ALFREDO M. ALMEDA, LEONARDO M. ALMEDA and ERNESTO M.

ALMEDA,petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE

PHILIPPINES,represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, respondents.G.R. No. 85322. April
30, 1991.*

FACTS:
The case involves a parcel of land with an area of 1,208 square meters located in BarrioPampangin, Pateros, Rizal,
and described in Survey Plan Psu-128539. It was originally owned
and possessed by EmilianoAlmeda, father of the petitioners, by virtue of an Escritura
deParticion Extrajudicial executed on June 15, 1935, between him and his brother Adriano,
wherein they attested the fact that the land in question was inherited from their parents,VedastoAlmeda and Josefa
C. Concepcion, who had inherited the same from their own parents(great-
grandparents of herein petitioners). After Emilianos death on May 1, 1948, his wife, Ana
Menguito, and their children received the produce of the land and rented out to third persons
portions of the property where Emiliano had three houses built. Upon Anas death on April 3,
1950, her children with Emiliano inherited the property and the lessees moved out. On June 9,1980, the brothers
Alfredo, Leonardo and Ernesto executed an extrajudicial partitionadjudicating the land to themselves. The Almeda
brothers applied for the registration of the landin the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch CLVI.

ISSUE:
Whet
her or not applicants possession of the disputed land prior to January 3, 1968 was
valid for purposes of a grant under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.

RULING:
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the private respondents had notqualified for a grant under Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act because their possession of theland while it was still inalienable forest land, or before
it was declared alienable and disposableland of the public domain on January 13, 1968, could not ripen into private
ownership, andshould be excluded from the computation of the 30-year open and continuous possession
inconcept of owner required under Section 48(b) of Com. Act 141. It accords with our ruling inDirector of Lands
vs. Court of Appeals, Ibarra Bishar, et al., 178 SCRA 708, that:
Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules onconfirmation of
imperfect
title do not apply.
The petition for review is denied for lack of merit
DIRECTOR OF LANDS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Petitioners-public officials, through the Solicitor General, seek a review of the Decision and
Resolution of the then Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the former Court of First
Instance of Bulacan,Branch III, decreeing registration of a parcel of land in private respondents'
favor. The land in question,Identified as Lot 2347, Cad-302-D, Case 3, Obando Cadastre, under
Plan Ap-03-000535, is situated inObando, Bulacan, and has an area of approximately 9.3
hectares. It adjoins the Kailogan River and privaterespondents have converted it into a fishpond.
In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976,private respondents (Applicants, for
brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the landapplied for partly through
inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not withinany forest zone or
military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names.The
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest
Developmentopposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within
the unclassified regionof Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and
that areas within the unclassifiedregion are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of
the disposable and alienable portion of thepublic domain. After hearing, the Trial Court ordered
registration of the subject land in favor of theApplicants. This was affirmed on appeal by
respondent Appellate Court, which found that "throughindubitable evidence (Applicants) and
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of the subject parcel of land under a bona fide claim of ownership for more than 30
years prior to the filing of the application" and are, therefore, entitled toregistration.

Issue:

Whether or not the areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do
notform part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain.

Held: In effect, what the Courts

a quo
have done is to release the subject property from the unclassifiedcategory, which is beyond their
competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an

exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In
theabsence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released
therefrom andrendered open to disposition.
3
This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is alsoin consonance with the
Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State,
4
and thatthe State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony.

The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling
of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable.
Applicants'remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. The appealed
Decision isreversed and the application for registration in Land Registration Case No. N299-V-
76 of the formerCourt of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch III, is hereby dismissed, without
prejudice to the availment bythe applicants of the proper administrative remedy.
Director of Forestry v. Villareal
[G.R. No. L-32266. February 27, 1989.]En Banc, Cruz (J): 13 concur, 1 took no part.

Facts:
Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on 25 January 1949, a land consisting of 178,113 sq.
m. of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of Sapian, Capiz, alleging that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than 40 years. He was
opposed by several persons,including the Director of Forestry on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines. After trial, the applicationwas approved by the CFI Capiz. The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The Director of Forestry then came to the Supreme Court in a
petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private appropriation?

HELD:

The Supreme Court set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the application
forregistration of title of Villareal,
DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD
&VENEER CO. INC., ETC.

FACTS:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
AppellateCourt affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered
registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481,
390 square meters, more orless, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the
Dumagat tribe. The Director of Landstakes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to thematter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the
registration proceedings have been commenced onlyon July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973
Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctlyapplicable law; and since section 11 of
its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations fromholding alienable lands of the
public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibitionnot found in the 1935
Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands inquestion from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48,paragraphs (b)
and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1935 Constitution is applicable as the sale of the disputed land took place
onOctober 29, 1962.

Held:

When the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor
isdeemed to have acquired,
by operation of law
, a right to a grant, a government grant, without thenecessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain andbeyond the authority of the Director of
Lands to dispose of.
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent
.

Even on the proposition that theland remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors,until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act,there can be no serious question of Acmes
right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being

nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that
type of so-called"incomplete" or "imperfect" title.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, thatthe majority ruling in
Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent.

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation asamended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as naturalpersons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired byconclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the hereincorporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) andgranting the applications for confirmation of title to
the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.There is also nothing to prevent Acme from
reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter fromthemselves applying for confirmation of
title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,deeding the lands back to Acme.
There being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of theIntermediate Appellate Court, the
same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance

Lee Hong Hok vs David

G.R. No. L-30389, Dec. 27, 1972
FACTS:This is regarding a piece of land which Aniano David acquired lawful title thereto,
pursuant to hismiscellaneous sales application. After approval of his application, the Director of
Lands issued an orderof award and issuance of sales patent, covering said lot by virtue of which
the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent.
The Register of Deeds thenissued an original certificate of title to David. During all this time,
Lee Hong Kok did not oppose nor fileany adverse claim.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lee Hong Kok may question the government grant

HELD: Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands or the Secretary of
Agriculture andNatural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title issued
pursuant to a void patent.This was not done by said officers but by private parties like the
plaintiffs, who cannot claim that thepatent and title issued for the land involved are void since
they are not the registered owners thereof norhad they been declared as owners in the cadastral
proceedings after claiming it as their private property.The fact that the grant was made by the
government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformitywith the law or not is a question
which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the governmentand set aside, the
defendant cannot question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the granteeand the
government. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its
resolutionof March 14, 1969 are affirmed.

Ramirez v. Vda. De RamirezG.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

Facts:

The deceased was survived by his spouse, 2 grandnephews, and his companion. The
administratorsubmitted a partition to the court which divided the estate into 2: one-half would go
to the widow insatisfaction of her legitime; the other half, which is the free portion, would go to
the grandnephews;however, 1/3 of the free portion is charged with the widows usufruct and the
remaining 2/3 with a usufruct in favor of the companion.The grandnephews opposed the
substitution on the ground that the 1st heirs are not related to thesubstitutes within the 1st degree.

Issue:

Whether the fideicommissary substitution is valid if the substitutes are related to the
companionwithin one degree.

Decision:
SC ruled that the fideicommissary substitution is void. The substitutes (grandnephews) are
notrelated to the companion within one degree. In
effect, the SC ruled that one degree means onegeneration and not one designation. So,
it follows
that the fideicommissary can only be either a childor a parent of the 1st
heir
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 8, 2011

(GR # 57667, May 28, 1990) (Law on Natural Resources, Tax Declaration and Receipts)

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioner San Miguel Corporation who
purchased Lot 684 from Silverio Perez, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals
denying its application for registration of the said land in view of its failure to show entitlement
thereto.

The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending that the land in question
is part of public domain and that petitioner being a private corporation is disqualified from
holding alienable lands of the public domain. In this case, petitioner claims that its predecessor-
in-interest had open, exclusive and undisputed possession of the land in question based on
documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts, and testimonial evidence of vendor
Silverio Perez.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is sufficient to warrant a ruling
that petitioner and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable right over Lot 684.

HELD: No, documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land but mere indicia of a claim of ownership.
They only become strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession. Also, the testimony of vendor Silverio Perez as proof
of actual possession is weak and was not corroborated by other witnesses.
SANTA ROSA MINING COMPANY VS. JOSE LEIDO, JR., digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # L-49109 December 1, 1987 (Law on Natural Resources)

FACTS: Presidential Decree No.1214 was issued requiring holders of subsisting and valid
patentable mining claims located under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to file a
mining lease of application within one (1) year from the approval of the Decree. To protect its
rights, petitioner Santa Rosa Mining Company files a special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition confronting the said Decree as unconstitutional in that it amounts to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. Subsequently, three (3) days after, petitioner filed a mining
lease application, but under protest, with a reservation that it is not waiving its rights over its
mining claims until the validity of the Decree shall have been passed upon by the Court.

The respondents allege that petitioner has no standing to file the instant petition and question the
Decree as it failed to fully exhaust administrative remedies.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional.

HELD: Yes, Presidential Decree No. 1214 is constitutional, even assuming arguendo that
petitioners was not bound to exhaust administrative remedies for its mining claims to be valid in
the outset. It is a valid exercise of the sovereign power of the State, as owner, over the lands of
the public domain, of which petitioners mining claims still form a part. Moreover, Presidential
Decree No. 1214 is in accord with Sec. 8, Art XIV of the 1937 Constitution.
CHEESMAN V IAC 193 SCRA 93G.R. No. 74833 January 21, 1991
FACTS: This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman)
to annul

for lack of consent on his part

the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot andbuilding to Estelita Padilla
December 4, 1970
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda Cheesman were married but have been separatedsince February
15, 1981
June 4, 1974
a Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights was executed by Armando Altares,convey
ing a parcel of land in favor of Criselda Cheesman, married to Thomas Cheesman. Thomas,
although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made only to his wife. Tax
declarationsfor the said property were issued in the name of Criselda Cheesman alone and she
assumed exclusivemanagement and administration of the property

July 1, 1981

Criselda sold the property to Estelita Padilla without knowledge and consent of Thomas
July 31, 1981
Thomas filed a suit for the annulment of the sale on the ground that the transaction hadbeen
executed without his knowledge and consent. Criselda filed an answer alleging that the property
soldwas paraphernal, having purchased the property from her own money; that Thomas, an
American wasdisqualified to have any interest or right of ownership in the land and; that Estelita
was a buyer in goodfaith
During the trial, it was found out that the transfer of property took
place during the existence of theirmarriage as it was acquired on June 4, 1974
June 24
, 1982

RTC declared the sale executed by Criselda void ab initio and ordered the delivery of the
property to Thomas as administrator of the conjugal property
Thomas appealed to IAC where he assailed the granting of Estelitas petition for relief and res
olution of matters not subject of said petition; in declaring valid the sale to Estelita without his
knowledge andconsent. On January 7, 1986, IAC affirmed summary judgment decisionISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can dispose of the property in question; Whether or not Cheesman,
beingan American citizen, can question the sale HELD: Section 14, Art. XIV of 1973
Constitution provides
that: save in cases of
hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed except toindividuals,
corpora
tions, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Thus,assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be purchased by him and his wife,
he acquiredno right whatsoever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right orinterest in land, he was knowingly violating the Constitution.As such, the sale
to him was null and void. At any rate, Cheesman had and has NO CAPACITY TOQUESTION
THE SUBSEQUENTSALE OF THE SAME PROPERTY BY HIS WIFE ON THETHEORY
THAT IN SO DOING HEIS MERELY EXERCISING THE PREROGATIVE OF AHUSBAND
IN RESPECT OFCONJUGAL PROPERTY. To sustain such a theory would permit
indirectcontroversion of the Constitutional prohibition

If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantialinterest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer
or disposition. This isa right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.Even if the wife
did use conjugal funds to make the acquisition, his recovering and holding the propertycannot be
warranted as it is against the constitution. Consequently, Estelita is a purchaser in good faithsince
she knew that Thomas cannot intervene in the sale or disposition of the said
property.DECISION: The Court AFFIRMED the appealed decision.

Director of Lands vs. Kalahi Investments Inc.

Facts:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
of Pampanga, denying the application of Kalahi Investments, Inc. (Kalahi, for short) for
registration of LotNo. 1851-B of the Floridablanca Cadastre. In its decision, the Court of Appeals
found the following factsto be established by the evidence: On December 12, 1963, Kalahi
Investment, Inc. moved for an advancedhearing of Lot No. 1851-B, Floridablanca Cadastre.
Evidence was presented and Kalahi's title was to beregistered under the provisions of Act 496.
The Bureau of Forestry's opposition is based on the groundthat these lands are part of the vast
public forest, known as TIMBER LAND of Project No. 11, Exhibit 4,Director of Forestry. Until
now these lands are not released by the proper authorities as alienable agricultural lands; instead
on August 9, 1966, the President of the Philippines issued Proclamation No. 82,declaring these
lands as part of the Mt. Dorst Forest Reserve.

Issue:

a. Whether or not mining claims, acquired, registered, perfected acted, and patentable under the
OldMining Law, mature to private ownership which would entitle the claimant-applicant to the
ownershipthereof.

b. Which agency has the authority to examine, process and find out whether or not the
requirements of theAct of Congress of 1902 have been complied with, by the applicant

the courts or the Bureau of Mines?

HELD:
Mere
location does not mean absolute ownership over the affected land or the located claim. Itmerely
segregates the located land or area from the public domain by barring other would be
locatorsfrom locating the same and appropriating for themselves the minerals found therein. To
rule otherwisewould imply that location is all that is needed to acquire and maintain rights over a
located mining claim.This, the Court cannot approve or sanction because it is contrary to the
intention of the lawmaker that thelocator should
faithfully and consistently
comply with the requirements for annual work andimprovements in the located mining claims. It
is not clear if claimant Kalahi has fully complied with therequirements of the Act of Congress of
1902. This is a factual issue which is not within the scope of our jurisdiction. The records show
that claimant has already filed a mining lease application (p. 357, Recordon Appeal). Its mining
claims, therefore, are deemed covered by P.D. 1214, and the Bureau of Minesmay, accordingly
process the same as a lease application, in accordance with P.D. 463, pursuant to Sec. 2of P.D.
No. 1214. It is understood of course that prior to the approval of the lease application,
theapplicant must show that it has fully and faithfully complied with the requirements of the
Philippine Billof 1902, in effect upholding the dissenting opinion of Justice Concepcion in the
Gold Creek Mining case.As to whether or not the Bureau of Mines is likewise qualified to rule
on whether there has been full andfaithful compliance with the requirements of the Philippine
Bill of 1902 as amended, the Court ruled thatthe Bureau of Mines is so empowered as a corollary
function in the processing of mining leaseapplications. The decision of the CFI of Pampanga,
(now Regional Trial Court) is hereby AFFIRMED,with the MODIFICATION in that Kalahi's
mining claims may be processed as a mining lease applicationby the Bureau of Mines

DIRECTOR OF LANDS VS. AQUINO 192 SCRA 296

FACTS:
The center of controversy for the review of petition is a limestone-rich 70-hectare land in Bucay,
Abra 66hectares of which are, according to petitioners, within the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve.Privaterespondent Abra Industrial Corporation (AIC for brevity), a duly registered
corporation established for thepurpose of setting up a cement factory, claims on the other hand,
to be the owner in fee simple of thewhole 70-hectare area indicated in survey plans PSU-217518,
PSU-217519 and PSU-217520 with a totalassessed value of P6,724.48. Thus, on September 23,
1965, it filed in the then Court of First Instance of Abra an application for registration in its name
of said parcels of land under the Land Registration Act or,in the alternative, under Sec. 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 1 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942inasmuch as its
predecessors-in-interest had allegedly been in possession thereof since July 26, 1894.
Therequisite publication and posting of notice having been complied with, the application was
set for hearing.Except for the Director of Lands, nobody appeared to oppose the application.
Hence, the court issued anorder of default against the whole world except the Director of
Lands.After the applicant had rested itscase, the provincial fiscal, appearing for the Director of
Lands, submitted evidence supporting theopposition filed by the Solicitor General to the effect
that AIC had no registerable title and that the highlymineralized parcels of land applied for were
within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve which had notyet been released as alienable and
disposable land pursuant to the Public Land Law.

On July 22, 1966, thelower court 3 favorably acted on the application and ordered the
registration of the parcels of land underthe Land Registration Act. Then the Director of Lands
filed a motion for reconsideration. AIC havingfiled its opposition to the motion for
reconsideration, the lower court denied it on September 28, 1967holding that the grounds raised
therein were relevant and proper only if the Bureau of Forestry and theBureau of Mines were
parties to the case. AIC filed a motion to dismiss the instant petition on thegrounds that it raises
"unsubstantial" issues and that it was filed out of time. The motion was denied bythe Court 13
but it bears pointing out that AIC's second ground for dismissal, which is premised on
itsperception that a motion for reconsideration of the order of November 27, 1969 is necessary
before thefiling of the instant petition, is incorrect.

A motion for new trial or reconsideration is not a prerequisite toan appeal, petition for review or
a petition for review on
Certiorari
. Petitioners herein contend that thelower court erred in granting the application for registration
of the parcels of land notwithstanding itsfinding that they are within the forest zone. They also
argued that the lower court erred in denying thepetition for review based on actual fraud because
under Section 38 of Act No. 496, a decree of registration may be reviewed not only by reason of
actual fraud but also for a fatal infirmity of thedecision upon which the decree is based, provided
no innocent purchaser for value will be prejudiced.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower court erred in
granting the application for registration of the parcels of land notwithstanding its finding that
they are within the forest zone.

Held:

The Court found the petition to be meritorious. They reiterated the rule enunciated by this Court
inDirector of Forestry vs. Muoz 18 and consistently adhered to in a long line of cases 19 the
more recentof which is Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 20 that forest lands or forest reserves are
incapable of privateappropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them
into private properties. Thisruling is premised on the Regalian doctrine enshrined not only in the
1935 and 1973 Constitutions butalso in the 1987 Constitution Article XIII of which provides
that:

"Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal . . . , forests or timber, . . . and
other naturalresources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other
natural resources shallnot be alienated."The petitioners therefore validly insisted on the review of
the decision ordering the issuance of the decreeof registration in view of its patent
infirmity.DECISION:

The order of November 27, 1969 denying the petition for review under Section 38 of ActNo. 496
and the decision of July 22, 1966 insofar as it orders the registration of land within the
CentralCordillera Forest Reserve is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary
restraining orderissued on April 7, 1970 is hereby made permanent.

Ayog et.al. vs. Cusi

Facts:
On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after bidding, awarded to Bian Development Co.,
Inc. onthe basis of its 1951 Sales Application No. V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at
Barrio Tamugan,Guianga (Baguio District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty
hectares. Some occupantsof the lot protested against the sale. The Director found that the
protestants (defendants in the 1961ejectment suit, some of whom are now petitioners herein)
entered the land only after it was awarded to thecorporation and, therefore, they could not be
regarded as
bona fide
occupants thereof. The Directorcharacterized them as squatters. He issued a writ of execution but
the protestants defied the writ andrefused to vacate the land. Because the alleged occupants
refused to vacate the land, the corporation filedagainst them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, anejectment suit (
accion publiciana
). The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for theSecretary of Natural
Resources, recommending approval of the sales patent, pointed out that the purchasercorporation
had complied with the said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution, thatthe
land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance of the patent was
inconformity with the guidelines prescribed in Opinion No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of
JusticeVicente Abad Santos and was an exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of
theConstitution and the Secretary of Natural resources approved the patent. Before the patent
was issued,there was a trial, and 15 of the defendants testified that they entered the disputed land
long before 1951and that they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees.
However the court did not givecredence to their testimonies. They found out that the plantings on
the land could not be more than tenyears old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when
the sales award was made. Hence, the trialcourt ordered the defendants to vacate the land and to
restore the possession thereof to tile company. Afterthe record was remanded to the trial court,
the corporation filed a motion for execution. The defendants,some of whom are now petitioners
herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of theConstitution, which took
effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening fact which rendered it legallyimpossible to
execute the lower court's judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition,
alreadymentioned, that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domainexcept by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area." The lower court
suspended action on themotion for execution because of the manifestation of the defendants that
they would file a petition forprohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the instant
prohibition action was filed.

Issue:

Whether or not the application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution (disqualifying
aprivate corporation from purchasing public lands) to a
1953
sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, forwhich a sales patent and Torrens title were issued
in
1975
, and to the
1964
decision of the trial court
jecting some of the petitioners from the land purchased, which decision was
affirmed in 1975 by theCourt of Appeals.

Held:

Some of the petitioners were not defendants in the ejectment case. The
Court held that the saidconstitutional prohibition has no retroactive
application to the sales application of Bian DevelopmentCo., Inc. because it
had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the
1973Constitution took effect. That vested right has to be respected. lt could
not be abrogated by the newConstitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchasepublic agricultural lands
not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners'
prohibitionaction is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional
law. As they cannot review the factualfindings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, they cannot entertain petitioners' contention that manyof them
by themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed
portions of land evenbefore the war. They should have filed homestead or
free patent applications. Their jurisdiction is limitedto the resolution of the
legal issue as to whether the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to
theimplementation of the trial court's 1964 final and executory judgment
ejecting the petitioners. On thatissue, we have no choice but to sustain its
enforceability. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit but withthe clarification
that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those petitioners herein
who were notdefendants in the ejectment case, Civil Case No. 3711, and
over whom the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction. The contempt
proceeding is also dismissed.
Oh Cho vs. Director of LandsG.R. No. 48321, August 31, 1946

FACTS:
Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a parcel of land in Tayabas, which
theyopenly, continuously and adversely possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho
applied forregistration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed on the ground that Oh Cho
lacked title to said landand also because he was an alien.
ISSUEs:

Whether or not Oh Cho had title

Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration

HELD:
Oh Cho failed to show that he has title to the lot, which may be confirmed under the Land
RegistrationAct.All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to thepublic domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have
been in the possession of anoccupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial,
for such possession would justify thepresumption that the land had never been part of the public
domain or that it had been a private propertyeven before the Spanish conquest. The applicant
does not come under the exception, for the earliestpossession of the lot by his first predecessor in
interest began in 1880.Under the Public Land Act, Oh Chois not entitled to a decree of
registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from acquiring landsof the public
domain.Oh Cho's predecessors in interest would have been entitled toa decree of registrationhad
they applied for the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition
precedent,which was not complied with by the Lagmeos. Hence, the most they had was mere
possessory right, nottitle. This possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since
the latter is an alien, thepossessory right could never ripen to ownership by prescription. As an
alien, Oh Cho is disqualified fromacquiring title over public land by prescription.

REPUBLIC VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

G.R. No. 75042 November 29, 1988

FACTS:
This is an appeal from the 1) decision of the FIRST CIVIL CASES DIVISION of the then
IntermediateAppellate Court dated May 13, 1986, in AC G.R. No. 01410 entitled the ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOPOF Lucena, represented by Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant-appellee vs.
Republic of the Philippines, et al ., Oppositors-appellants, affirming the decision of the then
Court of FIRST INSTANCE of Quezon,9th Judicial District, Branch 1, dated November 4, 1980
in Land Registration Case No. N-1106 entitledthe ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena,
represented by
Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, applicant vs. the Director of Lands and the Director, Bureau of Forest
Development , oppositors, ordering the registrationof title to the parcel of land designated, as lots
1, 2 and 3 of plan PSD-65686 and its technicaldescriptions, and the parcel of land described in
plan PSU-112592 and its technical description, togetherwith whatever improvements existing
thereon, in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena and 2) its resolution Dated
June 19,1986, denying appellant's "Motion for Reconsideration forlack of merit." On February 2,
1979, the ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP of Lucena, represented by Msgr.Jose T. Sanchez, filed
an application for confirmation of title to four (4) parcels of land. Three of saidparcels,
denominated as Lots 1, 2 and 3, respectively, of plan PSU-65686 are situated in Barrio
Masin,Municipality of Candelaria, Quezon Province. The fourth parcels under plan PSU-112592
is located inBarrio Bucal (Taguan), same municipality and province. In behalf of the Director of
Lands and theDirector of the Bureau of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed an
Opposition on April 20,1979, alleging therein among others, that the applicant did not have an
imperfect title or title in fee simpleto the parcel of land being applied for. At the initial hearing
held on November 13, 1979, only theProvincial Fiscal in representation of the Solicitor General
appeared to interpose personal objection to theapplication. Hence, an Order of General Default
against the whole world was issued by the Court a quoexcept for the Director of Lands and the
Director of the Bureau of Forest Development. For his part, theFiscal in a Manifestation dated
July 22, 1980, said 'the State will not adduce evidence in support of itsopposition and will submit
the instant case for decision. Accordingly, the court ordered the registrationof the four parcels
together with the improvements thereon "in the name of the ROMAN CATHOLICBISHOP OF
LUCENA, INC., a religious corporation sole duly registered and existing under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines." A reconsideration of the aforequoted Decision was sought by
AppellantRepublic of the Philippines, but for lack of merit, its motion for reconsideration was
denied on June 19,1986, by Resolution of the First Civil Case Division, Intermediate Appellate
Court which resolution readsin full: Considering appellant Republic of the Philippines "Motion
for reconsideration" filed on June 4,1986; the Court RESOLVED to DENY the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit, grounds raisedtherein having all been considered in the
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Roman Catholic Bishop of Lucena, as a corporation sole is qualified to
applyfor confirmation of its title to the four (4) parcels of land subject of this case.
HELD:
In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in
Director of Lands vs. IAC
,(
supra
, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time theapplication
for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb
thefindings of the appellate court. The petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the appealed
decision andResolution of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby AFFIRMED

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF APPEALS

(GR # 57667, May 28, 1990)

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari where petitioner San Miguel Corporation
whopurchased Lot 684 from Silverio Perez, seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals denyingits application for registration of the said land in view of its failure to show
entitlement thereto.The Solicitor General opposed and appealed the application contending that
the land in question is part of public domain and that petitioner being a private corporation is
disqualified from holding alienable landsof the public domain. In this case, petitioner claims that
its predecessor-in-interest had open, exclusiveand undisputed possession of the land in question
based on documentary evidence of tax declarations andreceipts, and testimonial evidence of
vendor Silverio Perez.ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence presented by the petitioner is
sufficient to warrant a ruling thatpetitioner and/or its predecessor-in-interest has a registrable
right over Lot 684.HELD: No, documentary evidence of tax declarations and receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership or right of possession over a piece of land but mere indicia of
a claim of ownership. They onlybecome strong evidence of ownership of land acquired by
prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession. Also, the testimony of vendor
Silverio Perez as proof of actual possession is weak andwas not corroborated by other witnesses