The Limitations of Regional Organizations and Hegemonic

States in international peacekeeping and security:

The Case of the South African military intervention in Lesotho in 1998

Siyabonga Patrick Hadebe

Supervisor: Dr. Robert H. Jackson

Project Submitted as Part of the Requirements for the Masters of Arts in International
Relations

Alliant International University

Mexico City Campus

September 30, 2011

 ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the limitations of regional organizations and hegemonic

states in international peacekeeping and security. It seeks to explain that powerful
states intervene in the internal affairs of other states to further their national interests.
Due to the advantageous position that hegemonic states hold in relation to weaker
states, they elect to or act unilaterally if they did not want to take multilateral action.
As a result, they have been adept in using, or even disregarding, the United Nations
(UN) system to further their interests in the global system. The case of the South
African/ Southern African Development Community (SADC) military intervention in
Lesotho in 1998 forms the core of the study. In addition to the Lesotho case study, a
selected number of interventions are used to substantiate the main arguments of this
investigation.

The initial argument of this study is that South Africas strategic interests
motivated it to intervene in Lesotho, rather than for humanitarian reasons. South
Africa wanted to demonstrate its political dominance in the region. It also feared that
the deteriorating political situation in Lesotho would affect its supply of fresh water to
the Gauteng province. A stable Lesotho was also important to South African
interests. The actions of South Africa in the Lesotho crisis were a clear indication that
the country would do everything in its power to protect these interests. Most worrying,
both South Africa and the SADC, at the time, shared something in common, both
lacked reputable credentials as players in conflict prevention and peacemaking in
Southern Africa. South Africa, supported by Botswana and the SADC, failed to obtain
prior authorization from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as required by
Chapter VIII of the Charter, and did not consult the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), which did not encourage any form of intervention at the time. The SADC did
not have a legal mechanism for allowing interventions in member states.

The second argument of the study is that the primacy of hegemonic states and
regional organizations does not advance international peacekeeping and security.
Weaker and smaller states in the global system are at the bottom of the power
hierarchy, and always suffer at the hands of the more powerful states. Pure realist
interests motivate states to send troops to intervene militarily. Regional bodies, such
ii
as the SADC, are simply tools used by states to advance their foreign policy. The first
concern of states is not to maximize power, but to maintain their position in the
international system. Therefore, the task of maintaining global peace should not be
left to hegemonic states and regional organizations. Instead, the UNSC should have
the ultimate say on military interventions in different parts of the world. The
qualification of this argument is that there is a need to reform the UNSC. The P5
countries (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) make
decisions on behalf of the other 189 states. It is presumed that a reformed UNSC
would at least be representative enough to make resolutions that could be binding
and representative of all states.

Striking concerns arise from the analysis of interventions, both before and after
1990, in that strong states present themselves as policemen to monitor the
unbecoming behaviors of weaker states in the international system. Hegemonic
states find legal arguments to justify their interventions in weaker states. These
biased legal arguments in all cases would inevitably arise because in many instances
stronger states, whether individually or as a collective, motivate the interventions in
the UNSC. This makes UNSC authorizations to be as questionable as is the role and
intentions of powerful states in all interventions.

The UNSC delegates authority without specifying to whom. This allows any
state the right to undertake whatever acts it deems fit. This view condemns the role
of the UNSC to be an authority without accountability. For example, Britain and the
US invaded Iraq in 2003 because they wanted Saddam Hussein to comply with
previous resolutions. The two states were later accused of unilateralism, following
Frances strong opposition to the intervention. In 2011, Britain, France and the US
managed to reconcile their differences and joined together to bombard Libya. The
cases of Iraq and Libya demonstrate the UNSCs inability to implement its decisions.
The roles of the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court create
endless disagreements among UN member states.

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For my wife Linda and our three sons: Asanda Langalibalele, Luyanda Meluleki and
Nala Siyabonga Jnr.

Printed in Pretoria - Tshwane, South Africa, on September 22, 2011

iv
 Writing this thesis would not have been possible without the support of many
people that I honestly am greatly indebted.

I am forever thankful to my wife Linda and our sons: Asanda Langalibalele,

Luyanda Meluleki and Nala Siyabonga Jnr.

To begin with, I am very much indebted to my parents. I am indebted to my

parents Bernard and Constance Hadebe, who have always supported my academic
and career progress and aspirations, provide an excellent example of diligence and
perseverance.

The successful completion of this study has been possible only through the
sincere interest and support of a few key people. It is my greatest privilege to them
for their assistance. I am immensely thankful to Dr. Robert H. Jackson, for accepting
to supervise my thesis. Working with Robert has been a great privilege for me. He
helped me frame my ideas and did not allow me to be carried away in my
arguments. I am also grateful to my good friend Kwezi Mgqibisa who made certain
that all my pronouncements about the peace and security arrangements on the
African continent were accurate.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ..............................................................................................................................II

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................................. VIII

LIST OF TABLES, MAPS AND FIGURES ............................................................................ XII

INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................1
STATE SOVEREIGNTY ........................................................................................................5
THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS ..........................................................................................................................8
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT...............................................................................10
PURPOSE AND ARGUMENTS ..........................................................................................12
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION ...........................................................................15

CHAPTER 1 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA ...................................18

INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................18
THE REGION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA .............................................................................19
BRITISH COLONIAL PERIOD (1806 1960S): IMPERIALISM EXTENDS TO SOUTHERN
AFRICA ...............................................................................................................................22
THE SHAPING OF A WHITE DOMINATION: THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA (1910
1960) ...................................................................................................................................24
THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
RESPONSE ........................................................................................................................31
THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO: THE POOR LITTLE BROTHER .......................................37
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................46

CHAPTER 2 ATTEMPTS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ..........48

SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOM UNION (SACU) .............................................................49
PRE-1992 POLITICAL CLIMATE AND INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ..............53
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) ...............................58
PEACE AND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE SADC .....................................65
PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA ....................................................................68
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................70

CHAPTER 3 THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO .................77

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO ...................................78
BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION .........................................................................80

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 A QUICK OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK IN
AFRICA ...............................................................................................................................84
THE EXPLORATION OF WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA (AND BOTSWANA) OBTAINED
PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FROM THE OPDSC/UNSC/ AU PEACE AND SECURITY
COUNCIL ............................................................................................................................85
THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN LESOTHO ......................................87
THE ROLES OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SADC IN CONFLICT PREVENTION AND
PEACEMAKING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA DURING THE 1990S ........................................91
THE POST 1998 SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY ....................................................93
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................97

CHAPTER 4 CASE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS ...................................................................98

THE PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION CASES ...............................98
RESEARCH FINDINGS ....................................................................................................116
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................127

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS ..........................................................129

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 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AGOA Africa Growth and Opportunities Act

AMIS African Mission in Sudan
AMISOM African Mission in Somalia
ANC African National Congress
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
ASF African Standby Force
AU African Union
BCP Basutoland Congress Party
BDF Botswana Defense Force
BLS Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland
BNLS Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho
BNP Basutoland National Party
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CADSP Common Defense Policy for the African Continent
CARICOM Caribbean Community and Common Market
CET Common External Tariff
CMA Common Monetary Area
COI Indian Ocean Commission
COMESA Common Market for Eastern and the Southern Africa
CONSAS Constellation of Southern African States
COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions
CSSDCA Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-
operation in Africa
DEIC Dutch East India Company (Dutch: Vereenigde Oostindische
Compagnie)
DIRCO South African Department of International Relations
Cooperation
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

viii
EU European Union
EUFOR RD Congo European Union Force in the DRC
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIFA International Football Federation
FIS Algerian Islamic Front
FLS Frontline States
FSLN Sandinista National Liberation Front
FTA Free Trade Area
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution
HCTs British High Commission Territories
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC International Criminal Court
ICJ International Court Of Justice
ICM Integrated Committee of Ministers
IEC Independent Electoral Commission (Lesotho)
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
LCD Lesotho Congress for Democracy
LDF Lesotho Defense Force
LHDA Lesotho Highlands Development Authority
LHWP Lesotho Highlands Water Project
MENA Middle East and North Africa region
MERCOSUR Common Market of the South
MFP Marematlou Freedom Party
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MMA Multilateral Monetary Agreement
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the DRC
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD New Partnership for African Development
NIS National Intelligence Service
OAU Organization of African Unity
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC United Nations Mission in the Congo

ix
OPDSC Organ for Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
P5 Five permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council
PAC Pan African Congress
PLO Palestine Liberation Organization
PPDSC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation
PSC AU Peace and Security Council
RDP Reconstruction and Development Program
RENAMO (Portuguese: Resistncia Nacional Moambicana)
RISDP Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan
RMU Rand Monetary Union
RSF Revenue-sharing formula
SACU Southern African Customs Union
SADC Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG SADC Brigade
SADCC Southern African Development Coordination Conference
SADF South African Defense Force
SANDF South African National Defense Force
SANNC South African Native National Congress
SARS South African Revenue Services
SATTCC Culture, Information, Sport, and the Transport and
Communications Commission
SIPO Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defense and
Security Cooperation
TCTA Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority
TNC Transitional National Council
TRC Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDF United Democratic Front
UMA Arab Maghreb Union
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNITA (Portuguese: Unio Nacional para a Independncia Total de
Angola)

x
UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNOSOM II United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission
WMD Weapons of mass destruction

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 LIST OF TABLES, MAPS AND FIGURES

Tables

Table 1 Patterns of actual military interventions

Table 1.1 The economic status of the Kingdom of Lesotho (1999 2010)
Table 2.1 Major Attempts at regional integration in Southern Africa
Table 2.2 Sector responsibilities within SADC
Table 2.3 The objectives of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and
Security
Table 2.4 The SADC protocols and agreements
Table 2.5 SADC Military Expenditures and Armed Forces

Maps

Map 1.1 Map of Southern Africa

Map 2.1 The geographical map of the SADC region

Figures

Figure 2.1 Organogram of the SADC

Figure 2.2 Organogram of the SADC Secretariat
Figure 3.1 The Structure and Elements of the Peace and Security Council
of the African Union

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 Introduction

Four years following the establishment of Black majority rule in 1994, South
Africa led the invasion of Lesotho in 1998, as it was declared at the time, under the
banner of the Southern African Development Community (SADC). South Africa
claimed that the armed intervention (or the Operation Boleas) was sanctioned by
the SADC, and that it was aimed at promoting democracy and stability in the
kingdom.1 This was in the aftermath of the highly disputed March 1998 parliamentary
elections. Botswana assisted in this undertaking, but there were no other SADC
member countries involved. The Lesotho invasion coincided with the escalation of
political problems in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). DRC became an
SADC member in 1997. These military involvements took place after the end of the
Cold War. In this period, there was high optimism that there would finally be peace
and stability in the region of Southern Africa.

Major changes occurred in the international system at the end of the 1980s. The
dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia was significant for many reasons. It
meant that the Cold War had reached its dead end, and thus the eastern European
states could claim their place in the global system. Between 1991 and 2008, 25
independent states were created. Africa also experienced dramatic shifts in the
economic and political order.2 For Africa, the end of the Cold War brought hope for
peace and security. It may be argued that this aspiration was achieved, as many long
wars in Southern Africa ended. The region was free of harassment by the white
minority state of South Africa. Namibia and South Africa became democratic states in
1990 and 1994, respectively. As a result, South Africa was admitted to the Southern
African Development Community.

Ian Johnstone argues that the end of the Cold War had a profound impact on
the normative agenda of the United Nations (UN). 3 This normative agenda
manifested in three inter-related areas of practice: humanitarian intervention,
consent-based peace-keeping and peace-building, and the broader human rights,
democratization and good governance activities of UN institutions.4 As a result, the
United Nations role in international affairs, especially in conflict areas, gained

1
prominence. The 1990s saw the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) actively
implementing the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in terms of what
constituted a threat to international peace and security. The UNSC currently consists
of five permanent members (P5), the Peoples Republic of China, France, Great
Britain, the Russian Federation, and the United States of America. The practice of
humanitarian intervention commenced with the adoption of a number of resolutions
that eventually resulted in the intervention in Iraq in 1991. As a result of many
interventions between 1990 and 2000, James Kurth concluded that: The 1990s were
a decade of humanitarian intervention.5 The United States of America led invasions
of Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Australia and Britain also intervened in East Timor
(1999) and Sierra Leone (2000), respectively. The UNs failures soon followed in
Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda.

The US-led UN Somalia military intervention in 1993 gained worldwide

attention, after the worlds sole superpower was caught in the crossfire of warlords.
The US prematurely departed Somali, and the intervention was generally classified
as a disaster. The outcomes of this failed intervention was going to have an impact
on other conflict areas in the world. At the end of Cold War, the United States had no
particular interest in Somalia and East Africa, except for strategic naval bases in
Kenya.6 Influenced by the Persian Gulf War of 199091, President George H. W.
Bush in 1992 nonetheless committed the US involvement to the United Nations
Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II). In 1993, the killing of US soldiers at the hands
of local warlords forced the US to withdraw from Somalia, and the mission collapsed.
This left the Somalis in chaos, where the country remains even now. Following the
catastrophic Somalia intervention, most Western governments, led by the US
became extremely reluctant to deploy troops in ongoing conflicts, particularly in
Africa where their strategic interests were limited.7 Howard French maintains that
Western countries in any case had lost interest in Africa after the Cold War, and
moved funding away from emerging African democracies to emerging Eastern
European democracies.8 This reluctance to be involved in African affairs is often
blamed for the 1994 Rwandan genocide. 9 Cases on non-intervention continue to
exist in Congo and Darfur.

2
 The US military, however, returned to Africa to launch attacks against Sudan in
1998. On August 7, 1998, bombs simultaneously blasted the US embassies in
Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). The US government blamed the
attacks on al-Qaeda, and immediately attacked Afghanistan and Sudan. Thirteen US
ships in the Red Sea launched cruise missiles that destroyed a pharmaceutical
factory in the Sudans capital of Khartoum. President Clinton defended the US
counterstrike as an exercise of our inherent right of self-defense consistent with
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter... to prevent and deter additional attacks by a
clearly identified terrorist threat.10 The US military attack on Sudan could not be
technically classified as a humanitarian intervention, but it marked the early stages
of US war against global terrorism.

The political changes following the Cold War also resulted in a significant
increase in interventions on the African continent. The examples of the African-
made military interventions in the 1990s, included Nigeria and the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervention in Sierra Leone (1997)
and Liberia (1990); Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and the SADC in the DRC (1998);
and South Africa and the SADC in Lesotho (1998). Alfred Mashishi states that: What
made these military interventions special was that they were carried out by African
states, under the auspices of sub-regional organizations. This marked a departure
from traditional military interventions in Africa, which had been conducted by foreign
powers with ties to the African state in question.11Foreign powers such as the United
States, the Soviet Union and Cuba had already left the continent.

Anton du Plessis claims that during this period foreign states were reluctant to
intervene, and to become involved in military interventions beyond the confines of
their geographical and national interest.12 Africa was not important in that regard. The
1993 Somali conflict, discussed above, was therefore the only exception to the rule.
Maybe Somalias geographical position, at the southern end of the Red Sea and just
across from the Arabian Peninsula made it part of the overall US Middle East
geopolitical and economic strategy. The US in particular was opposed to military
action at the global level, and was unwilling to reinforce UN operations in troubled
spots, particularly in Africa. Sarah Sewall confirms that the US in the 1990s had
pushed to curtail UN operations and fallen further behind in paying its assessments
for UN peacekeeping.13 Kurth concurs that the United States evinced very little

3
interest in intervening in Africa.14 The US Congress feared that the Administrations
peacekeeping policy was too proactive, overly supportive of the UN, and divorced
from US national interests.15 The international withdrawal in Africa left a huge gap,
and local big players such as Nigeria and South Africa took advantage. The regional
hegemonic states, supported by the sub-regional organizations, stepped forward to
fill the vacuum. Regional hegemonic states felt the direct impact of the nearby
conflicts. For example, displaced people often crossed borders to neighboring states.
Many African states have less or no capacity to provide public goods to their citizens,
and the influx of people thus pressured their limited resources.

The new peacemaking interventions in Africa disregarded international law,

especially the international legal principle of non-interference in the affairs of the
sovereign states. This principle of non-interference is espoused in the founding
charter of Organization of African Unity (OAU). The OAU was transformed in 2002 to
become the African Union (AU). In contrast to the OAU, the AU Constitutive Act
grants the Union the right to intervene in a member state in the event of war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. 16 Mashishi summarizes these military
interventions in the following manner:

these interventions have been conducted by sub-regional organizations whose mandates,

until recently, were limited to promoting regional economic cooperation and integration. These
organizations are themselves weak, lacking in peacemaking experience and financial
resources. This weakness is reflected in the absence of structures that specifically deal with
intrastate conflict, not an issue of concern to these organizations. Mainly, the available
17
structures were built around the possibility of a state to state conflict.

The absence of an international power that was willing to be directly involved in

African wars, the leaders of the states whose sovereignty and control were
threatened approached either their powerful neighbors, or the regional organization.
In the African context, South Africa generally sees itself as the natural power in
Southern Africa, and Nigeria is a powerhouse in West Africa.18 For example, the
leaders of both DRC and Lesotho overlooked the OAU and the United Nations.
President Laurent Kabila of the DRC approached the SADC, without necessarily
directing the request to any particular state. The situation for Kabila was a bit
different because there was no obvious hegemonic power in Central Africa.19 After
South Africa declined to accept the invitation to send troops to Congo, Zimbabwe
took the opportunity of projecting itself as a hegemon. South Africa could have
entered the fray in the Congo much earlier. However, its human rights based foreign

4
policy at the time prevented it from supporting Kabila. Perhaps the early presence of
South Africa in the DRC could have deterred states such as Rwanda and Uganda
from attacking the Congo.

This thesis focuses on the military intervention by South Africa and SADC in
Lesotho in 1998. In the case of Lesotho, Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili
unilaterally approached South Africa for assistance.20 The Lesotho intervention was
generally understood as an intervention by a sub-regional hegemon, with the
approval of the sub-regional organization.21 South Africa deployed 700 South African
troops to Lesotho, and single handedly carried out the military operation. When the
Botswana Defense Force (BDF) reached Lesotho the mission was almost complete.
South Africa also contributed the majority of the financial resources to carry out the
military intervention. In any event, a military intervention cannot be possible without
the commitment of a hegemon. Smaller states do not have the political will or the
financial resources to participate in interventions. The hegemons also contribute the
large part of resources to the functioning of regional and international bodies.

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

For more than three hundred years, state sovereignty has been a defining
principle of interstate relations and a foundation of world order.22 The concept of
sovereignty of states is defendable through customary international law and the UN
Charter. 23 Even in the current international relations system, sovereignty has
remained an important component of the mechanisms for the maintenance of
international peace and security, as well as a defense for weaker states against the
powerful ones. In contradiction to the international legal framework, sovereignty of
states has been continuously violated and breached in practice. However, this does
not imply that the concept is anyhow less entrenched in legal and political discourse.

The subject of state sovereignty attracts sufficient attention and controversy

when the topic of invention is raised. As a result, there are endless debates and
contentious literature on the subject. It will therefore not be feasible for me to discuss
all the different views, but Nico Schrijver summarizes the complexities of sovereignty
as follows:

5
 Few subjects in international law and international relations are as sensitive as a notion of
sovereignty. Steinberger refers to it in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law as the
most glittering and controversial notion in the history, doctrine and practice of international
law. On the other hand, Henkin seeks to banish it from out vocabulary and Lauterpacth
calls it a word which has an emotive quality lacking meaningful specific content, while
Vwezijl notes that any discussion on this subject risks degenerating into a Tower of Babel.
More affirmatively, Brownlie sees sovereignty as the basic constitutional doctrine of the
law of nations and Alan James sees it as the one and only organizing principle in respect
of the dry surface of the globe, all that surface nowbeing divided among single entities of
a sovereign, or constitutionality independent kind. As noted by Falk, There is little neutral
24
ground when it comes to sovereignty.

Nonetheless, the importance of sovereignty in the international system cannot

be undervalued. The definitions above show that it is complex and therefore
demands a careful examination. According to Thomas Weiss and Don Hubert,
sovereignty refers to the competence, independence, and legal status equality of
states.25 The history of a modern state system can be traced back to the Treaties of
Westphalia in 1648. These treaties, by the European states, informed the present
foundations of international law with regard to sovereignty. The Treaties of
Westphalia were concluded to bring the Thirty Years War to an end. Out of this,
three key principles were established as a way of creating peace and order in
Europe. These principles are the sovereignty of states and the fundamental right of
political self-determination; equality between states; and non-intervention of one state
in the internal affairs of another state.

The 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States marked a
turning point in the international system as the core elements of state sovereignty
were codified. These elements included a permanent population, a defined territory,
and a functioning government. 26 Weiss and Hubert stress that an important
component of sovereignty has always been an adequate display of the authority of
states to act over their territory to the exclusion of other states.27 The current world
order, as governed by the UN Charter, may be said to be following this basic model
of sovereignty. The post-1945 system of international order also absorbed the
formerly colonized territories, especially in Africa and Asia. As Weiss and Hubert put
it: Following decolonization, what had been a restrictive and Eurocentric order
became global.28 This statement expresses that the whole world was made up of the
Westphalian state system. Therefore, every person on earth lived in a sovereign
state. The increased number of states does not eliminate the controversies of
sovereignty in many parts of the world.

6
 The definition of the external sovereignty of states is enshrined and given legal
expression in the charters of many international bodies, including the UN and the
OAU. Article 2(1) of the UN Charter states that the UN is based on the principle of
the sovereign equality of all its members. 29 The corresponding principle of non-
intervention is asserted in article 2(7): Nothing contained in the present Charter shall
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state.30 Both the principles of sovereign equality (article
3(1)) and that of non-intervention (articles 3(2) and 3(3)) were also articulated in the
Charter of the OAU.31

However, the realities of statehood as we know it today is that territorial

sovereignty underlies the system of international order in relations among states.32 It
follows that any act of aggression towards another state is forbidden in terms of the
international law. The challenge for the international community of states arises when
one or more states cannot exercise (internal) sovereignty within their borders. Failure
by states to maintain control results in the political vacuum, which in turn is
33
responsible for human tragedies and international and regional insecurity.
Moreover, repressive, aggressive or collapsed states are also not good for
international peace and security. Despite the proliferation of the non-state actors in
the international system, the state remains the fundamental guarantor of human
rights locally, as well as the building block for collectively ensuring international
order.34 Therefore, the international community works towards preserving the state
system as the primary form of organization in the international system.

State formation in Africa tended to be very different when contrasted with other
parts of the world. Hlne Gandois argues that sovereignty seems to be a rather
elastic notion in Africa. 35 Consequently, the concept of sovereignty in Africa is
convoluted. First of all, the frontiers of the modern African state are colonial
creations. Borders between states on the continent resemble the administrative
divisions created by the English, French, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish colonial
empires. Most of these borders were established in the Berlin conference of 1884
85, also known as the Scramble for Africa.36 This could be the case in other parts of
the world too, but in Africa this is more prominent and problematic.

7
 Bronwen Manby reasons that Africas artificial borders are often blamed for
Africas wars.37 The leaders of the newly independent states in Africa recognized the
challenge of borders between their countries. Instead, they did not attempt to change
the borders to reflect the new realities, but they decided to retain the European
created borders. In 1964, the Organization of African Unity strengthened the principle
of the intangibility of colonial frontiers in Africa.38 It promoted external sovereignty
through the principle of non-interference and uti possidetis juris. The latter proclaims
that newly formed sovereign states should have the same borders that they had
before their independence.39 To this day, however, many states in Africa lack the
qualities of state, as defined above. The post-colonial history in many Africans
demonstrates difficulties in establishing a functioning polity.40 For example, many
states do not even have functioning armies to protect their territories, and have
extremely weak economies to provide for their citizens.

THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

Humanitarian intervention may be defined as the use of force to avert an

overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.41 The topic of humanitarian intervention is
appropriate for scrutiny because it is not only contentious, but also highly
controversial. Conflicts elsewhere in the world, such as in Kosovo and East Timor,
brought this reality to light. Christopher Greenwood states that these two conflicts
made the questions whether there is a right of humanitarian intervention and, if so,
when that right may be exercised and by whom into issues of the utmost
importance.42 Different actors have interfered in other sovereign states claiming that
their interventions were for humanitarian reasons.

In the past 51 years, the UN, regional organizations and individual states alike
have also entered sovereign territories to provide so-called humanitarian assistance.
UN forces first entered the Congo 1960 to help end the conflict in that country, and
again in the 1990s to provide humanitarian assistance, see Chapter 4. The Economic
Community of West African States intervened in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-
Bissau in the 1990s. 43 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also
shelled Kosovo in 1999. Individual states such as the United States and Uganda

8
have attacked other sovereign states under the guise of humanitarian intervention.
Many of these interventions have not gone unnoticed.

The topic of humanitarian intervention becomes complicated when the element

of the usage of force (jus ad bellum) is brought into the picture. The act of
humanitarian intervention involves the protection of the nationals of the target or
third state from a human rights catastrophe. 44 This leads to the question as to
whether any state has the right to use force against another state in terms of
international law. According to Michael Wood, the rules of international law in this
regard are located in the Charter and in customary international law. 45 The UN
Charter (Article 2, paragraph 4) is against the threat or use of force.46 However, in
terms of the UN Charter, there are specific circumstances under which the use of
force may be permitted. First, the use of force may be allowed or authorized by the
UNSC (Chapter VII). Second, forcible measures may be applied in the exercise of
the right of individual and collective self-defense (Article 51). Humanitarian
intervention, though is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, is another instance
under which customary international law allows for the use of force in the current
international system. Martin Ortega argues that humanitarian intervention occurs
when one state or a group of states use armed force to alleviate the suffering of
human beings in the territory of other states. 47 For a list of patterns of military
interventions, see Table 1.1.

The literature reviewed does not provide guidance on how states should act
when they perceive that their interests and rights are infringed upon by another state
and/ or by a non-state actor. As stated earlier, the US the global war on terror
targeted the states of Sudan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. These attacks were unique
because they, for the first time in the history of international politics, involved the use
of force against a non-state actor (Al Qaeda).48 This created an unusual situation in
international politics. In Europe, for example, the Iraq war was seen as a way in
which the US was demonstrating its unique position as the sole power after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. However, the US remained resolute in arguing that it
carried out the military attacks in self-defense. 49 Modern international politics is
evidently complex and therefore requires innovation from the international
community, especially on matters of international security.

9
 Article 51 of the Charter sates: Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations50 It appears that this clause seeks to reaffirm that
a state has a right to protect itself from external attack. However, what is not clear is
how should the non-state actors should be dealt. These new players in the global
system are not states and therefore do not have authority over any sovereign
territory. States cannot be simply attacked because they host terrorist groups within
their boundaries. At the same, throughout history states have attacked one another
based on claims that another state harbored a terrorist group. In 2008, the
Colombian army bombed the rebel Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
sites located in Ecuador. Uganda launched attacks against south Sudan (now part of
the newly-formed state of South Sudan) and east DRC because it accused them of
collaborating with the Lords Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Front,
respectively. In 2010, Somalias militant group, Al Shabbab, attacked the Ugandan
state for contributing troops to the African Union peacekeeping force in Somalia.51

THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT

Sovereignty goes hand in hand with notion of the responsibility to protect.52

Sovereignty thus can only be in the hands of legitimate authority. It has been argued
that despot governments cannot hide behind sovereignty, while violating human
rights in their states. This understanding has created a situation where many
observers have questioned under whose domain the responsibility to protect falls.
Is it the responsibility of individual states and/ or the international community? In
1992, the former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992 - 96)
commented that: The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty, however, has
passed; its theory was never matched by reality.53 Since then, the responsibility to
protect is widely accepted as a duty of both the state, and the international
community. On September 16, 2005, the 191 member states of the United Nations
endorsed and recognized the notion of sovereignty as the responsibility to protect
as a new international norm. 54 This United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)
resolution read as follows:

Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the

10
 prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary
means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.

The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, to help protect populations from
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peacefully
means by inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their
55
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

This resolution sets the conditions under which individual states committed not
only to protecting their citizens, but also people in other countries. The careful
wording of the resolution such as the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means shows that the states still prefer not to use
force against each other. This poses the question of whether or not the use of force
is permissible in humanitarian operations. The other shortcoming of the resolution is
that it fails to state whether humanitarian intervention can take place without seeking
UNSC authority. The former Secretary-General Kofi Annan (1997 2006) noted the
dilemma of humanitarian intervention by stating that On the one hand, is it legitimate
for a regional organization to use force without a UN mandate? On the other, is it
permissible to let gross and systematic violations of human rights, with grave
humanitarian consequences, continue unchecked? 56 Annan made these remarks
following the UN inaction to prevent the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and the
unauthorized NATO operations in Kosovo in 1999.

Gandois points out that the 2005 UNGA resolution also failed to define an
institutional process to overcome a UNSC deadlock or indications on how to deal
with unauthorized intervention.57 It is possible that the P5 wanted to hold on their
veto power, and also to remain above the law as far as undertaking unauthorized
interventions is concerned.

The ongoing debate in international politics also entails peacekeeping

concerns, on whether it should be executed by the UN, regional organizations (for
example, the AU, NATO or the European Union (EU), or ad hoc coalitions of willing
states.58 In terms of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the
Security Council or the General Assembly should permit UN-led peacekeeping
initiatives. Chapter VIII (Articles 52-54) expresses the involvement of regional bodies

11
or agencies and neighboring states on matters of international peace and security. In
this regard, the purpose of regional arrangements or agencies is to deal with such
matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and their
activities must be consistent with the purposes and principles of the United
Nations.59 In case of the latter, it is apparent that the international organization would
still want to monitor and guide actions of non-UN actors in matters of international
peace and security.

With all problems associated with interventions, Kurth suggests a trade-off

between the legitimacy and the efficacy of an intervention.60 The UN seems to be the
political authority with the greatest legitimacy in the international system. Within the
UN framework, any proposed humanitarian intervention is likely to be viewed by one
of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council as a threat to its particular
interests and the proposed intervention will likely be vetoed.61 The veto power of
the P5 therefore limits the UNSC efficacy. This leaves space for the political authority
with the greatest efficacy, in this occasion regional hegemons, regional organizations
and international powerful states. Most probably, these powerful states can include
Australia, Britain, France, the United States, or even Canada. Many of these states,
however, have serious legitimacy problems due their colonial pasts and the legacy of
imperialism. The dilemma of intervention decisions is that the most efficacious
political authority is also likely to be the least legitimate one.62 These international
dynamics are also applicable to regional bodies and regional hegemons.

PURPOSE AND ARGUMENTS

Another feature of the end of the Cold War was the emergence of regional
organizations in all parts of the world. In theory, all member states in these
organizations have an equal relationship, and have the same voice in all matters
concerning the region. However, member countries differ from each other in terms of
economic capabilities and physical geographic size. These differences imply that
hegemonic states tend to have a larger portion of resources that are necessary for
the functioning of the regional body. This idea is explained in detail in Chapter 3. For
example, in relation to the other SADC member states South Africa has a larger
economy, military, and resources. As a result, South Africa contributes the majority

12
funding to the SADC, participates in UN peacemaking institutions, and subsidizes the
economies of Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho.63 These features clearly
make South Africa a hegemonic state. Hegemonic states exist at both the
international and regional levels. The five permanent members of UNSC hold
unusual positions of international and regional hegemonic states. South Africa and
Nigeria are hegemonic states in Africa, the US in the Americas, Brazil in South
America, China in Asia, Russia in Eurasia, France and Britain in Europe, and India in
the Indian subcontinent.

Due to the advantageous position that hegemonic states hold in relation to

weaker states, they elect to or act unilaterally if they did not want to take multilateral
action. Powerful states are able to dominate other countries in many ways in order to
achieve their policy preferences.64 In this regard, Carolyn Shaw points out that US
dominance is limited in the context of the OAS. Shaw isolates the voice of Latin
American states as a counterforce to the US power.65 This assertion fails to take into
account the many instances that the US overrode the OAS to destabilize the
continent. Augusto Varas argues, US interventionist, protectionist, unilateralist and
coercive policies have not earned it much sympathy in the region.66 US aggression,
for example, created many problems in Latin American countries such as Nicaragua
and Panama, see Chapter 4. The OAS, much like the AU and SADC, does not have
the means of preventing hegemonic states from advancing their agendas.

Powerful states intervene in neighboring states to further their national interests.

Stuart Croft and Adrian Treacher mention that regional power intervention concerns
the actions of the most powerful states in a particular, or of those states which wish
to attain that status.67 In this instance, a powerful state pursues regional hegemony
through the use of force to or the forcible removal of actual or potential threats to
existing regional hegemony.68 Since the hegemonic states interests are overriding,
the state would develop arguments to justify why it intervened in the neighboring
state. To improve their public diplomacy, the powerful states turn to a regional body
for endorsement of its actions. However, these regional organizations, particularly in
Africa, are generally weak, lack peacemaking experience, and financial resources.69
For example, the OAU, SADC and ECOWAS did not have structures to specifically
deal with intrastate conflict in the 1990s. It is ironic that these organizations can be
entrusted with a responsibility of maintaining peace and security in Africa.

13
 The argument that the use force, in particular, to attain their national interest at
regional level also holds for the international level. Obviously, at this level the
relations between states are complex, and differ significantly from relations found in a
specific geographic region of the world. In a particular region, states are likely to
share commonalities such as historical links, language, religion, and common traits in
their respective societies. Conversely, these shared characteristics could be a source
of conflict. At the international level, states from different parts of the globe hardly
share such linkages. Nonetheless, powerful states such as the US have the ability to
dominate the international system in many ways to achieve their policy
preferences.70 The international and regional hegemonic states have been adept in
using, or even disregarding, the UN system to further their interests in the global
system.

The initial argument of this study is that South Africas strategic interests
motivated it to intervene in Lesotho, rather than for humanitarian reasons. First,
South Africa wanted to demonstrate its political dominance in the region. Second,
South Africa feared that the deteriorating political situation in Lesotho would affect its
supply of fresh water to the Gauteng province.71 Therefore, South Africa decided to
take swift action to protect its strategic interests in Lesotho. A stable Lesotho was
also important to protect these interests. The actions of South Africa in the Lesotho
crisis were a clear indication that the country would do everything in its power and
capacity to protect these interests.

The second argument of the study is that the primacy of hegemonic states and
regional organizations does not advance international peacekeeping and security.
Weaker and smaller states in the global system are at the bottom of the power
hierarchy, and always suffer at the hands of the more powerful states. Pure realist
interests motivate states to send troops to intervene militarily. Regional bodies, such
as the SADC, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), and the Caribbean
Community and Common Market (CARICOM), are simply tools used by states to
advance their foreign policy. The first concern of states is not to maximize power, but
to maintain their position in the international system. 72 Therefore, the task of
maintaining global peace should not be left to hegemonic states and regional
organizations. Instead, the United Nations Security Council should have the ultimate
say on military interventions in different parts of the world. The qualification of this

14
argument is that there is a need to reform the UNSC. The P5 countries make
decisions on behalf of the other 189 states. It is presumed that a reformed UNSC
would at least be representative enough to make resolutions that could be binding
and representative of all states. There is definitely a need to reduce and contain the
power of hegemonic states in the international system. It is therefore debatable if the
UNSC has been successful in preventing the outbreak of war.

METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION

This thesis will be carried out using an explanatory approach based on existing
literature. 73 Thus, to contextualize the limitations of regional organizations and
hegemonic states in international peacekeeping and security, this study will perform
an in-depth literature review of different cases of intervention. The Case of the South
African/ SADC military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 forms the core of the study.
Qualitative methods will be used to gather and examine data from different literature
sources on intervention in different parts of the world. This qualitative research aims
to describe the limitations of regional organizations and hegemonic states in
international peacekeeping and security.

Secondary data sources such as academic journals, UN documentation,

government publications, and other scientific data sources will be utilized extensively,
and will also basically serve as primary sources for the study.74 Therefore, this study
does not utilize methods such as fieldwork and questionnaires for data collection. In
this instance, a literature review underlines what research has been previously done.
This demonstrates how regional organizations and hegemonic states sanctioned
interventions in the international self-help system, with or without due consideration
for the UNSC. This also shows how hegemonic states utilize their power, whether
within or without the UNSC seat, and manage to manipulate existing international
humanitarian regulations.

15
 The study will be divided into four chapters. The Introductory Chapter covers
the theoretical foundations and the main arguments of the study, the research
methodology, and the general outlay of the subsequent chapters. Chapter One
examines the northward European expansion from the Cape of Good Hope, the
confrontations between the different groups (including the English, the Afrikaners and
the native Africans), the discovery of precious metals and economic exploitation, and
some of the problems that occurred as a result the discovery of the mineral wealth in
South Africa. The chapter also presents the formation of the states of Lesotho and
South Africa. Chapter Two looks at attempts at political integration in Southern Africa
as well as at peace and security issues in Southern Africa and Africa.

After performing the literature review, this study presents and analyzes the case
studies of interventions. Chapter 3 focuses on the South African military intervention
in Lesotho in 1998. As stated in the preceding paragraph, the 1998 South African
invasion of Lesotho is the base of the study. To enhance the validity of the findings
on the South African Lesotho case study, Chapter Four analyzes five additional
cases of interventions. Chapter Four also presents the findings of the study. The
Conclusion presents the conclusions and recommendations of this study.

16
Table 1: Patterns of actual military interventions
Imperialistic/ hegemonic
intervention pattern
Colonial
Balance of power
Ideological
Self-determination
Self-defense
Cold War pattern of
intervention
Humanitarian intervention
Collective intervention
Punitive intervention
Source: Adapted from Ortega N (2001), pp. 5 7.
A powerful state intervenes militarily in another state in order to
gain some advantage, to further its interests and to increase its
influence both in the target state and on the international scene.
For example, a hegemonic state intervenes within its sphere of
influence to avoid a political development that is not favorable to
its interests.
National interests of powerful colonialist states are coercively
imposed upon weak (newly independent) states. For example,
The Opium Wars against
China and the gunboat diplomacy employed against Latin
America republics in the nineteenth century are examples of this
pattern.
For centuries, the main feature regulating relations between
European states was the balance of power between sovereign
states, and in practice this led to non-intervention. However, one
actor sometimes used war and intervention as tools to redress
that balance and to prevent the transformation of a multipolar
system into a hegemonic one dominated.
An intervening state seeks to change the political system of the
target state for ideological reasons.
Military intervention in civil wars may have imperialistic or
ideological motivations, but the intention may also be to support
one of the parties claiming the right to national self-
determination. Similarly, foreign intervention may also be
intended to help peoples who are struggling against colonialist
occupation.
Armed force is used in a neighboring state to respond to armed
incursions from it which are not restrained by its government.
Between 1945 and 1990, the two superpowers intervened in
their respective spheres of influence or in disputed zones, on
both imperialistic and ideological grounds.
One state or a group of states use armed force to alleviate the
suffering of human beings in the territory of other states.
The international community as a whole decides to intervene
militarily in a state to maintain international peace and security.
Some states carry out selected armed attacks on another state
to penalize previous wrongdoings attributed to the target state.
17
 Chapter 1

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

They resemble us, but in appearance are the color of pumpkin-porridge

They are rude of manners and without any graces or refinement. They
carry a long stick of fire. With this they kill and loot from many nations.1

INTRODUCTION

Before the arrival of Europeans the southern tip of the African continent was
divided into a number of political communities of tribes and kingdoms.75 The Zulu
empire on the east coast and the Kingdom of Zimbabwe in the centre were perhaps
the most written about of the regions dynasties. The very first known contact
between Africans and Europeans occurred with the arrival of the Portuguese
explorers in the 1497, and later the Dutch settlement of the Cape of Good Hope in
1652.76 The arrival of the British towards the end of the eighteenth century changed
Southern Africas social, political and economic landscape forever.

This section examines the northward European expansion, the confrontations

between the different groups (including the English, the Afrikaners and the native
Africans), the discovery of precious metals and economic exploitation, as well as the
formation of the states of Lesotho and South Africa. South Africa and Lesotho share
parallel colonial histories.

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
A Zulu impression of first white men, taken from Zulu epic poem - Emperor Shaka the
Great - translated by Mazisi Kunene, drawing on the memories of a number of Zulu
oral historians.
18
 THE REGION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA

The geographical region of Southern Africa consists of Angola and Zambia in

the north; Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mozambique are located in the center
and with South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland on the south.77 The political region
also includes the DRC (Central Africa), Tanzania (East Africa), Seychelles,
Madagascar and Mauritius. 78 The island states of Seychelles, Madagascar and
Mauritius are an integral part of the region.

Map 1.1: Map of Southern Africa

79
Source: Wanderlust webpage.

The region of Southern Africa is unique for its Mediterranean climate, which was
conducive for the Europeans who came to that part of Africa. The arrival of the
colonizers in the seventeenth century onwards paved the way for the economic
exploitation of the native population.80 The Europeans set about taking over and
profiting from other peoples land. The economic and political domination by a
minority of Europeans was to define the political landscape of the region for many
more years to come.

19
 The colonization of Southern Africa by the Europeans occurred relatively late
compared to the Americas and Asia. Hermann Giliomee and Bernard Mbenga are of
the opinion that, for the Europeans, the region was not of strategic value.81 Southern
Africa had no great staple products, such as rice, sugar, tobacco, wool or timber,
which could integrate the colony into the worlds trading systems.82 Furthermore, the
indigenous population of the San and the Khoikhoi were not as culturally, and
technologically advanced than the peoples the Dutch had encountered in East Asia.
As a result, the Dutch East India Company (DEIC) (Dutch: Vereenigde Oostindische
Compagnie) had no particular interest to move inland.

European nations defined the future of the region and that of the African
continent at the Berlin Conference (18841885), also known as the Scramble for
Africa.83 The conference initiated the extraordinary surge of European imperialism in
the continent. Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy led
a full-fledged land grab of vast territories in Africa. In less than two decades at the
end of the nineteenth century, the European countries expanded out from the few
strongholds they had along the African coastlines and divided the vast mass of the
continent between them.84

The importance of the continent to Europe cannot be over emphasized. The

African continent was attractive to Europeans for numerous reasons. Following the
Long Depression (18731896), Africa presented the European powers, including
Britain, Germany, and France, new markets that would assist them to achieve a trade
surplus.85 The British were attracted to Southern Africa by its strategic location. They
used the African southern and eastern coasts as stopover ports for ships going to
India and the rest of Asia. At the end of the 19th century, Southern Africa was
partitioned between Britain, Portugal, France and Germany.

Europeans first colonized the coastal areas of Southern Africa in the sixteenth
century. The Portuguese colonized Mozambique in 1505 and Angola in 1655. 86
Belgium also occupied the Belgian Congo (the Democratic Republic of Congo) in
1887. Tanganyika (United Republic of Tanzania, minus the island of Zanzibar) in
1885 and South West Africa (Namibia) in 1884 came under the German rule.87 Great
Britain became the dominant player in the region. Of todays political region of the
SADC, to be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, seven of the fifteen member states

20
were under the British. They were (Bechuanaland) Botswana, (Basutoland) Lesotho,
(Nyasaland) Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland, (North Rhodesia) Zambia and (South
Rhodesia) Zimbabwe.88 For the purposes of this study, however, I limit the colonial
history of the region to the British occupation, since both Basutoland (Lesotho) and
South Africa were controlled by Britain.

As noted above, the Dutch were the first European power to settle in the Cape
of Good Hope (the Western Province, South Africa). The Dutch East India Company
ruled the Cape of Good from 1652 to 1795, when the Cape came under direct control
of the Dutch government.89 The Dutch established a way station for their ships sailing
between the Dutch East Indies and the Netherlands. The Dutch settlers or Boers
(farmer in Dutch) expropriated African lands, mainly from the Khoisan, to establish
large farms. A community of French Huguenots followed the Dutch to Southern
Africa, and settled in the Cape, mainly from La Motte d'Aigues in France, between
1687 and 1689.90 The Boers are also referred to as the Afrikaners.91 Thus, for the
purposes of this study the terms Boers and Afrikaners will be used
interchangeably.

It took more than a 100 years for the southern tip of the continent to receive the
attention of other European powers. The increase in the number of Europeans in the
region also meant that the political upheavals in Europe would shape the future of the
newly found territories in Southern Africa. The Napoleonic wars pitted the French
against the English.92 This struggle was carried over to the Cape of Good Hope, with
Britain attacking and occupying the territory in 1795. However, the British decided to
relinquish the land in 1803, only to return three years in January 1806 to reoccupy
the Cape at the request of the deposed Dutch royal household.93 Thereafter, the
Dutch formally ceded the Cape to the British Crown following the Anglo-Dutch Treaty
of 1814, to form the Cape Colony. The organization of a new colony and the British
settlement were to prove to be a significant watershed for the peoples of Southern
Africa for many years to come.

21
 BRITISH COLONIAL PERIOD (1806 1960S): IMPERIALISM EXTENDS TO
SOUTHERN AFRICA

The system of the British colonial rule in Southern Africa started after 1806.94
The history of the British colonial period began in the Cape region of South Africa,
and it later engulfed the kingdom of Lesotho during a period of expansion in 1843.

After the Cape of Good Hope came under the British, the Boers and the new
rulers disagreed on a number of issues, especially landownership and slavery. Britain
abolished the slave trade in 1807 and slavery in 1833.95 In the 1830s, the Boers
decided to head north to search for new lands to occupy, and more importantly to
escape the British. This migration was later to be known as the Great Trek. 96
Giliomee and Mbenga mention that many factors, including lack of land, lack of labor,
lack of security and political marginalization encouraged the Boers to move inland.97
The British also followed hard on the heels of the Boers. This was probably the
turning point of the political power relations in the region.

As the British and the Boers moved northeastwards from the Cape Colony, and
on their way they were greeted by the powerful Zulu and Xhosa nations. The
African tribes fiercely resisted the European takeover of their lands.98 Nonetheless,
the new Boer republics of the South African Republic (later renamed to Transvaal)
and the Orange Free State were created in 1838 and 1854, respectively.99 Conflicts
between the Europeans and Africans were to be a permanent fixture in Southern
Africa for many years to come.

The Europeans were keen on destroying the African kingdoms in Southern

Africa. The powerful kingdoms, such as the Zulu, Pedi, Sotho and Swazi, violently
opposed the political aspirations of the Europeans. For example, the Zulu kingdom
defeated the British in the Battle of Isandlwana in 1879. Giliomee and Mbenga wrote
that:
In the 1870s settler and colonial determination to bring blacks more firmly under political
control undermined the hard-won security that many African societies had achieved. This
was due to changed economic conditions in South Africas hinterland and the consequent
need to secure sufficient political authority over Africans, to ensure security and access to
100
labor.

22
 Mineral wealth in Southern Africa exacerbated conflict between Africans and
Europeans. The discovery of diamonds in 1867, and then gold in 1884, marked an
intensification of the conflict for control over the newly found wealth between the
Europeans and the indigenous population, and also between the Afrikaners and the
British. It also raised the importance of the sub-continent, turning it from a forgotten
corner of the British Empire into a fount of wealth to rival that of the ultimate jewel in
the imperial crown: India.101 Competition for ownership of diamond and gold mines
also led to clashes between the Africans and the Europeans.102 The importance of
Southern Africa to the Colonial Office stimulated Britains need for deepening its rule
over the Africans, and the Boers.

In addition, the need for labor in the mines threatened the survival of rural
African households.103 Whites stripped Africans of their agricultural land, and thus
leaving them with no alternative but cheaply sell his labor. Taxation was also a
popular method of forcing Africans to sell their labor. The British, in particular,
asserted that they wanted to spread civilization in South Africa. In practice, this
amounted to little more than the expansion of a capitalist economy and, the
destruction of traditional political structures in the face of increasing demands for
cheap labor.104 Despite the gold and diamond mines, cheap labor was also required
in agriculture. Farming occurred in different parts of Southern Africa, for example
wine in southern Cape, sheep herding in the interior and sugar cane plantations in
Natal. The resistance of indigenous populations in Natal to work in the sugar cane
fields led to the arrival of cheap labor from India between 1860 and 1911.105 By 1990,
Africans had lost their independence in their territories, and subsequently
incorporated in the British imperialist rule.

Perhaps, the legacy of the discovery of minerals in South Africa was the racial
division of the workforce into White skilled labor and Black unskilled labor. The
British, for example, were a step ahead of the Africans and the Boers. The syndicate
of Cecil John Rhodes, and later the Anglo American Cooperation and De Beers,
achieved the concentration of ownership of diamond and gold mines. The new
corporations institutionalized forms of labor control such as the compound system
now emerged, and in the industrial environment exploitative relations now assumed
the same racial form as they that which already existed.106 This also introduced the
migrant labor system that reached its mature form after the opening of the gold mines

23
and dominated the South African economy over 100 years of segregation and
apartheid.107

Many European adventurers also headed south to seek new fortunes. The
Boers were not pleased with the new arrivals, and blamed the British for the influx.
They then took up arms and fought the British. The British and the Boers fought two
wars. After the 1880-1881 and the 1889-1902 Anglo-Boer wars, the British finally
took full control over South Africa.108 The Treaty of Vereeniging signed in 1902 ended
the second war. This treaty also ushered in the beginning of a critical period of
smoothing British-Afrikaner antagonism through the idiom of White national unity in
what would become the Union of South Africa.109 One of the main reasons that the
English decided to cooperate with Afrikaners was that they came to realize that
English speakers would never constitute a majority in White South Africa. The
Afrikaners have always been the majority position in relation to the English, and other
people of European ancestry.

THE SHAPING OF A WHITE DOMINATION: THE UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

(1910 1960)

In 1910, the two former Boer republics (Transvaal and Orange Free State) and
two former British colonies (Natal and the Cape) were merged to create the Union of
South Africa. The new states joint capitals were Pretoria (administrative), Cape
110
Town (legislative) and Bloemfontein (judiciary). Basutoland (Lesotho),
Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland were, however, not incorporated but
became self-governing states.

The formation and consolidation of the new state completely excluded the
participation of the Africans. Section 35(2) of the constitutive South Africa Act of 1909
stipulated that: No person who at the passing of any such law is registered as a
voter in any province shall be removed from the register by reason only of any
disqualification based on race or color.111 This section, however, was only applicable
to the former Cape Colony. For the rest of the country, this legislation was clear in its
racial definition of citizenship. It gave exclusive privileges and responsibilities of
voting and leadership only to White people. 112 The government also wanted to

24
ensure that the economic independence of Blacks was curtailed under the new
administration. The Mines and Works Act of 1911, for example, limited Black workers
exclusively to menial work and so guaranteed the availability of cheap labor and
secured the better jobs for White workers.

Despite these developments in South Africa, the years that followed were not
peaceful. The processes of state formation and consolidation of power in a state
were simple. State formation in South Africa was abnormal since the Black majority
was not considered to be a part of the nation. Jeff Herbst posits that the colonial state
was serious about extending political power in Southern Africa.113 In settler colonies
like South Africa, a remarkably efficient and brutal state that protected the interests of
Whites was created at the expense the Black majority. As with the rest of Africa,
South Africa evidenced low population densities in most parts of the country. National
politics were not far reaching amongst the Black populations, who could not to resist
the draconian laws of the colonial state. Herbst argues that the emergence of a
nationalist movement was an important catalyst for politics to become national during
the colonial periods.114 The South African Native National Congress (SANNC), later
known as the African National Congress (ANC), was the first liberation movement to
be created by the Africans in 1912 to free South Africa from White rule.115 The ANC
was to become a source of inspiration for the development of similar organizations in
the region and beyond.

The relationship between the ANC and the Union South Africa was cordial but
not close. The government decided to press ahead with discriminatory laws. This
was despite of the fact that Blacks had hoped for better racial harmony under the
British rule. Thomas Pakenham acknowledges that the price of trying to reconcile
the Whites was paid by the Blacks and browns.116

Strong sentiments among the Boers for independence and anti-British policies
emerged after 1910. This was paralleled by resentment over sharing the country with
Africans. Nelson Mandela argued that the Afrikaners felt bitterness towards the
English, who had treated them as inferiors for decades, and bitterness towards the
African, who the Nationalists believed was threatening the prosperity and purity of the
Afrikaner culture. 117 Many laws were enacted to exclude Blacks from political,
economic and social participation in South Africa. A series of discriminatory laws

25
prevented Blacks and other people of color from owning land, and restricted
movement. They included the Native Land Act (1913), the Natives in Urban Areas Bill
(1918), the Urban Areas Act (1923), the Color Bar Act (1926), the Native
Administration Act (1927), the Native Land and Trust Act (1936) and the Asiatic Land
Tenure Bill (1946).

With these laws, the government worked tirelessly to create an unbearable

political environment for Africans. First, the cynical Immorality Act of 1927 prohibited
sexual relations across color lines. Moreover, the right to vote conferred to African
voters from the Cape was removed through the Representation of Natives Act in
1934, and those of mixed race in 1948.118 Racial segregation of Blacks strengthened
from 1948 onwards. Repressive laws against Blacks (known collectively as
apartheid) were codified in 1948. Boer nationalism had also received a political boost
when Britain granted the Union of South Africa partial independence in 1931. During
the Second World War, the government sent troops as an ally of the United Kingdom.
Internally, this move was met with opposition from the conservative Boers, which led
to the split of the ruling United Party in 1939. As a consequence of these
disagreements, the Boer-led Nationalist Party came to power in 1948.

Life under the racist Nationalist Party became increasingly unbearable for
Africans, and those who stood against its policies. Races in South Africa were now
formally separated into three categories, namely Whites, Coloreds and Africans.119
And, rights and limitations for each of those rights were developed for Coloreds and
Africans, including pass laws and residential restrictions. The implication of this was
that few Whites were granted privileges to control the Black majority. This system of
laws (apartheid) also conferred economic rights to Whites and ensured that they
enjoyed living standards comparable to those of the developed countries.

Emergence of an international pariah state (1945 1960)

Until the late 1940s, the Union of South Africa enjoyed a prestigious position in
the (western) world community.Within the Commonwealth and the League of
Nations, the union was well respected, especially for its military strength and strong
industrial base. Most important, it was seen, at least in Britains eyes, as a link in the
Commonwealth chain of defense when Africa was threatened by outside powers.120

26
South African state made notable contributions to international relations, Prime
Minister Jan Smuts played an important role in the formation of the League of
Nations at the Peace of Versailles in 1919. Smuts also contributed to the drafting of
the Preamble of the United Nations Charter after World War II.121

However, the contributions to the creation of the post-1945 world order proved
to be a watershed in South Africas international standing. Thereafter, the country
122
steadily declined into international unpopularity and eventual ostracism.
Unfortunately for the South African regime, the legacy of the World War II led to an
increased importance of human rights. This was in reaction to the Holocaust in
Germany before and during the war. Greg Mills argued that the world community
became intolerant of morally indefensible and politically repugnant to create an
elaborate and socially divisive system based purely on racism.123 Apartheid policies
were therefore not going to be tolerated internationally due to racial segregation.

Furthermore, the apartheid state came under severe pressure because of the
anti-colonialist sentiments and a desire for self-determination in Africa and Asia.124
An anti-apartheid movement soon developed in all corners of the developed and
developing countries. These developments created a common denominator and
binding political link between Third World countries, as exemplified by the statement
issued by Pandit Nehru, Prime Minister in the Interim Government of India, in 1946
that: The kernel of our policy is the ending of colonialism all over Asia, or for that
matter, in Africa and elsewhere and racial equality ... and the end of domination or
exploitation of one nation by another.125 Similar sentiments were expressed in the
United Nations from the 1940s onwards. The pariah state was later at the centre of
the Southern African wars from 1961 to 1990. Chester Crocker remarked that these
wars represented the final chapter of in the global drama which ended the European
maritime empires.126

The birth of the Republic of South Africa and intensification of racial

segregation (1961 1994)

The majority of African colonies gained independence from European countries

in the 1960s. In South Africa, a bizarre situation took place when the United Kingdom
granted independence to the White minority. Following a Whites-only referendum,
South Africa became a republic on May 31, 1961 and ceased its membership of the
27
Commonwealth. Tanzania, Malawi, Botswana, Swaziland, Zambia and Lesotho also
achieved independence from the British rule by the end of the 1960s. For the rest of
the countries, it took much longer for Southern African colonies to become self-
governing states.127 Angola and Mozambique waited until 1975 to become free of
Portuguese occupation. The remaining states of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990)
and South Africa (1994) achieved majority rule much later.

Mills argued that the apartheid policies were in part created to counter the
strong sentiments for self-rule, as in most of Africa.128 White South Africa did not see
itself as part of the African continent, at least politically speaking. Its foreign policy
focused solely on the West. It further identified with the colonial order by encouraging
close ties with White settler communities in other parts of Africa. The experiences of
White communities in countries that were in transition to Black majority rule had an
overwhelming effect on South African policies with the neighboring states. However,
it is important to point out that Ghanas independence from Great Britain in 1957
challenged South African foreign policy leanings towards the colonial order.129

Apartheid policies promoted divisions among the races in South Africa. The
regime wanted to use these policies to create different states separate from the
main South African state. Mills opines that the White South African state wanted to
identify with the decolonizing trend in Africa by granting self-determination status to
the countrys different native population groups. 130 These states were to be
composed of different Black ethnic groups, such as the Zulu, the Xhosa and the
Tswana. In practice, different racial groups were physically split into thirteen racial
federations (Bantustans) or homelands, using the Promotion of Black Self-
Government Act of 1958. The Black Homeland Citizenship Act of 1970 turned out to
be the main repression tool against the Black populations in South Africa, as they
became effectively illegal aliens in their own territory. This piece of legislation
effectively stripped Black South African citizens of their nationality, by placing them in
one of the ten autonomous territories. The sole aim of this law was to ensure a
demographic majority of White people within South Africa by having all ten
Bantustans achieve full independence.131

28
 The South African independence from the United Kingdom in 1961 increased
the simmering political tensions between Whites and Blacks. There were many
dissenting voices opposed to the policies of apartheid. However, the birth of the
Republic of South Africa coincided with unparalleled economic growth and high
levels of industrialization.132 This strengthened the position of the White population
against the native Africans, and perpetuated their stranglehold on political and
economic power. According to John Omer-Cooper, the apartheid policies ensured
that the wealth accumulated from this growth was not going to be shared with the
Black population.133 This economic exclusion, and other policies created to contain
Blacks, led to increased resistance to apartheid on a scale that was not foreseen by
the state. The state used force to deal with those who were openly critical. On March
21, 1960, the South African governments domestic policies took another turn with
the Sharpeville massacre. The township of Sharpeville is located in the south of
Johannesburg. The police opened fire on demonstrators and killing 69 people.134 The
Sharpeville massacre marked a new stage in the Unions deteriorating international
position.135

Africans, through the African National Congress and later the Pan African
Congress (PAC), responded to the apartheid laws by military action.136 They carried
out bomb attacks on strategic targets, including one at the Johannesburg railway
station that killed at least one person. 137 This led to the banning of the Black
independence organizations in South Africa. Their leaders were killed, imprisoned
and/ or forced to go into exile abroad, mainly in Southern Africa. The countrys moral
and political order was viciously attacked in the UN, OAU and elsewhere. As a result,
there were demands for the imposition of international economic sanctions to isolate
Pretoria from the world community.138 The UNGA Resolution 1761 passed in 1962 as
a first step towards imposing economic and other sanctions on South Africa.139

The period between 1961 and 1974 marked the introduction of a newly
independent White South African state in the international political landscape and the
resultant worldwide condemnation of its racist policies. The government pursued an
external policy of establishing relations and increasing cooperation with other African
nations. The only notable victory in this regard was the establishment of diplomatic
relations with Malawi in 1967.140 On the other hand, the closer links were established
with the BLS states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) through the revision of the

29
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) agreement in 1969.141 The customs union
is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The government also opened the so-called
diplomatic offices in the independent self-governing states or Bantustans (Transkei,
Bophuthatswana, Venda and Ciskei) in the 1960s. It was only in the 1980s that South
Africa managed to establish trade missions operating as de facto consulates in
Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland.142

South Africas desired position as a leading state in the region was directly
challenged by the escalation of the guerilla warfare in Rhodesia and in the
Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique. 143 Pretoria sided with the anti-
liberation Black movements in these countries. As a result of its position, South Africa
created enemies with the Black majority led governments in the region. Mills states
that it was politically disadvantageous for any Black African regime to be seen to be
cooperating with the racist apartheid state. 144 In fact, the 1975 OAU Council of
Ministers in Dar es Salaam pronounced that any talk with the apartheid regime is
such nonsense that it should be treated with the contempt it deserves.145 South
Africa accepted its position of a pariah state by forging close relations with Augusto
Pinochets Chile, Israel, Alfredo Stroessners Paraguay and Taiwan.

The actions of the apartheid regime received world attention. The basis was laid
for a long battle between the West-sponsored South African government and the
Soviet-backed independence movements in Southern Africa, more specifically in
South West Africa (Namibia), Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe), Mozambique and
Angola. 146 Lesotho, for example, was primary home to the South African exile
community due to its proximity and, as a result, suffered a great deal at the hands of
the South African Defense Force (SADF) crackdown missions, especially in the
1980s.

Following an unexpected defeat in the Angolan war, the stability and

governance of a divided South Africa reached point of crisis in 1976, and this would
continue until 1989. Chaos began in 1974 when the Bantu Education Minister
decided to place the Afrikaans language to be utilized in Black schools on an equal
basis with English as a medium of instruction. At this time it was clear that the
tensions between the Whites-only government and the majority Black population
were on the rise. However, the apartheid state seemed to misjudge the domestic

30
political situation by forcibly introducing the Afrikaans language in Black schools.
Since the Africans saw Afrikaans as the language of the oppressor, young high
school students opposed this new government decree. In June 1976, the students in
Soweto, the African township southwest of Johannesburg, took to the streets to
protest against the language policy. The states security machine responded with
violence, killing scores in the process. The whole country reached a crisis point when
similar outbreaks occurred all over South Africa. Approximately 494 Africans, 75
Coloreds, one Indian and five Whites had died in state repression by February
1977.147

THE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND THE SOUTH

AFRICAN RESPONSE

The struggle for independence from the colonial system in many parts of
Southern Africa was not smooth.148 Botswana, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland,
Tanzania and Zambia achieved independence without much violence. The main
reason for this peaceful transition was that few Europeans settled in these countries.
Many Whites settled in South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Angola, Mozambique
and South West Africa (Namibia). In the case of the Lusophone states, Namibia and
Zimbabwe the prolonged liberation wars ensued and were supported by the two
ideological and incompatible blocs of the East and the West.149 Apartheid South
Africa played a key role in perpetuating violence and terror in the region. In the midst
of political chaos, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique won independence. The end of
the Cold War permitted emergence of democratic regimes in Namibia and South
Africa.

Like many parts of the world, the Cold War and other conflicts defined Southern
Africas political landscape. South Africa played a critical role in destabilizing the
neighboring countries, particularly in the 1980s. From 1966 to 1974, South Africa
provided military support to neighboring White colonial governments in Southern
Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Mozambique and Angola. 150 During the 1980s, the
apartheid state believed that it was preferable to eliminate your enemy outside
South Africa through pro-active cross border operations, rather than to track them
down once they have crossed the borders. 151 One such example of the South

31
African destabilization tactics of the region, as mentioned earlier on, was the raid by
the SADF on Maseru in 1982.

South African aggression until the early 1990s

South African aggression against the neighboring states led to the realization by
a growing number of African states of its military and economic hegemony, and the
weakness of the liberation movements in the region. 152 This perception soon
changed with the political changes in Portugal in 1974 to 1975. Mozambique and
Angola were the only two Southern African territories under the Portuguese rule. The
coup dtat and the subsequent collapse of the Portuguese empire led to the
independence of Mozambique in June 1975, and Angola in November 1975. Many
scholars and commentators argued that these events marked the beginning of the
collapse of the White empire in Southern Africa.153

The authoritarian and conservative Estado Novo regime under Marcello

Caetano abused power, repressed civil liberties and political freedoms in Portugal.
The foreign policy of the regime concerned itself with circumventing the communist
influence, and preserving the Portuguese empire abroad. This resonated with the
South African policy of aggression in the region. As part of its strategy, Portugal
engaged in bloody conflicts with liberation movements in foreign colonies.
Approximately 140,000 out of 204,000 Portuguese troops were stationed in overseas
territories of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique.154 However, Portugals colonial war
was opposed locally and abroad. The regime faced increasing dissent, arms
embargoes and other punitive sanctions. On April 25, 1974, a bloodless military coup
and the revolution, also referred to as the Carnation Revolution, removed the ruling
junta. The new regime then decided to push through a rapid and hasty decolonization
program. As a result, Mozambique and Angola, together with other African colonies
of Sao Tome and Principe and Cape Verde Islands, became independent in 1975.

South Africa attacked Angola within months after its independence. 155 The
South African involvement in the Angolan civil war was partly encouraged by
promised western states, and particularly the US support, as they sought to limit the
extension of Soviet influence in the area. The apartheid regime was distrustful of the
support the new Angolan government, and was afraid that it would provide to

32
Namibian liberation movements.156 South Africa occupied Namibia (then South West
Africa) until 1990. The South African version of the war of terror against the frontline
states brought about the formation of the Frontline States (FLS) and the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), to monitor economic and
political developments among the member states.157 The implications for neighboring
states a result of this strategy were vast. The states suffered great economic losses
from continued the South African anti-liberation terror that led to the sabotage of the
SADCC member countries.

The war in Angola in the mid 1970s was, however, a major setback for the
apartheid regime. First, African governments increased their opposition to apartheid
at international level. They viewed the South African involvement in Angola as a way
of perpetuating racism and extending apartheid imperialism.158 Second, the Cuban
forces in the Angolan war exposed South Africas weaknesses and forced the South
African army to withdraw in March 1976. This was followed by two important political
developments within the country, namely the collapse of the Vorster regime and the
Soweto student uprisings.159 These two events prompted the state to reinforce its
military capacity and to focus on security and control within its borders. This change
in direction, however, should not be seen as less interference in the affairs of
neighboring states. However, it was an elaboration of a comprehensive strategy (the
total strategy) for the Southern African subcontinent. Neighboring states experienced
the devastating force of this strategy throughout the 1980s.

The events in Portugal were very important for Southern Africa for two reasons.
First, two more states were under the control of Black majority rule in the region.
Second, the collapse of the Estado Novo regime in Portugal meant that South Africa
lost an important ally. As a result, South Africa refused to recognize the new
governments in Mozambique and Angola, and shifted its strategy to supporting
opposition groups in those countries.160 The principal opposition group in Angola was
UNITA (Portuguese: Unio Nacional para a Independncia Total de Angola), and in
Mozambique was RENAMO (Portuguese: Resistncia Nacional Moambicana). In
addition to South Africa, both RENAMO and UNITA received arms, military transport,
military hardware and equipment from the United States, France, and Israel.

33
 The policy of South Africa towards other countries in the region was two-
pronged. It harassed its neighbors with military incursions and bombing raids. It also
organized sabotage campaigns, concealing mines, placing bombs and planning
assassinations. This affected countries with no military support from the Soviet
Union, like Botswana and Lesotho.161

The winds of change and the end of apartheid in 1990

The end of the White rule in Southern Rhodesia in 1980 was the heaviest
defeat for the White regime in sub-Africa. This meant that the apartheid state was the
last and the only remaining territory in Africa governed by Europeans. Within South
Africa, there was a groundswell of resistance, as the United Democratic Front (UDF)
became the new face in the struggle against apartheid. Youth, student, civic, trade
union, religious, professional, political and womens groups were affiliated to this
organization. The UDF led a campaign for the release of Nelson Mandela, and for
opposing the tri-cameral constitution. 162 In 1983, the apartheid government put
forward a constitution providing for a tri-cameral legislature, consisting of Whites,
Indians and Coloreds. Blacks were again excluded from the governance of the
country. At this point, Blacks enjoyed industrial rights but no political rights. This was
after successful labor demonstrations in the late 1970s. Actions of Black workers
through industrial action, often led by the Congress of South African Trade Unions
(COSATU), created business and political crisis in South Africa. As a result, leaders
of major private businesses decided to meet with the ANC leadership in Zambia in
September 1985.163 This meeting, however, did not stop consumer boycotts, and
even deadly bombings.

The international pressure on South Africa also became unbearable throughout

the 1980s. The international community used economic sanctions to show its
rejection to apartheid policies. Sport sanctions and academic sanctions
supplemented the economic sanctions. In July 1985, Chase Manhattan Bank did not
roll over its outstanding loans to the apartheid state.164 The South African currency
weakened by almost 40 percent, and South Africa was starved of foreign capital. In
addition, 264 of 400 American companies disinvested during the 1980s. It was a
matter of time before the apartheid regime collapsed.

34
 Irrespective of the internal and external pressures, South Africa was resilient
and continued to perpetuate its terror against the neighboring states. This was mainly
due to the support the apartheid state received from the Ronald Reagan
administration (1981 1989).165 Reagans constructive engagement policy stressed
common strategic interests and empathized with White fears. Nevertheless, the US
Congress in October 1986 overrode Reagan by passing the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act. Among other things this legislation set a timetable for the elimination
of apartheid laws and the release of political prisoners including Nelson Mandela.166
It was after this comprehensive law that the apartheid state became an outlaw in the
world community of nations.

Violence against neighboring states proceeded, withstanding economic

setbacks.167 On May 20, 1986 South Africa raided ANC bases in Lusaka (Zambia),
Harare (Zimbabwe) and Gaborone (Botswana). This military act happened after
Commonwealth heads of state had concluded a tour of South Africa and the Frontline
states between February and May 1986.168 The tour aimed at ending the conflict in
Southern Africa. Furthermore, South African security forces were accused of killing
Mozambiques President Samora Michael in October 1986. This was despite the
existence of the Nkomati Peace Accord between the two countries, signed on March
16, 1984. However, Presidents PW Botha and Jaochim Chissano (Machels
successor) revived this accord in September 1998. Rodney Davenport and
Christopher Saunders suggested that South Africa needed to improve its political
profile abroad.169 South Africa wanted to prove to the world that there was real
change in its political direction, and that the Nkomati Peace Accord was evidence of
the diplomatic evolution. President Botha visited Portugal, Switzerland, Great Britain,
West Germany and Italy in 1984. In many respects, Bothas journey failed to
convince the international community that indeed South Africa was moving away
from its segregationist policies.

Between 1986 and 1988, the weakened apartheid states National Intelligence
Service (NIS) commenced discussions with members of the ANC in exile, and secret
talks also occurred with Mandela in prison. At the same, the negotiations on the
transfer of power in South West Africa (Namibia) were in progress, after South Africa
ended its involvement in Angola. In December 1988, Angola, Cuba and South Africa
concluded agreements for the end of the Angolan War, and for South Africa and

35
Angola to cooperate with the UN in ensuring independence for Namibia through free
and fair elections.170 Namibia became independent from South Africa on March 21,
1990. This was a mere four weeks after Mandela was released from prison on
February 11, 1990.

Harri Chhabra opined that the release of Mandela, and the unbanning of the
ANC and other liberation organizations raised hopes, as never before, of a peaceful
end to apartheid and the establishment of a non-racial majority rule.171 This was also
the important period for the international system, as the cold war was on its final
days. After protracted negotiations South Africa adopted an interim republican
constitution in 1993, and adopted formally in 1996. The first democratic elections
were held on April 27, 1994. The ANC emerged as victors, but achieving fractionally
less than the parliamentary two-thirds majority that it would require to draft a new
constitution on its own.172 For the first time in its entire history, the majority Black
population was involved in the countrys political management, and became
undisputed citizens. Human rights and the spirit of reconciliation were at the centre of
the new administrations agenda. For example, the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) was created in 1995 to to bear witness to, record and in some
cases grant amnesty to the perpetrators of crimes relating to human rights violations,
as well as reparation and rehabilitation. 173 Mandela became the countrys first
African and democratically elected South African head of state after the elections.
Moreover, the last white head of state, President FW de Klerk, was one of Mandelas
two deputies, together with Thabo Mbeki. Mbeki went on to become the president of
the republic in 1999.

The end of apartheid changed the political dynamics in the region. The ANC-led
South Africa became a member of the Southern African community of nations. South
Africa finally became an all-inclusive democratic state, with a human rights based
constitution.174 These important changes were very important not only for the African
community within the former apartheid state, but also for the whole region. The early
1990s ushered a new era of peace and stability for the whole region.

36
 THE KINGDOM OF LESOTHO: THE POOR LITTLE BROTHER

The Kingdom of Lesotho, or simply Lesotho, is a small country in Southern

Africa. The country has a total land area of 30,355 square kilometers, which is
slightly smaller than the state of Maryland.175 The physical character of the Lesotho,
in relation to South Africa, is quite unique but also unusual. Lesotho is entirely
surrounded by South Africa (see Figure 1). This makes it the only member of the
United Nations to find itself within the borders of another state.176 David Coplan
states that the kingdom holds the worlds unique distinction for being the only native
reserve located within the boundaries of South Africa that was not both annexed and
absorbed by the colonial government and White minority state, and so ultimately
became the only country in the world entirely surrounded by another independent
state.177 This status of a country-within-another-country has created problems and
challenges for the landlocked territory throughout history. Basutoland, and later
Lesotho, somehow managed to preserve its status, but at great cost.

Lesotho is officially divided into ten administrative districts. They are Berea,
Butha-Buthe, Leribe, Mafeteng, Maseru, Mohales Hoek, Mokhotlong, Qachas Nek,
Quthing, and Thaba-Tseka. Maseru is the countrys capital and largest city, and the
majority of the population resides in this area. In 1996, the population was estimated
at two million.178

The political and constitutional history of Lesotho has been largely eventful and
tumultuous. But, over the years the country has grown to become a democratic
state.179 It is a member of many international and regional organizations, including
the United Nations and the African Union. As a former colony of the British Empire,
the country is a member of the Commonwealth of Nations. With established
diplomatic relations with more than seventy countries, the kingdoms participation in
international affairs is quite limited.180 In an unexpected move in July 2005, the British
government took the Lesotho government by surprise by closing its diplomatic
mission in Maseru. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) believes that the state is
considered to be of marginal importance to countries such as the UK.181 At regional
level, the country is an active member of the SADC, the SACU and the Common
Monetary Area (CMA).

37
 The literal translation of the name Lesotho is the land of the Basotho, the
people who speak Sesotho. Unlike many states in Africa, the Kingdom of Lesotho is
ethnically and linguistically homogenous.182 The majority of the countrys two million
people are SeSotho speakers and identify themselves as Basotho.183 However, the
SeSotho speakers are not confined solely within the borders of Lesotho. The majority
of the Sotho language speakers live in the nearby South African province of the Free
State. This makes Lesotho bound to South Africa since the citizens of the two
countries are tied together by common linguistic and ethnic lines, as well as by
family networks that cross the border between the Lesotho and the Free State.184

Since the creation of Lesotho as a British Protectorate in 1868, its citizens have
formed an integral part of the South African economy. They have worked as wage
laborers, traders, produce exporters and retail consumers. As regards to migrant
wageworkers, they outnumbered wage employees who remained in Lesotho by at
least five to one.185 Jonny Steinberg strongly suggests that the historical participation
of the Basotho in the South African economy indicates that they will continue to earn
their living in South Africa for many more years to come.

As related to the point above, until 1963 there was no border between Lesotho
and South Africa. The 1960s marked an important milestone for most people in the
African continent, as many territories gained their independence from their European
colonizers. This was not different in Lesotho. Political and nationalistic aspirations
pitted them against the apartheid state. The border posts along the border of the two
countries were not installed to regulate the movement of goods or economically
active people, but because of political animosity between the apartheid government
and the new sovereign state of Lesotho.186 The political differences between the two
countries continued for many years and influenced Lesothos domestic politics from
the 1960s and into the 1980s.

The existence of a border between Lesotho and South Africa is a highly

contentious issue. Many Basotho do not recognize the geographical division between
the two states. They believe that Lesotho should be integrated to South Africa or that
at least the Free State province should be returned to them.187 The former scenario
would be more likely. It is very rare in international politics that another state would
voluntarily hand over part of its territory to another state. In an unprecedented move

38
South Africa, however, gave back the arid town of Walvis Bay to Namibia in 1994.188
Walvis Bay is geographically detached from South Africa and is situated in the
Namibian Atlantic coast. Unlike Walvis Bay, the Free State province is important to
the South African economy, and it is unlikely that many South African citizens would
ever want to be come part of the less successful state of Lesotho.

The intertwined nature of the relations between the two states prompts political
commentators to conclude that the tiny state of Lesotho will eventually be absorbed
into South Africa at some point in the future. 189 The elite class in Lesotho who
dominate the economy and politics will not permit such a move, as they will lose their
privileges stemming from Lesothos sovereign status. Further, as a consequence of
the policies of apartheid South Africa has its own internal strife, ranging from poverty,
diseases to unemployment. It is unlikely that South Africa can willingly accept an
additional two million people, who in all likelihood would be a burden to the state.

The recent political and economic history of Lesotho may be divided into two
parts: the Basutoland period (1800s to 1960s) and the Kingdom of Lesotho period
(1960s to the present).

Basutoland (1870 1960s)

The history of the Colonial Lesotho, also known as Basutoland, is not only
interesting, but also dramatic. Its existence has been tenuous from its birth.190 This is
one of the main reasons, as indicated earlier, that many argue for Lesothos
incorporation into South Africa. Many Basotho are proud of their countrys resistance
first against the colonial settlers and later against incorporation into South Africa and
apartheid. 191 Created in the neighborhood of the mighty Zulu state, Basutolands
survival was bound to be challenged. Nonetheless, Basutoland survived the most
difficult period then of a series of wars in the early 1800s (or lifaqane in SeSotho),
related to the growth of the Zulu state.

King Moshoeshoe I (1783 1870) established the chieftaincy in 1818, and

settled his people in the enviably fertile and well-watered Mohokare (Caledon) River
valley. This attracted many enemies, first Bantu-speaking tribes (namely the Hlubi,
Ngwane, Tlokwa, Ndebele and Griquas), then the White settler colonialists (the

39
Afrikaners) and finally both the colonial and imperial British.192 Most notably, the
relations between the Basotho tribe and the Afrikaner settlers in the neighboring
Orange Free State were not peaceful. Basutoland lost a large part of its cultivable
land to them between 1843 and 1869. After independence in 1965, there have been
political appeals and attempts by the Basotho monarchy, and the government alike,
for the return of this Conquered Territory.193

The conflicts between British and Dutch colonists leaving the Cape Colony also
affected Basutoland. The Boer trekkers (people of Dutch descent who settled in
South Africa) arrived in the western parts of Basutoland and claimed land rights to
the great annoyance of the Basotho. The British followed the Boers. The Basotho
fought a number of wars against the Europeans, in different fronts of course. For
example, the Basotho defeated the British in 1851.194 However, this resulted in a
backlash as the British came back in 1852 to try and take over the Basotho
territories. The British finally defeated Moshoeshoe in 1853.

The British did not take over Basutoland after their victory, but they only
annexed the mountain kingdom in 1868. This was after King Moshoeshoe had
sought protection from the British Crown against the Orange Free State, which
became a Boer sovereign state in 1854. 195 In 1871, the territory was formally
transferred to the administrative control of the Cape Colony.196 This transition was
met with fierce resistance by the Sotho tribes. There were continuous struggles for
power between the British high commissioners and the paramount chiefs. These
include three rebellions, namely the 1879 1880 Moorosi rebellion, the 1880 - 1884
Gun War and the civil war between Masopha and Lerotholi in 1898. In these battles
the Basotho gained notable successes against the Cape military. The constant feuds
led to the transfer of Basutoland back to the British Crown as a protectorate in 1884.
Before his death in 1870, King Moshoeshoe did not believe that his territory would
lose its sovereignty at the hands of the British. Nonetheless, his son and heir Letsie
was left to contend with colonial overrule from the White settler government from the
Cape Colony.197

King Moshoeshoe defeated the Free State in the 1858 Battle of Senekal.
However, Cape Colonys Sir George Grey, a mediator, colluded with the Boers and
deprived them the fruits of their victory without satisfying the Free Staters.198 The

40
peace treaty precipitated the next war in 1866 between the Basotho and Free State,
in which the Boers comprehensively won. The Basotho lost livestock and two-thirds
of arable land to Free State, and the size of the kingdom was greatly reduced. The
kings request for protection against the Boers was a choice between partial survival
and annihilation of his state, and that of his people. Moshoeshoe was compelled to
opt for the lesser of the two evils, that is the protection from the British Crown.199 As
a result, the Basotho lived under colonial rule until 1966.

Besides the foreign rule from the Cape Colony, there was a later bid on by
Britain to incorporate Basutoland into South Africa. In 1910, Britain successfully
combined its colonies and the Boer republics to form the Union of South Africa.
There were attempts by South Africa to absorb Basutoland into the newly formed
political entity, but this was not well received within Basutoland. As a result, the
United Kingdom Colonial Office turned down the proposal of incorporating
Basutoland into the Union of South Africa.200 The Basothos struggle for survival
continued as they accommodated themselves under the oppressive English political
rule in preference to what would be harsher direct rule by South Africa.201

The main source of income for the enclave of Basutoland was the exportation of
grain and cattle to the mining towns in South Africa in the 1870s and 1880s. The
demand for labor in the mines attracted migrant labor from Basutoland. It is at this
point that Lesothos dependence on the more powerful state that surrounds it
began. 202 The experiences of the Basotho, especially conflict and war with the
Afrikaners, also encouraged the males to go to Witwatersrand mines in order to
acquire guns to defend their country. The White capitalists who owned the mines
benefited directly from the need to defend Lesotho. During this time, the British were
locked in ongoing wars with Blacks within South Africa. Therefore, cheap labor was
available for exploitation.

For the British, it does not look as if they had any particular interest in
developing Basutoland. Their eyes were always fixed on controlling the richer areas
surrounding Basutoland. Their focus was mainly on external relations, with tax
collecting, the punishment of serious crime, and the settlement of boundary disputes
between rival chiefs.203 The British colonial government imposed the Hut Tax paid
mainly in cash on the Basotho as a cheap source of revenue, and as a means of

41
securing labor. The Basotho flocked into the mines in order to pay hut tax, which was
based on based on the number of huts in each family compound. 204 Elizabeth
Eldredge argues that this hut tax forced the entry of Basotho into the money
economy.205 But, the turning point in the economic history of Lesotho came when the
country experienced high population growth and agricultural decline.206 At the turn of
the century, which is between 1902 and 1903, Basutoland was no longer self-
sufficient in food production, and was compelled to obtain food supplies from abroad.
More men depended on employment in the mines to feed their families. 207 The
number of Basotho men employed in South African mines continued to grow
throughout the twentieth century.

With internal self-government a possibility, two political parties were established

in Basutoland in the 1950s. They were the left-wing Basutoland Congress Party
(BCP) and the more traditional Basutoland National Party (BNP). The latter went on
to win the countrys first democratic elections in 1965. And, one year later in 1966
Basutoland gained independence from Britain, as the Kingdom of Lesotho. Chief
Leabua Jonathan was the first prime minister of Lesotho, and the paramount chief
Moshoeshoe II was the head of state.

The Kingdom of Lesotho period (1960s to date)

Lesotho achieved its independence from Britain on October 4, 1966. 208

Although the pre-independence period was free of violence, however, this did not
lead to a stable and consensual post-colonial society in Lesotho.209 The kingdom
has been troubled by political instability since independence. 210 The economy of
Lesotho still depends on South Africa. Independence did not lead to the development
of an economically prosperous state, which could create sufficient jobs, improve
living conditions, and reduce poverty. The government constantly engaged in running
battles with both the BCP, and the King and his supporters. The antagonism between
Jonathan and the King could be attributed to a bitter nineteenth century dynastic
rivalry.211 In fact, Jonathans rivalry with the monarch saw King Moshoeshoe II exiled
to the Netherlands in 1970, although he returned a year later. The aggressive
apartheid state undermined the process of state formation in Lesotho.

42
 Lesothos post independence period has seen short, peace-threatening
episodes. However, the country had periods of constitutional rule, namely between
1966 and 1970 as well as between 1993 and 2007. Following the 1966 1970
democratic rule, Chief Leboa Jonathan annulled the first post-independence
elections, which he had lost to his opponent Ntsu Mokhehle.212 Elections took place
in 1993 and the BCP won. There were new elections in 1998. Lesotho is small and
relies on South Africa to guarantee its safety. The apartheid state took advantage of
the weaknesses of the Lesotho state security system throughout the 1970s and the
1980s.

Chief Leabua Jonathan and his conservative, Catholic, aristocratic Basotho

National Party, won the countrys first elections in 1965. Jonathan had the support of
the White South African government.213 Four years after the first elections, in 1970,
the BNP lost the elections to the Basutoland Congress Party under Ntsu Mokhehle.
The BCP won 35 seats to the BNP's 23 and 1 seat to the Marematlou Freedom Party
(MFP).214 However, Jonathan did not want to leave office and resorted to abuses of
power. Jonathan abolished parliament. He also declared a state of emergency and
used security forces to harass members of the BCP. Many people went into exile in
neighboring states. Jonathan held power for the next 15 years until 1986. The
autocratic rule spurned Lesothos opportunity of consolidating democratic rule.

The 1970s saw Jonathan change his strategy towards South Africa. He took
advantage of the international communitys opposition to apartheid by opposing the
undemocratic rule in South Africa. As a result, relations between Lesotho and South
Africa deteriorated. The government of Lesotho, for example, demanded the return of
the conquered territories in the Free State province, and even raised this issue with
the UN.215 Lesotho also positioned itself as a frontline state, which allowed many
South African political and anti-apartheid activists to settle in Lesotho, to the great
displeasure of the apartheid regime. In response, the gigantic neighbor closed border
crossings, which affected Lesothos economy. However, the most significant and
notable retaliation by the South African regime was the military attack in December
1982.The SADF launched an attack and raids on ANC refugee safe houses in
Maseru and killed scores of unarmed innocent Lesotho citizens as well as South
African refugees.216 South Africa finally managed to topple the Jonathan regime in
1986, by providing military support to Major General Metsing Lekhanya.

43
 The military government of Major General Lekhanya followed a two-pronged
approach in its relations with the South Africa. Firstly, it reached out to the apartheid
regime, and this was key to improving relations between the two states. In return, the
South African government donated arms and equipment to the army of Lesotho.217
Furthermore, it has been suggested that South Africa deliberately installed a more
friendly government to ensure an unhindered supply of fresh water to South Africa.
Nine months after the coup dtat, the apartheid state took full advantage of the
improved political climate, by signing the Lesotho Highlands Water Treaty with the
military regime in 1986.218 A project first proposed in the 1950s, it was to provide
gravity fed water from the highlands of Lesotho to the Gauteng area, through a
diversion tunnel. It was also to generate hydroelectric power.219 Negotiations lasted
30 years between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa.

The military regime also permitted South African police to follow criminals
across the border into Lesotho. At the same time, Lesotho tried to retain its position
as an opponent of the apartheid state.220 However, the Lesotho government expelled
members of the South African exiled community. The Lekhanya regime remained in
power until in 1991. Colonel (later Major-General) Phisoana Ramaema staged a
coup dtat and ruled the country until 1993. He remains the only Lesotho prime
minister to leave office voluntarily. Finally, Lesotho returned to civilian rule when
Mokhehle and the BCP came to power in 1993. The 1998 elections and the
subsequent political problems that led to the military intervention by South Africa and
Botswana are discussed at length in Chapter 4.

Lesothos Economy

The stark reality of the kingdom is that it depends almost entirely on its big and
dominant neighbor, South Africa.221 For example, it imports all that it needs from
South Africa, its currency, the Loti (plural Maloti), is pegged to the South African
rand. It also receives the remittances from its citizens employed in South Africa.
Pefole estimates that in 2004 approximately 35 percent of male wage earners
worked in South African mines as migrant laborers. 222 Between 1985 and 1990,
approximately 125,000 Basotho males worked in South Africa.223 However, only a
small number of females worked in South Africa as domestics. South Africa supplies

44
almost all the consumer goods and owns many large businesses in Lesotho. Lesotho
conducts most of its international trade through South Africa. For example, it uses
South African ports and harbors to export goods to other countries. On the other
hand, the Lesotho Highland Water Project supplies much of South African water
needs in the central parts of the country.

Lesotho is one of the poorest countries in Southern Africa. It is not clear how
the country would have fared without the assistance of South Africa. As such, the
economies of the countries are intrinsically linked. Table 1 shows that Lesothos
gross domestic product (GDP) totaled 1,651 billion in 2004. Between 1985 and 1990,
the remittances from Basotho male workers employed in South Africa constituted 46
percent of Lesotho economy. 224 However, this valuable source of government
revenue depends on the economic performance of the South African economy.
Thabo Fuolo argues that in Lesotho there is currently a wave of uncertainty in the
official, academic, business as well as the general public concerning the future
employment prospects of these workers.225

The economic independence of Lesotho as a sovereign state is also

questionable because more than 50 percent of the countrys total government
revenues come from grants contributed by the SACU. This figure as a percentage of
the GDP comes close to 30 percent. 226 Lesotho is a member of the common
monetary area, the Multilateral Monetary Agreement (MMA), together with Namibia,
South Africa, and Swaziland. The MMA offers the kingdom a banking system with
access to the South African capital market and the currency peg.227 This makes
Lesotho's monetary policy tightly connected to South Africa's. The Minister of
Finance and Development Planning, for example, served as a Deputy Governor of
the South African Reserve Bank from 1996 to 2001, prior to appointment to his
current post in 2002.228

The countrys dependence on South Africa goes beyond SACU revenues and
remittances. South Africa provides most of the tiny neighbors infrastructure,
including a transport network, air transportation, and access to telecommunications.

45
 Nonetheless, in recent years the government of Lesotho has attempted to
diversify the economy and to improve its infrastructure in order to promote trade and
accessibility. In 2001, for example, Lesotho became eligible for preferences under
the United States Africa Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA). AGOA allows sub-
Saharan African states market access for textile and apparel goods into the United
States.229 Under this scheme, Lesothos clothing exports to the US reached US$460
million in 2004, and created employment for more than 50,000 workers. 230 This
growing sector of the economy also supplies garments to major South African
retailers as well as overseas markets in Canada, the European Union (EU) and the
rest of Southern Africa.231 Foreign direct investment (FDI) also helps the Lesotho
economy to grow.232 Most FDI inflows go to the apparel and textile industries, and
into the Lesotho Highland Water Project. South Africa, Taiwan and Mainland China
are top investors in Lesotho.233

CONCLUSION

Lesotho and South Africa share many commonalities and interdependence.

However, the legacies of colonialism and imperialism in the region created
anomalies, where a state was formed within another state. This situation has
hindered the development of the Basotho kingdom. The unfair advantage enjoyed by
South Africa over Lesotho has ensured that the bigger state could easily undermine
Lesothos sovereignty. The bullying tactics of the apartheid state continued for many
years until the Black South African population majority first voted in 1994. It is evident
that the apartheid state was responsible for much of the instability in the region.
Smaller countries such as Lesotho suffered from the South African expansive
security and political agenda.

46
Table 1.1: The economic status of the Kingdom of Lesotho (1999 2010)

GDP (US$ million) 1 651 (2004)

GDP (purchasing power parity) (US$) 3.31 billion (2010)
GDP (official exchange rate) (US$) 1.799 billion (2010)
GDP - real growth rate 3.5% (2010)
Unemployment rate 45% (2002)
Population below poverty line 49% (1999)
Inflation rate 6.1% (2010)
Debt external (US$) 647 million (2010)
Exchange rate 7.9 (2010) (Maloti per USD)
Source: Lesotho economic figures adapted from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World
Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/lt.html(Accessed on May 17, 2011)

47
 Chapter 2

ATTEMPTS FOR POLITICAL INTEGRATION IN

SOUTHERN AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

When dealing with developments in the regions political and economic

situation, it is impossible to ignore the role that regional bodies have played in
ensuring regional integration. The regions of Southern and Eastern Africa share a
common history. As a result, the countries of the two regions tend to have multiple
memberships in institutions such as the SADC, SACU, the Indian Ocean
Commission (COI), the Common Market for Eastern and the Southern Africa
(COMESA), and the East African Community (EAC) (See Table 2.1).234

As in other parts of the world, Southern African states belong to a wide range of
regional security, political and economic bodies. The multiplicity of membership, as
anywhere in the world, appears to be an issue also for the region. One of the main
three regional organizations in Southern Africa, COMESA will not be discussed in
this study for two reasons. Lesotho and South Africa as well as eight other SADC
states do not belong to the organization. Only DRC, Madagascar, Malawi,
Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are of members COMESA. 235 At
present, there are calls for the harmonization, and even a merger, of COMESA and
the SADC. On June 12, 2011, the twenty-six leaders of COMESA, the EAC and the
SADC signed a declaration on the launch of negotiations to set up a free trade area
(FTA) by 2012.236 The planned FTA will create a market of twenty countries, with a
combined GDP of a trillion US dollars, and six hundred million consumers, more than
half the population of the continent.237 SACU is likely to be absorbed in the new FTA,
if it is created.

Relations between South Africa and Lesotho are therefore best understood
through two important regional organizations, the SADC and the SACU.

48
 SOUTHERN AFRICAN CUSTOM UNION (SACU)

The history of economic and political integration in Southern Africa can be

traced from the 1889 Customs Union Convention between the British Colony of Cape
of Good Hope, and the Orange Free State Boer Republic. These territories merged
later, together with the Transvaal Boer Republic and the Natal Colony, to form the
Union of South Africa in 1910. The three British High Commission Territories (HCTs)
of Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Swaziland governed from
the United Kingdom Colonial Office turned down the proposal of incorporation into
the Union of South Africa.238 Christian Peters-Berries claims thatSouth Africa tried
several times to incorporate the three territories until they became independent in
the early 1960s.239

The year 1910 was also significant for the region because Britain and South
Africa made a decision extend the Customs Union Convention to incorporate the
whole of the Union of South Africa, parts of South West Africa (Namibia), and the
HCTs. The whole of South West Africa came under the white minority South African
control and administration after World War I. However, only Britain (on behalf of the
HCTs) and the Union of South Africa were involved in the negotiations. 240 The
convention was formally known as the Southern African Customs Union. SACU is
said to be the worlds oldest customs union.241 This entitys primary goal was to
promote economic development through regional coordination of trade.242

The creation of SACU was accompanied by the conclusion of an agreement.

The 1910 agreement established:

(a) A common external tariff (CET) on all goods imported into the Union from the
rest of the world; a common pool of customs duties as per the total volume of
external trade and excise duties based on the total production and
consumption of excisable goods.
(b) The free movement of SACU manufactured products within SACU, without
any duties or quantitative restrictions.

49
(c) A revenue-sharing formula (RSF) for the distribution of customs and excise
revenues, collected by the union.243

In the 1960s, the three HCTs became independent. They then sought to revise
the 1910 Agreement. In 1969, to the surprise of the world, the HCTs, now called
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS), signed a new agreement with the South
African state under white minority rule. It was in the white minority rule states interest
to tie the newly independent states to the apartheid state. It offered the new states
generous revenues for their political compliance.244 In this period, the white minority
rule South Africa was in the worlds limelight because of its apartheid policies,
already discussed in Chapter 1. UN member states imposed sanctions in 1968.
Nonetheless, the conclusion of the 1969 agreement attracted attention because it
was proof that the three frontline states (BLS) were very much reliant on apartheid
South Africa for their imports and exports. 245 This economic dependence on the
apartheid state proved to be universal source of political problems for all states going
forward.

The 1969 agreement attracted widespread attention from economists and

political commentators, since it effectively ensured that throughout the sanctions
period the three frontline states (BLS) continued to depend on the white minority rule
South Africa for their imports, and to a lesser extent their exports. Apartheid South
Africa further dominated the economies of the smaller neighboring states by
compelling them to remain members of the Rand Monetary Union (RMU),
established in 1921. 246 Botswana, however, pulled out of the monetary area in
1975. 247 The 1910 agreement also included a revenue sharing formula for the
division of customs and excise revenue collected in the union, and the HCTs
received a significant proportion of their government revenue through this formula.
The newer agreement retained the main features of the original agreement
concluded before 1969. However, it added a revenue sharing formula for the division
of customs and excise revenue, from which the smaller states were to receive a
significant proportion of their government revenue. As a result, this connection to
apartheid tarnished the image of the 1969 Agreement.248

50
 The character of SACU prior to 1990, especially after the HCTs became
independent, was a political conundrum for Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.
These states, Lesotho and Swaziland in particular, paid a high price for participation,
and taking orders from the powerful apartheid state at the height of the liberation
movements in the entire region. Apartheid South Africa saw the BLS as its first ring of
protection or a cordon sanitaire.249

With the political changes taking place in Namibia (1990) and the majority ruled
South Africa (1994), the states decided to enter into negotiations for a new
agreement. These negotiations culminated in the signing of a new agreement in
October 2002, which now included South Africa and the so-called BNLS states
(Botswana, Namibia, Swaziland and Lesotho).250 South Africa, however, continued to
dominate the economies of the BNLS states. South Africa opted against changing
the economic unions revenue distribution formula. Botswanas influential newspaper
Mmegi claims that South Africa accepted the skewed revenue sharing formula
during renegotiations of the SACU agreement in recognition of the historical
inequities in the old SACU and the constraints it placed on BLNS development.251
The 2002 Agreement was much more comprehensive than earlier agreements, since
it covered economic policy issues, developed a new revenue sharing formula, and
established institutions to manage SACU affairs. In terms of this agreement, the total
customs revenues collected would be distributed according to each countrys share
of total intra-SACU imports.

The South African economy dwarfs the economies of other SACU member
states, as well as those of the non-SACU members in the region. This creates over
dependence on the South African economy by the neighboring states. The World
Banks 2006 Gross Domestic Product report indicated that South Africa contributed
92.5 percent of SACUs GDP. The other four member states contributed the rest,
namely Botswana (3.7%), Namibia (2.3%), Swaziland (0.9%) and Lesotho (0.5%).252
The trade policies of the BNLS are directly linked to those of South Africa. Over 90
percent of the imports that enter the SACU region go to South Africa. South Africa
plays a dominant role in the functioning of SACU, and also in the disbursement of
revenues.

51
 The economies of the BNLS rely heavily on the grants from SACU. SACU
revenue made up 27 percent of Botswanas total budget for the 2007/2008 fiscal
year.253 The 2006 revenue share from the SACU tariff pool constituted an estimated
53.0 and 56.9 percent of total government revenues of Lesotho and Swaziland, as
well as 28.2 and 24.1 percent of the GDP for the two states, respectively.254

In 2009, however, the unthinkable happened when Botswana, Lesotho and

Swaziland entered into an Interim Economic Partnership Agreement with the EU,
which left out Namibia and South Africa.255 Both Namibia and South Africa were in
favor of a broader framework of negotiations with the EU, which would have included
all SADC countries rather than the individual states. The actions of the three
countries were seen to be divisive, and could even have led to the breakup of the
customs union.256 It was predicted that the BNLS states would be the biggest losers
because they would no longer receive generous SACU grants.257 On September 14,
2010, for example, the South African National Treasury and South African Revenue
Services (SARS) declared before the Parliaments Standing Committee on Finance
that the SACU payments were increasingly becoming a fiscal burden.258 Should the
South African government decide to decrease the monetary contributions and/ or
even abandon SACU, this could have an impact on the future of the customs union
and the BNLS states. If the customs union were to fall apart, and the BNLS countries
would face serious economic challenges. At present, South Africa media reports
claim that Swaziland faces financial difficulties, and that it sought a grant from South
Africa in June 2011.

The second important organization in the Southern African region is the SADC.
The main SADC objective is to support economic growth and development amongst
its members, and to promote trade liberalization and economic integration. In recent
years the organization has played an important political role that combines
development issues, and matters related to peace and security as well as defense
cooperation.

52
 PRE-1992 POLITICAL CLIMATE AND INSTITUTIONS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Prior to 1990 the apartheid states brute use of power framed the politics
throughout the region. Therefore, any efforts at integration and peace building by the
post-colonial states were undermined by the minority ruled South African
destabilization policy. Institutions such as Frontline States and the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference were a direct response to the apartheid
South Africas violent foreign policy. The FLS and the SADCC were forerunners to
the creation of the SADC in 1992. The FLS and the SADCC were established in the
1975 and 1980 respectively to deal mainly with security cooperation and socio-
economic development.259 Therefore, in order to understand the current formation of
the SADC and its capabilities for peace and security, it is necessary to review its
history.

The Frontline States (FLS)

The regional states desire to destroy the apartheid state and end economic
domination and displacement of people, framed the recent history of political
integration in Southern Africa.260 The fight against apartheid was the last effort to end
colonialism in Southern Africa. The struggle against apartheid pitted the majority
blacks in the region against the powerful, white minority. This resulted in the
formation of the Frontline States in the 1975, following the collapse of the Portuguese
colonial empire in Africa. The FLS went on to become a major diplomatic force in the
regions struggle against white domination.261 The organization comprised states that
considered themselves as either being in direct confrontation with apartheid South
Africa or victims of its aggression. 262 These states were Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.263 Zimbabwe only joined the organization after
its liberation from minority white rule in 1980.264

The importance of the Frontline States had not only to do with the military
opposition to aggression by the apartheid state, but also opposition to the apartheid
states creation of the Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS). To
counter the obvious mounting threats from the black independent states, apartheid
South Africa also put in place a total national strategy of which the Constellation was
a critical input. 265 Deon Geldenhuys sums up the purpose of the total national
53
strategy as mobilization of South African total physical and human resources in a
national endeavor to thwart the onslaught. 266 The apartheid state created this
strategy to contain the threats posed by both internal and external factors, such as
the 1972-1975 political and labor unrests, and the 1976 Soweto students uprising.

James Chipasula and Katabaro Miti presented the underlying CONSAS

objectives as follows:

To tie South African neighboring states more firmly into the South African
state, and thus inhibit them from aiding South African Liberation
Movements. In fact South Africa wanted its neighbors to act as police
agents and prohibit political activity by refugees resident in their countries.
To force the neighboring countries to indirectly recognize the
independence and sovereignty of the South African homelands, and thus
provide international legitimacy to its separate development policy leading
to formal diplomatic recognition of the homelands by major western
powers.
To create an international environment conducive to rapprochement
between apartheid South Africa and the west.267

As regards CONSAS, Jackie Cilliers added that the apartheid state intended to
seek strictly regional solutions to political, economic and security problems from
among regional states, while purposefully marginalizing the West.268 In 1979, the
apartheid state invited itself and its three Bantustans (Bophuthatswana, Transkei and
Venda), Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi
to become members of the Constellation.269 At the time, Malawi was the only majority
black state in the region that had diplomatic relations with Pretoria.270 The CONSAS
initiative, however, did not bear any fruit. When Zimbabwe gained its independence
from Rhodesia-Britain, the government of Robert Mugabe opted to join the FLS, and
not CONSAS. Zimbabwe went on to become a key member of the FLS and the
SADCC, because it had a stronger economy and infrastructure compared to the
other member states. Perhaps the biggest blow to the CONSAS dream was when
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland refused to recognize the Bantustans, and when
the BLS states, together with Malawi, subsequently became members of the

54
SADCC. 271 The South African-sponsored Constellation was stillborn. Had the
experiment succeeded, it would have changed the political dynamics of the whole
region.

In 1983, there were nine members of the SADCC: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is possible
that Lesotho and Swaziland, in particular, had harbored the idea of joining the FLS
earlier but were afraid of provoking the white minority South African regime directly
because they shared borders and depended on South Africa. Furthermore, due to
their closeness to the apartheid state they were excluded from the critical security
organ of the body, namely the Inter-State Defense and Security Committee
(ISDSC). 272 Malawi and Swaziland became members, together with the black
majority ruled South Africa, when the ISDSC disbanded in 1996.273 The ISDSC was
also largely informal yet better structured than the FLS.

The FLS created the ISDSC in 1975 to advise and implement the decisions and
resolutions of the FLS summit meetings. The member states ministers of defense,
home affairs, police, state security, intelligence and immigration constituted this
membership. In 1999, the then South African Department of Foreign Affairs, now the
Department of International Relations Cooperation, described the functions of the
ISDC in the following manner:

Defense: to review and share experiences on the prevailing military

security situation in member states; to explore areas of further multilateral
military co-operation and practical means for its realization; to exchange
views and propose mechanisms for the prevention, management and
resolution of conflicts.
Public security: to co-ordinate public security activities in the sub-region; to
exchange experience and information between member states on public
security issues such as motor vehicle theft, drug-trafficking, counterfeit
currency, illegal immigrants, forged travel documents and firearm-
smuggling; and to explore areas and means of enhancing co-operation
among police agencies in the sub-region.

55
 State security: to review the security situation in the sub-region and to
analyze issues affecting respective member states, including political
instability, armed conflict, influx of refugees, religious extremism and
organized crime; to recommend appropriate measures to deal with
potential threats to the stability of the sub-region; and to consider ways of
consolidating and expanding co-operation between member states on
matters relating to state security.274

Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC)

With the liberation of Zimbabwe from white minority rule in 1980, the FLS
grouping established the SADCC.275 It was formed in Lusaka, Zambia, on April 1,
1980. This was a mere extension of the FLS in that all the founding members were
present, plus Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. The sates adopted the
Lusaka Declaration (or the Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation document)
to create the SADCC. Only South Africa and Namibia were still in the hands of white
minority rule. The member states announced their commitment to policies aimed at
economic liberation on the basis of sustainable integrated development of the
economies.276 The primary goal of the SADCC was therefore to achieve the total
economic liberation of all countries in the region. The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development report claimed that part of the organizations strategy
was to reduce economic dependence on South Africa both as a trading partner, and
as a conduit for the SADCC trade with the outside world.277

In the 1980s, apartheid South Africa decided to pursue a massive

destabilization policy directed to neighboring countries. The white minority rule state
harassed and terrorized the countries in the region. As a result of this policy, Peters-
Berries maintains that the SADCC never fully realized its potential. 278 The
destabilization policy was part of the total strategy and CONSAS, already discussed
above. South Africa was not very happy when CONSAS failed to develop, and was
even more following the creation of the SADCC. Pretoria regarded the new formation
as deadly challenge.279 The white minority rule state attacked strategic transportation
infrastructure to cut off the trade links among SADCC member states. For instance, it
blew up the Luangwa and Chambeshi bridges connecting Zambia with Malawi and
Tanzania, respectively.280 This caused immense economic hardship to Zambia and

56
its neighbors. These bridges and other routes were key in avoiding the use of South
African harbors. Their continued use would have seriously lessened the regions
dependency on the apartheid state.

The small and poorer states could not match the military strength of the white
minority rule state.Table 2.5 shows the SADC military expenditures and armed forces
in 1985 and 2001. The South African government spending on the military has
always been large when compared to other sates in the region. After 1994, however,
the democratic government introduced major changes to the military forces to reflect
the political changes that had taken place. The changes led to mass resignations
from the army by former white soldiers to seek alternative employment as
mercenaries.281 For example, a Pretoria-based private military company, Executive
Outcomes, was implicated in many destabilization acts in many African states,
including the sale of arms to Sierra Leone in contravention of a UN embargo, during
the 1990s. The South Africa parliament passed a legislation to prohibit most citizens
282
from serving in foreign wars in any capacity. This was obviously an
embarrassment for the democratic government, which worked hard to present itself
as part of the African continent.

The apartheid regime also extended the destabilization strategy to supporting

anti-government movements in Angola (UNITA) and Mozambique (RENAMO), as
well as the dissidents in Zimbabwe. South Africa provided support in the form of
military, logistical and training assistance to these rebel movements.283 In the case of
Angola and Mozambique the conflicts became full-blown wars, and in Zimbabwe
nothing of significance was achieved. In Mozambique, RENAMO disrupted major
railway links, cut connections to important harbors, and destroyed the electricity grid
from the Cabora Bassa dam. The sustained pressure on Mozambique forced
Presidents Machel and Botha to sign the Nkomati Accord in 1984.284 The treaty
compelled both Mozambique and South Africa to stop all attacks from their
respective territories against the neighbor and also not to support attacks from a third
country against their countries.285 Unfortunately, this treaty never received support
from the majority of states, and failed as apartheid South Africa continued to support
the rebel movements.286

57
 UNITA was not as successful in Angola due to the large presence of Cuban
forces. It was only after the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987/88 that South Africa
retreated, and realized that they would not be able to overcome the Angola-Cuban
forces. UNITA and South African failure to defeat Angola changed the face of
international and regional politics.287 The strategic balance of power between NATO
and the Warsaw Pact was altered, with the capture of the SA-8 anti-aircraft missile
system on October 3, 1987 by the Angola-Cuban forces. South African pullout led to
Namibias independence in 1990.

The exact costs of the destabilization policies of the apartheid state in the
region remain unknown. Babongile Mandela estimated the cost between US$10 and
US$30 billion in 1980 and 1984. 288 Chipasula and Miti, on the other hand,
approximated the cost of South African destabilization on SADCC between US$2.1
billion in 1980 and US$18.7 billion in 1985.

THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC)

After the end of apartheid in South Africa and following Namibias independence
in the 1990 and 1994, the leaders of the Southern African states signed the
Windhoek Treaty transforming the SADCC from a coordination conference into
Southern Africa Development Committee (SADC), and redefined the basis of co-
operation of member states from a loose association into a legally binding
arrangement.289 As the name suggests, the focus of the organization shifted from
supporting liberation movements to creating a co-operative framework for
development. This commitment was expressed through the restructuring of SADC
institutions, market integration and development, and the facilitation and promotion of
trade and investment and variable geometry (different arrangements at various
levels of integration applying to different groups of countries within the group).290

Article 4 of the SADC Treaty lists the following, as the five principles member
states were to adhere to:

58
 Sovereign equality of all Member States;
Solidarity, peace and security;
Human rights, democracy, and the rule of law;
Equity, balance and mutual benefit; and
Peaceful settlement of disputes.291

According to the SADC webpage and article 5 of the SADC Treaty, the
objectives of the organization are to:

Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance

the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration;
Evolve common political values, systems and institutions;
Promote and defend peace and security;
Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the inter-dependence of Member States;
Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and
programs;
Promote and maximize productive employment and utilization of resources
of the region;
Achieve sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective
protection of the environment; and
Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural
affinities and links among the peoples of the region.292

The SADC has fifteen member states: Angola, Botswana, DRC, Lesotho,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa,
Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.293 In 2008, the
DRC, South Africa and Tanzania made up approximately two thirds of the total
population (60 percent), while the six smallest members (Seychelles, Swaziland,
Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and Lesotho) comprised only four percent of the total
population.

59
Map 2.1: The geographical map of the SADC region

Source: Southern African Development Community (SADC) webpage.294

The South African Department of International Relations Cooperation (DIRCO)

states that: In order to address national priorities through regional action most
member states had been allocated the responsibility of coordinating one or more
sectors. This involved proposing sector policies, strategies and priorities, and
processing projects for inclusion in the sectoral program, monitoring progress and
reporting to the Council of Ministers.295 Only DRC and Seychelles were not allocated
sector responsibilities, see Table 2.2. The SADC protocols and agreements are listed
in Table 2.4.

The SADC is a very important vehicle for regional integration, but it still faces a
number of political, economic and social challenges. These include economic
underdevelopment and poverty; the HIV and AIDS pandemic; inter and intra state
conflicts; consolidation of democracy and good governance; refugees, irregular
movers, illegal migrants and internally displaced persons; the need to redress
imbalances in the accessibility to natural resources and wealth; the demobilization,

60
disarmament, reintegration and monitoring of ex-combatants; the development and
consolidation of regional disaster management mechanisms; and corruption.296

Figure 2.1: Organogram of the SADC

Summit(Heads of Government)

Organ on Politics, Defense and Security

Cooperation
Council of

Ministers

Standing Committee Ministerial Committee

of Officials

Inter-State Inter-State
Integrated Defense and
Politics and
Security
Committee of
Diplomacy
Ministers
Committee Committee

SADC Secretariat

National Committees

Sub-committees

Source: Isaksen, J & Tjnneland E (2001)297

61
 The structural composition of the SADC

Jackie Cilliers and Mark Malan note that the SADC structure clearly separates
political and security considerations from the institutions created to foster regional
economic development and integration.298 The two segments of the SADC are the
SADC proper (namely regional economic development and integration, through the
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP)) and the Organ for Politics,
Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC), or simply the SADC Organ.

In the main, however, the SADC is made up of eight institutions: the Summit of
heads of state and government; the SADC Tribunal; the Council of ministers;
OPDSC; the Sectoral/ Cluster Ministerial committees; the SADC Secretariat; the
Standing committee of senior officials; and the SADC National committees.299 The
structure of the SADC is presented in Figure 2.1.

The Summit (heads of state and government)

The Summit, consisting of the heads of government, is the highest policy-

making institution of the SADC. It also adopts decisions regarding SADC; determines
the organizational structure of SADC and any changes thereof; elects the annually
rotating SADC chairperson; and appoints the executive secretary of SADC.300

It functions under the leadership of the Troika, comprising the chairperson,

incoming chairperson and the outgoing chairperson. Zambian President Rupiah
Banda is the current chair of the troika, and the other two members are the
Mozambican and South African presidents, Armando Guebuza and Jacob Zuma.301
Following 2001 reforms the annual rotation of the SADC leadership and other major
bodies were formally introduced. The meetings of the Troika take place twice a year,
in March every year to discuss regional economic development matters and the
SADC Program of Action, and in August/ September to deliberate on political matters
concerning the region.

62
 The Council of Ministers

The Council of Ministers is the second important level of authority, and the
highest functional level in the SADC.302 One national minister per each member state
is a member of the council, and usually is the foreign affairs or finance/ development
planning serve on this body. Just like the summit, the leadership elections follow the
troika principle. The council has two important functions. It advises the Summit; the
council therefore meets before the Summit. It oversees the work of the five
directorates that constitute the SADC. Lastly, the council approves the budgets for all
the SADC institutions, including the Secretariat.

Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM)

The Integrated Committee of Ministers (ICM) serves as an umbrella policy

organ for all SADC Program of Action activities, and is responsible for the
implementation of the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP). The
five broad targets and priorities of the RISDP are: peace, security and democracy;
trade and economic liberalization; infrastructure and services development; human
and social imperatives, such as HIV and AIDS and food security; and cross-cutting
issues with a critical bearing on these core integration areas.303 Other functions of the
ICM include formulating decisions on matters pertaining to the directorates;
monitoring and evaluating work of the directorates; and creating ad-hoc committees
where necessary.

In terms of the current structure of the SADC, the ICM reports directly to the
Council of Ministers. It is constituted by at least two ministers from each member
state that are expected to attend the Integrated Committee of Ministers meetings. It
meets once a year, and follows the consensus principle.304 Its first meeting was in
Luanda, Angola, in March 2003. The mandate of the ICM is to oversee the work of
the Secretariat.

63
 The Secretariat

The Secretariat is the principal executive institution of the SADC, and its
headquarters are located in Gaborone, Botswana. The Secretariat was established in
1981, but it was restructured in 1992 and 2001. The Executive Secretary is the head
of the Secretariat. Dr. Tomz Augusto Salomo of Mozambique is the current
Executive Secretary of the SADC.305 The main tasks of the Secretariat are strategic
planning, co-ordination and management of the SADC programs.306

Figure 2.2: Organogram of the SADC Secretariat

Source: SADC webpage

The priorities for the Secretariat are based on how the Secretariat can best
contribute to the overall objective of the SADC. They are trade, finance and
investment; enhancing the capacity for human resources development; stakeholder
participation; gender mainstreaming; promotion of the SADC image; policy,
formulation and harmonization; and strengthening of institutions involved in
community building.307
64
 PEACE AND SECURITY-RELATED ACTIVITIES OF THE SADC

Since this investigation concerns itself with the security structure in the
Southern African region. It is necessary to double check if the region body has the
institutional framework to deal with the security threats facing the member states as
well as the larger region. Babongile Mandela states that the SADC utilizes the
OPDSC and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defense and
Security Cooperation (SIPO) as two key instruments to manage threats to the
regions peace and security in the region.308

The Organ for Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (OPDSC)

The Heads of State of the SADC created the Organ for Politics, Defense and
Security Cooperation, or simply the SADC Organ, in 1996 by in Windhoek, Namibia.
Louis Fisher and Naison Ngoma argued that the SADC Organ was a result of the
security challenges that the region had been experiencing, particularly from the
1960s to the early 1990s.309 The focus of the OPDSC is therefore to implement
Article 4 of the SADC Treaty principles, as outlined above. The objectives of the
SADC Organ, as summarized by Cilliers and Malan, are summarized in Table 2.3.310

The foundations of the security community in the Southern African region

linked developmental and integration goals or objectives, and the tasks of conflict
prevention, conflict management, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. 311 Gina
van Schalkwyk proposes the conceptual framework for the Organ should be read in
conjunction with the following documents: the treaty of the SADC; the founding
documents of the African Union, particularly the protocol establishing the Peace and
Security Council (PSC); the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Co-
operation in Africa (CSSDCA); the framework document of the New Partnership for
African Development (NEPAD) and the principles of the African Peer Review
Mechanism (APRM).312

However, during its early days, the functions of the OPDSC were not at all
clear. Its founding communiqu in 1996 stipulated that the Organ was going to:

operate at Summit level, and [] function independently of other SADC structures. The Organ
shall also operate at ministerial and technical levels. The chairmanship of the Organ shall rotate
313
on an annual and on a Troika basis.

65
 The proposal of maintaining the SADC proper and the Organ as separate
institutions caused friction between the member states in the latter part of the
1990s.314 In practical terms, this meant that two centers of power were created in the
SADC. South African Nelson Mandela chaired the SADC proper, and Zimbabwes
Robert Mugabe became the first Chairperson of the Organ. Different authors argue
that Mandela and Mugabe could not agree on how the Organ should be structured.
This was mainly due to the fact that Mugabe wanted to treat the Organ as a personal
estate.315 The simmering tensions almost led to South African resignation as the
chair of the SADC.316 It was not until August of 2001 that the SADC Summit in
Blantyre, Malawi, formalized the existence of the Organ, through the Protocol on
Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation (PPDSC). The Summit also delineated
the main elements of the OPDSC, such as the structure, functions, objectives,
secretariat, ratification and accession.

The bickering between the member states affected on the firm establishment of
the Organ and its operations in the years that followed. The point of contention was
the proposal that the Organ would function independently of the rest of SADC and
have its own summit level body with authority over political and defense related
matters.317 South Africa was not favor of this proposal based on its understanding of
the SADC treaty. Its belief was that the SADC Summit was the supreme policy
making institution of the regional body. South Africa proposed that the Organ was to
be one of the SADC programs, and that it was to report to the SADC Summit. Kyu
Deug Hwang inferred that the implication of this was that the Organ simply would
become a subordinate [to] the decision-making authority of the Summit of SADC
proper.318 Mugabe rejected the South African interpretation and proposal.

Mugabe insisted on the informality of the Organ on the same lines as the FLS,
and to maintain it independent from other SADC structures. Mugabe also pushed for
the creation of the Organ with its own summit, chairperson and mandate. This
proposal also stated that the chairperson of the body should be the longest serving
head of state in the region.319 Interestingly, Mugabe was the longest serving head of
state in Southern Africa at the time. South Africa vehemently opposed the idea of
leaving the whole responsibility of security and defense in the hands of one state.

66
 The tensions between Mandela and Mugabe exposed not only the divisions
between OPDSC and the Organ, but laid bare the realities of the power relations
between states in the region. It appears that the admission of South Africa to the
SADC changed the balance of power in Southern Africa. Prior to the end of
apartheid, Zimbabwe was a political and economic force in the region. It was the de
facto leader of the SADC. The end of apartheid in South Africa implied that the
emergence of hegemonic rivalry between Pretoria and Harare in the SADC.320

Fako Likoti argues that: The impasse crippled the OPDS(C) completely during
this period. 321 The foundations for creating a functional peace and security
infrastructure for Southern Africa were seriously undermined. This made it impossible
for the SADC member states to make collective decisions on matters relating to
security and defense, including military interventions. This raises questions of
whether the 1998 military interventions in the DRC and Lesotho were indeed
sanctioned by the largely impotent SADC.

As mentioned earlier, it was not until August of 2001 that the SADC formalized
existence of the Organ was formalized. Following the 2001 SADC Summit held in
Blantyre the OPDSC was placed under the authority of the SADC Summit.322 This
decision represented a small victory for South Africa, and other states that were in
favor of streamlining decision making in the SADC. The Protocol also incorporated
the ISDSC and its subcommittees under the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and
Security Cooperation.

The Strategic Indicative Plan of the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security
Cooperation (SIPO)

The foreword to the SIPO document states that the SADC Protocol on Politics,
Defense and Security Co-operation is intended to serve as an instrument for dealing
with the regions political and security challenges, and that the SIPO was formulated
to assist with the implementation of the Protocol.323 The core objective of SIPO,
according to Bayano Valy, is:

to create a peaceful and stable political and security environment through which the region will endeavor to
realize its socio-economic objectives. SIPO provides general guidelines that spell out specific activities, in
accordance with objectives of the Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, as well as
324
strategies for their realization and public security.

67
 Valy also states that the SIPO is constituted of four main sectors, namely
political, defense, state security and public security. The sectors have three main
objectives. The first objective is to protect the people and safeguarding the
development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and
order, intrastate conflict and aggression. The second is to promote the development
of democratic institutions and practices within the territories of state parties and
encouraging the observance of universal human rights as provided for in the
respective charters and conventions of the AU and the UN. Finally, it is to develop
peacekeeping capacity of national defense forces and coordinating the participation
of state parties in international and regional peacekeeping operations.325

PEACE AND SECURITY ISSUES IN AFRICA

Article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act provides for establishment of the Protocol
on the Peace and Security Council. This structure was formulated as a collective
security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to
conflict and crisis situations in Africa.326 The PSC Protocol allows for the creation of
an African Standby Force (ASF), which would consist of five regional brigades in
each of the five regions of the Africa. The SADC is one of these five regions, together
with the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) plus Egypt, the EAC, the Economic Community
of Central African States (ECCAS), and the ECOWAS. In April and May 2005, the
SADC member states concluded a memorandum of understanding to regulate the
formation of the standby brigade for the SADC. In African southern region, the SADC
Brigade (SADCBRIG) was finally launched on August17, 2007 in Lusaka, Zambia.327
The SADC Brigade forms part of the African Standby Force.

The SADC Brigade is to participate in several missions to achieve a number of

objectives. The Brigade would perform observations and monitoring, peace support,
interventions for peace and security restoration in grave circumstances at the request
of a member state. It would prevent the spearheading to neighboring areas or states
of conflict or the resurgence of violence after agreements have been reached. Lastly,
it would assist in peace-building efforts, which include post-conflict disarmament and
demobilization and humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian
populations in conflict areas and support efforts on major natural disasters.328

68
 The conceptual framework of the brigade is interesting in that it can be
deployed at two levels.329 First, the brigade and its components are mandated to be
part of UN or AU peacekeeping missions in the continent. Second, and most
importantly, it consists of military personnel from the SADC member states, and can
be assigned to maintain peace and stability in troubled areas within the region.330
The latter is extremely significant because there is now a framework within which a
member state can intervene in the affairs of another country. At present, the SADC
member states are reluctant to develop a framework for military interventions in the
region.

SADC and international security: South African contribution to peacekeeping

missions

Since 2000, the black majority South Africa has played an active role in
peacekeeping missions in the continent, whether as part of the AU and or the UN.
However, it does not participate under the banner of the SADC. The country has
deployed its troops and military observers in many places, including the DRC,
Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia/ Eritrea, Comoros, Sudan and Central African
Republic as well as in Nepal.331 The expertise and experience of the South African
army in peacekeeping missions would prove very critical in the effectiveness of the
SADC Brigade.

The dominant and central role that South Africa plays in the SADC region on
security and related matters cannot be simply ignored. The military strength of the
apartheid regime was outlined above. After 1994, the black majority government in
South Africa moved quickly to improve relations with its neighboring states. It also
engaged other states with greater caution, especially after the 1998 military
intervention in Lesotho. It is undeniable that the countrys hegemonic status, from its
massive economic weight and power, will always drive any strategic peace and
security moves in the region. South Africa accounts for more than eighty percent of
the GDP of the SADC. This economic strength permits it to participate in
peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in the region and in the continent. Adekeye
Adebajo applauds South African new peacemaking and peacekeeping role by stating
that: In a short decade and a half, the country has gone from being the most
destabilizing force in Africa to being its most active peacemaker.332 South African

69
political and economic stability are vital for successful peacemaking and
peacekeeping missions in the sub-region and in Africa as a whole.

The main point of concern, however, is that the institutions responsible for
African security are weak, and lack financial and logistical means. They depend on
foreign funds to carry out AU missions in the troubled spots across the continent. For
example, the AUs peacekeeping mission in Darfur between 2003 and 2007 was
financed, almost entirely, through donated funds.333 This over reliance on external
donors makes the AUs peace and security missions weak, and unsustainable in the
long run. However, this situation is unlikely to improve soon as many of the African
states remain fragmented and politically weak.

The positive developments in the area of peace and security in Africa derive
from South African participation in the United Nations Security Council starting on
January 1, 2011. Nigeria and Gabon are also non-permanent members of the
UNSC.334 In the past the UNSC did little or nothing to increase the capacity of African
regional organizations as well as to collaborate effectively with them. However, it
was hoped that South African increased role in world affairs, and in the UNSC, would
build a strong case for the credible involvement of the UNSC in Africa. The events
unfolded in 2011 in Libya certainly proved that the issues of political stability in Africa
have a long way to go. External influence by the worlds powerful states in African
issues undermines the development of a viable continental security and
peacekeeping infrastructure.

CONCLUSION

The attempts at political and economic regional integration in Southern Africa

have a very long history. SACU holds a noteworthy position as the oldest customs
union in the world. However, the history of the region hampered cooperation between
states, which is an important ingredient for development, peace and stability. The
role of the minority white populations in the region, particularly the Portuguese in
Angola and Mozambique, South Africa and South Rhodesia, created many problems
that destabilized Southern Africa. Racist policies in these countries polarized the
communities in these countries. After the fall of the Portuguese (1975) and Ian

70
Smiths regime (1979), South Africa and the occupied territory of South West Africa
(Namibia) remained the only states in Africa under white minority rule. It even went
as far as strengthening its military to attack neighboring states. It discouraged any
chance of political change within its territory, and stood as the axis in the fight against
the Soviet Union influence in the region. It tried every trick in the book to survive in
the face of external attacks such as economic sanctions and guerilla warfare.

The newly independent black majority states felt the power of South Africa from
the 1960s to 1990, when the apartheid state collapsed. To cope with the brute force
of their strong neighbor, black majority governments created organizations that would
help them to plan together how to promote the downfall of the white minority regime.
The FLS and the SADCC proved to be key institutions in the fight against apartheid,
and in promoting economic development and regional economic integration. The
SADC is an evolution of these two important institutions. The SADC is also one of the
key institutions in the development of the African Union. With the exception of South
Africa and like many African states, the SADC states remain weak and poor. This
affects the organizations ability to implement its programs. This is particularly true for
the regions peace and security system, as dictated by the Protocol on Politics,
Defense and Security Co-operation. South Africa, however, participates in the
peacekeeping missions of the UN and AU on the continent, and beyond. South
African strength overshadows its neighbors in military, political, and economic terms.

71
Table 2.1: Major Attempts at regional integration in Southern Africa

Name Full Name Duration Member states Goal

Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt,
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya,
Common Market Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius,
Full economic
for Eastern and 1993 Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia,
COMESA union
Southern Africa Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia
and Zimbabwe

Southern Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,

SACU Customs
African 1910 Swaziland and South Africa
union
Customs Union

Transformed into SADC in 1992;

Southern consisting of Angola, Botswana,
African Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, (from
SADCC Multi-sectoral
Development 1980-1992 1990) Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania,
cooperation
Coordination Zambia and Zimbabwe; based in
Conference Gaborone

Angola, Botswana, DR Congo,

Southern Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Full political/
African Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia,
1992 economic
SADC Development South Africa, Swaziland, Seychelles,
union
Community Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe

Source: Adapted from Peters-Berries C (2010), pp. 38 - 40.

72
Table 2.2: Sector responsibilities within SADC

Country Sector
Angola Energy Commission
Botswana Agricultural Research, Livestock Production and Animal
Disease Control
Lesotho Environment, Land Management and Water
Malawi Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife
Mauritius Tourism
Mozambique Culture, Information, Sport, and the Transport and
Communications Commission (SATTCC)
Namibia Marine Fisheries and Resources Legal Affairs
South Africa Finance, Investment and Health
Swaziland Human Resources Development
Tanzania Industry and Trade
Zambia Employment, Labor and Mining
Zimbabwe Crop Production, Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources
Source: South African Department of International Relations Cooperation webpage

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Table 2.3: The objectives of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense and Security
Military/ Defense
Protect against instability from
within or outside its borders
Develop a collective security
capacity
Conclude Mutual
Defense Pact to respond to
external threats
Develop a regional
peacekeeping capacity
Source: Cilliers J & Malan M (1997), pp. 4.
Crime prevention Intelligence Foreign policy Human rights
Close cooperation to Close cooperation Promote cooperation and common political Develop democratic institutions
deal with cross-border value systems and institutions to deal with and practices
crime cross-border crime
Promote community- Early warning Develop foreign policy and a joint Encourage observance of
based approach international lobby universal human rights
Conflict prevention, management and Encourage and monitor
N/A N/A resolution international human rights
conventions and treaties
Mediate in inter-and intra-state disputes
Preventive diplomacy
Early warning
Encourage and monitor international arms
N/A N/A control/ disarmament conventions and Early warning
treaties
Coordinate participation in peace operations
Address extra-regional conflicts which
impact on the region
!
Table 2.4: The SADC protocols and agreements

Protocol on Immunities and Privileges

Protocol on Shared Watercourse Systems in the Southern African Region
Revised Protocol on Shared Watercourses
Protocol on Combating Illicit Drug Trafficking in the Southern African region
Protocol on Energy
Protocol on Mining
Protocol on Trade
Protocol on Transport, Communications and Meteorology
Protocol on Education and Training
Protocol on Tourism
Protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement
Protocol on Health
Protocol on Legal Affairs
Protocol on the Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof
Amendment Protocol on Trade
Protocol on Fisheries
Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and other Related Materials
Protocol Against Corruption
Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Co-operation
Protocol on Culture, Information and Sport
Agreement Amending the Treaty of SADC
Declaration Towards a Southern Africa free of Anti- personnel landmines
Declaration on Gender and Development
Declaration on Productivity
Declaration Concerning Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials
Source: South African Department of International Relations Cooperation webpage !
Table 2.5: SADC Military Expenditures and Armed Forces

DEFENSE EXPENDITURE ARMED FORCES RESERVES PARAMILITARY

US$m US$ Percentage Percentage of GDP Thousand

1985 2001 1985 2001 1985 2001 1985 2001 1985 2001
Angola 978 1,47 112 109 15.1 17 49.5 130.5 n/a 15
Botswana 56 203 52 127 1.1 3.8 4.0 9 n/a 1
DRC 122 392 4 7 1.5 8.9 48 81.4 n/a n/a
Lesotho 70 24 45 11 4.6 3.1 2 2 n/a n/a
Malawi 32 6 5 0 1.0 0.3 5.3 5.3 n/a 1.5
Mauritius 4 9 4 7 0.3 0.2 1 n/a n/a n/a
Mozambique 361 71 26 4 8.5 1.9 15.8 11.0 n/a n/a
Namibia n/a 91 n/a 51 n/a 3.1 n/a 9 n/a 6.0
Seychelles 12 11 186 142 2.1 1.8 1.2 0.2 n/a 0.3
South Africa 4,342 1,829 130 41 2.7 1.7 106.4 61.5 89.2 5.5
Tanzania 212 140 10 4 4.4 1.6 40.4 27 80.0 1.4
Zambia 60 27 9 3 1.1 0.8 16.2 21.6 n/a 1.4
Zimbabwe 257 267 31 23 5.6 2.9 41.0 39 n/a 21.8
Source: Adapted from Mller, B (2003), pp. 19.
 Chapter 3

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN

LESOTHO

The end of apartheid was not smooth a process since the South African state
was not integrated in the regional and international political system, after many years
of isolation. The early years of the democratic South Africa were eventful, and were a
steep learning curve especially in its foreign policy. The South African foreign policy
was not very successful during the Mandela presidency (1994 1998). According to
Peter Kagwanja, South African initial forays into African diplomacy were less than
successful.335 Chhabra also called the South African foreign policy a mixed bag, to
show that South Africa found it hard to adjust to the political realities on the continent,
and beyond.336 South Africa learnt the hard way before its foreign policy showed
signs of stability and direction in the late 1990s.

In an article published 1993, Mandela stated unequivocally that: South Africas

foreign policy will be based on our belief that human rights should be the core
concern of foreign policy.337 After the democratic elections in 1994, the Mandela
administration placed an emphasis on universal human rights. 338 The Mandela
regime took a very strong idealistic stance, as it was to discover later, against
repressive regimes across the world, and particularly in Africa. In 1995, for example,
South Africa opposed the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa and other Ogoni
environmental activists in Nigeria. South Africa went so far as to withdrawing its
diplomatic representative in Nigeria. However, other African leaders did not
appreciate Mandelas stance. As a result, South Africa was largely excluded from
peace initiatives in the continent.339

South African foreign policy challenges did not end with the Nigerian diplomatic
standoff. The country grappled for some time with its policy towards Taiwan and
China.340 Taiwan, as mentioned in the previous chapter, was one of the main allies of
the apartheid state. Even after 1994, Taiwan exerted its influence by offering the
ANC funds. It offered the country millions of dollars, and promised more investments.
South African relations with Taiwan, however, were in an uncomfortable position for
77
the former liberation movement, and the ANC blamed the conservative white officials
in the Department of Foreign Affairs (now DIRCO) for this situation. The irrationality
of the South African foreign policy was exposed when the country suggested the
dual-recognition idea to Beijing.341 China outrightly rejected the idea. It was only
after this diplomatic incident that Pretoria formally dropped its formal recognition of
Taiwan in November 1996.

Other diplomatic setbacks included Mandelas failure to convince Zambias

Frederick Chiluba to postpone elections, and allow Kenneth Kaunda to contest the
elections in December 1996. Pretoria also infuriated the Algerian government, when
in February 1996 Mandela met with Anouhar Haddam of the fundamentalist Algerian
Islamic Front (FIS). The reactions to this action included protests in Algeria, and the
withdrawal of the Algerias ambassador from Pretoria. Chhabra claims that if it were
not for the protests in Israel, a meeting between Mandela and Hamas would have
occurred. 342 Mandela also provoked the US by announcing good relations with
Cuba, Iran and Libya.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO

The turning point in South African foreign policy occurred in 1998, when
Mandelas regime authorized the use of force in Lesotho. At the invitation of Prime
Minister Phakalitha Mosisili, the South African Defense Force entered Lesotho on
September 22, 1998.343 This occupation lasted for seven months from September
1998 to May 1999. South Africa led the invasion of Lesotho, as it was declared at the
time to have been under the banner of the Southern African Development
Community. South Africa claimed that SADC sanctioned the armed intervention (or
the Operation Boleas), and that it was aimed at promoting democracy and stability
in the kingdom.344 This was in the aftermath of the highly disputed March 1998
parliamentary elections.

Botswana assisted South Africa in the intervention, but there were no other
SADC member countries directly involved. The Lesotho military intervention
coincided with the escalation of political problems in the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Three SADC states, Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe, also sent troops to the

78
DRC to fight on the side of President Laurent Kabila.345 These military involvements
took place after the end of the Cold War. In this period, there was high optimism that
there would finally be peace and stability in the Southern Africa region.

On Tuesday September 22, 1998, South African troops entered Lesotho to end
anti-government protests that had been staged since August 4, 1998 in front of the
royal palace. The opposition political parties led by the BCP, the BNP, and the MFP
rejected the outcome of the May elections. The South African National Defense
Force (SANDF) violently took over the Royal Palace, Ratjomose and Makoanyane
Lesotho Defense Force (LDF) headquarters in Maseru, and its Katse Dam
battalion.346 The armed intervention assisted Mosisili to hold on to power, and to
control the sate. The intervention and the violent protests left many people dead or
injured, and the commercial sector suffered damages worth millions of US dollars.

The military intervention in Lesotho consisted of between 1 600 to 3 500 South

African troops, and the 400 Botswana troops. The seven-month occupation cost
millions of dollars. Francis Makoa claims that: Between September and December
1998 the Lesotho government paid South Africa R240 million for maintaining its
military presence in Lesotho. 347 This amount was approximately 10 percent of
Lesotho's 1998/99 budget, and 175 percent more than its annual defense budget.
This excludes damage to infrastructure and deaths that occurred during the
intervention.

The 1998 military intervention in Lesotho was very important for a number of
reasons. First, it was a major milestone for the new South Africa. The intervention
marked the first time the post-apartheid regime had deployed troops on foreign soil in
a conflict situation. Second, the 1998 operation also signified a loss of innocence
for the new South Africa as it announced the arrival of a very different South Africa;
Big Brother is bashful no longer.348 This unexpected action by South Africa changed
the countrys relationship with Lesotho and the region as a whole.

79
 BACKGROUND TO THE INTERVENTION

Following the May 23, 1998 general elections, domestic and international
observers applauded the Basotho for holding peaceful elections. The ruling Lesotho
Congress for Democracy won 79 of the 80 available seats in the national parliament.
349
The opposition parties complained that the elections were rigged. This
overshadowed the validity of the elections. The 1998 elections took place against the
background of deep tensions and animosity between the BCP and the Lesotho
Congress for Democracy (LCD). Eight months before the elections, Ntsu Mokhehle,
the former leader of the BCP and also Lesothos prime minister from 1993 to 1998,
led a splinter group that created the LCD. Khabele Matlosa posited that Mokhehles
personality played an important role in the LCDs victory, rather than the strength of
the policies of the party.350

It was not the first time opposition parties were not satisfied with elections
results in Lesotho. In the 1993 general elections the BCP defeated the BNP, which
had ruled the country since 1966. Roger Southall and Roddy Fox maintain that: The
proximate cause of the present crisis [sic: 1998] in Lesotho is the nature of the victory
won by the BCP in the general election of March 1993, when it won all 65 seats up
for grabs with some 74.7 per cent of the popular vote.351 After losing its majority, the
BNP complained that the elections had been rigged, and approached the High Court
for annulling of the elections. The High Court dismissed this application. The BNP
controlled the army, was close to the monarch, and use the armed forces to
destabilize the newly elected government. Fighting broke out between two factions
within the army, and the new government was powerless to intervene. The tense
relations between the BCP government and the monarch reached the lowest point,
when in August 1994 King Letsie III removed the government. Matlosa argues that
the removal of the government amounted to a coup.352 Mediators from the OAU,
the Commonwealth and eventually the four presidents, of Botswana, Zimbabwe and
De Klerk of South Africa and Mandela of the ANC restored order after nearly two
weeks of chaos.353 Furthermore, infighting in the ruling BCP led to the formation of
the LCD. Among many factors, the crisis in the army, infighting in the ruling party,
and the need for re-launching democracy following a long period of authoritarian rule
demanded major changes in the Lesotho election framework.

80
 The framework for the 1998 election therefore differed from that of the previous
democratic elections in 1993 based on three factors. The voting age was lowered
from 21 to 18. The number of constituencies was increased from 65 to 80. For the
first time September 1997 Lesotho established an Independent Electoral
Commission (IEC) to run the elections.354 Southall and Fox state that 400 observers
monitored the elections. These included observers from non-governmental
organizations, 15 different countries, and from the European Union (EU), SADC, the
Organization of African Unity (now AU), the United Nations Development Program
(UNDP), the Ecumenical Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and
Southern Africa, and the World Alliance of Reformed Churches.355 At the end of the
elections, the observers released a joint statement declaring that the election was
conducted in a manner which should be considered acceptable according to
international standards. 356 The LCD officially won the election. Several months
before the election, the LCD leader Mosisili had predicted a landslide victory for his
party. The opposition did not agree with him. After the elections tensions soared as
the Opposition Alliance (BCP, BNP and MFP) proclaimed that the elections had
been rigged, and thus the government was illegitimate.

The Opposition Alliance mobilized its supporters to hold demonstrations in the

streets of Maseru. The opposition called for the monarch to disband the government.
However, the king does not have authority and power to dismiss the government
under the Lesotho constitution.357 South African and international media contributed
to the tension by running stories that the election had indeed been rigged. The new
government, however, did not seem to have any answer to the allegations. Tension
increased as the opposition supporters began to assemble at the monarchs palace
to demand the kings intervention in the political stalemate. Francis Makoa claims
that the protest was also staged to secure SADC's "mediation" in the crisis.358 A
gathering was planned for August 11, 1998, despite the fact that the permit for the
public gathering had expired on August 4, 1998.

The countrys security institutions were concerned that the situation was getting
out of hand. The chief of police ordered the erection of roadblocks, and that
protestors should be turned back. The opposition parties ignored the security
measures that had been put in place to control the crowds. They proceeded with the
mobilization of youths in front of the palace, and offered them food and

81
sustenance.359 The army chief Major General Makhula Mosakeng then gave orders
that tear gas could be used to disperse the demonstrating crowds. This placed the
country further into crisis, as a contingent of troops aimed their ammunition at fellow
soldiers, who then withdrew. The divisions within the army were now apparent.360
There were serious fears that conflict could arise between the factions of the army.
Furthermore, there were also concerns that the continued protest by the opposition
parties could worsen these tensions.

The government was not in control of the country. Civil disorder engulfed the
streets of the capital city, and the gun-wielding opposition supporters effectively took
over the capital, preventing civil servants from getting to work, hijacking vehicles and
closing down Radio Lesotho. 361 Junior army officers arrested Major General
Mosakeng, and bullied him into firing 28 senior Lesotho Defense Force officers in the
name of creating a non-partisan defense force. More than anywhere else, South
Africa did not want the situation in Lesotho to deteriorate further. South African
Defense Minister Joe Modise visited Maseru, and negotiated for the release of the
detained 28 senior LDF officers. Modise failed to create peace in the country, as the
coalition of opposition parties, the soldiery and elements of the police were working
together to paralyze the functioning of the government.

It was against this background that the SADC troika of South Africa, Botswana,
and Zimbabwe agreed that the best way to resolve the crisis was via the
appointment of a commission to examine the conduct of the recent election and to
adjudicate upon the validity of the result. According to Southall and Fox, the creation
of the commission was was probably also driven by [Thabo] Mbekis [South African
Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, 1994 - 1998] own apparent lack of conviction that the
election had been properly conducted. 362 South Africa invited Botswana and
Zimbabwe to form a mediation team, under the leadership of the South African High
Court Judge, Justice Pius Langa, to audit the election results. 363 The Langa
Commission did its job diligently and produced its findings within the shortest time
possible. The Commission, however, delayed the announcement of the findings
because they had to be first discussed in the SADC leaders meeting in Mauritius
before being released.

82
 The SADC leaders met in Mauritius on September 13 14, 1998, under the
chairmanship of Nelson Mandela. Before this meeting, a dramatic shift in South
African diplomatic policy occurred.364Mandela had openly declared his support for the
intervention by the Angolan, Namibian and Zimbabwean troops, after he was critical
of the three countries response to the civil war in the DRC. The president of South
Africa stated that in the face of aggression, President [Laurent] Kabila had the
right as a sovereign leader to call for military assistance from his allies. Mandela,
however, stressed that the shift in the South African position did not conflict with
regional attempts to broker a cease-fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo.365
South Africa now believed that a diplomatic initiative could work hand-in-hand with
military intervention.

Opposition leaders were apparently also invited to Mauritius, but they declined
366
the invitation. Southall and Fox construed that the report had been so
condemnatory of the LCD that Mbeki had had to refer it back to the troika of heads of
state.367 It was also reported that Prime Minister Mosisili, who had left for Mauritius
earlier, returned to Lesotho before the end of the summit. Rumors went on that
Mosisili had seen the report but none of the opposition parties had access to it. All
the speculation and rumors about the outcomes of the Langa Commission Report
laid the ground for army mutiny within the Lesotho Defense Force. This mutiny
occurred in the armys barracks in Maseru from September 10 16, 1998. The
security forces were also divided in their support for the new government.368 The
countrys tense situation escalated into a political crisis.

The Langa Commission released its report on September 17, 1998. The report
pointed to a number irregularities and administrative flaws in the electoral process.369
Section 7.7 of the Langa Commission Report stated that:

We are unable to state that the invalidity of the elections has been conclusively established.
We point out, however, that some of the apparent irregularities and discrepancies are of
sufficiently serious concern. We cannot, however, postulate that the result does not reflect
370
the will of Lesotho electorate.

This finding proved that there were certainly problems in the way the IEC
conducted the elections, and it gave some measure of satisfaction and
dissatisfaction to both the government and the opposition parties.371 When reading
between the lines, the report revealed serious irregularities in the 1998 elections, but

83
the commission did not release the contents of the report to the people of Lesotho.
Rumors started within Lesotho that the report was being falsified in favor of the LCD
government.372 The delays in releasing the report and the rumor mill created tension
and anxiety in Lesotho. The rumors also bolstered the oppositions beliefs that the
elections were definitely fixed. The demonstrators and their soldier allies interrupted
the government departments, and barricaded the entrances to the Government
Office Block, Lesotho Bank, the High Court, the Lesotho Highlands Development
Authority, as well as other buildings. 373 These events went on without police
intervention, and resulted in the suspension of the countrys parliament. The
government had not only lost control of the army, but also the police.

Southall and Fox state that the LCD acted in an unbecoming manner by
sending secret requests to the SADC to intervene militarily, and on September 22,
the SANDF did just that.374

A QUICK OVERVIEW OF PEACE AND SECURITY INSTITUTIONAL

FRAMEWORK IN AFRICA

Asian and African states disliked the idea of external interference in violation
of their sovereignty, irrespective of whatever justification. As regards to the principle
of non-interference, the introductory chapter showed that the OAU was clearly
against the concept of military and other forms of intervention in African states. As
the successor to the OAU, the AU (article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act) permits military
intervention and the use of force in one of its member states in response to war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. No recorded evidence shows that
the AU Peace and Security Council has ever endorsed any form of military
intervention in any African country. Up to the 2002 AU Durban summit and the 2001
SADC Blantyre summit, there was no institutional framework for authorizing military
interventions in Africa, and particularly in Southern Africa. For example, the crisis in
Darfur continued for years without meaningful action from the continental body. Arab
and African leaders respectively established the Arab League and the AU to protect
their nations sovereignty. 375 This must be seen against the background of
colonization and the need for fostering unity in Africa and in the Arab world.

84
 Deane-Peter Baker and Sadiki Maeresera state that [sic: Chapter VIII of] the
UN Charter allows member states to form subordinate groupings in order to assist
with the maintenance of peace and security.376 The AU Peace and Security Council
looks after the matters of peace and security in the whole continent. In Southern
Africa, as mentioned in the previous chapter, the SADC Politics, Defense and
Security Organ is tasked with handling peace and security issues, including
interventions, in the region. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the AU Peace
and Security Council, the OPDSC, and the UNSC.

THE EXPLORATION OF WHETHER SOUTH AFRICA (AND BOTSWANA)

OBTAINED PRIOR AUTHORIZATION FROM THE OPDSC/UNSC/ AU PEACE
AND SECURITY COUNCIL

The actions of Lesothos Prime Minister created controversy inside the kingdom
because it was discovered that the king was not consulted as required by the
Lesotho constitution.377 Furthermore, the legitimacy of the intervention was debatable
for a number of reasons. The actions of South Africa, supported by Botswana and
the SADC, appeared to have failed to obtain prior authorization from the UN Security
Council as required by Chapter VIII of the Charter.378 South Africa did not consult
the OAU before the military intervention occurred. The intervention was also not in
line with Article 4(a) of the SADC Treaty, which guarantees the principle of the
sovereign equality of all member states. The military intervention was heavily
criticized both in South Africa and Lesotho.

The issue of sovereignty becomes controversial when the notion of the

maintenance of international peace is brought into the equation. The UN Charter
(Article 2, paragraph 4) rejects the threat or the use of force.379 However, there are
specific circumstances under which the use of force may be permitted, under
international law. First, the UN Security Council (Chapter VII) may authorize the use
of force. Second, forcible measures may be applied in the exercise of the right of the
individual and collective self-defense (Article 51). States often claim that they
intervene in the affairs of other states for humanitarian reasons. Some military
interventions in the post-1945 international system include, among others, the
Belgian intervention in the Congo (1960), the US in the Dominican Republic (1965),
Tanzania in Uganda (1979), the US in Panama (1989), the US in Iraq (2003), and the

85
NATO in Libya (2011). Some of these interventions are dealt with in detail in Chapter
4. Humanitarian intervention, though is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter
as another instance, under which international law allows military intervention.

The admission of South Africa into the SADC in 1994 changed the balance of
power in Southern Africa. Prior to the end of apartheid, Zimbabwe was a political and
economic force in the region. It was therefore a de facto leader of the SADC.
Zimbabwes unchallenged position ended in the early 1990s, when a political
settlement was reached in South Africa. This resulted in the emergence of
hegemonic rivalry between Pretoria and Harare.380 The admission of South Africa to
the union resulted in relative political and economic stability, but also increased
suspicion on the part of the other members of the organization.381 As regards to the
latter, South Africa was seen to be maintaining its hegemonic power in Southern
Africa, and this was said to be affecting the economic development of the region.
During the 1998 Lesotho intervention, South Africa was still competing with
Zimbabwe for influence the region. With the armed intervention in Lesotho, South
Africa supposed that other countries, especially Zimbabwe, might come forward to
assume regional leadership, if it failed to deal quickly and effectively. Most important
though, Likoti argues that South Africa was not only fearful of losing its hegemonic
status in the region, but control of Lesothos precious resource, water.382 I discuss
the water issue below.

The question of whether the military intervention in Lesotho was permissible in

terms of the SADCs 1996 Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation
remains debatable. The structure of the OPDSC was created in such a way that it
would make it flexible in responding to regional problems that might arise.383 The
SADV created the OPDSC in line with Chapter VIII, Article 52 of the UN Charter to
deal with conflicts between member states. 384 This regional security structure
(OPDSC) did not take off as anticipated due to power squabbles between South
Africa and Zimbabwe. At the time of the DRC and Lesotho conflicts the OPDSC had
been suspended.385 Therefore, the SADC had no mechanism for authorizing military
intervention. It follows that South Africa, and Botswana as a junior partner, had no
legal basis to justify the military intervention in Lesotho. One possible action available
to member states was to convene a special session of the SADC to deal with the
problems in Lesotho. Unfortunately, no SADC Summit was called to confirm and

86
ratify intervention. South Africa believed that the international system is uncertain,
untrustworthy and unreliable.386 South Africa was the chairperson of the SADC when
the Lesotho intervention took place.

The SADC member states did not consistently apply the provisions of the
OPDSC, including South Africa and Botswana. Africas World War started also in
1998, in the Democratic Republic of Congo, involving eight African nations. An
estimated 5.4 million people were reportedly killed from the armed conflict by
2008.387 Zimbabwe, Namibia and Angola also used the SADCs OPDSC to justify
their involvement in the war. South Africa and Botswana followed a similar argument
to explain their military intervention in Lesotho. This was hardly a month after the two
countries had rejected to do the same in the DRC. These two interventions were not
only unauthorized, but also showed the elements of dominance in the foreign policies
of dominant states, Zimbabwe and South Africa. On the part of the SADC, it failed to
authorize any military intervention in the regions conflict ridden states. For example,
there was no military intervention in Angolas protracted civil war, which only ended in
the late 1990s.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN LESOTHO

South African strategic interests motivated the government to intervene in

Lesotho, rather than for humanitarian reasons. South Africa wanted to demonstrate
its political dominance in the region. South Africa wanted to advance its neo-liberalist
economic agenda in the region, and on the continent. It also feared that the
deteriorating political situation in Lesotho would affect its supply of fresh water to
central province of Gauteng through the Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP).388
Therefore, South Africa decided to take swift action to protect its strategic interests. A
stable Lesotho was important to protect these interests. The actions of South Africa
in the Lesotho crisis were a clear indication that the country would do everything in its
power to protect these interests.

87
 Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP)

David Black argues that the wars of the next millennium will be fought over
scarce resources.389 The South African interests in Lesotho are directly linked to
water resources. The South African Acting President during the 1998 intervention,
Mangosuthu Buthelezi, explained that the military intervention sought to achieve
three objectives, namely to secure the Dam [Katse Dam], restore order in the
security establishment and clear protestors from the Royal Palace.390 The European
Investment Bank (EIB) describes the Lesotho Highlands Water Project as

... a major transnational project consisting of a system of dams and tunnels to store and
transfer water from the catchment of the Orange river in the Highlands of Lesotho to the
industrial heartland of South Africa, the Gauteng / Johannesburg area; it also comprises a
391
Hydropower Plant at Muela, which is basically a spin-off of the water transfer.

The Katse Dam and the members of the LDF guarding it were the first targets of
the South African army. The dam is part of a cluster of dams and rivers that make the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The LWHP is a joint project between South Africa,
and Lesotho. It cost more than US7.5 billion to build and generates hydroelectric
power for Lesotho (currently almost 100 percent of Lesothos requirement). It also
stores water and transfers 2.2 billion cubic meters of water for the South
Africanprovince of Gauteng. Gauteng is located in the centre of the country, and
constitutes the backbone of the South African economy. The European Investment
Bank claims that: Prior to the LHWP the chronic shortage of water was particularly
acute in the Gauteng area with its large industrial activity and its numerous
townships. 392 In 2007, the Gauteng province had a population of more than 10
million, and contributed close to 60 percent of the national GDP.393 Gauteng is one
of the very few metropolitan areas in the world not established along any natural
body of water. 394 South Africa required additional water resources, and the
interbasin water transfers were identified as the least cost solution leading to the
LHWP.

The apartheid regime and the government of Lesotho signed the LHWP Treaty
in October 1986. 395 The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority (LHDA) in
Lesotho and the Trans Caledon Tunnel Authority (TCTA) in South Africa
implemented the treaty in several phases. The Phase IA (Katse and the Muela

88
Dams) was completed in 1998, and the Phase IB (the Mohale Dam, the Mohale
Tunnel and the Matsoku Tunnel and Weir) in 2002/03. Other phases of the project
are planned, and are likely to start in the near future.396 The 1986 Treaty conferred
the responsibility of all water transfer components (notably for project costs) to South
Africa. Lesotho is responsible of the electricity component of Africas largest joint
water management scheme.397

Regional leadership and dominance

South African foreign policy during Mandelas tenure created diplomatic

embarrassment. South Africa wanted to reclaim its position as the leader in Southern
Africa. The prolonged disagreement between South Africa and Zimbabwe on the
SADC institutional arrangement showed that South Africa was taking seriously its
leadership position. The dispute was over the power and status of the Organ for
Politics, Defense and Security. Kagwanja states that Mandela was even prepared to
lead his countrys walkout from the SADC during the Blantyre summit in 1997.398
However, South Africa did not resign the SADC chairmanship. If South Africa had
decided to leave the SADC, this would have had serious implications for both the
SADC, and South Africa. South African absence from the regional body would have
implied SADCs failure, because other states would have followed the powerhouse
and created a competing structure. In the 2011-12 financial year, for example, the
South African contribution to the SADC's fiscus was estimated at US$ 6268
million.399

South Africa understood that economic dominance alone was not sufficient. It
needed political power to play a meaningful role in the region, and in Africa as a
whole. The African states harsh reaction to the Mandela administrations open
criticism of undemocratic governments in Africa, alluded to in the first paragraph,
shaped South African foreign policy in the latter years of the Mandela presidency.
Mandelas about-turn before the 1998 Mauritius summit, when he declared support
for the military intervention in the DRC, was an indication that South Africa realized
that its human rights based foreign policy (preventive diplomacy) was a failure. The
change in the South African foreign policy was probably an attempt to save his
country from isolation and to reclaim the regional leadership mantle lost (or about to
be lost) to the Zimbabwean President.400 Mugabe attempted to isolate South Africa

89
over its position in regards the DRC civil war, by labeling South Africa as a US
surrogate.401 The South African military intervention in Lesotho should be interpreted
in this context.

Citing The Star newspaper article, Makoa argues that South Africa was under
pressure from other SADC member states with close associations to Zimbabwe to
abandon its notion of preventive diplomacy and to adopt, instead, a robust African
policy. 402 As a result, it was no coincidence that Zimbabwe supported the
establishment of the Langa Commission, which preceded the military intervention in
Lesotho. Botswana was left with no option, but to follow the decision of the
competing powers. An estimated 200 Botswana Defense Force troops participated in
the South African intervention in Lesotho.403

It is generally accepted that the military intervention in Lesotho undermined

rather than promoted democracy and stability. Makoa criticizes the notion of linking
the spread of democracy to stability.404 The liberal ideology sees the two values to be
mutually dependent. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and
other western democracies utilized aid as a form of coercion and persuasion to
induce democratic transformation in Africa and other aid-dependent states by offering
or withholding financial assistance in order to encourage the desired political
change.405 For example, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
require of developing states seeking financial assistance and loans to demonstrate
their commitment to democracy and liberalization. Kagwanja points out that the
preventive diplomacy became inextricably linked to the ANCs post-apartheid neo-
liberal internationalism. The ANC in 1996 dumped its the socio-economic policy
framework, the Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP), for the market-
friendly framework of the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy.
In the first few years of the democratic dispensation, therefore, the ANCs strategy
was to stabilize the continent in order to improve Africas image to attract foreign
investment and to provide a new frontier for South Africas investment and trade.406
South Africa was interested in positioning itself as a destination of foreign investment
and a global trading power.

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 The South African foreign policy between 1994 and 1998 was not only
concerned with its power or leadership in the Southern African region, but also
stability and security were also important.407 When the country perceived its security
interests were threatened, and it took decisive action. Perhaps, South Africa did not
consult the SADC Summit and the OAU before intervening in the Lesotho domestic
conflict because it considered itself the ultimate authority as far as Lesotho was
concerned.408 At the time South Africa was openly critical of undemocratic states in
Africa. The South African unilateral action was necessary to protect its vital interests
in the kingdom, and also to portray itself as a custodian of democracy and stability in
the eyes of the democratic world.

In contrast, other notable and recent interventions by the South African

government in countries across the African continent, including Burundi and the
DRC, were peaceful and under the auspices of either the UN or the OAU. Maxi
Schoeman argued that the main interest of South Africa in these far-flung places is to
influence the foreign policies of these countries rather than to intervene militarily.409

THE ROLES OF SOUTH AFRICA AND THE SADC IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

AND PEACEMAKING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA DURING THE 1990s

It was disingenuous on the part of South Africa to claim that the military
intervention in Lesotho was in response to a request made to its rulers by Lesothos
Prime Minister. 410 On September 11, 1998, however, Lesothos Deputy Prime
Minister disapproved South African actions by declaring that: there was something
like a coup in the kingdom.411 The histories of both South Africa and the SADC, in
relation to conflict resolution and enforcement of stability in the region were
questionable or non-existent in the 1990s.

The destabilization policies of the minority white ruled South African state were
extensively covered in the previous chapter. As a result of its aggression, the
apartheid state was politically isolated. Leading up to and after 1994, South Africa did
not have a positive political capital balance on the African continent. Building up to
the military intervention in 1998, the South African record in conflict prevention and
peacemaking in Southern Africa did not exist. Withstanding the open criticism of

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authoritarian governments in Africa, South African foreign policy was not yet oriented
towards playing a role in conflict prevention and peacemaking in Southern Africa.
This does not imply that South Africa has ever participated in a SADC mandated
peace missions, because the SADC has never had a peace mission.

The name Operation Boelas given to the intervention in Lesotho was not in
line with international practice for naming operations of this nature. At the
international level, some of the UN peace missions were the United Nations
Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC), the United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti (MINUSTAH), the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK), and the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB). The European Union
created a peace mission to support the MONUC in 2007, and it was named the
European Union Force in the DRC (EUFOR RD Congo). The AU peacekeeping
operations in the Sudan and Somalia were the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and
the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).412

From its early days when it was created, the SADC was occupied with the
aggression of the apartheid state, and not peacekeeping missions. As a result, the
SADC in 1998 did not have tangible achievements to show in the areas of conflict
prevention and peacemaking. Laurie Nathan does not see the SADC as a body that
is capable of resolving violent conflicts in the region. Nathan recounts instances
where the SADC failed to execute its mandate, including the civil wars in Angola and
in the Congo, the failed secessionist bid in Namibia in 1998/1999, and the election
dispute in Malawi in 1999.413 The SADC remained silent in the case of extreme of
state repression and abrogation of the rule of law in Zimbabwe. The SADC was
accused of showing solidarity with Robert Mugabe, and also of disapproving of the
sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe by the United States and the EU.414 In April 2011,
the SADC lost its patience with Mugabe by criticizing him and his party for the
ongoing intimidation in Zimbabwe, and checked Mugabes drive for early elections by
demanding more reform.

The discussion above demonstrates that South Africa and the SADC shared
something in common, both lacked credentials as reputable role players in conflict
prevention and peacemaking in Southern Africa. The question is: Can members of
the international community with poor credentials violate sovereignty rights of other

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states, under the guise of saving democracy? The response to this question is not
simple. The South African Press Association argued that the biggest weakness of the
SADC regions leadership is that they talk democracy but use undemocratic means
to stay in power.415 The South African leadership should have been sensitive to the
horrors and brutal force of the SADF under the previous regime. The SADF was not
given enough time to show that it had changed from being an offensive, aggressive
and brutal force to an army that is capable of running successful peace keeping
missions. The South African army is involved in the United Nations and or African
Union peacekeeping missions in different parts of Africa.416 In the SADC setup the
concept of peace missions is still underdeveloped. South Africa currently participates
in peace missions under the banner of the AU and the United Nations, rather than
the SADC.

THE POST 1998 SOUTH AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICY

In 1999, Thabo Mbeki succeeded Nelson Mandela as the president of South

Africa. The Mbeki era introduced drastic changes to the countrys foreign policy,
especially its African policy. Mbeki abandoned the unilateralism of the past, and
embraced a new multilateral strategy guided by his precept of African
Renaissance.417 In addition to advancing the course of democracy and human rights
and pursuing sustainable development and the alleviation of poverty, South Africa
considered the promotion of peace and security as its highest African policy goal.
South Africa also saw the building of a strong institutional framework to achieve
these goals. The institutions identified were the AU, the SADC, and the NEPAD as
Africas socio-economic development program.

The new multilateral strategy received a boost when on July 9, 2002 South
Africa hosted the summit in Durban that transformed the OAU into the African Union.
Kagwanja refers to the AU as a new pan-African institution. 418 South Africa
became as the first chair of the AU. Mbeki was the leading figure in the formulation of
the new strategy direction for the African continent. The preamble of the AU
Constitutive Act of July 2000 states that member states are conscious of the fact
that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-
economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security

93
and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and
integration agenda.419 Article 3(a) to (h) and Article 4(d) of the Act spelled out the
need for a common defense and security policy on the continent, through the
establishment of a Common Defense Policy for the African Continent (CADSP). As a
first step, the peace and security architecture for Africa was created, and aligned to
the UNs infrastructure of global peace.

The AU created the Peace and Security Council in 2004 to promote peace,
security and stability and advancing democratic practices and human rights in Africa,
see Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Structure and Elements of the Peace and Security Council of the African
Union

Source: Golaszinski U (2004). Africas Evolving Security Architecture, Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-

Stiftung, pp. 4. Available from http://mocambique.fes-
international.de/downloads/Africa%20Security%20Architecture.pdf (Accessed on July 19,
2011)

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 The South African political capital was enhanced even further when its foreign
minister, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, was elected as its first chairperson. South Africa
was also chosen to host the secretariats of the NEPAD, the APRM, as well the
African Parliament. At this point, Mbeki was credited with crafting a far more holistic
and systematic African policy, which promoted bilateral and multilateral co-
operation.420 It looked like the post-apartheid state was now developing a better
understanding of the problems and sensibilities of the continent. Moreover, South
Africa showed that it had learnt from its early mistakes, by embracing multilateralism.
Mbekis multilateral strategy sought to reverse the ineffectiveness of the countrys
foreign policy during the Mandela era. Some of the notable achievements for the
Mbeki administration included the transformation of the OAU into the AU, and
forming a powerful partnership with Nigeria. The Zimbabwe posed a problem for
Mbekis foreign policy.421 South Africa also played a pivotal role in supporting AU
initiatives in the DRC, Burundi, the Sudan, and the Ivory Coast. Roger Southall
concludes that South Africa displayed its commitment to peace in Africa when it
moved to secure the arrest of mercenaries headed for Equatorial Guinea to topple
President Obiang Mbassongo in March 2004. 422 Finally, South Africa at least
appeared to be heading towards the right direction, as far as Africa was concerned.

The South African contribution to peacekeeping missions

South Africa learnt a valuable lesson from its contested military intervention in
Lesotho. Since 2000, post-apartheid South Africa has played an active role in
peacekeeping missions in the continent, either as part of the AU or the UN. The
country has deployed its troops and military observers in many places, namely the
DRC, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Comoros, Sudan and Central African
Republic as well as in Nepal.423 The expertise and experience of the South African
army in peacekeeping missions would prove very critical in the effectiveness of the
SADC Brigade.

The dominant and central role that South Africa plays in the SADC region on
security and related matters cannot be ignored. The government moved quickly to
improve relations with its neighboring states. It also engages other states with greater
caution, especially after the 1998 military intervention in Lesotho. It is undeniable that
the countrys hegemonic status derived from its economic weight and power will

95
always drive any strategic peace and security moves in the region. South Africa
accounts for more than 80 percent of the GDP of the SADC. This economic strength
permits it to participate in peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in the region and in
the continent. Adebajo applauds South African new peacemaking and peacekeeping
role by stating that: In a short decade and a half, the country has gone from being
the most destabilizing force in Africa to being its most active peacemaker.424 South
African political and economic stability are vital for successful peacemaking and
peacekeeping missions in the sub-region and in Africa as a whole.

The main point of concern, however, is that the institutions responsible for
Africas security architecture are weak, and lack financial and logistical means. They
depend on foreign funds to carry out AU missions in the troubled spots across the
continent. For example, the AUs peacekeeping mission in Darfur between 2003 and
2007 was financed, almost entirely, from donated funds.425 This over reliance on
external donors makes the AUs peace and security missions inviable and
unsustainable in the long run. However, this situation is unlikely to improve soon as
many of the African states remain fragmented and politically weak.

The positive developments in the area of peace and security in Africa result
from the South African participation in the United Nations Security Council. Nigeria
and Gabon are also non-permanent members of the UNSC.426 In the past the UNSC
has done little or nothing to increase the capacity of African regional organizations as
well as to collaborate effectively with them.

The South African foreign policy was heavily tested with the Libyan crisis in
2011. It was hoped that the increased South African role in world affairs and in the
UNSC would build a strong case for the credible involvement of the UNSC in Africa.
The African representatives in the UNSC (South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon) worked
to undermine the AU and its institutions by supporting the UN Resolution 1973 on
Libya. South Africa, Nigeria and Gabon were surprisingly part of the 10 of 15
members voted in favor of the resolution against the Libyan government.427 Brazil,
China, Germany, India and Russia, abstained from authorizing the use of force
against Libya. Immediately after the NATO countries started their own operation,
South Africa called for a ceasefire to allow dialogue between Muammar al-Gaddafi,
and the Libyan opposition.428 From that point, South Africa and the AU have tried in

96
vein to find a solution, and to stop the bombardment of Libya. In the China summit in
April 2011, South Africa collaborated with the leaders of the BRICS ((Brazil, Russia,
India, China and South Africa) declaration that: We share the principle that the use
of force should be avoided.429

The South African reactionary policy has been widely criticized in Africa, and
within South Africa itself. The efforts to salvage some pride have come too late for
the South Africa to gain a permanent seat in the UNSC. Michael Bokor reflects that
South Africa should have taken its history before it voted in favor of the use of force
against Libya. Bokor states that: It is a paradox for South Africa to back the military
action now going on against Libya because that country's own deplorable history in
terms of human rights and governance doesn't warrant its support for the Coalition's
actions.430 The events unfolding in Libya certainly prove that the issue of political
stability in Africa has a long way to go. External influence by the worlds powerful
states in African issues undermines the development of a viable continental security
and peacekeeping infrastructure.

CONCLUSION

The South African military intervention in Lesotho in 1998 failed the smell tests.
South Africa did not consult the SADC, the OAU, and the UNSC before it sent troops
into Lesotho. The SADC and the OAU did not have the mechanisms for authorizing
military interventions. In the 1990s, local hegemonic states invaded other countries,
partly due to the existing reluctance by the international community to send troops to
African conflict areas. The intervention in 1998 made important revelations. Lesotho
proved again that it had no control over its territory, and that South Africa regarded
the kingdom as an enclave. Lesothos sovereignty was completely eroded. At the
same time, it is difficult to condone the intervention. South African political dominance
in the region was enhanced. South Africa was interested in protecting its strategic
interests in Lesotho, rather than promoting democracy and stability.

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 Chapter 4

CASE ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

This chapter offers an analysis of additional cases of interventions to

strengthen the thesis of this study. The cases complement the findings presented in
Chapter 3 on the 1998 South African invasion of Lesotho. The interventions
represent two different but also highly related periods in the international system, the
pre-1990 (Cold War) and the post-1990 periods. The analysis will assist in the
presentation of the research findings of this study.

THE PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF INTERVENTION CASES

Five cases of interventions are discussed. They are the NATO military
intervention in Libya (2011); the two Iraqi wars: The US invasion of Iraq (1991 and
2003); the United States intervention in Panama (1989); and the International Court
of Justice (ICJ) and international humanitarian law. This is the case concerning the
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua addressed inNicaragua v.
United States of America (1986). The last case is the Belgian intervention in the
Congo (1960).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military intervention in Libya,

2011

Late 2010 and the beginning of 2011 marked the start of wide-scale riots in the
North African region, which saw the collapse of governments in Tunisia and Egypt. A
number of factors have been attributed to these unprecedented political
demonstrations. Inflation, unemployment, poverty and the need for economic and
political reforms stood out as primary concerns for the protestors. The long-time
rulers in Tunisias Ben Ali (1987 - 2011) and Egypts Hosni Mubarak (1981 - 2011)
were forced to step down in January and February 2011, respectively. Egypt and
Tunisia experienced unexpected political changes, and this encouraged the citizens
of neighboring states to also call for democratic rights and freedom. After the
unprecedented changes in Egypt and Tunisia, political riots and violence spread to

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other parts of the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA). In addition to Egypt
and Tunisia, demonstrations occurred in countries such as Algeria, Bahrain, Libya,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen.

Of particular interest were the political demonstrations in the Libyan Arab

Jamahiriya, or simply Libya. Libyans demanded political reforms including the
stepping down of the countrys long-term leader, Muammar al Gaddafi (1969 to
present). In 1969, Gaddafi successfully led a revolt against the Libyan monarchy in
the name of nationalism, self-determination, and popular sovereignty. 431 The
demonstrators or opposition groups, as they are generally called, revolted against
the Gaddafi rule, and demanded that the 40 year-old authoritarian political system
should end. However, the arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel on February 15
sparked riots in the city of Benghazi. According to Nicole Koenig, the [sic: Gaddafi]
regime responded with massive repression and violence against civilians.432 This led
to a violent armed conflict between the Gaddafi government and the opposition
groups, later referred to as the rebels. The Libyan governments use of force
against opposition forces caught the worlds attention in February and early March of
2011.

On February 22, the Arab League was the first to take strong action against
Libya. It suspended Libyan delegates from participating in its meetings. This was
followed by a UN Security Council statement, which called for an end to the use of
force against protesters, and reminded the Libyan government it must meet its
responsibility to protect its population.433 In spite of this statement the Libyan conflict
continued to escalate. The EU, Switzerland, and the UNSC, for example, stated that
they were going to take drastic measures against the Gaddafi regime.434 The EU first
suspended negotiations on the Framework Agreement on bi-lateral relations with
Libya. Switzerland decided to freeze Gaddafis assets held in that country. As
tensions increased, more actions against the state of Libya were expected. On
February 26, the UNSC passed the resolution 1970 that affirmed the sanctions
against Libya, and these included an arms embargo, a travel ban, and an asset
freeze on Gaddafis family, and other regime leaders.435 Two days later, the EU
formally adopted similar sanctions against Libya.436

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 At this point the major states had not yet decided on their involvement in the
Libyan crisis. As a dominant figure in the current global political system, the United
States declared that Gaddafi had lost the legitimacy to rule and must leave
now.437 However, the strongest possible reaction did not come from the United
States, but rather from France. The French actions in the Libyan conflict are
important because they became a major determinant in the events in that country.
On March 5, the French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe suggested that France was
seeking a UN Security Council resolution to impose a no-fly zone.438 Bolstered by
the UN Resolution 1970, the opposition forces created the Transitional National
Council (TNC) in Benghazi, on March 5, and announced that the TNC was the sole
representative of Libya. 439 A major diplomatic triumph for the Libyan opposition
followed five days later, when France became the first country in the world to
recognize Libyas rebel leadership. It also pledged to exchange ambassadors with
the newly established TNC. According to the former Libyan ambassador and rebel
leader Ali al Issawi, France recognizes the National Council as the legitimate
representative of the Libyan people.440 By the end of September 2011, a number of
states including Australia, Britain, Ethiopia, Italy, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Nigeria,
Spain, and the United Arab Emirates had also recognized the TNC.441

France, supported by Britain and Lebanon, introduced a draft UN Security

Council resolution that would grant authority to states to enforce a no-fly zone over
Libya, and use all necessary measures, including military force, to protect civilians
and grant access for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.442 On March 17, ten
UNSC members adopted resolution 1973 to authorize member states, acting
nationally or through regional organizations or arrangements, to take all necessary
measures to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country443 Ten of the 15
members voted in favor of the resolution, including the African and the Middle
Eastern UNSC members. Brazil, China, Germany, India and, the Russia did not vote.

On March 19 a coalition of states led by France, the United Kingdom and the
United States began to launch air strikes against pro-Gaddafi forces.444 At the end of
March, NATO announced that it had assumed full command of all air operations in
Libya. The military intervention in Libya has caused many casualties, and has
displaced thousands of people. The International Organization for Migration (IOM)
reported that the Libyan conflict has produced a refugee and humanitarian crisis.445

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By August 9, a total of 654,267 migrants had crossed Libyan borders to Tunisia,
Egypt, Niger, Chad, as well as to Italy.

The two wars: The US invasions of Iraq in 1991 and 2003

The Persian Gulf War (August 2, 1990 - February 28, 1991)

The United States led a coalition of more than 30 states in the Persian Gulf War
that lasted from August 2, 1990 to February 28, 1991. The war was a response on
Iraqs attack on the State of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Approximately 150,000 Iraqi
troops easily defeated the inexperienced Kuwaiti forces, and within a few hours Iraq
had assumed control of the entire country. The Iraqi invasion received condemnation
from all over the world, especially from the UNSC and the Arab League. The UNSC
adopted Resolution 660 on August 2, 1990 to demand the withdrawal of Iraqi
troops.446 The Arab League also called for the Iraqi withdrawal, but did not favor any
form of intervention by outside states. However, the Arab states were split into two
camps, one small group supporting Iraq (Jordan, the Palestine Liberation
Organization (PLO), Sudan, and Yemen), and the majority was on the side of
Kuwait. 447 On August 6, 1990, the UNSC passed Resolution 661 imposing an
economic embargo on Iraq that prohibited nearly all trade with Iraq.448

The Iraqi government argued that the UN applied double standards, as it had
not forced Israel to leave Arab territories it occupied during and after the 1967 Six-
Day War. Moreover, Iraq added that it could withdraw from Kuwait if Israel also
withdrew from the Occupied Territories. The Iraqi arguments managed to convince a
few Arab states, with the exception of Morocco and Syria. However, many countries
chose to support the US hardline, which favored the use of force against the Iraqis.
On November 29, 1990, the UNSC adopted Resolution 678 permitting all member
states to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990)
and all subsequent relevant Resolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the area.449 The military assault on the state of Iraq did not begin until
January 17, 1991. Iraq retaliated by launching missiles against the coalition troops in
Saudi Arabia, and against Israel. On February 28, the coalition finally overcame Iraqi
resistance, and recaptured the State of Kuwait. Since, the goals of the war had been
attained, the coalition forces declared a cease-fire.

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 More than 700,000 troops went to the Middle East to fight Iraq. Josef Joffe
claims that the United States contributed approximately 600,000 troops. 450 The
remainder of the troops came from other coalition members. The coalition included
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. Other countries
that supported the US in the war included Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the
former Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, and South Korea. The coalition used air
bases in Turkey. Japan and Germany only contributed financial resources totaling
US $10 billion and US $6.6 billion respectively.451 The total cost of the war is not
known, but the Iraqi state was destroyed and millions lost their lives. It is, however,
not surprising that almost 20 years later the global economy went into a serious
meltdown, which now threatens to destroy lives of many people across the world.

As a strict condition for the ceasefire and for the eventual lifting of sanctions
against that country, the UN Security Council issued Resolutions 686, 687, and 688
between March 2 and April 5, 1991. Resolution 686 compelled Iraq, among other
things, to release prisoners held in detention, to return Kuwaiti property seized in the
war, and to accept liability under international law for damages from its illegal
invasion of Kuwait.452 Resolution 687 accused Iraq of possessing chemical and
biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and
components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;
and established the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to verify the
elimination of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programs and mandated that
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) verify elimination of Iraq's nuclear
weapons program.453 John Baylis, James Wirtz, Eliot Cohen and Colin Gray claim
that before the war Iraq possessed very active weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
programs, building a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons, and attempting to
construct nuclear warheads.454 Lastly, Resolution 688 condemned the repression of
Iraqi civilian population, the consequences of which threaten international peace and
security. 455 Of these three Resolutions, Resolution 687 of April 3 of 1991 is
important as it formed the base for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.

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 The 1991 war in Iraq demonstrated that multilateralism is possible in the
international system. All countries involved in the war respected the UNSC authority,
in so far as it was still compatible with the aspirations of the United States. Even long
after the Gulf War had ended, the international community worked with the US in
imposing economic sanctions on Iraq and developing, through the United Nations,
an inspections program to discover, dismantle, and destroy Iraqs remaining long-
range missiles and WMD.456 The US and the UK, and for a time joined by France,
conducted air raids in December 1998 to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and
southern Iraq.457 The UNSC criticized the actions of the three states, and France was
forced to withdraw from the military operation due to an alleged lack of humanitarian
character.458

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003

The French withdrawal from Iraq after the 1998 bombings led to the
disintegration of the coalition. Tensions over the policy towards Iraq soon appeared.
Nonetheless, there were still agreements on issues such as sanctions and
inspections, but tensions would arise in the UNSC.459 France argued that eight
years of sanctions and occasional military actions, while failing to change or oust
Saddam Hussein, have inflicted great suffering on the Iraqi people. 460 France
wanted to change the approach as far as the UNSC position towards Iraq was
concerned. The United States remained steadfast and insisted on the
implementations of the UNSC resolutions. The US wanted Hussein to cooperate with
the UNSC. As a compromise, sanctions against Iraq had been partially removed;
and restrictions on Iraqi oil exports were eased.461 Under the framework of Food for
Oil program, for example, Iraq was allowed to sell oil on the world market in
exchange for food, medicine, and other humanitarian needs for ordinary Iraqi citizens
without allowing Iraq to boost its military capabilities.462 The US and Britain were not
convinced and were in favor of the use of force against Iraq.

After more than a decade of US pressure on Iraq to disclose or destroy the

WMDs, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks meant an even more direct pressure
from the George W. Bush Administration. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1368
condemning the horrifying terrorist attacks, which it called a threat to international
peace and security.463 The UNSC continued and stated that those responsible for

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aiding, supporting or harboring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these
acts will be held accountable. 464 This statement was a clear indication that the
United States was going to do all it could to retaliate. Saddam Hussein had been on
the radar of the US since the Gulf War. The Bush Administration showed a strong
desire to overthrow the Saddam regime.465 Although there were many reasons cited
for this, the US put it on this record that it suspected Iraq of WMD programs, and of
having ties to international terrorist groups. Baylis, Wirtz and Gray state that Iraq, at
the time, had close connections to international terrorist organizations, but the clues
as to whether Baghdad had any meaningful ties to Al Qaeda remained unproven.
Despite the weak links, Iraq fell into the wider context of the US-led global war on
terror. The US war on terror had already started with the destruction of the Taliban
government in Afghanistan that began on October 7, 2001.466

The terror attacks changed the US foreign policy to become trigger-happy

against all those it viewed as enemies. President George W. Bush declared a
national emergency on September 18, 2001.467 On the same day, he signed into law
a joint resolution of Congress that authorized the United States to use:

all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future
acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or
468
persons.

President Bush was even more determined on declaring a war against Iraq.
Bush collectively defined all the group countries and organizations that were
identified as enemies as an axis of evil.469 Iran, Iraq, and North Korea formed the
first three axis. On May 6, 2002, the United States added Cuba, Libya and Syria to
the list. 470 Wojciech Lewandowski noted that: After the success of the military
operation in Afghanistan, the American administration started to see the removal of
Saddam Hussein as the prerequisite for US security.471 On September 12, 2002,
President Bush approached the United Nations to demand fulfillment of the UN
Security Council resolutions. In September 2002, Bush presented a speech at the
UN General Assembly, where he mentioned six areas where the Iraqi government
had violated UN resolutions, or had become a threat to international peace and
security. 472 These areas included development of WMD, repression of the Iraqi
people, support of international terrorism, refusal to account for Gulf War prisoners,
refusal to return stolen property, and efforts to circumvent economic sanctions. Philip
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Gordon suggests that, perhaps by going to the UN, President Bush implicitly
recognized the importance the United States attaches to winning allied support.473
President Bush also mentioned that:

My nation will work with the U.N. Security Council to meet our common challenge. If Iraqs
regime defies us again, the world must move deliberately, decisively to hold Iraq to account. We
will work with the U.N. Security Council for the necessary resolutions. ...The Security Council
resolutions will be enforced the just demands of peace and security will be met or action
474
will be unavoidable.

However, other assessments of the Iraqi threat to international security were

different. 475 This meant that Britain and the US were unlikely to obtain UNSC
authority to use force on Iraq. Many nations supported Hans Blix, the UN chief WMD
inspector, that there were no WMD in Iraq, and hence no need for a military invasion.
The other P5 members and European nations distanced themselves from the US.
Three veto-holding members of the UNSC (China, France, and Russia) wanted to
avert an invasion of Iraq. Germany, Turkey and some other European countries, with
the exception of the UK, Poland, Italy and Spain, opposed the United States. The US
assertions were questioned because they could not provide sufficient evidence of the
development of WMD in Iraq. Questions were also raised as towhether the use of
force was the only solution.Many states still supported further inspections in Iraq, and
discussions at the UNSC. On November 8, 2002, the UNSC passed yet another
resolution (Resolution 1441) giving Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its
disarmament obligations that had been set out in several previous resolutions.476
These included resolutions 660, 661, 678, 686, 687, 688, 707, 715, 986, and 1284.

China, Russia and France stated they understood Resolution 1441 authorized
no automatic use of force.477 Paragraph 13 of the resolution stated that Iraq would
face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its
478
obligations. As such, the resolution did not specify what those serious
consequences would be, and did not confer any rights of unilateral enforcement by
the US, and the UK. However, British and the US diplomats spent considerable
efforts to get the Council to adopt a so-called second resolution that would
determine that Iraq had failed to comply with Council resolution 1441
(2002).479 These attempts in the end failed dismally. The UNSC did not issue an
authority for the invasion of Iraq.

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 Britain and the US decided to invade Iraq on March 19, 2003, this was in spite
of the fact that they had not received UNSC authority. In its March 20 letter to the
Security Council, the US argued that the coalition's actions against Iraq in 2003 were
necessary steps to defend the United States and the international community from
the threat posed by Iraq and to restore international peace and security in the
area.480 The letter proceeded to state that the actions being taken are authorized
under existing Council resolutions, including its resolutions 678 (1990) and 687
(1991).481 States such as Australia, Italy, Poland, and Spain supported the British
US invasion of Iraq.

The United States intervention in Panama, 1989

Up until the early 20th century, Panama was a Colombian territory. The French
began the construction of the canal in 1884, but financial problems forced the French
to abandon the project in 1889. It is at this point that the United States became the
dominant player in the Panamanian politics. Theodore Roosevelt demanded that
Colombia should turn over the Panama Isthmus region to a US consortium, but
Colombia rejected the US proposal.482 The US then assisted rebels in the Isthmus
region to secede from Colombia, and to form a new state of Panama in 1903. After
independence, the US committed to continue the construction of the Panama Canal,
which would form a commercial artery uniting the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans. The construction of the canal ended in 1914. The Panama Canals
operation and defense immediately became an integral part of Americas strategic
interests in the hemisphere.483

The US installed a puppet government at independence in 1903. The first Canal

Treaty, or the HayBunauVarilla Treaty, was signed between the US and, most
interestingly, the French. No Panamanian was involved in the treaty. Nonetheless,
the treaty established an American zone on both sides of the future waterway,
legalized US military intervention, and gave Washington virtual control over this
newly formed independent nation.484 John Perkins argues that Panama was forced
to break away from Colombia in order to serve the United States. Latin America is a
backyard of the United States.485 As such the US, whether directly or indirectly,
strategically influenced the political outcomes in many Latin American states,
including Panama.

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 According to Noam Chomsky, Panama was traditionally controlled by its tiny
European elite, less than 10 percent of the population.486 This oligarchy of wealthy
families had strong connections with the United States. The US strategy for Latin
America was to act as a barrier to socialist revolutions and targeted populist and
487
nationalist governments that were aided by the communists. The US
interventionism ensured that democratically elected leaders and governments were
either destabilized or overthrown. For, example, the US successfully overthrew
legitimate governments in countries such as Guatemala (1954), Dominican Republic
(1965), and Grenada (1983). The US interests dictated the contemporary history of
Panama, and the rest of Latin America.

Although Panama is a sovereign state, it did not own the Panama Canal Zone,
which was US property throughout the 20th century. The large American presence in
the Canal Zone, including the US troops and thousands of American citizens living
there exempted from Panamanian jurisdiction, aggravated nationalist sentiments
and fueled resentment.488 Panamanians argued for more rights and control over the
canal. In 1968, Omar Efran Torrijos Herrera (1968 1981) and the military finally
seized power from President Arnulfo Arias (1940 1968).489 Lawrence Yates argues
that Torrijos rise to power ended the white, urban-based oligarchys near monopoly
of political power.490 Torrijos continued with the rhetoric and strongly argued that
Panama had its own rights.491 These rights were the sovereignty of its people, its
lands, and a waterway that bisected it. Torrijos also rejected the presence of the US
armed forces, especially the School of the Americas and the US Southern
Commands tropical warfare training center, both situated in the Canal Zone.

As part of the plan of retuning the ownership of the canal back to Panama,
Torrijos negotiated two treaties over the Panama Canal that were signed on
September 7, 1977. Yates opines that these treaties would restructure US -
Panamanian relations.492 The first treaty committed to an end to U.S. control of the
canal beginning in 2000, and both Panama and the US were to be jointly responsible
for the operation and defense of the canal. The second treaty gave the US
permanent authority to defend the canal if it were placed under threat as a neutral
water passage.493 The treaties did not enjoy the support of many in Washington.
Torrijos political leanings towards the left also angered Washington. After signing the
treaties, for example, Torrijos supported the Marxist-Leninist guerrilla movement, the

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Sandanistas, in Nicaragua. 494 Torrijos died in a plane crash in 1981. Colonels
Florencio Flores Aguilar and Rubn Daro Paredes ruled Panama between 1981 and
1983.

General Manuel Antonio Noriega ruled as the de facto leader of Panama from
1983 until 1989. Chomsky describes General Noriega as a criminal who had been a
cohort of Torrijos and US intelligence.495 In brief, Noriega worked with the US secret
agencies and organizations, including the U.S. military command in Panama, before
and after he became the leader of Panama. Yates claims that he had been recruited
by U.S. military intelligence as early as 1952.496 The relationship between the US and
Noriega was based on convenience and the fact that he was an informer on Latin
American insurgencies, and on Cuban activities in the region. However, the
relationship between Noriega and the US was complex. Unlike his predecessor,
Trojillo, Noriega provided assistance to the American government in its campaign
against the Sandinistas. The US was aware of Noriegas drug trafficking activities as
early as1972. 497 Since Noriega served the US interests, Washington deliberately
overlooked this fact.

In 1987, Noriega announced that he would remain the military forces

commander for another five years, and this angered one of the high-ranking colonels,
Colonel Roberto Daz Herrera. In retaliation, Daz Herrera first confirmed Noriegas
underground links, and also accused Noriega of fraud, and corruption, as well as of
committing murders of high profile politicians including the former president
498
Torrijos. Noriegas firing of Daz Herrera and Daz Herreras subsequent
allegations precipitated the political crisis in Panama. For the first time, mass
demonstrations occurred as a serious challenge to Noriegas position of power. A
series of events occurred in Panama including attacks on the US Embassy that drew
Washingtons attention.

The United States decided to invade Panama on December 20, 1989.499 The
US Ambassador to the UN, Thomas Pickering, justified the military action because of
the need to defend Americans in Panama and the integrity of the Panama Canal
treaties. Pickering also remarked that the long-simmering outrage of the American
people and many in this hemisphere who are sick of stolen elections.500 However,
there were more political reasons that were cited for the invasion. These included the

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improved relations between Noriega and Cubas Fidel Castro; and a federal grand
jury in the United States in February 1988 that had indicted Noriega for drug
trafficking.

The United States justified its actions by stating that they were in conformity
with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, article 21 of the OAS Charter,
and the provisions of the Panama Canal Treaties.501 The article on the use of force
was inappropriately interpreted. Many countries criticized the proportionality of the
United States response to General Noriegas armed actions.Algeria, Colombia,
Ethiopia, Malaysia, Nepal, Senegal, and Yugoslavia sponsored a draft UNSC
resolution on the US invasion of Panama.502 France, United Kingdom, and the United
States vetoed this resolution.503 In the end, the US succeeded in installing a puppet
government that was going to look after its Panama Canal interests.

The Belgian intervention in the Congo, 1960

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (French: Rpublique dmocratique du

Congo), previously known as Zaire, is a state located in Central Africa that became
independent from Belgium on June 30, 1960. 504 Patrice Lumumba became the
countrys first prime minister, and Joseph Kasavubu held the honorary position of
president. In normal text, the Democratic Republic of Congo is often referred to as
DRC, RDC or Congo-Kinshasa, after its capital Kinshasa. Congo came under
the control of Belgium in the late nineteenth century.505 Angela McIntyre claims that
records illustrate the Belgian King Leopolds involvement in the Congo entailed the
ruthlessly exploitative slave, ivory and rubber trades.506 Approximately 60 percent of
the population perished during the height of the plunder, not only from severe
working conditions, but also from displacement, disease and starvation.507 It was not
until independence that hope was raised that peace and stability would be achieved.
However, foreign interference in Congolese internal affairs would create political and
economic instability for many years to come. The Belgian intervention in 1960 marks
the first instance that a foreign power interfered in the affairs of the Congo.

Summarizing the DRCs post-colonial political history, the British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC) maintains that: The history of DR Congo has been one of civil
war and corruption. After independence in 1960, the country immediately faced an

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army mutiny and an attempt at secession by its mineral-rich province of Katanga.508
Ludo De Witte writes that:

Foreign intervention [sic: in Congo] began shortly after the Belgian colony gained its
independence on June 4, 1960; first Belgian soldiers landed in the Congo, then the Blue Berets,
Brussels, and the other Western powers, operating under cover of the United Nations, were
determined to overthrow Lumumbas nationalist government and install a neo-colonial regime,
thereby putting the country at the mercy of the trusts and holding companies which had controlled
509
it for decades.

After independence, Belgium still wanted to control Lumumbas government

through the Congolese armys Belgian officer corps. 510 The Belgian officer corps
worked against the newly independent state, and subjugated the Congolese people.
The conservative and racist white Belgian officers occupied the high ranks in the
army, to the dissatisfaction of African officers. The white officers did not hide the fact
that the army would never fall into African hands. As a result, the Congolese soldiers
rebelled not against the state, but it was a revolt the Belgian officer class, a revolt
with social demands.511 As expected, the government took the side of the revolting
soldiers, and soon appointed black officers to occupy high ranks in the army. The late
Zairean dictator Joseph Mobutu became colonel and chief-of-staff.

The deposed Belgian officers regrouped in the southeastern province of

Katanga, and rejected the new reforms. The Katanga premier Mose Kapenda
Tshombe supported the white soldiers. De Witte stated that rumors of the rape of
European women by a small group of soldiers caused a mass exodus to Belgium on
July 8. 512 Following the European exodus, Belgium decided to intervene in the
Congo.513 This intervention occurred in the town of Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi),
also the capital of Katanga, when black officers rebelled against the white soldiers.
On July 10, four planes of the Belgian battalions left their bases at Kitona and
Kamina, and took control of a number of Congolese towns without the consent of the
Congolese government. Additional troops were flown in from Belgium. Tshombe, still
under the protection of the Belgians, made matters more complicated for the
government as he declared the mineral-rich Katanga to be independent.

Belgiums intervention shocked both President Kasavubu and Prime Minister

Lumumba. They approached the UN to help with military assistance to fight Belgium
since they saw Belgiums actions as an act of aggression against the Congo.
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld (1953 1961) called an urgent meeting of the

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Security Council to discuss the crisis in the Congo. The UNSC condemned the
Belgian intervention, and passed Resolution 143 of July 14, 1960. Paragraph 1 of the
resolution called for the Government of Belgium to withdraw its troops from the
territory of the Republic of the Congo.514 The UNSC also authorized the deployment
of a peacekeeping force, the United Nations Mission in the Congo (ONUC). Thirty
states sent troops to participate in the Congolese peacekeeping mission. By July
1961, there were more than 19,000 soldiers and some 2,000 civilian experts and
technicians.

Although Belgian troops agreed to adhere to the provisions of the resolution,

they refused to withdraw from Katanga. This prompted the UNSC to issue Resolution
146 on August 9, 1960. This resolution not only restated the previous resolution, but
also ordered the withdrawal of Belgian troops from Katanga. It also authorized the
deployment of the UN forces in the province.515 The resolutions did not achieve what
was intended. Instead, the Belgians encouraged the diamond-rich province of South
Kasai to also declare independence on August 9.516 The role of the UN served to
strengthen the Belgian position, and to weaken the national government by co-
operating with Katanga. Lumumba realized the impartiality of the UN (and the United
States). He then requested and received military assistance from the Soviet Union to
suppress the rebellions in Katanga and South Kasai. Prime Minister Lumumba was
abducted and killed in 1961.

When the Congo achieved its political freedom from Belgium, it was ill prepared
to govern itself. The interference by foreign forces did not help the situation. The BBC
reasons that the past Belgian colonial policy only focused on the economic
exploitation of its vast African territory, with less interest in building institutions for
good governance.517 In many occasions, the illegal business of stealing the countrys
wealth is often concealed. Belgium did not obtain the UNSC authority before its entry
to the Congo, and was motivated by its strategic interests in Congo.

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 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and international humanitarian law -
The Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua: Nicaragua v. United States of America (1986 I.C.J. 14)

The examples of military interventions discussed above have in common that

the UNSC was drawn in to either settle the dispute or to authorize the use of force.
The cases relied on the provisions of the UN Charter to establish their legality.
Nonetheless, the UN Charter is not the only mechanism that states use to challenge
the contraventions of their sovereignty. Weiss and Hubert state: International
criminal prosecution was another type of intervention that, for the first time since the
immediate aftermath of the Second World War, was employed to bring to justice
those who had committed crimes against humanity. 518 Although there are many
sources of international humanitarian/ criminal law, this study limits the discussion on
the International Court Of Justice (ICJ) and International Criminal Court (ICC).

The ICC is a permanent court to try individuals who commit the world's most
serious crimes: genocide (the extermination of a group of people based on race,
class, or creed), war crimes (violations of the Geneva Conventions), and crimes
against humanity (systematic abuses based on political, social, or cultural
differences).519 The International Court of Justice is the principal judicial organ of
public international law, and contributes to the understanding of the fundamental
values of the international community expressed in international humanitarian law.520
Thus, international case law is very important in determining the legal framework of
humanitarian law. The ICJ has no jurisdiction to try individuals accused of war
crimes or crimes against humanity.521 Vincent Chetail states there are two important
cases that were brought to the ICJ. They are the June 27, 1986 judgment concerning
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, and the Advisory
Opinion of July 8, 1996 regarding the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons. 522 This study examines only the judgment concerning Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (1986 I.C.J. 14).

The politics of Nicaragua in the mid-1970s dominated the international legal

discourse. Unlike the other cases discussed above, the United States did not send
the military but supported military and paramilitary activities of the National Guard,
and later the contra counter-insurgency (or the Contras).523 For many years, the
US supported the government of Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua,

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against the left wing, broad-based and democratically inspired Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN or the Sandinistas). The relations between the Somoza
regime and the US declined. The US publicly objected to the dictatorship. Chomsky
remarks that the US began to withdraw its support by terminating military assistance
to Somoza, and pressured other states such as Israel and Guatemala to stop
supplying armaments to the Nicaraguan dictatorship.524

The US pressed further by initiating a resolution in the Organization of American

States on June 23, 1979. This resolution the OAS called for the immediate and
definite replacement of the Somocista [sic: Somoza] regime.525 It also dictated that
there was a need for the installation of democratic government, free elections, and
human rights guarantees. With the resolution, the US hoped to install a friendly
regime that would be under its control. However, the Sandinistas decided to break
away from the control of the US, and aligned itself with Cuba and the Soviet Union.
This angered the US to the point that it decided to support the Contras against the
Sandinista-led government throughout the 1980s. The US was assisted by the
Argentinean military in helping the Contras to wage a war against the FSLN.526 The
US Argentina governments were responsible for state terror tactics (Operation
Charly) against Marxists throughout Central America.

In the 1980s, the US used a three-fold attack on the state of Nicaragua.527 It

coerced the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to terminate all
projects and assistance. The US launched the contra war along with an illegal
economic war to stop the FSLN-government, and thus ended any hope of economic
development and social reform. The poor country was compelled to use its limited
resources to reconstructing the ruins that were created by the US-backed military
and paramilitary groups. The US also backed the contras in the 1990 elections, and
the Sandinistas lost the elections to Violetta Barios de Chamorro.528

On April 9, 1984, the Ambassador of the Republic of Nicaragua to the

Netherlands filed in the Registry of the International Court of Justice an application
instituting proceedings against the United States with regards to a dispute
concerning responsibility for military and paramilitary activities in and against
Nicaragua.529 It also sued the United States for the mining of Nicaraguan harbors.
Just two days before the case was filed, the Human Rights Watch claims that the

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United States announced its refusal to accept Court jurisdiction for disputes
involving Central America; in 1985, the United States announced that it was ending
its policy of automatic compliance with Court decisions.530

The Nicaraguan legal suit resulted in an ICJ judgment on July 27, 1986 against
the United States government. 531 The US boycotted the merits phase of the
proceedings. It argued that it would not be subject to the Courts jurisdiction, the ICJ
declared that the application was admissible and that the Court had jurisdiction to
hear the case. 532 Fred Morrison argues that telegraphic nonappearances, an
instance where the state indicates its refusal to appear before the court, are
common.533 To make its decision, the Court elaborated on two resolutions of the
United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 2625 (XXV) on the Principles of
Friendly Relations and Resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the Definition of Aggression. The
World Court held that the U.S. had violated international law by supporting the
contras in their rebellion against the Nicaraguan government and by mining
Nicaraguas harbors.534 The ICJ also found the US guilty of sponsoring large-scale
human rights abuses in Nicaragua committed by the Contras and related groups.

In its earlier submission to the Court, the US accused Nicaragua of supplying

arms to armed groups in the neighboring countries such as El Salvador, Honduras,
and Costa Rica. The Nicaraguan government disputed this claim. The Court also
concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the US allegations. The
dissenting opinion of ICJ member US Judge Schwebel sought to counter the ICJ
judgment in a number of ways. The US claimed that it was exercising a right of
collective self-defense, which it regards as a justification of its own conduct towards
Nicaragua.535 Although the states of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica did not
file a case against Nicaragua, the US felt it had to defend them from the aggression
from the Nicaragua-backed armed groups in these three countries.

Judge Schwebel also attempted to block the ICJ judgment by arguing that the
United States was under an obligation to make reparation to the Republic of
Nicaragua for all injury caused to Nicaragua by the breaches of obligations under
customary international law.536 According to the Human Rights watch, the World
Court never specified an amount.537 On the other hand, the Friendship Office of the
Americas claims that the reparations were estimated at US$ 17 billion, or US$ 58

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billion in 2011 estimations.538 Laura McGinnis also states that the US used strong
position as a UNSC permanent member to veto the enforcement of the decision.
Nicaragua remains one of the poorest states in the western hemisphere. The
reparations would have assisted the country to rebuild itself after the conflict. The
Chamorro government withdrew the charges against the United States in September
1992. In an interesting development, President Daniel Ortega on March 10, 2011
declared that Nicaragua reserved the right to reopen the lawsuit against the United
States.

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 RESEARCH FINDINGS

Striking concerns arise from the analysis of interventions, in that strong states
present themselves as policemen to monitor the unbecoming behaviors of weaker
states in the international system. Without exception, powerful states intervene in
weak states, and the opposite is minimal. The cases, including the 1998 South
African invasion of Lesotho, show that hegemonic states find legal arguments to
justify interventions in weaker states. These biased legal arguments in all cases
inevitably arise in the current international dispensation because in many instances
states, whether individually or as a collective, motivate the interventions in the UNSC.
States exploit the current international regime of humanitarian intervention by
claiming that there was a need to protect people. The outcomes of the interventions,
whether unilateral or multilateral, appear serve the interests of the intervening states,
rather than the UN Charter objectives of ensuring global peace and security.
Therefore, the humanitarian justifications are merely a facile way for states to further
their interests in the anarchic international system.

The pre-1990 (Cold War) interventions

Distrust and enmity defined the relations between states in the Cold War era. Of
the selected five cases three cases took place before 1990. They are the Belgian
intervention in the Congo (1960), the US invasion of Panama (1989), and the ICJ
judgment on the Nicaragua v. United States of America case (1986).

Superpower competition was often blamed for many conflicts that ravaged
Africa, Asia and Latin America in the last century. This is said to have been
responsible for the prevalence of proxy wars in many parts of the world.539 One
relevant example is the involvement of the armies of Cuba and South Africa in the
Angolan conflict in the late 1970s. These wars led to a massive destruction of
infrastructure, loss of human life, and undermined any development efforts in the
affected states. Charles Cater claims that conflicts are both caused and sustained by
a complex and shifting interplay between political and economic factors.540 Therefore,
one aspect that received less attention from academics and analysts was this
economic dimension of these intrastate or civil wars. The Belgian states economic
interests motivated that countrys invasion of the Congo in 1961.

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 Many authors and academics oversimplify the Congos problems by giving all
the credit to Cold War politics. In fact, as early as 1959, Lumumba stated: The
exploitation of the mineral riches of the Congo should be primarily for the profit of our
own people and other Africans.541 The 1960 Belgian intervention happened under
the premise that Belgium had a sacred duty to take the measures required by
morality and by public international law.542 Belgiums NATO allies including Britain,
France, Italy, and the United States supported its actions in the Congo. States such
as Ecuador, Poland, the Soviet Union, and Tunisia opposed all justifications provided
by the Western allies. For example, Poland and the Soviet Union questioned
Belgiums pretext of protecting human life, and asserted that its commercial interests
motivated its actions.

The Belgians aimed the 1961 intervention at preventing the Africanization of

the ANC [sic: the Congolese National Army] spilling into Katanga and depriving the
Belgian government of the jewel in the colonial crown.543 As it was to be expected,
when Lumumba and Kasavubu took over after independence, they faced too many
challenges. First, after only five days in office there were troubles in the army, which
was still under the control of the Belgians. Second, Belgium and the United States
sponsored the secession of the mineral-rich province of Katanga. In January 1961, it
was claimed that the Mobutu-led troops captured and killed Lumumba.544 In recent
years, however, new evidence suggests that the US may have had a hand in the
killing of the Congolese leader.545 Congolese mineral wealth encouraged the actions
of the Belgians and other Western powers to meddle in the affairs of another state.
Belgium and the US in 1964 went back to invade the city of Stanleyville, today
Kisangani, again without the authority of the United Nations.

The geographical location of Lesotho makes it difficult for its political

independence, but also makes it vulnerable to South African aggression. The water
resources are very scarce in South Africa and the small Lesotho has plenty. It is
inevitable that South Africa would use its power to gain access to the scarce
resource. With superior armed forces, Belgium easily invaded Katanga to secure its
uninterrupted access to the Congos mineral wealth. The Belgian government
deployed the army in the pretext of protecting people. South Africa also presented
the same argument when it invaded Lesotho. In both instances, Belgium and South
Africa respectively took advantage of the weaknesses of Lesotho and the Congo to

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protect their strategic interests. Although Lesotho has never been part of South
Africa, South Africa does not see it as an entirely independent entity. South Africa is
responsible for almost all of Lesothos economic activity, in the same manner a
colonial power would dictate the economies of dependent territories.

The decision of the ICJ in the Nicaragua v. United States of America case was
not only important for its general pronouncements on questions of international law,
but also for allowing a small nation, Nicaragua, to confront a superpower and to
present its grievances in an international forum.546 The US however refused to pay
the reparations, and questioned the Worlds Courts jurisdiction over its constitution.
At worst, the United States used its UNSC permanent membership to veto any
possible Security Council resolutions on the subject. As if the judgment did not exist,
the US continued to openly support the Contras in the precise manner prohibited by
the judgment.547 The US involvement in the Nicaraguan civil war ended in 1990
when the Sandanista government lost elections. Unlike the US, South Africa did not
lend support to any of the warring factions in the Lesotho crisis. It is clear that South
Africa preferred stability to chaos. Mosisili benefited from this South African foreign
policy preference. Political stability would ensure that South Africa controlled the
water scheme. There is no mention of protecting human lives. South African troops
did not start in Maseru and other hotspots, but they first attended to the Katse Dam.
Only later, they went to the city to restore order and stability.

The World Courts decision was a major victory for the Sandinista government,
but the US refusal to comply with the Courts decision demonstrated the selectivity
with which the United States upholds international law. Nicaragua did not get a fair
deal, especially when it came to the enforcement of the Courts decision. It is not so
much Nicaraguas problem alone, but for all countries. When pressed to comply with
the judgment, the United States simply undermined the Court. It also decided to put
an end to the whole matter by invoking its veto power.548 The lesson drawn from the
Nicaraguan experience was that the ICJ and the UNSC are unable to enforce their
decisions. In as much as South Africa was responsible for damage to infrastructure
and loss of life in Lesotho, there was no way that it was going to pay for the losses
incurred. In the regional context, there is institution that would have forced the
regional hegemon to comply. Similar to the veto power that the US possesses, South
Africa has the financial and other resources to manipulate the SADC decisions.

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South Africa would always use its economic strength to control the regional body and
other states. There are no mechanisms in place within SADC to tame the powerful
state. Even in the context of the United Nations, it has been proven on many
occasions that it is almost impossible to pacify the US and its close allies.

In the case of the1989 US Panamanian military intervention, a combination of

Cold War politics and the US economic interests in the Panama Canal stimulated the
US to send troops to invade Panama. Neither the OAS nor the UNSC authorized the
US military intervention in Panama. The United States sought to celebrate the
collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War by invading Panama outright.
Noriega benefited from the US Cold War policy of rendering support to murderous
and corrupt regimes in Latin America, and in other parts of the world. In the 1980s,
for example, the United States backed dictators like Ferdinand Marcos in the
Philippines, Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti, and a host of Central American criminals.
Noriega was in cahoots with the US security agencies for a long time. He also
supported the US anti-communist strategy in Latin America. He was definitely
someone who could be trusted, at least in Washingtons eyes. A number of political
mistakes diminished Noriegas reputation, and also affected his popularity within
Panama. The United State States then became wary of the political problems that
could arise as a result Noriegas ousting.

However, Noriegas regimes differences with Washington threatened US

interests in the Panama Canal. Before the invasion the US tried a number of
strategies and tactics to bring down Noriega.549 First, the US unilaterally imposed
economic sanctions that destroyed the economy. The US dollar is also the currency
in Panama. The Panamanian economy is heavily dependent on the US, and the
revenues from the Panama Canal. Second, the US facilitated two coup d'tats in
March and October 1989, which were not successful. As per the 1977 treaty, the
administration of the canal had to be transferred to the Panamanians before the final
hand over in the year 2000. Chomsky argues that the US had to make certain that
Panama was in the hands of people that could be trusted and controlled before that
date.550 The US therefore could no longer trust Noriega as a true friend who could
help the US to further its Panama Canal interests. The invasion restored power to
the rich white elite that had been displaced by the Torrijos 1968 coup.551 As noted

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earlier, this was necessary before the canal was given to the Panamanians. The US
invasion of Panama is a clear example of aggression by a powerful state.

The South African invasion of Lesotho resembled the Panamanian invasion in

more than one ways. The US troops entered isthmus without prior authority from
either the OAS or the UN. The north Americans were fixated on retaining control over
those who ruled Panama. This would automatically give the US a free passage to
controlling the Panama Canal. South Africa also illegally entered Lesotho without any
permission. The South African government was interested in the multi-billion water
scheme and steady water supplies to its central province of Gauteng. Both South
Africa and the US used force against the defense forces of Lesotho and Panama,
respectively. Loss of life and destruction of property were not as important as
defending the strategic assets. The continued control over the Panama Canal and
thewater scheme was guaranteed only when the hegemons had direct influences on
the governments of the two smaller states.

The post-1990 interventions

The P5 states continued to dominate the post-1990 period. Their veto power
determines whether a UNSC resolution (authorizing an intervention) on a specific
humanitarian crisis would be adopted or not. In the 1990s, for example, the P5 states
such as the United States were reluctant to send troops to Africa. This permitted
regional hegemonic states including Zimbabwe, South Africa and Nigeria to intervene
in the neighboring states,such as the 1998 invasions of Lesotho. Unilateral
interventions without UNSC backing also occurred in other parts of the world. The US
invasion of Iraq in 2003 generated worldwide criticism, for example. However, the
post-1990 period marked a major shift in international politics. The previous
competitors in the Security Council now concurred on authorizing military
interventions. This period also stressed the need for genuinely multilateral
interventions, rather than single-state military operations. Whether a multilateral
intervention anda humanitarian intervention have the same meaning requires a
separate analysis. Two UNSC authorized interventions, Iraq (1990) and Libya (2011),
took place in the post-1990 period. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 did not receive
UNSC authorization.

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 The Persian Gulf War was the first large-scale conflict after the end of the Cold
War. The United States and the Soviet Unionstood together in condemning the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. Most significant, the war was multilateral in nature as a large
number of countries were involved in the war. The US and other states participated
in the conflict to stop Iraq from controlling the worlds oil supply. The US managed
somehow to convince the world that the invasion of Iraq was justified. At the time of
the war Iraq controlled 20 percent of the worlds oil reserves. After capturing Kuwait,
Iraq not only controlled 40 percent of oil reserves but also gained control of a close
US military ally in the region. The US feared that Iraq would take over Saudi Arabia
as well. This implied that Iraq would control the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), and eventually dictate world oil production.

The 2003US invasion of Iraq presented the UNSC with a serious challenge. The
US decided to contravene Article 51 of the UN Charter on the use of force. The US
argued that it attacked Iraq in self-defense, but there was no evidence that Iraq had
carried out an armed attack. The UNSC did not identify the Iraqi state as a threat to
international peace and security. Moreover, the UNSC could not authorize
appropriate means to respond to such a threat. The war in Iraq was a serious set
back to the gains (multilateralism) achieved in the 1990 Iraqi war. All the P5
members had supported the first war, and the UNSC was a respected authority. The
2003 Iraqi invasion simply undermined the spirit of multilateralism in favor of
unilateralism. The US saw itself as the highest authority for enforcing the UN
resolutions, and an engineer for regime change in Iraq.

The assessment of the military intervention in Libya raises a number of

controversies. Paragraph 4 of Resolution 1973 authorized Member States to take all
necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat
of attack while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of the
Libyan territory.552 The elements of the authorization gave a very broad mandate to
the Member States. The resolution did not specify effecting regime change, and
formal intervention in civil war. On June 15, 2011, South African Foreign Minister
Maite Nkoana-Mashabane informed the joint Security Council-African Union meeting
on Libya that aim of the UNSC resolution 1973 was never regime change nor was it
the targeting of individuals as it seems to be the case with Colonel Gaddafi.553
During the early stages of the intervention the UK and the US boasted that they had

121
achieved a firmer legal framework for military action in Libya, as opposed to the
2003 Iraqi involvement.554 However, the intentions of these states and their allies in
the intervention, particularly France, have gone beyond the authority of Resolution
1973, and in the process undermine the UNSC.

Following the intervention, many countries joined France and the United States
in asserting that Gaddafi should give up power. This is of serious concern because
this outcome (regime change) was not specified in Resolution 1973.555 The use of
force and the goal of forcing the regime change have been widely criticized by the
international community. The AU did not concur with the assertion that
Gaddafishould be forcefully removed, and favored a diplomatic settlement. Other
international players also opposed the Libyan military intervention.For example,
Brazil, Cuba and Venezuela called for a ceasefire to allow dialogue between
Colonel Gaddafi and the Libyan opposition. 556 The leaders of the BRICS also
condemned the Libyan military intervention.

Libya is both a member of the AU and the League of Arab States. None of the
two regional organizations authorized the use of force against Libya. It must be noted
that the actions of the individual member states do not necessarily mean that they
acted on behalf of their regional bodies. On March 12, the Arab League requested
the UN to authorize a no-fly zone over Libya.557 As mentioned in Chapter 3, the AU
member states in the UN Security Council, South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria, also
voted for the enforcement of a no-fly zone.The UNSC resolution 1973 only
recognizes the important role of the League of Arab States in matters relating to the
maintenance of international peace and security in the region, and urges that the
member states of the Arab League to cooperate with other Member States in the
implementation of measures taken pursuant to the resolution to protect Libyan
civilians.558 However, the Arab League and the AU openly opposed the NATO forces
use of force in enforcing the UNSC resolution 1973. Both the Arab League and the
AU opposed foreign interference in the internal affairs of Libya. They emphasized the
need to respect national unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity.

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 The most worrisome development in the Libyan war is that France, the UK, and
US called for the arming of rebels in Libya. The US Secretary of State, Hillary
Clinton, and the UK British Prime Minister, David Cameron, were convinced that UN
Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya were open to the arming the rebels.559 The
decision by the UK and the US, in particular, to deviate from the UN mandate
resulted from deep-seated hatred for Gaddafi. The pretext of the British, the French
and the US for their war on Gaddafiwas that Libya bombed two-passenger planes
inDecember 1988 and September 1989. Based on this, the world community
entrusted wrong parties to save the people of Libya.

The French and the NATO air strikes in Libya epitomize the continued foreign
interference in African affairs. Michel Chossudovsky argued: The geopolitical and
economic implications of a US-NATO led military intervention directed against Libya
are far-reaching.560 Libya has the largest oil resources in Africa, and ninth largest in
the world. This makes approximately between two and four percent of the worlds oil,
more than twice those of the US.561 The US-NATO military interference in Libya is
strategic and monetary driven. The United States Justice Department stated that
President Barack Obama justified the use of military force in Libya because it served
the US interests in preventing instability in the Middle East and preserving the
credibility and effectiveness of the United Nations Security Council.562

The actions and the underlying intentions of Britain, France and the US in the
Libyan conflict deserve scholastic attention. Future UNSC decisions on whether to
intervene in other countries will be extremely onerous. The South African Business
Day newspaper argues: The way the coalition behaves in Libya today will greatly
influence future calls for intervention in UN member states.563 The NATO coalition
misused the resolution and deceived the world community by posing as the
legitimate actors in the Libyan conflict. South Africa also posed as a neutral player in
the Lesotho crisis, but it invaded Lesotho not to sort the chaotic situation and to
protect people. It simply overran the weak state and ensured that its water supply
was guaranteed. The European states are interested in gaining access to Libyan oil.
Libya was always attractive to Europe due to the proximity and its wealth. NATO had
to forcefully expropriate the oil and deny India and China access to the resources.

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 The responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international
peace and security: Authority without accountability

The UNSC was established through the UN Charter, and is an organ of an

international organization, deriving its very broad powers from a treaty concluded by
States. The P5 states and their allies, in particular, are primary beneficiaries from
the existing international peace and security. This reinforces a view that the doctrine
of UN sanctioned humanitarian intervention, through UNSC, does not necessarily
reflect the views of many UN members.564 Commenting on the responsibility of the
Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Zimbabwe, Nathan Shamuyarira, stated that great care has to
be taken to see that these domestic conflicts are not used as a pretext for the
intervention of big powers in the legitimate domestic affairs of small states, or that
human rights issues are not used for totally different purposes of destabilizing other
governments.565 Shamuyarira also suggested that there was a need to strike a
delicate balance between the rights of States, as enshrined in the Charter, and the
rights of individuals, as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.566

UNSC authorizations are as questionable as is the role and intentions of

powerful states in all interventions. The prevailing tendency in UNSC resolutions is to
utilize general wording that allows powerful states to abuse the authority for the use
of force against the offending country. Resolution 678 on Iraq (1990) and resolution
1973 on Libya (2011) simply refer to member states, to take all necessary
measures/ means to As early as 1990, states began questioning the precise role
and authority of the UNSC, in relation to the assumed position of powerful states
dominance in implementing UNSC resolutions. For example, Colombia remarked that
on Resolution 678 on Iraq the UNSC was delegating authority without specifying to
whom. Nor do we know where that authority is to be exercised or who receives it.
Indeed, whoever does receive it is not accountable to anyone.567 Yemen observed
that Resolution 678 authorized every maritime State with a presence in the area
would have the right to undertake whatever acts it deems fit, and I believe that this
would detract from the Security Councils role of directing and supervising such
acts. 568 This view condemns the role of the UNSC to be authority without
accountability.

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 Perhaps, international law needs to be reviewed in order to bolster the UNSCs
increased accountability in the maintenance of international peace and security. In
1998, Britain, France, and the US bombarded Iraq to enforce the previous resolutions
taken to end the Persian Gulf War. Again, in 2003 Britain and the USinvaded Iraq
because it allegedly possessed WMD, and was also a threat to international security.
These two states argued that their actions were geared towards ensuring Iraqi
compliance with the earlier resolutions (Resolutions 687 and 688). However, Britain
and the US were later accused of undermining the UNSC authority and of being
unilateralists. Depending from what perspective one interprets the events leading to
the Iraqi war in 2003, the decision as to whether the use of force is authorized or not
relies on the interests of the P5 states at the time. Had France decided to back
Britain and the US case, it is likely that a resolution would have gone through
authorizing the use of force against Iraq. The 2003 Iraqi war represented a temporary
disagreement amongst the NATO members, the Atlantic divide.569 Almost 10 years
later in 2011, the NATO partners managed to overcome their differences and
imposed questionable resolutions (1970 and 1973) on Libya. In future, the UNSC
would have to be legally empowered to implement its decisions.

The roles of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International
Criminal Court (ICC)

The roles of the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court
create endless disagreements among UN member states. These two institutions are
not intergovernmental bodies like the UN, but powerful states also uses them to
achieve their international political goals. Most of the ICJ and the ICC work to date
have focused on Africa for a number of reasons, which are beyond the scope of this
study. In July 2008, for example, the ICC accused the Sudanese President Omar al-
Bashir of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes in Darfur.570 On June
25, 2011, it also issued an arrest warrant for Gadhafi, citing evidence of crimes
against humanity committed against political opponents.571 The UNSC referred the
Sudan and the Libyan cases to the ICC. The conditions for the referrals are
complicated and cumbersome because not all UN member states recognize the ICC.
For example, some of the big countries including P5 states such as China, India,
Russia, and the US have not signed the Rome statute founding the ICC. This makes
citizens of these states immune from prosecution for war crimes. The ICJ therefore
quickly lost credibility and cooperation in Africa and most of the developing world.

125
Many states argue against the ICJ because it is seen as a tool the rich nations use to
control weak states. Whether this interpretation is correct or not, the fact is that none
of the western leaders have been indicted thus far.

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq and the War Against Terror have created
considerable controversy because US troops have been accused of human rights
abuses in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Guantanamo Bay. It does not matter whether the
claims are valid or not because the United States has not ratified the Rome statute.
In this regard, the US has worked hard to place US officials and military personnel
beyond the reach of war crimes prosecution.572 The US attitude towards the ICC has
been generally appalling, considering that the US campaigns aggressively against
human rights abuses. For example, in 2003 the US campaigned against the ICC, and
also threatened to cut off military aid to about 35 countries that failed to meet a June
30 deadline for signing bilateral immunity agreements with Washington.573 Only two
of the P5 states (France and the United Kingdom) are part of the ICC. Now the
question remains whether it is possible for the UNSC to fulfill its responsibilities
without intimidation from China, Russia, and the US, especially on issues that affect
their own interests. The P5 have the right to veto referrals to the ICC. It is therefore
possible that many cases involving powerful states are vetoed before they reach the
ICC.

The P5 have the power to undermine both the International Court of Justice and
the International Criminal Court. This directly relates to the discussion above on the
responsibility of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and
security. The International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court should be
placed directly under the UNSC control. This will make it impossible for powerful
states such as the US apply double standards on matters of international peace and
security. It does not help to punish leaders of weak states, and thus allowing the rich
countries to perpetuate global atrocities in the name of humanitarianism.

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 CONCLUSION

In summary, the pre-1990 interventions showed that the Security Council was
ineffective, and superpower animosity paralyzed the UNSC from making decisions on
many conflicts that required humanitarian interventions at the time. The powerful
states, especially the P5, took sides in wars, and conflicts. This took form in either
direct or indirect participation in conflicts. In the cases of Congo (1960) and Panama
(1989), Belgium and US troops were directly involved in the conflict. Their troops
entered other countries without UNSC authorization as dictated in the UN Charter.
The US did not send an army to invade Nicaragua in the 1980s, but provided direct
support to the military and paramilitary groups operating within the borders of
Nicaragua, and against the Sandinista-FSLN government. In all three cases, the P5
led in maintaining a dysfunctional international system. They often refused to
cooperate and took sides in many conflicts simply to defy each other. The animosity
amongst the P5 states rendered the UNSC inoperative.

The post-1990 interventions were either unauthorized or authorized. However,

their legality in terms of international law depended on the views of the P5 states.
Therefore, the invasions of Iraq (1990) and Libya (2011), are as questionable as
theunauthorized ones. The dominant role that powerful states such as Britain,
France, and the US played in these two operations have led to doubts as to if these
were genuine humanitarian interventions. The need to control world oil production
superseded humanitarianism. Britain, France, and the US decided to drift away from
the confines of the resolutions adopted to deal with the conflicts. They pushed hard
for the overthrowing of the heads of state in the two countries, which is not a UN
agenda. The UN charter does not allow members to conduct regime change in
another country.

The contrasts and similarities between the invasions in Libya (2011) and Iraq
(2003) are striking. Britain and the US spent years trying to get Hussein to voluntarily
comply with UN resolutions. In the end, however, the UN refused to grant the two
states the authority to intervene, largely due to Frances opposition to the use of force
against Iraq. Economic interests in Iraqi oil encouraged France to block a resolution
on the Iraqi invasion. Gadhafis situation before the conflict was not as tense as when
compared to the Hussein regime. The similarities between the two conflicts in Iraq

127
and Libya stem from Europes hunger for Libyan oil. The US apparently now controls
the oil resource in Iraq. France probably lost out to the US in Iraq. The French are
trying hard to force regime change in Libya because this would allow Europe access
to a significant amount of energy resources from the Libyan fields.

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 Chapter 5

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The topic of humanitarian intervention is highly contended in the current

international political system. Certain aspects of the practice of humanitarian
intervention that create controversies include, among others, the use of force, the
notion of forcing regime change, and who exactly is supposed to implement and
enforce UNSC decisions. In recent years, regional organizations and hegemonic
states have generally undertaken classic peacekeeping involving the use of force
within the sovereign jurisdiction of other states, in many occasions without prior
UNSC authorization. Regional organizations and hegemonic states view the issue of
maintaining stability as their right and prerogative, especially where the interests of
hegemonic states are at stake. This practice is a clear indication of the weaknesses
in the UNSC system. Authorization is granted without clearly identifying who exactly
is supposed to carry out enforcement action. For example, the military invasion of
Libya in 2011 raised a number of questions that remain unresolved.

The Libyan crisis began when France and the UK drafted a resolution, which
was later adopted by the UNSC, seeking to put to an end the clashes between the
Libyan government and opposition groups. There were general concerns on the
Libyan governments disproportionate use of force against citizens. Economic
sanctions and condemnation of Libyan governments actions were some of the first
steps towards compelling the Gaddafi regime to stop its aggression. Later, the UNSC
imposed a no-fly zone in Libya. Perhaps, this is where the situation became tricky
and challenging. The NATO alliance partners, primarily France, the UK, and US,
announced that they would bomb Libya to force the Gaddafi regime to comply with
the no-fly zone. These states not only shelled the Mediterranean state, but also
announced that they would provide funding to support opposition groups and called
for Gaddafi to step down. They also failed to consult the AU on the appropriate steps
on finding a peaceful solution in Libya.

129
 Many states including Brazil, South Africa and Venezuela raised questions on
the intentions of the three hegemonic states. Their actions in Libya went beyond the
UNSC 1973 Resolution. Another important question raised: Who gave the NATO
alliance permission to use of force on Libya? The response of the three states was
that humanitarian intervention was necessary to protect the citizens. They stated that
the Gaddafi regime had failed to protect its citizens. France, the UK, and US provided
similar reasons when they bombed Iraq in the 1990s. In 2003, the UK and US
invaded Iraq without UNSC approval, killed millions of people, destroyed
infrastructure and, most important, forced a regime change. Many states objected to
the 2003 US and UK invasion of Iraq, but without finding mechanisms of dealing with
similar situations if they occurred in future.

Regional organizations are tools used by states to advance their foreign policy.
The same argument goes for the UNSC. The UNSC is equivalent to a mouthpiece for
powerful states in the current global system. The P5 holds a far too strong position in
the UN multilateral system. They have veto powers that they easily manipulate to
advance their agendas in the world. Their failure to authorize the UN to intervene in
the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the continuing crisis in Darfur demonstrates their
unwillingness to intervene in places where their interests are not at stake. Iraq and
Libya have oil resources that these states wanted to control. Therefore, they find
ways of advancing their agenda in the pretext of humanitarian intervention. This is
not different from the reasons advanced during the Cold War. Five pre-1990 case
studies showed that hegemonic states intervened in different parts of the world to
protect their interests. The superpower competition dominated the international
political system. The Soviet Union and the US took their rivalry to Africa, Asia, and
Latin America. The interests were primarily ideological. However, after 1990 there
was only one superpower, the United States.

Powerful states continued to intervene in other states after the Cold War had
ended. In the African context, lack of strategic resources for international hegemonic
states presented an opportunity to regional hegemonic states and regional
organizations to intervene in neighboring states. Nigeria and ECOWAS intervened in
Liberia and Sierra Leon, Zimbabwe and the SADC in the DRC, and South Africa and
SADC in Lesotho. The powerful regional states invaded the weaker states to
advance their interests. Regional organizations in Africa are far too weak to

130
implement decisions of this nature. As a result, powerful regional states use them to
promote their interests. In the 1990s, for example, the OAU did not permit
interventions in member states, and the same goes for sub-regional organizations. In
all instances, the powerful regional states did not consult the OAU and the UNSC
before intervening in neighboring states. The 1998 South African invasion of Lesotho
was illegal and should not have happened. Hegemonic states disregard international
law when they feel that their interests are threatened. South Africa viewed the
instability in Lesotho as a serious threat to the steady supplies of fresh water to
Gauteng. South Africa invested billions of US dollars in LHWP, and is dependent on
the water supplies from the Lesotho. The LHWP provides gravity fed water from the
highlands of Lesotho to South Africas Gauteng province. Gauteng is the core of the
South African industrial and economic activity. South Africa would attack Lesotho
again if political conflict in Lesotho were to arise again.

The practice of humanitarian intervention is complex and does not have the
same meaning to all states. As pointed above, powerful states take advantage of this
by asserting that humanitarianism precipitates all infringements on the sovereignty of
other states. To them humanitarian interventions must equal the use of force.
International law needs to be amended to provide a clear definition of what
constitutes humanitarian intervention, and basically who should implement UNSC
decisions where humanitarian intervention is deemed necessary. In world football,
the Federation of International Football (FIFA) seems to be stronger than member
states. It therefore sets rules of membership, disburses funds to member
associations, and has powers to expel or suspend members. The two points of
financial resources and expulsion of members are relevant for the discussion of the
UN for two reasons. The UNSC lacks resources to implement its program and
decisions. It relies on the financial contributions from member countries. Big states
such as France, the US and the UK are responsible for a large percentage of the UN
funding. This makes the powerful states an important component of the UN
multilateral system.

The UN does not have mechanisms for implementing economic and other types
of sanctions against its members. Here again, it depends on individual states to
enforce such decisions. Powerful states take advantage of this shortcoming by
manipulating UNSC decisions. They have the knowledge, the resources and big

131
armed forces and artillery. They are aware of the fact that the UN does not have any
of this. They therefore become useful when it is necessary to end state aggression
against citizens. States, irrespective of size and wealth, generally control resources
and the army. It is impossible how a troublesome regime can be stopped without the
use of force. The UNSC should use force on a member state, in the same manner
FIFA suspends its members. FIFA does not rely on a single or group of member
associations to impose and enforce its sanctions. This explains the organizations
fair play principle, which opposes the creation of inequality among members.

In the same way as the international football federation understands the

importance of member associations, the UN system requires deep reforms to allow
some equality among member states. At present, the UNSC permanent membership
excludes the majority of states and regions. There is no clear and legal relationship
between the UN at macro level and regional organizations such as the AU, the EU,
the OAS, and ASEAN. These regional bodies have worked very well and, to a large
degree, their members appear to respect accept leadership roles of fellow members.
Amongst many suggestions on how the UN system should be reformed, regional
based representation particularly in the UNSC (and the Bretton Wood institutions) is
viewed as the most credible way of ensuring fairness. Powerful states such as
France and the UK are not in agreement because they individually stand not to
benefit if UNSC seats are allocated according to regions. Their current veto powers
will thus be diluted because the EU has 27 member states with divergent views on
many issues. The scope of this thesis does not necessarily cover the popular topic of
UN reforms. However, it is necessary to highlight the point that the study nonetheless
should contribute to the ongoing debate. There is a need to contain the influence of
powerful states in the international system.

The roles of the International Court of Justice and International Criminal Court
create endless disagreements among UN member states. Both institutions have
been largely ineffective and the large powerful states ignored or undermined their
decisions. In the case of the ICC, for example, some of the big countries including P5
states such as China, India, Russia, and the US have not signed the Rome statute
founding the ICC. This makes citizens of these states immune from prosecution for
war crimes. The ICJ and, more specifically, the ICC therefore quickly lost credibility
and co-operation in Africa and most of the developing world. This implies that

132
developing states perceive that international law is applied unequally, and that the P5
states have discretion on which parts of the law they wish to respect.

The discussion above demonstrates that the UNSC is not equal to the sum of
its parts. The P5 are more powerful than the UNSC as an institution. This explains
the powerful states dominance of the maintenance of international peace and
security. The current self-help and anarchic international system favors the interests
of powerful states, and the interests of the small weaker states are largely ignored.
Weak states only become relevant when they possess resources that are needed by
stronger states. It is also not interest of the powerful states to change the manner in
which UNSC decisions are made.

In the post-1990 period, the P5 states use force freely in the international
system. There seems to be an agreement between the P5 on the use of armed
force. For example, the US and the UK attacked Iraq and Afghanistan, Russia
against Georgia and the autonomous region of Chechnya, France, the UK and the
US bombarded Libya, and the Chinese government uses the army to control
dissenting voices in that country. The US and the UK maintain that states such as
Iran, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela are a serious threat to international peace. It
is likely that the agreement would dictate an attack on one of these states in the
future.

133
Notes

!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

1
Makoa, FK (1999). Foreign military intervention in Lesotho's elections dispute: Whose
project?, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, June, vol. 21(1), pp. 66-87.
2
Keller, E (1996).Introduction: Toward a new African political order, in Keller EJ &
Rothchild D (eds.), Africa in the new international order: Rethinking state sovereignty,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 1.
3
Johnstone, I (2004). US-UN Relations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order) As We
Know It?, EuropeanJournal of International Law, Vol. 15 (4), pp. 813 838.
4
Ibid., pp. 821.
5
Kurth, J (2005). Humanitarian Intervention After Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military
Realities, Orbis, Vol. 50 (1), Winter, pp. 87 101.
6
Judson, K (2004). Africa, Modern U.S. Security Policy and Interventions, Encyclopedia
of Espionage, Intelligence, and Security. Available from
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3403300014.html (Accessed on August 27,
2011)
7
Borton, J (1998). The state of the international humanitarian system, Refugee Survey
Quarterly, Vol. 17 (1), pp. 16 23.
8
French, HW (2005). A Continent for the Taking: The Tragedy and Hope of Africa, New
York: Random House, pp. 159.
9
Judson, K (2004). Africa, Modern U.S. Security Policy and Interventions; see also
Kurth J (2005), pp. 93.
10
Clinton, WJ (1998). Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
Afghanistan and Sudan, August 20, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United
States, William J. Clinton III (1998, Book II), pp. 1460 - 1462. Available from
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-1998-book2/pdf/PPP-1998-book2-doc-pg1460-
2.pdf (Accessed August 28, 2011)
11
Mashishi, AK (2003). Intervention in Africa: Assessing the rationale behind sub-
regional peace-making military interventions, Unpublished Masters thesis, Monterrey,
California: Naval Postgraduate School, pp. 2.
12
Du Plessis, A (2000). Military intervention: Nature and scope, in Du Plessis, L &
Hough, M, Managing African conflicts: The challenge of military intervention, Pretoria:
HSRC Publishers, pp.19.
13
Sewall, SB (2000). U.S. Policy and Practice Regarding Multilateral Peace Operations,
Carr Center for Human Rights Policy Working Paper 01-3, pp. 2. Available from
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/cchrp/Web%20Working%20Papers/PKO.pdf (Accessed on
August 28, 2011)
14
Kurth, J (2005), pp. 93.
15
Sewall, SB (2000), pp. 13
16
Kioko, B (2003). The right of intervention under the African Union's Constitutive Act:
From non-interference to non-intervention, International Review of the Red Cross, No.
852, December. Available from
http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5wnjdl.htm (Accessed on July 27,
2011)
17
Mashishi, AK (2003), pp. 2.
18
Stratfor (2007). South Africa, U.S.: Dueling for Hegemony in Africa, September 2.
Available from http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=294869

134
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
(Accessed August 27, 2011); see also Sagen, JR (2008). United States South African
Relations: The Challenge for AFRICOM, Unpublished thesis in partial fulfillment of the
requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War
College, pp. 10 17.
19
Mashishi, AK (2003), pp. 4.
20
Makoa, FK (1999), pp. 66.
21
Ibid.
22
Weiss, GW & Hubert, D (eds.) (2001). The responsibility to protect: research,
bibliography, background - Supplementary volume to the Report of the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre (IDRC), pp. 5 8.
23
Ibid.
24
Schrijver, N (2000). The Changing Nature of State Sovereignty, The British Year Book
of International Law 1999, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 69 - 70.
25
Weiss, GW & Hubert, D (eds.) (2001), pp. 6.
26
Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933, Article 1.
27
Weiss, GW & Hubert, D (eds.) (2001), pp. 6.
28
Ibid.
29
United Nations (UN) (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of The
International Court of Justice, New York: United Nations.
30
Ibid.
31
Organization of African Unity (OAU) (1964). OAU Charter, Addis Ababa: OAU.
32
Weiss, GW & Hubert, D (eds.) (2001), pp. 6.
33
Ibid.
34
Ibid.
35
Gandois, H (2008). Sovereignty as responsibility: Theory and practice in Africa, Paper
prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association,
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36
Manby, B (2009). Struggles for citizenship in Africa, London: Zed Books, pp. 3.
37
Ibid.
38
Organization of African Unity (OAU) (1964). OAU Charter.
39
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uti_possidetis_juris
40
Manby, B (2009), pp. 3.
41
Wood, M (2007). The law on the use of force: Current challenges, Singapore Year
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42
Greenwood, C (2002). Humanitarian intervention: the case of Kosovo, Finnish Year
Book of International Law, pp. 141.
43
Paliwal, S (2010). The primacy of regional organizations in international
peacekeeping: The African example, Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 51(1),
pp. 208.
44
Ibid, pp. 185 230.
45
Wood, M (2007), pp. 1.
46
United Nations (UN) (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of The
International Court of Justice.
47
Ortega, N (2001). Military intervention and the European Union, Chaillot Paper 45,
Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, pp. 5 7.
48
Wood, M (2007), pp. 3.

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49
Clinton, WJ (1998). Address to the Nation on Military Action Against Terrorist Sites in
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50
Ibid.
51
Bariyo, N (2010). Deadly Blasts Rock Uganda's Capital, The Wall Street Journal, 12
July. Available from
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52
Gandois, H (2008), pp. 6.
53
Boutros-Ghali, B (1992). An Agenda for peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking
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54
Gandois, H (2008), pp. 7 - 8.
55
United Nations General Assembly (2005). Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly: 2005 Summit Outcome, A/60/L.1, September 16, paras. 138 139.
56
Annan, K (1999). Two concepts of sovereignty, The Economist, September 18, pp. 49
- 50.
57
Gandois, H (2008), pp. 8.
58
Wallensteen, P & Heldt, B (2010). International peacekeeping: The UN versus regional
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(Colorado): Lynne & Rienner Publishers, pp. 143 159.
59
United Nations (UN) (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of The
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60
Kurth, J (2005), pp. 90.
61
Ibid.
62
Ibid.
63
http://www.worldbank.org/(Accessed on 31 May2011)
64
Shaw, CM (2003). Full Access Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of
American States, Latin American Politics and Society, Vol. 45 (3), Autumn, pp. 59 -
92.
65
Ibid.
66
Varas, A (2008). Brazil in South America: from indifference to hegemony, FRIDE
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67
Croft, S &Treacher, T (1995). Aspects of Intervention in the South, in Dorman, AM &
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Du Plessis, A (2000). Military Intervention: Nature and scope, in du Plessis, L & Hough,
M, Managing African Conflicts: The Challenge of Military Intervention, Pretoria: HSRC
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69
Mashishi, AK (2003), pp. 2.
70
Shaw, CM (2003), pp. 59.
71
Mwangi, O (2007). Hydropolitics, Ecocide and Human Security in Lesotho: A Case
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72
Waltz, KN (1979). Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, pp.
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73
Zikmund, WG (2003). Business research methods, 7th edn., Thompson, Mason, Ohio,
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Yin, RK (2003). Case Study research: Design and methods, 3rd edn, Sage
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75
Wilson, M (1969). The hunters and herders, in Wilson, M & Thompson, L (eds.), The
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76
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998), South Africa, Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica
Volume 11, pp. 32 36.
77
World Travel Pictures Review and Gallery:
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78
Southern African Development Community (SADC): http://www.sadc.int(Accessed on
June 15, 2011)
79
Wanderlust webpage:http://www.wanderlustore.com/Southern-Africa (Accessed August
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80
Amusan, L (2010). Pan-Africanism and the State of Politico-Economic Integration in
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81
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007). New history of South Africa, Cape Town: Tafelberg
Publishers, pp. 41 - 42.
82
Ibid.
83
Koponen, J (1993). The Partition of Africa: A scramble for a mirage?, Nordic Journal
of African Studies, Vol. 2(1), pp.117135.
84
Ibid.
85
Shillington, K (2005). History of Africa, Revised 2nd ed., New York: Macmillan
Publishers, pp. 301.
86
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/(Accessed on May 28, 2011)
87
Ibid.
88
Ibid.
89
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 79.
90
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Huguenots_in_South_Africa (Accessed on June
28, 2011)
91
Eldredge, EA (2007). Power in Colonial Africa: Conflict and Discourse in Lesotho,
18701960, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 21.
92
Ibid.
93
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/(Accessed on May 28, 2011)
94
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998), pp. 32 36.
95
Abolition of Slavery Act, 1807
96
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998), pp. 32 36.
97
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 108 - 115.
98
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998), pp. 32 36.
99
Ibid.
100
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 159 - 164.
101
Oakes, D (ed.) (1995). Illustrated history of South Africa: The real story, the expanded
3rd ed., Cape Town: The Reader's Digest Association, pp. 163.
102
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 165.
103
Oakes, D (ed.) (1995), pp. 176 - 193.
104
Ibid.
105
Ibid., pp. 222.
106
Ibid., pp. 159 - 164.
107
Ibid.
108
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Boer_War(Accessed on June 06, 2011)
109
Lieberman, ES (2001). National Political Community and the Politics of Income
Taxation in Brazil and South Africa in the Twentieth Century, Politics & Society, Vol.
29 (4), December, pp. 530.
110
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998), pp. 32 36.
111
Union of South Africa Act, 1909
112
Lieberman, ES (2001), pp. 530.

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113
Herbst, JI (2000). States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and
Control, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 16 17.
114
Ibid.
115
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 236.
116
Pakenham, T (1988). The Boer War, London: Futura, pp. 576.
117
Mandela, NA (1994). Long Walk to Freedom, Randburg, South Africa: Macdonald
Purnell, pp. 104 105.
118
Lieberman, ES (2001), pp. 530.
119
Baldwin-Ragaven, L, London, L & du Gruchy, J (1999). An ambulance of the wrong
color: health professionals, human rights and ethics in South Africa, London, UK: Juta
and Company Limited, pp. 18.
120
Mills, G (2000). The wired model: South Africa, foreign policy and globalization, Cape
Town: Tafelberg, pp. 227.
121
Geldenhys, D (1984). The diplomacy of isolation: South African foreign policy making,
Johannesburg: SAIIA/ Macmillan, pp. 6.
122
Ibid.
123
Mills, G (2000), pp. 224.
124
Ibid.
125
Reddy, ES (1991). India and South Africa: A collection of papers, Durban: University of
Durban-Westville, pp. 3. Available from http://sahistory.org.za/ (Accessed on June 01,
2011)
126
Crocker, CA (1993). High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough
Neighborhood, Johannesburg: Jonathan Ball, pp. 34.
127
Chingono, M & Nakana, S (2009). The challenges of regional integration in Southern
Africa, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, October, Vol. 3
(10), pp. 396 - 408.
128
Mills, G (2000), pp. 227.
129
Ibid.
130
Ibid.
131
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa_under_apartheid (Accessed on
June 2, 2011)
132
Nattrass, J (1981). The South African economy: Its growth and change, Cape Town:
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133
Omer-Cooper, JD (1987). History of Southern Africa, London : J. Currey, pp. 210.
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Mills, G (2000), pp. 227.
136
Nupen, D. (2004). Elections, Constitutionalism and Political Stability in South Africa,
African Journal on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4(2), pp. 119 142.
137
Mongabay.com website: http://www.mongabay.com/history/south_africa/south_africa-
the_anc_and_the_pac_turn_to_violence.html (Accessed on May 18, 2011)
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Mills, G (2000), pp. 227.
139
United Nations (UN) (1962). United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1761: The
policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa, November 6, New York: UN.
140
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Malawi(Accessed on May
28, 2011)
141
Kirk R & Stern M (2003). The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement, Africa
Region Working Paper Series No. 57, June, Pretoria: Southern African Regional
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May 28, 2011)
142
Mills, G (2000), pp. 231.
143
Chipasula, JC & Miti, K (1991). South Africa and its SADCC neighbors pula,
Botswana Journal of African Studies, Vol. 7(1), pp. 159 178.
144
Mills, G (2000), pp. 231.
145
Ibid.

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146
Chingono, M & Nakana, S (2009), pp. 405; see also Crocker CA (1993), pp. 27 - 28.
147
Mongabay.com website.
148
Chingono, M & Nakana, S (2009), pp. 396-408.
149
Amusan, L (2010), pp. 138.
150
Stott, N (2002). From the SADF to the SANDF: Safeguarding South Africa for a better
life for all?, Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 7, pp. 1 - 88.
151
Marais, MM (1994). Southern Africa's Prospects - Stability or Chaos?, African
Defense Review, Issue No. 16. Online. Available from
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152
Chipasula, JC & Miti, K (1991), pp. 160.
153
Ibid.
154
British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) webpage:
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(Accessed on June 07, 2011)
155
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Angola__South_Africa_relations(Accessed on
June 09, 2011)
156
Chipasula, JC & Miti, K (1991), pp. 161.
157
Amusan, L (2010), pp. 141.
158
Chipasula, JC & Miti, K (1991), pp. 161.
159
Ibid.
160
Peters-Berries C, (2010). Regional Integration in Southern Africa A Guidebook,
Bonn, Germany: InWEnt, pp. 57 59.
161
British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) webpage:
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sed on June 07, 2011)
162
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 380.
163
Ibid., pp. 389.
164
Ibid., pp. 390.
165
Chhabra, HS (1997). South African Foreign Policy: Principles, options, dilemmas, New
Delhi: Africa Publishing, pp. 16 - 17.
166
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_Anti-Apartheid_Act (Accessed
on July 09, 2011)
167
Davenpoort, R & Saunders, C (2000). South Africa: A modern history, 5th ed., London:
Macmillan, pp. 553.
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
Chhabra HS (1997), pp. 17.
171
Ibid.
172
Davenpoort R & Saunders C (2000), pp. 568.
173
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 413.
174
Ibid.
175
Lesotho National Development Corporation (LNDC) webpage:
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176
Steinberg, J (2005). The Lesotho/Free State Border, Institute of Security Studies Paper
113, October, Pretoria: ISS, pp. 1 13.
177
Coplan, DB (2003). Land from the Ancestors: Popular Religious Pilgrimage along the
South AfricaLesotho Border, Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 29 (4),
December, p. 977 993.
178
Pefole, K (2004). Country study: Lesotho, in Gould, C & Lamb, G, Hide and seek:
Taking account of small arms in Southern Africa, October, Pretoria: Institute of Security
Studies, pp. 48.
179
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2008). Lesotho: Country Report, London:
Economist Intelligence Unit, pp. 4.
180
Ibid., pp. 10.
181
Ibid.
182
Steinberg, J (2005), pp. 1.

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183
Ibid.
184
Ibid.
185
Cobbe, J (1995), Macroeconomic statistical evidence from Lesotho, in Crush, J &
James, W (eds), Crossing boundaries: mine migrancy in a democratic South Africa,
Cape Town, IDASA, pp. 152.
186
Steinberg J (2005), pp. 1.
187
Sechaba Consultants (2002). The border within: the future of the Lesotho-South
African international boundary, Migration Policy Series Number 26. Cape Town:SAMP.
http://www.queensu.ca/samp/sampresources/samppublications/policyseries/policy26.ht
m (Accessed on May 14, 2011).
188
Simon, D (1994). Namibia regains Walvis Bay at last, Review of African Political
Economy, Vol. 21 (59), March, pp. 127-129.
189
Cobbe, J (2004). Lesotho: Will the enclave empty?, Migration Information Source,
September, MPI, Washington, D.C. Available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=248 (Accessed May 14,
2011)
190
Quinlan, T (1996). The State and National Identity in Lesotho, in van Rouveroy van
Nieuwaal, EAB & Ray DI, (eds.), Journal of Legal Pluralism, Vol.37/38, pp. 377- 405.
191
Ibid.
192
Ibid.
193
Ibid., pp. 977.
194
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lesotho
195
Eldredge, EA (2007), pp. 38.
196
Gascoigne, B (2001). History of Lesotho, History World Online.Available from
http://www.historyworld.net/about/sources.asp. (Accessed May 16, 2011)
197
Eldredge, EA (2007), pp. 38.
198
Giliomee, H & Mbenga, B (2007), pp. 79.
199
Ibid.
200
Amusan, L (2010), pp. 147.
201
Eldredge, EA (2007), pp. 38.
202
Foulo, T (1991). Migrant workers retrenchments: Implications for Lesotho economy,
Staff Occasional Paper No. 6, October, Maseru: Central Bank of Lesotho, pp. 10 - 13.
203
Government of Lesotho Website: http://www.gov.ls/about/default.php (Accessed on
May 17, 2011)
204
Foulo, T (1991), pp.12 - 14.
205
Eldredge, EA (1993), pp. 3.
206
Ibid., pp. 3.
207
Ibid., pp. 81.
208
Lesotho National Development Corporation website.
209
Makoa, FK (2004). Electoral Reform and Political Stability in Lesotho, African Journal
on Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4(2), pp. 79 95.
210
The Economist (2007). Poor little brother: Why Lesotho is still unstable?, The
Economist Online, June 28. Available from
http://www.economist.com/node/9413770?story_id=9413770(Accessed on June 27,
2011)
211
Institute of Security Studies website:
http://www.iss.co.za/Af/profiles/Lesotho/lesotho1.html (Accessed on May 18, 2011)
212
Ibid.
213
Coplan, DB (2001). A river runs through it: the meaning of the Lesotho-Free State
border, African Affairs, Issue 100, p. 81 11.
214
Institute of Security Studies website.
215
Coplan DB, (2003), pp. 977.
216
Coplan DB, (2001), pp. 95.
217
Ibid.
218
Mwangi, O (2007), pp. 4 7.

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219
Conley, AH & Van Niekerk, PH (2000). Sustainable management of international
waters: The Orange case, Water Policy, Vol. 2(12), pp. 131149.
220
Mwangi, O (2007), pp. 4.
221
The Economist (2007).
222
Pefole, K (2004), pp. 48.
223
Foulo, T (1991), pp. 1.
224
Ibid.
225
Ibid.
226
Bertelsman-Scott, T & Grant, C (2007). Economic Partnership Agreements: Handbook,
Stellenbosch: US Printers. Available from www.tralac.org(Accessed on June 12, 2011)
227
The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (2008), pp. 15.
228
Ibid, pp.6.
229
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Growth_and_Opportunity_Act
230
Bennet, M (2006).Lesothos export textiles and garment industry, in Jauch, H & Traub-
Merz, R (eds.), The Future of the Textile and Clothing Industry in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Bonn: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, p. 165.
231
Ibid.
232
World Bank (2007). Benchmarking FDI competitiveness: Snapshot Africa Lesotho,
Washington: World Bank Group, pp. 6.
233
Ibid.
234
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2005). Regional
Integration Agreements, Paris: OECD, pp. 71. Available from
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/37/1923431.pdf (Accessed on June 01, 2011)
235
Peters-Berries C, (2010), pp. 42.
236
All Africa Global Media (2011). SADC, COMESA and EAC Agree on Free Trade, All
Africa.com, June. Available from http://allafrica.com/stories/201106140286.html
(Accessed on June 20, 2011); see also COMESA webpage: http://www.comesa.int
(Accessed on June 20, 2011);
237
Ibid.
238
Amusan, L (2010), pp. 147.
239
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 42.
240
Kirk, R & Stern, M (2003). The New Southern African Customs Union Agreement,
Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 57, June, Pretoria: Southern African Regional
Poverty Network, pp. 2. Available from
http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000447/P413_Customs_union.pdf(Accessed on
June 12, 2011)
241
Ruppel, OC (2010). Customs Union, Namibia Law Journal, Vol. 2 (2), pp. 121 134.
242
Southern African Customs Union website:
http://www.sacu.int/about.php?include=about/history.html(Accessed on 01 June 2011)
243
Ibid.
244
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 42.
245
Kirk, R & Stern, M (2003), pp. 2.
246
Ibid.; see also McCarthy, C (2008). The Roadmap towards Monetary Union in Southern
Africa is the European experience commendable and replicable?, Third GARNET
Annual Conference, Bordeaux, September, pp. 12. Available from
http://www.tralac.org/cause_data/images/1694/tralacBordeauxGarnetMcCarthy_20081
022.pdf (Accessed on June 19, 2011)
247
McCarthy, C (2008), pp. 12.
248
Kirk, R & Stern, M (2003), pp. 2.
249
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 42.
250
http://www.worldbank.org/(Accessed on 31 May 2011)
251
Mmegi (2009). Collapse of SACU could sink Botswana Study, Mmegi, Vol.26
(179), Friday, November 27. Available from
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009/November/Friday27(Accessed on June 12, 2011)
252
http://www.worldbank.org/(Accessed on May 31, 2011)

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253
Mmegi (2009).
254
Bertelsman-Scott, T & Grant, C (2007). Economic Partnership Agreements.
255
Mmegi (2009).
256
Ibid.
257
Ibid.
258
Marais L (2010). Possible Review of the SACU Revenue Sharing Formula,
Jacobsens Customs News Bulletin, September 17. Available from
http://www.customstariff.co.za/customs_news_bulletins/Bulletin%20173.html
(Accessed on May 30, 2011)
259
Hull, C & Derblom, M (2009). Abandoning Frontline Trenches? Capabilities for Peace
and Security in the SADC region, June, Stockholm: FOI, Swedish Defense Research
Agency, pp. 7.
260
Chingono, M & Nakana, S (2009), pp. 153.
261
Chipasula, JC & Miti, K (1991), pp. 159 178.
262
Ibid., pp. 160.
263
Cilliers, J (1999). Building security in Southern Africa. Available from
http://www.iss.co.za/Pubs/Monographs/No43/SADCOrgan.html(Accessed on May 30,
2011)
264
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 56.
265
Cilliers, J (2005), pp. 90.
266
Geldenhuys, D (1984), pp. 3.
267
Chipasula, JC & Miti, K (1991), pp. 164.
268
Cilliers, J (2005), pp. 90 - 91.
269
Ibid.
270
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_relations_of_Malawi (Accessed on May
28, 2011)
271
Cilliers, J (2005), pp. 90 91; see also Mandaza I (1991). Southern Africa in the
1990s: Resolving the South African (national) question, Southern African Political and
Economics Monthly (SAPEM), May.
272
Cilliers, J (1999). Building security in Southern Africa. Available from
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July 10, 2011)
273
Ibid.
274
South African Department of International Relations Cooperation webpage:
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275
Nathan L (2004). The absence of common values and failure of common security in
Southern Africa, 1992-2003, Working Paper no.50, Crisis States Research Centre,
London School of Economics, pp. 1 29.
276
SADC website
277
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2005), pp. 16.
278
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 57 59.
279
Ibid.
280
Cilliers, J (2005), pp. 98.
281
Mller, B (2003). Raising armies in a rough neighborhood: The Military and Militarism
in Southern Africa, Development Research Series, Working Paper No. 118, Aalborg:
Research Center on Development and International Relations (DIR), pp. 29.
282
Ibid.; see also Wines, M (2006). Africa: South Africa: Anti-Mercenary Law Passed,
The New York Times, August 30. Available from
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C8B63 (Accessed on August 31, 2011)
283
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 57 59.
284
Cilliers, J (2005), pp. 98.
285
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 57 59.
286
Mozambican Notes (1984). The Nkomati update, Mozambican Notes, November, No.
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288
Mandela, BT (2010). Regional Hegemony as a Tool for Peace: An evaluation of South
African role in regional development through the Spatial Development Initiatives,
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289
SADC website
290
Chingono, M & Nakana, S (2009), pp. 398.
291
Southern African Development Community Treaty of 1992, art. 4. Available from
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292
Ibid., art. 5.
293
SADC website
294
Ibid.
295
South African Department of International Relations Cooperation webpage
296
Southern African Development Community (SADC) (2004).Strategic Indicative Plan for
the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, Gaborone: SADC, pp. 17.
297
Isaksen, J & Tjnneland E (2001).Assessing the restructuring of SADC: Positions,
policies and progress, A Report Commissioned by the Norwegian Agency for
Development Co-operation (NORAD), December, Bergen, Norway: Chr Michelsen
Institute, pp. 9.
298
Cilliers, J & Malan, M (1999). The SADC Treaty: Building Security in Southern Africa,
An Update on the Evolving Architecture, Monograph No 43, Pretoria: ISS, pp. 2.
299
SADC website; see also Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 74.
300
SADC website
301
Muzulu, P (2011). SADC Troika finally flexes its muscles, Zimbabwe Independent,
Thursday, April 07. Available from http://www.theindependent.co.zw/opinion/30570-
sadc-troika-finally-flexes-its-muscles.html (Accessed on May 30, 2011)
302
SADC website
303
Ibid.
304
Peters-Berries, C (2010), pp. 77.
305
Ibid.
306
SADC website
307
Ibid.
308
Mandela, BT (2010), pp.49 50.
309
Fisher, LM & Ngoma, N (2005). The SADC organ challenges in the new millennium,
ISS Paper 114, August, Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, pp. 2.
310
Cilliers, J & Malan, M (1997). SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security: Future
development, Occasional Paper No.19, March, Halfway House: Institute of Security
Studies, pp. 4.
311
Van Schalkwyk, G (2005). Challenges in the creation of a Southern African sub-
regional security community, Journal on Science and World Affairs, Vol. 1 (1), pp. 33
43.
312
Ibid.
313
SADC (1996), Communiqu of the Summit, June 28, Gaborone: SADC.
314
Hull, C & Derblom, M (2009), pp. 20.
315
Fisher, LM & Ngoma, N (2005), pp. 2.
316
Likoti, FJ (2006). African Military Intervention in African Conflicts: An Analysis of
Military Intervention in Rwanda, the DRC and Lesotho, Unpublished PhD thesis, Cape
Town: School of Government, University of the Western Cape, pp. 170 173.
317
Hull, C & Derblom, M (2009), pp. 7.
318
Hwang, KD (2006). The Mechanisms of Politico-Security Regionalism in Southeast
Asia and Southern Africa: A Comparative Case Study of ASEAN and SADC,
Unpublished Doctoral thesis in International Relations, Pretoria: University of Pretoria,
pp. 163.

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319
Francis, DJ (2006). Uniting Africa: Building regional peace and security systems,
Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 204.
320
Amusan, L (2010), pp. 138.
321
Likoti FJ, (2006), pp. 170 173.
322
Van Schalkwyk ,G (2005), pp. 33 43.
323
Van Nieuwkerk, A (2006). Security cooperation in SADC: Insights from the New
Institutionalism, Scientia Militaria, Vol. 34 (2), pp. 1-20; see also Southern African
Development Community (SADC) (2004). Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ on
Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation.
324
Valy, B (2005). Peace and security at the core of development, SADC Today, Vol. 7
(6), February, pp. 4.
325
Ibid.
326
Baker, DP & Maeresera, S (2009). SADCBRIG intervention in SADC member states:
Reasons to doubt, African Security Review, Vol. 18 Issue 1, pp. 105 110.
327
Lusaka Times (2007). Zambia: SADC peacekeeping force becomes a reality, Lusaka
Times Online, Friday, August 17. Available from
http://www.lusakatimes.com/2007/08/17/sadc-peacekeeping-force-becomes-a-
reality/(Accessed on June 14, 2011)
328
Ibid.
329
Baker, DP & Maeresera, S (2009), pp. 107.
330
Lusaka Times (2007).
331
Ocnus (2011). South African Peacekeepers, Ocnus Newsletter, January 27. Available
from http://www.ocnus.net/artman2/publish/Defence_Arms_13/South-African-
Peacekeepers.shtml(Accessed on July 04, 2011)
332
Adebajo, A (2008). Strengthening African security architecture, Africa: Political partner
and global actor opportunities and challenges, October, Oslo: Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Available from
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533013(Accessed on July 04, 2011)
333
Ibid.
334
African Leadership Magazine (2011). South Africa, Nigeria And Gabon to push African
Agenda on UNSC, African Leadership Magazine, Monday, January 10. Available from
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agenda-on-unsc-p116-89.htm (Accessed on June 28, 2011)
335
Kagwanja, P (2006). Power and Peace: South Africa and the Refurbishing of Africas
Multilateral Capacity for Peacemaking, in Southall, R (ed.), South Africas Role in
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pp. 32.
336
Chhabra, HS (1997), pp. 4 8.
337
Mandela, N (1993). South Africas future foreign policy, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, pp.
86 94.
338
Barber, J (2005). The New South Africas foreign policy: principles and practice,
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339
Mabuda, P (2008). South Africas foreign relations towards Kenya: The political and
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340
Daniel, J (1995). One China or Two? South Africa's foreign policy dilemma,
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341
Ibid., pp. 35 49.
342
Chhabra, HS (1997), pp. 5.
343
Likoti FJ, (2007). The 1998 Military Intervention in Lesotho: SADC Peace Mission or
Resource War?, International Peacekeeping, Vol.14 (2), pp. 251 263.
344
Makoa, FK (1999). Foreign military intervention in Lesotho's elections dispute: Whose
project?, Strategic Review for Southern Africa, June, Vol. 21(1), pp. 66 87.

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British Broadcasting Company (BBC) (1998). South Africa shifts position on Congo,
BBC, Thursday, September 3. Available from
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346
Makoa, FK (1999), pp. 66.
347
Ibid., pp. 84 - 87.
348
Fabricius, P (1998). Fearful Milestone for South Africa, The Star, September 25, pp.
14. Available from http://www.thestar.co.za/(Accessed on July 6, 2011)
349
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999). Lesothos General Election of 1998: Rigged or de
rigeur?, Journal of Modern African Studies, 37(4), pp. 669 696.
350
Matlosa, K (1998). Lesotho after 1998 Elections: what went wrong?, Southern African
Economist, Vol.11 (12), pp. 6-10.
351
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 672.
352
Matlosa, K (1997). The 1993 Elections in Lesotho and The Nature of the BCP Victory,
African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2 (1), pp. 140 151.
353
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 672.
354
Ibid., pp. 679.
355
Ibid.
356
Joint Statement by National and International Observers Regarding the Parliamentary
Elections of May 23, 1998 in Lesotho. Mimeo.
357
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 677 679.
358
Makoa,FK (1999), pp. 67.
359
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 680.
360
Ibid., pp. 681.
361
Ibid.
362
Ibid.
363
Sehoai, S (1999). Conflict Management and Post- Conflict Peace Building in Lesotho,
in Lambrechts, K (ed.), Crisis in Lesotho: The challenges of managing conflict in
Southern Africa, Foundation for Global Dialogue Series No. 2, Johannesburg: FGD, pp.
11 13.
364
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) (1998). South Africa shifts position on Congo.
365
Ibid.
366
Transformation Resource Centre (TRC):
http://www.trc.org.ls/events/events19.983.htm#Langa%20Commission%20Report%20
Further%20Delayed:%20Demonstrations%20in%20Maseru%20Disrupt%20Governme
nt (Accessed July 20, 2011)
367
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 681; see also Mail & Guardian (1998). The two
versions of the Langa report, Mail & Guardian Online, September 25. Available from
http://mg.co.za/article/1998-09-25-the-two-versions-of-the-langa-report (Accessed July
20, 2011)
368
Southall ,R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 680.
369
Mail & Guardian (1998). The two versions of the Langa report.
370
The Langa Commission Report (1998).The Commission of Enquiry into the Conduct
and Results of the Lesotho General Elections held in May 1998. Available from
http://cs.nul.ls/~mofana/LangaReport.htm(Accessed on July 22, 2011)
371
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 681 - 682.
372
Mail & Guardian (1998). The two versions of the Langa report.
373
Ibid.
374
Southall, R & Fox, R (1999), pp. 681 - 682.
375
Kelley, J (2010). The Role of Membership Rules in Regional Organizations, ADB
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Development Bank, pp. 10.
376
Baker, DP & Maeresera, S (2009), pp. 105 110.
377
Ibid.
378
De Coning, C (1998). Conditions for intervention: DRC & Lesotho, Conflict Trends,
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United Nations (UN) (1945). Charter of the United Nations and Statute of The
International Court of Justice, New York: UN.
380
Amusan, L (2010), pp. 136 163.
381
Ibid., pp. 141.
382
Likoti, FJ (2006), pp. 257.
383
Ibid.
384
SADC (1996). Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security Co-Operation, Gaborone:
SADC. Available from http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/157(Accessed on July
06, 2011)
385
Ibid.
386
Milner, H (1993). The assumption of anarchy in international relations theory: A
critique, in Baldwin, DA (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary
Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, pp.143 69.
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Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Congo_War(Accessed on July 11,
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388
Mwangi, O (2007), pp. 3 17.
389
Black, D (1996). Security Issues in Africa after Apartheid: Implications for Canadian
Policy, in Black, D & Swatuk, L (ed.), Southern Africa and Africa After Apartheid:
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390
Likoti, FJ (2006), pp. 257.
391
The European Investment Bank (EIB) (2002). Lesotho Highlands Water Project,
November 26. Available from http://www.eib.org/projects/news/lesotho-highlands-
water-project.htm (Accessed on July 30, 2011)
392
Ibid.
393
Statistics South Africa (2007). Community Survey: Basic results, Pretoria: Statistics
South Africa. Available from
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July 30, 2011)
394
The European Investment Bank (EIB) (2002). Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
395
Mwangi, O (2007), pp. 3 17.
396
The European Investment Bank (EIB) (2002). Lesotho Highlands Water Project; see
also Wikipedia:
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The European Investment Bank (EIB) (2002). Lesotho Highlands Water Project.
398
Kagwanja, P (2006), pp. 35.
399
Christie, S (2011).Little commitment to fixing dysfunctional secretariat, Mail &
Guardian Online, 10 June. Available from http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-10-little-
commitment-to-fixing-dysfunctional-secretariat (Accessed on July 31, 2011)
400
Makoa, FK (1999), pp. 67.
401
Ibid., pp. 257.
402
Ibid., pp. 257.
403
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) (1998). Troops committed until peace returns to
Lesotho, BBC, Tuesday, September 22. Available from
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/178017.stm (Accessed on July 31, 2011)
404
Makoa FK (1999), pp. 68.
405
Ibid; see also Hyden, G (1997). Foreign Aid and Democratization in Africa, Africa
Insight, Vol. 27 (4), pp. 235 - 236.
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Kagwanja, P (2006), pp. 30.
407
Waltz, KN, The origin of war in neo-realist theory, in Williams, P, Goldstein, DM &
Shafritz, JM (eds), Classic Reading of International Relations, Belmont, CA:
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Schoeman, M (2004). South Africa in Africa: Behemoth, hegemon, partner or just
another kid on the block?, Presentation to a discussion forum, Anthropology and
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Ibid., pp. 257.
410
Makoa, FK (1999), pp. 68 69.
411
Ibid.
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Ross, CH (2008). South African perspective on pre- deployment mission readiness
preparation of personnel to be deployed in peace missions, Presented in partial
completion of the requirements of the Certificate of Training in United Nations Peace
Support Operations, Williamsburg VA: The Peace Operations Training Institute, pp. 16
18; see also Wikipedia:
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July 31, 2011)
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Nathan L (2004). The absence of common values and failure of common security in
Southern Africa, 1992-2003, Working Paper no.50, Crisis States Research Centre,
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) (2003). Summit Communiqu in
Dar es Salaam, August 26, Gaborone: SADC Secretariat, paragraphs 24 25.
415
South African Press Association (2000). Leaders Should Practice Democracy
SADC, South African Press Association, October 15, Johannesburg: SAPA.
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Ross, CH (2008), pp. 16 18.
417
Kagwanja, P (2006), pp. 27.
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Ibid.
419
African Union (AU) (2000). AU Constitutive Act of 2000, Addis Ababa: AU.
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Daniel J, Lutchman J & Naidu S (2005). South Africa and Nigeria: Two unequal centers
in a periphery, in Daniel, J, Southall, R & Lutchman, J (eds.), State of the nation: South
Africa 20042005, Cape Town: HSRC Press.
421
Southall, R (2006). South Africa, an African peacemaker, in Southall, R (ed.), South
Africas Role in Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking, Cape Town: Human Science
Research Council, pp. 5.
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Ibid.
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Ocnus (2011). South African Peacekeepers.
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Adebajo A (2008). Strengthening Africas security architecture.
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Ibid.
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African Leadership Magazine (2011). South Africa, Nigeria And Gabon to push African
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Borger, J (2011). Libya no-fly resolution reveals global split in UN, The Guardian,
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Marfinati B, Parra-Bernal, G & Beech E (2011). Brazil calls for ceasefire in Libya,
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Kent JL (2011). Leaders at BRICS Summit speak out against airstrikes in Libya,
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Bokor, M (2011). Have Nigeria, South Africa, and Gabon betrayed the African
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Blanchard, CM (2011). Libya: Unrest and U.S. Policy, CRS Report for Congress,
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Koenig, N (2011).The EU and the Libyan Crisis: In Quest of Coherence?, IAI Working
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UN Security Council (2011a). Security Council Press Statement on Libya, SC/10180,
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Euronews (2011). Libya: a timeline of international diplomacy, Euronews, March 18.
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UN Security Council (2011b). In swift, decisive action, Security Council imposes tough
measures on Libyan regime, adopting Resolution 1970 in wake of crackdown on
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436
Euronews (2011). Libya: a timeline of international diplomacy.
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Ibid.
438
Agence France-Presse (2011). Timeline: Libya revolt, ABS-CBN, June 03. Available
from http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/global-filipino/world/03/05/11/timeline-libya-revolt
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Koenig N (2011, pp. 2.
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France 24 (2011). Rebel Benghazi to get ambassador, France 24 International,
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441
Zeliger, R (2011). So which countries now officially recognize the Libyan rebels?,
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Foreign Policy (2011). The Draft Security Council Resolution (to replace the UN 1970
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443
United Nations Security Council (2011c). Security Council approves no-fly zone over
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Koenig, N (2011), pp. 2.
445
International Organization for Migration (2011).IOM Response to the Libyan Crisis:
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UN Security Council (1990). Resolution 660 of August 2 1990, S/RES/0660, New York:
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447
Swaidan, Z & Nica, M (2002). The 1991 Gulf War And Jordan's Economy, Middle
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448
UN Security Council (1960a). Resolution 661 of August 2 1990, S/21423, New York:
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UN Security Council (1960b). Resolution 678 of November 29 of 1990, S/RES/0678,
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Joffe J (2009). The Default Power: The False Prophecy of America's Decline, Foreign
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UN Security Council (1991a). Resolution 686 of March 2 of 1991, S/RES/0686, New
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UN Security Council (1991b). Resolution 687 of April 3 of 1991, S/RES/0687, New
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Baylis, J, Wirtz, JJ & Gray, CS (eds) (2007). Strategy in the Contemporary World, 2nd
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455
UN Security Council (1991c). Resolution 688 of April 5 of 1991, S/RES/0688, New
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Juster, KI (1999). Iraq: An American Perspective, in Haass, RN (ed.), Transatlantic
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457
Krisch, N (1999). Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the
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Ibid.
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Lewandowski W (2004). The Influence of the War in Iraq on Transatlantic Relations,
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460
Juster KI (1999), pp. 107.
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Lewandowski, W (2004), pp. 14 - 15.
462
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463
UN Security Council (2001).Threats to international peace and security caused by
terrorist acts, S/RES/1368, September 12, New York: UN.
464
Ibid.
465
Baylis, J, Wirtz, JJ & Gray, CS (eds) (2007). Strategy in the Contemporary World.
466
The Guardian (2001). It's time for war, Bush and Blair tell Taliban, The Guardian,
Sunday October 7. Available from
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17, 2011)
467
Chesterman S (2005). Just War Or Just Peace After September 11: Axes Of Evil And
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United States of America (2001). Authorization for Use of Military Force, Congress
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Bush, GW (2002). State of the Union Address, January 29. Available from
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470
British Broadcasting Cooperation (BBC) (2002). US expands 'axis of evil', BBC, May
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Lewandowski, W (2004), pp. 15.
472
Ibid., pp. 15 16; see also White House (2002). A Decade of Deception and Defiance.
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473
Gordon, PH (2002). Iraq: the Transatlantic debate, Occasional Papers, no.39, Institute
for Security Studies, December, Paris: European Union, pp. 3; see also UN Security
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White House (2002).A Decade of Deception and Defiance.
475
Lewandowski, W (2004), pp. 15; see also Gordon, PH (2002), pp. 12 - 14.
476
UN Security Council (2002). Resolution 441 of November 8 of 2002, S/RES/1441, New
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O'Connell, ME (2003). Addendum to Armed Force in Iraq: Issues of Legality,
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UN Security Council (2002), para. 13.
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Browne MA (2003). The United Nations Security Council Its Role in the Iraq Crisis: A
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480
UN Security Council (2003). Letter to the President of the United Nations Security
Council of March 20 of 2003, S/2003/351, New York: UN.
481
Ibid.

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Crisis Management June 1987 December 1989, Washington, DC: Center for Military
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484
Perkins, J (2006), pp. 67 70.
485
Ibid.
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Chomsky, N (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants, Berkeley, CA: Odonian Press.
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Naidu, S. (2006). The South African arms industry: redefining the boundaries, in
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Cape Town: HSRC Press. 256.
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Yates LA (2008), pp. 3.
489
Ropp, SC (2011). Panama: New Politics for a New Millennium, in Wiarda, IS & Kline,
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Yates, LA (2008), pp. 6.
491
Perkins, J (2006), pp. 67 70.
492
Yates, LA (2008), pp. 7.
493
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) webpage: http://www.cfr.org/panama/panama-
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Huff, WH (2002). The United States 1989 Military Intervention In Panama: A Just
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495
Chomsky, N (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants; see also Reichstein, M (2008).
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496
Yates, LA (2008), pp. 13.
497
Chomsky, N (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants.
498
Ibid.
499
Nanda, VP (1990). The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under
International Law, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 84, pp. 495.
500
Ibid.
501
UN Security Council (1989). Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousand Nine
Hundred and Second Meeting, S/PV. 2902, New York: UN, pp. 400.
502
UN Security Council (1989). Draft Resolution of December 22, 1989, S-21048, New
York: UN.
503
Lewis, P (1989). Fighting in Panama: United Nations Security Council Condemnation
of Invasion Vetoed, New York Times, December 24. Available from
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/12/24/world/fighting-panama-united-nations-security-
council-condemnation-invasion-vetoed.html (Accessed August 13, 2011)
504
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (2008). Attacks on Justice 2005 -
Democratic Republic of Congo, Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, pp. 117.
505
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo (Accessed
on August 15, 2011)
506
McIntyre, A (2007). Giving back to the future: A discourse on the dilemma of child
soldiers, in Aboagye, FB (ed.), Complex Emergencies in the 21st Century: Challenges
of new Africas strategic peace and security Issues, ISS Monograph Series 134, May,
pp. 13 28.
507
Ibid.
508
British Broadcasting Company (BBC) webpage:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/country_profiles/1076399.stm (Accessed on August
10, 2011)
509
De Witte, L (2001). The assassination of Lumumba, Johannesburg: Jacana, pp. xix.
510
Ibid.
511
Ibid.

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512
Ibid.; see also Lefever, EW (1965). Crisis in the Congo, Washington, DC: Brookings
Institution, pp. 11.
513
Weiss, GW & Hubert ,D (eds.) (2001), pp. 49.
514
UN Security Council (1960). Resolution 143 of July 14 1960, S/RES/14, New York:
UN.
515
UN Security Council (1960d). Resolution 146 of August 9 1960, S/RES/4426, New
York: UN.
516
De Witte, L (2001), pp. 12.
517
British Broadcasting Company webpage.
518
Weiss, GW & Hubert, D (eds.) (2001), pp. 118.
519
Hanson, S (2008).Africa and the International Criminal Court, Council on Foreign
Relations, July 24. Available from http://www.cfr.org/africa/africa-international-criminal-
court/p12048 (Accessed August 20, 2011)
520
Ibid.
521
International Court of Justice webpage: http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/index.php
(Accessed August 20, 2011)
522
Chetail, V (2003). The contribution of the International Court of Justice to international
humanitarian law, International Review of the Red Cross, Vol. 85 (850), pp. 235 - 269.
523
Chomsky, N (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants.
524
Ibid.
525
Organization for American States (OAS) (1979). Resolution 2 of June 23, 1979,
adopted at the 17th Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs,
Washington: OAS.
526
Duiker, WJ & Spielvogel, JJ (2007). The Essential World History, Volume II: Since
1500, 6th ed., Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, pp. 846.
527
Chomsky, N (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants.
528
Duiker, WJ & Spielvogel, JJ (2007), pp. 846.
529
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1984). The Case concerning the military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua: Nicaragua v. United States of America,
November 26, The Hague: International Court of Justice; see also Chetail V (2003), pp.
235.
530
Human Rights Watch (1992). Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 Nicaragua,
January 1, Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
Available from http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/467fca491e.html (Accessed August
14, 2011)
531
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1986). The Case concerning the military and
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua: Nicaragua v. United States of America
(Merits), (1986 I.C.J. 14), June 27, The Hague: International Court of Justice; see also
Morrison, FL (1987). Legal Issues in The Nicaragua Opinion, American Journal of
International Law, January, Vol. 81, pp. 160 - 166.
532
Morrison, FL (1987), pp. 160 166; see also International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1986),
supra note 1, at 56 - 57.
533
Pax, TJ (1985). Nicaragua v. United States in the International Court of Justice:
Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, Boston College International &
Comparative Law, Vol.8 (2), pp. 471 515.
534
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contras#cite_note-45 (Accessed August 14,
2011)
535
International Court of Justice (ICJ) (1986), pp. 126.
536
Ibid.
537
Human Rights Watch (1992).Human Rights Watch World Report 1992 Nicaragua.
538
Friendship Office of the Americas webpage: http://www.friendshipamericas.org/1980s-
world-court-suit-against-us-may-be-refiled (Accessed August 14, 2011)
539
Diehl, PF & Frederking, B (eds.) (2010). The politics of global governance: International
organizations in an interdependent world, 4th ed., London & Boulder (Colorado): Lynne
& Rienner Publishers, pp. 139.

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540
Cater, C (2003). The Political Economy of Conflict and UN Intervention: Rethinking the
Critical Cases of Africa, in Ballentine, K & Sherman, J (eds.), The Political Economy of
Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp.
19 - 45.
541
Colby, G & Dennett, C (1995). Thy Will Be Done, New York: HarperCollins, pp. 325 -
326.
542
Weiss, GW & Hubert, D (eds.) (2001), pp. 50 51.
543
De Witte, L (2001), pp. 8.
544
Pease, L (2009). Midnight in the Congo: The Assassination of Lumumba and the
Mysterious Death of Dag Hammarskjold, Probe, March-April, Vol. 6 (3). Available from
http://www.ctka.net/pr399-congo.html (Accessed on July 31, 2011)
545
Ibid.
546
Morrison, FL (1987), pp. 160 - 166.
547
McGinnis, L (2009). Enforcement of Decisions of International Bodies: ICJ and WTO,
Journal of International Service, September 16. Available from
http://journalofinternationalservice.org/?p=31 (Accessed August 14, 2011)
548
Ibid.
549
Huff, WH (2002).The United States 1989 Military Intervention In Panama: A Just
Cause?, Unpublished Master of Arts in Liberal Arts, Tallahassee, FL: Florida State
University, pp. 9.
550
Chomsky, N (1992). What Uncle Sam Really Wants.
551
Ibid.
552
United Nations Security Council (2011c), para. 4.
553
Mail & Guardian (2011). SA slams Nato's 'regime change' in Libya in UN speech, Mail
& Guardian Online, June 15. Available from http://mg.co.za/article/2011-06-15-sa-
slams-natos-regime-change-in-libya-un-speech (Accessed August 13, 2011)
554
The Guardian (2011). Libya: The perils of intervention, The Guardian, Saturday,
March 19. Available from http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/19/libya-perils-of-
intervention-editorial (Accessed August 13, 2011)
555
Blanchard, CM (2011), pp. 1.
556
Marfinati, B, Parra-Bernal, G & Beech, E (2011). Brazil calls for ceasefire in Libya,
Reuters, March 22. Available from
http://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFTRE72L0YY20110322 (Accessed July 20,
2011)
557
Euronews (2011). Libya: a timeline of international diplomacy.
558
United Nations Security Council (2011c), pp. 4.
559
The Daily Star (2011). Arming Libyan rebels risks diplomatic showdown: US to pull out
warplanes, missiles from Libya mission, The Daily Star, Sunday, April 3. Available
from http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=180187 (Accessed
August 13, 2011)
560
Chossudovsky, M (2011). Operation Libya US-NATO Military intervention Is Far-
Reaching, Global Research, March 10. Available from
http://www.webnewsjax.com/?p=1573 (Accessed August 13, 2011)
561
Ibid.
562
US Department of Justice (2011). Authority to use military force in Libya: Memorandum
opinion for the Attorney General, Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 35,
Washington: Department of Justice, pp. 6. Available from
www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (Accessed August 13,
2011)
563
Business Day (2011). Second thoughts on Libya, Business Day, March 31. Available
from http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/Content.aspx?id=138720(Accessed August
13, 2011)
564
Lillich, RB (1995). The Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights In
Crisis Situations: UN Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, Tulane
Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 3 (1), pp. 2 17.

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565
United Nations Security Council (1992). Provisional Verbatim Record of The Three
Thousand and Forty-Sixth Meeting, S/PV.3046, New York: UN, pp. 131.
566
Ibid.
567
United Nations Security Council (1990). Provisional Verbatim Record of The Two
Thousand Nine Hundred and Thirty-Eighth Meeting, S/PV.2938, New York: UN, pp. 25.
568
Ibid., pp. 11.
569
Gordon, PH (2003). Bridging the Atlantic Divide, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82 (1), pp. 70
83.
570
Hanson, S (2008). Africa and the International Criminal Court.
571
Al Jazeera (2011). ICC issues Gaddafi arrest warrant, Al Jazeera, June 25. Available
from http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2011/06/20116278148166670.html
(Accessed August 20, 2011)
572
Vann, (2003). US retaliates over war crime immunity demand: 35 countries denied
arms aid, World Socialist, July 5. Available from
http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/icc-j05.shtml (Accessed August 20, 2011)
573
Ibid.

153