wing-cheuk chan

MOU ZONGSANS TRANSFORMATION OF

KANTS PHILOSOPHY

Mou Zongsan (190995), a major founder of contemporary Neo-

Confucianism, might be the first Chinese scholar to single-handedly
translatethough from the English translation, rather than from the
German originalall three of Kants critiques into Chinese.1 More
importantly, his idealist Confucianism results from a transformation
of Kants transcendental philosophy. This is particularly shown in the
title of his magnum opus, Xianxiang yu wuzishen (Phenomenon and
Thing-in-Itself).2 Historically, this work might be the most significant
publication in Chinese philosophy of the twentieth century. In this
work he tries to overcome the limitation of Kants philosophy in
terms of Chinese philosophy. As is well known, in the West the phi-
losophies of Jrgen Habermas and Jean-Franois Lyotard are also
outcomes of their different transformations of Kants doctrines. From
the title of Mou Zongsans magnum opus, one can learn that he
centers on Kants Critique of Pure Reason. On the other hand, Hab-
ermass discourse ethics targets Kants Critique of Practical Reason,
whereas Lyotards aesthetics of the sublime focuses on Kants Cri-
tique of Judgment.3 Mou Zongsans approach nonetheless extends to
cover a transformation of Kants ethics as well as aesthetics. In criti-
cizing Kants doctrine of the unity between happiness and morality, he
produces a Confucian version of the theory of the highest good.
Kants Fundamental Foundations of Morality and Religion within the
Boundary of Reason are hence also caught sight of by Mou Zongsan.
He particularly translates the former in its entirety and the first part of
the latter in Chinese.4
In this paper, we will show in what way Kants philosophy is trans-
formed by Mou Zongsan. Such a transformation will be construed in
the following four steps: (1) Being as activity; (2) The intuitive pre-
sentation of free will; (3) Delimitation of the principle of finality; (4)
The real combination of happiness and morals.

WING-CHEUK CHAN, associate professor, Department of Philosophy at Brock Uni-

versity. Specialties: Continental Philosophy, Chinese Philosophy, Yogacara Buddhism.
E-mail: wchan@brocku.ca
2006, Journal of Chinese Philosophy
126 wing-cheuk chan

There are two major stages in Mou Zongsans reception of Critique of

Pure Reason. While in the first stage it is understood as a work in
epistemology, in the second stage it is understood as a work in ontol-
ogy. Traditionally, Chinese philosophy is weak in epistemology. Mou
Zongsans master, Xiong Shili, plans to produce a theory of knowl-
edge. However, Xiong Shili himself does not realize his goal. In order
to complete his masters plan, Mou Zongsan constructs a new system
in epistemology with the publication of Renshixin zhi pipan (Critique
of Cognitive Mind).5 From the title of this work one can immediately
sense its Kantian flavor. In Mou Zongsans theory of knowledge, the
Kantian categories are only understood as conditions of possibility of
cognition, but not as conditions of possibility of objects of cognition.
In Mou Zongsans terminology, the Kantian categories have the func-
tion of transcendental operation, but not that of transcendental deter-
mination. That is to say, the Kantian categories represent the a priori
structure of our cognition, rather than the a priori structure of the
world. To this extent, Mou Zongsans early understanding of Kants
first critique is similar to that of Neo-Kantianism.
Nonetheless, after reading Heideggers Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics, Mou Zongsan gives up his early approach. What he
learns from Heideggers interpretation is that Kants first critique is
primarily ontological, rather than epistemological, in approach. He
thereby recognizes the original significance of Kants thesis that the
conditions of possibility of experience in general are at the same time
conditions of possibility of the objects of experience.6 In reaffirming
the transcendental determination of the Kantian categories, he intro-
duces a two-layer structure of understanding (Verstand). First, there is
a logical layer of understanding. Second, there is an ontological
layer of understanding. With the introduction of the first layer, he tries
to develop a new philosophy of logic along the Kantian line. For him,
Kant might be called a logical empiricist in the broad sense. Certainly,
what he means by logic is primarily transcendental logic.
Kants thesis that man is the legislator of nature is challenging to
our common sense. In order to make sense of such a Copernican
revolution, Mou Zongsan turns to Yogacara Buddhismbesides
Heideggers ontological interpretationfor help. He emphasizes that
the Kantian thesis that objectivity is subjectivity is not an ontical
proposition, but rather an ontological proposition. It aims to depict
the activity of understanding which belongs to the Being of objects
(Gegenstndlichkeit). In order to avoid the misunderstanding of
Kants philosophy as an anthropocentrism or a subjective dogmatism,
Mou Zongsan asserts that categories disclose the universal charac-
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 127

teristics of objects.7 But this by no means implies that his hermeneu-

tic commits to any realism of ontological categories. Instead, this
notion of the universal characteristics of objects should be under-
stood as the correlation of the transcendental synthesis. Following
Yogacara Buddhism, Mou Zongsan insists that apart from subjectiv-
ity, no objectivity is possible. Heideggers dynamic approach further
enables him to declare that Being must be understood in terms of
activity. He also shows a strong admiration of Heideggers interpre-
tation of Kants schematism.To this extent, for Mou Zongsan, Heideg-
ger is faithful to Kants thesis that the transcendental synthesis . . . is
an action of the understanding on the sensibility.8 All this helps him
to appreciate the possibility of Kants immanent metaphysics.
However, Mou Zongsan now finds Kants denial of intellectual
intuition to human beings problematic. For Kant, such intellectual
intuition seems to belong solely to the primordial being, and can
never be ascribed to a dependent being, dependent in its existence as
well as in its intuition, and which through that intuition determines its
existence solely in relation to given objects.9 As a result, Kant
declares that human beings are incapable of producing any intuitive
knowledge of thing-in-itself. But Mou Zongsan points out that this
position raises a serious problem in Kants philosophy. For, if thing-
in-itself is merely a limiting concept, then the Kantian transcendental
distinction between phenomena and noumena can never be evidently
justified.
In attempt to solve this important problem, Mou Zongsan returns
to Chinese philosophy. For him, the Confucian liangzhi (original
mind), the Daoist xiongzhi (mystical seeing), and the Buddhist prajna
(wisdom) are different forms of infinite and creative intuition. Origi-
nally, according to Kant, if all that is manifold in the subject were
given by the activity of the self, the inner intuition would be intellec-
tual.10 That is to say, intellectual intuition creates its object. But this
is object in itself, which is not object as appearance. Intellectual intui-
tion is therefore to be distinguished from sensible intuition. The latter
cannot reach any noumenon and hence is finite. Under the influence
of Christianity, Kant only assigns intellectual intuition to God. In
contrast, Mou Zongsan claims that such intellectual intuition is also
possible for human beings. First, the Confucian liangzhi (original
mind) is not only the transcendental ground of our moral actions, but
at the same time the ontological origin of all things. As the absolute
and infinite principle of creativity, liangzhi is an intellectual intuition.
Second, in letting things spring spontaneously, the Daoist xiongzhi
(mystical seeing) is an objectless intuition. With the help of the
daoxin, things are given in themselves. In spite of the lack of any moral
import, xiongzhi represents a principle of aesthetic creativity. So, it is
128 wing-cheuk chan

an intellectual intuition which is at the same time aesthetic and cos-

mological. Third, what is witnessed by the Buddhist prajna (wisdom)
is the suchness of the world. That is to say, as a nonsensible intuition,
prajna sees the things in themselves. As particularly pointed out
by the Tiantai perfect teachings, all things originate from the non-
dwelling ground.11 As such a nondwelling ground, prajna also signi-
fies an ontological origin of all beings. All this indicates that the
Confucian liangzhi (original mind), the Daoist xiongzhi (mystical
seeing), and the Buddhist prajna (wisdom) satisfy the conditions of
Kants conception of intellectual intuition. Though there is no God in
the Christian sense in Chinese philosophy, the Confucian Sage, the
Daoist true man, and the Buddha are understood as infinite beings.
Here one can recognize that for Mou Zongsan, the term infinity has
a double implication. Negatively, it means freedom from the bound-
ary of the sensible. Positively, it signifies the absolute source of
things. With the help of these different forms of infinite intuition, the
human being is able to know the thing-in-itself. Since Chinese phi-
losophy ascribes intellectual intuition to human beings, it can help us
to develop a positive justification of the transcendental distinction.
In claiming that such a way out is more Kantian than Kant himself,
Mou Zongsan makes an appeal to the following thesis in Kants Opus
Postumum, which he learns from Heideggers Kantbuch:

The distinction between the concept of thing in itself and that of

appearance is not objective but merely subjective. The thing in itself
is not another but another aspect (respectus) of the representation
with regard to the same object.12

This means when man is in the stage of the cognitive mind, things
are given as appearance; while he is in the stage of the infinite mind,
things are given as noumena. This thesis forms the basic premise of
Mou Zongsans transformation of Kants philosophy. In spite of his
admiration of Heideggers reaffirmation of the subjective character
of the Kantian transcendental distinction, Mou Zongsan cannot
accept the idea of fundamental ontology in its original sense. Indeed,
Mou Zongsan finds Heideggers concept of fundamental ontology
attractive, in addition to Heideggers ontological interpretation. But
he opposes Heideggers Dasein-analytic. It is because Heidegger
sticks to the Kantian thesis of the finitude of human beings. Like Kant,
Heidegger does not ascribe intellectual intuition to human beings.
Besides, Mou Zongsan disagrees with Heideggers value-free, and
in particular, morally-neutral approach. In brief, Heidegger tries to
develop his fundamental ontology via the immanent metaphysics. In
the eyes of Mou Zongsan, since the immanent metaphysics merely
focuses on the problem of the meaning of Being, it fails to deal with
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 129

Kants concepts of freedom, immortality, and God, not to mention the

important concept of thing-in-itself. All these concepts belong to the
dimension of the transcendent metaphysics. A genuine fundamental
ontology can only result from a transformation of the transcendent
metaphysics.
For Mou Zongsan, in ascribing intellectual intuition to human
beings, Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are superior to Heideg-
gers fundamental ontology. According to these schools of Chinese
philosophy, human beings can become infinite, in spite of their fini-
tude. Consequently, it is one and the same subjectivity that is either in
the stage of finitude or in that of infinity. In this way, one can make
sense of Kants final insight that the transcendental distinction is
merely subjective. What is wrong with Kant himself is that he
however mistakenly splits subjectivity into two. While God is the only
infinite subjectivity, human beings are finite subjectivity. Due to the
unbridgeable gap between God and human beings, there is no single
subjectivity which can grasp both the phenomenal and the noumenal
thing, for God can never grasp the world as an objectdue to the lack
of sensible intuition, while the finite human beings cannot have
knowledge of things-in-themselvesdue to the lack of intellectual
intuition. In other words, God has intellectual intuition only, whereas
human beings have sensible intuition only. In so far as intellectual and
sensible intuition cannot be ascribed to one and the same subjectivity,
one can hardly make sense of Kants thesis that the transcendental
distinction is merely subjective. Therefore, in doing justice to such a
thesis, it is necessary to grant intellectual intuition to human beings.
At this juncture, one can appreciate the possible contribution of
Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism in revitalizing the Kantian
idea of transcendent metaphysics.
In stressing that the transcendental distinction is merely subjec-
tive, Mou Zongsan, however, does not mean to deny the reality of
things-in-themselves.13 For him, thing-in-itself is primarily an axi-
ological notion. As a value, thing-in-itself must be real.14 Although
Mou Zongsans formulation is not precise, his point is that thing-in-
itself is not a notion of a real thing in the ontical sense, but rather
that of a real thing in the axiological sense.15 He said,Everything as
such, not only a human being as such, is an end and not just an
instrument. When it is identified as an end, it is a thing in itself. 16
Indeed, Kant also uses the term thing-in-themselves as a plural
noun. To the extent that thing-in-itself is primarily a correlate of the
practical reason, it is axiological. Accordingly, in order to make
possible the knowledge of thing-in-themselves, it is necessary for us to
go beyond the pure, theoretical reason. For Mou Zongsan, Kants
failure in achieving this kind of infinite knowledge of things-in-
130 wing-cheuk chan

themselves is related to an essential limitation of his moral philosophy

as well.

II

Mainly along the Confucian line, Mou Zongsans transformation

starts with an identification of intellectual intuition with moral activ-
ity. For him, morality not only refers to an action following our
liangzhi, but also has an ontological significance. It is impossible to
limit liangzhi to human actions only. Rather, it must also be linked to
the emergence of things. Accordingly, moral activity is at the same
time cosmological creation. In terms of the moral creativity, nature
and morals can be unified. More specifically, it is only with the help of
liangzhi as a form of intuitus originarius that things-in-themselves are
created. As the principle of actualization, liangzhi signifies the onto-
logical ground of the whole universe. That is, liangzhi not only creates
the moral action, but also accomplishes the things-in-themselves.
Therefore, it is with an idealist thesis that Apart from the mind, there
is no event; apart from the mind, there is nothing that Mou Zongsan
identifies liangzhi as intellectual intuition.17 Only then it gives rise to
a Confucian moral metaphysics. Mou Zongsan also tries to justify his
founding of such a moral metaphysics by a comparison with Kants
idea of moral theology. While moral theology is a conviction of the
existence of a supreme beinga conviction which bases itself on
moral laws, moral metaphysics aims to disclose the ultimate reality of
the cosmos via moral activity.18 There is a superiority of moral meta-
physics over moral theology, for it grants intellectual intuition to
human beings. Such a moral metaphysics, which is different from the
metaphysics of morals, should have been developed by Kant himself.
However, since Kant merely conceives of freedom as a postulate, and
hence not a concrete presentation, he misses such a possibility.
Besides, Kant overlooks the identity of the moral will and the original
mind. Therefore, Kant is only able to think of a moral theology, but
not of a moral metaphysics.19 In spite of this limitation of Kants
ethics, for Mou Zongsan, among the Western philosophers, it is only
Kant who is able to seriously recognize such a radical and strict moral
consciousness.20 A moral metaphysics can become possible only
through a radicalization of Kants moral philosophy.
According to Mou Zongsan, in order to radicalize Kants moral
philosophy, it is necessary to secure freedom as an intuitive presenta-
tion. Originally, Kant only characterizes freedom as a fact of reason.
Hence the freedom of the will remains a nonintuitive presupposition
of morality.21 But the problem is that if freedom is only a postulate
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 131

and not a presentationfor it is beyond of empirical knowledge, then

moral laws and the categorical imperative etc. must become empty.22
Mou Zongsan traces the cause of Kants blindness to the possibility of
freedom as a real presentation in the following two limitations in his
moral philosophy. First, Kant separates mind from reason; second, he
separates reason from feeling.
In addressing the problem of the incentives of the pure practical
reason, Kant insists that the concepts of incentive, interest, and maxim
can only be applied to finite beings. That is, they cannot be applied to
the divine will.23 For Kant, it is only God that can have the holy will.
It is due to His supersensible nature. As a perfect being, God auto-
matically complies with all moral laws with necessity. The major
ground for his separation of feeling from reason is that only human
beings need moral sense as the incentive. For the holy will is beyond
the reach of human beings. As he says, complete fitness of the will to
the moral law is holiness, which is a perfection of which no rational
being in the world of sense is at any time capable.24 In the case of
finite beings, the moral necessity is a constraint, and an obligation.25
By contrast, Mou Zongsan insists that the moral necessity can
originate from human nature. Following Menciuss thesis of the iden-
tity between the original mind and nature, he blames Kants misiden-
tification of moral necessity as a constraint. As a Confucian, he would
rather trace moral necessity to our original mind, but not to love or
inclination. For while our original mind is infinite, love and inclination
belongs to the finite realm. He further argues that it is out of the
self-willing of our original mind that moral necessity becomes an
obligation. Accordingly, it is necessary for us to differentiate the plea-
sure of our original mind from the sensible love or inclination. With
Kants discovery of the autonomy of our moral will, one should rec-
ognize the fact that our will must subject itself to moral necessity. If it
is only probablerather than necessaryfor us to follow moral laws,
then the autonomy of our will would become impossible. So, moral
necessity must be understood as a logical consequence of the
autonomy of our will. Failing to see this would give rise to the incom-
patibility between Kants thesis of the autonomy of moral will and his
identification of freedom as a postulate.26 All this indicates that
freedom is more than a mere fact of reason. It is, in reality, identical
with our original mind. As a purely intellectual intuition, the original
mind must be differentiated from the sensible intuition. In particular,
there is no moral law which is pregiven like an external thing to our
purely intellectual intuition. Rather, all moral laws must originate
from the latter. In exercising such a function, our purely intellectual
intuition is identical with reason.27 Moreover, though our original
mind is no longer sensible, it does not lack of feeling. For, there is also
132 wing-cheuk chan

the possibility of the nonsensible feeling. It is due to Kants reduction

of all feelings to the sensible that he improperly separates reason
from feeling. However, what really functions as the Bewegungsgrund
is such nonsensible moral feeling. Furthermore, that the original mind
in the Confucian sense is infinite implies that the Sage is a holy will.
Accordingly, what blocks Kant from granting intellectual intuition to
human beings is his overlooking of the Confucian Sage as a holy will.
In short, for Mou Zongsan, it is only with the discovery that our
original mind is self-conscious of itself as reason (law), as feeling
(moral feeling), and as purely intellectual intuition that one is able to
transcend Kants position.28
All this indicates that in order to produce moral metaphysics, it is
necessary to go beyond Kants ethics as well. In granting the possibil-
ity of the intellectual intuition for human beings, Mou Zongsan is
basically a Confucian, particularly a follower of Mencius, Lu Xiangs-
han and Wang Yangming. To this extent, he sticks to the lineage of the
School of Mind.

III

Mou Zongsan is more than just a Chinese translator of Kants Cri-

tique of Judgment. He might be the first one who challenges Kants
identification of finality (Zweckmssigkeit) as the transcendental
principle for aesthetic judgment. Since Kant divides two kinds of
reflective judgment:Teleological and aesthetic judgment, the principle
of finality should be applied to both of them. But, in Mou Zongsans
eyes, this gives rise to a difficulty in Kants transcendental analytic of
reflective judgment. For him, the principle of finality is applicable to
teleological judgment, but not to aesthetic judgment. It is even mean-
ingless to speak of the finality of aesthetic judgment. Due to the
overlooking of such a gap between teleological and aesthetic judg-
ment, Kant errs in subsuming them to one and the same transcenden-
tal principle. In brief, Kant commits the mistake in sloping from the
speech of the principle of finality for teleological judgment to that of
the principle of finality for aesthetic judgment.29
One can ask for the reason why Kant assigns finality to reflective
judgment. In the third Critique it is written, we only apply the term
final to the object on account of its representation being immedi-
ately coupled with the feeling of pleasure: and this representation
itself is an aesthetic representation of the finality.30 That is, when
imagination refers intuitions to concepts, it is brought into accord with
understanding in a nonintentional way. This gives rise to a feeling of
pleasure. Accordingly, the object is understood as final for reflective
judgment.
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 133

But, for Mou Zongsan, it is artificial to introduce finality as the

transcendental principle for aesthetic judgment. He is highly suspi-
cious of the idea of a finality of the aesthetic object. In particular, he
discovers a dilemma in Kants position. He writes:
Is it because the flower grounds its possibility upon such finality? Or
is it because it must ground its possibility in the fitting of the subjec-
tive cognitive faculty? If the former is the case, then judging the
beauty of the flower is a teleological judgment, rather than an aes-
thetic judgment. If the latter is the case, then I can hardly understand
what kind of effect can the free performance of the subjective cog-
nitive faculty in reflective judgment have in my appreciating of the
beauty of the follower or of the view of (the landscape).31

This indicates that the concept of finality is applicable to teleologi-

cal judgment only, but not to aesthetic judgment. To be sure, when
watching the beautiful flowers, one would have a feeling of pleasure.
But one can hardly see any relationship between such a feeling of
pleasure and the finality in Kants sense. More importantly, when
one is searching for the principle of finality in aesthetic phenomena,
then these phenomena would no longer be beautiful objects. Such a
dilemma shows that one can hardly speak of any principle of finality
in the face of these beautiful objects. This evidently shows that the
concept of finality is not applicable to aesthetic judgment.
Such a critique of Kants assigning the transcendental principle of
the finality to aesthetic judgment seems to be supported by Kants
apology for the obscurity involved.32 However, for Mou Zongsan,
what is involved is not only obscurity, but rather improper slope and
confusion in Kants doctrine. Kants apology is not made whole-
heartedly, and this is because Kant would maintain his position, pro-
vided that the accuracy of our statement of the principle is proved
with all requisite clearness.33 In reality, what is problematic is exactly
the scope of validity of such a condition. Though such a condition
holds for teleological judgment, it is not valid for aesthetic judgment.34
Consequently, Kants thesis of beauty as the symbol of morality
must be rejected.35
As an alternative, Mou Zongsan outlines his own view on beauty.
First, he approaches beauty from an analytic perspective. Second, he
introduces the thesis of the unity of beauty with truth and good. With
the latter thesis, he also aims to show how a unification of nature and
freedom is possible.
From an analytic standpoint, beauty is separated from truth and
good. Subjectively, beauty only represents a principle of relaxation in
life. It signifies the freedom and authenticity of life. It is only when one
is able to live freely and authentically that he/she can exist productively
and relaxedly. However, one should not ignore that there is always the
134 wing-cheuk chan

danger for a relaxed person to fall into indulgence. Objectively, beauty

is the surplus of the illumination of the transformation of qi (force).All
the forms of beauty result from the gathering of the transformation of
qi. In parallel, truth is limited to the knowledge of phenomena, while
good merely refers to the struggle in existence. To this extent, there is
no unification, but only a possible crash, among beauty, truth, and good.
By contrast, if beauty is primarily understood as the beauty of Heaven
and Earth, the face of the divine in Zhuangzis sense, then beauty is
more than beauty.36 At this level, beauty no longer has the form of
beauty. In particular, as Laozi says, Great music sounds faint.37
Correspondingly, neither truth has the form of truth, nor good has the
form of good. In short, all these three are now formless.Their objects
are likewise beyond the form of object. In reality, they are things-in-
themselves. It is only when beauty is completely united with truth and
good that noumena can be reached. Therefore, in replacement of the
Kantian thesis of beauty as the symbol of morality, one should say that
beauty in the analytical sense is the symbol of the formless beauty. In
stressing the idea of formlessness, Mou Zongsans position is closer to
Daoism and Chan Buddhism. Nonetheless, as a Confucian, he insists on
the primacy of the moral mind. For him, what stands out in our life must
be grounded in the ought of our moral mind. In granting a priority to
the practical reason, he returns to the Kantian tradition. Meanwhile, he
goes beyond Kants system in reaching the complete unity of beauty,
truth, and good. All in all, it is only with assigning intellectual intuition
in the moral sense to human beings that Mou Zongsan is able to
develop his double view on beauty in attempting to transcend Kants
original position.

IV

In his last work Yuanshan lun (Theory of the Perfect Good), Mou
Zongsan claims that solving the problem of the highest good signifies
the ultimate completion of a philosophical system.38 Originally, the
Kantian concept of the highest good is defined in terms of the neces-
sary combination of virtue and happiness. The term highest in the
Kantian sense can have two meanings. First, it means the supreme;
second, it means the perfect. Due to the fact that the second
meaning is what is intended, Mou Zongsan renames the highest good
as the perfect good. According to Kant, the necessary combination of
virtue and happiness is not analytic but synthetic. From a logical
standpoint, the moral action is merely a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition of the perfect good. In addressing the significance of the
problem of the highest good, Kant writes,
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 135

If, therefore, the highest good is impossible according to practical

rules, then the moral law which commands that it be furthered must
be fantastic, directed to empty imaginary ends, and consequently
inherently false.39

This implies that the problem of the highest good according to

practical rules is also essential for the possibility of morality. In reality,
the problem of the highest good is concerned with finding happiness
in just proportion to virtue. Kant maintains that the possibility of the
highest good must be grounded in the context of an intelligible world.
To this extent, the highest good is beyond our sensible intuition. While
virtue belongs to the kingdom of ends, happiness belongs to the
kingdom of nature. Apart from God, there is no guarantee for the
necessary combination of virtue and happiness. Therefore, in order to
make possible the highest good, it is necessary to postulate Gods
existence. In this sense, Kant declares, it is morally necessary to
assume the existence of God.40 But Mou Zongsan reminds us that
Kant does not identify the existence of God as the foundation of all
obligations. For it would otherwise ground morality upon religion and
hence lead to an ethics of heteronomy.41
In regard to Kants solution of the problem of the highest good,
Mou Zongsan finds Kants Christian solution of the problem of the
highest good unacceptable.42 For the personal God in the Kantian
sense is only an object of faith. By contrast, he insists that the moral
praxis must imply the affirmation of existence, and therefore it must
imply the expectation of improving existence. 43 Such an expecta-
tion of the improvement of existence is nothing but the expectation of
happiness. More importantly, the Kantian solution is . . . a solution
out of the distinctive teaching.44 According to the Buddhist distinc-
tive teaching, in order to reach the highest realm, that is, the realm of
the Buddha, it is necessary to abolish all the other realms of existence.
For Mou Zongsan, what is wrong with the distinctive teaching is that
it separates the true mind from all other realms of existence. Likewise,
for Christianity, there is an unbridgeable gap between God and world.
It is therefore logical for God not to change the world after its crea-
tion. To the extent that Kants solution of the problem of the highest
good is based on the conception of Christian God, it is exactly like a
solution out of the Buddhist distinctive teaching.
On the other hand, Mou Zongsan insists that the real solution of
the problem of the highest good must be developed out of the perfect
teaching. According to the Buddhist perfect teaching, the realm of
the devil is identical with the Buddha. Therefore, all existence can be
transformed. When all good, evil, pure, and defiled dharmas become
dharmas of the Buddha, they are eternal and pleasant. This is happi-
ness.45 In this way, there is a necessary combination of virtue and
136 wing-cheuk chan

happiness. But since the Buddhist approach is primarily morally

neutral, the problem of the highest good can only be solved in a
Confucian perfect teaching. For a Confucian, the infinite mind is not
just an object of faith (God)like in the case of Christianity, but
rather is the mind of the moral Sage. In the case of a Confucian Sage,
virtue is identical with existence, while existence is identical with
virtue.46 From a metaphysical standpoint, our moral mind is at the
same time an onto-cosmological principle. While moral praxis neces-
sarily points to the expectation of the improvement of existence,
happiness is the transformation of existence according to our
mind.47 As a result, Mou Zongsan claims that It is only in terms of
Confucian perfect teaching . . . that the possibility of the highest good
can be demonstrated.48

After giving up the early attempt in Renshixin zhi pipan (Critique of

Cognitive Mind), Mou Zongsans mature transformation of Kants
philosophy starts with an ontological reading of Kants texts and ends
up with a new type of transcendent metaphysics. To be sure, one might
not entirely agree with his doctrine. Nonetheless, from such an
attempt one can see to what extent the modern development of
Confucianism is decisively influenced by Kants philosophy. What is
innovative in Mou Zongsans transformation of Kants philosophy is
especially shown in the radicalization of moral theology into a moral
metaphysics, and the replacement of the Kantian solution of the
problem of the highest good with a Confucian counterpart. Regarding
such a transformation of Kants philosophy, the following critical
questions could be raised.
First, in reducing Being to activity, Mou Zongsan develops a moral
metaphysics in the form of subjectivism. Can such subjectivist meta-
physics survive the Heideggerian overcoming?
Second, one of Kants revolutionary contributions to the develop-
ment of moral philosophy lies in grounding morality in the idea of
autonomy rather than in that of perfection. Does Mou Zongsans
identification of the Confucian Sage as a holy will imply the under-
mining of such an important breakthrough made by Kant? On the
other hand, even Confucianism does not deny the fallibility of the
Sage, then how can a fallible Sage be qualified as a holy will?
Third, for Mou Zongsan, it is improbable to make sense the
Kantian thesis of the finality of aesthetic judgment. But, following
Lyotards work, one discovers that in the aesthetics of the sublime
Kants formlessness or absence of form can be interpreted as a
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 137

possible index to the unpresentable.49 For Kant, as Lyotard pointed

out, the sublime . . . occurs when the imagination in fact fails to
present any object that could accord with a concept, even if only in
principle.50 But this only indicates that in the aesthetics of the
sublime, the finality of aesthetic judgment must be understood in
terms of such a presentation of something unpresentable. Is Kants
speech of the finality of aesthetic judgment not then at least partly
meaningful in the light of Lyotards hermeneutics?
Lastly, one might agree with Mou Zongsans thesis that there is a
necessary expectation of improving existence in moral praxis. But
how can he guarantee a necessary fulfillment of such an expectation?
Furthermore, as shown in many cases, good motives might give rise to
catastrophic consequences. How can he explain these possibilities? In
identifying happiness as the transformation of existence according to
our mind, he in fact ontologicalizes happiness. For him, the trans-
formation of existence is primarily understood in terms of the partici-
pation of the cosmological creativity. Accordingly, happiness in this
sense is basically supersensible. But, for Kant, happiness is the
satisfaction of all our desire.51 Does Mou Zongsans thesis only mean
that happiness results from the transformation of our understanding
of the world, rather than the transformation of the world itself?
Furthermore, in what way is a Confucian Sage able to find happiness
in just proportion to virtue for the whole mankind? Is it possible for
a Sage to know everyones desire? According to Mou Zongsan,
Kants solution of the problem of the highest good is unacceptable for
the reason that it is developed out of a distinctive teaching. Nonethe-
less, in articulating his moral metaphysics, Mou Zongsan employs the
doctrine of the tathagata-garbha as a theoretical framework, which is
also classified by him as a distinctive teaching.52 On the other hand, he
maintains that his Confucian solution for the problem of the highest
good is developed out of a perfect teaching. Then how can he dissolve
the conflict between his moral metaphysics and his Confucian theory
of the highest good?

BROCK UNIVERSITY
Ontario, Canada

Endnotes

I am thankful to Professor Chung-ying Cheng for helpful comments on an earlier version

of this paper.
1. Mou Zongsan, Kangde chuncui lixing zhi pipan (Kants Critique of Pure Reason), 2
vols. (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1983); Mou Zongsan, Kangde de daode zhexue (Kants Moral
Philosophy) (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1983), 121453; Mou Zongsan, Panduanli zhi pipan
(Critique of Judgment), 2 vols. (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1992).
138 wing-cheuk chan

2. Mou Zongsan, Xianxiang yu wuzishen (Phenomenon and Thing-in-Itself) (Taipei:

Xuesheng, 1975).
3. Cf. Jrgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Chris-
tian Lenhart and S. W. Nicholson (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991); Jean-Francois
Lyotard, Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Inhuman, trans.
Geoffry Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
4. Mou, Kangde de daode zhexue, 1119; Mou Zongsan, Yuanshan lun (Theory of the
Perfect Good) (Taipei: Xuesheng, 1985), 61130.
5. Mou Zongsan, Renshixin zhi pipan (Critique of Cognitive Mind), 2 vols. (Hong Kong:
Youlian, 1957).
6. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London:
Macmillan, 1929), 194, A158/B197. As James Churchill pointed out, Kemp Smiths
translation omits at the same time [zugleich]. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics, trans. James Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1962), 123.
7. Mou, Xianxiang yu wuzishen, 173.
8. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 165, B152.
9. Ibid., p. 90, B72.
10. Ibid., p. 88, B68.
11. Mou Zongsan, Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue (Intellectual Intuition and Chinese
Philosophy) (Taipei: Xsiangwu, 1971), 216.
12. Heidegger, Kant and Metaphysics, 37; see also: Mou, Xianxiang yu wuzishen, 15.
13. Cf. Mou, Xianxiang yu wuzishen, 8.
14. Cf. ibid., 16.
15. Cf. ibid., 8.
16. Ibid., 436.
17. Ibid., 442.
18. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 526, B662; see also Mou Zongsan, Xinti yu xingti (The
Mind-Substance and the Nature-Substance), 3 vols. (Taipei: Zhengzhong, 1968),
1:180ff.
19. Mou, Xinti yu xingti, 1:173.
20. Ibid., 120.
21. Cf. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapo-
lis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 31.
22. Mou, Xinti yu xingti, 155.
23. Cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 82.
24. Ibid., 126.
25. Ibid., 84.
26. Cf. Mou, Kangde de daode zhexue, 261.
27. Cf. ibid., 29495.
28. Ibid., 297.
29. Mou, Discussion, in Panduanli zhi pipan, 1:26.
30. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. James Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon
Press: 1961), 30.
31. Mou, Discussion, 1:19.
32. Kant, Critique of Judgment, 7.
33. Ibid.
34. Mou, Discussion, 1:27.
35. Ibid., 83; see also: Kant, Critique of Judgment, 221.
36. Zhuangzi, Zhuangzi (Taipei: Zhonghua, 84), chap. 10, 14a.
37. Mou, Discussion, 1:8291; see also: Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese
Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 160.
38. Mou, Yuanshan lun, ii.
39. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, 118.
40. Ibid., 130.
41. Mou, Yuanshan lun, 238.
42. Ibid., 241.
 mous transformation of kants philosophy 139

43. Ibid., 254.

44. Ibid., i.
45. Ibid., 279.
46. Ibid., 325.
47. Ibid., 326.
48. Ibid., x.
49. Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Explained, ed. and trans. Julian Pefanis et al.
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 10.
50. Ibid.
51. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 636, A806/B834.
52. Cf. Mou, Yuanshan lun, 271. For an analysis of Mou Zongsans employment of the
doctrine of the tathagata-garbha as the theoretical framework for his moral meta-
physics, please see Wing-cheuk Chan, On Mou Zongsans Idealist Confucianism
(forthcoming).

Chinese Glossary

Mou Zongsan Chan

Xianxiang yu wuzishen Laozi
Yuanshan lun
Xiong Shili Kangde chuncui lixing zhi pipan
Renshixin zhi pipan
Kangde de daode zhexue
liangzhi
xiongzhi Panduanli zhi pipan
daoxin
Tiantai Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue
Lu Xiangshan
Wang Yangming Xinti yu xingti
qi
Zhuangzi