NZ USAR Awareness Manual

New Zealand Urban Search & Rescue l Awareness Student Manual
Page 1 of 87 l Version 1.0 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

Table of Contents
USAR NZ HISTORY ...........................................................................................................7

Define USAR .....................................................................................................................7
Typical USAR scenarios.....................................................................................................8
Global evolution of USAR..................................................................................................8
FEMA ............................................................................................................................8
INSARAG......................................................................................................................8
United Kingdom .............................................................................................................9
Australia.........................................................................................................................9
NZ evolution of USAR.......................................................................................................9
USAR TIER SYSTEM .......................................................................................................10
NZ USAR tier system.......................................................................................................10
International tier systems ..................................................................................................11
USA .............................................................................................................................11
Europe..........................................................................................................................11
Australia.......................................................................................................................11
USAR NZ TASK FORCE ..................................................................................................12
Task Force overview ........................................................................................................12
Task Force structure .........................................................................................................12
Task Force capability & role.............................................................................................13
Responders & Task Force Technicians .............................................................................13
ORANGE CARD INFORMATION ..................................................................................13
Orange Card overview......................................................................................................13
Why get an Orange Card?.................................................................................................14
How do I get one? ............................................................................................................15
SUPPORT SERVICES & RESOURCES..........................................................................15
RESPONSE TEAM COMPOSITION...............................................................................17
PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT.....................................................................17

Minimum PPE required ....................................................................................................18
Standards for equipment...................................................................................................20
HELMET CODING SYSTEM ..........................................................................................21
Responder level Helmet Coding System ...........................................................................21
Task Force level Helmet Coding System ..........................................................................21
Notes regarding Helmet Coding System ...........................................................................21
HEALTH & HYGIENE.....................................................................................................22
Dehydration......................................................................................................................22
Fatigue .............................................................................................................................22
Body substance infection ..................................................................................................23
Stress................................................................................................................................23
Claustrophobia, anxiety & panic.......................................................................................24
Phobia ..........................................................................................................................24
Anxiety.........................................................................................................................24
Panic ............................................................................................................................24
Biological reactions ......................................................................................................24

Subconscious forces .....................................................................................................25
Control Techniques.......................................................................................................25
Behavioural training .....................................................................................................25
Contextual Therapy ......................................................................................................26
Paradoxical Intervention ...............................................................................................27
Practical considerations ................................................................................................27
CIMS OVERVIEW............................................................................................................28
Background of ICS...........................................................................................................28
Major responsibilities of the Incident Controller ...............................................................28
INITIAL ACTION STRATEGIES....................................................................................29
Constantly gather information ..........................................................................................29
Set up communications quickly ........................................................................................29
Limit supervisory staffing.................................................................................................29
Have an inventory control ready .......................................................................................29
Centralise logistics ...........................................................................................................29
Determine the estimated length of the incident .................................................................29
HAZARDS..........................................................................................................................30
Situational hazards ...........................................................................................................31
Below Debris Hazards ..................................................................................................31
Flooding ...................................................................................................................31
Oxygen deficient atmosphere....................................................................................31
Toxic environment....................................................................................................32
Hazardous material ...................................................................................................32
Flammable environment ...........................................................................................32
Different (or Altered) elevation.................................................................................32
Surface Hazards............................................................................................................33
Climate.....................................................................................................................33
Sharp and jagged objects...........................................................................................34
Pooling of water .......................................................................................................34
Dust and Wind..........................................................................................................34
Noise and Vibrations ................................................................................................34
Overhead Hazards ........................................................................................................34
Structural Instability .....................................................................................................36
Environmental ..................................................................................................................37
Hazardous Materials .....................................................................................................37
Utilities (services).........................................................................................................38
STATE OF EQUILIBRIUM..............................................................................................39
Define state of equilibrium ...............................................................................................39
Importance of monitoring .................................................................................................39
SAFE WORKING PRACTICES.......................................................................................39
Safe Working Practice Groups..........................................................................................39
Personal........................................................................................................................39
Planning .......................................................................................................................40
General Safety Considerations ......................................................................................41
CONFINED SPACE OPERATIONS ................................................................................41
Confined space definition .................................................................................................41
Confined space protocols..................................................................................................42
OCCUPANCY INTERVIEWS..........................................................................................44
Primary occupancy interviews ..........................................................................................44
Other occupancy interviews..............................................................................................44
Information management..................................................................................................44
CONSTRUCTION METHODS & HAZARDS.................................................................44
Common building construction types................................................................................44
Identifying structural collapse hazards ..............................................................................45
Timber frame................................................................................................................45
Reinforced Masonry .....................................................................................................45
Unreinforced Masonry..................................................................................................46
Concrete Tilt-up ...........................................................................................................46
Reinforced Concrete and Steel Frame ...........................................................................46
COLLAPSE PATTERNS ..................................................................................................47
Typical collapse patterns ..................................................................................................47
Curtain Fall Wall collapse.............................................................................................48
Inwards / Outward collapse...........................................................................................48
Lean Over collapse .......................................................................................................49
Lean to Floor collapse...................................................................................................49
900 Angle Wall collapse................................................................................................49
Pancake Floor collapse .................................................................................................50
" V " collapse................................................................................................................50
Inverted, "A" or Tent collapse.......................................................................................50
Cantilever collapse .......................................................................................................51
Progressive collapse .....................................................................................................51
SECONDARY COLLAPSE INDICATORS .....................................................................52
Identifying the three secondary collapse indicators ...........................................................52
Movement in the structure ............................................................................................52
Visual alertness.............................................................................................................52
Hearing alertness ..........................................................................................................53
During Practical Operations..........................................................................................53
STRUCTURAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEMS .............................................................54
Importance of identifying structures .................................................................................54
Single structure – Side Label ............................................................................................55
Floor identification ...........................................................................................................56
Structure identification within a geographic area ..............................................................56
Identification of bridges, flyovers & trains........................................................................57
Zone/barrier marking system (INSARAG)........................................................................58
Operational Work Zone ................................................................................................58
Collapse/Hazard Zone ..................................................................................................58
Other markings.................................................................................................................58
Facility .........................................................................................................................58
Vehicle .........................................................................................................................58
Teams...........................................................................................................................58
FEMA STRUCTURE HAZARD EVALUATION ............................................................59
COLLAPSE PLAN PHASES.............................................................................................60

Reconnaissance & survey .................................................................................................60
Elimination of utilities ......................................................................................................62
Primary surface search and rescue ....................................................................................62

Exploration of all voids and spaces...................................................................................63
Access by selected debris removal....................................................................................64
Terminate by general debris removal ................................................................................64
WARNING SIGNALS .......................................................................................................66
INSARAG warning signals...............................................................................................66
Other considerations.........................................................................................................66
SEARCH & VICTIM MARKING SYSTEM ...................................................................67
Structure/search assessment marking ................................................................................67
Sample marking box.....................................................................................................67
Completed marking box................................................................................................67
Victim area marking .........................................................................................................68
Potential Victim Location .............................................................................................68
Confirmed Victim Location ..........................................................................................68
Dead/Live Victim(s) Location ......................................................................................69
Only Dead Remain .......................................................................................................69
Extricated All Victim(s)................................................................................................69
RUBBLE CRAWL .............................................................................................................70
LINE & HAIL SEARCH ...................................................................................................71
STRETCHER WALK........................................................................................................74
FURTHER READING.......................................................................................................75
NZ Colour Light Stick Codes ...........................................................................................75
Operational Briefings .......................................................................................................75
Situation (introduction, terrain & risk) ..........................................................................76
Mission.........................................................................................................................76
Execution .....................................................................................................................76
Administration and Logistics ........................................................................................76
Command and Communication.....................................................................................76
Questions......................................................................................................................76
Team effectiveness ...........................................................................................................77
Effective teamwork ......................................................................................................78
Different types of people within a team.........................................................................80
Phases of Teamwork ........................................................................................................82
Phases of Team Formation................................................................................................83
The appreciation process ..................................................................................................83
Continuing Action ........................................................................................................85
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...............................................................................................86

© New Zealand Fire Service 2002
No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system or

transmitted in any form or by means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recorded
or otherwise without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.
The contributing organisations (not individuals) as listed in the acknowledgement

annex are exempt from the above restriction. The New Zealand Fire Service wishes
to thank those organisations who have provided references to aid the development of
this package.
Urban Search & Rescue

New Zealand Fire Service
PO Box 6343
Wellington
www.fire.org.nz

USAR NZ History
Define USAR
An integrated multi agency response, which is beyond the capability of normal rescue
arrangements, to provide initial medical care and removal of entrapped persons from
damaged structures or other environments in a safe and expeditious manner.
USAR (Urban Search and Rescue) is the mobilisation of resources required to safely
and expeditiously locate and remove trapped and often injured victims from partially
or totally collapsed structures or environments and providing for emergency medical
care in doing so. USAR is not the same as Land SAR, which is search and rescue of
persons in wilderness environments.
USAR involves the integrated response of highly specialised equipment and trained
personnel from different disciplines, effective communications and an established
method of command and control and logistical support. In addition to the response of
personnel and equipment, effective USAR involves preparing prior to an incident
occurring, and assisting the affected community to recover from the incident. In many
instances, this will involve cross agency, national and possibly international
participation and co-operation.
The complexities of the search and rescue function after a structural collapse
requires a co-ordination and incident management system that is commonly
understood, constantly used and effective, and SOPs (Standard Operating
Procedures) developed for the strategic and tactical functions of the incident.
Picture 1. Edgecome Earthquake (1987)

Typical USAR scenarios

Urban Search and Rescue is considered a "multi-hazard" discipline, as it may be
needed for a variety of emergencies or disasters, including earthquakes, hurricanes,
typhoons, storms and tornadoes, floods, dam failures, technological accidents,
terrorist activities, and hazardous materials releases. The events may be slow in
developing, as in the case of hurricanes, or sudden, as in the case of earthquakes.
Global evolution of USAR
FEMA
FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) launched its USAR Task Force
system in 1989. The program originally evolved in response to the need for trained
personnel to assist in coping with natural disasters, primary earthquake. Following
Oklahoma bombing in 1995 the government realised that the Task Forces had a
broader potential and began to deploy them to such events as 1996 Atlanta Summer
Olympics at which a catastrophic event could occur.
INSARAG
INSARAG (International Search and Rescue Advisory Group) was formed in 1991 as
a co-operative effort by the United Nations and many of the participating countries,
including New Zealand, in international SAR (Search and Rescue). With the
assistance of all participants, the conclusions and recommendations adopted at the
initial INSARAG meeting were based on their collective experiences in disaster
responses.
The mission of INSARAG is to develop effective international relationships in order to

save lives and render humanitarian services following natural or man-made
disasters. The activities of INSARAG include the improvement of emergency
preparedness and co-operation between international SAR teams as well as the
promotion of information exchange on operational procedures and lessons learned.
As a result of the efforts of many participating countries who collectively make up

INSARAG, participants have developed a common understanding of the functions and
operations of SAR teams, which have resulted in the development of the International
Search and Rescue Response System.
These Guidelines were developed by member countries of INSARAG to assist

international SAR teams to operate in the most efficient and effective manner possible.

United Kingdom
Historically, the British Fire Service has been responding to disasters around the
world for a number of years. In the Mexico City (1985) and El Salvador (1986)
earthquakes, a team from the London Fire Brigade were sent with thermal imaging
cameras. In Armenia in December 1988, teams including London, Kent and
Hampshire responded on search & rescue missions. These efforts were not co-
ordinated and action depended upon individual brigades.
Following the UK response to assist the Kurdish population in northern Iraq (1991),
as a consequence of the Gulf War, the then Minister for Overseas Development,
announced a new initiative designed to improve the effectiveness of any future British
relief effort.
A steering group of Chief Fire Officers was set up, the steering group developed the
protocols & guidelines under which teams would be utilised or mobilised.
Australia
As a consequence of the Thredbo disaster in July 1997, a general agreement was

made that there was a need for more planning and co-ordinated resources to
efficiently handle such incidents. Training for such a specialist discipline was also
needed.
The USAR CAT2/Technician course was developed in September 1998. In the first
USAR course they held four back to back courses in three months training over 100
fire fighters, as well as a number of Police and Ambulance Officers in USAR.
NZ evolution of USAR
1995 Emergency Services review highlighted a gap in NZ response capabilities for

structural collapse.
A National USAR Technician training pilot was run in Palmerston North in October
1995, pioneered by Bernie Rush, former Wanganui CFO, NZFS (New Zealand Fire
Service), with Ernesto Ojeda, Don Reyes and Frank Borden, specialist trainers from
Los Angeles City Fire Dept, USA.
During 2000, the New Zealand Fire Service & Ministry of Civil Defence proposed to
NZ Government the establishment of a national USAR capability with one Task Force
Teams in Palmerston North, Christchurch and Auckland.
A three-week Category 2 USAR Technician course was run in Palmerston North in

2001. Attended by 33 people, including one representative from the Pacific Islands,
this was the first such course run in NZ since 1997. US Task Force Leader Ernesto
Ojeda, fresh from the World Trade Centre collapse in New York, also assisted with
the course

USAR Tier System

NZ USAR tier system
Introduction Awareness Responder Technician Manager
Awareness Awareness CIMS Advanced CIMS

Compulsory & 1+
Skill Set(s) (Minimum Modules (All Modules from First Aid USAR Unit -
Specialist Strand
1 & 4 from package) package) General Rescue Management
USAR Category 0 1-A 1-R 2 3
Provider-based National Certificate

Industry Certificate National Diploma in
Qualification attendance Unit Standard 18516 in USAR
in USAR USAR
Certificate only (Technician)
Awareness Orange USAR USAR USAR

Orange Card No Card or Ticket
Ticket Responder Technician Manager
Interested ES Civil Defence,

All ES personnel
Personnel, Civil potential CAT-2 Task Force Task Force
Audience and interested
Defence & Support Techs & Support Members Leaders/Manager
community sectors
Teams Teams
All levels require previous level as pre-requisite

International tier systems
USA
US NFPA 1670
• Awareness
• Operation
• Technician
There are 28 federally funded US&R Task Forces across the United States. FEMA
teams organise existing search and rescue capability into a national program that can
quickly deploy to an event. They have additional training, and must be able to deploy
within six hours and to sustain themselves for 72 hours. They must also have a roster
that fills 31 different positions with at least two people for each position. To receive
the FEMA certification, the team must be approved by a US&R oversight board that
includes leaders in the field and FEMA officials
A task force is really a partnership between local fire departments, law enforcement
agencies, federal and local governmental agencies and private companies.
Task Force members include structural engineers and specialists in the areas of
hazardous materials, heavy rigging, search (including highly trained search dogs),
logistics, rescue and medicine.
Europe
4CL:
• Awareness
• Medium
• Heavy
• Executive/Command
Australia
• Awareness (CAT1)
• Technician (CAT2)
• Manager (CAT3)
62 Person Task Force
13 Positions, 2 watches, 2 teams per watch

USAR NZ Task Force

Task Force overview
3 Task Forces
• TF1 – Palmerston North
• TF 2 – Christchurch
• TF 3 – Auckland (No resources)
Each Task Force has 32 Technicians plus support staff (max 40 persons). This
allows for 2 watches each doing 12hr shifts. It is made up from multiple agencies
including Fire, Ambulance, Defence Force and Civil Defence.
USAR NZ is administered by the New Zealand Fire Service & Ministry of Civil
Defence & Emergency Management.
Currently requests for Task Force activation is made through the New Zealand Fire
Service Communication Centre.
Task Force structure

Task Force capability & role
Provide multi agency response to anywhere in NZ to structural collapse and other

long duration special incidents.
Provide self-sufficient 72-hour response to single structure collapse capable of

maintaining 24-hour operations.
Responders & Task Force Technicians
First Responders need to do primary survey of incident and disseminate intelligence

back to EOC (Emergency Operations Centre) quickly so that a Task Force
deployment can be managed effectively.
Responders provide first response and focuses on majority of victims that are
entrapped on the surface, once Task Forces arrive responders support operations
such as debris bucket lines.
Task Forces focus on a small percentage of victims that are subsurface.
USAR Response Teams (CAT1-R) are managed by Local CDEMG are not nationally
managed.
In NZ incident Command & Control is managed by using the Co-ordinated Incident

Management System (CIMS).
Orange Card Information

Orange Card overview
The USAR incident ground card (Orange Card) and industry certificate have been
developed by FRSITO (Fire & Rescue Services Industry Training Organisation) and
the USAR Training Standards Committee, on behalf of the National USAR Steering
Committee.
The Responder Orange Card has been designed to identify individuals who have the
necessary certification to function as a first responder to a structural collapse
incident. Specialist skill endorsements can also be identified on the rear of the card to
aid effective and safe logistical management at such incidents.
As well as the Orange Card, the same competencies will be recorded on an industry
certificate. The minimum competencies required also contribute to proposed national
qualifications in Urban Search and Rescue.
USAR Task Force Technicians and Managers are also eligible for Technician and
Manager USAR Orange Cards upon meeting specified criteria and such applications
can be made through the USAR Training Standards Committee.

The Orange Card provides identification for anyone holding the competencies
required to provide first response to a structural collapse. This may include personnel
both career and voluntary from Fire Service, Police, Ambulance, Civil Defence, Red
Cross, Search Dog Teams, SAR groups and other teams
At USAR incidents, standard command and control systems apply; the Orange Card
does not delegate any special authority or powers to the holder in such operations.
USAR Responders still work under the Incident Controller as per the New Zealand
CIMS model.
Why get an Orange Card?
Under health and safety legislation, the employer must ensure staff are competent to
carry out a task or are supervised by someone who is. The Orange Card is an ideal
and easy way to do this.
It is foreseen that if an agency or team wishes to be recognised as a national USAR

resource, that the Orange Card will be one of the team/resource registration
requirements.
Having an Orange Card is a way to identify yourself at any USAR operation or

emergency incident. Your card will have your name and if applicable any specialist
endorsements.
The card also promotes a minimum industry standard of competency, meaning that
teams can ensure their members hold or are supervised by someone who is trained.
This is particularly helpful when interacting with other agencies where you may not
know their skill level, whether in training or operations.

How do I get one?
Contact Fire Rescue Service Industry Training Organisation (FRSITO) or visit website
www.frsito.org.nz and send a completed form with payment, along with photo and
proof of unit standard achievements.
Support Services & Resources

A major incident, which requires the extended implementation of USAR techniques,
will have the potential to quickly overwhelm and deplete the resources of any single
agency.
This was highlighted at the Oklahoma City Bombing, where it was quickly realised
that the resources of the Oklahoma City Fire Department were going to be insufficient
to cope with the incident.
In addition to the 26 Fire departments, eleven 56 member FEMA task forces and
countless other agencies that responded to assist, there was over 26 tons of
specialist equipment shipped in to assist in the operations. This was in addition to the
tons of equipment donated by the people of Oklahoma City and surrounding areas.
Pre-planning is required for any USAR operation, and much thought must be given to
the overall quantity and type of equipment that is required and may be available for a
large scale incident.
The type of equipment required can be broken down into the following areas:
Heavy
Heavy machinery that could be used in USAR operations or support, includes:
Aerial ladders, elevated platforms, bull dozers, bob cats, cranes, backhoes,
generators.
Medium
Portable equipment used, not specifically designed for rescue, but able to support
USAR operations, includes: Hydraulic jacks, lights towers, wire rubble baskets.
Rescue
Specialist rescue equipment - usually hand tools, includes: Acoustic devices, fibre
optic cameras, time lapse cameras, search cameras, thermal imaging cameras, infra
red cameras, chainsaws, bolt cutters, concrete cutters, air hammers, drills, lighting,
ropes, Tifor host, fulcrum lever
Support
Non-technical equipment used to support USAR operations, includes: Wheel
barrows, buckets, medical waste disposal, and morgue facilities.

Medical
Medical services and resources that aid USAR operators and victims, includes:
Triage, transport, specialist drug administration, health and safety, veterinary.
Communications
Communications equipment to support USAR operations and administration,
includes: Mobile data terminals, SATCOM, HF Comms, portable radios, repeaters,
mobile phones, computers, printers, copying machines, fax machines.
Shoring
Structural collapse stabilisation resources, includes: Large quantities of timber and
tubular steel, nails, carpentry tools, hydraulic shoring equipment
Animals
USAR Certified search dogs for victim location, includes: Live victim search dog and
cadaver search dogs.
Services
Non-Operational Support services and resources, includes: Portable toilets, tents,
catering heaters.
While this list is not complete or exhaustive, it provides an indication of the types of
equipment that will be required at an incident.
Some of this equipment may already be available to your agency, but the majority of
it will not, and close working relationships will be essential with other agencies and
private contractors in order to ensure that the equipment that is needed will be
available when it is required.
The following agencies have similar or specialised resources that change from time
to time. The following organisations may be able to provide resources at an incident:
• Fire Brigade
• Police Services
• Defence Force
• Ambulance service
• Local Emergency Response Teams
• National Rural Fire Authority
• Commercial suppliers
• Local Government

• International agencies
Response Team Composition

Team Leader
Deputy Team Leader
Safety Officer
(Look Out)
Certified Certified Certified Certified Certified

Responder Responder Responder Responder Responder
A Safety Officer is recommended if multiple teams are being used.
Each team would have a maximum of 5-7 responders to ensure and manageable
span of control, although a further 5-7 responders could be available for the rotation
of crew members.
Personal Protective Equipment

When a USAR incident is compared to any of the daily rescue situations that
emergency authorities attend, it will be realised that additional protective clothing will
be required. This is due to the proliferation of debris, broken reinforcing bars, glass,
bricks, tiles, conduit, steel and other parts of a building’s structure that have been
displaced from their normal position due to the collapse.
All of this debris leads to a situation where normal operations become difficult and
extra care and equipment is required to ensure the safety of rescue personnel, which
is the primary consideration at any incident.
In addition to the dangers associated with the damaged structure, there are the
problems associated with utilities in and around the building, e.g. gas, electricity,
water and other building services. One of the first tasks of personnel attending an
incident will be to isolate these utilities, but there will always be hidden dangers within
a building that can affect the safety of workers and rescuers.
At an incident that is entering its second, third or subsequent days, some of the major
problems that will confront rescuers will be the biological hazards due to the
decomposition of bodies, the presence of body fluids in the debris, food decomposing
and untreated sewage. These incidents begin to take on a special hazard in
themselves, and precautions must be taken to protect rescuers from any body fluids
and airborne pathogens (micro organism, germs, virus, bacterium etc) that may be
present.

Decontamination of not only equipment, but of personnel, will be required before any
person or equipment leaves the site of a protracted USAR incident. Crews must
ensure that all appropriate hazardous materials (HazMat) procedures for the incident
are adopted in line with your agencies SOPs for HazMat incidents.
Minimum PPE required
Due to the nature of a USAR incident it is important to be familiar with the types of
protective clothing that give the maximum protection while still being suited to the
environment of a structural collapse.
Traditional fire service turnout gear and self contained breathing apparatus (S.C.B.A.)
are not suited to non fire incidents of long duration under rubble or in confined
spaces, due to their bulkiness, lack of mobility, and related heat stress factors.
USAR teams who are trained and endorsed in its use may use supplied airline
respiratory equipment. This equipment will give the teams more freedom of
movement especially in confined spaces if additional respiratory protection is required
due to irrespirable atmospheres.
Close fitting garments that are both durable and comfortable should be worn to
exclude dirt and rubble and protect the rescuer from cuts and abrasions. They should
have pockets to carry small items, minimal openings and no loose straps that may
catch on edges when crawling through debris. In addition to the pockets on the
clothing, a bum bag or tool bag can become a handy addition to carry spare personal
protective equipment and any small gear that may be required.

Picture 2. USAR Technician reporting to Operations Officer, note personal

protection and personal equipment
The following list describes the types of personal protective equipment that should be
considered as a minimum requirement for personnel entering any USAR incident.
Specific incidents may necessitate the use of additional protective equipment as
required.
• Helmets A lightweight helmet that is comfortable and able to be properly secured

must be worn to protect the head from falling debris and overhead hazards. The
helmet must meet the requirements of the applicable AS/NZ standard for the
situation for which it is being used.
• Whistle for warning signals (INSARAG) as explained later in this manual
• Full length clothing or uniform to protect from cuts and abrasions. Ensure
sleeves are rolled down to protect your skin
• Head lamp with spare bulb and batteries for night and confined space operations
• Torch for secondary lighting, ensure it is robust and waterproof.
• Goggles or safety glasses to protect the eyes from dust and dirt (fully
encapsulating, not glasses)
• Dust masks will prevent the inhalation of dust. Asbestos masks and suits may
have to be used if there is a chance of asbestos contamination.

• Gloves will protect the hands from a range of hazards that will be encountered at
an incident. They should give the palms good protection and extend a short way
up the arms to overlap the sleeves of the overalls/protective garment.
• First aid kit for personal use. Your team will also have comprehensive first aid kits
in its equipment cache.
• Knife or shears capable of cutting victims clothing.
• Boots should incorporate toe cap and sole protection and give good support.
• Hearing protection from noise generated by rescue equipment.
• Knee and elbow protection is also advisable, as the rescuer may have to spend
many hours on hands and knees, crawling through or over rubble.
Picture 3. Essential personal protection
Standards for equipment
When considering purchase or use of equipment rescue teams should ensure the
equipment complies with AS/NZS Standards. Information on standards or purchase
of documentation is available from http://www.standards.co.nz

Where there is no AS/NZS standards for equipment, teams should ensure equipment
complies with one of the following standards
• NFPA (US National Fire Protection Association)

• UIAA (Union International Alpine Association)
• CE (European Standards)
• ANSI (American National Standard Institute)
Helmet Coding System
Responder level Helmet Coding System
USAR responders are to wear orange helmets with their name & team ID visible. The
following stripes will also be used to indicate the individual’s position within the team.
Team Leader = 2 red reflective stripes

Deputy Team Leader = 1 reflective stripe
Responder = 1 orange reflective stripe
Medic = 1 green reflective stripe
Responder Medic has to hold a minimum of Pre-Hospital Emergency Care unit

Standards.
Jerkins should also be worn denoting the wearers role in English, consistent to the
CIMS model
Task Force level Helmet Coding System
Incident Commander (TF Management) = White

Task Force Team Leader = Red
Task Force Technician = Yellow
Task Force Structural Engineer = Blue
Task Force Support Crew = Orange
Task Force Medical Specialist = Green with Red Cross
Jerkins should also be worn denoting wearers role in English, consistent to the CIMS
model
Notes regarding Helmet Coding System
The USAR helmet colours differ from that of the New Zealand Fire Service and of
many rescue teams. The USAR Orange Card may also be used to verify the
competencies of any individual.

Health & Hygiene
Dehydration
To avoid dehydration
• Drink fluids every hour
• Avoid caffeine and sweet drinks
• Drink at least 2 litres of water every day (more if it is hot)
Check for dehydration

• If you are thirsty, have a headache or are light-headed, you are already
dehydrated!
• If your urine is dark and has a strong odour, you are dehydrated!
• Drink more WATER.
Encourage your team members to drink water whenever you have a drink.
Fatigue
Causes of fatigue
• Working long hours

• Performing stressful or physically demanding work
• Working shifts
To avoid fatigue
• Work as a team a watch for signs of fatigue in other team members

• Rotate the work load and take regular breaks
• Move away from the work site when you have a break
• Get a good sleep during your down time.
• Avoid alcohol and caffeine
Wind down before going to sleep
• Go for a walk, jog or swim

• Listen to music or meditate
• Talk to someone

Body substance infection
Wear latex or neoprene gloves beneath your leather gloves when handling victims
and/or bodies. Eye protection should also be considered to avoid splash infection.
It is important to thoroughly wash hands before eating at meal breaks. A wash area
will be set up by HazMat teams for this purpose.
Cover any cuts or abrasions. This is necessary to prevent the transfer of bacteria and
viruses.
Wear your Personal Protective Equipment; ensure that sleeves are rolled down to
protect bare skin. It is advised that front line emergency service workers undergo
periodical hepatitis status checks and immunisation (available from your doctor or
GP)
Stress
Stress is both an external and self-generated response to events that exceeds your
bodies’ ability to cope.
Stress is a personal reaction; each situation creates a different stress reaction for
each individual. Some examples of situations that may cause stress are
• being involved in managing trauma

• dealing with dead bodies
• pressure of victims families
• overwhelmed by the incident size and demands
• lack of sleep
• self doubt
Ways to reduce stress:
• recognise the early signs of stress

• have time out / take breaks
• sleep well
• massage or meditation
• eat a balanced diet
• peer support
• Critical Incident Stress Debriefing

Claustrophobia, anxiety & panic
• Claustrophobia
• Anxiety
• Panic
The following brief explanation assists in understanding this terminology and has
been adapted from an article written by Deputy Firemaster Geoff Williams, Central
Scotland Fire Brigade, Scotland.
Phobia
This term is generally used as a suffix e.g. Acrophobia, Agoraphobia etc. These are
fears of some situation or object where the danger is magnified out of all proportion to
its actual seriousness. The word claustrophobia has limited value to Emergency
Service Workers but it is worth understanding the meaning of the term i.e.-abnormal
fear of a close or confined space. (Claustrum = closed, Phobia = abnormal fear)
Anxiety
Anxiety is a complex emotional state. Specifically, anxiety is a distress or uneasiness

of the mind. It is the emotion you feel when an object, situation, person or impulse
seems dangerous to you. An example is when you see an object about to fall over
and you feel afraid it might strike you. To avoid this you quickly move out of the way.
This fear is part of the emotional state and the avoidance behaviour it evokes
probably saves your life. Normal anxiety is productive in that it helps you to survive.
Excessive anxiety can become crippling and during delicate rescue situations can
add to the existing hazards.
Panic
Panic is a chronic fear, or an unreasoning, infectious and uncontrollable fear. Panic

can be induced by the anxiety created by a particular phobia. This panic or loss of
control can be lethal during a rescue operation. One thing is certain - the difficulties
encountered within a confined space rescue can be the catalyst for anxiety and panic
to be produced.
Biological reactions
Biological reactions will influence how a person will react to the stresses of being in a
confined space. The control of claustrophobia focuses on the individual’s ability to
control their feelings. The operator with more experience can achieve this due to
having been exposed to this type of environment previously. In this instance what the
operator is doing is controlling their 'adrenaline rush', or more correctly their response
to the release of catecholamines, in particular nor adrenaline. This is one of the
hormones released when you are frightened, anxious or working extremely hard. For
the more inexperienced operator, prior psychological training in control techniques
can be of benefit.

As you can imagine many other substances are released as a result of the 'fight or
flight' response, (the normal physiological response to stress), however it is irrelevant
and impractical to try to measure these in the field. It is worth noting that there is no
chemical substance within the body that will reduce stress, except the removal of the
operator from the event or the environment which is producing stress. The above
mentioned hormones dissipate, and their production is significantly reduced once the
event causing the stress has ended.
Subconscious forces
Some psychoanalysts state that phobias may be passed from childhood experiences.
An example of this could be where as a child the individual was trapped within some
small room or object. The anxiety created at this time might be shifted into the
subconscious mind and remain as an unclarified source of anxiety into adulthood.
The anxiety could be known to the individual i.e. he/she knows consciously that they
have this feeling. However, it could be subconscious and the person may not be
aware of this particular fear. Therefore the person may be attempting to avoid the
threat e.g. missing the actual entry involvement during a confined drill period by
acting defensively. This defensive behaviour may work by temporarily relieving
anxiety and it tends to be repeated i.e. a habitual response.
Every person has a different biological make up and understanding these effects and
learning how to control them should be phased into training programmes when
preparing for confined space rescues.
Control Techniques
There are any number of control techniques that may be used to overcome the
psychological factors encountered at an USAR incident. Some of these are listed
below, but remember that you as an individual should use whatever works for you.
Behavioural training
Behavioural training is one method of learning how to control the effects of

claustrophobia. An example of this method is an attempt to alter childhood memories
through open discussion and a subsequent re-evaluation of learned responses.
Primarily this involves the person having direct exposure to a phobic situation. This
can be included into training sessions by progressively making the situation more
difficult as the individual demonstrates more ability and psychological stability. This
candid expression of anxieties previously experienced can allow for a measured
training response to be produced, tailored for the individual.
One theory, which supports this type of psychological progression, is the graded
exposure method, or step by step approaches to the anxiety-creating situation.
When one considers the confined space scenario, these steps include:
1. Identify the anxiety creating mechanism, in this case entering the confined space.

2. Grade the fear as it relates to individuals, least fearful to most fearful. For
example:
• being in a room with the door closed

• within an elevator
• the thoughts of entering a confined space
• confront a confined space
• entering a confined space
• proceeding through a confined space
Once the person can visualise a mildly fearful situation without feeling unduly anxious
then they move up the hierarchy to a more anxiety-provoking situation.
Contextual Therapy
A therapy developed by Doctors Zane and Milt suggest a 6-point program for phobia
related anxiety control called "Contextual therapy". The following example outlines
these steps when related to a confined space entry.
• Expect, allow and accept that fear will arise

The phobic reaction will be triggered spontaneously once the rescuer steps into the
phobic situation. Don't fight these pre incident feelings. Understand the anxiety will be
present and be prepared for it to happen. The objective is to control the process as
the fear intensifies.
• When the fear arrives, wait, let it be

The concept is to slow down the automatic fear generating thoughts and expectations
by taking one step at time. One way of achieving this is to create a goal, e.g. enter
the confined space and concentrate on access and means of assisting the casualty
to safety. In adopting this approach one is attempting to move cerebral energy
towards accomplishing the goal.
• Focusing attention on the rescue

Training for these situations requires focussing on moving from point A to B and
accomplishing the goal. The feelings of anxiety can be greatly reduced by
concentrating on these objectives.
• Grade fear responses 1 to 10

Monitor the fear levels by taking the occasional readings during the operation. This
grading helps analyse the anxiety by making the individual an outside observer.
Imagined horrors are given a more realistic understanding allowing the study of
reactions to be a means for controlling the fear.
• Learning to function with levels of fear and appreciating achievement

The controlling of fear is self-preserving and assists in keeping the mind alert.
• Appreciate and accept that fear will reappear

Fear in these situations will reappear and the individual must appreciate that this re
occurrence is not a setback. Knowledge of this phenomenon can help the individual
prepare during training under anxiety creating conditions.

The primary comparison between both theories involves confronting and entering the
enclosure, preferably under a training environment, so that the reactions are not
unexpected and potentially dangerous.
Paradoxical Intervention
This control technique involves the individual exaggerating the symptoms and
feelings of anxiety, e.g. a person thinking they would faint if they went higher than two
floors. This sometimes humorous approach has a means of diminishing the
symptoms by taking control of them. Training in the area would allow persons to
become familiar with fear producing situations.
Practical considerations
Example: normal self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) can be bulky and

awkward in a confined space operation. This physical restraint adds to the difficulties
already being encountered by the rescuer. Airline equipment is preferred for
breathing apparatus because:
• Total body bulk is reduced and this provides more freedom of movement and
assists by giving the person a greater feeling of confidence.
• This increase in confidence allows the rescuer to concentrate on the rescue and
not on feelings of confinement.
The tight working areas, electrical and mechanical devices, numerous obstructions,
extremes of temperature combined with poor lighting and long access time ensure
any rescuer will be pushed to their physical and mental limitations.
Compound all this into a hazardous atmosphere and a "cocktail" for a serious incident
is assured.
The confined space rescue demands tactical decisions such as ventilation, casualty
access, assessment and removal. These are entirely different from the more typical
rescue problems.

CIMS Overview
Background of ICS
The Incident Command System used in New Zealand is CIMS, Co-ordinated Incident
Management System. It incorporates modern management principles and has been
modified and adapted for New Zealand. The system has been used in the USA since
1970s and was introduced into Australia in the 1980s
An Incident Command System is designed for both planned and unplanned events
such as fires, earthquakes, floods, riots, HazMat, motor vehicle accidents, parades,
etc.
CIMS is a subject in its own and all rescue workers should complete an Introduction
in Co-ordinated Incident Management System. The Unit Standard for Introduction in
CIMS is required as part of the Orange Card.
Major responsibilities of the Incident Controller
The Incident Controller is responsible for the overall direction of response activities in
an emergency situation and is the person in charge at an incident. The Incident
Controller fulfils all management functions and responsibilities until the incident
requires additional appointments.
The major responsibilities include
• Establishing command and control

• Establishing the Incident Command Point (ICP)
• Protecting life and property
• Controlling personnel and equipment
• Maintaining accountability for responder and public safety, as well as for task
accomplishment
• Establishing and maintaining effective liaison with outside organisations including
the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC), when it is activated
Incident Management Structure

INFORMATION
INCIDENT
SAFETY
CONTROLLER
LIAISON
PLANNING /
OPERATIONS LOGISTICS
INTELLIGENCE

Initial Action Strategies

The following points of information were learned from the Oklahoma City Bombing,
and are equally valid at any operation:
Constantly gather information
Gather information of resource and situation status to allow for effective planning and
logistical management.
Set up communications quickly
Use mobile phones and ES Liaison Simplex Channels for the Incident Management
Team. Learn how to use ES Liaison Simplex/Duplex channels on your radios.
Limit supervisory staffing
Limit the number of people supervising the logistics area, and make sure they all use
the same system.
Have an inventory control ready
Have an inventory control system set up before an incident occurs, and update
resources on a readily available computer. These computer systems should have
facilities to update resources as they arrive, and allow for the operators to preplan
logistics requirements.
Centralise logistics
Have only one logistics area for the entire incident, and for all attending agencies.
This helps to prevent duplication of resource requests.
Determine the estimated length of the incident
Plan accordingly, ensure future staff replacements are forecasted and arranged
including logistical support for new staff.

Hazards
The USAR incident often has many hazards. These are combined in an environment
that is unfamiliar and can overwhelm the large percentage of untrained rescuers.
There are six major hazards that can be grouped into two areas, Situational and
Environmental. Each of the six major hazards is a challenge in itself but as long as
the trained rescuer maintains awareness and addresses each hazard in the correct
method, a successful outcome can be achieved.
Situational
• below debris hazards
• surface hazards
• overhead hazards
• structural instability
Environmental
• hazardous materials
• utilities
Picture 4. The terrorist attack on the Pentagon (Sept 11 2001) contained

numerous situational and environmental hazards.

Situational hazards
Below Debris Hazards
These can be defined as those below the finished ground or debris surface height
and may include
• flooding
• oxygen deficient atmosphere
• toxic environments
• flammable environments
• different levels of elevation
An oxygen deficient atmosphere, flooding and toxic or flammable environments might

be encountered by rescuers as they descend below the debris. Atmospheric
monitoring and the elimination of ignition sources are essential. Adequate lighting
and ventilation is necessary and as rescuers move deeper below the surface the
greater the requirement for shoring.
Before stepping onto surfaces first probe for false floors and differences in elevation.
Keep in mind that after a building collapse the orientation of floors may be altered.
Flooding
This is not only a hazard to those persons trapped in the vicinity of the flooding but
also the rescuers working above. The flooding may be a static level or dynamic
(raising, flowing or falling) all of which can effect the debris pile’s stability and
composition.
Oxygen deficient atmosphere
The possibility of an oxygen deficient atmosphere is always present in an USAR

incident. As the stability of the structure has been compromised the normal
atmosphere may have also been altered. For instance there may be living persons
trapped in the void and their breathing is lowering the oxygen content or the persons
are deceased and their bodies are starting to decompose.

Picture 5. Atmospheric monitoring must always precede entry to a void!
Toxic environment
The toxic environment may exist from stored hazards, which have been released due
to the collapse of the structure. Personal protective equipment must be worn at all
times to reduce the risk of injury.
Hazardous material
As with all HazMat incidents the correct level of protective clothing and equipment
must be used to ensure personnel safety. Set procedures must be adopted and
specialist advice will, in many cases, be required.
If unsure, questioning witnesses and survivors can give clues as to the type of
occupancy of the building.
Pre-planning and local knowledge are useful tools to determine the possibility of
hazardous material.
Hospital and research institutes usually contain radioactive material and compressed
gases; similarly chemicals are commonplace in many industries. For more
information on identifying hazardous materials, consult to your own agencies HazMat
documentation or see you local Dangerous Goods Inspector.
Flammable environment
These could occur from ruptured storage tanks or lines. Obviously ignition sources
must be eliminated and the atmosphere rendered safe.
Different (or Altered) elevation

The surfaces that were once ceiling and walls can now appear to be the floor. As
rescuers move into voids to search, the surface on which they are working cannot be
guaranteed as being stable. As the search proceeds debris will continue to settle and
further altered levels may be encountered throughout the structure.
Note; in the Oklahahoma bombing (1995) a Fire fighter fell four floors from
basement level 2 to basement level 6 as he stepped through a doorway.
Surface Hazards
Rubble found at a structural collapse could weigh from less than 1 kg to several
tonnes. The quantity and position of the debris can add to the complexity of the
rescue. Nails, reinforcing bars, steel, conduit, electrical cables and copper piping may
be exposed or found just below the surface.
Rain, snow and ice can also create slippery conditions as well as hiding sharp
surfaces and holes. The hazards on the surface can depend on the nature of the
collapse, and the cause of the collapse.
The surface hazards could be largely affected by the weather and time of incident
and could include:
• snow and ice (sub zero temperatures)

• slippery and uneven surfaces
• sharp and jagged objects
• pooling of water
• dust and wind
• noise and vibrations
Climate
Inclement weather and poor building construction may be the factors that lead to a
building collapse and it is these same weather conditions that the rescuer will be
working in. In sub zero temperatures ice and snow will cause surfaces to become
slippery, especially if working with hydraulic cutting equipment using water, snow will
hide voids and levels, conceal sharp objects, reduce visibility and possibly impose
additional weight on the structure.

Surfaces
In the debris pile the surfaces will be uneven and unsound, creating slippery and
dangerous conditions. These conditions will exist well into the incident and will
require the rescuer to move with caution at all times.
Note: the use of a lower body height and the debris crawl will assist in the safe
transition of the debris pile.
Sharp and jagged objects
Care must be taken to avoid sharp and jagged objects in the debris pile in the USAR
environment. Personal protective equipment and vigilance while moving on the scene
can help to prevent unnecessary injuries.
Pooling of water
A pool of water can appear shallow although it could be deep enough to drown the
unwary. If the water must be traversed then probing for depth and soundness of
bottom should first be carried out. Buildings may have internal swimming pools or
open tanks and knowledge of these will assist rescuers to avoid these types of
hazards.
The pools of water may be from broken water mains, sewage lines or local flooding.
Considerations must be given to the origin of such pools and the subsequent removal
of the water.
Dust and Wind
After the collapse of the structure the dust can be suspended for extended periods,
further to this any cutting will also contribute to this problem. The use of dust masks is
essential to protect the rescuer.
The wind if present will contribute to the plan of attack as this will have an effect on
several aspects of the rescue. These include the stability of the structure, the amount
of dust produced and the carriage of sound.
Noise and Vibrations
The noise on a site must be kept to a minimum as this will facilitate effective
searching and afford the rescuers a warning of the locations of victims and some pre
warning of the structure under stress, which may lead to secondary collapse.
The vibrations that can be caused by the use of heavy cutting tools and machinery
must be closely monitored to keep vibration at a minimum. This will allow for early
detection of victims and aid in the stabilisation of the debris pile.
Overhead Hazards

The phrase look up and live is an appropriate catch cry in the USAR incident as the
dangers from above can kill the unwary. This can range from the falling debris in the
event of further collapse to the dropping of a load by a crane during debris clearance
Picture 6. The only rescuer killed after the Bombing at Oklahoma (April 1995)
was a civilian nurse who died after being struck by a computer whilst she was
attempting to remove surface casualties.
Although the threat is likely to be obvious in daylight, at night it could be overlooked.

Sections of the structure can be disconnected from their tie points and be susceptible
to failure due to the wind or after shocks in the event of an earthquake.
All overhead hazards must be stabilised or removed before lower level rescue
operations commence.
Large sections of floors, walls, ceilings and building contents can be left hanging
overhead after a structural collapse. These can suddenly fall, especially in
aftershocks and high wind conditions.
Low hanging power lines can cause a tripping or electrical shock hazard. A broken
conductor could energise any material capable of conducting electricity. Very high
voltage (11,000 volts) is fed into many larger buildings. The high voltage is reduced
to 415 volts within the building. Power must be isolated prior to commencing rescue
operations and expert advice is required to ensure site safety.
Ornamental plasterwork, loose windowpanes and broken panes of glass, neon signs
and any other structure that can fall must be secured or removed before work
commences. Rescuers must not work under cranes or machinery employed to
remove hazards and rubble.

Structural Instability
Areas where structural instability can occur are walls, columns, beams, floor
assemblies, overhangs, roofs and unconnected walls or parapets. Fallen trees, low
hanging power lines and building contents can place a load on structural elements.
Chain link fences can be “loaded” if unbroken and under stress and have the
potential energy to create further damage and collapse.
The method in which a building is tied together is critical to prevent further collapse.
Moving or removing any load-bearing element can cause other building elements to
collapse and load bearing elements may be under heavier loads and stresses than
they are designed to carry. Some pre-collapse non-load bearing elements may
become load bearing after the collapse. An elevator car or counterweight’s guide can
be separated from the rails and hoisting cables and could be in danger of falling.
Points to consider include:
• consult structural engineer wherever possible

• columns and other load bearing members should only be cut as a last resort and
only when properly shored
• when shoring, only apply enough force to maintain the member or assembly in its
existing position
• secure pneumatic shoring devices by hand
• be aware of the location of elevators, especially when working adjacent to an
elevator shaft
The cause of the collapse will result in a type of structural failure. These causes can
range from natural events such as:
• earthquakes
• flooding
• wind
• landslide
Structural collapse and failure can also result from man made events such as;
• fires
• explosions (terrorist, accidental)
• inadequate construction methods
In each of these situations the size of the destructive forces, combined with the
physical aspects of the structure will all influence the degree of damage. The amount
of the structure left standing and its type add to the possibility of further collapse
(secondary collapse).
The design factors of the load bearing structural members (beams, columns and
floors) are all compromised in the emergency situation. The additional loads placed
on the remaining structure could place it at the verge of collapse. Load points on the
building will be altered so all possible care must be taken.
Rescuers as they penetrate into voids will place additional loads on the remaining
structure. These will have to be shored and braced to prevent further collapse. Before
attempting to brace any structural load, experts in engineering should be consulted.
Picture 7. The scene of the terrorists attack on World Trade Centre

(Sept 11 2001) shows the extent of devastation.
Environmental
Hazardous Materials
Hazardous materials in the collapse site or adjacent to it should always be

considered. These could include materials stored on site or used in the construction.
They may include:
• asbestos
• various types of cylinders, e.g. oxygen, acetylene.
• research materials ( biological, radioactive, or base chemicals)
• pesticides
• bleaches
• acids, oils
• contaminated waste products.
The type of use of the structure will give some information as to the likelihood of
these conditions. Additional information could be obtained from pre - planning,
survivors and any Fire Safety and Evacuation plans or Territorial Building Authority
The type of hazard that the rescuer will encounter will dictate the level of personal
protective equipment required. The physical and chemical properties of the material
will determine the type of threat, be it respiratory, direct contact or skin absorption to
the rescuer and the victims alike.

Utilities (services)
The disruption of gas, water and power services will further complicate a rescue at a
collapse incident. The escape of gas causes two areas of concern. The first is the
displacement of oxygen in a confined space and the second the potential for an
explosive mixture.
With the displacement of oxygen, the victims and rescuers could be overcome by the
lack of oxygen. Ventilation or the use of breathing apparatus will assist, but
atmospheric monitoring is essential to ensure a safe working environment.
If there is a risk of fire or explosion, cutting off the source of ignition and providing
safe and effective ventilation can reduce this threat.
Note: Constant monitoring of air quality throughout the rescue can reduce the
likelihood of explosion that would cause further casualties and greater injury.
Due to the additional weight and the possibility of trapped victims drowning, water
used for fire fighting purposes or from a ruptured pipe must be kept to a minimum and
not allowed to accumulate. Water soaked debris can also make manual removal
efforts more demanding for rescuers.
Gas and water meters operating can indicate if either hazard is leaking or flowing and
are usually situated at an isolation point.
In order to monitor Environment and Situational Hazards, a Safety Officer should be

part of each rescue team. The Safety Officer’s duties include:
• monitoring the scene for unsafe conditions and acts

• warning team members of impending danger
• ensuring crews are rotated as required
• monitoring the location of the team and its mission

State of Equilibrium
Define state of equilibrium
State of equilibrium is where a building (or part thereof) is stable in its current
situation in the absence of external influences (additional weight or movement due to
people working on the pile, earth tremors, wind, vibration, train passing nearby etc).
Importance of monitoring
Eliminate and minimise any factors that may affect the state of equilibrium. Cordon
the area and stop trains and masses of bystanders running over collapsed structure
Ensure a Safety Officer (Look Out) is appointed and watches for indicators of
secondary collapse
Locate machinery and appliances away from the hot zone where possible.
Check weather forecasts for possible wind changes and rain that may significantly
affect the state of equilibrium
Safe Working Practices
Safe Working Practice Groups
The safe working practices that are used in an Urban Search and Rescue incident
are those that are derived from combating the hazards and effective management
practices.
These are in three generalised groupings:
• personal
• planning
• general
Personal
Personal protective equipment is covered earlier in this manual. Refer to the section
as required. In addition to wearing your full personal protective equipment, the
following guidelines should be followed:
• look out for sharp objects

• stand well clear of materials being removed or lifted clear of debris
• establish an escape route
• work in a minimum crew size of two

• work only in your established work zone

• monitor your fellow workers for signs of fatigue
Picture 8. Urban Search and Rescue operators monitoring the progress of one
of their colleagues.
Planning
The basic plan of the USAR incident is SURVEY / STABILISE and SEARCH. In order
for this approach to be effective, all persons involved in the incident must effectively
use information.
Information must be:

• collected
• collated
• interpreted AND
• disseminated
With this in mind, effective planning should include, but is not limited to the following:
• conducting reconnaissance and survey

• establishing work zones
• monitoring position of building
• rotating crews on a frequent basis
• providing temporary shelter and rest areas for rescue crews
• developing a system for warning rescuers working in hazardous areas
• monitoring and co-ordinating the use of plant and equipment.

General Safety Considerations
• safe working distance from weakened walls is 1.5 times the height of wall
• atmospheric monitoring
• eliminate sources of ignition
• don’t use gas pressure to set pneumatic shores
• provide adequate ventilation and lighting
• use the services of experts (structural engineers, chemists)
• cut columns only as a last resort
• use a safety check list and crew timers
Confined Space Operations

Confined space definition
The confined space entry and rescue represents one of the most challenging and
dangerous rescue operations undertaken by rescue workers today. The increasing
use of confined areas for construction, industrial and Government Customs and
Excise purposes means rescuers must be aware they need to develop specialist
techniques for these dangerous environments.
The following description of a confined space has been adapted from an article
written by Deputy Firemaster Geoff Williams, Central Scotland Fire Brigade,
Scotland.
"Any space that has a limited means of egress, not intended for continual
occupancy, which may have the potential for an oxygen deficient or hazardous
atmosphere or where the potential for engulfment may occur"

Picture 9. Confined space rescue in progress.
Confined space protocols
A confined space is any area that is not intended for human occupancy and that also
has the potential for containing a dangerous atmosphere.
A confined space:
• is large enough for a worker to enter and perform assigned work
• has limited entries and exits
• may contain a hazardous atmosphere arising from chemicals, sludge or

sewage
• may contain flammable material or gasses
• is constructed so that anyone who enters could be asphyxiated or trapped by

walls or floor that converge to a small cross-section, such as a hopper
• contains a material, such as sawdust or grain, that could engulf anyone who
enters
• trenches that are greater than your waist in depth
• any place that access to a victim may be restricted

Examples of confined spaces include wells, silos, pits, cellars, tanks and vessels,
manholes, utility tunnels, culverts, caves, collapsed structures and large-diameter
pipes and ducts.
USAR Responders are NOT permitted to engage in confined space operations

unless endorsed to do so (Orange Card) and have all safety procedures in place.
If, as a responder, you are faced with a confined space incident you must advise the
incident controller the need for Task Force or specialist teams.
You may be able to ventilate the area from the exterior to assist in stabilising the
patients’ condition. This should only be done after seeking expert advice from a
HazMat or Confined Space Technician.
For further information on working in a confined space consult your agencies

Standard Operating Procedures or consult the NZ standards document
AS/NZS 2865:2001 (Safe Working in a Confined Space)
Picture 10. A void from which a survivor was removed following a structural
collapse is an example of a confined space.

Occupancy Interviews
Questioning witnesses and survivors can give clues as to the type of occupancy,
potential or known hazards and provides clear working zones of the building. It also
provides newly arriving teams with an organised operations area.
Primary occupancy interviews
• who lives in which room

• colours of ceiling or floor tiles
• floor coverings and furniture types
• potential for occupancy and hazards (chemicals, electricity, animals)
Other occupancy interviews
• time of collapse (and secondary collapse)

• has the building been searched before?
• availability of building plans (floor evacuation maps)
• location of utility main switches etc
• what have you heard or seen
Information management
• team leader to conduct interview

• record all information in your notebook with date/time as well as name and
address of interviewee as it could be used as legal evidence
• report relevant information back to Emergency Operations Centre or dispatch as
per agency protocol
• brief your team on intelligence gathered
Construction Methods & Hazards
Common building construction types
When considering the structural collapse potential of buildings, there are five principal
construction types to consider. The references to these types of construction are
common throughout New Zealand, and for that matter most of the world.
• Timber frame
• Reinforced masonry
• Unreinforced masonry
• Concrete tilt-up
• Reinforced concrete and steel frame

These construction types will all react differently when subjected to forces that lead to
a structural collapse. The following descriptions will give you some idea of what to
expect, but there may be large variations due to any combination of factors, but most
importantly, the cause of the structural collapse will have the largest bearing upon
how the building reacts.
Identifying structural collapse hazards
Timber frame
E.g. Low-rise (up to 3 storeys) residential or school buildings.

• Masonry chimneys can crack and collapse into or out from the structure.
• House sliding off foundation.
• Racking of walls (out of plum).
• Displaced walls.
• Openings can become out of shape (rectangular to parallelograms).
• Masonry veneers can fall off the walls.
There is an extreme risk from fire in these structures due to the abundance of fuel.
Due to their relatively lightweight nature and small size few people are seldom
comprehensively entrapped within timber residential collapsed structure.
Extreme care should be taken around significantly damaged or partially collapsed

timber framed buildings with heavy tile roofs. The disproportionately heavy upper
levels can quickly cause total collapse with a minimum of warning.
Reinforced Masonry
E.g. 1960’s onwards office blocks and residential or industrial buildings

• Parapets and full walls fall off or out of buildings due to inadequate
connections to floors, roofs and surrounding frames.
• During fires and earthquakes, connections (that hold the walls in to the
building) can break and cause complete fall out (rotation) of the whole .wall,
like tilt-up concrete panels.
• Voids are normally formed by wooden or concrete floors in familiar patterns of
V, lean to floor and pancake formations.

Unreinforced Masonry
E.g. Brick or stone construction prior to mid-1930’s.

• Unreinforced masonry infill has been known to fall off and often become
displaced from its surrounding frames.
• Parapets and full walls fall off buildings due to inadequate anchors.
• Multi thickness walls may spilt and collapse or break at openings.
• Roof / floors may collapse if there are no interior wall supports and if the
earthquake has a long enough duration.
• Voids are usually formed by wood floors in familiar patterns of " V ", lean to
and pancake formations.
• Broken bricks often line the streets where these building are located and
people can become trapped on the pavements or in their parked or passing
vehicles.
A number of un-reinforced masonry buildings have been strengthened in cities and in

schools around New Zealand. Even if significantly cracked, strengthened brick
buildings are much less likely to collapse further due to traffic vibrations or
aftershocks. The most apparent external sign of strengthening is the presence of
headed bolts or plates along the walls at floor and roof levels.
Concrete Tilt-up
E.g. Warehouses with large floor areas and some newer medium-rise residential
buildings.
• Walls separate from wood floors / roof causing at least local collapse of the
floor / roof, possible general collapse of walls and floor / roof.
• Suspended wall panels become dislodged and fall off the building.
• During fires and earthquakes, the steel connections that hold the wall panels
to the primary frames can break and cause a pack of cards style collapse
(sequential angle wall collapse).
Reinforced Concrete and Steel Frame
E.g. Most major new commercial buildings in town centres and cities.
• Columns break at joints with other members
• Reinforcement ties and bars do not confine concrete when subjected to high
shear and compression stress
• Punching shear failure at intersection of slabs and columns
• Precast floor slab units dislodge due to overall structure movement or
inadequate seating
• Weak concrete and poor construction can worsen above hazards
Buildings constructed prior to the mid-1970’s typically have a lower level of

earthquake resistance than newer buildings. It wasn’t until this time that modern
seismic codes came into being, with greatly improved proportioning and detailing of
key structural elements.
Modern buildings therefore have the ability to deform significantly and still stay up,
whereas earlier buildings are much more vulnerable to sudden, brittle collapse.

Collapse Patterns
Typical collapse patterns
There are ten types of possible structural collapse patterns, the first five being the
most common. The remaining five require more specialised training in rescue
techniques, which is beyond the scope of this manual.
These patterns are the types that you are most likely to see as a result of structures
becoming fire damaged, but the patterns are equally recognisable due to any
collapse factor.
1. Curtain Fall Wall Collapse

2. Inward / Outward Collapse
3. Lean Over Collapse
4. Lean to Floor Collapse
5. Angle Wall Collapse
A further five collapse patterns may be seen, but rescue following these collapses
usually involves accessing void and confined spaces.
6. Pancake floor collapse

7. Inverted, " A " or tent collapse
8. " V " collapse
9. Cantilever collapse
10. Progressive collapse
The majority of these structural collapse patterns are based on research and
experience following earthquakes.
It must be stressed that other collapse patterns and a combination of these collapse
patterns may occur. For example, building collapse following an explosion is
dependent on a large number of factors that may or may not be predictable.

Curtain Fall Wall collapse
Occurs when a wall made of bricks or blocks falls like a curtain, i.e. drops straight
downward.
Inwards / Outward collapse

Occurs when a wall made of bricks or blocks falls with the top portion of the wall
falling inwards and the bottom portion of the walls falls outwards.

Lean Over collapse
Occurs when wooden frame building collapses to one side.
Lean to Floor collapse
Occurs when a floor above ground level becomes dislodged from one side of the
structure and falls to the level below.
900 Angle Wall collapse
Occurs when a wall made of masonry, bricks or blocks collapses at a

900 degree angle covering the ground with the wall for a distance of the height of the
wall.

Pancake Floor collapse

Occurs when a floor or ceiling falls flat downwards.
" V " collapse
Occurs when a floor or ceiling gives way in the centre and falls to the floor below.
Inverted, "A" or Tent collapse
Occurs when a floor or ceiling gives way in the centre resulting in the opposite of the
" V " type collapse pattern.

Cantilever collapse
Occurs when a piece of floor, ceiling or wall falls landing on a stationary structure and
leaves a large segment hanging over an open area.
Progressive collapse
Occurs when there is an initial failure of a single primary support member. A chain
reaction of failures continues in a downward movement.

Secondary Collapse Indicators
Identifying the three secondary collapse indicators
There are a number of indications of the potential for a secondary collapse at an

Urban Search and Rescue incident. The three most common signs that you should
be alert for are
• Movement in the structure
• Visual alertness
• Hearing alertness
Movement in the structure
• movement in any floor, ceiling and roof

• movement of ornamental shop fronts
• movement of unsupported or non-load bearing walls
• movement of structural beams
• columns and walls out of plumb
• structural ceilings sagging
Visual alertness
• fire consuming location where sprinkler tank is housed

• uneven surface, heavy signs on a section or the whole of the roof
• cracks appearing in the exterior walls
• sagging or bulging walls / chandelier shaking or swaying
• large fire which has been unsuppressed for more than 20 mins involving 2 or more
floors
• walls showing smoke or water seeping through

Picture 11. Cracks in a wall showing smoke seepage and potential for collapse.
Hearing alertness
• creaking and groaning types of noises coming from the building / structural
elements
• interior explosions, rumbling noises, hissing sounds, electrical arcing
• strong winds
• safety warning signals
During Practical Operations
The way rescuers are deployed onto a structural collapse or for that matter, any
building on fire, can have an effect on the integrity of a building. The Team Leader
should always monitor the location of rescuers, as should the Safety Officer. Some
points to be particularly aware of are listed below.
• Do not allow large numbers of personnel to work on external fire escapes,

because the escape may become weakened and collapse.
• Ensure crews are reduced or instruct them to keep close to the building to reduce
the leverage effect caused by standing close to railings.
• If a sense of soft feel / sponginess is felt walking on sections of roofs or floors,
then it is a good indication that the integrity of the structural component may have
been compromised.
• Prior knowledge of your response area is essential to ensure that crews are
aware of any in built hazards that a building may have.
• One hazard may be large water tanks in buildings that are used as secondary
sprinkler supplies or cooling towers. These are often on the 13th or 14th floor; it is
unusual to find them above the 17th floor due to difficulties with water pressure.
For example,

Structural Identification Systems

Importance of identifying structures
Structural collapse can occur for a variety of reasons, which include earthquakes,
faulty construction methods, fires and explosions. The incident may involve single
structures or, as found in many natural disasters, multiple structure damage spread
across a large geographical zone.
It is possible, if called to a structural collapse incident that encompasses several

buildings, for rescuers to be confronted with little or no identification and search and
reconnaissance information.
Height, design and type of buildings and the magnitude and duration of the
destructive force responsible for the devastation are important factors. Combined,
they determine the severity of damage that can make identification of individual
structures difficult.
Regardless of the number of structures involved - from a single structure to several

structures - it is equally important to have a standardised system for identifying
individual locations. Proper identification allows:
• structures to be individually identified

• search and rescue to be conducted systematically and efficiently
• a PSA (Priority Structure Assessment) to be conducted which determines the
highest potential for viable rescue opportunities
• a hazard assessment and marking of any particular building prior to search and
rescue operations
• an accurate method of allowing general and specific incident and site
documentation, e.g., events which took place at a given site at a given time
• long term post-disaster identification of the site
• overall site safety

Single structure – Side Label
The system adopted by New Zealand USAR is the one used in the US and Europe
for identifying locations following both fires and structural collapses. This system
nominates the address, the street or address side of the structure as SIDE 1.
The other sides of the structure should be assigned numerically in a clockwise

manner from SIDE 1.
The structure’s interior should be divided into quadrants. The quadrants are identified
alphabetically and in a clockwise manner starting from the area where SIDE 1 and
SIDE 2 perimeters meet.
The central core where all four quadrants meet is designated, as QUADRANT E. It
must be remembered that quadrants do not have to be symmetrical, and can be
altered to suit the needs of the incident.

Floor identification
Structural collapse incidents involving multi-floor structures must have each floor
clearly identified. In the event of a partial or total collapse making this task not clearly
discernible, the floors should be numbered as viewed from the exterior.
The ground floor should be designated GROUND and moving upwards the second
floor designated FLOOR 1 and so on. Conversely, the first floor below ground level
should be B-1, the second B-2 and so on.
Where there are multi-floor access to the building, the ground floor will be designated
by the main entrance. Other entrances such as the rear entrance may be several
floors above or below the main entrance
Structure identification within a geographic area
As discussed earlier, it is important to clearly identify each separate structure within a

geographic area. The primary method of identification should be the existing street
name and building number. If post-collapse site conditions do not allow this, then
Priority Structure Assessment teams should identify the street name and the area
from the nearest named street junctions on each side of the incident. The area in the
figure below would be identified as the intersection of Brown Street and Smith Street.

Structures should also be assigned appropriate numbers to differentiate them. If

previously existing street numbers have been obliterated, an attempt should be made
to re-establish the numbering system based upon one or more structures that still
display an existing number. The front of structures are clearly marked using
“International Orange” spray paint with the assigned number. The boundary frontage
of individual structures is also indicated using the spray paint or barrier tape.
Identification of bridges, flyovers & trains
Structural collapses involving bridges and flyovers can be sectored into manageable
sections along their length. Once again, the size of sectors will be based on the
incident and geography of the area.
COLLAPSED BRIDGE
SECTOR A SECTOR B SECTOR C SECTOR D

Zone/barrier marking system (INSARAG)
General cordon markings (cordon banners, flagging, etc.) are to be used for small
defined area. They can be enlarged to include other non-buildings (i.e., bridge,
dangerous zones, security, etc.). Large areas may require barricades/fences/patrol/etc.
Operational Work Zone
PELIGRO PELIGRO PELIGRO
Collapse/Hazard Zone
PEL
IGR
O O
IGR
PEL
PE LIG
O RO
IGR
PEL
PEL
IGR
O O
IGR
PEL
Other markings
Facility
All team facilities (medical facility, ICP, etc.) must be identified by team name (Iconic
flags, banners, balloons, etc)
Vehicle
Vehicles must be marked with team name and function (flag, magnetic sign, etc.).
Teams
Response teams must be identified by country and team name (uniform, patch, etc.)

FEMA Structure Hazard Evaluation

The FEMA Structure Hazard Evaluation is used by Task Force team members to
indicate structural integrity and other dangers associated with the site. This is a
different marking system to the structure/search assessment marking explained
under the section labelled Search & Victim Marking System
Task Force members will place the markings adjacent to the safe entry point of the
structure. This marking system where appropriate will also occur inside the structure
adjacent to rooms, hallways, stairwells, etc.
The marking consists of a 1m x 1m square box in international orange. The inside of

the box may contain a “/” or and ‘X”
Safe Needs Shoring Unsafe
“HM” is placed on the outside of the box to indicate hazardous material and an arrow
is located next to the marking to indicate the direction of safe entrance into the
structure should the marking need to be made away from the indicated entrance.
The example below indicates a safe point of entry to the left of the marking. The
structure may require some shoring and/or bracing. The assessment was made on
19 November by New Zealand TF1. There is also a risk of LPG in the building
19 Nov 1730 Hr
HM - LPG
NZ TF1

Collapse Plan Phases

The following information is intended as a guide for those teams who initially respond
to a structural collapse incident. It is not intended to become a Hard & Fast rule for
officers to adhere to regardless of what type of incident they are confronted with. A
degree of common sense must prevail, as flexibility is one of the signs of a good plan.
Since the Second World War and the Blitz experiences' of numerous major cities a
standard plan was designed to ensure those involved in collapse rescue situations
were not prone to indecision and delay. This methodical approach was vital for teams
to perform in a professional manner. Over the passing years this basic plan of initial
action has been updated by numerous emergency agencies, however the basic
standard format still remains very similar to it's original concept. The following is a
developed version of the plan combined into a mnemonic for ease of learning and
remembering by the USAR team member.
PHASES OF A COLLAPSE PLAN
Reconnaissance & survey.

Elimination of utilities.
Primary surface search & rescue.
Exploration of all voids spaces
Access by Selected debris removal.
Terminate by general debris removal.
Reconnaissance & survey
When the rescue team arrives at the site the Team Leader should immediately set
his/her team to work attending to surface casualties which are not trapped and not
within the collapsed structure. It may be that surface casualties have already been
removed and in this case the rescuers will be instructed to go rapidly over the area,
working in from the perimeter of damage to check that all such casualties have in fact
been cleared. It is the Team Leader‘s responsibility to ensure that work undertaken
by others is properly completed. Therefore the Team Leader should consider specific
assignments for incoming teams to perform a thorough site survey.
Surface casualties are not generally trapped in any way and would suffer mostly from
injuries inflicted by flying fragments. The work of attending to them or having them
removed could generally be nearing completion when the Team Leader returns from
his/her reconnaissance provided the site is not too large an area.
It must be remembered that the Team Leader of the incident may change as the
incident escalates. For more information on escalating incidents, consult with your
instructor, or refer to your agencies Incident Management System manual.
Reconnaissance and survey work is not confined to phase 1. It should continue

through all phases until the last casualty is located. What is implied by this phase title
is preliminary collecting of information and careful surveying which covers the whole
area and guides the Team Leader to his/her decisions on priorities and methods of
extrication.

The collecting of relevant information is an important part of rescue reconnaissance.

It will assist in the technical work of extrication; it will also be beneficial to the Team
Leader to identify casualties and so save valuable time in accounting for missing
persons.
The following headings summarise the information which the Team Leader should
seek from persons who know the area affected e.g. residents of nearby property
which is unaffected, local Police etc.
The extent of the area of damage that the team must cover needs to take into
account the hazards from damage to public services, e.g. gas, flooding, and
electricity. The nature of the damage and any particular hazards involved must also
be considered and includes leaning roofs and walls, explosives, flammable
substances or radioactive sources.
Compile a list of the normal occupants of damaged structures, plus particulars of

those already rescued or who have left the area. Note the position of trapped victims
already located; the suspected location of those who have not been contacted and
also any injuries demanding special attention and what treatment has previously
been given, (e.g. in the case of crush injury, what treatment has been given?).
The Team Leader should consider the removal of casualties, position of ambulance
loading points; position of a temporary mortuary; the use of medical teams etc.
To supplement the information on casualties already obtained it may be necessary

for the Team Leader to question bystanders. It is very important in this connection
that he/she should keep in mind the distinction between fact and opinion (or
hearsay). Information secured from excited or distressed people is liable to be
garbled, incoherent and misleading. The Team Leader should to use the services of
Police Officers when collecting and checking information from bystanders. This would
leave freedom for the work of observation that he/she must carry out.
The Team Leader should ensure a rapid tour of damaged buildings where casualties
are trapped is undertaken. He/she should note the various forms of collapse and
attempt to establish the likely position of casualties in the debris. The survey should
form a preliminary plan for the extrication of casualties and develop a sequence of
priorities.
It is advantageous to the Team Leader in this work if he/she is able to mentally

reconstruct the structure as it stood before the collapse. Local information may be of
assistance by comparing similar structures which are undamaged or less severely
damaged.
Hazards should be noted such as a wall leaning dangerously; a floor where a

supporting wall is displaced; a gas filled basement; dangerous stairs etc.
All this must be done rapidly. A reconnaissance at this phase is general in nature and
should not be carried down to minute details. It is important that the Team Leader
should get back to the team as soon as possible and get them operating to a logical
plan. During this initial reconnaissance phase, the Team Leader (if possible) should
be accompanied by a member of the team who can assist in hazard assessment.

Elimination of utilities
Phase II is one of the most important phases and can often be overlooked because
of the scene of carnage often presented to the initial responding teams. It is a vital
assignment of any team to ensure the elimination of all utilities is completed as soon
as possible.
A broken gas pipe leaking flammable gas throughout the area can cause a severe
explosion and possible secondary collapse. Leaking gas can also accumulate in
confined spaces where victims may be trapped thus causing them to become
asphyxiated and possibly die.
Damaged electrical wiring not isolated can cause fires to break out and possible
electrocution of rescuers.
Leaking water can form at lower levels and victims have been known to drown in
these situations. Broken water pipes can cause mortar to form into sludge and cause
possible secondary collapses throughout the debris.
Primary surface search and rescue
Slightly damaged buildings may be defined as structures in which the floors or roofs
have not collapsed. These should be systematically searched and any injured or
trapped people attended to and removed. Care in approach and entry to this type of
building is important. Floors that are still in position may be precariously supported
and temporary shoring may be required.
Where a number of structures have to be searched, it will be vital to adopt a

disciplined Priority Structure Assessment (PSA), also a Hazard Marking System and
Search Marking System which will indicate clearly that all areas have been hazard
assessed and searched by a USAR team. Agencies should teach their USAR teams
to understand these systems and how to apply them in practical situations.
If casualties are conscious a 'calling and listening period' may locate them (the Line
and Hail Technique is covered later in this manual). The Team Leader positions
teams along the fringe of the debris near the position where casualties are thought to
be trapped. They lie on the debris and if possible get their heads close to openings
that go down into the debris. The Team Leader calls for silence on the site and if
necessary asks the Police to ensure that silence is maintained while the calling lasts.
Each team member in turn is instructed to call, using terms such as "rescue team
above, can you hear me?" All listen intently for any answering sound from a trapped
casualty and if a reply or knocking sound is heard each rescuer indicates with an
outstretched arm in the direction from which they think the sound originated.

The Team Leader, observing the various bearings given by team members should be
able to estimate the position of the casualty with a good degree of accuracy.
If there is no reply to the rescuers a good tactic is to try knocking on objects such as
steel beams which go deep into the debris. This sound may reach the casualty even
though the calls have failed to do so, and they in turn may be able to knock in reply.
When contact has been established the rescuer must question the casualty (if they
are able to speak). The questions should be confined to ones aimed at receiving
information that will help the Team Leader in forming a strategic plan for the
extrication. The nature of the casualty's injuries, for instance, is often significant in
this regard. How are they trapped? Are there any openings in the walls in their
vicinity? This latter question is of great importance. A lane cleared through the debris
in a straight line towards the casualty, for instance, may bring the rescuers up against
a blank wall. Such a clearance should be aimed at doors or windows or other
openings formed in the walls by the collapse.
Once communication of this kind has been established with a person it should, as far
as it is possible, be maintained for the following reasons:
• It helps to maintain the casualties’ morale. It helps them to withstand whatever

pain and discomfort they may be suffering and may even give them sufficient hope
to keep them alive.
• It helps rescuers to work in the right direction - sometimes a difficult matter in the
dark.
• The victims, if sufficiently conscious, may be able to give warning of any
displacement or movement in the debris likely to cause them further injury, or give
information of any other casualties whom may be located nearby.
• Conversation with a trapped person must always be of a reassuring nature.
Exploration of all voids and spaces
In this phase rescuers explore all places where trapped casualties might have
survived the collapse even when there is no evidence of the presence of such
casualties. Examples of survival points are:
• Sheltered parts of buildings likely to have withstood damage.

• Voids under collapsed floor. (NB USAR teams must remember different Collapse
Patterns and void locations).
• Under stairs.
• Beside chimney breasts in older constructions (especially where there are
cupboards).
• In basements.
• In rooms which have not completely collapsed but where the entrance is blocked.

Access by selected debris removal
Phase V is generally associated with collapsed structures where casualties are

trapped by debris, but their whereabouts is known or can be inferred with reasonable
certainty. This locating of trapped casualties should be, where possible, verified by
technical devices and/or canine search teams. This is vitally important at large
incidents where a multi-collapse situation exists with numerous victims reported
trapped. Rescue teams must be deployed to a place where a high probability of
saving life exists and not to a site where evidence of survival is minimal.
The rescue teams should make themselves familiar with the different types of
collapse patterns and understand the locations where to start removing debris in an
orderly manner and with the best chances of finding people alive.
It must be noticed that in general the casualty's chance of survival decreases with
each succeeding phase. Many persons buried under debris in this phase will
unfortunately be dead but their positions nevertheless must be explored and all
casualties located before work starts on phase VI.
Terminate by general debris removal
When rescue teams have gone systematically through the first five phases and there
are still some casualties to be accounted for (or even in cases where parts of bodies
are still missing), the whole area must be stripped of debris until they are recovered.
Unless special orders to the contrary are given, a rescue operation must be carried
on diligently without interruption until phase VI is completed. Every person known or
likely to have been in the building must be accounted for. In the absence of specific
instructions to the contrary there should be no relaxation of effort until this phase is
reached, no matter how long the work may take. It should never be assumed,
because persons have not been extricated after several days' work that they must be
dead and there is no further need for strenuous work. Persons have, in fact, been
recovered alive after being trapped under debris for many days, for example, in the
1976 Terngshan China Earthquake 459 people were rescued alive after 5 days.
It is impossible for even the most experienced USAR team members to tell from an
external inspection of a pile of debris whether casualties buried in the debris will be
alive or not. Even the most tightly packed debris may be quite loose underneath and,
in fact, experience has shown that this is often the case.
When rescue operations are prolonged, work can be carried on continuously only by
employing relays of rescuers working at high pressure for short periods. Only in this
way can the attack be maintained with undiminished effort. Rescuers must not be
allowed, in their own interest or in the interest of the rescue effort, to work until they
are exhausted. Few can carry on rescue work efficiently at really high pressure for a
continuous period of more than about four hours, and even though they may be keen
and willing to work longer, it is much better to bring another team into action to effect
relief.
The question of how many teams can be spared for relief will need to be considered
by the Team Leader. It is his/her duty however, to call for a relief team as soon as

they know the operation is likely to be prolonged and prior to the team starting to
show signs of fatigue.
In this regard the Team Leader must bear in mind that it may take a relief team some
time to arrive because of distance, even if one is immediately available.
As has already been indicated, the Team Leader’s principal duties is to decide on the
best method of tackling the incident and to see that teams and equipment are
employed to the best possible advantage with the minimum risk. The Team Leader of
methods is by no means an easy one largely because it is impossible to foresee
exactly whether or not certain strategies and tactics are going to be the most efficient
until they have been tried. For example, almost insurmountable difficulties may be
encountered in approaching a casualty from one direction whereas, later efforts may
reveal that an approach from another direction is much easier. Difficulties of this kind
cannot be avoided, no matter how good the judgement and experience of the Team
Leader may be.
If sufficient rescuers are available, considerable time can be saved by trying different
approaches simultaneously, although simultaneous action of this kind has the
disadvantage that unless the strictest command and control is maintained by the
Team Leader, the work of one team may endanger the lives of another. Two teams or
half teams working simultaneously in the same site must always be under the
direction of one Sector Team Leader and not be allowed to work independently
` The six phases sequence gives the Team Leader a meaningful checklist and a
helpful order of priorities.
It does not suit every collapse scenario nor is it applicable to widespread areas of
damage where a large number of casualties are involved e.g. mass area earthquake.
It also does not take account of First Aid or Medical priorities; however it is structured
in being used as a starting point for operations to commence and flexible enough in
application to be expanded into an overall large rescue strategy.

Warning Signals
INSARAG warning signals
At any Urban Search and Rescue operation, there needs to be a set of standard,
internationally accepted signals that can be conveyed over the entire area of
operations in case of an emergency. An example may be where another aftershock
occurs or a secondary explosive device is suspected or found.
There also needs to be a signal when search teams require quiet, for example if they
believe they have heard a survivor, and need to fix a bearing on where they are.
The most commonly used apparatus for warning signals is the air horn, either a fixed
model, or a portable rechargeable model.
Search crews will normally have a portable air horn with them in the structure, and
will sound it when required.
The Internationally accepted warning signals are:
Action required Signal
Evacuate 3 X short blasts
Cease operations, all quiet 1 X long blast
Resume operations 1x long blast followed by 1x short

blast
Short blasts = 1 second

Long blasts = 3 seconds
Other considerations
You can use whistles, portable air horns or vehicle horns. Ensure everyone is briefed
on the method you will be using
The evacuation signal should be relayed by members of the team to ensure that
everybody on the work site can hear the signal.
During briefing remind the team that only INSARAG signals are to be used, as
different whistle signal systems are used in other rescue disciplines. ASTM Rope
Rescue Standard F1768-97 for down rope = INSARAG evacuate signal for example

Search & Victim Marking System
Structure/search assessment marking
The basic symbol consists of a 1-metre X 1-metre square box at the primary access
point into any compromised structure. The marking will identify any known hazards,
whether it is safe to search (G or N), the team name and the start time and date of
the search.
The structure/search markings should be made with florescent colour, preferably

‘International orange’
Sample marking box
Completed marking box
Once a search has been completed a circle is put around the entire search marking
As the incident progresses, further information may indicate that the structure needs
searching again, if this were the case a new search marking would be made by the
new search team.

Victim area marking
During the search function, it is necessary to identify the location of any known or
potential victim. The amount and type of debris in the area may completely cover or
obstruct the location of the known or potential victim. The victim location markings are
made by the Search Team or other individuals conducting search and rescue
operations whenever a known or potential victim is located and not immediately
removed.
The victim location markings should be made with florescent colour, preferably
‘International orange’
Potential Victim Location
Draw a large "V" near the location of the known or potential victim. The letter “L” with a
number will denote the number of live victims. The letter “D” with a number will denote
the number of dead victims.
Confirmed Victim Location
Draw an arrow beside the "V" when the location of a victim has been confirmed either
visually, vocally or hearing specific sounds, which would indicate a high probability of a
victim. This may be done when the victim is initially located or may need to be done
later after some debris removal or use of specialised search equipment. A canine alert
will initially receive the "V" without an arrow to indicate a potential victim.

Dead/Live Victim(s) Location
Only Dead Remain
Draw a horizontal line through the “V” to indicate only dead victim(s) remain.
Extricated All Victim(s)
A circle would be drawn around the "V" when all victims have been extricated from that
location.

Rubble Crawl
When a rescue team arrives at a structural collapse incident one of the first
considerations for the Team Leader is surface casualties who are not trapped and
not within the collapsed structure. Where it is safe to do so, rescue teams can
remove these victims to the casualty staging area. Surface casualties are not
generally trapped in any way and are usually suffering from injuries caused by flying
fragments.
Rescuers working on a rubble pile need a co-ordinated team approach when

searching and subsequently rescuing victims. Rescuers should keep as low as
possible, watching where they place their hands and feet. Three points of contact
should be kept with the rubble pile at all times to ensure maximum stability. Full
safety gear must always be worn and hazards such as protruding reinforcing bars
should be pointed out to all team members.
Picture 12. Highlights three points of contact with rubble and correct safety
gear.

Line & Hail Search

Once a zone has been identified, rescuers can conduct an audible search for trapped
sub-surface victims. A collapsed area is selected and the rescue team members -
except for the Team Leader - stand in a straight line approximately 1.5 meters
apart. The Team Leader remains behind the line of rescuers ensuring he/she can see
all of the rescue team. The line of rescuers is numbered sequentially from the Team
Leader’s left-hand side, number 1, number 2, and so on.
Under the direction of the Team Leader the line moves 2 -3 metres forward into the
rubble pile and all rescuers crouch with their heads as low as possible. Rescuer No 1
shouts the rescue call, “RESCUE TEAM ABOVE; CAN YOU HEAR ME?" The entire
rescue team listens for a response for 15 - 20 seconds. If nothing is heard rescuer No
1 will shout, “NOTHING HEARD”
This is the cue for No 2 to shout the rescue call and again, the rescue team listens for
a response, then rescuer No 3 shouts the rescue call, and so on. Once all rescue
team members have shouted the rescue call and nothing has been heard, the line
moves forward 1.5 - 2 metres and the evolution is repeated. A large area of collapse
can be covered using the audible search method.

“RESCUE TEAM ABOVE, CAN YOU HEAR ME?”
Rescuers who hear a call or any other noise coming from the collapse site must raise
their arm until acknowledged by Team Leader. They must then point with their arm
fully extended in the direction they believe the noise is coming from and remain in
that position until otherwise directed by the Team Leader. The Team Leader can then
move individual team members to pinpoint the source of the noise.

During an audible search all unnecessary noise must be kept to a minimum. It must
also be remembered that metal is an excellent conductor of sound. A person trying to
attract attention below the rubble surface may tap steel RSJ with a piece of broken
concrete or other hard object. The tapping sound at surface level, depending on the
collapse may be several metres away from the victim. It is worthwhile during the
audible search for rescuers to tap any protruding steel structural members with a
hard object and listen for a response.
Casualties found buried or partly buried must be approached with extreme caution. It
can be difficult to determine if these casualties are in a vertical or horizontal position
below the rubble. Debris removal must start a few metres from, and around, the
casualty. This prevents rescuers standing on any unseen parts of the casualty just
below the debris if he/she is in a horizontal position and provides a reasonable step-
down distance if the casualty is in a vertical position.
Picture 13. Category 2 Urban Search and Rescue operators preparing for a line
and hail search.
Identify casualties as soon as possible and mark the victim's location with a ‘V’
painted in orange paint. The bottom of the ‘V’ should point towards the victim. It is
important to mark the victim's location, for you may at any stage be evacuated or
relieved from the area, and a different crew may be assigned to remove the victim.
Ask the victim if they know of any other victims and where they are or were located.
Always consider the possibility of Crush Syndrome for trapped casualties and
conduct basic First Aid requirements as required.

Stretcher Walk
Casualties should only be moved in a stokes litter, stretcher or other carrying device.
Rescuers, working in a team of seven can use one member to “scout” in front of the
carrying team when removing victims from a structure. This person selects the
easiest route, identifies any hazards and informs the team. Keep in mind that the
shortest route may not always be the easiest.
The carrying team, working three members each side, pass the stretcher forward,
hand-over-hand, allowing the rear two members to release their hold of the stretcher
and carefully move to the front of the team whilst the other four members bear the
weight of the victim.
Clear, loud orders such as “BREAKING”, “SAFE”, and “PASSING” must be given
during the operation. Team members need to rest at regular intervals and maintain
their fluid levels. Protect and reassure the casualty during the rescue, know where
the patient staging area is located before you commence return and relay relevant
information to the Team Leader via situation reports (SITREP).
When breaking from the stretcher and moving forward, never lean on crewmembers
holding the litter to support yourself. You may stumble and possibly cause the
member supporting you to fall as well and as a consequence the rescue crew may
drop the stretcher and victim.
Picture 14. Stretcher handling exercise.

Further Reading
NZ Colour Light Stick Codes
Some specialist rescue teams in New Zealand use a Colour Light Stick coding
system for night operations, this however is not an internationally approved coding
system and some countries have their own system which differ from the system
below.
Colour Use
Green Personnel & general illumination
Red Hazard/Danger – Keep Away
Blue Patient location/ID
Yellow Rope monitoring or as decided by

command
Green/Red Team Leader
Operational Briefings
Formal briefings convey a large amount of important information in a logical

comprehensive way. This process enables events to be managed more efficiently
and effectively either as a response to a known event or upon subsequent situation
reports of an events magnitude
Often briefings are not given because the event seems so insignificant that the
briefing would seem ‘over the top’ and a source of ridicule. With the benefit of
hindsight it would have, in a number of situations been beneficial.
A common briefing pneumonic used in many countries by Defence Forces and

Emergency Services is called SMEAC. In New Zealand this has been modified and is
called SMEACQ (Situation, Mission, Execution, Administration and Logistics,
Command and Communication, Questions)

Situation (introduction, terrain & risk)
Give the team enough information on the current activity to enable them to complete
their tasks. If this is a continuation from a previous activity then it may only include an
update on that briefing.
When covering the terrain also mention the current location. Should you or a member
of your team suffer harm it is important that other team members know where to
direct other emergency crews to for assistance
Ensure your team is advised of risks that they may have to deal with, e.g. tide times,
gas, power, unstable or slippery surfaces, etc.
Mission
This is a concise statement of what is to be achieved by the team and is for the
particular briefing been given. You should state the mission and then restate it again;
your team must leave the briefing knowing what the mission is.
Execution
Give a brief overview of how the mission will be achieved. Describe each persons
role and what they are to do, but keep it simple. Cover details like sequencing of
events, priorities, key timings, etc.
Administration and Logistics
This section covers essential administration and logistic information regarding the
mission. It may contain information on vehicles, equipment, stores, forms to be
completed and even when lunch is.
Command and Communication
Give details on who is in charge and whom the team or members within the team are
to report to. You should cover how reporting to the person in charge should take
place, i.e. by whom, through what process and when.
When covering communication you may wish to remind the team of light stick
colours, radio call signs, phone and fax numbers, whistle and evacuation signals, etc.
Questions
It is important to ask the team if they have any questions to ensure they understand
their role. Once all the questions are answered it is important to check their
understanding of the briefing. This can be achieved by asking several team members
questions about what was covered in the briefing. If the person giving the briefing has
learned the Pose, Pause, Pounce, Praise method of questioning, it should be used.

The use of the SMEACQ format for briefings can be great time saver as well as a
checklist for the team leader. It should be used in any situation where a briefing is
required.
Other guidelines you should consider:
• Briefings may be given daily, or more frequently as situation demand
• Briefings should be brief but to the point , it is not a discussion on what should be
done or a detailed guide on how to perform each task
• Do not allow discussion during the briefing as it may distract others
• Have the team take notes as they may have to relay the briefing to other
members of your team as they arrive
• Ensure that everyone who the briefing is intended for is present
• Advise the team you are about to give a formal briefing
Team effectiveness
Any incident requiring the mobilisation of an USAR team is likely to be conducted

over a long time frame. The incident is likely to require the resources of more than
one agency, and possibly even the need for USAR teams from regions.
Each person at an USAR incident must realise that there are a number of roles that
combine to make an effective USAR team. In particular, the Incident Controller has a
number of roles that increase with the size of the incident.
An example of the need for USAR teamwork was the bombing of the Alfred P Murrah
building in Oklahoma City, 1995. The rescue operations at this incident involved 682
USAR Trained personnel, 20 search dogs, 460,000 pounds of rescue equipment,
1000 Oklahoma City Fire Department members, and 100's of Local and State Police
and Federal Agents. The co-ordination and control of an incident of this magnitude
requires effective teamwork at all levels of the operation.
Each individual who responds to a USAR incident will have a different role to play
that is dependent upon their agency’s role. These roles are primarily legislative, and
will be in accordance with each agency’s SOP's.

Effective teamwork
In order to achieve effective teamwork, there are three sets of needs that have to be
present. These are:
Task Needs
Team Needs
Individual Needs
Task needs are the successful concluding of the incident itself, and the task you will
be required to perform based on legislation, resources, training etc.
Team needs are how you fulfil your role as a team member, and what your team is
required to do.
Individual needs are how you perform at the incident, and how you cope with the
work and stress of the incident.
One of the problems that face any team is that each individual may have a different
perception of how these three needs fit together.
For example, at an incident, one person's perception may be like the diagram below,
with their task needs being the dominant factor.
Another's perception may have a greater emphasis on the team as shown in the
diagram below.

This is called personal paradigms and means that each individual has a different
perception of the incident based on how they feel, their experience, what they know
and what they have been told.
The role of the Team Leader is to ensure that each part balances, and when
combined with the personal traits of the individual, the team is working towards
reaching the objectives set by the Incident Controller.
This requires you to understand where you fit into the overall team, to understand
that your perception of an incident may not be the same as that of the Incident
Controller, and that you are a part of a team working towards an overall objective.
At different stages of an incident, there will also be a different relationship between

the three parts.
For example, when you arrive at an incident, the relationship may look like the
diagram below with the greatest emphasis being on the task at hand.
But after four or five days at an incident, as you become tired and stressed, the
relationship between the parts may begin to look like the diagram below as your
individual needs become greater.
In order to ensure that the overall incident objectives are always met, Team Leaders
will need to continually monitor their team and how their three sets of needs are
balanced.
It needs to be impressed upon all individuals who attend an incident, that not every
individual team member can be working at the 'coal face' conducting rescues. Your
agency will have a role, and through your agency, your role will be defined. All of this

information is used by the Incident Controller and Incident Management Team

towards formulating an objective for the effective completion of the incident.
In summary, each person has an individual role that helps ensure that the overall
incident objectives are met. Despite these different roles, you are still a part of a
team, achieving its task.
In theory, the ideal balance of task team and individual needs should appear like the
circles shown below.
Different types of people within a team.
In order to effectively manage an USAR incident, the Incident Controller and each
Team Leader, must be aware of the way individuals approach their work. Dr Susan
Segal has identified four different approaches that people have to work, these are:
BULLETS An example of a bullet will be a responder who

often goes straight into an incident, without
weighing up the consequences of their actions,
and possibly putting themselves at risk.
DIGGERS An example of a digger is someone who does

not like to make a quick decision, but would
rather weigh up the facts before acting.
INVOLVERS An example of an involver is the person who

keeps the group together and provides harmony.
DREAMERS An example of a dreamer is someone who has

all the creative ideas, but relies on the rest of the
team to make them a reality.

Bullets
Give job progress
Not good managers
Task oriented
Make things happen
Risk takers
Willing to compromise
Motivated by results
Diggers
Like information in writing
Do not like quick decisions
Need proof of everything
Very thorough
Will not compromise
Needs lot of time to think
Motivated by recognition as an expert
Involvers
There to promote harmony
Think about people and likely reactions
Make people rather than task things happen
Will compromise
Motivated by acceptance and belonging
Dreamers
Innovative lateral thinkers
Creative
Their thought processes are conceptual
Can facilitate change
Not good at implementation
Usually generate enthusiasm
Dislike detail
Motivated by recognition or ego.
Each person will have an assigned job at an incident, whether that is medical
support, logistical support, or rescuer. In addition to how you approach your work as
an individual, the team that you form a part of will go through various phases before it
is able to function effectively.

Picture 15. Teamwork is essential to ensure operations such as this are

conducted effectively!
Phases of Teamwork
Tucklan's model for teams defines four specific stages that a team will go through
when they are put together. The first four phases that any team goes through are:
Forming (Either at the incident or before)
This is the stage where the team comes together, establishes a structure and
identifies common goals.
Storming (Each person having a different view of the objective)
This is the stage where conflict occurs normally due to the issues of autonomy within
the group, and dependence on the group.
Norming (Working together as a team)
This is the stage where group goals are re established and group norms appear and
are reinforced. Definite roles will appear for members that help the group to function
effectively. If roles are defined before an incident, this phase can be reached quicker.

Performing (Meeting incident objectives)
This is the stage where group energy is now being channelled into the task. This is
when the designated leader begins to take a less active and more supporting role.
These four phases will always occur to varying degrees whenever a team is formed.
Sometimes teams never progress beyond the storming phase, and as a result,
incident objectives cannot be met.
The final phase that some teams will go through is called the mourning stage, when
the incident is over and the teamwork is no longer required. This is a topic beyond
the scope of this manual, and is an issue for Critical Incident Stress Debriefing
(CISD) teams.
Phases of Team Formation
In addition to these four phases, there are another four phases that the formed team
will go through. These phases relate directly to the four phases of teamwork and are:
Dependence (Upon each other)

Forming
Independence (Different points of view)

Storming
Interdependence (Working together as a team)
Norming
Synergy (Getting more out than you put in)

Performing
The appreciation process
The appreciation process is a simple method of problem solving which is effective in

rescue situations. It involves the logical assessment of the situation, and the
reconnaissance, and results in the formation of the workable plan.
The appreciation process consists of six steps:
Step One – Define The Problem
The problem to be solved, or task to be accomplished must be clearly defined. The

problem may be too large or complex to be easily tackled, and may be divided into a
number of manageable elements, each with a set aim.

Step Two – State The Aim
The aim is a clear statement of what the team has to achieve in order to solve the
problem. The aim must be clear, concise, achievable, and expressed in positive
terms. The aim will form the mission statement in an operational briefing and should
be as simple as: “To rescue the casualty from the bottom of the lift shaft”.
Step Three – Consider The Factors
Factors are points relevant to the problem that has to be solved. Some factors that
may have to be considered in an operational situation are:
• Number and location of casualties
• Time and space
• Topography
• Weather
• Available resources, both personnel and equipment
• Support requirements and availability
• Communications
• Logistics
• Priority of tasks.
Each factor will lead to one or more logical deductions, so that the leader should be
in a position to say: “If this is the case – then…”
Factors in an appreciation may be set out as in the following example:
Factor The casualty’s legs are trapped under a heavy steel

beam.
Deduction The rescue team must use cutting and lifting
equipment to free the casualty.
Each factor should be thoroughly examined and care should be taken not to
introduce irrelevant facts into the examination.
Step Four – Determine Courses Open
All possible courses that will attain the aim and that are practical must be considered
in the ‘Courses Open’ segment. Only facts dealt with in the ‘Factors’ should be
considered and no new material should be introduced at this stage.
Step Five – Decide On Best Course
At this stage, a choice must be made from one of the possible solutions developed by
the appreciation process. If more than one workable solution is produced and the
best course is not obvious, the following criteria should be applied to each:
Risk — Which solution carries the least risk factor in its execution, or the
consequence of failure?
Simplicity — Which is the simplest course?
Time — If urgency is a factor, which course can be completed in the shortest time?
Economy — In the terms of resources, which solution imposes the least demand?

Step Six – Plan
The plan will result from the choice of the best course open. That is, it will be the
best solution to the problem with the most advantages and the least disadvantages.
The plan must be simple, and it must relate directly to the aim. When completed, the
plan should be checked against the following test questions:
• Is the reasoning sound?
• Is it set out in a logical order?
• Is everything relevant to the problem?
• Has anything relevant been left out?
• Is it free of uncertainties or ambiguities?
• Is it accurate (positions, timings and so on)?
• Has the aim been kept in mind throughout?
• Can the plan achieve the aim?
Continuing Action
Having made decisions and deployed personnel, Team Leaders must ensure
reconnaissance is continued with a view to allocating priorities for the further
deployment of resources.
Rescuers deployed on a particular building, damaged by blast or natural causes,

should make careful observation of how that building has collapsed. The art of
rescue lies in being able to identify and exploit to the maximum, all debris formations
such as voids etc, which can be used to facilitate access to casualties once their
whereabouts have been fixed by firm information or inference.
Attempt to locate and identify the parts of the building and especially those parts in
which casualties are reported to be. This will provide a rough idea where casualties
might be found in relation to the various parts of the damaged structure.
At times such as this, a leader will need to call upon all accumulated experience and
training and combine them with effective decision-making

Acknowledgements
Developed by
Manager
Steve Glassey
Project Manager – USAR CAT 1 Course Development
New Zealand Fire Service – Training Systems
National USAR Training Standards Committee
Author
Shane Briggs
Private Contractor to New Zealand Fire Service – Training Systems
On Behalf of
National USAR Steering Committee
Technical Editors
Ian Craig
USAR Technician (NZ TF-2)
National USAR Standards Committee
Environment Canterbury Civil Defence
Bernie Rush
National Rescue Manager

NZ-TF1 Manager
New Zealand Fire Service
Dave Brunsden
Structural Engineer
National USAR Steering Committee
Editor
Daphne Sutton
New Zealand Fire Service – Training Systems

Acknowledgements
The author and project manager wishes to thank the following individuals and
organisations that have contributed to the development of this manual.
Bernie Rush, Jim Dance, Ian Craig, David Brunsden, Des Bull, Trevor Brown, Leonce
Jones, David Guard, Graeme Mills, Charles Ollivier, Daphine Sutton, Geoff Williams
and the following organisations:
• New Zealand USAR Task Force 1

• National USAR Standards Committee
• Federal Emergency Management Agency (USA)
• New South Wales Fire Brigade
• Australian Capital Territory Fire Brigade
• Melbourne Metropolitan Fire & Emergency Management
• Ministry of Civil Defence & Emergency Management
• Unit Nations: International Search & Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG)
• Information Centre, Professional Development Unit (NZFS)
• Assessment Coordination Team, New Zealand Fire Service
• Cue Design
Photos
Picture 1. NZ Fire Service Information Library

Picture 2. NZ Task Force 1
Picture 4 FEMA
Picture 5. NSW Fire Brigade's Rescue section
Picture 6. Chase Sargent Virginia Beach F.D. USA
Picture 7. FEMA
Picture 10. S.O. Bruce Johnston WA Fire and Rescue
Picture 11. ACT Fire Brigade
Picture 12. Pat Jones, ACT Fire Brigade

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New Zealand Urban Search & Rescue l Awareness Student Manual

Page 1 of 87 l Version 1.0 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

USAR NZ HISTORY ...........................................................................................................7

RESPONSE TEAM COMPOSITION...............................................................................17

PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT.....................................................................17

Biological reactions ......................................................................................................24

COLLAPSE PLAN PHASES.............................................................................................60

Primary surface search and rescue ....................................................................................62

LINE & HAIL SEARCH ...................................................................................................71

Page 5 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

© New Zealand Fire Service 2002

No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system or

The contributing organisations (not individuals) as listed in the acknowledgement

Urban Search & Rescue

Page 6 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

Picture 1. Edgecome Earthquake (1987)

Page 7 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

Typical USAR scenarios

Global evolution of USAR

The mission of INSARAG is to develop effective international relationships in order to

As a result of the efforts of many participating countries who collectively make up

These Guidelines were developed by member countries of INSARAG to assist

Page 8 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

As a consequence of the Thredbo disaster in July 1997, a general agreement was

1995 Emergency Services review highlighted a gap in NZ response capabilities for

A three-week Category 2 USAR Technician course was run in Palmerston North in

Page 9 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

USAR Tier System

Introduction Awareness Responder Technician Manager

Awareness Awareness CIMS Advanced CIMS

USAR Category 0 1-A 1-R 2 3

Provider-based National Certificate

Awareness Orange USAR USAR USAR

Interested ES Civil Defence,

All levels require previous level as pre-requisite

Page 10 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

International tier systems

62 Person Task Force

13 Positions, 2 watches, 2 teams per watch

Page 11 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

USAR NZ Task Force

Task Force structure

Page 12 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

Task Force capability & role

Provide multi agency response to anywhere in NZ to structural collapse and other

Provide self-sufficient 72-hour response to single structure collapse capable of

Responders & Task Force Technicians

First Responders need to do primary survey of incident and disseminate intelligence

Task Forces focus on a small percentage of victims that are subsurface.

In NZ incident Command & Control is managed by using the Co-ordinated Incident

Orange Card Information

Page 13 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

Why get an Orange Card?

It is foreseen that if an agency or team wishes to be recognised as a national USAR

Having an Orange Card is a way to identify yourself at any USAR operation or

Page 14 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

How do I get one?

Support Services & Resources

Page 15 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

• Local Emergency Response Teams

• National Rural Fire Authority

Page 16 of 87 l Version 1.2 l 2002 © New Zealand Fire Service

Response Team Composition