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Author(s): Matthias Steup
Review by: Matthias Steup
Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 4 (Oct., 1992), pp. 856-858
Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185936
Accessed: 29-09-2015 02:42 UTC
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BOOK REVIEWS
The Philosophical
Review,Vol. 101, No. 4 (October 1992)
856
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BOOK REVIEWS
857
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BOOK REVIEWS
Since Norman Kemp Smith,all Hume scholarshave had to deal not only
with Hume's negative argumentstowardsthe rationaljustificationof be-
liefs such as those in causality,necessaryconnection,the external world,
substance,and personal identity,but also withhis naturalisticexplanation
of those beliefs. In fact, it is now not uncommon to so emphasize the
positiveaspects of Hume's philosophythatmany hold that Hume is not a
skepticin any interestingsense at all.' In the opinion of thisreviewer,the
beginning of truthwhen it comes to interpretingHume is to give equal
weightto both the skepticaland the positiveargumentsthat Hume gives
regarding the aforementionedbeliefs.2aDaniel Flage's David Hume'sThe-
oryofMind takes thisapproach. Flage describesHume's techniqueof deal-
ing with each of the problematicbeliefs as "doxastic pathology"; in each
case, Hume undercuts the rationaljustificationof the belief,while going
on to provide an explanation,in termsof the associationof ideas, of why
we continue to hold on to that belief. The success of these explanations
bolstersnot onlythe fundamentalrole played by the associationof ideas in
Hume's philosophy,but also the bundle theoryof mind of whichit forms
a part.
The bundle theoryof mind, Flage argues, provides the unifyingtheme
of Book I of the Treatise,and he structureshis account of Hume's "doxastic
pathology"of beliefs so that each of Hume's argumentscan be seen as a
'For a thorough surveyand criticismof these views,at least with respect to the
nonmoral issues, see Kenneth P. Winkler,"The New Hume," Philosophical Review
100 (1991): 541-79.
2The locusclassicusof thisbalanced view is Barry Stroud's Hume(London: Rout-
ledge, 1977).
858
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