G.R. No.
86421 May 31, 1994 On 07 October 1985, a complaint for "Annulment of Judgment, Lease Contract and Damages"
SPS. THELMA R. MASINSIN and MIGUEL MASINSIN, SPS. GILBERTO and ADELINA,
ROLDAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. ED VINCENT ALBANO, Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila, Branch X, DEPUTY SHERIFF JESS ARREOLA, VICENTE CAEDA and THE HON.
LEONARDO CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge Regional Trial of Manila,
Branch XXV, respondents.
Gregorio T. Fabros for petitioners.
Isidro F. Molina for private respondent.
RESOLUTION
VITUG, J.:
Spouses Miguel and Thelma Masinsin, et al., instituted this petition for certiorari, prohibition,
relief from judgment, as well as declaratory relief, with prayer for preliminary mandatory
injunction, asking us to order the Metropolitan Trial Court ("MTC") of Manila, Branch X, to
cease and desist from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 107203-CV.
This case emerged from an ejectment suit (docketed Civil Case No. 107203-CV) filed by
private respondent Vicente Caeda ("Caeda"), then as plaintiffs, against herein petitioners,
as defendants, with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila (Branch X). After trial, the MTC, on
01 July 1985, rendered judgment; thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants and
all persons claiming right under them to vacate the premises and to remove their
house/apartment and surrender possession of the subject land to the plaintiff; to pay
to the plaintiff the sum of P100.00 a month from January 1987 as the reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises until the land is actually
vacated, and the costs of suit. 1
No appeal having been taken therefrom, the judgment became final and executory. On 22
August 1985, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch XXXII) seeking the annulment of the aforesaid decision in the ejectment case and to
set aside an order of its execution. The petition was in due time dismissed. Again, no appeal
was taken therefrom.
was filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch XLI) asking, in main,
for the nullification of the judgment in the ejectment case. The complaint was dismissed on
the ground of res judicata. This time, petitioners appealed the dismissal to the Court of
Appeals. Meanwhile, a writ of execution was issued by the MTC for the enforcement of its
decision. The writ, however, was held in abeyance when petitioners deposited with the Court
of Appeals the sum of P3,000.00 in cash plus an amount of P100.00 to be paid every month
beginning February 1987. On 11 March 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of
dismissal of the lower court. Petitioners' recourse to this Court was to be of no avail. The
petition was denied, and an entry of judgment was made on 14 July 1987.
Accordingly, the records were remanded to the MTC for execution. When petitioners refused
to remove their house on the premises in question, upon motion of private respondent, an
order of demolition was issued. Shortly thereafter, the demolition began. Before the
completion of the demolition, a restraining order was issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila (Branch XIX) following a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction and
restraining order, filed by petitioners. On 23 February 1988, the trial court dismissed the
petition.
Unfazed by the series of dismissals of their complaints and petitions, petitioners assailed
anew the MTC decision in a petition for certiorari, with preliminary injunction, and for
declaratory relief (docketed Civil Case No. 88-43944) before the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch XXV), which, again, issued a restraining order. 2
Private respondent then filed a motion for an alias writ of execution with the MTC. An ex-
parte motion of petitioners for the issuance of a second restraining order was this time
denied by the RTC (Branch XXV). 3 On 23 August 1990, 4 the trial court, ultimately, dismissed
the petition with costs against petitioners.
In this petition, petitioners contend that the MTC of Manila (Branch X) has lost jurisdiction to
enforce its decision, dated 01 July 1985, in Civil Case No. 107203, when the property in
question was proclaimed an area for priority development by the National Housing Authority
on 01 December 1987 by authority of Presidential Decree 2016.
The petition is totally without merit.
In resolving this issue, we only have to refer to our resolution of 01 February 1993 in G.R. No.
98446, entitled, "Spouses Thelma R. Masinsin, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.," to which this
case is intimately related, where we ruled:
. . . The singular question common to both cases submitted for resolution of this
court is the implication of Presidential Decree No. 1517, otherwise known as the
"Urban Land Reform Law," and its amendments or ramifications embodied in
Proclamation No. 1893, as amended by Proclamation No. 1967 and Presidential
 Decree No. 2016. All the above statutes are being implemented by the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board, and the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating
Council, Office of the President.
There is a prejudicial issue the answer to which hangs the resolution of this case. On
May 20, 1992, this Court required the National Housing Authority to submit a
Comment on the status of the program of acquisition by the Government of the land
area which includes the disputed property, as part of the Areas for Priority
Development (APD), under the aforementioned decrees and proclamations.
In compliance with said order of this Court, Mr. Andres C. Lingan, Manager of the
Metro Manila Project Department of the National Housing Authority, submitted the
following report on the status of Lot 6-A, Block 1012, located at No. 1890 Obesis
Street, Pandacan, Manila, known as the Carlos Estate, an APD site. Pertinent portions
of the report read:
Please be informed that Lot 6-A, Block 1012 located at No. 1890 Obesis St.,
Pandacan, Manila which is the subject matter of the case and located within the
Carlos Estate declared as APD site pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 1967, is
not for acquisition by NHA.
The Carlos Estate is located outside of the NHA projects under the Zonal
Improvement Project (ZIP) and Community Mortgage Program (CMP). The site,
however, is under the administration of the Presidential Commission on Urban Poor
(PCUP) for acquisition and upgrading. (Emphasis Supplied.)
The above information answers the uncertainty concerning the status of the alleged
negotiation for the acquisition by the government of certain areas in Metro Manila.
The NHA is definitely NOT acquiring the said lot for its program.
It appearing that the purpose of this Petition for Review is to set aside the decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the lower courts,
in order to avoid eviction from the disputed premises and to be allowed to acquire
the same allegedly under the Community Mortgage Program of the National Housing
Authority, we find the petition without merit and deny the same. Consequently, the
petition is DISMISSED. 5
What immediately catches one's attention to this case is the evident predilection of
petitioners, through different counsel, to file pleadings, one after another, from which not
even this Court has been spared. The utter lack of merit of the complaints and petitions
simply evinces the deliberate intent of petitioners to prolong and delay the inevitable
execution of a decision that has long become final and executory.
Four times did the petitioners, with the assistance of counsel, try to nullify the same MTC
decision before different branches of the court, trifling with judicial processes. Never, again,
should this practice be countenanced. 6
The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating
ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred
trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of
that pledge; thus -
LAWYER'S OATH
I, . . ., do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support and defend its Constitution and obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood nor
consent to its commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will not
delay any man's cause for money or malice and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
the courts as to my clients and I impose upon myself this obligation voluntary,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD. (Emphasis supplied.)
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an
officer of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the
administration of justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action
and warranting application of the contempt power. 7
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Petitioners' counsel of record is hereby strongly
CENSURED and WARNED that a similar infraction of the lawyer's oath in the future will be
dealt with most severely. Double costs against petitioners.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5624. January 20, 2004]
NATASHA HUEYSUWAN-FLORIDO, complainant, vs. ATTY. JAMES BENEDICT C.
FLORIDO, respondent.
 DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for the disbarment of respondent Atty. James Benedict C.
Florido and his eventual removal from the Roll of Attorneys for allegedly violating his oath as
a lawyer by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious and bogus Court of Appeals
Resolution/Order.[1]
In her Complaint-Affidavit, Natasha V. Heysuwan-Florido averred that she is the legitimate
spouse of respondent Atty. James Benedict C. Florido, but that they are estranged and living
separately from each other. They have two children namely, Kamille Nicole H. Florido, five
years old, and James Benedict H. Florido, Jr., three years old both of whom are in
complainants custody. Complainant filed a case for the annulment of her marriage with
respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 23122, before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 24. Meanwhile, there is another case related to the complaint for annulment of
marriage which is pending before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54235
entitled, James Benedict C. Florido v. Hon. Pampio Abarientos, et al.
Sometime in the middle of December 2001, respondent went to complainants residence in
Tanjay City, Negros Oriental and demanded that the custody of their two minor children be
surrendered to him. He showed complainant a photocopy of an alleged Resolution issued by
the Court of Appeals which supposedly granted his motion for temporary child custody.
[2]
Complainant called up her lawyer but the latter informed her that he had not received any
motion for temporary child custody filed by respondent.
Complainant asked respondent for the original copy of the alleged resolution of the Court of
Appeals, but respondent failed to give it to her. Complainant then examined the resolution
closely and noted that it bore two dates: November 12, 2001 and November 29, 2001.
Sensing something amiss, she refused to give custody of their children to respondent.
In the mid-morning of January 15, 2002, while complainant was with her children in the ABC
Learning Center in Tanjay City, respondent, accompanied by armed men, suddenly arrived
and demanded that she surrender to him the custody of their children. He threatened to
forcefully take them away with the help of his companions, whom he claimed to be agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation.
Alarmed, complainant immediately sought the assistance of the Tanjay City Police. The
responding policemen subsequently escorted her to the police station where the matter could
be clarified and settled peacefully. At the police station, respondent caused to be entered in
the Police Blotter a statement that he, assisted by agents of the NBI, formally served on
complainant the appellate courts resolution/order. [3] In order to diffuse the tension,
complainant agreed to allow the children to sleep with respondent for one night on condition
that he would not take them away from Tanjay City. This agreement was entered into in the
presence of Tanjay City Chief of Police Juanito Condes and NBI Investigator Roger Sususco,
among others.
In the early morning of January 16, 2002, complainant received information that a van arrived
at the hotel where respondent and the children were staying to take them to Bacolod City.
Complainant rushed to the hotel and took the children to another room, where they stayed
until later in the morning.
On the same day, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch
31, a verified petition[4] for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus asserting his right to
custody of the children on the basis of the alleged Court of Appeals resolution. In the
meantime, complainant verified the authenticity of the Resolution and obtained a certification
dated January 18, 2002[5] from the Court of Appeals stating that no such resolution ordering
complainant to surrender custody of their children to respondent had been issued.
At the hearing of the petition for habeas corpus on January 23, 2002, respondent did not
appear. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.
Hence, complainant filed the instant complaint alleging that respondent violated his
attorneys oath by manufacturing, flaunting and using a spurious Court of Appeals Resolution
in and outside a court of law. Furthermore, respondent abused and misused the privileged
granted to him by the Supreme Court to practice law in the country.
After respondent answered the complaint, the matter was referred to the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline for investigation, report and recommendation. The IBP-CBD recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three years with a warning
that another offense of this nature will result in his disbarment. [6] On June 23, 2003, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and recommendation of the
Commission with the modification that the penalty of suspension be increased to six years.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively liable
for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking the
Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This, however, is
belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several times. As
pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was presented by
respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas
Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, [7] which he filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor children from complainant. Since it
was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he is presumed to have participated in its
fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary would
be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will
have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted could easily be
imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to display the utmost zeal
in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense of the truth. [8] Thus, the
Code of professional Responsibility states:
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood; nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of
a paper, the language or the argument of an opposing counsel, or the text of a
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a law a provision already rendered
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
proved.
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but dignified,
emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.[9] The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be gracious to both court
and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be properly addressed by one
gentlemen to another.[10] By calling complainant, a sly manipulator of truth as well as a
vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a
lawyer.
Respondents actions erode the public perception of the legal profession. They constitute
gross misconduct and the sanctions for such malfeasance is prescribed by Section 27, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court which states:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore.- A
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for
a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
Considering the attendant circumstances, we agree with the recommendation of the IBP
Board of Governors that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law. However,
we find that the period of six years is too harsh a penalty. Instead, suspension for the lesser
period of two years, which we deem commensurate to the offense committed, is hereby
imposed on respondent.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, Atty. James Benedict C. Florido is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.
Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a
member of the Bar and furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) and the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts of the country.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-93-781 November 16, 1993
EDUARDO R. SANTOS, Petitioner, vs. JUDGE ORLANDO C. PAGUIO, MTC, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Respondent.
Eduardo R. Santos for and in his own behalf.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The complainant herein is the lawyer for the defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706, an action
for unlawful detainer commenced on 5 May 1990 with the Municipal Trial Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan while the respondent is the presiding Judge of the said court. In his
verified complaint filed through the Office of the Court Administrator on 18 March 1993, the
complainant charges the respondent with gross ignorance of the law and gross
incompetence. The complainant supports his charge with the allegation that after the answer
in the said case was filed and "without notice and hearing," the latter rendered a decision on
28 June 1991, 1the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, it is hereby respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered in accordance with plaintiff's prayer in their Complaint in the above-
entitled case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
He further alleges that Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulacan, in its Order of
19 January 1993 in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 2- a petition for certiorari filed by the
defendants in Civil Case No. 90-1706 - had already opined that the said decision is void upon
its face because it:
. . . would be impossible to be implemented for the simple or obvious reason that the same
cannot be considered a decision at all. Instead of deciding or ordering something to be done,
it merely prays that judgment be rendered.
but despite this, the respondent still "changed and amended [his] final decision [of 28 June
1991] in order to nullify the order of a superior Court, the RTC of Bulacan" via a new decision
in Civil Case No. 90-1706 3promulgated on 25 January 1993. The dispositive portion of this
new decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
by:
1. Ordering defendants and persons claiming any rights under them to vacate the premises
occupied by them, more particularly the portion on which are erected their respective
dwelling structure/unit, at 117 Bayugo, Meycauayan, Bulacan (or lot of plaintiff
aforementioned) and to remove said dwelling structure/units from said subject premises of
plaintiff;chanrobles virtual law library
2. Ordering defendants individually to pay the sum of P350.00 Philippine Currency, per month
by way of monthly rental commencing from May 16, 1990, and thereafter until they shall
have vacated the premises of the plaintiff;chanrobles virtual law library
3. Ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the sum of P2,000.00, Philippine
currency, on account of plaintiff's attorney's fees (retainer) and P500.00, Philippine Currency,
for every hearing/trial attended by said attorney before this Honorable Court; andchanrobles
virtual law library
4. Ordering the defendants to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.
According to the complainant, the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision exhibits
the respondent's gross ignorance in "decision preparation," and that respondent's "haste to
amend the same to favor plaintiff was both appalling (sic) and downright improper." The
complainant then prays that the respondent "be removed from office if only to save the
integrity of the judiciary."chanrobles virtual law library
In his Comment filed on 2 July 1993, 4 the respondent denies the imputations and
alleges, inter alia, that: (1) the complainant was not the original counsel for the defendants
but one Atty. Adriano Javier, Sr. who represented the latter until the time that the parties were
directed to file their respective position papers, specifically until 29 November 1991 when
Atty. Javier filed a motion to withdraw his appearance and the complainant filed his notice of
appearance as counsel for the defendants; (2) the Decision of 28 June 1991 was rendered
only after a preliminary conference was held where the parties with their respective counsels
discussed the possibility of an amicable settlement and after the defendants failed to comply
with the 16 November 1990 Order for the parties to submit in writing their "respective
position statements setting forth the law and the facts relied upon by them and to submit the
affidavits of their witnesses and other evidences in support thereof within fifteen (15) days
from receipt" thereof, prompting the plaintiff to file on 5 April 1991 an ex-parte motion
praying that judgment be rendered in this case; (3) the defendants did not appeal from the
28 June 1991 Decision, hence the plaintiff filed a motion for execution on 2 September 1991,
which the defendants did not oppose; instead they filed a motion for reconsideration and to
declare the decision null and void on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trail brief
and there was no valid pre-trial order; (4) on 4 December 1991, the plaintiff's motion for
execution was granted and a writ of execution was issued, a copy of which was sent to the
Clerk of Court of the RTC of Malolos for service; (5) on 5 January 1991, 5 he received an order
from Branch 18 of the RTC of Bulacan directing him to desist from implementing the writ of
execution; (6) the presiding judge of said Branch 18, Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal, Sr.,
issued on 19 January 1993 its order disposing of Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93; (7) thereafter,
he (respondent) handed down a new decision in Civil Case No. 90-1706 on 25 January 1993
that contained "completely the missing sentences needed in the dispositive portion" of its
earlier decision; (8) instead of appealing therefrom, the defendants filed on 4 February 1993
a motion to set aside the decision, which the court set for its consideration and to which the
plaintiff filed its opposition on 8 February 1993 together with a motion for immediate
execution; (9) on 22 March 1993, the complainant filed a motion to inhibit the respondent by
the former did not appear on the date it was set for consideration. He finally contends that
the issue regarding the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision was rendered moot
and academic by the corrections made in the Decision of 25 January 1993; that the charge of
gross ignorance is contemptuous and unfounded; and the complainant's sweeping
conclusions show his disrespectful attitude.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
In his 17 June 1993 Rejoinder filed on 7 July 1993, 6 the complainant reiterates his charge that
the respondent is incompetent because he lacks the "ability to prepare a sensible and
credible decision," and maintains that the respondent's attempt to convince this Court that
the dispositive portion of the 28 June 1991 Decision is permissible and proper shows "gross
ignorance." Further, that the respondent believes that "he could correct the decision after its
finality" and after the RTC of Bulacan had declared it to be null and void upon its face clearly
manifests his "patent ignorance of our laws and jurisprudence."chanrobles virtual law library
In his Sur-Rejoinder filed on 13 July 1993, 7 the respondent argues that while the 28 June 1991
Decision "could hardly be enforced for the reason that there is some sort of ambiguity or
omission (sic) in its dispositive portion," he was not prohibited from having the defect "timely
corrected and clarified," which was what he had in fact done, and that the "clarified decision"
did not prejudice "the substantial rights of the parties" since they "were given their day in
court and passed through the usual course of the proceedings." Accordingly, he could not be
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of lack of
competence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Wanting to have the last word, the complainant filed a Reply to Sur-rejoinder and
Manifestation on 28 July 1993. 8 Not to be outdone, the respondent filed a Manifestation to
Reply on 9 August 1993. 9chanrobles virtual law library
The Court referred this to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
On 31 August 1993, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted its Memorandum
containing its evaluation, report and recommendation. After summarizing the antecedent
facts, the said office submitted that the instant complaint is meritorious, and made the
following findings:
It is quite unbelievable, nay, impossible for respondent to have overlooked the missing
dispositive portion of his original decision which is considered the executory portion thereof.
The only ineluctable conclusion is that respondent never read said decision before he signed
the same. If only he devoted even only a little time to read the same, such a missing portion
considered to be the most important part of a decision could not have escaped his attention.
The alleged dispositive portion was a prayer. It did not have the effect of finally disposing the
case. Presumably, this must have been simply copied from plaintiff's
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
True, it was legally permissible for respondent to amend his original defective decision since
the RTC dismissed the petition for certiorari although Judge Perfecto Macapagal found that
what was rendered by Judge Paguio "can not be considered a decision at all." It took
respondent Judge 1-1/2 years to discover and correct his error; the error could have easily
been discovered at the time the Motion for Execution was filed on September 2, 1991. But
the writ was nonetheless issued on December 4, 1991. Hence, the belated correction would
not mitigate his liability. There is no denying that the quality of a decision rendered by the
judge such as herein respondent, is a reflection on the integrity of the court in dispensing
justice to whom it is due. Respondent was at the very least careless in failing to read carefully
the decision that he signed. In fact, both the original and amended decisions still contained
errors in grammar and syntax indicating that there was no adequate editing of the decision
that was signed by him. If he had been more careful, he would have avoided such fractured
phrases as:chanrobles virtual law library
1. Plaintiff on being opposed to this motion, countered as follows: (Page 5, Decision, June 28,
1991);chanrobles virtual law library
2. For a more vivid explanation showing the incidental facts (Ibid);chanrobles virtual law
library
3. And defendants seems that they are not really sincere (Ibid);chanrobles virtual law library
4. But nothing has been done by the latter to renew such contract of lease of which right
becomes one of a detainer plain and simple (page 6, Ibid);chanrobles virtual law library
5. That being the case to allow them will mean ownership over the
property (Ibid).chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is possible that this is not the usual language of the Judge, for their fractured constructions
have no place in a court decision. Careful editing and rewriting should have been done.
and recommends that:
. . . a fine of P5,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that any repetition of the
same or similar infraction shall be meted with a more severe penalty of dismissal from the
service. He is also admonished to exhibit greater care in the writing of his decisions.
We find the above observations of the Office of the Court Administrator to be sufficiently
supported by the pleadings submitted by the parties in this
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
After a careful examination of the respondent's "Decision" of 28 June 1991, we do find its
body to be flawed with grammatical and syntactic errors. Its "dispositive portion" disposes of,
resolves or decrees nothing. It cannot even be called a dispositive or decretal portion at all. It
is obviously a prayer lifted from a pleading of the plaintiff, such as the Memorandum or
the ex-parte manifestation and motion praying that judgment be rendered filed after the
defendants failed to file their position paper, although not from the complaint as suspected
by the Court Administrator. How it gained entry into what should have been the fallo is an
arcanum. Any attempt to unravel the mystery may only complicate the matter against the
respondent who is only charged herein with gross ignorance or
incompetence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
There can, however, be no dispute behind the errors of grammar and syntax and the fatally
infirmed "dispositive portion" is the inefficiency, neglect of duty or carelessness on the part of
the respondent betraying the absence of due care, diligence, conscientiousness and
thoroughness - qualities which Judges must, among others, possess. Respondent could have
easily avoided the errors and defects had he taken a little more time and effort to at least
read its original copy before he finally affixed his signature thereon. While this Court cannot
expect every Judge to be an expert on the English language or an authority in grammar, he
must, however, do everything he can, through constant study, extraordinary diligence, and
passion for excellence, to produce a decision which fosters respect for and encourages
obedience to it and enhances the prestige of the court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
As we see it then, the respondent failed to comply with two standard of conduct prescribed
by the Canons of Judicial Ethics, namely: that "[h]e should exhibit an industry and application
commensurate with the duties imposed upon him" 10 and that he should be conscientious,
studious and thorough. 11chanrobles virtual law library
Moreover, the respondent did not only issue a manifestly infirmed "decision," he even
granted the motion for its execution and issued the corresponding writ with full knowledge
that there was nothing to execute. He could not have feigned ignorance of such nothingness
for it is embarrassingly self-evident. He nevertheless ordered its execution, exhibiting once
more his inefficiency, carelessness, negligence, or even his
incompetence.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We must add, however, that it is not the respondent alone who must be blamed for such
unmitigated faux pas. The counsel for the parties in the case knew or ought to have known
the fatal defect of the dispositive portion and the obvious inefficacy of any writ of execution,
yet, the plaintiff's counsel still filed a motion for execution, while the counsel for the
defendants - the complainant herein - merely filed a motion for reconsideration based solely
on the ground that the plaintiff did not file her pre-trial brief and that there was no valid pre-
trial order. Obviously, the complainant initially believed in the completeness of the decision.
As a matter of fact, when he assailed the 25 January 1993 Decision, he alleged that what was
amended was a " final decision," a position totally inconsistent with his claim that the latter
was void as declared by the RTC of Bulacan. As officers of the court who owe to it candor,
fairness and good faith, 12 both attorneys should have called the court's attention to the
glaring defect of the "dispositive portion" of the 28 June 1991
Decision.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We thus conclude that the respondent Judge is guilty of, in the very least, inefficiency,
neglect of duty and the violation of Canons 5 and 31 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics. He could
not, however, be liable for ignorance of law and jurisprudence or for incompetence when he
handed down a new decision on 25 January 1993. The 28 June 1991 Decision was
"incomplete" since, for all legal intents and purposes, it had no fallo and could not attain
finality, hence the respondent had the power to amend it to make it conformable to law and
justice. 13 It is not therefore correct to say, as the complainant suggested, that the order of
the RTC of Bulacan in Sp. Civil Action No. 03-M-93 stating that the respondent's Decision of 28
June 1991 is "void upon its face" forever bars the respondent from rendering a new or
amended decision in the ejectment case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
We take this opportunity to stress once again that the administration of justice is a sacred
task and all those involved in it must faithfully adhere to, hold inviolate, and invigorate the
principle solemnly enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust and all
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act with patriotism and justice
and lead modest lives. 14 Every Judge should never forget that he is the visible representation
of the law and, more importantly, of justice. 15 Therefore, he must constantly be the
embodiment of competence, diligence, conscientiousness, thoroughness, efficiency, and
integrity so as to preserve, promote and enhance the people's confidence in the
Judiciary.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
A few words must also be made of record regarding the complainant. We note that in his
complaint in this case he alleged under oath that after the defendants filed their answer, the
respondent "without any hearing, or at least this counsel was never notified of any such
hearing," rendered the 28 June 1991 Decision. This is of course inaccurate, if not outright
false. What the complainant conveniently left out in his complaint was that, as disclosed in
the Comment which he did not refute, after the defendants' answer with counterclaim was
admitted by the court, the case was set for preliminary conference and thereafter the parties
were required to submit their position papers and the affidavits of their witnesses and other
evidence. We find that the case was properly placed and considered under the Rule on
Summary Procedure and, accordingly, the court could decide the case on the basis of the
submitted position papers, affidavits and other pieces of evidence. Complainant further
suppressed the fact that he entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants only after
the court had conducted the preliminary conference and issued the order for the submission
of the foregoing pleadings and documents. He was not, therefore, entitled to any notice
before then.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The failure to divulge the foregoing facts may have been intended by the complainant to give
his complaint a strong prima facie case against the respondent. While he was entitled to
adopt certain strategies in his pleadings, he forgot that he owes to this Court absolute
candor, fairness and good faith. This Court can neither condone nor tolerate attempts to
mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial
action. Complainant should, therefore, be admonished to faithfully adhere to the Code of
Professional Responsibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, for inefficiency and neglect of duty amounting to a violation of Canons 5 and 31
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, respondent Judge ORLANDO C. PAGUIO is hereby sentenced
to pay a FINE of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). He is further warned that a repetition of
the same or similar infractions shall be dealt with more
severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Complainant is hereby ADMONISHED to be more careful in the drafting of pleadings, always
keeping in mind his duty under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 2837 October 7, 1994
ESTEBAN M. LIBIT, complainant,
vs.
ATTYS. EDELSON G. OLIVA and FLORANDO A. UMALI, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
In civil Case No. 84-24144 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled "Pedro Cutingting,
plaintiff versus Alfredo Tan, defendant", the Honorable Presiding Judge Domingo Panis issued
the following order:
The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) is hereby ordered to
conduct an investigation with the end in view of determining the author of the
Sheriff's Return which appears to have been falsified and to institute such criminal
action as the evidence will warrant. (p. 1, Final Report.)
After conducting the necessary investigation, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
through herein complainant, charged respondents as follows:
That sometime in May 1984 in the City of Manila, at the Regional Trial Court, Branch
XLI, Manila, Philippines, the above-named Respondents, as Counsels for PEDRO
CUTINGTING in Civil Case No. 84-24144, entitled PEDRO CUTINGTING, Plaintiff vs.
ALFREDO TAN, Defendant, did then and there, knowingly, willfully
introduced/presented in evidence before the aforesaid Regional Trial Court, a
falsified Sheriff's Return of Summons during the hearing of the aforesaid Civil Case
thereby impending and/or obstructing the speedy administration and/or
dispensation of Justice. (p. 2, Final Report, ff. p. 69, Record.)
Respondents in their respective answers denied having any hand in the falsification of the
said sheriff's return.
Pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court and the resolution of the Court En Banc of April
12, 1988, the case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
In view, however, of the report of the National Bureau of Investigation to the effect that the
signature above the typewritten name Florando Umali on the last page of the complaint in
said civil case is not his signature, complainant, through counsel, agreed to the dismissal of
the case with respect to Atty. Umali.
With respect to Atty. Edelson G. Oliva, the IBP submitted the following report and
recommendation:
There is ample evidence extant in the records to prove that
Atty. Oliva has something to do with the falsification of the Sheriff's Return on the
Summons in said Civil Case No. 84-24144.
The oral and documentary evidence of the complainant strongly tend to show the
following: (1) The Sheriff's Return of the Summon in the said civil case was falsified
as it was not signed by Deputy Sheriff Rodolfo Torella (Exh. "J" Sworn Statement of
Rodolfo Torella dated February 1, 1985, and Exh. "S", which is the falsified Sheriff's
Return); (2) The summons was received from the clerk of the Court of the Manila
RTC-Branch LXI by Ronaldo Romero, a messenger in the law office of Attys. Umali
and Oliva and said messenger brought the summons to the law office of the
respondents (Exh. "H" Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Ronaldo Romero, and Exh. "G",
Exh. "I" Sworn Statement dated February 28, 1985 of Mariano Villanueva, Chief
Staff Asst. 2, RTC, Manila; (3) On the basis of the falsified Sheriff's Return on the
Summons, Atty. Oliva, counsel for the defendant [should be plaintiff] in said civil
case, filed a typewritten Motion to Declare Defendant in Default (Exh.) "R" Motion
to Declare Defendant In Default in said civil case signed and filed by Atty. Oliva);
(4) On March 29, 1984, Atty. Oliva, in his capacity as Operations Manager of Judge
Pio R. Marcos Law Office, sent a final demand letter on Alfredo Tan, the defendant in
said Civil case, for payment of the sum of P70,174.00 (Exh. "T" Demand Letter
dated March 28, 1984 of Atty. Oliva addressed to Alfredo Tan); (5) The demand letter
of Atty. Oliva (Exh. "T"), the complaint in said civil case (Exh. "Q", "Q-1", and "Q-2"),
the falsified Sheriff's Return on the Summons (Exh. "S"), the Motion To Declare
Defendant In Default dated October 30, 1984 signed and filed by
Atty. Oliva (Exh. "R" and "R-1") were typed on one and the same typewriter, as
shown in the Questioned Document Report No. 198-585 dated 19 June 1985 (Exh.
"Q", "Q-1" and "Q-2"; Exh. "V", "V-1" and
"V-2").
After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct
which warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by
the evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent's failure to live up to his
duties as a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer's responsibility to
protect and advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled
by ill motives and malicious intentions against the other party.
At this juncture, it is well to stress once again that the practice of law is not a right but a
privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess, and continue to
possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. One of these
requirements is the observance of honesty and candor. It can not be gainsaid that
candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the expeditious administration of
justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has the fundamental duty
to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all times that their first
duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all court officers sworn
to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only secondarily are they
advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients. For this reason, he is required to swear to
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court (Chavez vs. Viola, 196 SCRA 10
[1991].
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a
lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor
shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
The case is ordered dismissed as against Atty. Florando Umali.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
Per Rec. Nos. 3527, 3408 August 23, 1935
JUSTA MONTEREY, complainant,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO V. ARAYATA and TERESO MA. MONTOYA, respondents.
Eustaquio V. Arayata in his own behalf.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for the Government.
IMPERIAL, J.:
It is alleged in the charges filed against Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata (1) that on August 27,
1931, while practicing his profession, he prepared and drew up in his favor a deed of sale of
the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 7591, for the sum of P4,000, stating
therein that the person who executed the document and sold the land to him was his father,
Arcadio Arayata, when he knew positively that this alleged vendor had already died on
November 5, 1916; that knowing the document to be fictitious, he appeared before notary
public Tereso Ma. Montoya and made the latter legalize said document and state that Arcadio
Arayata personally appeared before him, although said fact was not true; and he later
succeeded in having the register of deeds cancel the transfer certificate of title issued to
Arcadio Arayata and issue transfer certificate of title No. 8370 in his favor; and (2) that on
June 5, 1933, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil, he filed an application to marry
Engracia F. Ortega, stating therein under oath that he was single when in fact he was
married, said marriage not having been dissolved.
The charge filed against attorney and notary public Tereso Ma. Montoya consists in having
ratified the deed of sale and having stated that Arcadio Arayata personally appeared before
him and confirmed the sale, knowing fully well that said person is already dead and therefore
could do neither the one nor the other.
The investigation was finally conducted by the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Cavite, who recommended that a disciplinary action be taken against Arayata and
that Montoya be exonerated, it having been clearly established that the latter, in ratifying the
document, acted in good faith and relied on Arayata's assurance that the old man then with
him was really the vendor Arcadio Arayata who ratified all the contents of the instrument. We
concur in the appreciation of the facts and we are of the opinion that said notary public and
attorney should really be exonerated and held innocent.
The established facts show that the respondent Arayata is the son of Arcadio Arayata who
died on November 5, 1916, leaving a widow and five children; that Arcadio Arayata in life,
purchased from the Bureau of Lands lot No. 3448 of the Hacienda de Santa Cruz de Malabon,
for which transfer certificate of title No. 7591 was issued to him; that on August 27, 1931,
many years after Arcadio Arayata's death, the respondent attorney prepared the deed,
Exhibit A, stating therein that his father sold the land in question to him for the sum of
P4,000; that after affixing the names of the alleged vendor and the two witnesses, the
respondent brought an old man and the two witnesses before notary public Tereso Ma.
Montoya and requested the latter to ratify said document, assuring him that the old man was
the grantor and vendor and the other two were the instrumental witnesses thereto; that the
notary honestly believing said information, legalized and registered the document after
verifying from the old man that he ratified the contents thereof; that the transfer was invalid
and the document not genuine because another, not Arcadio Arayata, signed it; that the
respondent later applied for and obtained transfer certificate of title No. 8370 of said land
from the registry of deeds of Cavite after the former title was cancelled; that sometime later,
or on April 11, 1933, the respondent sold a portion of said land having an area of two and
one-half (2 ) hectares to Sinforosa Torres, married to Basilio Sorosoro, for the sum of P500.
With regard to the second charge, it likewise appears established that on June 5, 1933, the Lacsina, Lontok and Perez and Luis F. Aquino for petitioners.
respondent, being legally married to Aurora L. Saguil and said marriage not having been
dissolved, signed under oath an application to marry Engracia F. Ortega stating therein that Francisco de los Reyes for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.
he was single, he being in fact married; the application was registered and duly considered
and on September 25, 1933, the register of the Province of Cavite issued the corresponding
license upon payment by the respondent of the sum of P2; for some unknown reasons the Araneta, Mendoza and Papa for other respondents.
marriage applied for was not solemnized; the respondent's wife, nevertheless, filed a
complaint for bigamy against the former, which is now pending in the justice of the peace CASTRO, J.:
court of Santa Rosa, Laguna, for which reason the investigator is of the opinion, and so
recommends, that no action should be taken on the second charge. The recommendation is
Appeal, by certiorari to review a decision and a resolution en banc of the Court of Industrial
well founded and has our approval.
Relations dated August 17, 1965 and October 20, 1965, respectively, in Case 1698-ULP.

In his first answer, respondent Arayata admitted that the sale had been made by his father
The Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., Employees Association-NATU, FGU Insurance Group
who was his true predecessor in interest, but alleged that nobody, including the complainant,
Workers & Employees Association-NATU, and Insular Life Building Employees Association-
could complain of the transfer because none was prejudiced, he being the true and only heir.
NATU (hereinafter referred to as the Unions), while still members of the Federation of Free
In his second answer, however, and in the course of the investigation, he set up another
Workers (FFW), entered into separate collective bargaining agreements with the Insular Life
defense alleging that the person who had really sold him the land was his uncle Januario
Assurance Co., Ltd. and the FGU Insurance Group (hereinafter referred to as the Companies).
Arayata who, in the deed and relative to the land, assumed the name of Arcadio Arayata. He
further alleged that it was his said uncle who signed the deed of transfer and ratified it before
notary Montoya. We find this second new defense improbable and unestablished. Two of the lawyers of the Unions then were Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia; the latter was
formerly the secretary-treasurer of the FFW and acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association. Garcia, as such acting president,
The acts committed by the respondent Arayata relative to the deed of sale Exhibit A, and his
in a circular issued in his name and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the
statements to notary Montoya with regard to said document, constitute malpractice and
Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of Trade Unions
unprofessional conduct under the provisions of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
(NATU), to no avail.
meriting for him a disciplinary action mitigated in this case by the circumstance that he was
apparently the heir entitled to the ownership of the land and that the complainant has neither
real nor direct interest in the transaction complained of by her. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, the Companies hired Garcia in the latter part of 1956
as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant in their Legal Department, and he was
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Attorney Eustaquio V. Arayata guilty of malpractice and
soon receiving P900 a month, or P600 more than he was receiving from the FFW. Enaje was
suspend him from the practice of his profession for one (1) month, hereby reprimanding him
hired on or about February 19, 1957 as personnel manager of the Companies, and was
for having prepared and executed the deed of sale in question. So ordered.
likewise made chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.

G.R. No. L-25291 January 30, 1971
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKERS and EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR
LIFE BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES
and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
In a letter dated September 16, 1957, the Unions jointly submitted proposals to the
Companies for a modified renewal of their respective collective bargaining contracts which
were then due to expire on September 30, 1957. The parties mutually agreed and to make
whatever benefits could be agreed upon retroactively effective October 1, 1957.
Thereafter, in the months of September and October 1957 negotiations were conducted on
the Union's proposals, but these were snagged by a deadlock on the issue of union shop, as a
result of which the Unions filed on January 27, 1958 a notice of strike for "deadlock on
collective bargaining." Several conciliation conferences were held under the auspices of the
Department of Labor wherein the conciliators urged the Companies to make reply to the
Unions' proposals en toto so that the said Unions might consider the feasibility of dropping
their demand for union security in exchange for other benefits. However, the Companies did
not make any counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand
for union security, promising money benefits if this was done. Thereupon, and prior to April
15, 1958, the petitioner Insular Life Building Employees Association-NATU dropped this
particular demand, and requested the Companies to answer its demands, point by point, en
toto. But the respondent Insular Life Assurance Co. still refused to make any counter-
proposals. In a letter addressed to the two other Unions by the joint management of the
Companies, the former were also asked to drop their union security demand, otherwise the
Companies "would no longer consider themselves bound by the commitment to make money
benefits retroactive to October 1, 1957." By a letter dated April 17, 1958, the remaining two
petitioner unions likewise dropped their demand for union shop. April 25, 1958 then was set
by the parties to meet and discuss the remaining demands.
From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory result due to a stalemate on the matter of salary increases. On May 13, 1958 the
Unions demanded from the Companies final counter-proposals on their economic demands,
particularly on salary increases. Instead of giving counter-proposals, the Companies on May
15, 1958 presented facts and figures and requested the Unions to submit a workable formula
which would justify their own proposals, taking into account the financial position of the
former. Forthwith the Unions voted to declare a strike in protest against what they considered
the Companies' unfair labor practices.
Meanwhile, eighty-seven (87) unionists were reclassified as supervisors without increase in
salary nor in responsibility while negotiations were going on in the Department of Labor after
the notice to strike was served on the Companies. These employees resigned from the
Unions.
On May 20, 1958 the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular Life
Building at Plaza Moraga.
On May 21, 1958 the Companies through their acting manager and president, the respondent
Jose M. Olbes (hereinafter referred to as the respondent Olbes), sent to each of the strikers a
letter (exhibit A) quoted verbatim as follows:
We recognize it is your privilege both to strike and to conduct picketing.
However, if any of you would like to come back to work voluntarily, you may:
1. Advise the nearest police officer or security guard of your intention to do so.
2. Take your meals within the office.
3. Make a choice whether to go home at the end of the day or to sleep nights at the
office where comfortable cots have been prepared.
4. Enjoy free coffee and occasional movies.
5. Be paid overtime for work performed in excess of eight hours.
6. Be sure arrangements will be made for your families.
The decision to make is yours whether you still believe in the motives of the strike
or in the fairness of the Management.
The Unions, however, continued on strike, with the exception of a few unionists who were
convinced to desist by the aforesaid letter of May 21, 1958.
From the date the strike was called on May 21, 1958, until it was called off on May 31, 1958,
some management men tried to break thru the Unions' picket lines. Thus, on May 21, 1958
Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records
section, respectively of the Companies, tried to penetrate the picket lines in front of the
Insular Life Building. Garcia, upon approaching the picket line, tossed aside the placard of a
picketer, one Paulino Bugay; a fight ensued between them, in which both suffered injuries.
The Companies organized three bus-loads of employees, including a photographer, who with
the said respondent Olbes, succeeded in penetrating the picket lines in front of the Insular
Life Building, thus causing injuries to the picketers and also to the strike-breakers due to the
resistance offered by some picketers.
Alleging that some non-strikers were injured and with the use of photographs as evidence,
the Companies then filed criminal charges against the strikers with the City Fiscal's Office of
Manila. During the pendency of the said cases in the fiscal's office, the Companies likewise
filed a petition for injunction with damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila which,
on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking members of the
Unions, issued on May 31, 1958 an order restraining the strikers, until further orders of the
said court, from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the free and peaceful use of the
Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free movement of persons and vehicles to
and from, out and in, of the Companies' building.
On the same date, the Companies, again through the respondent Olbes, sent individually to
the strikers a letter (exhibit B), quoted hereunder in its entirety:
The first day of the strike was last 21 May 1958.
 Our position remains unchanged and the strike has made us even more convinced of
our decision.
We do not know how long you intend to stay out, but we cannot hold your positions
open for long. We have continued to operate and will continue to do so with or
without you.
If you are still interested in continuing in the employ of the Group Companies, and if
there are no criminal charges pending against you, we are giving you until 2 June
1958 to report for work at the home office. If by this date you have not yet reported,
we may be forced to obtain your replacement.
Before, the decisions was yours to make.
So it is now.
Incidentally, all of the more than 120 criminal charges filed against the members of the
Unions, except three (3), were dismissed by the fiscal's office and by the courts. These three
cases involved "slight physical injuries" against one striker and "light coercion" against two
others.
At any rate, because of the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against them as well
as the ultimatum of the Companies giving them until June 2, 1958 to return to their jobs or
else be replaced, the striking employees decided to call off their strike and to report back to
work on June 2, 1958.
However, before readmitting the strikers, the Companies required them not only to secure
clearances from the City Fiscal's Office of Manila but also to be screened by a management
committee among the members of which were Enage and Garcia. The screening committee
initially rejected 83 strikers with pending criminal charges. However, all non-strikers with
pending criminal charges which arose from the breakthrough incident were readmitted
immediately by the Companies without being required to secure clearances from the fiscal's
office. Subsequently, when practically all the strikers had secured clearances from the fiscal's
office, the Companies readmitted only some but adamantly refused readmission to 34
officials and members of the Unions who were most active in the strike, on the ground that
they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents," without however stating
the specific acts allegedly committed. Among those who were refused readmission are
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice president of the Insular Life Building Employees' Association-NATU;
Florencio Ibarra, president of the FGU Insurance Group Workers & Employees Association-
NATU; and Isagani Du Timbol, acting president of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-NATU. Some 24 of the above number were ultimately notified months
later that they were being dismissed retroactively as of June 2, 1958 and given separation
pay checks computed under Rep. Act 1787, while others (ten in number) up to now have not
been readmitted although there have been no formal dismissal notices given to them.
On July 29, 1958 the CIR prosecutor filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against the
Companies under Republic Act 875. The complaint specifically charged the Companies with
(1) interfering with the members of the Unions in the exercise of their right to concerted
action, by sending out individual letters to them urging them to abandon their strike and
return to work, with a promise of comfortable cots, free coffee and movies, and paid
overtime, and, subsequently, by warning them that if they did not return to work on or before
June 2, 1958, they might be replaced; and (2) discriminating against the members of the
Unions as regards readmission to work after the strike on the basis of their union membership
and degree of participation in the strike.
On August 4, 1958 the Companies filed their answer denying all the material allegations of
the complaint, stating special defenses therein, and asking for the dismissal of the complaint.
After trial on the merits, the Court of Industrial Relations, through Presiding Judge Arsenio
Martinez, rendered on August 17, 1965 a decision dismissing the Unions' complaint for lack of
merit. On August 31, 1965 the Unions seasonably filed their motion for reconsideration of the
said decision, and their supporting memorandum on September 10, 1965. This was denied by
the Court of Industrial Relations en banc in a resolution promulgated on October 20, 1965.
Hence, this petition for review, the Unions contending that the lower court erred:
1. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in sending out
individually to the strikers the letters marked Exhibits A and B;
2. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the striking members of the Unions in the matter of readmission of
employees after the strike;
3. In not finding the Companies guilty of unfair labor practice for dismissing officials
and members of the Unions without giving them the benefit of investigation and the
opportunity to present their side in regard to activities undertaken by them in the
legitimate exercise of their right to strike; and
4. In not ordering the reinstatement of officials and members of the Unions, with full
back wages, from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to their
usual employment.
I. The respondents contend that the sending of the letters, exhibits A and B, constituted a
legitimate exercise of their freedom of speech. We do not agree. The said letters were
directed to the striking employees individually by registered special delivery mail at that
without being coursed through the Unions which were representing the employees in the
collective bargaining.
 The act of an employer in notifying absent employees individually during a strike
following unproductive efforts at collective bargaining that the plant would be
operated the next day and that their jobs were open for them should they want to
come in has been held to be an unfair labor practice, as an active interference with
the right of collective bargaining through dealing with the employees individually
instead of through their collective bargaining representatives. (31 Am. Jur.
563, citing NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co. [CA 9th] 133 F2d 676, 146 ALR 1045)
Indeed, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer operating under a collective bargaining
agreement to negotiate or to attempt to negotiate with his employees individually in
connection with changes in the agreement. And the basis of the prohibition regarding
individual bargaining with the strikers is that although the union is on strike, the employer is
still under obligation to bargain with the union as the employees' bargaining representative
(Melo Photo Supply Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332).
Indeed, some such similar actions are illegal as constituting unwarranted acts of interference.
Thus, the act of a company president in writing letters to the strikers, urging their return to
work on terms inconsistent with their union membership, was adjudged as constituting
interference with the exercise of his employees' right to collective bargaining (Lighter
Publishing, CCA 7th, 133 F2d 621). It is likewise an act of interference for the employer to
send a letter to all employees notifying them to return to work at a time specified therein,
otherwise new employees would be engaged to perform their jobs. Individual solicitation of
the employees or visiting their homes, with the employer or his representative urging the
employees to cease union activity or cease striking, constitutes unfair labor practice. All the
above-detailed activities are unfair labor practices because they tend to undermine the
concerted activity of the employees, an activity to which they are entitled free from the
employer's molestation.1
Moreover, since exhibit A is a letter containing promises of benefits to the employees in order
to entice them to return to work, it is not protected by the free speech provisions of the
Constitution (NLRB v. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213 F2d 70). The same is true with exhibit B
since it contained threats to obtain replacements for the striking employees in the event they
did not report for work on June 2, 1958. The free speech protection under the Constitution is
inapplicable where the expression of opinion by the employer or his agent contains a promise
of benefit, or threats, or reprisal (31 Am. Jur. 544; NLRB vs. Clearfield Cheese Co., Inc., 213
F2d 70; NLRB vs. Goigy Co., 211 F2d 533, 35 ALR 2d 422).
Indeed, when the respondents offered reinstatement and attempted to "bribe" the strikers
with "comfortable cots," "free coffee and occasional movies," "overtime" pay for "work
performed in excess of eight hours," and "arrangements" for their families, so they would
abandon the strike and return to work, they were guilty of strike-breaking and/or union-
busting and, consequently, of unfair labor practice. It is equivalent to an attempt to break a
strike for an employer to offer reinstatement to striking employees individually, when they
are represented by a union, since the employees thus offered reinstatement are unable to
determine what the consequences of returning to work would be.
Likewise violative of the right to organize, form and join labor organizations are the following
acts: the offer of a Christmas bonus to all "loyal" employees of a company shortly after the
making of a request by the union to bargain; wage increases given for the purpose of
mollifying employees after the employer has refused to bargain with the union, or for the
purpose of inducing striking employees to return to work; the employer's promises of benefits
in return for the strikers' abandonment of their strike in support of their union; and the
employer's statement, made about 6 weeks after the strike started, to a group of strikers in a
restaurant to the effect that if the strikers returned to work, they would receive new benefits
in the form of hospitalization, accident insurance, profit-sharing, and a new building to work
in.2
Citing paragraph 5 of the complaint filed by the acting prosecutor of the lower court which
states that "the officers and members of the complainant unions decided to call off the strike
and return to work on June 2, 1958 by reason of the injunction issued by the Manila Court of
First Instance," the respondents contend that this was the main cause why the strikers
returned to work and not the letters, exhibits A and B. This assertion is without merit. The
circumstance that the strikers later decided to return to work ostensibly on account of the
injunctive writ issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot alter the intrinsic quality
of the letters, which were calculated, or which tended, to interfere with the employees' right
to engage in lawful concerted activity in the form of a strike. Interference constituting unfair
labor practice will not cease to be such simply because it was susceptible of being thwarted
or resisted, or that it did not proximately cause the result intended. For success of purpose is
not, and should not, be the criterion in determining whether or not a prohibited act
constitutes unfair labor practice.
The test of whether an employer has interfered with and coerced employees within
the meaning of subsection (a) (1) is whether the employer has engaged in conduct
which it may reasonably be said tends to interfere with the free exercise of
employees' rights under section 3 of the Act, and it is not necessary that there be
direct evidence that any employee was in fact intimidated or coerced by statements
of threats of the employer if there is a reasonable inference that anti-union conduct
of the employer does have an adverse effect on self-organization and collective
bargaining. (Francisco, Labor Laws 1956, Vol. II, p. 323, citing NLRB v. Ford, C.A.,
1948, 170 F2d 735).
Besides, the letters, exhibits A and B, should not be considered by themselves alone but
should be read in the light of the preceding and subsequent circumstances surrounding them.
The letters should be interpreted according to the "totality of conduct doctrine,"
... whereby the culpability of an employer's remarks were to be evaluated not only
on the basis of their implicit implications, but were to be appraised against the
background of and in conjunction with collateral circumstances. Under this
"doctrine" expressions of opinion by an employer which, though innocent in
themselves, frequently were held to be culpable because of the circumstances under
which they were uttered, the history of the particular employer's labor relations or
 anti-union bias or because of their connection with an established collateral plan of
coercion or interference. (Rothenberg on Relations, p. 374, and cases cited therein.)
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an amended
renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the respondents, the latter
hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal counsels of the petitioners, as personnel
manager and assistant corporate secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. After
the notice to strike was served on the Companies and negotiations were in progress in the
Department of Labor, the respondents reclassified 87 employees as supervisors without
increase in salary or in responsibility, in effect compelling these employees to resign from
their unions. And during the negotiations in the Department of Labor, despite the fact that
the petitioners granted the respondents' demand that the former drop their demand for union
shop and in spite of urgings by the conciliators of the Department of Labor, the respondents
adamantly refused to answer the Unions' demands en toto. Incidentally, Enage was the
chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective bargaining between the
former and the Unions. After the petitioners went to strike, the strikers were individually sent
copies of exhibit A, enticing them to abandon their strike by inducing them to return to work
upon promise of special privileges. Two days later, the respondents, thru their president and
manager, respondent Jose M. Olbes, brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others,
escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings
occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the
process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular Life
Building. This resulted in injuries on the part of the picketers and the strike-
breakers.lwph1.t Then the respondents brought against the picketers criminal charges,
only three of which were not dismissed, and these three only for slight misdemeanors. As a
result of these criminal actions, the respondents were able to obtain an injunction from the
court of first instance restraining the strikers from stopping, impeding, obstructing, etc. the
free and peaceful use of the Companies' gates, entrance and driveway and the free
movement of persons and vehicles to and from, out and in, of the Companies' buildings. On
the same day that the injunction was issued, the letter, Exhibit B, was sent again
individually and by registered special delivery mail to the strikers, threatening them with
dismissal if they did not report for work on or before June 2, 1958. But when most of the
petitioners reported for work, the respondents thru a screening committee of which Ramon
Garcia was a member refused to admit 63 members of the Unions on the ground of
"pending criminal charges." However, when almost all were cleared of criminal charges by
the fiscal's office, the respondents adamantly refused admission to 34 officials and union
members. It is not, however, disputed that all-non-strikers with pending criminal charges
which arose from the breakthrough incident of May 23, 1958 were readmitted immediately by
the respondents. Among the non-strikers with pending criminal charges who were readmitted
were Generoso Abella, Enrique Guidote, Emilio Carreon, Antonio Castillo, Federico Barretto,
Manuel Chuidian and Nestor Cipriano. And despite the fact that the fiscal's office found no
probable cause against the petitioning strikers, the Companies adamantly refused admission
to them on the pretext that they committed "acts inimical to the interest of the respondents,"
without stating specifically the inimical acts allegedly committed. They were soon to admit,
however, that these alleged inimical acts were the same criminal charges which were
dismissed by the fiscal and by the courts..
Verily, the above actuations of the respondents before and after the issuance of the letters,
exhibit A and B, yield the clear inference that the said letters formed of the respondents
scheme to preclude if not destroy unionism within them.
To justify the respondents' threat to dismiss the strikers and secure replacements for them in
order to protect and continue their business, the CIR held the petitioners' strike to be an
economic strike on the basis of exhibit 4 (Notice of Strike) which states that there was a
"deadlock in collective bargaining" and on the strength of the supposed testimonies of some
union men who did not actually know the very reason for the strike. It should be noted that
exhibit 4, which was filed on January 27, 1958, states, inter alia:
TO: BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
MANILA
Thirty (30) days from receipt of this notice by the Office, this [sic] unions intends to
go on strike against
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD.
Plaza Moraga, Manila
THE FGU INSURANCE GROUP
Plaza Moraga, Manila
INSULAR LIFE BUILDING ADMINISTRATION
Plaza Moraga, Manila .
for the following reason: DEADLOCK IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING...
However, the employees did not stage the strike after the thirty-day period, reckoned from
January 27, 1958. This simply proves that the reason for the strike was not the deadlock on
collective bargaining nor any lack of economic concessions. By letter dated April 15, 1958,
the respondents categorically stated what they thought was the cause of the "Notice of
Strike," which so far as material, reads:
3. Because you did not see fit to agree with our position on the union shop, you filed
a notice of strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations on 27 January 1958, citing
`deadlock in collective bargaining' which could have been for no other issue than
the union shop." (exhibit 8, letter dated April 15, 1958.)
The strike took place nearly four months from the date the said notice of strike was filed. And
the actual and main reason for the strike was, "When it became crystal clear the
management double crossed or will not negotiate in good faith, it is tantamount to refusal
collectively and considering the unfair labor practice in the meantime being committed by
the management such as the sudden resignation of some unionists and [who] became
supervisors without increase in salary or change in responsibility, such as the coercion of
employees, decided to declare the strike." (tsn., Oct. 14, 1958, p. 14.) The truth of this
assertion is amply proved by the following circumstances: (1) it took the respondents six (6)
months to consider the petitioners' proposals, their only excuse being that they could not go
on with the negotiations if the petitioners did not drop the demand for union shop (exh. 7,
respondents' letter dated April 7, 1958); (2) when the petitioners dropped the demand for
union shop, the respondents did not have a counter-offer to the petitioners' demands. Sec. 14
of Rep. Act 875 required the respondents to make a reply to the petitioners' demands within
ten days from receipt thereof, but instead they asked the petitioners to give a "well reasoned,
workable formula which takes into account the financial position of the group companies."
(tsn., Sept. 8, 1958, p. 62; tsn., Feb. 26, 1969, p. 49.)
II. Exhibit H imposed three conditions for readmission of the strikers, namely: (1) the
employee must be interested in continuing his work with the group companies; (2) there
must be no criminal charges against him; and (3) he must report for work on June 2, 1958,
otherwise he would be replaced. Since the evidence shows that all the employees reported
back to work at the respondents' head office on June 2, 1953, they must be considered as
having complied with the first and third conditions.
Our point of inquiry should therefore be directed at whether they also complied with the
second condition. It is not denied that when the strikers reported for work on June 2, 1958, 63
members of the Unions were refused readmission because they had pending criminal
charges. However, despite the fact that they were able to secure their respective clearances
34 officials and union members were still refused readmission on the alleged ground that
they committed acts inimical to the Companies. It is beyond dispute, however, that non-
strikers who also had criminal charges pending against them in the fiscal's office, arising from
the same incidents whence the criminal charges against the strikers evolved, were readily
readmitted and were not required to secure clearances. This is a clear act of discrimination
practiced by the Companies in the process of rehiring and is therefore a violation of sec. 4(a)
(4) of the Industrial Peace Act.
The respondents did not merely discriminate against all the strikers in general. They
separated the active from the less active unionists on the basis of their militancy, or lack of it,
on the picket lines. Unionists belonging to the first category were refused readmission even
after they were able to secure clearances from the competent authorities with respect to the
criminal charges filed against them. It is significant to note in this connection that except for
one union official who deserted his union on the second day of the strike and who later
participated in crashing through the picket lines, not a single union officer was taken back to
work. Discrimination undoubtedly exists where the record shows that the union activity of the
rehired strikers has been less prominent than that of the strikers who were denied
reinstatement.
So is there an unfair labor practice where the employer, although authorized by the
Court of Industrial Relations to dismiss the employees who participated in an illegal
strike, dismissed only the leaders of the strikers, such dismissal being evidence of
discrimination against those dismissed and constituting a waiver of the employer's
right to dismiss the striking employees and a condonation of the fault committed by
them." (Carlos and Fernando, Labor and Social Legislation, p. 62, citing Phil. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Phil. Air Lines Emloyees Association, L-8197, Oct. 31, 1958.)
It is noteworthy that perhaps in an anticipatory effort to exculpate themselves from
charges of discrimination in the readmission of strikers returning to work the respondents
delegated the power to readmit to a committee. But the respondent Olbes had chosen
Vicente Abella, chief of the personnel records section, and Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate
secretary, to screen the unionists reporting back to work. It is not difficult to imagine that
these two employees having been involved in unpleasant incidents with the picketers
during the strike were hostile to the strikers. Needless to say, the mere act of placing in
the hands of employees hostile to the strikers the power of reinstatement, is a form of
discrimination in rehiring.
Delayed reinstatement is a form of discrimination in rehiring, as is having the
machinery of reinstatement in the hands of employees hostile to the strikers, and
reinstating a union official who formerly worked in a unionized plant, to a job in
another mill, which was imperfectly organized. (Morabe, The Law on Strikes, p. 473,
citing Sunshine Mining Co., 7 NLRB 1252; Cleveland Worsted Mills, 43 NLRB 545;
emphasis supplied.)
Equally significant is the fact that while the management and the members of the screening
committee admitted the discrimination committed against the strikers, they tossed back and
around to each other the responsibility for the discrimination. Thus, Garcia admitted that in
exercising for the management the authority to screen the returning employees, the
committee admitted the non-strikers but refused readmission to the strikers (tsn., Feb. 6,
1962, pp. 15-19, 23-29). Vicente Abella, chairman of the management's screening
committee, while admitting the discrimination, placed the blame therefor squarely on the
management (tsn., Sept. 20, 1960, pp. 7-8, 14-18). But the management, speaking through
the respondent Olbes, head of the Companies, disclaimed responsibility for the
discrimination. He testified that "The decision whether to accept or not an employee was left
in the hands of that committee that had been empowered to look into all cases of the
strikers." (tsn., Sept. 6, 1962, p. 19.)
Of course, the respondents through Ramon Garcia tried to explain the basis for such
discrimination by testifying that strikers whose participation in any alleged misconduct during
the picketing was not serious in nature were readmissible, while those whose participation
was serious were not. (tsn., Aug. 4, 1961, pp. 48-49, 56). But even this distinction between
acts of slight misconduct and acts of serious misconduct which the respondents contend was
the basis for either reinstatement or discharge, is completely shattered upon a cursory
examination of the evidence on record. For with the exception of Pascual Esquillo whose
dismissal sent to the other strikers cited the alleged commission by them of simple "acts of
misconduct."
III. Anent the third assignment of error, the record shows that not a single dismissed striker
was given the opportunity to defend himself against the supposed charges against him. As
earlier mentioned, when the striking employees reported back for work on June 2, 1958, the
respondents refused to readmit them unless they first secured the necessary clearances; but
when all, except three, were able to secure and subsequently present the required
clearances, the respondents still refused to take them back. Instead, several of them later
received letters from the respondents in the following stereotyped tenor:
This will confirm the termination of your employment with the Insular Life-FGU
Insurance Group as of 2 June 1958.
The termination of your employment was due to the fact that you committed acts of
misconduct while picketing during the last strike. Because this may not constitute
sufficient cause under the law to terminate your employment without pay, we are
giving you the amount of P1,930.32 corresponding to one-half month pay for every
year of your service in the Group Company.
Kindly acknowledge receipt of the check we are sending herewith.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) JOSE M. OLBES
President, Insurance Life
Acting President, FGU.
The respondents, however, admitted that the alleged "acts of misconduct" attributed to the
dismissed strikers were the same acts with which the said strikers were charged before the
fiscal's office and the courts. But all these charges except three were dropped or dismissed.
Indeed, the individual cases of dismissed officers and members of the striking unions do not
indicate sufficient basis for dismissal.
Emiliano Tabasondra, vice-president of the petitioner FGU Insurance Group Workers &
Employees Association-NATU, was refused reinstatement allegedly because he did not report
for duty on June 2, 1958 and, hence, had abandoned his office. But the overwhelming
evidence adduced at the trial and which the respondents failed to rebut, negates the
respondents' charge that he had abandoned his job. In his testimony, corroborated by many
others, Tabasondra particularly identified the management men to whom he and his group
presented themselves on June 2, 1958. He mentioned the respondent Olbes' secretary, De
Asis, as the one who received them and later directed them when Olbes refused them an
audience to Felipe Enage, the Companies' personnel manager. He likewise categorically
stated that he and his group went to see Enage as directed by Olbes' secretary. If Tabasondra
were not telling the truth, it would have been an easy matter for the respondents to produce
De Asis and Enage who testified anyway as witnesses for the respondents on several
occasions to rebut his testimony. The respondents did nothing of the kind. Moreover,
Tabasondra called on June 21, 1958 the respondents' attention to his non-admission and
asked them to inform him of the reasons therefor, but instead of doing so, the respondents
dismissed him by their letter dated July 10, 1958. Elementary fairness required that before
being dismissed for cause, Tabasondra be given "his day in court."
At any rate, it has been held that mere failure to report for work after notice to return, does
not constitute abandonment nor bar reinstatement. In one case, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that the taking back of six of eleven men constituted discrimination although the five strikers
who were not reinstated, all of whom were prominent in the union and in the strike, reported
for work at various times during the next three days, but were told that there were no
openings. Said the Court:
... The Board found, and we cannot say that its finding is unsupported, that, in taking
back six union men, the respondent's officials discriminated against the latter on
account of their union activities and that the excuse given that they did not apply
until after the quota was full was an afterthought and not the true reason for the
discrimination against them. (NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,
58 Sup. Ct. 904, 82 L. Ed. 1381) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 725,
728)
The respondents' allegation that Tabasondra should have returned after being refused
readmission on June 2, 1958, is not persuasive. When the employer puts off reinstatement
when an employee reports for work at the time agreed, we consider the employee relieved
from the duty of returning further.
Sixto Tongos was dismissed allegedly because he revealed that despite the fact that the
Companies spent more than P80,000 for the vacation trips of officials, they refused to grant
union demands; hence, he betrayed his trust as an auditor of the Companies. We do not find
this allegation convincing. First, this accusation was emphatically denied by Tongos on the
witness stand. Gonzales, president of one of the respondent Companies and one of the
officials referred to, took a trip abroad in 1958. Exchange controls were then in force, and an
outgoing traveller on a combined business and vacation trip was allowed by the Central Bank,
per its Circular 52 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks) dated May 9, 1952, an allocation
of $1,000 or only P2,000, at the official rate of two pesos to the dollar, as pocket money;
hence, this was the only amount that would appear on the books of the Companies. It was
only on January 21, 1962, per its Circular 133 (Notification to Authorized Agent Banks), that
the Central Bank lifted the exchange controls. Tongos could not therefore have revealed an
amount bigger than the above sum. And his competence in figures could not be doubted
considering that he had passed the board examinations for certified public accountants. But
assuming arguendo that Tongos indeed revealed the true expenses of Gonzales' trip which
the respondents never denied or tried to
disprove his statements clearly fall within the sphere of a unionist's right to discuss and
advertise the facts involved in a labor dispute, in accordance with section 9(a)(5) of Republic
Act 875 which guarantees the untramelled exercise by striking employees of the right to give
"publicity to the existence of, or the fact involved in any labor dispute, whether by
advertising, speaking, patrolling or by any method not involving fraud or violence." Indeed, it
is not only the right, it is as well the duty, of every unionist to advertise the facts of a dispute
for the purpose of informing all those affected thereby. In labor disputes, the combatants are
expected to expose the truth before the public to justify their respective demands. Being a
union man and one of the strikers, Tongos was expected to reveal the whole truth on whether
or not the respondent Companies were justified in refusing to accede to union demands. After
all, not being one of the supervisors, he was not a part of management. And his statement, if
indeed made, is but an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution.
Free speech on both sides and for every faction on any side of the labor relation is to
me a constitutional and useful right. Labor is free ... to turn its publicity on any labor
oppression, substandard wages, employer unfairness, or objectionable working
conditions. The employer, too, should be free to answer and to turn publicity on the
records of the leaders of the unions which seek the confidence of his men ...
(Concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 547, 65
Sup. Ct. 315, 89 L. Ed. 430.) (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 591.)
The respondents also allege that in revealing certain confidential information, Tongos
committed not only a betrayal of trust but also a violation of the moral principles and ethics
of accountancy. But nowhere in the Code of Ethics for Certified Public Accountants under the
Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of Accountancy formulated in 1954, is this stated.
Moreover, the relationship of the Companies with Tongos was that of an employer and not a
client. And with regard to the testimonies of Juan Raymundo and Antolin Carillo, both vice-
presidents of the Trust Insurance Agencies, Inc. about the alleged utterances made by
Tongos, the lower court should not have given them much weight. The firm of these
witnesses was newly established at that time and was still a "general agency" of the
Companies. It is not therefore amiss to conclude that they were more inclined to favor the
respondents rather than Tongos.
Pacifico Ner, Paulino Bugay, Jose Garcia, Narciso Dao, Vicente Alsol and Hermenigildo
Ramirez, opined the lower court, were constructively dismissed by non-readmission allegedly
because they not only prevented Ramon Garcia, assistant corporate secretary, and Vicente
Abella, chief of the personnel records section of the Companies, from entering the
Companies' premises on May 21, 1958, but they also caused bruises and abrasions on
Garcia's chest and forehead acts considered inimical to the interest of the respondents.
The Unions, upon the other hand, insist that there is complete lack of evidence that Ner took
part in pushing Garcia; that it was Garcia who elbowed his way through the picket lines and
therefore Ner shouted "Close up," which the picketers did; and that Garcia tossed Paulino
Bugay's placard and a fight ensued between them in which both suffered injuries. But despite
these conflicting versions of what actually happened on May 21, 1958, there are grounds to
believe that the picketers are not responsible for what happened.lwph1.t The picketing
on May 21, 1958, as reported in the police blotter, was peaceful (see Police blotter report,
exh. 3 in CA-G.R. No. 25991-R of the Court of Appeals, where Ner was acquitted). Moreover,
although the Companies during the strike were holding offices at the Botica Boie building at
Escolta, Manila; Tuason Building at San Vicente Street, Manila; and Ayala, Inc. offices at
Makati, Rizal, Garcia, the assistant corporate secretary, and Abella, the chief of the personnel
records section, reported for work at the Insular Life Building. There is therefore a reasonable
suggestion that they were sent to work at the latter building to create such an incident and
have a basis for filing criminal charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and
applying for injunction from the court of first instance. Besides, under the circumstances the
picketers were not legally bound to yield their grounds and withdraw from the picket lines.
Being where the law expects them to be in the legitimate exercise of their rights, they had
every reason to defend themselves and their rights from any assault or unlawful
transgression. Yet the police blotter, about adverted to, attests that they did not resort to
violence.
The heated altercations and occasional blows exchanged on the picket line do not affect or
diminish the right to strike. Persuasive on this point is the following commentary: .
We think it must be conceded that some disorder is unfortunately quite usual in any
extensive or long drawn out strike. A strike is essentially a battle waged with
economic weapons. Engaged in it are human beings whose feelings are stirred to the
depths. Rising passions call forth hot words. Hot words lead to blows on the picket
line. The transformation from economic to physical combat by those engaged in the
contest is difficult to prevent even when cool heads direct the fight. Violence of this
nature, however much it is to be regretted, must have been in the contemplation of
the Congress when it provided in Sec. 13 of Act 29 USCA Sec. 163, that nothing
therein should be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way
the right to strike. If this were not so, the rights afforded to employees by the Act
would indeed be illusory. We accordingly recently held that it was not intended by
the Act that minor disorders of this nature would deprive a striker of the possibility
of reinstatement. (Republic Steel Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 107 F2d 472, cited in Mathews,
Labor Relations and the Law, p. 378)
Hence the incident that occurred between Ner, et al. and Ramon Garcia was but a necessary
incident of the strike and should not be considered as a bar to reinstatement. Thus it has
been held that:
Fist-fighting between union and non-union employees in the midst of a strike is no bar to
reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, p.
855 citing Stackpole Carbon, Co. 6 NLRB 171, enforced 105 F2d 167.)
Furthermore, assuming that the acts committed by the strikers were transgressions of law,
they amount only to mere ordinary misdemeanors and are not a bar to reinstatement.
In cases involving misdemeanors the board has generally held that unlawful acts are not bar
to reinstatement. (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Id., p. 854, citing Ford
Motor Company, 23 NLRB No. 28.)
Finally, it is not disputed that despite the pendency of criminal charges against non-striking
employees before the fiscal's office, they were readily admitted, but those strikers who had
pending charges in the same office were refused readmission. The reinstatement of the
strikers is thus in order.
[W]here the misconduct, whether in reinstating persons equally guilty with those
whose reinstatement is opposed, or in other ways, gives rise to the inference that
union activities rather than misconduct is the basis of his [employer] objection, the
Board has usually required reinstatement." (Teller, supra, p. 853, citing the Third
Annual Report of NLRB [1938], p. 211.)
Lastly, the lower Court justified the constructive dismissal of Florencio Ibarra allegedly
because he committed acts inimical to the interest of the respondents when, as president of
the FGU Workers and Employees Association-NATU, he advised the strikers that they could
use force and violence to have a successful picket and that picketing was precisely intended
to prevent the non-strikers and company clients and customers from entering the Companies'
buildings. Even if this were true, the record discloses that the picket line had been generally
peaceful, and that incidents happened only when management men made incursions into
and tried to break the picket line. At any rate, with or without the advice of Ibarra, picketing is
inherently explosive. For, as pointed out by one author, "The picket line is an explosive front,
charged with the emotions and fierce loyalties of the union-management dispute. It may be
marked by colorful name-calling, intimidating threats or sporadic fights between the pickets
and those who pass the line." (Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 752). The picket line
being the natural result of the respondents' unfair labor practice, Ibarra's misconduct is at
most a misdemeanor which is not a bar to reinstatement. Besides, the only evidence
presented by the Companies regarding Ibarra's participation in the strike was the testimony
of one Rodolfo Encarnacion, a former member of the board of directors of the petitioner FGU
Insurance Group Workers and Employees Union-NATU, who became a "turncoat" and who
likewise testified as to the union activities of Atty. Lacsina, Ricardo Villaruel and others (annex
C, Decision, p. 27) another matter which emphasizes the respondents' unfair labor
practice. For under the circumstances, there is good ground to believe that Encarnacion was
made to spy on the actvities of the union members. This act of the respondents is considered
unjustifiable interference in the union activities of the petitioners and is unfair labor practice.
It has been held in a great number of decisions at espionage by an employer of
union activities, or surveillance thereof, are such instances of interference, restraint
or coercion of employees in connection with their right to organize, form and join
unions as to constitute unfair labor practice.
... "Nothing is more calculated to interfere with, restrain and coerce employees in
the exercise of their right to self-organization than such activity even where no
discharges result. The information obtained by means of espionage is in valuable to
the employer and can be used in a variety of cases to break a union." The unfair
labor practice is committed whether the espionage is carried on by a professional
labor spy or detective, by officials or supervisory employees of the employer, or by
fellow employees acting at the request or direction of the employer, or an ex-
employee..." (Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining, Vol. II, pp. 765-766,
and cases cited.) .
IV. The lower court should have ordered the reinstatement of the officials and members of the
Unions, with full back wages from June 2, 1958 to the date of their actual reinstatement to
their usual employment. Because all too clear from the factual and environmental milieu of
this case, coupled with settled decisional law, is that the Unions went on strike because of the
unfair labor practices committed by the respondents, and that when the strikers reported
back for work upon the invitation of the respondents they were discriminatorily
dismissed. The members and officials of the Unions therefore are entitled to reinstatement
with back pay.
[W]here the strike was induced and provoked by improper conduct on the part of an
employer amounting to an 'unfair labor practice,' the strikers are entitled to
reinstatement with back pay. (Rothenberg on Labor Relations, p. 418.)
[A]n employee who has been dismissed in violation of the provisions of the Act is
entitled to reinstatement with back pay upon an adjudication that the discharge was
illegal." (Id., citing Waterman S. S. Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 119 F2d 760; N. L. R. B. v.
Richter's Bakery, 140 F2d 870; N. L. R. B. v. Southern Wood Preserving Co., 135 F. 2d
606; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. N. L. R. B., 108 F2d 390; N. L. R. B. v. American Mfg. Co., 106
F2d 61; N. L. R. B. v. Kentucky Fire Brick Co., 99 F2d 99.)
And it is not a defense to reinstatement for the respondents to allege that the positions of
these union members have already been filled by replacements.
[W]here the employers' "unfair labor practice" caused or contributed to the strike or
where the 'lock-out' by the employer constitutes an "unfair labor practice," the
employer cannot successfully urge as a defense that the striking or lock-out
employees position has been filled by replacement. Under such circumstances, if no
job sufficiently and satisfactorily comparable to that previously held by the
aggrieved employee can be found, the employer must discharge the replacement
employee, if necessary, to restore the striking or locked-out worker to his old or
comparable position ... If the employer's improper conduct was an initial cause of
the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement and the dismissal of
replacement employees wherever necessary; ... . (Id., p. 422 and cases cited.)
A corollary issue to which we now address ourselves is, from what date should the backpay
payable to the unionists be computed? It is now a settled doctrine that strikers who are
entitled to reinstatement are not entitled to back pay during the period of the strike, even
though it is caused by an unfair labor practice. However, if they offer to return to work under
the same conditions just before the strike, the refusal to re-employ or the imposition of
conditions amounting to unfair labor practice is a violation of section 4(a) (4) of the Industrial
Peace Act and the employer is liable for backpay from the date of the offer (Cromwell
Commercial Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, L-19778,
Decision, Sept. 30, 1964, 12 SCRA 124; Id., Resolution on motion for reconsideration, 13 SCRA
258; see also Mathews, Labor Relations and the Law, p. 730 and the cited cases). We have
likewise ruled that discriminatorily dismissed employees must receive backpay from the date
of the act of discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge (Cromwell Commercial
Employees and Laborers Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, supra).
The respondents notified the petitioner strikers to report back for work on June 2, 1958, which
the latter did. A great number of them, however, were refused readmission because they had
criminal charges against them pending before the fiscal's office, although non-strikers who
were also facing criminal indictments were readily readmitted. These strikers who were
refused readmission on June 2, 1958 can thus be categorized as discriminatorily dismissed
employees and are entitled to backpay from said date. This is true even with respect to the
petitioners Jose Pilapil, Paulino Bugay, Jr. and Jose Garcia, Jr. who were found guilty only of
misdemeanors which are not considered sufficient to bar reinstatement (Teller, Labor
Disputes and Collective Bargaining, p. 854), especially so because their unlawful acts arose
during incidents which were provoked by the respondents' men. However, since the
employees who were denied readmission have been out of the service of the Companies (for
more than ten years) during which they may have found other employment or other means
of livelihood, it is only just and equitable that whatever they may have earned during that
period should be deducted from their back wages to mitigate somewhat the liability of the
company, pursuant to the equitable principle that no one is allowed to enrich himself at the
expense of another (Macleod & Co. of the Philippines v. Progressive Federation of Labor, 97
Phil. 205 [1955]).
The lower court gave inordinate significance to the payment to and acceptance by the
dismissed employees of separation pay. This Court has ruled that while employers may be
authorized under Republic Act 1052 to terminate employment of employees by serving the
required notice, or, in the absence thereof, by paying the required compensation, the said Act
may not be invoked to justify a dismissal prohibited by law, e.g., dismissal for union activities.
... While Republic Act No. 1052 authorizes a commercial establishment to terminate
the employment of its employee by serving notice on him one month in advance, or,
in the absence thereof, by paying him one month compensation from the date of the
termination of his employment, such Act does not give to the employer a blanket
authority to terminate the employment regardless of the cause or purpose behind
such termination. Certainly, it cannot be made use of as a cloak to circumvent a final
order of the court or a scheme to trample upon the right of an employee who has
been the victim of an unfair labor practice. (Yu Ki Lam, et al. v. Nena Micaller, et al.,
99 Phil. 904 [1956].)
Finally, we do not share the respondents' view that the findings of fact of the Court of
Industrial Relations are supported by substantial and credible proof. This Court is not
therefore precluded from digging deeper into the factual milieu of the case (Union of
Philippine Education Employees v. Philippine Education Company, 91 Phil. 93; Lu Do & Lu Ym
Corporation v. Philippine-Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, 11 SCRA 134 [1964]).
V. The petitioners (15 of them) ask this Court to cite for contempt the respondent Presiding
Judge Arsenio Martinez of the Court of Industrial Relations and the counsels for the private
respondents, on the ground that the former wrote the following in his decision subject of the
instant petition for certiorari, while the latter quoted the same on pages 90-91 of the
respondents' brief: .
... Says the Supreme Court in the following decisions:
In a proceeding for unfair labor practice, involving a determination as to whether or
not the acts of the employees concerned justified the adoption of the employer of
disciplinary measures against them, the mere fact that the employees may be able
to put up a valid defense in a criminal prosecution for the same acts, does not erase
or neutralize the employer's right to impose discipline on said employees. For it is
settled that not even the acquittal of an employee of the criminal charge against
him is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should
the act upon which the criminal charged was based constitute nevertheless an
activity inimical to the employer's interest... The act of the employees now under
consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a just cause for
dismissal. (Lopez, Sr., et al. vs. Chronicle Publication Employees Ass'n. et al., G.R.
No. L-20179-81, December 28, 1964.) (emphasis supplied)
The two pertinent paragraphs in the above-cited decision * which contained the underscored
portions of the above citation read however as follows:
Differently as regard the dismissal of Orlando Aquino and Carmelito Vicente, we are
inclined to uphold the action taken by the employer as proper disciplinary measure.
A reading of the article which allegedly caused their dismissal reveals that it really
contains an insinuation albeit subtly of the supposed exertion of political pressure by
the Manila Chronicle management upon the City Fiscal's Office, resulting in the non-
filing of the case against the employer. In rejecting the employer's theory that the
dismissal of Vicente and Aquino was justified, the lower court considered the article
as "a report of some acts and omissions of an Assistant Fiscal in the exercise of his
official functions" and, therefore, does away with the presumption of malice. This
being a proceeding for unfair labor practice, the matter should not have been
viewed or gauged in the light of the doctrine on a publisher's culpability under the
 Penal Code. We are not here to determine whether the employees' act could stand
criminal prosecution, but only to find out whether the aforesaid act justifies the
adoption by the employer of disciplinary measure against them. This is not
sustaining the ruling that the publication in question is qualified privileged, but even
on the assumption that this is so, the exempting character thereof under the Penal
Code does not necessarily erase or neutralize its effect on the employer's interest
which may warrant employment of disciplinary measure. For it must be
remembered that not even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges
against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees,
should the act upon which the criminal charges was based constitute nevertheless
an activity inimical to the employer's interest.
In the herein case, it appears to us that for an employee to publish his "suspicion,"
which actually amounts to a public accusation, that his employer is exerting political
pressure on a public official to thwart some legitimate activities on the employees,
which charge, in the least, would sully the employer's reputation, can be nothing but
an act inimical to the said employer's interest. And the fact that the same was made
in the union newspaper does not alter its deleterious character nor shield or protect
a reprehensible act on the ground that it is a union activity, because such end can
be achieved without resort to improper conduct or behavior. The act of the
employees now under consideration may be considered as a misconduct which is a
just cause for dismissal.** (Emphasis ours)
It is plain to the naked eye that the 60 un-underscored words of the paragraph quoted by the
respondent Judge do not appear in the pertinent paragraph of this Court's decision in L-
20179-81. Moreover, the first underscored sentence in the quoted paragraph starts with "For
it is settled ..." whereas it reads, "For it must be remembered ...," in this Court's decision.
Finally, the second and last underlined sentence in the quoted paragraph of the respondent
Judge's decision, appears not in the same paragraph of this Court's decision where the other
sentence is, but in the immediately succeeding paragraph.
This apparent error, however, does not seem to warrant an indictment for contempt against
the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels. We are inclined to believe that the
misquotation is more a result of clerical ineptitude than a deliberate attempt on the part of
the respondent Judge to mislead. We fully realize how saddled with many pending cases are
the courts of the land, and it is not difficult to imagine that because of the pressure of their
varied and multifarious work, clerical errors may escape their notice. Upon the other hand,
the respondents' counsels have the prima facie right to rely on the quotation as it appears in
the respondent Judge's decision, to copy it verbatim, and to incorporate it in their brief.
Anyway, the import of the underscored sentences of the quotation in the respondent Judge's
decision is substantially the same as, and faithfully reflects, the particular ruling in this
Court's decision, i.e., that "[N]ot even the acquittal of an employee, of the criminal charges
against him, is a bar to the employer's right to impose discipline on its employees, should the
act upon which the criminal charges were based constitute nevertheless an activity inimical
to the employer's interest."
Be that as it may, we must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and
rulings, it is the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same
word-for-word and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and
salutary reason why they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all
other courts, as well as lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the
decisions referred to in article 8 of the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines," are only those enunciated by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain
terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al. (77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this
Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present
is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court
may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the detriment of other courts, lawyers and the
public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior courts and members of the bar meticulously
discharge their duty to check and recheck their citations of authorities culled not only from
this Court's decisions but from other sources and make certain that they are verbatim
reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark, appellate courts will be precluded
from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious time in finding out whether the
citations are correct.
Happily for the respondent Judge and the respondents' counsels, there was no substantial
change in the thrust of this Court's particular ruling which they cited. It is our view,
nonetheless, that for their mistake, they should be, as they are hereby, admonished to be
more careful when citing jurisprudence in the future. ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Court
of Industrial Relations dated August 17, 1965 is reversed and set aside, and another is
entered, ordering the respondents to reinstate the dismissed members of the petitioning
Unions to their former or comparatively similar positions, with backwages from June 2, 1958
up to the dates of their actual reinstatements. Costs against the respondents.
Asa vs Castillo
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Subject of the present Decision are four administrative cases, docketed by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) as Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Case Nos. 03-1076,03-
1108,03-1109, and 03-1125.
I. CBD Case No. 03-1076
In 1996, Atty. Pablito M. Castillo (Castillo), then an associate of the Laurel Law Offices of
which Attorneys Leon L. Asa (Asa) and Jose A. Oliveros (Oliveros) are partners, endorsed to
the law firm a guardianship case, Special Proceeding No. 5222, In re: Guardianship of the
Minors Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jerill Nonan, which was pending before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 59. Castillo appeared as counsel of record for the therein
petitioner, Dr. Salvador H. Laurel, guardian ad litem of the minors Nonan who appear to have
inherited a sizeable amount of US dollars.
A misunderstanding later occurred between Asa and Castillo as regards their sharing in the
attorneys fees in the guardianship case.
On page 6 of a pleading entitled Reply to Petitioner-Guardians Comment/Opposition, [1] ETC.
dated July 19, 2002 filed before Branch 59 of the Angeles RTC and signed by Castillos
daughter Ginger Anne Castillo (Ginger Anne) as counsel for Castillo who filed a Notice
Ad Cautelam, it was alleged that, inter alia, Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for
his services in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there is a conference at the
Laurel Law Offices.[2]
Finding the above statement of Castillo and Ginger Anne to be a brazen falsehood concocted
to besmirch Asas reputation, Asa and Oliveros filed before IBP an administrative
complaint[3] against Castillo and Ginger Anne, for gross violation of the lawyers oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1076.
In their complaint, Asa and Oliveros also charged Castillo with machinations and deceit
arising from the following alleged incidents:
In a conference held at the Laurel Law Offices prior to January 20, 2000 attended by Dr.
Laurel, the Nonan minors counsel abroad Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III (Cassiday), Asa and
Castillo, it was agreed that the amount to be received by Dr. Laurel in trust for
the Nonan heirs would be deposited at the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St.
Francis Square Branch, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-00043-0. Castillo,
however, proposed that the funds be deposited instead at the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), he explaining that he knew an employee there who could facilitate the
transaction. Dr. Laurel rejected this proposition and instead instructed Castillo to file the
appropriate motion to have the funds deposited at the RCBC.[4]
Without showing to Dr. Laurel the motion he was instructed to prepare, Castillo filed the same
with the Angeles trial court. Dr. Laurel subsequently received a copy of a March 2, 2000 RTC
Order[5] signed by the then trial Judge Eliezer R. De los Santos granting his motion and
accordingly directing that the funds to be held in trust for the Nonanchildren be deposited at
the Trust Department of the UCPB Head Office. Dr. Laurel, Cassiday and Asa thus filed with
the Angeles City trial court an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration [6] of the March 2, 2000
Angeles RTC Order in order to have the funds deposited at the RCBC transferred to the RTC,
as previously agreed upon. This motion was granted.
Still in the same complaint, Asa and Oliveros alleged that in a Reply to Answer [7] dated June
25, 2001 filed by Castillo with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 145 in Civil Case No. 01-
506, Atty. P.M. Castillo v. United Coconut Planters Bank, Lorenzo V. Tan and Angelica S.
Hernandez, Castillo again committed a clear falsehood when he therein stated that:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff [Castillo] was also profuse in extolling his
academic credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer as follows:
Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers of the Laurel
Law Offices,[8] (Underscoring supplied),
he knowing that retired Justice Kalalo had never been at any time a lawyer at the Laurel Law
Offices. In support of this allegation, they appended to the complaint a certified true copy of
the Service Record[9] of Justice Kalalo which does not show that he was ever connected with
the Laurel Law Office.
In their Answer[10] to the complaint, Castillo and Ginger Anne declared:
There is nothing wrong or objectionable to the statement that Asas services in the
guardianship case consisted in providing coffee and opening doors whenever there was a
conference at the Laurel Law Offices, as this was in fact the truth, the comportment being
strictly in accordance with long cherished Filipino hospitality, and he [Castillo] would have
done the same with his own visitors.[11] In any event, they claim that the assailed factual
narration was material and relevant to Castillos question why Asa was given the lions share of
attorneys fees when he had not rendered any known material service which redounded to the
benefit of the Nonan children.
Moreover, the Castillos declared that the deposit of the Nonan funds at the UCPB was not
attended with malice or bad faith, nor was it intended to benefit them as the funds could only
be withdrawn by Dr. Laurel who had exclusive access to all the information pertaining to the
interest and benefits accruing thereto.
As regards the assailed June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer filed with the Makati RTC in Civil Case
No. 01-506, the Castillos asserted that Castillo had no control nor influence over the
voluntary and spontaneous testimony of retired Justice Kalalo in his favor during the
proceedings adverted to.[12]
II. CBD Case No. 03-1108
Castillo subsequently filed a complaint[13] against Oliveros before the IBP, docketed as CBD
Case No. 03-1108, for gross violation of lawyers oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Castillo alleged that: (1) Oliveros assisted Cassiday in embezzling US $950,000 representing
the share adjudicated to the Nonan heirs; (2) in conspiracy with Dr. Laurel and a certain Atty.
Douglas Cushnie, Oliveros resorted to forum shopping to undermine and defeat the
jurisdiction of the Philippine court in the guardianship proceedings; (3) Oliveros, along
with Asa, Dr. Laurel and Cassiday, perpetuated other acts of fraud in the guardianship
proceedings; and (4) Oliveros, together with Asa, deliberately and maliciously filed a
groundless administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne.
In his Answer[14] to the Complaint in CBD Case No. 03-1108, Oliveros, decrying the allegations
against him as patently false, baseless and malicious, claimed that the complaint was
Castillos way of retaliating against him for having joined Asa in filing the administrative
complaint against him and Ginger Anne (CBD Case No. 03-1076).
III. CBD Case No. 03-1109
Castillo also filed an administrative complaint[15] against Asa before the IBP, charging him
with embezzlement, dishonesty, betrayal of trust, grave abuse of confidence and violation of
the lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The case was docketed as CBD
Case No. 03-1109.
Castillo alleged that (1) Asa, Cassiday and Dr. Laurel scandalously mismanaged the estate of
the Nonan heirs, the bulk of which they indiscriminately pocketed; (2) Asa and Oliveros filed a
groundless administrative complaint against him and Ginger Anne to compel him to withdraw
his claim for attorneys fees against Dr. Laurel and his bid to replace the latter as guardian of
the Nonan heirs; (3) despite an Agreement[16] dated February 16, 2000 between him
and Asa that the latter would receive only 25% of whatever he (Castillo) would receive as
attorneys fees, Asa secretly pocketed the amounts of $24,500 and $160,500 from the
guardianship case on April 18, 2000; (4) Asa refused to account for and turn over the amount
of $130,000 in attorneys fees which belonged to him (Castillo); and (5) Asa embarked on a
scheme to force him into resigning as counsel for Dr. Laurel to enable them to exercise
absolute control over the guardianship case and appropriate for themselves the attorneys
fees allocated for him.
In his Answer to the Complaint[17] in CBD Case No. 03-1109, Asa alleged as follows: It was in
fact Castillo who reneged on their February 16, 2000 Agreement as the latter had earlier
bluntly told him that he changed his mind and that he would not give him (Asa) any share in
the attorneys fees he would receive from the guardianship case, Castillo reasoning that he
was the therein counsel of record and had endorsed the case to the Laurel Law Offices. He
thus reported the matter to Dr. Laurel and informed him that he would likewise not give
Castillos share in the attorneys fees he [Asa] might receive because [Castillo] has no word of
honor.[18]
As regards the $24,500 that he allegedly secretly pocketed, Asa explained that several days
prior to April 18, 2000, Dr. Laurel and Atty. Cassiday fixed the attorneys fees of both Castillo
and Asa at $100,000 each, based on the amount to be paid by the four heirs or $25,000 per
heir. When the first heir Merceditas Feliciano (Merceditas) paid $1,150,000 on April 18, 2000,
he deposited $24,500 of this amount in his and his wifes joint Dollar Account No. 247-702-
9275 at the Philippine National Bank (PNB), OrtigasBranch as his share in the attorneys fees,
while he opened a new account in the name of Dr. Laurel to which he deposited the amount
of $160,500.
Asa went on to declare that Castillo received his own $25,000 plus interest amounting to
$25,023.13 representing full payment of his attorneys fees from Merceditas, as evidenced by
a Receipt[19] dated May 2, 2000 signed by Castillo.
Continuing, Asa declared that of the $160,500 belonging to Dr. Laurel, $100,000
represented partial payment for his consenting to be the guardian ad litem of the Nonanheirs
and $60,000 represented reimbursement for expenses incurred over several years by Dr.
Laurel, the total of which was placed temporarily on April 18, 2000 in his (Asas) Dollar
Account No. 8-250-00047-3 in RCBC. Dr. Laurel, however, withdrew $160,000.00 the following
day from RCBC and placed it in his own Dollar Time Deposit Account for which $500.00 was
spent for the purpose. A Certification[20] to this effect, issued by RCBC Ortigas Business Center
Manager Dolores L. Del Valle, was appended to AsasAnswer.
Finally, Asa declared that Castillos claim for $130,000 in attorneys fees is baseless and
unconscionable, and that Castillo filed the complaint merely to harass him in retaliation for
the complaint he and Oliveros priorly filed against him and Ginger Anne.
IV. CBD Case No. 03-1125
On August 25, 2003, Asa filed yet another administrative complaint,[21] against Castillo
before the IBP, for disbarment/suspension, docketed as CBD Case No. 03-1125, charging
him with deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, immoral conduct, violation of the
lawyers oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of his baseless, malicious
and derogatory allegations in CBD Case No. 03-1109 which were founded on deceit and
deliberate falsehood, and of promoting a groundless, false and unlawful suit.
IBP REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION:
By Report and Recommendation [22] of February 27, 2004, the IBP CBD, through Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the consolidated cases in this wise.
From the facts and evidence presented, what have been shown by the
counsels are mutual bickerings, unjustified recriminations and offensive
personalities between brother lawyers which detract from the dignity of the
legal profession and do not deserve the attention of the Commission. The
voluminous case record contains but personal peculiarities and
idiosyncrasies hurled by the counsels against each other which constitute
highly unprofessional conduct. A great part of mans comfort, as well as of
his success at the bar, depends upon his relations with his professional
brethren. With them he is in daily necessary intercourse, and he must have
their respect and confidence, if he wishes to sail along in smooth
waters. Hence, the parties are advised to conduct themselves honorably,
fairly and candidly toward each other and try to maintain the dignity of the
legal profession.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
By Resolution[24] of April 16, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved
the February 27, 2004 Report and Recommendation and dismissed the consolidated cases for
lack of merit.
The records of the cases were then forwarded for final action to this Court.
Asa filed with this Court an August 2, 2004 a Motion for Reconsideration [25] in CBD Case No.
03-1125. He too, together with Oliveros, filed on August 3, 2004 a Motion for
Reconsideration[26] in CBD Case No. 03-1076.
Castillo likewise filed with this Court a Consolidated Omnibus Motion for Partial
Reconsideration[27] dated August 9, 2004 in CBD Case No. 03-1108 and CBD Case No. 03-
1109.
On January 12, 2005, Asa filed his Comment[28] on Castillos Consolidated Omnibus Motion for
Partial Reconsideration in CBD Case No. 03-1109 while also Oliverosfiled his Comment on the
same motion on February 28, 2005.
On March 16, 2005, Castillo filed his Consolidated Reply to the Comments
of Asa and Oliveros, with Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner.[29]
THIS COURTS RULING
In his questioned Reply to Petitioner-Guardians Comment/Opposition, Castillos
statement reads:
x x x Atty. Leon Asa wants to be paid an additional $75,000.00 for his
services in providing coffee and opening the doors whenever there is a
conference at the Laurel Law Offices. He also conveniently provides himself
with the Nonan expediente to give assistance to the parties during their so-
called conferences. Worse, his express reluctance to appear before this
Honorable Court was repeatedly announced by Atty. Jose Oliveros because
of his so-called failing health x x x[30]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 of the same Canon mandates that a
lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
That a member of the bar is enjoined to observe honorable, candid and courteous dealing
with other lawyers[31] and employ respectful and restrained language is in keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession. [32] It is through a scrupulous preference for respectful language
that a lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial
officers.[33]
In the case at bar, Castillo and Ginger Annes choice of words manifestly falls short of this
criterion. Their disparaging statements in the pleading referred to above belie their proffered
good intention and exceed the bounds of civility and propriety.
Castillos claim that the statement about Asas services is relevant and pertinent to the claim
for attorneys fees and was, for all legal intents and purposes, a privileged
communication[34] deserves short shrift. Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of
judicial proceedings constitutes unprofessional conduct subject to disciplinary action, even if
the publication thereof is privileged.[35]
x x x this Court will not be inhibited from exercising its supervisory
authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to that standard
expected of them as members of the Bar.Indeed, the rule of absolute
privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and
criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like
the member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal
liability arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in
any committee thereof, but nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary
authority of the legislature for said speech or debate, a lawyer equally
remains subject to this Courts supervisory and disciplinary powers for
lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the legal profession.
[36]
(Underscoring supplied)
Castillo and Ginger Anne are thus ADMONISHED to exercise greater care and circumspection
in the preparation of their pleadings and refrain from using offensive or otherwise improper
language.
In support of Asa and Oliveros allegation that Castillo employed deceit and falsehood in
attempting to change the depositary bank for the funds to be held in trust by Dr. Laurel for
the Nonan heirs, they presented the March 2, 2000 RTC Order directing Dr. Laurel and his
principal counsel Castillo to deposit the balance of the proceeds of the settlement with any
and all of the adjudicated heirs with UCPB and the March 14, 2000 RTC Order directing the
deposit of the settlement proceeds with the RCBC.
A perusal of the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated March 8, 2000 signed by Dr. Laurel,
however, fails to establish any wrongdoing on the part of Castillo in having filed the Motion to
deposit the funds at UCPB. It simply stated that:
Considering the present raging controversy arising from the P50 Billion
coconut levy funds, the stability of the United Coconut Planters Bank
(UCPB), Head Office at Makati, may be seriously affected x x x
The Petitioner-Guardian can best protect the deposits of the Nonan children
if the proceeds of the settlement will be deposited with a solvent and more
conservative bank like the RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION
(RCBC) x x x[37]
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly
preponderant evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant. Moreover, an
administrative case against a lawyer must show the dubious character of the act done as well
as the motivation thereof.[38] In the case at bar, Asa and Oliveros failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that Castillo willfully and deliberately resorted to deceit and
falsehood in filing the Motion to have the funds deposited at UCPB.
Respecting Castillos June 25, 2001 Reply to Answer in the Makati RTC Civil Case No. 01-506,
he therein alleged:
On the other hand, retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the Court of Appeals who
personally knew the plaintiff, was also profuse in extolling his academic
credentials and accomplishments as a Trial lawyer, as follows:
 Q: Do you know the claimant Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: Yes sir, because we were both active Senior Trial lawyers at the
Laurel Law Offices.
Q: How could you characterize and rate the trial competency,
performance and expertise of Atty. P.M. Castillo?
A: He is highly competent, low key, aggressive and very brilliant in the
conduct of trial, as well as, in the formulation of courtroom
strategies. His pleadings are also very well written, direct to the point,
convincing, scholarly and exhaustive. To be sure, he is one of the
popular trial lawyers of our firm (The Laurel Law Offices), not only
because he came from an exclusive school, but also because of his
scholastic records at Ateneo de Manila was also impressive. That is why
he was taken in by former VP Salvador H. Laurel even before the
release of the 1964 bar where he was also No. 2 among the Ateneo bar
candidates for the year. He was No. 15 among the
bar topnotchers. This is not to mention his impressive and highly (sic)
batting average of winning about 80% to 90% of his load cases and
work. He was also one of the busy lawyers of our office, until he went
on private practice and excelled as one of the more successful and
respected trial practitioners.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
To Asa, by the foregoing allegation, Castillo committed clear falsehood for Justice Kalalo had
never been a lawyer at any time at the Laurel Law Offices.
Castillo explained, however, that he can only say that he has no control, nor influence on the
voluntary and spontaneous declaration and testimony of Retired Justice Felipe Kalalo of the
Court of Appeals in his favor during the highly adversarial proceedings. [40]
Castillos explanation does not impress, however. The records show that the above-quoted
statements attributed by Castillo to Justice Kalalo were lifted from an unsigned and
unsubscribed affidavit entitled Question and Answer Format in Lieu of Direct Testimony of
Justice Felipe Kalalo[41] dated January 21, 1993. This affidavit was earlier filed by Castillo with
the Pasig RTC, Branch 154 in connection with his claim for attorneys fees in Civil Cases Nos.
43049 and 56637 which affidavit was subsequently withdrawn, [42] however, as it was
unsigned and unsubscribed.
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the courts. Rule 10.01 of said Canon specifically commands that a
member of the bar shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice. Rule 10.02 of the same
Canon provides that a member of the bar shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the
contents of a paper or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
And Section 20(d), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court directs that a lawyer must employ such
means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or
any judicial officer by any artifice or false statement of fact or law. [43]
Complete candor or honesty is thus expected from lawyers, particularly when they appear
and plead before the courts.[44] They have an obligation to the court as well as to the
opposing party to make only truthful statements in their pleadings. [45] The burden cast on the
judiciary would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by
counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations
submitted could easily be imagined.[46]
In light of the above findings reflecting Castillos administrative culpability, his charge
against Asa and Oliveros of filing groundless disbarment cases against him and Ginger Anne
necessarily fails.
As regards Castillos claim that Asa secretly pocketed $24,500 and $160,500, the undated
certification issued by RCBC Branch Operation Head Dolores del Valle reading:
This is to certify that on April 18, 2000, Mr. Leon L. Asa opened a Dollar
Savings Account at our Business Center. A credit was made to his assigned
Dollar Savings Account Number 8-250-00047-3 in the amount of US Dollars:
One Hundred Sixty Thousand Five Hundred (USD: 160,500.00) as initial
transaction. We further certify that on April 19, 2000, there was a debit
made for said account in the amount of US Dollars: One Hundred Sixty
Thousand (USD: 160,000.00) and that same amount was placed in the
Dollar Time Deposit Account of Salvador H. Laurel. Mr. Leon Asa left the
amount of USD: Five Hundred in his account to serve as the maintaining
balance requirement. Subject Dollar Savings Account had closed already,[47]
and Dr. Laurel Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian [48] dated February 13,
2002 filed with the Angeles City RTC, Branch 59 in Sp. Proc. No. 5222 stating that:
3. On April 18, 2000, Guardian Ad Litem Salvador H. Laurel and his Principal
Foreign Legal Counsel, Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III received by way of
settlement from one of the duly adjudicated heirs of Larry
Lee Hillblom, Mercedita Feliciano, by and through her Guardian Ad Litem,
Milagros Feliciano, the amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND US DOLLARS (US$1,150,000.00) which was deposited with
the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), St. Francis Square
Branch, Ortigas Center, Pasig City under Dollar Savings Account No. 8-250-
000430-ABA. Routing No. RCBC PH MM in the name of Salvador H. Laurel, in
trust for Honeylyn, Alexandra and Jeril Nonan, in compliance with the Order
of this Honorable Court dated April 26, 2000;
4. Pursuant to the above-stated Orders of this Honorable Court, the
Guardian Ad Litem and Atty. Benjamin Cassiday III disbursed the following
amounts for the purposes indicated:
A. ATTORNEYS FEES & OTHER NECESSARY LEGAL EXPENSES:
xxxx
 (7) Partial payment of the fee of Salvador H. Laurel for consenting to be the
guardian ad litem of the Nonan children and accepting all responsibilities
attached to said position .US$100,000.00
(8) Reimbursement to Salvador H. Laurel for expenses incurred during the
last six (6) years for airfare, car rentals, overseas calls, and representation
and other incidental expenses while in the various states in the United
States in order to pursue the claim of the Nonan children against
the Hillblom estate .US$60,000.00
x x x x[49] (Underscoring supplied),
validate Asas explanation that the amount of $160,500 belonged to Dr. Laurel but was merely
temporarily placed in his (Asas) account.
The Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian shows that $12,500 was received
by Asa as attorneys fees for assisting Dr. Laurel and Castillo from 1996 to 2000. [50] Confirming
such disbursement is a Receipt [51] dated April 18, 2000 signed by Asa. The remaining $12,500
of the $25,000 attorneys fees of Asa per heir (as priorly agreed upon by Dr. Laurel
and Cassiday) were remitted by Asa to the Laurel Law Offices as Official Receipt No.
1766[52] issued by the treasurer/cashier of the Laurel Law Offices dated April 19, 2000 shows:
RECEIVED from Atty. Leon L. Asa the sum of Twelve thousand five hundred
US Dollars US$12,500.00 as fifty percent (50%) share of LLO [Laurel Law
Offices] in attorneys fees of US$25,000 of Atty. Asa in SP Proc. 5222 of RTC
Angeles City, Br. 59.
Cash.US$12,500-
By: Sgd.
Treasurer/Cashier
On Asas alleged unjust refusal to turn over Castillos attorneys fees: It appears that Asa and
Castillo each received $25,000 as attorneys fees but pursuant to their February 2000
Agreement, the aggregate amount of $50,000 would be divided between them, and Castillo
would receive 75% thereof or $37,500, while Asa would receive 25% or $12,500. The records
show that Asa kept only $12,500 for himself, he having remitted, as reflected above, the
remaining $12,500 to the Laurel Law Offices.
Dr. Laurel eventually gave Castillo $10,000 out of the $12,500 which Asa remitted to the
Laurel Law Offices, as reflected in the Partial Inventory, Account and Report of Guardian. [53]
Respecting Castillos claim that, in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Asa and Oliveros embarked on another sinister strategy to spite, insult and
provoke him to ostracize him and make him feel unwanted to continue as [Dr. Laurels] lawyer
in furtherance of their conspiracy to force him into resignation for them to replace him and
have absolute control over the guardianship case, the funds of the estate and the attorneys
fees, the same is unsubstantiated, hence, deserves no further consideration.
As to Castillos charge against Asa and Oliveros of embezzlement due to alleged scandalous
mismanagement of the estate of the Nonan heirs, premised on the October 13, 2003 RTC
Order[54] in SP No. 5222, this Court finds the evidence presented insufficient to warrant the
imposition of sanctions against them.
Finally, on Castillos Omnibus Motion to Appoint a Commissioner, the matters raised
therein[55] being entirely inappropriate, to say the least, for consideration in these
administrative proceedings, the same is denied.
A final word. The spectacle of members of the bar being engaged in bickering and
recrimination is far from edifying. Mutual bickerings and unjustified recriminations between
brother attorneys detract from the dignity of the legal profession and will not receive any
sympathy from this Court.[56] Personal colloquies between counsels which promote unseemly
wrangling should thus be carefully avoided.[57]
It appears that Castillo had previously been suspended for Six (6) Months by this Court in CBD
Case No. 176, Bongalonta v. Castillo,[58] for committing falsehood in violation of his lawyers
oath and of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He was then warned that commission of
the same or similar offense in the future would call for the imposition of a more severe
penalty. This Court thus imposes upon him a penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for a period of One (1) year.
WHEREFORE, the administrative cases filed against Atty. Leon L. Asa and Atty. Jose
A. Oliveros are DISMISSED.
Atty. Ginger Anne Castillo is found GUILTY of breach of Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby admonished to refrain from using offensive and improper
language in her pleadings.
Atty. Pablito M. Castillo is likewise found GUILTY of breach of Canons 8, as well as Canon 10
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of One (1) Year, effective upon receipt of this Decision.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the respective personal records of Atty. Ginger Anne
Castillo and of Atty. Pablito M. Castillo in the Office of the Bar Confidant.Let copies too be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-35469 October 9, 1987
ENCARNACION BANOGON, ZOSIMA MUNOZ, and DAVIDINA MUNOZ, petitioners,
vs.
MELCHOR ZERNA, CONSEJO ZERNA DE CORNELIO, FRANCISCO ZERNA, and the HON.
CIPRIANO VAMENTA, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental
(Branch III).
CRUZ, J.:
It's unbelievable. The original decision in this case was rendered by the cadastral court way
back on February 9, 1926, sixty one years ago. A motion to amend that decision was filed on
March 6, 1957, thirty one years later. This was followed by an amended petition for review of
the judgment on March 18, 1957, and an opposition thereto on March 26, 1957. On October
11, 1971, or after fourteen years, a motion to dismiss the petition was filed. The petition was
dismissed on December 8, 1971, and the motion for reconsideration was denied on February
14, 1972. 1 The petitioners then came to us on certiorari to question the orders of the
respondent judge. 2
These dates are not typographical errors. What is involved here are errors of law and lawyers.
The respondent court dismissed the petition for review of the decision rendered in 1926 on
the ground that it had been filed out of time, indeed thirty one years too late. Laches, it was
held, had operated against the petitioners. 3
The petitioners contend that the said judgment had not yet become final and executory
because the land in dispute had not yet been registered in favor of the private respondents.
The said judgment would become so only after one year from the issuance of the decree of
registration. If any one was guilty of laches, it was the private respondents who had failed to
enforce the judgment by having the land registered in their the pursuant thereto. 4
For their part, the private respondents argue that the decision of February 9, 1926, became
final and executory after 30 days, same not having been appealed by the petitioners during
that period. They slept on their rights for thirty one years before it occurred to them to
question the judgment of the cadastral court. In fact, their alleged predecessor-in-interest,
Filomeno Banogon, lived for nineteen more years after the 1926 decision and did not see fit
to challenge it until his death in 1945. The herein petitioners themselves waited
another twelve years, or until 195 7, to file their petition for review. 5
While arguing that they were not guilty of laches because the 1926 decision had not yet
become final and executory because the land subject thereof had not yet been registered,
the petitioners rationalize: "If an aggrieved party is allowed the remedy of re-opening the
case within one year after the issuance of the decree, why should the same party be denied
this remedy before the decree is issued? 6
Why not indeed? Why then did they not file their petition earlier? Why do they now pretend
that they have all the time in the world because the land has not yet been registered and the
one-year reglementary period has not yet expired?
7
Thinking to support their position, the petitioners cite Rivera v. Moran where it was held:
... It is conceded that no decree of registration has been entered and section 38 of
the Land Registration Act provides that a petition for review of such a decree on the
grounds of fraud must be filed "within one year after entry of the decree." Giving
this provision a literal interpretation, it may first blush seem that the petition for
review cannot be presented until the final decree has been entered. But on further
reflection, it is obvious that such could not have been the intention of the
Legislature and that what it meant would have been better expressed by stating
that such petitioners must be presented before the expiration of one year from the
entry of the decree. Statutes must be given a reasonable construction and there can
be no possible reason for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final
decree is entered before urging his claim of fraud. We therefore hold that a petition
for review under section 38, supra, may be filed at any time the rendition of the
court's decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final
decree of registration. (Emphasissupplied).
A reading thereof will show that it is against their contentions and that under this doctrine
they should not have delayed in asserting their claim of fraud. Their delay was not only for
thirty one days but for thirty one years. Laches bars their petition now. Their position is
clearly contrary to law and logic and to even ordinary common sense.
This Court has repeatedly reminded litigants and lawyers alike:
"Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is assent
essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment
has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of
the fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard against any scheme calculated
to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies,
courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them." 8
There should be a greater awareness on the part of litigants that the time of the
judiciary, much more so of this Court, is too valuable to be wasted or frittered away
by efforts, far from commendable, to evade the operation of a decision final and
executory, especially so, where, as shown in this case, the clear and manifest
absence of any right calling for vindication, is quite obvious and indisputable. 9
This appeal moreover, should fail, predicated as it is on an insubstantial objection
bereft of any persuasive force. Defendants had to display ingenuity to conjure a
technicality. From Alonso v. Villamor, a 1910 decision, we have left no doubt as to
our disapproval of such a practice. The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the
parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such
a worthy objective. Necessarily, therefore, any attempt to pervert the ends for which
they are intended deserves condemnation. We have done so before. We do so
again. 10
Regarding the argument that the private respondents took fourteen years to move for the
dismissal of the petition for review, it suffices to point out that an opposition thereto had
been made as early as March 26, 1957, or nine days after the filing of the
petition. 11 Moreover, it was for the petitioners to move for the hearing of the petition
instead of waiting for the private respondents to ask for its dismissal. After all, they were the
parties asking for relief, and it was the private respondents who were in possession of the
land in dispute.
One reason why there is a degree of public distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By
doing so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the same time lessen popular faith in the
legal profession as the sworn upholders of the law. While this is not to say that every wrong
interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as indeed most of them are only honest errors,
this Court must express its disapproval of the adroit and intentional misreading designed
precisely to circumvent or violate it.
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of
justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions that only add to the
workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A judicious
study of the facts and the law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be
permitted to be filed to merely clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not
advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that for sheer lack of
merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.
This petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioners. This decision is immediately
executory. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-22320 July 29, 1968
MERCEDES RUTH COBB-PEREZ and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968,
specifically directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the
petitioners resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages
alternatingly, abetted by their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the
execution of a simple money judgment which has long become final and executory.
Some of the actions were filed, only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners
and their counsel, far from viewing courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice,
have tried to use them to subvert the very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners,
while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far
as it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the
treble costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature
deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer
conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our
decision, was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners'
counsels in this adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso
Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed
alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be
overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in
CA-G.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in
order to end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the
execution in a piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale
six times. More than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same
has yet to be satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their
counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final
judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed
out temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of
Appeals decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and
asked for an ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in
connection with civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the
basic civil case 39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII
presided by the respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any
action relative to the execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
looking to Acosta vs. Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first
instance have no power to restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October
4, 1963 the ex parte writ which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from
carrying out the execution sale. It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the
movants, knew or ought to have known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal
did not have jurisdiction to issue the writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating
the recall of the writ improvidently issued, on September 3, 1963, a month before the said
writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of
execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as justification the conjugal nature of the
levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso Perez' judgment debt, the very
same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still pending in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any evidence in support of her
aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels appeared during the
scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for
hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been
duly notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is
waiving his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift
writ of execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer
of jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal),
Mrs. Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the
issuance of another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila (not the same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection
with civil case 7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably
anticipated anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of
Branch XXII, on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground,
among others, that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of
a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied,
Damaso Perez, as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with
another "remedy," as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case
39407 an "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied
his wife's above-mentioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October
19, 1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a
party to the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was
merely an offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez
spouses as stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set
for hearing on December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the
said cash dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled. 2 Consequently, the
respondent Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates
the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any
particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement
of the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on
a strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment.
It is equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they
ventured to adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed
another until the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was
delayed, and more than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically
waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and
55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity
of which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this
regard, the remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin
the Sheriff from proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal
nature of the levied stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent
issuance of a permanent injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally,
in the course of the protracted litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this
remedy in civil cases 7532 and 55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought
other, and often simultaneous, devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment
debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as
having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must
not be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed
of the suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in
question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for
devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested
remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they
sought the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal
and the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were
filed respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of
the writ of execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the
settled doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial
jurisdiction 4 or interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously enough, antedated by at least one
jurisdiction. 5 However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in civil case 7532.
cases 7532 and 55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action
in each case. Had the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968
could have done so. But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay
when she instituted the above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
basic civil case 39407, anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former
case, until the said civil case 7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own
motion. Anent civil case 55292, the Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they
instituted the herein petition for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on
the same grounds proffered in the said civil case until the latter was also dismissed on
G.R. No. L-77691 August 8,1988
March 20, 1964, with the consent of the parties because of the pendency then of the
aforesaid petition for certiorari.
PATERNO R. CANLAS, petitioner,
vs.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, and FRANCISCO HERRERA, respondents.
happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."

Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.

A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar. Abalos, Gatdula & Bermejo for private respondent.

It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause
is defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit,
rather than traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the
participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court
ordering that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their
counsel" is not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so
that when we said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were
responsible for the inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil
case 39407, after the Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of
November 15, 1962. And it is on record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas,
upon his own admission, "entered his appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court
of First Instance of Manila dismissed the petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No.
39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior to the Court of Appeals decision above-
mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963
when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case No. 55292 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala although it appears on record that the
urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs. Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on
September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin
Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be recalled that the said urgent motion
SARMIENTO, J.:
The case dramatizes the unpleasant spectacle of a lawyer tangling with his own client, more
often than not, in the matter of fees. The lawyer, the petitioner himself, would have his
petition decided on pure questions of procedure, yet, the Court cannot let pass unnoticed the
murkier face of the controversy, wherein the law is corrupted to promote a lawyer's
selfseeking ends, and the law profession, debased into a simple business dealing.
Accordingly, we resolve it on the basis not only of the questions raised by the petitioner
pertaining to procedure, but considering its serious ethical implications, on its merits as well.
We turn to the facts.
The private respondent was the registered owner of eight (six, according to the petitioner)
parcels of land located in Quezon City. 1 Between 1977 and 1978, 2 he obtained various loans
from the L & R Corporation, a financing institution, in various sums totalling P420,000.00 As
security therefor, he executed deeds of mortgage in favor of the corporation over the parcels
aforesaid. On August 28,1979, and upon the maturing of said loans, the firm caused an
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage following his failure to pay, as a consequence of which,
the said eight (six, according to the petitioner) parcels of land were disposed of at public
auction, and in which L & R Corporation was itself the highest bidder.
Pending redemption, the private respondent filed a complaint for injunction against L & R
Corporation, to enjoin consolidation of title in its name, in which he succeeded in obtaining
preliminary injunctive relief. He was represented by the petitioner. Two years later, and with
no imminent end to the litigation in sight, the parties entered into a compromise agreement
whereby L & R Corporation accorded the private respondent another year to redeem the
foreclosed properties subject to payment of P600,000.00, with interest thereon at one per
cent per month. They likewise stipulated that the petitioner shall be entitled to attorney's
fees of P100,000.00. On November 19, 1982, the court 3 approved the compromise.
The private respondent, however, remained in dire financial straits a fact the petitioner
himself concede 4 for which reason he failed to acquire the finding to repay the loans in
question, let alone the sum of P100,000.00 in attorney's fees demanded by the petitioner.
That notwithstanding, the petitioner moved for execution insofar as his fees were concemed.
The court granted execution, although it does not appear that the sum was actually
collected. 5
Sometime thereafter, the petitioner and the private respondent met to discuss relief for the
latter with respect to his liability to L & R Corporation on the one hand, and his obligation to
the petitioner on the other. The petitioner contends that the private respondent "earnestly
implored" 6 him to redeem the said properties; the private respondent maintains that it was
the petitioner himself who 'offered to advance the money," 7 provided that he, the private
respondent, executed a "transfer of mortgage" 8 over the properties in his favor. Who
implored whom is a bone of contention, but as we shall see shortly, we are inclined to agree
with the private respondent's version, considering primarily the petitioner's moral
ascendancy over his client and the private respondent's increasing desperation.
The records further show that the parties, pursuant to their agreement, executed a "Deed of
Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption and/or to Redeem," a document that enabled the
petitioner, first, to redeem the parcels in question, and secondly, to register the same in his
name. The private respondent alleges that he subsequently filed loan applications with the
Family Savings Bank to finance a wet market project upon the subject premises to find,
according to him, and to his dismay, the properties already registered in the name of the
petitioner. He likewise contends that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Redemption
and/or to Redeem" on file with the Register of Deeds (for Quezon City) had been falsified as
follows:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (Pl00,000.00) I, FRANCISCO HERRERA,
hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R. Canlas, any
and all my rights of the real properties and/or to redeem from the Mortgagee, L & R
Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at public auction by the
Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above Compromise Agreement in
Civil Case No. Q30679 ... 9
whereas it originally reads:
WHEREFORE, for and in full settlement of the attorney's fees of TRANSFEREE in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00), I, FRANCISCO
HERRERA, hereby transfer, assign and convey unto TRANSFEREE, Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas, any and all my rights of equity of redemption and/or to redeem from the
Mortgagee, L & R Corporation my mortgaged properties foreclosed and sold at
public auction by the Sheriff of Quezon City and subject matter of the above
Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. Q30679. . . 10
As a consequence, the private respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim upon
the respective certificates of title embracing the properties. Upon learning of the same, the
petitioner moved for the cancellation of the adverse claim and for the issuance of a writ of
possession. The court granted both motions. The private respondent countered with a motion
for a temporary restraining order and later, a motion to recall the writ of possession. He
likewise alleges that he commenced disbarment proceedings before this Court against the
petitioner 11 as well as various criminal complaints for estafa, falsification, and "betrayal of
trust" 12 with the Department of Justice. On December 1, 1983, finally, he instituted an action
for reconveyance and reformation of document, 13 praying that the certificates of title issued
in the name of the petitioner be cancelled and that "the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights
of Equity of Redemption and/or to Redeem dated May 3, 1983 ... be reformed to reflect the
true agreement of Francisco Herrera and Paterno R. Canlas, of a mortgage." 14 He vehemently
maintains that the petitioner's "agreement with [him] was that the latter would lend the
money to the former for a year, so that [petitioner] would have time to look for a loan for the
wet market which [the petitioner] intended to put up on said property." 15 Predictably, the
petitioner moved for dismissal.
The trial court, however, denied the private respondent's petition. It held that the alteration
complained of did not change the meaning of the contract since it was "well within [the
petitioner's] rights" 16 "to protect and insure his interest of P654,000.00 which is the
redemption price he has paid;" 17 secondly, that the petitioner himself had acquired an
interest in the properties subject of reconveyance based on the
compromise agreement approved by Judge Castro in the injunction case, pursuant to Section
29(b), of Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, that had, consequently, made him a judgment
creditor in his own right; thirdly, that the private respondent had lost all rights over the same
arising from his failure to redeem them from L & R Corporation within the extended period;
and finally, that the petitioner cannot be said to have violated the ban against sales of
properties in custodia legis to lawyers by their clients pendente lite, since the sale in question
took place after judgment in the injunction case abovesaid had attained finality. The
complaint was consequently dismissed, a dismissal that eventually attained a character of
finality.
Undaunted, the private respondent, on December 6, 1985, filed a suit for "Annulment Of
Judgment 18 in the respondent Court of Appeals, 19 praying that the orders of Judge Castro:
(1). granting execution over the portion of the compromise agreement obliging the private
respondent to pay the petitioner P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (2) denying the private
respondent's prayer for a restraining order directed against the execution: and (3) denying
the motion to recall writ of possession, all be set aside.
The petitioner filed a comment on the petition, but followed it up with a motion to dismiss. On
December 8, 1986, the respondent Court of Appeals promulgated the first of its challenged
resolutions, denying the motion to dismiss. On March 3, 1987, the Appellate Court denied
reconsideration. 20
Hence the instant petition.
As we stated, the petitioner assails these twin resolutions on grounds of improper procedure.
Specifically, he assigns the following errors:
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R.
NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND THAT IT IS IN REALITY A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED OUT
OF TIME AND SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN DUE COURSE.
II.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DISMISSING AC G.R.
NO. 07860 ON THE GROUND OF RES JUDICATA
III.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSE [sic] ITS DISCRETION IN NOT CONSIDERING AC G.
R. 07860 AS MOOT AND ACADEMIC SINCE PETITIONER HAD DISPOSED OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTIES LONG BEFORE THE FILING OF THIS SUIT.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT DENYING PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO DISMISS SOLELY ON THE GROUND THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED THEREIN ARE
BUT REHASH OF THE ARGUMENTS IN HIS COMMENT TO THE PETITION. 21
The petitioner argues that the petition pending with the respondent court "is actually a
petition for certiorari," 22disguised as a pleading for annulment of judgment and that in such
a case, it faces alleged legal impediments (1) It had been filed out of time, allegedly two
years from the issuance of the assailed orders, and (2) It was not preceded by a motion for
reconsideration. He adds that assuming annulment of judgment were proper, no judgment
allegedly exists for annulment, the aforesaid two orders being in the nature of interlocutory
issuances.
On purely technical grounds, the petitioner's arguments are impressive. Annulment of
judgment, we have had occasion to rule, rests on a single ground: extrinsic fraud. What
"extrinsic fraud" means is explained in Macabingkil v. People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation : 23
xxx xxx xxx
It is only extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, however,
that can serve as a basis for the annulment of judgment. Fraud has been regarded
as extrinsic or collateral, within the meaning of the rule, "where it is one the effect of
which prevents a party from having a trial, or real contest, or from presenting all of
his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but of the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy." In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any
fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of
the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting
fully his side of the case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. 24
A perusal of the petition of therein private respondent Herrera pending before the respondent
Court reveals no cause of action for annulment of judgment. In the first place, and as herein
petitioner Canlas correctly points out, the judgment itself is not assailed, but rather, the
orders merely implementing it. Secondly, there is no showing that extrinsic fraud,
as Makabingkil defines it, indeed vitiated the proceedings presided over by Judge Castro. On
the contrary, Herrera's petition in the respondent court will show that he was privy to the
incidents he complains of, and in fact, had entered timely oppositions and motions to defeat
Atty. Canlas' claims under the compromise agreement.
What he objects to is his suspected collusion between Atty. Canlas and His Honor to expedite
the former's collection of his fees. He alleges that his counsel had deliberately, and with
malevolent designs, postponed execution to force him (Herrera) to agree to sell the
properties in controversy to him (Atty. Canlas) subject to redemption. ("...[I]t was
understandable that respondent Atty. Paterno R. Canlas did not implement the writ of
execution, instead he contacted petitioner in order that petitioner would sign the questioned
documents. This was the clincher of the plan of respondent Atty, Paterno R. Canlas to divest
petitioner of his properties. For this purpose, it is obvious that respondent Atty. Paterno R.
Canlas had to conspire with the respondent court judge to achieve his plan." 25) Aside from
being plain speculation, it is no argument to justify annulment. Clearly, it does not amount to
extrinsic fraud as the term is defined in law.
Neither is it proper for the extraordinary remedy of certiorari. Certiorari presupposes the
absence of an appeal 26and while there is no appeal from execution of judgment, appeal lies
in case of irregular implementation of the writ. 27 In the case at bar, there is no irregular
execution to speak of As a rule, "irregular execution" means the failure of the writ to conform
to the decree of the decision executed. 28 In the instant case, respondent Herrera's charges,
to wit, that Judge Castro had erred in denying his motions for temporary restraining order and
to recall writ of possession, or that His Honor had acted hastily (". . . that respondent
court/judge took only one [1) day to resolve petitioner's motion for issuance of [a]
[restraining] order. . ." 29) in denying his twofold motions, do not make out a case for irregular
execution. The orders impugned are conformable to the letter of the judgment approving the
parties'compromise agreement.
The lengths the private respondent, Francisco Herrera, would go to in a last-ditch bid to hold
on to his lands and constraints of economic privation have not been lost on us. It is obvious
that he is uneasy about the judgment on compromise itself, as well as the subsequent
contract between him and his lawyer. In such a case, Article 2038 of the Civil Code applies:
Art. 2038. A compromise in which there is mistake, fraud, violence intimidation,
undue influence, or falsity of documents, is subject to the provisions of article 1330
of this Code ...
in relation to Article 1330 thereof:
Art. 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence, or fraud is voidable.
in relation to its provisions on avoidance of'contracts. 30 The court notes that he had, for this
purpose, gone to the Regional Trial Court, a vain effort as we stated, and in which the
decision had become final.
We, however, sustain Atty. Canlas' position-on matters of procedure for the enlightenment
solely of the bench and the bar. It does not mean that we find merit in his petition. As we
have intimated, we cannot overlook the unseemlier side of the proceeding, in which a
member of the bar would exploit his mastery of procedural law to score a "technical
knockout" over his own client, of all people. Procedural rules, after all, have for their object
assistance unto parties "in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding." 31 If procedure were to be an impediment to such an objective, "it
deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief
enemy." 32 It was almost eight decades ago that the Court held:
... A litigation is not a game of technicalities in which one, more deeply schooled and
skilled in the subtle art of movement and position, entraps and destroys the other. It
is, rather, a contest in which each contending party fully and fairly lays before the
court the facts in issue and then, brushing aside as wholly trivial and indecisive all
imperfections of form and technicalities of procedure, asks that justice be done upon
the merits. Lawsuits, unlike duels, are not to be won by the a rapier's thrust ... 33
It is a ruling that almost eight decades after it was rendered, holds true as ever.
By Atty. Canlas' own account, "due to lack of paying capacity of respondent Herrera, no
financing entity was willing to extend him any loan with which to pay the redemption price of
his mortgaged properties and petitioner's P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded in the
Compromise Judgment," 34 a development that should have tempered his demand for his
fees. For obvious reasons, he placed his interests over and above those of his client, in
opposition to his oath to "conduct himself as a lawyer ... with all good fidelity ... to [his]
clients." 35 The Court finds the occasion fit to stress that lawyering is not a moneymaking
venture and lawyers are not merchants, a fundamental standard that has, as a matter of
judicial notice, eluded not a few law advocates. The petitioner's efforts partaking of a
shakedown" of his own client are not becoming of a lawyer and certainly, do not speak well of
his fealty to his oath to "delay no man for money." 36
It is true that lawyers are entitled to make a living, in spite of the fact that the practice of law
is not a commercial enterprise; but that does not furnish an excuse for plain lust for material
wealth, more so at the expense of another. Law advocacy, we reiterate, is not capital that
yields profits. The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is
a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
government interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject to State
regulation. 37Anent attomey's fees, section 24, of Rule 138, of the Rules, provides in part as
follows:
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of
the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing
of the attorney... A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
So also it is decreed by Article 2208 of the Civil Code, reproduced in part, as follows:
Art. 2208 ...
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
We do not find the petitioner's claim of attorney's fees in the sum of P100,000.00 reasonable.
We do not believe that it satisfies the standards set forth by the Rules. The extent of the
services he had rendered in Civil Case No. 30679, and as far as the records will yield, is not
impressive to justify payment of such a gargantuan amount. The case itself moreover did not
involve complex questions of fact or law that would have required substantial effort as to
research or leg work for the petitioner to warrant his demands. The fact that the properties
subject thereof commanded quite handsome prices in the market should not be a measure of
the importance or non-importance of the case. We are not likewise persuaded that the
petitioner's stature warrants the sum claimed.
All things considered, we reduce the petitioner's fees, on a quantum meruit basis, to
P20,000.00.
It is futile to invoke the rule granting attorneys a lien upon the things won in litigation similar
to that vested upon redemptioners. 38 To begin with, the rule refers to realty sold as a result
of execution in satisfaction of judgment. In this case, however, redemption was decreed by
agreement (on compromise) between the mortgagor and mortgagee. It did not give the
petitioner any right to the properties themselves, much less the right of redemption, although
provisions for his compensation were purportedly provided. It did not make him a
redemptioner for the plain reason that he was not named one in the amicable settlement. To
this extent, we reverse Judge Pedro Santiago's ruling in Civil Case No. 40066, recognizing
Atty. Canlas' "legal right, independent of the questioned deed of sale and transfer which was
executed subsequently on May 3, 1983, to redeem the subject realty from the L & R
Corporation pursuant to Sec. 29 (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court." 39Whatever right he had,
it was, arguably with respect alone to his renumeration. It did not extend to the lands.
Secondly, and assuming that such a right exists, it must be in proportion to the "just fees and
disbursements" 40due him. It is still subject to the tempering hand of this Court.
The Court notes a hidden agenda in the petitioner's haste to execute the compromise
agreement and subsequently, to force the transfer of the properties to himself. As we have
observed, in spite of the issuance of the writ of execution, it does not appear that the
petitioner took pains to implement it. We find this perplexing given his passionate and
persistent pleas that he was entitled to the proceeds. There can indeed be no plausible
explanation other than to enable him to keep an "ace" against the private respondent that
led finally, to the conveyance of the properties in his favor. To be sure, he would have us
beheve that by redeeming the same from the mortgagee and by in fact parting with his own
money he had actually done the private respondent a favor, but this is to assume that he did
not get anything out of the transaction. Indeed, he himself admits that "[t]itles to the
properties have been issued to the new owners long before the filing of private respondents
[sic] petition for annulment." 41 To say that he did not profit therefrom is to take either this
Court or the petitioner for naive, a proposition this Court is not prepared to accept under the
circumstances.
We are likewise convinced that it was the petitioner who succeeded in having the private
respondent sign the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity of Redemption and/or to
Redeem," a pre-prepared document apparently, that allowed him (the petitioner) to exercise
the right of redemption over the properties and to all intents and purposes, acquire
ownership thereof. As we have earlier averred, the private respondent, by reason of
bankruptcy, had become an easy quarry to his counsel's moral influence and ascendancy. We
are hard put to believe that it was the private respondent who "earnestly implored" 42 him to
undertake the redemption amid the former's obstinate attempts to keep his lands that have
indeed led to the multiple suits the petitioner now complains of, apart from the fact that the
latter himself had something to gain from the transaction, as alluded to above. We are of the
opinion that in ceding his right of redemption, the private respondent had intended merely to
forestall the total loss of the parcels to the mortgagee upon the understanding that his
counsel shall acquire the same and keep them therefore within reach, subject to redemption
by his client under easier terms and conditions. Surely, the petitioner himself would maintain
that he agreed to make the redemption"in order that [he] may already be paid the
P100,000.00 attorney's fees awarded him in the Compromise Agreement," 43 and if his sole
concern was his fees, there was no point in keeping the properties in their entirety.
The Court simply cannot fag for the petitioner's pretensions that he acquired the properties
as a gesture of magnanimity and altruism He denies, of course, having made money from it,
but what he cannot dispute is the fact that he did resell the properties. 44
But if he did not entertain intents of making any profit, why was it necessary to reword the
conveyance document executed by the private respondent? It shall be recalled that the deed,
as originally drafted, provided for conveyance of the private respondent's "rights of equity of
redemption and/or redeem" 45 the properties in his favor, whereas the instrument registered
with the Register of Deeds purported to transfer "any and all my rights of the real properties
and/or to redeem," 46 in his favor. He admits having entered the intercalations in question but
argues that he did so "to facilitate the registration of the questioned deed with the Register of
Deeds" 47 and that it did not change the meaning of the paper, for which Judge Santiago
acquitted him of any falsification charges. 48 To start with, the Court is at a loss how such an
alteration could "facilitate" registration. Moreover, if it did not change the tenor of the deed,
why was it necessary then? And why did he not inform his client? At any rate, the agreement
is clearly a contract of adhesion. Its provisions should be read against the party who prepared
it.
But while we cannot hold the petitioner liable for falsification this is not the proper
occasion for it we condemn him nonetheless for infidelity to his oath "to do no
falsehood" 49
This brings us to the final question: Whether or not the conveyance in favor of the petitioner
is subject to the ban on acquisition by attorneys of things in litigation. The pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code state as follows:
Art. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public or
judicial action, either in person or through the mediation of another:
(1) The guardian, the property of the person or persons who may be under his
guardianship;
 (2) Agents, the property whose administration or sale may have been intrusted to
them, unless the consent of the principal have been given;
(3) Executors and administrators, the property of the estate under administration;
(4) Public officers and employees, the property of the State or of any subdivision
thereof, or of any government owned or controlled corporation, or institution, the
administration of which has been instrusted to them; this provision shall apply to
judges and government experts who, in any manner whatsoever, take part in the
sale;
(5) Justice judges prosecuting attorneys clerks of superior and inferior courts, and
other officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the
property and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers,
with respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in
which they may take part by virtue of their profession.
(6) Any others specially disqualified by law.**
In Rubias v. Batiller, 50 we declared such contracts to be void by force of Article 1409,
paragraph (7), of the Civil Code, defining inexistent contracts. In Director of Lands v.
Ababa 51 however, we said that the prohibition does not apply to contingent contracts, in
which the conveyance takes place after judgment, so that the property can no longer be said
to be "subject of litigation."
In the instant case, the Court observes that the "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Rights of Equity
of Redemption and/or to Redeem" was executed following the finality of the decision
approving the compromise agreement. It is actually a new contract not one in pursuance
of what had been agreed upon on compromise in which, as we said, the petitioner
purportedly assumed redemption rights over the disputed properties (but in reality, acquired
absolute ownership thereof). By virtue of such a subsequent agreement, the lands had
ceased to be properties which are "the object of any litigation." Parenthetically, the Court
states that a writ of possession is improper to eject another from possession unless sought in
connection with: (1) a land registration proceeding; (2) an extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage of real property; (3) in a judicial foreclosure of property provided that the
mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) in execution sales. 52 It
is noteworthy that in this case, the petitioner moved for the issuance of the writ pursuant to
the deed of sale between him and the private respondent and not the judgment on
compromise. (He was, as we said, issued a writ of execution on the compromise agreement
but as we likewise observed, he did not have the same enforced. The sale agreement
between the parties, it should be noted, superseded the compromise.) The writ does not lie in
such a case. His remedy is specific performance.
At any rate, the transfer, so we hold, is not subject to the injunction of Article 1491 of the
Civil Code. But like all voidable contracts, it is open to annulment on the ground of mistake,
fraud, or undue influence, 53 which is in turn subject to the right of innocent purchasers for
value. 54
For this reason, we invalidate the transfer in question specifically for undue influence as
earlier detailed. While the respondent Herrera has not specifically prayed for invalidation, this
is the clear tenor of his petition for annulment in the Appellate Court. It appearing, however,
that the properties have been conveyed to third persons whom we presume to be innocent
purchasers for value, the petitioner, Atty. Paterno Canlas, must be held liable, by way of
actual damages, for such a loss of properties.
We are not, however, condoning the private respondent's own shortcomings. In condemning
Atty. Canlas monetarily, we cannot overlook the fact that the private respondent has not
settled his hability for payment of the properties. To hold Atty. Canlas alone liable for
damages is to enrich said respondent at the expense of his lawyer. The parties must then set
off their obligations against the other. To obviate debate as the actual amounts owing by one
to the other, we hold Francisco Herrera, the private respondent, liable to Atty. Paterno Canlas,
the petitioner, in the sum of P654,000.00 representing the redemption price of the
properties, 55 in addition to the sum of P20,000. 00 as and for attomey's fees. We order Atty.
Canlas, in turn, to pay the respondent Herrera the amount of P1,000,000.00, the sum he
earned from the resale thereof, 56 such that he shall, after proper adjustments, be indebted to
his client in the sum of P326,000.00 as and for damages.
Needless to say, we sustain the action of the respondent Court of Appeals in taking
cognizance of the petition below. But as we have stated, we are compelled, as the final
arbiter of justiciable cases and in the highest interests ofjustice, to write finis to the
controversy that has taxed considerably the dockets of the inferior courts.
Let the Court further say that while its business is to settle actual controversies and as a
matter of general policy, to leave alone moot ones, its mission is, first and foremost, to
dispense justice. At the outset, we have made clear that from a technical vantage point,
certiorari, arguably lies, but as we have likewise stated, the resolution of the case rests not
only on the mandate of technical rules, but if the decision is to have any real meaning, on the
merits too. This is not the first time we would have done so; in many cases we have
eschewed the rigidity of the Rules of Court if it would establish a barrier upon the
administration ofjustice. It is especially so in the case at bar, in which no end to suit and
counter-suit appears imminent and for which it is high time that we have the final say. We
likewise cannot, as the overseer of good conduct in both the bench and the bar, let go
unpunished what convinces us as serious indiscretions on the part of a lawyer.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered.
1. ORDERING the petitioner, Atty. Patemo Canlas, to pay to the private respondent, Francisco 3. DISMISSING this petition and REMANDING the case to the respondent Court of Appeals for
Herrera, the sum of P326,000.00, as and for damages; execution; and

2. ORDERING the petitioner to SHOW CAUSE why no disciplinary action may be imposed on 4. ORDERING the petitioner to pay costs.
him for violation of his oath, as a lawyer, within ten (10) days from notice, after which the
same will be consolidated with AC No. 2625; SO ORDERED.