Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
[client name deleted]
It has been an extraordinary week in Hanoi. Vietnam, as ASEAN Chair, has
successfully hosted the 43rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), the AMM post‐
ministerial conference with ten dialogue partners, separate meetings between
ASEAN and each dialogue partner, the 4th ASEAN Political‐Security Council meeting,
the ASEAN Plus Three meeting with China, Japan and South Korea, the 17th ASEAN
Regional Forum ministerial meeting (including a retreat and a plenary session), and a
number of other important gatherings.
This year the ASEAN related meetings were a combination of business as usual and
business that was quite unusual.
Unusual Business – North Korea
Simply put, great power rivalry and friction between China and the United States put
grey clouds over the proceedings. Sino‐American relations were already strained
when China cancelled all military‐to‐military contacts with the United States in
retaliation for the Obama Administration’s decision to resume arms sales to Taiwan.
More recently, China and the United States sparred diplomatically over assigning
responsibility for the sinking of the South Korean warship, Cheonan. An international
panel of experts that examined the wreckage of the ship concluded North Korea was
responsible. China took issue with this conclusion.
China was not really disputing the facts of the case but reacting to the outcome of
North Korea’s miscalculation. The sinking of the Cheonan dampened emerging
differences between Seoul and Washington on how to deal with Pyongyang. North
Korea’s actions brought South Korea and the United States closer together and
strengthened their alliance.
One outcome was their decision to conduct simultaneous naval exercises in the Sea
of Japan off Korea’s east coast and in the Yellow Sea off Korea’s west coast. These
naval exercises are a major display of U.S. military power on China’s doorstep. China
was angered and condemned the exercises.
Great power friction over North Korea intruded into all the ASEAN ministerial and
related meetings. The ASEAN response was lukewarm. ASEAN sought shelter under a
2
previous United Nations Security Council resolution that condemned the sinking of
the Cheonan but did not apportion blame.
All ASEAN ministers could do was to offer condolences to South Korea for the death
of 46 of its sailors and call on all parties to exercise restraint and call for a peaceful
resolution of the issue.
ASEAN’s position was undercut immediately by North Korea which threatened a
physical response.
Issues raised by the sinking of the Cheonan demonstrate that there are real limits to
‘the ASEAN Way’ in maintaining ‘peace, cooperation and development’ in the region.
Peace on the Korean peninsula also requires military deterrence against Pyongyang’s
threat to use force.
Only the U.S. alliance network in North East Asia can provide a deterrent to North
Korea’s provocative behaviour. Condolences by ASEAN are not enough to maintain
peace.
Unusual Business – The East Sea
Throughout the eight years of the Bush Administration, China made major inroads in
South East Asia by advancing it new concept of security. China sought to allay
concerns about the ‘China threat’ and was quite successful in this objective. China
became a strategic partner with ASEAN.
China and ASEAN negotiated a Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China
Sea (DOC) to reduce frictions over territorial claims in the East Sea. The DOC proved
to be a weak instrument as China became ever more assertive, even tabling a map to
a United Nations Commission formally claiming the entire area.
But China overplayed its hand when it sought to pressure American companies
working with Vietnam to develop the resources in the East Sea and by harassing U.S.
naval ships.
The 17th ASEAN Regional Forum witnessed the extraordinary intervention by 12
countries who raised maritime security issues including the East Sea. Foremost
among them was the United States. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared the
South China Sea to be an American ‘national interest’. She announced U.S.
willingness to intervene diplomatically and urged the speedy adoption of a binding
code of conduct.
China’s Foreign Minister was taken aback and claimed the criticism of his country’s
position had been orchestrated by the United States.
The 17th ARF meeting witnessed a turning of the tide. The Obama Administration has
turned the tables on China by re‐engaging with South East Asia on a multilateral
basis. The U.S. is seeking membership in the East Asian Summit and if approved it is
likely President Obama will attend next year’s summit in Jakarta.
These two examples of unusual business indicate that Vietnam’s work as ASEAN
Chair will get more difficult as the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defence Ministers
Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus) approaches. It is scheduled to be held on October 12th.
The ADMM Plus ideally will bring together all ten Southeast Asian defence ministers
3
and their counterparts from China, the United States, Japan, South Korea, India,
Australia, New Zealand and Russia.
Prior to the 43rd ASEAN ministerial and related meetings, China has been quietly
threatening to downgrade its representation if maritime issues, including the East
Sea, were put on the agenda. In light of the 17th ARF meeting China will have to
rethink its position. If China reacts negatively it runs the risk of isolating itself
diplomatically. Or to put it another way, the shoe worn by the Bush Administration is
now on China’s foot.
Business as Usual
ASEAN Ministerial Meetings are well‐planned affairs. The agenda is worked out well
in advance and proceedings run smoothly. This year was no different and Vietnam
deserves credit for this.
ASEAN ministers were privately critical of Myanmar. The ASEAN Secretary General
said they gave the Myanmar minister ‘an ear full’ at an informal dinner prior to the
AMM.
Myanmar briefed the AMM on election plans. In response, ASEAN ministers publicly
called for free and fair elections, national reconciliation and the participation of all
parties in the electoral process. There was nothing new in this statement.
Vietnam, as ASEAN Chair, can take pride in shepherding through a number of
important documents that will strengthen the ASEAN community‐building process.
The ARF too made progress by adopting the Hanoi Action Plan to implement the ARF
Vision Statement and approved a list of seventeen cooperative security measures.
The ARF adopted three plans: disaster relief, counter‐terrorism and transnational
crime, and maritime security.
Vietnam’s pursuit of a code of conduct for the East Sea was endorsed but as a future
goal.
ASEAN ministers have been arguing that ASEAN should play a central role in regional
security affairs. But their inability to deliver a firm response on the Korean question
revealed the weakness of ASEAN to deal effectively with security issues outside of
Southeast Asia.
The ARF lacks executive authority and serves as a discussion forum only. But the
intervention of major powers on the East Sea issue may portend that the East Asian
Summit (EAS) may emerge as the centre piece of the Asia‐Pacific region’s security
architecture. ASEAN may be central to the EAS but in future it will have to work with
its major dialogue partners to deliver practical results to restrain regional states that
threaten or use force.