Section 15.
The privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of
invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.
BINAY v. SANDIGANBAYAN
F: 1999, There are two consolidated cases.
G.R. No. 12068183
- Then Makati Mayor Binay was charged with the
violation of Art. 220 of the RPC and Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019. The informations, which were subsequently
amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts
constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during
petitioners incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a
municipality of Metro Manila.
- Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash the informations.
He contended that the sixyear delay from the time the
charges were filed in the Office of the Ombudsman on
July 27, 1988 to the time the informations were filed in
the Sandiganbayan on September 7, 1994 constituted a
violation of his right to due process. Arraignment of the
accused was held in abeyance pending the resolution of
this motion.
- Motion to quash denied. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration, which was opposed by the prosecution,
was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan.
- Petitioner thus filed before this Court a petition for
certiorari, to set aside the resolution denying his motion
for reconsideration, claiming that he was denied due
process when the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension
pendente lite before he could file a reply to the
prosecutions opposition to his motion for reconsideration
of the resolution denying the motion to quash. In a
Resolution dated April 28, 1995, the Court directed the
Sandiganbayan to, among other things, permit petitioner
to file said reply.
- After allowing and considering petitioners reply, the
Sandiganbayan just denied the same.
- Meanwhile, R.A. No. 7975, redefining the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, took effect on May 16, 1995.
- On June 13, 1995, petitioner filed before the
Sandiganbayan a motion to refer his cases to the proper
court for further proceedings, alleging that when the two
Resolutions, both dated June 6, 1995, were issued by the
AntiGraft Court, it had already lost jurisdiction over the
subject cases. The Sandiganbayan, in a Resolution dated
July 4, 1995, denied petitioners motion
There is no question that Municipal Mayors are
classified as Grade 27 under the
Compensation & Position Classification Act of
1989. Since, at the time of the commission of the
offenses charged in the aboveentitled cases, the
accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor, although in an acting or
interim capacity, the Sandiganbayan, has, under
Section 4 (e) 5, original jurisdiction over the cases
therein filed against him. The allegation that
Mayor Binay ought to have been classified with a
salary grade lower than Grade 27, because at
the time of the commission of the offenses
charged he was paid a salary which merits a
grade lower than Grade 27 does not hold
water. In 1986 when the herein offenses were
committed by the accused, the Compensation &
Position Classification Act of 1989 was not as yet
in existence. From the very definition of the very
Act itself, it is evident that the Act was passed
and had been effective only in 1989. The Grade
classification of a public officer, whether at the
time of the commission of the offense or
thereafter, is determined by his classification
under the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989. Thus since the
accused Mayor Jejomar C. Binay was a
Municipal Mayor at the time of the commission
of the offenses and the Compensation & Position
Classification Act of 1989 classifies Municipal
Mayors as Grade 27, it is a conclusion beyond
cavil that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the accused herein.
As of July 1, 1989, when Republic Act No. 6758
took effect, Municipal Mayor Jejomar C. Binay
had begun receiving a monthly salary of
P15,180.00 which is equivalent to Grade 28
under the salary scale provided for in Section 27
of the said Act. Under the Index of Occupational
Services, the position titles and salary grades of
the Compensation & Position classification
system prepared by the Department of Budget
and Management pursuant to Section 6 of
Republic [A]ct No. 6758, the position of
Municipal Mayor had been classified as Grade
27.
- The present petition for certiorari filed by Binay,
questioned the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over his case,
his motions for reconsideration prayed to set aside the
resolutions which denied the motion to quash and
suspend the petitioner pendente lite. And an addendum
followed which asked for alternative reliefs: that if the
Sandiganbayan does have jurisdiction over the case, have
it dismissed that the long delay of the preliminary
investigation before the Ombudsman prior to the filing of
the informations, deprived him of his right to due process
and that there was no probable cause for filing.
G.R. No. 128136
Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the
Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner
Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysays
copetitioners are officials of the same municipality.
In a complaint dated April 16, 1994, Victor Cusi, then
ViceMayor of San Pascual, Batangas, charged petitioners
along with Elpidia Amada, Jovey C. Babago, and Brigido
H. Buhain, also officials of San Pascual Batangas, with
violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
- The complaint charged the respondent municipal
officials of overpaying Vicente de la Rosa of TDR
 Construction for the landscaping project of the San
Pascual Central School.
- In a Resolution dated June 14, 1995, Graft Investigation
Officer Lourdes A. Alarilla recommended the filing of an
information for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, against petitioners with the
Sandiganbayan.
- Ombudsman approved and filed the case with Batangas
RTC.
-Meanwhile, Concerned Citizens filed a complaint before
the Ombudsman against the same petitioners for the
violation of R.A. 3019 because of the overpriced
landscaping. On February 9, 1996, another Information
for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing
of the landscaping project, this time before the
Sandiganbayan.
- The information was subsequently amended on May 17,
1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was
committed, the information charged essentially the same
inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC.
- The accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the
following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged
with the same offense in two informations; and that the
proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose
petitioners to double jeopardy.
- The Sandiganbayan denied the accuseds motion to
quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court,
however, suspended proceedings in the case until the
Supreme Court resolved the question of the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction involved in the Binay
petition.
I: 1. W/N Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction (YES)
2. W/N Binays right to speedy disposition of cases has been
violated. (NO)
3. W/N there is double jeopardy (NO)
H: 1. YES.
- Binay case was filed in 1994, where the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over RA 3019 cases has
not yet been classified.
- RA 7975 took effect in May 1995, when Binay had
not yet been arraigned.
- The Magsaysay case was filed in June 1995 which
means the law has already been in effect.
- The interpretation of salary grade is not based on
the amount but it is actually defined by law based on
the position and responsibility of the government
official. Clearly stated R.A. No. 6758 and the 1989
and 1997 versions of the Index of Occupational
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades List,
Mayors fall under Salary Grade 27, their actual
salaries may be subject to variation due to the funds
and said responsibilities.
- The law is clear that they are in fact included, so
there is no need for statutory construction. (Binay
used what is not included in the enumeration is
deemed excluded rule).
- The resort to congressional records to determine the
proper application of the law in this case is
unwarranted in this case for the same reason that the
resort to the rule of inclusio unius est expressio
alterius is inappropriate.
- On RA 7975s retroactive effect(?)
- The rule is that where a court has already
obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the
final determination of the cause is not affected
by new legislation placing jurisdiction over such
proceedings in another tribunal. The exception
to the rule is where the statute expressly
provides, or is construed to the effect that it is
intended to operate as to actions pending before
its enactment. Where a statute changing the
jurisdiction of a court has no retroactive effect,
it cannot be applied to a case that was pending
prior to the enactment of the statute.
1. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has
already begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975,
R.A. No. 7975 does not apply.
2. If trial of cases before the Sandiganbayan has not
begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 7975, then R.A.
No. 7975 applies.
(a) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case before it,
then the case shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(b) If by virtue of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case before
it, the case shall be referred to the regular courts.
- HOWEVER, it has been superseded by RA 8249:
The ramifications of Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 may
be stated as follows:
1. If trial of the cases pending before whatever court
has already begun as of the approval of R.A. No.
8249, said law does not apply.
2. If trial of cases pending before whatever court has
not begun as of the approval of R.A. No. 8249, then
said law applies.
(a) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, then it retains jurisdiction.
(b) If the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over a case
pending before it, the case shall be referred to the regular
courts.
(c) If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a case
pending before a regular court, the latter loses jurisdiction
and the same shall be referred to the Sandiganbayan.
(d) If a regular court has jurisdiction over a case pending
before it, then said court retains jurisdiction.
Thus, under both R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8429,
the Sandiganbayan retains jurisdiction over
said cases.
2. NO. In petitioner Binays case, the Court finds that there
was no undue delay in the disposition of the subject cases.
- The constitutional right to a speedy disposition of cases is not
limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to
all parties in all cases, including civil and administrative cases,
and in all proceedings, including judicial and quasi-judicial
hearings. Hence, under the Constitution, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action on all officials who are tasked
with the administration of justice.
- However, the right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the
right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the
proceedings is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the
trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried.
- Equally applicable is the balancing test used to determine
whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy
trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which
(a) the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant is
weighed, and such factors as:
(b) the length of the delay,
(c) the reasons for such delay,
(d) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused,
and
(e) the prejudice caused by the delay.
- The concept of speedy disposition is a relative term and must
necessarily be a flexible concept.
- A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved,
therefore, would not be sufficient.
1. That on July 27, 1988 Bobby Brillante filed with the Office
of the Tanodbayan an affidavit-complaint charging, Jejomar
Binay, Sergio Santos, Roberto Chang, Delfin Almeda, Nelson
Irasga, Nicasio Santiago, Feliciano Basam, Maria Chan,
Romeo Barrios, Azucena Diaz, Virgilio Clarete, Godofredo
Marcelo, Armando San Miguel, Salvador Pangilinan and John
Does of the following offenses: (a) Massive Malversation of
Public Funds; (b) Multiple Falsification of Public Documents;
(c) Usurpation of Official Functions; (d) Violation of Election
Law; and (e) Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
1.1. Brillantes complaint was based on the initial
findings and observations of the COA on the
examination of the cash and accounts covering
transactions from April 1, 1987 to January 4, 1988
and Post-Audit of Selected Accounts for the last
quarter of 1987 of the Municipality of Makati
contained in its Report dated January 11, 1988. The
COA furnished the Tanodbayan a copy of this report
on August 1, 1988 upon request of the latter.
1.2. In the letter of the COA transmitting a copy of
the report, the Tanodbayan was informed that this
COA audit report of January 11, 1988 is not yet
released since the Mayor of Makati was given thirty
days within which to explain/clarify the findings in
the report and is subject to change or modification
depending upon the explanation/clarification to be
submitted by the Mayor of Makati. Because of this
information from the COA the preliminary
investigation was held in abeyance until the
submission of the final report.
1.3. On March 1, 1989, the first part of the Final
Report on Audit of Makati was received by the Office
of the Ombudsman and was transmitted for purposes
of the ensuring preliminary investigation to the
Tanodbayan which received the same on March 22,
1989.
1.4. This first part of the Final Report contained the
fifteen (15) adverse findings, above elsewhere stated as
the basis of Bobby Brillantes complaint.
1.5. Eleven (11) COA auditors participated in the
documentation and analysis of its findings and
preparation of the final report.
1.6. The first part of the final report was followed by
a Supplemental Report on Findings No. 1 and 3.
This Supplemental Report is dated July 3, 1989.
2. After securing machine copies of the voluminous documents
supporting the COA findings, Pros. Margarito Gervacio,
Chairman of the Panel of Prosecutors, issued the
corresponding subpoena directing the respondents to submit
their respective counter-affidavits.
2.1. In compliance with the subpoena, Mayor
Jejomar Binay submitted his counter-affidavit on May
18, 1990, Marissa Chan, Feliciano Bascon, Nicanor
Santiago, Jr. on June 19, 1990, Renato Manrique on
June 4, 1990, Alfredo Ignacio on June 6, 1990,
Roberto Chang on August 27, 1990.Feliciano Bascon
submitted his Supplemental Affidavit on November
22, 1990.
2.2. Thereafter, clarificatory examinations were
conducted on September 27, 1990, October 26,
1990, November 8, 9, 14, 22, 1990.
3. On January 15, 1991 Mayor Jejomar Binay submitted a
copy of this Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 92380 which
he and the municipality of Makati filed with the Supreme
Court against COA Chairman, Eufemio Domingo and the
Commission on Audit, with a manifestation that said petition
is submitted to support Binays stand as regard COA Finding
No. 9 aforestated.
4. On April 2, 1992 respondent Marissa Chan filed an
affidavit containing allegations incriminating Jejomar Binay;
5. Upon being ordered to comment on the said April 2, 1992
affidavit of Marissa Chan, Jejomar Binay submitted his
comment thereto on April 30, 1992.
6. On August 4, 1993, the Investigation Panel submitted to the
Deputy Special Prosecutor its Resolution disposing the
preliminary investigation of the case.
6.1. On August 10, 1993 the said Resolution was
approved by the Special Prosecutor, who forwarded
the same and the entire records to the Office of the
Ombudsman for review and/or final action.
6.2. On August 16, 1994, the Review Panel of the
Ombudsman submitted to the latter its review action
for approval.
6.3. On August 19, 1994, the Ombudsman approved
some of the recommendations of the Review Panel
and directed the preparation and filing of the
informations.[50]
Furthermore, the prosecution is not bound by the
findings of the Commission on Audit (COA); it must
rely on its own independent judgment in the
determination of probable cause. Accordingly, the
prosecution had to conduct it s own review of the
COA findings. Judging from said findings, we find
that the cases were sufficiently complex, thus
justifying the length of time for their resolution. As
held by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution dated
March 29, 1995 denying the Motion to Quash:
2. Ten charges are involved in these cases and the prosecution,
unable to rely on the raw findings of the Commission on Audit
in 15 reports caused the investigation and examination of
thousands of vouchers, payrolls, and supporting documents
considering that no less than the Chairman of the Commission
on Audit, assisted by a team supervisor and 10 team members
had to take part in the conduct of a final audit consisting of
evaluation and analysis of the initial findings in the 15 raw
reports, the cases must have involved complicated legal and
factual issues which do warrant or justify a longer period of
time for preliminary investigation.
xxx
5. In the TATAD case, the preliminary investigation was
resolved close to three (3) years from the time all the counter-
affidavits were submitted to the Tanodbayan, notwithstanding
the fact that very few documentary and testimonial evidence
were involved. In the above-entitled cases, the preliminary
investigation of all ten (10) cases was terminated in merely two
(2) years and four (4) months from the date Mayor Binay filed
his last pleading, on April 30, 1992.[51]
Petitioner claims that the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
ordering his suspension pendente lite is unwarranted since
the informations charging him were not valid. This
contention, however, must fail in view of our pronouncement
that there was no delay in the resolution of the subject cases in
violation of his right to speedy disposition. Accordingly, the
informations in question are valid an petitioners suspension
pendente lite must be upheld.
Finally, whether or not there is probable cause to warrant the
filing of the subject cases is a question best left to the discretion
of the Ombudsman. Absent any grave abuse of such
discretion, the Court will not interfere in the exercise
thereof.[52] Petitioner in this case has failed to establish any
such abuse on the part of the Ombudsman.
3. NO. The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did
not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had
already pleaded not guilty to the information earlier filed in
the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place,
the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
US v. NAVARRO
F: The defendants, Baldomero Navarro, Marcelo de Leon,
and Fidel Feliciano (alias Bulag) are charged with the crime of
illegal detention.
- The said defendants, together with other persons unknown,
armed with revolvers and daggers, went one night about the
middle of November, 1902, to the house of one Felix
Punsalan, situated in Matangtubig, barrio of Malinta, town of
Polo, Province of Bulacan, and by force and violence kidnaped
the said Felix Punsalan, without, up to the date of this
information, having given any information as to his
whereabouts or having proven that they set him at liberty.
- In the course of the trial Teodoro Pangan, Gregorio
Mendoza, and Flaviano Punsalan testified as witnesses for the
prosecution.
- The witness Pangan said that one night about the middle of
November, 1902, while he was asleep in the house of Felix
Punsalan, situated in the barrio of Malinta, in front of Maysilo,
he, being at that time a servant of the said Punsalan, was
aroused by the barking of the dogs; that his master, Felix
Punsalan, arose and opened the window, and, upon seeing
some people there, asked them who they were; they answered
him by asking who was with him in the house, to which he
replied that his servant was there; they asked him if he had a
gun, and he replied that he had no gun, and they asked him to
come down and talk with them, and the said Felix Punsalan,
having gone down accordingly, did not return, and the witness
added that he had not seen him again since that time.
- 2 other witnesses named Mendoza and De Leon were also
kidnapped by the same men the night Punsalan was taken.
- The brother of Punsalan also came as a witness. He said that
he heard Navarro confess, freely and spontaneously, to his
superintendent of secret information that he was part of the
band that kidnapped Felix and that due to the torture that
resulted in his passing blood, which in turn caused his death.
He was then buried in Ogong.
I: W/N Art. 483 is violative of the constitution
H: YES. "A law which, while permitting a person accused of a
crime to be a witness in his own behalf, should at the same
time authorize a presumption of guilt from his omission to
testify, would be a law adjudging guilt without evidence,
and while it might not be obnoxious to the constitutional
provision against compelling a party in a criminal case to give
evidence against himself, would be a law reversing the
presumption of innocence, and would violate the fundamental
principles binding alike upon the legislature and the courts."
- It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a
crime, to produce evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt; and the accused can not be called upon. either by
express words or acts to assist in the production of such
evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him.
He has a right to rely on the presumption of innocence until
the prosecution proves him guilty of every element of the
crime with which he is charged.
- Article 483 punishes illegal detention with cadena temporal
which is 6-12 years and a day. IF the perpetrator decides to
withhold the whereabouts of the victim detained, the penalty
increases to cadena perpetua, which goes for 17 years to life.
This increase in penalty forced the defendant to be a witness in
his own behalf or suffer the greater punishment.
- This provision has the effect of forcing a defendant to
become a witness in his own behalf or to take a more severe
punishment. The burden of giving evidence, if he desires to
lessen the penalty, is put upon him. In other words, for failure
on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the
whereabouts of the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove
that he was set at liberty, the punishment may be increased
from imprisonment for a term of six years to life
imprisonment.
-So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under
article 483 of the Penal Code, would have the effect of
convicting him under article 481.
- It is argued by the defendant that it defeats the presumption
of innocence. And that only upon guilt should there be
prosecution.
- A criminal prosecution is divided into two principal parts:
 SUMMARY STAGE PLENARY STAGE fails to prove the whereabouts of the person whom he is
- PURPOSE: to inquire - PURPOSE: is a accused of making away with. or that he liberated him, then
whether a criminal act has contradictory discussion of the prosecuting attorney has a case falling within the last
been committed and to the question of the guilt or paragraph of article 483.
determine by whom the act innocence of the defendant, - It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law that
has been committedthat is and the rendition of a no prosecution under this article would have ever been
to say, the object is to get judgment of conviction or possible without a concomitant provision of the procedural law
together all the data possible acquittal which made it the duty of the accused to testify and permitted
for the purpose of proving the prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from his
that an act falling within the refusal to do so.
sanction of the penal law has - The crime under Art. 483 has 3 elements:
been committed by such and 1. Illegal detention of a person
such persons 2. Lack of evidence that the person has been liberated
3. A failure on the part of the accused in the course of
- It may appear in this stage - It may be proved in the summary proceeding to prove that he had
that the accused performed the plenary stage liberated the person detained
the criminal act, BUT > that he is not guilty. - Under the present system the information must charge the
- RECORD CONTAINS: accused with acts committed by him prior to the filing of the
1. evidence of the information and which of themselves constitute an offense
commission of a against the law. The Government can not charge a man with
punishable act one of the necessary elements of an offense and trust to his
2. all possible data making out the rest by availing himself of his right to leave the
tending to point out entire burden of proceeding on the prosecution from
the delinquent beginning to end.
3. a record of all - In this case the prosecuting attorney charges the accused with
proceedings kidnaping some person and with not having given any
connected with his information of the whereabouts of that person, of having
arrest and proved that hethe accusedhas set him at liberty. To make
imprisonment out a case the Government must show that the prisoner has
4. the answers of the been guilty of every act or omission necessary to constitute the
accused to the crime of which he is charged, and it will not be disputed that
interrogatories put the exercise of an absolute right can not form part of a crime.
to him as to any In this case the Government has proved that the defendant
other witness to was guilty of a breach of his duty to respect the rights of others
obtain from him a by showing that he, with others, carried a certain individual
statement of all he away from his house against his will, the accused not being
knows concerning vested with authority to restrain his fellowcitizens of liberty. It
the crime and is impossible for the Government to prove the other elements
those guilty of it. of the crime, because the acts necessary to constitute them
must be anterior in point of time to the trial, and must
- IN SECRET - IN PUBLIC constitute some breach of duty under an existing law.

- Now let us apply the rules of law above indicated to the case
in question, supposing that the crime had been committed
prior to the passage of the Philippine bill or General Orders,
No. 58. The judicial authorities having reason to believe that
some one has been illegally detained or kidnaped proceed to
make a secret investigation of the case, arrest the suspected
culprit, and demand of him that he give any information he
may have concerning the act under investigation and to state
whatever may have been his own participation therein. The
evidence shows that some one has been taken away from
home and has not been heard of again, and the facts point to
the prisoner as the presumptive criminal. He is told to state
what he knows of the matter. If he does so, and proves that the
person detained was liberated by him, or that such person is
living in such and such a place, then the prosecuting attorney
will know that he must draw a charge under the first or
following sections of article 481, according to whether the facts
elicited by the preliminary or summary investigation show
only a detention in general, or for the specific periods of time
indicated in the latter part of the section. But if the prisoner
US v. TAN TENG
F: UGH RAPE. Oliva Pacomio, a 7-year old girl was staying
in her sisters house. Chinamen were often seen gambling in or
near the house, and that they were in the habit of visiting
Olivas sister. After having taken a bath, Oliva returned in her
room. The accused then entered to ask for face powder. He
put the powder on his private parts, he then threw Oliva on
the floor and placed his private parts on hers and remained in
that position for a while. A few days later, Olivas sister found
out that she was suffering from gonorrhea and that it came
from Tan Teng.
- Upon this information the defendant was arrested and taken
to the police station and stripped of his clothing and examined.
The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his
body bore every sign of the fact that he was suffering from the
venereal disease known as gonorrhea. The policeman took a
portion of the substance emitting from the body of the
defendant and turned it over to the Bureau of Science for the
purpose of having a scientific analysis made of the same.
- Tan Teng, as his defense, said that Olivas sister was merely
threatening him with this case to extort P60 from him.
I: W/N the results of the examination after the arrest is
considered as a self-incriminating testimony
H: NO.
- The prohibition contained in section 5 of the Philippine Bill
that a person shall not be compelled to be a witness against
himself, is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the defendant's own lips, against his will,
an admission of his guilt.
- The substance was taken from the body of the defendant
without his objection, the examination was made by
competent medical authorities and the result showed that the
defendant was suffering from said disease. As was suggested by
Judge Lobingier, had the defendant been found with stolen
property upon his person, there certainly could have been no
question had the stolen property been taken for the purpose of
using the same as evidence against him. So also if the clothing
which he wore, by reason of blood stains or otherwise, had
furnished evidence of the commission of a crime, there
certainly could have been no objection to taking such for the
purpose of using the same as proof. No one would think of
even suggesting that stolen property and the clothing in the
case indicated, taken from the defendant, could not be used
against him as evidence, without violating the rule that a
person shall not be required to give testimony against himself.
- Holmes: "But the prohibition of compelling a man in a
criminal court to be a witness against himself, is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material. The objection, in
principle, would forbid a jury (court) to look at a person and
compare his features with a photograph in proof. Moreover we
are not considering how far a court would go in compelling a
man to exhibit himself, for when he is exhibited, whether
voluntarily or by order, even if the order goes too far, the
evidence if material, is competent."
- Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by
witnesses, can not violate the privilege granted under the
Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon the accused as a
witnessit does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in
this way from the accused, is not testimony by his body but his
body itself.
US v. ONG SIU HONG
F: An appeal from the judgment of the CFI. The court wishes
not to disturb the decision except to answer the constitutional
question, which involves the defendant spitting out the
morphine in his mouth as an act of self-incrimination.
I: W/N spitting out prohibited drugs is considered an act of
testifying against ones self.
H: NO. Follow Tan Teng case.
- To force a prohibited drug from the person of an accused is
along the same line as requiring him to exhibit himself before
the court; or putting in evidence papers and other articles
taken from the room of an accused in his absence; or, as in the
Tan Teng case, taking a substance from the body of the
accused to be used in proving his guilt. It would be a forced
construction of the paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights
in question to hold that any article, substance, or thing taken
from a person accused of crime could not be given in evidence.
The main purpose of this constitutional provision is to prohibit
testimonial compulsion by oral examination in order to extort
unwilling confessions from prisoners implicating them in the
commission of a crime.
- Following the practice of this court in cases of this character,
the judgment of the lower court is modified by imposing the
minimum penalty provided by law, i. e., three months
imprisonment and a fine of P300 or, in case of insolvency, to
suffer subsidiary imprisonment, with costs.
VILLAFLOR v. SUMMERS
F: A prayer for the writ of habeas corpus: In a criminal case
pending before the Court of First Instance of the city of
Manila, Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino Souingco are
charged with the crime of adultery. Judge of First Instance
ordered the petitioner herein, to submit her body to the
examination of one or two competent doctors to determine if
she was pregnant or not. The accused refused to obey the
order on the ground that such examination of her person was
a violation of the constitutional provision relating to self-
incrimination. Thereupon she was found in contempt of court
and was ordered to be committed to Bilibid Prison until she
should permit the medical examination required by the court.
I: W/N requiring a woman to submit to medical examination
is a form of self-incrimination
H: NO. For as long as violence, threat or force was not used in
the extraction.
- There has been no previous case like this, but the closest one
is People v. McCoy where the mother was charged with
infanticide and as a way to evidence the criminal act, the
coroner directed 2 physicians to examine her while she was in
jail. She objected to the examination but was threatened with
force. The results of the examination were not made
admissible in court.
- However, the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, in
two decisions, has seemed to limit the protection to a
prohibition against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination.
The constitutional limitation was said to be "simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the
defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt."
- Once again we lay down the rule that the constitutional
guaranty, that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination. The
corollary to the proposition is that, on a proper showing and
under an order of the trial court, an ocular inspection of the
body of the accused is permissible. The proviso is that torture
or force shall be avoided. Whether facts fall within or without
the rule with its corollary and proviso must, of course, be
decided as cases arise.
- It is a reasonable presumption that in an examination by
reputable and disinterested physicians due care will be taken
not to use violence and not to embarrass the patient any more
than is absolutely necessary.
BELTRAN v. SAMSON
F: This is a petition for a writ of prohibition, wherein the
petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to
appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter.
The order was given upon petition of said fiscal for the
purpose of comparing the petitioner's handwriting and
determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain
documents supposed to be falsified.
- And the petitioner, in refusing to perform what the fiscal
demanded, seeks refuge in the constitutional provision
contained in the Jones Law and incorporated in General
Orders, No. 58.
- We are not concerned here with a defendant, for it does not
appear that any information was filed against the petitioner for
the supposed falsification, and still less is it a question of a
defendant on trial testifying and under cross-examination.
This is only an investigation prior to the information and with
a view to filing it.
I: W/N executing a document to submit ones handwriting for
inspection is a form of self-incrimination
(W/N the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the
purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining
whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified,
constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of
the constitutional provision under examination.)
H: YES. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to
produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is
required to furnish evidence against himself.
And we say that the present case is more serious than that of
compelling the production of documents or chattels, because
here the witness is compelled to write and create, by means
of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which
may identify him as the falsifier.
- This text is not limited to declaracin but says "to be a
witness." Moreover, as we are concerned with a principle
contained both in the Federal constitution and in the
constitutions of several states of the United States, but
expressed differently, we should take it that these various
phrasings have a common conception.
- As to its scope, this privilege is not limited precisely to
testimony, but extends to all giving or furnishing of evidence.
- Whenever a defendant, at the trial of his case, testifying in his
own behalf, denies that a certain writing or signature is in his
own hand, he may on crossexamination be compelled to write
in open court in order that the jury may be able to compare
his handwriting with the one in question.
- In the case before us, writing is something more than moving
the body, or the hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely
mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means
that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states. Except that it is more serious,
we believe the present case is similar to that of producing
documents or chattels in one's possession.
CABAL v. KAPUNAN Jr.
F: Col. Jose C. Maristela of the Philippine Army filed with the
Secretary of National Defense a complaint charging petitioner
Manuel F. Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, with graft, corrupt practices, unexplained
wealth, conduct unbecoming of an officer and gentleman,
dictatorial tendencies, giving false statements of his assets and
liabilities in 1958 and other equally reprehensible acts.
- The President of the Philippines created a committee of 5
members, consisting of former justices to investigate the charge
of unexplained wealth contained in said complaint and submit
its report and recommendations as soon as possible.
- At the beginning of the investigation, the Committee, upon
request of complainant Col. Maristela, ordered petitioner
herein to take the witness stand and be sworn to as witness for
Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of
unexplained wealth.
- Thereupon, petitioner objected, personally and through
counsel, to said request of Col. Maristela and to the
aforementioned order of the Committee, invoking his
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
- The city fiscal then filed a charge against Cabal for
contempt, wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that respondent
be summarily adjudged guilty of contempt of the Presidential
Committee and accordingly disciplined as in contempt of
court by imprisonment until such time as he shall obey the
subject order of said committee.
- Respondents herein allege, inter alia, that the investigation
being conducted by the Committee above referred to is
administrative, not criminal, in nature; that the legal provision
relied upon by petitioner in relation to preliminary
investigations (Section 38C, Republic Act No. 409, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1201) is inapplicable to
contempt proceedings; that, under section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code, contempt against an administrative
officer is to be dealt with as contempt of a superior court; that
petitioner herein is charged with only one offense; and that,
under the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination,
petitioner herein may refuse, not to take the witness stand, but
to answer incriminatory questions.
- In this connection, it should be noted that, although said
Committee was created to investigate the administrative
charge of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question
that Col. Maristela does not seek the removal of petitioner
herein as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
As a matter of fact he no longer holds such office. It seems,
likewise, conceded that the purpose of the charge against
petitioner is to apply the provisions of Republic Act No. 1379,
as amended, otherwise known as the AntiGraft Law, which
authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a public
officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property.
I: W/N the accused may invoke the right against self-
incrimination in civil proceedings with forfeiture of property as
penalty
H: YES.
- Such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a
penalty because In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a
divestiture of property without compensation, in consequence
of a default or an offense. It may be said to be a penalty
imposed for a misconduct or breach of duty.
- As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are
deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses
against themselves are applicable thereto.
- Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods
that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any
person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such
proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that
where the person using the res illegally is the owner or
rightful possessor of it, the forfeiture proceeding is in the
nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in
the nature of criminal proceedings that a general verdict on
several counts in an information is upheld if one count is good.
According to the authorities such proceedings, where the
owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
quasi criminal proceedings as to relieve the owner
from being a witness against himself and to prevent the
compulsory production of his books and papers. x x x
- Although the contrary view formerly obtained, the later
decisions are to the effect that suits for forfeitures incurred by
the commission of offenses against the law are so far of a quasi
criminal nature as to be within the reason of criminal
proceedings for all purposes of x x x that portion of the
Fifth Amendment which declares that no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. x x x It has frequently been held upon constitutional
grounds under the various State Constitution, that a witness or
party called as witness cannot be made to testify against
himself as to matters which would subject his property to
forfeiture. At early common law no person could he
compelled to testify against himself or to answer any
question which would have had a tendency to expose his
property to a forfeiture, or to form a link in a chain of
evidence for that purpose, as well as to incriminate him. Under
this commonlaw doctrine of protection against compulsory
disclosures which would tend to subject the witness to a
forfeiture, such protection was claimed and availed of in some
early American cases without placing the basis of the
protection upon constitutional grounds.
- Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be
civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute
providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil cases
shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want of form is
applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits for
penalties and forfeitures are of quasicriminal nature
and within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of x x x that portion of the Fifth Amendment
which declares, that no person shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. The
proceeding is one against the owner, as well as against the
goods; for it is his breach of the laws which has to be proved to
establish the forfeiture and his property is sought to be
forfeited.
PASCUAL Jr. v. BOARD of MEDICAL EXAMINERS
F: Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitionerappellee, filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition
with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of
Medical Examiners, now respondentappellant. It was alleged
therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for
alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that
he would present as his first witness herein petitionerappellee,
for the malpractice charge against the same.
- Thereupon, petitionerappellee, made of record his
objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. Respondentappellant,
the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same
time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February
12, 1965, petitionerappellee would be called upon to testify as
such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a
restraining order from a competent authority.
- The petitioner believes that the administrative proceeding
against him, which could result in forfeiture or loss of a
privilege, being quasicriminal in character, qualifies his plea
to not testify against himself. Lower court decided for
petitioner, saying that the right against self-incrimination
applies.
- There was a motion for intervention by Salvador Gatbonton
and Enriqueta Gatbonton, the complainants in the
administrative case for malpractice against petitionerappellee,
asking that they be allowed to file an answer as intervenors.
The lower court in this case prohibited the Medical Board
from compelling Pascual to testify.
I: W/N the Constitutional right against self-incrimination
applies
H: YES. We hold that in an administrative hearing against a
medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board
of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-
incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to
take the witness stand without his consent.
- Applying Cabal v. Kapunan, the proceeding for forfeiture
while administrative in character thus possesses a criminal or
penal aspect. The case before us is not dissimilar; petitioner
would be similarly disadvantaged. He could suffer not the
forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a
medical practitioner, for some an even greater deprivation.
- The appeal apparently proceeds on the mistaken assumption
by respondent Board and intervenorsappellants that the
constitutional guarantee against self incrimination should be
limited to allowing a witness to object to questions the answers
to which could lead to a penal liability being subsequently
incurred, It is true that one aspect of such a right, to follow the
language of another American decision, is the protection
against "any disclosures which the witness may reasonably
apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which
could lead to other evidence that might be so used." If that
were all there is then it becomes diluted.
- The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence.
- Speaking through Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the
doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant "to forego
testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the
witness standwith undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own
free genuine will."
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by
reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.
(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist
except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted.
Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty
already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or
degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee
or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities
under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.
PEOPLE v. ESTOISTA
F: Prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Lanao for
homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal possession
of firearm under one information, the appellant was acquitted
of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for which he
was sentenced to one-year imprisonment.
- The firearm with which the appellant was charged with
having in his possession was a rifle and belonged to his father,
Bruno Estoista, who held a legal permit for it. Father and son
lived in the same house, a little distance from a 27hectare
estate belonging to the family.
- From a spot in the plantation 100 to 120 meters from the
house, the defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit
Diragon Dima, a laborer of the family who was setting a trap
for wild chickens and whose presence was not perceived by the
accused.
- This appeal is from that sentence raising factual, legal and
constitutional questions. The constitutional question, set up
after the submission of the briefs, has to do with the objection
that the penaltyfrom 5 to 10 years of imprisonment and
finesprovided by Republic Act No. 4 is cruel and unusual.
- It was then established that he was walking alone with his
fathers gun, what is being questioned is whether this evidence
stands to convict him.
I: W/N the penalty is unconstitutional for violating excessive
punishment
H: NO. It is constitutional and just. The SC finds the 1-year
sentence to be below the penalty authorized by RA 4, so it
increased the penalty to 6 years, but has recommended to have
a copy of this descision sent to the President for clemency,
reducing the penalty to 6 months.
- Republic Act No. 4, amending section 2692 of the Revised
Administrative Code, in its pertinent provision is directed
against any person who possesses any firearm, ammunition
therefor, etc. A point to consider in this connection is the
meaning of the word "possesses."
It goes without saying that this word was employed in its broad
sense so as to include "carries" and "holds." This has to be so if
the manifest intent of the Act is to be effective. The same evils,
the same perils to public security, which the Act penalizes exist
whether the unlicensed holder of a prohibited weapon be its
owner or a borrower.
- To accomplish the object of this law the proprietary concept
of the possession can have no bearing whatever. "Ownership
of the weapon is necessary only insofar as the ownership may
tend to establish the guilt or intention of the accused."
- The rule laid down by United States courtsrule which we
here adoptis that temporary, incidental, casual or harmless
possession or control of a firearm is not a violation of a statute
prohibiting the possessing or carrying of this kind of weapon.
A typical example of such possession is where "a person picks
up a weapon or hands it to another to examine or hold for a
moment, or to shoot at some object."
- Appellant's case does not meet the above test. His holding or
carrying of his father's gun was not incidental, casual,
temporary or harmless. Away from his father's sight and
control, he carried the gun for the only purpose of using it, as
in fact he did, with fatal consequences.
Incidentally, herein lies a fundamental difference between the
case at bar and the Samson case. Although Samson had
physical control of his employer's shotgun and cartridges, his
possession thereof was undoubtedly harmless and innocent, as
evidenced by the fact that, apparently, he bore them in full
view of the people he met and of the authorities. Unlike the
appellant herein, Samson carried the gun solely in obedience
to its owner's order or request without any inferable intention
to use it as a weapon.
- Without deciding whether the prohibition of the Constitution
against infliction of cruel and unusual punishment applies both
to the form of the penalty and the duration of imprisonment, it
is our opinion that confinement from 5 to 10 years for
possessing or carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having
due regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes
to suppress or curb.
- The rampant lawlessness against property, person, and even
the very security of the Government, directly traceable in large
measure to promiscuous carrying and use of powerful
weapons, justify imprisonment, which in normal circumstances
might appear excessive.
- If imprisonment from 5 to 10 years is out of proportion to the
present case in view of certain circumstances, the law is not to
be declared unconstitutional for this reason. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature is not to be judged
in the light of exceptional cases. Small transgressors for which
the heavy net was not spread are, like small fishes, bound to be
caught, and it is to meet such a situation as this that courts are
advised to make a recommendation to the Chief Executive for
clemency or reduction of the penalty.
- The sentence imposed by the lower court is much below the
penalty authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The judgment is
therefore modified so as to sentence the accused to
imprisonment for five years. However, considering the degree
of malice of the defendant, application of the law to its full
extent would be too harsh and, accordingly, it is ordered that
copy of this decision be furnished to the President, thru the
Secretary of Justice, with the recommendation that the
imprisonment herein imposed be reduced to six months.
PEOPLE v. ECHEGARAY
F: UGH RAPE CASE. Echegaray raped his 10-year old
daughter, and he had the audacity to claim that the case was
instigated or prodded by grandmother with ill-motives.
Defendant assails: factual findings, the constitutionality of the
death penalty, and matters relating to the trial proceedings
and findings (that the date of the rape was not alleged which
did not give Echegaray to prepare his defense).
- On December 31, 1993, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659,
entitled, An Act to Impose the Death Penalty on Certain
Heinous Crimes, Amending for that Purpose the Revised
Penal Code, as Amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and for
Other Purposes, took effect.
- Between December 31, 1993, when R.A. No. 7659 took
effect, and the present time, criminal offenders have been
prosecuted under said law, and one of them, herein
accusedappellant, has been, pursuant to said law, meted out
the supreme penalty of death for raping his tenyear old
daughter. Upon his conviction, his case was elevated to us on
automatic review. On June 25, 1996, we affirmed his
conviction and the death sentence.
- Now, accusedappellant comes to us in the heels of this
courts affirmation of his death sentence and raises for the first
time the issue of the constitutionality of R.A. 7659. His thesis is
twofold: (1) that the death penalty law is unconstitutional per
se for having been enacted in the absence of compelling
reasons therefor, and (2) that the death penalty for rape is a
cruel, excessive and inhuman punishment in violation of the
constitutional proscription against punishment of such nature.
I: W/N death penalty for rape is cruel, excessive, and
inhumane
H: NO. We reject accusedappellants proposition.
Three justices interposed their dissent hereto, agreeing with
accusedappellants view that Congress enacted R.A. No. 7659
without complying with the twin requirements of compelling
reasons and heinous crimes.
- Heinous crimes defined in the preamble of the bill: x x
x the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous
for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which, by
reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness,
atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a
just, civilized and ordered society.
- Under R.A. No. 7659, the following crimes are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death:
. (1) Treason (Sec. 2);
. (2) Qualified piracy (Sec. 3);
. (3) Parricide (Sec. 5);
. (4) Murder (Sec. 6);
. (5) Infanticide (Sec. 7);
. (6) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention if
attended by any of the following four circumstances:
(a) the victim was detained for more than three days;
(b) it was committed simulating public authority; (c)
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim
or threats to kill him were made; and (d) if the victim
is a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer (Sec. 8);
. (7) Robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation (Sec. 9);
. (8) Destructive arson if what is burned is; (a) one or
more buildings or edifice; (b) a building where people
usually gather; (c) a train, ship or airplane for public
use; (d) a building or factory in the service of public
utilities; (e) a building for the purpose of concealing or
destroying evidence of a crime; (f) an arsenal,
fireworks factory, or government museum; and (g) a
storehouse or factory of explosive materials located in
an inhabited place; or regardless of what is burned, if
the arson is perpetrated by two or more persons (Sec.
10);
. (9) Rape attended by any of the following
circumstances:
. (a) the rape is committed with a deadly weapon;
. (b) the rape is committed by two or more persons;
and
. (c) the rape is attempted or frustrated and committed
with homicide (Sec. 11);
. (10) Plunder involving at least P50 million (Sec. 12);
. (11) Importation of prohibited drugs (Sec. 13);
. (12) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution, and
transportation of prohibited drugs (id.);
. (13) Maintenance of den, dive or resort for users of
prohibited drugs (id.);
. (14) Manufacture of prohibited drugs (id.);
. (15) Possession or use of prohibited drugs in
certain specified amounts (id.);
. (16) Cultivation of plants which are sources
of prohibited drugs (id.);
. (17) Importation of regulated drugs (Sec. 14);
. (18) Manufacture of regulated drugs (id.);
. (19) Sale, administration, dispensation, delivery,
transportation, and distribution of regulated drugs
(id.);
. (20) Maintenance of den, dive, or resort for users of
regulated drugs (Sec. 15);
. (21) Possession or use of regulated drugs in specified
amounts (Sec. 16);
. (22) Misappropriation, misapplication or failure to
account dangerous drugs confiscated by the arresting
officer (Sec. 17);
. (23) Planting evidence of dangerous drugs in person
or immediate vicinity of another to implicate the
latter (Sec. 19); and
. (24) Carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant
of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or raped (Sec.
20).
- All the foregoing crimes are not capital crimes per se, the
uniform penalty for all of them being not mandatory death but
the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. In other
words, it is premature to demand for a specification of the
heinous elements in each of the foregoing crimes because they
are not anyway mandatorily penalized with death. The
elements that call for the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death in these crimes, would only be relevant when the trial
court, given the prerogative to impose reclusion perpetua,
instead actually imposes the death penalty because it has, in
appreciating the evidence proffered before it, found the
attendance of certain circumstances in the manner by which
the crime was committed, or in the person of the accused on
his own or in relation to the victim, or in any other matter of
significance to the commission of the crime or its effects on the
victim or on society, which circumstances characterize the
criminal acts as grievous, odious, or hateful, or inherently or
manifestly wicked, vicious, atrocious or perverse as to be
repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered
society.
- The Revised Penal Code, as it was originally promulgated,
provided for the death penalty in specified crimes under
specific circumstances. As early as 1886, though, capital
punishment had entered our legal system through the old
Penal Code, which was a modified version of the Spanish
Penal Code of 1870.
The opposition to the death penalty uniformly took the form
of a constitutional question of whether or not the death
penalty is a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment in
violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel and
unusual punishments.
- The courts unchanging answer: The penalty complained of
is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Exparte Kemmler,
the United States Supreme Court said that punishments are
cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death, but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that
word as used in the constitution. It implies there something
inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life.
- Previous constitutions have allowed death penalty. The 1987
constitution was drafted, Father Bernas presented the first
draft of the Bill of Rights where section 19 was worded in a
way that abolished death penalty through the constitution.
x x x [T]here was a division in the Committee not
on whether the death penalty should be abolished or
not, but rather on whether the abolition should be
done by the Constitutionin which case it cannot be
restored by the legislatureor left to the legislature.
The majority voted for the constitutional abolition of
the death penalty. And the reason is that capital
punishment is inhuman for the convict and his family
who are traumatized by the waiting, even if it is never
carried out. There is no evidence that the death
penalty deterred deadly criminals, hence, life should
not be destroyed just in the hope that other lives
might be saved. Assuming mastery over the life of
another man is just too presumptuous for any man.
The fact that the death penalty as an institution has
been there from time immemorial should not deter us
from reviewing it. Human life is more valuable than
an institution intended precisely to serve human life.
So, basically, this is the summary of the reasons which
were presented in support of the constitutional
abolition of the death penalty."
- The import of this amendment is unmistakable. By this
amendment, the death penalty was not completely abolished
by the 1987 Constitution. Rather, it merely suspended the
death penalty and gave Congress the discretion to review it at
the propitious time.
- However the first draft did not survive deliberation and was
later on left to legislature to decide whether death penalty
should form part of the penalties prescribed in our laws.
- What followed, thus, were proposed amendments to the
beleaguered provision. The move to add the phrase, unless
for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the national
assembly provides for the death penalty.
- With seventeen (17) affirmative votes and seven (7) negative
votes and no abstention, the Chair declared that the Senate
has voted to reincorporate death as a penalty in the scale of
penalties as provided in the Revised Penal Code. A nineperson
committee was subsequently created to draft the compromise
bill pursuant to said vote. The mandate of the committee was
to retain the death penalty, while the main debate in the
committee would be the determination of the crime to be
considered heinous.
- But we must bear in mind that the death penalty is imposed
in the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, when the Constitution
abolished the death penalty, it actually was amending the
Revised Penal Code to such an extent that the Constitution
provides that where the death penalty has already been
imposed but not yet carried out, then the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua, that is the penalty in the Revised Penal
Code. So we thought that it would be best to just amend the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, restoring the death
penalty for some crimes that may be considered as heinous.
That is why the bill is in this form amending the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code.
- In deliberating the meaning of heinous crimes:
Senator Tolentino: They are heinous by their nature, Mr.
President, but that is not supposed to be the exclusive
criterion. The nature of the offense is the most important
element in considering it heinous but, at the same time, we
should consider the relation of the offense to society in order to
have a complete idea of the heinous nature of these offenses.
In the case of malversation or bribery, for instance, these
offenses by themselves connected with the effect upon society
and the government have made them fall under the
classification of heinous crimes. The compelling reason for
imposing the death penalty is when the offenses of
malversation and bribery becomes so grave and so serious as
indicated in the substitute bill itself, then there is a compelling
reason for the death penalty.
- We have no doubt, therefore, that insofar as the element of
heinousness is concerned, R.A. No. 7659 has correctly
identified crimes warranting the mandatory penalty of death,
As to the other crimes in R.A. No. 7659 punished by reclusion
perpetua to death, they are admittingly no less abominable
than those mandatorily penalized by death. The proper time
to determine their heinousness in contemplation of law, is
when on automatic review, we are called to pass on a death
sentence involving crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under R.A. No. 7659, with the trial court meting out the
death sentence in exercise of judicial discretion. This is not to
say, however, that the aggravating circumstances under the
Revised Penal Code need be additionally alleged as
establishing the heinousness of the crime for the trial court to
validly impose the death penalty in the crimes under R.A. No.
7659 which are punished with the flexible penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.
- In the first place, the 1987 Constitution did not amend or
repeal the provisions of the Revised Penal Code relating to
aggravating circumstances. Secondly, R.A. No. 7659, while it
specifies circumstances that generally qualify a crime provided
therein to be punished by the maximum penalty of death,
neither amends nor repeals the aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code. Thus, construing R.A. No.
7659 in pari materia with the Revised Penal Code, death
may be imposed when: (1) aggravating circumstances attend
the commission of the crime as to make operative the
provision of the Revised Penal Code regarding the imposition
of the maximum penalty; and (2) other circumstances attend
the commission of the crime which indubitably characterize
the same as heinous in contemplation of R.A. No. 7659 that
justify the imposition of death, albeit the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua to death. Without difficulty, we understand
the rationale for the guided discretion granted in the trial court
to recognize circumstances that characterize the commission
of the crime as heinous.
- Anent the second ground, we disagree with the courts
predicate that the gauge of whether or not a crime warrants
the death penalty or not, is the attendance of the circumstance
of death on the part of the victim. Such a premise is in fact an
ennobling of the biblical notion of retributive justice of an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. We have already demonstrated
earlier in our discussion of heinous crimes that the forfeiture of
life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence
of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and
cultural experience; rather, the death penalty is imposed in
heinous crimes because the perpetrators thereof have
committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely
destructive effects on the national efforts to lift the masses from
abject poverty through organized governmental strategies
based on a disciplined and honest citizenry, and because they
have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their
victim and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose
actual threat to the safety of individuals and the survival of
government, they must be permanently prevented from doing
so.
CORPUZ v. PEOPLE
F: Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at
the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in
1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the
former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner
approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.
Private complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned
over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another
men's bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98, 000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed that
petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.
The period expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds
of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private
complainant was able to meet petitioner, the latter promised
the former that he will pay the value of the said items
entrusted to him, but to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime
of estafa.
- After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information.
The dispositive portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal
Code; there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor
ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable; accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of
FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of
Reclusion Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM;
to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount
of P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
- The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied
the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed
Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando
City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each
additional P10, 000.00, or a total of 7 years. The rest of the
decision stands.
- Hence this petition.
I: W/N the court can adjust the penalties for being
unconstitutional
H: NO. Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel
punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law
from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in
the present action. Not only is it violative of due process,
considering that the State and the concerned parties were not
given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is
settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded
directly and not collaterally, more so in the present
controversy wherein the issues never touched upon the
constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code.
- It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of
proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the
Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the
statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed
in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban,
the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive,"
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to
shock the moral sense of the community."
- The solution to the present controversy could not be solved
by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values to the
present value of money based only on the current inflation
rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be
taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon
before the said values could be accurately and properly
adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the
accused, its socio-economic impact, and the likes must be
painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at
a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our
existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-equipped, has no
resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these
changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress.
-As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was
deliberating on this case, the question of the continued validity
of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property
came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to
the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted
the Revised Penal Code. Since the members of the division
reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are
of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court
en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously
complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M.
Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President,
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties
were later heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc,
with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de oficio of
the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on
the matter, this Court finds the following:
- There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the
range of penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes
against property committed today, based on the amount of
damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in
1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of
penalties because that would constitute judicial legislation.
What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied
through this Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching
upon the power of another branch of the government. This,
however, does not render the whole situation without any
remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by
including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which
should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and
in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and
which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper
decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal
legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be
deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this
Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive
penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the
injury caused by the offense.
- The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that
for acts bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law
and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render
the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief
Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why
the same act should be the subject of penal legislation. The
premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the
subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to
inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that act
punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph
is similar to the first except for the situation wherein the act is
already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is
deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in
the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why
the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate
with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform
the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to
provide the proper penalty.
- In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal
Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the
duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive,
with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum
crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no
punishable act except those previously and specifically
provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body
does not deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with
penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless
to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend
the execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause
excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such
eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with
a recommendation for an amendment or modification of the
legal provisions, which it believes to be harsh.
- The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the
humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered with
mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the
wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or
not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe
enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law
may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the courts to enforce the
will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a
given penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines
or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for clemency
should be addressed to the Chief Executive.
- There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes
against property be based on the current inflation rate or at
the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00.
- However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates
and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes
against property be adopted, the penalties will not cease to
change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the
framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it should have
provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article
5 as a remedy.
- It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has
not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to
conform with the present times. For all we know, the
legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter
the further commission of those punishable acts, which have
increased tremendously through the years. In fact, in recent
moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden
the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of
Plunder, from its original minimum amount
of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it
to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered
the threshold amount upon which the Anti-Money
Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00
to P500,000.00.
- It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa,
the present penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to
the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties.
- In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00,
the above-provision states that the penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months
and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if
the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is
imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years
and 4 months). It would seem that under the present law, the
penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In
fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by
one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in
its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to
6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole
after serving the said minimum period and may even apply for
probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum
penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is
arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem
that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all
excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.
- Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the
value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage
caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum
and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining
the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the
penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to the
act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused.
- The equal protection clause requires equality among equals,
which is determined according to a valid classification. The
test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of
reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule
(IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as P10,000.00
may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today,
which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that
those who commit estafa involving higher amounts would
receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved,
because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the
same penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions,
which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates
requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing
conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions
that no longer exist today.
- Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean
Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article 315
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what
then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount
of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00? It
seems that the proposition poses more questions than answers,
which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate
remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to
exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
- With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related
provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough
study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There
may be some provisions of the law that should be amended;
nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude as to the
intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely
making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable
in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the
Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct
public hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and
who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to
amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even
create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to
amend the Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments,
counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present,
fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to
amend the Revised Penal Code, each one proposing much
needed change and updates to archaic laws that were
promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic,
and cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the
law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by
judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or
under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend,
distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should
apply the law in a manner that would give effect to their letter
and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and
purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from
encroaching upon the primary function of a co-equal branch
of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by
means of judicial legislation.
- In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended
party as a kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the
victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter
by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect.
Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person
dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the
offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of
money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due
to the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to
the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis
in the imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus,
the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity
awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that
would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a
minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which
is P3,000.00. The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus,
although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity
can be validly modified and increased when the present
circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under
Article 2220 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the
court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering of the
private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in
relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity.
Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
non-payment of a poll tax.
LOZANO v. MARTINEZ
F: The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22
for short), popularly known as the Bouncing Check Law,
which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue
presented by these petitions for decision. The question is
definitely one of first impression.
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented
here, we do not find it necessary to delve into the specifics of
the informations involved in the cases which are the subject of
the petitions before us. The language of BP 22 is broad enough
to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing
obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for
something of value.
I: W/N BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition
against imprisonment for debt
H: NO. The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police
power and is not repugnant to the constitutional inhibition.
- Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the
most serious is the alleged conflict between the statute and the
Constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt. It
is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in
the Bill of Rights, which states, "No person shall be imprisoned
for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." Petitioners insist that,
since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the
dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to
the drawee bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather
than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the non-payment
of the check, not the act of issuing it.
- The statute, it is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled
device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal
sanction.
- First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the
constitutional inhibition invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its
historical context, the constitutional prohibition against
imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually
during the early part of the nineteenth century in the various
states of the American Union as a result of the people's
revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by
common law, which permitted creditors to cause the
incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At
common law, money judgments arising from actions for the
recovery of a debt or for damages from breach of a contract
could be enforced against the person or body of the debtor by
writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a
debtor could be seized and imprisoned at the instance of the
creditor until he makes the satisfaction awarded. As a
consequence of the popular ground swell against such a
barbarous practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for
debt came to be generally enshrined in the constitutions of
various states of the Union.
- The 'debt' intended to be covered by the constitutional
guaranty has a well-defined meaning. Organic provisions
relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to
prevent commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising
from actions ex contractu The inhibition was never meant to
include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the reason
that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any
contract entered into between the parties but are imposed
upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and are
considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed
by the courts in criminal proceedings as punishments for
crime."
- The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of
making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the
non-payment of an obligation, which the law punishes. The
law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his
debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal
sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public
interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law
punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an
offense against public order.
- It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to
penalize a person for non-payment of a debt ex contractu
But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical
to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which
the law can punish. An act may not be considered by society as
inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can
do this in the exercise of its police power.
- By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank
and payable on demand. It is a written order on a bank,
purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the
payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person
therein named or to his order or to cash and payable on
demand. Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere
undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the
drawer has funds on deposit against which the check is drawn,
sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank.
- The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends
the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels
of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.
- BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any
check on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the
drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment."
The penalty prescribed for the offense is imprisonment of not
less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less
than the amount of the check nor more than double said
amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
- The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person
who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep
sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days
from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is
dishonored by the drawee bank.
- An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part
of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his
funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check upon its
presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to
establish, the statute itself creates a prima facie presumption
of such knowledge where payment of the check "is refused by
the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such
bank when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of
the check.
- BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of
issuing checks that are worthless, i.e. checks that end up being
rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice, as discussed
later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes
to public interests. Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions
already existed in our statute books which penalize the
issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has
dealth with the problem within the context of crimes against
property punished as "estafa" or crimes involving fraud and
deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage
caused to the property rights of the victim.
- The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 1887 until it was replaced by the Revised
Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions penalizing, among
others, the act of defrauding another through false pretenses.
Art. 335 punished a person who defrauded another "by falsely
pretending to possess any power, influence, qualification,
property, credit, agency or business, or by means of similar
deceit." Although no explicit mention was made therein
regarding checks, this provision was deemed to cover within
its ambit the issuance of worthless or bogus checks in exchange
for money.
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act.
PEOPLE v. YLAGAN
F: Against the appellee, Elisea Ylagan, a complaint for
physical injuries was filed in the justice of the peace court of
Batangas, Province of Batangas. After preliminary
investigation, the case was forwarded to the Court of First
Instance, where the provincial fiscal filed an information
charging her with serious physical injuries. Upon arraignment,
the defendant pleaded not guilty to the information;
whereupon the private prosecutor, with the concurrence of the
deputy provincial fiscal, moved for the dismissal of the case,
which motion was granted by the court. The attorney for the
defendant said nothing about the dismissal of the case.
Eleven days later, the acting provincial fiscal filed another
information in the same justice of the peace court, charging
the same defendant with the same offense of serious physical
injuries. After another preliminary investigation, the case was
again forwarded to the Court of First Instance, where the
information filed in the justice of the peace court was
reproduced. Upon arraignment, the defendant entered a plea
of double jeopardy, based on section 28 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the court sustained the
plea and dismissed the case. From this order of dismissal, an
appeal was taken by the Government.
I:
H:
- It seems clear that under Section 28 of the Criminal
Procedure, a defendant in a criminal prosecution is in legal
jeopardy when placed on trial under the following
conditions: (1) In a court of competent jurisdiction;
(2) upon a valid complaint or information;
(3) after he has been arraigned; and
(4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or information.
- There is no provision or principle of law requiring such a
condition for the existence of legal jeopardy. All that the law
requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined."
Under our system of criminal procedure, issue is properly
joined after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. The
mere calling of a witness would not add a particle to the
danger, annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after
going through the process of being arrested, subjected to a
preliminary investigation, arraigned, and required to plead
and stand trial.
- The accused would never be free from the cruel and constant
menace of a never-ending charge, which the malice of the
complaining witness might hold indefinitely suspended over
his head, were it not that the judiciary is exclusively
empowered to authorize, by an express order to that effect, the
repetition of a complaint or information once dismissed in the
cases in which the law requires that this be done.
- Counsel for the government, however, contends that the
previous case brought against the appellee was dismissed with
her consent, on the theory that the phrase "without the
consent of the accused", used in section 28 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, should be construed to mean "over the
objection of the accused" or "against the will of the accused".
We can not accept such a theory. We believe it a sound rule to
lay down, that the mere silence of the defendant or his failure
to object to the dismissal, of the case does not constitute a
consent within the meaning of section 28 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure. The right not to be put in jeopardy a
second time for the same offense is as important as the other
constitutional rights of the accused in a criminal case. Its
waiver cannot, and should not, be predicated on mere silence.
BULAONG v. PEOPLE
F: 1956 Agaton Bulaong and others were charged before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna with the crime of rebellion.
Trial did not proceed with respect to Agaton Bulaong until
1958 for he was then at large.
- Meanwhile Congress enacted the AntiSubversion Act
(Republic Act 1700) which took effect on June 20, 1957.
- On September 12, 1958, Agaton Bulaong was arrested.
- On October 1, 1958 the information for rebellion filed with
the Court of First Instance of Laguna was amended to read as
follows:
The accused then and there joined the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CCP) and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
ng Bayan (HMB), otherwise known as the Hukbalahaps
(HUKS), the latter being the military arms of the former,
whose aims and purposes are to remove people and
territory of the Republic of the Philippines and to
overthrow it eventually by the use of force and arms
- The case for subversion is still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila; while the case for rebellion has already
been decided by the Court of First Instance of Laguna
adversely against the accused.
I: W/N accused Bulaong can interpose the defense of double
jeopardy in this case in view of the filing against him of the
information for subversion in the Court of First Instance of
Manila which allegedly involves the same facts obtaining in
this case.
H: NO.
- Accuseds contention has no merit. Under Section 9,
Rule 1133 of the Rules of Court, the defense of double
jeopardy is available to the accused only where he was either
convicted or acquitted or the case against him was dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his consent.
- Accused contends that rebellion as defined in Article 134 of
the Revised Penal Code is a lesser cognate offense to that
defined in Section 4 of Republic Act 1700, And he further
contends that since the facts alleged in the informations for
rebellion and subversion are the same he can not be legally
prosecuted for both offenses without being placed twice in
jeopardy of being punished for the same acts.
- Such is not the situation in this case. For accused has not
been convicted or acquitted in the case filed in the Court of
First Instance against him for subversion. Neither was the said
case dismissed or terminated without his consent, for as stated,
it is still pending in said court. Needless to say, it is the
conviction, acquittal of the accused or dismissal or termination
of the case that bars further prosecution for the same offense
or any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or
for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.
MELO v. PEOPLE
F: Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First
Instance in 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having
allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife
and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different
parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of
more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing
his habitual labor for the same period of time.
- On December 29,1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the
accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15
in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his
wounds.
- The following day, January 4, 1950, an amended
information was filed charging the accused with consummated
homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended
formation alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by
the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further
entertaining the amended information.
I: W/N there is double jeopardy
H: Brushing aside technicalities of procedure and going into
the substance of the issues raised, it may readily be stated that
the amended information was rightly allowed to stand. Rule
106, section 13, 2d paragraph, is as follows:
"If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court may
dismiss the original complaint or information and order the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the
defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy,
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial."
Under this provision, it was proper for the court to dismiss the
first information and order the filing of a new one for the
reason that the proper offense was not charged in the former
and the latter did not place the accused in a second jeopardy
for the same or identical offense.
"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment f or
the same same offense," according to Article III, section 1 (20)
of our Constitution. The rule of "double jeopardy" had a
settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution
was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged with
an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or
identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of
reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of
the civil law non bis in idem, in the common law of England,
and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead
of having specific origin it simply always existed. It found
expression in the Spanish law and in the Constitution of the
United States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as
one of the fundamental rights of the citizens.
- It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitutional
inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense,
the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution,
that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same
offense, under the general rule, has always been construed
to mean not only that the second offense charged is
exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
information, but also that the two offenses are identical.
There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence
to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. This so called "same
evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was
restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate
form.
- Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not
only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first,
but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information.
- This rule of identity does not apply, however, when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the first
prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be
convicted for an offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where
the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide
against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.
This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Philippine case.
- Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries
and after conviction the injured person dies, the charge for
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy.
- an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be
necessarily included in another offense, f or the purpose of
determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both
offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first
prosecution, for otherwise, if the second offense was then
inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first
prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the
same cannot constitute second jeopardy. By the very nature of
things there can be no double jeopardy under such
circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to
recognize the existence of a condition where such condition in
reality does not exist. General terms of a statute or regulation
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always,
therefore, be presumed that exceptions have been intended to
their language, which would avoid results of this character.
- For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in
People vs. Tarok, as followed in People vs. Villasis, such
ruling is not only contrary to the real meaning of "double
jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution and by the Rules of
Court but is also obnoxious to the administration of justice. If,
in obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting officer
files an information within six hours after the accused is
arrested, and the accused claiming his constitutional right to a
speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on a new fact
supervenes which, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok ruling, no
way is open by which the accused may be penalized in
proportion to the enormity of his guilt. Furthermore, such a
ruling may open the way to suspicions or charges of collusion
between the prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave
detriment of public interest and confidence in the
administration of justice, which cannot happen under the Diaz
ruling.
PEOPLE v. BULING
F: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte, Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, presiding, finding the
accused Buenaventura Buling guilty of serious physical injuries
and sentencing him to imprisonment of four months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year of prisin
correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended
party.
- The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on
December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay
damages to the offended party in the sum of P20.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On the same
day he began to serve his sentence and has fully served the
same.
-1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace
Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious
physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining
witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint would
"require medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days
and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the
performance of his customary labors for the same period of
time."
- The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on
December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay
damages to the offended party in the sum of P20.00, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
- On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully
served the same.
- However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period
estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal
filed an information against the accused before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical
injuries.
- The information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the
accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and
incapacitated him for a period of from 112 months to 212
months. After trial the accused was found guilty of serious
physical injuries and sentenced in the manner indicated in the
first paragraph hereof. This is the decision now sought to be
set aside and reversed in this appeal.
I: W/N the prosecution and conviction of Buling for less
serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for
serious physical injuries.
H:
Melo case: Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where
after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the
defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense," the accused cannot be
said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense."
- In other words, has a new fact supervened, like death in the
case of Melo vs. People, which changes the character of the
offense into one which was not in existence at the time the case
for less serious physical injuries was filed?
- We do not believe that a new fact supervened, or
that a new fact has come into existence. What
happened is that the first physician that examined the wounds
of the offended party certified on December 10, 1956 that the
injury was as follows:
"wound, incised, wrist lateral, right, 34 inch long, sutured"
and that the same would take from 10 to 15 days to heal
and incapacitated (the wounded man) for the same period
of time from his usual work.
- It was on the basis of this certificate that on December 8,
1956, defendantappellant was found guilty of less serious
physical injuries and sentenced to imprisonment of 1 month
and 1 day of arresto mayor, etc.
- But on January 18, 1957, another physician examined the
offended party, taking an Xray picture of the arm of the
offended party which had been wounded. The examination
discloses, according to the physician, the following injuries:
"Old stab wound 4 inches long. With infection, distal end
arm, right. Xray plate finding after one month and 12
daysFracture old oblique, incomplete distal end, radius
right, with slight calus."
- And the certification is to the effect that treatment will take
from 112 months to 212 months barring complications.
- Counsel for the appellant claims that no fact had supervened
in the case at bar, as a result of which another offense had
been committed.
It is argued that the injury and the condition thereof was the
same when the first examination was made on December 10,
1956, as when the examination was made on January 18,
1957, and that if any new fact had been disclosed in the latter
examination failure of this new fact to be disclosed in the
previous examination may be attributed to the incompetence
on the part of the examining physician.
- We find much reason in this argument. What happened is no
Xray examination of the wounded hand was made during the
first examination, which was merely superficial. The physician
who made the first examination could not have seen the
fracture at the distal end of the right arm, and this could only
be apparent or visible by Xray photography.
- People v. Manolong which also has similar facts: The course
(not the length) of the healing of an injury may not be
determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after
the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the
court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring
since the filing of the original information.
- But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the
Xray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on
January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the
first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is,
therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to
have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action,
which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by
us in the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong,
supra. We attribute the new finding of fracture, which
evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the
very superficial and inconclusive examination made on
December 10, 1956. Had an Xray examination taken at the
time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The
wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at
the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by
the very superficial examination then made. As we have stated,
we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which
justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs.
People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are
constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy.
- We take this opportunity to invite the attention of the
prosecuting officers that before filing informations for physical
injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the
injuries should first be made to avoid instances, like the
present, where by reason of the important Constitutional
provision of double jeopardy, the accused can not be held to
answer for the graver offense committed.
-DISPOSITIVE: The decision appealed from is hereby
reversed. The judgment of conviction is set aside and the
defendant-appellant acquitted of the charge of serious physical
injuries.
PEOPLE v. TIOZON
F: That on or about the 24th day of February 1989 in
Kalookan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any
lawful motive or purpose, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one .38 cal. revolver, marked Squires Bingham with
SN 180169 with three live ammunitions without authority of
law, which firearm was used with treachery and evident
premeditation in shooting one Leonardo Bolima, which
caused death.
- While she and her husband were sleeping inside their house,
they were awakened by the loud knocks on their door; Her
husband opened the door and they saw that the person who
was knocking was their "Pareng Troping", accused herein; her
husband invited the accused, who appeared to be very drunk,
to come inside their house; once inside their house, accused sat
down and the two (accused and victim) exchanged
pleasantries; she even saw the accused showing a gun to her
husband and the latter even toyed with it; she got irritated by
her husband's playing with the gun, so she took a few steps
away from the two, however, when she looked back to the
place where her husband and the accused was, she found out
that the two had already left; five minutes later and/or after
she had heard two successive gunshots, she heard accused
knocking at their door and at the same time informing her that
he accidentally shoot (sic) her husband, "Mare, mare, nabaril
ko si Pare, hindi ko sinasadya" she got scared by the
appearance of the accused who was full of bloodstains so she
pushed him away from her; she immediately went to her sister-
in-law Marilyn Bolima and both of them proceeded to the
house of the accused; thereat, they saw the victim lying with
his face up; she took her husband's pulse and when she still felt
some warmth on his body, she sought help that her husband
be brought to the hospital; accused extended his help by
helping them in carrying the victim towards the main road,
however, after a few steps, he changed his mind and put down
the victim; accused reasoned out that the victim was already
dead; she pushed the accused and even without the latter's
help, they were able to reach the main road; afterwhich, some
of her neighbors arrived bringing with them lights; thereafter,
Kalookan policemen arrived and so she caused the arrest of
the accused; she spent about P100,000.00 in connection with
burial and wake of her husband.
- Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned on 15
March 1989. Pre-trial was conducted and thereafter the trial
court received the evidence for the parties. In a decision
promulgated on 30 June 1989, the court a quo found accused-
appellant guilty.
I: W/N being penalized for homicide and also for the
possession of an unlicensed firearm is considered double
jeopardy
H: NO.
- It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the
offense penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance
which increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that
the homicide or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise,
an anomalous absurdity results whereby a more serious crime
defined and penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed
by a statutory offense, which is just a malum prohibitum.
The rationale for the qualification, as implied from the
exordium of the decree, is to effectively deter violations of the
laws on firearms and to stop the "upsurge of crimes vitally
affecting public order and safety due to the proliferation of
illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, . . . " In fine
then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed
firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation
of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article
248 (Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal
Code. The accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or,
stated otherwise, the rule against double jeopardy cannot be
invoked because the first is punished by a special law while the
second, homicide or murder, is punished by the Revised Penal
Code.
- In People vs. Domiguez:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy
may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses.
A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct
and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires
proof of an additional fact or element which the other does
not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the
other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of
the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of
them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the
other.
- Since the informations were for separate offense the first
against a person and the second against public peace and
order one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the
rule on double jeopardy.
However, to justify the imposition of the increased penalty
under Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 because of the resulting
crime of homicide or murder, the prosecution must allege in
the information and prove by the quantum of evidence
required for conviction violation of said section and, more
specifically, the use of an unlicensed firearm and the
commission of homicide or murder. In this regard, the
information in this case is sufficient in form and substance. It
alleges illegal possession of a firearm and of murder, The latter
is covered by the clause "which firearm was used with
treachery and evident premeditation in shooting one
Leonardo Bolima y Mesia, which caused his death.
- We agree with the findings and conclusion of the court a
quo that more than one circumstantial evidence were duly
proved and that these circumstances point, beyond reasonable
doubt, to the accused-appellant as the one who shot and killed
the deceased Leonardo Bolima y Mesia. For circumstantial
evidence to be sufficient to convict an accused, it is necessary
that the following requisites must be satisfied:
(a) there must be more than one circumstance,
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven,
and
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction
based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute "an unbroken chain which
leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which points to the
defendant, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person,15
i.e., the circumstances proved must be consistent with each
other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis
except that of guilty.16
- Although the fact of death of the victim is undisputed, still the
presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
evident premeditation being alleged in the Information, must
be proven like the crime itself.
To properly appreciate evident premeditation it is necessary to
establish with proof, as clear as the evidence of the crime itself:
(1) the time when the offender determined to commit
the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had
clung to his determination; and
(3) a sufficient lapse of time to reflect upon the
consequence of his act.
- Although alleged in the Information, the record of this case is
bereft of any indication that evident premeditation attended
the killing of the victim.
- However, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is
appreciated in this case since its presence could be established
by the position/location of the wound of the victim, that is at
the back portion of his torso, which necessarily imply that he
was treacherously shot by his assailant.
PEOPLE v. RELOVA
F: The People of the Philippines seek to set aside the orders of
the respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266, dated 12 August 1976
and 8 November 1976, respectively, quashing an information
for theft filed against private respondent Manuel Opulencia on
the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
- Members of the Batangas City Police together' with
personnel of the Batangas Electric Light System, equipped
with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas City,
searched and examined the premises of the Opulencia
Carpena Ice Plant and Cold Storage owned and operated by
the private respondent Manuel Opulencia. The police
discovered that electric wiring, devices and contraptions had
been installed, without the necessary authority from the city
government, and "architecturally concealed inside the walls of
the building"1 owned by the private respondent. These electric
devices and contraptions were, in the allegation of the
petitioner "designed purposely to lower or decrease the
readings of electric current consumption in the electric meter
of the said electric [ice and cold storage] plant."
- During the subsequent investigation, Manuel Opulencia
admitted in a written statement that he had caused the
installation of the electrical devices "in order 3 to lower or
decrease the readings of his electric meter."
- The accused Manuel Opulencia pleaded not guilty to the
above information. On 2 February 1976, he filed a motion to
dismiss the information upon the grounds that the crime there
charged had already prescribed and that the civil indemnity
there sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the
Batangas City Court to award. In an order dated 6 April 1976,
the Batangas City Court granted the motion to dismiss on the
ground of prescription, it appearing that the offense charged
was a light felony which prescribes two months from the time
of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the
information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after
discovery of the offense charged in February 1975.
Fourteen (14) days later, on 20 April 1976, the Acting City
Fiscal of Batangas City filed before the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, Branch II, another information against Manuel
Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article
308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised
Penal Code.
I: W/N the dismissal of the first case can be properly pleaded
by the accused in the motion to quash
H:
- The first case, as it appears, was not simply one of illegal
electrical connections. It also covered an amount of
P41,062.16 which the accused, in effect, allegedly with intent
to defraud, deprived the city government of Batangas. If the
charge had meant illegal electric installations only, it could
have alleged illegal connections which were done at one
instance on a particular date between November, 1974, to
February 21, 1975. But as the information states "that from
November, 1974 to February 1975 at Batangas City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to defraud
the City Government of Batangas, without proper
authorization from any lawful and/or permit from the proper
authorities, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make unauthorized installations of electric
wirings and devices, etc." (italics supplied), it was meant to
include the P41,062.16 which the accused had, in effect,
defrauded the city government. The information could not
have meant that from November 1974 to 21 February 1975,
he had daily committed unlawful installations.
- The basic premise of the petitioner's position is that the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is protection
against a second or later jeopardy of conviction for the same
offense. The petitioner stresses that the first information filed
before the City Court of Batangas City was one for unlawful or
unauthorized installation of electrical wiring and devices, acts
which were in violation of an ordinance of the City
Government of Batangas. Only two elements are needed to
constitute an offense under this City Ordinance: (1) that there
was such an installation; and (2) no authority therefor had
been obtained from the Superintendent of the Batangas City
Electrical System or the District Engineer.
- The petitioner also alleges, correctly, in our view, that theft of
electricity can be effected even without illegal or unauthorized
installations of any kind by, for instance, any of the following
means:
" 1. Turning back the dials of the electric meter;
2. Fixing the electric meter in such a manner that it will not
register the actual electrical consumption;
3. Underreading of electrical consumption; and
- The petitioner concludes that:
'The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of
Batangas City] is not the same as theft of electricity [under
the Revised Penal Code]; that the second offense is not an
attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that
the second offense is not necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information. "
- The above arguments made by the petitioner are of
course correct.
- The basic difficulty with the petitioner's position is that it
must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of
Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the
second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of
Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional
protection against double jeopardy is not available where the
second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the
offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both
the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act
or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies
an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional
protection, against double jeopardy is available although the
prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the
offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as
the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring
from the same act or set of acts.
- Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double
jeopardy. The first sentence of clause 20, section 1, Article III
of the Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." (Emphasis in
the original) The second sentence of said clause provides that
"if an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act." Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense, whereas the second contemplates double
jeopardy of punishment for the same act Under the first
sentence, one may be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged
with different offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in, or does not include, the crime
charged in the other case. The second sentence applies,
even if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to
the fact that one constitutes a violation of an ordinance
and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges
are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar
a prosecution under the other.
- Incidentally, such conviction or acquittal is not indispensable
to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of
the informations charging said offense, the defense may be
availed of in the other case involving the same offense, even if
there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.
- Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are
penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by
different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity
of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown to
exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged.
- In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal
ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical
inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said
to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to - By the same token, acts of a person which physically occur on
the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double the same occasion and are infused by a common intent or
jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or design or negligence and therefore form a moral unity, should
have given rise to the first of fense under a municipal not be segmented and sliced, as it were, to produce as many
ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise different acts as there are offenses under municipal ordinances
to the offense charged under a statute. or statutes that an enterprising prosecutor can find.
- The two offenses would never constitute the same offense - It remains to point out that the dismissal by the Batangas
having been promulgated by different rulemaking City Court of the inf ormation f or violation of the Batangas
authoritiesthough one be subordinate to the otherand the City Ordinance upon the ground that such offense had already
plea of double jeopardy would never lie. prescribed, amounts to an acquittal of the accused of that
- The question of identity or lack of identity of offenses is offense. Under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code,
addressed by examining the essential elements of each of the "prescription of the crime" is one of the grounds for "total
two offenses charged, as such elements are set out in the extinction of criminal liability." Under the Rules of Court, an
respective legislative definitions of the offenses involved. The order sustaining a motion to quash based on prescription is a
question of identity of the acts which are claimed to have bar to another prosecution for the same offense.
generated liability both under a municipal ordinance and a - The civil liability aspects of this case are another matter.
national statute must be addressed, in the first instance, by Because no reservation of the right to file a separate civil
examining the location of such acts in time and space. When action was made by the Batangas City electric light system, the
the acts of the accused as set out in the two informations are so civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
related to each other in time and space as to be reasonably charged was impliedly instituted with the criminal action both
regarded as having taken place on the same occasion and before the City Court of Batangas City and the Court of First
where those acts have been moved by one and the same, or a Instance of Batangas. The extinction of criminal liability
continuing, intent or voluntary design or negligence, such acts whether by prescription or by the bar of double jeopardy
may be appropriately characterized as an integral whole does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability
capable of giving rise to penal liability simultaneously under arising from the offense charged. In the present case, as we
different legal enactments (a municipal ordinance and a noted earlier,16 accused Manuel Opulencia freely admitted
national statute). during the police investigation having stolen electric current
- In the instant case, the relevant acts took place within the through the installation and use of unauthorized electrical
same time frame: from November 1974 to February 1975. connections or devices. While the accused pleaded not guilty
During this period, the accused Manuel Opulencia installed or before the City Court of Batangas City, he did not deny
permitted the installation of electrical wiring and devices in his having appropriated electric power.
ice plant without obtaining the necessary permit or
authorization from the municipal authorities. The accused
conceded that he effected or permitted such unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of reducing his electric power
bill. This corrupt intent was thus present from the very
moment that such unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was
the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant
without the corresponding recording thereof in his electric
meter. In other words, the "taking" of electric current was
integral with the unauthorized installation of electric wiring
and devices.
- It is perhaps important to note that the rule limiting the
constitutional protection against double jeopardy to a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense is not to be
understood with absolute literalness. The identity of offenses
that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where
the second offense necessarily includes the first offense or is
necessarily included in such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof.
- Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be
available, not all the technical elements constituting the first
offense need be present in the technical definition of the
second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of
an accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which
though different from one another are nonetheless each
constituted by a common set or overlapping sets of technical
elements.