to the lawyers office to pay
some bills.47 Complainant said that her lawyer immediately admonished her
for agreeing to meet with respondent Judge Rubia. Complainant then texted
respondent Pecaa on August 8, 2010 on her lawyers reaction concerning the
March 3, 2010 meeting. The following exchanges took place via text message:

COMPLAINANT:

Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My

brother went to hm today to pay som bills. Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr
my meeting wid u n judge rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat
w/out hs knowledge. I cnt understand anymore wat he ws sayng kanina kse
nga galit. He wil file yata somtng abt dat n I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August
8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAA [sic]:

Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010,
3:48 p.m.)

COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something.
I hav to talk to hm n person para mas claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad
bcoz f our meetng nga, dats wat struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going
to col kuya tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to buy foncard pa. (August 8,
2010, 4:18 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAA [sic]

Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa

dn. (August 8, 2010, 4:28 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAA [sic]

Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it
end up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad
wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)48(Emphasis supplied)

On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubias

inhibition. This was denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a
motion for reconsideration denied in an order49 dated November 15, 2010.50

On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit51 before the

Office of the Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaa for gross
misconduct and respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge,
partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross
misconduct.52

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents

for comment.53

In her comment,54 respondent Pecaa did not deny meeting complainant on

February 20, 2010 through the introduction of Enrique Sison.55 However, she
claimed that the alleged meeting between complainant and respondent Judge
Rubia was merely a chance encounter.

Respondent Pecaa alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March
2010,"56 when she was on her way to Makati City to meet her sisters for
coffee, complainant invited her for dinner. Respondent Pecaa hesitantly
agreed after complainant had insisted.57 Complainant picked her up at
Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they proceeded to Caf Juanita in Burgos
Circle for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle, respondent Pecaa saw
respondent Judge Rubias car parked near Caf Juanita.58

At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaa said that she saw respondent
Judge Rubia together with some companions walking toward his car.59 She
stepped out of the restaurant and greeted him. Complainant allegedly
followed respondent Pecaa and so the latter was constrained to introduce
complainant as an employee of Philippine Airlines to respondent Judge
Rubia.60 After the introduction, respondent Judge Rubia went to his car and
left. Complainant and respondent Pecaa returned to the restaurant to finish
their food and pay the bill.61

Complainant drove respondent Pecaa back to Makati City. During the drive,
complainant allegedly asked her help regarding the cases filed in court and
inquired as to what she could give to respondent Judge Rubia because her
lawyers instructed her to bribe him. Respondent Pecaa only said that
respondent Judge Rubia does not accept money and that he is financially
stable.62

After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to

respondent Pecaa concerning her case filed in court.63 Respondent Pecaa
admitted to the exchanges through text messages she had with complainant
on August 8, 2010 regarding the filing of administrative case against her and
respondent Judge Rubia.64

Respondent Pecaa denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate.65 She

maintained the position that she should not be held administratively liable for
what she construed to be primarily judicial matters, such as the bases for
respondent Judge Rubias decisions and orders in court.66

Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.

Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and
his co-respondent Pecaa together with complainant was a mere chance
encounter.68 He denied any pre-arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the
brief encounter with complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing
wife.69 He stated that he was only introduced to complainant because she was
an employee of Philippine Airlines where he was a former
executive.70 Respondent Judge Rubia argued that if the alleged meeting with
complainant did take place, it should have been mentioned in the first motion
for inhibition.71 Further, he emphasized that it took complainant eight (8)
months since the alleged dinner meeting to file a motion for inhibition and an
administrative case.72

Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping
for a favorable outcome of the cases filed, initiated contact with respondent
Pecaa. The filing of the administrative case against him was only to compel
him to inhibit from the cases to seek a friendlier forum.73

Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages

exchanged between complainant and respondent Pecaa as well as any active
advocacy in favor of opposing counsel, Atty. Zarate.74

As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases
filed, respondent Judge Rubia argued that the best forum to ventilate
complainants allegations was not through an administrative proceeding but
through judicial recourse.75

Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the
parties, the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the
administrative complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation,
report, and recommendation.76

On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the

administrative complaint to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report, and recommendation.77 The complaint was assigned to Court of
Appeals Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.

On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for

Intervention78 allegedly due to the implication of his name in the
administrative complaint.79

Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
forum shopping because the orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and
mentioned in the complaint were assailed in a petition for certiorari.80
Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and
he was not closely associated with them.81 He asserted that the records were
replete with incidents where he and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in
heated discussions on legal matters.82 He maintained that he did not foster
any closeness or personal affinity with respondent Judge Rubia that would
substantiate complainants allegations.83

In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents narration

of the events on the alleged dinner meeting.84 He argued that if the dinner
meeting did take place, this incident should have been the ground for the
motion for inhibition filed.85

Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened,
there was nothing "wrong, improper or illegal"86 about it. It could have been
reasonably interpreted as an extrajudicial means initiated by respondent
Judge Rubia to assuage the parties in the contentious litigation.87

The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.88

On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared
before Justice Gaerlan. It was agreed that respondents would file their
respective supplemental comments and complainant her reply to the
comment. Complainant manifested that she would present three (3)
witnesses: herself and her two brothers. Respondent Pecaa would testify for
herself and present Semenidad Pecaa, her aunt, as witness. Respondent
Judge Rubia manifested that he would testify on his behalf and present
respondent Pecaa as witness.89

Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa filed their respective supplemental

comments dated December 15, 201190and December 16, 2011,91 respectively.
Complainant filed her consolidated reply on January 17, 2012.92

A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012

where complainant testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.

During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of

phone calls showing that she called respondent Pecaa on March 2 and 3,
2010.93 Counsel for respondent Pecaa stipulated that these calls were made
to her.94
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and
24, 2012.

In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaa testified to the allegations
in her comment and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the
dinner meeting with complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.

On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati
Southwest Chapter, was presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia.
Rodel testified that the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a
meeting on March 10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City.
Respondent Judge Rubia attended the meeting as shown in the attendance
sheet identified by Rodel.

Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent
Judge Rubia walked together toward the parking area. When they were
nearing Burgos Circle where their cars were parked, Rodel allegedly saw
complainant and respondent Pecaa approaching them.95 He then saw
respondent Pecaa introduce complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.96 After
the introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia go to his car and drive
away.97

Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and
judicial affidavit filed.98 He alleged that the encounter with complainant at
Burgos Circle was on March 10, not March 3, 2010.99

Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012,100 the parties filed their
respective memoranda.

Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012.101 In
his report, Justice Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against
respondents.102 He was "convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just
a chance encounter"103 and found that complainant failed to prove her claim
with substantial evidence that would justify the imposition of a penalty on
respondents.104

Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the

uncorroborated testimony of complainant.105
Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8)
months before she filed the administrative complaint.106 He stated that the
deliberate concealment of the meeting was inconsistent with her resolve to
prove respondent Judge Rubias alleged partiality toward the counsel of the
opposing party.107

As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated
that the administrative case was not the proper recourse for
complainant.108 The proper action for her was to pursue remedial action
through the courts "to rectify the purported error"109 in the court proceedings.

The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.

The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should
be held administratively liable.

This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice
Samuel Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaa should be held
administratively liable for their actions. The findings of fact of an investigating
justice must be accorded great weight and finality similar with the weight
given to a trial court judges since an investigating justice personally assessed
the witnesses credibility.110 However, this rule admits of exceptions.

In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,111 this court held:

Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would
alter the result of the case. Among the circumstances which had been held to
be justifiable reasons for the Court to re-examine the trial court or appellate
courts findings of facts are, when the interference made is manifestly
mistaken; when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; and when
the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate court is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on
record.112 (Citations omitted)

These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainants

testimony and relying on the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubias
witness, Justice Gaerlan said:
While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their
version of the incident on all material points, complainant miserably failed on
this regard. The Investigating Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity
to observe the deportment and demeanor of the respondents witness, Rodel
Cortez (Cortez) during the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts
credible and rang with truth. The clear, candid and unmistakable declaration
of Cortez that the incident that transpired along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle
was just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior motive for him to perjure,
swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner meeting between
Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony is credible if it bears
the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a spontaneous,
natural, and straightforward manner.

Not only that. Cortez[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces
of evidence, such as the Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the
Rotary Club of Makati Southwest which tend to prove that at that particular
date and time Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with
Rubia and Pecaa. These evidence, when taken together, debase the
uncorroborated version of incident as narrated by Barias. Barias[] self-
serving declarations have no evidentiary value when ranged against the
testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters.113 (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlans assessment of the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight given to their testimonies.

Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez,
the Secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified
him as a "disinterested" witness.

A disinterested witness testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her

lack of interest in the outcome of the case.1wphi1 This lack of stake makes
the disinterested witness testimony more believable. To actively take part in
litigation as a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous
and exacting nature of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested witness
candor and submission to the proceedings before the court add credibility and
believability to the content of his or her testimony.

To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the

circumstances that surround his or her testimony.
The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter,
employed Rodel in 1989.114 He was appointed Secretariat in 1994 where
respondent Judge Rubia was a former President and remains an active
member.115

The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint
the reputation of the organization that the witness has been serving for more
than 20 years. It would be a definite blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club
of Makati, Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty
of the offenses that complainant imputed upon respondent Judge Rubia. The
possibility of Rodel testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of
his loyalty to the latter and the Rotary Club puts into question the
characterization that he is disinterested. The substance of Rodels narration of
events should also be scrutinized.

Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent
Pecaa, and respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as indicated
in the investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the
Investigating Justice accepted the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was
complainants judicial affidavit establishing the date of the dinner as March 3,
2010 in Caf Juanita.116 Complainant also alleged in her complaint that
respondent Judge Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati from the Rotary
Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.117

The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged

that the chance meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and
respondent Pecaa took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos
Circle in Bonifacio Global City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest
Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa Restaurant, on their way to the parking
lot. This means that the testimony of and the evidence presented by Rodel do
not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as alleged by complainant,
since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting alleged by
complainant took place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged chance
meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia took place on
March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity
of complainants allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest
Chapter dinner and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in
the vicinity of Bonifacio Global City. This could have allowed respondent Judge
Rubia ample time to travel to the dinner meeting after the meeting of the
Rotary Club of Makati.

The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet118 and the program
of meeting that Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date
indicated on the attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was March
10, 2010, not March 3, 2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time
of arrival or departure of the attendees. Neither was there an indication of the
time when the meeting began or ended. The attendance sheet and the
program of meeting, by themselves or taken as corroborative evidence of
Rodels testimony, do not discount the distinct and tangible possibility that
the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the other hand,
we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3, 2010
more credible.

Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from

January to March 2010.119 She identified her cellular phone number120 as well
as respondent Pecaas.121 Respondent Pecaa admitted that the number
identified by complainant was her number.122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls
were made to respondent Pecaas number.123 Respondent Pecaa admitted
that she had received a call from complainant before the latter picked her up
at 6750 Makati City.124 However, no calls to respondent Pecaa were recorded
on March 10, 2010 in the document presented.125 On the other hand, the calls
made to respondent Pecaa as shown in the document coincided with
complainants allegations.

Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only
manifested that he would testify for himself and present respondent Pecaa
as witness.126 He did not manifest that he would be presenting Rodel or any
participant in the Rotary Club meeting as his witness.

The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent

Judge Rubia and Rodels narration of events.

The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the
investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that
complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely
because he came from a meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring
inconsistencies did not add evidentiary weight to respondents claims. They
only put into question the veracity of the exculpatory evidence.
This court has held:

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a

respondents malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced
with conflicting versions of complainant and respondent, the Court gives more
weight to the allegations and testimony of the complainant and her witnesses
who testified clearly and consistently before the Investigating
Judge.127 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she

presented to support her allegations, we find her account of the event to be
genuine and believable.

Complainants narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her
account of events leading up to the dinner meeting were detailed and
comprehensive. The conversation alleged by complainant that took place with
respondents during the meeting was replete with details.

The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainants allegations

was the exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent
Pecaa regarding the dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by
respondent Pecaa.128 However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to
the exchange of text messages. This fact was not included in his investigation
report.129

The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaa belied respondents

claim that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance
encounter.

AILEEN PECAA [sic]

Bkt xa galit kngmkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it
end up filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)

AILEEN PECAA [sic]

Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad
wid us. (August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)130(Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Pecaa used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to
"have a meeting." "Mkpg kta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.

Further, respondent Pecaas text messages sent to complainant belied her

claim of an innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia
would get angry after complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file
an administrative case against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have
had a reason to get upset because of the possibility of administrative liability
if an innocent and coincidental encounter happened and not a dinner meeting.
However, if the meeting took place as alleged by complainant, this would have
logically led to a hostile reaction from respondents, particularly respondent
Judge Rubia.

In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaa gave the following
testimony:

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental

comment that you received a text coming from Emilie Barias saying her
lawyer is mad with her because of that meeting, isnt it?

EILEEN PECAA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and
Judge Rubia in March 2010, isnt it?

EILEEN PECAA:

Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming
from you and this is: ["]ha anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["]
And another message says "bakit siya...another...did you do something to
pacify her lawyer...so you affirm these message [sic]? EILEEN PECAA:
Yes, sir.

ATTY FERNANDEZ:

Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?

EILEEN PECAA:

I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were
explaining the context of these messages?

EILEEN PECAA:

Alin po doon?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"

EILEEN PECAA:

Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"

EILEEN PECAA:

The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an
administrative case is filed against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and
our benefits and promotion chances we will be disqualified.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ

In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in
an administrative case because you simply thought that it was a chance
meeting?
EILEEN PECAA:

Ano po sir?

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was
only a chance meeting?

EILEEN PECAA:

Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why
should I have to explain?

....

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance
meeting?

EILEEN PECAA:

No more, sir.

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:

So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get
mad becauseit was only a chance meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131

Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because

respondent Pecaa, while having dinner with complainant, stepped out of the
restaurant to greet respondent Judge Rubia on the side street of Burgos Circle.
Since complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaa out of the
restaurant, the latter introduced complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.

This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following
admissions:

1. Respondent Pecaa described her relationship with Judge Rubia as

"[w]ala naman po masyado. My dealing with the Judge is only in relation
 with my work because during flag ceremonies he always reminds us not
to act as go between or not to be involved in the cases filed in the
court."132

2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent

Pecaa as the latter is in the Office of the Clerk of Court.

3. Respondent Pecaa was having dinner with complainant whom she

knew had a pending case before respondent Judge Rubia.

4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to

have dealings with litigants.

There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaa to go out of her way to
greet respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly
reminded that court employees should not have any dealings with litigants,
respondent Pecaa should not have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia
since she was dining with a litigant.

The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaa would meet respondent
Judge Rubia by pure coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance
meetings between persons may take place, but a chance meeting between a
litigant in the company of a court employee who acceded to assisting the
litigant in a case and the judge deciding that case is outside the realm of
common experience. The odds of such an occurrence are, indeed, one in a
million. The sheer improbability of such an occurrence already puts into
question the truth of respondents allegations.

Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more

believable and must be afforded greater evidentiary weight.

Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense

The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month

period between the alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative
complaint. The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint
is of no consequence.

Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to

question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant
must think about before filing an administrative case against judges and court
personnel. This is more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing
before the judge where an administrative complaint has been filed is high.

Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved
complainant and her late husbands estate. He wielded an unmistakable
amount of control over the proceedings.

Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal,

and it would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather
not expend in the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant
might have decided to tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of
respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the reprisal that could take place after the
filing of an administrative complaint.

Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court

proceedings of cases filed. Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing
administrative cases against judges and court personnel.

In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members

of the bench and bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must
be reported. In Heck v. Judge Santos,133 this court held that:

Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an

administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter
appointed as a judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the
offending act was committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were
otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very
oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private
complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being
completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to
answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of
law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time
of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical
pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to
deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyers
Oath.134 (Emphasis supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense
committed more than twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then
the eight-month period cannot prejudice the complainant.

The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time
when the offense was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the
veracity of complainants allegations. This courts mandate to discipline
members of the judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules
and statutes. Judges are disciplined based on whether their actions violated
the New Code of Judicial Conduct.135 Court personnel are also governed by the
Code of Conduct for Court Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance with
the Civil Service Law, as provided for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. None of these rules for administrative discipline mandates a
period within which a complaint must be filed after the commission or
discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality the liability of
erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an
administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a
complaint.

To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is

to ignore the distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually
committed. The commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of
revelation or disclosure. To dismiss the complaint on this ground is
tantamount to attaching a period of prescription to the offense, which does
not apply in administrative charges.

Respondent Pecaas actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for

Court Personnel

"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct

themselves in accordance with the strict standards of integrity and
morality."137

The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty.
Noe Zarate, counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the
sala of respondent Judge Rubia. Because of respondents actions, complainant
and all who will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust
toward the judiciary and its processes. For this alone, respondents should be
held administratively liable.
For respondent Pecaa, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a
position that could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is
disconcerting.

As a court employee, respondent Pecaa should have known better than to

interact with litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the
general public places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaa should have refused
to meet with complainant in her home. She should have refused any other
form of extended communication with complainant, save for those in her
official capacity as a Data Encoder of the court. This continued communication
between complainant and respondent Pecaa makes her culpable for failure
to adhere to the strict standard of propriety mandated of court personnel.

Respondent Pecaa admitted to meeting with complainant several times,

despite the formers knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where
she is employed and in addition to the text messages exchanged between
them. She had a duty to sever all forms of communication with complainant or
to inform her superiors or the proper authority of complainants attempts to
communicate with her. Respondent Pecaa failed to do so. Instead, she
continued to communicate with complainant, even to the extent of advising
complainant against filing an administrative case against her and respondent
Judge Rubia.

Respondent Pecaa violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court

Personnel:

CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY

....

SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special

favors to anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from
any party to influence their official acts or duties.

....

SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under
their official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the
prescribed statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaas actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement
that all court personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As
stated in Villaros v. Orpiano:138

Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and
officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most
junior clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must
be guided by strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and
maintain the publics respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all
court personnel must conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity,
honesty and uprightness.139

Respondent Pecaa should, thus, be held administratively liable for her

actions.

Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of

Judicial Conduct

By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent

Judge Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity
mandated by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of
respondent Pecaas actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At
the time of the referral of the complaint to the Office of the Court
Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was already the Executive Judge of
Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.140 As a judge, he had
the authority to ensure that all court employees, whether or not they were
under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the esteem of their office.

Respondent Pecaa even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several
warnings to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before
any court under his jurisdiction as Executive Judge.141 However, nothing in the
record shows that respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of
respondent Pecaas interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her
actions, conducting an inquiry to admonish or discipline her, or at least
reporting her actions to the Office of the Court Administrator.

For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively
liable. Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a
meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his
sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubias mere presence in the dinner
meeting provides a ground for administrative liability.

In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:

Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.

To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a
magistrates activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesars
wife - above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondents act discloses a
deficiency in prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must
exercise in the performance of his official functions and of his activities as a
private individual. It is never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and
circumspect in both speech and action, keeping in mind that her conduct in
and outside the courtroom is always under constant
observation.143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Respondent Judge
Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in
the dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaa for her
admitted impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Canon 1 INDEPENDECE

Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental

guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial
independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.

Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the

basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious
understanding of the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement,
pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any
reason.

Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in

relation to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to
adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct
in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental
to the maintenance of judicial independence.

Canon 2 INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.

Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach,
but that it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.

Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith
in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also
be seen to be done.

Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures

against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the
judge may have become aware.

In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,144 this court explained the necessity of a

judges integrity:

By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are
required to observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official
acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior.
It is therefore paramount that a judges personal behavior both in the
performance of his duties and his daily life, be free from the appearance of
impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge
Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:

While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position

exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an
individual than a seat in the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to
abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative
policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the administration of
justice.145

In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr.,146 this court held:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free
of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his
judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual.
There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his
private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judges official life can
not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome
by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public

service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official
duties and in private life should be above suspicion.147 (Citations omitted)

In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:

. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all his activities. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also
appear to be impartial. x x x Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.

. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge
Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that:

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but
should also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants
are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The
other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become
meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge.
Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do
so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and
integrity.

This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and
regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial
front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating parties.
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the
embodiments of the peoples sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct
should be beyond reproach.148 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty.
Zarate stated that even if respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner
meeting, it was merely an attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an
extrajudicial solution.149

This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting
nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge
Rubias meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge
Rubias actions.

Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge
Rubia, it should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such
an initiative.

As to complainants questioning of respondent Judge Rubias actions in the

issuance of the orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his judgment,
this court agrees that complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial
remedies. This, however, does not negate the administrative liability of
respondent Judge Rubia. His actions failed to assure complainant and other
litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial
judge."150 Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality:

CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies

not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is
made.

Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or
prejudice.

Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to
minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be
disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could

come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to
affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the
process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might
affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court

held:

Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the

law and of justice. Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal
conduct and imposes upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful
observance is the price one has to pay for holding such an exalted position.
Thus, a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most
searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a
judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial
system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the
standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be
like Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide
strictly by the Code of Judicial Conduct.

It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous

standards. Whether or not he purposely went to the Manila Hotel on
November 25, 1998 to meet complainant or only had a chance meeting with
him, his act of trying to convince complainant to agree to his proposal is an act
of impropriety. It is improper and highly unethical for a judge to suggest to a
litigant what to do to resolve his case for such would generate the suspicion
that the judge is in collusion with one party. A litigant in a case is entitled to
no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges are not only
required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is an
essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just
decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in the
instant case inevitably invites doubts about respondent's probity and
integrity. It gives ground for a valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity
is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of
impartiality or the mere appearance of bias would cause resentment if the
party who refused the judge's proposal subsequently lost his case. It would
give rise to suspicion that the judgment was "fixed" beforehand. Such
circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public
contempt, disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that
respondent violated Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His misconduct
is not excused but rather made more glaring by the fact that the controversy
involving complainant was pending in his own sala.152 (Citations omitted)

The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation

of a lack of integrity and impartiality essential to a judge.

By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4

of the New Code of Judicial Conduct:

CANON 4. PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of

all the activities of a judge.

Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety

in all of their activities.

Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept

personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall
conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial
office.

Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of

the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations
which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism
or partiality.

On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo
Belen153 that: Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to
be models of propriety at all times.
 ....

A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all
times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand
the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of
propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in
the judicial system.154

Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting,
respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his
office. Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting
was a chance encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the
meeting itself.

Respondent Judge Rubias actions belittled the integrity required of judges in

all their dealings inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent
Judge Rubia now lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety
fundamental to his office. He cannot be allowed to remain a member of the
judiciary.

Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber

mandated of the judiciary and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office
and besmirched its integrity. In effect, both respondents are guilty of gross
misconduct. This court defined misconduct as "a transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer."155 In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of
Appeals,156 this court held that "[m]isconduct has been defined as wrong or
improper conduct and gross has been held to mean flagrant; shameful. . . .
This Court once held that the word misconduct implies a wrongful intention
and not a mere error of judgment."157

Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent

Judge Rubia is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating
Canons 2, 3, and 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean
hands either. As a litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not
place the integrity of the proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not
the subject of these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer
be committed by any party, respondents must be sanctioned accordingly, in
keeping with the courts mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity
in society. WHEREFORE, the court resolved tore docket the case as a regular
administrative matter. Respondent Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED
from the service, with corresponding forfeiture of all retirement benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and disqualified from reinstatement or
appointment in any public office, including government owned or -controlled
corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaa is SUSPENDED for one (1) year for
gross misconduct. This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge
Rubia is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of
his office upon receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the
personal records of respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,

vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and
to have the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.1

Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on

Certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 13, 2007
Decision3 and the August 8, 2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an Administrative Complaint5 against
Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.) of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse of Authority and
Grave Misconduct.

Factual Antecedents

Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the

previous owners of a 601-square meter property, with two buildings
constructed on it, in South Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon.6 The said property,
which they mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for
their loan, was foreclosed and sold at public auction on July 15, 1998, where
PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the amount
of P2,355,000.00.7Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in PNBs name, which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds
for Bukidnon on August 25, 1999.8 The one-year redemption period lapsed
but spouses Sombilon failed to redeem the property.9

In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay
(Atty. Garay), a Public Attorneys Office (PAO) lawyer, who was once
appointed by the court as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal
case and who happens to be the owner of a lot adjacent to the
property.10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that they wanted to
reacquire11 the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase it.12 Thus,
they were hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in exchange,
they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the property,
where one of the buildings is located, for P5 million.13

On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB
to inquire about the status of the property.14 They were informed by the bank
that the property could be purchased at the fair market value
of P2,938,000.00.15 The following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and
offered to buy the property by making a down payment of P587,600.0016 or
20% of the purchase price.17

On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase
the entire property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the
property from PNB.18 The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment
of the banks total claim19 to formalize their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of
PNB.21

On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in
the name of PNB.22

On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty.
Garay23 since spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.24

G.R. No. 179914

On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of

Possession25 before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The case was
docketed as Special Civil Case No. 375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided
over by Judge Venadas, Sr.

On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order26 granting the Petition
and, on June27, 2005, he issued a Writ of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28

On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garays offer to
purchase the property had been approved due to their failure to pay the full
down payment.29

On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration30 of the

issuance of the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay,31 who was the
former counsel of Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to
paragraph 5,32 Article 1491 of the Civil Code.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order33 holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, a portion of which reads:

Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a

mandatory and ministerial duty under Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an
exception to this rule that if the implementation and enforcement of the writ
of possession would work [great] injustice to the registered owner because
the petitioner PNB or in this case Atty. Garay counsel for the Sombilon[s] is
not entitled thereto. There is much to be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay
in manipulating that the property in question was finally bought by him from
the PNB not to mention the possible violation of the [canon] of legal and
judicial ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the version of Mrs. Sombilon.
The court will give Atty. Garay [the opportunity] to rebut the evidence
presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2,
2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be accommodated in the
morning[,] it will proceed in the afternoon.

Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said
date.

In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is

hereby held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C. Bugahod is hereby directed to
return all items to the house of Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full
possession of the property, if already implemented and enforced.

SO ORDERED.34

Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Injunction35 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for Certiorari for
several procedural defects.37However, on reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated
the Petition.39

On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution40 granting the PNB and Atty.
Garays application for a TRO. Thus:

Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the

posting of a Five Thousand Peso (P5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from
receipt hereof ordering, [petitioners] to:

1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves
danger to, or alters the nature and condition of the property;

2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said
property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they
may have already received to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
the Tenth Judicial Region, Malaybalay City; and

Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising
from the disputed property to the said Clerk of Court.

SO ORDERED.41

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision42 granting the Petition for
Certiorari. The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge
Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession.43 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed
July 14, 2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.44

Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in
its August 8, 2007 Resolution.46

Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
contending that:

THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN

GRANTING THE PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB]
AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION COMMITTED BYTHE
[RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO] LAW
AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.47

Spouses Sombilons Arguments

Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for
Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Order.48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when
they filed a Motion to Recall Order with the RTC, in addition to the Petition for
Certiorari they earlier filed with the CA.49

As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession because PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply
for a Writ of Possession considering that the subject property had already
been sold to Atty. Garay,50 who they claim is also not entitled to the Writ of
Possession as he is disqualified from purchasing the subject property
pursuant to paragraph 5,

Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51

Atty. Garays and PNBs Arguments

Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the
Petition for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of
discretion when he recalled the Writ of Possession without notice to him and
PNB.52 He also emphasizes that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a
writ of possession after the redemption period has lapsed.53

PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property,
it is entitled to the Writ of Possession.54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession, which he had earlier issued.55

PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship

between Atty. Garay and spouses Sombilon.56 In any case, the prohibition in
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code does not apply to the instant case
as Atty. Garay purchased the subject property from PNB and not from spouses
Sombilon.57

Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition
for Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration may be dispensed with as the issue involved is purely one of
law, which is an exception under prevailing jurisprudence.58

Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the
time considering that Judge Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording
PNB the opportunity to be heard.59

Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not
institute another action simultaneously with the Petition for Certiorari it filed
with the CA.60

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified

Complaint61 against Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of
Authority and Grave Misconduct when he proceeded with the hearing of
spouses Sombilons motion for reconsideration of the Order granting the
issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to PNB and for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case No.
375-05.

Atty. Garays Arguments

Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively

sanctioned for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier
issued62 and for ignoring Sections 4,63 5,64 and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of
Court as he proceeded to hear the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.66

Judge Venadas, Sr.s Arguments

In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that
he did not annul the Writ of Possession but merely stayed its execution and
implementation to prevent any injustice.67 He insists there was no violation of
due process because he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present
its evidence.68

Report and Recommendation of the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)

The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of
procedure.70 Although the OCA did not touch on the issue of whether Judge
Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it was still pending with the
CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of blatantly
disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court when he
acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon.71 It also pointed out
that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no
proper notice was sent to them.72 Thus, the OCA recommended that:

a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular

administrative complaint;

b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance

of procedure; and

c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of

TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar
transgression x x x will be dealt with more severely.73

On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-
2000 with G.R. No. 179914.74

Issues

Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge
Venadas, Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession; and (2) whether he should be
administratively sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession and for disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court.

Our Ruling

G.R. No. 179914

The issuance of a writ of possession is

ministerial upon the court.

A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with
the Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property.75 During the one-
year redemption period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the
posting of a bond.76 But after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to
consolidate the title and to possess the property, without need of a
bond.77 And once title is consolidated under the name of the purchaser, the
issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the
court; thus, no discretion is left to the court.78 Questions regarding the
regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be
raised as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of
possession as these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of
the mortgage or the foreclosure sale.79 The pendency of such action is also not
a ground to stay the issuance of a writ of possession.80

In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the
issuance of the Writ of Possession.1wphi1 In fact, the title over the subject
property had already been consolidated in PNBs name. Thus, it was
ministerial upon Judge Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of
PNB, the registered owner of the subject property.

Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may
be deferred,81 we find none of these recognized exceptions present in the
instant case. Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty.
Garay was invalid as it was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of
the Civil Code. However, the alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to
oppose or defer the issuance of the Writ of Possession as this does not affect
PNBs right to possess the subject property. Thus, there was no reason for
Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession
of the subject property as a matter of right.

Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of
the assailed Order prior to the availment of a special civil action for certiorari,
we agree with PNB that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with where the decision is a patent nullity or where there is
violation of due process,82 such as in the instant case.

All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for
Certiorari.

A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000

As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree
with the findings and recommendations of the OCA.

Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day
notice rule and the required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally
defective. Despite this, Judge Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion
filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due
process.

To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims
that the motion was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12,
2005 but they refused to receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by
the OCA, no affidavit was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we
agree with the Court Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave
abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly
disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and

law is gross ignorance of the law,83which is classified as a serious charge
under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-
10-SC, punishable by either dismissal from service, suspension for more than
three months but not exceeding six months, or a fine of more than P20,000.00
but not exceeding P40,000.00.84

Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Order, and considering that this is his first
offense, we find Judge Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority
bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is hereby fined the amount
of P20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No.
12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge Venadas, Sr. for
disability retirement but withheld the amount of P100,000.00 pending the
final resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of P20,000.00 herein
imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the withheld amount
of P100,000.00.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13,
2007 Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of
the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby
found guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the
law and is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00)
to be deducted from the withheld amount of P100,000.00 from his retirement
benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007 Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778 June 5, 2013

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1966-MTJ)

MARICOR L. GARADO, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a Verified Complaint-Affidavit,1 filed by complainant Maricor L.

Garado charging respondent Judge Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres, Presiding
Judge, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, with violation
of the Rule 3.05,2 Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct in connection with
Civil Case No. 20129 entitled "Maricor Garado v. Rose Virgie Estor."

Complainant alleges that she is the plaintiff in the aforesaid civil case for sum
of money and damages. She complaints that the case is covered by the 1991
Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and only involves a claim for the
payment of a loan amounting to P50,000 plus interest and a claim for damages
amounting to P30,000, but the case has remained unresolved for more than
20 months from the time it was filed.

Complainant narrates that her complaint against defendant Rose Virgie Estor
was filed on August 22, 2005. After respondent judge denied defendant
Estors motion to dismiss on July 3, 2006, Estor thereafter filed an Urgent Ex-
parte Motion for Extension of Time (To File Responsive Pleading) followed by
a second motion to dismiss on November 16, 2006. Complainant, meanwhile,
filed a motion to render judgment with an opposition to the second motion to
dismiss on November 27, 2006. The two motions were submitted for
resolution on November 27, 2006 and January 15, 2007, respectively, but both
motions remained unresolved as of the date of the filing of the complaint on
May 9, 2007.

In a 1st Indorsement3 dated May 17, 2007, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) directed Judge Torres to file her Comment on the
complaint within ten days. Respondent judge received the 1st Tracer4 against
respondent judge on July 24, 2007 requiring her to file the May 25, 2007, but
failed to comply with the directive. Thus, the OCA issued required Comment
within five days from notice. Respondent judge also received the 1st
Indorsement on Tracer on August 3, 2007, but still failed to comply.

On March 10, 2008, this Courts Third Division issued a Resolution5 directing
respondent judge to: (1) show cause why she should not be administratively
sanctioned in view of her refusal to submit her Comment despite the two
directives, and (2) file her Comment within five days from receipt of notice,
otherwise, an administrative case will be filed against her. Respondent judge
received a copy of the Resolution on April 16, 2008, but again ignored the
same. Consequently, the Court issued another Resolution6 on July 14, 2008
imposing upon Judge Torres a fine of P1,000, to be paid within ten days from
receipt, or imprisonment of five days if the fine is not paid within the period of
ten days. The July 14, 2008 Resolution also directed respondent judge to
comply with the Courts Show Cause Resolution dated March 10, 2008.
Despite receipt of the Resolution, however, Judge Torres neither complied
with the Resolution nor paid the fine.

Thus, on April 21, 2010, the Court issued a Resolution7 and resolved to await
the payment of the fine by respondent judge; to consider the filing of her
Comment as waived; and to refer this administrative matter to the OCA for
final evaluation, report and recommendation.

On November 11, 2010, the OCA submitted its Memorandum8 to the Court
finding respondent judge administratively liable and recommending that the
Court:

1. RE-DOCKET the case as a regular administrative matter against respondent

Judge Lizabeth G. Torres;

2. DISMISS respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres from the service and impose
upon her all the attendant penalties; and
3. IMPOSE upon respondent Judge Lizabeth G. Torres the penalty of FIVE (5)
days imprisonment for her failure to pay the FINE of P1,000.00 within the
required period, pursuant to the Courts Resolution dated 14 July 2008.9

In recommending the penalty of dismissal, the OCA noted that in five previous
administrative cases,10 respondent was found liable for undue delay in
rendering a decision, resolution or order, and sternly warned that the
commission of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The OCA also noted eight other pending administrative cases11 filed by
different litigants against respondent judge involving offenses of similar
nature. As well, the OCA noted the four instances under the present
administrative case where respondent judge failed to comply with
directives/orders issued by this Court.

We agree with the OCA that respondent judge should be held administratively
liable.

At the outset, the Court notes that respondent had been given ample
opportunity to address the complaint against her. The OCA sent and
respondent judge received the 1st Indorsement dated May 17, 2007 and 1st
Tracer dated July 24, 2007, both of which explicitly required her to file her
Comment on the complaint. However, up until her dismissal from the service
by the Court on November 23, 2010,12 respondent had not complied with the
OCA directives. Moreover, respondent also failed to comply, despite due
notice, with the Resolutions dated March 10, 2008 and July 14, 2008 of the
Court itself.

Respondents failure to submit her Comment and compliance as required by

the OCA and this Court is tantamount to insubordination, inefficiency, and
neglect of duty.14 It was respondents duty then not only to obey the lawful
orders of her superiors, but also to defend herself against complainants
charges and prove her fitness to remain a member of the bench. By her failure
to comply with the OCA and this Courts directives, respondent judge has
completely lost her chance to defend herself.

As to the merits of the administrative complaint, the pleadings and evidence

on record clearly establish respondents liability for undue delay in resolving
Civil Case No. 20129.
Section 15(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, mandates that cases or
matters filed with the lower courts must be decided or resolved within three
months from the date they are submitted for decision or resolution. With
respect to cases falling under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure,
first level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last
affidavit and position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same,
within which to render judgment. Section 6 of the said Rule also requires first
level courts to render judgment motu proprio or upon motion of the plaintiff if
the defendant fails to file an answer to the complaint within the allowable
period.

Judges are oft-reminded of their duty to act promptly upon cases and matters
pending before their courts. Rule 3.05, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
directs judges to "dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases
within the required periods." Canons 6 and 7 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
further exhort judges to be prompt and punctual in the disposition and
resolution of cases and matters pending before their courts:

6. PROMPTNESS

He should be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,

remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied.

7. PUNCTUALITY

He should be punctual in the performance of his judicial duties, recognizing

that the time of litigants, witnesses, and attorneys is of value and that if the
judge is unpunctual in his habits, he sets a bad example to the bar and tends to
create dissatisfaction with the administration of justice.1wphi1

Administrative Circular No. 1 dated January 28, 1988 likewise reminds all
judges to observe scrupulously the periods prescribed in Section 15, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution and to act promptly on all motions and
interlocutory matters pending before their courts.

Prompt disposition of cases is attained basically through the efficiency and

dedication to duty of judges. If judges do not possess those traits, delay in the
disposition of cases is inevitable to the prejudice of litigants. Accordingly,
judges should be imbued with a high sense of duty and
responsibility in the discharge of their obligation to administer justice
promptly.15 In this case, respondent judge failed to live up to the exacting
standards of duty and responsibility that her position required. Upon the
failure of the defendant Estor to file her Answer in Civil Case No. 20129,
respondent was then required under Section 6 of the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure to render judgment in Civil Case No. 20129 within 30
days. She failed to do so contrary to the rationale behind the said Rule, which
was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to
the speedy disposition of cases.16

Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies undue delay in
rendering a decision and violation of Supreme Court directives as less serious
charges which are punishable with the penalty of suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for one month to three months, or a fine
of P10,000 to P20,000. Given that respondent had been previously dismissed
from the service in Lugares v. Gutierrez-Torres,17 however, the penalty of
suspension is already inapplicable. Thus, the Court imposes upon respondent
for her undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. 20129 a fine in the maximum
amount of P20,000, and another fine of P10,000 for her repeated failure to
obey this Courts directives, both amounts to be deducted from her accrued
leave credits.

WHEREFORE, respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres is found LIABLE of the

less serious charges of undue delay in resolving Civil Case No. No. 20129 and
violation or Supreme Court directives. She is FINED the amount or P20,000
for the first offense and another P10,000 for the second offense, both amounts
to be deducted from her accrued leave credits. To effect the penalties
imposed, the Employee's Leave Division, Office of Administrative Services-
OCA, is DIRECTED to ascertain respondent Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total
earned leave credits. Thereafter, the Finance Division, Fiscal Management
Office-OCA, is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value or respondent
Lizabeth Gutierrez-Torres's total accrued leave credits and deduct therefrom
the amount of the fines imposed, without prejudice to whatever penalty the
Court may impose on other remaining and/or pending administrative cases
against her, if any.

SO ORDERED.
AM No. RTJ-02-1669 April 14, 2004
[Formerly OCA IPI No.00-961-RTJ]

HON. JULIETA A. DECENA, HON. VIRGILIO D. PONTANAL, HON. AMELITA

A. IBASCO, HON. GERRY D. RAA, HON.PEDRO N. MORA. JR., and HON.
FERDINAND T. AGUILAR, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE NILO A. MALANYAON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 32, Pili, Camarines Sur, respondent.

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The regular session of a municipal council was interrupted by a heckler in the

audience hurling various accusatory remarks and insults at the council
members. The heckler is a judge, the incident, the subject of this case.

On 26 May 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator received a

Joint Affidavit-Complaint executed by various municipal officials of Bula,
Camarines Sur. The affiants-complainants, Mayor Julieta A. Decena ("Decena"),
Vice-mayor Virgilio D. Pontanal ("Pontanal"), and Councilors Amelita A. Ibasco
("Ibasco"), Gerry D. Raa ("Raa"), Pedro N. Mora, Jr. ("Mora"), and Ferdinand
T. Aguila ("Aguilar") sought the dismissal from the service and the disbarment
of respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon ("Judge Malanyaon"), Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, of Pili, Camarines Sur, on
account of his conduct during the 21 February 2000 session of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Bula.

In a Resolution dated 19 June 2002, the Court referred the matter for
investigation, report and recommendation to Court of Appeals Justice Eriberto
U. Rosario, Jr.1 After Justice Rosario sought to be excused owing to his
forthcoming retirement then,2 the Court referred the matter to the Court of
Appeals for assignment to a Justice by court-wide raffle.3 The case was raffled
to Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. After conducting several hearings on the case,
Justice Reyes, Jr. rendered a Report and Recommendation ("Report"), which
was received by this Court on 22 July 2003. From the Report, we draw the
following antecedent facts:
 On 21 February 2000, the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur
convened its regular session, with Vice-mayor Pontanal presiding.
Among the matters on the agenda was the revocation of two previous
council resolutions4 authorizing Rolando N. Canet ("Canet") to operate a
cockpit in the municipality. A former vice-mayor of Bula, Canet is also
the nephew-in-law of Judge Malanyaon. Both Judge Malanyaon and
Canet attended the 21 February 2000 session of the Sangguniang Bayan.
Canet, however, came along with many supporters.5 Noticing his
presence, the Sanggunian offered to recognize Judge Malanyaon; but he
declined, saying that he merely wanted to be an observer.6

From that point on, the episode during the Sanggunian session as culled in
the Report on the basis of the submitted affidavits transpired in this wise:

Subsequently, during the deliberations, the vice mayor attested that

respondent interrupted the session by shouting comments in their
vernacular such as: "Ambog, Ambog iyan" ("lies, they are lies"); "Butig!
Caya mo yan? Maski Butig! Maski Piglalado Camo!" ("Lies! Can you do
that? Even if they are lies? Even if you are being deceived?")
and "Dale Sana Camong Dale!" ("You do things recklessly"). During the
deliberations relative to the authority of Mr. Rolando N. Canet to
operate a cockpit, the respondent judge, with blazing eyes and a red face
further interrupted the session by lambasting the municipal councilors
with disparaging and insulting remarks, which left the whole
proceedings in confusion.

In the heat of respondents outbursts, he uttered the following remarks to the

vice mayor:

"Ika Bondying (the vice mayors nickname),. So kag-igin MO BUKO

ADTONG MADAYA, Di adto nag gagamit kana kuwa kan municipyo, o
camo ginagamit mo si Revo mo! Mag adal kamo, a biente uno mil,
susmareosep kamo. Sabi co ka ninyo mig-lecture aco pero abo man
kamo, o taono, basta camo matugaan ni alkalde? Mga uda ugali!" ("You
Bodying, your father was not deceitful. He was not using the
property of the municipality, now you are using your Revo. You all
study! You are receiving twenty one thousand pesos, my god, I told
you I will lecture you, but you did not want me to. Why? As long as
you were promised by the mayor? You have no etiquette!")
"O Bondying ika, maski ambugan camo kana alkalde, tutubudon ninyo?
Urgent na ono? Din a kamo pwendeng butigan. Pigbubutigan camo. Amo
yan sabihon ko ka ninyo!" ("You Bondying, even if the mayor is telling
you lies, will you follow her? What urgent? You could not be lied
upon again! You are being deceived, thats what I will tell you!")

Pedro N. Mora, former municipal councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur, in his

affidavit also conformed that he heard the respondent judge utter:
"Ambog, Ambog iyan" ("lies, they are lies"); "Butig! Caya mo yan? Maski
Butig! Maski Piglalado Camo!" ("Lies! Can you do that? Even if they
are lies? Even if you are being deceived?") and "Dale Sana Camong
Dale!" ("You do things recklessly") during the session of Sangguniang
Bayan of Bula, held on 21 February 2000.

xxx

Ferdinand T. Aguilar, another former councilor of Bula, Camarines Sur,

likewise attested to the intemperate language used by the respondent
during the regular session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula on 21
February 2000. Aguilar however adds that he too became the object of
respondents ire when the latter publicly told him the following:

"O, Aguilar, ono pigsusunod mo? Ilinga, ilinga tolos ninyo, ono regal, o ono
regal ninyo? You cannot suspend the rule without 2/3 votes! Ono,
magbasa kamo! Saying kito sweldo ninyo!" (You Aguilar, What are you
following? Look, look at this, what is the regulation, what are your
regulations? You cannot suspend the rule without the 2/3 votes!
You read! Your salary is just a waste!");

"O, ika (pointing at Aguilar) O ono pigsusunod mo? O, kua raw, basaha
ninyo! Onong klaseng Sanggunian adi? Di nagsusunod sa regal a,
Ferdinand? Di ninyo piggagamit to mga payo ninyo! O, ilinga! Basaha
Ferdinand." ("You, [pointing at Aguilar] what are you following? You
get [the rules] and read them! What kind of Sanggunian is this? You
not following the rules a, Ferdinand? You are not using your head!
You look and read it, Ferdinand.");

"Ika sana Ferdinand saying kito alintak mo! Uray ni ina nya, onong urgent
na nakakaptan ninyo? Kon pig-gagamit ya mga gamit kot munisipyo, di
ninyo pigaactibaran!" (You Ferdinand you what is in your head is
such a waste. Ass of your mother! To what urgent matter that you
are holding on? If it is the property of this municipality is the one
being used, you are not acting on it.");

"Ika Ferdinand nag-aadal ka kin abugasiya, nagpapabuta man ika, ining,

pigbubutigan na kamo?" ("You Ferdinand, you are studying law and
yet you were blinded even though you are cheated");

"Ika, Ferdinand basahon ko, kon gusto mo bikolon ko, di san sinasabing
bago magtaong permit agko Ordinansa. Si isay ya nagsasabi? Ya
tinatawam kin poder ngowan uya Sangguniang Bayan ya mig-taong
lisensya! Tinawan na kin lisensa o ono pa?" ("You Ferdinand, I will read
to you, if you want I will read it to you in our dialect. That it is
never stated there that before issuing permit, there should be an
ordinance first. Who said that? The one that is given the power is
the Sangguniang Bayan the one that will issue the license! He
[Rolando Canet] was already given a license, what else?");

"Ika Aguilar, basahon mo iton a! da siton nagsasabing bago tawan kin

lisensya, kumasta ngona kin ordinansa! O sa cockfighting o kon sa
demonyo! Ining sa bulangan na ini 1964 pa ako, a! ngani ninyong
maintindihan. Ngowan, si Rolando Canet agko lisensiya, huli ta abo ni
Decena, natugon man kamo gusto ninyong anularan! Ngowan, gusting
bumayad abong pabayadon. Magbasa kamo, 21 mil, buray ni ina niya!
Ako, nag-absent akong kabangang aldow para magatender kading
session, sangribo ana nauda kanako! Gusto ko sanang porbaran kamo
adding osipon na kon talagang nakastahan na kamo! Magbasa kamo, 21
mil, buray ni ina niya, 21 mil." ("You Aguilar, read that [referring to
the rules], it is never stated here that before you issue a license,
you have to pass first an ordinance, in the cockfighting or whatever
devil is that! This law about the cockfighting this has been the law
since 1964 so that you will understand. Now, Rolando Canet has a
license, just because Decena does not want to give permit you want
the same annulled. Now, he wants to pay but does not want to
accept the same. You read, 21 thousand [referring to our salary]
ass of your mother! I did not report for half a day just to attend this
session and I lost P1,000.00 in the process in the form of salary just
so I will be able to prove for myself about the rumors that you have
been bought [or to that effect]! You read! Twenty one thousand!
Ass of your mother, twenty one thousand!")

"Sayang Ferdinand, kun arog ya naturan mo, di ida makakapasar, amo

yan sasabihon ko kanimo! Kon arog kito ya studio mo, babaliktaron mo to
demonyong iton, a, maski ton butig, amo tutuboron mo a, tibaad di ika
maka-abogado, kon maka-abogado man, makakarsel ka!" ("What a
waste Ferdinand, if thats what you learned, you will not pass [the
Bar exams] thats what I will tell you. What are you going to tell
them, if that is how you understand, that you will reverse this kind
of devil even if it is a lie and yet you will follow the same. You might
not become a lawyer, and if you become one you will go to jail.")

Ernesto B. Ballaber, who is the incumbent Barangay Captain of

Salvacion, Bula, Camarines Sur, testified through his affidavit that he
was present and seated beside the respondent judge on the date in
question. He noticed that the respondent judge was drunk as the latter
gave off a strong alcoholic scent. Moreover, Ballebar observed that the
respondents eyes were watery and red.

Ballebars deduction that Judge Malanyaon was drunk was reinforced

when the respondent stood up, banged the table and shouted in the
vernacular: "Butig!, Butig! Butig!" ("Lies! Lies! Lies!") and "Ambog!
Ambog iyan!" ("Lie! Its a lie!) during the session. Ballebar further
testified that the respondent also verbally abused the members of the
Sangguniang.

xxx

Gerry D. Raa asseverated that when the issue on the resolutions

affecting the operation of the cockpit arena by Rolando N. Canet was
being taken up by the council, Judge Malanyaon suddenly pushed the
table in front of him, bolted from his chair and fiercely castigated the
members of the Sangguniang Bayan with every personal attacks. In fact,
Raa attested that the respondent publicly discredited and humiliated
him during the session by imputing that he was operating an illegal
cockpit in the municipality.7 (Emphasis not ours.)
Mora and Raa, as well as two other witnesses8 for the complainants
confirmed that Judge Malanyaon reeked of liquor as he proceeded with his
tirade.

According to Bartolome D. Parro, the Sangguniang Bayan OIC Secretary,

because of the outbursts of Judge Malanyaon the session was suspended.
Meanwhile, the Sanggunian members were involuntarily detained at the
session hall. They were unable to leave as the entrance and exits were blocked
by supporters of Canet. Meanwhile, Judge Malanyaon continued his outbursts
against the councilors.9

Admitting his presence during the Sanggunian session, Judge Malanyaon

explained, however, that he was there not as a judge but in his private
capacity as a taxpayer. He denied he was drunk, even as he admitted he was
enraged and furious over the proceedings at the Sanggunian. He did not deny
delivering a diatribe, but he claimed his actions were appropriate since the
proposed revocation of his nephew-in-laws cockpit license was illegal in his
estimation.10

All told, Judge Malanyaon did not dispute the facts as laid down by the
complainants and the latters witnesses. He justified his behavior though as
the fulminations of a righteously outraged citizen which according to him
should be segregated from his function as a judge.

Judge Malanyaon deserves to be taken to task for his outrageous behavior as it

clearly violates the Code of Judicial Conduct.

First. The remarks uttered are patently defamatory and even vulgar. Indeed,
such utterances should not be expected of a public official worthy of his office.
At fault is not the sentiment harbored, but the impolitic choice of words
employed to express such sentiment.11 It is not even particularly relevant if
Judge Malanyaon was inebriated at that time, for the reckless character of his
remarks are in themselves palpable, whether they were delivered in a
drunken or sober state.

Second. Judge Malanyaons harangue was directed at the members of the

Sangguniang Bayan in the course of a regular session of the body. The
members of the Sanggunian are, by reason of their public office, entitled to the
respect of other people, especially their fellow public officers. Judge
Malanyaons diatribe indicates his inability to accord his fellow public officials
their due.

Third. Judge Malanyaon made his remarks in a public forum. Obviously,

however, he forgot or even failed to realize that he is a representative of the
judicial branch of government, the judge being the visible representation of
the law and, more importantly, of justice.12 The judiciary is loathe to interfere
with the due exercise by co-equal branches of government of their official
functions, absent any justiciable action brought in due course.

Fourth. It must be understood that Judge Malanyaons remarks were aimed at

preventing the Sanggunian from revoking the cockpit license of Canet. In
doing so, he was attempting to interfere with the will of the Sanggunian as an
independent legislative body. As observed by Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr.,
the awkward situation was aggravated when Judge Malanyaon publicly
humiliated the councilors in front of their constituents, making them look
witless and obtuse, and thereby creating a mockery of the proceedings.13 The
disruptive presence of several supporters of Canet, a local town politician,
porated the protest against the plan to revoke the cockpit license with
political color. Judge Malanyaons active participation in apparent concert
with Canets supporters exposed him as nothing but a common lobbyist, as he
forgot to act as a judge with the standard judicial temperament and prudence.

Fifth. Judge Malanyaon obstructed the Sangguniang members from

performing their official duties. As Investigating Justice Reyes, Jr. pointed out,
the acts complained of Judge Malanyaon is no less a crime under Article 144 of
the Revised Penal Code.14 As a judge, respondent should very well know how
deleterious it would be to the discharge of his functions if the court hearings
he presides over would be rudely interrupted by fulsome tirades delivered by
a spectator in the audience. If such a situation arise in his courtroom, Judge
Manlayaon would have every right to take offense to the disruption in the
proceedings. A legislative session is no less an official proceeding as a court
session and any one who disrupts either proceedings deserves to be
sanctioned.

Sixth. The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge shall neither allow
family relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor allow the
prestige of judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests of
others.15 It does not escape our attention that Judge Malanyaon was agitated
during the Sanggunian session because the interests of his nephew-in-law
were under attack. Perhaps, Judge Malanyaon honestly believed that the
revocation of Canets cockpit license was illegal. Yet, it would not justify his
undisguised attempt to prevent the threatened detrimental action against his
relative with his influence. We agree with the conclusion of Investigating
Justice Reyes, Jr. that Judge Malanyaon allowed himself to be used by his
nephew-in-law to promote the latters private interests, in contravention of
the Code of Judicial Conduct.16

Judge Malanyaon needs to be reminded that his judicial identity does not
terminate at the end of the day when he takes off his judicial robes. Even when
garbed in casual wear outside of the halls of justice, a judge retains the air of
authority and moral ascendancy that he or she wields inside the sala. As the
Court once held:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as
burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public

service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of
official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.17

It may strike perhaps as a poetically tragic notion, but for very good reasons, a
judge's official life cannot simply be detached or separated from his personal
existence.18 Indeed, the Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2 in particular,
mandates that a judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety in all activities, as well as behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.19 Thus, the Court
has to dismiss outright Judge Malanyaons suggestion that his actions be
evaluated as one of a taxpayer or ordinary citizen and not as that of a judge. In
fact, his utterances were not made under a cloak of anonymity, for the
members of the council, as well as some of the people in the gallery knew very
well that he was a judge. It is highly probable that his invectives took on a
greater imperative on the listeners precisely because he was a judge, with all
the authority attendant to the office.

The conduct of Judge Malanyaon relative to the 21 February 2000 legislative

session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula is inexcusable and simply cannot be
condoned. His actuations constitute palpable violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct:
 CANON 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE
APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.

Rule 2.01. A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public

confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary

xxx

Rule 2.03. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships
to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office
shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor
convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a
special position to influence the judge.

The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that respondent be fined

Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). In his seventeen (17) years in the judiciary,
Judge Malanyaon has not been sanctioned, except once by reprimand. With
the comparative seriousness of the offense, a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00) would serve as an appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Nilo A. Malanyaon is hereby found GUILTY of

conduct unbecoming of a judge, in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.01 and Rule
2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that the
commission of the same or a similar act or omission in the future will be dealt
with more severely.`

A.M. No. MTJ-07-1691 April 2, 2013

(Formerly A.M. No. 07-7-04-SC)

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO, Branch 2; JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA,
Branch 3; JUDGE ROSABELLA M. TORMIS, Branch 4; and JUDGE
EDGEMELO C. ROSALES, Branch 8; all of MTCC-Cebu City; CELESTE P.
RETUYA, Clerk III, MTCC Branch 6, Cebu City; CORAZON P. RETUYA, Court
Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City; RHONA F. RODRIGUEZ,
Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court
(RTC) Cebu City; EMMA D. VALENCIA, Court Stenographer III, RTC,
Branch 18, Cebu City; MARILOU CABANEZ, Court Stenographer, MTCC,
Branch 4, Cebu City; DESIDERIO S. ARANAS, Process Server, MTCC,
Branch 3, Cebu City; REBECCA ALESNA, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch
1, Cebu City; and HELEN MONGGAYA, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch
4, Cebu City. Respondents.

*PERLAS-BERNABE

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This Court has long held that "[the] administration of justice is circumscribed
with a heavy burden of responsibility. It requires that everyone involved in its
dispensation from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk live up to the
strictest standards of competence, honesty, and integrity in the public
service."1

THE CASE

This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007

Memorandum of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA).2 The judicial
audit team created by the OCA reported alleged irregularities in the
solemnization of marriages in several branches of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.3 Certain package
fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for instant
marriages.4

THE FACTS

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to

Cebu City and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches
2, 3, 4, and 8 of the MTCC in Cebu City.5 A female and male lawyer of the audit
team went undercover as a couple looking to get married. They went to the
Palace of Justice and were directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and
look for a certain "Meloy". The male lawyer feared that he would be
recognized by other court personnel, specifically the Clerk of Court of Branch
4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers then agreed that
only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage
application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and
assisted the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage
process could be rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be
solemnized the next day, but the marriage certificate would only be dated the
day the marriage license becomes available. Helen also guaranteed the
regularity of the process for a fee of three thousand pesos (P3,000) only.6

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6
July 2007 of the judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and
directed Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales to submit their respective
comments.7 The Court also suspended the judges pending resolution of the
cases against them.8

On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator

Zenaida N. Elepao submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 20079 and
Supplemental Report.10 Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates
were examined by the judicial audit team.11 The team reported that out of the
643 marriage certificates examined, 280 marriages were solemnized under
Article 3412 of the Family Code.13 The logbooks of the MTCC Branches indicate
a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of marriage
certificates in the courts custody.14 There is also an unusual number of
marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili
and Liloan, Cebu.15 There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with
marriage licenses obtained on the same day.16 The town of Barili, Cebu is more
than sixty (60) kilometers away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of
almost two (2) hours.17 Liloan, Cebu, on the other hand, is more than ten (10)
kilometers away from Cebu City.18

The judicial audit team, after tape-recording interviews with other court and
government personnel, also reported the following:

1) Celeste P. Retuya admitted that she assisted couples who wanted to get
married by checking whether their documents were complete and referred
them to Judges Tormis, Necessario, and Rosales afterwards;19

2) Corazon P. Retuya referred couples who wanted to get married to Judge

Necessario. There were also "assistants" who would go over the couples
documents before these couples would be referred to Judge Necessario.
Retuya also narrated several anomalies involving foreign nationals and their
acquisition of marriage licenses from the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu
despite the fact that parties were not residents of Barili. Those anomalous
marriages were solemnized by Judge Tormis;20

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez assisted couples and referred them to any of the

available judges. She admitted that after the payment of the solemnization fee
of three hundred pesos (P300), a different amount, as agreed upon by the
parties and the judge, was paid to the latter.21 She admitted that she accepted
four thousand pesos (P4,000) for facilitating the irregular marriage of Moreil
Baranggan Sebial and Maricel Albater although she gave the payment to a
certain "Mang Boy";22

4) Emma D. Valencia admitted that she assisted couples seeking to get

married and that most of the marriage licenses were obtained from the local
civil registrar of Barili and Liloan, Cebu because the registrars in those towns
were not strict about couples attendance in the family planning seminar. She
also admitted that couples gave her food while the judge received five
hundred pesos (P500) if the marriage was solemnized inside the chambers.
Foreigners were said to have given twice the said amount. The judge accepted
one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500) for gasoline expenses if the
marriage was celebrated outside the chambers;23

5) Marilou Cabaez admitted that she assisted couples and referred them to
Judges Tormis, Necessario, or Rosales. However, she denied receiving any
amount from these couples. She told the audit team that during the 8th, 18th,
and 28th of the month, seven (7) to eight (8) couples would go directly to
Judge Rosabella M. Tormis for a fifteen-minute marriage solemnization;24

6) Desiderio S. Aranas admitted that he started assisting couples in 2003. He

told the investigating team that Judge Gil Acosta would talk to couples wishing
to get married without a license. He would produce a joint affidavit of
cohabitation form on which he or the clerk of court would type the entries.
The judge would then receive an envelope containing money from the couple.
Aranas also confirmed the existence of "open-dated" marriage certificates;25

7) Antonio Flores, Branch 9 Process Server of RTC Cebu City, told the
investigating team that couples looked for Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City, "para menos ang
bayad."26 The excess of three hundred pesos (P300) that couples paid to Judge
Econg as solemnization fee went to a certain "sinking fund" of Branch 9;27
8) Rebecca L. Alesna admitted that she usually referred couples to Judges
Necessario or Tormis. Couples who wanted to get married under Article 34 of
the Family Code were advised to buy a pro-forma affidavit of joint
cohabitation for ten pesos (P10);28

9) Arvin Oca, Branch 1 Process Server of the MTCC of Cebu City, admitted that
he referred couples to Branch 2, Clerk of Court, Harrish Co. Oca declared that
on 28 June 2007, he accompanied a couple to the chambers of Judge
Necessario.29 He informed the judge that the couple only had birth
certificates.30 The respondent judge then inquired about their ages and asked
them if they had been previously married then proceeded to solemnize the
marriage;31 and

10) Filomena C. Lopez, local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu, declared that she
does not scrutinize marriage applications.32 Couples who are non-Barili
residents are able to obtain marriage licenses from her Barili office because
these couples have relatives residing in Barili, Cebu.33 She also added that
while couples still need to submit a certificate of attendance in the family
planning seminar, they may attend it before or after the filing of the
application for marriage license.34

Affidavits of private persons were also attached to the records. Jacqui Lou
Baguio-Manera was a resident of Panagdait, Mabolo, Cebu and on 21 May
2007, she and her then fianc wanted to set a marriage date.35 Her younger
sister who was married in a civil wedding last year gave her the number of a
certain "Meloy". After talking to Meloy on the phone, the wedding was
scheduled at 2 p.m. on 23 May 2007 and the couple were asked to bring their
birth certificates. No marriage license was required from them. Meloy asked
for a fee of one thousand five hundred pesos (P1,500). According to Baguio-
Manera, their marriage certificate was marked as "No marriage license was
necessary, the marriage being solemnized under Art. 34 of Executive Order
No. 209". Their marriage was solemnized that day by Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis. Baguio-Manera claimed that they did not understand what that
statement meant at that time. However, in her affidavit, she declared that the
situation premised under Article 34 did not apply to her and her fianc.

Mary Anne Flores-Patoc was a resident of Barrio Luz, Cebu City. In her 5 July
2007 affidavit, she recounted how she and her boyfriend went to the
Provincial Capitol to get married in February 2006. While logging in at the
entrance, they were offered assistance by the guards for a fee of one thousand
five hundred pesos (P1,500). The guard also offered to become "Ninong" or a
witness to the wedding. The couple became suspicious and did not push
through with the civil wedding at that time.

On 27 November 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution: a) requiring

Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M. Tormis, and
Edgemelo C. Rosales of the MTCC, Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8, respectively, of Cebu
City, to comment on the findings of the 14 August 2007 Supplemental Report
of the OCA, within fifteen (15) days from notice; b) directing the Process
Servicing Unit to furnish the judges with a copy of the Supplemental Report; c)
requiring the court personnel listed below to show cause within fifteen (15)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them for
their alleged grave misconduct and dishonesty and impleading them in this
administrative matter:

1) Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

2) Corazon P. Retuya, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 6, Cebu City;

3) Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,

RTC, Cebu City;

4) Emma D. Valencia, Court Stenographer III, RTC, Branch 18, Cebu City;

5) Marilou Cabaez, Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City;

6) Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, MTCC, Branch 3, Cebu City;

7) Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, MTCC, Branch 1, Cebu City;

8) Helen Mongaya,Court Stenographer, MTCC, Branch 4, Cebu City.

The Court in the same resolution also: a) ordered the referral to the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas for appropriate action on the
administrative matter involving the violation of the law on marriage by Ms.
Filomena C. Lopez, Local Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and one Ms. Veronica S.
Longakit, former Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu; b) directed the Process
Serving Unit to furnish the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas
with a copy of the Supplemental Report of the OCA; and c) required Judge
Geraldine Faith A. Econg, RTC, Branch 9, Cebu City, to comment within fifteen
(15) days from notice on the statement of staff member Antonio Flores saying
that Branch 9s court personnel received an amount in excess of the P300
solemnization fee paid by couples whose marriages were solemnized by her.
This amount goes to the courts "sinking fund".36

In their Comments and/or Answers to the Memorandum dated 5 July 2007 of

the OCA and its Supplemental Report,37 the respondent judges argued the
following:

Judge Anatalio S. Necessario relies on the presumption of regularity regarding

the documents presented to him by contracting parties.38 He claims that
marriages he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code had the required
affidavit of cohabitation. He claims that pro forma affidavits of cohabitation
have been used by other judges even before he became a judge.39 He avers
that he ascertains the ages of the parties, their relationship, and the existence
of an impediment to marry.40 He also asks the parties searching questions and
clarifies whether they understood the contents of the affidavit and the legal
consequences of its execution.41 The judge also denies knowledge of the
payment of solemnization fees in batches.42 In addition, he argues that it was a
process server who was in-charge of recording marriages on the logbook,
keeping the marriage certificates, and reporting the total number of marriages
monthly.43

Judge Gil R. Acosta argues that the law only requires a marriage license and
that he is not required to inquire whether the license was obtained from a
location where one of the parties is an actual resident.44 The judge believes
that it is not his duty to verify the signature on the marriage license to
determine its authenticity because he relies on the presumption of regularity
of public documents.45 The judge also outlines his own procedure in
solemnizing marriages which involves: first, the determination whether the
solemnization fee was paid; second, the presentation of the affidavit of
cohabitation and birth certificates to ascertain identity and age of the parties;
third, if one of the parties is a foreigner, the judge asks for a certificate of legal
capacity to marry, passport picture, date of arrival, and divorce papers when
the party is divorced; fourth, he then asks the parties and their witnesses
questions regarding cohabitation and interviews the children of the parties, if
any.46

Judge Rosabella M. Tormis denies the charges brought by the OCA. She calls
the actions of the judicial audit team during the investigation an
"entrapment".47 She also claims that there is nothing wrong with solemnizing
marriages on the date of the issuance of the marriage license and with the fact
that the issued marriage license was obtained from a place where neither of
the parties resided.48 As to the pro forma affidavits of cohabitation, she argues
that she cannot be faulted for accepting it as genuine as she and the other
judges are not handwriting experts.49 The affidavits also enjoy the
presumption of regularity.50 Judge Tormis also discredits the affidavit of
Baguio-Manera as hearsay.51 The respondent said that when Baguio-Manera
and her husband were confronted with the affidavit they executed, they
affirmed the veracity of the statements, particularly the fact that they have
been living together for five years.52 The judge also attributes the irregularity
in the number of marriages solemnized in her sala to the filing clerks.53

Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales denies violating the law on marriage.54 He

maintains that it is the local civil registrar who evaluates the documents
submitted by the parties, and he presumes the regularity of the license
issued.55 It is only when there is no marriage license given that he ascertains
the qualifications of the parties and the lack of legal impediment to
marry.56 As to the affidavits of cohabitation, the judge believes there is nothing
wrong with the fact that these are pro forma. He states that marriage
certificates are required with the marriage license attached or the affidavit of
cohabitation only and the other documents fall under the responsibility of the
local civil registrar. He surmises that if the marriage certificate did not come
with the marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation, the missing document
might have been inadvertently detached, and it can be checked with the
proper local civil registrar. As to the payment of the docket fee, he contends
that it should be paid after the solemnization of the marriage and not before
because judges will be pre-empted from ascertaining the qualifications of the
couple. Besides, the task of collecting the fee belongs to the Clerk of
Court.57 The judge also argues that solemnization of marriage is not a judicial
duty.58

On 12 November 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Memorandum of

Law with Plea for Early Resolution, Lifting of Suspension and Dismissal of
Case.59 This Court in a Resolution dated 11 December 2007 lifted the
suspension of the respondent judges but prohibited them from solemnizing
marriages until further ordered.60
On 7 December 2007, Judges Tormis and Rosales filed a Motion for Early
Resolution with Waiver of Formal and/or Further Investigation and Motion to
Dismiss.61 In a Resolution dated 15 January 2008, the Court noted the motion
and granted the prayer of Judges Tormis and Rosales for the payment of their
unpaid salaries, allowances and all other economic benefits from 9 July
2007.62

THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE OCA

In its Memorandum dated 15 June 2010,63 the OCA recommended the

dismissal of the respondent judges and some court employees, and the
suspension or admonition of others. The OCA summarized the liabilities of the
respondents, to wit:

JUDGE ANATALIO S. NECESSARIO is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of

duty for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents and wherein
one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere affidavit of
his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his embassy. He is
also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under
Article 34 of the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties
were minors during the cohabitation.

xxx

JUDGE GIL R. ACOSTA is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty for

failure to make sure that the solemnization fee has been paid. He is also guilty
of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing marriages under Article 34 of
the Family Code wherein one or both of the contracting parties were minors
during the cohabitation.

JUDGE EDGEMELO C. ROSALES is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty

for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make
sure that the solemnization fee has been paid and for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from his
embassy. He is also guilty of gross ignorance of the law for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license.

JUDGE ROSEBELLA M. TORMIS is guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty

for solemnizing marriages with questionable documents, for failure to make
sure that the solemnization fee has been paid, for solemnizing marriages
wherein one of the contracting parties is a foreigner who submitted a mere
affidavit of his capacity to marry in lieu of the required certificate from the
embassy and for solemnizing a marriage with an expired license.

xxx

HELEN MONGGAYA is guilty of grave misconduct for violating Section 2,

Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel that prohibits court
personnel from soliciting or accepting any gift, favor or benefit based on any
or explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit shall
influence their official actions and for giving false information for the purpose
of perpetrating an irregular marriage.

RHONA RODRIGUEZ is guilty of gross misconduct for violating Section 2,

Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel
Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by instructing her to
indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.

DESIDERIO ARANAS and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of conduct prejudicial

to the best interest of the service for providing couples who are to be married
under Article 34 of the Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.

CELESTE RETUYA, EMMA VALENCIA and REBECCA ALESNA are guilty of

violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
which prohibits court personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for
assisting or attending to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions
or proceedings with the Judiciary.64

The OCA, however, recommended the DISMISSAL of the complaints against

Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Corazon P. Retuya, and Marilou Cabaez, for
lack of merit.

THE ISSUE

The issue now before this Court is whether the judges and personnel of the
MTCC and RTC in Cebu City are guilty of gross ignorance of the law, gross
neglect of duty or gross inefficiency and gross misconduct, and in turn,
warrant the most severe penalty of dismissal from service.
THE COURTS RULING

The findings in the 2010 Memorandum of the Office of the Court

Administrator are supported by the evidence on record and applicable law
and jurisprudence.

This Court has long held that court officials and employees are placed with a
heavy burden and responsibility of keeping the faith of the public.65 In
Obaana, Jr. v. Ricafort, we said that:

Any impression of impropriety, misdeed or negligence in the performance of

official functions must be avoided. This Court shall not countenance any
conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration
of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish
the faith of the people in the Judiciary.66

The OCA described accurately the Palace of Justice in Cebu City as a hub of
swift marriages. The respondent judges and court personnel disregarded laws
and procedure to the prejudice of the parties and the proper administration of
justice.

The OCA found that Judges Anatalio S. Necessario, Gil R. Acosta, Rosabella M.
Tormis, and Edgemelo C. Rosales are all guilty of gross inefficiency or neglect
of duty when they solemnized marriages without following the proper
procedure laid down by law, particularly the Family Code of the Philippines
and existing jurisprudence. The OCA listed down aspects of the solemnization
process which were disregarded by the judges. The Court will now discuss the
individual liabilities of the respondent judges and court personnel vis--vis
the evidence presented by the OCA against them.

Liability of Judge Anatalio S. Necessario

The OCA reported that Judge Necessario solemnized a total of one thousand
one hundred twenty-three (1,123) marriages from 2005 to 2007.67 However,
only one hundred eighty-four (184) marriage certificates were actually
examined by the judicial audit team.68 Out of the 184 marriages, only seventy-
nine (79) were solemnized with a marriage license while one hundred five
(105) were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. Out of the 79
marriages with license, forty-seven (47) of these licenses were issued by the
Local Civil Registrar of Liloan, Cebu. This translates to 42.93% of the
marriages he solemnized with marriage license coming from Liloan for over a
period of years.69 There were also twenty-two (22) marriages solemnized by
the judge with incomplete documents such missing as marriage license,
certificate of legal capacity to marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.70

Judge Necessario solemnized nine (9) marriages that had questionable

supporting documents such as marriage licenses.71 The OCA found that the
place of residence of the contracting parties appearing in the supporting
documents differ from the place where they obtained their marriage
license.72 The documents invited suspicion because of erasures and
superimpositions in the entries of residence.73 Likewise, in lieu of the required
certificate of legal capacity to marry, a mere affidavit was submitted by the
parties.74 Variations in the signatures of the contracting parties were also
apparent in the documents.75

The respondent judge solemnized forty-three (43) marriages under Article 34

of the Family Code. These marriages appeared dubious since the joint affidavit
of cohabitation of the parties show minority of one or both of them during
cohabitation.76 For example, he solemnized on 14 May 2004 the marriage of
22-year-old Harol D. Amorin and 19-year-old Dinalyn S. Paraiso who are
residents of Lapu-Lapu City.77

There are also sixteen (16) marriage licenses with attached official receipts of
the solemnization fee but the corresponding marriage certificates cannot be
found.78 The presence of the receipts implies that these marriages were
solemnized.

Liability of Judge Gil R. Acosta

Judge Acosta solemnized a total of eighty-seven (87) marriages from 2003 to

2007.79 However, the logbook showed that he solemnized two hundred
seventy-two (272) marriages while the monthly reports of cases showed that
he solemnized five hundred twelve (512) marriages over the same period. Out
of the 87 marriages, he solemnized seventy-five (75) under

Article 34 of the Family Code.80 This is equivalent to 86.21% of the marriages

solemnized under Article 34 in a four-year period.81

There were forty-one (41) marriage certificates signed by Judge Tormis or

Judge Necessario as solemnizing officers found in his custody.82 There were
also ten (10) marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code where one or both
of the contracting parties were minors during cohabitation.83 To illustrate,
respondent judge solemnized on 4 May 2004 the marriage of Julieto W. Baga,
22 years old, and Esterlita P. Anlangit, 18 years old.84

There were seventeen (17) marriages under Article 34 where neither of the
contracting parties were residents of Cebu City.85 The judge solemnized three
(3) marriages without the foreign partys required certificate of legal capacity
to marry.86 Lastly, there was no proof of payment of the solemnization fee in
almost all of the marriages the judge officiated.87

Liability of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis

Judge Tormis solemnized a total of one hundred eighty-one (181) marriages

from 2003 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates actually
examined.88 However, the monthly report of cases showed that she
solemnized three hundred five (305) marriages instead for the years 2004 to
2007.89 The OCA report also noted that it was only in July 2007 that her court
started to use a logbook to keep track of marriages.90

Respondent judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages with incomplete or

missing documents such as the marriage license, certificate of legal capacity to
marry, and the joint affidavit of cohabitation.91 In several instances, only
affidavits were submitted by the foreign parties in lieu of the certificate of
legal capacity to marry.92

Judge Tormis solemnized thirteen (13) marriages despite the questionable

character of the validity of the required documents particularly the marriage
license.93 The judicial audit team found numerous erasures and
superimpositions on entries with regard to the parties place of residence.94

In one instance, the judge solemnized the marriage of Rex Randy E. Cujardo
and Anselma B. Laranio on 28 December 2006 despite the marriage license
containing a rubberstamp mark saying, "THIS LICENSE EXPIRES ON" and a
handwritten note saying "12/28/06" under it.95

The judge solemnized a total of forty-seven (47) marriages under Article 34 of

the Family Code wherein the marriage requirements authenticity was
doubtful due to the circumstances of the cohabitation of the parties and the
given address of the parties.96 These irregularities were evident in the case of
22-year-old John Rey R. Tibalan and Ana Liza Secuya who were married on 25
May 2007. The residential address of the couple in the marriage certificate is
"Sitio Bamboo, Buhisan, Cebu City." However, there was an application for
marriage license attached to the marriage certificate showing that Secuyas
address is "F. Lopez Comp. Morga St., Cebu City."97

Liability of Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales

Judge Rosales solemnized a total of one hundred twenty-one (121) marriages

from 2006 to 2007 based on the marriage certificates examined by the judicial
audit team.98 However, only three (3) marriages were reported for the same
period.99 Out of the 121 marriages the judge solemnized, fifty-two (52) or
42.98% fall under Article 34 of the Family Code.100 Thirty-eight

(38) marriage licenses out of the sixty-six (66) obtained or 57.57% were from
the local civil registrar of Barili, Cebu.101 Nineteen (19) or 28.79% were from
the local civil registrar of Liloan, Cebu.102 Nine (9) or 13.64% were from other
local civil registrars.103

There were marriage documents found in his court such as marriage licenses,
applications for marriage license, certificates of legal capacity to contract
marriage, affidavits in lieu of certificate of legal capacity to contract marriage,
joint affidavits of cohabitation, and other documents referring to the
solemnization of one hundred thirty-two (132) marriages, with no
corresponding marriage certificates.104 He solemnized two marriages of
Buddy Gayland Weaver, an American citizen, to two different persons within
nine (9) months.105 No copy of the required certificate of legal capacity to
contract marriage or the divorce decree was presented.106

The judge solemnized thirty-seven (37) marriages without or with incomplete

supporting documents such as the certificate of legal capacity to marry and
the joint affidavit of cohabitation.107 He solemnized nine (9) marriages under
questionable circumstances such as the submission of an affidavit or
affirmation of freedom to marry in lieu of the certificate of legal capacity to
marry, the discrepancies in the residence of the contracting parties as
appearing in the marriage documents, and the solemnization of the marriage
on the same day the marriage license was issued.108
Judge Rosales also solemnized forty-three (43) marriages with no proof that
the solemnization fee of P300 was paid.109 On the other hand, there were
twenty-six (26) marriages whose solemnization fees were paid late.110

To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the
requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable
character. Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering,
erasures, corrections or superimpositions of entries related to the parties
place of residence.111These included indistinguishable features such as the
font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed entries in the marriage
certificate and marriage license.112 These actions of the respondent judges
constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala,113the Court held that
inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the
payment of solemnization fees. The Court, in Rodrigo-Ebron v.
Adolfo,114 defined neglect of duty as the failure to give ones attention to a task
expected of him and it is gross when, from the gravity of the offense or the
frequency of instances, the offense is so serious in its character as to endanger
or threaten public welfare. The marriage documents examined by the audit
team show that corresponding official receipts for the solemnization fee were
missing115 or payment by batches was made for marriages performed on
different dates.116 The OCA emphasizes that the payment of the solemnization
fee starts off the whole marriage application process and even puts a "stamp
of regularity" on the process.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages

where a contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of
legal capacity to marry from his or her embassy. What the foreigners
submitted were mere affidavits stating their capacity to marry. The
irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are required under Article
21 of the Family Code117 displayed the gross neglect of duty of the judges.
They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the
marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in
the qualifications of parties to contract marriage.118

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross
ignorance of the law under Article 34 of the Family Code119 with respect to the
marriages they solemnized where legal impediments existed during
cohabitation such as the minority status of one party.120 The audit team cites
in their Supplemental Report that there were parties whose ages ranged from
eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were married by mere
submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation.121 These affidavits
were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.122

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of

marriages of some couples where no marriage license was previously issued.
The contracting parties were made to fill up the application for a license on
the same day the marriage was solemnized.123

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the
duty of a solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of
evidence that point to the contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the
presumption of regularity accorded to a marriage license disappears the
moment the marriage documents do not appear regular on its face.

In People v. Jansen,124 this Court held that:

the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a

marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar.
All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by
the competent official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the
license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the
contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.

However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas,125 that "the presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the
marriage licenses should have alerted the solemnizing judges to the
irregularity of the issuance.

It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the
submission of the certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the local
registrar for acquiring a marriage license, the judges should have been more
diligent in reviewing the parties documents and qualifications. As noted by
the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the presence of
mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the
marriage license issuance.

The judges gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized
marriages under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required
qualifications and with the existence of legal impediments such as minority of
a party. Marriages of exceptional character such as those made under Article
34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the
formal requisite of a marriage license.126 Under the rules of statutory
construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed.127 The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted
pro forma particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this
matter. The five-year period of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union
valid under the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract.128 The parties should have been capacitated to marry each
other during the entire period and not only at the time of the marriage.129

To elaborate further on the gravity of the acts and omissions of the

respondents, the Family Code provides the requisites for a valid marriage:

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of
this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal
declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of
not less than two witnesses of legal age. (53a, 55a)

Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2). A defect in any of the
essential requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. (n)

The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab

initio.130 The actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding
the validity of the marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the
proper procedure or check the required documents and qualifications. In
Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano,131the Court said that a marriage solemnized
without a marriage license is void and the subsequent issuance of the license
cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the marriage. It is the
marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize
a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

As held by this Court in Navarro v. Domagtoy:

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts are at least
proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary layman.
They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the
ones involved in the instant case. It is not too much to expect them to know
and apply the law intelligently.132

It is important to note that the audit team found out that Judge Rosabella M.
Tormis ordered Celerina Plaza, a personal employee of the judge, to wait for
couples outside the Hall of Justice and offer services.133 Crisanto Dela Cerna
also stated in his affidavit that Judge Tormis instructed him to get all marriage
certificates and bring them to her house when she found out about the judicial
audit.134 In the language of the OCA, Judge Tormis considered the
solemnization of marriages not as a duty but as a business.135 The respondent
judge was suspended for six (6) months in A.M. No. MTJ-071-962 for
repeatedly disregarding the directives of this Court to furnish the complainant
a copy of her comment. She was also fined the amount of five thousand pesos
(P5,000) in A.M. Nos. 04-7-373-RTC and 04-7-374 RTC.136 She was
reprimanded twice in A.M. No. MTJ-05-1609 and in A.M. No. MTJ-
001337.137 Finally, in the very recent case of Office of the Court Administrator
v. Hon. Rosabella M. Tormis and Mr. Reynaldo S. Teves, A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817,
promulgated last 12 March 2013, Judge Tormis was found guilty of gross
inefficiency, violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars and
gross ignorance of the law by this Court. She was dismissed from service, with
forfeiture of all benefits and privileges, except accrued leave credits, if any,
with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations.
The respondent judges violated Canons 2138 and 6139 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics which exact competence, integrity and probity in the performance of
their duties. This Court previously said that "Ignorance of the law is a mark of
incompetence, and where the law involved is elementary, ignorance thereof is
considered as an indication of lack of integrity."140 In connection with this, the
administration of justice is considered a sacred task and upon assumption to
office, a judge ceases to be an ordinary mortal. He or she becomes the visible
representation of the law and more importantly of justice.141

The actuations of these judges are not only condemnable, it is outright

shameful.

Liability of Other Court Personnel

The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA on the liability of the
following employees:

Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, MTCC,

Branch 4, Cebu City, is guilty of grave misconduct when she informed the
female lawyer of the judicial audit team that she can facilitate the marriage
and the requirements on the same day of the lawyers visit.142

What Monggaya was proposing was an open-dated marriage in exchange for a

fee of P3,000. Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
prohibits court personnel from soliciting or accepting gifts, favor or benefit
based on any explicit or implicit understanding that such gift, favor or benefit
shall influence their official actions.

Mongayas claim that she was merely relating to the lady lawyer what she
knew from other offices as the usual practice143 is inexcusable. As found by the
OCA in its Memorandum, "Monggaya deliberately gave false information for
the purpose of perpetrating an illegal scheme. This, in itself, constitutes grave
misconduct."144Sec. 52, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on

Administrative Cases in the Civil Service defines grave misconduct as "a grave
offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service even on
a first offense.

In Villaceran v. Rosete, this Court held that:

Court personnel, from the lowliest employee, are involved in the dispensation
of justice; parties seeking redress from the courts for grievances look upon
court personnel, irrespective of rank or position, as part of the Judiciary. In
performing their duties and responsibilities, these court personnel serve as
sentinels of justice and any act of impropriety on their part immeasurably
affects the honor and dignity of the Judiciary and the peoples trust and
confidence in this institution. Therefore, they are expected to act and behave
in a manner that should uphold the honor and dignity of the Judiciary, if only
to maintain the people's confidence in the Judiciary.145

Mongaya acted improperly and in a manner opposite of what is expected of

court personnel. Her actions placed doubts on the integrity of the courts.

Rhona Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I of the Office of the Clerk of Court of

the MTCC, Cebu City, is guilty of gross misconduct. She assisted the couple,
Moreil Sebial and Maricel Albater, and demanded and accepted P4,000 from
them.146 The act was a violation of Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel. As found by the OCA and adopted by this Court,
Rodriguez induced Albater to falsify the application for marriage license by
instructing her to indicate her residence as Barili, Cebu.147 The claim that she
gave the amount to a certain Borces who was allegedly the real facilitator
belies her participation in facilitating the marriage. According to the OCA,
when the couple went back for their marriage certificate, they approached
Rodriguez and not Borces.148 When Borces told Rodriguez that the marriage
certificate had been misplaced, it was Rodriguez who instructed Sebial to fill
up another marriage certificate.149

This Court has held that improper solicitations prohibited by Section 2, Canon
I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel, merits a grave penalty.150 Such
penalty can be dismissal from service.

Desiderio Aranas, Branch 3 Process Server, MTCC, Cebu City and Rebecca
Alesna are guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best of interest of the service.
Aranas provided couples who were to be married under Article 34 of the
Family Code with the required affidavit of cohabitation.151 On the other hand,
Alesna refers such couples to Aranas to acquire the said affidavit which
according to Alesna costs P10. As aptly put by the OCA, even if the amount
involved in the transaction is minimal, the act of soliciting money still gives
the public the wrong impression that court personnel are making money out
of judicial transactions.152
The Court said in Roque v. Grimaldo153 that acts of court personnel outside
their official functions constitute conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service because these acts violate what is prescribed for court personnel. The
purpose of this is to maintain the integrity of the Court and free court
personnel from suspicion of any misconduct.

Celeste P. Retuya, Clerk III of Branch 6 of the MTCC, Cebu City, Emma Valencia,
Stenographer III of Branch 18, RTC, Cebu City, and Rebecca Alesna, Court
Interpreter of Branch 1, MTCC, Cebu City, admitted to the audit team that they
received food from couples they assisted.154 This is in violation of Section 2(b),
Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel which prohibits court
personnel from receiving tips or other remuneration for assisting or attending
to parties engaged in transactions or involved in actions or proceedings with
the Judiciary. As recommended by the OCA, they are admonished considering
that this is their first offense and the tips were of minimal value. In Reyes-
Domingo v. Morales, this Court held that commission of an administrative
offense for the first time is an extenuating circumstance.155

The Court finds that there is insufficient evidence against Corazon P. Retuya.
The OCA reports that Corazon Retuya admitted initially that she
received P5,000 from spouses Ichiro Kamiaya and Mary Grace Gabiana to
secure necessary documents.156 The information was volunteered by Corazon
Retuya with no supporting sworn statement from the couple. However, she
denies this fact later on in her Comment.157 Finding the earlier statement of
Corazon Retuya as unclear and lacking support from evidence, the Court
adopts the findings of the OCA and decides to give her the benefit of the doubt.

The Court also finds insufficient evidence to support the claims against
Marilou Cabaez. Cabaez was only implicated in this case through the sworn
statement of Jacqui Lou Baguio-Manera who attested that they paid a certain
"Meloy" P1,200 for the wedding under Article 34 of the Family through the
assistance of Cabaez.158Cabaez denies that she was the one who assisted the
couple and explained that it may have been Celerina Plaza, the personal
assistant of Judge Rosabella M. Tormis. Baguio-Manera got the nickname
"Meloy" not from Cabaez herself but from Baguio-Maneras younger
sister.159 When Baguio-Manera met the said "Meloy" at the Hall of Justice, she
did not obtain confirmation that the said "Meloy" is Cabaez. The Court adopts
the findings of the OCA that there is lack of positive identification of Cabaez
and finds merit in her denial.160
The Court accepts the recommendation of the OCA as to the dismissal of the
case against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg. The judge was only implicated
through the statement of Process Server Antonio Flores about an "alleged
sinking fund". No evidence was presented as to the collection of an excess of
the solemnization fee. Neither was it proven that Judge Econg or her staff had
knowledge of such fund.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents:

1. Judge Anatalio S. Necessario, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in

Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and
of gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that
he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

2. Judge Gil R. Acosta, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
3, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of gross
ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that he be
disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or -controlled corporation;

3. Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

Branch 4, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of
gross ignorance of the law and that she would have been DISMISSED FROM
THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if
any, and disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation, had she not been
previously dismissed from service in A.M. No. MTJ-12-1817 (Formerly A.M.
No. 09-2-30-MTCC);

4. Judge Edgemelo C. Rosales, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,

Branch 8, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross inefficiency or neglect of duty and of
gross ignorance of the law and that he be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE
with forfeiture of his retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that
he be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;
5. Helen Mongaya, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 4,
Cebu City, GUILTY of violating Section 2, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel and that she be DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE with
forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave credits, if any, and that she
be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment to any public office,
including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

6. Rhona F. Rodriguez, Administrative Officer I, Office of the Clerk of Court,

Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, GUILTY of gross misconduct for Section 2,
Canon I of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel and for inducing Maricel
Albater to falsify the application for marriage and that she be DISMISSED
FROM THE SERVICE with forfeiture of her retirement benefits, except leave
credits, if any, and that she be disqualified from reinstatement or appointment
to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporation;

7. Desiderio S. Aranas, Process Server, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch

3, Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and that he be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

8. Rebecca Alesna, Court Interpreter, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1,

Cebu City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
of violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and that she be SUSPENDED without pay for a period of six (6) months with a
warning that a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely;

9. Celeste Retuya, Clerk III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City,
and Emma Valencia, Stenographer III, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Cebu
City, GUILTY of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and of
violating Section 2(b), Canon III of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
and that they be ADMONISHED with a warning that a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely;

The complaints against Judge Geraldine Faith A. Econg, Presiding Judge,

Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Cebu City; Corazon P. Retuya, Court
Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 6, Cebu City; and Marilou
Cabaez, Court Stenographer, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.
The case against Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, including the sworn statements
of Celerina Plaza and Crisanto dela Cerna, should be REFERRED to the Office
of the Bar Confidant for the purpose of initiating disbarment proceedings
against the judge.

The Honorable Mayors of Barili, Cebu and Liloan, Cebu, are to be furnished
copies of the Supplemental Report dated 14 August 2007 and are ADVISED to
conduct an investigation with respect to the statements of Filomena C. Lopez,
Civil Registrar of Barili, Cebu, and Bonita I. Pilones, Civil Registrar of Liloan,
Cebu, regarding the processing of marriage licenses and to take the necessary
action as the findings of the investigation may warrant.

Let a copy of this Decision be included in the respondents files that are with
the Office of the Bar Confidant and distributed to all courts and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801 (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-2438

MTJ) February 27, 2013

ANONYMOUS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE RIO C. ACHAS, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz
City, Misamis Occidental, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is an anonymous letter-complaint,1 dated August 2, 2010,

alleging immorality and conduct unbecoming of a judge against respondent
Judge Rio C. Achas (Judge Achas), Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Branch 2, Ozamiz City, Misamis Occidental.

The letter calls on the Court to look into the morality of respondent Judge
Achas and alleges that: (1) it is of public knowledge in the city that Judge
Achas is living scandalously with a woman who is not his wife; (2) he lives
beyond his means; (3) he is involved with illegal activities through his
connection with bad elements, the kuratongs; ( 4) he comes to court very
untidy and dirty; (5) he decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material and
monetary consideration; and (6) he is involved with cockfighting/gambling.

In the Indorsement,2 dated September 30, 2010, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) referred the matter to Executive Judge Miriam Orquieza-
Angot (Judge Angot) for Discreet Investigation and Report.

In her Report,3 dated November 26, 2010, Judge Angot found that Judge Achas
had been separated from his legal wife for quite some time and they are living
apart; and that he found for himself a young woman with whom he would
occasionally go out with in public and it was not a secret around town. Anent
the allegations that Judge Achas was living beyond his means and was
involved in illegal activities, Judge Angot reported that she could not be
certain whether such were true, and only ascertained that he had established
friendships or alliances with people of different social standings from around
the city. Judge Angot opined that the allegation that Judge Achas would come
to court untidy and dirty was a matter of personal hygiene and in the eye of
the beholder. Lastly, she found the charge that Judge Achas decided cases
unfairly in exchange for consideration to be vague and unsubstantiated.

In his Comment,4 dated February 4, 2011, Judge Achas denied all the
allegations against him and claimed that they were hatched to harass him,
pointing to disgruntled professionals, supporters and local candidates who
lost during the May 2010 elections. He asserted that after 28 years in the
government service, he had remained loyal to his work and conducted himself
in a righteous manner.

In the Resolution, dated December 14, 2011, the Court resolved to redocket
the case as a regular administrative matter and to refer the same to the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Ozamiz City for investigation,
report and recommendation.

In her Report,5 dated April 4, 2012, Executive Judge Salome P. Dungog (Judge
Dungog) stated that an investigation was conducted. Judge Achas and his two
witnesses testified in his defense, namely, his Branch Clerk of Court, Renato
Zapatos; and his Process Server, Michael Del Rosario. The anonymous
complainant never appeared to testify. During the investigation, Judge Achas
again denied all the charges but admitted that he was married and only
separated de facto from his legal wife for 26 years, and that he reared game
cocks for leisure and extra income, having inherited such from his forefathers.
Judge Dungog found that "it is not commendable, proper or moral per Canons
of Judicial Ethics to be perceived as going out with a woman not his wife,"6 and
for him to be involved in rearing game cocks.

In its Memorandum, dated December 17, 2012, the OCA recommended that
Judge Achas be reprimanded as to the charge of immorality. It was further
recommended that he be ordered to refrain from going to cockpits or avoid
such places altogether, with a warning that the same or similar complaint in
the future shall be dealt with more severely. The other charges were
recommended to be dismissed for lack of merit.

The Court agrees, with modification.

Under Section 1 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, anonymous complaints may
be filed against judges, but they must be supported by public records of
indubitable integrity. Courts have acted in such instances needing no
corroboration by evidence to be offered by the complainant. Thus, for
anonymous complaints, the burden of proof in administrative proceedings
which usually rests with the complainant, must be buttressed by indubitable
public records and by what is sufficiently proven during the investigation. If
the burden of proof is not overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to
prove his defense.7

In the present case, no evidence was attached to the letter-complaint. The

complainant never appeared, and no public records were brought forth during
the investigation. Respondent Judge Achas denied all the charges made
against him, only admitting that he was separated de facto from his wife and
that he reared fighting cocks.

The charges that he (1) lives beyond his means, (2) is involved with illegal
activities through his connection with the kuratongs, (3) comes to court very
untidy and dirty, and (4) decides his cases unfairly in exchange for material
and monetary consideration were, therefore, properly recommended
dismissed by the OCA for lack of evidence.

The charges that (1) it is of public knowledge that he is living scandalously

with a woman not his wife and that (2) he is involved with
cockfighting/gambling are, however, another matter.
The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary pertinently
provides:

CANON 2
INTEGRITY

Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but
also to the personal demeanor of judges.

SEC. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but
that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.

SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in
the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be
seen to be done.

xxx xxx xxx

CANON 4
PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of

all the activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in

all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal

restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct
themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

xxx xxx xxx

Judge Angots discreet investigation revealed that the respondent judge found
"for himself a suitable young lass whom he occasionally goes out with in
public and such a fact is not a secret around town."8 Judge Achas denied this
and no evidence was presented to prove the contrary. He did admit, however,
that he had been estranged from his wife for the last 26 years.
Notwithstanding his admission, the fact remains that he is still legally married
to his wife. The Court, therefore, agrees with Judge Dungog in finding that it is
not commendable, proper or moral for a judge to be perceived as going out
with a woman not his wife. Such is a blemish to his integrity and propriety, as
well as to that of the Judiciary.

For going out in public with a woman not his wife, Judge Achas has clearly
failed to abide by the above-cited Canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for Philippine Judiciary.

Regarding his involvement in cockfighting, however, there is no clear

evidence.1wphi1 Judge Achas denied engaging in cockfighting and betting. He
admitted, however, that he reared fighting cocks for leisure, having inherited
the practice from his forefathers. While gamecocks are bred and kept
primarily for gambling, there is no proof that he goes to cockpits and gambles.
While rearing fighting cocks is not illegal, Judge Achas should avoid mingling
with a crowd of cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors as it undoubtedly
impairs the respect due him. As a judge, he must impose upon himself
personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen and should do so freely and willingly.

The Court further notes that in A.M. No. MTJ-04-1564,9 Judge Achas was
charged with immorality for cohabiting with a woman not his wife, and with
gross misconduct and dishonesty for personally accepting a cash bond in
relation to a case and not depositing it with the clerk of court, and for
maintaining a flock of fighting cocks and actively participating in cockfights.
The Court, in 2005, found him guilty of gross misconduct for personally
receiving the cash bond and fined him in the amount of P15,000.00 with a
stern warning. The charge of immorality was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Although the Court, at the same time, noted that the charge of maintaining a
flock of fighting cocks and participating in cockfights was denied by the
respondent judge, it made no ruling on the charge.

Seven years later, similar charges of immoral cohabitation and cockfighting

have again been levelled against Judge Achas. Considering that his immoral
behaviour is not a secret around town, it is apparent that respondent judge
has failed to ensure that his conduct is perceived to be above reproach by the
reasonable observer, and has failed to avoid the appearance of impropriety in
his activities, to the detriment of the judiciary as a whole.

No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its

occupant than does the judicial office. Judges in particular must be individuals
of competence, honesty and probity, charged as they are with safeguarding
the integrity of the court and its proceedings. He should behave at all times so
as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. His personal behaviour outside the court, and not only while in the
performance of his official duties, must be beyond reproach, for he is
perceived to be the personification of law and justice. Thus, any demeaning
act of a judge degrades the institution he represents.10

Under Section 10 in relation to Section 11 C (1) of Rule 140 of the Rules of

Court, as amended, "unbecoming conduct" is classified as a light charge,
punishable by any of the following sanctions: (1) a fine of not less than
Pl,000.00 but not exceeding P10,000.00; and/or (2) censure; (3) reprimand; (
4) admonition with warning. The Court, thus, finds that the penalty of a fine in
the amount of P5,000.00 and reprimand are proper under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, respondent

Judge Rio Concepcion Achas is REPRlMANDED and FINED in the amount of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00), ADMONISHED not to socially mingle
with cockfighting enthusiasts and bettors, and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC February 8, 2011

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHARGES OF PLAGIARISM, ETC., AGAINST

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

Petitioners Isabelita C. Vinuya, et al., all members of the Malaya Lolas

Organization, seek reconsideration of the decision of the Court dated October
12, 2010 that dismissed their charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited
materials, and gross neglect against Justice Mariano Del Castillo in connection
with the decision he wrote for the Court in G.R. No. 162230, entitled Vinuya v.
Romulo.1
Mainly, petitioners claim that the Court has by its decision legalized or
approved of the commission of plagiarism in the Philippines. This claim is
absurd. The Court, like everyone else, condemns plagiarism as the world in
general understands and uses the term.

Plagiarism, a term not defined by statute, has a popular or common definition.

To plagiarize, says Webster, is "to steal and pass off as ones own" the ideas or
words of another. Stealing implies malicious taking. Blacks Law Dictionary,
the worlds leading English law dictionary quoted by the Court in its decision,
defines plagiarism as the "deliberate and knowing presentation of another
person's original ideas or creative expressions as ones own."2 The
presentation of another persons ideas as ones own must be deliberate or
premeditateda taking with ill intent.

There is no commonly-used dictionary in the world that embraces in the

meaning of plagiarism errors in attribution by mere accident or in good faith.

Certain educational institutions of course assume different norms in its

application. For instance, the Loyola Schools Code of Academic Integrity
ordains that "plagiarism is identified not through intent but through the act
itself. The objective act of falsely attributing to ones self what is not ones
work, whether intentional or out of neglect, is sufficient to conclude that
plagiarism has occurred. Students who plead ignorance or appeal to lack of
malice are not excused."3

But the Courts decision in the present case does not set aside such norm. The
decision makes this clear, thus:

To paraphrase Bast and Samuels, while the academic publishing model is

based on the originality of the writers thesis, the judicial system is based on
the doctrine of stare decisis, which encourages courts to cite historical legal
data, precedents, and related studies in their decisions. The judge is not
expected to produce original scholarship in every respect. The strength of a
decision lies in the soundness and general acceptance of the precedents and
long held legal opinions it draws from.4

Original scholarship is highly valued in the academe and rightly so. A college
thesis, for instance, should contain dissertations embodying results of original
research, substantiating a specific view.5 This must be so since the writing is
intended to earn for the student an academic degree, honor, or distinction. He
earns no credit nor deserves it who takes the research of others, copies their
dissertations, and proclaims these as his own. There should be no question
that a cheat deserves neither reward nor sympathy.

But the policy adopted by schools of disregarding the element of malicious

intent found in dictionaries is evidently more in the nature of establishing
what evidence is sufficient to prove the commission of such dishonest conduct
than in rewriting the meaning of plagiarism. Since it would be easy enough for
a student to plead ignorance or lack of malice even as he has copied the work
of others, certain schools have adopted the policy of treating the mere
presence of such copied work in his paper sufficient objective evidence of
plagiarism. Surely, however, if on its face the students work shows as a whole
that he has but committed an obvious mistake or a clerical error in one of
hundreds of citations in his thesis, the school will not be so unreasonable as to
cancel his diploma.

In contrast, decisions of courts are not written to earn merit, accolade, or

prize as an original piece of work or art. Deciding disputes is a service
rendered by the government for the public good. Judges issue decisions to
resolve everyday conflicts involving people of flesh and blood who ache for
speedy justice or juridical beings which have rights and obligations in law that
need to be protected. The interest of society in written decisions is not that
they are originally crafted but that they are fair and correct in the context of
the particular disputes involved. Justice, not originality, form, and style, is the
object of every decision of a court of law.

There is a basic reason for individual judges of whatever level of courts,

including the Supreme Court, not to use original or unique language when
reinstating the laws involved in the cases they decide. Their duty is to apply
the laws as these are written. But laws include, under the doctrine of stare
decisis, judicial interpretations of such laws as are applied to specific
situations. Under this doctrine, Courts are "to stand by precedent and not to
disturb settled point." Once the Court has "laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply
it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same; regardless of
whether the parties or property are the same."6

And because judicial precedents are not always clearly delineated, they are
quite often entangled in apparent inconsistencies or even in contradictions,
prompting experts in the law to build up regarding such matters a large body
of commentaries or annotations that, in themselves, often become part of legal
writings upon which lawyers and judges draw materials for their theories or
solutions in particular cases. And, because of the need to be precise and
correct, judges and practitioners alike, by practice and tradition, usually lift
passages from such precedents and writings, at times omitting, without
malicious intent, attributions to the originators.

Is this dishonest? No. Duncan Webb, writing for the International Bar
Association puts it succinctly. When practicing lawyers (which include judges)
write about the law, they effectively place their ideas, their language, and their
work in the public domain, to be affirmed, adopted, criticized, or rejected.
Being in the public domain, other lawyers can thus freely use these without
fear of committing some wrong or incurring some liability. Thus:

The tendency to copy in law is readily explicable. In law accuracy of words is

everything. Legal disputes often centre round the way in which obligations
have been expressed in legal documents and how the facts of the real world fit
the meaning of the words in which the obligation is contained. This, in
conjunction with the risk-aversion of lawyers means that refuge will often be
sought in articulations that have been tried and tested. In a sense therefore
the community of lawyers have together contributed to this body of
knowledge, language, and expression which is common property and may be
utilized, developed and bettered by anyone.7

The implicit right of judges to use legal materials regarded as belonging to the
public domain is not unique to the Philippines. As Joyce C. George, whom
Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno cites in her dissenting opinion, observed in her
Judicial Opinion Writing Handbook:

A judge writing to resolve a dispute, whether trial or appellate, is exempted

from a charge of plagiarism even if ideas, words or phrases from a law review
article, novel thoughts published in a legal periodical or language from a
partys brief are used without giving attribution. Thus judges are free to use
whatever sources they deem appropriate to resolve the matter before them,
without fear of reprisal. This exemption applies to judicial writings intended
to decide cases for two reasons: the judge is not writing a literary work and,
more importantly, the purpose of the writing is to resolve a dispute. As a
result, judges adjudicating cases are not subject to a claim of legal plagiarism.8
If the Court were to inquire into the issue of plagiarism respecting its past
decisions from the time of Chief Justice Cayetano S. Arellano to the present, it
is likely to discover that it has not on occasion acknowledged the originators
of passages and views found in its decisions. These omissions are true for
many of the decisions that have been penned and are being penned daily by
magistrates from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts nationwide and with them, the municipal
trial courts and other first level courts. Never in the judiciarys more than 100
years of history has the lack of attribution been regarded and demeaned as
plagiarism.

This is not to say that the magistrates of our courts are mere copycats. They
are not. Their decisions analyze the often conflicting facts of each case and
sort out the relevant from the irrelevant. They identify and formulate the issue
or issues that need to be resolved and evaluate each of the laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities that the parties to the case invoke. The decisions
then draw their apt conclusions regarding whether or not such laws, rulings,
principles, or authorities apply to the particular cases before the Court. These
efforts, reduced in writing, are the product of the judges creativity. It is
hereactually the substance of their decisionsthat their genius, originality,
and honest labor can be found, of which they should be proud.

In Vinuya, Justice Del Castillo examined and summarized the facts as seen by
the opposing sides in a way that no one has ever done. He identified and
formulated the core of the issues that the parties raised. And when he had
done this, he discussed the state of the law relevant to their resolution. It was
here that he drew materials from various sources, including the three foreign
authors cited in the charges against him. He compared the divergent views
these present as they developed in history. He then explained why the Court
must reject some views in light of the peculiar facts of the case and applied
those that suit such facts. Finally, he drew from his discussions of the facts and
the law the right solution to the dispute in the case. On the whole, his work
was original. He had but done an honest work.

The Court will not, therefore, consistent with established practice in the
Philippines and elsewhere, dare permit the filing of actions to annul the
decisions promulgated by its judges or expose them to charges of plagiarism
for honest work done.
This rule should apply to practicing lawyers as well. Counsels for the
petitioners, like all lawyers handling cases before courts and administrative
tribunals, cannot object to this. Although as a rule they receive compensation
for every pleading or paper they file in court or for every opinion they render
to clients, lawyers also need to strive for technical accuracy in their writings.
They should not be exposed to charges of plagiarism in what they write so
long as they do not depart, as officers of the court, from the objective of
assisting the Court in the administration of justice.

As Duncan Webb said:

In presenting legal argument most lawyers will have recourse to either

previous decisions of the courts, frequently lifting whole sections of a judges
words to lend weight to a particular point either with or without attribution.
The words of scholars are also sometimes given weight, depending on
reputation. Some encyclopaedic works are given particular authority. In
England this place is given to Halsburys Laws of England which is widely
considered authoritative. A lawyer can do little better than to frame an
argument or claim to fit with the articulation of the law in Halsburys. While in
many cases the very purpose of the citation is to claim the authority of the
author, this is not always the case. Frequently commentary or dicta of lesser
standing will be adopted by legal authors, largely without attribution.

xxxx

The converse point is that originality in the law is viewed with skepticism. It is
only the arrogant fool or the truly gifted who will depart entirely from the
established template and reformulate an existing idea in the belief that in
doing so they will improve it. While over time incremental changes occur, the
wholesale abandonment of established expression is generally considered
foolhardy.9

The Court probably should not have entertained at all the charges of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, coming from the losing party. But it is a
case of first impression and petitioners, joined by some faculty members of
the University of the Philippines school of law, have unfairly maligned him
with the charges of plagiarism, twisting of cited materials, and gross neglect
for failing to attribute lifted passages from three foreign authors. These
charges as already stated are false, applying the meaning of plagiarism as the
world in general knows it.
True, Justice Del Castillo failed to attribute to the foreign authors materials
that he lifted from their works and used in writing the decision for the Court
in the Vinuya case. But, as the Court said, the evidence as found by its Ethics
Committee shows that the attribution to these authors appeared in the
beginning drafts of the decision. Unfortunately, as testified to by a highly
qualified and experienced court-employed researcher, she accidentally
deleted the same at the time she was cleaning up the final draft. The Court
believed her since, among other reasons, she had no motive for omitting the
attribution. The foreign authors concerned, like the dozens of other sources
she cited in her research, had high reputations in international law.1awphi1

Notably, those foreign authors expressly attributed the controversial passages

found in their works to earlier writings by others. The authors concerned
were not themselves the originators. As it happened, although the ponencia of
Justice Del Castillo accidentally deleted the attribution to them, there
remained in the final draft of the decision attributions of the same passages to
the earlier writings from which those authors borrowed their ideas in the first
place. In short, with the remaining attributions after the erroneous clean-up,
the passages as it finally appeared in the Vinuya decision still showed on their
face that the lifted ideas did not belong to Justice Del Castillo but to others. He
did not pass them off as his own.

With our ruling, the Court need not dwell long on petitioners allegations that
Justice Del Castillo had also committed plagiarism in writing for the Court his
decision in another case, Ang Ladlad v. Commission on Elections.10 Petitioners
are nit-picking. Upon close examination and as Justice Del Castillo amply
demonstrated in his comment to the motion for reconsideration, he in fact
made attributions to passages in such decision that he borrowed from his
sources although they at times suffered in formatting lapses.

Considering its above ruling, the Court sees no point in further passing upon
the motion of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for leave to file and admit
motion for reconsideration-in-intervention dated January 5, 2011 and Dr.
Peter Payoyos claim of other instances of alleged plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES petitioners motion for reconsideration for

lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING

INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent
law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the
Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of the
Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly
dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect
contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting
opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the
said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary
proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect
contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice
Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution and the present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in
mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member
of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or
tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered
defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of
respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of
their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil
rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case

are as follows:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
and promote respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at

defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to

the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court
to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or

misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument
of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or
knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and

shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to

the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from
any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when

lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to
observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and
abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter,
for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for
such decisions reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a
member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue
has been used to deflect everyones attention from the actual concern of this
Court to determine by respondents explanations whether or not respondent
members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and acceptable
professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through
improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case.
Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who
called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement,2 which they formally
submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Courts
proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and
academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here
that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that freedom of
expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using
intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be
applied to respondents invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely
because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and
mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents own non-
observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly
motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by
this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents actuations, it is

apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo
(Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the
"Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision,
raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this

Honorable Courts (sic) assertion that the Executives foreign policy
prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are
proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards,
including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of
which the Philippines is a party.4
 II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the
broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human
rights of its citizens especially where the rights asserted are subject of
erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr.
(Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they
posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque
and Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE

COURTS JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE
SOURCES AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MAKE
IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENTS ARGUMENTS
FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE
PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITIONS
CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact
not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of
the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed
Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the
Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decents
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams book
Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration
on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an
article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on
the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV
website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roques column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted,"
appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly
acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddles response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the
alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle
responded to Kus blog entry in this wise:

The newspapers16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for

reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday.
The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-
plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Courts decision contains thirty-four sentences
and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL
article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were
unaware of the petitioners [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was
filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the courts jus cogens
discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against
humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article
emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Courts decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm1
7

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the
Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the
Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:
I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the
last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am

compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an
advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the
possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international
crime in your esteemed Courts Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v.
Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism
by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative
(SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative
(MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in

footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also
concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made
in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic
since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal
remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve

Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your
esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to
carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the

issues raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed
the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee)
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In
an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22,
2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was
subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares
to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo.21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring

Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the
Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreaks website22 and on
Atty. Roques blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on
various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun
Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the
University of the Philippines College of Laws bulletin board allegedly on
August 10, 201026 and at said colleges website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the
University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover
letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice
Subject: Statement of faculty
from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by

thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope
that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,
(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain
the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37
UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For
convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is reproduced
here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering
as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief
from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their
hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had
these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary.
The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the individual
scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but
also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial
System.

In common parlance, plagiarism is the appropriation and misrepresentation

of another persons work as ones own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at
best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone elses ideas and
expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing
such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such
ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty,
pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one
that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the
land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of
laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete perversion and
falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows
that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers works
and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work.
Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Courts and no
longer just the ponentes. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers names and the
publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case
and the spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original
articles is a reference to the primary sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors writings and the
effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together
with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the
plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to
appropriate the original authors work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be

familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and
careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of
the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers,
Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually
misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of
Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue
that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as
crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens.
Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works
without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by
copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it

deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage
suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties home States in
the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners
were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford
them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of
many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the
Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge
and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy
and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most
basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme
Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its
decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards
of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these
undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Courts recent history and the controversy that surrounded
it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the
judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for
justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who
have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the
Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of
pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority
without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its
Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only
the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions,
are credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be
conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of
sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an
absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of
professional care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are
critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines.
It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as
the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and
integrity completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the
exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust
reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of
the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive

Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high
standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional
competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and

credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the
foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing
implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal
precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of

the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the
Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those
who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as
the petitioners therein;
 (4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the
dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme
Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to
any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the
manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches
and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar
acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and
Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and
writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27

July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA
Dean (2005-2008) and Professor
Dean (1995-1999)
of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P.

(SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D.
SALVADOR DAWAY
BATTAD
Associate Dean and Associate
Assistant Professor
Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

Associate Professor Assistant Professor
 (SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA
Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made
known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote
Prof. Tams letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the

University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my
publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Courts
Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As
the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken
almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press
2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno
Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in
the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of
referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support

the Judgments cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most
cursory reading shows that my books central thesis is precisely the opposite:
namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter
notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the very
mysterious concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the
same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters show
that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in
the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work
should have been cited to support as it seemingly has the opposite
approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your
Honourable Courts Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable

Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares exhibits
during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring
Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain
faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said
Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was
given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the
signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty
members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was
that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former
Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as
represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty.
Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included among the
signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total
number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same
Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11,
2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following
observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators opinion on
the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they
expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillos explanation on how he
cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.
Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of

deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus
that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan,
Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison,
Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T.
Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon
F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur
P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A.
Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza,
Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and
Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy
of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar
for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why
he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10,
2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before
the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy
which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular

administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October

19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court,
respondents filed the following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37

respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in
relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa
Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T.
Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);
 (4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen,
in relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen
Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and

Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19,

2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels
(the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance,
respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in
the discharge of the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers
in the profession of law, and as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter
of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise
alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that
"none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case.
Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause Resolutions
findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment that respondents indeed are
in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of
the Court, and have violated Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05
of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal

processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the
appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their Statement,
respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but
rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued
confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive
action."45 Respondents call in the Statement for the Court "to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the
highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts
in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice"
(under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to
"promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1,
id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest
and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation
because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the

Restoring Integrity Statement as an institutional attack x x x on the
basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at
the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it
appeared to them the Court "was not going to take any action on the
grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their
belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the
Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not
order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of
Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the
gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation
charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the
Courts indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations
against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public
stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents position that Justice Del Castillo

committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance
with the standards of academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a

discussion of the merits of respondents charge of plagiarism against
Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the
plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that
they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity
Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among
others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M,
Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that
the Vinuya decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text
from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the
Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International
Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review
Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International
Human Rights Law" by Michael OFlaherty and John Fisher, in support of
their charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article
without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court
when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the

plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public
issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the
issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple
Romero;56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine

Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25,

2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in
the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director

General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on
August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban

published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010;61
 (vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinans call for
the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily
Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar

Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on
the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The
Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on
August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo

from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the
Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of
Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Bulacan
Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College

of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10,
2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled
them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution
dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly

discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they should be
seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the Bar,
officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a
democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free
speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67 In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of
Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act
4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that
their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as
teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the
University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he
national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic
freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the
extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy
discussion and communication of a faculty members field of study without
fear of reprisal. It is respondents view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their]
integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a
culture and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would
lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or, worse, [that]
their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity
has no bearing or relevance to ones conduct."71

In closing, respondents Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider

the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in
Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and
impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the
judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of
his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any
court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which
affects in no way the outcome of a case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the
Common Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members

of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

 2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the
Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that
respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law
professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the
dignity and authority of this Court, and not to promote distrust
in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of
Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing

prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in
assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be
rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute

and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the Show
Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion
of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that
appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and
defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to
require the production of and to present testimonial,
documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R.
No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts,

records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who
were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo
(A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T.

Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in
the Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled
her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution.
Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may
be punished only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good
faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one
member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep
disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were what
motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited

jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is
constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools
have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be
taught, how lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and
that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools exercise of discretion
in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the
Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the
Philippines and other universities on their right to determine how lessons
shall be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of

respondents constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be
curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public
morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate
Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance,
Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the
Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of conversation
among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-
11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the
sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of
the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with the main
theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be
disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof.
Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a
democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente
Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing
in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any
intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or
should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that
"attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondents
mind when he signed the Statement."84 Unlike his colleagues, who wish to
impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010,
some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit
plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were
of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This
uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College.
Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate
intent to steal anothers work and to pass it off as ones own.85 (Emphases
supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he
"might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in
the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion
with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully
complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he
had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of

Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions
of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of
the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of
the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause
Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical
signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven
(37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of
Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP
College of Law on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity
II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of
the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the
filing of Restoring Integrity I.

"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II,

and which presently serves as the official file copy of the Deans Office in
the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who
still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original
signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the
notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight (8)
other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten
names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring

Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain
are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents.
Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and

came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad

agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed
his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so
that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded
the law faculty roster to serve as the printed drafts signing pages. Thus
did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Restoring
Integrity I, come into being.
 2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Honorable Courts Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable
Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and
Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonens staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the
members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Deans Office
to sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the College
of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who,
for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at
that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their assurances that
they would sign as soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring

Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his
staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for
posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in
relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the
signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first
printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)"
note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or

above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public
issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the
integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting statements
with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendozas name as among the

signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring
Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication
involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the
reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the
name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice
Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring
Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the
 attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justices name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had
spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010.
According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the
Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with
its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that
time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was leaving
for the United States the following week. It would later turn out that this
account was not entirely accurate.91 (Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative

officer, however, and so placed full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were
indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate
that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix
their signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his
staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice
Mendozas signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the deans staff talked to

Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially
agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally
agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say
that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement.
Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he
was about to leave for the United States. The deans staff informed him
that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity
Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was

unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the
U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice
Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a
day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to
sign.94
According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the
call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice
Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity
Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time,
he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the faculty.
By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to
the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing to
unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95(Emphases
supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovits name in the signature page of
Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring
Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonens August 10, 2010
letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by
38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when

it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by
Dean Leonens staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring
Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the
reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice
Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice
Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a

dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the
same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in
all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statements] essential nature as a
live public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its message,
its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other
printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the
same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by
analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance where it has been
made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when
the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring
Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed their desire to be
signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation
of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent
to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law
faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories
to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule
10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate channels by
transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latters
information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be
duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon
Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required
quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character
or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative
sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical

reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for
access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in
this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving
Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is
not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State
of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP
College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010. He
further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court
and the Supreme Court of the United States, that [d]ebate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to
speak means the right to speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions
in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch
argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make
the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would
deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very teachers who are
supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their
pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In
the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic
Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,108 Prof. Lynch believed that
the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive
evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e.,
referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that
he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause
Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the
same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of

respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of
expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents academic

freedom as law professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they

should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain

why he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under Canon
10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for
hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to
require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-
17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?
 DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of
expression.

It is respondents collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show
Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents constitutionally mandated
right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption
behind respondents assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying
them the right to criticize the Courts decisions and actions, and that this Court
seeks to "silence" respondent law professors dissenting view on what they
characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly
show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of
the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that
motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor
counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and
consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause
Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court
considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding
the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law
facultys Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief

that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of
that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth"111 when it was "[o]f
public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show
Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the
Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the
portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the
said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as
fair or constructive, to wit:
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise
concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave
Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v.

Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of

deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Courts alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency
and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents freedom

of expression when it stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to
maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus
that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the facultys less
than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the
Vinuya case and undermine the Courts honesty, integrity and competence in
addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
womens claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the
flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the
said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and
officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as
attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x.
(Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents

submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and
judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that
the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or
interference. In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of
the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers,
whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and
common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty.
Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the
following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution
of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a
mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order
that this error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige
of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of
the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous
decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will
necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make
the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.117 (Emphases
supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor
necessary and further held that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential
points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in
question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can
never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder
the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's

motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of
Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of
which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the
court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it
odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his
motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the
proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary
tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this
country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the
dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid
of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good
reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their

quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo
concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike
the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case
and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case.
Instead of supporting respondents theory, Salcedo is authority for the
following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J.

Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the
high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but
also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial
power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious
statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here,
the respondents Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the
Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their

position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the
Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to
the press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title" in protest of
what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme
Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar
of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of
justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind,
but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustices
committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices
that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a
prayer that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of
the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation
that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and
confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession."121
It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign
jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right
to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial
authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the
courts, whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of
fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive
discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from
that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts
and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties
which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more
imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the
Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics
enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance
of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by

express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar,
is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all
times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in
open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language
and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts."
(Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential

to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients'
rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to
rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer
than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary
to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal
appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as
to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements
made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the
course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to
disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance,

observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause,

respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt
proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of
the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or

unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and
contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing
or modifying its decision. x x x.
xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part
of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily
to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the
administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may
repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect
justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar
and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the
stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting
on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can
be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer,

through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded
criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of
administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any
other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers.
This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we
stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the
court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even
his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen
(31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into
the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in
Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and
the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of

speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding
obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the
confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595
[1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA
107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68
SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja
vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in
Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and
Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate,
and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177
SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint

which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the
lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x
x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of

simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and
imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or

menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members
of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one
to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to

abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement
exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected free
speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re:
Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held
that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear

that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times
and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis
supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the
threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of
law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the
Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech.

No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs
on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interest. One of these fundamental public interests is
the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration
of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of
the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of
freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a
functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that
the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public
interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents academic
freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence,

guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point
out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their
instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic
freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action
for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in
favor of a party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if
purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed
upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether
lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a
defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending
to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the "free speech" defense in
other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked
by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed
above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of members of
the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due
respect to the courts and to uphold the publics faith in the legal profession
and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression
may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force to the
academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the
broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod,134 lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other
disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are
bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession.
Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar
as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact
that they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents proposition in the

Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with
their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating
or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in
keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal
processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the
courts. Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to
abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are
not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just
their preferred portions thereof.

The Courts rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of

Canons 1, 11 and 13.

Having disposed of respondents main arguments of freedom of expression

and academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in their
submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents allegations presented two main ideas:
(a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the
correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents
staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution.
No matter how firm a lawyers conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public
behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into disrepute.
This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re
Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as the
respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it
to change its decision therein, in a public statement using contumacious
language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for
"proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of
the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in
the following paragraphs from the same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only
of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered
the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot
coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does
violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable
recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Whether or not respondents views regarding the plagiarism issue in

the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be
properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one
of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common
Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to
support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present
controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with
the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the
filing of respondents submissions in this administrative case. As respondents
themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding
interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring
up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their
own administrative case.
Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement
was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to
make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect
respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous,
dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect.
The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively
plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were
deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the
sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic
irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works.
Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court,
they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and
scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not
do the same. These foreign authors letters underscore the universality of the
tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions
logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents noble intention is to spur the Court to
take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts
as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Courts
consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first
before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement
was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to capture
media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most
controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in
the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents colleague on the UP Law
faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of
fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew
fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits
of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statements issuance, were still
both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have
been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time the
Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the
constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under
the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge
against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the
drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and
submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had
already been convened. If it is true that the respondents outrage was fueled
by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it
became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to
prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this
supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in
the respondents reliance on various news reports and commentaries in the
print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled
out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show
that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of
disciplinary137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature
of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the
Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the profession who
may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or
other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps
tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who
appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary and worse,
would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot
remain silent for such silence would have a grave implication on legal
education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance,

considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been
involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give
them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-
intentioned in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in
jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is
plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court
expounded in Salcedo:
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention
to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately,
there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a
well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as those
in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13
C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts
a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used
was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the
judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118
La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said motion.
This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a
recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from
taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of
said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should,

notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty,
under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain
from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his
Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one
among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the
Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign
the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the
Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of
discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the
October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought
about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent
was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he
may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the
Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to
retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved
reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of
deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court
expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only
that they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical
lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of
the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution
involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquezs Compliance
satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar
of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority
of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he
should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law
school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct
to his students even without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if
one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of
the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any
nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and
fairness.

The Courts ruling on Dean Leonens Compliance regarding the charge of

violation of Canon 10.

To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause
why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and
faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity

II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed
copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there
were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement
(i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is
but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as
more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses
that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the
members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories
thereto."140
To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonens implied view that
the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live
public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at
a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely
in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statements
persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the
persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from
respondents explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their
positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the
matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonens predicament is

the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring
Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring
Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn
out, according to Dean Leonens account, that there were errors in the
retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an
unnamed administrative officer in the deans office gave the dean inaccurate
information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among
the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed
to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature pages of
Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or
a website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures may
be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to
accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate
blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of

a signed document for the Courts consideration that did not contain the
actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed
document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of
the actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation
why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of
Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the
dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks
and unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with
respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care
of documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen
deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain
the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a
display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonens explanations yield the answer. In the
course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative
officers claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory,
Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only
authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the
Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted
and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not
actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonens proposition, that is
precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or
persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for
perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one
person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he
had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice
Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former intended
to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor
and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he could
not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the
Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as
a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures,
such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad, then Dean
Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to
secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for
actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As
respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was
neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court;
rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any time.
In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonens Compliance unsatisfactory.
However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of
Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due
consideration of Dean Leonens professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and
honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.

Respondents requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence

bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230
and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative

reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the
Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be
allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case
(G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were
presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
was substantially echoed in Dean Leonens separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-
Bautistas Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the
Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after
charge and hearing."141 It is this group of respondents premise that these
reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in

this case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for
indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October
19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the majoritys
purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as
her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect
contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution
this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on
disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.In proceedings initiated motu

proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of
justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to
the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner
provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation,

through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not
mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an
investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A
will be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not

require a trial type hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied

to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded
the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all
times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which
are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v.
Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil
nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not
being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a
fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with
the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a
prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court Br. 81,

Romblon On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of
Law,145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or
resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any
further investigation after considering his actions based on records showing
his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image
of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and
welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled
by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in
circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical
sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative
liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the principle
of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no

evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.

xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or
formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer
or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter
through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this
Court.146 (Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a

hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these
proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for
this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically
stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to
present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and
witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the
findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution
were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the
Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request
for access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the

only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the
fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or
Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart
from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC,
the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent
matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution
that the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court deems
objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four
corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns
(many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their
Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public
knowledge.
Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the
language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting,
printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not
see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could
possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the
knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the
same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonens Compliance he narrated how as

early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics
case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19,
2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable
person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statements principles,
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit
recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should
simply let pass. This belies respondents claim that it is necessary for them to
refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the
bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their

respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time,
because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents
own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be
aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a
hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk
they have taken.

Thus, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and
evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have

monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as
lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are
bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is
certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court
demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to another
under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges,
court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court
and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the
courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors,
regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission,
the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic

M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador
Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit,
Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica,
Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Via, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose
C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B.
Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and
Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent
law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11
and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to
the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language
tending to influence the Court on pending matters or to denigrate the
Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or
similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding

the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is
further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of
the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and
warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
 (4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused
from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is
engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be
a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents requests for a hearing and for access to the
records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON.

VICENTE S.E. VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No. 119461.

x---------------x

A.C. No.: 10300

RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J

AGAINST ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

RESOLUTION

BRION, J.:

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1 dismissing the

administrative complaint of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution, we also
directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt.

After considering Atty. Adazas explanation,2 we find his account

insufficient, and find him guilty of indirect contempt.

According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect

contemptas he was merely performing his duty as Merdegias counsel
when he assisted him in preparing the administrative complaint against
Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed
Justice Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of
immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he
counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from
the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit
himself, Merdegia repeated his request to file an administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza acceded. Thus,
Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client,
especially when heal so believes in the merits of his clients case.

Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of
the case, fails to convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.

As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative

complaint after Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he
was handling. The complaint and the motion for inhibition were both
based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso
during the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing
the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of Justice
Velosos bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso
who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note
that he was allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court
of Appeals.3 Had Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this
resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a petition for
certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The
settled rule is that administrative complaints against justices cannot and
should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies against an
assailed decision or ruling.4While a lawyer has a duty to represent his
client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law.5 He is
also duty-bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal
action the latter wants to undertake, and to encourage compliance with
the law and legal processes.6

A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint7 shows an apparent

failure to understand that cases are not always decided in ones favor,
and that an allegation of bias must stem from an extrajudicial source
other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the
case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to
impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system, the
substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his
own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of
the Court demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.

To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an

easy task. We have to strike a balance between the need for
accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the
need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from
vindictive and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be
made to bow down to the wiles of litigants who bully judges into
inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither should
we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt
practices of people who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed,
litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of
erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing
administrative cases against them; neither should these litigants be
unjustly deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court that
they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient
cause.

What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of
the facts of thecasethat,when read together with the administrative
complaint heprepared,shows that his complaint is merelyan attempt to
malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas penchantfor
filingmotions for inhibition throughout the case:first, against Judge Ma.
Theresa Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
who issued an order unfavorable to his client; and second, against all the
justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his appeal, for alleged
bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken
together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice
Veloso after he penned an order adverseto Atty. Adazas client,
disclosethat there was more to the administrative complaint than the
report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.

In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a

litigant in indirect contempt of court for his predisposition to
indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members of the
Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office,
interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary, and
thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to
the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts constitute an improper
conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus
punishable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court.

As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject

to disciplinary sanction as a member of the bar.10 If we do not now
proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented
from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution
of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be
cited in contempt, and not why he should not be administratively
penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty.
Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due
process as a disciplinary action is independent and separate from a
proceeding for contempt. A person charged of an offense, whether in an
administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of the nature
of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his
side.11

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each

other,12 a contempt proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary
proceeding for erring lawyers,13 and vice versa. There can be no
substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings
against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and
purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals. The two
proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in
exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent
power granted to courts in general.14 Its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the
administration of justice;15 thus, it may be instituted against any person
guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.16 Further, jurisprudence
describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature;
hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to
contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt,
for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same manner that the
prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accuseds
acquittal.17
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui
generis in nature; it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a
criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict
punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed
the privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court
of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary objective, public
interest.18 Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the
lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party
from seeking reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition
of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge
for unprofessional conduct.19

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by

different procedures. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the
practice of law are governed by Rules138 and 139 thereof.20

IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF

INDIRECT CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals
Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay,
within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment,
a fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar
misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the institution of
disciplinary proceedings against him.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834 October 2, 2013

(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)

JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, President Roxas, Capiz, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:
This is an administrative case for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Bias
and Partiality against Judge Hannibal R. Patricio (Judge Patricio), commenced
thru a verified Complaint1 filed before the Office of Court of Administrator
(OCA) by Jesus D. Carbajosa (Carbajosa).

Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave
coercion against accused Dolores Bieles (Bieles), heard and tried before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas-Pilar, President
Roxas, Capiz, in the sala of then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge
stemmed from Bieles menacing and intimidating attitude in preventing
Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo City fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn by
removing and unloading the same out of the latters Efren Bus Liner.

In a Decision2 dated August 6, 2002, the MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime
charged and sentenced her to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) months of arresto mayor as
maximum, and ordered her to pay: (1) a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and (2) the amount of P20,000.00
representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn or its equivalent value as the
first lien on judgment.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,affirmed
Bieles conviction but modified her sentence by increasing the maximum
penalty imposed to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional.3 This modified judgment was later affirmed by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in a Decision4 dated October 26, 2006 and eventually by this
Court when Bieles petition for review on certiorari was denied in a
Resolution5 dated August 13, 2008 for late filing and for absence of reversible
error in the appealed judgment. Likewise denied was Bieles ensuing motion
for reconsideration.6 The Court thereafter issued an Entry of
Judgment7 stating that the Resolution of August 13, 2008 has become final and
executory on January 15, 2009. Undeterred, Bieles filed a Motion to Set Aside
Entry of Judgment but the same was denied in the Resolution8dated June 1,
2009.

Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a motion before the RTC for the remand of the case
to the court of origin for proper execution. The motion was granted in the
RTCs Order9 dated December 21, 2009. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion
for Execution of Judgment before the MCTC presided by herein respondent
Judge Patricio. Bieles opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter
addressed to the Chief Justice, Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review
of her case on the merits. She claimed that the letter was favorably acted upon
as evidenced by the first endorsement dated January25, 2010 requesting the
Clerk of Court of the Third Division to include the case in its agenda.10

Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order11 dated April 7, 2010
wherein he reckoned that it will be best to hold in abeyance the resolution of
Carbajosas Motion for Execution of Judgment and await the result of the
referral/endorsement made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of execution is made, viz:

It is the honest belief of the undersigned, that the resolution of the issuance of
the writ of execution, opposition, and objection of the parties in the above-
entitled case be held in abeyance, considering that the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court had referred to the Clerk of Court of the Third Division the
letter of [Bieles].

The holding in abeyance of the resolution is in [deference] to the first

endorsement made by the Chief Justice. The undersigned deemed it proper to
first wait the result of the referral of the Chief Justice before it will rule on the
propriety of the issuance of the writ of execution.12

On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order
and insisted on the issuance of a writ of execution averring that in the absence
of any restraining order, its issuance is imperative so as not to unduly delay
the administration of justice.13

On May 24, 2010, Judge Patricio issued an Order14 reiterating his previous
stance that there is a necessity to await the result of the referral made by the
Chief Justice to the Third Division Clerk of Court, thus:

Wherefore, the previous order of this Court granting the holding in abeyance
of the issuance of a writ of execution still stands.

Furnish copy of this order to the offended party, the private prosecutor, as
well as [Bieles] and their counsel for their information.

SO ORDERED.15
Bieles thereafter moved that the property bond she initially posted be
substituted by a cash bond because the former was already needed by her
bondsman. The motion was vehemently opposed by Carbajosa. On May31,
2011, Judge Patricio issued an Order16 granting Bieles motion explaining that
the same is not covered by Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court
prohibiting an accused to put up a bail bond when there is already a final and
executory judgment. Judge Patricio clarified that this is not a case for the
posting of a bond but rather, the substitution of one posted at the beginning
stage of the case.

In the same Order, Judge Patricio disclosed that he sent a query to the OCA
regarding the effect of the Chief Justices endorsement of Bieles letter to the
implementation of the final judgment of her conviction. In an endorsement
dated September 29, 2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)Raul Villanueva
referred his query to Atty. Wilhelmina Geronga (Atty.Geronga), Chief of the
OCA-Legal Office for comment.

In a letter17 dated September 5, 2011, Atty. Geronga informed Judge Patricio

that the subject matter of his query is judicial in nature hence, beyond the
mandate of the OCA. Also, as a matter of policy, the OCA refrains from
rendering an opinion on matters that may later on be brought to the Court for
judicial determination. Atty. Geronga suggested that the issue be resolved
based on pertinent jurisprudence and relevant laws.

In the meantime, two (2) motions were awaiting Judge Patricios ruling, viz:
(a) Carbajosas motion to recall the Order dated May 31, 2011approving the
substitution of Bieles property bond by a cash bond; and (b) motion to
suspend proceedings filed by Bieles.

Both motions were resolved in an Order18 dated January 6, 2012.Carbajosas

motion was denied for being filed out of time while Bieles motion to suspend
proceedings was granted.

In so ruling, Judge Patricio ratiocinated that the motion to recall the Order
dated May 31, 2011 can be likened to a motion for reconsideration that must
be filed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order sought to be
reviewed. Having been filed two (2) months after June 17, 2011, the date
Carbajosa received the Order dated May 31, 2011, the motion to recall is
considered filed out of time.
Anent the granting of Bieles motion to suspend proceedings, Judge Patricio
again reasoned that any action on the issuance of the writ of execution should
await the resolution by the Third Division of the Supreme Court on Bieles
letter as endorsed by the Chief Justice, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby grants the instant

motion to suspend proceedings filed by [Bieles] until the indorsement made
by the then Chief Justice Reynato Puno for the review of this case had been
resolved by said Division.

Furnish copy of this order to the parties and counsels.

SO ORDERED.19

These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein

administrative complaint20 imputing gross ignorance of the law, manifest
partiality and evident bad faith against Judge Patricio in continuously
deferring the issuance of a writ of execution for the final and executory
judgment in Criminal Case No. 2540.

In his Comment21, Judge Patricio admitted postponing the resolution of

Carbajosas motion for the issuance of a writ of execution but he denied that
he acted in bad faith and/or with partiality. He claimed that he was merely
abiding by the endorsement made by the Chief Justice that the letter of
accused Bieles be referred to the Third Division for action.

The administrative case was referred to the OCA for evaluation. In its
Report22 dated July 24, 2013, the OCA accorded merit to the complaint. The
OCA found Judge Patricio guilty of gross ignorance of the law and
recommended that he should be fined in the amount of P21,000.00.

We agree with the OCAs findings and recommendation.

Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant
to the ideal administration of justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment
attains finality, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
enforcement of such judgment should not be hampered or evaded; for the
immediate enforcement of the parties rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a
major component of the ideal administration of justice.23 Our penal laws and
rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when the judgment of conviction
is already final and executory its execution is ministerial.24

Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above

rule by repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment of
conviction against Bieles.

The justification proffered by Judge Patricio is not well-taken. As correctly

observed by the OCA, the Courts Resolution dated August 13,2008 in G.R. No.
182956 affirming the conviction of Bieles and the Entry of Judgment dated
January 15, 2009 evidently carried more legal and procedural significance and
effect in Criminal Case No. 2540, as against the endorsement referring the
letter of Bieles to the Third Division for Agenda. The endorsement did not
result in a definite action on the part of the Court as it did not even remotely
suggest that G.R. No. 182956 will be re-opened. Hence, there was absolutely
no justifiable reason for Judge Patricio to rely on the latter and thereby thwart
the basic rules on execution of judgment.

The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know
how to apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance
of a writ of execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In
other words, a judge is not given the discretion whether or not to implement
the judgment. He is to effect execution without delay and supervise
implementation strictly in accordance with the judgment. Judge Patricios
actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the law.

Apropos are the following pronouncements in Spouses Monterola v. Judge

Caoibes, Jr.25 where the Court found a judge administratively liablefor gross
ignorance of the law when he unreasonably delayed and refused the issuance
of a writ of execution for a final judgment, viz:

Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every

judge. When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owe sit to his office to simply
apply it; anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross
ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to
keep abreast with the law and changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one not even judges from
compliance therewith. We cannot expect a judge to deliberately disregard an
unequivocal rule on execution and a doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court.
Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be
studious of the principles of law.1wphi1 Canon18 mandates that he should
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law
itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge
under the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency
springs from a failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or principle
in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and
undeserving of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of
judicial authority x x x.

While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of

occasional mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they
should be conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to
merit the confidence of the citizenry. Respondent Judge has shown lack of
familiarity with our laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public
confidence in the integrity of the courts x x x.26 (Citations omitted)

Under A.M. No. 01-8-1 0-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court Re: Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a
serious charge, punishable by a tine of more than P20,000.00, but not
exceeding P40,000.00, suspension from office without salary and other
benefits for more than three (3) months but not exceeding six ( 6) months, or
dismissal from the service. Based on the attendant circumstances of this case,
a fine of P21 ,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio,

Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas-Pilar,
President Roxas, Capiz is hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the
Law and FINED in the amount of P21 ,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a
repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.