GEORGE P. MERCADO vs. HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.
) PRESIDING JUDGE, Finally, the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001 was a reinforcement of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE, BRANCH 31
STATE PROSECUTOR EMMANUEL Y. VELASCO vs. HON. ERASTO D. SALCEDO, (Ret.)
PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGUM CITY, DAVAO DEL NORTE,
BRANCH 31
In a series of letters-complaints dated January 2, 2001, 2 July 16, 2001,3 August 28,
20014 and November 23, 20015 filed before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA),
George P. Mercado (complainant) charged respondent judge as summarized below.
In the letter dated January 2, 2001, the respondent judge was accused of bias and gross
partiality in handling the investigation of the administrative case filed against Judge Napy
Agayan (Judge Agayan) of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao
del Norte. The complainant alleged that the respondent judge mishandled the investigation
and based his "findings of facts" on "gossip and rumors"6 to aid a fellow judge.
On January 16, 2001, the complainant formally charged the respondent judge of
committing these unethical infractions:
(1) Mishandling of, or rendering a false report to the Supreme Court on, his investigation of
Judge Agayan;
(2) Grave misconduct and impropriety in possessing and using a stolen Pajero vehicle with
knowledge, actually and constructively, that it was a subject of an Anti-Fencing Law case,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 11728, which he had earlier dismissed; and
(3) Serious irregularities, dishonesty or grave misconduct relating to the handling and
improper execution of the final decision in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, entitled
Soriano Fruits Corporation and Others versus Department of Agrarian Reform and/or Land
Bank of the Philippines, where the respondent judge modified the final judgment on the
amount of just compensation from which the respondent judge benefited in the amount of
Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00).
The letter-complaint dated August 28, 2001 was filed by the complainant to supplement
his earlier allegations. The complainant alleged that in connection with the stolen Pajero,
the respondent judge was one of the respondents in a criminal complaint for violation of
the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6539) and/or the Anti-Fencing Law of 1973
(Presidential Decree [P.D.] 1612) filed by the Philippine National Police. In Agrarian Case
Nos. 31-99 to 51-99, the respondent judge showed partiality in hastily resolving the
motions filed by the plaintiff, but not the motions filed by the defendant.
allegations in the earlier letters-complaints. The complainant additionally related that the
use by the respondent judge of the stolen Pajero became a subject of media coverage.
The Office of the Chief Justice referred the letters-complaints dated January 2, 2001 and
July 16, 2001 to Hon. Zenaida N. Elepao as Acting Court Administrator. 7 Subsequently,
then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., in
an Indorsement dated January 21, 2002, required the respondent judge to file his comment
on the letter-complaint dated November 23, 2001.8
The respondent judge duly filed his Comment (dated February 22, 2002 9), which the OCA
received on February 27, 2002. The OCA summarized the respondent judges position as
follows:
Re: Investigation of Judge Napy Agayan.
Judge Salcedo contends that he has already submitted his recommendation to this Office
and Mr. Mercado, through his complaint, would like to interfere and dictate what his
recommendation would be.
Re: Stolen Pajero found in his possession.
Judge Salcedo contends that Criminal Case No. 11728 against Leopoldo Gonzaga was
dismissed in 1999 on motion of the prosecution because during the reinvestigation, the
witness of the prosecution did not appear. He adds that from this dismissal the Traffic
Management Group did not file any motion for reconsideration. Worse, the TMG authorized
the change of color of the vehicle and allowed the buyer to use it for years.
Judge Salcedo avers that in June 2001, the owner lent him the vehicle and he did not know
that it was the same vehicle subject of Criminal Case No. 11728, otherwise, he would not
have used it for reason of delicadeza. According to him, there was no way of identifying the
vehicle because the TMG authorized the change of color. The vehicle was green during the
pendency of the criminal case while it was dirty white.
Re: Irregularities in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99.
Judge Salcedo claims that he was designated as Acting Presiding Judge of the Special
Agrarian Court in July 2000. He maintains that when he took over the said cases, the
decision therein were already final and executory. Judge Salcedo asserts that he issued an
order for the execution of the judgment which function is purely ministerial. He adds that if
there was something wrong with the valuation of the land then the counsel for Land Bank
should have questioned the same. As for the accusation that he received P3,000,000.00 for
which he was able to construct a house in Tagum City, Judge Salcedo contends that the
said house was constructed through a bank loan and the proceeds from the sale of a prime
lot in Cagayan de Oro City.10
The complainant filed a Reply dated March 12, 2002. 11 He argued that the handling of the
reinvestigation of the Anti-Fencing case against Leopoldo Gonzaga was hastily concluded
and resolved by Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan, who conducted the reinvestigation merely two
days after the order to reinvestigate was issued by the respondent judge. The complainant
further advanced the view that the respondent judge merely relied on the prosecutors
findings and dismissed the case with undue haste. According to the complainant, Leopoldo
Gonzaga also had three (3) pending cases in the respondent judges sala at that time.
The complainant also pointed out that two (2) checks for P800,000.00 were drawn from the
payments made by Land Bank in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99. The proceeds of one
of these checks were given to the wife of the respondent judge.
Administrative Case No. RTJ-03-1782
On December 18, 2001, State Prosecutor Emmanuel Y. Velasco (State Prosecutor Velasco)
brought to the attention of then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. the indictment of the
respondent judge for violation of P.D. No. 1612 and recommended that appropriate
administrative charges be initiated by the Supreme Court against him for violations of the
provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. 12 State
Prosecutor Velasco stated:
undersigned finds no cogent reason why Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO chose to use a
vehicle which was the subject of a criminal case before his very own sala. There is no proof
or evidence whatsoever that the Respondent Judge forgot that the alleged owner of the
subject vehicle (Respondent LEOPOLDO GONZAGA) previously appeared before him as
respondent in a criminal case. He could never forget it because the authorities
apprehended him, Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO even showed them a copy of his very own
July 7, 1999 Decision "exonerating" GONZAGA from the crime of Anti-Fencing. His
contention that he did not know that he was using the very same vehicle (subject of the
previous criminal complaint before his court) because its color has been changed is
fallacious x x x Respondent JUDGE SALCEDO to be more cautious, out of delicadeza, in his
dealing with GONZAGA, assuming for the sake of argument that he acted in good faith. 13
In a Resolution dated April 10, 2002, we referred this administrative matter to the OCA and
the respondent judge filed his Answer on August 30, 2002. 14 In addition to the arguments
he had already raised, the respondent judge posited that the whole incident was a smear
campaign engineered against him by a carnapping syndicate operating in Manila-
Mindanao. The respondent judge also posited that there was no impropriety in using the
subject vehicle since it was no longer in custodia legis as Criminal Case No. 11728 had
already been dismissed.
Thereafter, we referred the administrative cases to Justice Noel G. Tijam 15 (Justice Tijam) of
the Court of Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation. The referred cases
involved:
(a) The respondent judges investigation of Judge Agayan, his possession of a stolen Pajero
and the alleged irregularities he committed in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99;
(b) The suspension of Judge Salcedo pending the outcome of the instant case;
(c) The dismissal of the complaint of George Mercado dated April 22, 2002 for grave abuse
of authority for being subjudice;16 and
(d) The referral of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 11728 to the Department of Justice for
its appropriate action on the possible administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquitan.
Pending investigation of these administrative cases before the CA, several significant
developments took place. First, the respondent judge retired from the Judiciary on
November 25, 2003. Second, the complainant was killed by unidentified men on April 14,
2004 and was substituted in the case by his wife and children. 17 Lastly, the respondent
judge himself was killed on July 26, 2009.
CA Report and Recommendation
Justice Tijam found the respondent judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency, incompetency
and violation of Rules 1.01, 2.01 and 3.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and of Canon 3 of
the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Justice Tijam reported:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
CONDUCTED BY RESPONDENT JUDGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE AGAINST THE LATE
MTC JUDGE NAPY AGAYAN AND HIS COURT PERSONNEL
The 1st Indorsement dated June 6, 2000 referring the complaint against Judge Agayan and
his staff to the Respondent Judge expressly directed the Respondent Judge to investigate
therein respondents irregular attendance in court. Hence, even if Minda Amar was not
specifically named by Complainant Mercado in his first letter-complaint, the fact that the
charges involved the alleged repeated absence not only of Judge Agayan, but also of the
personnel assigned in Judge Agayans court, Respondent Judges investigation should have
also included the court attendance of Minda Amar, the Clerk of Court.
. . . In the course of his investigation, the Respondent Judge would have discovered the fact
of Minda Amars prolonged absences. However, Respondent Judge failed to make any
findings in this regard. Neither was there a statement that Clerk of Court Minda Amar was
absent during said period of investigation and/or that her absences were authorized and
approved by Judge Agayan. Instead, the Respondent Judge made a sweeping declaration
that Complainant Mercados charges of absenteeism against Judge Agayans court
personnel were unfounded.
There is no evidence that Respondent Judge examined the Court personnels daily time
records . . .
Indubitably, Respondent Judge was negligent and inefficient, if not dishonest, in his
investigation of the administrative complaint filed against Judge Agayan and his court
personnel. For this reason, the Respondent Judge must be held liable.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE MATTER OF THE STOLEN PAJERO VEHICLE 19
. . . although the criminal case against the Respondent Judge for violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law was dismissed, the Respondent Judge could still be held liable for his improper
conduct pursuant to Rules 1.01 20 and 2.0121 of the Code Judicial Conduct . . . and Canon 3
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics 22 [Emphasis theirs]
In this case, Respondent Judge displayed conduct that fell short of the standards expected
of a magistrate of the law. Respondent Judge failed to be more circumspect in his dealings
with Leopoldo Gonzaga.
Leopoldo Gonzaga was once an accused before Respondent Judges sala in a criminal case
for violation of the anti-fencing law which was later dismissed by the Respondent Judge.
From this fact alone, any association which Respondent Judge may have with Leopoldo
Gonzaga would be a cause for suspicion. When Respondent Judge borrowed the subject
vehicle from the accused, he already displayed improper and reproachable conduct.
The fact that the vehicle lent to Respondent Judge was the same Pajero vehicle which was
the subject of the dismissed criminal case makes the act more unethical. Respondent tried
to justify that it was only after Gonzaga assured him that the Pajero was not a carnapped
vehicle that he allowed himself to use it. This is inexcusable.
Respondent Judge was wrong when he borrowed from the accused the same vehicle
subject matter of the criminal case which was dismissed and decided in the accuseds
favor. Respondent Judge failed to comport himself in such a manner that his conduct,
official or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSOLIDATED AGRARIAN CASES
Complainant Mercado suggested that the Respondent Judge benefited from the awarded
commissioners fee. Complainant Mercado presented copies of the 3 cashiers checks and
the deposit purportedly showing how Respondent Judge profited from said fees.
However, this claim is completely without factual basis. The complainant failed to adduce
any substantial, direct and convincing evidence to substantiate his allegation that
Respondent Judge materially benefited from the transaction. At most, such allegation is a
mere suspicion or conjecture.
. . . unless there is direct and convincing evidence which will prove Respondent Judge
materially benefited from the transaction, the Respondent judge cannot be held guilty of
said charge.
However, . . . Respondent Judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law in according and/or
modifying a final and executory decision.
As settled, when the judges inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and
elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too
incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds, or is too vicious that the
oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial
authority.
Respondent Judge had clearly exhibited gross ignorance of the law when he amended the
already final decision He is therefore guilty of violating Rule 3.01 24 of the Code of Judicial
Ethics.
Justice Tijam recommended the imposition of the following penalties:
(a) First cause of action a fine of P40,000.00;
(b) Second cause of action a fine of P20,000.00;
(c) Third cause of action a fine in the amount of P20,000.00.
The Courts Ruling
After considering the CA Report and the entire records, we find the Report to be
substantially supported by the evidence on record, and by applicable law and
jurisprudence. We therefore adopt the findings and recommendations of the CA Report,
subject to the modifications indicated below.
Administrative cases against judges stem from the time-honored constitutional principle
that a public office is a public trust. This principle requires a judge, like any other public
servant and more so because of the sensitivity of his position, to exhibit at all times the
highest degree of honesty and integrity; 25 his high and exalted position in the Judiciary
requires him to observe exacting standards of morality, decency and competence. As the
visible representation of the law and given his task of dispensing justice, a judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of
the people.26 He must conduct himself in a manner characterized by propriety and
decorum; like Ceasars wife, he must be above suspicion. 27 As we held in Padua v. Paz:28
Court personnel charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk, bear a heavy responsibility in insuring that their conduct is always beyond
reproach. The preservation of the integrity of the judicial process is of paramount
importance. All those occupying offices in the judiciary should at all times be aware that
they are accountable to the people. They must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity,
loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice and lead modest lives.
The records show that respondent judge failed to live up to these exacting standards.
Investigation of Judge Agayan and his court personnel
In his report dated August 2, 2002 (in compliance with the OCA directive to investigate
Judge Agayan), the respondent judge stated that the complaint against Judge Agayan and
his court staff for absenteeism and irregular attendance had no merit. The respondent
judge related that he went twice to the office of Judge Agayan to ascertain the veracity of
the complaint and found that Judge Agayan was really sickly because of a heart condition
that compelled him to take leaves of absence. 29 The respondent judge claimed that since
the complainant failed to specify the particular dates when Judge Agayan failed to report to
work, he could not ascertain whether his absences had been authorized. The respondent
judge also stated that he personally inquired from other offices in the Municipality of
Kapalong, Davao del Norte, from lawyers, and from party-litigants with pending cases in
the sala of Judge Agayan; he found that no complaint from party-litigants in the
Municipality of Kapalong had been made involving the failure to attend to official
transactions due to the absence of Court personnel. Neither was there any complaint from
lawyers about proceedings "grinding to a halt." Like party-litigants, local officials are more
concerned in the speedy disposition of cases when their constituents are involved. Yet, not
a single local official made a complaint.30
The respondent judge, in his Comment dated February 22, 2002, emphasized that the
present complaint was simply an undue interference by the complainant in his
recommendation in Judge Agayans case.
In its investigation, the CA found evidence refuting the statements made by the
respondent judge in his report to the OCA. One of these was the Certification dated
February 6, 2003 issued by Jaime Mondejar, Clerk of Court II, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Kapalong-Talaingod, Davao del Norte, attesting that one Minda Amar, the Clerk of Court in
Judge Agayans sala, had not reported for work prior to and during the dates the
respondent judge reportedly conducted his investigation. 31 The CA investigation also found
no evidence that the respondent judge ever examined the daily time records of Minda
Amar and the court personnel assigned to Judge Agayans sala.
Justice Tijam noted that since the act complained of was absenteeism, the investigators
first course of action should have been to check and verify the daily time records of the
concerned personnel; from such examination the respondent judge would have known of
the prolonged absences of Minda Amar and others. Likewise, the respondent judge would
have noticed Minda Amars absence when he went to the sala of Judge Agayan on two
occasions. These incidents, however, were not mentioned in the respondent judges report.
In addition to these findings, we note that the respondent judge was similarly remiss in
ascertaining Judge Agayans absences. The respondent judge merely relied on the leave of
absence filed by Judge Agayan for October 8, 1997, and did not at all consider the latters
absences, subject of the complaint, and the fact that the respondent judge conducted his
investigation only in February 2000. At the very least, the gap of more than two (2) years
between the leave of absence on record and the investigation of Judge Agayans absences
should have alerted the respondent judge to examine the formers records in the
intervening period, particularly the period immediately prior to the complaint. The
respondent judge failed to do this. We observe, too, that in the "course of his
investigation," he did not appear to have asked Judge Agayan about his absences in any
formal inquiry or, at the very least, in an interview. No record appears in the respondent
judges report on Judge Agayans position on the matter under investigation. A close
scrutiny of the report in fact shows that the respondent judge, instead of making an
objective report on the results of his investigation, tried to downplay and deflect the issue
of absenteeism and irregular attendance by stating that nobody complained of the delay in
the disposition of cases due to the absence and irregular attendance of Judge Agayan and
his staff.32
From all these, what appears clear to us is that the respondent judge conducted a very
superficial investigation, if what he did can be labelled as an investigation at all. Based on
this shallow effort, he prepared a slanted report that could not but lead to the exoneration
of Judge Agayan. These actions tell us that the respondent judge deliberately covered up
Judge Agayans absences and irregular attendance. The motivation for all these is not hard
to discern as it can be read between the lines in the respondent judges report, considered
in light of the attendant facts. He did all these under the mistaken notion of aiding a fellow
judge, who was allegedly too sickly to fully perform his judicial duties. In rendering this
assistance, the respondent judge also overlooked the absences and irregular attendance of
the court staff of Judge Agayan.
The respondent judge apparently forgot that his first and foremost duty was to conduct a
thorough and objective investigation and to make a complete report of his findings
regardless of his personal sentiments and beliefs. The task assigned to him was an
assignment involving trust and the exercise of his functions as a judge. An administrative
investigation is an essential component in the judicial machinery for the administrative
supervision of courts and court personnel; it is a key process in determining violations of
the norms of conduct and standards of service in the judiciary. The respondent judge,
therefore, not only failed to do his duty, but violated as well the trust reposed in him as a
judge.
The absenteeism of judges or court employees and/or their irregular attendance at work is
a serious charge that, if proven, may warrant the imposition of the penalty of dismissal or
suspension from service.33 Unauthorized absence and irregular attendance are detrimental
to the dispensation of justice and, more often than not, result in undue delay in the
disposition of cases; they also translate to waste of public funds when the absent officials
and employees are nevertheless paid despite their absence. As heretofore mentioned, the
Supreme Court regulates the conduct of court officials and employees and it acts through
its subordinates, among them in this case, the respondent judge. His responsibility in this
administrative supervision is direct by virtue of the delegation made by this Court. By
conducting a superficial investigation and by his slanted findings that caused the OCA to
recommend the dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Agayan and his
court personnel, the Courts administrative machinery failed; the respondent judges intent
to shield another judge, resulting in the lack of objectivity of his report, deprived the Court
of the opportunity to act properly on the reported violations of the norms of conduct of
judges and court employees.
For failing to faithfully perform the tasks assigned to him, the respondent committed
dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct in violation of Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of
Canon 3, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which state:
Canon 3. A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY
AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 3.08 A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain
professional competence in court management, and facilitate the performance of the
administrative functions of other judges and court personnel.
We also find that the respondent judge violated Rule 2.01, Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, which states that "[a] judge should so behave at all times as to promote public
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary," in relation to Canon 31 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics, which requires that a judges conduct be above reproach and that
he administer justice according to law. This means that a judge, in dispensing justice,
"should apply the law impartially, independently, honestly, and in a manner perceived by
the public to be impartial, independent and honest." 34
Serious misconduct, as defined, refers to weighty and serious transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer. 35 It warrants dismissal from the service when the judicial
act is corrupt and inspired by an intention to violate the law, and when it translates to
wrongful intention rather than mere error of judgment.36
In this case, by giving premium to personal relations and personal feelings rather than to
the faithful discharge of his duty as investigating judge, the respondent judge acted
dishonestly and inefficiently, coupled with a deliberate and wrongful intent to perform his
duties unfaithfully. This is no less a serious misconduct than a corrupt act undertaken for
monetary gains; one as well as the other eroded public confidence in a judges ability to
render justice.37
The Possession and Use of a Stolen Vehicle
In his defense on this issue, the respondent judge claimed that the case was filed by the
complainant merely to harass him. He also claimed good faith and lack of knowledge that
the vehicle he had borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was the same vehicle involved in the
Anti-Fencing case that he dismissed in 1999.
The act of borrowing a vehicle by a judge or any court employee is not per se a violation of
judicial norms and standards established for court personnel, as borrowing is a legitimate
and neutral act that can happen in everyday life. However, judges and court employees
by the nature of their functions and of the norms and standards peculiar to their positions
live their lives under restrictions not otherwise imposed on others; specifically, they cannot
simply borrow in situations when this act may or can affect the performance of their duties
because of the nature of the thing borrowed or the identity of the borrower, or in situations
when borrowing would involve ethical questions under express rules. In this case, the
complaint alleged that what the respondent judge borrowed was in fact a vehicle that was
the subject of a previous litigation before his sala; the respondent judge borrowed, too,
from a lender who still had cases before his sala.
We hold, based on our examination and analysis of the records, that the respondent judge
went over the dividing line that separates permissible from impermissible borrowing.
First, during his cross-examination before the CA, the respondent judge admitted that he
knew that the vehicle he borrowed was owned by Leopoldo Gonzaga, who was the accused
in the Anti-Fencing case previously before him. 38 The respondent judge could not have
avoided this admission given the surrounding circumstances of the case; the vehicle in the
Anti-Fencing case was a Pajero, while the vehicle he borrowed from Leopoldo Gonzaga was
also a Pajero;39 while the color of the vehicle had been changed from green to dirty white,
it was shown that the vehicle consistently carried the same plate number "UTN
571";40 the respondent judge could not have missed the identity of the vehicle considering
his admission that the Pajero was under the courts custody for several months. 411avvphi1
Second, the records show that the respondent judges initial claim of lack of knowledge is
not true. In the preliminary investigation conducted by State Prosecutor Velasco in the
Anti-Fencing case involving the Pajero, the respondent judge, when apprehended by
policemen, exhibited a court decision he penned in 1999 dismissing the Anti-Fencing case
against Leopoldo Gonzaga for the same vehicle. 42 This incident, which the respondent
judge never refuted, clearly indicated that he knew that the vehicle he possessed and
used, despite its change of color, was the same vehicle involved in the 1999 Anti-Fencing
case that came before him.
Third, the unrefuted statement of the complainant in his Affidavit (Direct
Examination)43 filed before the CA states:
I know for a fact that Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had several cases pending in the two (2) salas
presided by Executive Judge Salcedo . . . Also, I know for a fact that before the Criminal
Case No. 11728 . . . was dismissed by Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo, several cases of
Mr. Leopoldo Gonzaga had been pending in the sala of Judge Salcedo. I also know for a fact
that Executive Judge Erasto D. Salcedo inhibited himself from the cases of Mr. Leopoldo
Gonzaga when there was a question raised on the propriety of his borrowing the Pajero
from Mr. Gonzaga, a court litigant in his sala, during the pendency of this Administrative
case. [Emphasis theirs]
Thus, the respondent judge not only borrowed a vehicle that was the subject of an Anti-
Fencing case before him; he also borrowed it from a lender who had other pending cases
before him. In fact, he had to inhibit himself from hearing these cases because of the
pendency of the present administrative cases.
Under the circumstances, the respondent judge is liable for serious misconduct, given his
repeated and deliberate intention to disregard and violate the legal norms of conduct
governing his behavior and action as a judge. He committed serious misconduct, first, in
using and possessing a vehicle with the knowledge that it was the subject of an anti-
fencing case previously before him; and second, he borrowed this vehicle from a litigant
who had pending cases before his sala. Both the character of the vehicle borrowed and the
identity of the lender precluded him from borrowing and using Leopoldo Gonzagas Pajero.
While the criminal case filed against the respondent judge by State Prosecutor Velasco was
dismissed by the Department of Justice, we agree with Justice Tijam that the respondent
judges acts at least constitute irresponsible and improper conduct whose effect is to erode
public confidence in the judiciary.44 As aptly stated by Justice Tijam, the respondent judges
act compromised the image, integrity and uprightness of the courts of law; 45 it cast
suspicion not only in his own impartiality, but also in the impartiality and integrity of his
judicial office, thereby impairing public trust in the exercise of his judicial functions.
In several cases of the same import, the Court penalized a judge for highly improper
conduct.
In Cabreana v. Avelino, 46 the Court castigated the respondent judge who hitched a ride in
the car of a party-litigant in going to and from the place of the ocular inspection. We ruled
that the respondent judges act exposed him and his office to suspicion and impaired the
trust and faith of the people in the administration of justice.
In Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana, 47 we admonished the judge to be circumspect in his
conduct and dealings with lawyers who had pending cases before him. It was established
that the judge displayed before the public his close familiarity with one of the lawyers who
appeared before him and whose car the judge sometimes borrowed.
We explained in Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva that the duty to avoid improper conduct or the
appearance of impropriety becomes more crucial when one is a trial judge who has
constant dealings with the public:48
[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible symbol of
government especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial judges are
those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities which the
judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the administration
of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him. Thus, a judge
must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as the epitome of
integrity and justice. x x x it is essential that judges, like Caesar's wife, should be above
suspicion.
The evidence adduced in this charge showed that the respondent judge violated Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 and Rule 2.01, Canon 2, both of the Code of Judicial Conduct, in failing to maintain
the appearance of integrity and in failing to engage in conduct to promote public
confidence in the judiciary. Likewise, he violated Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics relating to the avoidance of impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all the judges activities, official or otherwise.
The Execution of a Final Judgment in the Consolidated Agrarian Cases
The pertinent portion of the joint decision dated February 7, 2000 rendered by the Special
Agrarian Court in Agrarian Case Nos. 31-99 to 51-99 reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises duly considered, the Court hereby renders its
judgment fixing, as it has judiciously determined, the just compensation for the
landholdings and the improvements of all the herein petitioners in all these above-
captioned docketed agrarian cases, as follows:
First Hereby fixing, as determined, the just compensation of herein petitioners aggregate
landholdings of 123.4629 hectares hereby fixed and determined at P25,405,553.55, plus
the fixed and determined just compensation for the existing improvements thereon
of P32,800,000.00, or a total of P58,205,553.55; and proper-computed adjustment to make
such valuation at par with current true value of the Philippine Peso vis--vis the US Dollar,
said upgraded amount in its upgraded value totals P89,547,005.46; and further adding
thereto the computed interests pegged at 6% per annum, which amounted
to P21,986,680.68, the total amount of just compensation which Respondent-DAR through
LBP must pay, jointly and severally, to petitioners for their landholdings and improvements
would be, as it is hereby fixed in the aggregate amount of P111,533,686.14;
The respondent judge contends that he merely acted on the motion filed by the
landowners who requested adjustments in enforcing the final judgment considering the
statement in the dispositive portion of the judgment that allowed adjustments based on
the current true value of the Philippine Peso vis--vis the US Dollar.
In his findings, Justice Tijam observed that the adjustment contemplated in the joint
decision was already included in the dispositive portion, making it unnecessary for the
respondent judge to make any additional adjustment. We also note that this joint decision,
after having become final and executory, was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment of
the Special Agrarian Court on May 3, 2000. 49 It was not until October 26, 2000 that the
respondent judge made further "adjustment" of the judgment amount when he acted on
the motion filed by the landowners.50
The respondent judge ought to have known that the joint decision was already final and
executory and could no longer be disturbed when he made his adjustments. This legal
reality, known as the rule of immutability of judgment, is an elementary principle of law
and procedure. Once a judgment becomes final, it may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the Highest Court of the land. 51 The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors, or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc
entries, which cause no prejudice to any party, and where the judgment is void. 52 To be
sure, the respondent judges ground for modifying the joint decision is not among these
recognized exceptions.
For modifying a final and executory decision in the course of its execution, we find the
respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law. Where the law is straightforward and
its application to the facts plainly evident, not to know the law or to act as if one does not
know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53 The respondent judge violated Rule 3.01,
Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates professional competence on the
part of a judge. A judge owes the public and the court the duty to be proficient in the law
and is expected to keep abreast of laws and prevailing jurisprudence; 54 otherwise, he
erodes the confidence of the public in the courts. 55Ignorance of the law by a judge can
easily be the mainspring of injustice.56
The Penalty
The retirement of the respondent judge and death of both the complainant and the
respondent judge pending the investigation of these administrative cases are not
deterrents to the resolution on the merits of the complaints and to the imposition of the
sanctions demanded by the circumstances. Jurisprudence holds that the death of the
complainant does not warrant the withdrawal of the charges against the respondent nor
does this development render the complaint moot; the complainant is treated only as a
witness in this type of proceedings.57 On the other hand, the death of the respondent in an
administrative case, as a rule, does not preclude a finding of administrative liability. The
recognized exceptions to this rule are: first, when the respondent has not been heard and
continuation of the proceedings would deny him of his right to due process; second, where
exceptional circumstances exist in the case leading to equitable and humanitarian
considerations; and third, when the kind of penalty imposed or imposable would render the
proceedings useless.58 None of these exceptional circumstances are present in the case.
Thus, despite the above supervening events, we can still impose the penalty of fine against
the respondent judge deductible from his retirement benefits. In this case, we find that the
infractions he committed all constitute serious charges warranting the imposition of fine in
the amount of P20,000.00 to P40,000.00 range.59 Considering the several violations he
committed and the gravity and circumstances of these infractions, we find that the
maximum amount of fine should be imposed on each charge. In so ruling, we note that this
is not the first administrative infraction committed by the respondent judge; he had
previously been fined P10,000.00 for undue delay in rendering decisions or orders. 60
On the first charge (false investigation report on Judge Agayan), we find the respondent
judge guilty of dishonesty, inefficiency, and serious misconduct. He violated the provisions
of Rule 2.01 of Canon 2, Canon 3 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct;
and Canons 3 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, classifies dishonesty and gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of
Judicial Conduct as serious charges. We impose a fine of P40,000.00 on the respondent
judge on this charge.61
On the second charge (use and possession of the vehicle of a litigant before his sala), the
respondent judge is guilty of serious misconduct and impropriety as provided in Rule 1.01
of Canon 1, Canon 2 and Rule 2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and Canon 3
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. Considering the compounded administrative offenses, he is
meted the maximum fine of P40,000.00.62
For violation of Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct (in the execution of the
decision of an agrarian case), the respondent judge is liable for gross ignorance of the law
for which the maximum fine of P40,000.00 is imposed. Gross ignorance of law is
considered a serious charge that warrants the imposition of the penalties provided under
Section 11 (A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.63
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Judge Erasto D. Salcedo GUILTY of the
following administrative offenses:
1. Dishonesty, inefficiency and serious misconduct and violation of Rule 2.01 of
Canon 2 and Rule 3.08 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and Canons 3
and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. We impose a FINE of P40,000.00.
2. Serious misconduct and impropriety in violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule
2.01of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Canon 3 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics. He is meted a FINE of P40,000.00.
3. Gross ignorance of the law under Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, for which a FINE of P40,000.00 is imposed.
The Office of the Court Administrator is hereby ordered to deduct the amount of One
Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) from the retirement benefits due to Judge
Erasto D. Salcedo, and to proceed with the processing and release of these benefits, unless
there are other lawful causes for withholding them.
Finally, we refer to the Department of Justice for appropriate action the possible
administrative liability of Prosecutor Matias Aquiatan arising from the imputations made by
the complainant that he committed a hasty reinvestigation of Leopoldo Gonzaga in
Criminal Case No. 11728.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO LEJANO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, et al.
SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION
BRION, J.:
In addition to my vote and independently of the merits of the present case, I write this
opinion to point out the growing disregard and non-observance of the sub judice rule, to
the detriment of the rights of the accused, the integrity of the courts, and, ultimately, the
administration of justice. I seize this opportunity fully aware that the present case dubbed
in the news media as the Vizconde Massacre is one of the most sensational criminal cases
in Philippine history in terms of the mode of commission of the crime and the personalities
involved. From the time the charges were filed, the case has captured the publics interest
that an unusual amount of air time and print space have been devoted to it.Of late, with
the publics renewed interest after the case was submitted for decision, key personalities
have again been unabashedly publicizing their opinions and commenting even on the
merits of the case before various forms of media. A Senior Justice of this Court, who was a
witness in the case (while he was in private law practice) and who consequently inhibited
himself from participation, was even publicly maligned in the print and broadcast media
through unsupported speculations about his intervention in the case. That was how bad
and how low comments about the case had been.
In essence, the sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to pending
judicial proceedings. The restriction applies not only to participants in the pending
case, i.e., to members of the bar and bench, and to litigants and witnesses, but also to the
public in general, which necessarily includes the media. Although the Rules of Court does
not contain a specific provision imposing the sub judice rule, it supports the observance of
the restriction by punishing its violation as indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule
71:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. x x x a person guilty
of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect contempt:
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice[.]
Persons facing charges for indirect contempt for violation of the sub judice rule often
invoke as defense their right to free speech and claim that the citation for contempt
constitutes a form of impermissible subsequent punishment.
We have long recognized in this jurisdiction that the freedom of speech under Section 4,
Article III of the Constitution is not absolute. A very literal construction of the provision, as
espoused by US Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black, [1] may lead to the disregard of other
equally compelling constitutional rights and principles. In Vicente v. Majaducon,[2] this
Court declared that [the freedom of speech] needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests such as the
maintenance of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. Courts, both within and outside this jurisdiction, have long grappled with the
dilemma of balancing the publics right to free speech and the governments duty to
administer fair and impartial justice. While the sub judice rule may be considered as a
curtailment of the right to free speech, it is necessary to ensure the proper administration
of justice and the right of an accused to a fair trial. [3] Both these latter concerns are equally
paramount and cannot lightly be disregarded.
Before proceeding with this line of thought, however, let me clarify that the sub judice rule
is not imposed on all forms of speech. In so far as criminal proceedings are concerned, two
classes of publicized speech made during the pendency of the proceedings can be
considered as contemptuous: first, comments on the merits of the case, and second,
intemperate and unreasonable comments on the conduct of the courts with respect to the
case. Publicized speech should be understood to be limited to those aired or printed in the
various forms of media such as television, radio, newspapers, magazines, and internet, and
excludes discussions, in public or in private, between and among ordinary citizens. The
Constitution simply gives the citizens the right to speech, not the right to
unrestricted publicized speech.
Comments on the merits of the case may refer to the credibility of witnesses, the character
of the accused, the soundness of the alibis offered, the relevance of the evidence
presented, and generally any other comment bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
accused.[4] The danger posed by this class of speech is the undue influence it may directly
exert on the court in the resolution of the criminal case, or indirectly through the public
opinion it may generate against the accused and the adverse impact this public opinion
may have during the trial. The significance of the sub judice rule is highlighted in criminal
cases, as the possibility of undue influence prejudices the accuseds right to a fair trial.The
principal purpose of the sub judice rule is to preserve the impartiality of the judicial system
by protecting it from undue influence. [5] Public opinion has no place in a criminal trial. We
ruled that
it is a traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the
decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that
facts should be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or
sympathies.[6]
The right to a fair trial is an adjunct of the accuseds right to due process which guarantees
[him] a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a trial x x x where the
conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influence but only by evidence
and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is demanded. [7]
In foreign jurisdictions, the courts do not hesitate to exercise their power to punish for
contempt where necessary to dispose of judicial business unhampered by publications that
tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts.[8]
If the media publish prejudicial material, they can appear to urge, or may in fact be urging,
a particular finding: the media can wage a campaign against one of the parties to
proceedings. If the jury decides in accordance with an outcome promoted by the media, it
will appear as if the jurors were swayed by the media. By the same token, if the jurys
decision does not accord with media opinion, it may appear as if they were deliberately
reacting against it. Either way, it may appear that the jurys decision was not impartial and
based on the evidence presented in court, even if it was. [9]
The accused must be assured of a fair trial notwithstanding the prejudicial publicity; [10] he
has a constitutional right to have his cause tried fairly by an impartial tribunal,
uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. [11] The sub judice doctrine protects against
the appearance of decisions having been influenced by published material. [12]
As may be observed from the cited material, the sub judice rule is used by foreign courts
to insulate members of the jury from being influenced by prejudicial publicity. But the fact
that the jury system is not adopted in this jurisdiction is not an argument against our
observance of the sub judice rule; justices and judges are no different from members of the
jury, they are not immune from the pervasive effects of media. It might be farcical to build
around them an impregnable armor against the influence of the most powerful media of
public opinion.[13] As I said in another case, in a slightly different context, even those who
are determined, in their conscious minds, to avoid bias may be affected. [14]
Also, it is not necessary that the publicity actually influenced the courts disposition of the
case; the actual impact of prejudicial publicity is not relevant to liability for sub
judice contempt.[15] In several cases, the Court has noted the enormous effect of media in
stirring public sentience x x x Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or
pressure that media can bring to bear on [witnesses and judges] directly and through the
shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that, indeed, it does so in so many ways
and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect that such a coverage may results may be, doubts will linger about the real merits of the case due to the inordinate
have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it media campaign that transpired.
can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it. [16]
Lest we be misunderstood, our application of the sub judice rule to this case cannot serve
Comment on the conduct of the courts with respect to the case becomes subject to a as a precedent for similar future violations. Precisely, this Supplemental Opinion is a signal
contempt proceeding when it is intemperate, is contumacious, and unduly impairs upon to all that this Court has not forgotten, and is in fact keenly aware of, the limits of what can
the dignity of the court. A comment that impairs of the dignity of the court excites in the be publicly ventilated on the merits of a case while sub judice, and on the comments on
mind of the people a general dissatisfaction with all judicial determinations, and indisposes the conduct of the courts with respect to the case. This Court will not standby idly and
their minds to obey them[.][17] If the speech tends to undermine the confidence of the helplessly as its integrity as an institution and its processes are shamelessly brought to
people in the honesty and integrity of the court and its members, and lowers or degrades disrepute.
the administration of justice, then the speech constitutes contempt. [18] Unwarranted
attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of
said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of courts or public
respect therefore and confidence therein.[19] Without the sub judice rule and the contempt
power, the courts will be powerless to protect their integrity and independence that are
essential in the orderly and effective dispensation and administration of justice.

This, of course, is not meant to stifle all forms of criticism against the court. As the third
branch of the government, the courts remain accountable to the people. The peoples
freedom to criticize the government includes the right to criticize the courts, their
proceedings and decisions. This is the principle of open justice, which is fundamental to
our democratic society and ensures that (a) there is a safeguard against judicial
arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and that (b) the publics confidence in the administration of
justice is maintained.[20] The criticism must, however, be fair, made in good faith, and not
spill over the walls of decency and propriety. [21] And to enhance the open court principle Conrado Que v. Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr.
and allow the people to make fair and reasoned criticism of the courts, the sub judice rule
excludes from its coverage fair and accurate reports (without comment) of what have In a complaint for disbarment, [1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio
actually taken place in open court. Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar Discipline or CBD) of
In sum, the court, in a pending litigation, must be shielded from embarrassment or committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional
influence in its all-important duty of deciding the case. [22] Any publication pending a suit, Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:
reflecting upon the court, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel, etc., with
reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision of the controversy, is contempt of (1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition
court and is punishable. The resulting (but temporary) curtailment of speech because of for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before
the sub judice rule is necessary and justified by the more compelling interests to uphold the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment before the RTC and
the rights of the accused and promote the fair and orderly administration of justice. lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject cases) to assail
and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court[2] (MeTC) and RTC[3] in the
unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this
If we do not apply at all the sub judice rule to the present case, the reason is obvious to
regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing
those who have followed the case in the media both parties are in pari delicto as both have
fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The
apparently gone to the media to campaign for the merits of their respective causes. Thus,
respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings titles over the
the egregious action of one has been cancelled by a similar action by the other.It is in this
property subject of the unlawful detainer case;
sense that this Supplemental Opinion is independent of the merits of the case. Their
common action, however, cannot have their prejudicial effects on both; whatever the
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to
impede, obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal
gain and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and
RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by
resorting to falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by fabricating an
imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that
the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived
his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above falsehood. [4]
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed
the good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the
previous counsel of the respondents clients.
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the
petition for annulment of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment
of title as counsel for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants
in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.
The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.
In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan
Development Cooperative (KDC) that handles pro bono cases for the underprivileged, the
less fortunate, the homeless and those in the marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He
agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC members. One of these
cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the
complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were
the defendants.
With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his
sincerity, honesty and good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these
petitions to protect the interests of his clients in their property. The respondent asserted
that these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of jurisdiction of the MeTC
and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud committed
by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the
complainant and his family against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained
property did not really belong to the complainant and his family but is a forest land. The
respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of judgment and a
petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all
parts of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.
On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal
of the petition for annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment
complaint), the respondent maintained that his allegations were based on his observations
and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the presiding judge dictated in
open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with
respect to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded by inadvertence; he immediately
rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for annulment of
judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed
the certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The
respondent likewise denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the
second petition for annulment of title. The respondent pointed out that there was no
allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the complainants (his
clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition
embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the
case.[6]
The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or
immoral acts towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good
faith in his dealings with them and his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a
lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the interests of his clients. The
respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the
complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.
Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings [7] before the IBP that the present complaint
violated the rule on forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones
on which a complaint was filed against him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy
before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent also posited that the present
complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation and,
indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.
The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil
Case No. Q-03-48762, Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan [8](Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges against the respondent meritorious. In his
Report and Recommendation, he stated:
While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and
rights of his client with all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true
that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the
law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to maintain and defend the
cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must
not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping. [9]
On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan
noted the unnecessary use by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution
of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in the unlawful detainer case against his
clients.[10]
On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent
in filing two petitions for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later
on a petition for declaratory relief were all done to prevent the execution of the final
judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited forum-shopping. [11]
On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample
evidence showing that the respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in
his petition for annulment of judgment; he resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty.
Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. [12]
On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the
respondents explanation that he had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the
litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the petition for annulment of judgment
(Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the respondent merely
glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of
the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The
Investigating Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding
his misrepresentation in the second complaint for annulment of title since he knew very
well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action for reversion on behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed the
amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No.
XVII-2005-164 on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. [13] On reconsideration,
the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice of law to
one (1) year.[14]
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of
Investigating Commissioner Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline.
We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed
involving the respondent; another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been
filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C. Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we
suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful and intentional falsehood
before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially
imposed a suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the
suspension to six (6) months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of
serious misconduct for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from
the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case
against these clients:
First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with
prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to
question the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the
respondents petition, the CA held:
Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy,
still it must be rejected for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of
jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City over the ejectment
case.[17]
Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent
again questioned the MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer
case in a petition for annulment of judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-
45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the motion
to dismiss filed.[18]
Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-
38780 and Civil Case No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the
property involved in the unlawful detainer case. The records show that these petitions
were both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the plaintiffs to file the
petition.[19]
Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for
annulment of title, the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the complainant and his siblings from
exercising their rights over the same property subject of the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title because the
property is a part of forest land.
Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions
he had filed in several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of
judgment, the second petition for annulment of complainants title and the petition for
declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in preventing and avoiding the
execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the unlawful
detainer case.
Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate
means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client.These
are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC
and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]
Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping
The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are
directed against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same objective. Both violations
constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to degrade the administration of justice;
wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; [22] and add to the congestion of the heavily
burdened dockets of the courts.[23]
While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a
procedurally legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent
petitions involving the same property and the same parties not only demonstrate his
attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora, but his obvious objective as well of
preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case
against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment
of judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the
unlawful detainer decision, long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate falsehood before the courts
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon
City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment
sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last paragraph of the petition, as follows:
In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the
proper remedy then available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration
thus corruptly sold out the interest of the petitioners (defendants therein) by
keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit by a false pretense
of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact,
have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the
prejudice of the petitioner (defendants therein) [24]
Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion
for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he
believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.
[25]
These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the purpose of
supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated
attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately
discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second
petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule
that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands [26] on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party and
not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be
represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines
was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c)
the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as counsel for the
plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to compel the Republic to
litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the
court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both
counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in
open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and
their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO DENY THE MOTION
TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER
TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD .[27][Underscoring and emphasis
theirs]
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually
for the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on
the adverse partys motion to dismiss. [28] The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in
abeyance the respondents application for injunctive relief pending the resolution of the
motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party. [29] As stated in the order of the Presiding Judge
of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as
transcribed by the Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion
for Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal
bases as required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of
irregularity in the preparation by Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court
interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the
respondent took advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who
are all squatters) to convince them to support, through their affidavits, his false claims on
what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in
his dealings with the court. This provision states:
CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court,
nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law .
[31]
The respondent failed to remember that his duty as an officer of the court makes him an
indispensable participant in the administration of justice, [32] and that he is expected to act
candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. [33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to
conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how
demanding his duties to his clients may be. [34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client
yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.[35]
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives
of his clients
This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are
consistent with truth and honor. [36] He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless
appeals or institute clearly groundless actions. [37] The recital of what the respondent did to
prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients shows that he actually
committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.
Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the
respondent attacked (as quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico
and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel
for the adverse party.
We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his
accusation against Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated
in the cases previously assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time,
the respondents petition for annulment of judgment also represented that no second
motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the
unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions
were null and void ab initio.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his
professional relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because
he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he
effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
Unauthorized appearances
We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice
represented parties without proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of
judgment; and second, in the second petition for annulment of title.
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment
of judgment on behalf of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15
individuals did not. We cannot agree with the respondents off-hand explanation that he
truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the certification of non-forum
shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the others.
We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a
seasoned lawyer like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for
more than 30 years and who received rigid and strict training as he so proudly declares,
from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the two law firms with which he
was previously associated.[39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum
shopping glossed over the real charge of appearing in court without the proper
authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.
In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the
respondent knew that only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of
the Philippines in actions for reversion of land. Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition
where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff without its authority and
consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed the
amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court when he undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer
may not represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from the latters
representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court. [40] The willful
unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious
conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional
misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses
We find no merit in the respondents defenses.
Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage
of another. Accordingly, in University of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith
connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage of another, even
though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the absence of all information or
belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." [42] Bad faith, on the other
hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of
self-interest, ill will or for an ulterior purpose. [43] As both concepts are states of mind, they
may be deduced from the attendant circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts
and statements of the person whose state of mind is the subject of inquiry.
In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his
clients. We draw this conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he
made, all obviously geared towards forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal knowledge and experience and misread
the Rules immeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.
We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the
soundness and merit of the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the
MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own conduct of presenting conflicting theories in
his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation that negates the
sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his
objective of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.
On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is
not amiss to note that this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case.
[44]
As we explained in Plus Builders, the exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his
client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the words of this cited case:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the
law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his
clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and
counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always
remind himself of the oath he took upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to
the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
Needless to state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of
truth and the administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason
and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his
client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions
against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed
because the counsel of the complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We
reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty. Uy who filed the present disbarment
case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy has filed his own
separate disbarment case against the respondent.
The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the
complainants unimportant and with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment
proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer to continue acting as an officer of
the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the complainants
personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also
explained in the case In re: Almacen:
. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be
allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of-the
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]
Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the
complainant Que and his counsel to file the present disbarment case.
Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of
professional misconduct and thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-
year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the
nature of these violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss
over concerns for the orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the administration of justice which he has
disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not
even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save
him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the
profession and the orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical
infraction of the same nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia
versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court;
for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed leniency then by
reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience
and since then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the profession and the
interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164

dated December 17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of
the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty.
Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional misconduct for violations of the
Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon
12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21
and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed,
and hold that the respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Respondent published in the Manila newspapers of Sunday, December 5, 1948, a written
statement in relation with the decision rendered by this Court sentencing Angel Parazo to
30 days imprisonment for contempt.
On December 7, 1948, considering the statement as "intended not only to intimidate the
members of this Court or influence the final disposition of said (Parazo) case, but also to
degrade and vilify the administration of justice," this Court adopted a resolution ordering
respondent to show cause within five days why he should not be punished for contempt,
"without prejudice to taking further action against him as attorney."
Alleging to be suffering from myologenous leukemia, with moderately severe anemia, and
that his physician had advised him to have "absolute rest and to avoid any form of mental
and physical strain for a few weeks," respondent prayed for a 15-day extension to file his
answer. He was granted a 10-day extension.
In the resolution of December 13, 1948, granting said extension, this Court branded as
false respondent's allegations the effect that he had formal charges pending in this Court
against Mr. Justice Perfecto and that the latter is the "moving spirit" of these contempt
proceedings.
Two days after the expiration of the 10-day extension granted to him, respondent filed his
answer. The belated filing of said answer was overlooked by this Court in order not to
deprive respondent of the benefits of his answer. Filed out of time, due to his unexplained
fault, it could legally have been rejected.
In said answer, dated December 24, 1948, respondent repeated one of his allegations
which, in the resolution of December 13, 1948, this Court had already declared to be false.
Respondent has not denied that he is the author of the statement for which he has been
summoned to our bar for contempt and he has not denied the correctness of the text
published in the Manila Chronicle and other daily newspapers and which is reproduced in
the resolution of this Court of December 7, 1948.
In his statement, respondent does not limit himself to saying that this Tribunal has
erroneously interpreted Republic Act No. 53, but alleges that said erroneous interpretation
"is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority
of its members," coupled with this sweeping and calumnious accusation:
In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court.
To fittingly crown this dastard imputation of deliberately committing blunders and injustice,
respondent would bully the members of this Court, by making the following intimidating
announcement:
To this effect, I announce that one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the
coming congressional sessions, will have as its objects the complete reorganization of the
Supreme Court.
There are other rhetorical passages in respondent's statement, aimed to emphasize the
nuclear ideas of the statement, to the effect that the majority of the members of the
Supreme Court are incompetent and narrow-minded and guilty of "so many blunders and
injustices deliberately committed" and that the author will introduce in the coming
congressional sessions a measure "to change the members of the Supreme Court" and to
effect a "complete reorganization of the Supreme Court.
Among such maximizing expressions intended to stress the main ideas and purposes of the
statement are the following:
1. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to
liberty and democracy.
2. It need be said loudly, very loudly so that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court if
today is far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those memorable times of
Cayetano Arellano, Victoriano Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
glory of the Philippine judiciary.
3. The reporter, who is erroneously convicted of contempt and unjustly sentenced to 30
days imprisonment by the Supreme Court, should be immediately and spontaneously
pardoned by the Executive Power, to serve as lesson in law to the majority of the members
of that High Tribunal.
4. That sentence is intolerable, and should be protested by all newspapers throughout the
country, under the cry of "The press demands better qualified justices for the Supreme
Court."
There can be no question that respondent knowingly published false imputations against
the members of this Court. He accused them of such depravity as to have committed
"blunders and injustices deliberately." He has maliciously branded them to be incompetent,
narrow-minded, perpetrators of evil, "a constant peril to liberty and democracy," to be the
opposite of those who were the honor and glory of the Philippines judiciary, to be needing
a lesson in law, to be rendering an intolerable sentence, to be needing replacement by
better qualified justices.
Respondent has not presented any evidence or offered any to support his slanderous
imputations, and no single word can be found in his answer showing that he ever believed
that the imputations are based on fact.
Respondent appears to belong to the class of individuals who have no compunction to
resort to falsehood of falsehoods. The record of this case indicates that the practice of
falsehoods seems to be habitual in respondent, and this is proved when he reiterated in his
answer one of his allegations in a previous petition which were pronounced by this Court to
be false in its resolution in its resolution of December 3, 1948.
More than thirty years ago, using the words of respondent himself, in "those memorable
times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, and Manual Araullo and other learned jurists
who were the glory of the Philippines judiciary" and when it was the "impregnable bulwark
of Justice," the Supreme Court pronounced respondent guilty of falsehoods three times:
first, in case in which he was sentenced to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional for
criminally abducting Aquilina Vasquez, a girl less then 18 years of age, and to pay her a
dowry of P500 and to support the offspring of his relations with her (U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil.,
231); second, in a sentence of disbarment as a blackmailer (In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532); and
third, in prison sentence for false libel (U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666). The first and the last
sentences bear the signature of Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano himself.
In the first case the Supreme Court found that only on July 29, 1906, Vicente Sotto wrote a
letter to Aquilina Vasquez, protesting his love for her and urging her to leave her house and
go with him; on the afternoon of August 1, 1906, Sotto made an arrangement with Luis
Crisologo for the renting of his house since that night when Sotto went with Aquilina into
the room of the house, where she passed the night; Sotto had told Crisologo that he
wanted the house for a forestry ranger who was just arriving from Bohol; Sotto did not
leave the room until the middle of the night; Aquilina transferred to a house in Sambag
where Sotto brought various housekeeping utensils; during the following days and nights
Aquilina was visited by respondent.
On August 10, 1906, a complaint was filed against Vicente Sotto and Pio Datan, charging
them with the crime of rapto. As a defense, respondent offered evidence to show that on
August 5, 1906, a legal marriage was celebrated between Aquilina and the accused Pio
Datan, Sotto's washerman and accomplice in crime. Upon the evidence, the Supreme Court
pronounced the celebration of the alleged marriage to be false. The certificate of marriage
offered as evidence in support of the claim that the marriage took place had been declared
a forgery.
It is not necessary to give the details of the whole disgusting affair, wherein the revolting
and sinister nature of an individual is pictured in bold relief with some of its ugliest
features. The more that 4 years of imprisonment imposed upon the accused did not reform
him. It only served to emphasize the beginning of along career of falsehoods and slanders
already spanning more than 40 years, soon nearing half of a century.
Respondent also chose not to deny his intimidating announcement to introduce in the
coming sessions of Congress, among the first measures, one for the change of the
members of the Supreme Court and for the latter's complete reorganization.
He has not explained or justified why he has to intimidate the members of the Supreme
Court with change and reorganization, and why, to make the intimidation more dreadful,
he had to announce the horrible course of subverting and trampling down the Constitution,
as all who can read and understand the fundamental law know that it is beyond the powers
of Congress to reorganize and change the membership of the Supreme Court.
Because the announcement is highly subversive, being aimed at shaking the very
foundations of this Republic, it could have been no less terrible than for the respondent to
have announced an intention to attain his purposes by resorting to open rebellion. The fact
that respondent is a lawyer and a senator aggravates his flaunted purpose to assault the
very Constitution he has sworn to obey and defend.
We have devoted considerable time to respondent's answer.
As first defense, respondent alleges that he made the written press statement, not as a
lawyer or as a private citizen, but as a senator. He avers a senator should have ample
liberty to discuss public affairs and should not be annoyed with contempt proceedings.
Now law or valid authority has been invoked in support of the theory, unless we could
countenance a fictitious maxim that respondent is the sovereign. The theory lacks even
the merit of novelty. Long before the claim of respondent that, because he is a senator, he
is above the law, Mussolini, Hitler and all the tyrants and dictators who preceded them
since the dawn of history had always claimed that they were above they law and acted as
if they were really so. Unfortunately for respondent, senators are creatures of the
Constitution and the Constitution makes them amenable to law.
As a second defense, respondent alleges that, not having appeared either as attorney or a
witness in the Parazo case, he cannot be held either for direct or for indirect contempt.
The defense is based on stark ignorance of the law on the subject.
Respondent alleges, as third defense, that he made his statement with "utmost good
faith," with "no intention of offending any of the majority of the honorable members of the
High Tribunal," and that he has not attacked nor intended to attack the honesty or integrity
of any one.
This allegation lacks sincerity in view of his imputation, among several others equally false
and calumnious, that the majority members of the Supreme Court have committed many
blunders and injustices deliberately." The slanderous imputation can only be attributed to
bad faith.
As another defense, respondent questions the validity of the penal provisions of Rule 64,
implying that said penalties are not procedural in nature, and invoking the provisions of
section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution, limiting the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court to matters of pleading, practice, and procedure in courts, and to the admission to the
practice of law.
Respondent's contention can be easily disposed of by quoting the following provisions of
Act No. 190:
SEC. 231. What Contempts of Court may be Punished Summarily. A court of First
Instance or a judge of such court at chambers, may punish summarily, by fine not
exceeding two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten days, or both, a
person guilty of misbehavior in the presence of or so near the court or judge as to obstruct
administration of justice, including the refusal of a person present in court to be sworn as a
witness or to answer as a witness when lawfully required.
SEC. 232. What Other Acts are Contempts of Court. A person guilty of any of the
following act any be punished as for contempt:
1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment of command of a
court, or injunction granted by a court or judge;
2. Misbehavior of an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties, or in his
official transactions;
3. A failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
4. The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by
virtue of an order or process of the court held by him.
5. The persons defeated in a civil action concerning the ownership or possession of real
estate who, after being evicted by the sheriff from the realty under litigation in compliance
with judgment rendered, shall enter or attempt to enter upon the same for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession or who shall in any manner disturb possession
by the person who the sheriff placed in possession of said reality.
SEC. 235. Trial of the Charge. Upon the day fixed for the trial, the court shall proceed to
investigate the charge and shall hear any answer or testimony which the accused may
make or offer.
SEC. 236. Punishment if Found Guilty. The court shall then determine whether the
accused is guilty off the contempt charged; and, if it be adjudged that he is guilty, he may
be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months, or
both. If the contempt consist in the violation of an injunction, the person guilty of such
contempt may also be ordered to make complete restitution to the party injured by such
violation.
Therefore, even on the false hypothesis that penalties for contempt are not procedural in
nature, courts of justice may impose said penalties, if not under Rule 64, under the
provisions of Act No. 190.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in courts of justice. It springs from the very
nature of their functions. Without such power, courts of justice would be unable to perform
effectively their functions. They function by orders. Every decision is a command. The
power to punish disobedience to command is essential to make the commands effective.
Respondent is in error in maintaining that the Supreme Court has no power to enact Rule
64, He is correct in calling it judicial legislation although he fails to remember that judicial
legislation in matters of judicial practice and procedure is expressly authorized by section
13 of Article VIII of the Constitution.
As a last defense, respondent invokes the constitutional freedom of the press, which
includes the right to criticize judges in court proceedings.
Respondent, undoubtedly, misses the point, and his citations about said freedom, with
which we fully agree, have absolutely no bearing on the question involved in these
proceedings.
No one, and the members of the Supreme Court would be the last to do so, has ever
denied respondent the freedom of the press and his freedom to criticize our proceedings,
this Court and its members. Respondent's statement goes much further than mere
criticism of our decision and the majority members of this Court. The statement is an
attempt to interfere with the administration of justice, to miscarry and defeat justice, by
trammelling the freedom of action of the members of the Supreme Court, by bullying them
with the menace of change, reorganization, and removal, upon the false accusation that
they have been committing "blunders and injustices deliberately," and the menacing
action constitutes a flagrant violation of the Constitution. Such a thing is not covered by
the freedom of the press or by the freedom to criticize judges and court proceedings, as no
one in his senses has ever conceived that such freedom include any form of expressed
gangterism, whether oral or written.
The freedom of the press is not involved in these proceedings. To assert otherwise is to
mislead. What is at stake in these proceedings is the integrity of our system of
administration of justice and the independence of the Supreme Court and its freedom from
any outside interference intended to obstruct it or to unduly sway it one way or another.
The freedom of the press is one of the causes which we have always endeared. The
repeated prosecution and persecutions we have endured in the past for its sake we have
been hailed to court eight times, are conclusive evidence of the firm stand we have
taken as defender of such freedom. It can be seen from official records that every acquittal
handed down to us by the Supreme Court had been a new step forward and new triumph
for the freedom of the press. (U. S. vs. Perfecto, 42 Phil., 113 Sept. 9, 1921; U.S. vs.
Perfecto, 43 Phil., 58, March 4, 1922; U. S. vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil., 887, March 4, 1922.) That
stand has remained the same, as can be shown in our written opinion in another contempt
proceedings in the Ben Brillantes case, which failed to attract public attention at the time.
Among the facts which we cannot ignore in deciding this case, are the following:
1. That this is not the first time respondent has been brought to a court of justice, for a
grave misbehavior and for perpetrating stark falsehoods. In a decision by the Supreme
Court of September 6, 1918, respondent was removed from the office of attorney-at-law
and incapacitated from exercising the legal profession. He was found guilty of:
(a) Lack of fidelity to clients;
(b) Blackmailing, by abusing his position as director of a newspaper whose columns he
used to blacken the reputation of those who refused to yield to demands made by him in
his business as lawyer;
(c) Publication of malicious and unjustifiable insinuations against the integrity of a judge
who had fined him for the crime of libel;
(d) Giving false testimony or perjury. (38 Phil., 532.)
2. On September 24, 1918, the Supreme Court sentenced respondent to imprisonment for
libel, for besmirching the honesty of three private individuals, Lope K. Santos, Jose Turiano
Santiago and Hermenegildo Cruz with false charges. (38 Phil., 666.)
3. After having been cited for contempt in these proceedings, respondent, in order to pose
as a martyr for the freedom of the press, waged a campaign of viturperation against the
Supreme Court. He made repeated press statements and delivered speeches in his home
province to show that he cannot expect justice from the Supreme Court, that the Supreme
Court will imprison him, that he will be imprisoned for the sake of the freedom of the press,
thereby posing as a false martyr for it.
4. In his persecutory obsession, respondent would make all believe that, contrary to fact,
the writer of this opinion is the moving spirit behind these contempt proceedings and that
the Supreme Court is acting merely as a tool. Apparently, respondent was irked by his
failure to sit even for a single moment in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because of our
objection. The publicity given to our objection has exposed the illegality of respondent's
designation made by the Senate President as, under section 11 of Article VI of the
Constitution, the power to choose Senators for the Electoral Tribunal belongs to the Senate,
and not to its presiding officer. At the bar of public opinion, the Senate President and
respondent appeared either to be ignorant of the Constitution or to be bent on flagrantly
violating it.
5. Respondent is the number of the bill which was enacted into Republic Act No. 53, but the
purposes of his bill were thwarted by an amendment introduced by the Senate, denying
the privilege granted therein when in conflict with the interest of the Senate. Respondent's
bill was for an absolute privilege. Because the majority decision of the Supreme Court had
made his failure patent, respondent took occasion to give vent to his grudge against the
Supreme Court, wherein, of the 15 cases he had since liberation, he lost all except three,
as can be seen in the records of the following cases:
L-23, Filomena Domiit Cabiling vs. The Prison Officer of
the Military Prison of Quezon City LOST
L-212, Narcisa de la Fuente vs Fernando Jugo, etc. et al. WON
L-247, Monsig. Canilo Diel vs. Felix Martinez, etc. et al. WON
LOST
L-301, In the matter of the petition of Carlos Palanca to
(As amicus
be admitted a Citizen of the Philippines
curiae
L-307, Eufemia Evangelista et al. vs. Rafael Maninang LOST
L-599, Amalia Rodriguez vs. Pio E. Valencia et al. LOST
L-1201, Vicente Sotto vs. Tribunal del Pueblo et al. LOST
 L-1287, Ong Sit vs. Edmundo Piccio et al. LOST
L-1365, Vitaliano Jurado vs. Marcelo Flores LOST
L- 1509, Tagakotta Sotto vs. Francisco Enage LOST
L-1510, Bernarda Ybaez de Sabido et al. vs. Juan V.
Borromeo et al. LOST
L-1938, Vicente Sotto vs. Crisanto Aragon et al. WON
L-1961, The People of the Philippines vs. Antonio de los
Reyes LOST
L-2041, Quirico Abeto vs. Sotero Rodas LOST
L-2370, Voltaire Sotto vs. Rafael Dinglasan et al. LOST
Upon the records of his previous cases in 1918 and of these proceedings, it is inevitable to
conclude that we have before us the case of an individual who has lowered himself to
unfathomable depths of moral depravity, a despicable habitual liar, unscrupulous vilifier
and slanderer, unrepented blackguard and blackmailer, shameful and shameless libeler,
unmindful of the principles of decency as all hardened criminals. He is a disgrace to the
human species. He is a shame to the Senate.
Aghast at the baseness of his character, we felt, at first blush, the impulse of acquitting
him, as his contemptible conduct, culminating in the press statement in question, seemed
compatible only with the complete irresponsibility of schizophrenics, idiots, or those
suffering from doddery.
His repeated press releases in which he tried to focus public attention to the most
harmless part of his statement, wherein he accuses the majority of the Supreme Court of
incompetency or narrow-mindedness, have shown, however, that respondent is not
completely devoid of personal responsibility, as he is aware that he has no possible
defense for alleging that the members of the Supreme Court have committed "blunders
and injustices deliberately," for which reason he has widely publicized his expectation that
he will be sentenced in this case to imprisonment, a penalty that, by his repeated public
utterances, he himself gives the impression that he is convinced he deserves.
Verily he deserves to be sentenced to six months imprisonment, the maximum allowed by
Rule 64, and such penalty would not be heavy enough because of the attendance of
several aggravating circumstances, namely, the falsehoods he resorted to in this case, his
insolence after he was cited for contempt, the fact that he is a lawyer and a Senator, the
fact that he has already been sentenced to imprisonment for falsely libeling three private
individuals, the fact that more than 30 years ago he had been disbarred as a blackmailer,
the fact that more than 40 years ago he was sentenced to be jailed for more than 4 years
as an abductor. The majority of this Court has sentenced a young and humble
newspaperman to 30 days imprisonment only for refusing to answer a question. The
offense committed by respondent is much graver than a mere refusal to answer a
question.
We concur, however, in the decision imposing upon respondent a fine of P1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment and ordering him to show cause why he should not be completely
deprived of the privilege of practicing the profession of a lawyer. High reasons of humanity
restrained us from sending respondent to prison, unless he should voluntarily choose to
enter therein, instead of paying the fine. He is old and, according to his physician, suffering
from myologenous leukemia with moderately severe anemia, requiring absolute and
avoidance of any from of mental and physical strain, and we do not wish to endanger
respondent's life by sending him to prison, and thus causing him the mental and physical
strains which his physician advised him to avoid. Although the continued existence of
respondents is more harmful than beneficial to our Republic and to human society, we
have to be consistent with our abidance by the injunction of the Sermon on the Mount:
"Thou shalt not kill." (Matth., Chapter 5, paragraph 21.) Although their segregation from
the society of decent men is advisable because of the dangers of corruptive contamination,
even the lives of moral lepers have to be spared. After all, the heaviest punishment for an
evildoer is the inherent stigma of shame of his evildoings.
Let it be clear that we are not punishing respondent because we want to curtail his
freedom of the press, but because of his wanton interference in the independence of the
Supreme Court his overt attempt to deprive us of our freedom of judgment in a pending
case, his swashbuckling bravado to intimidate the members of this Court to sway their
decision in favor of a litigant.
The freedom of the press is not in the least involved in these proceedings. The offensive
statements has not been published by respondent as a newspaperman, editor or journalist.
He does not appear to be a member of the staff of any one of the newspapers which
published his statement. We did not even molest said newspapers. Their editors have not
been cited for contempt. We did not interfere with their freedom to publish the scurrilous
statement.
If respondent has not attempted by his browbeating to undermine and overthrow the very
foundations of our judicial system and actually sought to defeat and miscarry the
administration of justification in a pending litigation, we would certainly have abstained
from summoning him merely for criticizing, insulting and slandering the members of the
Court. After all his reputation for lack of veracity, malice and unscrupulosity is well-known
in official records branding him with the indelible stigma of infamy.
His blatant posing, therefore, in this case as a martyr for the freedom of the press, as part
of his systematic campaign of falsehoods and slanders directed against the Supreme
Court, is an imposture that only ignorants, blockheads and other mental pachyderms can
swallow.
It takes too much effrontery for such a character as respondent to pose as a martyr and no
less than for the sake of a sacred cause, the freedom of the press, which no one has no
much dishonored with his blackmailing practices and by his long list of cases in the courts
of justice, starting as far back as 1901. (Julia vs. Sotto, 2 Phil., 247; U. S. vs. Sotto, 9 Phil.,
231; In re Sotto, 38 Phil., 532; U. S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil., 666; R.G. No. 201; U. S. vs. Sotto,
R.G. No. 11067; U. S. vs. Sotto, R.G. No. 14284; U. S. vs. Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 16004;
People vs. Vicente Sotto, R.G. No. 23643.)
Respondent belongs to that gang of unprincipled politicians headed by a Senate President
who trampled down the popular will by the arbitrary and unconstitutional suspension of
Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192), who issued the false
certification as to the voting of the congressional resolution regarding the infamous Parity
Amendment, thus perpetrating falsification of public document (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito,
78 Phil., 1), who muzzled the people by ordering, in usurpation of executive powers mayors
all over the country not to allow the holding of public meetings which the opposition had
organized to denounce the frauds in the elections of November 11, 1947 (Cipriano C.
Primicias, as General Campaign Manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties vs. Valeriano E.
Fugoso, as Mayor of the City of Manila, 80 Phil., 71) who wantonly violated the Constitution
by interfering with the management of the funds of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(Suanes vs. The Chief Accountant of the Senate, 81 Phil., 819), who, again in violation of
the fundamental law, usurped the exclusive powers of the Senate when he designated
respondent to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and who crowned his misdeeds by
enunciating on Saturday, January 15, 1949, the most immoral political philosophy that of
open toleration of rackets, graft and corruption in public office.
According to Rizal, the victims immolated in the altar of great ideals, to be acceptable,
have to be noble, spotless and pure. They should, therefore, be as noble and pure as
Socrates, Christ, Joan of Arc, Lincoln, Bonifacio, Mabini, Gandhi and Rizal himself. Then and
only then will martyrdom be hallowed and glorified because it is will worthy of the effulgent
grandeur of sacred ideals. "Hate never produces anything but monsters and crime
criminals!" Love alone realizes wonderful works, virtue alone can save! Redemption
presupposes virtue, virtue sacrifice, and sacrifice love! Pure and spotless must the victim
be that the sacrifice may be acceptable!" (El Filibusterismo.)
Respondent complains in his answer that he is not accorded fair dealing because the writer
of this opinion has not abstained from taking part in this case. The complaint is absolutely
groundless. It is based on two false premises, concocted by respondent to make it appear
that he is a victim of persecution, and on a conclusion, also false, because based on the
two false premises.
Respondent alleges that there are pending in the Supreme Court certain charges he filed
against the writer and that the undersigned is the "moving spirit" behind these
proceedings. Both trump-up allegations are false, and the Supreme Court has declared it to
be so in its resolution of December 13, 1948.
The records of the Supreme Court show that no such charges have been filed. Respondent
ought to know, if he can read and understand the Constitution, that if he has any charge to
file against a justice of the Supreme Court to seek his ouster, he has to file it with the
House of Representatives, the only agency authorized by the fundamental law to institute
impeachment proceedings.
If the House of Representatives should institute it, the respondent will have the opportunity
to sit in judgment as a senator as, under the Constitution, the Senate is the sole tribunal on
cases of impeachment.
No justice with full sense of responsibility should commit a dereliction of official duty by
inhibiting himself in a case upon imaginary or fabricated grounds. The members of the
Supreme Court are not such moral weaklings as to easily yield to dishonest appeals to a
false sense of delicacy. A cowardly surrender to groundless challenges of unscrupulous
parties is unbecoming to a judge, and much more to a Justice of the Highest Tribunal of the
Republic.
It is true that, after respondent had failed to sit in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, because
we objected to the designation issued to him by Senate President Avelino on constitutional
grounds, he requested the Chief Justice to relieve us one of the members of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and respondent would make it appear that for his move we are
prejudiced against him.
He is absolutely wrong. His request to the Chief Justice did not disturb us the least. The
Constitution does not grant anyone the power to oust, replace, or dismiss any member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, judicial or senatorial, during his term of office in the Tribunal.
Although an illegal substitution has been made once in the case of Senators Sebastian and
Cuenco, such precedent did not make constitutional what is unconstitutional, and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court has made clear his stand to uphold the Constitution by
stating it in black and white in the decision he penned in the Suanes case L-2460.
Respondent's failure was so obvious for us to mind his move.
After all, should we waste time and energy by entertaining any kind of prejudice against
respondent, when there are so many great minds, beautiful characters, and wonderful
personalities that are demanding our attention and whose spiritual companionship makes
life enjoyable?
If we had entertained any prejudice against respondent, we would have meted out to him
the penalty of imprisonment which he well deserves ,without minding the ill consequences
it may entail to his health and life and without heeding the promptings of our pity and
sense of humanity. Fortunately, very many years have already elapsed since we acquired
the state of mind with which we can judge things and persons with an open and free
conscience, truly emancipated from the shackles of any prejudice. The hateful events
during the Japanese occupation were the best mycelium for spawning and the choicest
fertilizers for growing prejudices against Generals Yamashita and Homma, to the extent of
justifying any measure or action that would spell their doom. Immediate members of our
family and ourselves endured agonizing sufferings and some of our near relatives were
liquidated under their regime. But when Yamashita and Homma came to this Supreme
Court, seeking remedy against the absurdly iniquitous procedure followed by the military
commissions which tried them, so iniquitous that it closed to the Japanese generals all
chances of fair trial, no scintilla of prejudice precluded us from casting the lone vote
intended to give them the remedy and justice they sought for, notwithstanding the fact
that Yamashita and Homma, appeared, in the general consent of our people, to be
veritable monsters of cruelty and murder. Certainly, respondent would not pretend having
given us, if ever, stronger grounds for prejudice than Yamashita and Homma, or that he is
worse than both of them.
We are not to end this opinion without expressing our steadfast addiction to the following
propositions:
2. The freedom of the press includes the right to comment on pending judicial cases and
the right to criticize the public and private life of all public officers, without any exception.
3. The freedom of the press does not, however, safeguard any publication intended to bully
courts and judges in order to sway their judgment on pending cases, and such interference
and obstruction should be promptly and drastically checked for the sake of an effective
administration of justice.
4. Tribunal should be prompt in stopping the threatening and browbeating tactics of
swaggering political ruffians and cutthroats bend on thwarting the scale of justice, as the
opposing alternative to such a stern judicial attitude is surrendered to judicial anarchy.
5. Courts of justice annealed to face and ever ready to deal vigorously with attempts to
turn them into puppets of domineering would-be dictators are essential in maintaining the
reign of law and guaranteeing the existence of an orderly society.
This opinion has been written to modify and clarify our stand in concurring in the decision.

1. The independence of the judiciary from outside interference or obstruction is essential to

the effectively of its functions so that it can afford protection to fundamental rights
including the freedom of the press, against encroachments and illegal assaults.