UPDATES IN PROPERTY REGISTRATION, MORTGAGES,

CONDOMINIUMS AND RELATED PROCEEDINGS

(June 2013)

(Based on Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws

(Land Titles and Deeds), 2011 ed., and Reviewer in Property Registration
(With Sample MCQs and Suggested Answers)1

Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili2

REGALIAN DOCTRINE

Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of whatever classification and other natural
resources not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State which is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. 3
Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the
inalienable public domain.4 Property of the public domain is beyond the commerce of
man and not susceptible of private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. Occupation
thereof in the concept of owner no matter how long cannot ripen into ownership and be
registered as a title.5

1
Published by Rex Book Store. See also: Law on Natural Resources, and Reviewer in Property
Registration and Related Laws (with MCQs and Suggested Answers).
2
Justice Oswaldo D. Agcaoili finished law at the University of Sto. Tomas. He obtained a degree in
Management at the Asian Institute of Management. A former Chief of Legislative and Research Section,
Bureau of Lands, he was appointed Solicitor in the Office of the Solicitor General in 1975, and Assistant
Solicitor General in 1984. In 1995, he was appointed Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. He was
Chairman of the 13th Division upon his retirement from the Court. Court. Justice Agcaoili is a full-time
Professor of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) and Professorial Lecturer of the UP Institute for the
Administration of Justice (UP-IAJ) and other MCLE providers. He is a duly accredited Appellate Court
Mediator (ACM). A delegate/participant in several international conferences, he wrote a paper entitled
Environmental Protection: The Convergence of Law and Policy which he read during the 20th Biennial
Conference on the Law of the World held in Dublin, Ireland in October 2001. Described by Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno as isa sa mga eksperto sa mga karapatan sa lupa (one of our experts on land rights),
Justice Agcaoili is the author of three books: Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles
and Deeds), with a Foreword by Chief Justgice Reynato S. Puno, Law on Natural Resources and
Environmental Law Developments, with a Foreword by Justic Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, and Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Proceedings. (Tel.:
922-0232, 552-9636, 0920-9506384; E-mail: oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com) Justice Agcaoili is married to
the former Consuelo Guerrero Jose with whom he has three children, Mario, Cynthia and Wendy now all
residing with their families in the US.
3
Secretary of the DENR v. Yap, GR No. 172775, Oct. , 2008; Arbias v. Republic, GR No. 173808, Sept. 17,
2008; Alcantara v. DENR, GR No. 161881, July 31, 2008; Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865,
March 2, 2007;Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006; Pagkatipunan v. Court of
Appeals, GR No. 129862, March 21, 2002; Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011.
4
Republic v. Tri-Plus Corporation, G.R. No. 150000, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA 91, 101-102.
5
Republic v. Candy Maker, Inc., G.R. No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272, 291.
 2

The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, 6 embodies the
principle of State ownership of lands and all other natural resources as provided in
Section 2, Art. XII, to wit:

All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and
other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be
alienated.

ANCESTRAL DOMAINS AND

ANCESTRAL LANDS

In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,7 petitioners

challenged the constitutionality of RA No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), on the ground that it amounts to an unlawful
deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural
resources therein, by recognizing the right of ownership of Indigenous Cultural
Communities or Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) to their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands on the basis of native title. After due deliberation on the petition, the Supreme
Court voted as follows: seven (7) Justices voted to dismiss the petition while seven (7)
others voted to grant the petition. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the
necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after
redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56
of the Rules of Court, the petition was dismissed, and the validity of the law, deemed
upheld.

Justice Kapunan, voting to dismiss the petition, stated that the Regalian theory
does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial,
adverting to the landmark case of Cario v. Insular Government,8 where the United
States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes, declared:

It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as
testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of
private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.

The rights of ICCs/IPs may be acquired in two modes: (a) by native title over both
ancestral lands and domains; or (b) by Torrens title under the Public Land Act and
Property Registration Decree with respect to ancestral lands only.

THE TORRENS SYSTEM

OF REGISTRATION

6
Saad Agro-Industries, Inc. v. Republic, GR No. 152570, Sept. 27, 2006.
7
Supra.
8
212 U.S., 449; 53 Law Ed., 594.
 3

The Government has adopted the Torrens system due to its being the most
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of land titles and to protect their
indefeasibility once the claim of ownership is established and recognized. If a person
purchases a piece of land on the assurance that the seller's title thereto is valid, he should
not run the risk of being told later that his acquisition was ineffectual after all, which will
not only be unfair to him as the purchaser, but will also erode public confidence in the
system and will force land transactions to be attended by complicated and not necessarily
conclusive investigations and proof of ownership. The further consequence will be that
land conflicts can be even more abrasive, if not even violent. The Government,
recognizing the worthy purposes of the Torrens system, should be the first to accept the
validity of titles issued thereunder once the conditions laid down by the law are satisfied.9

The Government is required under the Torrens system of registration to issue an

official certificate of title to attest to the fact that the person named in the certificate is the
owner of the property therein described, subject to such liens and encumbrances as
thereon noted or what the law warrants or reserves.10 The objective is to obviate possible
conflicts of title by giving the public the right to rely upon the face of the Torrens
certificate and to dispense, as a rule, with the necessity of inquiring further. The Torrens
system gives the registered owner complete peace of mind, in order that he will be
secured in his ownership as long as he has not voluntarily disposed of any right over the
covered land.11

PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION

The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration, as expressed in Legarda v.

Saleeby,12 a 1915 decision, is to quiet title to land; to put a stop forever to any question of
the legality of the title, except claims which were noted at the time of registration, in the
certificate, or which may arise subsequent thereto. The Torrens system aims to decree
land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable, 13 and to relieve the land of the
burden of known as well as unknown claims.14

However, the Torrens system does not furnish a shield for fraud, 15 nor permit one
to enrich himself at the expense of others,16 otherwise its acceptability is impaired.17

9
Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011Tenio-Obsequio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 107967, March 1, 1997, 230 SCRA 550.
10
Republic v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 133168, March 28, 2006, 485 SCRA 424; citing Noblejas, Land Titles
and Deeds, 1986 ed., p. 32.
11
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-46626-27, December 27, 1979, 94 SCRA 865, 874.
12
GR No. 8936, Oct. 2, 1915, 31 Phil. 590, 31 Phil. 590; see also Ching v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 59731,
Jan. 11, 1990, 181 SCRA 9; National Grains Authority v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-68741,
Jan. 28, 1988, 157 SCRA 388.
13
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Abural, GR No. 14167, Aug. 14, 1919, 39 Phil. 996.
14
SM Prime Holdings, Inc. v. Madayag, supra.
15
Rodriguez v. Lim, GR No. 135817, Nov. 30, 2006, 459 SCRA 412; Manlapat v. Court of Appeals, GR No.
125585, June 8, 2005.
16
Ibid.
17
Ermac v. Ermac, GR No. 149679, May 30, 2003, 403 SCRA 291.
 4

REGISTRATION NOT A MODE

OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP

Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership but is merely a procedure to

establish evidence of title over realty.18 It is a means of confirming the fact of its
existence with notice to the world at large. A certificate of title is not a source of right. It
merely confirms or records a title already existing and vested. 19 The mere possession
thereof does not make one the true owner of the property.20

Mere issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not
foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons
not named in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other
parties may have acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.21

DISTINCTION BETWEEN TITLE

AND CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

Title may be defined briefly as that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, or which is the foundation of ownership of property. Certificate of title, on
the other hand, is a mere evidence of ownership; it is not the title to the land itself.22

CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON

REGISTRATION

Registration in a public registry works as constructive notice to the whole world.

Section 51 of Act No. 496, as amended by Section 52 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
provides:

SECTION 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every conveyance,

mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting
registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds
for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all
persons from the time of such registering, filing, or entering.

REGISTRATION OF LANDS:
GOVERNING LAW

PD No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) issued on June 11, 1978 covers both
ordinary and cadastral registration proceedings, and supersedes Act No. 496 (Land

18
Solid State Multi-Products Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 83383, May 6, 1991, 196 SCRA 630;
Vagilidad v. Vagilidad, GR No. 161136, Nov. 16, 2006, 507 SCRA 94.
19
Tiro v. Phil Estates Corporation, GR No. 170528, Aug. 26, 2008 563 SCRA 309.
20
Borromeo v. Descallar, supra.
21
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
22
Castillo v. Escutin, GR No. 171056, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 258.
 5

Registration Act) which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act No. 2259, or the Cadastral
Act, governs cadastral proceedings.

Section 48(b), CA No. 141 (Public Land Act) governs the procedure for the
judicial confirmation of imperfect of incomplete titles over public lands.

JURISDICTION

Regional Trial Courts have plenary jurisdiction over land registration proceedings
and over all petitions filed after original registration of titles. 23 The registration court may
now hear both contentious and non-contentious cases.24 But first level courts may be
delegated by the Supreme Court to hear and decide cadastral and land registration cases
(a) covering lots without controversy or opposition, or (b) contested lots where the value
does not exceed P100,000.00.25 Appeal is taken to the Court of Appeals.

All petitions or motions after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the
original case in which the decree of registration was entered.26 Section 19 of BP Blg. 129
confers jurisdiction on the RTC over all civil actions which involve the title to or
possession of, real property or any interest therein x x x. The Court of Appeals, or the
LRA for that matter, has no jurisdiction to cancel a certificate of title.27

REGISTRATION UNDER PD 1529

IS A PROCEEDING IN REM

A land registration is a proceeding in rem and jurisdiction in rem cannot be

acquired unless there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service
of notice.28

CLASSIFICATION OF LANDS

Lands of the public domain are classified into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber,
(3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks. With the exception of agricultural lands, all
other natural resources shall not be alienated.29

Sec. 48(b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively to alienable and disposable

public agricultural land. Possession of inalienable public lands, no matter how long,
cannot ripen into private ownership.

SEC. 9. For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the

23
Sec. 2, PD No. 1529.
24
Averia v. Caguioa, GR No. L-65129, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 459.
25
Sec. 34 BP Blg. 129, as amended by RA 7691. See also SC Circular No. 6-93, dated November 15, 1995.
26
Sec. 8, PD No. 1529; Office of the Court Administrator v. Matas, Adm. Mater RTJ-92-836, Aug. 2, 1995,
247 SCRA 9.
27
Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008.
28
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ribaya, GR No. 113549, July 5, 1996, 258 SCRA 223.
29
Secs. 2 and 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
 6

public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use
or purposes to which such lands are destined, as follows:

(a) Agricultural;

(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;

(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and

(d) Reservations for town-sites and for public and quasi-public uses. (CA No.
141 or the Public Land Act).

ILLUSTRATIVE CASE: CLASSIFICATION

OF BORACAY ISLAND

The case of Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v.

30
Yap illustrates the classification by Presidential fiat of Boracay Island in the
Municipality of Malay, Aklan. On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of the case,
President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into 400
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and 628.96 hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable).

Under PD No. 705, or Revised Forestry Code, all unclassified lands are
considered public forest. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its
effectivity.

NON-REGISTRABLE PROPERTIES

Property is either of public dominion or of private ownership.31 The following

things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads and others of similar
character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.32

The following properties are outside the commerce of men and may not be
disposed of or registered: lands for public use or public service, forest lands, mineral,
foreshore lands, swamplands, mangrove lands, watershed, rivers and creeks,
seashore, reclaimed and public reservation.

30
Supra.
31
Art. 419, Civil Code.
32
Art. 420, ibid.
 7

Properties of public dominion are not only exempt from real estate tax, they are
exempt from sale at public auction. But portions of the properties leased to taxable
entities are not only subject to real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction to
satisfy the tax delinquency.33

In Laurel v. Garcia,34 the executive department attempted to sell the Roppongi

property in Tokyo, Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine government for use as
the Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. Although the Chancery had transferred to
another location thirteen years earlier, the Court ruled that, under Article 422 of the Civil
Code, property of public dominion retains such character until formally declared
otherwise.

Foreshore lands, or that part of the land adjacent to the sea which is alternately
covered and left dry by the ordinary flow of the tides, belong to the State. 35 They can
only be disposed of under a foreshore lease or revocable permit application filed with the
Lands Management Bureau.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Republic Real Estate

Corporation,36 the Court held that foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended
for public use. So too are lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,37 Justice Carpio gives an enlightening
historical background of foreshore and reclaimed lands and the development of the law
governing such lands.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Morato,38the Court held that when the sea
moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore
land and passed to the realm of the public domain.

Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can submerged areas be classified as
public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural resources that
the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural lands, the
government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition. Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no longer needed for
public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.39

Forest and mineral lands are public lands not subject to private ownership.
Subsequent release of forest lands as A and D lands does not validate the grant.40

33
City of Pasig v. Republic, GR No. 185023, Aug. 24, 2011
34
GR No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 17 SCRA 797.
35
Republic v. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 199.
36
Supra.
37
Supra.
38
GR No. 100709, Nov. 14, 1997, 281 SCRA 639.
39
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, supra.
40
Ituralde v. Falcasantos, 301 SCRA 293; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 295 SCRA 296.
 8

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to
crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as
forest is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title do not apply.41

Minerals found in public or even private land belong to the State. 42 In a resolution
dated December 1, 2004, the Supreme Court in La Bugal-Blaan Association v. Ramos43
held that all mineral resources are owned by the State and their exploration, development
and utilization must always be subject to the full control and supervision of the State.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and De la Rosa,44 Justice Cruz said that the
Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels
of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. Thus, if a person is
the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such
land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

Land inside a military or naval reservation cannot be registered. 45 The Calumpang

Point Naval Reservation can not be subject to occupation, entry or settlement. The
government, through the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), has title
and ownership over Fort Bonifacio. To segregate portions of the public domain as a
military reservation, all that is needed is a presidential proclamation to that effect.

In Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc.,46 it was held that a

military reservation, like the FBMR, or a part thereof is not open to private appropriation
or disposition and, therefore, not registrable, unless it is in the meantime reclassified and
declared as disposable and alienable public land. And until a given parcel of land is
released from its classification as part of the military reservation zone and reclassified by
law or by presidential proclamation as disposable and alienable, its status as part of a
military reservation remains, even if incidentally it is devoted for a purpose other than as
a military camp or for defense.

41
Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, GR No. L-27873, Nov. 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69.
42
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Dela Rosa, 160 SCRA 228.
43
GR No. 127882, Dec. 1, 2004, 445 SCRA 1.
44
GR No. L-43938, April 15, 1980, 160 SCRA 228.
45
Republic v. Southside Homeowners Association, Inc. GR No. 156951, Sept. 2, 2006.
46
GR No. 156951, Sept. 22, 2006.
 9

Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and registered,47 and so are lakes,48

watersheds49 and mangrove swamps.50

WHO MAY APPLY FOR REGISTRATION

Under Section 14, PD No. 1529, the following may apply for registration:

(1) Those who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or acquired under existing laws;

(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
for by law.

Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 (Public Land Act), it is provided as follows:

Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto may apply for the confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title.

NO SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN

SEC. 14(1), PD No. 1529 and SEC. 48(b), CA NO. 141

There is no substantial difference between Sec. 14(1) of PD No. 1529 and Sec.
48(b) of CA No. 141. In both, the applicant must show that (1) the land is alienable and
disposable (A and D) public agricultural land; and (2) he has been in open, continuous
exclusive and notorious possession thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945, or prior thereto.51 Both refer to original registration proceedings, are
against the whole world, and the decree of registration for both is conclusive and final.

REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTRATION

47
Republic v. Sioson, 9 SCRA 533.
48
Pelbel Manufacturing Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 141325, July 31, 2006; Republic v. Court
of Appeals and Del Rio, 131 SCRA 532.
49
Sta. Rosa Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 367 SCRA 175.
50
Sec. 4, RA No. 8550.
51
Republic v. San Lorenzo Development Corporation, GR No. 170724, Jan. 29, 2007; Reyes v. Republic,
GR No. 141924, Jan. 23, 2007; Republic v. Manna Properties, GR No. 146527, Jan. 31, 2005, 450 SCRA
247..
 10

UNDER SEC. 14(1), PRD IN RELATION

TO SEC. 48(B), PLA.

Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree has three requisites for
registration of title: (a) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; (b) that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation; and (c) that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.52

Possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted

and adverse. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or
occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the
land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so
conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the
neighborhood.53

In Malabanan v. Court of Appeals,54 the Court en banc reiterated the rule in

Republic v. Court of Appeals and Naguit55 that since Section 48(b) (in relation to Section
14[1]) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands
should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the
possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is
declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the
Public Land Act.56

Originally, Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 provided for the possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since July 26, 1984. This was superseded by
RA No. 1942 which provided for a simple 30-year prescriptive period of occupation by
an applicant for judicial confirmation of an imperfect title. The law, however, has been
amended by PD No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, which now requires possession
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto.57

Vested rights acquired under Sec. 48(b) prior to its amendment by PD 1073 must
be respected. Thus, an applicant who, prior to the effectivity of PD 1973 on Jan. 25,
1977, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
52
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011;
Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 489 Phil. 405, 413 (2005).
53
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012, citing.
Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, Sept. 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
54
GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.
55
448 SCRA 442.
56
Emphasis supplied.
57
Rep. v. East Silverlane, GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012; Rep. v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012;
Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources v. Yap, GR No. 173775, Oct. 8, 2008; Republic v. Sarmiento, GR No. 169397, March 13, 2007;
Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 183; Republic v. Doldol, 295 SCRA
359. See also RA No. 6940, dated March 28, 1990.
 11

of an agricultural land of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at
least 30 years, or at least since Jan. 24, 1947, may apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the PLA.58

ONLY FILIPINO CITIZENS MAY ACQUIRE

LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

On the basis of their capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain, the
following may acquire private lands:

(1) Filipino citizens;

(2) Filipino corporations and association as defined in Section 2, Article XII of

the Constitution; and, by exception,

(3) Aliens but only be hereditary succession; and

(4) A natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship can both
acquire or hold lands of the public domain, the limitation being up to a
maximum of 5,000 square meters if urban land, or 3 hectares if rural land.59

Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities qualified to acquire

or hold lands of the public domain. Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60%
of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain. The fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or
holding title to private lands, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition
was made by a former natural-born citizen.60 Aliens, however, may lease private lands.61

The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine

land and not to the improvements built thereon. Land cannot sold to an alien and is
allowed to recover the money spent for the purchase thereof. The provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution.62

CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE LAND IS

DETERMINED AT THE TIME OF ITS
ACQUISITION, NOT REGISTRATION

The time to determine whether a person acquiring land is qualified is the time the
right to own it is acquired. Thus, a naturalized Canadian citizen who, while still a
natural-born Filipino, acquired land from a vendor who had already complied with the
58
Rep. v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012,
59
Bernas, The 1987 Constitution, A Reviewer Primer, 2000 ed., 515; Sec. 8, Art. XII, Constitution; RA No.
7042, as amended by RA No. 8179.
60
Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, Feb. 24, 2009.
61
Ong Ching Po v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 341; Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461;
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52.
62
Beumer v. Amores, GR No. 195670, Dec. 3, 2012, citing cases.
 12

requirements of registration prior to the purchase, can validly register his title to the land
even if at the time of the filing of his application he was already an alien. 63 He already
had a vested right to the land.

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND

BY PRESCRIPTION

In Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation,64 Section 14(2)

must be considered in relation to the rule on prescription under the Civil Code as a mode
of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. Possession and occupation of an
alienable and disposable public land for the periods provided under the Civil Code do not
automatically convert said property into private property or release it from the public
domain. There must be an express declaration that the property is no longer intended for
public service or development of national wealth. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the State, and
thus, may not be acquired by prescription. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public
dominion begin to run.65 Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized
by law.66 The period of possession preceding the classification of the property as
patrimonial cannot be considered in determining the completion of the prescriptive
period.67

Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a

patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with
just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith
or just title, ripens into ownership.68

Open, continuous and exclusive possession of land classified as A and D land for
at least thirty years segregates the land from the public domain and ipso jure converts the
same to private property.69 The conversion works to summon in operation Sec. 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree which authorizes the acquisition of private lands
through ordinary prescription of ten years or extraordinary prescription of thirty years. 70

(Note: In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon, 71 the Court

ruled that a mere Notice of Adverse Claim did not constitute an effective interruption of

63
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Lapia, 235 SCRA 567.
64
GR No. 186961, Feb. 20, 2012.
65
Malabanan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009.
66
Republic v. Espinosa, GR No. 171514, July 18, 2012
67
Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corporation, supra.
68
Id.
69
Buenaventura v. Republic, GR No. 166865, March 2, 2007; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 56;
See Arts. 1127 and 1134, Civil Code.
70
Lincoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic, GR No. 167652, July 10, 2007.
71
G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391.
 13

possession. In the case of Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, 72 which
also cited the Raon Case, the Court stated that the acts of declaring again the property
for tax purposes and obtaining a Torrens certificate of title in one's name cannot defeat
another's right of ownership acquired through acquisitive prescription. In the same vein, a
protest filed before an administrative agency and even the decision resulting from it
cannot effectively toll the running of the period of acquisitive prescription. Only in cases
filed before the courts may judicial summons be issued and, thus, interrupt possession.73)

ACQUISITION OF PRIVATE LAND

BY RIGHT OF ACCESSION OR
ACCRETION

Under Article 420, paragraph 174 and Article 502, paragraph 175 of the Civil Code,
rivers and their natural beds are property of public dominion.

River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the
waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in
proportion to the area lost.76 However, the owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall
have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not
exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.

By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the
effects of the current of the water belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the
banks of rivers where it forms.77 The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the
dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian
owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person. 78 In Celestial v.
Cachopero,79 it was held that a dried-up creek bed is property of public dominion.80

Article 457 of the Civil Code requires that the deposit be gradual and
imperceptible; that it be made through the effects of the current of the water; and that the
land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers.81 However, the
accretion does not automatically become registered land just because the lot which

72
Heirs of Bienvenido and Araceli Tanyag v. Gabriel, G.R. No. 175763, April 11, 2012. citing Heirs of
Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Raon, G.R. No. 171068, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 391, 406-407.
73
Virtucio v. Alegarbes, GR No. 187451, Aug. 29, 2012.
74
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; . . . .
75
Art. 502. The following are of public dominion:
1) Rivers and their natural beds; . . . .
76
Art. 461, Civil Code.
77
Art. 457, id.
78
Republic v. Santos, GR No. 160453, Nov. 12, 2012.
79
459 Phil. 903 (2003).
80
See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
81
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011.
 14

receives such accretion is covered by a Torrens title. There must be a separate action for
the registration thereof.82

Alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain and is not open
to acquisition by adverse possession, unless subsequently declared as no longer needed
for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries.83

PRIVATE CORPORATIONS DISQUALIFIED

FROM ACQUIRING PUBLIC LANDS

A private corporation may not hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares.84 The rule does not apply where at the time the
corporation acquired the land, the same was already private land as when it was
possessed by its predecessor in the manner and for such length of time as to entitle the
latter to registration.85

If the predecessors-in-interest of the corporation have been in possession of the

land in question since June 12, 1945, or earlier, then it may rightfully apply for
confirmation of title to the land.86 In Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court
and Acme,87 it was held that a private corporation may apply for judicial confirmation of
the land without need of a separate confirmation proceeding for its predecessors-in-
interest first.88

PUBLICATION, MAILING AND POSTING

Within five days from the filing of the application for registration, the court shall
issue an order setting the date and hour of initial hearing which shall not be earlier than
45 days nor later than 90 days from date of the order. 89 The public is given notice of the
initial hearing by (a) publication once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of
general circulation; (b) mailing of the notice to persons named in the application for
registration and also to relevant government officials, and (c) posting of the notice on a
conspicuous place on the land itself and on the bulletin board of the city or municipality
where the land is situated.90 Publication in the OG shall be sufficient to confer
jurisdiction.91 However, publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation
remains an indispensable requirement consistent with procedural due process.92

82
Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524.
83
Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335.
84
Sec. 3, Art. XII, Constitution.
85
Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court and ACME, 146 SCRA 509.
86
Republic v. Iglesia ni Cristo, GR No. 180067, June 30, 2009, 591 SCRA 438.
87
GR No. 73002, Dec. 29, 1986, 230 Phil. 590.
88
Republic v. Manna Properties, Inc., supra.
89
Sec. 23, PD No. 1529.
90
Id.
91
Sec. 24, PD No. 1529.
92
Roxas v. Court of Appeals, 63 SCRA 302; Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Abistado, 27 SCRA
276.
 15

If amendment of the application is made to include additional area, a new

publication of the amended application must be made, but not when the amendment
consists in the exclusion of a portion form the area originally applied for.93

OPPOSITION

Any person, whether named in the notice or not, may appear and file and
opposition, based on right of dominion or some other real right, to the application for
registration.94 The absence of opposition does not justify outright registration. Since the
presumption is that all lands belong to the State, the applicant has the burden of proving
his imperfect right or fee simple title to the land applied for.95 The failure of the
government to file an opposition, despite receipt of notice, does not deprive it of its right
to appeal a decision adjudicating the land as private property.96

PROOF AS TO THE
IDENTITY OF THE LAND

As required by Section 17 of PD No. 1529, the application for registration must

be accompanied by a survey plan of the land duly approved by the Director of Lands
(now Regional Technical Director, Lands Management Bureau), together with the
applicants muniments of title. No plan or survey may be admitted in land registration
proceedings until approved by the Director of Lands.

In Director of Lands v. Reyes,97 the Supreme Court declared that the submission
of the tracing cloth plan is a statutory requirement of mandatory character. But in
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Iglesia ni Cristo,98 the Court considered the
submission of a white print copy of the plan as sufficient to identify the land. The Court
was more categorical in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court and
Espartinez99 when it stated that the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required x x x
may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan the correctness of which had not
been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence.

PROOF OF CLASSIFICATION
OF LAND AS A AND D
The following may be considered sufficient to establish the classification of land
as alienable and disposable land for purposes of original registration:

1. Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development that the land has been
released as alienable and disposable land.

93
Benin v. Tuason, 57 SCRA 531.
94
Sec. 27 PD No. 1529.
95
Director of Lands v. Agustin, 42 Phil. 227.
96
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
97
GR No.L-27594, Nov. 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
98
GR No. L-56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 586.
99
GR No. 70825, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 98.
 16

2. Land Classification Map showing that the land lies within the alienable
and disposable portion of the public domain.

3. Executive proclamation withdrawing from a reservation a specific area

and declaring the same open for entry, sale or other mode of disposition.

4. Legislative act or executive proclamation reserving a portion of the public

domain for public or quasi-public use, which amounts to a transfer of ownership to the
grantee.

5. The report of a land inspector of the Bureau of Lands that the subject land
was found inside an agricultural zone and is suitable for rice cultivation is binding on
the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the
Government to classify public lands. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or
status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.100

6. A certification by the CENRO of the DENR stating that the land subject of an
application is found to be within the alienable and disposable site per a land classification
project map is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of the
application.101

7. The Certification by DENR Regional Technical Director that Lot 249 had
been verified as belonging to the alienable and disposable area as early as July 18, 1925,
as annotated on the subdivision plan, constitutes substantial compliance with the legal
requirement.102

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,103 the Court held that the applicant shall
submit the following: (a) CENRO or PENRO certification that the land is A and D, and
(b) copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as
true by the legal custodian thereof.

But in DENR Memorandum No. 564, dated Nov. 15, 2012, it was clarified that
the issuance of the certification and the certified copy of the approved LC Map to prove
that the area applied for is indeed classified as A and D is within the competence and
jurisdiction of the CENRO where the area is below 0.50 has., or the PENRO where it is
more than 0.50 has.

100
Republic v. De Porkan, GR No. L-66866, June 18, 1987, it is not enough for the Provincial Environment
and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(CENRO) to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove th
151 SCRA 88.
101
Llanes v. Republic, GR No. 177947, Nov. 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, citing Republic v. Candy Maker,
Inc., GR No. 163766, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 272.
102
Republic v. Serrano, GR No. 183063, Feb. 24, 2010.
103
GR No. 154953, June 26, 2008, 613 SCRA 537. See also Republic v. Bantigue, GR No. 162322, March
14, 2012; Republic v. Dela Paz, GR No. 171631, Nov. 5, 2010; Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines
Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011; Victoria v. Republic, GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.
 17

In Llanes v. Republic,104 the Court allowed consideration of a CENRO

Certification although it was only presented during appeal to the CA to avoid a patent
unfairness. In Victoria v. Republic,105 the subject property was covered by a cadastral
survey of Taguig conducted by the government. The Court held: Such surveys are
carried out precisely to encourage landowners and help them get titles to the lands
covered by such survey. It does not make sense to raise an objection after such a survey
that the lands covered by it are inalienable land of the public domain, like a public forest.
This is the City of Taguig in the middle of the metropolis.

That there are building structures, residential houses and even government
buildings existing and standing on the area does not prove that the land is no longer
considered and classified as forest land.106 The conversion of the property by the
applicant into a fishpond or the titling of properties around it, does not authomatically
render the property alienable and didsposable.107

PROOF OF IDENTITY
OF THE LAND

The land must be surveyed to establish its identity, location and area. Only the
LMB Director may approve survey plans for original registration purposes. (PD 239, July
9, 1973) A certified blue print or white print copy of the plan suffices for registration
purposes. (Director of Lands v. CA and Iglesia ni Cristo, 158 SCRA 586)

Survey is the process by which a parcel of land is measured and its boundaries
and contents ascertained; also a map, plat or statement of the result of such survey, with
the courses and distances and the quantity of the land.108 What defines a piece of land is
not the area but the boundaries thereof.109

EVIDENCE OF POSSESSION

Under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 and Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529, the
reckoning point of possession is June 12, 1945.110 It is only necessary that the land is
already classified as A and D land at the time of the filing of the application for
registration.111

Possession must be open, continuous, exclusive and notorious under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.112 Acts of a possessory character by
104
G.R. No. 177947, November 27, 2008, 572 SCRA 258, 268-269.
105
GR No. 179673, June 8, 2011.
106
Chang v. Republic, GR No. 171726, Feb. 23, 2011.
107
Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals and Valeriano, GR No. 58867, June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689.
108
Pabaus v. Yutiamco, GR No. 164356, July 27, 2011.
109
Republic v. CA and Santos, 301 SCRA 366; Dichoso v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 55613, Dec. 10, 1990.
110
Del Rosario-Igtiben v. Republic, GR No. 158449, Oct. 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 188..
111
Malabanan v. Republic, GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009, 587 SCRA 172.
112
Sec. 14(1), PD No. 1529; Sec. 48(b), CA No. 141, as amended; Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec.
4, 2008; Republic v. Herbieto, GR No. 156117, 26 May 2005, 459 SCRA 183
 18

virtue of a license or mere tolerance on the part of the real owner are not sufficient. 113
Mere casual cultivation of land, the raising of cattle or grazing of livestock without
substantial enclosures or other permanent improvements do not constitute exclusive and
notorious possession under claim of ownership114

VESTED RIGHTS

A vested right is some right or interest in property that has become fixed and
established, and is no longer open to doubt or controversy. Rights are vested when the
right to enjoyment, present or prospective, has become the property of some person as
present interest.

An open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public

domain from time immemorial by a private individual personally o through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land cease to be
public, and becomes private property. Compliance with all requirements for a
government grant ipso jure converts land to private property. The land ceases to be of the
public domain and is beyond the authority of the DENR to dispose of it under any of the
modes of disposition under the Public Land Act.115

TAX DECLARATIONS AND

TAX RECEIPTS

Tax declarations and payment of taxes are not conclusive proof of ownership but
have strong probative value when accompanied by proof of actual possession or
supported by other effective proof.116 Declaring land for taxation purposes and visiting it
every once in a while do not constitutes acts of possession. 117 Tax declarations are not
evidence of the right of possession unless supported by the other effective proof. But
they constitute proof that the holder has claim of the title over the property.118

Payment of taxes is on an annual basis. Delayed declaration of property for tax

purposes negates a claim of continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner.119 Hence, payment in one a lump sum to cover all past taxes is
irregular and affects the validity of the applicants claim of ownership. 120 But mere
failure of the owner to pay taxes does not warrant a conclusion that there was
abandonment of the property.121

113
Seminary of San Carlos v. Municipality of Cebu, GR No. L-4641, March 13, 1911, 19 Phil.32.
114
Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734; Director of lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
115
Susi v. Razzon, GR No. 24066, Dec. 9, 1925, 48 Phil. 424.
116
Tan v. Republic, GR No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008; Municipality of Santiago v. Court of Appeals, id.
117
Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 214.
118
Municipality of Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820; Masagana v. Argamora, 109 SCRA 53; Director of
lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177.
119
Regalado v. Republic, GR No. 168155, Feb. 15, 2007.
120
Republic v. Tayag, 131 SCRA 140.
121
Reyes v. Sierra, 93 SCRA 472.
 19

SPANISH TITLES NO LONGER

VALID PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

Spanish titles are no longer admissible as proof of ownership. The so-called

Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136 is inexistent.122 In a case, TCT No. 451423-A was traced
back to Titulo de Propriedad No. 4136, which, in the Intestate Estate of the late Don
Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court of Appeals, was already declared null and void,
and from which, the Court declared, no rights could therefore be derived.123

JUDGMENT; DECREE OF REGISTRATION

Within 15 days from entry of judgment, the court shall issue an order directing the
Land Registration Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration and certificate of
title.124 There is no period within which to issue the decree.125

While the judgment becomes final 15 days from receipt of notice of the judgment
(as to the government, period of appeal shall be reckoned from receipt of the decision by
the Solicitor General who represents the government in all registration proceedings), 126
the court nevertheless retains jurisdiction over the case until after the expiration of one
year from the issuance of the decree of registration; 127 hence, the case may still be
reopened and the decision set aside when granted.128

Execution pending appeal is not applicable in a land registration proceeding and

the certificate of title thereby issued is null and void. A Torrens title issued on the basis of
a judgment that is not final is a nullity, as it is violative of the explicit provisions of the
Property Registration Decree which requires that a decree shall be issued only after the
decision adjudicating the title becomes final and executory, and it is on the basis of said
decree that the Register of Deeds concerned issues the corresponding certificate of title.129

A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land

already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land registration case. A second
decree for the same land would be null and void.130

122
PD No. 892, dated Aug. 16, 1976; Santiago v. SBMA, GR No. 156888, Nov. 20, 2006; Quezon Province
v. Marte, GR No. 139274, Oct. 23, 2001; Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro v. Court of Appeals,
265 SCRA 733; Director of Land v. Rivas, 141 SCRA 329.
123
De la Rosa v. Valdez, GR No. 159101, July 27, 2011.
124
Sec. 30, PD No. 1529)
125
Del Rosario v. Limcaoco, GR No. 177392, Nov. 26, 2012.
126
Sec. 1 (e), PD No. 478; Republic v. Sayo, 191 SCRA 71.
127
Gomez v. Court of Appeals, 168 SCRA 503.
128
Cayanan v. De los Santos, 21CRA 1348.
129
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing cases.
130
Mercado v. Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc., GR No. 141019, Nov. 23, 2011, citing Laburada v.
Land Registration Authority, G.R. No. 101387, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 333, 343-344, citing
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage Systems v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103558, November 17,
1992, 215 SCRA 783, 788.
 20

In Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals,131 the Court held that a judicial

declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same applicant from
subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land, provided he
thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48132 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
as amended, and as long as said public lands remain alienable and disposable.133

WRIT OF POSSESSION

The writ may be issued not only against the person defeated in the registration
case but also against any one adversely occupying the land during the proceedings up to
the issuance of the decree.134 The writ does not lie against a person who entered the land
after the issuance of the decree and who was not a party in the case. He can only be
proceeded against in a separate action for ejectment or reivindicatory action. 135 The writ
is imprescriptible. A writ of demolition is but a compliment of the writ of possession 136
and may be issued by a special order of the court. Mandamus is a proper remedy to
compel the issuance of a writ of possession.137

JURISDICTION: REAL ACTIONS

Section 1, 14 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that actions
affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real actions) shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the area
where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

An action for reconveyance or to remove a cloud on one's title involves the title
to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, hence, exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action pertains to the RTC, unless the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila), in which instance
the MTC having territorial jurisdiction would have exclusive original jurisdiction.
Determinative of which regular court had jurisdiction would be the allegations of the

131
G.R. No. 45828, June 1, 1992, 209 SCRA 457, 463, citing Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
47847, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 426, 433.
132
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis supplied).
133
Valiao v. Republic, GR No. 170757, Nov. 28, 2011
134
Vencilao v. Vano, 182 SCRA 491.
135
Bernas v. Nuevo, 127 SCRA 399.
136
Gawaran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 162 SCRA 154; Lucero v. Leot, 25 SCRA 687.
137
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011.
 21

complaint (on the assessed value of the property) and the principal relief thereby
sought.138

The original and exclusive jurisdiction over a complaint for quieting of title and
reconveyance involving friar land belongs to either the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Hence, the dismissal of such a complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction due to the land in litis being friar land under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Land Management Bureau (LMB) amounts to manifest grave abuse of discretion
that can be corrected through certiorari.139

Actions for cancellation of title and reversion belong to the class of cases that
"involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein" and where the
assessed value of the property exceeds P20,000.00, fall under the jurisdiction of the
RTC.140

When the dispossession or unlawful deprivation has lasted more than one year,
one may avail himself of accion publiciana to determine the better right of possession, or
possession de jure, of realty independently of title. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership which necessarily includes recovery of
possession. While an accion reivindicatoria is not barred by a judgment in an ejectment
case, such judgment constitutes a bar to the institution of the accion publiciana. 141

REMEDIES CONSEQUENT TO
FRAUDULENT OR IRREGULAR
REGISTRATION

The aggrieved party has a number of remedies to question the validity of the
decision. These include the remedies of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 37 of the
Rules of Court, relief from judgment under Rule 38, or appeal to the Court of Appeals or
Supreme Court pursuant to Section 33, PD No. 1529.

Under the property Registration Decree, the remedies consequent to fraudulent or

irregular registration are: review of decree under Section 32; reconveyance under Secs.
53 and 96; damages under Sec. 32; claim against the Assurance Fund under Sec. 95;
reversion under Sec. 101, CA No. 141; cancellation of title; quieting of title; annulment
of judgment under Rule 47; and criminal prosecution under the Revised Penal Code and
other special laws.

Petition for review of decree. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

In Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia,142 the Supreme Court, citing Agcaoili,

138
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011, citing Heirs of Generoso Sebe v. Heirs of Veronico
Sevilla, G.R. No. 174497, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 395, 400.
139
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011.
140
Republic v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, GR No. 192975, Nov. 12, 2012; Santos v. CA, 214 SCRA 162.
141
Viray v. Usi, GR No. 192486, Nov. 21, 2012, citing cases.
142
GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010, per Justice Peralta.
 22

Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and Deeds), stressed that
courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final decision or decree when an
application for review is filed by the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of
the decree of registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved party must be anchored
solely on actual fraud.

It has been ruled that the petition may be filed at any time after the rendition of
the courts decision and before the expiration of one year from the entry of the final
decree of registration for, as noted in Rivera v. Moran,143 there can be no possible reason
for requiring the complaining party to wait until the final decree is entered before urging
his claim of fraud.

The rule on the incontrovertibility and indefeasibility of a Torrens title after one
year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to titles acquired
through homestead or free patents.144 It has been held that the date of issuance of the
patent corresponds to the date of the issuance of the decree in ordinary registration cases.

Under the Torrens system of registration, the Torrens becomes indefeasible and
incontrovertible one year from the issuance of the final decree and is generally conclusive
evidence of the ownership.145 The rule on the inconvertibility and indefeasibility of a
Torrens title after one year from entry of the decree of registration is equally applicable to
title acquired through homestead or free patents.146 Only extrinsic or collateral, as
distinguished form intrinsic, fraud is a ground for annulling a judgment.

To avail of a petition for review, the following requisites must be satisfied: (a) the
petitioner must have an estate or interest in the land; (b) he must show actual fraud in the
procurement of the decree of registration; (c) the petition must be filed within one (1)
year from the issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Authority; and (d) the
property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value.147

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the successful party in a litigation
which is committed outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case. On the other hand, intrinsic fraud refers to acts of a party
in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just
determination of the case.

Relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists
in the following acts:

(a) Deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they
143
GR No. 24568, March 2, 1926, 48 Phil. 836.
144
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
145
Calalang v. Register of Deeds, 231 SCRA 88 (1992)
146
Iglesia ni Cristo v. CFI of Nueva Ecija, GR No. L-35273, July 25, 1983, 208 Phil. 441.
147
Walstrom v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431.
 23

are;

(b) Applying for and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-
owner of land which he knows had not been alloted to him in the partition;

(c) Intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the land inspector to
include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream;

(d) Willfully misrepresenting that there are no other claims;

(e) Deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to notice;

(f) Inducing a claimant not to oppose the application for registration;

(g) Misrepresentation by the applicant about the identity of the lot to the true
owner causing the latter to withdraw his opposition.148

(h) Failure of the applicant to disclose in her application for registration the vital
facts that her husbands previous application for a revocable permit and to
purchase the lands in question from the Bureau of Lands had been rejected,
because the lands were already reserved as a site for school purposes;

(i) Deliberate falsehood that the lands were allegedly inherited by the applicant
from her parents, which misled the Bureau of Lands into not filling the
opposition and thus effectively depriving the Republic of its day in court.149

In all these examples, the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of
the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting
his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the
court.

In Cruz v. Navarro,150 it was held that the intentional omission by the respondent
to properly inform the court a quo that there were persons (the petitioners) in actual
possession and cultivation of the parcels in question, with the result that the court as well
as the Land Registration Authority were denied of their authority to require the sending of
specific individual notices of the pendency of the application in accordance with Sections
23 and 24 of the Property Registration Decree, constitutes actual fraud.

Reconveyance. (Sec. 96 PD No. 1529)

148
Libudan v. Palma Gil, GR No. L-21164, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17.
149
Republic v. Lozada, GR No. L-43852, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 502.
150
GR No. L-27644, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 109.
 24

An action for reconveyance is a legal and equitable remedy granted to the rightful
landowner, whose land was wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another,
to compel the registered owner to transfer or reconvey the land to him.151

An action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a person whose

property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in another's name. It is
filed as an ordinary action in the ordinary courts of justice and not with the land
registration court. A notice of lis pendens may be annotated on the certificate of title
immediately upon the institution of the action in court.152

As held in Medizabel v. Apao,153 the essence of an action for reconveyance is that

the certificate of title is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought is the transfer of the
property, in this case its title, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another person's name, to its rightful owner or to one with a better right. The mere
issuance of the certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named in
the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have
acquired interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.154

Reconveyance does not aim to reopen proceedings but only to transfer or

reconvey the land from registered owner to the rightful owner.155 Reconveyance is
available in case of registration of property procured by fraud thereby creating a
constructive trust between the parties.156

To warrant a reconveyance of the land, the following requisites must concur:

(a) the action must be brought in the name of a person claiming ownership or
dominical right over the land registered in the name of the defendant;

(b) the registration of the land in the name of the defendant was procured
through fraud or other illegal means;

(c) the property has not yet passed to an innocent purchaser for value; and

(d) the action is filed after the certificate of title had already become final and
incontrovertible but within four years from the discovery of the fraud, 157 or
151
Leoveras v. Valdez, GR No. 169985, June 15, 2011.
152
Muoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011, citing cases.
153
G.R. No. 143185, February 20, 2006, 482 SCRA 587, 608. See also Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030,
Sept. 14, 2011
154
Pineda v. Court of Appeals. 456 Phil. 732, 748 (2003), citing Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, 354
Phil. 556, 561-562 (1998).
155
Bautista-Borja v. Bautista, GR No. 136197, Dec. 10, 2008; Daclag v. Macahilig, GR No. 159578, July
28, 2008; Esconde v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603; Rodriguez v. Toreno, 79 SCRA 356.
156
Huang v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 198525, September 13, 1994.
157
Balbin v. Medalla, GR No. L-46410, Oct. 30, 1981, 108 SCRA 666, which held that: An action for
reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which
requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud.
 25

not later than 10 years in the case of an implied trust.158

A petition for review and action for reconveyance are no longer available if the
property has already been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value.

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to
recover the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must
prove two (2) things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.159

There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance, for it is enough that the
aggrieved party asserts a legal claim in the property superior to the claim of the registered
owner, and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value.160

ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE MAY

BE BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION

(1) Action based on fraud - four years

(2) Action based on implied trust - ten years

(3) Action based on a void contract imprescriptible

(4) Action to quiet title where plaintiff is in possession imprescriptible

An action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in

ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property, or the instrument
affecting the same is inscribed in accordance with law, inasmuch as it is what binds the
land and operates constructive notice to the world. Repudiation of said trust is not a
condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period. 161
The 10-year prescriptive period applies only when the reconveyance is based on
fraud which makes a contract voidable (and that the aggrieved party is not in possession
of the land whose title is to be actually reconveyed). It does not apply to an action to
nullify a contract which is void ab initio. Article 1410 of the Civil Code categorically
states that an action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.162

But prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the
158
New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, GR No. 168800, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 329, citing Walstrom
v. Mapa, GR No. 38387, Jan. 29, 1990, 181 SCRA 431; Kionisala v. Dacut, GR No. 147379, Feb. 27,
2002, 378 SCRA 206.
159
Fierro v. Seguiran, GR No. 152141, Aug. 8, 2011, citing Hutchinson v. Buscas, 498 Phil. 257, 262
(2005).
160
Reterta v. Mores, GR No. 159941, Aug. 17, 2011; Heirs of Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. v. Lumocso, G.R.
No. 158121, December 12, 2007, 540 SCRA 1, 13-14.
161
Cabacungan v. Laigo, GR No. 175073, Aug. 15, 2011Spouses Abrigo v. De Vera, 476 Phil. 641, 653
(2004).
162
Abalols v.Dimakuta, GR No. 164693, March 23, 2011.
 26

disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or
his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right.163

LACHES MAY BAR RECOVERY

Where a court of equity finds that the position of the parties has to change that
equitable relief cannot be afforded without doing injustice, or that the intervening rights
of third persons may be destroyed or seriously impaired, it will not exert its equitable
powers in order to save one from the consequences of his own neglect. 164 This is the basic
principle of laches which may bar recovery for ones neglect or inaction.

Cancellation of title

Fraud and misrepresentation, as grounds for cancellation of patent and annulment

of title, should never be presumed, but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
mere preponderance of evidence not being adequate. Fraud is a question of fact which
must be proved.165

Action for damages. (Sec. 32, PD No. 1529)

This action may be filed against applicant or person responsible for the fraud
where reconveyance is no longer possible as when the land has been transferred to an
innocent purchaser for value.166

Action for compensation from the Assurance Fund. (Sec. 95, PD No. 1529)

The requisites for recovery are: (a) a person sustains loss or damage, or is
deprived by any estate or interest in land; (b) on account of the bringing of land under the
Torrens system; (c) through fraud, error, omission, mistake or misdescription in the
certificate of entry in the registration book; (d) without negligence on his part, and (e) is
barred from bringing an action for recovery of the land.167

Reversion. (Sec. 101, CA No. 141)

The action is instituted by the government, through the Solicitor General, in all
cases where lands of public domain are held in violation of the Constitution 168 or were
fraudulently obtained.169

Annulment of Judgment. (Rule 47, Rules of Court)

163
Yared v. Tiongco, GR No. 161360, Oct. 19, 2011.
164
Lucas v. Gamponia, GR No. L-9335, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 277.
165
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011
166
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9)
167
Sec. 95, PD No. 1529.
168
Sec. 35, Chapter XII, Title III, EO No. 292.
169
Hermosilla v. Remoquillo, GR No. 167320, Jan. 30, 2007.
 27

A petition for annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final orders of

Regional Trial Court for which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. are no
longer available must be based on (a) extrinsic fraud, (b) lack of jurisdiction 170 and (c)
lack of due process.171 A petition for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
must be filed within four (4) years from its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction,
before it is barred by laches or estoppel.172

Lack of jurisdiction as a ground for annulment of judgment refers to either lack of

jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the
claim.173

Where the questioned judgment is annulled, either on the ground of extrinsic

fraud or lack of jurisdiction, the same shall be set aside and considered void. 174
Annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment
sought to be annulled was rendered. Consequently, an action for annulment of judgment
may be availed of even if the judgment to be annulled had already been fully executed or
implemented.175

In Yujuico v. Republic,176 the Court ruled that the action of the government for
reversion on the ground that the land was part of the Manila Bay was improperly filed
with the RTC as the action should have been filed with the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Rule 47 of the Rules of Court governing annulment of judgments of RTCs.

Final judgments of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies are not

susceptible to petitions for annulment under Rule 47.177

PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH

Section 32 of PD No. 1529 provides that in no case shall such (petition for
review) be entertained by the court where an innocent purchaser for value has acquired
the land or an interest therein, whose rights may be prejudiced.
An innocent purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without
notice that some other person has a right to or interest in it, and who pays a full and fair
price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another persons
claim.178

170
Rule 47. Rules of Court.
171
Diona v. Balangue, GR No. 173559, Jan. 7, 2013.
172
Section 3, id.; Galicia v. Manliquez, GR No. 155785, April 13, 2007.
173
Alcazar v. Arante, GR No. 177042, Dec. 10, 2012.
174
RULES OF COURT, Rule 47, Sec. 7; Bulawan v. Aquende, GR No. 182819, June 22, 2011.
175
Bulawan v. Aquende, supra.
176
GR No. 168861, Oct. 26, 2007, citing Agcaoili, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws.
177
Fraginal v. Paraal, GR No. 150207, Feb. 23, 2007, 516 SCVRA 530.
178
Rosales v. Burgos, GR No. 143573, Jan. 30, 2009, 577 SCRA 264.
 28

A person dealing with registered property need not go beyond, but only has to rely
on, the title. He is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims which are
annotated on the title, for registration is the operative act that binds the property.179 But a
purchaser can not close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man on his guard
and still claim that he acted in good faith.180
The rule of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title
of the vendor and one who buys without checking the vendors title takes all the risks and
losses consequent to such failure.

Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides that, as regards immovable property,
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first recorded the sale
in the Registry of Property.

In Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, the adverse claim and the notice of lis
pendens were annotated on the title on October 30, 1979 and December 10, 1979,
respectively; the real estate mortgage over the subject property was registered by
respondent only on March 14, 1980. The Court stated that the prior registration of a lien
created a preference. Even a subsequent registration of the prior mortgage will not
diminish this preference, which retroacts to the date of the annotation of the notice of lis
pendens and the adverse claim.

The maxim prior est in tempore, potior est in jure (he who is first in time is
preferred in right) is followed in land registration. 181 Thus, it has been held in a case that
Mahinays notice of lis pendens having been registered ahead of Sorensen's real estate
mortgage, the notice of lis pendens takes precedence over the real estate mortgage. The
claim of Sorensen that the owner's copy of TCT No. 117531 does not contain any adverse
annotation at the time the owners transacted with her is of no moment. Being in the
nature of involuntary registration, the annotation of the notice of lis pendens on the
original copy of TCT No. 117531 on file with the Registry of Deeds is sufficient to bind
third parties. It affects the whole world even if the owner's copy does not contain the
same annotation.182

The phrase innocent purchaser for value in Section 32 of the Property

Registration Decree includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for
value.183 But unlike private individuals, banks are expected to exercise greater care and
prudence in their dealings, including those involving registered lands. A banking
institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a mortgage
contract.184

179
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710.
180
Yared v. Tiongco, supra.
181
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 184 Phil. 358, 365 (1980) citing Bass v. De la Rama, 73 Phil. 682, 685
(1942).
182
Mahinay v. Gako, GR No. 15338, Nov. 28, 2011, citing Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-903
(1995).
183
Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, supra.
184
PNB v. Jumanoy, GR No. 169901, Aug. 3, 2011.
 29

In St. Dominic Corporation v. Intermediate Appellate Court,185 the Court, held

that where a Torrens title was issued as a result of regular land registration proceedings
and was in the name of the mortgagor when given as a security for a bank loan, the
subsequent declaration of said title as null and void is not a ground for nullifying the
mortgage rights of the bank which had acted in good faith.

In Mahinay v. Gako,186 the Court ruled that when a mortgagee relies upon what
appears on the face of a Torrens title and lends money in all good faith on the basis of the
title in the name of the mortgagor, only thereafter to learn that the latter's title was
defective, being thus an innocent mortgagee for value, his or her right or lien upon the
land mortgaged must be respected and protected.187

In Blanco v. Esquierdo,188 it was held that the right or lien of an innocent

mortgagee for value upon the land mortgaged must be respected and protected, even if
the mortgagor obtained his title thereto thru fraud. In this case, upon a complaint filed by
the legal heirs of Maximiano, the trial court ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-6582
for having been secured through fraud, and also the cancellation of DBPs mortgage. The
only question is whether the bank is an innocent purchaser for value. The Court answered
in the affirmative. The bank was not a party to the fraud. The certificate of title was in the
name of Fructuosa at the time of the mortgage. Hence, the bank had the right to rely on
what appeared in the certificate and was under no obligation to look beyond the
certificate and investigate. The remedy of the persons prejudiced is to bring an action for
damages against those who caused the fraud, and if the latter are insolvent, an action may
be filed for recovery of damages against the Assurance Fund.

RULE ON DOUBLE SALE OF

IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

Article 1544 of the Civil Code reads:

ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees,
the ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken
possession thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.

Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person

acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.

Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person

who in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.

185
GR No. 70623, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 577.
186
Supra.
187
Id., citing Penullar v. Philippine National Bank, 205 Phil. 127, 135-136 (1983), citing Director of Lands
v. Abache, 73 Phil. 606 (1942) and Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494 (1960).
188
GR No. L-15182,Dec. 29, 1960, 110 Phil. 494.
 30

Between two buyers of the same immovable property registered under the Torrens
system, the law gives ownership priority to: (a) the first registrant in good faith; (b) then,
the first possessor in good faith; and (c) finally, the buyer who in good faith presents the
oldest title. This provision, however, does not apply if the property is not registered under
the Torrens system.189 Based on this provision, the overriding consideration to determine
ownership of an immovable property is the good or bad faith not of the seller, but of the
buyer; specifically, to determine who first registered the sale with the Registry of
Property (Registry of Deeds) in good faith. 190 As against the registered owners and the
holder of an unregistered deed of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.191

In Remalante v. Tibe,192 the Court ruled that the civil law provision on double sale
is not applicable where there is only one valid sale, the previous sale having been found
to be fraudulent.

Likewise, in Espiritu and Espiritu v. Valerio,193 where the same parcel of land was
purportedly sold to two different parties, the Court held that despite the fact that one deed
of sale was registered ahead of the other, Art. 1544 of the Civil Code will not apply where
said deed is found to be a forgery, the result of this being that the right of the other
vendee should prevail.194 The rule that where two certificates purport to include the same
land, the earlier in date prevails, is valid only absent any anomaly or irregularity tainting
the process of registration.195 On the other hand, while the execution of a public
instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, it only gives
rise to a prima facie presumption of delivery. It is deemed negated by the failure of the
vendee to take actual possession of the land sold.196

Moreover, it is an established principle that no one can give what one does not
have nemo dat quod non habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one owns or is
authorized to sell, and the buyer can acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally. In a number of cases, an action for reconveyance has been treated as an action to
quiet title.197

PRESUMPTION OF CONJUGAL
OWNERSHIP

In Dewara v. Lamela,198 the subject property was acquired by spouses Elenita and
Eduardo during their marriage, before the enactment of the Family Code. The issue is
whether the property is the paraphernal/exclusive property of Elenita or the conjugal
property of spouses Elenita and Eduardo, and whether the same may be subject to levy
189
Abrigo v. De Vera, GR No. 154409, June 21, 2004, 432 SCRA 544.
190
Cabigas v. Limbaco, GR No. 175291, July 27, 2011
191
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
192
GR No. L-59514, February 25, 1988, 158 SCRA 138.
193
GR No. L-18018, Dec 26, 1963, 119 Phil. 69.
194
Fudot v. Cattleya Land, Inc., GR No. 171008, Sept. 13, 2007, 533 SCRA 350.
195
Mathay v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 15788, Sept. 17, 1988, 295 SCRA 556.
196
Beatingo v. Gasis, GR No. 179641, Feb. 9, 2011.
197
Ney v. Quijano, GR No. 178609, Aug. 4, 2010, and cases cited therein.
198
GR No. 179010, April 11, 2011.
 31

and execution sale to answer for the civil liability adjudged against Eduardo in a criminal
case for serious physical injuries. Held:

All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,

unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. 199
Registration in the name of the husband or the wife alone does not destroy this
presumption.200 The separation-in-fact between the husband and the wife without judicial
approval shall not affect the conjugal partnership. The lot retains its conjugal in nature. 201
Moreover, the presumption of conjugal ownership applies even when the manner in
which the property was acquired does not appear. The use of the conjugal funds is not an
essential requirement for the presumption to arise. However, it does not necessarily
follow that it may automatically be levied upon in an execution to answer for debts,
obligations, fines, or indemnities of one of the spouses. Before debts and obligations may
be charged against the conjugal partnership, it must be shown that the same were
contracted for, or the debts and obligations should have redounded to, the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Fines and pecuniary indemnities imposed upon the husband or the
wife, as a rule, may not be charged to the partnership. However, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if the property should be insufficient, the
fines and indemnities may be enforced upon the partnership assets only after the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161 of the Civil Code have been covered.

In Ros v. PNB,202 the subject property was acquired in 1968 during Ros and
Aguete's marriage. Ros mortgaged the property in 1974. Is the debt chargeable to the
conjugal partnership? Held:

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the
consent, express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is
voidable.203 Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros' encumbrance of
the subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will
declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding
that the wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the
appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros' encumbrance of the subject
property. Debts contracted by the husband for and in the exercise of the industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of the family cannot be deemed to be
his exclusive and private debts. For this reason, we rule that Ros' loan from PNB
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.

FORGED DEED MAY BE THE ROOT

OF A VALID TITLE

Generally, a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title. 204 But a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the
199
CIVIL CODE, Art. 160; Villanueva v. Chiong, G.R. No. 159889, June 5, 2008, 554 SCRA 197, 203.
200
Bucoy v. Paulino, et al., 131 Phil. 790, 800 (1968).
201
CIVIL CODE, Art. 178; Villanueva v. Chiong, supra, at 202.
202
GR No. 170166, April 6, 2011.
203
Vera-Cruz v. Calderon, G.R. No. 160748, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 534 citing Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-
Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, G.R. No. 143826, 28 August 2000, 410 SCRA 97.
204
Sec. 53, PD No. 1529.
 32

certificate of title has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the
name of the forger or the name indicated by the forger, and while it remained that way,
the land was subsequently sold to an innocent purchaser.205

CERTIFICATE OF TITLE

A certificate of title is conclusive of ownership. It enjoys the presumption of

validity. Registration does not vest title: It is not a mode of acquiring ownership. 206 It
does not give any person any better title than what he lawfully has. 207 Registration is
merely a system of registration of titles to lands.208 A certificate of title is an indefeasible
title and is conclusive as to the ownership of the registrant, 209 the identity of the land,210
and its location.211As against the registered owners and the holder of an unregistered deed
of sale, it is the former who has a better right to possess.212

While certificates of title are indefeasible, unassailable and binding against the
whole world, including the government itself, they do not create or vest title. They merely
confirm or record title already existing and vested. They cannot be used to protect a
usurper from the true owner, nor can they be used as a shield for the commission of
fraud; neither do they permit one to enrich himself at the expense of other.213

If two certificates of title purport to include the same land, whether wholly or
partly, the better approach is to trace the original certificates from which the certificates
of title were derived. Should there be only one common original certificate of title, the
transfer certificate issued on an earlier date along the line must prevail, absent any
anomaly or irregularity tainting the process of registration.214

An original certificate of title issued by virtue of administrative proceeding is as

indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under judicial proceedings. However, the
indefeasibility of title does not attach to titles secured by fraud and misrepresentation.215

205
Muoz v. Yabut, GR No. 142676, June 6, 2011; Solivel v. Francisco, GR No. 51450, Feb. 10, 1989, 170
SCRA 218; Duran v. Intermediate Appellate Court, GR No. L-64159, Sept. 10, 1985, 138 SCRA 489;
Director of Lands v. Addison, GR No. 23148, March 25, 1926, 49 Phil. 19.
206
Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172; Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339; Avila v.
Tapucar, 201 SCRA 148.
207
Legarda v. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590. Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No.
140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
208
Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 180; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 366.
209
Tan v. Bantegui, GR No. 154027, Oct. 24, 2005.
210
Demasiado v. Velasco, 71 SCRA 105.
211
Odsigue v. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 626.
212
Catindig v. De Meneses, GR No. 165851, Feb.2, 2011.
213
Sta. Lucia Realty v. City of Pasig, GR No. 166838, June 15, 2011, citing De Pedro v. Romasan
Development Corporation, 492 Phil. 643 (2005).
214
Top Management Programs Corp. v. Fajardo, GR No.150462, June 15, 2011, citing Degollacion v.
Register of Deeds of Cavite, G.R. No. 161433, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 108, 115 and
Mathay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115788, September 17, 1998, 295 SCRA 556.
215
Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18, 2011.
 33

One who deals with property registered under the Torrens system need not go
beyond the certificate of title, but only has to rely on the certificate of title. 216 He is
charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title.217

CONVEYANCE AND OTHER DEALINGS

BY REGISTERED OWNER

The general rule in dealing with registered land is set forth in Section 51 of P.D.
No. 1529:

Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner. An

owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge or otherwise deal with the
same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage,
lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or affect
registered land shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only
as a contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to
make registration.

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land
insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration
shall be made in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land lies.

No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the Register of Deeds, unless the

owner's duplicate certificate is presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in the law (PD 1529) or upon order of the court, for cause shown.218

From the standpoint of third parties, a property registered under the Torrens
system remains, for all legal purposes, the property of the person in whose name it is
registered, notwithstanding the execution of any deed of conveyance, unless the
corresponding deed is registered.219 Simply put, if a sale is not registered, it is binding
only between the seller and the buyer, but it does not affect innocent third persons.220

DISTINCTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY

AND INVOLUNTARY REGISTRATION

216
Sec. 44, PD 1529; Casimiro Development Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 175485, July 27, 2011;
Sandoval v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106657, August 1, 1996, 260 SCRA 283; Santos v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 90380, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA 550; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
78775, May 31, 1988, 161 SCRA 710; Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-78178, April 15,
1988, 160 SCRA 738; Director of Lands v. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, 487 (1935); Quimson v. Suarez, 45 Phil.
901, 906 (1924).
217
Agricultural and Home Extension Development Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92310, September
3, 1992, 213 SCRA 563; Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, supra.
218
Sec. 53, PD 1529.
219
Narciso Pea, supra note 38, at 189.
220
Bulaong v. Gonzales, GR No. 156318, Sept. 5, 2011.
 34

As a rule, the order of entries in the Primary Entry Book determines the priority in
registration.221

In voluntary registration, such as a sale, mortgage, lease and the like, if the
owner's duplicate certificate be not surrendered and presented or if no payment of
registration fees be made within fifteen (15) days, entry in the day book of the deed of
sale does not operate to convey and affect the land sold. In involuntary registration, such
as an attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens and the like, entry thereof in the day
book is a sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse claim.222

AMENDMENT OR ALTERATION
OF CERTIFICATES

The proceeding for the amendment and alteration of a certificate of title under
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 is applicable in seven instances or situations, namely: (a)
when registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or
inchoate, have terminated and ceased; (b) when new interests have arisen or been created
which do not appear upon the certificate; (c) when any error, omission or mistake was
made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any duplicate certificate;
(d) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (e) when the
registered owner has been married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been
terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (f) when
a corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not conveyed the
same within three years after its dissolution; and (g) when there is reasonable ground for
the amendment or alteration of title.223

While Section 108, among other things, authorizes a person in interest to ask the
court for any erasure, alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title or of any
memorandum appearing therein, the prevailing rule is that proceedings thereunder are
summary in nature, contemplating corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only
clerical but certainly not controversial issues.224 Relief under the said legal provision can
only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or that there is no adverse claim
or serious objection on the part of any party in interest.225

The court has no authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and
that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other
interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and
assigns without his or their written consent.226

REGISTERED LAND NOT SUBJECT

221
Id.
222
Bulaong v Gonzales, supra.
223
Paz v. Republic, GR No. 157367, Nov. 23, 2011.
224
Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA, 463 Phil. 417, 431-432 (2003).
225
Philippine Veterans Bank v. Valenzuela, GR No. 163530, March 9, 2011;Tagaytay-Taal Tourist
Development Corporation v. CA, 339 Phil. 377, 389 (1997).
226
Id.
 35

TO PRESCRIPTION

No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.227 Thus, the right to recover possession of
registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of
ownership.228 Prescription is unavailing not only against the titled owner but also against
his heirs.229 But ownership may be lost through laches 230 which is failure or neglect to
assert a right for an unreasonable length of time.231

CERTIFICATE NOT SUBJECT

TO COLLATERAL ATTACK

A certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,

modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding.232 Thus, in a complaint for recovery
of possession, defendant cannot raise in the action the validity of plaintiffs title. 233 There
must be a direct attack on the title via a separate action; but a direct attack may be made
in a counterclaim or third-party complaint.234

What cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title
235
itself. The certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law means ownership which is,
more often than not, represented by that document. 236 The prohibition against collateral
attack does not apply to spurious or non-existent titles, since such titles do not enjoy
indefeasibility.237

REPLACEMENT OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE

Section 109, PD No. 1529, governs the procedure for the replacement of a lost or
destroyed owners duplicate certificate of title. Where the owners duplicate copy is not
in fact lost or destroyed, a petition for the purpose is unwarranted as the court has no
jurisdiction over the petition.238

227
Sec. 47, PD No. 1529.
228
Fernando v. Acuna, GR No. 161030, Sept. 14, 2011, citing Umbay v. Alecha, 220 Phil. 103, 107
(1985).
229
Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251; Guinoo v. Court of Appeals, 97 Phil. 235.
230
Fernando v. Acuna, supra, citing cases. See also Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277.
231
Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 339.
232
Sec. 48, PD No. 1529; Tapuroc v. Loquellano, GR No. 152007, Jan. 22, 2007.
233
Gaiterio v. Almeria, GR No. 181812, June 8, 2011; Ybaez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA
743.
234
Leyson v. Bontuyan, GR No. 156357, Feb. 18, 2005; Sampaco v. Lantud, GR No. 163551, July 18,
2011.
235
Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115402, July 15, 1998, 292 SCRA 544, 547.
236
Lacbayan v. Samoy, GR No. 165427, March 21, 2011.
237
(Oliveros v. San Miguel Corporation, GR No. 173531, Feb. 1, 2012.
238
Camitan vs. Court of Appeals, GR No. 128099, Dec. 20, 2006.
 36

RECONSTITUTION OF LOST OR
DESTROYED CERTIFICATE

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form

and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument attesting the title of a person to a piece of
land. The purpose of the reconstitution of title is to have, after observing the procedures
prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss
or destruction occurred.239 The lost or destroyed document referred to is the one that is in
the custody of the Register of Deeds. When reconstitution is ordered, this document is
replaced with a new one the reconstituted title that basically reproduces the
original. After the reconstitution, the owner is issued a duplicate copy of the reconstituted
title.240

Reconstitution denotes restoration of the certificate of title allegedly lost or

destroyed in its original form and conditions: it does not pass upon the question of
ownership.241 For an order of reconstitution to issue, the following must be shown: (a)
that the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed; (b) that the documents presented by
petitioner are sufficient and proper to warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed
certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is the registered owner of the property or had an
interest therein; (d) that the certificate of title was in force at the time it was lost or
destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and boundaries of the property are
substantially the same and those contained in the lost or destroyed certificate of title.242

Reconstitution is governed by RA No. 26 in relation to Section 110 of PD No.

1529. Administrative reconstitution is also governed by RA No, 26, as amended by RA
No. 6732, dated July 17, 1989. Section 12 of R.A. No. 26 describes the requirements for
a petition for reconstitution while Section 13 prescribes the requirements for a notice of
hearing of the petition. Non-compliance with the requirements deprives the court of
jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution.243

The requirements of Sections 2 and 3, RA No. 26 are almost identical. The

enumerated requirements are documents from official sources which recognize the
ownership of the owner and his predecessors-in-interest. The phrase any other
document in paragraph (f) of Sections 2 and 3 refers to documents similar to those
enumerated.244

As held in Castillo v. Republic,245 liberal construction of the Rules of Court does

not apply to land registration cases.246 Indeed, to further underscore the mandatory
239
Republic v. Tuastumban, G.R. No. 173210, April 24, 2009, 586 SCRA 600, 614.
240
Republic v. Vergel de Dios, GR No. 170459, Feb. 9, 2011.
241
Republic v. Santua, GR No. 155703, Sept. 8, 2008; Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development
Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008; Pinote vs. Dulay, 187 SCRA 12.
242
Republic v. Lorenzo, GR No. 172338, Dec. 10, 2012; Layos v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development
Corporation, GR No. 150470, Aug. 6, 2008.
243
Castillo v. Republic, GR No. 182980, June 22, 2011.
244
Republic v. Lagramada, GR No. 150741, June 12, 2008; Republic v. Santua, supra.;
245
Supra.
246
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 37

character of these jurisdictional requirements, the Rules of Court do not apply to land
registration cases.247 In all cases where the authority of the courts to proceed is conferred
by a statute, and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is prescribed by a statute, the
mode of proceeding is mandatory, and must be strictly complied with, or the proceeding
will be utterly void.248

Courts have no jurisdiction over petitions for reconstitution of allegedly lost or

destroyed titles over lands that are already covered by duly issued subsisting titles in
the names of their duly registered owners.249

The absence of opposition from government agencies is of no controlling

significance because the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its
officials or agents, hence, the Republic is not barred from assailing the decision granting
the petition for reconstitution if the same has no merit.250

ADVERSE CLAIM

An adverse claim is registered by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn

petition starting the basis of the right claimed.251 The duty of the Register of Deeds to
record the same on the title of ministerial. 252 The notice of adverse claim is to apprise
third person that there is controversy over the ownership of the land, such that any
transaction regarding the land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.253 The annotation
of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 254
247
Section 4, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
248
Caltex Filipino Managers & Supervisors Ass'n. v. CIR, 131 Phil. 1022, 1030 (1968).
249
Manotok v. Barque, GR No. 162335, Dec. 18, 2008.
250
Republic v. Lorenzo, GR No. 172338, Dec. 10, 2012.
251
Sec. 70, PD No. 1529.
252
Sajonas v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 79.
253
Ching v. Enrile, GR No. 156076, Sept. 17, 2008; Arrazola v. Bernas, 86 SCRA 279; Duque-Rosario v.
Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
254
Section 70 of Presidential Decree 1529 provides:
Section 70. Adverse claim. Whoever claims any part or interest in registered land adverse to the
registered owner, arising subsequent to the date of the original registration, may, if no other provision is
made in this Decree for registering the same, make a statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired, a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the
registered owner, the name of the registered owner, and a description of the land in which the right or
interest is claimed.
The statement shall be signed and sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's residence, and a
place at which all notices may be served upon him. This statement shall be entitled to registration as an
adverse claim on the certificate of title. The adverse claim shall be effective for a period of thirty days from
the date of registration. After the lapse of said period, the annotation of adverse claim may be canceled
upon filing of a verified petition therefor by the party in interest: Provided, however, that after cancellation,
no second adverse claim based on the same ground shall be registered by the same claimant.
Before the lapse of thirty days aforesaid, any party in interest may file a petition in the Court of
First Instance where the land is situated for the cancellation of the adverse claim, and the court shall grant a
speedy hearing upon the question of the validity of such adverse claim, and shall render judgment as may
be just and equitable. If the adverse claim is adjudged to be invalid, the registration thereof shall be ordered
canceled. If, in any case, the court, after notice and hearing, shall find that the adverse claim thus registered
was frivolous, it may fine the claimant in an amount not less than one thousand pesos nor more than five
thousand pesos, in its discretion. Before the lapse of thirty days, the claimant may withdraw his adverse
 38

requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. The existence of an easement of
subjacent and lateral support need not be annotated at the back of the title of the servient
estate.255

An adverse claim is not ipso facto cancelled upon the lapse of the thirty days from
its registration. There must be a petition for the purpose to afford the adverse claimant an
opportunity to be heard.256

Parties with liens annotated on the certificate of title are entitled to notice in an
action for cancellation of their liens.257

NOTICE OF LIS PENDENS

A notice of lis pendens is an announcement to the whole world that a particular

real property is in litigation, serving as a warning that one who acquires an interest over
said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over the said property.258 The title obtained by the transferee pendente lite affords him no
special protection; he cannot invoke the rights of a purchaser in good faith and cannot
acquire better rights than those of his predecessor-in-interest. 259 Thus, one who buys land
where there is a pending notice of lis pendens cannot invoke the right of a purchaser in
good faith; neither can he have acquired better rights than those of his predecessor in
interest.260
A notice of lis pendens should contain (1) a statement of the institution of the
action or proceeding; (2) the court where the same is pending; (3) the date of its
institution; (4) a reference to the number of the certificate of title; and (5) an adequate
description of the land affected and its registered owner.261 The notice is not a lien or
encumbrance on the property, but simply a notice to prospective buyers or to those
dealing with the property that it is under litigation. 262 The litigation must involve the title
to, or the use or occupation of, a specific property. It does not apply where the object of
the suit is money judgment, or proceedings for the probate of will or administration of the
estate of a deceased person, levy on execution or preliminary attachments. 263 A notice of
lis pendens subjects the interest of the transferee to the results of the pending suit.

CONSULTA

claim by filing with the Register of Deeds a sworn petition to that effect.
255
Castro v. Monsod, GR No. 183719, Feb. 2, 2011.
256
Sajonas vs. Court of Appeals, supra; see also Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011
257
Crisologo v. Omelio, GR No. A.M. No. RTJ-12-2321, Oct. 3, 2012.
258
Dela Merced v. GSIS, GR No. 167140, Nov. 23, 2011.
259
Yu v. Court of Appeals, 321 Phil. 897, 901-902 (1995).
260
Yu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 109078, December 25, 1995, 251 SCRA 509, 513-514, citing
Constantino v. Espiritu, No. L-23268, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 557, 563 and Tanchoco v. Aquino, No. L-
30670, September 15, 1987, 154 SCRA 1, 15; see Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, No. L-
34404, June 25, 1980, 98 SCRA 207, 232.
261
Sec. 76, PD No. 1529.
262
Republic v. Ravelo, GR No. 165114, Aug. 6, 2008.
263
Biglang-awa vs. Constantino, 109 Phil. 168.
 39

It is the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds to register documents presented

to him for registration. (Sec. 10, PD No. 1529). If the Register of Deeds is in doubt as to
the registrability of the document, the remedy is to elevate the matter to the LRA via en
consulta. The same procedure may be availed of by the interested party.264 Appeal from
the LRA decision may be taken to the Court of Appeals.265

MORTGAGES AND LEASES

The requisites of a mortgage are: (a) it is constituted to secure the fulfillment of a

principal obligation; (b) the mortgagor is the absolute owner of the property, and (c) the
mortgagor has the free disposal thereof.

Under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, one of the essential requisites of the
contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the property
to be mortgaged; otherwise, the mortgage is considered null and void. However, an
exception to this rule is the doctrine of "mortgagee in good faith." Under this doctrine,
even if the mortgagor is not the owner of the mortgaged property, the mortgage contract
and any foreclosure sale arising therefrom are given effect by reason of public policy.
This principle is based on the rule that all persons dealing with property covered by a
Torrens certificate of title, as buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what
appears on the face of the title. This is the same rule that underlies the principle of
"innocent purchasers for value." Hence, even if the mortgagor is not the rightful owner
of, or does not have a valid title to, the mortgaged property, the mortgagee in good faith
is, nonetheless, entitled to protection.266

A mortgage lien is a right in rem which follows the property whoever its owner
may be. If the mortgagor sells the property, the buyer must respect the mortgage, if
registered, or if he knows of its existence.267 The phrase innocent purchaser for value
includes an innocent lessee, mortgagee or other encumbrancer for value.268 The
subsequent nullification of the mortgagors title will not nullify the mortgage.269

HIGHER STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED

OF BANKING OR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The general rule that a mortgagee need not look beyond the title does not apply to
banks and other financial institutions as greater care and due diligence is required of

264
Almirol vs. Register of Deeds of Agusan, 22 SCRA 1152.
265
Calalang vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88.
266
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
267
Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 244 SCRA 693.
268
Unchuan v. Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 710.
269
Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 587; Blanco v. Esquierdo, 110 Phil. 494; Penullar
v. Philippine National Bank, 120 SCRA 171.
 40

them.270 Imbued with public interest, they "are expected to be more cautious than
ordinary individuals."271

In a case,272 the Court adjudged that unlike private individuals, a bank is expected
to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings, including those involving registered
lands. A banking institution is expected to exercise due diligence before entering into a
mortgage contract. The ascertainment of the status or condition of a property offered to it
as security for a loan must be a standard and indispensable part of its operations.273

FORECLOSURE OF MORTAGE

When the principal obligation becomes due and the debtor fails to perform his
obligation, the creditor may foreclose on the mortgage for the purpose of alienating the
(mortgaged) property to satisfy his credit.274

The procedure for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage is governed by

Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118. The purchaser at the public auction sale of
an extrajudicially foreclosed real property may seek possession thereof in accordance
with Section 7 of said Act.275

Unlike in an ordinary sale, inadequacy of the price at a forced sale is immaterial

and does not nullify the sale. It is also not required that the bid should at least be equal to
the market value of the foreclosed property or the outstanding obligation of the mortgage
debtor.276 If "the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to cover the debt in an extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage, the mortgagee is entitled to claim the deficiency from the
debtor.277

Where the mortgagee is a banking institution, the determination of the

redemption price for the foreclosed property is governed by Section 78 of the General
Banking Act. There must be an unequivocal tender of payment for the full amount of the
repurchase price.278 The only instance when this rule may be construed liberally, i.e.,
allow the non-simultaneous tender of payment, is if a judicial action is instituted by the
redemptioner.279

GUIDELINES ON FORECLOSURE
270
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co., v. Pascual, G.R. No. 163744, February 29, 2008, 547 SCRA 246, 261.
271
Alano v. Planters Development Bank, GR No. 171628, June 13, 2011. Philippine National Bank v.
Corpuz, G.R. No. 180945, February 12, 2010, 612 SCRA 493, 496; Gonzales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 157 SCRA 187.
272
Cruz v. Bancom Finance Corporation, 429 Phil. 225, 239 (2002).
273
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, supra.
274
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Doyon, GR No. 167238, March 25, 2009.
275
China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, GR No. 164919, July 4, 2008.
276
BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Avenido, GR No. 175816, Dec. 7, 2011.
277
Id.
278
Allied Banking Corporation v. Mateo, GR No. 167420, June 5, 2009; Quisumbing v. PNB, GR No.
178242, Jan. 20, 2009.
279
Quisumbing v. PNB, supra.
 41

A.M. No. 99-10-05-0, FEBRUARY 20, 2007

The resolution embodies the additional guidelines intended to aid courts in

foreclosure proceedings, specifically limiting the instances, and citing the conditions,
when a writ against foreclosure of a mortgage may be issued, to wit:

(1) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against

the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that
the loan secured by the mortgage has been paid or is not delinquent unless the application
is verified and supported by evidence of payment.

(2) No temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against

the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage shall be issued on the allegation that
the interest on the loan is unconscionable, unless the debtor pays the mortgagee at least
twelve percent per annum interest on the principal obligation as stated in the application
for foreclosure sale, which shall be updated monthly while the case is pending.

(3) Where a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against a

foreclosure of mortgage, the disposition of the case shall be speedily resolved. To this
end, the court concerned shall submit to the Supreme Court, through the Office of the
Court Administrator, quarterly reports on the progress of the cases involving ten million
pesos and above.

(4) All requirements and restrictions prescribed for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction, such as the posting of a bond,
which shall be equal to the amount of the outstanding debt, and the time limitation for its
effectivity, shall apply as well to a status quo order.

REDEMPTION AND CONSOLIDATION

OF OWNERSHIP

If the foreclosed property is registered, the mortgagor has one year within which
to redeem the property from and after registration of sale with the Register of Deeds.280
After the expiration of the period of redemption, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale or
anyone claiming under him may petition the court for the entry of a new certificate to
him. But before the entry of a new certificate of title, the registered owner may pursue all
legal and equitable remedies to impeach or annul such proceedings.281

The rule on redemption is liberally construed in favor of the original owner of the
property. The policy of the law is to aid rather than to defeat him in the exercise of his
right of redemption. The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person
offering to redeem manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be
accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of payment. The redemption price
should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court.282

280
Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 370 Phil. 837, 847 (1999); BPI Family Savings
Bank, Inc. v. Avenido, GR No. 175816, Dec. 7, 2011.
281
Sec. 75, PD 1529; Reyes v. Tang Soat Ing, GR No. 185620, Dec. 14, 2011
282
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, GR No. 140528, Dec. 7, 2011.
 42

Upon the expiration of the redemption period of one year from the registration of
the sale, the right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute.283 He is entitled to possession following the consolidation of ownership in his
name.284 The writ of possession becomes a matter of right and its issuance to a purchaser
in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function. 285 The trial court has no
discretion on this matter."286

May persons to whom several mortgaged lands were transferred without the
knowledge and consent of the creditor redeem only several parcels if all the lands were
sold together for a single price at the foreclosure sale? In several early cases decided by
the Court, the right of the mortgagor or redemptioner to redeem one or some of the
foreclosed properties was recognized.287

ISSUANCE OF WRIT OF POSSESSION

MINISTERIAL

Under Sec. 7 of Act No. 3135, a writ of possession may be issued either (a) within
the one-year period, upon the filing of a bond, or (b) after the lapse of the redemption
period, without need of a bond.288

The proceeding for the issuance of the writ is ex parte and is ministerial duty of
the court,289 unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
judgment debtor,290 or where the bid price is unjustifiably higher than the real amount of
the obligation.291 The issuance of the writ may not be stayed by a pending action for
annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, without prejudice, of course, to the
eventual outcome of the pending annulment case.292

The order of the RTC granting the petition for a writ of possession is final which
can only be questioned on appeal.293

PUBLIC LAND ACT;

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

283
Philippine National Bank v. Gotesco, GR No. 183211, June 5, 2009.
284
Edralin v. Philippine Veterans Bank, GR No. 168523, March 9, 2011; Bank of the Philippine Islands v.
Tarampi, GR No. 174988, Dec. 10, 2008.
285
Duque-Rosario v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, supra.
286
Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Bance, G.R. No. 167280, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 507, 515-516.
Emphasis supplied.
287
Yap v. Dy, GR No. 171868, July 27, 2011.
288
Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, 465 SCRA 287.
289
Sueno v. Land Bank of the Philippines, GR No. 174711, Sept. 17, 2008.
290
Glapuno v. Gapultos, 132 SCRA 429; China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, supra.
291
Sulit v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441.
292
.Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Tarampi, GR No. 174988, Dec. 10, 2008.
293
San Fernando Rural Bank, Inc. v. Pampanga Omnibus Development Corporation, GR No. 168088, April
4, 2007.
 43

Regalian doctrine all lands and all other natural resources are owned by the
State

No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or
implied from the government. It is indispensable that there be a showing of a title
from the State.

Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classified and, when practicable, surveyed, and
which have not been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by
the government, nor in any manner become private property.

Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.

The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch of

government.

For purposes of their administration and disposition, lands of the public domain
which are alienable or open to disposition may be further classified as: (a)
agricultural, (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive
purposes, (c) educational, charitable, or other similar purposes, and (d)
reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.

MODES OF DISPOSITION

1. For homestead settlement;

2. By sale;

3. By lease

4. By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title

(a) By judicial legalization

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent)

Homestead - any citizen of the Philippines over the age of eighteen years, or the
head of a family, may enter a homestead of not exceeding twelve hectares of
agricultural land of the public domain. The applicant must have cultivated and
improved at least one-fifth of the land continuously since the approval of the
application and resided for at least one year in the municipality in which the land
is located.

 44

When a homesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which
entitle him to a patent for a tract of public land, he acquires a vested interest
therein, and is to be regarded as the equitable owner thereof.

The execution and delivery of the patent, after the right to a particular
parcel of land has become complete, are the mere ministerial acts of the
officer charged with that duty.

Free patent - Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of
more than 12 hectares and who, for at least 30 years, has continuously occupied
and cultivated, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract of
agricultural public land, and who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon shall
be entitled to have a free patent issued to him for such tract of land not to exceed
twelve 12 hectares.

RA No. 10023, dated March 9, 2010, authorizes issuance of free patent titles
to zoned residential lands. Residence requirement: 10 years.

Requirements:

Survey plan and technical description

Affidavit of two 2 persons who are residents of the barangay that the
applicant has actually resided on, and actually possessed and occupied, the
land applied for, under a bona fide claim of ownership, for at least 10
years, and has complied with the other requirements prescribed by the Act.

Sales patent - Any citizen of the Philippines of lawful age or the head of a family
may purchase any tract of public agricultural land not to exceed twelve hectares
which shall be sold thru sealed bidding. The land shall be awarded to the highest
bidder, but the applicant may equal the highest bid.

The purchaser shall have not less than one-fifth of the land cultivated
within five years from the date of the award, and pays the full purchase
price.

Direct sale - RA No. 730 permits the direct sale of public lands for residential
purposes to qualified applicants.

The applicant must: (a) be a Filipino citizen of legal age; (b) not the
owner of a home lot in the municipality or city in which he resides; (c)
have established in good faith his residence on a parcel of public land
which is not needed for public service; and (d) have constructed his house
and actually resided therein.
 45

TITLE INDEFEASIBLE

A certificate of title issued pursuant to a public land patent partakes of the nature
of a certificate of title issued through judicial proceeding. It becomes
incontrovertible upon the expiration of one year from the date of the order for
issuance of the patent, hence, prescription cannot operate against the registered
owner.

If the land covered by a free patent was a private land, the Director of Lands has
no jurisdiction over it. Such free patent and the subsequent certificate of title
issued pursuant thereto are a nullity.294 The aggrieved party may initiate an action
for cancellation of such title.295

CONTINUING AUTHORITY
TO INVESTIGATE

But the Regional Director has continuing authority to conduct an investigation to

determine whether or not fraud attended the issuance of the patent.

The Solicitor General may bring an action for cancellation of title obtained
through fraud and for the reversion of the land to the State.

Action is not barred by prescription.

PROHIBITED ALIENATIONS

Homestead - may not be sold or encumbered within 5 years from the issuance of
the patent, and for a term of 20 years thereafter without the consent of the DENR
Secretary.

Land covered by a Free paent may not be sold within 5 years from the issuance
of the patent.

Prohibition against alienation is mandatory.

Policy of the law:

To conserve the land which a grantee has acquired under the Public Land Act for
him and his heirs as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it

To give the patentee a place where to live with his family so he may become a
happy citizen and useful member of society
294
Agne v. Director of Lands, G.R. Nos. 40399 & 72255, February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 793, 803.
295
Pabaus v. Yutiamco, GR No. 164356, July 27, 2011
 46

EFFECT OF A VOID CONVEYANCE

It shall produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the title and cause the
reversion of the property and improvements to the State.

REPURCHASE

Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or homestead provisions,
when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal
heirs, within a period of five years from the date of the conveyance.

The five-year period of redemption of homestead sold at extrajudicial foreclosure

runs after the expiration of the one-year period of repurchase allowed in an
extrajudicial foreclosure.

Query: Where the patentee sold the land during the prohibited period, may he
recover the property from the vendee? Yes, consistent the with the fundamental
policy to afford the patentee a piece of land for his home and cultivation.
(Binayug v. Ugaddan, GR No. 181623, Dec. 5, 2012)

SUBDIVISION AND CONDOMINIUM

BUYERS DECREE (PD 957)

Subdivision project - a registered parcel of land registered partitioned for

residential purposes into individual lots and offered to the public for sale, in cash
or in installment terms. It shall include all residential, commercial, industrial and
recreational areas as well as open spaces and other community and public areas in
the project.

Condominium unit - a part of the condominium project intended for any type of
independent use or ownership, including one or more rooms or spaces located in
one or more floors (or part of parts of floors) in a building or buildings and such
accessories as may be appended thereto.

Developer - the person who develops or improves the subdivision project or

condominium project for and in behalf of the owner thereof.

JURISDICTION OF THE HLURB

Unsound real estate business practices;

Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker
or salesman; and
 47

Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations

filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.

HLURB has jurisdiction over cases for collection of unpaid installments and
claims for damages.
No jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision owners or developers against lot
or unit buyers

Court, not HLURB, has jurisdiction over issues involving ownership or

possession of property.

SUMMARY OF CASES WHERE

HLURB HAS JURISDICTION

For a determination of the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a

subdivision lot;

For the delivery of title against the subdivision owner;

For the refund of reservation fees for the purchase of a subdivision lot;

For specific performance filed by a lot buyer against the seller of a subdivision
lot;

For the annulment of the mortgage constituted by the project owner without the
buyers consent, the mortgage foreclosure sale, and the condominium certificate
of title issued to the highest bidder at the said foreclosure sale;

For the collection of the balance of the unpaid purchase price of a subdivision lot
filed by the developer of a subdivision against the lot buyer; and

For incidental claims for damages.

LICENSE TO SELL

The owner or dealer must have a license to sell the project within two weeks from
the registration of such project.

However, the absence of a license to sell the subdivision lots does not render the
sale thereof void. The absence of the license to sell only subjects the
condominium developer and its officers civilly and criminally liable.

EXEMPT TRANSACTIONS
 48

Sale of a subdivision lot resulting from the partition of land among co-owners and
co-heirs.

Sale or transfer of a subdivision lot by the original purchaser and any subsequent
sale of the same lot.

Sale of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit by or for the account of a

mortgagee in the ordinary course of business when necessary to liquidate a bona
fide debt.

FOREIGNERS MAY PURCHASE

Under RA No. 4726, foreign nationals can own Philippine real estate through the
purchase of condominium units or townhouses up to not more than 40% of the
total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.

The land is owned by the condominium corporation and the unit owner is simply
a member in this condominium corporation.

DEALERS AND BROKERS

No real estate dealer, broker or salesman shall engage in the business of selling
subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has registered himself with the
Board.

Applicant must be of good repute and has complied with the applicable rules of
the Authority

REGISTRATION
All contracts to sell, deeds of sale and other similar instruments relative to the sale
or conveyance of the subdivision lots and condominium units, whether or not the
purchase price is paid in full, shall be registered in the Office of the Register of
Deeds of the province or city where the property is situated.

MORTGAGES

No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer without
prior written approval of the Board. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is
shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of
the condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been
provided to ensure such utilization.

The mortgage of a subdivision lot or a condominium unit is void if executed by a

property developer without the prior written approval of the HLURB. That an
 49

encumbrance has been constituted over an entire property, of which the subject lot
or unit is merely a part, does not affect the invalidity of the lien over the specific
portion at issue. The fact that the lot had no separate TCT did not make it less of a
"subdivision lot" entitled to the protection of PD 957.296

The circumstance that DBP and ADC executed the mortgage contract prior to the
selling of the subdivided portions of the property to Capulong is immaterial
considering that when DBP granted the loan to ADC, it already knew that the loan
was to be used for realty development. DBP should have considered that it was
dealing with a property subject of a real estate development project. x x x DBP
cannot be deemed to be an innocent mortgagee.297

The essence of the government's socialized housing program is to preserve the

beneficiary's ownerships for a reasonable length of time, at least within five years
from the time he acquired it free from any encumbrance.298

ADVERTISEMENTS

Advertisements by the owner or developer must not mislead or deceive the public.

A subdivision owner was held in breach when it failed to deliver a closed-circuit

TV monitor through which residents from their apartments can see their guests
as advertised. (BPI v. ALS Management, GR No. 151821, April 14, 2004)

TIME OF COMPLETION

Petitioner may be held liable in damages for any delay in the construction.
A request for extension of time to complete development of a subdivision or
condominium project may be granted only where non-completion of the project is
caused by fortuitous events or legal ordersand with written notice to lot or unit
buyers.

DESISTANCE OR NON-PAYMENT
OF AMORTIZATIONS

Buyer need not give prior notice before desisting from further paying
amortizations.

Buyer may not be ousted for non-payment due to the failure of the subdivision
owner to put up the required improvements.

296
Far East Bank and Trust Co, v, Marquez, GR No. 147964, April 14, 2004.
297
DBP v. Capulong, GR No. 181790, Jan. 30, 2009.
298
Lalicon v. NHA, GR No. 185440, July 13, 2011.
 50

Failure to develop a subdivision may justify non-payment of amortizations by a

lot buyer.

Failure of seller to deliver the condominium unit entitles buyer to cancel contract.

THE MACEDA LAW

Buyer is entitled to the following rights in case he defaults in the payment of

succeeding installments:

Grace Period to pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments

due within the total grace period earned by him which is fixed at the rate of one
month grace period for every year of installment payments made: Provided, That
this right shall be exercised by the buyer only once in every five years of the life
of the contract and its extensions, if any; and

Refund of Cash Surrender Value if the contract is cancelled, the seller

shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value of the payments on the property
equivalent to fifty percent of the total payments made and, after five years of
installments, an additional five percent every year but not to exceed ninety per
cent of the total payments made; Provided, That the actual cancellation of the
contract shall take place after thirty days from receipt by the buyer of the notice of
cancellation or the demand for rescission of the contract by a notarial act and
upon full payment of the cash surrender value to the buyer.

ISSUANCE OF TITLE

The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon
full payment of the lot or unit.

Even with a valid mortgage over the lot, the seller is still bound to redeem said
mortgage without any cost to the buyer apart from the balance of the purchase
price and registration fees.

ROADS, ALLEYS, OPEN SPACES

The owner as developer of a subdivision shall provide adequate roads, alleys and
sidewalks, and for subdivision projects one hectare or more, reserve 30% of the
gross area for open space exclusively for parks, playgrounds and recreational use.

These areas shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable.

The roads, alleys, sidewalks and playgrounds shall be donated by the owner or
developer to the city or municipality and it shall be mandatory for the local
government to accept; provided, however, that the parks and playgrounds may be
 51

donated to the Homeowners Association of the project with the consent of the city
or municipality concerned.

VISITORIAL POWERS

The Board, through its duly authorized representative may, at any time, make an
examination into the business affairs, administration, and condition of any person,
corporation, partnership, cooperative, or association engaged in the business of
selling subdivision lots and condominium units.

It may deputize the Philippine Constabulary or any law enforcement agency in the
execution of its final orders, rulings or decisions.

TAKEOVER DEVELOPMENT

The Board may take over or cause the development and completion of the
subdivision or condominium project at the expenses of the owner or developer
who has refused or failed to develop or complete the development of the project.

It may demand, collect and receive from the buyers the installment payments due
on the lots for the development of the subdivision.

ADMINISTRATIVE FINES

The Board may prescribe and impose fines not exceeding ten thousand pesos for
violations of the provisions of the Decree or of any rule or regulation thereunder.
Fines shall be payable to the Board and enforceable through writs of execution in
accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court.

HLURB is without jurisdiction to determine criminal liability.

ILLUSTRATIVE CASES

Gotesco Properties, Inc. (GPI) v. Fajardo, GR No. 201167, Feb. 27, 2013

Section 25 of PD 957 imposes on the subdivision owner or developer the

obligation to cause the transfer of the corresponding certificate of title to the buyer upon
full payment. For the long delay in the performance of its obligation, GPI substantially
breached its contract to sell which accords the buyers the right to rescind the contract.
Equity and justice dictate that the buyers should be allowed to recover the prevailing
market value of the undelivered lot, with payment of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees, including costs of suit.

PNB v. Lim, GR No. 171667, Jan. 30, 2013

 52

The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to
include jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of mortgage. This is pursuant to the
intent of PD No. 957 to protect hapless buyers from the unjust practices of unscrupulous
developers which may constitute mortgages over condominium projects sans the
knowledge of the former and the consent of the HLURB.

Liwag v. Happy Glen Hope Homeowners Association, Inc., GR No. 189755,

July 4, 2012

PD No. 1216 expressly provides that open spaces in subdivisions are reserved for
public use and are beyond the commerce of man. The term "open space" is defined in PD
1216 as "an area reserved exclusively for parks, playgrounds, recreational uses, schools,
roads, places of worship, hospitals, health centers, barangay centers and other similar
facilities and amenities. The enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common
welfare of the community. The water facility in question was used continuously for more
than 30 years as the residents' sole source of water and forms part of the area reserved for
open space. The sale by the subdivision owner of the water facility is null and void and
makes out a case of unsound real estate business practice within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the HLURB.

Bethel Realty and Development Corporation v. HLURB, GR No. 184482,

July 4, 2012

For failure of petitioner, Bethel Realty, to deliver the title to the complainants
despite the latters full payment of the subdivision lot in question, the HLURB rendered a
decision ordering petitioner to immediately deliver the corresponding title to
complainants, failing in which it shall refund to complainants the total amount paid to it
plus interest and damages. In addition, HLURB directed petitioner to pay damages to
complainants in the sum of P20,000.00, and to the Board, administrative fine of
P10,000.00 for violation of Sections 4, 5 and 25 of Presidential Decree No. 957. The
decision was affirmed by the Court.

Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. Mactan Rock Industries, Inc., GR No.

172438, July 4, 2012

Citing Pea v. GSIS,299 the Court held that although the complaint for specific
performance, annulment of mortgage, and damages filed by the petitioner against the
respondent included title to, possession of, or interest in, real estate, it was well within the
jurisdiction of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), a quasi-judicial
body, as it involved a claim against the subdivision developer, Queen's Row Subdivision,
Inc., as well as the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). Pea was later cited in
Badillo v. Court of Appeals,300 where the Court concluded that the HLURB had
jurisdiction over complaints for annulment of title. The Court also held that courts will
not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound

299
GR No. 159520, Sept. 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 383.
300
GR No. 131903, June 26, 2008, 555 SCRA 435.
 53

administrative discretion, such as that of the HLURB, the sole regulatory body for
housing and land development.

Ortigas & Co. v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 129822, Jun 20, 2012

Section 1 of P.D. 1344 6 vests in the HLURB the exclusive jurisdiction to hear
and decide the following cases: (a) unsound real estate business practices; (b) claims
involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker, or salesman; and (c) cases nvolving
specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of
subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman. In the context of the evident objective of Section 1, it is implicit that the
"unsound real estate business practice" would, like the offended party in paragraphs (b)
and (c), be the buyers of lands involved in development. The policy of the law is to curb
unscrupulous practices in real estate trade and business that prejudice buyers. But not
every case involving buyers and sellers of subdivision lots or condominium units can be
filed with the HLURB. Its jurisdiction is limited to those cases filed by the buyer or
owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit and based on any of the causes of action
enumerated in Section 1 of PD 1344.301

Go v. Distinction Properties Development and Construction, Inc., GR No.

194024, April 25, 2012

The HLURB is given a wide latitude in characterizing or categorizing acts which

may constitute unsound business practice or breach of contractual obligations in the real
estate trade. This grant of expansive jurisdiction to the HLURB does not mean, however,
that all cases involving subdivision lots or condominium units automatically fall under its
jurisdiction. For an action to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB, the
decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in Section 1 of PD 1344. It has
been consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, HLURB, has jurisdiction
over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its
contractual and statutory obligation.302 A perusal of the complaint discloses that
petitioners are actually seeking to nullify and invalidate the duly constituted acts of
PHCC the April 29, 2005 Agreement 27 entered into by PHCC with DPDCI and its
Board Resolution 28 which authorized the acceptance of the proposed
offsetting/settlement of DPDCI's indebtedness and approval of the conversion of certain
units from saleable to common areas. Petitioners alleged causes of action are nott
cognizable by the HLURB considering the nature of the action and the reliefs sought.

Luzon Development Bank v. Enriquez, GR No. 168646, Jan. 12, 2011.

DELTA violated Section 18 of PD 957 in mortgaging the properties in Delta Homes I

(including Lot 4) to the BANK without prior clearance from the HLURB. This violation
renders the mortgage void. We have held before that "a mortgage contract executed in

301
Citing Delos Santos v. Sarmiento, GR No. 154877, March 27, 2007, 519 SCRA 62, 75.
302
Citing Christian General Assembly, Inc. v. Ignacio, GR No. 164789, August 27, 2009, 597 SCRA 266.
 54

breach of Section 18 of [PD 957] is null and void." Considering that "PD 957 aims to
protect innocent subdivision lot and condominium unit buyers against fraudulent real
estate practices," we have construed Section 18 thereof as "prohibitory and acts
committed contrary to it are void. Sec. 17 of PD 957 requires that contracts to sell
registered is registered with the Register of Deeds in order to make it binding on third
parties. But despite non-registration, the BANK cannot be considered an innocent
purchaser for value since it was well aware that the assigned properties, including Lot 4,
were subdivision lots and therefore within the purview of PD 957.

JUSTICE OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI

Philippine Judicial Academy
Supreme Court
552-9636, 922-0232, 0920-9506384
Email: oswaldodagcaoili@yahoo.com

Reference:

AGCAOILI, Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and
Deeds) 2011 ed., (with a foreword by Chief justice Reynato S. Puno), cited by the
Supreme Court as one of the recognized textbooks on property registration in Eland
Philippines Inc. v. Garcia, GR No. 173289, Feb. 17, 2010. See also: Agcaoili, Law on
Natural Resources and Environmental Law Developments (with a Foreword by
Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor, Philippine Judicial Academy, Supreme
Court), and Reviewer in Property Registration and Related Laws (With Sample
MCQs and Suggested Answers) Published by REX Book Store, Inc.