SGL IMS Document

Document Title: SGL Integrity Management system Issue Date: October -16.
Document No: SGL/AI/IMS/001 Issue no. 1.0
Title of Document SGL Integrity Management System (IMS)
Document Number SGL/AI/IMS/001
Issue Number 1 . 0
Name: Ram Bahadur Singh Tomar

Authored By
Designation: Chief General Manager Sign:
Name:
Approved By
Designation: Senior Engineer Sign:
Yes ----- ------
Circulation / Access
General Confidential Highly Confidential
Date of Issue August, 2016
Custodian HOD (HSE & AI)
Authored By Approved By Custodian
Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

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1.0 Title & commencement.
The Coverage in this SGL Integrity Management System manual is in line with the
regulations titled as Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (Integrity
Management System for City or Local Natural Gas Distribution Networks) Regulations,
2013.
These regulations are in force since the date of their Publication in the official Gazette
i.e 16th May, 2013 (Date of Notification)
2.0 Definitions
All definitions as per PNGRB IMS regulations, 2013 (clause 2.) are followed by SGL in
the context of IMS documentation & nomenclature.
3.0 Applicability
This regulation is applicable to SGL being in the business of City Gas Distribution of
Piped Natural Gas (PNG) & Compressed Natural Gas (CNG).
4.0 Scope
This IMS document covers scope from CGS outlet up to gas appliance for domestic
consumers including,
City Gate Station (CGS)

Primary network (42 bar steel pipeline)
Secondary network (4bar Polyethylene pipeline)
Tertiary network (GI/ Cu pipeline)
Meter for Industrial / commercial customer
Appliance valve including connecting hose for domestic consumer.
5.0 Objective
To manage the integrity aspects of gas handling physical assets (eg pipelines, valves,
DRSs, CNG stations etc) i.e. assessing their reliability, performance and associated
risks along the whole life cycle, right from the design through construction, operation &
maintenance so as to ensure that the entire gas distribution system delivers optimum
performance, reliability and safety as originally intended.
Managing the integrity of gas pipeline and associated equipments is the primary goal
of SGL. SGL wants to continue providing safe and reliable delivery of natural gas to
their customers without adverse effects on employees, the public, the customers or the
environment. The intent of this document is to enable personnel with concise
information to undertake appropriate actions to develop Integrity Management System
(IMS) through:

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- Evaluating risk associated with CGD network and effectively allocating

resources for prevention, detection and mitigation activities.
- Improving safety of CGD network so as to protect the personnel, property, public
and environment.
- Effective operation to minimize the probability of network failure
This document explains process to assess and mitigate risk in order to reduce both the
likelihood and consequence of incident.
This document has been evolved to specifically to serve as a bridging document to

address all requirements as per PNGRB by cross referring to relevant SGL
documents / systems / practices / equipment etc. containing the required information.
This document needs to be read in conjunction with the PNGRB (Integrity
Management System for City or Local Natural Gas Distribution Networks), 2013.
6.0 Policy and Goals
The policy of integrity management is consistent with corporate HSE & Quality policy
of the company, laying emphasis on safety, environment & customers. The Asset
Integrity policy of SGL in regard to Integrity management program is stated as under:
We in SANWARIYA GAS LIMITED are committed to ensure that our Gas Supply
Assets are designed, constructed, operated & maintained to deliver optimum
performance, reliability and safety throughout their working life.
This will be achieved by;
The application of the national and International codes & standards.

The use of industry best practices
Utilisation of effective techniques and systems to prevent failures by; identifying
hazards, potential consequential & undertake the necessary mitigation actions.
Ensuring all personnel required to work on the network are trained &
competent.
Monitor performance, review and amend as required to achieve this goal
Involvement of all stakeholders.
This endeavour shall be supported by the provision of all the necessary resources.
7.0 Integrity management system
The development and implementation of integrity management system for the city gas
distribution network has been described in Schedule 1 to 10 of this manual.

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8.0 Schedule 1 Objective
The objective of IMS is to have in place a formal written document to set, understand
and implement various systems, processes & techniques to be followed to carry out
integrity management on gas pipeline network and to upkeep its safe operation to
protect public, environment, maximize availability and also minimizing business risk in
compliance with the requirements laid down vide PNGRB regulation.
Failure to provide and exercise adequate controls and procedures in relation to the
operation and maintenance of gas pipelines and transmission and distribution facilities
carry the latent potential to cause breakdowns and potential incidents impacting health,
safety and security of the work force and the public, the environment, property,
production, undue costs and reputation.
The unplanned release of large volumes of gas at high pressure in a city like Mathura
could result in high impact incidents. These risks shall be mitigated by ensuring that
appropriate standards are used in the design, construction, operation and maintenance
of pipelines and systems, that work is undertaken by suitably qualified and competent
personnel, and that there are adequate quality assurance arrangements in place. To
further mitigate these risks it is essential that the general public, residents in the vicinity
of gas pipelines and distribution systems and all gas consumers are made aware of
the odour of the gas supplied, the procedures to be followed in the event of leakage,
and that appropriate assurance measures are taken to ensure that the integrity of the
pipeline and system is maintained.
In view of above, the objectives & strategies have been evolved on the following lines:
To have systems in place to assess the level of risk of each component / equipment
of the gas supply system.
To have controls in place which manage the risk to an insignificant level or As Low
As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
To anticipate major failures and the preventive action required
To continually improve the quality of the information of the gas supply system and
facilitate access to the interested parties;
To monitor the Damage Prevention activities & interaction with the external entities;
To keep the Emergency Response Plan updated along with all the resource,
material & communication requirements;
To have an assurance that all the employees of SGL and its contracted parties are
competent to execute the activities, by means of relevant trainings;
To have an effective management of change process in place.

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9.0 Schedule 2 Introduction to the SGL Integrity Management System (IMS)
Pipeline Integrity Management system covers all the activities right from construction
through commissioning and operation up to the design life of assets. Quality control
measures are taken to ensure that installation is as per the designed specifications.
After the pipeline system is commissioned, all critical activities directly or indirectly
affecting the integrity of pipeline is continuously monitored through preventive
inspection schedules and remedial measures taken accordingly. To achieve pipeline
integrity five basic elements are introduced in Pipeline integrity management program.
These elements are:-
1) Integrity Management Plan

2) Performance Plan
3) Communications Plan
4) Management of change Plan
5) Quality control Plan

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10.0 Schedule 3 Description of SGL City Gas Distribution (CGD) System
A) Physical Description - Description of the principal elements of the SGLs CGD

system which constitute the gas distribution network from the receiving the Natural
Gas supplies at City Gate Stations up to the delivery points at the customers end is
given below;
10.1 Sub transmission pipeline SGL does not own sub transmission pipeline.
10.2 City Gate station (CGS)

At present SGL receives gas at a single location. It is the custody transfer points
between SGL and its transporter GAIL Ltd. At CGSs the Pressure regulation,
filtration & Odorisation activities are carried out before dispatching Natural Gas into the
SGL network at 42 bar pressure.
Figure below represents the SGL Gas Supply chain
City Gate Station CNG Station DRS

4 Bar PE Network
21 mbar CU Network 100 mbar PE Network
Customer Kitchen GI Installation Service Regulator
The following activities are carried out by at the City Gate Station: gas filtration,
metering, pressure regulation & Odorisation. Accordingly the CGS facility comprises of:
filters, knock out drums, pressure regulators, safety valves, Gas flow meters, control
instrumentation and odorizing system.
The filtration is done with the objective of eliminating dust and solid matter from the
gas received, metering is to measure the quantity of gas received from the suppliers,

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Pressure regulation ensures a steady downstream pressure while Odorisation imparts

the characteristic smell to the gas so as to make it detectable to human nose in case of
a leakage. Ethyl Mercaptan is used for Odorisation normally in a dosage of 15 to 30
PPM.
City Gate Station has been designed based on international standards and with a
provision of twin stream system for supply reliability
10.3 Odorizing System
The odorization system comprises of a storage tank, a dosing pump with pneumatic
action, a reserve pump, instrumentation, filters, tubing & fittings etc. All this equipment
is installed and operated in a self-carrying Skid Mounted compact unit so as to
facilitate its installation, operation & maintenance.
Salient features of odorising unit are as follow.

Odorizing injection rate, 13 to 15 ppm
2 pumps ( in auto mode, 1 in manual)
Two Odorant storage tanks (200 & 500 litre)
Inlet / Outlet and Drain valves.
Visual level indicator
Y strainer at the outlet
Level Transmitter : Indicates 0 to 100% of tank Level
PLC programming
Current SGL Flow signal
A Pressure switch to give alarm for excess pressure
A pressure relief valve for excess pressure

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Odorant storage tank Odorant filling mechanism (SBC)
Small bulk container method (SBC) has been adopted so that the odorant is procured,
transported and unloaded directly into the odorant tank. With this initiative, need for
storage of Ethyl Mercaptan in barrels and disposal of empty barrels (a hazardous
activity) & a hazardous waste has been eliminated.
10.4 Steel pipeline network

The basic steel grid pipeline network is laid for transporting & distributing Gas from the
CGS to various points of consumption like DRS, MRS and CNG compressors. The
steel network pipelines are built in carbon steel and normally operate at 42 bar
pressure. In most of the cases the 42 bar pressure of the trunk lines is too high for
direct customer usage thereby necessitating the facility of Pressure Regulation through
District Regulating Stations, to reduce & regulate the pressure to 4 bar to supply into
the medium pressure networks. Whereas in case of major industries and CNG
stations, direct gas supply from 42 bar network is provided. The steel grid network
along with isolation valve assemblies and above ground installations like DRS, MRS
are constructed in conformance to the PNGRB / ASME B31.8 and relevant IGE
standards.
Steel pipelines of different sizes are varying from diameter 4 to 18. Steel pipes
of size 4 to 12 conform to API 5L Grade B while pipe size 18 conforms to API
5L X-52. Pipe thickness is as follows - 4 NB : 6.4 mm, 6 NB : 7.1 mm, 8 NB :
8.18 mm, 12 NB : 9.52 mm, 18 NB : 10.30 mm. These are laid underground with a

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top cover generally in excess of 1.0 meter. Where this depth of cover can not be
achieved deviations are approved through the SGL Management of Change (MoC)
procedure (Refer document SGL/SCO/002).
Route markers have been installed at regular intervals along the entire pipeline route
and are distinctly marked with pipeline warning, emergency contact telephone number
information etc.
SGL has adopted one of the best passive corrosion protection systems by applying
three layers PE coating on the steel pipeline and heat shrinkable PE sleeves on the
weld joints and fittings like bends.
To supplement the passive corrosion protection system, SGL has installed active
cathodic protection using the temporary and permanent system at various
stages. Impressed Current Cathodic Protection (ICCP) system takes care of
complete underground carbon steel pipeline network. A total of 2 nos. of
Transformer Rectifier Units are utilised for the purpose installed at appropriate
locations. The CP effectiveness is monitored through a series of Test Lead
points (TLPs), totalling to in excess of 37 of them, at an interval of 500 metre
across the entire steel pipeline. The inspection of materials, pipeline laying
activities and testing of pipeline is carried out by reputed Third Party Inspection
agencies appointed by SGL
10.5 Secondary PE networks (Medium pressure PE network)
The Medium Pressure PE Distribution Network starts from downstream Isolation valve
of District Regulating Stations. The Local Distribution Network is constructed of Poly
-ethylene pipes varying from diameter 20 mm to 180 mm. These pipes are made of PE
80 & PE 100 material with SDR as 11. The network has been designed as per
IGE/TD/3 (Institution of Gas Engineers UK - Transmission and Distribution
requirement) and is operated at a maximum pressure of 4 bar. The Potential Gas
Supply area, which is fed by a DRS is called as a DRS area. Each DRS caters for to
specific load of Domestic, Commercial and Industrial customers in the respective DRS
area. The DRSs are looped to each other to provide reliability & continuity of supply.
The pressure is reduced from 42 bar to 4 bar (g) at the DRS from where the gas is fed
into the PE network. The 4 bar PE system is called as Medium Pressure (MP) Network
& is made up of Medium Density Poly Ethylene (MDPE) pipe.

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PE network utilises lengths of MDPE pipes which are supplied either in coils or straight
lengths (depending upon dia); electro fusion process conforming to Standards BG/PL-
2 Part 4 / ISO 8085 Part-iii / EN 1555Part-IV is employed for jointing of these pipes
which ensures 100% leak proof joints. Tapping Tees are utilised for drawing fresh
branches out of the Live PE network without affecting the Gas supply. Both the electro
fusion & Online Tapping procedures can be done within a very short period with
adequate safety & ease. PE has strong advantages for usage as under ground
network, some of which are listed below.
- Resistant to corrosion - Easily repairable

- Squeezable - Flexible
- Easy handling - Easily identifiable
- High life period (Design life 50 years) - Low cost
10.6 Tertiary networks Low pressure PE, GI and Copper

Service Regulators (SRs) & Metering and Regulating Stations (MRSs) are installed at
appropriate locations within respective customers premises. The SR regulates the
pressure from 4 Bar to 100 Mbar, which is further distributed through smaller dia PE
pipes i.e. size of 20, 32, 63 mm forming the LP network, while an MRS feeds an
Industrial/commercial customer at the required pressure, normally about 500mbar. The
MRS & SR too have UPSO, OPSO & pressure relief safety devices.
Galvanised Iron (GI) pipes are installed on the external walls of the building with an
entry into every registered customers kitchen in the building. Once inside the kitchen
the pressure is further reduced to 21mbar by another regulator, known as the Meter
Regulator. The meter is installed to measure the gas consumption for each customer.
The pipe work inside the domestic kitchen is that of Copper pipe of dia. 12mm/15mm.
Two valves - Meter Control Valve (MCV) and Appliance Valve (AV) are installed inside
kitchen at the entry as well as at the end point of the piping so as to further enhance
control & safety.
10.7 District Regulating Station

SGL has District Regulating Stations whose function is to reduce and regulate the
pressure of gas supplied from the steel grid network into the Medium pressure PE
network at 4bar. A DRS also filters any impurities such as dust that may be present in
the gas. The principal components of a typical DRS are described as follows:

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a) Inlet isolation: The inlet section to DRS comprises insulation joint & an isolation
valve. The inlet thereafter bifurcates into two separate streams each provided with inlet
as well outlet isolations.
b) Filtration: The filtration of incoming gas is through the filter of a rating adequate for
the types of equipment installed downstream such as pressure regulators, relief
valves, slams etc.
c) Slam Shut-off: Upstream of the pressure regulator is fitted the Over pressure shut
off (OPSO) valves with the aim of shutting of the Gas flow in the event the outlet
pressure exceeds the set values. OPSO protects the facilities & equipment
downstream of the DRS. DRS is also fitted with Under pressure slam shut off (UPSO)
valves to protect the system in case the pressure drops to extremely low values (lower
than the predefined values i.e outside the safe operating envelope)
d) Pressure Regulating: Two pressure regulators are installed in series forming the
Monitor & Active configuration with the one taking over the other in case of
malfunction. This system ensures uninterrupted supply of Gas by automatic switching
between the two regulators in the event of the Active suffering a malfunction. The
models & ratings of both the regulators are the same with only a required variation in
their pressure settings.
e) Safety Relieving: A Safety Relief Valve is installed Downstream of the regulator for
relieving of excess pressure build ups caused by the such things as the regulator
valves not fully sealing at lockup, sudden drop of consumption or any other fluctuations
causing an upsurge in pressure.
f) Outlet Isolation: The outlet of the DRS is provided with an isolation valve through
which Gas passes into the downstream Medium pressure PE network. Typical DRS
internal layout and its installation at site is shown in picture below.
Typical DRS installation and assembly
10.8 Isolation Valve in Steel & PE network

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Isolation valves have been provided in the steel as well as Polyethylene network at the
time of installation. Spacing between the valves are generally 3 km.
In each Sectionalizing Valve Assembly in steel pipeline network, vent valves have been
installed both on the upstream and downstream to enable prompt depressurization of
the affected section in the event of any untoward incidents resulting into gas escapes.
This feature effectively minimises the duration of uncontrolled escape of gas and is in
compliance with ASME B31.8.
Isolation valves also are installed on the inlet and outlet piping of each regulator station
Such as CGS, DRS, MRS, SR etc, controlling flow or pressure of gas in distribution
system of CGD network.
10.9 CNG Station
The CNG stations are complied with OISD 179 Safety requirements on
compression, storage, handling & refuelling of natural gas for use in automotive
sector. A typical CNG station comprises of reciprocating Compressor(s) of a capacity
of 750/1200 SCMH, CNG storage cascade(s) and dispensers. Depending upon the
location & expected load the CNG station is designed with the right size & number of
compressors & dispensers.
Types of CNG stations

TYPICAL CNG MOTHER STATION TYPICAL CNG MOTHER STATION
250 BARG 250 BARG 250 BARG
250 250
BARG BARG
16-19 BARG 16-19 BARG 250 BARG
GAS SUPPLY "CNG" GAS SUPPLY "CNG" "BOOSTER"

COMPRESSOR COMPRESSOR LCV-MOUNTED-CASCADES
COMPRESSOR
LCV-MOUNTED-CASCADES LCV-MOUNTED-CASCADES
200 STORAGE
BARG CASCADE
200 STORAGE 200 STORAGE

BARG CASCADE BARG CASCADE
CNG VEHICLE
CNG VEHICLE CNG VEHICLE

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a) Compressor
The CNG compressors conforms to API 618/ / API 11P & other relevant International
Standards. All compressor are mounted inside a weather-proof (protection level
equivalent to IP 44 as defined in AS 4239) acoustic enclosure to limit the noise to a
maximum of 65 dBA at a distance of 1 meter. All electrical devices, control panel,
instruments etc are selected for the relevant hazardous area classification i.e. class I,
Div I, Group D as per NEC or Zone-I, Group IIA/IIB as per IS/IEC specifications or
equivalent specifications.Gas detection system consisting of 2 nos. Infrared type LEL
detectors are provided inside each compressor enclosure for automatic shut down of
the compressor in the event of gas leakage.
b) Dispenser
The CNG dispensers conform to NFPA-52, NZS 5425, Oil Industry Safety Directorate
(OISD) 179 / relevant international standards. All the electrical and electronic
components are mounted in flame/ explosion proof housing suitable for hazardous
area classification of Class I, Div 1, Group D as per NEC or Zone 1, Group IIA/IIB as
per IS/IEC specifications. Dispensers are housed in weather-proof cabinet of robust
construction and stainless steel (SS 304) material with a tamper proof locking
arrangement. Dispensing units have overfilled protection through electronically
programmed microprocessors with 2 nos. of pressure limiting device per filling line.
Dispensers refueling hoses are provided with return vent line hose for safe venting of
gas. Dispensers are provided with easily accessible emergency shut off valve on each
filling line
c) Cascade
Construction, licensing & inspection, markings, fitment, handling, storage and all other
relevant aspects of cylinders and fittings are as per The Gas Cylinder Rules and are
approved by Chief Controller of Explosives (CCOE). Cylinders are mounted on a
robust frame structure which does not allow lateral / rotating movement of cascade in
any condition. All cylinders are subject to a hydraulic stretch test at a minimum
pressure of 422 bar or to pressure as determined and approved by CCOE and as
required under rules 39 to 42 of Gas Cylinder Rules, 4281 (India). All cylinders are
provided with safety relief device consisting of fusible burst disc assembly as approved
by Chief Controller of Explosives (CCOE). The burst disc discharge is manifolded to a
common header for safe venting. All cylinders are periodically examined & hydro
tested every five years as per Gas Cylinder Rules.

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10.10 Individual Pressure Regulating Station (IPRS) / Common Pressure

Regulating Station (IPRS) / Metering Station
The large commercial / industrial consumers are supplied by means of Spur lines
originating from the high or medium pressure networks, as applicable. The gas supply
is received by these customers at the Metering & Regulating station (MRS) that
perform the function of regulating the pressure as per the contracted requirements as
well as the measurement of the volume of Gas delivered/ consumed.
10.11 Control Room / Master control room

The contact point for reporting gas escapes is the Emergency control room (ECR).
Emergency control room is control and co-ordination point for all emergency work and
is manned on a 24 hour basis. The emergency control room number is
7055018032.The Key role of Emergency control room is to ensure that:
1. Details of reported gas escapes are recorded accurately in SAP
2. Safety advice is given to the person reporting the gas escape
3. The gas escape is passed to the appropriate district crew for action
Gas escapes reported during normal working hours should be passed to the
appropriate emergency technician, who will attend site immediately. In the event of a
more serious incident being reported (i.e. major part of gas network or large number of
people affected by the emergency) the call will also be passed to the MCC Engineer
on duty who will also attend site. Site personnel may also request the assistance of
more senior staff when necessary
10.12 Instrumentation and Electrical systems
Compressor and dispensers are the important installations wherein instrumentation

plays a major role. All safety controls like PSV etc. and pressure / temperature
monitoring equipments are configured in PLC. Any deviation in process parameters is
captured / detected to safeguard the machine.
The electrical system plays an important role in gas industry. It is required at CGS and
CNG stations. The design, manufacturing process and performance of electrical
system complies with the latest Indian Standards set by B.I.S. It includes following
major components-
a) HT Substation: It includes transformers, Air circuit breaker, relays, etc. There are
two transformers of 750 KVA, 11KV / 433V which are used to step down the voltage
from 11 KV to 433 V. In addition to this, vacuum circuit breaker, relays and other
auxiliary equipments are present.

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b) LT Distribution Panel: It includes the control room from where power is distributed
for compressors, lighting, etc. It has air circuit breaker, relays and other auxiliary
equipments.
c) Capacitor Bank / APFC Panel: It is the part of LT distribution panel. It is one of the
most important panels it maintains the power factor to unity and thereby helps in
efficient working of system.
d) Earthing system: It limits earth resistance sufficiently low to permit adequate fault
current for the operation of protective devices in time and to reduce neutral shifting.
Every earthing system is being tested for its resistance to earth on a dry day during
dry season not less than once in a year. The earth resistance measured for each
pits should not be more than 5 ohms and when two or more earth pits are
interconnected, then the system earth resistance should not be more than 1 ohm.
e) Uninterrupted Power Supply (UPS): In SGL, it is generally used as a power supply

to instrumentation circuits of dispensers.
f) DG set: Diesel Generator set is installed at CGS and is operated when there is a
power failure. Monthly inspection is carried out in order to maintain its performance.
10.13 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) The whole text needs
to be removed as we dont have
For the safe and efficient operation of the gas supply network, SGL has installed a
SCADA system for the remote monitoring of the operating conditions of the gas supply
network and to be able to monitor and operate / control certain equipment. SCADA
system also enables the Sectionalizing Valves (SVs) in the high pressure steel network
to remotely operate from the Main control room located at City Gate Station - Sion.
Currently, following equipments / installations have been configured in SGL SCADA

system.
Four City Gate Station (CGS) Wadala, Mahape, Taloja and Ambarnath
Steel Sectionalizing Valves (SV) on the High Pressure Pipeline system Currently
at Airoli, Kalwa and Rabale.
CNG stations 35 nos. (Refer list of CNG stations at annexure 1)
A master SCADA control room has been set up at CGS Wadala with a back up
control room installed at CGS -Mahape. These will facilitate the monitoring and control
of the:
Gas flows into the SGL system at various CGS flow control, metering and gas
composition
Sectionalizing valve Stations on the 42 bar system close / open
Operating conditions of CNG compressors.
Monitoring of gas dispensing volume in dispensers

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Sectionalizing Valve stations

Valves are installed with hydraulic actuator for underground valves and Gas Over Oil
Actuated (GOOA) for stem extended buried valves with a Remote Terminal Unit (RTU)
based system.
These valves can be closed remotely from both control rooms located at CGS-Wadala
and CGS Mahape within 22 seconds in the case of an emergency. Once situation is
normalized SV shall be opened manually (locally) after getting clearance from line
manager.
CNG Compressor Stations

Real time information about operating parameters of compressors would be available
at the control room. The objective of pulling information at control room is to increase
the operational efficiency of the compressors and minimize breakdowns. This also
facilitates reduction in operational expenditure. By having online data, the performance
of these stations can be monitored and controlled remotely, this eliminates the need for
personnel to be present continuously on every site thereby reductions on manpower
can be achieved.
City Gate Station

Currently one CGS at Chaata have been configured on SCADA system. Following
parameters of CGS terminal can be monitored on real time basis at Control room.
1) Metering at custody transfer (ultrasonic meter as check meter)

2) Gas composition analysis thru gas chromatograph
3) Flow control valves to control the flow
4) Outlet pressure at CGS terminal
10.14 Safety Equipments
Numbers of safety equipments have been provided in the gas distribution system to
safeguard the system from any deviation in process parameters. Some of them are as
follows.
CGS Fire hydrant system, Gas detector.

Pressure Regulating skid Relief valve, SSV, OPSO, UPSO
Compressor PRV, GD, FD, ESD, CO2 flooding system
Dispenser - Relief valve, ESD
In addition to the above, fire extinguishers are made available at all installations
10.15 Customer base (PNG, CNG, Industrial and Commercial)
SGL has already connected nearly 1600 household (domestic customers) and about
80 small commercial and industrial establishments. SGL also supplies CNG to over 3.2

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lakh vehicles which include above 1.6 lakh autorickshaws, 57,000 taxis and over 1.0
lakh cars.
B) Other Description
i) Interfaces with Geographical areas - SGL is presently operating in Mathura.. The

CGS is in loop with downstream steel network. This facilitates uninterrupted gas supply
to downstream consumers.
ii) Incident reporting - SGL has a centralized Emergency control room established at
Gayatri Mother station which is operational round the clock (24x7x365). Two dedicated
emergency helpline telephone number are established (one of them being toll free) on
which the Operator on duty at the Control room receives complaints from general
public / utility agencies etc. The complaint so received is immediately transmitted to
respective district I/C on their mobile phone/radio and also via a text message. The
Complaint is also logged into SAP system with relevant details like reporting time,
name of reportee, location, nature of complaint etc.
iii) Information on Documentation A key element of the integrity management

framework is the integration of available information into the decision making process.
Obtaining information from various sources that can impact the companys
understanding of the significant risk to the Gas distribution system remain a key
component of the Integrity management program.
iv) Statutory Requirements - Being a City Gas Distribution Company (CGD) SGLs
operations are governed by downstream regulating authority i.e. Petroleum & Natural
Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) of the Govt. of India.
11.0 Schedule 4 Selection of Integrity Management System
SGLs integrity management plan is developed after gathering the data and completing
the risk assessment for each threat for each installation. Two types of planned
approaches can be used for developing an integrity management plan. These are
Prescriptive and Performance based, SGL shall use both depending on suitability and
availability of data.
The Integrity management plan shall contain detailed information regarding each of the
following elements for each threat analyzed and each installation
The basic endeavor here is to identify the Assets & the potential threats faced by them
such as corrosion, third party damage, eqpt failure, erosion etc; all the significant
threats are suitably attended for minimizing their occurrence & consequences.
.

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Integrity Management plan shall be developed after gathering the data and completing
risk assessment for each threat and of each installation. Integrity assessment of each
segment shall be accomplished through various technologies. SGLs Integrity
Management plan comprises following elements and their interrelations as per the
below mentioned scheme.
Identification of Potential Pipeline Integrity threats

Gathering, Reviewing and Integrating Data
Risk assessment
Integrity assessment
Response to Integrity assessment and Mitigation Strategy
Continuing Assessment.

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12.0 Schedule 5 Integrity Assessment Tools
The integrity assessment methods are in-line inspection, pressure testing or direct
assessment. More than one integrity method may be used to address all the threats
.SGL carbon steel gas pipelines cannot be subjected to inline Inspections (ILI), nor can
they be taken out of service for pressure testing to find time-dependent defects, such
as external or internal corrosion or stress corrosion cracking. Direct Assessment
methodologies shall provide alternative means for assessing the integrity of pipelines.
(a) Direct assessment and evaluation
Direct assessment means performing inspections on active pipelines without removing

them from service. It is an integrity assessment method that uses a structured process
by integrating knowledge of the physical characteristics and operating history of a
pipeline system or segment with the results of inspection, examination and evaluation
to determine the existing level of integrity. The External Corrosion Direct Assessment
(ECDA) methodology is a four-step process requiring integration of pre-assessment
data, data from multiple indirect field inspections, and data from pipe surface
examinations. The four steps of the process are:
Pre-Assessment: Collection of historical and current data of CP system, DCVG /

CIPS survey, leak detection survey, patrolling information and past incidents.
Indirect Examinations: Conducting aboveground inspection (s) during any third party
excavations to identify and define coating faults, anomalies, and corrosion activity.
Direct Examinations: During hot tapping, pipe coupons drawn shall be examined for
internal, external corrosion, coating bonding strength etc.
Post Assessment: Analysis of data collected from the previous three steps helps to
determine the remaining life of pipeline selected and reassessment interval. It also
helps to assess overall effectiveness of the ECDA process.
(b) Thickness assessment and periodic review against baseline values
During hot tapping, pipe coupons drawn shall be examined for internal, external
corrosion, coating bonding strength etc.
(c) Cathodic protection system surveys:
Cathodic Protection adequacy survey shall be carried out so as to cover the entire
steel network of pipelines so as to detect insufficient Cathodic Protection levels and
other irregularities and anomalies in the steel pipeline. Suitable procedures shall be
established by the operator to account for adequate cathodic Protection levels to
pipeline extensions and new projects.
Cathodic Protection (CP) system shall be effectively utilized & monitored thru the Pipe
to soil potential (PSP) & TR readings etc to ascertain adequacy. It also involves various

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techniques such as DCVG (Direct Current Voltage Gradient), Inspection with the CIPS
(Closed interval Potential Survey), direct assessment like opportunistic coupons; all
these shall collectively contribute to corrosion monitoring.
Based upon the findings of the above mentioned inspections carried out on the
network segments with elevated risk levels shall be further examined using direct
assessment methods to evaluate the remaining life of the pipeline & rehabilitation
measures, as necessary. SGL CP monitoring covers all these activities as per
document on Gas pipeline CP monitoring. (Refer COP section 55)
(d) Pressure testing
Testing of pipeline is carried out by reputed Third Party Inspection agencies appointed
by SGL. Ref. document SGL- Work Instruction for carrying out hydro testing of steel
pipeline (STL WI 009), Work Instruction for carrying out pneumatic testing of MDPE
pipeline (STL WI 011)

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13.0 Schedule 4 SGL Integrity Management System
13.1 Integrity Management plan:

The integrity management plan is developed after gathering the data and completing
the risk assessment for each threat for each pipeline segment. Two types of planned
approaches can be used for developing an integrity management plan. These are
Prescriptive and Performance based. As mentioned earlier, SGL has followed
Prescriptive based approach.
The Integrity management plan shall contain detailed information regarding each of the
following elements for each threat analyzed and each pipeline segment. The basic
endeavor here is to identify the Assets & the potential threats faced by them such as
corrosion, third party damage, equipment failure, erosion etc; all the significant threats
are suitably attended for minimizing their occurrence & consequences.
Integrity assessment of each segment shall be accomplished through various

technologies as explained in PNGRB regulation schedule 5. The highest risk segments
shall be prioritized for integrity assessment. SGLs Pipeline Integrity Management plan
comprises following elements and their interrelations as per the below mentioned
scheme.
Identification of Potential Pipeline Integrity Threats
Gathering, Reviewing and Integrating Data
Risk assessment
Integrity assessment
Response to Integrity assessment and Mitigation Strategy
Continuing Assessment.
Identify Potential pipeline Gathering, reviewing and

impact by threat (13.1.1) integrating data (13.1.2)
Risk assessment (13.1.3)
All threats evaluated?

No

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Yes
Integrity assessment (13.1.4)
Response to integrity assessment

& mitigation (13.1.5)
Pipeline Integrity Plan process Flow Diagram

13.1.1 Identifying Potential Pipeline Integrity Threats
The identification, management and assessment of threats to a pipeline are the first
step in managing integrity of pipeline. These threats could be several in numbers, with
specific ones relevant to particular pipeline segment(s); corresponding risk they pose,
needs to be considered in determining the overall approach to integrity management.
In the threat identification phase, total steel pipeline network is divided into different
segments with respect to Transformer Rectifier (TR) units and identified with unique
segment numbers.
After identifying each pipe segment, High Consequence Areas are located. A High
Consequence Area or HCA is defined as an area where the potential consequences of
a gas pipeline accident may be significant or may cause considerable harm to life &
property.
By virtue of its pipeline network & operations in a highly congested city like Mumbai its
only natural to anticipate the following types of threats which could be encountered on
the carbon steel pipeline network
- Third party damages

- External corrosion
This is because of continuous excavation undertaken by different utility agencies

around SGL gas pipelines, the third party activity therefore carries potential of causing
damage to the coating which in turn may lead to corrosion AND at times a more direct
impact causing dents / damage to parent metal during mechanical excavation. Other
threats (from the list below, although not noticed / recorded so far, shall also be
considered suitably on SGL carbon steel pipeline network.
1. External corrosion
2. Internal corrosion
3. SCC
4. Manufacturing
5. Construction / fabrication
6. Equipment
7. Third Party damage
8. Incorrect operations
9. Weather and outside force

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The above mentioned threats are broadly grouped as
Time dependent : Sr. 1, 2 & 3

Stable : Sr. 4, 5 & 6
Time independent : Sr. 7, 8 & 9
13.1.2 Gathering, Reviewing and Integrating Data
The next step in the integrity process is performing a resource inventory of existing
pipeline system data. The amount and type of data to support risk assessment will vary
depending on the threat being assessed. Data acquisition is accomplished by use of
MIS, GIS, maintenance, audit database, spreadsheets, etc. A key step in managing
data involves correlating data to a common reference and maintaining quality control
measures.
Given below are primary data categories and some potential data sources:
Material Information pipe attributes.
Construction and Installation Data - repair methods, hydrostatic tests.
Corrosion Control History- internal and external.
Operating Data - gas composition, pressures, temperatures, pipeline liquids.
Leak and Failure Data - leak history; pipeline condition reports, failure data.
Excavation Activities - class location, right-of- way encroachments.
Prior Assessment Data opportunistic coupon for level of internal corrosion
Other data maps, alignment sheets, digital photos etc.
Complete gas network (high pressure steel as well as medium pressure Polyethylene)
has been mapped in GIS along with essential reference details like top cover, lateral
distances, other utilities etc. Network information shall be updated on regular basis and
as and when changes take place with reference to landmarks. Data shall be gathered
to evaluate each threat for integrity management program applications. All of the
specified data elements shall be available for each threat in order to perform the risk
assessment.
Data Sources:

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Existing MIS, KPIs, SAP, GIS, root cause analysis etc of previous failures shall be
valuable data sources. Significant insights may be obtained from experts / external
agencies additionally.
Data review & analysis:
While reviewing data, consideration shall be given to the age of the data. Data
pertaining to the time dependant threats such as corrosion or Stress Corrosion
Cracking (SCC) may not be relevant if it was collected many years before the integrity
management program was developed.
13.1.3 Risk Assessment
The design & operational data collected in the previous step has been used to conduct
a risk assessment of the pipeline system. The risk assessment begins with a
systematic and comprehensive search for possible threats to pipeline or facility
integrity. When evaluating the information collected in the previous step, the risk
assessment process identifies the location specific events or conditions, or
combinations of events and conditions that could lead to loss of pipeline integrity, and
provides an understanding of the likelihood and consequences of these events.
Risk = Probability of occurrence (Frequency) x Severity of incident (Consequence)
Risk assessment approach used shall be a combination of qualitative and quantitative

methods. The Risk assessment shall be conducted starting with the pipelines figuring
on high priority on integrity management activities & the output so obtained shall be
used for devising further actions and decisions. Risk assessment shall be performed
periodically on existing pipes and facilities to capture changes and updations & their
impact on the previous studies.
Appropriate weightage factors are devised based on prevalent industry standards and
in house operating experiences with the pipeline. Consequences are expressed in
terms of the potential amount of property damaged, number of people injured (&
fatalities, if any) and any loss of reputation to the company. Once evaluated &
prioritised, the mitigation strategies are applied, starting with those segments which
pose highest risk.
Risk assessment model is in place to conduct risk assessment of each pipeline

segment. The model makes use of simple excel spreadsheets wherein information &
data is fed for all factors contributing to threats, accordingly the likelihood and
consequence score is calculated. Risk of a particular segment then is obtained as the
sum of the products of likelihood and consequences. Refer document AI RF 015.
13.1.4 Integrity Assessment:

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Once the risk assessment is done, appropriate integrity assessment techniques are
selected and utilised. The integrity assessment methods are in-line inspection,
pressure testing or direct assessment. More than one integrity method may be used to
address all the threats of a particular pipeline segment. SGL carbon steel gas pipelines
cannot be subjected to inline Inspections (ILI), nor can they be taken out of service for
pressure testing to find time-dependent defects, such as external or internal corrosion
or stress corrosion cracking. Direct Assessment methodologies shall provide
alternative means for assessing the integrity of pipelines.
Direct Assessment
Direct assessment means performing inspections on active pipelines without removing

them from service. It is an integrity assessment method that uses a structured process
by integrating knowledge of the physical characteristics and operating history of a
pipeline system or segment with the results of inspection, examination and evaluation
to determine the existing level of integrity.
The External Corrosion Direct Assessment (ECDA) methodology is a four-step process

requiring integration of pre-assessment data, data from multiple indirect field
inspections, and data from pipe surface examinations. The four steps of the process
are:
Pre-Assessment: Collection of historical and current data of CP system, DCVG /

CIPS survey, leak detection survey, patrolling information and past incidents.
Indirect Examinations: Conducting aboveground inspection (s) during any third

party excavations to identify and define coating faults, anomalies, and corrosion
activity.
Direct Examinations: During hot tapping, pipe coupons drawn shall be examined
for internal, external corrosion, coating bonding strength etc.
Post Assessment: Analysis of data collected from the previous three steps helps
to determine the remaining life of pipeline selected and reassessment interval. It
also helps to assess overall effectiveness of the ECDA process.
13.1.5 Response to Integrity assessment and Mitigation Strategy
Once the segments are prioritized according to assessed risk, mitigation actions will be
implemented for each pipeline segment.
The goal is to synchronise mitigation techniques to pipeline segments in ways that

optimize available resources (money, time and personnel) to enhance system-wide
pipeline integrity. This is accomplished by matching mitigation tools and techniques to
threats of the individual pipeline segment. Cost estimates for responsive and effective
mitigation techniques are predicated on four major categories: monitoring; inspection
and investigation; remediation; and education:

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a) Monitoring
SGL has a program of patrolling of its networks which consists of traversing the
pipeline routes by trained Patrolmen either on foot or on vehicle with the objective of
locating situations posing risk to the underground gas networks and allied equipments
& to initiate the remedial measures. SGL survey policy covers this activity. (Document
no. AI RF 002)
Leakage surveys shall be undertaken, using appropriate equipment such as leak

detector devices throughout the network as per SGL Gas pipeline leak detection
survey policy (Document no. AI RF 003)
b) Inspection and Investigation
Cathodic Protection (CP) system shall be effectively utilized & monitored thru the Pipe
to soil potential (PSP) & TR readings etc to ascertain adequacy. It also involves various
techniques such as DCVG (Direct Current Voltage Gradient), Inspection with the CIPS
(Closed interval Potential Survey), direct assessment like opportunistic coupons; all
these shall collectively contribute to corrosion monitoring.
Based upon the findings of the above mentioned inspections carried out on the
network segments with elevated risk levels shall be further examined using direct
assessment methods to evaluate the remaining life of the pipeline & rehabilitation
measures, as necessary. SGL CP monitoring covers all these activities as per
document on Gas pipeline CP monitoring. (Document no. COP section 55)
c) Develop Baseline Assessment Plan
Using the output of risk assessment, various plans have been developed to address
the most significant threats / risk as explained below.
Damage Prevention plan - The following initiatives have been introduced to prevent
third party interferences & damages to SGLs network & installations:
SGL has a program of patrolling of its networks 24 x 7 /365 days. This consists of
traversing the pipeline routes by trained Patrolmen either on foot or on motorbikes
with the objective of locating situations posing risk to the pipeline network &
installations & to initiate the remedial measures. In order to raise effectiveness of
patrolling, all the motor bikes of patrolmen have been installed with the GPS.
SGL survey policy covers this activity. Refer document AI RF 002.

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Necessary co-ordination and follow up with the other utility companies and Third
parties for familiarizing them with SGL installations & the care needed to be
exercised on their behalf while working in their close vicinity.
Making network maps available to the third party utilities and marking our pipes in
their plans, as applicable, prior to undertaking any excavation activity.
Manning third party excavations with SGL trained supervisors for continuous advice
at site.
Dial before Dig campaigns.
Round the clock support thru Emergency crew & dedicated telephone lines.
Damage reduction forms a part of the performance KPIs of the relevant SGL O&M
personnel.
Corrosion Management plan - SGL has adopted the impressed current Cathodic
protection system (ICCP) for managing external. CP system is regularly monitored thru
the Pipe to soil potential (PSP) & TR readings etc to ascertain adequacy & signals of
current leaks, if any, hinting coating damages thereby indicating potential corrosion
spots. Other renowned techniques such as DCVG (Direct Current Voltage Gradient),
Inspection with the CIPS (Closed Interval Survey), thickness testing, opportunistic
coupon analysis are also employed. At the time of construction, the pipe wrapping is
checked by holiday detection equipment prior to lowering and a DCVG survey is
undertaken prior to commissioning. Refer document SGL COP section 55 - SGL steel
pipeline CP monitoring.
Leakage surveys - are undertaken, using appropriate equipment such as Flame

Ionization Devices (FID) or Gaskoseekers across the network. Refer document AI RF
003.
Maintenance plan - The maintenance activities are programmed and executed

according to the SGL Maintenance Policy. The maintenance policy is reviewed at least
annually to identify the need for alterations in the periodicity and the established
criteria. Applicable Risk Assessments are also done during maintenance to ensure that
all the components of the Distribution Network are in good operational condition i.e.
meeting the performance standards & specifications. Aim is to eliminate emergency
break downs & incidents. Maintenance activities are carried out in line with the
document AI RF006.
SGL has implemented SAP (Systems Applications and Products in Data processing)
which is one of the most popular Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) tools across the

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world. Accordingly all maintenance activities are planned, executed and monitored
(included emergency complaints) using SAP system as a robust platform.
Safety Critical Elements (SCE) - are those devices or processes that are the final
safety protection or barrier to present an incident occurring.
SGL has reviewed all its operational process associated with the gas supply system
and has identified the Safety Critical Elements. These are detailed in Annexure 5
together with their performance standard.
Independent audit and verification of the maintenance and performance of the SCE is
undertaken by the Asset Integrity Department. Refer document AI RF 042.
Competency management - The competence aspects are addresses at the

recruitment & selection process of the new personnel whereas existing employees
undergo competency assessment once in five years or earlier in case of a change of
role or in the event of a competence gap noticed at any stage during the course of job,
as per SGL Competency framework.
SGL Competency framework covers all direct employees of SGL, who have a safety
and/or technical element to their duties associated with the Gas Supply Network. It will
include all posts ranging from Technical Director to an office Assistant who has to input
critical information into a data base. Departments such as HR Commercial and
Finance are outside the scope of this document. Refer Competency framework vide
document no. AI RF 011.
Emergency Response Plan - SGL has established a robust system elaborate

procedure for Responding to Emergencies and incidents such as Gas leaks, Fire,
supply outages etc and to minimize their consequential effects, if any, on Health,
Safety, Security & Environmental aspects & the integrity of its assets. SGLs ERP has
been aligned with the PNGRB Regulations 2010 i.e. Emergency Response and
Disaster Management Plan (ERDMP). SGL is assessed and certified for the
compliance with the ERDMP G.S.R 39 (E) regulation of PNGRB. The ERP is made
available & understood by each member of the Incident control team & all other
relevant personnel. The incident categorization, time scales of reporting, manning,
escalation etc are all covered in the ERP. Emergency Control room is kept updated
with the ERP document & its usage. Refer document HSE 007.
13.1.7 Continuous Improvement

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Hazard and near miss reporting is one of the prime means of identifying weak spots
and risks. All employees and contractors are encouraged to report hazards and
suggest innovative solutions which may lead to improvements in both safety and
operational practices.

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13.2 Performance Plan
Information and data reflecting operational performance of the pipeline network is

acquired & analysed. The performance plan comprises leading (pro active) and lagging
(reactive) indicators required to monitor integrity and also triggers improvement
actions. Performance management plan includes reporting of following to the
management:
13.2.1 Performance Measures Characteristic
Performance measures are selected carefully to ensure that they act as reasonable
program effectiveness indicators. Changes (deviations) are monitored so that control
measures remain effective over time as the plans mature.
a) Process measures
Process or activity measures are used to evaluate prevention or mitigation activities.

Third party excavation on or in the vicinity of SGL gas pipeline network is a major
threat.
Lagging Process measure Pipeline damage during third party excavation

Leading Process measure No. of excavations reported during patrolling
b) Operational measures:
Operational measures include operation and maintenance trends that measure how
well the system is responding to integrity management program. Operation &
maintenance plan covers the maintenance of all the gas supply assets and equipment
that are required for safe and uninterrupted supply of natural gas to SGL customers
i.e. from City Gate Station (CGS) up to the customers appliance isolation valve. As
mentioned earlier it comprises various components such as pipe lines, regulators,
valves, compressors, CNG dispensers, meters, etc.
Maintenance is undertaken as a part of a routine preventative planned process or as a

reaction to a breakdown situation. To achieve high level of integrity, all the equipment
on the gas supply network shall be included in a routine preventive scheduled
maintenance.
Lagging Operational measure Number of breakdowns, equipment failures

Leading Operational measure Maintenance backlog, change in CP current demand
c) Direct Integrity Measures
Performance measures have been categorized as leading or lagging indicators.

Leading indicators provide an indication of how the network may be expected to
perform whereas lagging indicators reflects on past / historical performance aspects.
These indicators are called as KPIs (Key Performance Indicators).

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Lagging Operational measure No. of leaks, Leak per km of network

Leading Operational measure Change in leak per km
13.2.2 Performance Measurement Methodology
Key performance indicators (KPIs) including combination of leading and lagging

indicators pertinent to functioning of assets are listed below. Objective of monitoring
these KPIs is to ascertain assets performance trends & directing corrective actions at
the week signals. Current KPIs is being monitored in SGL are as follows.
Sr. Indicator Coverage
1 Loss of Primary Incidents of gas release greater than 1.5 ton.
Containment with Greatest
Consequences (API 754 -
Tier 1)
2 Loss of Primary Incidents of gas release between 0.5 to 1.5 ton.
Containment with lesser
Consequences (API 754 -
Tier 2)
3 % Incidents with Human % of Incidents with Human Error as a causal factor
Error as Causal Factor = (Number of Incidents where Human error as a
causal factor/ Total number of AI Incidents)
4 Number of Safety Critical Ensuring that changes, if any, to the SCEs are
Work Order Past properly covered & approved thru an MoC within
Completion Date the stipulated timelines.
5 % Emergency Work CNG station was under breakdown beyond 24 hrs
which did not have a neighboring CNG station
within 2.0 km.
6 Progress in Asset integrity Following important initiatives have been identified
Improvement Plan which are being continuously progressed:
Implementation i) PIMS ii) GIS improvements iii) Ecompmap iv)
QRA.
7 % Compliance with BG No of BG standards in which High & Medium
Standards priority action is open
8 % SCE without % of SCE without performance standards = 100 -
Performance Standards (Number of identified SCE / Number of SCE with
approved PS at the end of each quarter).
Additional KPIs

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Sr. Indicator Coverage

1 Other Loss of Primary Incidents of gas release caused by corrosion, joint
Containment (API 754-Tier failure in PE, rat bites and any threat excluding
3) those arising from Third Party Damages. Measured
in damages per 1000 Km of pipelines.
2 Number of Damages by Number of damages by third Party/1000km of
Third Party /1000 KM main Mains = (Total Number of reported damages to
mains & services in the last 12 months) / (average
of the Length of Mains & Service in kilometers
which are in service at the end of the last 12
months) * 1/1000.
3 Supply Failure Failure of supply of any duration to an industrial or
commercial customer taking more than 200,000
cubic meters/year or to more than 500 customers in
a single incident. These failures should be caused
by operational problems or failure in regulating
stations (equipment failure), third Party Damages
should be excluded
4 Pipeline Inspection - Non Number of instances of pipeline (MAOP>7bar)
Conformities operating under code infringement or non-
compliance where permanent mitigation is required
but has not yet been effected.
13.2.3 Performance Improvement:
The results of the performance measurements and audit shall be utilized to modify and
adjust the integrity management program as a part of continuous improvement
process. Internal and external audit results provide the opportunities for improvement
which can be utilised for further strengthening and upgrading the systems.

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13.3 Communication Plan:
SGL believes that having a well informed workforce, with everyone knowing the
objectives and challenges of the company, plus their role in ensuring success and
sustaining continuous improvement, can only be achieved by good communication
within and outside the company.
Communication is conducted as often and as necessary to ensure that appropriate

individuals and authorities have current information about system and integrity
management efforts. Different communications have been categorized under two main
categories; external communication and internal communication as explained below.
Refer document AIQ RF 010 - Communication mapping.

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13.4 Management of Change Plan:
Changes in the design, construction & maintenance from the set standards are
carefully assessed, evaluated and mitigated for adverse impacts, if any and the
affected records are accordingly updated. This process also applies to the changes in
Codes & procedures & can even be extended to organizational changes affecting
Asset integrity.
The MoC process clearly indicates the reasons & justification for change, authority to
approve, Risk assessment, documentation updates and the close outs. A change
register is maintained which keeps a detailed database & trail of all MoCs processed.
This information provides a better understanding of the system and prevalent integrity
threats & also serves to guide future installations.
An MOC is raised whenever:
(i) It is not possible to adhere to the specifications / Code of Practice for any
installation work, design change etc. These are operational changes & fall in
category A.
(ii) There is a requirement to deviate from SGL standard procedures / policies etc. This
applies to non operational changes and falls in category B.
MoC process defines the system and responsibilities for the efficient management of
technical, physical, procedural, and organisational changes to the system whether
permanent or temporary and/ or affects reliability, availability, operability or
maintainability and which may impact the HSSE requirements & therefore overall
system integrity. This procedure is generated with the following objectives:
To carry out modification and repair on gas distribution system for its effective
application, monitoring & control and to ensure that the same is not carried out
without formal approval.
To control all changes, design deviations during execution of the project and
ensure that the same is not carried out without formal approval.
To ensure that all relevant documents and records are updated and maintained.
To identify risk level of gas distribution system affected by the modification or

repair and ensure control measures are in place post the completion of
modification or repair activities.
To reduce the risk of serious injury from stored energy as a result of failure of a
pressure system or part of it.
To ensure integrity of an installation

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All Changes shall be reviewed after twelve months to determine the effectiveness of
the engineering changes and whether any additional lessons learnt can be drawn out
and utilized. Identification of potential areas for training shall also be a part of MoC
process.
Refer document SCO 01 - Management of change (MOC) procedure.

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13.5 Quality Control Plan:
Quality Control Plan (QCP) shall contribute to the integrity management program by
means of assuring conformance to integrity aspects of physical assets (eg pipelines,
valves, DRSs, CNG stations etc) i.e. assessing their reliability, performance and
associated risks along the whole life cycle, right from the design through construction,
operation & maintenance so as to ensure that the entire gas distribution system
delivers optimum performance, reliability and safety as originally intended.
Periodic integrity audits are conducted to validate the effectiveness of integrity

management program. Audits are performed by internal competent staff covering the
following aspects.
1) Inspection, maintenance & monitoring programs for all the elements are in
place.
2) Standard operating procedures, activity descriptions & records are up to date
and readily available.
3) Responsibility has been assigned for each activity.
4) Individuals have received proper trainings and skills.
5) All non conformities are closed in a time bound manner.
6) The risk criteria has been reviewed and documented.
7) Prevention, mitigation and repair criteria have been established and
documented.
This plan shall also ensure that the applicable quality standards are met & are
recorded in writing to provide objective evidence. QCP shall provide assurance that,
Necessary documentation has been adequately prepared.

Requirements have been met as planned.
Meet external verification requirements.
Communication of changes has been undertaken.
Employs a controlled document process.
Inspection, mitigation and prevention activities
The quality aspects pertinent to the execution of various activities on the SGL pipeline
network have a great significance on the safety & integrity of the installations. Due care
shall be taken at the construction stage to ensure quality standards of pipeline as
intended.
Quality Assurance Manual shall be reviewed and approved for each contractor,
which shall include Scope, Methodology, Organization chart, Welding Procedure
Specification (WPS) & Procedure Qualification Records (PQR), Quality Assurance
Plan, list of procedures for each activity, list of certificates for each instrument,
certificates of consumables like electrode, list of qualified personals of the
contractor & Quality formats to be used at site.
Quality Manual will be a guideline extracted in line with the tender specification
and applicable codes and standards.

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New formats shall be developed for Quality system / Engineering compliance for
SGL and developing Master list of Quality formats.
Procedures for Non-Destructive testing, i.e. Radiography testing, Dye-

Penetrate testing, Magnetic Particle testing and Ultrasonic testing shall be reviewed
& approved.
Regular meeting with Third Party Inspection agencies shall be conducted to

collect feedback of their quality surveillance at site.
The contractor shall qualify and establish WPS and PQR by welding the
test coupons and the testing of specimens (as per the codes & standards) to
demonstrate Integrity of the steel pipeline. Accordingly all welders shall be qualified
as per the WPS.
Mechanical clearance report of the pipeline and documents of commissioning

audit report shall be verified.
Hydro testing of the pipeline shall be witnessed for compliance to SGL

specification.
Contractor evaluation shall be carried out to monitor the performance of the

contractor.
Training shall be conducted for the contractors as well as Third party inspectors
to update them to the Quality requirement of SGL.
Technical audits & checks shall be conducted at random to assess compliance to

Codes / standards / specifications during the construction stage; reporting appropriate
feedback to the process owners for improvements where necessary.
Refer Integrity Assurance Quality Plan document covered in ISO documentation vide
document no. AIQQP101.

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14.0 Schedule 7 Approval of Integrity Management System
SGL Integrity management plan shall be approved by Technical Director and

constantly reviewed and updated systematically at all levels of management comply
with its content.
15.0 Schedule 8 Implementation schedule of IMS
SGL Integrity management system shall be implemented as per PNGRB regulation,

2013 on Integrity Management system for City Gas Distribution network.
16.0 Schedule 9 Review of Integrity Management System
16.1 Periodic review SGL shall review Integrity Management System every three
years based upon the revised baseline data and critical inputs from various
department.
16.2 Review of Internal and external audit System is in place to ensure compliance
of IMS by conducting following audits during operation.
- Internal audits - as per annexure 1.

- External audit by third party approved by PNGRB, as per the methodology
specified by PNGRB, once every three years.
17.0 Schedule 10 Review of Integrity Management System
Minimum qualification of various personnel and contractors involved in CGD activities

shall be as per PNGRB regulation - Appendix III.

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Annexure 1 List of Internal audits
Sr.
Document Title Audit by
no.
1 Risk audit of major installations MRS, DRS, CNG station, SR etc AI team
2 Emergency preparedness of O&M District AI team
3 SCE Maintenance audit AI team
4 QA Technical audits QA team
5 Non process installation audits Fire hydrant, DG set, RF Tower etc. AI team
6 Pre commissioning audit Cross Functional team

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Annexure 2 Reference : Most of the standards are available but are not
documented with the document number.
Reference documents of standard operation and maintenance procedures related to

CGD network integrity are as follows. List is as below.
Sr. Document
Document Title
no. no.
A External standards
1 PNGRB Regulation for City Gas Distribution Network, 2013 ------
2 ASME B 31.8 Gas transmission and distribution piping system
3 ASME B31.8 S- Managing system integrity of gas pipeline
B Internal standards
1 SGL Gas pipeline surveillance AI RF 002
2 SGL Gas Pipeline Leak Detection Survey AI RF 003
3 Guideline On Welding GI Riser AI RF 005
4 SGL Maintenance Plan AI RF 006
5 Framework for review & assessment of risk associated with A/G installations AI RF 007
6 SGL Defect Assessment & Repair Procedure AI RF 008
7 Written Scheme Of Examination (Non Process Installations) AI RF 009
8 Communication Mapping AIQ RF 010
9 Competency framework AIQ RF 011
10 Domestic Meter Regulator Replacement Methodology AI RF 012
11 Technical Standards & Documents Process AIQ RF 013
12 Flange Joint Management AI RF 013-A
13 SGL Domestic Maintenance Policy AI RF 014
14 Pipeline Integrity Management System (PIMS) AI RF 015
15 HAZOP Procedure AI RF 016
16 Asset Integrity site tour audit framework AI RF 018
17 SGL Safety Critical Elements AI RF 042
18 SGL Operation Management system AI RF 021
42 Quality Assurance Framework AIQ RF 051
20 Code of Practice on PE activities Section 1 to 11
21 Code of Practice on Steel activities Section 51- 55
22 Code of Practice Installation & testing of CNG station Section 61
23 SCO Policy SC0 2010
24 Management of Change (MoC) Procedure SC0 01
25 Permit to Work (PTW) SCO 02
26 Non Routine Operation (NRO) SCO 03
27 Standard procedures and work instructions (ISO documents) SCO 04
28 Work place inspection SCO 05
29 License to work SCO 06

HSE & AI
Annexure 3 Critical activities in SGL and its status
Sr. no. Activity Status
CP routine monitoring plan is in

Cathodic protection adequacy survey
place and being followed.
1 to ensure an integrated cathodic
Supplementary survey like DCVG,
system.
CIP are carried out as per set plan.
Odorant smell survey at farthest Odorant level at farthest points is
2
points from odoriser. being monitored on daily basis.
Complete steel and medium

3 GIS mapping of the network pressure Polyethylene network
mapped in GIS.
As per cylinder rule, CNG cylinders

Establish system for testing of CNG
4 are tested once in three years. Plan
cascades.
is generated thru SAP.
Gas loss computation based on the

Loss and Un-accounted Gas
mass or volume balance for 3 months
5 (LUAG) being calculated on monthly
or other selected interval depending
basis.
upon the billing cycle.
Domestic maintenance pan is in

Integrity inspection system for GI and
place thru which GI riser and meter /
6 copper piping forming part of tertiary
copper installation is inspected once
network and list mile connectivity.
in ten years.

HSE & AI

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Document Title: SGL Integrity Management system Issue Date: October -16.

Document No: SGL/AI/IMS/001 Issue no. 1.0

Title of Document SGL Integrity Management System (IMS)

Document Number SGL/AI/IMS/001

Name: Ram Bahadur Singh Tomar

Date of Issue August, 2016

Custodian HOD (HSE & AI)

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

1.0 Title & commencement.

City Gate Station (CGS)

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

- Evaluating risk associated with CGD network and effectively allocating

This document has been evolved to specifically to serve as a bridging document to

6.0 Policy and Goals

This will be achieved by;

The application of the national and International codes & standards.

7.0 Integrity management system

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

8.0 Schedule 1 Objective

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

9.0 Schedule 2 Introduction to the SGL Integrity Management System (IMS)

These elements are:-

1) Integrity Management Plan

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

10.0 Schedule 3 Description of SGL City Gas Distribution (CGD) System

A) Physical Description - Description of the principal elements of the SGLs CGD

10.2 City Gate station (CGS)

Figure below represents the SGL Gas Supply chain

City Gate Station CNG Station DRS

21 mbar CU Network 100 mbar PE Network

Customer Kitchen GI Installation Service Regulator

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

Pressure regulation ensures a steady downstream pressure while Odorisation imparts

10.3 Odorizing System

Salient features of odorising unit are as follow.

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

Odorant storage tank Odorant filling mechanism (SBC)

10.4 Steel pipeline network

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

10.5 Secondary PE networks (Medium pressure PE network)

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

- Resistant to corrosion - Easily repairable

10.6 Tertiary networks Low pressure PE, GI and Copper

10.7 District Regulating Station

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

Typical DRS installation and assembly

10.8 Isolation Valve in Steel & PE network

Authored By Approved By Custodian

Chief General Manager Senior Engineer HOD

10.9 CNG Station

Types of CNG stations

250 BARG 250 BARG 250 BARG

16-19 BARG 16-19 BARG 250 BARG

GAS SUPPLY "CNG" GAS SUPPLY "CNG" "BOOSTER"