BELO-HENARES VS. ATTY.

GUEVARRA

FACTS:
This instant administative case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
complainant Maria Victoria G. Belo-Henares (complainant) against respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C.
Guevarra (respondent) for alleged violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Complainant is the Medical Director and principal stockholder of the Belo Medical Group, Inc. (BMGI), a
corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws 2 and engaged in the specialized field of
cosmetic surgery.3 On the other hand, respondent is the lawyer of a certain Ms. Josefina "Josie" Norcio
(Norcio ), who filed criminal cases against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her
buttocks in 2002 and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.

In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account insulting and verbally abusing
complainant. The complaint further alleged that respondent posted remarks on his Facebook account that were
intended to destroy and ruin BMGI's medical personnel, as well as the entire medical practice of around 300
employees for no fair or justifiable cause. His posts include the following excerpts:

Argee Guevarra Quack Doctor Becky Belo: I am out to get Puwitic Justice here! Kiss My Clients Ass, Belo.
Senator Adel Tamano, dont kiss Belos ass. Guys and girls, nagiisip na akong tumakbo sa Hanghalan 2010 to
Kick some ass!!! I will launch a national campaign against Plastic Politicians -No guns, No goons, No gold -IN
GUTS I TRUST!

Argee Guevarra Dr. Vicki Belo, watch out for Josefina Norcios Big Bang on Friday -You will go down in
Medical History as a QUACK DOCTOR!!!! QUACK QUACK QUACK QUACK. CNN, FOX NEWS,
BLOOMBERG, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, L.A. TIMES c/o my partner in the U.S., Atty. Trixie Cruz-Angeles
(September 22 at 11:18pm)

Argee Guevarra is amused by a libel case filed by Vicki Belo against me through her office receptionist in
Taytay Rizal. Haaaaay, style-bulok at style-duwag talaga. Lalakarin ng Reyna ng Kaplastikan at Reyna ng
Payola ang kaso si Imelda Marcos nga sued me for P300 million pesos and ended up apologizing to me, si
Belo pa kaya? (September 15 at 12:08pm

Argee Guevarra get vicki belo as your client!!! may extra-legal budget yon. Kaya Lang, bistado ko na kung
sino-sino ang tumatanggap eh, pag nalaman mo, baka bumagsak pa isang ahensya ng gobyerno dito, hahaha
(August 9 at 10:31pm)

Argee Guevarra ATTENTION MGA BA TCHMATES SA DOJ: TIMBREHAN NJYO AKO KUNG
MAGKANONG PANGSUHOL NJ BELO PARA MADIIN AKO HA???? I just [want] to know how much
she hates me, ok? Ang payola budget daw niya runs into tens of millions . (September 15 at 3:57pm) xxx
xxx xxx
Asserting that the said posts, written in vulgar and obscene language, were designed to inspire public hatred,
destroy her reputation, and to close BMGI and all its clinics, as well as to extort the amount of P200 Million
from her as evident from his demand letter dated August 26, 2009, complainant lodged the instant complaint
for disbarment against respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case
No. 09-2551.

In defense, respondent claimed that the complaint was filed in violation of his constitutionally-guaranteed right
to privacy, asserting that the posts quoted by complainant were private remarks on his private account on
Facebook, meant to be shared only with his circle of friends of which complainant was not a part. He also
averred that he wrote the posts in the exercise of his freedom of speech, and contended that the complaint was
filed to derail the criminal cases that his client, Norcio, had filed against complainant. He denied that the
remarks were vulgar and obscene, and that he made them in order to inspire public hatred against complainant.
He likewise denied that he attempted to extort money from her, explaining that he sent the demand letter as a
requirement prior to the filing of the criminal case for estafa, as well as the civil case for damages against her.
Finally, respondent pointed out that complainant was a public figure who is, therefore, the subject of fair
comment.

ISSUES:
1. Whether respondent can validly invoke his right to privacy.
2. Whether respondent can validlyn invoke freedom of speech.

RULING:
Respondent never denied that he posted the purportedly vulgar and obscene remarks about complainant and
BMGI on his Facebook account. In defense, however, he invokes his right to privacy, claiming that they were
"private remarks" on his "private account" that can only be viewed by his circle of friends. Thus, when
complainant accessed the same, she violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy.
The defense is untenable. Before, can have an expectation of privacy in his or her online social networking
activity -in this case, Facebook -it is first necessary that said user manifests the intention to keep certain posts
private, through the employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility. This intention
can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of Facebook's privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation, in the cyber world, of the user's invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.
The bases of the instant complaint are the Facebook posts maligning and insulting complainant, which posts
respondent insists were set to private view. However, the latter has failed to offer evidence that he utilized any
of the privacy tools or features of Facebook available to him to protect his posts, or that he restricted its
privacy to a select few. Therefore, without any positive evidence to corroborate his statement that the subject
posts, as well as the comments thereto, were visible only to him and his circle of friends, respondent's
statement is, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.

Moreover, even if the Court were to accept respondent's allegation that his posts were limited to or viewable
by his "Friends" only, there is no assurance that the same -or other digital content that he uploads or publishes
on his Facebook profile -will be safeguarded as within the confines of privacy, in light of the following:
1. Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way";
2. A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;
3. The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
4. A user's Facebook friend can "share" the former's post, or "tag" others who are not Facebook
friends with the former, despite its being visible only to his or her own Facebook friends.

Thus, restricting the privacy of one's Facebook posts to "Friends" does not guarantee absolute protection from
the prying eyes of another user who does not belong to one's circle of friends. The user's own Facebook friend
can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by
the latter is Face book friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged,
the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the
privacy setting of which was set at "Friends." Under the circumstances, therefore, respondent's claim of
violation of right to privacy is negated.

As to the second issue, it has been held that the freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute. As such, the constitutional right of freedom of expression may not be availed of to
broadcast lies or half-truths, insult others, destroy their name or reputation or bring them into disrepute.

A punctilious scrutiny of the Facebook remarks complained of disclosed that they were ostensibly made with
malice tending to insult and tarnish the reputation of complainant and BMGI. Calling complainant a "quack
doctor," "Reyna ng Kaplastikan," "Reyna ng Payola," and "Reyna ng Kapalpakan," and insinuating that she
has been bribing people to destroy respondent smacks of bad faith and reveals an intention to besmirch the
name and reputation of complainant, as well as BMGI. Respondent also ascribed criminal negligence upon
complainant and BMGI by posting that complainant disfigured ( "binaboy ") his client Norcio, labeling BMGI
a "Frankenstein Factory," and calling out a boycott of BMGI's services -all these despite the pendency of the
criminal cases that Norcio had already filed against complainant. He even threatened complainant with
conviction for criminal negligence and estafa -which is contrary to one's obligation "to act with justice."

In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act of publicly insulting
and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete
and utter violation of the following provisions in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 -A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall
he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 -A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 -A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and
shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI, respondent disregarded the
fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He
overlooked the fact that he must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm,
and decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an officer of the law,
and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and maligning complainant's and BMGI' s
reputation.

That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage who is exposed to
criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the cardinal condition of all criticism that it
shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's
remarks against complainant breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto "Argee" C. Guevarra is found guilty of violation of Rules 7.03,
8.01, and 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, effective upon his receipt of this Decision, and is STERNLY WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
TAN VS SABANDAL

FACTS: Petitioner files a motion for reconsideration after the court allows respondent to finally take oath and
practice the law profession after considering his plea for forgiveness and showing willingness to reform along
with testimonials attesting to his good moral character among which is a testimonial by the IBP Zamboanga.
Petitioners contend that such testimonial was only signed by its President, a counsel for the in-laws of
Sabandal, without the authorization of the IBP Board members. The court allowed the IBP to manifest
testimony to certify as to the good moral character of the respondent and asked for a comment from the RTC
Judge in Zamboanga. Members of the IBP manifested that they see no impediments as to the moral character
of Sabandal while the RTC Judge informed the court of the civil case against the respondent concerning the
mortgaged land which he secured for a free patent which turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible for
acquisition for a free patent. The civil case however was settled amicably and the respondent was not charged
of any crime. Subsequently, Tan already forgave the respondent and withdrew her opposition for the taking of
oath of office of the respondent while the other 2 petitioners leave upon the court to decide.

ISSUE: WON Sabandal should be allowed to take oath of office

RULING: The court ruled that in the development of the case, they find Sabandal to have concealed the civil
case brought against him in the course of his series of petitions to be allowed to take oath together with the
testimonies attesting to his good moral character without any mention of the pending case against him. The
court finds this as manipulative and gross dishonesty on the part of the respondent. Although there were
testimonials on his good moral characters those were made without any knowledge of the case against him.
The commission of his offense itself is devoid of honesty. With the practice of law a matter of privilege and
not as a right, they find respondent unfit to be a member of the law profession therefore it recalled the court
resolution of allowing the respondent to take oath.
MELENDREZ VS. DECENA

FACTS:
First Cause of Action

On Aug. 5, 1975, complainants (spouses Erlinda Dalman & Narciso Melendrez) obtained from Atty.
Reynerio Decena (Decena) a loan of P4K. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage.It was made to
appear in the REM that the amount borrowed was P5K. Decena assured the spouses that the REM was a
mere formality, and due to this assurance the spouses signed the REM.Despite the assurance, Decena
collected from the spouses P500/month as usurious interest. The spouses paid such usurious interest for 3
months.Because of their failure to pay the amounts, Decena drafted a new REM; new contract of mortgage
in the amount of P10K with interest at 19%/annum; a special power of attorney authorizing Decena to sell
the mortgaged property in public auction.The spouses never knew the implications of the new REM. They
failed to pay their obligation and so Decena acquired their property in pulic auction and later sold it to
Trinidad Ylanan for P12K.Spouses then went to Decena with P10K in the hopes of getting their property
back. Decena then informs them that their debt has soared to P20.4K. With shattered hopes and grief in
their hearts (andrama!), the spouses filed this case for disbarment.

Second Cause of Action

Spouses filed a case for estafa against Reynaldo Pineda for recovery of P2K. Decena then entered into a
compromise agreement with Pineda. Pineda then paid P500 to Decena. This settlement was never brought
to the attention of the spouses nor were they ever consulted about such.

ISSUE:
W/N Decenas acts show gross misconduct and should therefore be disbarred

HELD:
Yes, Decena shall be disbarred. The acts of Decena as to the 1st cause of action constitute deception,
dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the bar. As to the 2nd cause of action, Decena clearly
failed to get the consent of the spouses before entering into a compromise. Decena also failed to inform the
spouses or turn over to them the P500 given to him by Pineda as downpayment for the settlement of the
case.Decenas failure to turn over to the spouses the money underscores his lack of honesty and candor in
dealing with his clients.
VITUG VS. RONGCAL

FACTS:

Catherine Joie P. Vitug sought the service of respondent Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal who was introduced to
her by a common friend. Complainant asked Atty. Rongcal to represent her in the support case she was going
to file against her former lover, Arnulfo Aquino. Soon after, herein complainant and respondent started having
sexual relationship with each other. According to Vitug, respondent also gave her sweet inducements such as
the promise of a job, financial security for her daughter, and his services as counsel for the prospective claim
for support against Aquino.

On 9 February 2001, respondent allegedly convinced complainant to sign an Affidavit of Disclaimer which the
latter signed without reading the said affidavit. It was said that Aquino will give complainant a lump sum
provided she would execute an affidavit to the effect that Aquino is not the father of her daughter.
Complainant argues that respondent's acts constitute a violation of his oath as a lawyer. She filed an
administrative case against Rongcal which was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which
recommended the suspension of Rongcal from the practice of law. The same was approved by the IBP Board
of Governors.
Respondent then filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Set Case for Clarificatory Questioning
with the IBP and a Motion to Reopen/Remand Case for Clarificatory Questioning with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WON respondent be disbarred for immorality.

RULING:

One of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess good moral character. Said
requirement persists as a continuing condition for the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the
loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.

ON SEXUAL RELATION AND ON RESPONDENTS SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGE:

By his own admission, respondent is obviously guilty of immorality in violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code
which states that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We find credence in respondent's assertion that it was impossible for her not to have known of his subsisting
marriage.

We believe that complainants allegations of deceit were not established by clear preponderant evidence
required in disbarment cases. We are left with the most logical conclusion that she freely and wittingly entered
into an illicit and immoral relationship with respondent sans any misrepresentation or deceit on his part.

ON THE AFFIDAVIT SIGNED:

Complainant does not deny being a college graduate or that she knows and understands English. The Affidavit
is written in short and simple sentences that are understandable even to a layman. The inevitable conclusion is
that she signed the Affidavit voluntarily and without any coercion whatsoever on the part of respondent.

It was not unlawful for respondent to assist his client in entering into a settlement with Aquino after explaining
all available options to her. The law encourages the amicable settlement not only of pending cases but also of
disputes which might otherwise be filed in court.
This court finds Atty. Diosdado M. Rongcal GUILTY of immorality and imposes on him a FINE of
P15,000.00 with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD VS. CLORIBEL

FACTS:
Note -- There are two contempt cases here involving two different sets of people

First Contempt case:

The Supreme Court rendered a decision against MacArthur International Minerals Corp and in their third
Motion for Reconsideration, Attys. Vicente Santiago and John Beltran Sotto made use of language that are
disrespectful and contemptuous to the Court like "it seems many of our judicial authorities believe they are
chosen messengers of God", "corrupt in its face" and insinuating favouritism and partisanship of the members
of the Court, notably Chief Justice Concepcion and Justice Castro due to alleged interest in the case(Castro's
brother works for one of the parties). Santiago and Castro wanted for the two justices to inhibit themselves in
the MR. The Court demanded for Santiago and Sotto to "show cause" why they shouldn't be cited in contempt
for the said statements. Santiago insisted that the statements he made were inadvertently included in the copy
sent to the Court, and was just intended to be in the MR's rough draft.

Second Contempt case:

Counsel for MacArthur drafted a fourth motion for reconsideration, this time with Atty. Juanito M. Caling as
counsel, and again contained language which the Court found disrespectful. The MR assailed the decision
penned by CJ Concepcion since he was out of town when the decision was written and included seeming
threats of elevating the issue to the World Court and allegations of rise of graft and corruption in the judiciary.
The Court demanded Caling to also "show cause" and he said that it the motion was already prepared by
Santiago when he took the case as was verified by Morton Meads, an employee from MacArthur.

ISSUE:
W/N the lawyers should be cited in contempt?

RULING:
1st case:
YES. The language employed by Santiago and Sotto degrades the administration of justice which transgresses
Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as well as Sec. 20 (f) of Rule 138 of the RoC which states that "a
lawyer's language should be dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession". They are also
expected to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers but their acts
resulted in the contrary and are intended to create and atmosphere of distrust. The inadvertence of Santiago's
use of words can't be used as a shield to absolve him of any misdeeds.

2nd case:
YES. Even if the idea of the language used in the 4th MR came from Meads, both Santiago and Caling
should've adhered to Canon 16 of the Code of Legal Ethics wherein "a lawyer should use his best efforts to
restrain and to prevent his clients from doing those things which a lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly
with reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists
in such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminate their relation". Santiago is also liable here since Caling's
represent didn't divest him of his capacity as counsel for MacArthur.
IN RE: ALMACEN

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen (passed the bar in 1941) was counsel for the defendant in the case of Virginia
Yaptinchay v. Antonio H Calero. It was a civil case which the trial court decided against Atty. Almacens
client. He then filed motion of reconsideration and furnished a copy of it to the adverse party. Such copy
however failed to state the time and place of the hearing thereby making it a useless scrap of paper. The lack
of proof of service meant failure to perfect the motion on time (Atty. Almacen served it late and therefore had
no more time to correct his mistake). The issue was raised to the CA who agreed with the plaintiff in the case
that it should be dismissed. Atty. Almacen then raised the issue on certiorari to the SC who rejected it via
minute resolution. It was at this point that Atty. Almacen expressed his disappointment over the SC via filing a
Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate of Title where he would surrender his certificate to the Clerk of
Court to be held in trust until the time comes when he shall regain faith and confidence in the SC once again
and therefore resume his practice of the noblest profession. Such petition also contained lengthy accusations of
constitutional violations and saying that the justice administered by the SC was not only blind but also deaf
and dumb. Asked to show cause as to why he should not be disciplined for his actions he replied with an
answer that was undignified, cynical embellished with sarcasm and innuendo, saying things like:

We condemn the SIN not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this
Court, not the members.
xx x We were provoked.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY
and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason,
NEVER.

Atty. Almacen also quoted the bible as opening statement; But why doust thou see the speck in thy brothers
eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? x x x Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy
own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brothers eys. Basically, Atty.
Alamacen felt extremely bitter at his motion being denied and the reason for such denial being delivered only
through a minute resolution.

RULING:
First off, the SC justified the need to reject numerous appeals with an outright denial or minute resolution.
Were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject we should be unable to carry
out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The SC only accepts those cases which
present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further
notice. The Supreme Court emphasizes that it is the RIGHT and RESPONSIBILITY of every lawyer to
criticize the decision of the Court but such criticism must be decent and proper. A critique of the court must be
intelligent and discriminating fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. Any time after this
suspension becomes effective Atty. Almacen may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law. (We assume by apologizing because he was unapologetic when he was asked to explain why
he shouldnt be disciplined.)
CASTILLO VS. ATTY. PADILLA JR.

FACTS: Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedingsComplainant was the counsel for the
defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan. Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case
on November 19, 1981, while complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say
"bobo." When complainant turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant)
menacingly. Embarrassed and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed
with his offer of evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.

While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant, claiming that
what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to inject wholly irrelevant
and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making an offer of evidence. The
statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent was:
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was because
defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his house and crying over
the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and immediately, this representation like any
good husband would do in the defense of his wife immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino
Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes,
right then and there l would sock his face."

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Padilla violated the Code of Professional Ethics.

RULING:

Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo" or "Ay,
que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant which such
cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack of respect not only to a
fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language, respondent failed to measure up to the
norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession, which all the more deserves reproach because
this is not the first time that respondent has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings.
He has previously been admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more
circumspect in the preparation of his pleadings.

Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and
(2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. (Rules of Court, Rule
138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities
between counsel. (Canon 17.) The respondent was reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe
proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more severely.c
In Re Clemente Soriano

FACTS: On October 10, 1969, Clemente M. Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar entered his appearance
in the present case (L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the
respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that
it was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano asked the
Court to exhume the case from the archives. Atty. Soriano's subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to
dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him
for entering an appearance at such a late date. He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969,
the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to
him to engage his professional services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114) and the Varsity
Hills case (L-30546). Atty. Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance and
representation of Marcelino Tiburcio that the two cases were pending in the Court. He then agreed to render
professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the
430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Soriano is guilty of negligence.

HELD: YES. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the
conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very
least, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution. His entry of appearance in the case without
the consent of the first lawyer amounts to an improper encroachment upon the professional employment of the
original counsel. Atty. Soriano violates Rule 8.02, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to
those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer and
as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from the
practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his mistake
and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he is hereby
severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met with heavier
disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has entered
as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Tapay vs. Bancolo

FACTS:
In October 2004, Tapay and Rustia, complainants, received a complaint from the Office of the Ombudsman-
Visayas for falsification of public document, and graft and corrupt practices filed by Nehimias Divinagracia,
Jr. Allegedly the complaint was signed on behalf of Divinagracia by Atty. Charlie Bancolo of the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office. When Atty. Bancolo and Rustia met, the latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented Divinagracia and that the
signature in the complaint was not his. Rustia convinced Atty. Bancolo to sign an affidavit to attest such fact.
Tapay and Rustia, using Atty. Bancolos affidavit and other evidence filed a counter-affidavit accusuing
Divinagracia of falsifying the signature of Atty. Bancolo. With this, the Office of the Ombudsman
provisionally dismissed the complaint against Tapay and Rustia and ordered separate cases for Falsification of
Public Documents and dishonesty against Divinagracia. Divinagracia, however, denied that he falsified the
signature of Atty. Bancolo and presented evidence that the Jarder Bancolo Law Office accepted the
Divinagracias case and that thecomplaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman was signed by the office
secretary asinstructed by Atty. Bancolo.On November 2005, Tapay and Rustia filed with the IBP a complaint
to disbar Atty. Bancolo ad Atty. Jarder. The complainants alleged that ther were subjected to a harassment
complaint withthe forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. Furthermore, they presented a report which examined
three other complaints signed by Atty. Bancolo for other clients and the result was that the signatures in the
complaints were not written by one and the same person.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Bancolo and Atty. Jarder violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:
In the case of Atty. Bancolo, he violated Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
allowing a non-lawyer to affix his signature to a pleading. It is a lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least
not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law. This duty is founded on public interest and policy that
requires that practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in education and character.
The fact that a lawyer is busy cannot serve as an excuse for him from signing personally any legal document.
The practice of letting his secretary affix his signature for him constitute negligence and is subject to
disciplinary action.
Alawi vs. Alauya

FACTS:
Alawi and Alauya were high school classmates and were friends. However, Alauya, the Executive Clerk of
Court from the 4th District Sharia District of Marawi City alleged that Alawi obtained his signature on a
blank piece of paper through fraud and gross misrepresentation. He alleges that Alawi used this to make it look
as if he was buying a house from Villarosa & Co., where Alawi worked as a real estate sales agent. Moreover,
because of that same transaction, Alauya was able to receive a loan from the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation, also without his consent. Because of this, he sent strongly-worded letters to the president and VP
of Villarosa, as well as to the NHMFC, detailing in acerbic language Alawis supposed fraudulent and
deceitful acts. One of the letters, though sent by mail, did not have any postage stamp. Instead, the phrase
Free Postage PD 26 was typewritten in the upper right corner. In all of these letters, Alauya referred to
himself as Attorney Ashary M. Alauya. Because of the letters, Alawi filed a complaint against Alauya before
the SC, alleging that he imputed malicious and libellous charges against her w/ no solid ground, that he used
the franking privilege given to the judiciary without authority, and that he usurped the title attorney.
According to Alauya, his reactions were merely normal from someone who was distraught and has been
victimized of fraud. He says that the word Attorney is synonymous with Counsellor at-law or
Counsellor, which is the title reserved for those who pass the Sharia Bar. Alauya says that he prefers
attorney because most mistake counselor for councilor or konsehal. With regard to the alleged improper
use of the free postage service, Alauya says that he actually gave a subordinate P20 to mail the letters, and that
to the best of his knowledge, the letters were sent using that money. This was supported by an affidavit of one
of his subordinates.

ISSUES:
1. W/N the Alauyas actions violated his duties as a public officer
2. W/N his use of the title Attorney was valid
3. W/N the his use of the franking privilege was valid

RULING:

1. YES, public officers are always expected to act with proper decorum. As a member of the Sharia Bar and
anofficer of the Court, Alauya is impressed with an even stricter and more stringent standard of conduct.
Righteous indignation or vindication does not allow one to use virulent or insulting language, most especially
name-calling.As a man of the law, he is expected to act with restraint and dignity. While his actions may be
mitigated, they cannot be excused.

2. NO, the title attorney is reserved for those who pass the Philippine Bar. While both Sharia Bar and
Philippine Bar passers are considered counsellors, if one only took and subsequently passed the Sharia Bar,
he is still not entitled to use the title attorney.

3. The Court did not decide on this matter citing lack of evidence. In the end, the Court reprimanded Alauya
for his actions.
Five J Taxi and/or Juan Armamiento vs. NLRC

FACTS: Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
boundary of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also required
to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
boundary, for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed to report
for work for unknown reasons. Petitioners learned that he was working for Mine of Gold Taxi Company. With
respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 1983, he was held up by his armed
passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after his discharge, he
went to this home province to recuperate.

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms and conditions
as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an alternative basis where he drove
only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during his schedule. On
September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his boundary of P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he
abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners for
him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving a taxi for
Bulaklak Company.

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years,
but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were not even enough
to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the
refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination
from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his taxi seat covers.

On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the manila Arbitration Office of the
National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the deductions made were illegal and if illegal, considered a prohibition regarding
wages.

RULING: The Court declares that the deposits made amounts to the prohibition provided by law. The deposits
made were illegal and the respondents must be refunded.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

Deposits for loss or damage. No employer shall require his worker to make deposits from which deductions
shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the
employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or business where the practice of
making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as determined by the Secretary of Labor in
appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
equipment supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit deposits to defray any
deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his boundary.

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the issue of
illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of duty, it is
incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has given to the same clean condition when he took it out, and
as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private respondents herein)
were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid directly to the person who
washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to consider the amount paid by
the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law."

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments they made. It
will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units themselves, if
they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing after a tour of
duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.