CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C.

11/19/2016

COMPARATIVE CASE NO. 1 NUGUID VS NUGUID AND CACHO VS UDAN

[G.R. No. L-23445. June 23, 1966.]

REMEDIOS NUGUID, petitioner-appellant, vs. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA

NUGUID, oppositors-appellees.

FACTS:

Rosario died on December 30, 1962, single, without descendants and survived by her
legitimate parents, Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters namely: Alfredo, Federico,
Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto.

Petitioner Remedios filed a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario

Felix and Paz entered their opposition to the probate of her will. Ground is that by the
institution of petitioner Remedios as universal heir of the deceased they were illegally
preterited and that in consequence the institution is void.

The court's order of November 8, 1963, held that "the will in question is a complete
nullity and will perforce create intestacy of the estate of the deceased Rosario Nuguid"
and dismissed the petition without costs.

A motion to reconsider having been thwarted below, petitioner came to this Court on
appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the rule on intrinsic validity is valid.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

COURT'S AREA OF INQUIRY LIMITED TO EXTRINSIC VALIDITY OF WILL; WHEN

COURT MAY RULE ON INTRINSIC VALIDITY

In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination of, and resolution on:

the extrinsic validity of the will;

the due execution thereof;
the testatrix's testamentary capacity; and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed the by law.
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In the case at bar, however, a peculiar situation exists. The parties shunted aside the
question of whether or not the will should be allowed probate. They questioned the
intrinsic validity of the will.

Normally, this comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. But if the case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will
be gained. In the event of probate or if the court rejects the will, probability exists that
the case will come up once again before this Court on the same issue of the intrinsic
validity or nullity of the will.

The result would be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.

These practical considerations induce this Court to meet head-on the issue of the nullity
of the provisions of the will in question, there being a justiciable controversy awaiting
solution.

[G.R. No. L-19996. April 30, 1965.]

WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN and RUSTICO G.

UDAN, oppositors-appellants.

FACTS:

Silvina, single, and a resident of Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son
Francisco and Wencesla, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla filed a
petition to probate said Will. Rustico, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an
opposition to the probate.

Francisco, through counsel, filed his opposition to the probate of this Will. On 15
September 1960 oppositor Rustico, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his
opposition, due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in the Will and
said opposition was ordered withdrawn.

After one witness, the Notary Public who made and notarized the Will, had testified in
court, oppositor Francisco died.

After the death of Francisco, John and Rustico, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix
Silvina, filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and
executed as required by law; that testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it
was procured by fraud or undue influence.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

Honorable Court of First Instance of Zambales issued an Order disallowing these two
oppositions for lack of interest in the estate and directing the Fiscal to study the
advisability of filing escheat proceedings

ISSUE:

Whether or not the inquiry into the testamentary rights is premature.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:
INQUIRY INTO TESTAMENTARY RIGHTS NOT PREMATURE IF PURPOSE IS TO
EXCLUDE OPPOSITION

Inquiry into the hereditary rights of the appellants is not premature, if the purpose is to
determine whether their opposition should be excluded in order to simplify and
accelerate the proceedings. If, as already shown, appellants cannot gain any hereditary
interest in the estate, whether the will is probated or not, their intervention would merely
result in unnecessary complication.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

In the case of NUGUID VS NUGUID, it is discussed that in a proceeding for the probate
of a will, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination of, and resolution on:

the extrinsic validity of the will;

the due execution thereof;
the testatrix's testamentary capacity; and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed the by law.

However, the case also discussed the exception on the limitation on examination on
extrinsic validity. The Court stated that the examination on intrinsic validity is valid when
the result would be waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.

Also in the case of CACHO VS UDAN, the Court includes another exception on the
limited issues to be resolved which would be the inquiry on the testamentary rights, that
is if the purpose is to exclude opposition to simplify and accelerate the proceedings.
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COMPARATIVE CASE #2 VALERA VS INSERTO AND TRINIDAD VS CA

[G.R. No 56504. May 7, 1987.]

POMPILLO VALERA and EUMELIA VALERA CABADO, petitioners, vs. HON.

JUDGE SANCHO Y. INSERTO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, Branch 1, and MANUEL R. FABIANA, respondents.

FACTS:

There is a conflicting claim over a fishpond asserted by the administrators of the estate
of deceased spouses, on one hand, and by the heirs of a daughter of said spouses and
their lessees, on the other.

Intestate estate of the decedent spouses Rafael and Consolation, in which Eumelia and
Pompiro were appointed as administrators. The daughter of the spouses, Teresa, filed a
motion to declare Eumelia in contempt as she failed to account for her administration.
Eumelia replied that the fishpond possessed by Teresa still needs to be returned to the
estate.

Teresas husband said that the fishpond is owned by the children.

The court ordered Teresas heir to reconvey the fishpond to the estate of the spouses.
Such was based on the 2 administrators testimony. The court stated that the issue on
ownership is not yet final.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the curt erred the order of reconveyance.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AND DETERMINE

THE ISSUE OF TITLE TO PROPERTY CLAIMED BY THIRD PERSON; EXCEPTIONS

Settled is the rule that a Probate Court, exercises but limited jurisdiction, and has no
power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a
third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all the other parties
having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of
the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are
not thereby prejudiced.
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The reason for the exception being that the question of whether or not a particular
matter should be resolved by the Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its
limited jurisdiction as a special court, is in reality not a jurisdictional but in essence of
procedural one, involving a mode of practice which may be waived.

CASE AT BAR DOES NOT FALL UNDER THE EXCEPTION

As already earlier stressed, it was at all times clear to the Court as well as to the parties
that if cognizance was being taken of the question of title over the fishpond, it was not
for the purpose of settling the issue definitely and permanently, and writing " finis"
thereto, the question being explicitly left for determination "in an ordinary civil action,"
but merely to determine whether it should or should not be included in the inventory.

This function of resolving whether or not property should be included in the estate
inventory is, to be sure, one clearly within the Probate Court's competence, although the
Court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to
the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.

EXAMINATION OF PERSON SUSPECTED HAVING CONCEALED, EMBEZZLED OR

CONVEYED PROPERTY OF DECEDENT

The same norm governs the situation contemplated in Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules
of Court, expressly invoked by the Probate Court in justification of its holding a hearing
on the issue arising from the parties' conflicting claims over the fishpond. The
examination provided in the cited section is intended merely to elicit evidence relevant
to property of the decedent from persons suspected of having possession or knowledge
thereof, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away the same.

DETERMINATION OF THE QUESTION OF TITLE TO THE PROPERTY; CANNOT BE

THE SUBJECT OF EXECUTION AS AGAINST ITS POSSESSOR

Since the determination by the Probate Court of the question of title to the fishpond was
merely provisional, not binding on the property with any character of authority,
definiteness or permanence, having been made only for purposes of inclusion in the
inventory and upon evidence adduced at the hearing of a motion, it cannot and should
not be subject of execution, as against its possessor who has set up title in himself (or
in another) adversely to the decedent, and whose right to possess has not been
ventilated and adjudicated in an appropriate action. These considerations assume
greater cogency where, as here, the Torrens title to the property is not in the decedents'
names but in others, a situation on which this Court has already had occasion to rule.

JURISDICTION OVER QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP INVOLVING ESTATE

PROPERTY; MERELY SECONDARY OR PROVISIONAL
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

Since, both the Probate Court and the estate administrators are one in the recognition
of the proposition that title to the fishpond could in the premises only be appropriately
determined in a separate action, the actual filing of such a separate action should have
been anticipated, and should not therefore have come as a surprise, to the latter.

And since moreover, implicit in that recognition is also the acknowledgment of the
superiority of the authority of the court in which the separate action is filed over the
issue of title, the estate administrators may not now be heard to complain that in such a
separate action, the court should have issued orders necessarily involved in or flowing
from the assumption of that jurisdiction.

Those orders cannot in any sense be considered as undue interference with the
jurisdiction of the Probate Court. Resulting from the exercise of primary jurisdiction over
the question of ownership involving estate property claimed by the estate, they must be
deemed superior to otherwise contrary orders issued by the Probate Court in the
exercise of what may be regarded as merely secondary, or provisional, jurisdiction over
the same question.

[G.R. No. 75579. September 30, 1991.]

TOMAS TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS:

Atty. Tomas Trinidad was charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title.

Atty. Trinidad, administrator of late NICOLAI DREPIN and with knowledge of the sale of
lot to Dimabuyo, failed to deliver the title. He pleaded not guilty.

Dimabuyo did not pay the Real estate tax because there was no knowledge that she
must pay. She also did not go to the probate court.

Atty. Trinidad was convicted. He appealed but failed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction in reference to the settlement
of the estates of a decedent of which a delivery of title to a lot is one such.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

CLAIM FOR DELIVERY OF TITLE NOT DUTY OF THE BUYER TO FILE AGAINST
THE ESTATE BUT OF THE ADMINISTRATOR TO DELIVER THE SAME TO THE
BUYER

It should not be the obligation of the buyer to file before the Probate Court her claim for
delivery of the title against the estate of the decedent. That was petitioner's obligation as
the administrator not only of the estate of the decedent but also as
administrator/manager of the development corporation. Article 1495 of the Civil Code
mandates that the vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as
warrant the thing which is the object of the sale. The vendee has the right to receive,
and the vendor the corresponding obligation to transfer to the former, not only the
possession and enjoyment of the land but also the certificate of title.

SECTION 41 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 957

Section 41 of Presidential Decree 957 provides, thus:

"Section 41. Other Remedies. The rights and remedies provided in this Decree shall
be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under
existing laws."

From the foregoing, it is apparent that whatever rights or remedies accruing to a lot
buyer, Ms. Dimabuyu in this case, under other laws do not foreclose the application of
PD 957.

REMEDY

If the probate proceedings referred to in this case are still going on, the proper remedy
of the private complainant herein is to file before said Probate Court her claim for the
delivery of the title of the lot she has purchased. If, on the other hand, said probate
proceedings are already closed and terminated, the Mother Earth Realty Development
Corporation through its present President or General Manager is hereby ordered to
cause the delivery of said title to Ms. Dimabuyu, within the shortest possible time, as
soon as all the requirements therefore have been complied with. We are giving this
remedy to prevent Ms. Dimabuyu from being prejudiced.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT

In the two cases, they discussed that the Probate Court has limited jurisdiction.
Furthermore, in the case of Trinidad vs CA, it is stated that the Probate Court has no
exclusive jurisdiction over the title.

In the case of Valera vs Inserto, the Court discussed that the Probate Court could have
admitted and taken cognizance of Fabianas complaint in intervention after obtaining the
consent of all interested partied to its assumption of jurisdiction over the question of the
title or ascertaining the absence of objection thereto.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION OVER TITLE

In the case of Valera vs Inserto, the Court discussed that the judgment of the court in
exercise of primary jurisdiction is superior from Probate Court.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

COMPARATIVE CASE #3 ROXAS VS PECSON AND MATIAS VS GONZALES

[G.R. No. L-2211. December 20, 1948.]

NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner, vs. POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of

First Instance of Bulacan, MARIA ROXAS and PEDRO ROXAS, respondents.

FACTS:

Pablo died and left property in Bulacan.

Siblings of deceased, Pedro and Maria, filed a petition for the administration.

Pablo died. His widow filed for administration.

Court denied the probate as the witnesses failed to sign in the presence of the testator.

The court appointed the widow as special administrator on all conjugal property of Pablo
and Maria as special administrator of all exclusive property of Pablo.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment was valid.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR; SECTION 1, RULE 81 AND

SECTION 2 OF RULE 83 DO NOT APPLY

It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain
persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the
statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under
section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or
removal of an special administrator.

SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, APPOINTMENT OF; DISCRETION OF COURT

As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the
qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection
of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.

ONE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, SUFFICIENT

CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer,
liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one
special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a
special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of
the general administrator.

DUTIES OF ADMINISTRATOR

The administrator appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive property of a

deceased spouse shall also administer, liquidate and distribute the community property,
because the estate of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is, administered,
liquidated and distributed, consists not only of the exclusive properties of the decedent,
but also of one- half of the assets of the conjugal partnership, if any, which may pertain
to the deceased, as determined after the liquidation thereof in accordance with the
provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the Civil Code.

[G.R. No. L-10907. June 29, 1957.]

AUREA MATIAS, petitioner, vs. HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALES, ETC., ET AL.,

respondents.

FACTS:

Aurea initiated said special proceedings with a petition for the probate of a document
purporting to be the last will and testament of her aunt, Gabina. The heir to the entire
estate of the deceased except the properties bequeathed to her other niece and
nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio Salud, Santos Matias and
Rafael Matias is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea Matias, likewise, appointed
therein as executrix thereof, without bond.

Basilia Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate. The court sustained
said opposition. Aurea appealed.

Meanwhile, Basilia moved for the dismissal of Horacio, as special administrator of the
estate, and the appointment, in his stead of Ramon.

The motion was set for hearing on February 23, 1956, on which date the court
postponed the hearing to February 27, 1956.

Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last mentioned.
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Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time within which to answer the
charges preferred against him by Basilia and for another postponement of said hearing.
This motion was not granted.

Basilia introduced evidence. The judge found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of authority and
gross negligence, and relieved him as special administrator of the estate of the
deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special administratrix thereof, to "be assisted
and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina Salud," who "shall always act as aide,
interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said order, likewise, provided that "Basilia
Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . . who is hereby appointed as co-
administrator."

Aurea Matias asked that said order be set aside and that she be appointed special co-
administratrix, jointly with Horacio Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia is over eighty
(80) years of age, totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of said
office, and that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person
appointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will.

This motion was denied.

Basilia tendered her resignation as special administratrix by reason of physical

disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment, in her place, of Victorina
Salud.

Before any action could be taken thereon, Aurea sought a reconsideration of said order
of March 10, 1956.

Moreover, she expressed her conformity to said resignation, but objected to the
appointment, in lieu of Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on account of her antagonism
to said Aurea Matias she (Victorina Salud) having been the principal and most
interested witness for the opposition to the probate of the alleged will of the deceased
and proposed that the administration of her estate be entrusted to the Philippine
National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, or any other
similar institution authorized by law therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the
movant as special administratrix of said estate.

This motion for reconsideration was denied on March 26, 1956.

Shortly afterwards, respondents Ramon and Victorina requested authority to collect the
rents due, or which may be due, to the estate of the deceased and to collect all the
produce of her lands, which was granted.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

Respondents filed another motion praying for permission to sell the palay of the
deceased then deposited in different rice mills in the province of Cavite, which
respondent judge granted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appointment was valid.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

APPOINTMENT OF TWO OR MORE SPECIAL ADMINISTRATORS

Where it appeals that there are, at least, two factions among the heirs of the deceased,
representing their respective interest in the estate, and the probate Court deems it best
to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity demands that both
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

The two cases has similar situations which is the appointment of two or more special
administrators. In the case of Roxas vs Pecson, the said appointment was said invalid
while in the case of Matias vs Gonzales the said appointment was valid.

The reason for the difference is in the facts of each case.

The lower court in the case of Roxas vs Pecson appointed therein one special
administrator for some properties forming part of said estate, and a special
administratrix for other properties thereof. In other words, there were two (2) separate
and independent special administrators.

In the case of Matias vs Gonzales, there is only one (1) special administration, the
powers of which shall be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators.
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

COMPARATIVE CASE #4 EUSEBIO VS EUSEBIO AND FULE VS CA

[G.R. No. L-8409. December 28, 1956.]

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO

EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee, vs. AMANDA EUSEBIO, VIRGINIA EUSEBIO, JUAN
EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,
oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:

This case was instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing,
according to said petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda,
Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said
petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be
dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence,
the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order, by Amanda Eusebio, and her
aforementioned sister and brothers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the venue is in Rizal.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

VENUE

Where it is apparent, from the facts duly established, that the domicile of origin of the
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70) years,
the presumption is that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the
absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once
required is retained until a new domicile is gained." (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p. 70;
Restatement of the law of conflicts of laws, p. 47; In re Estate of Johnson, 192 Iowa 78).

DOMICILE
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence in a place merely
for one's own health," even if coupled with knowledge that one will never again be able,
on account of illness to return home."

[G.R. No. L-40502. November 29, 1976.]

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge,

Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS * , PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA,
respondents.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the
City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the same time, she
moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even
date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.

Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months
before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he
was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the residence is the domicile.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

VENUE NOT JURISDICTION

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
CHOACHUY, ANNE MARIE C. 11/19/2016

of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates:
"Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes." It could not have
been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.

A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that
the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue."

RESIDES

We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like
the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. "Resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence
in a place and actual stay thereat.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:

In the case of Eusebio vs Eusebio, the residence is the domicile while in Fule vs CA, the
residence is not synonymous with domicile.