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GEORGE L. KLINE
7 I have briefly surveyed the four Nietzschean Marxists' views on the question of the
individual person in my essay, "Changing Attitudes Toward the Individual," in C. E.
Black, ed., The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change Since I86I
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960), 618-624. The views of Volski and Baza-
rov are sketched in my "Theoretische Ethik ... " (cited in fn. 4 above), 275-278. For con-
cise summaries of the philosophical - including epistemological - views of Volski,
Lunacharski, Bogdanov, and Bazarov, see my articles in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
ed. Paul Edwards, 8 vols. (New York: Macmillan & Free Press, 1967).
8 Filosofiya borby: opyt postroyeniya etiki marksizma, (Moscow, 1909). 3II pp.
172 "NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA
13 Ibid., 300.
u Ibid., 15.
15 Ibid., 27 2 .
16 Ibid., 277.
17 Ibid., 12.
18 Ibid., 306, 302.
174 "NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA
5. A. V. Lunacharski
Anatoli Vasilyevich Lunacharski (1875-1933) joined the Russian
Social Democratic (Marxist) Party in 1892. Because of radical political
activities in secondary school, he was not permitted to matriculate at a
Russian university. He attended lectures at Kiev University and at the
University of Zurich, where in 1894-1895 he studied under Richard
A venarius; this experience left him a permanent convert to the
"empiriocritical" epistemology.
Lunacharski returned to Moscow in 1897, was exiled to Vologda
(1899-1902), and spent several years between 1904 and 1917 in Western
Europe. He was the first People's Commissar for Education (1917-
1929). If he had not died a natural death in 1933, it seems likely that
19 Ibid., 30 9.
20 Ibid., 3 ID.
21 Ibid., 31 I.
"NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA 175
he would have shared the fate of other old Bolshevik intellectuals who
were purged during the late 1930's.
Lunacharski's ethical and social theory is essentially Nietzschean
and anti-Kantian. (His value theory, however, is essentially positivistic,
inspired mainly by Avenarius.) As a self-styled "aesthetic amoralist,"22
he rejects the categories of duty and obligation, stressing free creativity
and the unfettered "artistic" shaping of ends and ideals.
He was sarcastic about Kantian ethics, although he recognized it as
"the most profound moral system that the bourgeoisie [sic!] has pro-
duced."23 Kant, Lunacharski declared, would explain a hen's actions
in protecting her chicks by postulating that "there is in her a spark of
the divine fire, and this spark, through the categorical imperative,
causes her to act as every hen ought to act in her place."24
Lunacharski called his own ethical position an "aesthetics of prac-
tice" or "aesthetics of life." He avoided the terms 'ethics' and'morality',
which for him had a strong Kantian flavor. To be sure, he used the term
'aesthetics' in a broad and ullconventional sense, equivalent to "gene-
ral theory of valuation." "We acknowledge the aestheticians of life,"
Lunacharski declares, "the artists of life, the creators of ideals.
Nietzsche is a creator of ideals .... "25
Referring specifically to the relation between Marxism and Nietz-
scheanism, Lunacharski writes: "Rejecting morality, or rather acknow-
ledging in its place only a morale sans sanction ni obligation ... , some
Marxists find Nietzsche's critique of morality, and much in the positive
doctrines of the 'philosopher with the hammer' of great interest."26 The
French phrase, of course, is from Guyau - the title of his major work.
The only function of moral obligation, and hence of moral norms, for
Lunacharski is an instrumental one: to serve as a means for the richer
gratification of desire and the fuller manifestation of will, in a word,
to increase the "fulness of life" (polnota zhizni - probably a translation
of Nietzsche's FiJ,lle des Lebens).
"Nietzsche," Lunacharski wrote in 1903, "and all the other critics
of the morality of duty, have defended the autonomy of the individual
person, the individual's right to be guided in his life solely by his own
desires."27 He goes on to reject laws, norms, and even "universally
human ideals" as constraints upon the free individual.
Moral indoctrination, according to Lunacharski, can generate only
slaves. In contrast, "the aesthetic preaching of [individual] life-ideals
generates not new obligations. but new, higher needs."28 An ideal
should be regarded "not as categorically demanding, but as raising its
splendid (prekrasny) voice at the inner council of the impulses, and
emerging victorious ... by the power of immediate aesthetic emotion,
... "29 Lunacharski preaches not the "ideal above," but the "ideal ahead"
(in history), the ideal of the Vbermensch - the fulness of self-affirming
life, "whole, flourishing, triumphant, creative. "30
"We set no limits whatever," Lunacharski writes, "to the will to
power and love of the far-off [Nietzsche's Willezur Macht and Fernsten-
liebe], i.e., a striving to realize one's ideals in their broadest scope .... The
more grandiose the scope, ... the more self-sacrificingly the individual
person consumes his energies in the name of his ideals - the better."3i
Lunacharski opposes the attempt - by Bogdanov and Bazarov,
among others - to "transform the individual into a cell of the social
organism,"32 and speaks of a future social order which will provide "the
broadest foundation for an infinitely luxurious growth of the most
varied individualities." Yet his own preference for "macro-psychic"
(broad-souled) over "micropsychic" (narrow-souled) individualism
seems to impel him toward a "collectivist" view.
"The most wonderful word in human language," he writes, "is the
word 'we'." This "greater I" makes it possible for us to "rejoice in
victories which will be achieved a century after the death of the 'little
I,' to live the life of generations long dead, which also were a part of
the 'we', .... "33 The I of the macropsychic individualist, he writes, "is
identified with some broad and enduring 'we' ."34
Lunacharski's characteristic stress on the historical continuity of the
creators of culture links his ethics and social philosophy to his philoso-
phy of religion.
'7 " 'Problemy idealizma' ... ," 133.
28 Ibid., 142.
29 Etyudy (Studies), (Moscow, 1922), 250.
30 "Osnovy pozitivnoi estetiki" ("Foundations of Positivist Aesthetics"), in Ocherki
realistichcskovo mirovozZ1'cniya, ed. S. Dorovatovski and A. Charushnikov, (St. Peters-
burg, 1904), 13I.
al "'Problemy idealizma' .... " 136.
3. Etyudy, 255.
aa Ibid., 255, 256.
"' Lac. cit.
"NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA 177
The faith of the active human being," he declared in 1904, "is a faith in future
mankind; his religion is an aggregate of those feelings and thoughts which makp.
him a co-participant in the life of mankind, a link in the chain which stretches
toward the overman (sverkhchelovek = Nietzsche's Vbermensch), toward a
beautiful and powerful creature, a perfected organism .... 3
6. A. A. Bogdanov
Bogdanov, whose real name was Alexander Aleksandrovich Malinov-
ski (1873-1928), was trained in psychiatry at Kharkov Medical School,
served as an army surgeon during the First World War, and was one
of the founders (in 1926) of the Moscow Institute for Blood Transfusion.
(He died as the result of a transfusion experiment performed upon
himself under conditions which suggest suicide.) He became a Marxist
in 1896 and divided his mature energies between Bolshevik politics
and the elaboration and popularization of Marxist economics, philoso-
phy, and sociology. He is probably best known for his neo-Machian
"empiriomonist" theory of knowledge and experience, a position vio-
lently attacked by Lenin in Materialism and Empiriocriticism (1909).
Bogdanov shares with Bazarov, his fellow collectivist among the
Nietzschean Marxists, a basic doctrinal tension. Both are genuinely
concerned to free the individual from the constraints of coercive norms
and binding obligation; yet they proceed to dissolve the "emancipated"
individual in an impersonal social collective.
Bogdanov recognizes the positive function of norms, even coercive
norms, in social organization. Without them, he writes, society "would
disintegrate, like a human organism deprived of the regulative, unify-
ing activity of its [central] nervous system."37 Without norms, econo-
mic exchange would degenerate into relentless mutual robbery;
competition would become a physical annihilation of competitors; class
struggle would take the form of "a cruel and bloody intraspecific war. "38
However, norms - as "forms of life" - are of two radically different
kinds. Bogdanov calls them, respectively, "coercive norms" (normy
prinuzhdeniya) and "expediency norms" (normy tselesoobraznosti). It
might be less misleading to call them "sanctioning" and "instrumental"
norms, respectively. In any case, they correspond to the Kantian cate-
gorical and hypothetical imperatives.
All norms are "organizing adaptations for the social life of human
beings."39 The organization of social life involves regulation and adjust-
ment of its various manifestations. Such regulation may be either coer-
cive or non-coercive, i.e., effected by expediency norms that merely
specify which means are best adapted to achieving a given (freely
chosen) end. Their form is: "If you desire x, you must do (or choose) y."
Coercive norms, according to Bogdanov, compel without giving
reasons or analyzing relevant conditions; they are rigid, inflexible,
exempt from criticism. In contrast, expediency norms are non-coercive,
flexible, open to criticism. Their model is the technical or scientific rule.
"Norms of external compulsion," Bogdanov writes, "prescribe man's
very goals, or at least the limits of those goals. Expediency norms leave
the choice of goals open .. ,,"40
Bogdanov considers expediency norms to be widely accepted in
science and technology, but not yet accepted in social, political, or
economic relations. The contemporary capitalist system, he wrote in
1905, "is sustained wholly by coercive norms. The [coercive legal]
norms of property and contractual subordination comprise the soul of
capitalism."41
Socialism, Bogdanov insists, will put an end to the "great fetishism"
of coercive norms. Socialist society will be governed entirely by ex-
pediency norms. The general goal for which such norms will stipUlate
specific means is the "maximum of life" for society as a whole, coin-
ciding with a maximum of life for each of its members. Under socialism
man will be not an embryonic but a developed being, not a fragmented
but an integral being.42 In his essay of 1906 entitled "The Integration
of Man" - at the head of which he placed the Nietzschean epigram,
"Man is a bridge to the overman" - Bogdanov sketched the collectivist
38 Ibid., 55.
39 Lac. cit.
40 Ibid., 70.
n Ibid., 56 .
.. "Sobiraniye cheloveka" ("The Integration of Man"), (1906); reprinted in Navy
mir, 40.
"NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA 179
7. V. A. Bazarov
Bazarov, whose real name was Vladimir Aleksandrovich Rudnev
(1874-1939), was trained as an economist. Though less involved in
politics than either Bogdanov or Lunacharski, he was prominent in the
Bolshevik faction between 1904 and 1907. After 1922 he worked as an
economist in the Soviet State Planning Commission, publishing tech-
nical papers until the late 1920'S. He was arrested in 1930, and died,
presumably in a forced-labor camp, in September 1939.
Bazarov, in 1904, launched an attack upon normative ethics which
has few parallels in the West, apart from Nietzsche himself, and can be
compared only to the later revolt of Shestov and Berdyaev among
Russian thinkers. His first essay in ethics bears the characteristic title
"Authoritarian Metaphysics and the Autonomous Individual."50 Baza-
rov admits only instrumental norms, norms which serve as "means for
attaining the joys of life." Non-instrumental norms are for him "meta-
physical" and "authoritarian." He lashes out at "sodden, dull, self-
satisfied moral systems through which life appears in the most desolate
light.. .. Life, it may be, appears a hopelessly vulgar thing precisely
because it is viewed through the dim glass of moral norms .... To seize
life's mystery, one must revolt against norms as such .... "51 What we
need, Bazarov declares, is a rejection of law itself, a Brutus of crime,
an ascetic, "saintly" criminal, like Raskolnikov (the hero of Dostoyev-
ski's Crime and Punishment).
49 Ibid . 8f.
0 "Avtoritarnaya metafizika i avtonomnaya lichnost," in Ocherki realisticheskovo
mirovozzreniya (the volume cited in footnote 30 above).
61 Na dvafronta (On Two Fronts). (St. Petersburg. 1910). 105. (This is a collection
of previously published polemical essays with a new preface.)
"NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA 181
fusion of all human souls which will be the inevitable result of the
communist order. "67
At only one point does Bazarov's collectivism appear to verge to-
ward the "normative" or "deontological." He asserts that "artists of
disorderly individual searching" will be replaced by "artists in schools
which move by plan [planomerno] toward their goal. "58 This "movement
according to plan" suggests an element of coerciveness, or at least
normativeness, which in general is foreign to Bazarov's thinking. Its
relevance to the politics of Soviet art is too obvious to require comment.
More characteristic (and more Nietzschean) is Bazarov's claim that
socialism "will liberate the spirit of cultural creativity, will create for
the first time the possibility of a 'pure,' self-sufficient culture, not sub-
ordinated to the extrinsic interests of individuals or groupS."69
Bazarov's collectivism frankly excludes any recognition of the in-
trinsic worth and dignity of the human individual. "It really is an
astonishing thing," he exclaims, "because, for purposes of zoological
and certain other classifications, it is convenient to refer to me and to
another given individual by the same term, 'man' ... that 'man' as such
should become the highest task of my life, that I should be obliged to
recognize a practical [i.e., moral] universal validity between myself
and every empirically given human being."60 Later, emphasizing the
collectivism and solidarity of the proletariat as a class, Bazarov added:
"The recognition of the 'individual person' as an absolute principle has
always been, and will always be, alien to the proletariat."61
Marx would have had no quarrel with this statement; nor would
Nietzsche (except for the reference to the proletariat). But, since Trot-
sky's embarrassingly candid avowals (in Terrorism and Communism,
1920), Marxist-Leninists have been too hypocritical to admit that they,
like Bazarov, repudiate in principle the absolute - or even the intrinsic
- value of the individual human person.
8. Conclusion
Russian "Nietzschean Marxism" as a more or less coherent intellec-
tual force lasted little more than a decade. Any amalgam of Nietzsche
and Marx, is, of course, beset by tensions: on the issue of individual
67 Ibid., 140.
68 Ibid., 164.
69 Ibid., 208.
80 Ibid., 269.
81 Ibid., 141.
"NIETZSCHEAN MARXISM" IN RUSSIA