Rolly Pentecostes vs. ATTY.

HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of

Court, Regional Trial Court, Kabacan,North Cotabato, respondents.
A.M. No. P-07-2337, August 3, 2007

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan (respondent), Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabacan, North Cotabato, stands administratively charged with grave
misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal
case which was placed under his care and custody.
The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn affidavit-complaint [1] filed on November 11,
2004 by Rolly Pentecostes (Pentecostes), the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered by
members of the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Mlang, North Cotabato from suspected carnappers against
whom a criminal case for carnapping, Criminal Case No. 1010, was lodged at Branch 22, RTC, Kabacan,
North Cotabato.
On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of Mlang, North Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to
respondent who acknowledged receipt thereof on August 1, 1995.
After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the motorcycle, the trial court issued an
Order[2] of November 15, 2000 for its release to Pentecostes.
Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to him. Respondent, however, told him to
wait and come back repeatedly from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.
In his Comment[3] filed on February 9, 2005, respondent gave the following explanation:

After the motorcycle was delivered to him by the Mlang chief of police on August 1, 1995, he requested Alex
Pedroso, a utility worker, to inspect the engine, chassis, and make, after which he issued an acknowledgement
receipt thereof.

He thereafter instructed Pedroso to bring the motorcycle to the Kabacan police station for which he (respondent)
prepared a receipt.

He and Pedroso visited and inspected the motorcycle every time a hearing on the criminal case was
conducted. When the court finally ordered the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes on November 15, 2000,
the latter refused to receive it, claiming that it was already cannibalized and unserviceable.

From that time on until 2003, Pentecostes harassed him, demanding that he be responsible for reconditioning
the vehicle. During the latter part of 2004, upon the advice of the executive judge, he accompanied Pentecostes
to the Kabacan police station only to discover that the motorcycle was missing.

As no explanation could be offered by then Kabacan police chief Nestor Bastareche for the loss, he prepared a
letter-complaint requesting for assistance in the recovery of the motorcycle and for the conduct of an
investigation. Pentecostes refused to sign the letter, however.

He later discovered that the turnover receipt attached to the record of the criminal case and the page of the
blotter where the turnover was recorded were missing. Hence, he submitted the sworn statements of
Pedroso[4] and SPO4 Alex Ocampo[5] who confirmed the transfer of the vehicle from his custody to that of the
Kabacan chief of police.

Belying respondents averments, Pentecostes, in his Rejoinder,[6] contended as follows:

The vehicle was in good running condition when it was delivered to respondent by police operatives[7] of Mlang.
Respondents act of passing the blame to the PNP of Kabacan was a clear case of hand washing as the records
showed that respondent was responsible for the safekeeping of the motorcycle. It was for this reason that he
(Pentecostes) refused to sign the letter to the chief of police of Kabacan protesting the loss. Moreover, the police
blotter of PNP Kabacan has no entry or record of the alleged turn over.

By Resolution of October 19, 2005,[8] this Court referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC,
Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation.

Then Executive Judge Francisco G. Rabang, Jr. of the RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato submitted on January 16,
2006 his findings and recommendation for the dismissal of the administrative complaint against respondent.[9]
In his report, Judge Rabang noted that Pentecostes denied any knowledge about the turnover of the motorcycle
to the PNP ofKabacan.

On the evidence for the defense, the investigating judge found that the motorcycle was delivered by the PNP of
Mlang, NorthCotabato to respondent who in turn transferred it to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabang, what remained an issue was the actual physical condition of the motorcycle when it was
turned over to the PNP of Kabacan. The judge noted that there was no proof of Pentecostes claim that the
vehicle was cannibalized from the time it was under respondents custody until its transfer to the PNP of
Kabacan.
In light of the peace and order situation in Kabacan in the late 1990s and in the early part of 2000 and the
absence of a suitable courthouse then, Judge Rabang believed that respondent had made a wise decision in
turning over the custody of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

To Judge Rabangs report and recommendation, Pentecostes filed a Motion for Reconsideration[10] in which he
assailed the conclusion that the motorcycle was no longer roadworthy and was already cannibalized when it was
delivered to the office of the clerk of court from the Mlang police station.

Moreover, Pentecostes maintained that the alleged turnover of the motorcycle to the police station of Kabacan
was irrelevant because the proper custodian of the vehicle was respondent who should be held responsible for
its eventual loss.

The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found the investigating judges recommendation to be sufficiently
supported by the evidence.[11]

The OCA thus concurred with Judge Rabangs recommendation for the dismissal of the complaint against
respondent, subject to certain qualifications with respect to the physical condition of the vehicle upon its
delivery to respondent and the latters lack of authority for the turn over of the vehicle to the PNP of Kabacan.

While the investigating judge found no evidence to show the actual condition of the motorcycle at the time it
was turned over to respondent, the OCA observed that the evidence presented during the investigation supported
a finding that the vehicle had missing parts when it was delivered to respondent.

From the testimony of Pentecostes witness SPO2 Servando Guadalupe, the OCA noted, the motorcycle was
loaded into a service vehicle for delivery to respondent. This fact, according to the OCA, could only mean that
the vehicle could not run by itself.

Although the OCA agreed with the investigating judge that the evidence sufficiently proved that the vehicle was
turned over to the PNP of Kabacan where it got lost, it noted that respondent failed to ask prior authority from
the trial court to transfer its custody. Only when respondent was having problems with Pentecostes did he bring
the matter to the attention of the executive judge, the OCA added.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent be reminded to secure prior authority from the court
before evidence is turned over to any authorized government office or agency and that he be warned to be more
careful to prevent any similar incident from arising in the future.

The finding of the OCA insofar as respondents lack of authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on
account of which respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct.

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and public property
committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court (now
Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving such evidence shall
have been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. The clerk shall safely keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and public
property committed to his charge, including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging to his
office.
From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with
the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case, barring
circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever the reason
was, respondent was mandated to secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle
from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records of Criminal Case No. 1010, [13] with
nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. This circumstance is viewed with disfavor as it reflects badly on the
safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to respondent as clerk of court.

With regard to the condition of the vehicle upon its delivery to respondent, the evidence indicates that it was
still serviceable when it was delivered by the Mlang police to respondent and at the time it was turned over by
respondent to the Kabacan police station. The Joint Affidavit[14] of SPO2 Guadalupe and Police Inspector
Romeo Banaybanay categorically stated that the motorcycle was in good running condition when they delivered
it to respondent. Later during his testimony, Guadalupe narrated that he was the the driver of the service jeep
while Chief Banaybanay was on board the motorcycle when the vehicle was turned over to respondent
on August 1, 1995.[15]

Even respondents following testimony that:

x x x when x x x [he] received the motorcycle for safekeeping, he immediately delivered together with Alex
Pedroso [sic] because it could be noted that respondent do[es] not know how to drive a motorcycle, I requested
x x x Alex Pedroso to accompany me and deliver [it] to [the] chief of police of Kabacan[16] (Italics supplied)

suggests that the vehicle was in running condition when respondent took and subsequently transferred its
custody to the Kabacan police.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial
system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. [17] Their duties
include the efficient recording, filing and management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

Clearly, they play a key role in the complement of the court and cannot be permitted to slacken on their jobs
under one pretext or another.[18] They cannot err without affecting the integrity of the court or the efficient
administration of justice.[19]

The same responsibility bears upon all court personnel in view of their exalted positions as keepers of public
faith.[20] The exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed upon court employees are reflective of the
premium placed on the image of the court of justice, and that image is necessarily mirrored in the conduct,
official or otherwise, of court personnel. [21] It becomes the imperative and sacred duty of everyone charged with
the dispensation of justice, from the judge to the lowliest clerk, to maintain the courts good name and standing
as true temples of justice.[22]

By transferring Pentecostes motorcycle without authority, respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty
of keeping it under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the consequences of his act or omission,
which is akin to misconduct.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of action; more particularly, it is an unlawful
behavior by the public officer.[23] The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by
substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

The Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series
of 1999) classifies simple misconduct as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension of One Month and One
Day to Six Months. Considering that this is respondents first offense and no taint of bad faith has been shown
by his actuations, a 15-day suspension without pay is deemed appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Clerk of Court Hermenegildo Marasigan, is found guilty of Simple Misconduct.
He isSUSPENDED for 15 days without pay, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Father Ranhilio C. Aquino vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua

AC No. 5095, November 28, 2007

DECISION

For our resolution is the letter-complaint dated August 3, 1999 of Father Ranhilio C. Aquino, then Academic
Head of the Philippine Judicial Academy, joined by Lina M. Garan and the other above-named complainants,
against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public in Cagayan.

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed as follows:
(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Joseph B. Acorda entering the same
as Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.
(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the Affidavit-Complaint of one Remigio B. Domingo entering
the same as Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional
Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in the Notarial Register of
Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200 executed on December 28, 1998; and that,
therefore, he could not have notarized Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the
two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of
his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C.Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.
The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil
Service Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein were Lina M. Garan and the other above-named
complainants. They filed with this Court a Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply to Respondents
Comment. They maintain that Atty. Pascuas omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.[1] On November 16, 1999, we granted their motion.[2]
Thereafter, we referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On April 21, 2003, the Office of the Bar Confidant issued its Report and Recommendation partly reproduced as
follows:
A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must
observe the utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement in the performance of their
duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such register, in chronological order, the nature of each
instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or
acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and shall also state on the
instrument the page or pages of his register on which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries (Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative Code).
Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the
manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article VI).
In the instant case, there is no question that the subject documents allegedly notarized by Atty. Pascua were not
recorded in hisnotarial register.
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the
case, Atty. Pascuacannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he
admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound by the acts of his
staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.
The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is
Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized
on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus,
Fr. Ranhilio and the other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty.Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary
Public, but also as a member of the Bar.
This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty. Pascua is the
affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be considered a disinterested
witness or party.
Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was submitted only when
Domingos affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the administrative case filed by
Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This circumstance lends credence to the submission of
herein complainants that Atty. Pascua ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on
December 10, 1998 and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both
documents are datedDecember 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.
A member of the legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the
confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession
(Maligsa v. Cabanting, 272 SCRA 409).
As a lawyer commissioned to be a notary public, Atty. Pascua is mandated to subscribe to the sacred duties
appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public interest.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct in his professional or private
capacity. The Court has invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty
or misconduct in the performance of their duties.
In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr. (325 SCRA 123), respondent lawyer was suspended from his Commission as Notary
Public for a period of one year for notarizing a document without affiants appearing before him, and for
notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories. The Court held that respondent lawyer
failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duties as a notary public.
In Arrieta v. Llosa (282 SCRA 248), respondent lawyer who certified under oath a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors were dead was suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6)
months, with a warning that another infraction would be dealt with more severely. In said case, the Court did
not impose the supreme penalty of disbarment, it being the respondents first offense.
In Maligsa v. Cabanting (272 SCRA 409), respondent lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, after being
found guilty of notarizing a fictitious or spurious document. The Court considered the seriousness of the offense
and his previous misconduct for which he was suspended for six months from the practice of law.
It appearing that this is the first offense of Atty. Pascua, a suspension from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months may be considered enough penalty for him as a lawyer. Considering that his offense is also a ground
for revocation of notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most respectfully recommended that the notarial commission of Atty. EDWIN
V. PASCUA, if still existing, be REVOKED and that he be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of six (6) months.[3]

After a close review of the records of this case, we resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of law
by the Office of the Bar Confidant. We find Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties
for failing to register in hisNotarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B.
Domingo.
Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose.[4] The term, however, does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intent.[5]
The penalty to be imposed for such act of misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa,[6] wherein Atty. Joel A. Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale
knowing that some of the vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act constitutes
misconduct and thus imposed upon him the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this
being his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[7] we revoked the notarial commission
of Atty. Mario G. Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six months for violating
theNotarial Law in not registering in his notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he
notarized. In Mondejar v. Rubia,[8] however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from the practice of law
was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for making a false declaration in the document she notarized.
In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascuas first offense, we believe that the imposition of a three-
month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for
revocation of notarialcommission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
will be dealt with more severely. Hisnotarial commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.
SO ORDERED.
Re: Non-disclosure Before the Judicial and Bar Council of the Administrative Case Filed Against Judge
Jaime V. Quitain, in His Capacity as the then Asst. Regional Director of the National Police Commission,
Regional Office XI, Davao City. JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
10, Davao City on May 17, 2003.[1] Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his
capacity as then Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183
dated April 10, 1995.
In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS)[2] submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001,
Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439, 22812, 22813,
and 22814) filed against him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case was
disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.
To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now
Court Administrator) requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s) dismissing the criminal
cases.[3] On even date, letters[4] were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents
relative to the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain, particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10,
1995 dismissing him from the service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the alleged
misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.[5]
In a letter[6] dated November 28, 2003, the NAPOLCOM furnished the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
a copy of A.O. No. 183 showing that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for Grave
Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for
reimbursement of expenses. A.O. 183 partly reads:
THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 183

DISMISSING FROM THE SERVICE ASSISTANT REGIONAL DIRECTOR JAIME VEGA QUITAIN,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 11

This refers to the administrative complaint against Jaime Vega Quitain, Assistant Regional Director, National
Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office No. 11, Davao City, for Grave Misconduct (Violation of
Art. 48, in relation to Arts. 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and Art. IX of the Civil Service Law) filed
by the NAPOLCOM.

xxxx

After circumspect study, I am in complete accord with the above findings and recommendation of the
NAPOLCOM.
It was established that the falsification could not have been consummated without respondents direct
participation, as it was upon his direction and approval that disbursement vouchers were prepared showing the
falsified amount. The subsequent endorsement and encashment of the check by respondent only shows his
complete disregard for the truth which per se constitutes misconduct and dishonesty of the highest order. By any
standard, respondent had manifestly shown that he is unfit to discharge the functions of his office. Needless to
stress, a public office is a position of trust and public service demands of every government official or
employee, no matter how lowly his position may be, the highest degree of responsibility and integrity and he
must remain accountable to the people. Moreover, his failure to adduce evidence in support of his defense is a
tacit admission of his guilt. Let this be a final reminder to him that the government is serious enough to [weed
out] misfits in the government service, and it will not be irresolute to impose the severest sanction regardless of
personalities involved. Accordingly, respondents continuance in office becomes untenable.
WHEREFORE, and as recommended by the NAPOLCOM, Assistant Regional Director Jaime Vega Quitain is
herebyDISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of pay and benefits, effective upon receipt of a copy
hereof.

Done in the City of Manila, this 10th day of April in the year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and ninety-five.
(Sgd. by President Fidel V. Ramos)

By the President:
(Sgd.)
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.
Executive Secretary[7]
In a letter[8] dated October 22, 2003 addressed to DCA Lock, Judge Quitain denied having committed any
misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his interview, the members thereof only inquired about
the status of the criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and not about the
administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He also alleged that he never received from the Office of
the President an official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
Thereafter, DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10) days from notice why he did not
include in his PDS, which was sworn to before a notary public on November 22, 2001, the administrative case
filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.[9]
In his letters[10] dated March 13, 2004 and June 17, 2004, respondent explained that during the investigation of
his administrative case by the NAPOLCOM Ad Hoc Committee, one of its members suggested to him that if he
resigns from the government service, he will no longer be prosecuted; that following such suggestion, he
tendered his irrevocable resignation from NAPOLCOM on June 1, 1993[11] which was immediately accepted by
the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Governments; that he did not disclose the case in his PDS
because he was of the honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case by reason of his
resignation; that his resignation amounted to an automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that
the issues raised therein became moot and academic; and that had he known that he would be dismissed from
the service, he should not have applied for the position of a judge since he knew he would never be appointed.
Finding reasonable ground to hold him administratively liable, then Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco,
Jr. (now a member of this Court) and then DCA Lock submitted a Memorandum [12] dated September 3, 2004 to
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., which states:
In order that this Office may thoroughly and properly evaluate the matter, we deemed it necessary to go over the
records of the subject administrative case against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, particularly the matter that pertains to
Administrative Order No. 183 dated 10 April 1995. On 15 May 2004, we examined the records of said
administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM, Legal Affairs Service, and secured certified [true] copies of
pertinent documents.
After careful perusal of the documents and records available, including the letters-explanations of Judge Jaime
V. Quitain, this Office finds that there are reasonable grounds to hold him administratively liable.
An examination of the Personal Data Sheet submitted by Judge Quitain with the Judicial and Bar Council,
which was subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public Bibiano M. Bustamante of Davao City on 22
November 2001, reveals that he concealed material facts and even committed perjury in having answered
yes to Question No. 24, but without disclosing the fact that he was dismissed from the government
service. Question No. 24 and his answer thereto are hereunder quoted as follows:
24. Have you ever been charged with or convicted of or otherwise imposed a sanction for the violation of
any law, decree, ordinance or regulation by any court, tribunal or any other government office, agency or
instrumentality in the Philippines or in any foreign country or found guilty of an administrative offense or
imposed any administrative sanction? [ / ] Yes [ ] No. If your answer is Yes to any of the questions, give
particulars.
But all dismissed (acquitted)
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439
Date of [Dismissal] August 2, 1995
Sandiganbayan Criminal Cases Nos. 22812, 22813, 22814
Date of [Dismissal] July 17, 2000

As borne out by the records, Judge Quitain deliberately did not disclose the fact that he was dismissed from the
government service.At the time he filled up and submitted his Personal Data Sheet with the Judicial and Bar
Council, he had full knowledge of the subject administrative case, as well as Administrative Order No. 183
dismissing him from the government service. Based on the certified documents secured from the Office of the
NAPOLCOM, the following data were gathered:
1. In compliance with the Summons dated 19 March 1993, signed by Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado,
Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee of the NAPOLCOM, Judge Jaime V. Quitain, through Atty. Pedro S. Castillo,
filed his Answer (dated 29 March 1993) to the administrative complaint lodged against him by the Napolcom;
2. On 30 March 1993, Judge Quitain received a copy of the Notice of Hearing of even date, signed by Mr.
Canonizado, in connection with the formal hearing of the subject administrative case scheduled on 30 April
1993;
3. Administrative Order No. 183, dismissing Judge Quitain from the service, was dated 10 April 1995. On 18
April 1995, newspaper items relative to the dismissal of Judge Quitain were separately published in
the Mindanao Daily Mirror and in the Mindanao Times, the contents of which read as follows:
Mindanao Times:
Dismissed NAPOLCOM chief airs appeal
Former National Police Commission (Napolcom) acting regional director Jaime Quitain yesterday appealed for
understanding to those allegedly behind his ouster from his post two years ago. Quitain, who was one of the
guests in yesterdays Kapehan sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal
from government service.
Quitain claimed that after Secretary Luis Santos resigned from the Department of Interior and Local
Governments in 1991, a series of administrative charges were hurled against him by some regional employees.
I was dismissed from the Napolcom Office without due process, Quitain said.
He also said he had no idea as to who the people (sic) are behind the alleged smear campaign leveled against
him.
Whoever is behind all this, I have long forgiven you. My only appeal to you, give me my day in court, give me
the chance to clear my name, the only legacy that I can leave to my children, Quitain said in his statement.
It is my constitutional right to be present in all proceedings of the administrative case, he also said.
Quitain was appointed Assistant Regional Director of Napolcom in 1991 by then President Corazon Aquino
upon the recommendation of Secretary Santos. He was later designated Napolcom acting regional director for
Region XI.
Mindanao Daily Mirror:
Quitain vows to clear name

Former assistant regional director Jaime Quitain of the National Police Commission (Napolcom) vowed
yesterday to clear his name in court from charges of tampering with an official receipt.
Quitain[,] who is running for a council seat, expressed confidence that he would soon be vindicated in court
against the group that plotted his ouster from office: He said his only appeal was for Interior and Local
Government Secretary Rafael Alunan to grant him his day in court to answer the charges.
Whoever was behind all of these things, I have long forgiven them, Quitain said.
Just give me the chance to clear my name because this is the only legacy that I can give my children, Quitain
said.
While the records of the subject administrative case on file with the NAPOLCOM Office does not bear proof of
receipt of Administrative Order No. 183 by Judge Quitain, the same does not necessarily mean that he is totally
unaware of said Administrative Order. As shown by the above-quoted newspaper clippings, Judge Quitain even
aired his appeal and protest to said Administrative Order.
xxxx
Judge Quitain asseverated that he should not have applied with the JBC had he known that he was
administratively charged and was consequently dismissed from the service since he will not be considered. But
this may be the reason why he deliberately concealed said fact. His claim that he did not declare the
administrative case in his Personal Data Sheet because of his honest belief that there is no administrative or
criminal case that would be filed against him by reason of his resignation and the assurance made by the
NAPOLCOM that no administrative case will be filed, does not hold water. It is rather absurd for him to state
that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM amounts to an automatic dismissal of whatever administrative case
filed against him because when he resigned and relinquished his position, the issues raised therein became moot
and academic. He claims that he did not bother to follow up the formal dismissal of the administrative case
because of said belief. All these are but futile attempts to exonerate himself from administrative culpability in
concealing facts relevant and material to his application in the Judiciary. As a member of the Bar, he should
know that his resignation from the NAPOLCOM would not obliterate any administrative liability he may have
incurred[,] much less, would it result to the automatic dismissal of the administrative case filed against him. The
acceptance of his resignation is definitely without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative case filed
against him. If such would be the case, anyone charged administratively could easily escape from administrative
sanctions by the simple expedient of resigning from the service. Had it been true that Judge Quitain honestly
believes that his resignation amounts to the automatic dismissal of his administrative case, the least he could
have done was to personally verify the status thereof. He should not have relied on the alleged assurance made
by the NAPOLCOM.

On the strength of his misrepresentation, Judge Quitain misled the Judicial and Bar Council by making it appear
that he had a clean record and was qualified to join the Judiciary. His prior dismissal from the government
service is a blot on his record, which has gone [worse] and has spread even more because of his concealment of
it. Had he not concealed said vital fact, it could have been taken into consideration when the Council acted on
his application. His act of dishonesty renders him unfit to join the Judiciary, much less remain sitting as a
judge. It even appears that he was dismissed by the NAPOLCOM for misconduct and dishonesty.
Thus, the OCA recommended that: (1) the instant administrative case against respondent be docketed as an
administrative matter; and (2) that he be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any
position in the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all
retirement benefits except accrued leave credits.
Respondent was required to Comment.[13]
In compliance with the Courts Resolution respondent filed his Comment [14] contending that before he filed his
application for RTC Judge with the JBC, he had no knowledge that he was administratively dismissed from the
NAPOLCOM service as the case was secretly heard and decided. He averred that:
1. Being a religious lay head and eventually the Pastoral Head of the Redemptorist Eucharistic Lay Ministry in
Davao City and the surrounding provinces, he was recruited as one of the political followers of then Mayor Luis
T. Santos of Davao City, who later became the Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government
(DILG) and was instrumental in his appointment as Assistant Regional Director of the National Police
Commission, Region XI;

2. After Secretary Luis T. Santos was replaced as DILG Secretary, the political followers of his successor, who
were the same followers involved in the chain of corruption prevalent in their department, began quietly
pressing for his (Quitain) resignation as Assistant Regional Director;

3. Finding difficulty in attacking his honesty and personal integrity, his detractors went to the extent of filing
criminal charges against him;
4. Before these criminal charges were scheduled for trial, he was being convinced to resign in exchange for the
dismissal of said criminal charges, but when he refused to do so, he was unjustifiably detailed or exiled at the
DILG central office in Manila;
5. Upon his exile in Manila for several months, he realized that even his immediate superiors cooperated with
his detractors in instigating for his removal. Hence, upon advice of his relatives, friends and the heads of their
pastoral congregation, he resigned from his position in NAPOLCOM on condition that all pending cases filed
against him, consisting of criminal cases only, shall be dismissed, as in fact they were dismissed;
6. From then on he was never formally aware of any administrative case filed against him. Hence, when he
submitted his Personal Data Sheet before the Judicial and Bar Council in support of his application as RTC
judge, he made the following answer in Question No. 23:
23. Is there any pending civil, criminal, or administrative (including disbarment) case or complaint filed against
you pending before any court, prosecution office, any other office, agency or instrumentality of the government,
or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines?
He could only give a negative answer since there was no pending administrative case filed against him that he
knows;
7. Had he known that there was an administrative case filed against him he would have desisted from applying
as a judge and would have given his full attention to the said administrative case, if only to avoid ensuing
embarrassment; and
8. The filing of the administrative case against him as well as the proceedings had thereon and the decision
rendered therein, without his knowledge, could have probably occurred during his exile period when he was
detailed indefinitely in Manila. The proceedings had in the said administrative case are null and void since he
was denied due process.

Respondents Comment was submitted to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.[15]

OCA submitted its Memorandum[16] dated August 11, 2005 stating therein that it was adopting its earlier
findings contained in its Memorandum dated September 3, 2004. Based on the documents presented, it can not
be denied that at the time Judge Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No. 183
dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge Quitains explanations in his Comment are but
mere reiterations of his allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its recommendation
that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits.
The Court fully agrees with the disquisition and the recommendation of the OCA.
It behooves every prospective appointee to the Judiciary to apprise the appointing authority of every matter
bearing on his fitness for judicial office, including such circumstances as may reflect on his integrity and
probity. These are qualifications specifically required of appointees to the Judiciary by Sec. 7(3), Article VIII of
the Constitution.[17]
In this case, Judge Quitain failed to disclose that he was administratively charged and dismissed from the
service for grave misconduct per A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 by no less than the former President of
the Philippines. He insists that onNovember 26, 2001 or before he filed with the JBC his verified PDS in
support of his application for RTC Judge, he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183; and that he was denied due
process. He further argues that since all the criminal cases filed against him were dismissed on August 2,
1995 and July 17, 2000, and considering the fact that he resigned from office, his administrative case had
become moot and academic.
Respondents contentions utterly lack merit.
No amount of explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was dismissed from the service
and that he deliberately withheld this information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183 is
belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal. It bears emphasis that in the Mindanao
Times dated April 18, 1995,[18] Judge Quitain stated in one of his interviews that I was dismissed from the
(Napolcom) office without due process. It also reads: Quitain, who was one of the guests in yesterdays Kapehan
sa Dabaw, wept unabashedly as he read his prepared statement on his dismissal from the government
service. Neither can we give credence to the contention that he was denied due process. The documents
submitted by the NAPOLCOM to the OCA reveal that Commissioner Alexis C. Canonizado, Chairman Ad
Hoc Committee, sent him summons on March 19, 1993 informing him that an administrative complaint had
been filed against him and required him to file an answer.[19] Then on March 29, 1993, respondent, through his
counsel, Atty. Pedro Castillo, filed an Answer.[20] In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard, or an opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral
arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[21] Furthermore, as we have earlier
mentioned and which Judge Quitain ought to know, cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant
the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it
render said administrative case moot and academic. [22] Judge Quitain was removed from office after
investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal from the service is a clear proof of his
lack of the required qualifications to be a member of the Bench.
More importantly, it is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his bid to gain an exalted position
in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Estacion, Jr.,[23] this Court stressed:

x x x The important consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority and this Court
of the pending criminal charges against him to enable them to determine on the basis of his record,
eligibility for the position he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not contain the
important information in question because he deliberately withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of
candor is as obvious as his reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew would have been
taken into account against him if it had been disclosed.

Thus, we find respondent guilty of dishonesty. Dishonesty means disposition to lie, cheat or defraud;
unworthiness; lack of integrity.[24]
Section 8(2), Rule 140[25] of the Rules of Court classifies dishonesty as a serious charge. Section 11, same Rules,
provides the following sanctions:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations. Provided, however, That the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave
credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or
3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
In Re: Inquiry on the Appointment of Judge Enrique A. Cube,[26] we held:
By his concealment of his previous dismissal from the public service, which the Judicial and Bar Council would
have taken into consideration in acting on his application, Judge Cube committed an act of dishonesty that
rendered him unfit to be appointed to, and to remain now in, the Judiciary he has tarnished with his falsehood.
WHEREFORE, Judge Enrique A. Cube of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED with
prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits. This decision is immediately executory.
We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on the part of all those who are in the service of the
Judiciary.[27] We have often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the
lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility as to let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We condemn, and will never
countenance any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the administration of justice,
which would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just tend to diminish the faith of the
people in the Judiciary.[28]
Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme
penalty of dismissal.
However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice
stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City.Acting on said letter, the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable
resignation of Judge Jaime V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of the
administrative case.[29]
Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the Court without prejudice does not render
moot and academic the instant administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of the filing of
the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that the respondent judge by his resignation and its
consequent acceptance without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the pendency of this
case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges
against him. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful and dangerous
implications.[30] Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under the situation.[31]
WHEREFORE, in view of our finding that JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of grave misconduct which
would have warranted his dismissal from the service had he not resigned during the pendency of this
case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It appearing that he has yet to apply for his
retirement benefits and other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE of all benefits,
except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY
DISQUALIFIED from reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or agency of the
government, including government-owned and/or controlled corporations.
This Decision is immediately executory.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Judge Jaime V. Quitains 201 File.
SO ORDERED.

Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia

Admin Case No. 2984, August 31, 2007

RESOLUTION

NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with plea for reinstatement in the
practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia (Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the
practice of law for fifteen years.

The antecedent facts that led to Mejias disbarment are as follows.

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property belonging to
Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the
registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo (Annex P,
par. 51, complainants affidavit dates October 4, 1989);

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardos favor
(Annex Q, par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo
in the amount ofP50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently
funded.[1]
On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the [sic] respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges
against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT. Pending finality of this judgment, and
effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this
Decision be spread in his record in the Bar Confidants Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, as well as the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of
this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the practice of law. On July 6,
1999, the Supreme Court En Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.

On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea
for reinstatement in the practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.[2]

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion
of the Court. The action will depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly
and impartial administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicants reentry as a
counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration
the applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which
he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.[3]

In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed
since Mejias name was dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for
forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and he has suffered enough.
Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the indignity that they have
suffered due to his disbarment.

After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication containing his religious and social
writings. He also organized a religious organization and named it El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle
of Heart and Mind.

The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with the
severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also
cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the
length of time during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a
petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in
1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned
his lesson from this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose.After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to
correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to
practice law.[4]

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F.
Mejia is hereby GRANTED.

SO ORDERED.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-796-RTJ) v.s Hon. Vicente
A . Pacquing A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831, February 2, 2007
In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the
payment of the amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at
public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.

In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 [1] to
annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared the foreclosure void
and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed with modification the trial
courts decision and remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and determination of the
replacement value of the properties should petitioner fail to return them. The CA decision became final and
executory on February 10, 1988.

When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent
Judge Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed properties.
Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be permitted to present evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the
trial court directed petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. This order became final on April 24,
1995.

Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado,
went on AWOL and never informed it of respondent judges order.[2] This motion, treated as petition for relief
from judgment by respondent judge, was dismissed on January 16, 1997.[3]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) but respondent judge denied the same on April 23, 1998.

Petitioner then instituted a special civil action for certiorari in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
47669[4] assailing the court a quos denial of its petition for relief from judgment. The CA, however, dismissed
CA-G.R. SP No. 47669 for having been filed out of time as three years had elapsed since the order awarding
Bengson P31 million as costs of suit became final and executory.[5]

Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was pending resolution at the CA, respondent judge,
on December 16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay Bengson the P31 million.
[6]
Pursuant thereto, respondent Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Baez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ
and levied on petitioners shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation (SMC) worth P6.2 million. The garnished
shares were later sold at public auction with Bengson as the only bidder.

Aggrieved, petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt from
garnishment, levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291. [7] Respondent judge denied the motion stating
that only funds and properties that were necessary to maintain petitioners actuarial solvency, like contributions
of GSIS members, were exempt from garnishment, levy and execution under RA 8291.[8]

Petitioner filed its MR of the trial courts denial of its motion to quash the writ but this was rejected as well.

Via a special civil action for certiorari with an urgent motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or restraining order (TRO), petitioner came to us questioning the garnishment and sale on execution of its
SMC shares. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 136874.[9]

We referred G.R. No. 136874 to the CA for consideration and adjudication on the merits. In the CA, it was re-
docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 51131 and was consolidated with CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669.[10]

Later, the CA dismissed both petitions.[11]

Petitioner questioned the CAs dismissal of CA-G.R. SP. No. 47669 via a petition for review in this Court
docketed as G.R. No. 137448,[12] the ultimate issue of which was the existence of grounds for relief from
the P31 million costs of suit judgment by respondent judge.

Later, petitioner filed another case, a special civil action for certiorari in this Court, this time contesting the CAs
dismissal of its petition in CA-G.R. No. 51131. Docketed as G.R. No. 141454, [13] the petition ascribed grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CA for upholding the trial courts issuance of the alias writ of execution
and the subsequent garnishment and sale of its shares in SMC.
Petitioner also filed this administrative complaint [14] against respondents for ignorance of the law, bias and
partiality, and for violation of RA 8291. In its complaint, petitioner alleged:
In fine, [respondent judge] refused to take cognizance of [Section 39, RA 8291]. He refused to await an
authoritative and definitive resolution of the issues [on the exemption of GSISs funds and properties] from
execution or the issue of whether GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment of his [P]31 million peso cost[s] of
suit. [H]e was in a hurry, as Bengson, to execute the P31 million costs of suit[O]n the other hand, Sheriff Mario
Anacleto M. Baez, seemed to have the same objective when he refused to take heed of [GSISs request] to hold
in abeyance the execution sale on the basis of Section 39 (RA 8291).

The foregoing only shows [respondent judges] deliberate disregard of the express provisions of [RA 8291],
specifically Section 39and his bias, given his exorbitant award for cost[s] of suit, bereft, as it is, of any legal
basis. It evidently reveals a malicious scheme that seriously undermines the very integrity and impartiality of
his court.

The same can be said of the acts of Sheriff Baez in garnishing and selling [GSISs shares of stock in SMC] to
Bengson, characterized by an unusual swiftness and in clear disregard of the express provision of Section 39,
RA 8291[15]

We referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation. In its report[16] to the Court, the OCA found nothing in the records to support petitioners
accusations against both respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that respondent judge erred in
interpreting RA 8291, such error did not constitute gross ignorance of the law. It added that the records also
failed to prove malice, fraud, dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing the assailed alias
writ of execution.
On petitioners allegations against respondent Atty. Baez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him liable
for failing to defer the execution of the writ.

The OCA then recommended the dismissal of petitioners complaint against respondents.[17]
On petitioners motion, we referred the case to the CA for further investigation. It was assigned to Associate
Justice Roberto A. Barrios, who acted as investigating officer. Before a hearing on the case could be conducted,
respondent judge died.[18] The hearing proceeded but we withheld his benefits pending the completion of the
investigation of his case by Justice Barrios.

Subsequently, Justice Barrios submitted his report[19] to us agreeing with OCAs findings that petitioners
complaint against respondents was unfounded. According to Justice Barrios:

Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the Order of 16 December 1998 without
awaiting the resolution of [petitioners motion for reconsideration], and in holding that [its] properties are not
exempt from execution, these would not be errors that are gross and patent, or done maliciously, deliberately or
in evident bad faith. [Petitioner] has not presented proof to the contrary, which with the factual milieu would
call for administrative sanctions against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public policy, the acts of the judge in
his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge charged
with ignorance of [the] law can find refuge.[20]

He added that the filing of the administrative charges against respondents was premature because this Court at
that time had yet to decide G.R. No. 137448 and G.R. No. 141454. He thus recommended the dismissal of the
administrative charges against respondents.

On January 31, 2002,[21] we handed down our decision in the above cases nullifying the CAs resolutions
dismissing G.R. Nos. 51131[22] and 47669.[23] In the same decision, we set aside respondent judges January 16,
1997 order dismissing petitioners petition for relief from judgment and his April 23, 1998 order denying the
MR.[24]
Notwithstanding the nullification of respondent judges orders, we are adopting the findings and
recommendations of the OCA and Justice Barrios.

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must be gross or
patent.[25] To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or dishonesty. [26] That certainly does not appear to
be the case here as petitioners complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between
petitioner and respondent judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved. [27] Petitioner also proffered
no evidence that respondent judges acts were imbued with malice or bad faith.

In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against petitioner when he issued
the alias writ of execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not
supported by the records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years
from the finality of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was
not all tainted with undue haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the
issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right following the finality of said order. The rule is
that once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof
becomes a courts ministerial duty.[28]

Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act would still not merit
administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith. [29] Bad faith does not simply connote poor or flawed
judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.

Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand, petitioner should have demonstrated that respondent
judges decisions and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases other than what he had learned
from his study of the case. [30] Decisions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, although they appear
erroneous, are not necessarily partial as long as they are culled from the arguments and evidence of the parties.
[31]
The party who alleges partiality must prove it with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in that
aspect.

Interestingly, this Court, in our decision in G.R. Nos. 137448 and 141454, nullified the orders of respondent
judge only to give petitioner another chance to seek redress from the gross negligence and mistake of its then
counsel, Atty. Terrado. We did not at all declare respondent judges orders as erroneous or tainted with malice or
bad faith. In our decision, we said:

It is readily apparent that part of [petitioners] predicament stemmed from the negligence or mistake, to put it
mildly, of its former counsels.

Indeed, it is undisputed that despite ample opportunity, [petitioners] counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, did not
rebut BENGSONs evidence on the costs of suit or, at the very least, verify the schedule of costs and cross-
examine BENGSONs witnesses. Much worse, he allowed the 6 April 1995 Order awarding BENGSON P31
million costs of suit to attain finality by not filing a motion for reconsideration with the trial court or a petition
with the Court of Appeals. Instead, he went AWOL without informing petitioner of the said Order. These acts
constituted gross negligence, if not fraud, and resulted in the deprivation of petitioner of an opportunity to move
to reconsider or appeal the adverse order.

[A]s a general rule, the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client for otherwise there would be never
be no end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that the former
counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. But if under the circumstances of the case,
the rule deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors
must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and prevent miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court has the
power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice require it.

Moreover, the filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy for correcting the actions of a
judge perceived to have gone beyond the norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. [32] The actions
against judges should not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or substitute for, the judicial
remedies which can be availed of by a party in a case.[33]

Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez, the Court finds no basis to hold him liable for
executing the assailed writ at that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the execution
of judgment.[34] Charged with this task, he must act with considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise,
a judgment, if not executed at once, would just be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. [35] In
executing the writ, Atty. Baez merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the writ
or not.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and violation of RA 8291 against
the late Judge Vicente A. Pacquing and Atty. Mario Anacleto M. Baez, is hereby DISMISSED.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Office of the Court Administrator so that the benefits due the
late respondent judge can be promptly released to his heirs, unless there exists some other lawful cause to
withhold the same.

SO ORDERED.

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, vs. ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA AC No. 6697, July 25, 2006

Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and
Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty.
de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-
request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his
removal as Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the
national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation
on subject case,[1] summarized the antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or
disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following grounds:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by
the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter
No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to
have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San
Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429. Complainant alleged that the
respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade
the recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral
competence necessary to lead the countrys most noble profession.

Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation rule provided for in
Administrative Matter No. 491 when he transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the
respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to transfer of Chapter
Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next
IBP National President. Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP
National President.

Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned
Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against
him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon
by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to
Disqualify Atty. Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed
following the principle of res judicata.

On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in
support of their respective allegations.

Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence
showing respondents moral baseness, vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his
disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his clients money. Complainant
argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters
resignation and even if such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from
liability.

Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted
that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to schedule his
oath taking as IBP National President. A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May
2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing this Court with the IBPs
Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for
committing acts inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP
Board of Governors held on 14 January 2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the
IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed as Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described
Petition were herein respondent Governor and EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to
withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached to his letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January
2005 Resolution.[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as National
President, was filed. The same was subsequently consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed
against Atty. de Vera.[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10 th National IBP Convention at the CAP-
Camp John Hay Convention Center,Baguio City. It was at this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some
untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to withdraw the
Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from
assuming office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed
for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to
the IBP Board and the IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20 th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP
Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP
Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said Resolution:

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera

is REMOVED as a member of the IBP Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts
inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:

1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10 th National Convention of
Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the decision
of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, S.C.-R. 165108,
was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of thePhilippines;

2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of Governors
and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;

3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;

4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of Governors
in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;

5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of the
10thNational Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution, dated 25
January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that the IBP
National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect thereto, thus
compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.[11]

On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. a letter captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors;
Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and
Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of Governors in Less Than
Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation.[12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and
its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP
Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the minimum
standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially
when, as the incumbent Executive Vice President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National
President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x

I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:

1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint against me
was in writing.

2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after receipt of
the complaint.

3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.

4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I challenged Gov.
Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to testify under oath so I could be
questioned. My request was denied.

5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.

6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser, prosecutor, and
judge all at the same time.

7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his motion to
expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for another round of
voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me. [13] (Emphasis and underscoring in
original.)

On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP
Board explained to this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was
intended to protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board
were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP
Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end
in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the decision to withdraw
the PETITION.

(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP
National President in public or during the Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.

(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera
fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies
about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He deliberately and intentionally
did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate
and expose the IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.

(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the
members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning
names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi may mga
kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution,
withdrawing the petition, due to influence or pressure from the Supreme Court.[15]

The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last straw that broke
the camels back. He committed acts inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board
decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from
various IBP Chapters all condemning his expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board
held at theEDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13 June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of
the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor Pura Angelica Y. Santiago
was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]

On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago. [18] On 20 June 2005, Atty.
Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board. [19] Thus, on 25
June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the person of IBP Governor Jose
Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.

On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to
this Court Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty.
Salazars election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National President in the event that Atty. de
Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of
Governors and as EVP is approved by this Court. [21] Also on28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of
Atty. Salazar.[22]

In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual
or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued
that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then
his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the
minimum standards of due process of law.

Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the
speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate,
were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the IBP in general and
the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the
Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of
the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or
the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.

Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts Resolution
granting the withdrawal of the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed
that he made no such remarks.As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de Vera contended that the said
election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two
years from July 1 following their election until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors
shall have been duly chosen and qualified.

In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the
Executive Vice President, and in the event of death, resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice
President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of death,
resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of
Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the
period of disability.

Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with
the consent of the Board shall hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.[24]

To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are
removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only provides for the election of an Acting President and that no
mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is contrary to the
express provision of the IBP By-Laws.

Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come
from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47,
Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.

In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply
dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:

(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an
intractable member by virtue of Article VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;

(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his
disagreement with the IBP Boards position but because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP
Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;

(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free
Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;

(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of
due process. As the records would bear, Atty. de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP
Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the day before the
said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself
and his accuser, Gov. Rivera;

(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the
IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;

(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a)
the rotation rule under Article VII, Section 47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when
Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the rotation rule need not be
enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that

(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as
IBP National President.[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of
the Court:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED

MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF
CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF

ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND
BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS

BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.

IV.

WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]

The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we
will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.

In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:

To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded
on the following:

1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by
the State Bar inCalifornia; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative
Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).

It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the
respondent. Verily, these issues were already argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and
discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in Administrative Matter No.
6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).

As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:

As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in
California, which in turn compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring
for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the
records relied upon by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are
recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and the
final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in theCalifornia administrative case
has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction
was not considered by the investigating officer. xxx

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in
California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the
investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in
the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove
the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.

On the other hand, as regards the second issue:

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern
Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter.
He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP
post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De
Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

xxx

It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a
member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the
particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his preference that he
will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in
registering one's preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.

The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

xxx

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three
months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1
August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty.
Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was made effective sometime between 1
August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides
that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other
year.Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent
de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27
February 2003.

In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November
1996), this Court declared that:

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the
[Courts] administrative powers.

In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly
prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67
to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the respondent on the basis of the
same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the
same incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same
misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in
nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring court
personnel under the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a
lawyer under the Courts plenary authority over membersof the legal profession.

In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative
cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No.
RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:

While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial
justice to penalize respondent judge a second time for an act which he had already answered for.
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon,
Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie DelosReyes (Administrative Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this
Court held that:

Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes
dismissible.

xxx

Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be
deemed to have been finally and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties and for the same cause.It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of
the parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim,
demand, or cause of action.Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with
whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and should not be permitted to litigate it again.

This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious
trials. At the same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes
rights and promotes the rule of law.

In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved
by this Court in an earlier administrative case. The complainants contention that the principle of res
judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the
instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is
worthy to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or
disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but instead merely sought to
enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.[28]

Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in
the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute a bar to the filing of Adm.
Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical,
their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application
of res judicata.

In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely:
(1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must be a judgment or
order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of
subject matter, and identity of causes of action. [29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera
cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrat ive cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In
Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the
position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the subject matter is
his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras
alleged violation or circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of
action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to
prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as
clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de Veras suspension or
disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the
parties rights and obligations under the IBP By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the
disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground
to stand on. Likewise, we held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the
IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants were not - can file with the IBP President
a written protest against the candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for
pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the
administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him from the practice of
law for three years. We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for
IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should
emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]

What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring
otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any
person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through a petition for
disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer
concerned.

And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form
and substance, we have given it due course pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that
this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left for consideration is
whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence
submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not proof of
malpractice.

In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera,
[31]
we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is
concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the practice of law in said
foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the
foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the
practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in
connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment
for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three
years as he surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of
California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction
does not automatically result in his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his
suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a
Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the
foreign courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise
held that the judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

xxxx

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of
a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a] foreign judgment is
presumed to be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the
hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by
Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon which the recommendation by the
hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical
under Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the recommendation
of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for
a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary
agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or
suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of
the ground for disbarment or suspension.[33]

Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of
officers of the court and to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose
confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers cannot be restricted.[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives
a special and technical meaning to the term Malpractice. [36] That meaning is in consonance with the elementary
notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which
is unbecoming a member of that profession.[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed
then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius
Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis
(father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying
in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in
settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;[39]

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended
from the practice of law for three years;[40] and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme
Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his clients funds
as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing
officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.
By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has
impliedly admitted the use of the Willis funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera) received
US$12,000.00 intended for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a
separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.[42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. [43] It means such evidence which affords a
substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility is emphatic about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT
THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others
kept by him.

In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that

The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith,
loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the
protection of the client.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his
client that may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:

The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage
of the confidence reposed in him by his client.

Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer
should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with
his own or be used by him.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in
violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.

Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be
disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)

In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for personal use, he has
unwittingly sealed his own fate since this admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of
malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he himself
supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for
the latters son.Atty. de Vera also points out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before
the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.[46]
Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof
that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we
declared that

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that
degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.

Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified
that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the
admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from relying thereon. Besides, that
the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of
consent to the use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de
Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or
the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his
own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct and
unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he
belongs. For, it cannot be denied that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished
whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence. [48] Respondent violated his oath to
conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.

Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution. [49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law
for depositing the funds meant for his client to his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v.
Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52]Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the respondents were meted one year
suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00,
and P51,161.00, respectively, received by them for their clients without the latters permission.In Dumadag v.
Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly
sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the amount
involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground for his
suspension or disbarment

Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias and
Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the rotation rule as it was
made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a
resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground
for his disqualification for the post of IBP Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-
Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months immediately preceding any
chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of
unethical conduct or behavior. And while one may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be
ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that -- based on the
rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the
next term. Our Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish
lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such
goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC

To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be
addressed:

I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de
Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13 May 2005.

i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative

due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.

II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can
consequently assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.

The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor

We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to remove any of its
members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its
members, elective or otherwise, has for any reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by
resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to the approval of
the Supreme Court.

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the
remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.

In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by
majority vote, elect a successor from among the members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a
member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted
by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive
grounds. He argues that he was denied very basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even
in administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within reasonable time, the right to
present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to
cross-examine the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well
for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the
fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his inhibition
resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for
another round of voting so he could vote to support his own motion.
The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally
witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since
they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to refute and answer
all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and
that he was present at the Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of
the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[55] It
cannot be said that the position of EVP of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since
there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required to remove any member of
the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.
Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the
essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. [56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that
the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning for all purposes due to the very
nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not
susceptible of more than one general statement. [57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension, [58] because it
depends on circumstances and varies with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.[59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not always
essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in
administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no
particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical.Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The
constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter,
there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination
may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. What is required for
hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. [61] Nor is an actual hearing always
essential[62] especially under the factual milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose
shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed subject to the approval of the
Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when
the matter was taken up. From the transcript of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein
Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to defend himself against
the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the complaint against
him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera
likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting but when this resulted in the
defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary 2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time,
he voted in favor of his motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion
(including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it (including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive
absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of
the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the
remaining members.The phrase remaining members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant
member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested parties and are
thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera
and de Vera should be stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be
counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion while two voted against it which still adds
up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause

All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP Governor has
not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three consecutive absences from Board
meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues that it is vested with sufficient power and
authority to protect itself from an intractable member whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with
the IBP Board but due to various acts committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP
Board in particular and the IBP in general.
Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during
the Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP
Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right
to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.

After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP
Board was not capricious or arbitrary.

Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the
internal life of an organization, but especially of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.
However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside
its governing body for then there would be the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of
Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would accordingly
diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so
as to free it from the stresses that invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts
and disagreements within the group after the members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it
does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by a majority vote, the
dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the
governing board are deemed to implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the
authority of the board.[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations during the
10th National IBP Convention were detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP.
When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it cannot effectively perform its
duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as
improve the administration of justice.
In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board
who insists on bringing to the public his disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after
due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body will be negated if its
pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom
so that he could criticize in public the majority opinion/decision to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects
himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as
well

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal as EVP as
well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice
President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as
practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x

Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras
removal from the Board of Governors, automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist
otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since it was
rendered without grave abuse of discretion

While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over the IBP, [64] it is
axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of supervision of the Supreme Court over
the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its reasonable discretion especially in the administration of
its internal affairs governed by the provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and
promulgated so as to define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational
structure, and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in place,
the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day affairs, without the
Courts interference.
It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of
Governors. The members of the Board are elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as
delineated in its By-Laws.[65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in accordance with the will of the
majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal
interest or malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be
accorded the disputable presumption[66] of validity, which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by
substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any allegation and
substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of
discretion, we shall not be persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.
There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI,
Section 44[67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and
discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As has been
previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process
and the IBP Board acted well within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws.There being no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to interfere in the Boards resolution to
remove Atty. de Vera.
The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was conducted in
accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws

In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors in
holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty. de Vera as EVP of the IBP
since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of discretion, and implemented without
violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he
was also removed from his post as EVP; thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill vacancies,
however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the Integration Rule, [68] and
Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70] Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48
(other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of Office)[73]of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and
sufficient guidelines in its Rules and By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de
Vera. We have faith and confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining
members of the 2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-
Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the
term 2005-2007, was well within the authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws,
particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically become President for the
next succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should
succeed Atty. Cadiz as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the
members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M. No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP
EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the
question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar
on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP, upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP
Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region
pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors
from among the nine Regional Governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our
pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:
ORDER

xxxx

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec.
47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive
Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the
office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions . One
who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until
after the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the
rotation shall begin anew.

xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)

In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine
Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession
rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the position of IBP EVP,
while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but
a consequence of the automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP,
each of the nine IBP regions had already produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only
unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and EVP rendered it
impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been
completed despite the non-assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.

Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic
succession rule, but should be applied in harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP
leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend to pressing and urgent
matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period.
The time that an IBP EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a
valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It should also be pointed out that this
wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP
Board of Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in
the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the
demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor
Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the
2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of 2003-2005 in this case,
Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.

It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term
2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the members of the House of Delegates of the Eastern
Mindanao region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in 13 May 2005 was about a month before
the expiration of the term of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor
would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.

In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly indicate that the
rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.

It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency
should be assumed by a nominee from Eastern Mindanao region from where he comes, can not hold water. It
would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of experience
and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would
have.

We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty.
Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not
done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant
to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS,
effective from the finality of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of
Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts;

2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-
SC, praying for the disapproval of the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;

3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice
President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been
conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and

4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the
Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic
succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7204 March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Cynthia Advincula against respondent Atty. Ernesto M.
Macabata, charging the latter with Gross Immorality.
Complainant alleged the following:
Sometime on 1st week of December 2004 complainant [Cynthia Advincula] seek the legal advice of the
respondent [Atty. Macabata], regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. As promised, he sent
Demand Letter dated December 11, 2004 (copy attached as Annex "I") to the concerned parties.
On February 10, 2005, met (sic) at Zensho Restaurant in Tomas Morato, Quezon City to discuss the possibility
of filing the complaint against Queensway Travel and Tours because they did not settle their accounts as
demanded. After the dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step out of the car,
respondent hold (sic) her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced her very tightly.
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop in
West Avenue, Quezon City to finalize the draft of the complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting,
respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way, complainant was
wandering (sic) why she felt so sleepy where in fact she just got up from bed a few hours ago. At along
Roosevelt Avenue immediately after corner of Felipe St., in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City when she
was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold (sic) her face and kissed her lips while the
other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked (sic) succeeded in resisting his
criminal attempt and immediately manage (sic) to go (sic) out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him that she decided to refer the
case with another lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him. The communications transpired
was recorded in her cellular phone and read as follows:
Sent by complainant - forget the case. I decided to refer it with other
At 5:33:46 pm lawyer
 replied by respondent - "does this mean I can not c u anymore"
at 6:16:11 pm (Does this mean I cannot see you
anymore)
sent by complainant - I feel bad. I cant expect that u will take advantage
at 6:17:59 pm of the situation.
Follow-up message - wrong to kiss a girl especially in the lips if you
Sent by complainant dont have relationship with her.
At 6:29:30 pm
Replied by respondent - "Im veri sri. Its not tking advantage of the
At 6:32:43 pm situation, 2 put it rightly it s an expression of feeling.
S sri" (Im very sorry. Its not taking advantage of the
situation, to put it rightly it is an expression of
feeling)
Follow up message - Im s sri. Il not do it again. Wil u stil c me s I can
by respondent show u my sincerity" (Im so sorry. Ill not do it
at 6:42:25 pm again. Will you still see me so I can show you my
sincerity)
On the following day, March 7, 2005 respondent sent another message to complainant at 3:55:32 pm saying "I
dont know wat 2 do s u may 4give me. "Im realy sri. Puede bati na tyo." (I dont know what to do so you may
forgive me. Im really sorry. Puede bati na tayo).
Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was received by her at 4:06:33 pm
saying "Ano k ba. Im really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n me." (Ano ka ba. Im really sorry. Please next time
behave na ko), which is a clear manifestation of admission of guilt.2
In his answer,3 respondent admitted that he agreed to provide legal services to the complainant; that he met with
complainant on 10 February 2005 and 6 March 2005, to discuss the relevant matters relative to the case which
complainant was intending to file against the owners of Queensway Travel and Tours for collection of a sum of
money; that on both occasions, complainant rode with him in his car where he held and kissed complainant on
the lips as the former offered her lips to him; and, that the corner of Cooper Street and Roosevelt Avenue, where
he dropped off the complainant, was a busy street teeming with people, thus, it would have been impossible to
commit the acts imputed to him.
By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: 1) there was a criminal case for Acts of Lasciviousness
filed by complainant against respondent pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Quezon City; 2) the
legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married to a certain Jinky Toriana
because the civil case for the nullification of their marriage was archived pursuant to the Order dated 6
December 2000 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Maburao, Occidental Mindoro; 3) the complainant was
living with a man not her husband; and 4) the complainant never bothered to discuss respondents fees and it
was respondent who always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
A hearing was conducted by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) at
the IBP Building, Ortigas Center, Pasig City, on 26 July 2005.
On 30 September 2005, Investigating Commissioner Dennis A. B. Funa submitted his Report and
Recommendation,4 recommending the imposition of the penalty of one (1) month suspension on respondent for
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117 dated 20 March 2006, approving and adopting, with
modification, the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, thus:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering the behavior of Respondent went beyond the norms of conduct
required of a lawyer when dealing with or relating with a client, Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED
from the practice of law for three (3) months.5
The issue to be resolved in this case is: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which
constitute serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law.
Simple as the facts of the case may be, the manner by which we deal with respondents actuations shall have a
rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps morality in our
liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be. This permissiveness notwithstanding, lawyers, as
keepers of public faith, are burdened with a high degree of social responsibility and, hence, must handle their
personal affairs with greater caution.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON I x x x
Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the Integrated Bar.
xxxx
Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
As may be gleaned from above, the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Lawyers have been repeatedly reminded that their possession of good moral character is a continuing condition
to preserve their membership in the Bar in good standing. The continued possession of good moral character is a
requisite condition for remaining in the practice of law.6 In Aldovino v. Pujalte, Jr.,7 we emphasized that:
This Court has been exacting in its demand for integrity and good moral character of members of the Bar. They
are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity
of the legal profession. Membership in the legal profession is a privilege. And whenever it is made to appear
that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of the public, it becomes not only the right but
also the duty of this Court, which made him one of its officers and gave him the privilege of ministering within
its Bar, to withdraw the privilege.
It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar,
free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand
no less than the highest degree of morality.8 We explained in Barrientos v. Daarol9 that, "as officers of the court,
lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character
and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community."
Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout
their legal career, in order to maintain their good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. They may be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.10
In Bar Matter No. 1154,11 good moral character was defined as what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, or the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality.
It should be noted that the requirement of good moral character has four ostensible purposes, namely: (1) to
protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect prospective clients; and (4) to
protect errant lawyers from themselves.12
In the case at bar, respondent admitted kissing complainant on the lips.
In his Answer,13 respondent confessed, thus:
27. When she was about to get off the car, I said can I kiss you goodnight. She offered her left cheek and I
kissed it and with my left hand slightly pulled her right face towards me and kissed her gently on the lips. We
said goodnight and she got off the car.
xxxx
35. When I stopped my car I said okay. I saw her offered (sic) her left cheek and I lightly kissed it and with my
right hand slightly pulled her right cheek towards me and plant (sic) a light kiss on her lips. There was no force
used. No intimidation made, no lewd designs displayed. No breast holding was done. Everything happened very
spontaneously with no reaction from her except saying "sexual harassment."
During the hearing held on 26 July 2005 at the 3rd floor, IBP Building, Dona Julia Vargas Avenue, Ortigas City,
respondent candidly recalled the following events:
ATTY. MACABATA:
That time in February, we met I fetched her I should say, somewhere along the corner of Edsa and Kamuning
because it was then raining so we are texting each other. So I parked my car somewhere along the corner of
Edsa and Kamuning and I was there about ten to fifteen minutes then she arrived. And so I said she opened
my car and then she went inside so I said, would you like that we have a Japanese dinner? And she said yes,
okay. So I brought her to Zensho which is along Tomas Morato. When we were there, we discussed about her
case, we ordered food and then a little while I told her, would it be okay for you of I (sic) order wine? She said
yes so I ordered two glasses of red wine. After that, after discussing matters about her case, so I said its
about 9:00 or beyond that time already, so I said okay, lets go. So when I said lets go so I stood up and then I
went to the car. I went ahead of my car and she followed me then she rode on (sic) it. So I told her where to?
She told me just drop me at the same place where you have been dropping me for the last meetings that we had
and that was at the corner of Morato and Roosevelt Avenue. So, before she went down, I told her can I kiss you
goodnight? She offered her left cheek and I kissed it and with the slight use of my right hand, I ... should I say
tilted her face towards me and when shes already facing me I lightly kissed her on the lips. And then I said
good night. She went down the car, thats it.
COMM. FUNA:
February 10 iyan.
xxxx
ATTY. MACABATA:
Okay. After that were through so I said lets go because I have an appointment. So we went out, we went inside
my car and I said where to? Same place, she said, so then at the same corner. So before she went down , before
she opened the door of the car, I saw her offered her left cheek. So I kissed her again.
COMM. FUNA:
Pardon?
ATTY. MACABATA:
I saw her offered her left cheek like that, so I kissed her again and then with the use of my left hand, pushed a
little bit her face and then kissed her again softly on the lips and thats it. x x x.14 (Emphases supplied.)
It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or
to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.15
In Zaguirre v. Castillo,16 we reiterated the definition of immoral conduct, as such conduct which is so willful,
flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. Furthermore, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must not simply be immoral,
but grossly immoral. It must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
The following cases were considered by this Court as constitutive of grossly immoral conduct:
In Toledo v. Toledo,17 a lawyer was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his lawful wife and
cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.
In Obusan v. Obusan, Jr.,18 a lawyer was disbarred after complainant proved that he had abandoned her and
maintained an adulterous relationship with a married woman. This court declared that respondent failed to
maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of the bar.
In Dantes v. Dantes,19 respondents act of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women during the
subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral conduct warranting the imposition of
appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in conjunction with the documentary evidence,
sufficiently established that respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for members of the
law profession.
In Delos Reyes v. Aznar,20 it was ruled that it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with children,
to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of medicine in asking complainant, a student
in said college, to go with him to Manila where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would
flank in all her subjects in case she refused.
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Palma,21 respondent lawyer was disbarred when he abandoned his lawful wife and three
children, lured an innocent woman into marrying him and misrepresented himself as a "bachelor" so he could
contract marriage in a foreign land.
In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,22 respondent entered into multiple marriages and then resorted to legal remedies to
sever them. There, we ruled that "[s]uch pattern of misconduct by respondent undermines the institutions of
marriage and family, institutions that this society looks to for the rearing of our children, for the development of
values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of our nation as a
whole." As such, "there can be no other fate that awaits respondent than to be disbarred."
In Tucay v. Tucay,23 respondent contracted marriage with another married woman and left complainant with
whom he has been married for thirty years. We ruled that such acts constitute "a grossly immoral conduct and
only indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession," warranting
respondents disbarment.
In Villasanta v. Peralta,24 respondent married complainant while his first wife was still alive, their marriage still
valid and subsisting. We held that "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage is contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality." Thus, lacking the good moral character required by the Rules of Court,
respondent was disqualified from being admitted to the bar.
In Cabrera v. Agustin,25 respondent lured an innocent woman into a simulated marriage and thereafter satisfied
his lust. We held that respondent failed to maintain that degree of morality and integrity which, at all times, is
expected of members of the bar. He is, therefore, disbarred from the practice of law.
Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct inconsistent with rectitude, or
indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct
showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community, and an inconsiderate attitude
toward good order and public welfare.26
Guided by the definitions above, we perceived acts of kissing or beso-beso on the cheeks as mere gestures of
friendship and camaraderie,27 forms of greetings, casual and customary. The acts of respondent, though, in
turning the head of complainant towards him and kissing her on the lips are distasteful. However, such act, even
if considered offensive and undesirable, cannot be considered grossly immoral.
Complainants bare allegation that respondent made use and took advantage of his position as a lawyer to lure
her to agree to have sexual relations with him, deserves no credit. The burden of proof rests on the complainant,
and she must establish the case against the respondent by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, 28 disclosing a
case that is free from doubt as to compel the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary power. 29 Thus, the adage
that "he who asserts not he who denies, must prove."30 As a basic rule in evidence, the burden of proof lies on
the party who makes the allegationsei incumbit probation, qui decit, non qui negat; cum per rerum naturam
factum negantis probation nulla sit.31 In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden
of proof required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice. Accusation is not
synonymous with guilt.32
Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the same was not motivated by
malice. We come to this conclusion because right after the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed
by the respondent through a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text message. The exchange of text messages between complainant and
respondent bears this out.
Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several people in the vicinity considering
that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for 24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on
complainant, he could have brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely
accomplish the same.
All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondents acts are not grossly immoral nor highly
reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
The question as to what disciplinary sanction should be imposed against a lawyer found guilty of misconduct
requires consideration of a number of factors.33 When deciding upon the appropriate sanction, the Court must
consider that the primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings are to protect the public; to foster public
confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar
misconduct.34 Disciplinary proceedings are means of protecting the administration of justice by requiring those
who carry out this important function to be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and clients
may repose confidence.35 While it is discretionary upon the Court to impose a particular sanction that it may
deem proper against an erring lawyer, it should neither be arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal
animosity or prejudice, but should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the purity
and independence of the bar and to exact from the lawyer strict compliance with his duties to the court, to his
client, to his brethren in the profession and to the public.
The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only
those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or suspension, while those acts which
neither affect nor erode the moral character of the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of
such nature and to such extent as to clearly show the lawyers unfitness to continue in the practice of law. The
dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which induced the lawyer to commit it must be
clearly demonstrated before suspension or disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense should also be considered.36
Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser nature. It is also imposed
for some minor infraction of the lawyers duty to the court or the client. 37 In the Matter of Darell Adams, 38 a
lawyer was publicly reprimanded for grabbing a female client, kissing her, and raising her blouse which
constituted illegal conduct involving moral turpitude and conduct which adversely reflected on his fitness to
practice law.
Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is respondents first offense,
reprimand would suffice.
We laud complainants effort to seek redress for what she honestly believed to be an affront to her honor. Surely,
it was difficult and agonizing on her part to come out in the open and accuse her lawyer of gross immoral
conduct. However, her own assessment of the incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be
corroborated or supported by more objective evidence.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged
immorality, is hereby DISMISSED. However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED to be more prudent and
cautious in his dealing with his clients with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be imposed
on him for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 6052. December 11, 2003]

IN RE: PETITION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, ON LEGAL AND MORAL
GROUNDS, FROM BEING ELECTED IBP GOVERNOR FOR EASTERN MINDANAO IN
THE MAY 31, IBP ELECTIONS

OLIVER OWEN L. GARCIA, EMMANUEL RAVANERA and TONY VELEZ, petitioners, vs. ATTY.
LEONARD DE VERA And IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS, respondents.

DECISION

TlNGA, J.:

This is a Petition[1] filed by Attys. Oliver Owen L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez, mainly
seeking the disqualification of respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern
Mindanao in the 16th Intergrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governors elections. Petitioner Garcia
is the Vice-President of the Bukidnon IBP Chapter, while petitioners Ravanera and Velez are the past President
and the incumbent President, respectively, of the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter.

The facts as culled from the pleadings of the parties follow.

The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set on April 26, 2003, a month prior to
the IBP National Convention scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance with
Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:

SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one month before the national convention,
the delegates from each region shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which shall as much as
possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution[2] No. XV-2003-99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the
elections to May 31, 2003, or after the IBP National Convention.

Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern
Mindanao, along with Atty. P. Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a letter [3] dated 28
March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored
on two grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By Laws to hold the election of
Regional Governors at least one month prior to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being
politicized since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into engaging in unacceptable
political practices, and; (2) holding the election on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP
Board from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May 31, 2003, as expressed in Section
40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the
announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest
setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special
meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending
parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and
conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.
[4]

On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003,
the petitioners filed aPetition[5] dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the postponement of the
election for Regional Governors to the second or third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of
respondent De Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
 The IBP Board denied the Petition in a Resolution issued on May 29, 2003. The pertinent portions of
the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, two specific reliefs are being sought, to wit, first, the postponement of the elections for regional
governors and, second, the disqualification of Atty. Leonard de Vera.

WHEREAS, anent the first relief sought, the Board finds no compelling justification for the postponement of
the elections especially considering that preparations and notices had already been completed.

WHEREAS, with respect to the disqualifications of Atty. Leonard de Vera, this Board finds the petition to be
premature considering that no nomination has yet been made for the election of IBP regional governor.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Board hereby resolves, as it hereby resolves, to deny the petition.[6]

Probably thinking that the IBP Board had not yet acted on their Petition, on the same date, May 29, 2003,
the petitioners filed the present Petition before this Court, seeking the same reliefs as those sought in
their Petition before the IBP.

On the following day, May 30, 2003, acting upon the petitioners application, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), directing the IBP Board, its agents, representatives or persons acting in their place
and stead to cease and desist from proceeding with the election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern
Mindanao.[7]

Citing the IBP By-Laws, the petitioners expound on the mechanics for the selection of the IBP officers
from the Chapter Officers up to the Regional Governors constituting the IBP Board which is its highest policy-
making body, as well as the underlying dynamics, to wit:

IBP Chapter Officers headed by the President are elected for a term of two years. The IBP Chapter
Presidents in turn, elect their respective Regional Governors following the rotation rule. The IBP has nine (9)
regions, viz: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Greater Manila, Southern Luzon, Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas,
Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao and Western Mindanao. The governors serve for a term of two (2) years
beginning on the 1st of July of the first year and ending on the 30th of June of the second year.

From the members of the newly constituted IBP Board, an Executive Vice President (EVP) shall be chosen,
also on rotation basis. The rationale for the rotation rule in the election of both the Regional Governors and the
Vice President is to give everybody a chance to serve the IBP, to avoid politicking and to democratize the
selection process.

Finally, the National President is not elected. Under the By-Laws, whoever is the incumbent EVP will
automatically be the National President for the following term.

Petitioners elucidate that at present, all the IBP regions, except Eastern Mindanao, have had two (2)
National Presidents each. Following the rotation rule, whoever will be elected Regional Governor for Eastern
Mindanao Region in the 16th Regional Governors elections will automatically become the EVP for the term
July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2005. For the next term in turn, i.e., from July 1, 2005 to June 20, 2007, the EVP
immediately before then will automatically assume the post of IBP National President.

Petitioners asseverate that it is in this light that respondent De Vera had transferred his IBP membership
from the Pasay, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter, stressing
that he indeed covets the IBP presidency.[8] The transfer of IBP membership to Agusan del Sur, the petitioners
went on, is a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the domicile rule and a great insult to
lawyers from Eastern Mindanao for it implies that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to
serve the IBP.[9]

Adverting to the moral fitness required of a candidate for the offices of regional governor, executive vice-
president and national president, the petitioners submit that respondent De Vera lacks the requisite moral
aptitude. According to them, respondent De Vera was sanctioned by the Supreme Court for irresponsibly
attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law.
They add that he could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating his clients funds had he
not surrendered his California license to practice law. Finally, they accuse him of having actively campaigned
for the position of Eastern Mindanao Governor during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, a
prohibited act under the IBP By-Laws.[10]

After seeking leave of court, respondent De Vera filed on June 9, 2003 a Respectful Comment [11] on
the Petition.

In his defense, respondent De Vera raises new issues. He argues that this Court has no jurisdiction over the
present controversy, contending that the election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter, governed as it is by the
IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and administered by the IBP. Respondent De Vera also assails the
petitioners legal standing, pointing out that the IBP By-Laws does not have a provision for the disqualification
of IBP members aspiring for the position of Regional governors, for instead all that it provides for is only an
election protest under Article IV, Section 40, pursuant to which only a qualified nominee can validly lodge an
election protest which is to be made after, not before, the election. He posits further that following the rotation
rule, only members from the Surigao del Norte and Agusan del Sur IBP chapters are qualified to run for
Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region for the term 2003-2005, and the petitioners who are from Bukidnon and
Misamis Oriental are not thus qualified to be nominees.[12]

Meeting the petitioners contention head on, respondent De Vera avers that an IBP member is entitled to
select, change or transfer his chapter membership. [13] He cites the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II and
Section 29-2, Article IV of the IBP By-Laws, thus:

Article II, Section 19. Registration. - xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a
lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his
office or, in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than
one Chapter.

Article IV, Section 29-2. Membership- The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll.
Each member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the
By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary
of the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter
election.

The right to transfer membership, respondent De Vera stresses, is also recognized in Section 4, Rule 139-A
of the Rules of Court which is exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provisions of the IBP By-Laws,
thus:

Rule 139-A, Section 4. xxx Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall
be considered a member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in
the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Clarifying that it was upon the invitation of the officers and members of the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter
that he transferred his IBP membership, respondent De Vera submits that it is unfair and unkind for the
petitioners to state that his membership transfer was done for convenience and as a mere subterfuge to qualify
him for the Eastern Mindanao governorship.[14]

On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to
any of its members during its deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the administrative
complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn
compelled him to surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for
determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there
is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon by the
petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory in character similar to
the recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which are subject to the review of and
the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative
case has retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the
retraction was not considered by the investigating officer. Finally, on the alleged politicking he committed
during the IBP National Convention held on May 22-24, 2003, he states that it is baseless to assume that he was
campaigning simply because he declared that he had 10 votes to support his candidacy for governorship in the
Eastern Mindanao Region and that the petitioners did not present any evidence to substantiate their claim that
he or his handlers had billeted the delegates from his region at the Century Park Hotel.[15]

On July 7, 2003, the petitioners filed their Reply[16] to the Respectful Comment of respondent De Vera who,
on July 15, 2003, filed anAnswer and Rejoinder.[17]

In a Resolution[18] dated 5 August 2003, the Court directed the other respondent in this case, the IBP Board,
to file its comment on thePetition. The IBP Board, through its General Counsel, filed a Manifestation[19] dated
29 August 2003, reiterating the position stated in itsResolution dated 29 May 2003 that it finds the petition to be
premature considering that no nomination has as yet been made for the election of IBP Regional Governors.[20]

Based on the arguments of the parties, the following are the main issues, to wit:

(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present controversy;

(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent De Vera, the determination of which
in turn requires the resolution of two sub-issues, namely:

(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is the proper remedy under the IBP
By-Laws; and

(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring this suit;

(3) whether the present Petition is premature;

(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the present petition is not premature,
whether respondent De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP Eastern Mindanao
Region;

Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera contends that the Supreme Court has
no jurisdiction on the present controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the election of the
Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is
purely an internal matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.

The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Supreme Court
the power to promulgate rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and the
legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and
shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis
supplied)
 Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the
election of its officers.

The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art.
VIII thereof granted the Supreme Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice
of law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading,
practice, and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Courts, subject to the power
of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines.

The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution and the similarly worded provision in
the intervening 1973 Constitution[21] through all the years have been the sources of this Courts authority to
supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names
appear in the Roll of Attorneys.[22] Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the integration of
the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to
ascertain the advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar.[23] Not long after, Republic Act No. 6397[24] was enacted
and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on
January 1, 1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar
to the Philippines, we ordained the Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the
Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making power under the 1935 Constitution.

The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in asserting IBP independence from the
Supreme Court, ironically recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over the
IBP. For one, Section 77[25] of the IBP By-Laws vests onthe Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP
By-Laws, either motu propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP. Also in Section
15,[26] the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP elections, whether local or national. Section
44[27] empowers the Court to have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of Governors.

On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme Court looked into the irregularities
which attended the 1989 elections of the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled In the Matter of
the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the Court formed a committee to
make an inquiry into the 1989 elections. The results of the investigation showed that the elections were marred
by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP
By-Laws.28 The Court invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as well as
explicitly disqualified from running thereat the IBP members who were found involved in the irregularities in
the elections, in order to impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the
non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering.

The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. First, it removed direct election by the
House of Delegates of the (a) officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive Vice-
President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the IBP Board choosing the IBP President and the
Executive Vice President (EVP) from among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws, as
amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the position of the President upon the expiration of their
common two-year term. Third, it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors shall
be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates and that the position of Regional Governor
shall be rotated among the different chapters in the region.

The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme Court over the IBP and establish
without doubt its jurisdiction to hear and decide the present controversy.
 In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have no cause of action against him,
respondent De Vera argues that the IBP By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional
Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election cases under Section 40 thereof which
reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an election shall, within two days after the
announcement of the results of the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written protest
setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition, the President shall forthwith call a special
meeting of the outgoing Board of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the contending
parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not later than the following May 31, and shall be final and
conclusive.

Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions the disqualification of candidates for
IBP governors. The remedy it provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this remedy, as
will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.

Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the disqualification of nominees for the position
of regional governor. This was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to wit:

SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to the eligibility of a candidate must be
raised prior to the casting of ballots, and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such
decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith resolve the appeal by plurality vote.
Voting shall be by raising of hands. The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall
thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in accordance with Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on nomination and election of the Board of
Governors. Before, members of the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of Delegates at its
annual convention held every other year.29 The election was a two-tiered process. First, the Delegates from each
region chose by secret plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees for the position of
Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees, arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were
written on the board within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies of the lists were
distributed to all the Delegates.30 Thereafter, each Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one
nominee for Governor for each Region. 31 The nominee from every Region receiving the highest number of
votes was declared and certified elected by the Chairman.32

In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP elections, this Court deemed it best to
amend the nomination and election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the
elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the delegates of the concerned region, and
adopted the rotation process through the following provisions, to wit:

SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed by a Board
of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the
Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for each region to be elected by the members of
the House of Delegates from that region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the different
chapters in the region.

SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as
much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and thus made it less controversial. The
grounds for disqualification were reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates may
choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process operates.
 The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of an Integrated Bar which is non-
political33 and effective in the discharge of its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving
the administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of the Philippine society.34

The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove the provision on disqualification
proceedings. Consequently, under the present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand on.

Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws,
petitioners are not the proper persons to bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the elections
of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the rotation rule under Section 39 of the
IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be
nominated.

Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the present petition, petitioners are not the
proper parties to bring the suit. As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the President
of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor. As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not
disputed by petitioners, only IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be
nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to
the rotation rule enunciated in the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia is from
Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP
Chapter. Consequently, the petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming election.

On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the present petition.

This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is premature for the petitioners to seek the
disqualification of respondent De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao Region.
Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera
has not been nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been made yet by the members of
the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets
nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.

Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern
Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He
only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP
post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De
Vera violated the domicile rule.

The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19 Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll
of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a
member of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or, in the
absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one
Chapter. (Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will
become a member of the chapter where his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to
choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register his
preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office.
The only proscription in registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one
chapter at the same time.
 The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP
membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members registered in its membership roll. Each
member shall maintain his membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth in the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of
the latter, provided that the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding any Chapter
election.

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three
months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.

In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1
August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter 35 addressed to Atty.
Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP
Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent De Veras transfer and advising them to make the
necessary notation in their respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification
mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made effective sometime between
August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-12.a of the IBP By-Laws which
provides that elections of Chapter Officers and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every
other year.36 Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003, seventeen months had elapsed. This makes
respondent De Veras transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on
February 27, 2003.

Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified because he is not morally fit to occupy
the position of governor of Eastern Mindanao.

We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the basic requirements provided in the IBP By-
Laws, he cannot be barred. The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a particular
region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP;37 2) he is included in the voters list of his chapter or
he is not disqualified by the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-Laws of the
Chapter to which he belongs;38 (3) he does not belong to a chapter from which a regional governor has already
been elected, unless the election is the start of a new season or cycle; 39 and (4) he is not in the government
service.40

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run
for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates lies in the
individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each members standard of
morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements
under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should
emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final
judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.

Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the basis of the alleged sanction imposed by
the Supreme Court during the deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently referring to
this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in
the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera.41 In this case, respondent De Vera was found guilty of
indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for
his remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted hereunder are the pertinent
portions of the report, with De Veras statements written in italics.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a petition filed by Estradas
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from Supreme Court insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two
other justices still undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a coalition formed by civil
society and militant groups to monitor the prosecution of Estrada.

We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence the justices- considering that it has a
P500 million slush fund from the aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada decision
declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, the group said.42

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx

People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal
Justice for All Movement and a leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the plunder law unconstitutional would
trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People Power II.

Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to People Power II if the rumor turned out
to be true.

People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. 43

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera admitted to have made said statements but
denied to have uttered the same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into
disrepute.44 He explained that he was merely exercising his constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of
speech.

The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the statements were aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court to decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.45

The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found
guilty of indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude.

In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines46 cited in Villaber v. Commission on Elections,47 the Court defines
moral turpitude as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between
man and man, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. 48The determination of whether
an act involves moral turpitude is a factual issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the
violation of the statute.49
 In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion on a public interest issue can be
considered as an act of baseness, vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor cause
undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on the Plunder Law.50 Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner to invoke the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged immorality.

On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law
in California, he explained that no final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he suffered at the hands of the
investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in
the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove
the same.51 In this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative complaint affects respondent De
Veras moral fitness to run for governor.

Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers had housed the delegates from Eastern
Mindanao in the Century Park Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not present any
proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof under our Rules of Court.52

WHEREFORE, the Petition to disqualify respondent Atty. Leonard De Vera to run for the position of IBP
Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the 16th election of the IBP Board of Governors is hereby DISMISSED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 30 May 2003 which enjoined the conduct of the
election for the IBP Regional Governor in Eastern Mindanao is hereby LIFTED. Accordingly, the IBP Board of
Governors is hereby ordered to hold said election with proper notice and with deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.

Roberto Soriano vs. Atty Manuel Dizon, AC 6792, January 25, 2006

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with
the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges
that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances
surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;[2] and
constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]

Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated
May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June
11, 2004.[4]

After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its
attachments.[5] Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.[6]
Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and Recommendation, which
was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March
12, 2005.

In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved
moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City in this wise:

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer
and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the
accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The
accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi
driver forced open his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had
been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got
out of his car to help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal
the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a second time,
got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his arm around. The
taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his
car and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his
way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up
intending to return them to the accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the
barrel of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the
accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose
testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano.[8]

It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the
hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would
have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending
surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left
part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.

The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an
application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction of
the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano.[10]

According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this particular
undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]

In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be disbarred from
the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the latter also
exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;

2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, had
overtaken him;

3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a gun,
wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;

4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;

5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot Complainant;

6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by Complainant
and two unidentified persons; and,

7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant.[12]

On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the
IBP Board of Governors.

Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a
ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold
the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral character.[13] In the instant case,
respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be
determined are as follows: 1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether
his guilt warrants disbarment.

Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an
act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]

The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed in International
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was dismissed on the
basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of
the crime, this Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve
moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations
and indeed a ground for dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances,
the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine
conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained
thus:

x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude
is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on
all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the
presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding
of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows:

x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his back turned
when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the
filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa
was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the
victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show
that Micosa's intention was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of
the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.
[17]

The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince the moral
turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.

Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least expected it.
The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm
twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the
lawyers assault.

We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of respondent.
He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the
latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for
his crime.

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct, respondent
revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who
deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident
reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced
vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity
with which he pursued complainant, we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged,
but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his
civil liabilities.[19]

He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in
his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the
land.

All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He
obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet,
it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent
remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by
his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and
youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even
fully restore what the latter has lost.

Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of lawyers,
but certainly to their good moral character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings is
so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by
their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]

We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an
essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.[24]

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial
court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainants
family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
complainants family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of having been
mauled by complainant and two other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:

The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not
support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him.
The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three
people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries
sustain the complainants version of the incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the
chest. x x x.[28]
Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than
truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their
dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession. They constitute
moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,

academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system,
lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw.
Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and
commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that
vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that disbarment should
never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, however, the
Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his
duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable
with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good moral
character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice
of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the
legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere fact of
their conviction would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the
appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his unworthiness to
continue as a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a member of the
Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for membership in the
legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession of legal learning. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit cannot
practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
The Facts
Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.
On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of
the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-taking on 22
May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could
not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the
lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave misconduct. Complainant alleges
that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before
the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in
the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented
himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel
for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging respondents
services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the
winning vice mayoralty candidate.
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but disallowed him
from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the
Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him before the
MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a lawyer or represented
himself as an attorney in the pleading.
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted his resignation
on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of
Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of
Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be
dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of respondent that
his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on
19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning candidate for
mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his
oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation, report and
recommendation.
OBCs Report and Recommendation
The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001
elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took
the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious doubt on his
moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized practice of law is
a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be
denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly violated
when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent resigned as
secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him
before the MBEC.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent appeared as
counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading
entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first paragraph of the same
pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty
Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized
Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her counsel. On the
same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by
REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself
wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty Candidate
Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for
Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the
winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of
law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.
In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all advice
to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained
legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x
In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice
of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice
law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.
Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC
and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.[3]
The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust [4] since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.[5]
The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate passed the
bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court
for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court.[7]
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
[8]
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed,
namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys. [9]
On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to act as counsel
for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts complained of as
constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice-
mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon
your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11 May 2001. [11] Thus, the
evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed authorized
respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no
misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 154207 April 27, 2007

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, Respondents.

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, grounded on pure questions of
law, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction assailing the Resolution dated May 3, 2002 promulgated by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 116, Pasay City, in Civil Case No. 02-0137, which denied the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction against the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 45, Pasay City, in Criminal
Case No. 00-1705;1 and the RTCs Order dated June 5, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration. No writ
of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:
On September 25, 2000, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as
private prosecutor, in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 for Grave Threats, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the
complaining witness.
The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on
the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan
v. Judge Cruz, Jr.2 that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party
litigant. The petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public
prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said
criminal case.
However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court
laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.3
On February 13, 2002, petitioner filed before the MeTC a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to reverse the
February 1, 2002 Order alleging that Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, does not have the effect of
superseding Section 34 of Rule 138, for the authority to interpret the rule is the source itself of the rule, which is
the Supreme Court alone.
In an Order dated March 4, 2002, the MeTC denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
On April 2, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Prayer for
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order against the private respondent and the public
respondent MeTC.
After hearing the prayer for preliminary injunction to restrain public respondent MeTC Judge from proceeding
with Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the Certiorari proceedings, the RTC, in a Resolution dated May 3,
2002, resolved to deny the issuance of an injunctive writ on the ground that the crime of Grave Threats, the
subject of Criminal Case No. 00-1705, is one that can be prosecuted de oficio, there being no claim for civil
indemnity, and that therefore, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not legally tenable.
On May 9, 2002, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration. The petitioner argues that
nowhere does the law provide that the crime of Grave Threats has no civil aspect. And last, petitioner cites Bar
Matter No. 730 dated June 10, 1997 which expressly provides for the appearance of a non-lawyer before the
inferior courts, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, even without the supervision of a member of the bar.
Pending the resolution of the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC, the petitioner filed a
Second Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2002 with the MeTC seeking the reversal of the March 4,
2002 Denial Order of the said court, on the strength of Bar Matter No. 730, and a Motion to Hold In Abeyance
the Trial dated June 10, 2002 of Criminal Case No. 00-1705 pending the outcome of the certiorari proceedings
before the RTC.
On June 5, 2002, the RTC issued its Order denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Likewise, in an Order dated June 13, 2002, the MeTC denied the petitioners Second Motion for
Reconsideration and his Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Trial on the ground that the RTC had already denied
the Entry of Appearance of petitioner before the MeTC.
On July 30, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant Petition and assigns the following
errors:
I.
the respondent regional trial court abused its discretion when it resolved to deny the prayer for the writ of
injunction of the herein petitioner despite petitioner having established the necessity of granting the writ;
II.
THE RESPONDENT TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF
THE LAW, WHEN IT RESOLVED TO DENY THE PRAYER FOR THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION AND THE SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE HEREIN
PETITIONER ON THE BASIS THAT [GRAVE] THREATS HAS NO CIVIL ASPECT, FOR THE SAID
BASIS OF DENIAL IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE LAW;
III.
THE RESPONDENT METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED
THE MOTION TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE TRIAL, WHEN WHAT WAS DENIED BY THE RESPONDENT
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION and
WHEN THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IS YET TO DECIDE ON THE MERITS OF THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI;
IV.
THE RESPONDENT COURT[s] ARE CLEARLY IGNORING THE LAW WHEN THEY PATENTLY
REFUSED TO HEED TO [sic] THE CLEAR MANDATE OF THE LAPUT, CANTIMBUHAN AND
BULACAN CASES, AS WELL AS BAR MATTER NO. 730, PROVIDING FOR THE APPEARANCE OF
NON-LAWYERS BEFORE THE LOWER COURTS (MTCS).4
This Court, in exceptional cases, and for compelling reasons, or if warranted by the nature of the issues
reviewed, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before it.5
Considering that this case involves the interpretation, clarification, and implementation of Section 34, Rule 138
of the Rules of Court, Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice and Rule 138-A of
the Rules of Court, and the ruling of the Court in Cantimbuhan, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition.
The basic question is whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.
The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.
Rule 138-A or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:
RULE 138-A
LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE
Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or
administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the
legal clinic of the law school.
Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school.
Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.
However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and
procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the
supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision
of a member of the bar.7 (Emphasis supplied)
The phrase "In the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the
court of a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138, thus:8
SEC. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. In the Court of a municipality a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In
any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
which is the prevailing rule at the time the petitioner filed his Entry of Appearance with the MeTC on
September 25, 2000. No real distinction exists for under Section 6, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court, the term
"Municipal Trial Courts" as used in these Rules shall include Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts
in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
There is really no problem as to the application of Section 34 of Rule 138 and Rule 138-A. In the former, the
appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly allowed, while the latter rule
provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, may appear before the
courts.
Petitioner expressly anchored his appearance on Section 34 of Rule 138. The court a quo must have been
confused by the fact that petitioner referred to himself as a law student in his entry of appearance. Rule 138-A
should not have been used by the courts a quo in denying permission to act as private prosecutor against
petitioner for the simple reason that Rule 138-A is not the basis for the petitioners appearance.
Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective
of whether or not he is a law student. As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34,
Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a
lawyer before inferior courts.
Petitioner further argues that the RTC erroneously held that, by its very nature, no civil liability may flow from
the crime of Grave Threats, and, for this reason, the intervention of a private prosecutor is not possible.
It is clear from the RTC Decision that no such conclusion had been intended by the RTC. In denying the
issuance of the injunctive court, the RTC stated in its Decision that there was no claim for civil liability by the
private complainant for damages, and that the records of the case do not provide for a claim for indemnity; and
that therefore, petitioners appearance as private prosecutor appears to be legally untenable.
Under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable
except in instances when no actual damage results from an offense, such as espionage, violation of neutrality,
flight to an enemy country, and crime against popular representation. 9 The basic rule applies in the instant case,
such that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.10
The petitioner is correct in stating that there being no reservation, waiver, nor prior institution of the civil aspect
in Criminal Case No. 00-1705, it follows that the civil aspect arising from Grave Threats is deemed instituted
with the criminal action, and, hence, the private prosecutor may rightfully intervene to prosecute the civil
aspect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116, Pasay City are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 45, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-1705 as a private
prosecutor under the direct control and supervision of the public prosecutor.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent
from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's
constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the
Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a
recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to
above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due
from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's
comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and
necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 in
accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra),
whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which
reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional
rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good
standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is
being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal
force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the
conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
"Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its
Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No.
526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes
sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and
public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and
to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State the administration of justice
as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege
must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U.
S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through
its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution
of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by
fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus
populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not
be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil.
726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals
from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article
X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary
power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the
said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common
good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a
member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a
member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer
is a ready a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the
State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers. 9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar,
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) which power the respondent acknowledges
from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed
as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation
of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of
law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession,
we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to
impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court appropriate, indeed
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court
is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has
limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed
only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the
public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be
misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court
the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the
integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a
member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A.
Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys
of the Court.

[B.M. No. 1370. May 9, 2005]

LETTER OF ATTY. CECILIO Y. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT
OF IBP DUES.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by
petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter,[1] dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption from payment of IBP dues in the amount
of P12,035.00 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after being admitted to
the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then
migrated to, and worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained
that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the
Civil Service law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service, and neither can he be
assessed for the years when he was working in the USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.[2]
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment[3] stating inter alia: that membership in the IBP is not
based on the actual practice of law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as long as he
continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as
determined by the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as provided for in Sections
9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been
upheld as necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the policy of the IBP Board of
Governors of no exemption from payment of dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all
members of the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It maintained that there is no rule
allowing the exemption of payment of annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is voluntary
termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that what petitioner could have done was to inform the
secretary of the IBP of his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could have been
terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of
Governors is in the process of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its members, which
if approved by the Board of Governors and by this Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of
the annual dues.
In his reply[4] dated 22 February 2005, petitioner contends that what he is questioning is the IBP Board of
Governors Policy of Non-Exemption in the payment of annual membership dues of lawyers regardless of
whether or not they are engaged in active or inactive practice. He asseverates that the Policy of Non-Exemption
in the payment of annual membership dues suffers from constitutional infirmities, such as equal protection
clause and the due process clause. He also posits that compulsory payment of the IBP annual membership dues
would indubitably be oppressive to him considering that he has been in an inactive status and is without income
derived from his law practice. He adds that his removal from nonpayment of annual membership dues would
constitute deprivation of property right without due process of law. Lastly, he claims that non-practice of law by
a lawyer-member in inactive status is neither injurious to active law practitioners, to fellow lawyers in inactive
status, nor to the community where the inactive lawyers-members reside.
Plainly, the issue here is: whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the
time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he
was working abroad from 1986-2003?
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
association organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in
carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,
including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of
the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility, breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation
for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.[5]
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population. This
requires membership and financial support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.[6]
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not to attend the
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to foster
the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of
improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program
the lawyers.[7]
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of the Philippine
Bar[8] - which power required members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is,
indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine Bar,[9] thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court is attempting to levy a
tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If
the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a
membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to
defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to impose such
exaction.
The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law is that the regulation does not impose
an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight
inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This
means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in the IBP
remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of membership dues. At most, as
correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to
stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his
obligation to pay dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process of
discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to
the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon,[10] in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondents right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed
to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as such
must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public
responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions,
[11]
one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such
privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
WHEREFORE, petitioners request for exemption from payment of IBP dues is DENIED. He is ordered to pay
P12,035.00, the amount assessed by the IBP as membership fees for the years 1977-2005, within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, with a warning that failure to do so will merit
his suspension from the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C No. 4749. January 20, 2000]

SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., complainant, vs. ATTY. FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues filed against respondent
Atty. Francisco R. Llamas.
In a letter-complaint to this Court dated February 8, 1997, complainant Soliman M. Santos, Jr., himself a
member of the bar, alleged that:
On my oath as an attorney, I wish to bring to your attention and appropriate sanction the matter of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas who, for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP O.R. Nos. and
data (date & place of issuance) in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" but he has been
using this for at least three years already, as shown by the following attached sample pleadings in various courts
in 1995, 1996 and 1997: (originals available)
Annex A.......- "Ex-Parte Manifestation and Submission" dated December 1,
1995 in Civil Case No. Q-95-25253, RTC, Br. 224, QC

Annex B.......- "Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation Motion" dated November 13,

1996 in Sp. Proc. No. 95-030, RTC Br. 259 (not 257),
Paraaque, MM

Annex C.......- "An Urgent and Respectful Plea for extension of Time to File
Required Comment and Opposition" dated January 17, 1997 in
CA-G.R. SP (not Civil Case) No. 42286, CA 6th Div.
This matter is being brought in the context of Rule 138, Section 1 which qualifies that only a duly admitted
member of the bar "who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law". There is also Rule 139-A,
Section 10 which provides that "default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension
of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal
of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys."
Among others, I seek clarification (e.g. a certification) and appropriate action on the bar standing of Atty.
Francisco R. Llamas both with the Bar Confidant and with the IBP, especially its Rizal Chapter of which Atty.
Llamas purports to be a member. Jksm
Please note that while Atty. Llamas indicates "IBP Rizal 259060" sometimes, he does not indicate any PTR for
payment of professional tax.
Under the Rules, particularly Rule 138, Sections 27 and 28, suspension of an attorney may be done not only by
the Supreme Court but also by the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court (thus, we are also copy furnishing
some of these courts).
Finally, it is relevant to note the track record of Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, as shown by:
1........his dismissal as Pasay City Judge per Supreme Court Admin. Matter No. 1037-CJ En Banc Decision on
October 28, 1981 ( in SCRA )
2........his conviction for estafa per Decision dated June 30, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 11787, RTC Br. 66, Makati,
MM (see attached copy of the Order dated February 14, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
conviction which is purportedly on appeal in the Court of Appeals).
Attached to the letter-complaint were the pleadings dated December 1, 1995, November 13, 1996, and January
17, 1997 referred to by complainant, bearing, at the end thereof, what appears to be respondents signature above
his name, address and the receipt number "IBP Rizal 259060."[1] Also attached was a copy of the order,[2] dated
February 14, 1995, issued by Judge Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati,
denying respondents motion for reconsideration of his conviction, in Criminal Case No. 11787, for violation of
Art. 316, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
On April 18, 1997, complainant filed a certification [3] dated March 18, 1997, by the then president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Atty. Ida R. Macalinao-Javier, that respondents "last payment of his IBP dues
was in 1991. Since then he has not paid or remitted any amount to cover his membership fees up to the present."
On July 7, 1997, respondent was required to comment on the complaint within ten days from receipt of notice,
after which the case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. In his comment-
memorandum,[4] dated June 3, 1998, respondent alleged:[5]
3. That with respect to the complainants absurd claim that for using in 1995, 1996 and 1997 the same O.R. No.
259060 of the Rizal IBP, respondent is automatically no longer a member in good standing.
Precisely, as cited under the context of Rule 138, only an admitted member of the bar who is in good standing is
entitled to practice law.
The complainants basis in claiming that the undersigned was no longer in good standing, were as above cited,
the October 28, 1981 Supreme Court decision of dismissal and the February 14, 1995 conviction for Violation
of Article 316 RPC, concealment of encumbrances. Chief
As above pointed out also, the Supreme Court dismissal decision was set aside and reversed and respondent was
even promoted from City Judge of Pasay City to Regional Trial Court Judge of Makati, Br. 150.
Also as pointed out, the February 14, 1995 decision in Crim. Case No. 11787 was appealed to the Court of
Appeals and is still pending.
Complainant need not even file this complaint if indeed the decision of dismissal as a Judge was never set aside
and reversed, and also had the decision of conviction for a light felony, been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Undersigned himself would surrender his right or privilege to practice law.
4. That complainant capitalizes on the fact that respondent had been delinquent in his dues.
Undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his Income Tax Return, up to the present, that he had
only a limited practice of law. In fact, in his Income Tax Return, his principal occupation is a farmer of which he
is. His 30 hectares orchard and pineapple farm is located at Calauan, Laguna.
Moreover, and more than anything else, respondent being a Senior Citizen since 1992, is legally exempt under
Section 4 of Rep. Act 7432 which took effect in 1992, in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example.
Being thus exempt, he honestly believe in view of his detachment from a total practice of law, but only in a
limited practice, the subsequent payment by him of dues with the Integrated Bar is covered by such exemption.
In fact, he never exercised his rights as an IBP member to vote and be voted upon.
Nonetheless, if despite such honest belief of being covered by the exemption and if only to show that he never
in any manner wilfully and deliberately failed and refused compliance with such dues, he is willing at any time
to fulfill and pay all past dues even with interests, charges and surcharges and penalties. He is ready to tender
such fulfillment or payment, not for allegedly saving his skin as again irrelevantly and frustratingly insinuated
for vindictive purposes by the complainant, but as an honest act of accepting reality if indeed it is reality for him
to pay such dues despite his candor and honest belief in all food faith, to the contrary. Esmsc
On December 4, 1998, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution [6] adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner which found respondent guilty, and recommended his
suspension from the practice of law for three months and until he pays his IBP dues. Respondent moved for a
reconsideration of the decision, but this was denied by the IBP in a resolution,[7] dated April 22, 1999. Hence,
pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(b) of the Rules of Court, this case is here for final action on the decision of the IBP
ordering respondents suspension for three months.
The findings of IBP Commissioner Alfredo Sanz are as follows:
On the first issue, Complainant has shown "respondents non-indication of the proper IBP O.R. and PTR
numbers in his pleadings (Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of the letter complaint, more particularly his use of "IBP
Rizal 259060 for at least three years."
The records also show a "Certification dated March 24, 1997 from IBP Rizal Chapter President Ida R.
Makahinud Javier that respondents last payment of his IBP dues was in 1991."
While these allegations are neither denied nor categorically admitted by respondent, he has invoked and cited
that "being a Senior Citizen since 1992, he is legally exempt under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7432 which
took effect in 1992 in the payment of taxes, income taxes as an example."
....
The above cited provision of law is not applicable in the present case. In fact, respondent admitted that he is still
in the practice of law when he alleged that the "undersigned since 1992 have publicly made it clear per his
Income tax Return up to the present time that he had only a limited practice of law." (par. 4 of Respondents
Memorandum).
Therefore respondent is not exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Esmmis
On the second issue, complainant claims that respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by
using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore liable for his actions.
Respondent in his memorandum did not discuss this issue.
First. Indeed, respondent admits that since 1992, he has engaged in law practice without having paid his IBP
dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he
indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chapter membership and receipt number for the years in which those
pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in
good faith that he is exempt from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, 4 as a senior
citizen since 1992.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 9. Membership dues. - Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of
Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten percent (10%)
of the collections from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members of the Chapter
and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. - Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
In accordance with these provisions, respondent can engage in the practice of law only by paying his dues, and
it does not matter that his practice is "limited." While it is true that R.A. No. 7432, 4 grants senior citizens
"exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for that
year," the exemption does not include payment of membership or association dues.
Second. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public and the
courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Esmso
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Respondents failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings he filed in court indeed merit
the most severe penalty. However, in view of respondents advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues
and plea for a more temperate application of the law,[8] we believe the penalty of one year suspension from the
practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is appropriate.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR, or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later. Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty.
Llamas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the land.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006

PETER T. DONTON, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco ("respondent") for serious
misconduct and deliberate violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility ("Code").
The Facts
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") stated that he filed a criminal complaint
for estafa thru falsification of a public document 4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge for perjury 5 against complainant.
Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint, stated that:
5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was prepared and notarized by me under
the following circumstances:
A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street,
Bgy. San Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen and thereby disqualified to own real property in
his name agreed that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to prepare several documents that would guarantee
recognition of him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free
and undisturbed use of the property for his residence and business operations. The OCCUPANCY
AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.6
Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier,
being a foreign national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious misconduct and is a
deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do
something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.
In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that complainant filed the disbarment case against
him upon the instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, 7 because respondent refused to
act as complainants witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he
"prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San
Juan") of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part in a "scheme to
circumvent the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner
San Juan recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for two years and the cancellation of
his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of Governors adopted, with modification,
the Report and recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under Section
12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP. Respondent stated that he was
already 76 years old and would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending cases. He also said
that his practice of law is his only means of support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for reconsideration because the IBP had no
more jurisdiction on the case as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve defiance of the laws
which he is bound to uphold and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen, was disqualified from owning real
property.11Yet, in his motion for reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of ownership
to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and
transferred the title in complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by preparing several
documents,13including the Occupancy Agreement, that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner
of the property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in
circumventing the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his oath and the Code when he prepared
and notarized the Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands. Respondent used
his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.15
In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended from the practice of law for three years for
preparing an affidavit that virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re: Santiago,17 respondent
Atty. Santiago was suspended from the practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared the
spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and allowed them to contract separately subsequent
marriages.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.
Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal
record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 6672 September 4, 2009

PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan Law
Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients 2 to
transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance 3 and expeditious collection on their
claims.4 To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit 5 of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano
tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize respondents services
instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached "respondents" calling card:6
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-
Grace Park, Caloocan City 7821
Cel.: (0926)
 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
1avvphi1

(emphasis supplied)
Hence, this complaint.
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the said
calling card.7
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.8
Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation, 9 found that
respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other
canons11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against soliciting
cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the Rules of
Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition
would merit a heavier penalty.
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the recommended
penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional
practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said
misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a lawyers
services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and
objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business; lawyers
should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. 13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent
or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics estimation and impair its
ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay
any mans cause.
This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an attorney,
personally or through an agent in order to gain employment) 17 as a measure to protect the community from
barratry and champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same persons
coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business
as well as profited from referrals suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the mandatory
hearing.
Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer
representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon
3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not steal
another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result or reduced
fees for his services.20 Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client
list nor receiving benefits from Labianos "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labianos connection to his
office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape
liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated Rule
16.04:
Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully protected by
the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in
the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of stenographic
notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his judgment
may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as
his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with
the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake
in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that
of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the
client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.24
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice 25 which calls for the exercise of the
Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating
contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment. 26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we
adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to
uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending money to
clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed
penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best advertisement is a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. 27 For
this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of
simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.28
Labianos calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal
actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial evidence to prove his
culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDEDfrom the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of
this resolution. He isSTERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of
the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator to be circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4984. April 1, 2003]

ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, PRECILLANA J. HONORICA, ARLEEN J. RAMOS, DR. ROGER
PEREZ, DR. IMELDA DARAUG, DR. REMIGIA NATHANIELZ, CELEDONIA CORONACION, and
JOSE RABALO, complainants, vs.ATTY. FELINA DASIG, respondent.
R ES OLUTIO N
PER CURIAM:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty. Felina S. Dasig, [1] an official of the Commission
on Higher Education (CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation of the
Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and
reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-
Affidavit filed with this Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was OIC of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for disbarment under Section 27, [2] Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel
Educational Center in Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later reduced to P5,000.00 for
the facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-
in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B. Dela Torre, a student, the amount of
P18,000.00 to P20,000.00 for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-
Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G. Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full knowledge of
the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during the effectivity of Respondents designation as
Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline N. Ng, a student, a
considerable amount which was subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of P5,000.00 more or
less for facilitation of her application for correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs Service,
CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by
Respondent Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.[3]
Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless,
groundless, and unfounded suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were
subsequently dismissed.[4]
Further, complainants charge respondent of transgressing subparagraph b (22), Section 36 [5] of Presidential
Decree No. 807, for her willful failure to pay just debts owing to Borela Tire Supply and Novas Lining Brake &
Clutch as evidenced by the dishonored checks she issued, [6] the complaint sheet, and the subpoena issued to
respondent.[7]
Complainants also allege that respondent instigated the commission of a crime against complainant Celedonia
R. Coronacion and Rodrigo Coronacion, Jr., when she encouraged and ordered her son, Jonathan Dasig, a guard
of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, to draw his gun and shoot the Coronacions on the evening of
May 14, 1997. As a result of this incident, a complaint for grave threats against the respondent and her son,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 86052, was lodged with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
36.[8]
Finally, complainants allege that respondent authored and sent to then President Joseph Estrada a libelous and
unfair report, which maligned the good names and reputation of no less than eleven (11) CHED Directors
calculated to justify her ill motive of preventing their re-appointment and with the end view of securing an
appointment for herself.[9]
In our resolution of February 3, 1999, we required respondent to file a Comment on the charges. [10] A copy of
said resolution was sent to the respondent at her address at Blk. 4, Lot 12, Hobart II Subdivision, Novaliches,
Quezon City, only to be returned to this Court with the notation Unclaimed.[11]
On July 5, 1999, we directed that a copy of the resolution of February 3, 1999, be served by registered mail to
respondent at her office address in CHED.
In a letter dated August 28, 2000, the Postmaster of the Ortigas Center Post Office informed the Court that the
said mail matter had been delivered to, received by, and signed for by one Antonio Molon, an authorized agent
of respondent on August 27, 1999.[12]
On November 22, 2000, we granted complainants motion to refer the complaint to the Commission on Bar
Discipline, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In its order dated February 6, 2001, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline directed respondent to submit her
Answer to the Complaint, failing which she would be considered in default and the case heard ex
parte. Respondent failed to heed said order and on January 8, 2002, the Commission directed her anew to file
her Answer, but again she failed to comply with the directive. As a result, the Commission ruled that she had
waived her right to file her Comment or Answer to the Complaint and the case was mainly resolved on the basis
of the documents submitted and on record.
In its report and recommendation, dated April 5, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline stated as follows:
From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that respondent in violation of her oath as a
government official and as a member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to extort money
from certain people who had pending applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to act
favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to secure
financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education.
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for the
maximum period allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action in the future will be a
ground for disbarment of respondent.
On August 3, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-393, the full text of which
reads as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex A:; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules; and considering that respondent unlawfully used her public office in order to
secure financial spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on Higher Education,
Respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years.[13]
At the threshold is the query of whether respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Legal
Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time
of filing of the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards Development Division, Office of
Programs and Standards, CHED.
Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [14] However, if said misconduct as a
government official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court
as a member of the Bar.[15]
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, CHED, attempted to extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje, and
Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable action on their pending applications or
requests before her office. The evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline to comment on the charges.
We find that respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect her
qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to have known that it was patently unethical and
illegal for her to demand sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and requests awaiting
action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and any violation thereof is a
ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes upon every
member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.[16] Respondents demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing
of pending applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took
when admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his professional obligations. Hence, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6 [17] of
said Code. Lawyers in government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public service. Thus,
they should be more sensitive in the performance of their professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to
the ever-constant scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office are
violative of Rule 1.01[18]of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[19] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private interests.
Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. Respondents
conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, specially from
one occupying a high public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.
Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 [20] and Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as gross
misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years
suspension from membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP Board of
Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this
decision.
WHEREFORE, respondent Arty. Felina S. Dasig is found liable for gross misconduct and dishonesty in
violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is hereby ordered
DISBARRED.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent, as
well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

JONAR SANTIAGO vs. Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,

AC No. 6252. October 5, 2004

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Notaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with
public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial
Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those who violate it or neglect observance
thereof.
__________________
*
On leave.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It
charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule
138[2] of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03 [3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and
12.08
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the
complainant in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several
documents on different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or
community tax certificate of the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register;
and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same
as evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a
certain date, Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after
confronting the latter disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, [7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8]He admitted having
administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the
non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public
and was not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He
pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before government prosecutors, did not have to
indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some of
whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or
have entries in their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 [9] of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to
bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of
their clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent averred that since they
were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of
their case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the
Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the next scheduled hearing, to avoid a
repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted
Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers whohad assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the
counsel of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the
BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for
hearing on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled
date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July
3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD
on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through
Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted
for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation

On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172 [19] approving and adopting the
Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial
register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of
the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07
and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the
party to every document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption
from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of such certification. [21] They are
also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to
give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one
in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.
[22]
Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are
presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty,
meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified
or authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus
making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is
by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large must
be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod
methods in their performance of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert
utmost care in the performance of their duties, [25] which are dictated by public policy and are impressed with
public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial
Law by failing to enter in the documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and
the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits
relative to cases pending before the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older
notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to
affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes
no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with the basics of notarial
procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an
acceptable justification for breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of
respondents clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal
Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the aforementioned
clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has personally examined the affiants
and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so
with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he
was not required to comply with the certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
the law and legal processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of
the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep
abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be conversant
with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge
competently and diligently their obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to
obey the laws.[28] No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to
adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of
the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power
to disbar must be exercised with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case
of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.
[30]
Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that
the penalty recommended by the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit
corroborating the defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the
CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, [31] except only in certain cases
pertaining to privileged communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their
clients as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In
contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and defend the cause of others. It is
difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The
question is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind
criticism and leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the
lawyer as disinterested.The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their sympathies are against
the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he
fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial
and untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause,
the preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they
do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his
clients, we cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the
benefit of the client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake. [35] It is the
fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges against them. They are
entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure
that if they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no
effort to save his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means
-- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end that his clients would not be
deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law.[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out
the fact that on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have
possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the
statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the
trial. In this instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was
merely inquisitorial.[37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary investigation has the oft-
repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting
them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public
trial; and protecting the State from useless and expensive prosecutions. [38] The investigation is advisedly called
preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in
any matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective
client.Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to serve the ends of justice, the
canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment

The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported
by evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is
not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent that is more credible, considering that
the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of the
Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and is hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future
will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY.
ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office,respondents.
R ES OLUTIO N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the
newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-4333/521-
2667.[1]
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court, called up
the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo, who
claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment cases and can guarantee
a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property or custody of
children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the
time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed that
similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and August 5,
2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of
the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and solicitation per
se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that
the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should
be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy
and public order as long as it is dignified.[4]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation.
[5]
On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-306, [6] finding
respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138,
Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1) year with the warning
that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court
on November 11, 2002.[7]
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, [8] which was denied by the IBP in
Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.This petition was consolidated with A.C. No.
5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were willing to
submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings. [10] Complainant filed his Manifestation on April 25,
2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its
early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof. [11]Respondent, on the other hand, filed a
Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified,
self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. [12] It is a profession in which duty to
public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-
making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. [13] The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be
the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they owe to
themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a business:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity and
reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.[16]
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he caused the
publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services again after he pleaded for
compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his answer,
he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001 issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17]Ten
months later, he caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.
[18]
Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of
Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness in our
society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six months from
the time of the filing of the case, [19] he in fact encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined
and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and decorous
manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name
or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well as advertisement in legal
periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.
[21]
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon,
of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic,
Inc.:[22]
Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date and
place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal teaching positions;
membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal
fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with
their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental
feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a
daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in
a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public
or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement of his
name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and special branch of
law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not
objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of
special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-41862 February 7, 1992

B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, EULOGIO B. REYES, NICANOR G. SALAYSAY, in his capacity as
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and ANTONIO MARINAS, in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff, respondents.
Benito P. Fabie for petitioner.
Ildefonso de Guzman-Mendiola for private respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary injunction, to review the
Resolution dated 10 November 1975 of respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R denying
petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, earlier dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
The material operative facts of this case, as gathered from the pleadings of the parties, are not disputed.
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages with the then Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, against the Director of Public Works, the Republic of the
Philippines and petitioner herein, B. R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
757-R. 1
On 7 May 1973, the trial court rendered a decision finding petitioner liable for damages but absolving the other
defendants. 2
Petitioner, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision
to the respondent Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as C.A.-G.R. No. 53546-R. 3
During the pendency of the appeal, the plaintiff-appellee therein, Eulogio B. Reyes, died. Upon prior leave of
the respondent Court, he was substituted by his heirs Enrique N. Reyes, Felicisima R. Natividad, Donna
Marie N. Reyes and Renne Marie N. Ryes who are now the private respondents in this present petition.
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within
45 days from receipt thereof. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9 July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution
requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's
Brief within the reglementary period. 4 A copy of this Resolution was received by counsel for petitioner on 17
July 1974. 5
As the latter failed to comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court, on 9 September 1974, issued
another Resolution this time dismissing petitioner's appeal:
It appearing that counsel for defendant-appellant failed to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed
(for failure to file the appellant's brief within the reglementary period which expired on April 5, 1974) within
the period of 10 days fixed in the resolution of July 9, 1974, copy of which was received by said counsel on July
17, 1974; . . . 6
On 28 September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for
reconsideration 7 of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas, senior partner in the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm are
still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas) and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having
established her own law office; furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in the trial
court and who is believed to have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant's Brief but failed to submit it
through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
In its Resolution of 9 October 1974, respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration, stating that:
Upon consideration of the motion of counsel for defendant-appellant, praying, on the grounds therein stated,
that the resolution of September 9, 1974, dismissing the appeal, be set aside, and that appellant be granted a
reasonable period of time within which to file its brief: considering that six (6) months had elapsed since the
expiration of the original period and more than two and one-half (2-) months since counsel received copy of
the resolution requiring him to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file brief;
Motion Denied. 8
No action having been taken by petitioner from the above Resolution within the period to file a petition for
review, the same became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded to the court of origin
for execution.
The trial court issued a writ of execution on 21 October 1975. 9 Pursuant thereto, respondent Provincial Sheriff
and Deputy Sheriff attached petitioner's Hough Pay Loader with Hercules Diesel Engine and issued on 5
November 1975 a Notice of Sheriff's Sale, scheduling for Friday, 14 November 1975 at 10:00 o'clock in the
morning, the auction sale thereof.10
On 6 November 1975, petitioner filed with respondent Court a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 11 dated 5 November 1975, and containing the following
allegations:
1. That late as it may be, this Honorable Court has the inherent power to modify and set aside its processes, in
the interest of justice, especially so in this case when the case was dismissed on account of the untimely death
of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas, counsel of BRSEI (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc.).
2. That to dismiss the case for failure to file the appellant's brief owing to the untimely death of the late Atty.
Crispin D. Baizas would be tantamount to denying BRSEI its (sic) day in court, and is, therefore, a clear and
unmistakable denial of due process on the part of BRSEI.
3. That to reinstate BRSEI's appeal would not impair the rights of the parties, since all that BRSEI is asking for,
is a day in court to be heard on appeal in order to have the unfair, unjust and unlawful decision, set aside and
reversed.
The respondent Court denied the said motion in its Resolution of 10 November 1975: 12
. . . it appearing that appellant was represented by the law firm of Baizas, Alberto & Associates, and while Atty.
Baizas died on January 16, 1974, his law firm was not dissolved since it received the notice to file brief on
February 19, 1974, and the copy of the Resolution of July 9, 1974, requiring appellant to show cause why the
appeal should not be dismissed was received by the law firm on July 17, 1974 and no cause was shown; . . .
Hence, on 13 November 1975, petitioner filed the original petition 13 in this case against the Court of Appeals,
Eulogio B. Reyes, Nicanor G. Salaysay, as Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, and Antonio Marinas, as Deputy Sheriff.
The petition likewise prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.
In the Resolution of 13 November 1975, this Court required respondents to comment on the petition within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, and issued a Temporary Restraining Order. 14
On 12 January 1976, respondents filed a Partial Comment on the Petition with a Motion to Suspend the
Proceedings 15 on the ground that respondent Eulogio B. Reyes is already dead and his lawful heirs had already
been ordered substituted for him during the pendency of the appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals.
In the Resolution of 21 January 1976, this Court ordered petitioner to amend its petition within then (10) days
from receipt of notice, and suspended the filing of respondents' Comment until after the amendment is presented
and admitted. 16
In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on 9 February 1976 a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition to
which it attached the said Amended Petition. 17 The amendment consists in the substitution of Eulogio B. Reyes
with his heirs.
This Court admitted the Amended Petition 18 and required the respondents to file their Comment within ten (10)
days from notice thereof, which they complied with on 5 April 1976. 19 Petitioner filed its Reply to the
Comment on 29 April 1976.20
In the Resolution of 12 May 1976, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit: 21
L-41862 (B.R. Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.). Considering the allegations, issues
and arguments adduced in the amended petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
respondents' comment thereon, as well as petitioner's reply to said comment, the Court Resolved to DENY the
petition for lack of merit.
However, on 31 May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration 22 claiming that since it was deprived
of the right to appeal without fault on its part, the petition should be given due course.
Respondents submitted on 22 July 1976 their Comment 23 to said Motion for Reconsideration.
On 10 September 1976, this Court resolved to reconsider 24 its Resolution of 12 May 1976 and required both
parties to submit simultaneously their respective Memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof.
Petitioner submitted its Memorandum on 5 November 1976 25 while respondents submitted theirs on 22
November 1976. 26 On 29 November 1976, this Court deemed the present case submitted for decision. 27
The sole issue to be addressed is whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in
denying petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal, previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant's Brief.
Petitioner, in its Memorandum, extensively expounds on respondent Court's authority to reinstate dismissed
appeals and cites as basis thereof the decision of this Court in Heirs of Clemente Celestino vs. Court of Appeals,
et al., 28 Indeed, in said case, this Court affirmed the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating an appeal
after being dismissed for failure by the appellants therein to file their brief, and after entry of judgment and
remand of the records to the lower court and cancelled the entry of judgment, requiring the lower court to
return the records to the Court of Appeals and admit appellant's brief. Said case, however, had a peculiar or
singular factual situation" which prompted the Court of Appeals to grant the relief and which this Court found
sufficient to justify such action. As this Court, through Associate Justice Ramon Aquino, said:
We are of the opinion that under the peculiar or singular factual situation in this case and to forestall a
miscarriage of justice the resolution of the Court of Appeals reinstating the appeal should be upheld.
That Court dismissed the appeal of the Pagtakhans in the mistaken belief that they had abandoned it because
they allegedly failed to give to their counsel the money needed for paying the cost of printing their brief.
But presumably the Appellate Court realized later that fraud might have been practised on appellants
Pagtakhans since their oppositions were not included in the record on appeal. In (sic) sensed that there was
some irregularity in the actuations of their lawyer and that Court (sic) itself had been misled into dismissing the
appeal.
Counsel for the Pagtakhans could have furnished them with copies of his motions for extension of time to file
brief so that they would have known that the Court of Appeals had been apprised of their alleged failure to
defray the cost of printing their brief and they could have articulated their reaction directly to the Court.
Counsel could have moved in the Appellate Court that he be allowed to withdraw from the case or that the
Pagtakhans be required to manifest whether they were still desirous of prosecuting their appeal or wanted a
mimeographed brief to be filed for them (SeePeople vs. Cawili, L-30543, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 728).
Since counsel did none of those things, his representation that the appellants had evinced lack of interest in
pursuing their appeal is difficult to believe.
If the appellate court has not yet lost its jurisdiction, it may exercise its discretion in reinstating an appeal,
having in mind the circumstances obtaining in each case and the demands of substantial justice (Alquiza vs.
Alquiza, L-23342, February 10, 1968, 22 SCRA 494, 66 O.G. 276; C. Vda. de Ordoveza vs. Raymundo, 62
Phil. 275; Chavez vs. Ganzon, 108 Phil. 6).
But even if it has already lost jurisdiction over the appeal by reason of the remand of the record to the lower
court, it, nevertheless, has the inherent right to recall the remittitur or the remand of the record to the lower
court if it had rendered a decision or issued a resolution which was induced by fraud practised upon it. Such a
right is not affected by the statutory provision that after the record has been remanded, the appellate court has
no further jurisdiction over the appeal (5 Am Jur. 2nd 433citing Lovett vs. State, 29 Fla. 384, 11 So. 176; 84
ALR 595; State vs. Ramirez, 34 Idaho 623, 203 Pac. 279).
In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtain is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel,
which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a
favorable action on its plea.
As held in Chavez, et al. vs. Ganzon, et al., 29 and reiterated in Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, 30We said:
Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that had been dismissed is included in or implied
from the power or discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be exercised upon a
showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to
allow extensions of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which would call for, prompt and
justify its exercise (sic). Otherwise, it cannot and must not be upheld.
To justify its failure to file the Appellant's Brief, petitioner relies mainly on the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas and
the supposed confusion it brought to the firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES. It says: 31
Petitioner, thru its president Bernardo R. Sebastian, engaged the services of Atty. Crispin D. Baizas to handle its
defense in Civil Case No. 757-R; however, it appears that Atty. Baizas entered petitioner's case as a case to be
handled by his law firm operating under the name and style "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates." Hence, the
Answer to the complaint, Answer to Cross-Claim, and Answer to Fourth-party Complaint filed for petitioner in
said case, evince that the law firm "Crispin D. Baizas & Associates" represents petitioner in the action.
After rendition of the assailed Decision of the trial court, petitioner's counsel appears to have changed its firm
name to "Baizas, Alberto & Associates." The appeal was thus pursued for petitioner by the law firm "Baizas,
Alberto & Associates."
On January 16, 1974, Atty. Crispin D. Baizas died as a result of a brief heart attack. In consequence ( sic) of his
death, the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was in a terribly confused state of affairs. In effect, said law
firm was dissolved. Atty. Ruby Alberto formed her own law office and other associates left the dissolved law
firms (sic) joining other offices or putting up their own. Atty. Jose Baizas, son of deceased Crispin D. Baizas,
took over the management of why may have been left of his father's office, it appearing that some, if not many,
cases of the defunct office were taken over by the associates who left the firm upon its dissolution.
But, none of the former partners and associates/assistants of the dissolved law firm filed the required appellant's
brief for herein petitioner in its appealed case before the respondent Court of Appeals. No notice was served
upon petitioner by any of the surviving associates of the defunct law firm that its appellant's brief was due for
filing or that the law office had been dissolved and that the law office had been dissolved and that none of the
lawyers herein formerly connected desired to handle the appealed case of petitioner. . . .
The circumstances that the law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" was dissolved and that none of the
associates took over petitioner's case, and no notice of such state of affairs was given to petitioner who could
have engaged the services of another lawyer to prosecute its appeal before respondent Court, constitutes (sic) an
UNAVOIDABLE CASUALTY that entitles petitioner to the relief prayed for. On the other hand, the non-
dissolution of said law firm "Baizas, Alberto & Associates" will not defeat petitioner's claim for relief since, in
such event, the said firm had ABANDONED petitioner's cause, which act constitutes fraud and/or reckless
inattention the result of which is deprivation of petitioner's day in court. In the abovementioned Yuseco case,
this Honorable Court had emphatically and forcefully declared that it will always be disposed to grant relief to
parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright incompetence of lawyers, which has the
consequence of depriving their day (sic) in court.
We find no merit in petitioner's contentions. Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-
client relationship between said firm and petitioner.
In Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 32 the appeal filed by the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES on behalf of respondent therein was dismissed for failure to comply with the requisites
enumerated in the Rules of Court; the excuse presented by said counsel was also the death of Atty. Crispin
Baizas. This Court held therein that:
The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's
appeal, supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with the task of representing Alvendia in the
Court of Appeals. Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually collaborating with Viola in
handling Alvendia's case. He did not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.
Undoubtedly, there was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel in failing to file the
Appellant's Brief. As revealed by the records, petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES
law firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it.
Said law firm also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of 9 July 1974 requiring it to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the reglementary period.
Petitioner chose not to comply with it, thus compelling the respondent Court to issue on 9 September 1974 a
Resolution dismissing the appeal, a copy of which the former also received. Then, on 28 September 1974, the
BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved for reconsideration of the said Resolution which respondent Court denied in its
Resolution of 9 October 1974. Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year when, on 6 November
1975, it filed the instant petition in reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court following
receipt of the records for the respondent Court.
The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid
justification for its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty. Alberto and
his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the
manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled the case for
petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to
handle the case, later left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others in the firm could
have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to
another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that
the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.
In the Negros Stevedoring case, supra., this Court held:
The negligence committed in the case at bar cannot be considered excusable, nor (sic) is it unavoidable. Time
and again the Court has admonished law firms to adopt a system of distributing pleadings and notices, whereby
lawyers working therein receive promptly notices and pleadings intended for them, so that they will always be
informed of the status of their cases. Their Court has also often repeated that the negligence of clerks which
adversely affect the cases handled by lawyers, is binding upon the latter.
Compounding such negligence is the failure of the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, which filed on 28 September 1974
the motion for reconsider the Resolution of 9 September 1974, to take any further appropriate action after the
respondent Court denied said motion on 9 October 1974. The appearance of said counsel is presumed to be duly
authorized by petitioner. The latter has neither assailed nor questioned such appearance.
The rule is settled that negligence of counsel binds the client. 33
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its
case. As pointed out by respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the intimate friend of
Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter must have been known to the former. 34 This fact should have
made petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed to act with prudence and
diligence, thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either
approval or sympathy. 35
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that there was failure to show a good and sufficient cause which would justify
the reinstatement of petitioner's appeal. Respondent Court of Appeals did not them commit any grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioner's motion to reinstate its appeal.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued in this case is
lifted.
Costs against petitioner.
IT SO ORDERED

Diana Ramos vs. Atty Jose R. Imbang AC No 6788, August 23, 2007

PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint for disbarment or suspension[1] against Atty. Jose R. Imbang for multiple violations of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
THE COMPLAINT
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil
and criminal actions against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. [2] She gave respondent P8,500 as
attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt for P5,000 only.[3]

The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent
never allowed her to enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come out after
several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled and rescheduled. [4] This happened six times and
for each appearance in court, respondent charged her P350.

After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became suspicious. She personally inquired about the
status of her cases in the trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn that respondent
never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office
(PAO).[5]
RESPONDENT'S DEFENSE
According to respondent, the complainant knew that he was in the government service from the very start. In
fact, he first met the complainant when he was still a district attorney in the Citizen's Legal Assistance Office
(predecessor of PAO) of Bian, Laguna and was assigned as counsel for the complainant's daughter.[6]

In 1992, the complainant requested him to help her file an action for damages against the Jovellanoses.
[7]
Because he was with the PAO and aware that the complainant was not an indigent, he declined.
[8]
Nevertheless, he advised the complainant to consult Atty. Tim Ungson, a relative who was a private
practitioner.[9] Atty. Ungson, however, did not accept the complainant's case as she was unable to come up with
the acceptance fee agreed upon.[10] Notwithstanding Atty. Ungson's refusal, the complainant allegedly remained
adamant. She insisted on suing the Jovellanoses. Afraid that she might spend the cash on hand, the complainant
asked respondent to keep the P5,000 while she raised the balance of Atty. Ungson's acceptance fee.[11]

A year later, the complainant requested respondent to issue an antedated receipt because one of her daughters
asked her to account for the P5,000 she had previously given the respondent for safekeeping. [12] Because the
complainant was a friend, he agreed and issued a receipt dated July 15, 1992.[13]

On April 15, 1994, respondent resigned from the PAO. [14] A few months later or in September 1994, the
complainant again asked respondent to assist her in suing the Jovellanoses. Inasmuch as he was now a private
practitioner, respondent agreed to prepare the complaint. However, he was unable to finalize it as he lost contact
with the complainant.[15]
RECOMMENDATION OF THE IBP

Acting on the complaint, the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) where the complaint was filed, received evidence from the parties. On November 22, 2004, the CBD
submitted its report and recommendation to the IBP Board of Governors.[16]

The CBD noted that the receipt[17] was issued on July 15, 1992 when respondent was still with the PAO. [18] It
also noted that respondent described the complainant as a shrewd businesswoman and that respondent was a
seasoned trial lawyer. For these reasons, the complainant would not have accepted a spurious receipt nor would
respondent have issued one. The CBD rejected respondent's claim that he issued the receipt to accommodate a
friend's request.[19] It found respondent guilty of violating the prohibitions on government lawyers from
accepting private cases and receiving lawyer's fees other than their salaries.[20] The CBD concluded that
respondent violated the following provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from a client.

Rule 18.01. A lawyer should not undertake a legal service which he knows or should know that he is not
qualified to render. However, he may render such service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as
collaborating counsel a lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Thus, it recommended respondent's suspension from the practice of law for three years and ordered him to
immediately return to the complainant the amount of P5,000 which was substantiated by the receipt.[21]
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the findings of the CBD that respondent violated Rules
1.01, 16.01 and 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It, however, modified the CBD's
recommendation with regard to the restitution of P5,000 by imposing interest at the legal rate, reckoned from
1995 or, in case of respondent's failure to return the total amount, an additional suspension of six months.[22]
THE COURT'S RULING
We adopt the findings of the IBP with modifications.
Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and integrity.[23] More specifically, lawyers in
government service are expected to be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants who owe utmost fidelity to public
service.[24]

Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to public service. For this reason, the
private practice of profession is prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto, public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official function.[25]
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are expected to devote themselves
full-time to the work of their respective offices.
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while
he was still connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship.[26] Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the complainant and the receipt confirmed
the presence of an attorney-client relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt showed
that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the
prohibition on private practice of profession.

Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees. The PAO was created for the purpose
of providing free legal assistance to indigent litigants. [27] Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 14. xxx

The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal assistance to indigent
persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial cases.[28]
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was
inconsistent with the office's mission.[29] Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees other
than his salary.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law.[30] This undertaking includes the observance of the above-
mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently, respondent's acceptance of the cases was
also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the private
practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the complainant's counsel.

Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases and accepting attorney's fees,
respondent also surreptitiously deceived the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the
Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done), respondent also led the complainant to believe
that he really filed an action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases were being tried
and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted
dishonesty, a violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.[31]

Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral character required of all lawyers,
specially one occupying a public office. Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act
or omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government but also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a high degree of social responsibility, higher
than his brethren in private practice.[32]

There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondent did not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted
it as his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the complainant (such as an amount delivered by
the sheriff in satisfaction of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) [33] nor was it given to him for a specific
purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail bond). [34] Nevertheless, respondent should return
the P5,000 as he, a government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to accept them.[35]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jose R. Imbang is found guilty of violating the lawyers oath, Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and
Canon 18, Rule 18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name isORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is also ordered to
return to complainant the amount of P5,000 with interest at the legal rate, reckoned from 1995, within 10 days
from receipt of this resolution.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant
and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

GISELA HUYSSEN vs. Atty. Fred L. Guiterrez

AC No. 6707, March 24, 2006

This treats of a Complaint[1] for Disbarment filed by Gisela Huyssen against respondent Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez.
Complainant alleged that in 1995, while respondent was still connected with the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), she and her three sons, who are all American citizens, applied for Philippine Visas under
Section 13[g] of the Immigration Law.Respondent told complainant that in order that their visa applications will
be favorably acted upon by the BID they needed to deposit a certain sum of money for a period of one year
which could be withdrawn after one year. Believing that the deposit was indeed required by law, complainant
deposited with respondent on six different occasions from April 1995 to April 1996 the total amount of
US$20,000. Respondent prepared receipts/vouchers as proofs that he received the amounts deposited by the
complainant but refused to give her copies of official receipts despite her demands. After one year, complainant
demanded from respondent the return of US$20,000 who assured her that said amount would be returned. When
respondent failed to return the sum deposited, the World Mission for Jesus (of which complainant was a
member) sent a demand letter to respondent for the immediate return of the money. In a letter dated 1 March
1999, respondent promised to release the amount not later than 9 March 1999. Failing to comply with his
promise, the World Mission for Jesus sent another demand letter. In response thereto, respondent sent
complainant a letter dated 19 March 1999 explaining the alleged reasons for the delay in the release of
deposited amount. He enclosed two blank checks postdated to 6 April and 20 April 1999 and authorized
complainant to fill in the amounts. When complainant deposited the postdated checks on their due dates, the
same were dishonored because respondent had stopped payment on the same. Thereafter, respondent, in his
letter to complainant dated 25 April 1999, explained the reasons for stopping payment on the checks, and gave
complainant five postdated checks with the assurance that said checks would be honored. Complainant
deposited the five postdated checks on their due dates but they were all dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds or payment thereon was ordered stopped by respondent. After respondent made
several unfulfilled promises to return the deposited amount, complainant referred the matter to a lawyer who
sent two demand letters to respondent. The demand letters remained unheeded.

Thus, a complaint[2] for disbarment was filed by complainant in the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).

On 15 November 2000, Victor C. Fernandez, Director for Bar Discipline, required [3] respondent to submit his
answer within 15 days from receipt thereof.
In his Counter-Affidavit dated 2 July 2001,[4] respondent denied the allegations in the complaint claiming that
having never physically received the money mentioned in the complaint, he could not have appropriated or
pocketed the same. He said the amount was used as payment for services rendered for obtaining the permanent
visas in the Philippines. Respondent explained thus:

a) Through a close-friend, Jovie Galaraga, a Pastor and likewise a friend of the complainant, the latter
was introduced to me at my office at the Bureau of Immigration with a big problem concerning their stay in the
Philippines, herself and three sons, one of which is already of major age while the two others were still minors
then. Their problem was the fact that since they have been staying in the Philippines for almost ten (10) years as
holders of missionary visas (9G) they could no longer extend their said status as under the law and
related polic[i]es of the government, missionary visa holders could only remain as such for ten (10) years after
which they could no longer extend their said status and have to leave the country.

b) Studying their case and being U.S. Citizen (sic), I advised them that they better secure a permanent
visa under Section 3 of the Philippine Immigration Law otherwise known as Quota Visa and thereafter,
provided them with list of the requirements in obtaining the said visa, one of which is that the applicant must
have a $40,000 deposited in the bank. I also inform that her son Marcus Huyssen, who was already of major
age, has to have the same amount of show money separate of her money as he would be issued separate visa,
while her two minor children would be included as her dependents in her said visa application. I advised them
to get a lawyer (sic), complainant further requested me to refer to her to a lawyer to work for their application,
which I did and contacted the late Atty. Mendoza, an Immigration lawyer, to do the job for the complainant and
her family.

c) The application was filed, processed and followed-up by the said Atty. Mendoza until the same
was finished and the corresponding permanent visa were obtained by the complainant and her family. Her son
Marcus Huyssen was given an independent permanent visa while the other two were made as dependents of the
complainant. In between the processing of the papers and becoming very close to the complainant, I became the
intermediary between complainant and their counsel so much that every amount that the latter would request for
whatever purpose was coursed through me which request were then transmitted to the complainant and every
amount of money given by the complainant to their counsel were coursed thru me which is the very reason why
my signature appears in the vouchers attached in the complaint-affidavit;

d) That as time goes by, I noticed that the amount appeared to be huge for services of a lawyer that I
myself began to wonder why and, to satisfy my curiosity, I met Atty. Mendoza and inquired from him regarding
the matter and the following facts were revealed to me:

1) That what was used by the complainant as her show money from the bank is not
really her money but money of World Mission for Jesus, which therefore is a serious violation of the
Immigration Law as there was a misrepresentation.This fact was confirmed later when the said entity sent their
demand letter to the undersigned affiant and which is attached to the complaint-affidavit;

2) That worst, the same amount used by the complainant, was the very same amount used
by her son MarcusHuyssen, in obtaining his separate permanent visa. These acts of the complainant and her son
could have been a ground for deportation and likewise constitute criminal offense under the Immigration Law
and the Revised Penal Code. These could have been the possible reason why complainant was made to pay for
quite huge amount.

e) That after they have secured their visas, complainant and her family became very close to
undersigned and my family that I was even invited to their residence several times;

f) However after three years, complainant demanded the return of their money given and
surprisingly they want to recover the same from me. By twist of fate, Atty. Mendoza is no longer around, he
died sometime 1997;

g) That it is unfortunate that the real facts of the matter is now being hidden and that the amount of
money is now being sought to be recovered from me;

h) That the fact is I signed the vouchers and being a lawyer I know the consequences of having
signed the same and therefore I had to answer for it and pay. I tried to raised the fund needed but up to the
present my standby loan application has not been released and was informed that the same would only be
forthcoming second week of August. The same should have been released last March but was aborted due to
prevalent condition. The amount to be paid, according to the complainant has now become doubled plus
attorneys fees ofP200,000.00.
Complainant submitted her evidence on 4 September 2002 and April 2003, and filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence on 25 August 2003.

On several occasions, the complaint was set for reception of respondents evidence but the scheduled hearings
(11 settings) were all reset at the instance of the respondent who was allegedly out of the country to attend to his
clients needs. Reception of respondents evidence was scheduled for the last time on 28 September 2004 and
again respondent failed to appear, despite due notice and without just cause.

On 5 November 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan submitted her report[5] recommending
the disbarment of respondent. She justified her recommendation in this manner:
At the outset it should be noted that there is no question that respondent received the amount of US$20,000
from complainant, as respondent himself admitted that he signed the vouchers (Annexes A to F of complainant)
showing his receipt of said amount from complainant. Respondent however claims that he did not appropriate
the same for himself but that he delivered the said amount to a certain Atty. Mendoza. This defense raised by
respondent is untenable considering the documentary evidence submitted by complainant. On record is the 1
March 1999 letter of respondent addressed to the World Mission for Jesus (Annex H of Complaint) where he
stated thus:

I really understand your feelings on the delay of the release of the deposit but I repeat, nobody really intended
that the thing would happen that way. Many events were the causes of the said delay particularly the death of
then Commissioner L.Verceles, whose sudden death prevented us the needed papers for the immediate release.
It was only from compiling all on the first week of January this year, that all the said papers were recovered,
hence, the process of the release just started though some important papers were already finished as early as the
last quarter of last year. We are just going through the normal standard operating procedure and there is no day
since January that I do not make any follow ups on the progress of the same.

and his letter dated 19 March 1999 (Annex L of Complaint) where he stated thus:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your good self in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family. It might take some more time
before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are being still compiled are being
looked at the files of the late CommissionerVerceles, who approved your visa and who died of heart attack.
Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed are already intact. This is
just a bureaucratic delay.

From the above letters, respondent makes it appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation. However, if this is true, how come only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by
respondent to complainant to prove his receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued
by the said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of the money to
complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and
appropriated the same for his personal use. It should also be noted that respondent has failed to establish that the
late Atty. Mendoza referred to in his Counter-Affidavit really exists. There is not one correspondence from Atty.
Mendoza regarding the visa application of complainant and his family, and complainant has also testified that
she never met this Atty. Mendoza referred to by respondent.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of his position with the Board
of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused
damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

On 4 November 2004, the IBP Board of Governors approved[6] the Investigating Commissioners report with
modification, thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
applicable laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and ordered to return the amount with legal interest from receipt of the money until payment. This case shall
be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.
We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be severely sanctioned.
We begin with the veritable fact that lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have
more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely condemned in
a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.[7]

It is undisputed that respondent admitted[8] having received the US$20,000 from complainant as shown by his
signatures in the petty cash vouchers[9] and receipts[10] he prepared, on the false representation that that it was
needed in complainants application for visa with the BID. Respondent denied he misappropriated the said
amount and interposed the defense that he delivered it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and
children in their application for visa in the BID.[11] Such defense remains unsubstantiated as he failed to submit
evidence on the matter. While he claims that Atty. Mendoza already died, he did not present the death certificate
of said Atty. Mendoza. Worse, the action of respondent in shifting the blame to someone who has been naturally
silenced by fate, is not only impudent but downright ignominious. When the integrity of a member of the bar is
challenged, it is not enough that he deny the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him.[12] He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which
at all times is expected of him. In the case at bar, respondent clearly fell short of his duty. Records show that
even though he was given the opportunity to answer the charges and controvert the evidence against him in a
formal investigation, he failed, without any plausible reason, to appear several times whenever the case was set
for reception of his evidence despite due notice.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is, thus, not convincing. It is settled that denial is inherently a
weak defense. To be believed, it must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability; otherwise, such
denial is purely self-serving and is with nil evidentiary value.

When respondent issued the postdated checks as his moral obligation, he indirectly admitted the charge. Such
admissions were also apparent in the following letters of respondent to complainant:

1) Letter[13] dated 01 March 1992, pertinent portion of which reads:

Be that as it may, may I assure you for the last time that the said deposit is forthcoming, the latest of which is 09
March 1999.Should it not be released on said date, I understand to pay the same to you out of my personal
money on said date. No more reasons and no more alibis. Send somebody here at the office on that day and the
amount would be given to you wether (sic) from the Bureau or from my own personal money.

2) Letter[14] dated 19 March 1999, reads in part:

I am sending you my personal checks to cover the refund of the amount deposited by your goodself in
connection with the procurement of your permanent visa and that of your family.

It might take some more time before the Bureau could release the refund as some other pertinent papers are still
being compiled and are being looked at the files of the late Commissioner Verceles, who approved your visa
and who died of heart attack. Anyway, I am sure that everything would be fine later as all the documents needed
are already intact. This is just a bureaucratic delay.
xxxx
As you would see, I have to pay you in peso. I have issued you 2 checks, one dated April 6, 1999 and the other
one dated April 20, 1999. I leave the amount vacant because I would want you to fill them up on their due dates
the peso equivalent to $10,000 respectively.This is to be sure that the peso equivalent of your P20,000 would be
well exchanged. I have postdated them to enable me to raise some more pesos to cover the whole amount but
dont worry as the Lord had already provided me the means.

3) Letter[15] dated 25 April 1999 provides:

Anyway, let me apologize for all these troubles. You are aware that I have done my very best for the early return
of your money but the return is becoming bleak as I was informed that there are still papers lacking. When I
stopped the payment of the checks I issued, I was of the impression that everything is fine, but it is not. I guess
it is time for me to accept the fact that I really have to personally return the money out of my own. The issue
should stop at my end. This is the truth that I must face. It may hurt me financially but it would set me free from
worries and anxieties.

I have arranged for a loan from money lenders and was able to secure one last Saturday the releases of which
are on the following:

May 4, 1999- 200,000

May 11, 1999 -200,000
May 20, 1999-200,000
June 4, 1999-200,000

I have given my property (lot situated in the province) as my collateral.

I am therefore putting an end to this trouble. I am issuing four checks which I assure you will be sufficiently
funded on their due dates by reason of my aforestated loans. Just bear with me for the last time, if any of these
checks, is returned, dont call me anymore. Just file the necessary action against me, I just had to put an end to
this matter and look forward. x x x

4) Letter[16] dated 12 May 1999, which reads:

The other day I deposited the amount of P289,000 to the bank to cover the first check I issued. In fact I stopped
all payments to all other checks that are becoming due to some of my creditors to give preference to the check I
issued to you.

This morning when I went to the Bank, I learned that the bank instead of returning the other checks I requested
for stop payment - instead honored them and mistakenly returned your check. This was a very big surprise to
me and discouragement for I know it would really upset you.

In view of this I thought of sending you the amount of P200,000 in cash which I initially plan to withdraw from
the Bank. However, I could not entrust the same amount to the bearer nor can I bring the same to your place
considering that its quite a big amount. I am just sending a check for you to immediately deposit today and I
was assured by the bank that it would be honored this time.

Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. As
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent would not have issued his personal checks if
said amount were officially deposited with the BID. This is an admission of misconduct.

Respondents act of asking money from complainant in consideration of the latters pending application for visas
is violative of Rule 1.01[17] of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members of the Bar from
engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of
Rule 6.02[18] of the Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their private
interest. Promotion of private interest includes soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in any transaction
requiring the approval of his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office. [19]Respondents
conduct in office betrays the integrity and good moral character required from all lawyers, especially from one
occupying a high public office. A lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government; he must also
uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with
high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than his brethren in private practice.
In a desperate attempt to put up a smoke or to camouflage his misdeed, he went on committing another by
issuing several worthless checks, thereby compounding his case.

In a recent case, we have held that the issuance of worthless checks constitutes gross misconduct, [20] as the effect
transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public since the circulation of valueless commercial papers can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. Thus,
paraphrasing Blacks definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges on his private
duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty,
justice, honesty or good morals.[21]
Consequently, we have held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that
he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment, is also a manifestation of moral turpitude.[22]
Respondents acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had
the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly,
he does not deserve to continue, being a member of the bar.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a special privilege
bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. A lawyer must at all
times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach. He must faithfully perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts
and to his clients. A violation of the high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative
sanctions which includes suspension and disbarment.[23] More importantly, possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss
thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.[24]

Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the
erring individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the
public from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard
of their lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the bar.[25] These pronouncement gain practical significance in the case at bar considering that respondent was a
former member of the Board of Special Inquiry of the BID. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who
are public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government lawyers should be
more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct is more likely to be magnified in
the public eye.[26]

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high
standards of the legal profession.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended by
this Court for any of the following acts: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office; (4) grossly
immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude ; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7)
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a
party without authority to do so.[27]
In Atty. Vitriolo v. Atty. Dasig,[28] we ordered the disbarment of a lawyer who, during her tenure as OIC, Legal
Services, Commission on Higher Education, demanded sums of money as consideration for the approval of
applications and requests awaiting action by her office. In Lim v. Barcelona,[29] we also disbarred a senior lawyer
of the National Labor Relations Commission, who was caught by the National Bureau of Investigation in the act
of receiving and counting money extorted from a certain person.
Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct; and consistent with the need to maintain the high standards of the
Bar and thus preserve the faith of the public in the legal profession, respondent deserves the ultimate penalty of
expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.[30]

WHEREFORE, Atty. Fred L. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and ordered to return
the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest from his receipt of the money until
payment. This case shall be referred to the Office of the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative
action. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the records of the respondent;
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.

[A.C. No. 4018. March 8, 2005]

OMAR P. ALI, complainant, vs. ATTY. MOSIB A. BUBONG, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a verified petition for disbarment[1] filed against Atty. Mosib Ali Bubong for having been found guilty of
grave misconduct while holding the position of Register of Deeds of Marawi City.
It appears that this disbarment proceeding is an off-shoot of the administrative case earlier filed by complainant
against respondent. In said case, which was initially investigated by the Land Registration Authority (LRA),
complainant charged respondent with illegal exaction; indiscriminate issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-2821 in the names of Lawan Bauduli Datu, Mona Abdullah, [2] Ambobae Bauduli Datu, Matabae
Bauduli Datu, Mooamadali Bauduli Datu, and Amenola Bauduli Datu; and manipulating the criminal complaint
filed against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and others for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law. It appears from the
records that the Baudali Datus are relatives of respondent.[3]
The initial inquiry by the LRA was resolved in favor of respondent. The investigating officer, Enrique Basa,
absolved respondent of all the charges brought against him, thus:
It is crystal clear from the foregoing that complainant not only failed to prove his case but that he has no case at
all against respondent Mosib Ali Bubong. Wherefore, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
the complaint against respondent be dismissed for lack of merit and evidence.[4]
The case was then forwarded to the Department of Justice for review and in a report dated 08 September 1992,
then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon exonerated respondent of the charges of illegal exaction and infidelity
in the custody of documents. He, however, found respondent guilty of grave misconduct for his imprudent
issuance of TCT No. T-2821 and manipulating the criminal case for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law
instituted against Hadji Serad Bauduli Datu and the latters co-accused. As a result of this finding, Secretary
Drilon recommended respondents dismissal from service.
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the
conclusion reached by Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government service.
Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order before this Court through a petition
for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition[5] claiming that the Office of the President did not have the authority
and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted that respondents [6] in that petition violated the laws
on security of tenure and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the LRA committed a
breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his authority to resolve the administrative complaint against
him (herein respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition for failure on the part of petitioner to
sufficiently show that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned order.
[7]
Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of
15 November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant is now before us, seeking the disbarment of
respondent. Complainant claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself unfit to be
further entrusted with the duties of an attorney[8] and that he poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal
profession.[9]
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in
the name of the Bauduli Datus. According to him, both law [10] and jurisprudence support his stance that it was
his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City, to act on applications for land registration on the
basis only of the documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli Datus, nothing in the
documents they presented to his office warranted suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821
in their favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal of criminal complaint for violation of the
Anti-Squatting Law allegedly committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-defendants. Respondent
explains that his participation in said case was a result of the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the
investigating prosecutor who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said dispute. He further
claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence
presented by the parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he influenced the outcome of the case is totally
unjustified.
Through a resolution dated 26 June 1995, [11] this Court referred this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. Acting on this resolution, the IBP commenced
the investigation of this disbarment suit. On 23 February 1996, Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued the
following order relative to the transfer of venue of this case. The pertinent portion of this order provides:
ORDER
When this case was called for hearing, both complainant and respondent appeared.
The undersigned Commissioner asked them if they are willing to have the reception of evidence vis--vis this
case be done in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur before the president of the local IBP Chapter. Both parties agreed.
Accordingly, transmit the records of this case to the Director for Bar Discipline for appropriate action.[12]
On 30 March 1996, the IBP Board of Governors passed a resolution approving Commissioner Fernandezs
recommendation for the transfer of venue of this administrative case and directed the Western Mindanao Region
governor to designate the local IBP chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report, and
recommendation.[13] The IBP Resolution states:
Resolution No. XII-96-153
Adm. Case No. 4018
Omar P. Ali vs. Atty. Mosib A. Bubong
RESOLVED TO APPROVE the recommendation of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of
Venue of the above-entitled case and direct the Western Mindanao Region Governor George C. Jabido to
designate the local IBP Chapter concerned to conduct the investigation, report and recommendation.
Pursuant to this resolution, Atty. Benjamin B. Bernardino, Director for Bar Discipline, wrote a letter dated 23
October 1996 addressed to Governor George C. Jabido, President of IBP Cotabato Chapter requesting the latter
to receive the evidence in this case and to submit his recommendation and recommendation as directed by the
IBP Board of Governors.[14]
In an undated Report and Recommendation, the IBP Cotabato Chapter [15] informed the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) that the investigating panel[16] had sent notices to both complainant and respondent for a series
of hearings but respondent consistently ignored said notices. The IBP Cotabato Chapter concluded its report by
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for five years.
On 01 July 1998, respondent filed a motion dated 30 June 1998 praying for the transmittal of the records of this
case to the Marawi City-Lanao del Sur Chapter of the IBP pursuant to Resolution No. XII-96-153 as well as
Commissioner Fernandezs Order dated 23 February 1996.
Commissioner Fernandez thereafter ordered the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter to comment on
respondents motion.[17]Complying with this directive, the panel expressed no opposition to respondents motion
for the transmittal of the records of this case to IBP Marawi City.[18] On 25 September 1998, Commissioner
Fernandez ordered the referral of this case to IBP Marawi City for the reception of respondents evidence.
[19]
This order of referral, however, was set aside by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XIII-98-
268 issued on 4 December 1998. Said resolution provides:
RESOLVED to DENY the ORDER of Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez for the transmittal of the case records
of the above-entitled case to Marawi City, rather he is directed to re-evaluate the recommendation submitted by
Cotabato Chapter and report the same to the Board of Governors.[20]
Prior to the issuance of Resolution No. XIII-98-268, respondent filed on 08 October 1998 a motion praying that
the recommendation of the IBP Cotabato Chapter be stricken from the records. [21] Respondent insists that the
investigating panel constituted by said IBP chapter did not have the authority to conduct the investigation of this
case since IBP Resolution XII-96-153 and Commissioner Fernandezs Order of 23 February 1996 clearly vested
IBP Marawi City with the power to investigate this case. Moreover, he claims that he was never notified of any
hearing by the investigating panel of IBP Cotabato Chapter thereby depriving him of his right to due process.
Complainant opposed[22] this motion arguing that respondent is guilty of laches. According to complainant, the
report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter expressly states that respondent was duly
notified of the hearings conducted by the investigating panel yet despite these, respondent did nothing to defend
himself. He also claims that respondent did not even bother to submit his position paper when he was directed
to do so. Further, as respondent is a member of IBP Marawi City Chapter, complainant maintains that the
presence of bias in favor of respondent is possible. Finally, complainant contends that to refer the matter to IBP
Marawi City would only entail a duplication of the process which had already been completed by IBP Cotabato
Chapter.
In an Order dated 15 October 1999,[23] Commissioner Fernandez directed IBP Cotabato Chapter to submit
proofs that notices for the hearings conducted by the investigating panel as well as for the submission of the
position paper were duly received by respondent. On 21 February 2000, Atty. Jabido, a member of the IBP
Cotabato Chapter investigating panel, furnished Commissioner Fernandez with a copy of the panels order dated
4 August 1997.[24] Attached to said order was Registry Receipt No. 3663 issued by the local post office. On the
lower portion of the registry receipt was a handwritten notation reading Atty. Mosib A. Bubong.
On 20 April 2001, Commissioner Fernandez ordered Atty. Pedro S. Castillo, Chairman of the Commission on
Bar Discipline for Mindanao, to reevaluate the report and recommendation submitted by IBP Cotabato Chapter.
This directive had the approval of the IBP Board of Governors through its Resolution No. XIV-2001-271 issued
on 30 June 2001, to wit:
RESOLVED to APPROVE the recommendation of Director Victor C. Fernandez for the Transfer of Venue of
the above-entitled case and direct the CBD Mindanao to conduct an investigation, re-evaluation, report and
recommendation within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice.[25]
Meanwhile, Bainar A. Ali, informed the CBD Mindanao of the death of her father, Omar P. Ali, complainant in
this case. According to her, her father passed away on 12 June 2002 and that in interest of peace and Islamic
brotherhood, she was requesting the withdrawal of this case.[26]
Subsequently, respondent filed another motion, this time, asking the IBP CBD to direct the chairman of the
Commission on Bar Discipline for Mindanao to designate and authorize the IBP Marawi City-Lanao del Sur
Chapter to conduct an investigation of this case. [27]This motion was effectively denied by Atty. Pedro S. Castillo
in an Order dated 19 July 2002.[28] According to Atty. Castillo
After going over the voluminous records of the case, with special attention made on the report of the IBP
Cotabato City Chapter, the Complaint and the Counter-Affidavit of respondent, the undersigned sees no need
for any further investigation, to be able to make a re-evaluation and recommendation on the Report of the IBP
Chapter of Cotabato City.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to authorize the IBP-Chpater of Marawi City, Zamboanga del Norte is hereby
denied. The undersigned will submit his Report to the Commission on Bar Discipline, IBP National Office
within ten (10) days from date hereof.
In his Report and Recommendation, Atty. Castillo adopted in toto the findings and conclusion of IBP Cotabato
Chapter ratiocinating as follows:
The Complaint for Disbarment is primarily based on the Decision by the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41 dated February 26, 1993, wherein herein respondent was found guilty of Grave
Misconduct in:
a) The imprudent issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821; and,
b) Manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law.
And penalized with dismissal from the service, as Register of Deeds of Marawi City. In the Comment filed by
respondent in the instant Adminsitrative Case, his defense is good faith in the issuance of T.C.T. No. T-2821 and
a denial of the charge of manipulating the criminal complaint for violation of the anti-squatting law, which by
the way, was filed against respondents relatives. Going over the Decision of the Office of the President in
Administrative Case No. 41, the undersigned finds substantial evidence were taken into account and fully
explained, before the Decision therein was rendered. In other words, the finding of Grave Misconduct on the
part of respondent by the Office of the President was fully supported by evidence and as such carries a very
strong weight in considering the professional misconduct of respondent in the present case.
In the light of the foregoing, the undersigned sees no reason for amending or disturbing the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP Chapter of South Cotabato.[29]
In a resolution passed on 19 October 2002, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved, with
modification, the afore-quoted Report and Recommendation of Atty. Castillo. The modification pertained solely
to the period of suspension from the practice of law which should be imposed on respondent whereas Atty.
Castillo concurred in the earlier recommendation of IBP Cotabato Chapter for a five-year suspension, the IBP
Board of Governors found a two-year suspension to be proper.
On 17 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the IBP which the latter denied as by
that time, the matter had already been endorsed to this Court.[30]
The issue thus posed for this Courts resolution is whether respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct
committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this question in the affirmative.
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because he has joined the
government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct of
lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks. Thus, where a
lawyers misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds. [31] Although the
general rule is that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for
infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however, be disciplined as a lawyer if his
misconduct constitutes a violation of his oath a member of the legal profession.[32]
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron,[33] we ordered the disbarment of respondent on
the ground of his dismissal from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared
[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is designed to impress upon him his
responsibilities. He thereby becomes an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility of
assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice. As an officer of the court he
is subject to a rigid discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be that truth and justice
triumph. This discipline is what has given the law profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a
lawyer, to paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of truth-speaking, a high sense of
honor, full candor, intellectual honesty, and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral character.[34]
Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig,[35] this Court found sufficient basis to disbar
respondent therein for gross misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal Services of
the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in that case
[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or omission which might tend to lessen
the trust and confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal profession
at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government
service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher
than her brethren in private practice.[36] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by the Office of the President and subsequently
affirmed by this Court, deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office as the Register
of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of the rules governing land registration for the benefit
of his relatives, respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform the functions of a civil
servant but also to retain his membership in the bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
explicit on this matter. It reads:
Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in the public office he used to occupy and
cast doubt on the integrity of the legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies of
the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this
case, we cannot possibly favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be interrupted or
terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of
the complainant to prosecute the same.[37] As we have previously explained in the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v.
Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:[38]
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant.
What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly
immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A
proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff
and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to
practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no
sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administrative of justice.[39]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Mosib A. Bubong is hereby DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED
STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondents record as a
member of the Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office
of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

JOVITO S. OLAZO vs. JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.),

A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule 6.02,
[1]
Rule 6.03[2] and Rule 1.01[3] of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests.
Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower
Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres Bonifacio that
was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, [4] issued on January 7,
1986, and Proclamation No. 172,[5] issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino
Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a recommendation on
the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by
the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee members, in his official capacity as the
Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas covered by
the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,[6] the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman and as a
member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainants sales application
because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the respondent exerted
undue pressure and influence over the complainants father, Miguel P. Olazo, for the latter to contest the
complainants sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The complainant also alleged that the
respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates, sums of money as payment of the latters
alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer
of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the
respondents deceased wife.
As a result of the respondents abuse of his official functions, the complainants sales application was denied. The
conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were subsequently given due course
by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel Olazo, the
complainants brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo to direct Manuel to
convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the respondents promptings, the
rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose of
nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant claimed that the
respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the Barangay Chairman of
Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an Assurance where he stated that he was the lawyer
of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge that
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The complainant
averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas and does not qualify
for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on Awards amounted to a violation
of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in the practice
of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,[7] the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed against
him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when he was
nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending with the Office
of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later conveyed these
rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazos rights over the subject land and the transfer of his rights to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR before whom the conflict of
rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, on one hand, and the
complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a
qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given due course. The respondent emphasized
that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court
of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainants allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the respondent had
been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation was without corroboration
and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the complainants sister.

(2) He denied the complainants allegation that he offered the complainant P50,000.00 for the subject land and
that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim the rights over the
subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazos affidavit where the latter
asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over the
subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter, Francisca
Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.
(5) The respondents participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuels belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, regarding
what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca Olazo, dated
August 2, 1997. In the saidSinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his father Miguel Olazo,
not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his agreement to the transfer of rights
(Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his
fathers application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs application.

(7) The complainants allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell the
subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision was clear
that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He alleged
that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the complainant,
Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for deliberation of the Committee
on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective supporting documents were before the Office of
the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000.
This ruling became the basis of the decision of the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility since
the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law to engage in private law
practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of law, have friends, former
associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law.[8] In this regard, the respondent had already
completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on Awards when he represented Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the complainant
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the Committee on Awards when he
was still a member.

The Courts Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. [9] He may be disciplined by this Court as a
member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.[10]

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondents actions constitute a breach of the
standard ethical conduct first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a member of the
Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private lawyer who
represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence, we
resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.
Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct to be
observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard of conduct
laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government service is obliged to
observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government service is
more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government service are subject to
constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the heavy burden of having to put
aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their private activities should not interfere with
the discharge of their official functions.[11]

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes the
following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:
A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private interests,
nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private interests;
(2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public duties. We
previously held that the restrictionextends to all government lawyers who use their public offices to promote
their private interests.[12]

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,[13] we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything of
monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by the
functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,[14]we recognized that private interest is not limited to direct
interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest interferes with
public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the intricacies of the law to benefit
relatives.[15]

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,[16] we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher Education)
of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to be a serious breach
of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[17] We reached the same conclusion in Huyssen, where
we found the respondent (an employee of theBureau of Immigration and Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence showing that he demanded money from the
complainant who had a pending application for visas before his office.[18]
Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano[19] we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he demanded
and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the manner
defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainants sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. By the complaints own account, the complainant filed a sales application in March 1990
before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainants sales application was pending before the
Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of Miguel Olazo, and,
subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on August 2, 2000 that the Office
of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after the term of the respondents elective
public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his private
interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not brought before the
Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis exists to conclude that he
used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the denial of the complainants sales
application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the Committee on Awards.
Second, the complainants allegation that the respondent orchestrated the efforts to get the subject land does not
specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,[20] categorically stating that the
respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the transfer of his rights
over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazos disclaimer is the nearest relevant statement
on the respondents alleged participation, and we find it to be in the respondents favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his claim that
the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter, dated June 22, 1996, to
the DENR Regional Director-NCR;[21] the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12, 1996;[22] and the Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated July 17, 1996[23]), do not contain any reference to the alleged pressure or force exerted by the
respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the respondent helped Miguel Olazo in
having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed. They also showed that the respondent merely
acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may
be rendered by one relative to another, and do not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision
of Miguel Olazo to contest the complainants sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to
the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to
what Miguel Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what
Miguel Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.
In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating evidence - of
the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo
in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 2003 [24] and July 21, 2010,[25] Francisca Olazo corroborated the
respondents claim that the sums of money he extended to her and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their
medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the
money borrowed from the respondent was used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondents claim that the latters
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According to
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly paid by
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of the purchase
price of the subject land.[26]

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when the
sums of money were extended by the respondent on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and October 17,
1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance [27] over the subject land was executed or on October 25, 1995,
showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over the subject land. These pieces
of evidence are consistent with the respondents allegation that Miguel Olazo decided to sell his rights over the
subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent and, also, to finance his continuing medical
treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from the
government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel
and the document entitled Assurance where the respondent legally represented Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to conclude that there was a
violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[28] we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in
the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge
or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to engage in
private practice after their separation from the service.
Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following
shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x
These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional concerned
cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with, in which case
the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession during their
incumbency.[29] By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her profession
under the following conditions:first, the private practice is authorized by the Constitution or by the law;
and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. [30] The last
paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of lawyers separated from the
government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving
the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the
term intervene which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has the power to influence the
proceedings.[31] Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by virtue of
his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the proceedings.

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the sales
application covering Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on Awards. The
complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face
value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of a single
document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,[32] we specifically described private practice of law as one that
contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as
a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the definition of practice of law, the available pieces
of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the Committee on Awards, or
that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and
we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the respondents favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the
Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainants claim that the respondent violated
paragraph 4(1)[33] of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguezs qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the proclaimed areas has been
resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004, [34] when the DENR
gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the Court of
Appeals[35]and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No. 173453. In
our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among
others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.[36]

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for the Court to
exercise its disciplinary powers.[37] The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove his/her defense,
[38]
until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case has in the first
place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.[39]
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the complainants
failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions warranting
the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule
6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

CONRADO QUE vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR.

AC no. 7054, December 4, 2009

PER CURIAM:
In a complaint for disbarment,[1] Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court:

(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for
annulment of judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court [2] (MeTC)
and RTC[3] in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The respondent in this regard,
repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC knowing fully-well that these courts
have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and
his siblings titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer case;

(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and
frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to defeat the right of the
complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer case;

(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood
and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The respondent asserted
falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by
fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to
dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover
up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the
above falsehood.[4]

(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and
reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of the respondents clients.

(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court in the petition for annulment
of judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased;

(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the second petition for annulment of title as counsel
for the Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.

Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-
03-48762 when no such authority was ever given to him.

The CBD required the respondent to answer the complaint.

In his Answer,[5] the respondent declared that he is a member of the Kalayaan Development Cooperative (KDC)
that handlespro bono cases for the underprivileged, the less fortunate, the homeless and those in the
marginalized sector in Metro Manila. He agreed to take over the cases formerly handled by other KDC
members. One of these cases was the unlawful detainer case handled by the late Atty. Catolico where the
complainant and his siblings were the plaintiffs and the respondents present clients were the defendants.

With respect to paragraph 1 of the disbarment complaint, the respondent professed his sincerity, honesty and
good faith in filing the petitions complained of; he filed these petitions to protect the interests of his clients in
their property. The respondent asserted that these petitions were all based on valid grounds the lack of
jurisdiction of the MeTC and the RTC over the underlying unlawful detainer case, the extrinsic fraud
committed by the late Atty. Catolico, and the extrinsic fraud committed by the complainant and his family
against his clients; he discovered that the allegedly detained property did not really belong to the complainant
and his family but is a forest land. The respondent also asserted that his resort to a petition for annulment of
judgment and a petition for declaratory relief to contest the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC were all parts
of his legal strategy to protect the interests of his clients.

On the allegations of falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal of the petition for
annulment of judgment (covered by paragraph 3 of the disbarment complaint), the respondent maintained that
his allegations were based on his observations and the notes he had taken during the proceedings on what the
presiding judge dictated in open court.
The respondent denied that he had made any unauthorized appearance in court (with respect to paragraphs 5 and
6 of the disbarment complaint). He claimed that the 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 were impleaded
by inadvertence; he immediately rectified his error by dropping them from the case. On the petition for
annulment of judgment, the respondent claimed that a majority (31 out of 49) of the litigants who signed the
certification constituted sufficient compliance with the rules on forum-shopping. The respondent likewise
denied having represented the Republic of the Philippines in the second petition for annulment of title. The
respondent pointed out that there was no allegation whatsoever that he was the sole representative of both the
complainants (his clients) and the Republic of the Philippines. The respondent pointed out that the petition
embodied a request to the Office of the Solicitor General to represent his clients in the case.[6]

The respondent submitted that he did not commit any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral acts
towards the complainant and his siblings. He stressed that he acted in good faith in his dealings with them and
his conduct was consistent with his sworn duty as a lawyer to uphold justice and the law and to defend the
interests of his clients. The respondent additionally claimed that the disbarment case was filed because the
complainants counsel, Atty. Cesar P. Uy (Atty. Uy), had an axe to grind against him.

Lastly, the respondent posited in his pleadings[7] before the IBP that the present complaint violated the rule on
forum shopping considering that the subject cases were also the ones on which a complaint was filed against
him in CBD Case No. 03-1099 filed by Atty. Uy before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline. The respondent
also posited that the present complaint was filed to harass, ridicule and defame his good name and reputation
and, indirectly, to harass his clients who are marginalized members of the KDC.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

Except for the last charge of unauthorized appearance on behalf of 52 litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762,
Investigating Commissioner Renato G. Cunanan [8] (Investigating Commissioner Cunanan) found all the charges
against the respondent meritorious. In his Report and Recommendation, he stated:

While an attorney admittedly has the solemn duty to defend and protect the cause and rights of his client with
all the fervor and energy within his command, yet, it is equally true that it is the primary duty of the lawyer to
defend the dignity, authority and majesty of the law and the courts which enforce it. A lawyer is not at liberty to
maintain and defend the cause of his clients thru means, inconsistent with truth and honor. He may not and must
not encourage multiplicity of suits or brazenly engage in forum-shopping.[9]

On the first charge on abuse of court processes, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan noted the unnecessary use
by the respondent of legal remedies to forestall the execution of the final decisions of the MTC and the RTC in
the unlawful detainer caseagainst his clients.[10]

On the second charge, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that the act of the respondent in filing two petitions
for annulment of title, a petition for annulment of judgment and later on a petition for declaratory relief were all
done to prevent the execution of the final judgment in the unlawful detainer case and constituted prohibited
forum-shopping.[11]

On the third and fourth charges, Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found ample evidence showing that the
respondent was dishonest in dealing with the court as shown in his petition for annulment of judgment; he
resorted to falsities and attributed acts to Atty. Catolico and to the presiding judge, all of which were untrue. [12]

On the fifth and sixth charges, the Investigating Commissioner disregarded the respondents explanation that he
had no intention to represent without authority 15 of the litigants (three of whom were already deceased) in the
petition for annulment of judgment (Civil Case No. Q-01-45556). To the Investigating Commissioner, the
respondent merely glossed over the representation issue by claiming that the authority given by a majority of
the litigants complied with the certification of non-forum shopping requirement. The Investigating
Commissioner likewise brushed aside the respondents argument regarding his misrepresentation in the second
complaint for annulment of title since he knew very well that only the Solicitor General can institute an action
for reversion on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. Despite this knowledge, the respondent solely signed
the amended complaint for and on behalf of his clients and of the Republic.
The Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline, through its Resolution No. XVII-2005-164
on CBD Case No. 03-1100, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Cunanan and recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.[13] On reconsideration, the Board of Governors reduced the respondents suspension from the practice
of law to one (1) year.[14]
The Issue
The case poses to us the core issues of whether the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical
infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these transgressions should carry.

The Courts Ruling

Except for the penalty, we agree with the Report and Recommendation of Investigating Commissioner
Cunanan and the Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline.

We take judicial notice that this disbarment complaint is not the only one so far filed involving the respondent;
another complaint invoking similar grounds has previously been filed. In Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo C.
Garcia v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.,[15] we suspended the respondent from the practice of law for his willful
and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution
of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We initially imposed a
suspension of two (2) years, but in an act of leniency subsequently reduced the suspension to six (6) months.[16]
Abuse of court procedures and processes
The following undisputed facts fully support the conclusion that the respondent is guilty of serious misconduct
for abusing court procedures and processes to shield his clients from the execution of the final judgments of the
MeTC and RTC in the unlawful detainer case against these clients:

First, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari (docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 53892) with prayer for the
issuance of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to question the final judgments of the MeTC
and RTC for lack of jurisdiction. In dismissing the respondents petition, the CA held:

Even for the sake of argument considering that the petition case be the proper remedy, still it must be rejected
for failure of petitioners to satisfactorily demonstrate lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City over the ejectment case.[17]

Second, notwithstanding the CAs dismissal of the petition for certiorari, the respondent again questioned the
MeTCs and the RTCs lack of jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case in a petition for annulment of
judgment (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-45556) before the RTC with an ancillary prayer for the grant of a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The RTC dismissed this petition on the basis of the
motion to dismiss filed.[18]

Third, the respondent successively filed two petitions (docketed as Civil Case No. Q-99-38780 and Civil Case
No. Q-02-46885) for annulment of the complainants title to the property involved in the unlawful detainer case.
The records show that these petitions were both dismissed for lack of legal personality on the part of the
plaintiffs to file the petition.[19]

Fourth, after the dismissals of the petition for annulment of judgment and the petitions for annulment of title,
the respondent this time filed a petition for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the complainant and his siblings from exercising their rights over the same property subject of the
unlawful detainer case. The respondent based the petition on the alleged nullity of the complainants title
because the property is a part of forest land.

Fifth, the persistent applications by the respondent for injunctive relief in the four petitions he had filed in
several courts the petition for certiorari, the petition for annulment of judgment, the second petition for
annulment of complainants title and the petition for declaratory relief reveal the respondents persistence in
preventing and avoiding the execution of the final decisions of the MeTC and RTC against his clients in the
unlawful detainer case.

Under the circumstances, the respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate means allowed by
professional ethical rules in defending the interests of his client. These are already uncalled for measures to
avoid the enforcement of final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated
Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to
observe the rules of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration of justice,
resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.[20]

Filing of multiple actions and forum shopping

The respondent likewise violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility,[21] as well as the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed against the filing of
multiple actions to attain the same objective.Both violations constitute abuse of court processes; they tend to
degrade the administration of justice; wreak havoc on orderly judicial procedure; [22] and add to the congestion of
the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.[23]

While the filing of a petition for certiorari to question the lower courts jurisdiction may be a procedurally
legitimate (but substantively erroneous) move, the respondents subsequent petitions involving the same
property and the same parties not only demonstrate his attempts to secure favorable ruling using different fora,
but his obvious objective as well of preventing the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful
detainer case against his clients. This intent is most obvious with respect to the petitions for annulment of
judgment and declaratory relief, both geared towards preventing the execution of the unlawful detainer decision,
long after this decision had become final.
Willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood before the courts

The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful,

intentional and deliberate falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts.

First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101, Quezon City, the respondent
cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment sought. The extrinsic fraud was alleged in the last
paragraph of the petition, as follows:

In here, counsel for the petitioners (defendants therein), deliberately neglected to file the proper remedy then
available after receipt of the denial of their Motion for Reconsideration thus corruptly sold out the interest of
the petitioners (defendants therein) by keeping them away to the Court and in complete ignorance of the suit
by a false pretense of compromise and fraudulent acts of alleging representing them when in truth and in fact,
have connived with the attorney of the prevailing party at his defeat to the prejudice of the
petitioner(defendants therein) [24]

Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second motion for reconsideration or
for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by
the MeTC and the RTC are null and void.[25] These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for
the purpose of supporting the petition for annulment.Worse, it involved a direct and unsubstantiated attack on
the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second petition for annulment of
title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule that only the Solicitor General may commence
reversion proceedings of public lands[26] on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed
by a private party and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that they be
represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the Philippines was simply
impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended
petition where he alone stood as counsel for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to
compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted suit.

Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his
petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his clients what actually transpired
in the hearing of June 28, 2002in this wise:

Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after both counsel have argued on
the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the
hearing distance of all the plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO
DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS COUNSEL TO FILE AN
ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING PERIOD .[27][Underscoring and emphasis
theirs]

The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for the respondents
application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the adverse partys motion to dismiss.
[28]
The records also show that RTC-Branch 101 held in abeyance the respondents application for injunctive
relief pending the resolution of the motion to dismiss filed by the adverse party. [29] As stated in the order of the
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 101:
Browsing over the records of this case specifically the transcripts of stenographic notes as transcribed by the
Stenographer, the same will indicate that the allegations in the Motion for Reconsideration are not true.
how can this Court make a ruling on the matter even without stating the factual and legal bases as
required/mandated by the Rules. Moreover, there are no indications or iota of irregularity in the preparation by
Stenographer of the transcripts, and by the Court interpreter of the Minutes of the open Court session.
[Underscoring theirs]
The records further disclose that despite knowledge of the falsity of his allegations, the respondent took
advantage of his position and the trust reposed in him by his clients (who are all squatters) to convince them to
support, through their affidavits, his false claims on what allegedly transpired in the June 28, 2002 hearing. [30]
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of Professional
Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness in his dealings with the court. This
provision states:

CANON 10 A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT

Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead
or allow the Court to be mislead by an artifice.

Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.[31] The respondent failed to remember that his
duty as an officer of the court makes him an indispensable participant in the administration of justice, [32] and that
he is expected to act candidly, fairly and truthfully in his work. [33] His duty as a lawyer obligates him not to
conceal the truth from the court, or to mislead the court in any manner, no matter how demanding his duties to
his clients may be.[34] In case of conflict, his duties to his client yield to his duty to deal candidly with the court.
[35]

In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which reads:

CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF
LAW

Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x

This Canon obligates a lawyer, in defending his client, to employ only such means as are consistent with truth
and honor.[36]He should not prosecute patently frivolous and meritless appeals or institute clearly groundless
actions.[37] The recital of what the respondent did to prevent the execution of the judgment against his clients
shows that he actually committed what the above rule expressly prohibits.

Maligning the name of his fellow lawyers

To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent attacked (as
quoted above) the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate neglect, corrupt
motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party.

We find it significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against Atty.
Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously assigned to Atty.
Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for annulment of judgment also
represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC
decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason that the respondent believed the said decisions
were null and void ab initio.

Under these circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional
relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness, and candor toward his
professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing to Atty. Catolico without showing any
factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty. Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.

Unauthorized appearances

We support Investigating Commissioner Cunanans finding that the respondent twice represented parties without
proper authorization: first, in the petition for annulment of judgment; and second, in the second petition for
annulment of title.[38]
In the first instance, the records show that the respondent filed the petition for annulment of judgment on behalf
of 49 individuals, 31 of whom gave their consent while the other 15 individuals did not. We cannot agree with
the respondents off-hand explanation that he truly believed that a majority of the litigants who signed the
certification of non-forum shopping in the petition already gave him the necessary authority to sign for the
others. We find it highly improbable that this kind of lapse could have been committed by a seasoned lawyer
like the respondent, who has been engaged in the practice of law for more than 30 years and who received rigid
and strict training as he so proudly declares, from the University of the Philippines College of Law and in the
two law firms with which he was previously associated. [39] As Investigating Commissioner Cunanan found, the
respondents explanation of compliance with the rule on the certification of non-forum shopping glossed over
the real charge of appearing in court without the proper authorization of the parties he allegedly represented.

In the second instance, which occurred in the second complaint for annulment of title, the respondent knew that
only the Solicitor General can legally represent the Republic of the Philippines in actions for reversion of land.
Nevertheless, he filed an amended petition where he impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as plaintiff
without its authority and consent, as a surreptitious way of forcing the Republic to litigate. Notably, he signed
the amended complaint on behalf of all the plaintiffs his clients and the Republic.
In both instances, the respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court when he
undertook the unauthorized appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not represent a litigant without
authority from the latter or from the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without leave of court.
[40]
The willful unauthorized appearance by a lawyer for a party in a given case constitutes contumacious
conduct and also warrants disciplinary measures against the erring lawyer for professional misconduct.[41]
The Respondents Defenses

We find no merit in the respondents defenses.

Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking unconscientious advantage of another.
Accordingly, inUniversity of the East v. Jader we said that "[g]ood faith connotes an honest intention to abstain
from taking undue advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious." [42] Bad faith, on the
other hand, is a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest, ill
will or for an ulterior purpose.[43] As both concepts are states of mind, they may be deduced from the attendant
circumstances and, more particularly, from the acts and statements of the person whose state of mind is the
subject of inquiry.

In this case, we find that the respondent acted in bad faith in defending the interests of his clients. We draw this
conclusion from the misrepresentations and the dubious recourses he made, all obviously geared towards
forestalling the execution of the final judgments of the MeTC and RTC. That he took advantage of his legal
knowledge and experience and misread the Rulesimmeasurably strengthen the presence of bad faith.

We find neither sincerity nor honest belief on the part of the respondent in pleading the soundness and merit of
the cases that he filed in court to prevent the execution of the MeTC and RTC decisions, considering his own
conduct of presenting conflicting theories in his petitions. The succession of cases he filed shows a desperation
that negates the sincere and honest belief he claims; these are simply scattershot means to achieve his objective
of avoiding the execution of the unlawful detainer judgment against his clients.

On the respondents allegations regarding his discretion to determine legal strategy, it is not amiss to note that
this was the same defense he raised in the first disbarment case. [44] As we explained in Plus Builders, the
exercise of a lawyers discretion in acting for his client can never be at the expense of truth and justice. In the
words of this cited case:

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he
must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes,
and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit
nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance
the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions
against the other party.[45]
We cannot give credence to the respondents claim that the disbarment case was filed because the counsel of the
complainant, Atty. Uy, had an axe to grind against him. We reject this argument, considering that it was not Atty.
Uy who filed the present disbarment case against him; Atty. Uy is only the counsel in this case. In fact, Atty. Uy
has filed his own separate disbarment case against the respondent.

The sui generis nature of a disbarment case renders the underlying motives of the complainants unimportant and
with very little relevance. The purpose of a disbarment proceeding is mainly to determine the fitness of a lawyer
to continue acting as an officer of the court and a participant in the dispensation of justice an issue where the
complainants personal motives have little relevance. For this reason, disbarment proceedings may be initiated
by the Court motu proprio upon information of an alleged wrongdoing. As we also explained in the case In re:
Almacen:

. . .disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this
proceeding is not - and does not involve - a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court
into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution.
xxx

It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his
actuations as an officer of-the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have
proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office
of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.[46]

Hence, we give little or no weight to the alleged personal motivation that drove the complainant Que and his
counsel to file the present disbarment case.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent committed various acts of professional misconduct and
thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot agree,
however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should
we limit ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two (2) years.

Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as previously discussed, and the nature of these
violations which shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the orderly
administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the
respondent to keep him away from the law profession and from any significant role in the administration of
justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not
even his ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save him. Such traits at the
expense of everything else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice,
this Court cannot accept nor tolerate.

Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the respondents first ethical infraction of the same
nature. We penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his
willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the
execution of a judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law. We showed
leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent
this time; it is clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited traits
of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public,
the profession and the interest of justice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December
17, 2005 and Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the Board of Governors of the IBP
Committee on Bar Discipline insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and
12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the
respondent should be DISBARRED from the practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge
of Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents. ULANDU
R ES OLUTIO N
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision
in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T.
Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty. Deogracias del
Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why
private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial courts order
specifically provided for private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner in said
residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the
residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including engaging
in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as
counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking
clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990,
prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now
(Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now
Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty.
Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"[2] Mis spped
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of
private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to
clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by
the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such arrest,
he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the custody of
private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his
official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario was appointed
judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be
deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts
order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be
detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order
was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention
prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as
well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself. Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of
the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the commission
of the offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. [4] Let it be stressed that all prisoners whether under
preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest
and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the
Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10) years,
the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue with the
trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the
Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the
jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San
Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. P-220 December 20, 1978

JULIO ZETA, complainant,
vs.
FELICISIMO MALINAO, respondent.

BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of
Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:
l ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of this
town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable information also says he has been appearing
in the municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we
believe. He makes it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients. He competes with attorneys but
does not pay anything. We believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good government. These facts can
be checked with records of those municipal courts.
2 GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would instigate
persons, especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he has cases in the municipal court in this
town involving himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be afraid as he is a court employee and
has influence over the judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and so would commit crimes.
This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary to good order and peace as he is using his supposed influences to urge
persons to commit crimes.
3 CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the
CFI. Even he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time record as present.
He receives salary for those absent days. This can be checked with time record he has submitted and if he has
any application for leave. He may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this should not be
allowed as he has already committed crime.
4 VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is
prohibited for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without
permission from the Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured that permission because he
should not be allowed to practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated that Executive Order and
Civil Service Law and we are urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil Service to
investigate him on this. If warranted he should be given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we
believe he deserve it. (Page 2, Record.)
After respondent filed the following 3rd indorsement relative to the above complaint:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, Manila, thru the Honorable District Judge,
Court of First Instance, Branch I, Catbalogan, Samar, and thru the Honorable Judicial Superintendent,
Department of Justice, Manila, the undersigned's reply to the preceding endorsements, to wit: That the alleged
letter-complaint of one Julio Zeta is not inclosed in the first indorsement, which absence has also been noticed
and noted on the right hand corner of the said first indorsement by the Clerk of Court, of this Court; that despite
this absence, and without waiving, however, his right to any pertinent provision of law, but for respect and
courtesy to a Superior, he hereby states that he has not violated any rule or law, much less Sec. 12, Rule XVIII
of the Civil Service Rules; that his participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage
the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality, said assistance has also
checked the miscarriage of justice by the Presiding Municipal Judge, now resigned; that he is attaching herewith
a carbon-original of a pleading submitted by Atty. Simeon Quiachon the attorney of record for the defendants in
Civil Case No. 24, entitled 'Jose Kiskisan versus Fidel Pacate, et al. for Forcible Entry, in the Municipal Court
of Talalora, Samar, which is a 'Motion To Withdraw Exhibits', as Annex 'A', as part of this reply. (Page 5, Rec.)
the Department of Justice that had jurisdiction over the matter then, referred the said complaint and answer to
District Judge Segundo Zosa, Court of First Instance, Catbalogan, Western Samar, for investigation, report and
recommendation, and after due hearing, Judge Zosa submitted his report pertinent parts of which read thus:
Inspite of diligent efforts exerted by the Court to subpoena the complainant, Julio Zeta, who is said to be a
resident of Zumarraga, Samar the same had failed because the said Julio Zeta appears to be a fictitious person
Inspite of the failure of the complainant to appear in the investigation in connection with his complaint against
Felicisimo Malinao, the Court nevertheless proceeded to investigate the case against him by calling Judge
Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, Judge Juanito Reyes of Zumarraga, Samar and Judge Miguel Avestruz of
Daram, Samar.
Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent appeared
as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in criminal case No. 1247 in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for
grave threats and in criminal case No. 1249 for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession
of firearm on August 5, 1960 and on September 17, 1970.
Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in civil case No. 39
in the Municipal Court of Daram, Samar, entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor Payao, et al., for forcible entry on
December 15, 1962, January 26, 1963, February 18, 1963 and on March 1, 1963.
Judge Juanito Reyes declared that on March 27, 1969, the respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant in
civil case No. 318 of the Municipal Court of Zumarraga entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for
forcible entry and again on June 17, 1970 in the same case.
From the certification of the Clerk of this Court, it appears that the respondent had the following entries in his
daily time record:
1. Was on leave from office on August 5, 1960 and September 17, 1960;
2. Was present in office on December l5, 1962;
3. Was present in office on January 26, 1963, and present also on February 18, 1963 but undertime by 1 hour;
4. Was on leave from office on March 1, 1963;
5. Was on leave from office on March 27, 1969; and
6. Was present in office on June 17, 1970 but undertime by 5 hours.
Comparing the dates when the respondent appeared before the aforementioned Municipal Courts with his daily
time records, he made it appear that on December 15, 1962 and February 18, 1963 he was present in his office
although according to the testimony of Judge Miguel Avestruz he was before his Court on December 15, 1962
as well as on February 18, 1963. Again according to Judge Juanito Reyes the respondent appeared in his Court
on June 17, 1970. The respondent again made it appear in his daily time record that he was present with an
undertime of five hours. The respondent did not offer any plausible explanation for this irregularity.
xxx xxx xxx
With respect to the crime of falsification of his daily time record as shown by the evidence, he had made it
appear that he was present in his office on December 15, 1962, February 18, 1963 and June 17, 1970 when as a
matter of fact he was in the Municipal Court of Daram attending to a case entitled Felix Versoza versus Victor
Payao, et al., for forcible entry as well as in the Municipal Court of Zumarraga attending to Civil Case No. 318
entitled Restituto Centino versus Jesus Tizon for forcible entry. The Inquest Judge respectfully recommends that
he be given stern warning and severe reprimand for this irregularity.
With respect to the fourth charge, for violation of Section 12, Rule XVIII, Republic Act 2260, as amended,
again the evidence shows that respondent had been appearing as counsel in the municipal courts of Sta. Rita,
Daram and Zumarraga in violation of the rules of the Civil Service Law. (Pp. 28-31, Record.)
We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of fact of the Investigator to be amply
supported by the evidence, particularly the documents consisting of public records and the declarations of the
judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is clear to Us that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel
in various municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors in violation of civil service rules and
regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear therein that he was present in his office on
occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel, without being a member of the bar,
which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of the
Investigator.
The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not
engage the services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true,
carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his
superiors and, worse, he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates
in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would
indicate that he was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.
In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more
drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate
him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from appearing in any court or investigative body
wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in
the Court of First Instance, CFI, Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial
branch of the government.

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

AC No. 6317, August 31, 2006
On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint[1] was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of
the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys
fees.

According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00
to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property
identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna,
Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for the issuance of the
Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she subsequently
entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.[2]

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant
was payment for legal services for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not
include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.

The complaint was referred[3] to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation. On September 21, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding
respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provide:

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 9.02 A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to
practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon the latters death, money shall
be paid over a reasonable period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement; or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer; or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement plan, even if the plan is based in
whole or in part, on a profit-sharing arrangement.

In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Investigating Commissioner opined that:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. To be made the suspension or
disbarment of a lawyer, the charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record must
disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers.
The dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly demonstrated. x x x.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely
and solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events
say otherwise, to wit:

1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.

By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as commission/referral fees respondent
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not
divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring
complainant to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that complainant
can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.[4]

The Investigating Commissioner thus recommended:

WHEREFORE, finding respondent responsible for aforestated violations to protect the public and the legal
profession from his kind, it is recommended that he be suspended for Six (6) months with a stern warning that
similar acts in the future will be severely dealt with.[5]

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.[6]

We agree with the findings of the IBP.

The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they possessed and continue to possess the
legal qualifications for it. Indeed, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to
society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal
profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7]

Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct[8] and are mandated
to serve their clients with competence and diligence. [9] They shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to them,
and this negligence in connection therewith shall render them liable.[10]

Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants savings deposit from
Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainants counsel in the
drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610.
Respondent admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her
signature. Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in
the recovery of the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.[11]
Respondents disregard for his clients interests is evident in the iniquitous stipulations in the compromise
agreement where the complainant conceded the validity of the foreclosure of her property; that the redemption
period has already expired thus consolidating ownership in the bank, and that she releases her claims against it.
[12]
As found by the Investigating Commissioner, complainant agreed to these concessions because respondent
misled her to believe that she could still redeem the property after three years from the foreclosure. The duty of
a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests commences from his retainer until his discharge from the case or the
final disposition of the subject matter of litigation. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-
client relationship and gives rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients cause. The canons of the legal profession
require that once anattorney agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with zeal, care and utmost
devotion.[13]

Respondents admission[14] that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a referral fee does not release
him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.[15]
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on the
following grounds: 1) deceit; 2) malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral
conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of the lawyers oath; 6) willful
disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party
without authority.

In Santos v. Lazaro[16] and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,[17] we held that Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal ethics. When a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention
makes such lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his
client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his clients case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he
should undertake the task with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his oath as a lawyer.
Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his
clients interests. It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the legal matter; he must
also give adequate attention to his legal work. Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the
cudgels for his clients cause.[18]

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. In
addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to existing
jurisprudence.[19]
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months effective from notice, and STERNLYWARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely. He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to
complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days
therefrom.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on the Court
Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Plus Builders Inc. vs. Atty. Atty. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR.

AC No. 7056, September 13, 2006

By their oath and under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers must uphold truth and justice above
everything else, even above their own and their clients interests. They must be willing and able to stand for their
convictions against all odds; to carry on in spite of seemingly insurmountable opposition; and to be beacons for
the weak, the oppressed and the marginalized. For failing miserably to live by this oath and Code, respondent
must be sanctioned.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case originated from a Verified Petition for Disbarment[1] filed by Plus Builders Inc. and
Edgardo C. Garcia before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainants charged Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla, Jr. with committing a willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of
law.
The material averments of the Complaint are as follows:

On April 7, 1999, Plus Builders Inc. filed before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR,
DARAB CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of
Bienvenido De Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin
Santarin, Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called [tenants/farmers] x x x.

On November 15, 1999, the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a consolidated Decision in
favor of petitioner/complainant [Plus Builders, Inc.], and against [tenants/farmers]. x x x.

[Tenants/farmers] filed several verified pleadings as part of the records of DARAB cases above-mentioned
alleging under oath that they were MAGSASAKANG NAMUMUWISAN or mere tenants of subject properties,
acknowledging the rights of the registered owners at that time, even before the ownership and title were
transferred to Petitioner/ Complainant Plus Builders, Inc. x x x.

On Dec[ember] 17, 1999, counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS who at that time was Atty. Damian S. J. Vellaseca,
filed a pro-forma Motion for Reconsideration and Manifestation x x x. As a result, PARAD did not give due
course to the same x x x.

On March 27, 2000, another counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, by the name of Atty. Willy G. Roxas, who
represented himself as counsel for TENANTS/FARMERS, filed a manifestation stating that he is representing
TENANTS/FARMERS and alleged that they were bona fide members of the [Kalayaan Development
Cooperative] (KDC). Thereafter, he filed a Notice of Appeal on March 27, 2000 stating that they received the
Decision on March 14, 2000 and alleged that the Decision is against the law and jurisprudence x x x.

On May 31, 2001, Respondent Anastacio Revilla Jr., knowing that there was a monetary judgment by way of
Disturbance Compensation granted to Tenants/Farmers, x x x filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Allow
Correction of Caption and Amendment of Judgment (referring to the Decision of PARAD of Cavite dated
November 15, 1999 x x x) with a prayer x x x to include the name of the KALAYAAN DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION representing the following respondents herein above stated in the caption of [the]
pleading. Also, a Contract of Retainership dated April 4, 2001 was attached to the Motion x x x to make x x x
KDC represented by Respondent, [the] retained x x x counsel on record x x x.
After realizing that his motion failed to give him beneficial monetary gain from the PARAD judgment, a
Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and to Quash Alias
Writ of Execution with Demolition plus Damages dated July 18, 2001 was filed by Respondent x x x before the
DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, notwithstanding the fact that this instant case was appealed by another
lawyer (Atty. Willy Roxas). x x x.

On the basis of this Petition, a Temporary Restraining Order by the DARAB Central Office, Quezon City, was
issued on July 25, 2001 and an extension of or another Temporary Restraining Order was issued dated August
24, 2001, as a result of the active participation of Respondent x x x.

Emboldened by the two (2) TROs coming from DARAB Central Office, Respondent x x x filed an Indirect
Contempt case dated August 28, 2001 against Plus Builders Inc. and their Board of Directors, Edgardo Garcia
and [its] counsel Atty. Leopoldo S. Gonzalez before the same Office. x x x.

Sensing a series of orders against herein Petitioners and considering, further, that the DARAB Central Office
refused to hear arguments from Petitioners on the two (2) questionable TROs, Petitioners decided to elevate the
matter to the Court of Appeals by way of a Petition for Certiorari. A Decision was rendered by the Court of
Appeals on [December] 20, 2001 stating that:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction. Consequently, this Court sees no impediment
for the IMPLEMENTATION of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial adjudicator.

SO ORDERED.

This incident was further elevated to the Supreme Court by Respondent x x x through a Petition, but said
Petition was dismissed with finality x x x.
Enraged by his defeat, Respondent x x x filed a verified Action to Quiet Title before the Regional Trial Court of
Imus, Cavite praying for a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and maliciously
stop the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to implement the PARAD Decision dated November
15, 1999. x x x.
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent signed his pleading under a group of non-lawyers joining him in the practice of law as [KDC]
LEGAL SERVICES, LAW OFFICERS AND ASSOCIATES which included KDC as law partners in violation
of the Rules on the practice of law with non-lawyers. As a matter of fact, under the Retainership Contract
submitted by Respondent before the PARAD of Cavite, it was specifically mentioned that legal fees were to be
collected as counsel on record for the cooperative and respondent. Therefore, this contract was effectively used
[for] unlawful solicitation of clients in the practice of law with non-lawyers, being the cooperative (KDC) to
become counsel on record [sic] x x x.

On March 6, 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite quashed the earlier issued TRO and dismissed the
case on the ground of res judicata because the Court of Appeals ruled that, x x x the Decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator of DAR dated November 15, 1999 has already become final x x x and that, prescription does not
run against registered land. x x x.[2]

In his Answer[3] dated March 29, 2004, respondent denied the charges against him. He averred that by filing the
action to quiet title in Civil Case No. 2763-03, he had merely wanted to protect the rights and interests of his
clients. According to him, they sincerely and honestly believed that their possession of the litigated land had
already ripened into ownership. He explained thus:

Notwithstanding the claim of said farmers of tenancy relationship with [the] previous owner in the decisions of
PARA[D], Court of Appeals and Supreme Court in the DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION CASES, (DARAB
CASE NO. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-
031-99) the said farmers, are not precluded, by any law or jurisprudence, from entertaining in good faith an
opinion or belief that they could legally be considered as owners of the subject-property precisely because of
the undisputed fact that they have been in possession thereof in an open, continuous, public, uninterrupted
possession for more than fifty (50) years. x x x.

It was on the basis of [a] sincere and honest belief and opinion o[f] acquiring ownership of the land through
prescription that the said farmers had decided to pursue and file the Action to Quiet Title in Civil Case No.
2763-03, before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20 x x x.
xxxxxxxxx

It should be stressed that the decisions of the PARA[D], Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in DARAB
CASE No. R-402-025-99; R-402-026-99; R-402-027-99; R-402-028-99; R-402-029-99; R-402-030-99; R-402-
031-99, [i]ndisputably refer only to the fixing of disturbance compensations. They did not in any way, involve
[the] question of ownership of the subject property, which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 2763-03,
(Action to Quiet Title), filed before the RTC of Imus, Cavite, Branch 20.

xxxxxxxxx

As new counsel of the said farmers x x x, respondent has the complete discretion [of] what legal strategy or
cause of action to undertake on their behalf and the complainant and their counsel have no business or right to
interfere with or dictate [upon] the respondent on how to protect the rights and interests of said farmers under
the applicable law and jurisprudence.

xxxxxxxxx

Respondent respectfully submits that he has not committed any illegal, unlawful, unjust, wrongful or immoral
acts towards the complainant. Respondent, in good faith filed the aforesaid cases (Action to Quiet Title, RTC,
Imus, Cavite, Branch 20; and Petition for Issuance of Preliminary Injunction and TRO, and Complaint before
the Ombudsman), as a lawyer sworn to uphold justice and the law who was the bounden duty to exert utmost
efforts to defend his client and protect his right, no matter how guilty or evil he appears to be, especially if they
are poor and uneducated like the said farmers.[4]

In a Reply[5] dated April 12, 2004, complainants emphasized that the nature of the possession of the subject land
by respondents clients had already been settled in the case for disturbance compensation. Complainants
maintained that the PARAD Decision, which was sustained by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court,
clearly stated that these clients were mere tenants of the land. Thus, adverse possession could not be claimed by
respondent in good faith, especially when he had previously acknowledged the rights of complainants as
landowners.

On August 4, 2004, both parties appeared at a hearing scheduled by Edmund T. Espina, commissioner of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). During the hearing, the parties
were directed to submit their respective Memoranda.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In his April 30, 2005 Report,[6] Investigating Commissioner Espina found respondent guilty of violating the
attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.[7] Allegedly, respondent had maliciously concealed
the defeat of his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite and the higher courts,[8] in order to secure a
temporary restraining order from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the execution of the
provincial adjudicators Decision dated November 15, 1999.

Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that respondent had been engaged in the unlawful
practice of law was neither satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of
respondent to do so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.

Thus, his suspension from the practice of law for two years was recommended by the investigating
commissioner. In Resolution No. XVII-2005-172,[9] the board of governors of the IBP adopted the findings and
recommendation of IBP Commissioner Espina.
The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final action,[10]pursuant
to Rule 139-B Section 12(b).

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP board of governors.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of
our legal system,[11] protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law.[12] They are expected to act with honesty
in all their dealings, especially with the courts. Verily, the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins lawyers
from committing or consenting to any falsehood in court or from allowing the courts to be misled by any
artifice.[13] Moreover, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.[14]

Good faith, fairness and candor constitute the essence of membership in the legal profession.[15] Thus, while
lawyers owe fidelity to the cause of their client, they must never abuse their right of recourse to the courts by
arguing a case that has repeatedly been rejected. Neither should they use their knowledge of the law as an
instrument to harass a party or to misuse judicial processes. These acts constitute serious transgression of their
professional oath.[16]

In the present case, respondent claims good faith in pursuing the cause of his clients. The records show,
however, that his course of legal action was obviously a stratagem. It was meant to delay unduly the execution
of the provincial adjudicators Decision dated November 15, 1999.

It must be noted that when the Court of Appeals and this Court upheld that Decision, respondent resorted to a
different forum to pursue his clients lost cause. In the disturbance compensation case, he represented his clients
as tenants and acknowledged that complainants were the owners of the subject land. In the action to quiet title,
however, he conveniently repudiated his previous admission by falsely alleging that his clients were adverse
possessors claiming bona fide ownership. Consequently, he was able to obtain a temporary restraining order
preventing the execution of the provincial adjudicators Decision.

Clearly, he was shielding his clients from the Order of execution. Contrary to his later claim of ownership of the
land, he cannot feign ignorance of his previous admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients
and complainants, as correctly observed by IBP Commissioner Espina.

The propensity of respondent for doublespeak was also revealed in his declaration that his clients were pauper
litigants. His prayer for an exemption to pay court fees, on the ground that they did not have sufficient income,
[17]
was granted by the trial court. Earlier, however, he admitted that they had engaged the services of his legal
office for a fee of P20,000, in addition to P2,500 per appearance in court. Also, in the action to quiet title, he
even alleged that they were willing to post a bond to answer for damages, in the event that the court ruled in
favor of the defendants. These facts contravene his claim that his clients could not afford to pay the appropriate
court fees.

In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within the
authority of the law.
This obligation, however, must never be at the expense of truth and justice,[18] as explained in Choa v.
Chiongson:[19]

While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine interest, and warm
zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he
must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and
probable results of his clients case with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes,
and counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as
he believes to be honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took upon
admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit
nor give aid nor consent to the same; and that he will conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients. Needless to state, the
lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the administration of justice, and it
must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A lawyers responsibility to protect and advance
the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions
against the other party.[20]

Moreover, we agree with the finding of IBP Commissioner Espina that the silence or failure of respondent to
challenge the
allegation that he allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law may be deemed an
admission of the truth of the accusation. We note that complainants successfully substantiated their claim that
respondent, who held himself out as a law partner of the KDC Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates, was
rendering legal services together with persons not licensed to practice law. His silence on this accusation is
deemed an admission, especially because he had every chance to deny it.[21]
Canon 9 and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide thus:

Canon 9 A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized practice of law.
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may
only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

The significance of this professional norm was emphasized in Cambaliza v. Cristal-Tenorio,[22] which we quote:
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is founded on
public interest and policy. Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an individual and
limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and the bar from the incompetence or
dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It
devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is attained. Thus, the canons and ethics of the profession enjoin
him not to permit his professional services or his name to be used in aid of, or to make possible the
unauthorized practice of law by, any agency, personal or corporate. And, the law makes it a misbehavior on his
part, subject to disciplinary action, to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of law.[23]

Respondent failed to live up to the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of law and justice. In line
with jurisprudence, he is held liable for gross misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law. [24]

WHEREFORE, Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct and is SUSPENDED for
two years from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent as attorney and served on the IBP, as well as
on the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.