EVIDENCE
1. Luspo v. People VAN D. LUSPO, Petitioner, v, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
This is an MR of the SCs decision affirming the conviction of the accused Duran,
Montano, and Tugaonen.
The Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership (ODC) of the PNP ) issued two (2)
Advices of Sub-Allotment (ASA), amounting to 5M pesos each, for the purchase of
combat, clothing, and individual equipment (CCIE items) for the PNPs North Capital
Command (CAPCOM). Montano, Chief Comptroller, North CAPCOM, directed Police
Chief Inspector Duranto prepare and draw 100 checks of P100,000.00 each, for a total
of P10M. The checks were all payable to four different entities that are all owned and
operated by Tugaoen who later collected the proceeds of the checks.
In her sworn statement, Tugaoen admitted that she received the P10 million worth of
checks as payment for the previously accumulated PNP debts and not for any CCIE
items that she delivered.
After the Ombudsman, conducted an investigation on the CCIE North Capcom
transaction, it recommended the filing of an Information for 100 counts of Malversation
of Public Funds against several PNP officials, including the accused. The Office of the
Special Prosecutor (OSP) filed an Information, but this was for violation of Section 3(e)
of RA No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, the accused filed a demurrer to evidence,
primarily questioning the admissibility of the checks (and its accompanying documents)
and Tugaoens sworn statements.
SB: denied the demurrer to evidence. While none of the accused took the witness stand,
Montano and Tugaoen maintained the inadmissibility of the evidence. On the merits, the
SB found the accused guilty as charged.
SC: The Court upheld the conviction of the accused on appeal. The Court ruled that
Montano and Durans bad faith was evident from their failure to prepare and submit
the required documentation ordinarily attendant to procurement transactions and
government expenditures, as mandated by Section 4(6) of P.D. No. 1445.
The accused filed MRs of the SCs decision.
Duran: He was acting in good faith in preparing and counter-signing the checks because
he only acted in accordance with the instruction and assurance of his superior, co-
accused Montano. He cannot be faulted for the lack of documentation accompanying
the transaction. He claims that the lack of documentation is none of [his] business.
Montano and Tugaoen: The Court erred in imputing bad faith on them based on
documentary evidence that shows the absence of supporting documents to the
transactions because these documents are inadmissible in evidence for being hearsay.
None of the persons who executed these documents testified in open court. Also, the
splitting of the checks cannot be the basis of conspiracy because to begin with, the
admissibility of the secondary evidence of the checks is in question. The accused ask the
Court to review the admissibility of these secondary pieces of evidence. They also
contend that Tugaoens admission that she did not deliver any CCIE items as contained
in her statement is inadmissible under Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
W/N the SB erred in convicting the accused? NO. Tugaoens statement before the PNP
investigating committee is admissible in evidence
*NB: No specific rule on evidence was mentioned here. The issue on admissibility was connected to the Consti rights
during custodial investigation. But this case does not involve a custodial investigation hence SC said rights under Sec 12
are not operative and then SC concluded that the fact that no one testified on the documents in open court is not fatal. (my
own words).
The rule on custodial investigation begins to operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime and the interrogation is then aimed on a particular suspect
who has been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory questions
that tend to elicit incriminating statements.
ITC: Contrary to the accused Tugaoens claim, the fact that she was invited by the investigating
committee does not by itself determine the nature of the investigation as custodial. The Sandiganbayan
correctly ruled that the investigation where Tugaoen made her statement was not a custodial
investigation that would bring to the fore the rights of the accused and the exclusionary rule under
paragraph 3, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The investigators reminder to Tugaoen
of her Miranda rights during the investigation cannot be determinative of the nature of the
investigation.
In the present case, the investigation conducted by the PNP GHQ-OIG, was prompted by the report
from the COA regarding disbursement irregularities for CCIE items. In short, it was simply a general
inquiry to clear the air of reported anomalies and irregularities within the PNP which a constitutional
body found and reported as part of its constitutional power and duty. That what was conducted is an
ordinary administrative (and not custodial) investigation is supported by the fact that the
investigating committee also took the statements of other PNP officials who ended up not being
charged with a crime. In this regard, the Sandiganbayan correctly observed:
The most crucial question to answer that could have absolved the accused from liability is whether the
subject purchases of CCIE items were truly ghost purchases, as contended by the prosecution.
It is very ironic that no single end user among thousands of police officers and men came forward to
attest and declare to the world that indeed he received the CCIE items subject matter of the case,
thereby leaving the prosecutions theory reinforced and unrebutted.
Accordingly, the fact that none of the persons who executed the documents cited by the Court
in its Decision testified in open court is not fatal to the accuseds conviction.
On the other points raised:
Contrary to Durans claim, affixing his signature on the checks is not a ministerial duty on
his part. His position as Chief of the Regional Finance Service Unit of the North CAPCOM
imposed on him the duty to be responsible for the management and disbursement and
accounting of PNP funds. This duty evidently gives him the discretion, within the bounds
of law, to review, scrutinize, or countercheck the supporting documents before facilitating
the payment of public funds.
With the admissibility of the checks in evidence and the prosecutions evidence on the
manner and circumstances by which they were prepared, we find no reason to disturb our
finding that conspiracy exists and that the accused acted in bad faith.
The prosecution was also able to prove injury to the government through the testimony of
Tuscano (the Supply Accountable Officer of the PNP) that the delivery of P10 million
 (rights during custodial investigation).
2. CLT v. High CLT REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HI-
Grades Feeds GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), REGISTRY
OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA, DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN CITY , AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
The properties in dispute in this case are part of the Maysilo Estate.
The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CLT and Hi-Grade, which
prompted CLT to file a case for Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title,
Recovery of Possession, and Damages before the RTC of Caloocan City against Hi-
Grade.
There are two versions of facts, each party proving its ownership of the disputed
properties. (not important, but briefly. . .)
Hi-Grades version: The title traces back to a certain Ruiz; while
CTs version: It is the registered owner by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale with Real
Estate Mortgage executed by the former registered owner, Estelita I. Hipolito.
During trial, CLT presented the following witnesses:
-Velasquez (OIC of the Records section of Lands Management Bureau, who testified
that LMB did not have a copy of the subdivision plan.
-Vasquez (Deputy Register of Deeds), who identified the various titles relevant
-Bustalino (Geodetic Engr), who testified that CLT engaged its services to survey the
subject properties and discovered that there was an overlap
-Atty. Santos (one of the counsel of CLT)
-Magsipoc (Forensic Chemist), who examined the titles as an expert witness
On the other hand, Hi Grade presented its sole witness:
-Atty. Madulid (counsel for and stockholder of Higrade), who testified that his family has
been occupying the subject properties under the concept of an owner for more than 27
years, until the properties were teansferred to Hi Grade.
RTC ruling: in favor of CLT
Hi-Grade's title, the older title, cannot prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from
patent defects and infirmities. Although Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the subject
properties, it is not considered as a conclusive proof of ownership.
[not relevant] Hi Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence and serious and patent errors in the court's
appreciation of evidence and factual findings based on the decision of the court in CLT
v. Sto. Nio Kapithahayan Association.
Court denied such motion saying that the ruling in favor of Hi-Grade in Sto. Nio is not
a newly-discovered evidence, as Hi-Grade could not have failed to produce such
evidence if it exercised reasonable diligence.
[important!!!] During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit
and Take Judicial Notice of Committee Report on Senate Inquiry into Maysilo Estate
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
worth of CCIE items for North CAPCOM in 1992 is not supported by the available record.
This testimony in turn finds support from accused Tugaoens own statement that she did
not deliver any CCIE in exchange for the checks that she encashed (and from the written
declarations of P/CInsp. Isaias Braga, Chief Logistics Officer, North CAPCOM, and
Rolando Flores, Supply Accountable Officer, North CAPCOM).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions for reconsideration are DENIED with
FINALITY.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial
notice of the Senate Report NO
CLT misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the law.
Rule 129, Sec. 1-Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, x x x the official acts of legislative, x x x.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on without proof
because these facts are already known to them; it is the duty of the court to assume something as a
matter of fact without need of further evidentiary support. Otherwise stated, by the taking of judicial
notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules
of evidence and court proceedings such as cross-examination.
ITC (In this Case): The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be
taken judicial notice of.
With regard to Petitioners contention that CA violated the time-honored principle of separation of
powers when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court cites the case of Angeles v. Sec. of
Justice.
The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they may
be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence submitted by the
parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the
courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports must still
undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will have the discretion to accept or
reject them.
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and
evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why
the taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle.
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the Court of Appeals.
It did not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.
Other issue:
(1) WoN the OSG can intervene- NO. Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Also, the
Republic is not an indispensable party.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation v. Hi-Grade Feeds
Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III," dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
 Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on Urban Planning,
Housing and Resettlement (Senate Report).

Court of Appeals granted the motion in a Resolution

Included in the Resolution, however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals
takes judicial notice of the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the
findings and conclusions therein.
[not relevant] OSG filed a Petition for Intervention.

CA ruling: reversed the RTC.

Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the trial court's reliance on the testimonies of CLT's
witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalmo, on the alleged patent infirmities and defects. Also,
Vasquez and Bustalino are incompetent to testify on the customary practices in land
registration at that time.

Petitioners contentions:
The taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of the Rules of Court and
CLT's right to due process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and should not be
given any probative value because it was obtained in violation of Rule 132, considering
that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed hearsay evidence. Contrary
to the mandatory procedure under Rule 132, which requires examination of
documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report was not put to proof and CLT
was deprived of the opportunity to conduct a cross- examination on the Senate Report.
It is also contended that the right of CLT to due process was violated because the
proceedings in the Senate were conducted without notice to CLT.

Finally, the admission in evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored
principle of separation of powers as it is an encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive
to the courts.

3. Allegation RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON
Made in the BRC COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST
Against Justice ASSOCIATE JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
Ong
This involves an administrative complaint against SB Assoc. Justice Gregory Ong
filed by the Court EB after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced
during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing regarding the pork barrel
scam.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS:
In the middle of 2013, the pork barrel scam broke out. In the course of the investigation
by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (SBRC), certain government officials and other
individuals were identified by the whistleblowers for allegedly transacting with or having
attended Mrs. Janet Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent SB
Associate Justice Ong.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement before the NBI stating, among others,
that:
In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and
other special occasions. xxx
Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that case
W/N Justice Ong is guilty of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety
SC: This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice
which are well supported by the evidence on record.
Respondent stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles
after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his letter to CJ Sereno
that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with
or attended any social event hosted by her.
We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the
pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal,
constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery
in the rendition of the said judgment.
In administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The
standard of substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such evidence might not
be overwhelming or even preponderant.
ITC: The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact with respondent
("naguusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy
who is a cousin) were privy to her daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue

Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
could take four to five years to clear. She said, Antayin niyo munang maclear pangalan
ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo. Sinabi niya na meron na siyang kausap sa
Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
Rappler also published an article by Aries Rufo [Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-
Graft Court Justice" showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada, one of the main
public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs. Napoles and
respondent.
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein
she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn statement, alleged to have
visited their office or attended their events, thus: xxx
W: Justice GREGORY ONG Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office sa
2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam JANET
NAPOLES sa conference room.
Xxx
In her testimony before the SBRC on Sept. 26, 2013, Sula confirmed her statement
regarding Justice Ong.
The Court, upon evaluation of the factual circumstances, found possible transgressions
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent. Accordingly, a
Resolution was issued re-docketing and assigning the same to retired SC Justice Angelina
SandovalGutierrez for investigation, report and recommendation.
Justice Angelina SandovalGutierrez submitted her report with the following
findings and conclusions:
- Sometime in 2001, two criminal cases known as the Kevlar Case [involving the
questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine Marine from suppliers
owned by Napoles] were filed with the SB.
- During the investigation, Benhur Luy testified that in the course of his
employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles mentioned to him the Kevlar case,
then pending in the SB, saying she has a "connect" in that court who would help
her. When asked about his testimony before the SBRC concerning the Kevlar
case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the SB is respondent.
- Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated [in 2010], Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each
other (naguusap na po sila). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in her favor.
- On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a ledger of
the SB case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum of P100M. He was surprised
why she would spend such amount considering that what was involved in the Kevlar
case was only P3.8M. She explained that she gave various amounts to different people
during the pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in
the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did not
mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
- Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went
twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas,
Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her other
employees. On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in
conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is his
(respondent's) favorite.
- Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of
Napoles twice sometime in 2012. Sula also explained that Napoles mentioned a TRO
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
them of developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a "connect" or "contact"
in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case involving her, her mother, brother and some
employees. Having closely observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even
prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were convinced she was indeed in
contact with respondent, whose identity was earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically
testified that Napoles told him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There
was no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger detailing her expenses
for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million. Napoles' information about her association with
respondent was confirmed when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent
visit her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as they have no personal
knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically,
he points to portions of Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact
persons" in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals, not him,
who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles never really disclosed to Sula
who was her (Napoles) contact at the Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even
supposedly said that respondent's "talent fee" was too high.
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The complainant must present a
panoply of evidence in support of such an accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the
respondent judge connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more than
substantial. Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to sustain the bribery and
corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy and Sula have not witnessed respondent
actually receiving money from Napoles in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case.
Napoles had confided to Luy her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find
credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the
Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates
respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in
the decisionmaking process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions,
respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not
the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of
partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of
respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest because of their close
relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in her transactions with government officials,
dubbed by media as the "Pork Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez, the
"challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first testified, made it
highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify against the respondent. During the
investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as
"candid, straightforward and categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as
"instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important,
these are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they never wavered or
faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally given great
weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the deportment of the
witnesses as they testified. The rule which concedes due respect, and even finality, to the
assessment of credibility of witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a
fortiori to administrative cases. In particular, we concur with Justice SandovalGutierrez's
assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with respondent's claim that these
witnesses are simply telling lies about his association with Napoles.
referring to the TRO to be issued by the SB in the event the case involving the P10B
PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and other
employees not to worry because she has a contact with the SB i.e. Justice Ong.
- Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she
will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in jest
that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay huag na iyon
kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
- Rufo, on the other hand, testified that he faxed a letter to respondent to "get his side
about the photo." When he went to respondent's office and showed it to him,
respondent was shocked and he explained that it must have been taken during one of the
parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy; that he did not know that the woman in the
picture is Napoles because she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and
that such picture must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would
like to pose with celebrities or public figures.
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him. He
asserted, among others, that:
- The whistleblower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility. While Sula
testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach respondent (should a
case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the Sandiganbayan) because his talent
fee is too high, however, both whistleblowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan.
- With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was insinuating
four things:
1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the Kevlar
case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and without factual
basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about legal strategies to be
pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the case was decided by a collegial
body and that he never interceded on her behalf.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierriezs evaluation:
- It bears stressing that before the SBRC, Benhur initially testified that Napoles fixed or
"inayos" the Kevlar case because she has a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to
respondent. Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony.
- Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The
witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected to
difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and
knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily detect
whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not. Considering this
challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable that the two
whistleblowers would testify falsely against respondent. Moreover, during the
investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a candid, straightforward,
and categorical manner. Their testimonies were instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth. In fact, their answers to the
undersigned's probing questions were consistent with their testimonies before the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-examination, they did not waver or falter. The
undersigned found the two whistle-blowers as credible witnesses and their story
untainted with bias and contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur and Sula
were lying.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula testified that whenever Napoles talked about her contacts in
the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it
was understood that she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some
persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting with Napoles at her office
Further, in her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported reason for
visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles and the Quiapo parish priest
[who, with the help of Napoles, made it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene]
were not presented as witnesses despite her suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other
hand, Luy's testimony on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her
office appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent denied
having issued a BDO check for P25.5M as claimed by Luy, and asserted he (respondent) did not
deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately, Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying
that, as previously testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were
shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of P282k supposed advance interest for
respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were given to respondent as consideration for the favorable
ruling in the Kevlar case. Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent a
staggering P100M just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe that
respondent went to Napoles office the second time just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again
visiting Napoles at her office, after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to
support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding advance interest for
AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why would Napoles extend such an
accommodation to respondent if not as consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case?
Respondent's controversial photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media
speculating on pay offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to doubt the honesty and
fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the integrity of our courts of justice. Before this
Court, even prior to the commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than
candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having attended parties or social
events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far
from being a plain omission, we find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to
Napoles. It was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the "contact" of
Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only one instance he visited Napoles.
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative
complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity)
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong
GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from
the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including
government-owned or -controlled corporations. [ARAY KO BES!]
 Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure hearsay,
inadmissible in evidence since these are all accusations against me by Luy and
Sula, and according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles.
Respondent suggested that Napoles be subpoenaed so that the truth will come out.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the undersigned's
suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the testimonies of Benhur and Sula.
After evaluation, Justice Gutierrez recommended that respondent be found GUILTY of
gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH
FORFEITURE of all retirement benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH
PREJUDICE to reemployment to any government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations.
4. People v. Diaz PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ALLAN DIAZ Y
ROXAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
An informant reported to the Pandacan Police Station Diazs illegal trade activities.
Around 10:00pm of the same day, a briefing was held and a buy-bust team was created.
A team member, PO2 Arturo Coronel, was provided with three pieces of 100-peso bills
which were marked with his initials: AC1, AC2 and AC3.
About 4am the next day, the team along with the informant went to see Diaz. The
informant introduced PO2 Coronel to Diaz as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Coronel gave Diaz
the three marked bills, and in exchange, Diaz gave him a small plastic sachet containing
white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu. At that juncture, PO2 Coronel made
the signal and immediately arrested Diaz.
At the police station, the plastic sachet was marked by PO2 Coronel with ARD-1 the
initials of Diaz. The specimen was found positive for shabu as per a Chemistry Report
after being subject to laboratory examination.
Diaz, on the other hand, claimed that he was walking home when he was suddenly
arrested, allegedly for verification purposes only, by policemen whose names he cannot
recall. He was brought to the police station and to an inquest prosecutor where he first
came to know that he was being charged with violation of RA 9165, i.e. illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.
RTC found Diaz guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Diaz appealed to the CA contending that the prosecution failed to prove
his guilty beyond reasonable doubt since the police officers failed to mark, conduct a
physical inventory of, and photograph the subject item in his presence and those of
persons mentioned under Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165. The CA affirmed in toto the RTC
Decision. Hence, this appeal.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Issue: w/n the appeal has merit (objection to admissibility for the first time on appeal)
None.
Objection to the admissibility of evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. When a party
desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without
such objection, he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.
ITC: Diaz failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact, at no
instance did he manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in
handling the seized item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Diaz raised the police
operatives alleged non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for the first time on
appeal before the CA.
[Doctrine specific to Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165] It is settled that an accused may still be found guilty,
despite the failure to faithfully observe the requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. [No.] 9165,
for as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken. Sec. 21(1) provides: (1) The apprehending team
having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;
ITC: The prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody of the subject
specimen from the moment it was seized from Diaz up to the time it was presented during trial as
proof of the corpus delicti:
Record shows that PO2 Coronel marked the confiscated sachet of shabu at the police
station and in the presence of appellant and the duty investigator. PO2 Coronel clarified that
the reason why he marked the said shabu at the police station and not at the scene of the
crime was because the place where they transacted was dark.
Then, the said shabu was properly turned over to the duty investigator, together with the
marked money.
Afterwards, the alleged shabu was brought to the forensic chemist for examination.
Likewise, the members of the buy-bust team executed their affidavits of arrest immediately
after appellant was apprehended and at the trial, PO2 Coronel positively identified the
seized drugs.
WHEREFORE, the assailed February 11, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 04206 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Allan Diaz y Roxas shall not be
eligible for parole.
5. Enrile v. People Full Title: Juan Ponce Enrile, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), and People
Of The Philippines, respondents.
Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse
of appropriations under (PDAF).
Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among
others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. In its
resolution, SB DENIED Enriles Motion particularly, on the matter of bail on the
ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily
surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to the
Director of CIDG in Camp Crame and he was later on confined at PNP General
Hospital following his medical examination.
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital , and his Motion
to Fix Bail which was heard by the SB.
In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post
bail because:
(a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong;
(b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only
be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and
(c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be
seriously considered.
SB (1ST assailed) Resolution: DENIED Enriles Motion to Fix Bail.
SB ruled that it is only after the prosecution shall have presented its evidence and the
Court shall have made a determination that the evidence of guilt is not strong against
accused Enrile can he demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail. Here, no such determination has
been made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus exceedingly premature for
accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his bail.
Also, as to Enriles 2nd argument, for purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating
circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These circumstances will only be
appreciated in the imposition of the proper penalty after trial should the accused be found
guilty of the offense charged.
Enrile filed an MR but SB issued its 2nd assailed resolution denying it.
Hence, this petition for certiorari to assail and annul the 2 resolutions issued by
the SB denying his motion to fix bail and motion for resolution, based on the ff.
grounds:
1. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall within the exception only upon concurrence of
two (2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
and (ii) when evidence of guilt is strong.
2. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile, if ever he
would be convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled
to bail as a matter of right.
3. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively that evidence of
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
ISSUE: w/not Enrile may be granted bail
HELD: YES! Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance
of the accused during the trial; and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
in denying Enriles Motion To Fix Bail.
RULING:
Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent. The purpose
of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts
as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty
before or during the trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
[you may skip this part and jump to ITC]
Bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion.
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
1. Bail as a matter of right:
a. All criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
b. Before conviction by RTC for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment; or
c. Before conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
2. Bail as a matter of discretion:
. Upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or
a. RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.
Admission to bail in offenses punished by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua is
subject to judicial discretion. Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to
ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted
provisional liberty. Bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of
the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled as the accused to due process. The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the
discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any
nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the
accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be
therein offered or admitted.
ITC: ENRILES POOR HEALTH JUSTIFIES HIS ADMISSION TO BAIL.
Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be
appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. Enriles averment has been mainly
uncontested by the Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has only argued that it is the
 Enriles guilt (if ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
4. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a flight risk.
5.
The Ombudsman, however, argues that:
1. Enriles right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
2. To be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and
3. Entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
maximum penalty provided by the offense that has bearing and not the possibility of mitigating
circumstances being appreciated in the accuseds favor. SC ruled that they will not determine the
question of whether or not Enriles averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime alleged against him being punishable
with reclusion perpetua, simply because the determination, being primarily factual in context, is
ideally to be made by the trial court.
Nonetheless, the SC in granting Enriles petition for certiorari ruled that it is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or
whenever so required by the court. In SCs view, his social and political standing and his having
immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the
risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from
the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and historys judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
[Note: I think this is where evidence comes in. Yung mention ng judicial notice sa may last part ng ruling]
The currently fragile state of Enriles health presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In the testimony of the Dr. Gonzales [director of PGH] in the Sandiganbayan, he classified
Enrile as a geriatric patient who was found during the medical examinations conducted at
the UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions: Chronic Hypertension with
fluctuating blood pressure levels on multiple drug therapy; Diffuse atherosclerotic
cardiovascular disease; Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular heart beat) documented
by Holter monitoring; Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrom (ACOS) and postnasal drip
syndrome. Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical conditions, singly or
collectively, could pose significant risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled
hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart complications, including recurrence of
stroke; (2) arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or non-fatal cardiovascular events,
especially under stressful conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with coronary
artery disease, because they could indicate a future risk for heart attack under stressful
conditions; and (4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered by certain
circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity, dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD. Hence, there is no question at all that
Enriles advanced age and ill health required special medical attention. His
confinement at the PNP General Hospital, albeit at his own instance, was not even
recommended by the officer- in-charge (OIC) and the internist doctor of that medical
facility because of the limitations in the medical support at that hospital.
[!!!] Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly
shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration
during the trial. [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of the
prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the humanity of the law makes
it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the proceeding, influence the
court to exercise its discretion to admit the prisoner to bail [Dela Rama v. The Peoples Court, 1946]
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful

6. Tankeh v. DBP ALEJANDRO V. TANKEH, Petitioner, vs. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, STERLING SHIPPING LINES, INC., RUPERTO V.
TANKEH, VICENTE ARENAS, and ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST,
Respondents.
Respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh is the president of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. Ruperto
applied for a $3.5 million loan from public respondent Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP) for the partial financing of an ocean-going vessel named M/V Sterling
Ace. This was granted by DBP subject to certain conditions which include the
requirement that certain earnings of the vessel and certain shares of stock should be
assigned in favor of DBP during the subsistence of the loan. It also required that
Ruperto, petitioner Alejandro, Vargas, as well as respondents Sterling Shipping Lines,
Inc. and Vicente Arenas should become liable jointly and severally for the amount of the
loan.
According to petitioner Dr. Alejandro V. Tankeh, Ruperto, his younger brother,
approached him sometime in 1980. Ruperto informed petitioner that he was
operating a new shipping line business. Petitioner claimed that respondent told
him that petitioner would be given one thousand (1,000) shares to be a director of
the business. (related ditto yung fraud in inducement na inaargue ni Alejandro)
Petitioner then signed a promissory note representing the loan from DBP.
Petitioner wrote a letter to respondent Ruperto saying that he was severing all ties and
terminating his involvement with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. Petitioner asked that the
private respondents notify Development Bank of the Philippines that he had severed his
ties with Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
The M/V Sterling Ace was sold in Singapore for $350,000.00 by DBPs legal counsel
Atty. Prospero N. Nograles. When petitioner came to know of the sale, he wrote
respondent DBP to express that the final price was inadequate, and therefore, the
transaction was irregular. At this time, petitioner was still bound as a debtor because of
the promissory note.
Petitioner filed several Complaints against respondents, praying that the
promissory note be declared null and void and that he be absolved from any liability
from the mortgage of the vessel and the note in question. Petitioner alleged that
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may be circumstances
decisive of the issue of bail whose existence is either admitted by the Prosecution,
or is properly the subject of judicial notice that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court thus
balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through ensuring his
personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the guarantees of due
process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
[the ruling did not mention what kind of judicial notice is it, whether it be (a) judicial notice when mandatory; (b) judicial
notice when discretionary; (c) judicial notice when hearing is necessary. But I think, its closest to judicial notice when
hearing is necessary.Pero feel ko lang yun. HAHAHAHA]
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari; ISSUES the writ of certiorari
ANNULING and SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in
Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the PROVISIONAL
RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash bond
of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some other lawful cause.
Whether the CA erred in finding that respondent Rupert V. Tankeh did not commit fraud
against the petitioner No fraud in inducement (dolo causante) but Ruperto is guilty of fraud in the
performance (dolo incidente). Hence he is liable for damages. As for the evidence part, SC said that
clear and convincing evidence is the quantum of proof for both dolo causante and incidente.
Two types of fraud
SC discussed 2 types of fraud (alam na natin to but Ill include a brief discussion here). In contracts, a
fraud known as dolo causante or causal fraud is basically a deception used by one party prior to or
simultaneous with the contract, in order to secure the consent of the other. Needless to say, the deceit
employed must be serious. In contradistinction, only some particular or accident of the obligation is
referred to by incidental fraud or dolo incidente, or that which is not serious in character and without
which the other party would have entered into the contract anyway. The effects of dolo causante are
the nullity of the contract (voidable) and the indemnification of damages, and dolo incidente also
obliges the person employing it to pay damages.
Quantum of Evidence to Prove the Existence of Fraud and the Liability of the Parties
The Civil Code, however, does not mandate the quantum of evidence required to prove actionable
fraud, either for purposes of annulling a contract (dolo causante) or rendering a party liable for
damages (dolo incidente). However, Jurisprudence provides that fraud must be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. Neither law nor jurisprudence distinguishes whether it is dolo incidente or
dolo causante that must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. It stands to reason that both dolo
incidente and dolo causante must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Thus, to annul a contract on the basis of dolo causante, the following must happen: First, the deceit
must be serious or sufficient to impress and lead an ordinarily prudent person to error In order
for the deceit to be considered serious, it is necessary and essential to obtain the consent of the party
imputing fraud. To determine whether a person may be sufficiently deceived, the personal conditions
and other factual circumstances need to be considered.
Second, the standard of proof required is clear and convincing evidence. This standard of proof
is derived from American common law. It is less than proof beyond reasonable doubt (for
criminal cases) but greater than preponderance of evidence (for civil cases). The degree of
believability is higher than that of an ordinary civil case. The imputation of fraud in a civil case
requires the presentation of clear and convincing evidence. Mere allegations will not suffice to sustain
the existence of fraud. The burden of evidence rests on the part of the plaintiff or the party alleging
fraud.
respondent Ruperto, together with Arenas, Jr. and Vargas, had exercised deceit
and fraud in causing petitioner to bind himself jointly and severally to pay
respondent DBP the amount of the mortgage loan. Petitioner alleged that he had
never invested any amount in the corporation and that he had never been an actual
member of the board of directors. He alleged that all the money he had supposedly
invested was provided by respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh. He claimed that he only
attended one meeting of the board. Petitioner further claimed that he had been excluded
deliberately from participating in the affairs of the corporation and had never been
compensated by Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. as a director and stockholder.
The trial proceeded with the petitioner serving as a sole witness for his case.
RTC: Petitioners consent was vitiated by the fraud before the several contracts were
consummated (SEC documents, Promissory Note, Mortgage (MC) Contract, assignment
(DA)). RTC annulled the Promissory Note as it relates to petitioner. Not to release him
from the clutch of the Promissory Note when he was never made a part of the operation
of the SSLI, when he was not notified of the Board Meetings, when the corporation nary
remitted earnings of M/V Sterling Ace from charter or shipping contracts to DBP, when
the SSLI did not comply with the deed of assignment and mortgage contract, and when
the vessel was sold in Singapore (he, learning of the sale only from the newspapers) in
contravention of the Promissory Note, and which he questioned, will be an injustice,
inequitable, and even iniquitous to plaintiff.
CA: reversed RTC. As to the evidence against Ruperto, the same consists only of the
testimony of the plaintiff. None of his documentary evidence would prove that Ruperto
was guilty of fraud or deceit in causing him to sign the subject promissory note. No
evidence of fraud or deceit was ever presented against defendants DBP, Arenas, SSLI
and APT.
Hence, this Petition was filed.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
ITC: There had been no dolo causante committed against the petitioner by Ruperto V. Tankeh.
The petitioner had given his consent to become a shareholder of the company without contributing a
single peso to pay for the shares of stock given to him by Ruperto V. Tankeh. This fact was admitted
by both petitioner and respondent in their respective pleadings submitted to the lower court. The
petitioner admitted that "he had never invested any amount in said corporation and that he had never
been an actual member of said corporation. All the money supposedly invested by him were put up by
defendant Ruperto V. Tankeh." This fact alone should have already alerted petitioner to the gravity of
the obligation that he would be undertaking as a member of the board of directors and the attendant
circumstances that this undertaking would entail. It also does not add any evidentiary weight to
strengthen petitioners claim of fraud. If anything, it only strengthens the position that petitioners
consent was not obtained through insidious words or deceitful machinations. Given his background as
a doctor, as a bank organizer, and as a businessman with experience in the textile business and real
estate should have apprised him of the irregularity in the contract that he would be undertaking. This
meant that at the time petitioner gave his consent to become a part of the corporation, he had been
fully aware of the circumstances and the risks of his participation. Intent is determined by the acts.
The required standard of proof clear and convincing evidence was not met. There was no
dolo causante or fraud used to obtain the petitioners consent to enter into the contract. Petitioner had
the opportunity to become aware of the facts that attended the signing of the promissory note. He
even admitted that he has a lawyer-son who the petitioner had hoped would assist him in the
administration of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. The totality of the facts on record belies petitioners
claim that fraud was used to obtain his consent to the contract given his personal circumstances and
the applicable law.
However, in refusing to allow petitioner to participate in the management of the business,
respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh was liable for the commission of incidental fraud. The records
showed that petitioner had been unjustly excluded from participating in the management of the affairs
of the corporation. This exclusion from the management in the affairs of Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
constituted fraud incidental to the performance of the obligation.
However, this Court finds there is nothing to support the assertion that Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc.
and Arenas committed incidental fraud and must be held liable. Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc. acted
through its board of directors, and the liability of respondent Tankeh cannot be imposed on Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc. The shipping line has a separate and distinct personality from its officers, and
petitioners assertion that the corporation conspired with the respondent Ruperto V. Tankeh to
defraud him is not supported by the evidence and the records of the case.
In addition, respondents Development Bank of the Philippines and Asset Privatization Trust or
Privatization and Management Office cannot be held liable for fraud. Incidental fraud cannot be
attributed to the execution of their actions, which were undertaken pursuant to their mandated
functions under the law. "Absent convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official functions has to be upheld."
On other issues:
The Court of Appeals was not correct in saying that petitioner could only raise fraud as a ground to
annul his participation in the contract as against respondent Rupert V. Tankeh, since the petitioner did
not make any categorical allegation that respondents Development Bank of the Philippines, Sterling
Shipping Lines, Inc., and Asset Privatization Trust had acted fraudulently. Admittedly, it was only in
the Petition before this Court that the petitioner had made the allegation of a "well-orchestrated fraud"
by the respondents. However, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that [see
codal].

7. People v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CHRIS
Corpus CORPUZ Y BASBAS, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Corpuz was charged with the crime of Murder with the Use of an Unlicensed Firearm in
an Information. He pleaded not guilty.
Version of the prosecution:
In the evening of 22 October 2000, the victim Cerezo together with his friends Aquino,
Baloy and Presto were in front of his house, which is adjacent to the road. The group
later sent Presto on an errand to buy gin. While waiting, Cerezo went to talk with
Naning, the daughter of the appellant. Suddenly, appellant Corpuz came out of his house
and shot Cerezo with a handgun with the latter not being able to put up any defense.
Aquino, Baloy and Presto then brought Cerezo to the hospital where he consequently
died. Appellant, on the other hand, walked towards the eastern dark portion of the road
after shooting Cerezo.
Version of the defense: as testified by appellant himself and his daughter.
In the evening of 22 October 2000, appellant was inside their house watching TV
together with his wife and children when he heard the firing of a gun, which he ignored
as shooting incidents occur in their place. As he went out to check on the water he was
boiling, he noticed something in front of the door. When he opened the door it was
Cerezo whom he saw, who even uttered the words Kuya Chris, to which appellant
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
In this case, the commission of fraud was an issue that had been tried with the implied consent of the
respondents, particularly Sterling Shipping Lines, Inc., Asset Privatization Trust, Development Bank of
the Philippines, and Arenas. Hence, although there is a lack of a categorical allegation in the pleading,
the courts may still be allowed to ascertain fraud.
[Procedural issue]
Respondents argue that the Petition is actually one of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
and not a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Thus, petitioners failure to show that there
was neither appeal nor any other plain, speedy or adequate remedy merited the dismissal of the
Complaint
Contrary to respondents arguments, the allegations of petitioner that the Court of Appeals "committed
grave abuse of discretion" did not ipso facto render the intended remedy that of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. In any case, even if the Petition is one for the special civil action of certiorari,
this Court has the discretion to treat a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari as a Rule 45 Petition for Review
on Certiorari. This is allowed if (1) the Petition is filed within the reglementary period for filing a
Petition for review; (2) when errors of judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to
justify the relaxation of the rules. When this Court exercises this discretion, there is no need to comply
with the requirements provided for in Rule 65.
In this case, petitioner filed his Petition within the reglementary period of filing a Petition for Review.
His Petition assigns errors of judgment and appreciation of facts and law on the part of the Court of
Appeals. Thus, even if the Petition was designated as one that sought the remedy of certiorari, this
Court may exercise its discretion to treat it as a Petition for Review in the interest of substantial justice.
WHEREFORE, this Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals as
to the assailed Decision in so far as the finding of fraud is SUSTAINED with the MODIFICATION
that respondent RUPERTO V. TANKEH be ordered to pay moral damages in the amount of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) and the amount of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) by way of exemplary damages.
Issue: WoN the there is reversible error in RTCs conviction, as affirmed by the CA. NO
[doctrines in bold and underlined. So appellants contention muna, then the Court ruling will
follow (i.e. the doctrine]
1) Appellant: There are reversible errors committed by the court a quo in giving credence to the alleged
eyewitness testimony of Aquino, despite the latters failure to positively identify the appellant as the
victims assailant and for wrongfully appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Court: The factual findings of the trial court, especially those affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
are conclusive on this Court when supported by the evidence on record. This Court observes
restraint in interfering with the trial courts assessment of the witnesses credibility, absent any
indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some material facts or gravely abused its
discretion, more so, when the CA sustained such assessment.
ITC: Nothing on the records show any indication of arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence that would warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the courts
a quo.
2) Appellant: The appellant challenges his conviction by attacking the credibility of prosecution witness
Romeo Aquino. According to appellant, the said eyewitness failed to positively identify him as the
victims assailant. This is aside from the inconsistencies between Aquinos affidavit submitted to the
 answered, Its you Gilbert, your daddy is looking for you. Cerezo said, dont mind police and the testimony he made in open court.
him, I was injured. At this point, appellant instructed his daughter Naning to call for Court: We do not find any such inconsistency that would place in doubt the evidence of appellants
Cerezos father. After Naning left, appellant followed her and he was able to bring guilt.
Cerezos father to appellants house. Upon seeing his son, Cerezos father asked him Appellants identity as Chris Corpuz was already admitted and he was positively identified by Romeo
what happened. When Gilbert failed to answer, his father boxed the appellant. Aquino during the trial as the person who shot his friend Gilbert Cerezo. In a straightforward manner,
RTC: found accused guilty Aquino narrated and demonstrated how appellant shot the victim and where they were positioned vis-
The Certification issued by the Firearms and Explosives Division of the PNP Camp a-vis his location at the time of the shooting. This was appreciated by the court a quo which observed
Crame indicating that the accused is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind the demeanor of Aquino while on the witness stand. At this point, we see no reason to disbelieve his
and caliber as of 22 October 2000. It likewise appreciated the existence of treachery as testimony, especially so, that there was no motive on his part to attribute the killing to appellant
demonstrated by the fact that the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected to the Corpuz, a neighbour known to him for so long.
extent that he was defenseless at the time of the shooting.
CA: sustained the ruling and found the same to be in order. 3) Appellant: Second assigned error pertaining to the contradicting statements of witness Aquino made
in his affidavit. It is posited that while on the stand, Aquino gave the impression that he saw the act of
shooting and not merely heard a gunshot which caused him to look at the direction where it came
from.
Court: An affidavit taken ex-parte is generally unreliable as oftentimes it is inaccurate.
Discrepancies on minor details do not erase but enhance the credibility of either the witness or
his testimony. Discrepancies referring only to minor details and collateral matters not to the central
fact of the crime do not affect the veracity or detract from the essential credibility of witnesses
declarations, as long as these are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.

4) Appellant: defense of denial and alibi

Court: The defense of denial can easily be overcome by a positive identification that is
categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses
testifying on the matter. Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that denial
and alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the witness.
Alibi, on the other hand, is viewed with suspicion and received with caution, because it can easily be
fabricated. For alibi to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was at some other place when
the crime was committed but that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the
time of its commission.

5) Appellant: the appellant offered the testimony of her daughter Christina also known as Naning,
who was allegedly with him from the time Cerezo was shot, until he was brought to the hospital,
Court: On further examination, however, it came to the fore that Christina had a relationship with the
victim, they being lovers, of which her father, appellant Corpuz, did not approve which explains why
Cerezo went to talk to Christina outside her house.
Finally, it is quite puzzling why the appellant took flight after the shooting incident and returned only
after six (6) years, until he was finally arrested in 2006. As we held in the case of People v. Deunida, flight
of an accused from the scene of the crime removes any remaining shred of doubt on his guilt.

Penalties and Damages imposed:

The lower courts correctly sentenced the appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua only, since
there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances that attended the commission of the crime.
The trial court likewise correctly awarded civil indemnity and moral damages and exemplary damages
to the heirs of the victim.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant
Chris Corpuz is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Gilbert Cerezo, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity; P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; P25,000.00 as temperate damages, all in addition to the
interest on all these damages assessed at the legal rate of 6% from date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

8. Asian ASIAN TERMINALS, INC. VS. PHILAM INSURANCE CO., INC. (NOW Who between ATI and Westwind is liable for the damage suffered by the subject cargo and to

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue

Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Terminals v. CHARTIS PHILIPPINES INSURANCE, INC.),
Philam Insurance This consolidated case involves a shipment from Japan of 219 packages containing 120
units of brand new Nissan Pickup Truck Double Cab 4x2 model, without engine, tires
and batteries to Universal Motors Corporation (UMC) in Manila. The shipment was
insured with Philam against all risks. When the shipment was delivered to UMC, it was
found that the cargoes were damaged. Owing to the extent of the damage to said
cargoes, UMC declared them a total loss.
UMC filed a formal claim for damages against Westwind (shipping corp), ATI
(stevedore) and R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. (authorized broker of UMC),
however, its demands remained unheeded, thus, it sought reparation from Philam.
Accordingly, UMC issued a Subrogation Receipt in favor of Philam.
Philam, as subrogee of UMC, filed a Complaint for damages against Westwind, ATI and
R.F. Revilla Customs Brokerage, Inc. before the RTC Makati.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Philam and ordered Westwind and ATI to pay Philam, jointly
and severally. It held that there was sufficient evidence to establish the respective
participation of Westwind and ATI in the discharge of and consequent damage to the
shipment. RTC acknowledged the subrogation between Philam and UMC on the
strength of the Subrogation Receipt.
CA: On appeal, CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. It affirmed
Westwind and ATIs joint and solidary liability for the damage to only one (1) unit of
Frame Axle Sub without Lower inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. It also noted that when
said cargo sustained damage, it was not yet in the custody of the consignee or the person
who had the right to receive it.
All the parties filed MR but were denied. Thus, they each filed a petition for review on
certiorari which were consolidated together by this Court considering that all three
petitions assail the same CA decision and resolution and involve the same parties.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
what extent?
NOT SO RELEVANT: The three consolidated petitions call for a determination of who between
ATI and Westwind is liable for the damage suffered by the subject cargo and to what extent. However,
the resolution of the issues raised by the present petitions is predicated on the appreciation of factual
issues which is beyond the scope of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended. It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of
law may be put in issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. But while it is not our duty to review,
examine and evaluate or weigh all over again the probative value of the evidence presented, the Court
may nonetheless resolve questions of fact when the case falls under any of the following exceptions:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
ITC: Fifth and seventh exceptions apply. While the CA affirmed the joint liability of ATI and
Westwind, it held them liable only for the value of one unit of Frame Axle Sub without Lower inside
Case No. 03-245-42K/1. The appellate court disallowed the award of damages for the six pieces of
Frame Assembly with Bush, which petitioner Philam alleged, for the first time in its Appellees Brief, to
be likewise inside Case No. 03-245-42K/1. Lastly, the CA reduced the award of attorneys fees to
P47,671.
Foremost, the Court holds that petitioner Philam has adequately established the basis of its claim
against petitioners ATI and Westwind. Philam, as insurer, was subrogated to the rights of the
consignee, UMC, pursuant to the Subrogation Receipt executed by the latter in favor of the former.
RELEVANT!!!
In their respective comments to Philams Formal Offer of Evidence, petitioners ATI and Westwind
objected to the admission of the Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt as documentary
exhibits. Petitioner Westwind objects to the admission of both documents for being hearsay as they
were not authenticated by the persons who executed them. For the same reason, petitioner ATI assails
the admissibility of the Subrogation Receipt.
The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be
presented as evidence in court. Public documents, as enumerated under Section 19, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, are self- authenticating and require no further authentication in order to be
presented as evidence in court.
In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed or instrument executed by a private
person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. Lacking the official or sovereign character of a
public document, or the solemnities prescribed by law, a private document requires authentication
in the manner prescribed under Section 20, Rule 132 of the Rules:
SEC. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

9. Prodon v. Heirs HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS, VS. HEIRS OF MAXIMO S.
of Alvarez ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO
ALVAREZ, JR., RESPONDENTS.
Respondents aver that their parents were the registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 84797 of the RD of Manila. They continued possessing the
property as heirs. They said that they could not locate the owners duplicate copy of
TCT No. 84797, but the original copy was on file with RD of Manila.
The original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to Prodon
subject to the right of repurchase. Respondents aver that Prodon maliciously did this
to the TCT because the deed of sale with the right to repurchase did not exist.
They filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages.
In her Answer, Prodon claimed that the predecessor of respondents executed a deed of
sale with the right to repurchase; and that they had the TCT annotated. For his failure to
repurchase the property, Prodon became the absolute owner of the property.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the files of the
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances,
specifically: (a) when the document is an ancient one within the context of Section 21, Rule 132 of the
Rules;
(b) when the genuineness and authenticity of the actionable document have not been specifically
denied under oath by the adverse party;
(c) when the genuineness and authenticity of the document have been admitted; or
(d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.
ITC: The Marine Certificate and the Subrogation Receipt are private documents which Philam
and the consignee, respectively, issue in the pursuit of their business. Since none of the
exceptions to the requirement of authentication of a private document obtains in these cases,
said documents may not be admitted in evidence for Philam without being properly
authenticated.
Contrary to the contention of ATI and Westwind, however, Philam presented its claims officer,
Ricardo Ongchangco, Jr. to testify on the execution of the Subrogation Receipt. He testified that he
personally delivered the claim check of UMC to Philam and have the subrogation receipt signed by
them personally.
All that the Rules require to establish the authenticity of a document is the testimony of a
person who saw the document executed or written. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting
the Subrogation Receipt in evidence despite petitioners ATI and Westwinds objections that it was not
authenticated by the person who signed it.
However, the same cannot be said about Marine Certificate which Ongchangcho merely identified in
court. There is nothing in his testimony which indicates that he saw Philams authorized representative
sign said document.
Yet, even with the exclusion of the Marine Certificate, the Subrogation Receipt, on its own, is adequate
proof that Philam paid the consignees claim on the damaged goods. Petitioners ATI and Westwind
failed to offer any evidence to controvert the same.
Upon a careful review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the finding that
Westwind and ATI are concurrently accountable for the damage to the content of Steel Case No. 03-
245-42K/1.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with MODIFICATION the Decision dated October 15,
2007 and the Resolution dated January 11, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69284 in
that the interest rate on the award of P190,684.48 is reduced to 6% per annum from the date of
extrajudicial demand, until fully paid.
Issue: w/n the requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had been complied with
NO need to apply the Best Evidence rule so the requisites need not be complied with. (See Sec. 3,
Rule 130 please, saying sa space)
[Doctrine] The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject
of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to
repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best Evidence Rule
does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original
document. (Read ITC because its not always that Best Evidence is inapplicable in a quieting of title action!)
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the
document must be produced in court. The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to
prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves:
a) the existence or due execution of the original;
b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and
c) the absence of bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.
Register of Deeds of Manila.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of Prodon. It opined that although the deed itself
could not be presented as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be
proved by secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its unavailability
being without bad faith. In this case, Prodon was able to establish the execution and
existence of the deed. Respondents raised the issues to the CA (no mention of which
mode).
CA reversed the RTCs decision. According to the CA, Prodon failed to establish the
existence of the document, its execution and subsequent loss. Respondents predecessor
was hospitalized and was physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale.
And even if the deed of sale was existing, its loss was not proven.
Heirs of Prodon (Prodon died) appealed to the SC through Rule 45.
So how did the issue of Best of Evidence found its way here? Just in case sir asks.
In the course of the trial, a question was propounded to Prodon as to who had signed or
executed the deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule.
The RTC then sustained the objection. At that point began the diversion of the focus in
the case. The RTC should have outrightly overruled the objection because the fact
sought to be established by the requested testimony was the execution of the deed, not
its terms.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are
brought before the court, considering that (a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words
of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or dispositive
instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great
difference in rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a
copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony purporting to give from memory
the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing
other situations generally. The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud.
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the
issue relates to the terms of the writing. Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the
terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external facts,
such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best
Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without
accounting for the original.
ITC: The action involves quieting of title. The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that
a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing may or may not
be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff.
For instance, when an action for quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not
complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code specifically provides that evidence
of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There
is then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
However, this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with the right to
repurchase. The principal issue raised was whether or not the deed of sale was duly executed
by the respondents predecessor.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase were not the issue, the CA did not have to address and determine whether the
existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence, had been
established by Prodons evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the
existence and execution of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of
evidence.
[Conclusion] Prodon did not establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase. Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its
existence and due execution by other means.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the
lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the presentation of secondary
evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her
lawyer, Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the
original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment. Such
evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilaos
belongings by himself or by any of his assistants or representatives was inadequate.
Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no
effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly improbable for him to travel from Manila all
the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order
only to negotiate and consummate the sale of the property.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave,

10. MCMP v. Full Title: MCMP Construction Corp., petitioner, vs. Monark Equipment Corp.,
Monark respondent.
MCMP leased heavy equipment from Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark)
for various periods in 2000, the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract
(Contract). Thus, Monark delivered 5 pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of
MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by invoices as well as
Documents Acknowledgment Receipts, received and signed by representatives of
MCMP.
Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices, MCMP failed to
pay the rental fees.
Upon demands made upon MCMP to pay the amount due, partial payments
were made in the amount of PhP100,000.00 on the 15th day of April and
August 2001, respectively. Further demands went unheeded. As of April 30,
2002, MCMP owed Monark the amount of PhP1,282,481.83,
Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the RTC. [omitted MCMPs Answer]
[!!!] During TRIAL, Monark presented as one of its witnesses, Peregrino, its Senior
Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there were two (2) original copies of the
Contract, one retained by Monark, while the other was given to MCMP. He further
testified that Monark's copy had been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the
copy proved futile. Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract
which he personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no diligent
efforts to search for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not present its copy of the
Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial court to produce the same.
RTC Decision: ruled in favor of Monark and found MCMP liable.
MCMP filed a Motion for Reconsideration while Monark interposed a Motion for
Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration. RTC denied MCMPs MR but granted
Monarks Motion for Clarification.
Unsatisfied, MCMP appealed the RTC's Decision and Order to the CA
CA Decision: AFFIRMED in toto the Decision and Order of the RTC. CA denied
MCMPs MR.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
MCMP argues that CA should have disallowed the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence
Rule. MCMP specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did
not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as evidenced by the fact that:
1. The actual custodian of the document was not presented:
2. The alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police; and
3. Monark only searched for the original copy of the document for the purposes
of the instant case.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
ISSUE: w/not CA erred in allowing the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the existence of
the ContractNO!
DOCTRINE + RULING:
Relevant Codal Provisions:
For Best Evidence RuleSection 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be
examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in
a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on the presentation of
secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost document:
Section 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost
or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or
existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or control. If the document is in
the custody or under the control of adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to
produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to
produce the document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.
Best Evidence Ruleit is a basic postulate requiring the production of the original document
whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry.
Exception: A party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original
document whenever the original copy has been lost.
Requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove the contents of the
original document whenever the original copy has been lost:
1. The existence or due execution of the original;
2. The loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and
3. On the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the
original can be attributed.
The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents.
ITC: Monark was able to prove that all the requirements are present.
Here, both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of Peregrino that the
original Contract in the possession of Monark has been lost and that diligent efforts
were exerted to find the same but to no avail. Such testimony has remained
uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, "findings of facts and
assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court." Hence, SC
respected the evaluation of the trial court on the credibility of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not the contract that

11. Spouses SPOUSES TEODORO and ROSARIO SARAZA and FERNANDO SARAZA,
Saraza v. Petitioners, vs. WILLIAM FRANCISCO, Respondent.
Francisco
This is a complaint for specific performance, sum of money and damages filed by
respondent Francisco against the petitioners. Francisco alleged that he and Fernando
executed an Agreement that provided for the latters sale of his 100-square meter share
in a lot situated in Bangkal, Makati City for a total consideration of P3.2M. The amount
of P1.2M was paid upon the Agreements execution, while the balance of P2M was to be
paid on installments to the Philippine National Bank (PNB), to cover a loan of Spouses
Saraza, Fernandos parents, with the bank. A final deed of sale conveying the property
was to be executed by Fernando upon full payment of the PNB loan. Spouses Saraza
signified their conformity to the Agreement. The respondent was also allowed to take
immediate possession of the property under a contract of lease.
When the remaining balance of the PNB loan reached P226,582.13, the respondent
asked for the petitioners issuance of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) that would
authorize him to receive from PNB the owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 156126
upon full payment of the loan. The petitioners denied the request. Upon inquiry from
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of the Contract even despite the
request of the trial court for it to produce its copy of the Contract. Normal business practice
dictates that MCMP should have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus,
MCMP's failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies
the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with Section 6 of
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, but it also gives rise to the disputable presumption
adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court that
"evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."
Lastly, MCMP claims that the pieces of equipment were not actually delivered to it by
Monark. It bears pointing out, however, that the witnesses of MCMP itself, Jorge Samonte,
a Budget Supervisor of MCMP, and Engr. Horacio A. Martinez, Sr., General Manager of
MCMP, both acknowledged the delivery of the equipment to the project sites.
[not relevant] However, SC takes notice that the trial court imposed upon MCMP a 24% per annum
interest on the rental fees as well as a collection fee of 1% per month compounded monthly and a 2%
per month penalty charge. In all then, the effective interest rate foisted upon MCMP is 60% per
annum. On top of this, MCMP was assessed for attorney's fees at the rate of 25% of the total amount
due. These are exorbitant and unconscionable rates, therefore are void. Hence, SC reduced the interest
rate of 24% per annum is hereby reduced to 12% per annum. Moreover, the interest shall start to
accrue thirty (30) days after receipt of the second set of invoices on January 21, 2001, or March 1, 2001
in accordance with the provisions in the invoices themselves.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit with
the MODIFICATION that the dispositive portion of the RTC's Decision dated November 20, 2007,
as amended in an Order dated April 28, 2008, should read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the defendant to pay the former:
1. PhP 765,380.33 representing the unpaid rental fees;
2. Interest of 12% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be computed from
March 1, 2001 until payment;
3. Penalty and collection charge of 6% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be
computed from March 1, 2001;
4. Attorney's Fees of five percent (5%) of the total amount to be recovered; and,
5. The costs of suit.
Whether or not the petitioners are bound to comply with their obligations to the respondent as
embodied in their Agreement - YES.
The issue of whether or not the respondents obligation to pay has already been satisfied is a factual
question.
We consider the fact that both the RTC and the CA have determined that there has been a full
payment by the respondent of his P3,200,000.00 obligation under the Agreement. Upon review, the
Court finds no reason to deviate from this finding of the courts, especially as it is supported by
substantial evidence. To begin with, the petitioners do not deny the authenticity and their
execution of the subject Agreement, a matter that is also sufficiently established by the fact
that the document was acknowledged before a notary public. As both the RTC and CA correctly
held, such Agreement sufficiently proves the fact of the respondents payment to the petitioners of the
agreed initial payment of P1,200,000.00, as it states:
That, for and in consideration of the agreed purchase price of THREE MILLION TWO
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([P]3,200,000.00), Philippine currency, of which the sum of ONE
MILLION TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ([P]1,200,000.00), has been paid by the buyer
upon execution of this instrument x x x.
 PNB, the respondent found out that the petitioners had instead executed an Amended
Authority, which provided that the owners copy of TCT No. 156126 should be returned
to the mortgagors upon full payment of the loan. Spouses Saraza also caused the eviction
of the respondent from the property. These prompted the respondent to institute the
civil case for specific performance, sum of money and damages with the RTC of Imus,
Cavite.
Petitioners opposed the respondents complaint on the ground that the amount of
P1,200,000.00 which was supposed to be paid by the respondent upon the
Agreements execution remained unpaid.
RTC: ruled in favor of respondent Francisco and ordered the execution of a deed of
sale.
The RTC held that contrary to the petitioners claim, the respondents full payment of
the P3,200,000.00 consideration provided in the Agreement was supported by: (1) the
petitioners acknowledgment in the Agreement that they received the amount of
P1,200,000.00 upon its execution; and (2) the Certification from PNB that the full
amount of Spouses Sarazas loan with the bank had been fully paid.
The RTC, however, declared that only Fernando should be held liable for the
respondents claims, since the main action was for specific performance, specifically to
compel him to execute a Deed of Absolute Sale over the subject property already
covered by TCT No. 220530 under Fernandos name.
CA: affirmed the RTC. It rejected the petitioners allegation that the amount of
P1,200,000.00 remained unpaid by the respondent, citing the stipulation in their
Agreement which provided that the said amount was paid upon the contracts execution.
MR denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
12. Ombudsman OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. MARCELINO A.
v. Dechavez DECHAVEZ, RESPONDENT.
Dechavez was the president of the Negros State College of Agriculture (NSCA) from
2001 until his retirement in 2006. On May 5, 2002, a Sunday, Dechavez and his wife,
used the college service Suzuki Vitara to go to Pontevedra, Negros Occidental.
Dechavez drove the vehicle himself. On their way back to the NSCA, they figured in a
vehicular accident in Himamaylan City, resulting in minor injuries to the occupants and
damage to the vehicle.
To support his claim for insurance, Dechavez executed an affidavit before the GSIS.
The GSIS subsequently granted Dechavezs claims amounting to P308,000.00, while the
NSCA shouldered P71,000.00 as its share in the vehicles depreciation expense. The
GSIS released P6,000.00 for Mrs. Dechavezs third-party liability claim for bodily
injuries.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Given this categorical statement, the petitioners denial that they have received the amount necessitated
concrete and substantial proof. A perusal of the case records shows that the petitioners failed in this
regard. Even their unsubstantiated claim that the documents notarization was irregularly made cannot
prevail over the presumption that the notary publics duty has been regularly performed. The CA also
correctly held that the parol evidence rule applies to this case. Unsubstantiated testimony, offered as
proof of verbal agreements which tend to vary the terms of the written agreement, is inadmissible
under the rule.
In addition to the foregoing, the petitioners plain denial of the respondents claim of full payment is
self-serving, belied by their admission that they had not at anytime demanded from the respondent the
payment of P1,200,000.00. The petitioners are presumed under the law to have taken ordinary care of
their concerns; thus, they would have exerted efforts to demand payment of the amount due them if in
fact, no payment had been made. Moreover, given this presumption, the petitioners were supposed to
be wary of the import of affixing their signature on the Agreement, and would not have voluntarily
signed the subject Agreement if they did not intend to give full effect thereto.
[Issue on venue:]
In addition to the defenses which he raised during the proceedings before the RTC, Francisco argued
in the CA that the RTC of Imus lacked jurisdiction over the case as it involved an adjudication of
ownership of a property situated in Makati City.
The petitioners argument that the action should have been instituted with the RTC of Makati City, and
not the RTC of Imus, Cavite, is misplaced. Although the end result of the respondents claim was the
transfer of the subject property to his name, the suit was still essentially for specific performance, a
personal action, because it sought Fernandos execution of a deed of absolute sale based on a contract
which he had previously made.
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court then governs the venue for the respondents action. It provides
that personal actions "may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-
resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff." Considering the
respondents statement in his complaint that he resides in Imus, Cavite, the filing of his case with the
RTC of Imus was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 28, 2011 and Resolution dated September 30, 2011 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 93961 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of Pl00,000.00 as damages in favor of respondent William Francisco is deleted.
Issue: WoN Dechavez is guilty of Dishonesty. - YAAAAASSSSSS
General Rule: The Court will not disturb the CAs findings of fact.
(One of the) Exceptions: presence of conflict of findings of fact between or among the tribunals
rulings on questions of fact.
ITC: squarely falls under this exception as the tribunals below made two critical conflicting factual findings.
The SC is thus compelled to undertake its own factual examination of the evidence.
Rule on Quantum of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings
In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings. Substantial evidence
is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The
requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to believe that the petitioner is guilty of the
act or omission complained of, even if the evidence might not be overwhelming.
Twenty (20) faculty and staff members of the NSCA (complainants) asked the
Commission on Audit to conduct an audit investigation of NSCAs expenditures in
the May 5, 2002 vehicular accident. The COA dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit.
The complainants then sought recourse with the Ombudsman, Visayas, through a
verified complaint charging Dechavez with Dishonesty under the Administrative
Code.
OMB ruling: GUILTY; dismissed Dechavez from service with all accessory penalties.
CA ruling: REVERSED. The complainants failed to sufficiently show that Dechavez
had deliberately lied in his May 10, 2002 affidavit. Dechavez sufficiently proved that he
went on an official trip, based on the following reasons:
- there was nothing wrong if Dechavez worked on a Sunday; he must, in fact, be
commended for his dedication.
- OMB should have accorded greater belief on the NSCA drivers positive assertion that
they were not available to drive for Mr. and Mrs. Dechavez as against the NSCA security
guards allegation that these drivers were available then (because they allegedly saw the
drivers within the college premises on that Sunday)
OMBs argument: The guilt of Dechavez has been proven by substantial evidence
the quantum of evidence required in administrative proceedings. It likewise invokes its
findings and posits that because they are supported by substantial evidence, they deserve
great weight and must be accorded full respect and credit.
Dechavezs argument: the present petition raises factual issues that are improper for a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. He adds that the present case has been
mooted by his retirement from the service and should properly be dismissed.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
ITC: Ombudsmans findings and appreciation of the presented evidence are more in accord with
reason and common experience so that it successfully proved, by the required quantum of evidence,
Dechavezs dishonesty. The following reasons are given by the Court:
-While working on a Sunday, by itself, is not sufficient basis for the conclusion that Dechavezs
business on that day was not official, the Court is nevertheless convinced that the spouses Dechavezs
trip was a personal one; thus, Dechavez had been dishonest when he made the claim that he went on
official business. The dishonesty, of course, did not arise simply from the nature of the trip, but from
the claim for insurance that brought the spouses a substantial sum.
-The Court DOES NOT agree with Dechavezs claim about the immateriality of the trip ticket
(NOTE: everytime a government vehicle is used, a trip ticket is required). The fact alone that the ticket,
for a trip that was allegedly urgent, was typewritten already speaks volumes about the integrity of this
piece of evidence. We agree with the Ombudsman, based on common experience and probability, that
had the trip really been urgent and had the trip ticket been accomplished on the date of the trip, May 5,
2002, it would have been handwritten. The trip ticket, however, was typewritten, indicating that it had
been prepared ahead of time. In fact, if it had been prepared ahead of time, then the trip could not
have been urgent as there was advance planning involved. Therefore, it was unlikely that Dechavez
would have known that no driver would be available for him on the date of the trip.
If the trip ticket had been prepared after the trip, the Ombudsman was correct in observing that
Dechavez had no authority to drive the vehicle in the absence of the requisite trip ticket. Worse, if it
had been prepared after the trip after an accident had intervened, then there had been a conscious
attempt to sanitize the incidents of the trip. It is at this point where the claim for insurance becomes
material; the trip ticket removed all questions about the regularity and official character of the trip.
- The Court leans in favor of the view that there were available drivers on May 5, 2002, contrary to
what Dechavez claimed. As between the assertion of the security guards that they had seen
available drivers on the day of the trip, and the drivers denial (and assertion that they had
serviced other faculty members at that time), the settled evidentiary rule is that as between a
positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth, on one hand[,] and a bare
denial[,] on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
-The Court cannot give weight to the certification of three co-public officials that Dechavez used the
visit to coordinate with their offices. The certifications of the two officials were submitted only in
October 2004 or two (2) years after the case was filed with the Ombudsman. The time lag alone already
renders the certifications suspect. The late use of the certifications also deprived the complainants of
the opportunity to refute them and the Ombudsman the chance to examine the affiants. As the
Ombudsman observed, too, it is hard to believe that all four (4) of them Mr. and Mrs. Dechavez, Mr.
Parroco, and Mr. Geanga happened to agree to work on a Sunday, a non-working day;
- Mrs. Dechavez was not on official business on May 5, 2002; in fact, she was not teaching at that time.
The parties presented two (2) conflicting instructors summer teaching loads for 2002: the first one did
not include Mrs. Dechavez, while the other included Mrs. Dechavezs name. Curiously, the same
person who prepared both documents, Mr. Cuizon, failed to explain why there were two (2) versions of
the same document.
Retirement from the service during the pendency of an administrative case does not render the case
moot and academic
The jurisdiction that was Ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased to be in office during the pendency of his

13. De Jose v. ROBERT DA JOSE AND FRANCISCO OCAMPO Y ANGELES,
Angeles PETITIONERS, VS. CELERINA R. ANGELES, EDWARD ANGELO R.
ANGELES ANDCELINE ANGELI R. ANGELES, RESPONDENTS.
This case involves a vehicular collision between the car (Mitsubishi Lancer) driven by
Eduardo Angeles and that of Robert Da Jose (Nissan Patrol) which was driven at that
time by Francisco Angeles. Eduardo died as a result of the collision. Thus, a criminal
complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property was
filed against Francisco before the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan. MTC declared Francisco
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Respondents subsequently filed a Complaint for Damages based on tort against Robert
and Francisco before the RTC.
RTC rendered the assailed Decision holding that it was recklessness or lack of due care on the
part of defendant Ocampo while operating the Nissan Patrol [that] was the proximate cause of the
vehicular collision which directly resulted in the death of Eduardo T. Angeles very soon thereafter. RTC
ordered defendants Robert Da Jose and Francisco Angeles to solidarily pay plaintiffs
Celerina Rivera-Angeles, Edward Angelo R. Angeles and Celine Angeli R. Angeles the
following amounts: [basta he did not award indemnity for lost of earning capacity]
1) P50,000.00 for the fact of death of the late Eduardo T. Angeles;
2) P500,000.00 as moral damages;
3) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4) P4,830.00 for the hospitalization and P50,000.00 for the burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; and
5) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
Dissatisfied, both parties sought recourse from the CA. CA affirmed with modification
the RTCs findings and ruling. It modified the award of damages, to wit:
1.The P500,000.00 award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00;
2. The award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is further reduced to P25,000.00;
3. P2,316,000.00 is awarded for lost earnings of the deceased Eduardo T. Angeles.
While sustaining the RTCs award of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000; actual
damages in the amount of P4,830 as hospitalization expenses and P50,000 as burial
expenses; and attorneys fees and costs of the suit in the amount of P50,000, the CA
reduced the awards for moral and exemplary damages in the amounts of P50,000 and
P25,000 respectively, in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Moreover, the CA awarded
respondents indemnity for Eduardos loss of earning capacity based on the
documentary and testimonial evidence they presented.Excluding the other cash
vouchers, the CA took into consideration the P20,000 monthly salary Eduardo
received from Glennis Laundry Haus in the computation thereof, finding that the
said cash vouchers were typewritten and duly signed by employees who prepared,
checked and approved them and that said business venture was validated by the
aforementioned Joint Affidavit. Thus, the CA awarded the amount of P2,316,000 for
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
case.
Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative liability when facing administrative sanction.
Jurisdiction, once it attaches, cannot be defeated by the acts of the respondent, save only where death
intervenes and the action does not survive.
WHEREFORE, under these premises, we hereby GRANT the petition for review on certiorari.
Accordingly, we REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the decision dated March 31, 2006 and the resolution
dated February 7, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 00673, and REINSTATE the
decision dated October 29, 2004 and the order dated April 6, 2005 of the Office of the Ombudsman.
W/N the CA erred in awarding the sum of P2,316,000 for loss of earning capacity.- YES
[NOT SO RELEVANT]
On the propriety of the matters raised by petitioners in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure
While indeed the petition raises a factual issue on the probative value of the cash vouchers submitted in
support of the claim for lost earnings, the present case falls under two of the abovementioned
exceptions because the findings of the CA conflict with the findings of the RTC and that the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts.
[RELEVANT]
Under Article 2206 of the Civil Code, the heirs of the victim are entitled to indemnity for loss of
earning capacity. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings, but for loss of
earning capacity. The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of
actual damages which must be duly proven by competent proof and the best obtainable
evidence thereof. Thus, as a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. By way of exception, damages for loss of earning
capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence when (1) the deceased is self-
employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in which case, judicial notice may be taken of
the fact that in the deceaseds line of work no documentary evidence is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a
daily wage
worker earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws.
Based on the foregoing and in line with respondents claim that Eduardo during his lifetime earned
more or less an annual income of P1M the case falls under the purview of the general rule rather than
the exceptions.
ITC: While it is true that respondents submitted cash vouchers to prove Eduardos income, the
officers and/or employees who prepared, checked or approved the same were not presented on the
witness stand. The CA itself in its assailed Decision disregarded the cash vouchers from Classic
Personnel, Inc. and the Jhamec Construction Corp. due to lack of proper identification and
authentication. We find that the same infirmity besets the cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus
upon which the award for loss of earning capacity was based.
The cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus were not identified by Celerina contrary to the findings
of the CA but by Celine in her testimony before the RTC and Celine, under cross- examination,
admitted by way of stipulation that she had no participation in the preparation thereof. We thus agree
with the RTCs ruling that said cash vouchers though admitted in evidence, whether objected to
or not, have no probative value for being hearsay.
DOCTRINE: Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons
other than the witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on
three reasons: (1) absence of cross-examination; (2) absence of demeanor evidence; and (3) absence of
oath. Basic under the rules of evidence is that a witness can only testify on facts within his or her
personal knowledge. This personal knowledge is a substantive prerequisite in accepting
testimonial evidence establishing the truth of a disputed fact. Corollarily, a document offered
 loss of earning capacity in favor of respondents.
Petitioners filed MR. Denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioners claim that the CA erred in admitting the Glennis Laundry Haus cash
vouchers as evidence to prove loss of earnings as the said vouchers are purely
hearsay evidence, hence, inadmissible and of no probative value. Petitioners argue
that contrary to the findings of the CA that Celerina identified said vouchers, records
show that it was Celine who actually identified them and that the latter acknowledged
her non-participation in the preparation of the same. Absent Celines personal
knowledge as to the due execution, preparation and authenticity of the Glennis Laundry
Haus cash vouchers and consistent with the CAs ruling in disregarding the cash
vouchers of Classic Personnel, Inc. and the Jhamec Construction Corp. as evidence, the
cash vouchers from Glennis Laundry Haus are considered hearsay evidence. Petitioners
point out that respondents did not present any employee who had knowledge of the
preparation and due execution of said vouchers. Neither did they present Glennis S.
Gonzales who executed theJoint Affidavit together with Eduardo.
They stress that whether objected to or not, the cash vouchers are hearsay
evidence which possess no probative value.Since the Glennis Laundry Haus cash
vouchers and the Joint Affidavit are inadmissible in evidence and without
probative value, petitioners assert that there exists no competent evidence to
support the award of lost earnings in the amount of P2,316,000, and consequently
such award by the CA should be set aside.
14. People v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ANECITO
Estibal ESTIBAL Y CALUNGSAG, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
Estibal, 43 years old, was charged with the rape of his 13-year old daughter, AAA. The
Information included aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior of strength and
dwelling. Estibal pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. During pre-trial, BBB, his wife
and mother of AAA, disclaimed any further interest to pursue the case. Her
reasons were that she pitied Estibal and according to her, AAA had already forgiven her
father. The trial court refused to entertain their desistance.
The prosecution presented witnesses: Dr. Baluyot who conducted the medicolegal
examination on AAA; Estudillo and Perlas, members of the Barangay Security Force,
who arrested Estibal; and PO3 Cobardo, an officer assigned at the PNP Women and
Children Protection Center of Taguity City. It was she who investigated the incident and
took down the sworn statement of AAA.
Several subpoenas were sent to the address of AAA and BB for the taking of their
testimonies, but they never appeared. It was reported that they had moved out of
their house.
The defense mainly denied the allegations: that Estibal could not have raped their
daughter; and that he and BBB used to fight about her brothers, whom Estibal now
suspected of influencing AAA to file the complaint for rape against him.
RTC considered the spontaneity of the declaration made by AAA as confirmed by
PO3 Cobardo as part of the res gestae, and convicted Estibal. It appears from the
sworn statement, executed by AAA before PO3 Cobardo, that she first revealed her
ordeal to her cousin DDD that same afternoon of February 5, 2009. With DDDs help,
BBB confronted her daughter AAA, who told her that Estibal did not only rape her that
morning, but had sexually abused her several times since she was in Grade III.
CA agreed with the RTC. It also said that the testimonies of the three prosecution
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
as proof of its contents has to be authenticated in the manner provided in the rules, that is, by
the person with personal knowledge of the facts stated in the document.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The award for the loss of earning capacity in the
amount of P2,316,000 granted by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 29, 2008 in CA-
G.R. CV No. 83309 in favor of respondents is hereby SET ASIDE. All the other monetary awards are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the
amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality of this Decision until full
payment thereof.
Issue: w/n res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule must be appreciated from the factual
circumstances of the case No!
A charge of rape by its very nature often must be resolved by giving primordial consideration to the
credibility of the victims testimony. Because conviction may rest solely thereon, the victims testimony
must be credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of
things, it must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, the victims credibility must be put
on trial as well. But if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in this case, then
the court must consider the adequacy of the circumstantial evidence established by the prosecution.
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the declarations must have
been voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence
of the transaction which they illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation. There are then three essential requisites to
admit evidence as part of the res gestae, namely:
1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; 2) the statements were made before the
declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
In People v. Dianos, the Court acknowledged that there are no hard and fast rules in determining the
spontaneity of a declaration, but at least five factors have been considered:
1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the
statement;
2) the place where the statement is made;
3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given;
4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative
thereto; and
5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.
 witnesses, PO3 Cobardo and the BSF members, form part of res gestae, although none of
them was a participant, victim or spectator to the crime.
The case was raised to the SC via automatic review (Estibal was sentenced with reclusion
perpetua).
15. Land Bank v. [Caveat: this case is soooo hard to understand. I did my best. I swear. L Also, I omitted parts of the
Onate ruling where evidence was not discussed. Focus on the exception to the hearsay rule]
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
By way of illustration:
In People v. Villarama, the 4-year-old rape victim did not testify, but the accused, an uncle of
the victim, was convicted on the basis of what the child told her mother;
In People v. Velasquez, the 2-year-old rape victim told her mother the following: a) Si Tatang
kakayan na ku pu. (Tatang has been doing something to me.); and b) I-tatang kasi,
kinayi ne puing pekpek ku kaya masakit ya. (Because Tatang has been doing something to
my private part, that is why it hurts.) The girl then showed her mother her private part,
which was swollen and oozing with pus, and then she gestured by slightly opening or raising
her right foot, and using her right finger, to show what the accused had done to it.
In People v. Moreno, shortly after the three accused left the house where the complaining
victims worked as maids, the maids told their employers, who had just arrived, that they had
been raped. The employers testified in court on these statements. The Court held that the
maids statements were part of res gestae since they were spontaneously made as soon as the
victims had opportunity to make them without threat to their lives.
ITC: AAAs statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as part of res gestae in view
of the missing element of spontaneity and the lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the
declarations which afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.
After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the courage to reveal to her mother her
heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her own father. Emboldened by her cousin DDDs moral
support, AAA told her mother that she had been hiding her dark secret since Grade III. But as soon as
BBB learned, events quickly took their logical course. With BBB now leading the way, BBB and AAA
sought the help of the barangay tanod that same day between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to have Estibal
arrested. At around 6:00 p.m., they were able to arrest him as he was coming home. Later that night,
AAA accompanied by BBB gave her statement to PO3 Cobardo of the PNP womens desk.
There is no doubt, however, that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about
the declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanod and later that night to the police. Her
statements were in fact a re-telling of what she had already confessed to her mother earlier that
afternoon; this time however, her story to the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious
pursuit of a newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally exposed and put
behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the authorities precisely because she was seeking their help
to punish the accused-appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-called res gestae
narrations, even as it is remarkable to note that while AAA was giving her said statements to the police,
her father was already being held in detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to
determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.
[Conclusion] The case falls under the hearsay rule; the exception of res gestae does not apply. A way to
cure this is to present the victim to the witness stand to afford the accused the opportunity to cross-
examine her. However, since AAA and BBB refused to go to court, the prosecution was not able to
give admissible evidence against the accused.
[As regards the forgiveness by AAA] Her pardon would not have worked the dismissal of the rape case
since it was given after the complaint was filed in court.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby ACQUITTED. His
immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful
cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to report to this Court the action
he has taken within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
ISSUE:
whether or not the entries in the passbook issued by Landbank in Oates trust account (express

Full Title: Land Bank of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Emmanuel Onate, respondent.
FACTS:
Land Bank is a government financial institution created under Republic Act No. 3844.
Oate opened and maintained seven trust accounts with Land Bank. Each trust
account was covered by an Investment Management Account (IMA) with Full
Discretion and has a corresponding passbook where deposits and withdrawals
were recorded. Oate appointed Landbank as his agent with full powers to hold,
invest and reinvest the fund.
In a letter, Land Bank demanded from Oate the return of P4 million it claimed
to have been inadvertently deposited to his Trust Account No. 01-125 as his
additional funds but actually represents the total amount of the checks issued to
Land Bank by its corporate borrowers as payment for their pre-terminated
loans. Oate refused. To settle the matter, a meeting was held, but the parties failed to
reach an agreement. Since then, the issue of miscrediting remained unsettled. Then,
Land Bank unilaterally applied the outstanding balance in all of Oates trust
accounts against his resulting indebtedness by reason of the miscrediting of
funds. Although it exhausted the funds in all of Oates trust accounts, Land Bank
was able to debit the amount of P1,528,583.48 only.
Land Bank filed a Complaint for Sum of Money seeking to recover the amount of
P8,222,687.89 plus interest at the legal rate of 12% per annum computed from May 15,
1992 until fully paid.
In Oates Answer (With Compulsory Counterclaim), he asserted that the set-off was
without legal and factual bases. He specifically denied any knowledge or involvement
in the transaction between Land Bank and its clients Philippine Virginia Tobacco
Administration (PVTA) and Philippine Virginia Tobacco Board (PVTB). He also
denied that he made fraudulent misrepresentation to induce the bank to deposit to his
Trust Account No. 01-125 as his additional capital the payments allegedly tendered by
the banks corporate borrowers. He maintained that all the funds in his accounts
came from legitimate sources and that he was totally unaware of and had
nothing to do with the alleged miscrediting. While Oate admitted having
received the demand letter, he argued that he did not acquiesce thereto and, in fact,
disputed the same during a meeting with an officer of Land Bank.
By way of compulsory counterclaim, Oate pointed out that per Balance Sheets, as of
June 30, 1982 the funds in his trust accounts already totaled P35,555,464.78. And as of
January 1993, the accumulated balance of his accounts reached P229,222,160.25 and
$3,472,683.94. Oate prayed that a judgment be issued dismissing the
Complaint filed by Landbank and order Landbank to pay him the amount
P229,222,160.25 and $3,472,683.94.
Upon Oates motion, RTC issued an Order creating a Board of Commissioners (the
Board) for the purpose of examining the records of Oates seven trust accounts, as
well as to determine the total amount of deposits, withdrawals, funds invested,
earnings, and expenses incurred. The Board issued a consolidated report. This
consolidated report revealed that there were undocumented and over withdrawals and
drawings from Oates trust accounts. On even date, the Board also submitted a
Manifestation informing the RTC that its findings as to the outstanding balance of
each trust account may not be accurate considering that it was not given ample
opportunity to collate and sort out the documents related to each trust account and
that there may have been double take up of accounts since the documents previously
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
trust) covered by an investment management agreement (IMA) with full discretion are sufficient to
meet the Rule on Presumption of Regularity of Entries in the Course of Business provided for
under section 43, rule 130 of the Rules of CourtNO!
Contention of Parties:
Landbank disputes the ruling of both lower courts that it failed to prove the fact of miscrediting
the amount of P4,086,888.89 to Onates Trust Account No. 01- 125 as the deposit slips pertaining
thereto were not presented. Citing Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, it asserts that the
entries in the passbooks must be accepted as proof of the regularity of the transactions
reflected in the trust accounts, including the miscrediting of P4,086,888.89, for they were
made in the regular course of business. In addition, said entries are supported by demand letters
and a Statement of Account. Land Bank avers that Oate never questioned the statements of account
and the reports it presented to him and, hence, he is deemed to have approved all of them.
Oate likewise asserts that Land Bank, as uniformly found by both lower courts, failed to prove by
preponderance of evidence the fact of miscrediting. As to the demand letters adverted to by Land
Bank, Oate asserts that the lower courts did not consider the same because they were not formally
offered. Land Bank also failed to present competent and sufficient evidence that he admitted his
indebtedness on account of the miscrediting of funds. Since Land Bank failed to prove the fact of
miscrediting it had no right to debit any amount from his accounts and must restore whatever
funds it had debited therefrom. Oate also denies having failed to seek the return of the funds
debited from his account. [!!!]Anent Land Banks invocation that the entries in the passbook made in
the ordinary course of business are presumed correct and regular, Oate argues that such
presumption does not relieve the trustee, Land Bank in this case, from presenting evidence
that the undocumented withdrawals and drawings were authorized. In any case, the
presumption invoked by Land Bank does not lie as one of its elements that the entrant must be
deceased or unable to testify is lacking. Land Bank cannot also excuse itself for failing to regularly
submit to him accounting reports as, anyway, he was free to inspect the records at any reasonable
day. Oate emphasizes that it is the duty of the bank to keep him updated with significant
developments in his accounts.
SC RULING:
1. The issues raised are factual and do not involve questions of law. Well-settled is the
rule that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45, only questions of law
can be raised. Here, Land Bank practically beseeches us to assess the probative weight of
the documentary evidence on record to resolve the same basic issues of (i) whether Land
Bank miscredited P4,086,888.89 to Trust Account No. 01-125 and (ii) whether x x x
the undocumented withdrawals and drawings are considered valid and regular and,
conversely, if in the negative, whether x x x such amounts shall be credited to the
accounts. These issues could be resolved by consulting the evidence extant on records,
such as the IMAs, the passbooks, the letters of instructions, withdrawal and deposit slips,
statements of account, and the Boards reports. Land Banks heavy reliance on Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court also attests to the factual nature of the issues involved in
this case.
2. [!!!] Land Bank failed to prove that the miscredited funds came from the
proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its corporate borrowers. Land Bank argues that the
entries in the passbooks were made in the regular course of business and should be accepted as prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. However, before entries made in the course of business
may qualify under the exception to the hearsay rule and given weight, the party offering them
must establish that:
a. The person who made those entries is dead, outside the country, or unable to testify;
b. The entries were made at, or near the time of the transaction to which they refer;
c. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated therein;
d. The entries were made in the professional capacity or in the course of duty of the entrant;
and,
 reviewed may have been considered again in subsequent reports.
In his Comment, Oate asserted that the undocumented withdrawals mentioned in the
consolidated report should not be considered as cash outflows. Rather, they should be
treated as unauthorized transactions and the amounts subject thereof must be credited
back to his accounts. On the other hand, Land Bank did not file any comment or
objection to the Boards consolidated comment.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed that they would submit the case for
decision based on the reports of the Board after they have submitted their respective
memoranda. After the parties filed their respective memoranda, the case was submitted
for decision.
RTC Ruling:
It dismissed Land Banks Complaint for its failure to establish that the
amount of P4M allegedly miscredited to Oates Trust Account No. 01-
125 actually came from the investments of PVTA and PVTB. Hence, the
RTC ordered Land Bank to restore the total amount of P1,471,416.52
which the bank unilaterally debited from Oates five trust accounts.
As to Oates counterclaim for the recovery of P220,999,472.36, as well as
the alleged US$3,472,683.94 balance of his dollar deposits in Trust Account
No. 01-014, RTC ruled that under the IMAs, Land Bank had the authority
to withdraw funds (as in fact it was at all times in possession of the
passbooks) from Oates accounts even without a letter of instruction or
withdrawal slip coming from Oate. It thus gave weight to the entries in
the passbooks since the same were made in the ordinary course of
business. The RTC also ruled that Oate is deemed to have approved the
entries in the statements of account that were sent to him as he never
interposed any objection thereto within the period given him to do so.
Landbank filed an MR but was denied by the same. Both parties appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling: denied Land Banks appeal and granted that of Onate.
CA affirmed RTCs ruling that Land Bank failed to establish the source of the funds it
claimed to have been erroneously credited to Oates account.
With respect to Oates appeal, CA agreed that he is entitled to the unaccounted
withdrawals which, as found by the Board, stood at P60,663,488.11 and $3,210,222.85.
The CAs ruling is anchored on the banks failure to observe Sections X401 and X425
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Manual of Regulation for Banks (MORB) requiring
it to give full disclosure of the services it offered and conduct its dealings with
transparency, as well as to render reports that would sufficiently apprise its clients of
the significant developments in the administration of their accounts.
Aside from allowing undocumented withdrawals, the CA likewise noted that Land
Bank failed to keep an accurate record and render an accounting of Oates accounts.
For the CA, the entries in the passbooks are not sufficient because they do not
specify where the funds withdrawn from Oates accounts were invested.
Landbank filed an MR but was denied. Hence, Landbank filed this instant petition for
review on certiorari.
16. Dela Liana v. DRA. LEILA A DELA LLANA, Petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
e. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
In this case, Land Bank has neither identified the persons who made the entries in the
passbooks nor established that they are already dead or unable to testify as required by
Section 43, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Also, and as correctly opined by the CA,
[w]hile the deposit entries in the banks passbook enjoy a certain degree of presumption
of regularity x x x, the same do not indicate or explain the source of the funds being
deposited or withdrawn from an individual account. They are mere prima facie proof of
what are stated therein the dates of the transactions, the amounts deposited or
withdrawn, and the outstanding balances. They do not establish that the total amount
of P4,086,888.89 deposited in Oates Trust Account No. 01-125 in November 1980
came from the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of Land Banks corporate
borrowers. It would be too presumptuous to immediately conclude that said amount
came from the checks paid to Land Bank by its corporate borrowers just because the
maturity dates of the loans coincided with the dates said total amount was deposited.
There must be proof showing an unbroken link between the proceeds of the pre-
terminated loans and the amount allegedly miscredited to Oates Trust
Account No. 01-125. As a bank and custodian of records, Land Bank could have easily
produced documents showing that its borrowers pre-terminated their loans, the checks
they issued as payment for such loans, and the deposit slips used in depositing those
checks. But it did not. It is worth emphasizing that in civil cases, the party making
the allegations has the burden of proving them by preponderance of evidence.
Mere allegation is not sufficient.
3. As a consequence of its failure to prove the source of the claimed miscredited
funds, Land Bank had no right to debit the total amount of P1,471,416.52 and must, therefore,
restore the same.
4. Land Bank was remiss in performing its duties under the IMAs and as a banking
institution.The contractual relation between Land Bank and Oate in this case is primarily governed
by the IMAs. Paragraph 4 thereof expressly imposed on Land Bank the duty to maintain accurate
records of all his investments, receipts, disbursements and other transactions relating to his accounts.
It also obliged Land Bank to provide Oate with quarterly balance sheets, statements of income and
expenses, summary of investments, etc. These are the obligations of Land Bank which it should have
faithfully complied with in good faith. Unfortunately, Land Bank failed in its contractual duties to
maintain accurate records of all investments and to regularly furnish Oate with financial statements
relating to his accounts. Had Land Bank kept an accurate record there would have been no need for
the creation of a Board of Commissioners or at least the latters work would have been a lot easier
and more accurate.
5. For [Landbanks] failure to faithfully comply with its obligations under the IMAs and for
having agreed to submit the case on the basis of the reports of the Board of Commissioners, the
latters findings are binding on Land Bank.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the December 18, 2009 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89346 is AFFIRMED with modification in that the interest of 12%
per annum, compounded annually, for the debited amount of P1,471,416.52 shall commence to run on
May 31, 2006, while the same rate of interest shall apply to the undocumented withdrawals in the
amounts of P60,663,488.11 and US$3,210,222.85 starting December 18, 2009. Beginning July 1, 2013,
however, the applicable rate of interest on all amounts awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6%
per annum, compounded yearly, until fully paid.
Whether Joels reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury -
Biong business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, Respondent.
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997 Toyota
Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at
the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the
car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the signal light turned red. A few
seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing gravel and sand suddenly rammed
the cars rear end, violently pushing the car forward. Due to the impact, the cars rear
end collapsed and its rear windshield was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra.
dela Llana. Apart from these minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have
suffered from any other visible physical injuries.
The traffic investigation report identified the truck driver as Joel Primero. It stated that
Joel was recklessly imprudent in driving the truck. Joel later revealed that his employer
was respondent Rebecca Biong, doing business under the name and style of "Pongkay
Trading" and was engaged in a gravel and sand business.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate pain on
the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense as days passed by.
Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated to the extent that she could no
longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000, she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a
rehabilitation medicine specialist, to examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she
suffered from a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve
running to her left arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to
alleviate her condition. Dra. dela Llanas condition did not improve despite three months
of extensive physical therapy.
She consulted 3 other doctors. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she
undergo a cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. Dr. Flores
operated on her spine and neck. The operation released the impingement of the nerve,
but incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June 2000
despite the surgery. Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay.
Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City (RTC). She claimed P150,000.00 for her medical expenses, average monthly income
of P30,000.00 since June 2000, actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as
attorneys fees.
Rebecca maintained that Dra. dela Llana had no cause of action against her as no
reasonable relation existed between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury.
She pointed out that Dra. dela Llanas illness became manifest one month and one week
from the date of the vehicular accident.
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel as a
hostile witness.
RTC: ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause of Dra. dela
Llanas whiplash injury to be Joels reckless driving. It pointed out that the massive
damage the car suffered only meant that the truck was over-speeding. It also concluded
that Joel was probably sleeping when the collision occurred as Joel had been driving for
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
NO. De la Llana failed to prove the connection.
Dra. dela Llana must first establish by preponderance of evidence the three elements of quasi-delict
before we determine Rebeccas liability as Joels employer. She should show the chain of causation
between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Only after she has laid this foundation can the
presumption - that Rebecca did not exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of Joel - arise. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. Thus, the burden of proving the
proximate causation between Joels negligence and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela
Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joels negligence, in its natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and
without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
Notably, Dra. dela Llana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
(1) the pictures of her damaged car,
(2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
(3) her testimonial evidence.
However, none of these pieces of evidence show the causal relation between the vehicular
accident and the whiplash injury. In other words, Dra. dela Llana, during trial, did not adduce
the factum probans or the evidentiary facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate
fact can be established, as fully discussed below.
1. The pictures of the damaged car only demonstrate the impact of the collision. It is a far-fetched
assumption that the whiplash injury can also be inferred from these pictures.
2. The medical certificate cannot be considered because it was not admitted in evidence by the
RTC in its order.
However, even if we consider the medical certificate in the disposition of this case, the medical
certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but
on the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand.
Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in very unusual
circumstance that is not found in the present case. Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not
be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to
convince and persuade.
ITC: It was Dr. Milla who had personal knowledge of the contents of the medical certificate. However,
she was not presented to testify in court and was not even able to identify and affirm the contents of
the medical certificate. Furthermore, Rebecca was deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine Dr.
Milla on the accuracy and veracity of her findings. We also point out in this respect that the medical
certificate nonetheless did not explain the chain of causation in fact between Joels reckless driving and
Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury. It did not categorically state that the whiplash injury was a result of
the vehicular accident. A perusal of the medical certificate shows that it only attested to her medical
condition, i.e., that she was suffering from whiplash injury. However, the medical certificate failed to
substantially relate the vehicular accident to Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury. Rather, the medical
certificate only chronicled her medical history and physical examinations.
3. Dra. dela Llanas opinion that Joels negligence caused her whiplash injury has no probative
value.
Dra. De la Llana merely testified as an ordinary witness.
Despite the fact that Dra. dela Llana is a physician and even assuming that she is an expert in
 fifteen hours on that fateful day. Rebecca was vicariously liable because she was the
employer and she personally chose him to drive the truck.
CA: reversed the RTC. It noted that the interval between the date of the collision and
the date when Dra. dela Llana began to suffer the symptoms of her illness was lengthy. It
observed that Dra. dela Llana did not immediately visit a hospital to check if she
sustained internal injuries after the accident. Moreover, her failure to present expert
witnesses was fatal to her claim. It also gave no weight to the medical certificate. The
medical certificate did not explain how and why the vehicular accident caused the injury.
De la Llanas petition [important]:
As opposed to the respondents in Nutrimix, Dra. dela Llana asserts that she has
established by preponderance of evidence that Joels egligent act was the proximate
cause of her whiplash injury. First, pictures of her damaged car show that the collision
was strong. She posits that it can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the
massive impact resulted in her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in
the medical certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her
testimony that the vehicular accident caused the injury is credible because she was a
surgeon.
Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has probative value.
She points out that expert opinion is unnecessary if the opinion merely relates to matters
of common knowledge. She maintains that a judge is qualified as an expert to determine
the causation between Joels reckless driving and her whiplash injury. Trial judges are
aware of the fact that whiplash injuries are common in vehicular collisions.
17. Kummer v. LETICIA I. KUMMER, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
People PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
Petitioner and her co- accused (her son) Freiderich Johan I. Kummer guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide
On June 19, 1988, between 9:00 and 10:00 p.m., Jesus Mallo, Jr., accompanied by Amiel
Malana, went to the house of the petitioner. Mallo knocked at the front door with a
stone and identified himself by saying, Auntie, ako si Boy Mallo.
Petitioner opened the door and at this point, her son and co-accused, Johan, using his
left hand, shot Mallo twice using a gun about six (6) inches long.[3] Malana, who was
with Mallo and who witnessed the shooting, immediately ran towards the west, followed
by Mallo. When Malana turned his back, he saw the petitioner leveling and firing her
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
neurology, we cannot give weight to her opinion that Joels reckless driving caused her whiplash injury
without violating the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an ordinary witness and an expert
witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness may be received in evidence regarding:
(a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may
also testify on his impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a person.
On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence on a matter requiring
special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he shown to possess.
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted expert testimony, much
less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting special knowledge. The reason is that the probative
value of an expert testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the expert's opinion. Rather, its
weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts by demonstrating the facts
which serve as a basis for his opinion and the reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.
ITC: Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given probative value for the reason that she was not
presented as an expert witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the nature,
and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during
trial, nonetheless did not provide a medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of
whiplash injury in her testimony.
4. The Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause whiplash
injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge, or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of
medicine. Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the parties
pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated February 11, 2008 and Resolution
dated March 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the RTCs decision convicting
her of the crime of homicide. NO (accused is guilty)
Variance between the eyewitnesses testimonies in open court and their affidavits does not affect
their credibility
Alleged inconsistencies between the affidavit of prosecutions witnesses and their direct testimonies in
open court:
- in the affidavit, he stated that after hearing two gunshots, he dived to the ground for cover and heard
another shot louder than the first two. This is inconsistent with his declaration during the direct
examination that he saw the petitioner and Johan fire their guns at Mallo.
-in the affidavit, Malana declared that he ran away as he felt the door being opened and heard two
shots, while in his testimony in court, he stated that he ran away after Mallo was already hit.
[DOCTRINE] The Court has consistently held that inconsistencies between the testimony of a
witness in open court, on one hand, and the statements in his sworn affidavit, on the other
long gun at Mallo, hitting the latters back and causing him to fall flat on the ground.
Petitioner went inside the house and came out with a flashlight. Together with her co-
accused, she scoured the pathway up to the place where Mallo was lying flat. At that
point, the petitioner uttered, Johan, patay na, in a loud voice. The petitioner and her
co-accused put down the guns and the flashlight they were holding, held Mallos feet and
pulled him to about three (3) to four (4) meters away from the house.
The prosecution filed an Information for homicide against the petitioner and Johan.
Both accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. They waived
the pre-trial, and the trial on the merits accordingly followed. (will no longer include
defenses version of facts)
RTC: found accused GUILTY. The prosecutions evidence is persuasive based on the
testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses Ramon Cuntapay and Malana who both testified
that the petitioner shot Mallo. The testimonial evidence, coupled by the positive findings
of gunpowder nitrates on the left hand of Johan and on the petitioners right hand, as
well as the corroborative testimony of the other prosecution witnesses, led the RTC to
find both the petitioner and Johan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Johan, still a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, was released on the
recognizance of his father, Moises Kummer. Johan subsequently left the country without
notifying the court; hence, only the petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction with
the CA.
Petitioners assignment of errors: RTC committed reversible errors:
- in giving credence to the testimonial evidence of Cuntapay and of Malana despite the
discrepancies between their sworn statements and direct testimonies
- in not considering the failure of the prosecution to cite the petitioners motive in killing
the victim
- in failing to consider that the writer of the decision, Judge Lyliha L. Abella-Aquino, was
not the judge who heard the testimonies
- in considering the paraffin test results finding the petitioner positive for gunpowder
residue.
CA: AFFIRMED the RTC. The discrepancies between the sworn statement and the
direct testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily discredit them because the
contradictions are minimal and reconcilable. The CA also ruled that the inconsistencies
are minor lapses and are therefore not substantial. The petitioners positive identification
by the eyewitnesses as one of the assailants remained unrefuted. Proof of motive is only
necessary when a serious doubt arises on the identity of the accused. That the writer of
the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies of the witnesses does not
necessarily make the decision erroneous.
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Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
hand, referring only to minor and collateral matters, do not affect his credibility and the
veracity and weight of his testimony as they do not touch upon the commission of the crime
itself. Slight contradictions, in fact, even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as these
may be considered as badges of truth rather than indicia of bad faith; they tend to prove that their
testimonies have not been rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual,
for no person has perfect faculties of senses or recall.
It is oft repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is
incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarants testimony in court. Worse, the
process of affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiants mouth, thus
allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context.
The discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the
witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. As
between the joint affidavit and the testimony given in open court, the latter prevails because affidavits
taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in court.
ITC: We find it undeniable that Malana and Cuntapay positively identified the petitioner as one of the
assailants. This is the critical point, not the inconsistencies that the petitioner repeatedly refers to,
which carry no direct bearing on the crucial issue of the identity of the perpetrator of the crime.
It is not necessary for the validity of the judgment that it be rendered by the judge who heard the
case
In fact, it is not necessary for the validity of a judgment that the judge who penned the decision should
actually hear the case in its entirety, for he can merely rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken
during the trial as the basis for his decision. It is sufficient that the judge, in deciding the case, must
base her ruling completely on the records before her, in the way that appellate courts do when they
review the evidence of the case raised on appeal.
Motive is irrelevant when the accused has been positively identified by an eyewitness
Motive gains importance only when the identity of the assailant is in doubt. As held in a long line of
cases, the prosecution does not need to prove the motive of the accused when the latter has been
identified as the author of the crime.
It is a matter of judicial knowledge that persons have been killed for no apparent reason at all, and that
friendship or even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime.
ITC: That Malana and Cuntapay have been eyewitnesses to the crime remains unrefuted. They both
confirmed in their direct testimony before the RTC that they saw the petitioner fire a gun at Mallo.
This was again re-affirmed by the witnesses during their cross examination. The fact that their
respective affidavits merely stated that they heard the gunshots does not automatically foreclose the
possibility that they also saw the actual shooting as this was in fact what the witnesses claimed truly
happened. Besides, it has been held that the claim that whenever a witness discloses in his testimony
in court facts which he failed to state in his affidavit taken ante litem motam, then an inconsistency exists
between the testimony and the affidavit is erroneous. If what were stated in open court are but details
or additional facts that serve to supplement the declarations made in the affidavit, these statements
cannot be ruled out as inconsistent and may be considered by the court.
There is no absolute uniformity nor a fixed standard form of human behavior
Petitioner alleged the ff:
- it was abnormal and contrary to the ways of the farmers in the rural areas for Cuntapay to go home
from his corral at about 9:00 p.m., while everybody else goes home from his farm much earlier, as
working late in the farm (that is, before and after sunset) is taboo to farming
- the act of the petitioner of putting down her gun in order to pull the victim away does not make any
sense because a criminal would not simply part with his weapon in this manner
- highly incredible that Malana, who accompanied Mallo, was left unharmed and was allowed to escape
- unbelievable that when Malana heard the cocking of guns and the opening of the door, he did not
become scared at all
- Malana and Cuntapay did not immediately report the incident to the authorities
- highly improbable for Malana to turn his head while running
- it was unusual that Cuntapay did not run away when he saw the shooting.
 Court: Human nature suggests that people may react differently when confronted with a given
situation. Witnesses to a crime cannot be expected to demonstrate an absolute uniformity and
conformity in action and reaction. People may act contrary to the accepted norm, react differently and
act contrary to the expectation of mankind. There is no standard human behavioral response when one
is
confronted with an unusual, strange, startling or frightful experience.
Public documents are admissible in court without further proof of their due execution and
authenticity
Applicable Rule: Rule 132, Sec. 19
SEC. 19. Classes of Documents. For the purpose of their presentation [in] evidence,
documents are either public or private.

Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign
country;

xxx

The chemistry report showing a positive result of the paraffin test is a public document. As a public
document, the rule on authentication does not apply. It is admissible in evidence without further proof
of its due execution and genuineness; the person who made the report need not be presented in court
to identify, describe and testify how the report was conducted. Moreover, documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence
of the facts stated therein.
ITC: Notwithstanding the fact that it was Captain Benjamin Rubio who was presented in court to
identify the chemistry report and not the forensic chemist who actually conducted the paraffin test on
the petitioner, the report may still be admitted because the requirement for authentication does not
apply to public documents. Furthermore, the entries in the chemistry report are prima facie evidence
of the facts they state, that is, of the presence of gunpowder residue on the left hand of Johan and on
the right hand of the petitioner.
On the issue of the normal process versus the actual process conducted during the test (di sinabi kung
ano)
In the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that the forensic chemist who conducted
the report observed the regular procedure. Stated otherwise, the courts will not presume irregularity
or negligence in the performance of ones duties unless facts are shown dictating a contrary conclusion.
The presumption of regularity in favor of the forensic chemist compels us to reject the petitioners
contention that an explanation has to be given on how the actual process was conducted. Since the
petitioner presented no evidence of fabrication or irregularity, we presume that the standard operating
procedure has been observed.
While the positive finding of gunpowder residue does not conclusively show that the petitioner indeed
fired a gun, the finding nevertheless serves to corroborate the prosecution eyewitnesses testimony that
the petitioner shot the victim.
Change in the date of the commission of the crime, where the disparity is not great, is merely a
formal amendment, thus, no arraignment is required
Applicable Rule: Rule 110, Section 14
A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of time is not great,
is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would not prejudice the rights of the accused
since the proposed amendment would not alter the nature of the offense.
Therefore, a new arraignment is no longer necessary.
ITC: The amendment in the complaint was from July 19, 1988 to June 19, 1988, or a difference of

Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue

Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)

18. Rioso v. AQUILES RIOSA, Petitioner, vs. TABACO LA SUERTE CORPORATION,
Tobacco La Respondent.
Suerte Aquiles Riosa (Aquiles) filed his Complaint for Annulment/Declaration of Nullity of
Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title, Reconveyance and Damages
against respondent Tabaco La Suerte Corporation (La Suerte) before the RTC. Aquiles
alleged, among others, that he was the owner and in actual possession of the subject
land; that subsequently, on 3 occasions, he loaned from Sia Ko Pio a total of P50k; that
he signed a document purportedly a receipt for the P50k loan that without reading the
document; and that in 2001, to his surprise, he received a letter from La Suerte
informing him that the subject lot was already registered in its name. Aquiles claimed
that by means of fraud, misrepresentation and deceit employed by Sia Ko Pio, he was
made to sign the document which he thought was a receipt and undertaking to pay a
P50k loan, only to find out later that it was a document of sale.
In its Answer, La Suerte averred that it was the actual and lawful owner of the
commercial property, after purchasing it from Aquiles in 1990; that it allowed Aquiles to
remain in possession of the property to avoid the ire of his father from whom he had
acquired property inter vivos, subject to his obligation to vacate the premises anytime
upon demand.
RTC: Ruled in favor of Aquiles. The RTC gave credence to the testimony of Aquiles
that he was made to sign an instrument of sale without his knowledge because he trusted
Sia Ko Pio and he was of the belief that what he had signed was merely an instrument of
indebtedness. Thus, according to the RTC, La Suerte was bound to reconvey to Aquiles
the subject property.
With its MR denied, La Suerte appealed to the CA.
CA: Reversed the RTC decision and upheld the validity of the subject deed of sale in
favor of La Suerte. The CA held that tax declarations or realty tax payments by Aquiles
were not conclusive evidence of ownership, citing Spouses Camara v. Spouses Malabao,
where it was ruled that a partys declaration of real property and his payment of realty
taxes could not defeat a certificate of title which was an absolute and indefeasible
evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person whose name appeared
thereon.
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to the SC.
Aquiles argues that there was no perfected contract to sell because (1) there was no
transaction between La Suerte and Aquiles for the sale of the property in question; (2)
there was no board resolution authorizing Sia Ko Pio to purchase the property; (3) there
was no evidence that the money received by Aquiles from Sia Ko Pio came from La
Suerte; and (4) he did not appear before the notary public for notarization of the
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
only one month.
It is clear that consistent with the rule on amendments and the jurisprudence cited above, the change in
the date of the commission of the crime of homicide is a formal amendment - it does not change the
nature of the crime, does not affect the essence of the offense nor deprive the accused of an
opportunity to meet the new averment, and is not prejudicial to the accused. Further, the defense under
the complaint is still available after the amendment, as this was, in fact, the same line of defenses used
by the petitioner. This is also true with respect to the pieces of evidence presented by the petitioner.
The effected amendment was of this nature and did not need a second plea.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated April 28, 2006, convicting the
petitioner of the crime of homicide, is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Leticia I.
Kummer.
W/N there was a perfected and valid contract of sale for the subject property between Aquiles
and La Suerte, through its CEO, Sia Ko Pio. NO!
The Court agrees with the finding of the RTC that there was no perfected contract of sale. It is a
hornbook doctrine that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and
should not be disturbed except for strong and valid reasons, because the trial court is in a better
position to examine the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
ITC: There was no clear and convincing evidence that Aquiles definitely sold the subject property to
La Suerte, nor was there evidence that La Suerte authorized Sia Ko Pio to negotiate and conclude a
purchase of the property. Aquiles narration in open court is clear that he did not intend to transfer
ownership of his property.
The testimony of Aquiles during trial negates any intention on his part to sell the property in exchange
for the amounts borrowed. Evidently, it was a series of loan transactions between Aquiles and Sia Po
Ko, but not between the parties. It was not a sale between Aquiles, as vendor, and La Suerte, as vendee.
There was no agreement between the parties. Thus, there was no contract of sale.
As to La Suertes contention that a deed of absolute sale was purportedly executed by Aquiles in its
favor, it failed to adduce convincing evidence to effectively rebut his consistent claim that he was not
aware that what he had signed was already an instrument of sale, considering his trust and confidence
on Sia Ko Pio who was his longtime friend and former employer.
The fact that the alleged deed of sale indubitably bore Aquiles signature deserves no evidentiary value
there being no consent from him to part with his property. Had he known that the document
presented to him was an instrument of sale, he would not have affixed his signature on the document.
It has been held that the existence of a signed document purporting to be a contract of sale does
not preclude a finding that the contract is invalid when the evidence shows that there was no
meeting of the minds between the seller and buyer.
Indeed, if Aquiles sold the property in favor of La Suerte, he would not have religiously and
continuously paid the real property taxes. Also of note is the fact that his daughter spent 300k for the
renovation of improvements. More important, La Suerte did not earlier ask him to transfer the
possession thereof to the company. These uncontroverted attendant circumstances bolster Aquiles
positive testimony that he did not sell the property.
!!! The CA also failed to consider the glaring material discrepancies on the dates appearing in
the purported deed of absolute sale notarized by Judge Arsenio Base.
The document was dated 1999, but the date in the acknowledgment and notarial reference was
an earlier date, 1990. The exoficio notary public, Judge Base, was not presented to explain the
apparent material discrepancy of the dates appearing on the questioned document. This only
confirms the claim of Aquiles that he signed the receipt representing his loan at the bodega of
instrument of sale. Moreover, there was a discrepancy in the date appearing in the
deed of sale and the date in the acknowledgment and the notarial reference.
La Suerte countered that the notarized deed of sale was the very evidence of the
agreement between them. According to it, said deed of sale was binding and
enforceable between them, albeit there was a discrepancy in the dates, for the
timehonored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale of real estate produces
legal effect between the parties.
Lim Miranda Rivera Santos Yogue
Remedial Law Review 2017 (Atty. Tranquil Salvador)
Sia Ko Pio sometime in 1990, and not at the office of Judge Base in 1999.
It is worthy to stress that a notarial document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal
manner therein expressed and has in its favor the presumption of regularity. While it is true
that an error in the notarial inscription does not generally invalidate a sale, if indeed it took
place, the same error can only mean that the document cannot be treated as a notarial
document and thus, not entitled to the presumption of regularity. The document would be
taken out of the realm of public documents whose genuineness and due execution need not be
proved.
An even more substantial irregularity pertains to the capacity of the notary public, Judge Base,
to notarize the deed of sale. Judge Base, who acted as exoficio notary public, is not allowed
under the law to notarize documents not connected with the exercise of his official duties.
Moreover, Aquiles wife, Erlinda, who appeared to have affixed her signature as a witness to the
purported document of sale, categorically stated that she never signed such an instrument and never
appeared before a notary public.
Although it is true that the absence of notarization of the deed of sale would not invalidate the
transaction evidenced therein, yet an irregular notarization reduces the evidentiary value of a
document to that of a private : document, which requires proof of its due execution and
authenticity to be admissible as evidence.
In fine, considering the irregularities or defects in the execution and notarization of the deed of sale,
the Court finds itself unable to stamp its seal of approval on it. The RTC was correct in ordering its
annulment.