Eriugena's Platonism

Eriugena's Platonism
Author(s): Werner Beierwaltes

Source: Hermathena, No. 149, Special Issue: The Heritage of Platonism (Winter 1990), pp.
53-72
Published by: Trinity College Dublin
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23041173
Accessed: 17-03-2017 16:22 UTC
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by Werner Beierwaltes
For ltdouard Jeauneau
The term 'Platonism' is a complex concept. In connection with

Eriugena we shall confine it to the form of thought developed in
late antiquity which we usually call 'Neoplatonism'. The question
which I wish to discuss, at least in its outlines, is this: what position
does Eriugena, the most important thinker in the early Middle Ages
between Boethius and Anselm of Canterbury, assume in respect of
the basic metaphysical questions of Neoplatonism? In so far as
Eriugena's relation to Neoplatonism was not, and could not, be a
direct one, the question should be raised to what extent he came
into contact with just this sort of philosophy? This justifies the
comparison of the two structures of thought. This comparison,
along with the attempt to trace Eriugena's central concepts back to
the fundamental metaphysical issues in Neoplatonic philosophy
upon which it is based, and thus to reveal the reflexive structure of
his thought, presupposes a close relationship between what we, at
least since the time of Aquinas, can define more objectively and in
more precise terminology as 'philosophy' and 'theology'. There are,
naturally, considerations in Eriugena about this relation between
what is called philosophia and religio, but more pronounced is a
practice of thought and writing which incorporates both of these.
Philosophy and theology form in his mind an integrated whole. We
can therefore say: Eriugena's thought is basically constituted by the
mutual penetration of philosophical and theological ideas into a
coherent unity. On account of this unity Eriugena's thought might
be considered to be the most compelling and internally coherent
paradigm of philosophical or speculative theology in the early
Middle Ages: in so far, that is, as we understand 'speculative' in
the positive sense of Hegel. 'Philosophy' and 'theology' form in
Eriugena's thought a dialectically conditioned unity: genuine philo
sophical ideas are transformed for the purposes of theology, theo
logical ideas conceptualised through philosophical reflection and
argument. That which is an image or symbol, in the history of
theology, and determined by the notion of the Incarnation as an
eschatological process, attains its form of reflection in philosophical
thought. Philosophy, in turn, unveils the sense of Holy Scripture in
53
Werner Beierwaltes
a way in which the latter could not reveal itself. In Eriugena's

first extensive work on the question of predestination we find
argumentative method which shows that he believed that theo
logical questions generally need philosophical-argumentative
reflection. This serves to clarify them in themselves and thus to
make them more convincing for others. This applies further to those
theological questions which are the immediate results of biblical
exegesis (such as the problem of creation in John's Prologue) as
well as those which arise from instructive works in the tradition
which have become controversial and which stand in need of
criticism, or analysis and further development (as in the case of
predestination or the Last Supper). Eriugena impressively for
mulates the relationship of religio to philosophia which we have
just sketched in the following thesis: veram esse philosophiam veram
religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam.' The
meaning and range of application of this sentence is not restricted
to the solution of controversial theological questions with the help
of philosophy. It can be taken to be a guiding principle for Eriugena's
philosophical-theological thought as a whole. One can show in the
same fashion how this principle is decisive for Eriugena's exegetical
writings, his interpretation of Dionysius, and for the developed
system in Periphyseon. Even if Eriugena does not explicitly discuss
the conditions and effects of this guiding principle, he makes use of
it in the main areas of his theology in which he is not immediately
dealing with Scripture or traditional dogmatic.
In order to define more exactly what we have generally called
'philosophy' or 'philosophical', we have to raise the question of
Eriugena's sources;2 a problem which has just as much significance
for the transmission of philosophical questions and problems as for
the philosophical terminology. On account of Eriugena's particular
situation, we are compelled to analyse the philosophical element or
implications in sources which may at first appear 'theological'.
Augustine, Gregory of Nyssa, Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius the Are
opagite (culmen theologiae) are, above all others, of particular auth
ority for Eriugena.
When dealing with these sources he does not blindly accept their
auctoritas, but judges them critically with his own ratio. In this way
auctoritas and ratio support and complement one another.3 If we
assume that these aforementioned theologians had a decisive influ
ence upon Eriugena's thought, it becomes obvious that he could
not have had any access from them to pure or original philosophy.
It was only indirectly that he had access to philosophy; and to a
54
philosophy already transformed into a theologically coherent con

text amid a range of theological issues, and where the philosophy
is a determining element or implication of the theology. It is the
internal reflexive structure which makes the thought as a whole
compelling.
This assessment has a thoroughly objective validity: it is an
objective characteristic of the structure of Eriugena's thought. It
provokes in our present consideration the question of whether
Eriugena himself could ever have been aware of philosophy as
philosophy, i.e. in the sense of a determining element in his theology.
We do not find one philosopher among the number of auctoritates
named, acknowledged and used by Eriugena. He mentions Plato4
but we cannot for this reason assume that he knows the Platonic
Dialogues5. Aristotle is merely familiar to him as the 'logician'
and this, ignoring other transmission of Aristotle, via the pseudo
Augustinian text Categoriae Decern6 and Boethius' commentary on
De Interpretatione. This implies a link with Aristotelian forms of
argument: his adoption of the dialectical method and syllogism,
and his reflection of the Aristotelian doctrine of categories as the
presupposition of his radically negative theology which denies as
its very goal the applicability of categorial being, or indeed categories
at all, as predicates of the supreme concept. This method is primarily
and genuinely Neoplatonic. Eriugena links the question of the appli
cability of categories to the concept of God with Aristotelian argu
ments. If we take into consideration the minimal effects of
Eriugena's direct contact with Greek philosophy we can doubtless
draw the following conclusion: neither Platonism nor Ari
stotelianism but Neoplatonism determines the fundamental method
and character of Eriugena's philosophical theology.
A direct historically verifiable dependence of Eriugena upon
the sources of genuine Neoplatonic philosophy, however, such as
Plotinus, Porphyry or Proclus, would be hard to establish. The
claims concerning Eriugena's direct relation to Plotinus as stated
by M. Techert7 cannot be corroborated: Eriugena's texts which
have been compared to Plotinus could just as well have been
based upon Augustine, Stoic tenets or Macrobius. The 'Neoplatonic
thought' in Eriugena's philosophy is transmitted to him exclusively
by his theological auctoritates and thus already in a theologically
modified rather than original form. A transmission of Neoplatonic
thought can be maintained because the theology of all his theological
auctoritates is influenced by Neoplatonic language, concepts, and
thought structures in varying intensity. The theological integration
55
Werner Beierwaltes
of Neoplatonic concepts is more convincing, for example, in Gregory

of Nyssa's or Augustine's works than in those of Dionysius the
Areopagite where the systematic thought of Proclus is still directly
evident. Eriugena is, further, most influenced by the form of theology
presented by Dionysius. In this way the preponderance of Neo
platonic philosophical tenets in Dionysian theology, with Eriugena's
deep and wide ranging sympathy for Dionysius, informs Eriugena's
theology with its philosophical Neoplatonic structure. Plotinus,
Porphyry and Proclus thus exerted an impact upon Eriugena's
theology indirectly but no less strongly. On the contrary, in so far as
Eriugena alights upon a form which has already been transformed
theologically, there is no question of possible or sometimes necessary
reservations with respect to philosophical conceptions which, taken
in themselves, could on occasion irritate Christian theology. Greek
philosophy which appears already as Christian theology need not
be tested as something foreign, questioned concerning usus iustus,
but as kindred thought (though naturally with necessary immanent
critique and transformation) it can yield a more extensive influence.
It is not as if philosophy here is theologically received and
transformed. Rather, theologically more or less disguised central
tenets play a determining role as theological doctrines in a com
monly accepted context of problems and thinking. Philosophy is
thus not opposed to theology, but both appear together in the
form of a tightly wrought theological system requiring no closer
inspection of its roots beyond Dionysius and Origen. The actual
origin is, however, as such still effective despite the theological
transformation. Eriugena's unconscious inclination to Neoplatonic
philosophy decisively influences the concept of his thought. I have
on several occasions previously attempted to explain and to illus
trate with examples, from Eriugena among others,8 the point that
it is simply not possible to understand a philosophical reception as
a purely formal process. By 'formal' we speak as if the adopted
philosophical terminology and framework of thought could be neatly
separated from its object and in the process of reception filled with
a new content which in turn could eradicate even the traces of the
original philosophical content. This would not only falsely assign
too little power of discrimination to the recipient, but would be a
serious mistake on the part of the modern interpreter. This mistake
has its basis in, and is perpetuated by, a delusion about one's own
hermeneutical position. On the contrary, we have to become aware
of, and remain aware of, the fact that a reception in so far as it
deserves this hermeneutical title, is not a complete alignment with
56
that which is alike, or the thoughtless levelling out of that which is

alien. Nor is it the conciliation of an unfavourable conflict between
sic and non where non is to be preferred to the sic while nevertheless
holding implicitly the sic as the original stimulus of the reception; it
is much more a dialectical process which itself is significant for the
issue at hand. That which is alien, or other, forms the indigenous
thought more than the recipient recognises or wishes to recognise.
At the same time the possibility must be acknowledged that the
indigenous thought can itself develop the alien or other, by way of
synthesis, into a new mode of thinking. The self-estimation of a
thinker is not always true to the actual circumstances of his relation
ship to the traditional sources.
In Eriugena's case we should remember that the issue of the
adoption of philosophical tenets into his theology is a radically
different problem from that of the Fathers up to Augustine or even
Dionysius himself. The unconscious or unreflected adoption and
transformation of philosophical tenets implicit in the theories which
appeared thoroughly theological and Christian to Eriugena did not
provoke the sharp distinction between Platonism and Christianity9,
which had appeared necessary for earlier theologians for dogmatic
reasons. Here we have no critical confrontation between Chris
tianity and pagan philosophy where pagan philosophy is deemed
acceptable or not according to Christian lights: on the model of
Origen contra Celsum. There develops instead (at least from our
vantage point where we can isolate the philosophical thought
transformed into theology) a theology which, in comparison to the
perhaps stronger boundaries set by earlier reception, remains from
its roots upwards indebted to Neoplatonic thought. Eriugena's
hermeneutical starting point for his confrontation with tradition
was of course Christian and as we have said this indeed
strengthened the Neoplatonic elements he found in the tradition.
When considering the historical transmission and the unity of
philosophy and theology in Eriugena's work an awareness of her
meneutical issues is necessary. Philosophy and theology should be
distinguished or even divided in order to synthesize them in full
awareness of their difference. Yet in this analysis the totality of
Eriugena's thought should not be lost sight of, and correspondingly
the philosophical structure should not appear in isolation.10
In what follows I wish to point out certain close inner connections
between Eriugena's thought and Neoplatonism.
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Werner Beierwaltes
1. The question concerning the One is a basic issue in Platonic

and Neoplatonic philosophy. Eriugena adopts it in his inquiry
concerning God simply as the One, or the unity in the Trinity.
The One, in the Neoplatonic sense, is the first 'hypostasis', the
all embracing cause and origin of reality as a whole, while being
identical with the Good and the universal goal of the activity of
Being which had emerged from him. Reality generally emerges from
the One, while the One remains absolutely unitary in itself and
transcends the realm of manifold being; indeed it is beyond thought
because self-reflection posits difference and thus multiplicity. As
the all-embracing cause and origin it is not something definite,
thoroughly transcendent over against that which exists from and
outside him, different from all this it is the 'Nothing of all'. It is
precisely because of its absolute otherness and transcendence over
against the realm of the other, the categorial, the realm of
manifold interrelatedness, that it can function as the principle
of existence in all being; the 'Being' of individual being in all and
at the same time beyond all: 'everywhere and nowhere' as Plotinus
paradoxically expresses the 'being' of the One. The beyond-Being
or radical transcendence of the One contrasted with that which has
emerged from it, and its in-Being or its immanence, provokes the
return of reality to its original ground (Ur-Grund). The One in
itself, as it in itself'is', can only be negatively circumscribed as the
'Nothing of all' by human thought which is necessarily conditioned
by plurality, difference and finitude. This limitation by negation is
accomplished by denying all possible categorial determinations of
the One: it is a process of thought which culminates in the 'Nothing
of all' or the negation of the negation. This process should abolish
all difference and thought itself, and is superseded in the resulting
unification with the principle, the One itself. Negation is the
exclusion of the limits of thought.
Dionysius, and along with him Maximus the Confessor, adopted
these Neoplatonic tenets from Proclus who develops them especially
in his Parmenides commentary in extenso. In formulations linguis
tically and in their substance very close to the Neoplatonic con
ception, Dionysius defines God as the One, who is 'beyond all' and
yet the origin of all. The Dionysian counterpart to the Neoplatonic
absolute and relationless One, according to the first hypothesis of
the Parmenides, is a form of divine Unity which is above all that
which implies or effects difference. In other words, the divine unity
58
is above Being since it is nothing of all, 'absolute', above the

differentiations of Being (i.e. above all form and boundary, itself
boundless and infinite), and above the act of reflexive movement in
the Many: thought. This pure unity, however, seen from the per
spective of the inner-trinitarian movement of God and his creative unfolding
is, none the less, identical with Being and self-reflective thought: on hen and
nous corresponding to the second hypothesis of the Parmenides, at the
same time Being, Wisdom and Logos are divine names by virtue of
the authority of Scripture. 'Being' should not only be understood
as real-Being and unchangeable-Being, (in the sense of Exodus 3,14:
ego eimi ho on), but also as actively embracing the ideas (logoi,
paradeigmata): This is His own Being as the pre-Being of the world,
the unitary coincidence of that which through its emergence appears
as opposite poles. The divine Being itself, however (auto to einai), in
respect of its absolute unity is equally well understood as Being
beyond Being or Essence beyond Essence (huperousios ousia). Being
does not abnegate Beyond Being, but is rather the implication
befitting the character of the pure unity and absoluteness of the
Beyond Being. The 'Divine Intellect' (theios nous) is the aforesaid
activity of Being by which God through knowledge and discernment
is related to Himself, i.e. to His Ideas. And thereby He includes
everything in Himself as a 'unity'. The 'Divine Intellect' is the
activity of Being on which gnosis, sophia, logos as characteristics of
His reality are based. Thus pure unity is disclosed in Being and
thought: to the henosis corresponds the immanent diakrisis, the dif
ference corresponds to the identity. The divine Unity is thus 'unified
in difference and differentiated in unity', an 'unmixed unity' in
itself. His One Being is not diminished in intensity because God
allows his agathon-Being to appear in a creative, world constituting
unfolding ('theophany'). The profusion of God's goodness reveals
itself to be the absolute cause and origin which is the 'Being of all'
and immanent in all, while nonetheless remaining Himself above
all else. This emergence, considering the absolute unity, can only
be formulated in paradoxes: the deity 'differentiates Itself while
in Itself identical' (while remaining unitary), makes Itself many,
without abandoning its oneness.12
In Dionysius, as I have shown above, essential elements of
Neoplatonic thought are transformed into a Christian frame of
thought. This Christian transformation of the Neoplatonic idea of
unity is decisive for the formation of Eriugena's conception of God
and the world. This is the case because of his immediate exposure
to that same theology which has not just adopted a method and
59
Werner Beierwaltes
form of reflection of the philosophy upon which it draws, but

essential constitutive elements of that philosophy. For Eriugena this
has certain consequences.
God whether immediately or mediately is the goal of all
reflection, meditation, exegesis or poetry, is absolutely unitary: the
One above and beyond any multiplicity and difference, an absolute
unity, which bears a conception of Being containing difference (Trin
ity), without being a being amongst other beings, even the highest.
A unity rather, 'prior to' Being as individual and as a whole; a unity
'above' Being (superessentialis) and thus Nothing of all being to which
it 'is' transcendent and in which it works as the constitutive ground.
In this concept of absolute unity the Neoplatonic One is reflected
from various angles: His excellence, his 'Nothingness' and his
difference from all things. Eriugena's methodological decision to
prefer ultimately negative theology to affirmative-symbolic theology
is the consequence of a thought, expounded just as vehemently by
Dionysius as by Proclus, that apart from the predication of God's
being per excellentiam or per infinitatem nihil13 the negative theology is
most fitting. The model for this, working implicitly through the
mediation of Dionysius and Maximus the Confessor, is the negative
dialectic of Plotinus and Proclus outlined above. This is the result
of a metaphysical interpretation of the Parmenides exegesis which
places the One beyond any particular being (i.e. beyond any cat
egorical being) in order to distinguish Him as that different from
all or as the Nothing of all.14 If'category' means one of the manifold
forms of predication which clarify the structure of an individual
being, then the task of the negation in respect of the infinite, the
infinitas dei, is precisely to deny any categorical being to the infinite
and so to fulfil the proposition nullam categoriam in Deum cadere,15 This
proposition should be thought of as simultaneously a presupposition
and a result. It is the result of the attempt which Eriugena under
takes exhaustively in the first book of Peripkyseon; the examination
of the validity of the application of predicates to God. This pro
position is further a presupposition for each further expression about
God. Such statements are only possible if they are intentionally
category-transcendent. The sentence nullam categoriam in Deum ca
dere entails that the superessentialis-esse of God must be thought of as
an incommensurable magnitude in comparison with categorical
being: affirmation which refers to His reality, and negation which
refers to His otherness are both paradoxically valid. Thus even the
most general and indeterminate statement that God 'is', must be
counterbalanced. The apparently affirmative 'above' of'more than'
60
proves to be a negation of being: "God is nothing", per excellentiam

or per infinitatem nihil. This points to the fact that God who is the
Essence-beyond or Being-beyond is the absolute otherness (nullum
eorum) or the opposite of all opposites (oppositio oppositorum);16 at the
same time, however, He is the universal-creating and determining
ground of being, the absolute wealth of all which out of Him, as
the absolute Being, individualizes itself in a definable being. The
negative dialectic which culminates in the predicate 'Nothing of all'
does not, however, 'destroy' every sense of affirmative statements
about God which call Him, for instance, Being, Wisdom, Truth,
Light or Life, but rather negative dialectic includes and 'elevates'
their meaning by explaining that all these affirmative predicates
are proper to God but do, nevertheless, not capture Him in His
essence. Thus He is more than Being, Wisdom, Truth, Thought,
Light or Life. He is all these paradoxically in so far as He is
Being beyond or nothing of all.
2. That Being which is Being per se, the transcendent 'Nothing

of all', has also another aspect which is turned to 'us' or to the
'world'. It is the principium omnium, the origin of everything besides
Itself; it is the creator of Itself and of everything else. The unfolding
of the absolute divine Nothingness into Itself (a subject which I shall
discuss in more detail below) emerges as world by creating that
world 'out of nothing'. Thus God is as the constituting ground
of all in all, without losing his absoluteness and without being
absorbed into all. God's being in the world is the reason, seen
cosmologically, for the world's teleology, and is also the reason,
theologically speaking, for its eschatological return to an original
'paradisal' condition of unity and harmony initiated and fostered
by the Incarnation. Thus as a whole this thought also reveals a
Neoplatonic structure in this dialectical relationship between God's
Beyond-Being and In-Being, between his immanence and tran
scendence. The One is all because It is the origin of all (arche panton),
or the 'power of all' {dynamis panton)}1 At the same time It is the
'Nothing of all', or otherwise expressed, It is not identical with any
particular, otherwise It could not be the origin of all. Eriugena's
concept of God corresponds to paradoxes of the Neoplatonic One:
His omnipresence corresponds to his being nowhere. Being in all,
He is thus above all. He is even 'all in all' as in I Cor 15:28 (omnia
in omnibus). Ontologically this means that God is at once in all and
is all because He is the principium omnium or the esse omnium without
as esse omnium thereby losing His status as Beyond Being.18 Eschat
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Werner Beierwaltes
ologically this means that at the end of history in the reditus omnium
in unum, in a universal process of spiritualisation and deification of
the world, He will be 'all in all'. Thus He shall prove his Beyond
Being through the process of history. Eriugena's concept of creation
does not level out God's transcendence to pantheism, but instead
explains His immanence and transcendence in terms of a dialectical
balance. The God beyond Being sublimates all difference in Himself
rather than dissipating or exhausting himself. Thus the previously
quoted verse from I Cor. 15,28 ut deus sit omnia in omnibus,19 is not
interpreted by Eriugena as the self-destruction of the absolute unity
into a diffuse unity of the Many. It is rather that the absolute origin
can be in all and that all can be through Him, because He conserves
his own absoluteness,20 because He does not achieve 'totality'21 by
virtue of the world-process, even if this manifests itself in the world.
3. Neoplatonic thought as a whole, albeit in various ways, is

determined by this thought: The universal principle, the One itself,
in spite of its emergence out of itself into the Many remains Itself
in Itself. The beings which have emerged from the One, however,
turn back to their origin on account of their causal and reflexive
bond with It. The triad which formulates this process or situation
is 'permanence, procession and reversion' (mone-prohodos-epistrophe)
can be seen as the lawlike structure of Being which structures reality
as a whole, is fulfilled in the realm of particulars and thus can bring
these particulars into its own unity.22 In Eriugena's thought this
triadic movement of permanence, procession and reversion which
one encounters in many areas is the prototype of his central ideas:
it is the prototype of God's creative proceeding within Himself, His
reflexive return to Himself, his creative expression in the world and
of its perfective return to its origin. The individual elements of the
triad are reifications of the cosmological activity of God and the
salvation history. Mone occurs through God's Beyond Being which
conceives of itself as a trinitarian relationship. Prohodos is embodied
by the turning of the logos towards the world in which it is created,
and by the incarnatio or inhumanatio Verbi. Epistrophe is manifest as
salvation: the turning to reconciliation or the restoration of the
original unity has its beginning in Christ's death and resurrection,
a death which is the death of death, and thus guarantees mercy and
salvation. In this respect the triad is thus the pattern of Eriugena's
main work Periphyseon: the analysis of God's Beyond Being and
Being in Himself, His proceeding within Himself is followed by a
creative outflowing into the world; thereby is the world first and
62
foremost constituted, or appears as Theophany (Books 1-3). In the

analysis of the universal reditus of man and world the outflowing is
fulfilled in the very transition (transitus) into the unity of its origin:
The alpha is eschatologically reached again in the omega in the
conclusion of the circular process of creation and sublimation (Books
4-5).
Amid this broad framework of issues I should like to emphasise
one central aspect of Eriugena's work: the creative inner self
disclosure of God and His transition 'to external reality' through
which He rejoins Himself to Himself in his wordly self-mani
festation. In order to explain the philosophical significance of his
thought and thus Eriugena's relationship to Neoplatonism on basic
questions, I wish to make a few remarks concerning the self expli
cation and self limitation of the One in Neoplatonic philosophy.
Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus, despite their difference, agree
upon the unfolding of the One into Being, into Intellect and into
the Cosmos, or into that 'being One' (das 'seiende' Eine) which
differentiates itself from the One as the creative spirit or mind in
the world or as world. The One as it is in itself is Beyond Being and
without internal relations (Plotinus, Proclus) or the most intensive
possible unity of thought and being without difference (Porphyry),
proceeds from Itself and thus creates beings which are characterised
by difference, it constitutes Being the primary realm of the many
as difference from the One itself. From the pure One emerges
the unitary Many, the unity in multiplicity or a unity in spite of its
internal differences. The Many in this Other, but nonetheless
unitary Being are 'ideas', identical in themselves and thus different
from the others. This limited or determinate Being is composed of
elements standing in an inextricable relation to each other. The
ground or medium for the fulfilment of this unity in difference is
active thought. By thinking the Ideas which are, It thinks itself in
them. Thus intellect is a thinking return or a reflection of itself, a
thinking of its own being which as a result of its existence without
process or time is true being. Intellect (nous) the act of thought
(noesis) and the 'object' or timeless 'result' of thinking (noeton, on)
are thus the same. Intellect as a hypostasis which is unified in itself
is to be understood as the 'place of the Ideas'; Its unity in multiplicity
or its unity arising from difference is not simply achieved through a
purely internal act of the intellect, but just this intellectual act bears
equally upon the One. It is a return to the One. It might be
interpreted as the operation of the One in His or Its otherness. 'The
movement and the otherness which proceed from the One are
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Werner Beierwaltes
undefined and need the One to define them. They are defined when
they turn to the One'.23 This return might be understood as the
cognitive determination or limitation of that which proceeds from
the One and 'initially' appears to be undefined 'intelligible matter'.
Then, however, through a reflexive relation to the One as its object,
it is transformed from the 'undefined duality' into a unity which is
defined, limited and formed. Thus the identity and difference of the
Ideas (as modes of the limitation of individuals) as well as the unity
of this relation of the indefinite being occurs, when it turns back to
the One as its own object of thought and in this way becomes a self
definition or ^//"-limitation of the Intellect as a ^//"-subsisting Being
(hypostasis).
This can be understood in a sense as the inclination of the One
to Itself in its otherness. In this inclination of the One to Itself in
the Other It sees Itself, a seeing which is still an 'indeterminate
seeing' (atypotos opsis), is transformed into a defined and full seeing
by the One this is Intellect in its self-subsisting relation unto
itself and which, at the same time, is a turning to the One which is
the very source of its being what it is.
This Plotinian thought is at work in Augustine's concept of the
conversio and the formatio of unformed or intelligible matter, not to
mention Proclus despite the latter's differentiated realms of being.
Thus it could also be a starting point for Dionysius: God as Intellect
[nous) or unity, which insofar as He is Intellect, Logos, Wisdom,
thinks Himself and as the 'place of the ideas' unfolds Himself
creatively into the world. Dionysius' rather positive judgement of
this constructive procession into spatio-temporal being is an essen
tial difference between his and Neoplatonic thought. The philo
sophical concept outlined above became a paradigm for Eriugena's
theory of the causae primordiales, the primordial causes, and thus the
model of the inner creative self-unfolding of God in the tradition of
Dionysius, Maximus and Augustine.
God's unfolding and revealing of Himself within Himself is, in
accordance with Scripture, trinitarian. Eriugena regards God's self
explication as identical with a creatio ex nihilo. 'Nothing' means
the absolute negation of God's 'Beyond-essence' (superessentialis).
Creatio, on the other hand, initially refers to God's 'internal' Being,
i.e. God's creative flowing out of His nothing into His being, into a
unity which is both unum and multiplex. God's creative procession
into Himself is thus identical with a 'creation of Himself (a se ipso
creator).2* Eriugena thinks this procession is primarily an internal
transition of God from 'nothing' to 'something'. It is, according to
64
Eriugena, an abandonment of 'nothingness' or a 'descent' from

Himself into Himself this might also be interpreted as a 'pro
ductive' self-negation of the Nothingness which simultaneously is a
process of forming or determining the 'yet' undefined wealth of
being. The active 'subject' of this transition which negates itself is
the Nothing of the superessentialitas dei itself. Since Eriugena thinks
that the first 'phase' of this timeless process is indefined or unformed
matter (informis materia) which defines and delimits itself by return
ing to itself i.e., 'looking back' unto itself and because he
understands this phase as the being most immediately dependent
upon the sapientia informis or on the informitas divinae sapientiae, he
adopts the Neoplatonic concept of the One's self-explication and
explains God's self-explication in the tradition of Augustine
as a self-reflection on the absolute timeless intellect and as a self
definition or self-constitution of what was 'before' unbounded and
indefined. This sort of self-explication and self-definition, however,
in which God creates and forms Himself, is not to be seen in
contradiction to God's infinitas. Eriugena's concept is quite clearly
stated in a paragraph in the third book of the Periphyseon:
The divine Goodness [identical with the Nothing] descends from the
negation of all essences or all beings into the affirmation of the essence of
the whole universe; from itself into itself, as though from nothing into
something, from non-essentiality into essentiality, from formlessness into
innumerable forms and species. For its first progression into the primordial
causes in which it is made is spoken of by Scripture as formless matter:
matter because it is the beginning of the essence of things; formless because
it comes nearest to the formlessness of the Divine Wisdom. Now the divine
Wisdom is rightly called formless because it does not turn to any form
above itself for its formation.25
4. Having pointed out the similarity of Eriugena's thought to

Neoplatonism, I wish to show now how Eriugena differs on this
issue. God's identification with Logos and Wisdom commended
by Scripture fulfils that which philosophy since Plotinus (with
recourse to Plato against Aristotle) had largely achieved with two
albetit connected dimensions in one sphere: God is at once Unity,
Being and Thought (Wisdom, Verbum). Only thus is a trinitarian
conception of God thinkable. The trinitarian self-disclosure of God
does not surrender its unity, but makes of it a unity born of self
reflection. Given the necessity to attribute wisdom to God, by virtue
of which He thinks Himself and 'sees' Himself and thus also creates
65
Werner Beierwaltes
Himself, the Neoplatonic thought that the One is prior to any 'what'
predominates: God's sapientia is indeed a thinking and creating self
relation, but not in the sense of an objectifying and disconnecting,
thus dividing essential knowledge. As the most intensive sapientia It
is ignorantia since the One as Itself (qua superesse) is not a something
(quid). It cannot know 'what' (quid) It is. Thus Its ignorantia is not
an inability but rather summa ac vera sapientia,26 It consists necessarily
of the not-being-able-to-know the 'what' (the what it is), because
It, as vera sapientia, is the consciousness of its own unity (or its
essence as super-essence) as not being a something ('what'). I
have described this as 'absolute self-consciousness'27 in order to
distinguish it from a reflection which of its nature is conscious of
itself as an object. I wanted further to make it evident that the
interaction or the One-being of thinking and not thinking is a model
for the 'divine metaphor' of a darkness which is light in itself or a
light which must appear dark because of its absoluteness. In spite
of the conception of an absolute self-consciousness of God, who does
not know what He is because He is not a 'what' or a something,
Eriugena's conception of God differs from that of Plotinus' or
Proclus' One precisely in his emphasis on the element of God's
internal self-revelation or creative self-unfolding. This has to be
understood as combined with an emphasis on the divine unity
which originated in Dionysius. The self-consciousness which is
totally united in Himself does not even permit the notion of a
difference within Him.
The two following characteristics are thoroughly bound together

in Eriugena's concept of God: a most intense unity which is prior
to 'something' else and which belongs to the One itself, and a self
explication and self-limitation (of the One) in the Intellect or as
Intellect. Both these elements could not have been developed in
this form if Eriugena only had access to pure Theology (i.e. without
being subject to Neoplatonic philosophical influence). These ideas,
further, can only be understood adequately in their manifold theo
logical adoption when we consider the philosophical paradigm in
itself and in its consequences. The same is true for what I have
called the basic law constituting Being as a whole and the particular
realms within it, especially the Nous or the inner Divine movement:
performance, progression and reversion.
5. I wish now to add some rather brief remarks about a further
point of contact between Eriugena and Neoplatonism: the meta
66
physics or metaphors of light in which Eriugena convincingly dis

plays a Neoplatonic form of thought.
'Light' and the predicates which refer to light are used in Neo
platonic philosophy metaphorically as well as ontologically-meta
physically. The idea of the unity of light, Being and the One which
is beyond Being becomes finally and comprehensively a basic feature
of metaphysics. Plotinus, for example, clarifies the operation of the
One by using Plato's image of the Sun; It is the origin of all,
dispersing and yet remaining within itself, the source of intelligible
light. It is as the illuminating ground, ubiquitous and undivided in
itself, and yet never completely absorbed as a whole into particular
being. In the Intellect, the sphere of the intelligible, timeless, and
pure reality of existent being, the light, the One, differentiates itself
and shines in the Intellect in the way of own reflection. This
developing otherness which is manifold and unitary is thus the light
of the centre (the One itself) which unfolds itself, the One itself
which 'unfolded-folded' becomes also the constituting origin of the
hypostasis of'Soul' (psyche). Thus Intellect and Soul are circles of
light which are to be understood as light of different intensity which
surrounds the One.28 The most evident example of the metaphysical
and ontological meaning of light is the Intellect: Intellect does not
possess light as though something were 'added' to it, but is 'in
its very essence transluminated'. This means that the intellect
transilluminates itself in a timeless act as its own being:
All things there are translucent and there is nothing dark or opaque;
everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything; for
light is transparent to light. Each there has everything in itself and sees
all things in every other, so that all are everywhere and each and every
one is all and the splendour is unbounded.29
Proclus regards reality as a whole in terms of a hierarchy of light.

The light goes out of the One and is mediated from step to step. It
is itself 'partaking of the Divine Being'.30 Knowledge of being is
thus light-like, and the self-reflection of the soul which through self
transcendence leads to the identification of its own light with the
primal light of the One. This is to be understood as a progressive
'illumination' of the human intellect-soul as a whole.
Dionysius the Areopagite has adopted the basic concepts of
Neoplatonic light-metaphysics and light-metaphors; in some
respects he even intensified the concentration upon Light. His
67
Werner Beierwaltes
work may thus rightly be called a 'handbook for medieval light

symbolism'.
The influence of Dionysius the Areopagite can still be seen in
Eriugena's own conception of light.31 For him God is in Himself
pure light. On account of His extreme brightness (a Dionysian
thought) He in Himself appears to the finite eyesight to be darkness
(tenebrae, caligo). His brightness, which blinds other beings, prohibits
any approach to His Being in Himself and makes any immediate
or non-metaphorical statements impossible. The bright darkness of
the Divine Light can only be experienced and understood in its
appearance or self-revelation in or as world. We have already analysed
the thought that God is both beyond all and, through his creative
self-explication also in all. This is, in other words, the infinite
Nothingness of God, which by negating itself flows out in itself as
a trinity and which 'then' flowing out into the being-something of
the world. That means that in His 'creation' He allows the other
beings to participate in the fulness which he contains and that he
reveals Himself in or as the world. In terms of the theory of light,
the world is a theophany, an appearance or shade of the Divine Light
which is in itself at the same time beyond light. In dialectical
terminology the world is the 'negati affirmatio' or the under
standable and expressible mode of being of that Being which is not
understandable and expressible as Himself.32 The Divine Light is
the 'light of the intellects' (lux mentium). It is the origin of the ability
of the intellect to enlighten itself praecendente et adiuvante gratia
divina and to progress towards the state of illuminatio, a state in
which man becomes aware that the Divine Light itself is the
moving and illuminating principle of its own operation.33 In general,
however, it is maintained 'that no rational or intellectual creature
is a substantial light through itself, but only in so far as it participates
in the one and pure substantial light which shines everywhere and
in all intelligibly'.34 The material world is also included in this
conception of light: omnia, quae sunt, lumina sunt,35 so that the light in
all things even in 'wood or stone' can provoke the search for the
origin of their own particular light. More generally, the world as a
bright theophany, the world as an image, symbol or metaphor of
the appearance of God, provokes and fosters the drive of the mind
from the world of appearances to the world beyond appearances
and to think of this latter world as the ground and basis of the
former. The intelligibility of the sensible (material) realm which is
in itself bright, thus invites a cognitive, moral and artistic return to
the primal light which makes itself accessible in the theophanic

light structure of the world.
The following thought, developed by Eriugena largely through
his Dionysius interpretation, has become a standard principle: the
need to progress from material being to the intelligible is a necessary
transition from visible light to the origin of its appearance. Abbot
Suger's adoption of this thought leads to its becoming a crucial
element in the origin of the Gothic style. The visible testimony of
this notion is the Western end and the choir of the cathedral of St.
Denis.36 Thus also in respect of this de facto Eriugenian theoretical
basis of medieval aesthetics, we see a connection between Eriugena
and genuine Neoplatonic thought on the common basis of the
conviction that the Image character of the world could be 'realised'.
In the context of this thought Plotinus had attributed an anagogical
function to art in the conviction that art can make the image
character of the world clear in a special way. As a mimesis of nature
art is not merely a copy of the external world, but is intent upon
giving a symbolic representation of the logoi which are the consti
tutive internal principles of nature. Thus, works of art as sensible
images become an impulse for the return to their intelligible para
digm.
The reflections on philosophical, and especially on Neoplatonic
elements, in Eriugena's thought should not conceal his theological
foundation or goal which is based on the recourse to Christian
revelation and which only from a modern point of view can be
distinguished from his philosophy. We have to be aware, for
example, that Eriugena's conviction in a merciful self-disclosure of
God into the world a self-explication which is incorporated by
creatio and incarnatio (omne datum optimum et omne donum perfectum
desursum est)31 is not compatible with Neoplatonic thought as a
whole, since it must be interpreted as an apriori gift which supports
the overcoming of incongruent and from a theological point of
view sinful elements. The reference to philosophical tenets which
Eriugena could not have been conscious of as such, should help to
clarify the fact that Eriugena's theology does not 'use' philosophy
as a form of reflection or instrumental method which comes 'from
outside'. He rather forms philosophical and theological tenets into
an integral and mutually interdependent whole. We distinguish
from our hermeneutical standpoint, quite distinct from that of
Eriugena, aspects and elements of his thinking which form a theo
logical unity: God's incommensurable super-essence, His trinitarian
'process' in Himself, His creative self-explication and utterance; the
69
Werner Beierwaltes
world as the basis of revelation of its own divine origin; a shadow

like unfolding of the light of the One which appears in the individual
as its intelligible illumination, and not least the world as an initial
call for the reversion of thought into itself and its elevation and
transcendence beyond itself. We might add to this the issue of the
divine answer to the situation of the world: the divine incarnation
which first and foremost enables the return of mankind to its original
status. This is a restauratio or transformatio which guarantees the
perfection of the world and men through Christ's resurrection. All
these are elements of a theology which, through its complex syn
thesis with Neoplatonic philosophy, is vital and compelling.38
Notes
1. De praedestinatione I 16 fT (ed. G. Madec, in: Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis

L, 1978).
2. On this issue see among others: The Mind of Eriugena, ed. John J. O'Meara and Ludwig
Bieler (Dublin 1973) \ Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen, ed. by W. Beierwaltes, (Abhandlungen
der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse 1980, 3. Abhandlung,
Heidelberg 1980); J. J. O'Meara, Eriugena (Oxford 1988).
3. Vera enim auctoritas rectae rationi non obsistit neque recta ratio verae auctoritati: Periphyseon ( =
P) I 192, 33 f (ed. Sheldon-Williams, who published book I-III: Scriptores Latini Hibemiae vol.
VII, IX, XI, Dublin 1968/1972/1981). Books IV/V of P are quoted according to the edition
of H. J. Floss, Patrologia Latina 122. (A critical edition of these two books will be published
by E. Jeauneau.)
4. e.g. P I 114, 24: Plato siquidem philosophantium de mundo maximus. ibidem 168, 18. Ill 284,
29 f. G. Madec, Jean Scot et ses Auteurs (Paris 1988) 49.
5. Except the Timaeus, which he had access to through Calcidius' commentary on it.
6. J. Marenbon, "John Scottus and the Categoriae Decern", in Eriugena. Studien zu seinen
Quellen (above note 2) 115-134; From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic, Theology
and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge 1981).
7. M. Techert, "Le Plotinisme dans le Systeme de Jean Scot Erigene", Revue Neoscolastique
de Philosophie 28 (1927) 28-68.
8. W. Beierwaltes, Identitat und Different (Frankfurt 1980); for Marius Victorinus, Augu
stine, Meister Eckhart and Cusanus, "Deus est Veritas. Zur Rezeption des griechischen
Wahrheitsbegriffes in der friihchristlichen Theologie", PIETAS, Festschrift tur Bernhard
Kotting, Jahrbuch fur Antike und Christentum, Erganzungsband 8 (1980) 15-29; "Augustins
Interpretation von Sapientia 11, 21," Revue des Etudes Augustiennes 15 (1969) 51-61; and for
Eriugena especially, Denken des Einen (Frankfurt 1985) 337-367.
9. H. Dorrie, "Was ist 'Spatantiker Platonismus'?" Theologische Rundschau 36 (1971) 285
302 (reprinted in Platonica Minora [Mtinchen 1976] 508-523. For a discussion of this opinion,
see E. P. Meijering, "Wie platonisierten Christen?" Vigiliae Christianae 28 (1974) 15-28. C.
J. de Vogel, "Platonism and Christianity: a Mere Antagonism or a Profound Common
Ground?", Vigiliae Christianae 39 (1985) 1-62; W. Pannenberg, "Christentum und Pla
tonismus. Die kritische Platonrezeption Augustins in ihrer Bedeutung fur das gegenwartige
christliche Denken," Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte 96 (1985) 147-161.
10. Cf. W. Beierwaltes, "Das Problem des absoluten SelbstbewuBtseins bei Johannes
Scotus Eriugena", in Platonismus in der Philosophie des Mittelalters (Wege der Forschung 197,
ed. by Werner Beierwaltes, Darmstadt 1969) 484-516; "Negati Affirmatio: Welt als Metapher",
Zur Grundlegung einer mittelalterlichen Asthetik, Phil. Jahrb. 83 (1976) 237-265 (English version
in: Dionysius [1977] 127-159); Die Wiederentdeckung Eriugenas im Deutschen ldealismus. (Frankfurt
70
1972) 188-201 (parts of this chapter in English in The Mind of Eriugena [above note 2] 190
199. Further see the chapter mentioned in note 8 in Denken des Einen.
11. Proclus in Parm. VII, 76, 6 (ed. R. Klibansky et C. Labowsky (Plato Latinus III,
London 1953).
12. de div. nom. II 1; PG 3,637 A: VCTEprivo)(ievr) v&5. I 5, 593 C: avxo be ou6ev <05
jiavxojv ujiepouatajg lppr)Hvov. I 1, 588 B: {utep vow evott^. VII 3, 871 B: viitEp vow
Evcoaig. I 1 588B: iutep 5iavoiav ev. XIII 3, 980 D: ov ev. ibid. B: itavxa ev eauxu). 977
C: Jiavxa feviaia)?. II 4,641 B. V 7, 821 B: evajoig, aair/xuxog Evcoaig. I 5,593B: xpia6txr|
tvaq. IV 14, 712 C: e^r|pr|nevr|5 Evcoaeojg ayadr|v Jtpoo&og. coel. hier. IV 1, 177 D. div.
nom. II 11, 649 B: Eivat Jtavxwv.
13. P III 166, 27.
14. Plotin V 3, 11, 18. Ill 8, 9, 54. Proclus Theol. Plat. II 5; 37, 24 ff (ed. H.-D. Saffrey et
L. G. Westerink). In Parm. 1076, 31 f (ed. V. Cousin). W. Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen (above
n. 8) 133 ff; 203; 318.
15. P I 208, 29 f. Cf. Proclus, in Parm. 1192, 13: xwv xaxT)yopubv xaOapEiiov to ev.
16. Eriugena P III 180, 19. I 206, 33.
17. z. B. Plotin III 8, 10, 1. V 3, 15, 33.
18. Eriugena P I 38, 25 f: Ipse namque omnium essentia est qui solus vere est, ut ait Dionysius
Ariopagita. 'Esse enim' inquit, 'omnium est super esse divinitas' (de coel. hier. IV I; PG 3, 177D: to
yap Etvai Jtdvrwv eoriv f| tinsp to Eivoa deotrig. Cf. further P I 64, 5. esse omnium as a
translation of the Dionysian term: III 84, 7 f. V 23,903 C. For another meaning of this term
see Gersh, From Iamblichus to Eriugena (Leiden 1978) 158 f.
19. cf. Eriugena P III 162, 10 ff. V 8, PL 122, 876 B; 37,987 C. 'In' and 'above': P III
168, 23 fF; 172, 13 f: dum in omnibus fit super omnia esse non desinit.
20. P II 108, 31: absolutus ab omnibus. Expositiones in Ierarchiam Coelestem (= IC), ed. J.
Barbet, in Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis XXXI. 1975: I 2, 356 f: dum. . . . in
omnia procedit, manet in seipso, munitus incommutabilis, sui similis uniformisfixus. e.g.: Dion. de. div.
nom. II 11, 649 B (4Sjflpr|nivov and yvoiq, at the same time). XI 1,949 B (on 'peace' which
is identical with God and flows out of Him): cute KoiXaRKaaiai^ovaa ai)xr)v aJioXfibiEi
Tr|v ecu)tt)5 Evtootv, aM.a xal upoEtatv iti jiavTa ev6ov ota-] ^levouoa 61' ujtepfk>X.r|v xfjg
Jtavxa iCTEpxoxior)5 frvwoECog. Plot. Ill 8, 10, 6 ff; VI 9, 9, 5; Proclus Theol. Plat. II 7; 50, 7
ff (Saffrey-Westerink).
21. P V 38, 994 B: Totus enim Deus est totus ubique, totus super omne quod dicitur et intelligitur,
exaltatus.
22. cf. W. Beierwaltes, Proklos. Grundzuge seiner Metaphysik (Frankfurt 1979)2 118-164.
23. Plotin II 4, 5, 29 ff. cf. W. Beierwaltes, Identitat und Different, (above note 8) 29 ff.
Denken des Einen (above n. 8) 52 ff.
24. e.g. P III 172,3.
25. P III 168, 10-20: Divina igitur bonitas, quae propterea nihilum dicitur, quoniam ultra omnia,
quae sunt et quae non sunt, in nulla essentia invenitur, ex negatione omnium essentiarum in ajfirmationem
totius universitatis essentiae a se ipsa in se ipsam descendit, veluti ex nihilo in aliquid, ex inessentialitate
in essentialitatem, ex informitate in formas innumerabiles et species. Prima siquidem ipsius progressio in
primordiales causas, in quibus fit, veluti informis quaedam materia a Scriptura dicitur, materia quidem,
quia initium est essentiae rerum, informis aero, quia informitati divinae sapientiae proximo est. Divina
autem sapientia informis recte dicitur quia ad nullam formam superiorem se ad formationem suam
convertitur.
Although Eriugena strongly approximates informis materia and sapientia, he maintains in II

52, 25 ff, for example, the basic difference between materia informis as created from the causae
primordiales, as evident being, and the causae primordiales themselves. This does not hinder him
in the attribution of informitas or informis to the creatura invisibilis intellectualis et rationalis which
limits itself through reflection. (II 54, 9ff; 56, 5ff). The term sapientia informis in 168, 18
certainly means the 'origin' or the 'nothingness' which, in so far as we consider the origin
'as such', is not determined by a form or boundaries, but which manifests itself in the first
phase of its proceeding as 'something' or as the Ideas. Thus it 'becomes' sapientia formata.
For a reference to Dionysius see also Praef. in vers. Dion. 1034 C.
26. P II 154, 6.
71
Werner Beierwaltes
27. Cf. the publication on this concept mentioned in note 10.

28. V 1, 6, 27 fF. V 6, 4, 16 ff. VI 9, 5, 16. On metaphors and the metaphysics of light see
my reflections in "Plotins Metaphysik des Lichtes" in Die Philosophic des Neuplatonismus (Wege
der Forschung 436 ed. by Clemens Zintzen, Darmstadt 1977) 75-117. Details of further
literature are given in this work.
29. V 8, 4, 44fT. On the interpretation of this passage see Denken des Einen, 57ff.
30. Theol.Plat. II 7;48, 14f.
31. J. Koch, "Uber die Lichtsymbolik im Bereich der Philosophic und Mystik des
Mittelalters," Studium Generate 13 (1960) 655ff; Klaus Hedwig, Sphaera Lucis. Studien zur
Intelligibilitdt des Seienden in Kontext der mittelalterlichen Lichtspekulation (Munster 1980) 46-60
Connected with the 'light'-metaphor: E. Jeauneau, "Jean Scot et la Metaphysique du Feu"
Etudes fcrigeniennes (Paris 1987) 299-319.
32. On this subject: W. Beierwaltes, "Negati Affirmatio" (above note 10).
33. Lux mentium: in Joh. Ev. 350, 25 (ed. E. Jeauneau, Sources Chretiennes 180, Paris 1972).
Homelia XIII; 266, 20-26 (ed. E Jeauneau, Sources Chretiennes 151, Paris 1959): Non vos estis
qui lucetis, sed spiritus patris vestri qui lucet in vobis, hoc est, me in vobis lucere vobis manifestat, quia
ego sum lux intelligibilis mundi, hoc est rationalis et intellectualis naturae; non vos estis qui intelligitis
me, sed ego ipse in vobis per spiritum meum meipsum intelligo, quia vos non estis subtantialis lux, sed
participatio per se subsistentis luminis.
For the charateristic transformation of Matthew 10, 20 in respect of other activities see:
W. Beierwaltes, "Sprache und Sache. Reflexionen zu Eriugenas Einschatzung von Leistung
und Funktion der Sprache", Zeitschrift fur philosophische Forschung 38 (1984) 523- 543 (on this
issue 529-31). For an English version of the paper see "Language and Object", in Jean Sco
Ecrivain, Actes du IVe Colloque international, Montreal, 28 aout 2 septembre 1983, ed
G.-H. Allard (Montreal-Paris 1986) 209-228).
34. Homelia XVI; 280, 21-24: nulla seu rationalis seu intellectualis creatura per seipsam sub
stantialiter lux est, sed participatione unius ac ueri luminis substantialis quod ubique in omnibusque
intelligibiliter lucet.
35. IC I 76ff; 108-117.
36. E. Panofsky, "Zur Philosophie des Abtes Suger von Saint Denis", in Platonismus in der
Philosophic des Mittelalters (Wege der Forschung 197, ed. by W. Beierwaltes, Darmstadt 1969
109-120. (Original English version in: Abbot Suger on the Abbey Church of St. Denis and its Art
Treatures, edited, translated and annotated by E. Panofsky [Princeton 1948] 17-26). I have
tried to extend and deepen philosophically this thought in this essay in my article "Negati
Affirmatio" (above note 10).
37. Dionysius' De coelesti hierarchia begins with this sentence taken from the letter of James
1,17. For Eriugena's interpretation see his commentary of this work: IC I 1, 23 ff and PHI
174, 25ff; V 23, 903 A ff; 31, 946 A ff. The distinction between datum and donum serves
Eriugena's discourse on the relation between nature and grace. On gratia see further: P III
98, 12ff; V 23, 902 D; 32, 949 B.
38. This article was translated into English by robert douglas hedley.
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Eriugena's Platonism

Author(s): Werner Beierwaltes

For ltdouard Jeauneau

The term 'Platonism' is a complex concept. In connection with

a way in which the latter could not reveal itself. In Eriugena's

philosophy already transformed into a theologically coherent con

of Neoplatonic concepts is more convincing, for example, in Gregory

that which is alike, or the thoughtless levelling out of that which is

1. The question concerning the One is a basic issue in Platonic

is above Being since it is nothing of all, 'absolute', above the

form of reflection of the philosophy upon which it draws, but

proves to be a negation of being: "God is nothing", per excellentiam

2. That Being which is Being per se, the transcendent 'Nothing

3. Neoplatonic thought as a whole, albeit in various ways, is

foremost constituted, or appears as Theophany (Books 1-3). In the

Eriugena, an abandonment of 'nothingness' or a 'descent' from

4. Having pointed out the similarity of Eriugena's thought to

The two following characteristics are thoroughly bound together

physics or metaphors of light in which Eriugena convincingly dis

Proclus regards reality as a whole in terms of a hierarchy of light.

work may thus rightly be called a 'handbook for medieval light

the primal light which makes itself accessible in the theophanic

world as the basis of revelation of its own divine origin; a shadow

1. De praedestinatione I 16 fT (ed. G. Madec, in: Corpus Christianorum. Continuatio Mediaevalis

Although Eriugena strongly approximates informis materia and sapientia, he maintains in II

27. Cf. the publication on this concept mentioned in note 10.

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Eriugena's Platonism

Eriugena's Platonism