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HOOVER INSTITUTION PUBLICATIONS

The Russian
Provisional Government
1917
DOCUMENTS
Selected and edited by
ROBERT PAUL BROWDER
an d
ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY

VOLUME II

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS


STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
1961
STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
STANFORD, CALIFORNIA
1961 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 60-9052
Piinted in the United States of America
Contents
OF VOLUMES I, II, AND III

Volume I

in tr o d u c tio n : Harbingers of Revolution................................................. 3


PART I. T h e F eb ru ary R e v o lu t io n .............................................................. 21
1. The Storm Breaks.............................................................. 26
2. The Collapse of the Monarchy......................................... 83
3. The Formation of the Provisional Government............... 117
PART II. T ow ard a D em o cra tic O r d e r ......................................................... 153
4. The Central Government................................................... 157
5. Justice and Law Enforcement........................................... 191
6. Local Government and Administration........................... 243
7. The Nationalities Problem............................................... 317
8. The Constituent Assembly................................................. 434
Source Abbreviations.................................................................................... 473
Glossary............................................................................................................ 475

Volume II
PART III. E con om ic and S o c ia l R e o r g a n iz a t io n ............................. 479
9. Public Finance................................................................... 484
10. The Agrarian Question................................................... 523
11. Supply and Provisioning ............................................... 615
12. Industry, Transport, and Communications.................. 666
13. L a b o r............................................................................... 709
14. Education and Welfare................................................... 771
15. Religion ........................................................................... 803
PART IV. M ilita r y A ffa ir s and O p e r a tio n s ..................................... 841
16. The Revolution in the Army and N a vy......................... 845
17. The Offensive and the German Counteroffensive.......... 921
18. Efforts to Strengthen the Army After J u ly ................... 977
PART V. F o reig n A f f a i r s ...................................................................
1039
19. The Period of the First Provisional Government.......... 10*1.2
20. May to October............................................................... 1102
Source Abbreviations..................................................................................... 1189
Glossary............................................................................................................ 1191

Volume III
PART VI. T h e P r o v isio n a l G overn m en t and P o lit ic a l F o rces t o
1J95
J u l y ......................................................................................................
21. Political Parties and the Soviet....................................... 1199
22. The April Crisis and the Formation of a Coalition Gov
ernment ........................................................................... 1236
23. The First Coalition Government................................... 1286
PART VII. T h e J u ly D ays and Su b seq u en t E ff o r ts t o S ta b iliz e
1331
t h e R e g im e .......................................................................................
24. The July Uprising........................................................... 1335
25. The Political C risis......................................................... 1383
26. The Moscow Conference................................................. 1451
PART VIII. From K o r n ilo v t o O c t o b e r ........................................................... 1523
27. The Kornilov A ffa ir....................................................... 1527
28. Military and Civil Demoralization................................. 1614
29. The Dissolution of the Democratic Coalition.............. 1653
30. October............................................................................. 17)4
Source Abbreviations..................................................................................... 1815
Glossary........................................................................................................... 1817
Chronology...................................................................................................... 1821
Bibliography.................................................................................................... 1831
In d e x ................................................................................... ........................... 1841
Documents in Volume II
PART III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Chapter 9. Public Finance
STATE CONTROL
429. The Establishment of a Permanent Preliminary and Current Audit and
Control................................................................................................... 484
430. The Inclusion of Zemstvo and Municipal Representatives in the Local Of
fices and the Council of the Department of State Control........................ 484
431. The Participation of Representatives of Public Organizations in the Activities
of the Institutions of State Control......................................................... 485
t h e l ib e r t y l o a n
432. The Issuance of the Liberty Loan of 1917..................................................... 485
433. Novoe Vremia on the Liberty Loan................................................................ 485
434. Den9on the Liberty Loan.............................................................................. 486
435. The Appeal of the Free Economic Society on the Liberty Loan.................... 486
436. The Debate on the Liberty Loan in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet .................................................................................................... 487
437. The Soviet Resolution in Support of the Liberty Loan, April 22,1917........... 488
438. An Appeal from the All-Russian Congress of Soviets................................... 489
439. The Extension of the Liberty Loan Subscription Until the Convocation of
the Constituent Assembly....................................................................... 490
440. Opposition and Apathy Toward Subscription to the Liberty Loan................. 490
PLANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM
441. The Establishment of a Council for the Preparation of a Plan for Financial
Reform................................................................................................... 492
442. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on Proposed Financial Reforms................. 493
443. Consideration of a Compulsory Loan........................................................... 494
444. The Decision Against a Compulsory Loan................................................... 494
NEW TAXATION
445. The Enactment of an Extraordinary Income Tax Levy................................. 495
446. The Increase in the War Profits Tax............................................................ 496
447. Resolution of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on Financial Policy, June
21, 1917................................................................................................. 496
448. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Financial Reforms............................................ 497
449. Opposition to the New Taxation and Its Subsequent Revision and Postpone
ment ...................................................................................................... 499
FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS
450. Minutes of a Governmental Conference on Loans and Credits from the
United States.......................................................................................... 500
Vlll UULUM&Nl b IN VOLUME II
451. American Loans and Credits to Russia........... ...................................502
452. British Credits to Russia............................................................................. 503
453. British Reply to the Russian Memorandum of June 2 2 ................................. 506
454. French Credits to Russia.............................................................................. 507
THE RUBLE
455. The Flood of Paper Money [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ................ 509
456. Report of United Stales Consul Winship at Petrograd on Lhe Cmrency Crisis 510
457. The Exchange Rate of the Ruble................................................................ 510
458. The Kerenky Notes.................................................................................. 511
459. Report on the Work of the Foreign Section of the Special Credit Office of the
Ministi y of Finance................................................................................ 511
GENERAL FINANCIAL POLICIES AND REPORTS
460. Basic Financial Policies Approved by the Government................................. 513
461. The Organization of a Special Committee for the Reduction of State Ex
penditures ............................................................................................. 514
462. The Financial Situation of Russia as of Mid-August 1917............................. 515
463. Survey of the Work of the Department of the State Treasury, Ministry of
Finance, February-October, 1917.......................................................... 518
Chapter 10. The Agrarian Question
FIRST ACTS
464. The Nationalization of the Imperial Appanages............................................ 523
465. The Nationalization of the Kabinet Lands and Properties............................. 523
466. The Suspension of the Activities of the Zemskie NachaVniki........................ 524
TIIE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIIE LAND COMMITTEES
467. The Government Declaration of March 19................................................... 524
468. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti................................................................... 525
469. Editorial in Izvestiia..................................................................................... 526
470. Appeal of the Provisional Government Concerning the Land Question......... 527
471. The Establishment of Land Committees..................................................... 528
472. Comment of Russkiia Vedomosti on the Land Committees............................ 532
473. Editorial in Ddo Naroda.............................................................................. 534
474. Izvestiia on the Agrarian Question.............................................................. 534
THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL LAND COMMITTEE
475. The Organization of a National Census of Land, Agriculture, and Urban
Population............................................................................................ 536
476. The First Session of the Central Land Committee, May 19-20, 1937............ 538
477. The Second Session of the Central Land Committee, July 1-6, 1917............ 544
478. General Plan by the Central Land Committee for the Work of the Guberniya,
Uczd, and Volost Land Committees on the Pieparation of the Land
Reform.................................................................................................. 547
479. The Third Session of the Central Land Committee, August 25-29................. 547
480. An Adverse Comment on the Woik of the Central Land Committee............... 548
481. The Foundation of the National Land Reserve............................................. 549
482. The Work of the Central Land Committees Commission on the Redistri
bution of the Land Reserve................................................................... 549
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II ix
THE PROBLEM OF LAND RELATIONS PENDING THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM
483. Recent Sibeiian Settlers Urged Not to Return to European Russia for the
Anticipated Land Allotment.................................................................. 554
484. All Land to the People [Editorial in Izvestiia] .......................................... 555
485. The Restriction on Transactions in Land..................................................... 556
486. The Ban on Land Transactions [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] .... 557
487. Chernovs Instruction to the Land Committees........................................... 558
488. Circular of the Minister of the Interior to Guberniya and Oblast Commissais,
July 17, 1917.......................................................................................... 562
489. Order of the Minister of Food to the Food Supply Committees.................... 563
490. A Supplemental Circular from the Minister of the Interior, I. G. Tseretelli,
to Guberniya Commissars....................................................................... 565
491. The Objections of Professor Posnikov to the Instructions of Chernov........... 566
492. Mandatory Instruction of the Supreme Commander on Agrarian Matters for
Localities in the Theater of War, July 31,1917....................................... 567
493. Messrs. Peshekhonov and Chernov [Editorial in Novoe Vremia]............ 568
494. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Instruction to Land Committees....................... 569
495. Resolution of the Kuznetskii Uezd Land Committee on the Necessity for
Explicit and Uncontradictory Instructions to Land Committees............. 570
496. Letter of Professor Posnikov to Kerensky Concerning the Need for Land
Legislation for Guidance Until the Introduction of the Agrarian Reform 571
497. Report of the Representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in the Kherson
Guberniya Land Committee.................................................................... 572
498. An Attempt by the Provisional Government to Find a Means of Curbing
Agrarian Disorders in Late September................................................... 575
499. A Ruinous Demagogy [Editorial in Vlast9 Naroda] ............................... 576
500. The Draft Law of Maslov on the Regulation of Agricultural Relations and
the Powers of the Land Committees....................................................... 577
501. Russkiia Vedomosti on Maslovs Proposed Legislation................................. 580
502. Lenins Attack on the Maslov Bill: A New Deception of the Peasants by the
Socialist-Revolutionary Party................................................................ 580

AGRARIAN DISORDERS
503. The Areas and Incidence of Agrarian Disorders in European Russia........... 582
504. Government Action on the First Disorders in Kazan Guberniya................... 582
505. The Socialization of the Land and Arbitrary Seizure [Editorial in Delo
Naroda] ................................................................................................. 583
506. Authorization to Use Troops to Suppress Agrarian Disorders........................ 584
507. Circular of Prince Lvov to Guberniya Commissars....................................... 584
508. Report on the Agrarian Situation in Saratov Guberniya............................... 585
509. Resolution of the Kazan Guberniya Soviet of Peasants Deputies, May 13,
1917 ....................................................................................................... 585
510. Report of the Commissar of the Novoaleksandrovsk Uezd, KovnoGuberniya 587
511. A Report from Riazan Guberniya................................................................. 588
512. Telegram from the Commissar of Kazan Guberniya..................................... 592
513. Telegram from the Commissar of Novorossiisk Guberniya.......................... 592
514. Civil War Has Begun [Editorial in Novoe Vremia] ................................... 593
515. Novaia Zhizn9on the Agrarian Disorders During September........................ 594
X DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
THE COSSACKS
516. Appeal of the Provisional Government to the Don Cossacks........................ 595
517. Resolution on the Land Question of the Cossack Congress, June15,1917. .. . 596
THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEASANTS SOVIETS
518. Resolution on the Land Question, May 26,1917............................................ 597
519. A Comment on the Work and Mood of the Congress..................................... 598
520. Russkiia Vedomosti's Attack on the Resolution............................................ 600
521. The Comments of Volia Naroda on the Resolution ................................... 602
522. Draft Resolution on the Agrarian Question Introduced by Lenin at the
Congress .............................................................................................. 603
THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OK
WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES
523. Resolution on the Agrarian Question........................................................... 604
THE KADET PROGRAM
524. Resolution of the Kadet Party Congress....................................................... 605
THE UNION OF LANDOWNERS
525. A Congress of Landowners in Saratov.......................................................... 608
526. Specch of N. N. Lvov at the Congress of the Union of Landowners inMoscow 608
527. Session of the Plenum of the Central Council of the Union of Landowners,
July 31, 1917......................................................................................... 609
THE COOPERATIVES
528. The New Cooperative Code........................................................................ 631
529. Congresses of Cooperative Representatives.................................................. 613
Chapter 11. Supply and Provisioning
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF FOOD
SUPPLY ORGANS AND THE GRAIN MONOPOLY
530. The Establishment of the State Committee on Food Supply....................... 615
531. An Appeal in Rabochcda Gazeta................................................................... 616
532. Difficulties Attendant upon the Introduction of Bread Rationing inPeti ograd 616
533. Reports from the Commissar of the Moscow Prefecture (GradonackaVstvo)
to the Commissar of the Provisional Government in Moscow (N. Kish-
kin) Concerning Food Supply............................................................... 617
534. The Establishment of the Grain Monopoly with Fixed Prices for Grain and
the Organization of Local Food Supply Committees............................. 618
535. Announcement of the Provisional Government Regarding the Grain Mo
nopoly .................................................................................................... 621
536. The Law on the Protection of Crops............................................................. 621
537. Comment of Russkiia Vedomosti on the Law Protecting Crops................... 622
538. Den9on the Protection of Crops and the Organization of Agriculture........ 623
539. Measures to Increase the Number of Agricultural Workers......................... 624
540. Authorization to Food Supply Committees to Draft the Population for
Assistance in Loading, Unloading, and Transporting Food andGrain.. 625
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xi
541. The Enlistment of Cooperative Institutions, Other Organizations and Enter
prises, and Individual Merchants in the Work of Purveying Grain Prod
ucts and Fodder....................................................................................... 626
542. Appeal of the Petrograd Soviet to the Peasants............................................ 627
543. The Establishment of Rationing for Grain Products..................................... 627
544. Statute on the Ministry of Food.................................................................... 629
545. The Resolution of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies on the Food
Question................................................................................................. 630
546. Opposition in Commercial Circles to the Grain Monopoly and Its Implemen
tation ..................................................................................................... 631
547. The Congress on Food................................................................................... 632
548. The Report of the Minister of Food (Peshekhonov) on the Supply Problem
to the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies................................................................................................. 633
549. Resolution on the Food Supply Question by the First All-Russian Congress
of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies......................................... 637
550. Telegram from the Commissar of Simbirsk Guberniya on the Resistance to
the Grain Monopoly............................................................................... 637
551. Compulsory Maximum Utilization of Agricultural Equipment.................... 638
552. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Growing Food Crisis........................................... 639
553. Authorization of the Minister of Food to Suspend and Terminate the Activity
of a Food Supply Organ......................................................................... 640
554. The Guarantee of the Government Not to Raise the Fixed Prices on Grain
Established by the Law of March 25....................................................... 641
555. The Doubling of the Fixed Prices on Grain.................................................. 641
556. The Explanation of the Government for the Doubling of Fixed Prices on
Grain .................................................................................................... 642
557. The Soviets, the Council of Trade Unions, and the Union of Towns Object to
the Nonparticipation of the Economic Council and the State Committee
on Food Supply in the Decision to Double Fixed Prices onGrain........... 643
558. The Placing of Land and Food Supply Committees Under the Jurisdiction
of the Administrative Courts.................................................................. 644
559. The Condition of Winter Crop Sowings as of September 10,1917................. 644
560. Some Suggestions in Russkiia Vedomosti for Improving the Food Supply
System ................................................................................................... 645
561. Report of the Minister of Food (S. M. Prokopovich) on the Food Supply
Situation to the Council of the Republic, October 16............................. 647
562. Authorization for the Use of Force to Expedite the Shipment ofGrain........... 653
THE PROVISIONING OF THE ARMY
563. Difficulties in the Delivery of Hay and Fodder to the Army.......................... 653
564. An Attempl to Regularize Military and Civilian Food Supply in Front Areas 654
565. The Threatening Food Supply Situation for August..................................... 655
566. The Food Supply Crisis on the Southwestern Front and the Decision to
Requisition Grain and Fodder in the Local Guberniyas........................ 656
567. The Continuing Crisis in September............................................................. 656
568. The Dangerous Food Supply Situation on the Western Front inOctober----- 657
THE SUPPLY AND REGULATION OF OTHER FOOD SUPPLIES
AND CONSUMER GOODS
569. The Establishment of a Commission to Examine the Question of Supplying
the Population with Consumer Goods.................................................... 658
570. The Statement of the Government Announcing the Establishing of the Com
mission ........................................ ........................................................ 659
571. Izvestiias Comment on the Establishment of the Commission...................... 659
572. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Advisability of Fixed Prices for Consumer Goods 661
573. Authorization for the Minister of Food to Organize the Supply to the Popu
lation of Textiles, Footwear, Kerosene, Soap, and Other Products of
Prime Necessity.................................................................................. 662
574. The Standards of Sugar Distribution.......................................................... 662
575. The Introduction of the State Sugar Monopoly............................................ 664
576. The Production of Candy and Pastry.......................................................... 665
Chapter 12. Industry9 Transport, and Communications
GENERAL MEASURES OF THE MINISTRY OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY
577. The Facilitation of the Formation of Joint-Stock Companies and the Elimi
nation from Their Charters of National and Religious Restrictions........ 666
578. The Establishment of a Council on Questions Relating to the Development
of the Productive Forces of the Country................................................. 667
579. The Establishment of a Supply Committee {ZagotoviteVnyi Komitet) in the
Ministry of Trade and Industry............................................................ 667
580. Konovalovs Distress at Prevailing Economic Conditions............................. 668
581. The Resignation of Konovalov..................................................................... 670
582. Resolution of the First All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Industry
and Trade, Petrograd, June 1917.......................................................... 671
583. The Lesson of the English Industrialists [Editorial in Den.] .................... 671
584. Memorandum on the Economic Situation from the Acting Minister of Trade
and Industry to the Provisional Government.......................................... 672
585. The Statute Establishing the Economic Council and the Central Economic
Committee............................................................................................. 677
586. Comment of Rabochaia Gazeta on the New Economic Oi gans...................... 679
587. The Statute Broadening the Representation in and the Powers of the Fac
tory Councils......................................................................................... 679
588. Russkiia Vedomosti7$ Criticism of the Second All-Russian Congress of Rep
resentatives of Industry and Trade........................................................ 682
589. Statute Establishing Chambers of Commerce and Industry.......................... 683
590. The Recommendation of the President of the Economic Council (S. N. Tret-
iakov) that the Council Be Abolished................................................... 684
591. The Abolition of the Economic Council...................................................... 685
METALS
592. Statute on Regional Commissioners for the Distribution of Metals and Fuel 685
593. The Establishment of Fixed Prices on Metals and Metal Coods.................. 687
594. The Regulation of the Trade and Prices of Agricultural Machinery........... 688
FUEL
595. The Statute on the Temporary Committee of the Donets Basin.................... 688
596. Coordinating the Orders of the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel and
of Other Authorities for the Application of Emergency Measures with
Respect to Fuel..................................................................................... 689
597. Statute on the Regulation of the Distribution of Oil..................................... 689
598. Appeal to the Peasants to Aid in the Procurement of Wood for Fuel........... 690
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xiii
599. Statute on the Utilization of Water Power.................................................. 691
600. New Rules on the Regulation of the Purchase of Fuel Oil........................... 691
601. Statute Establishing a State Monopoly of the Sale of Donets Coal.............. 692
602. A Vicious Circle [Article in Russkiia Vedomosti] .................................... 695
603. Measure to Expedite the Shipment of Oil on the CaspianSea...................... 696
604. Explanation of the Reduction in Oil Production......................................... 697
LEATHER GOODS AND TEXTILES
605. The Establishment of the State Leather Monopoly..................................... 697
606. All Cotton and Its Distribution Placed Under the Control of the Cotton
Committee .............................................................................................. 698
607. The Right of Purchase of Coarse Wool Given Exclusively to Mills Manufac
turing for Defense Needs...................................................................... 699
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
608. An Appeal to the Soldiers on the Use of the Railroads................................ 700
609. The Decision of American Railroad Car and Locomotive Manufacturers to
Give Priority to Russian Orders............................................................ 701
610. The Agreement Concerning American Aid to Russian Railroad Transport.. 701
611. The Organization of the Stevens Commission............................................... 702
612. Measures for Regulating the Transport of Passengers and Freight.............. 703
613. The Appointment of Commissars to the Railroads...................................... 704
614. The Provisional Government Accepts the Recommendations of the Stevens
Commission for Improvements on the Trans-Siberian Railroad............ 704
615. Work of the Stevens Mission........................................................................ 705
616. The Railroads Are Slopping [Article in Russkiia Vedomosti] ................ 705
617. The Condition of the Postal and Telegraphic Services................................ 707
Chapter 13. Labor
THE RESUMPTION OF WORK AND THE INITIATION
OF NEW LABOR CONDITIONS
618. Resolution of the Petrograd Soviet Approving the Resumption of Work---- 709
619. Izvestiia Urges Economic Demands Be Made by Labor with the Resumption
of W ork................................................................................................ 709
620. An Address from the Minister of Trade and Industry to the Workers........... 710
621. Appeal of the Soviet to the Workers............................................................. 711
622. The Agreement on Working Conditions in Petrograd.................................. 712
623. Appeal of the Government to the Ural Metallurgical Workers..................... 713
624. The Soldiers Concern over the Implications of the Eight-Hour Working Day 714
625. A Report of Worker Irresponsibility............................................................ 714
626. We Must Strike Back [Editorial in Izvestiia] ......................................... 715
627. Statement on the Eight-Hour Day by the Chairman of the Council of the
Congress of Representatives of Industry and Trade (N. N. Kutler).... 716
628. The First of May [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ................................ 717
629. The First of May [Editorial in Izvestiia] .................................................. 717
FACTORY COMMITTEES
630. The Statute on Factory Committees.............................................................. 718
631. Civil War in the Pipe Factory [An Incident of Industrial Violence]... 720
xiv DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
632. Difficulties in the Implementation of the Law on Factory Committees......... 721
633. Circular of the Minister of Labor Concerning Worker Interferencein Hiring
and Firing.............................................................................................. 721
634. The Circular of August 28 of the Minister of Labor on the Inadmissibility
of Workers Meetings During Working Hours....................................... 722
635. Protest Against the August 28 Circular of the Minister of Labor................. 722
636. Policies of the Special Council on Defense Regarding Labor Relations in
Defense Plants...................................................................................... 723
637. Account of the Activities of the Factory Committees and Their Relation to
the Trade Union Movement.................................................................... 724
THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOR
638. The Establishment of the Ministry of Labor.................................................. 727
639. Grievances of the Donets Workers................................................................ 728
640. The Unsuccessful Attempt of the Ministry of Labor to End Industrial Con
flict in the Donbas................................................................................... 729
641. The President of the Special Council on Defense Urges the Government to
Establish Wage Scales........................................................................... 730
642. An Appeal from the Minister of Labor......................................................... 731
643. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Appeal of the Minister...................................... 732
644. Volia Naroda on the Appeal of the Minister................................................ 733
645. The Institution of Local Commissars of the Ministry of Labor.................... 734
646. The Enactment of New Legislation on Workers Medical Insurance........... 735
647. Social Insurance in Russia in 1917.............................................................. 736
648. Restrictions on Night Work for Women and Children................................. 740
649. Izvestiia Urges the Establishment of Chambers of Conciliation.................... 741
650. The Organization of Chambers of Conciliation and Arbitration.................. 742
651. The Statute on Labor Exchanges.................................................................. 744
652. A Conference on the Organization of Labor Exchanges............................... 744
653. Additional Legislative Proposals of the Ministry of Labor............................ 745
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
654. The All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions and the Soviets of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies [Editorial in Izvestiia] ..................................... 746
655. The Trade Unions in Russia in 1917............................................................ 747
WORKERS COOPERATIVES
656. The Workers Cooperatives in 1917.............................................................. 751
THE RAILROAD WORKERS
657. The Establishment of Provisional Supervisory Committees on the Railroads
to Deal with Labor Relations............................................................... 755
658. The Organization of a Commission on the Economic Condition of Railroad
Workers................................................................................................ 756
659. The Threat of a Railroad Strike................................................................. 756
660. The Settlement of the Threatened Strike..................................................... 757
661. The Appeal of the Minister-President to the Railroadmen in Connection
with the Threatened Strike of September.............................................. 758
662. The Strike Movement in September............................................................ 759
663. The Settlement of the September Strike....................................................... 761
664. The All-Russian Union of Railroadmen and the Bolsheviks.......................... 762
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xv
THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
665. The Confiscation of the Guzhon Factory....................................................... 764
666. A Resolution on Lockouts by the Conference of Factory Committees in Mos
cow ........................................................................................................ 765
667. Labor Disputes in Baku and on the Volga.................................................... 766
668. The Question of Shutdowns and Unemployment.......................................... 767
669. Communication from the French Embassy to the Provisional Government
Concerning the Dangers of Labor Unrest to French Interests in the Don
Basin ..................................................................................................... 768
670. Politics and Economics [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] .................... 769
Chapter 14. Education and Welfare
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
671. The Teaching of Ukrainian and the Removal of the Jewish Quota............... 771
672. Criticism of the New Minister of Education.................................................. 771
673. The Inciease in the Salary of Elementary School Teachers.......................... 772
674. The Regional Congress of the All-Russian Teachers Union in Petrograd... 773
675. Commentary on the Democratization of the Schools..................................... 774
676. The Broadening of Vocational Education..................................................... 776
677. A Recommendation for Vocational Courses in the Secondary Schools......... 778
678. The Establishment of Coeducation in the Gymnasia9 Pro-Gymnasia, and
Real Schools.......................................................................................... 778
679. Approval of the Establishment of Four-Year (Senior) Gymnasia and Real
Schools.................................................................................................. 779
680. New Statute on Teacher Training Schools................................................... 780
681. The Introduction of the New Orthography................................................... 781
682. Support for the Orthographic Reform........................................................... 783
683. A Summary of the First Three Months of Reform in Education.................. 784
684. The State Committee on Education and A. A. Manuilov............................... 786
685. The State Committee on Education and S. F. OPdenburg............................ 787
686. The Transfer of the Administration of Upper Primary Schools to the Juris
diction of Local Government.................................................................. 788
687. The Proposed Reorganization of the Administration of Secondary Schools.. 789
HIGHER EDUCATION
688. Increased Self-Government for the Academy of Sciences.............................. 791
689. New Statute on Teachers Colleges............................................................... 792
690. The Founding of the University of the Don and Other Institutions of Higher
Learning ............................................................................................... 793
691. The Abrogation of Governmental Controls over the Selection and Use of
Books and Other Teaching Materials.................................................... 793
692. The Procedure for Appointing Professors to Vacant Posts in Institutions of
Higher Learning ................................................................................... 794
693. The Establishment of the Position of Docent in Russian State Universities.. 795
694. The Extension of Membership in University Councils and FacultyMeetings 796
695. The Improvement of the Financial Position and Academic Rank of Faculty
Members of Higher Technical Institutions............................................ 797
696. New Statute on Student-Administration Relations........................................ 798
xvi DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
WELFARE
697. The Increase in Pensions............................................................................... 799
698. The Transfer of the Department of the Empress Mariia and of the Chari
table Society to the Ministry of Welfare................................................ 800
699. The Extension of Support for Soldiers Families.......................................... 800
700. The Establishment of a Temporary National Committee and Local Commit
tees to Aid Disabled War Veterans......................................................... 801
701. A Conference on the Organization of Social Aid to Children...................... 802
Chapter 15. Religion
INITIAL REFORMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORTHODOX
CHURCH AND OFFICIAL POLICIES ON RELIGIOUS MATTERS
702. The Removal of the Rasputinites from the Holy Synod................................. 803
703. The Appeal of the Holy Synod for Support of the Provisional Government. 803
704. The Urgent Need for a Church-State Act [Editorial in Reck] ................. 804
705. The Abolition of Restrictions on the Rights of the Clergy Who Voluntarily
Left Ecclesiastical Orders or Who Were Unfrocked.............................. 805
706. Ukase of the Provisional Government Dismissing All But Two Members of
the Holy Synod and Appointing New Members..................................... 806
707. V. N. Lvovs Explanation of the Dismissal of Synod Members.................... 806
708. A Diocesan Conference in Nizhnii Novgorod................................................ 807
709. The All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen........................................ 808
710. The Law on Freedom of Conscience............................................................ 809
711. The Establishment of the Ministry of Confessions........................................ 810
CHURCH SCHOOLS
712. The Grant to Councils of Theological Seminaries and Schools of the Right
to Select Candidates for Administrative and Teaching Positions........... 812
713. The Separation of Church and State and the Separation of Church and
School [Editorial in Izvestiia].............................................................. 812
714. The Transfer of Church Parochial Schools to the Jurisdiction of the Min
istry of Education................................................................................. 813
715. A Clerical Commentary on the Reform of Church Schools............................ 814
THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOBOR OF THE RUSSIAN
ORTHODOX CHURCH
716. The Resolution of the Pre-Sobor Council on the Relations Between Church
and State, July 13, 1917........................................................................ 818
717. A Commentary in Russkiia Vedomosti on the Position of the Church and the
Tasks Before the Sobor.......................................................................... 819
718. Greetings to the Sobor upon Its Convocation............................................... 820
719. A Message from the Sobor to General Kornilov............................................ 822
720. Message of the Sobor Ordering Prayers for the Salvation of the Russian
Power................................................................................................... 823
721. The Sobor and the Kornilov Movement........................................................ 824
722. The Appeal of the Sobor to the Provisional Government Following the Kor
nilov Affair.......................................................................................... 825
723. The Sobor Requests the Repeal of the Law Transferring Orthodox Parochial
Schools to the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education........................ 825
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xvii
724. The Meeting with A. F. Kerensky of the Delegation of the Sobor on the
Church School Question.......................................................................... 826
725. The Restorers of the Shades of the Past [Editorial in Volia Naroda] ........ 826
726. The Refusal of the Sobor to Participate in the Preparliament...................... 827
727. The Conflict Between the Liberals and the Conservatives in the Sobor......... 828
728. The Debate on the Establishment of the Patriarchate................................... 829
729. The Restoration of the Patriarchate in Russia.............................................. 830
730. The Sobor and the October Revolution......................................................... 830
THE OLD BELIEVERS
731. A Conference of Old Believers...................................................................... 831
732. The Petition for a Law on the Old Believers................................................ 832
733. The Approval in Principle of the New Law on the Belokrinitskii Old Be
lievers ..................................................................................................... 832
THE GEORGIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
734. The Autocephaly of the Ancient Orthodox Georgian Church........................ 833
735. The Establishment of Temporary Rules on the Status of the Georgian Ortho
dox Church........................................................................................... 833
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
736. New Legislation on the Roman Catholic Church.......................................... 835
737. A Conference Regarding the Affairs of the Roman Catholic Church........... 837
OTIIER RELIGIOUS FAITHS AND SECTS
738. Concerning the Uniate Metropolitan............................................................. 838
739. The Approval of the Return of the Dukhobors.............................................. 838
740. The Lutheran Church.................................................................................... 838
741. Regarding the Skoptsy in Rumania.............................................................. 839
742. The Buddhists............................................................................................. 839
PART IV. MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Chapter 16. The Revolution in the Army and Navy
DEMOCRATIZATION AND MORALE IN THE FIRST MONTHS
743. The Proclamation of the Mezhduraionnyi Committee to the Soldiers........... 845
744. The Genesis of Order No. 1: Rodziankos Version....................................... 846
745. The Genesis of Order No. 1: The Version of the Executive Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet.................................................................................... 846
746. Order No. 1................................................................................................... 848
747. The Officers and the Soldiers [Editorial in Izvestiia] ............................... 849
748. Order of General Alekseev Concerning Revolutionary Detachments Proceed
ing Toward the Northern Front on the Railroads................................... 850
749. Request of Alekseev that the Government Take Measures to Restore Order
in the Army and Reaffirm the Authority of Commanding Officers......... 850
750. Order No. 2................................................................................................... 851
xviii DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
751. Alekseev Objects to the Method of Transmission, Souice, and Content of
Order No. 2........................................................................................... 852
752. Order No. 114 of the Minister of War Abolishing Certain Practices and Re
strictions Applied to Enlisted Personnel .............................................. 853
753. Order No. 115 Establishing a Commission to Revise the Laws and Statutes
on Military Service................................................................................ 854
754. Manifesto to the Soldiers and Citizens, Maich 9,1917................................. 854
755. An Appeal From V. G. Korolenko............................................................ 856
756. The Dismissal of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander
and a Report from General Alekseev Concerning the Mood of the Army
at the Front............................................................................................. 857
757. The Reports of Duma Members N. 0. Yanushkevich and Father Filonenko
on a Visit to the Front............................................................................. 859
758. Letter of General Alekseev Describing the Reactions of the Army and Navy
to the Recent Events, March 14, 1917................................................... 862
759. The Soviet Decision to Appoint Commissars to Military Commands, March
19, 1917................................................................................................ 865
760. Typical Military Demonstrations at the Duma.............................................. 866
761. Pravda Editorial by Stalin Calling for the Army to Stand at Its Posts and
Maintain Discipline.............................................................................. 868
762. Reorganization of the Civil Administration of the Cossacks........................ 868
763. Letter of General Lukomskii, Quartermaster General at Stavka, to General
Kaledin, Commander of the 8th Army, Advising Restraint in Opposing
Democratization .................................................................................... 869
764. Statute of the Sebastopol Military Committee on the Organization of Offi
cers, Warrant Officers, Sailors, Soldiers, and of Workers Engaged on
Defense Works...................................................................................... 870
765. Admiral Kolchak on Conditions in the Black Sea Fleet............................... 871
766. The Resolution of a Naval Officers Meeting in Revel................................. 872
767. The Soldier and the Worker [Editorial in Izvestiia]................................. 874
768. Telegram of Guchkov Enjoining the Maintenance of Discipline................... 875
769. Guchkovs Order on the Criteria for the Appointment of Senior Officers,
April 2,1917, No. 32.............................................................................. 875
770. Order of Guchkov on Elective Military Organizations and Disciplinary
Courts................................................................................................... 876
771. Draft of a Resolution of the Petrograd Soviet on Soldiers Rights, March
9, 1917.................................................................................................. 878
772. The Reactions of General Alekseev and Other Senior Officers to the Pro
posed Declaration of Soldiers Rights................................................... 880
773. Order No. 8 on the Rights of Servicemen (Declaration of Soldiers Rights),
May 11, 1917........................................................................................ 880
774. Proclamation of the Petrograd Soviet on the Declaration of Soldiers Rights 883
775. The Reply of Izvestiia to Pravda$ Attacks on the Declaration.................... 883
776. Theses on the Declaration by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets............... 885
777. The Dismissal of General Gurko as Commander in Chief of the Western
Front ................................................................................................... 886
778. The Disbandment of Four Regiments.......................................................... 887
779. Izvestiia's Comment on the Disbandment of Regiments............................... 887
780. Penalties Imposed for the Commission of Military Crimes.......................... 888
781. Arbitrary Action by Military Committees.................................................... 889
782. Regulations on the Authority of Officers and Committees in the Navy......... 889
783. The Mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet.............................................................. 891
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xix
MILITARY JUSTICE
784. The Abolition of Field Courts-Martial......................................................... 892
785. The Abrogation of the Right of Military Commanders to Increase During
Wartime the Penalties Established by Law............................................ 893
786. The Special Commissions for the Investigation of Malfeasance in the War
and Navy Ministries............................................................................... 893
787. The Organization of Elected Regimental Courts.......................................... 894
788. Judicial Procedure in Regimental Courts..................................................... 895
789. The Introduction of Military Juries............................................................... 897
790. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Reform of Military Courts................................. 899
DESERTION AND FRATERNIZATION
791. Appeal of the Provisional Government to Deserters and Shirkers............... 900
792. Extraordinary Penalties for Desertion......................................................... 901
793. Excerpts from a Report on Fraternization at the Front Between March 1
and May 1, 1917.................................................................................... 901
794. Order of General Gurko Concerning Fraternization..................................... 903
795. Lenins Article on The Meaning of Fraternisation................................... 903
796. Appeal of the Soviet to the Army to Cease Fraternization........................... 905
797. Izvestiia9s Attack on Pravdas Call for Fraternization................................. 907
ARMY DELEGATIONS AND CONFERENCES
798. Politics and the Army [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ........................ 908
799. Kerenskys Address to the Delegation from the 7th Army........................... 908
800. Resolution of the Regional Congress of the Caucasian Army...................... 911
801. Speeches of Guchkov and Kerensky Before the First Congress of Delegates
from the Front........................................................................................ 911
802. Alarming Speeches [Article in Russkiia Vedomosti]............................... 916
803. Words That Are Needed [Editorial in Volia Naroda] ............................. 917
804. The Russian Revolution and the Last Speech of Kerensky [Article in
Delo Naroda] ........................................................................................ 918
805. Comment of Izvestiia on Kerenskys Appointment as Minister ofWar.......... 918
806. Resolution of the Conference of Delegates from the Front.......................... 919
807. An Address of the 8th Army to the Provisional Government........................ 920
Chapter 17. The Offensive and the German Counteroffensive
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THE PREPARATION
FOR AN OFFENSIVE
808. The Disposition of Russian and Enemy Forces at the Beginningof March.. 921
809. Letter of General Alekseev to Guchkov on Organizational andOther Diffi
culties in the Army................................................................................. 922
810. Memorandum of General Lukomskii on the Fighting Capacityof the Army 924
811. Telegram from General Brusilov to the Minister of War on the Feasibility
of an Offensive........................................................................................ 925
812. Copy of a Memorandum from General Janin, Chief of the French Military
Mission, to General Alekseev Transmitting Nivelles Request for the
Opening of the Offensive........................................................................ 926
813. Elaboration of General Alekseev on the Inability of the Russian Army to
Launch an Offensive Before June or July.............................................. 927
XX DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
814. General Nivelles Replies to Alekseevs Messages....................................... 928
815. The Defeat on the Stokhod........................................................................... 929
816. Alekseev Tentatively Sets the Offensive for the Beginning of May............... 930
817. The Formation of Volunteer Shock Battalions.............................................. 930
818. General Alekseevs Objections to the Formation of Shock Battalions........... 931
819. Report of General Brusilov on the Organization of Shock Battalions........... 932
820. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on the Need for an Offensive.................... 932
821. Loyalty to the Allied Democracy [Editorial in Den9] ............................... 933
822. Lenin on an Offensive.................................................................................. 934
823. Kerenskys Order to the Army and Navy After Assuming Office as Minister
of W ar.................................................................................................. 935
824. The Speech of the Assistant Minister of War on the Offensive.................... 936
825. How Long Shall We Wait? [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti]................. 937
826. An Offensive or Preparedness for an Offensive? [Editorial in Izvestiia] ., 938
827. Report of General Brusilov to Alekseev on the Results of Kerenskys Visit to
the Southwestern Front........................................................................... 939
828. Kerensky Speaks to the Soviet on the Question of the Offensive.................. 939
829. Report of General Denikin, Commander in Chief of the Western Front, on
the General Condition of His Armies on the Eve of the Offensive......... 940
THE OFFENSIVE
830. Kerenskys Order for the Offensive.............................................................. 942
831. Appeal from the Provisional Government..................................................... 942
832. Kerensky Requests Honors for the Regiments Leading the Offensive......... 943
833. Message of Congratulations to Kerensky and the Army from the Temporary
Committee of the State Duma................................................................ 943
834. Appeal of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Executive Committee
of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies................................. 944
835. Two Victories [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti].................................... 945
836. The Two Points [Editorial in Delo Naroda]............................................ 946
837. The Offensive [Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta]....................................... 947
838. The Movement in Germany and Our Offensive[Editorial in Izvestiia] ... 948
839. The Offensive [Editorial in Novaia Zhizn] .............................................. 949
840. Appeal of the 12th Army to the Petrograd Garrison..................................... 950
841. Resolution on the Offensive and the Political Situation by the First Infantry
Reserve Regiment in Petrograd.............................................................. 95 ]
842. Izvestiia on the Appeal of the 12th Army and the Actions of the Petrograd
Garrison................................................................................................ 952
843. The Beating of Sokolov and Other Members of the Petrograd Soviet Execu
tive Committee by Soldiers at the Front................................................. 953
844. Resolution of the 10th Army Committee on the Sokolov Incident................. 954
845. Izvestiia on the Sokolov Incident................................................................. 955
846. Vitriolic Letters to Kerensky and Brusilov................................................... 955
847. The Decision to Send Skobelev and Lebedev to the Front........................... 956
848. German Propaganda at the Front............................................................... 95(3
849. Bolshevik Subversion at the Front............................................................... 953
850. Army Reports on Bolshevik Subversion at the Front................................... 959
851. Kerensky on the Front.................................................................................. 962
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xxi
THE GERMAN COUNTERATTACK
852. The Appeal of the Government to the Army..................................................... 966
853. The Attack on the Western Front: The MlynovskiiRegiment......................... 966
854. The Attack on the Southwestern Front: the 11th Army................................. 967
855. Kerenskys Order to the Army and Navy, No. 28............................................. 968
856. Report of the Commander of the 11th Army to Stavka................................... 968
857. Breakthrough in the Rear and at the Front [Editorial in Den9']................ 969
858. Appeal to the Army from the Executive Committees of the Soviet of Work
ers and Soldiers Deputies and theSoviet of Peasants Deputies........... 970
859. The Situation on the Galician and Rumanian Fronts................................. 971
860. The Vindication of the 6th Grenadier Division and the Mlynovskii Regiment 973
861. In Defense of the Actions of the Guards........................................................... 974

Chapter 18. Efforts to Strengthen the Army After July


MILITARY CENSORSHIP, THE DEATH PENALTY,
AND MILITARY COMMISSARS
862. Appeal from the General Staffon the Publication of MilitaryInformation.. 977
863. Explanation from the Government on the Reimposilion of Military Censor
ship ............................................................................................................... 977
864. Rules on Military Censorship............................................................................ 978
865. The Order to Discontinue the Publication of Pravda9 Okopnaia Pravda, and
Other Subversive Newspapers.................................................................... 979
866. A Letter from the Front Concerning the Restoration of Military Censorship 979
867. Letter from Brusilov to Kerensky Urging the Reintroduction of the Death
Penalty and the Institution of Firm Discipline......................................... 980
868. Kerenskys Explanation of the Restoration of the Death Penalty.................. 982
869. The Restoration of the Death Penalty in Wartime for Military Personnel and
the Establishment of Military-Revolutionary Courts............................... 982
870. Kornilov Requests a Mitigation of the Terms of the Law on the Death Pen
alty ............................................................................................................... 984
871. The Petrograd Soviet Demands the Abrogation of the Death Penalty.......... 985
872. Den9 on the Soviet Action.................................................................................. 986
873. The Establishment and Jurisdiction of Military Commissars of the Provi
sional Government...................................................................................... 986
874. Rabochaia Gazeta on the New Measures for the Army................................... 987
THE CONFERENCE AT STAVKA ON JULY 16 AND THE
VIEWS OF THE COMMANDING STAFF
875. Excerpts from the Protocols of the Conference of Government and Military
Leaders at Stavka ai Mogilev on July 16................................................... 989
876. Letter to Kerensky from Alekseev..................................................................... 1010
877. Letter to Rodzianko from Alekseev on the Conference of July 16..................1013
878. The Demands of the Central Committee of the Officers Union of the Army
and N avy..................................................................................................... 1016
879. Careless Words [Article in Vlastf Naroda] ................................................. 1017
880. Resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Peasants Deputies...................................................................................... 1018
xxii DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL KORNILOV AS
SUPREME COMMANDER
881. The Appointment of Kornilov as Supreme Commander and of Savinkov as
Assistant Minister of War..................................................................... 1019
882. Novoe Vremia on the Kornilov Appointment................................................ 1019
883. Statement on the Significance of the Kornilov Appointment........................ 1020
884. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Proposals of General Kornilov.......................... 1021
885. Kornilovs First Meeting with the Provisional Government.......................... 1021
886. Opposition to the Rumored Dismissal of Kornilov........................................ 1022
887. Kornilovs Second Meeting with the Provisional Government...................... 1023
888. Delo Naroda on the Rumored Introduction of New Repressive Measures in
the R ear................................................................................................ 1024
889. Savinkov on the Army Committees.............................................................. 1025
REPORTS OF IMPROVED MORALE AND DISCIPLINE
AT THE FRONT
890. The Southwestern Front.............................................................................. 1026
891. An Improvement in the Attitude of the Army.............................................. 1027
892. Izvestiia on Evidences of Rehabilitation of the Army................................... 1027
893. The Rumanian Front.................................................................................... 1028
THE FALL OF RIGA
894. Novoe Vremia on the Loss of Riga................................................................ 1029
895. Russkoe Slovo on Riga................................................................................ 1029
896. Volia Naroda Calls for New Sacrifices and Attributes the Defeat to German
Superiority............................................................................................ 1030
897. Rabochaia Gazeta Warns of Counterrevolutionary Attempts........................ 1031
898. Izvestiia Urges Unity in the Democracy to Save Russia and the Revolution.. 1032
899. The Report of Assistant Commissar Voitinskii on the Breakthrough of
August 1 9 ............................................................................................ 1033
900. Protest of Commissar Stankevich Against Stavkas Communiques Concern
ing Riga................................................................................................ 1034
901. General Danilov Denies Rumors Derogating the 5th Army.......................... 1035
902. Telegram from the Executive Committee of the 12th Army Refuting Attacks
on Its Combat Performance................................................................... 1036
903. But Where Is the Truth? [Editorial in Delo Naroda] ............................. 1036
904. The Enigma of Riga [By the Special Correspondent of Le Temps] ......... 1037
PART V. FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Chapter 19. The Period of the First Provisional Government
THE ALLIES AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION
905. The Governments Initial Statement on Foreign Policy............................... 1042
906. The Recognition of the Provisional Government by the Major Powers......... 1043
907. America Joins the Allies.............................................................................. 1043
908. Press Interview with Miliukov..................................................................... 1044
909. The Provisional Governments Declaration of March 27 on War Aims......... 1045
910. Novoe Vremia on the Declaration............................................................... 1046
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xxiii
911. Editorial in Rech on the Declaration........................................................... 1047
912. Delo Naroda on the Declaration.................................................................... 1048
913. Rabochaia Gazeta Terms the Declaration a Victory of Democracy........... 1049
914. Attitude of the British Government Toward the Russian Situation...............1050
915. The Reception of the British and French Socialists..................................... 1050
916. The Absence of Russian Representatives at Allied Meetings........................1052
917. American Concern over Russian Foreign Policy.......................................... 1053
918. Russian Diplomatic Representation in Washington..................................... 1053
919. British Refutation of Reports of Possible Japanese Occupation of Siberia if
Russia Left the War............................................................................... 1054
THE STRAITS AND CONSTANTINOPLE
920. Summary of the Agreements Among the Allies Concerning the Straits and
Constantinople ...................................................................................... 1054
921. The Briand-Pokrovskii Agreement on the Future Western Boundaries of
Russia and the Eastern Boundaries of France....................................... 1056
922. Kerenskys Interview Advocating the Internationalization of the Straits. ... 1057
923. Effect in Britain of Kerenskys Statement................................................... 1057
924. Miliukovs Denial that the Government Has Renounced the Agreement on
Constantinople and the Straits.............................................................. 1058
925. Miliukov Tries to Revive the Plan for an Expedition Against the Straits___1058
926. Continued Hope for an Expedition.............................................................. 1059
927. Bazili Suggests an Agreement with Turkey as an Alternative to a Straits Ex
pedition ................................................................................................. 1060
TIIE ASIA MINOR AGREEMENTS
928. The Meetings at Folkestone and St. Jean de Maurienne on the Italian De
mands .................................................................................................... 1062
929. Miliukov Protests the Failure to Inform Russia Beforehand of the Confer
ences at Folkestone and St. Jean de Maurienne..................................... 1063
930. Ribots Reply to Miliukovs Protest.............................................................. 1064
931. The Ambassador in Rome Reports on the St. Jean Agreement.................... 1064
932. Russian Rejection of the Italian Proposal................................................... 1065
APPROACHES FOR PEACE
933. The Kolyshko-Erzberger Negotiations........................................................... 1065
934. The Prince Sixte Affair................................................................................ 1067
935. Approaches Through Copenhagen................................................................ 1069
936. German Evidence of Informal Separate Peace Talks on the Front in the First
Part of April........................................................................................... 1070
937. Unofficial Russian-German Talks on the Front South of the Desna River... 1071
938. Official German Approval of the Negotiations Proposed by Unofficial Rus
sian Representatives South of the Desna................................................ 1072
939. A Bulgarian Peace Proposal Addressed to Maxim Gorky............................ 1073
940. The Possibilities of a Separate Peace with Turkey....................................... 1075
THE SOVIET APPEAL TO THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE WORLD
' AND THE RESOLUTION ON WAR AIMS
941. The Debate in the Soviet on the Appeal....................................................... 1076
942. Soviet Appeal to the Peoples of All the World............................................ 1077
xxiv DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
943. Reck 9 on the Appeal..................................................................................................... 1078
944. Izvestiias Comments on the Appeal.......................................................................... 1079
945. Secret Diplomacy [Editorial in Izvestiia] .........................................................1081
946. Tseretelli Answers Objections to His Resolution on War Aims Submitted to
the All-Russian Conference of Soviets............................................................. 1082
947. Tseretelli Speaks Against an Amendment Calling for the Publication of
Secret Agreem ents................................................................................................ 1083
948. The Resolution on War Aims of the All-Russian Confercncc of Soviets......... 1083
949. Lenins Farewell Letter to the Swiss Workers.......................................................1085
950. Russkiia Vedomosti on the General Discussion of Peacc Terms...................... 1086
THE RETURN TO RUSSIA OF POLITICAL EXILES
951. The Soviet Protest Against the Detention by the British of Trotsky and Other
Revolutionaries...................................................................................................... 1087
952. Statement by the Provisional Government Absolving the British of Responsi
bility for the Detention of Emigres Because of Political Affiliation......... 1088
953. The Request of Lenin and His Associates for Transportation Through Ger
many ....................................................................................................................... 1089
954. Lenin and Zinoviev Ask for Immediate Transportation...................................... 1090
955. The Conditions for the Passage Through Germany.............................................. 1090
956. The Need for Extreme Discretion in the Arrangements for the Trip..............1091
957. Martov and Other Leading Mensheviks Also Request the Right of Transit
Through Germ any................................................................................................ 1092
958. Novoe Vremia on Lenins Transit Through Germany.......................................... 1092
959. Rech9 on Lenins Arrival by Way of Germany....................................................... 1093
960. Rabochaia Gazeta Denounces the Attacks on Lenin............................................ 1094
961. Discussion in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet on the Status
of the Emigrants in Switzerland and Lenins Mode of Return.................. 1094
THE MILIUKOV NOTE OF APRIL 18
962. The Newspaper Reports on the Drafting of a War Aims Note by the Gov
ernment ................................................................................................................... 1096
963. Miliukovs Contemporary Account of the Origins of the Note.......................... 1097
964. The Note of April 18.................................................................................................... 1098
965. Rech9on the Note........................................................................................................... 1098
966. The Governments Explanatory Note of April 2 2 ................................................ 1100
967. Soviet Acceptance of the Governments Explanation, April 21........................ 1100
Chapter 2 0 . May to October
FIRST STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY BY THE
COALITION GOVERNMENT
968. Interview with Prince Lvov....................................................................................... 1 1 0 2
969. Communique to the Press from Foreign Minister Tereshchenko...................... 1103
970. Lenins Interpretation ofthe Governments Statement......................................... 1105
971. Tereshchenkos Message to the UnitedStates Secretary of State................... 1106
ALLIED REPLIES TO THE NOTE OF APRIL 18, WILSONS
MESSAGE, AND THE AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN
SPECIAL MISSIONS
972. The British Reply......................................................................................................... HQ5
973. The French Reply......................................................................................................... H 0 7
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II XXV
974. The Italian Reply........................................................................................ 1108
975. President Wilsons Message............................................................................ 1109
976. Delo Naroda on the Allied Replies............................................................... 1110
977. Izvestiia on the Allied Replies...................................................................... 1112
978. The Aims of the Root Mission to Russia....................................................... 1113
979. The Bakhmetev Mission to the United States.............................................. 1114
THE QUESTION OF THE REVISION OF WAR AIMS
980. Resolution on the War and War Aims by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets
of Peasants Deputies............................................................................. 1114
981. Arthur Henderson Before the Executive Committee of the Soviet............... 1115
982. Address of Albert Thomas to the Executive Committee of the Soviet..........1116
983. Vandervelde Before the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets...................1117
984. Trotskys Comments on the Eve of the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets 1118
985. Resolution on the War by the FirstAll-RussianCongress of Soviets............ 1119
986. The Foreign Ministers Note of June 3 Proposing an Allied Conference for
the Revision of War Aims..................................................................... 1120
987. Izvestiia9^ Comment on the Note................................................................ 1121
988. Bakhmetev Urges American Participationinthe Conference..................... 1122
989. Tereshchenko Approves Bakhmetevs Recommendation and Advises that
the Conference Must Be Postponed....................................................... 1123
990. Russian Message to the Allies Following the Failure of the Offensive and
the Disorders of the July Days, July 19................................................. 1123
991. Nabokovs Account of Russian Treatment at One of the Periodic Allied Con
ferences ................................................................................................ 1124
992. Ribot, Alleging Russian Objections, Refuses the Request for Publication of
the Briand-Pokrovskii Agreement.......................................................... 1126
993. Teieshchenko Denies Ribots Allegations and Informs France that Russia
Has No Objection to the Publication of AllAgreements....................... 1126
994. The Revival of Plans for an Allied Conference............................................ 1127
995. Instructions Drawn Up by the Central Executive Committee for the Soviet
Delegate to the Allied Conference......................................................... 1128
996. Tereshchenkos Appearance Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the
Council of the Republic, October 12..................................................... 1130
997. Tereshchenkos Speech Before the Council of the Republic on Foreign Pol
icy and in Opposition to Skobelevs Instructions, October 16, 1917....... 1138
998. Further Discussion of Skobelevs Instructions in the Foreign Affairs Com
mittee of the Council of the Republic, October 17................................. 1144
999. Miliukovs Reply to Tereshchenko and Attack Upon Skobelevs Instructions
in the Council of the Republic.............................................................. 1147
1000. Den on Tereshchenkos Address to the Council of the Republic................. 1151
1001. Professor Thomas Masaryk on the Instructions to Skobelev.................... 1152
1002. Izvestiia on the Foreign Policy Controversy................................................ 1154
1003. The Draft of Instructions to Skobelev by the Executive Committee of the
All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies................................................ 1155
1004. Den9 on the Instructions of the Peasants Deputies..................................... 1156
1005. Rech9on the Instructions of the Peasants Deputies................................... 1157
MORE APPROACHES FOR PEACE
1006. The Separate Peace Offer of May 22 from the German Commander in Chief
of the Eastern Front............................................................................... 1158
xxvi DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
1007. Order to the Army and to the Navy in Reply to the German Offer (May 30,
1917, No. 15).......................................................................................... 1159
1008. A Separate Peace Offer to Kerensky........................................................... 1161
1009. The Reichstag Peace Resolution of July 19 (N.S.)................................... 1161
1010. Erzbergers Explanation of the Motives Behind the Peace Resolution........ 1162
1011. Izvestiia?s Comment on the Resolution and the Papal Peacc Note............. 1163
1012. Statement of Tereshchenko on the German Reply to the Papal Note..........1165
1013. A More Sympathetic View of the German Peace Statements...................... 1166
1014. German Peace Feeler by Way of Madrid................................................... 1168
1015. The Western Allies Denial of Any Separate Peace Plans.......................... 1169
THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE CRIMM AFFAIR
1016. The Debate on April 25 in the Soviet Executive Committee on Calling an
International Socialist Conference......................................................... 1169
1017. The Soviet Call for an International Socialist Conference, April 25......... 1170
1018. Appeal by the Petrograd Soviet to the Socialists of All Countries............. 1171
1019. The Letter of Henderson, Thomas, and Vandervelde to the Petrograd Soviet
Regarding the Appeal of May 20........................................................... 1173
1020. The Executive Committees Answer to Comrades Vandervelde, Thomas,
and de Brouckere.................................................................................. 1174
1021. Russkiia VedomostTs Comment on the Acceptance by the German Minority
and Majority Socialists of the Stockholm Invitation.............................. 1175
1022. The Soviet Executive Committees Conditional Appointment on May 29 of
a Delegate to the Third Zimmerwald Conference in Stockholm............. 1176
1023. German Approval of Robert Grimms Departure for Russia...................... 1177
1024. Grimms Telegram to Swiss Federal Councilor Hoffmann.......................... 1178
1025. Telegram from the Legation in Bern to the German Foreign Ministry....... 1179
1026. The German Peace Program for Hoffmanns Transmittal to Grimm......... 1179
1027. The Intercepted Hoffmann-Grimm Telegram, Grimms First Explanation,
and the Decision of the Provisional Government that Grimm Must Leave
Russia .................................................................................................. 1180
1028. The Debate on the Grimm Affair in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets,
June 3 .................................................................................................. 1181
1029. Grimms Admission.................................................................................... 1182
1030. The Labour Conference Decision to Attend the Stockholm Conference, the
Russian Telegram to Nabokov, Hendersons Resignation, and the Brit
ish Governments Decision Not to Issue Passports to Stockholm Dele
gates . ................................................................................................... 1183
1031. Rabochaia Gazetds Comments on the Henderson Episode........................ 1185
1032. The Inter-Allied Socialist Conference in London, August 28-29, 1917
(N.S.) .................................................................................................. 1186
The Russian
Provisional Government
1917

VOLUME II
PART III
Economic and Social Reorganization

High among the legacies from the old regime was the burden of the war upon
the financial and economic resources of the state. To be sure, all of the belligerents
were sorely tried after three years of conflict. But Russia was particularly affected
because of her relatively retarded economic development and her unfortunate
geographical position. The Central Powers were able to block almost all access to
her by sea and land, denying her imports and necessitating a drastic reorganiza
tion of economic life.
With the revolution came further demands upon the treasury to provide for
needed reforms and the economic betterment of the population. At the same time,
the continuing strain of war upon the national economy, aggravated by earlier
Tsarist mismanagement and the subsequent dislocations occasioned by the revolu
tion, had weakened the financial base from which the government drew and com
plicated the implementation of measures to increase revenue.1
To meet its expenditures, the Government called for a new internal loan, the
Liberty Loan, and with little hesitation decided on greatly increased direct taxa
tion. Although the sums realized by the Loan were considerable, the political
situation after July acted to slow down the subscription rate, and the multiplying
expenses of the Government diminished the proportional value of the returns.
In the realm of direct taxation, a series of measures was introduced on June 12,
increasing sharply the rates of the income and war profits taxes and introducing
an extraordinary income lax levy. But the Government did not have time to
promulgate the other measures contemplated, nor to realize substantial results
from the new taxation. Furthermore, in October, as a result of various pressures
and considerations, the paymenl of the extraordinary income tax levy was post
poned to 1918 and the war profits tax reduced.
Other sources of revenue were foreign loans and credits and the institution of
new indirect taxation. The entrance of the United States into the war and its
sympathy for the new regime in Russia opened the way for American loans to
supplement those already granted by her other allies. But they were restricted to
specific purposes and comparatively modest in amount.2 To increase revenues
from indirect taxation, certain duties were raised and a number of state monopo
lies were proposed for revenue, of which only that on sugar, a supply measure as
1Financial matters in Russia during World War I, including the period of the Provisional
Government, are covered in Alexander M. Michelson, Paul N. Apostol, and Michael W. Ber-
natzky, Russian Public Finance During the War, and, for the Provisional Government period
only, in Lozxnskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. III.
2See For. Rel. of US., J918, Russia, HI, 1-28.
480 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
well, was actually introduced before October. Meantime, to meet its obligations,
the Government was forced to increase drastically currency emissions, with the
result that inflation spiraled and the exchange rate of the ruble plummeted.
Serious as the financial impasse was for the survival of the State, it touched the
average Russian less directly, or rather less obviously, than other pressing eco
nomic issues. First among these was, most certainly, the land question. The way
at last was clear for an agrarian reform in accordance with the will of the majority/1
But so sweeping a change could not be achieved overnight. Pending the convoca
tion of the Constituent Assembly, which had to approve the fundamental agrarian
law, and in order to expedite its work, the Government established a Cenlial Land
Committee and local land committees to assemble pertinent information, draft
proposed legislation, and temporarily aid in the regulation of land relations. At
its second session, on May 20, the Central Land Committee adopted a declaration
to the effect that the future land reform should be based on the principle that all
agricultural lands must be transferred to the use of the toiling agricultural popu
lation. Earlier, a land reserve fund had been inaugurated with the transfer of
crown and appanage lands to the State.4
But many peasants failed to comprehend the need for time, and many land
owners viewed the future with apprehension. Partisan solutions vied for the alle
giance of the citizenry and repercussions from the recurring political criscs com
pounded the difficulties in maintaining order in the countryside. The result was
growing peasant impatience and recurrent agrarian disorders, which greatly
increased after August.
These disturbances not only boded ill for a peaceful and equitable solution of
the land question, but immeasurably complicated the crucial issue of food supply.*
A variety of factors were responsible for the shortages in food supply which had
plagued the old regime and continued into the new era. Agricultural production,
though not abundant, was sufficient for the needs of the population and the army.
But the peasant, discouraged by fixed prices on his product and by the high prices
or absence of consumer goods, together with the prohibition against vodka sales,
often chose to keep his grain and wait for a better price and time.0 Transportation
problems and other hindrances to distribution added further to the alarming
situation.
The Provisional Government established the State Committee on Food Supply
March 9 to replace the prerevolutionary organs and to work out a national pro
gram for supply. On March 25, in an effort to obtain the grain surpluses held
by the peasants and to establish centralized control over distribution, a slate grain
monopoly was created and local food supply committees were authorized. During
s For the prerevolutionary agrarian situation, see G. T. Robinson, Rural Russia Under the
Old Regime, and George Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution.
4 The agrarian problem dunng the war and the Provisional Government period is dis
cussed in Alexis N. Antisferov, Alexander D. Bilimovich, Michael 0. Balshev, and Dimitry N.
Ivantsov, Russian Agriculture During the War, and Lozmskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap,
V. On the cooperatives, Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, The Cooperative Move
ment in Russia During the War, is helpful.
5 See P. B. Struve, K. I. Zaitzev, N. V. Dolinsky, and S. S. Demoslhenov, Food Supply in
Russia During the World War, and Lozmskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. IV.
6E. E. Yashov, Dostatochno-h Khleba v Rossii?9a contemporary pamphlet, gives a succinct
account of the reasons for the shortage of cereals.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION 481
this period the administration of food supply was under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Finance, but on May 5 a separate Ministry of Food was organized
in which was eventually concentrated all governmental efforts to overcome the
supply crisis threatening the civilian population and military forces. Eventually,
the new Ministry delegated commissioners to the food-producing areas, where
they were authorized to exercise far-reaching powers to expedite the collection
and distribution of food. In August, in order to encourage the sale of grain by
the peasant, its price was doubled.
The related problem of supplying the population with consumer goods was
recognized by the Government with the appointment in April of a commission
to investigate and recommend methods of expediting the delivery to the consumer
of articles of prime necessity. Early in June, the Ministry of Food was authorized
to organize the supervision of the distribution and price control of several basic
items.
The questions of supply, of the regulation of industry and transport, and of
labor relations were all, obviously, closely related, so much so that it is difficult
to separate the materials pertaining to them. The formation of the Economic
Council and the Central Economic Committee in June, following the introduction
earlier of less sweeping measures concerning economic life and especially indus
trial production by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, was an attempt to co
ordinate the national economy and to work out plans from the center concerning
all these important issues.
The rights of some existing regulatory agencies were extended and new organs
established for the industrial and commercial sector. Special attention was given
the vital areas of fuel and metal produclion and textile and leather manufacturing.
In August a state coal monopoly was introduced. But, as in other of its activities,
the Government was not vouchsafed time to test its regulatory methods for in
dustry. Furthermore, the opposition of certain commercial and industrial groups
often handicapped attempts to carry out legislation.7
At the very core of Russias economic difficulties was the breakdown of trans
portation. Great technical problems resulting from the lack of new rolling stock,
the deterioration of the old, and the terrible strain upon the overburdened lines
and other facilities were coupled with Lension between the workers and the un
popular supervisory personnel. Efforts were made to increase the acceptability
of the administrations to Lhe workers and to introduce greater efficiency in the
system. The attempt to improve service and equipment and expedite the purchase
and use of new rolling stock was aided somewhat by American railroad car manu
facturers, who gave priority to Russian orders, and by the Washington govern
ment, which dispatched the Stevens Commission of railroad experts. In the brief
period of its activity before October, the Commission assisted the Ministry of
Transport in ameliorating conditions on the Trans-Siberian line and in the Vladi
vostok marshaling yards.8
Next in the vicious economic circle facing the Government stood labor rela
7Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. II, and S. 0. Zagorsky, State Control of In
dustry in Russia During the War.
8Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 81-85, and For. Rel. of U.$., 1918, Russia, III,
183-205.
482 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
tions.9 Under the old regime, working conditions had remained far from satis
factory and recourse to collective action by the workers was severely limited. The
war years brought further privation and a drop in real wages.
After the revolution the Labor Department, at first within the Ministry of
Trade and Industry and later raised to cabinet rank in the coalition governments,
worked out a series of advanced reforms with the participation of labor as well
as employer and public representatives. Full rights to organize, bargain, and
strike were granted, factory committees were established, chambers of conciliation
and arbitration were organized, and social insurance was extended. In addition,
the Government assisted in the improvement of working conditions and wages.
But the resentment and radicalism among the workers, bred by years of
oppression and the conditions of Russian economic life, were explosive forces
not easily or quickly assuaged, especially in the heady atmosphere of revolution
and sudden freedom. Of greater significance in the evenL, they offered fertile
ground for Bolshevik propaganda and agitation, which attacked the extent and
intent of the new reforms and took advantage of every difficulty in implementa
tion. As a result, the period was marked by industrial strife, which increased in
the later months with the mounting influence of political conflict and parallel eco
nomic disorganization and hardship.10
In the field of education the Provisional Government introduced a number of
major reforms.11 The Ministry of Education enlisted ihe advice of pedagogical
experts and other interested groups in its work through the organization of a
State Committee on Education. Allhough it was accused of neglecting the current
problems of the schools in its zeal to introduce sweeping changes, much can be
said for the Committees long-term program.
Legislation was enacted altering and democratizing the elementary and sec
ondary school system to facilitate the hitherto often impeded advance of students
from one level to the other. New schools were authorized and an expansion in
the teacher-training program undertaken. In order to unify all elementary edu
cation in one system, the Government transferred all primary schools to the juris
diction of the Ministry of Education, including some 37,000 Orthodox parochial
schools. Similarly, secondary schools for boys and for girls which had also boon
under the Holy Synod, as well as those in the Department of the Empress Mania,
were transferred to the Ministry. Despite the opposition of the majority of the
Orthodox hierarchy and appeals for the reversal of the church school measures,
the Government held to its decision.
The Provisional Government was also responsible for an innovation of con
siderable and lasting importance to Russian letters, an orthographic reform intro
duced in the schools in the fall term of 1917.
Higher education benefited by the establishment or authorization of new uni
versities and higher technical institutions and the grant of far-reaching autonomy,
9 See Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu and Lozmskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Cliap. VI.
10 The many documents in the two volumes of Ekon. Polozhenie, only a few of which have
been translated and printed here, are invaluable on all economic questions.
11 William H. E. Johnson, Russias Educational Heritage, is useful for a survey of educa
tion under the Tsars, while Count Paul N. Ignatiev, Dimitry M. Odinelz, and Paul J. Novgo-
rotsev, Russian Schools and Universities m the World War, covers the period from 1914 to
October 1917.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION 483
including the election of faculty. In the interests of more democratic self-govern
ment, the lower ranks of the faculty were admitted to university councils with
voting rights on most academic matters. At the same time, new legislation im
proved and regularized relations between students and administrations. The
rights of student bodies were recognized, including that of participation in deci
sions of the university councils and faculties concerning student life and interests.
Previous to the revolution, most welfare activity was privately sponsored, and
much of it was directed by institutions under the patronage of members of the
Romanov House. With the establishment of a democratic regime, it was con
sidered proper that these institutions and other private philanthropic and chari
table organizations come under government control. In the beginning, they were
placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Education, but after the forma
tion of a Ministry of Welfare in May, they were transferred. In June and July,
the Ministry greatly increased and extended the allowances to relatives of men
in service as well as assistance to disabled war veterans. In this connection, men
tion should also be made of the increases in state pensions.12
The intimate connection between the established Orthodox Church and the
Tsarist Government complicated the question of its position under the new order.13
In its first days, the Provisional Government dismissed from the Synod the fol
lowers of the late Rasputin, and, eventually, it replaced all but two of the members.
The Government, while accepting the establishment of the Orthodox Church,
granted complete freedom of religious belief or disbelief and removed the exist
ing disabilities against other churches and faiths in the country. It also, as men
tioned above, assumed control of the church-school system.
At the same time, the Orthodox Church was encouraged to call its long-delayed
and greatly desired All-Russian Sobor, which convened in Moscow on August 15.
There, after much discussion and considerable preoccupation with current po
litical questions, it voted to introduce a greater measure of self-government in the
Church and accept an autonomous position in its relations with the State. Al
though for various reasons there was some opposition to the re-establishment of
the patriarchate, the advent of the October Revolution in the midst of the de
liberations and the trying times it seemed to presage for the Church hastened a
decision in favor of the restoration. Archbishop Tikhon was chosen the first
Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church since the reign of Peter the Great.
12Michelson, Russian Public Finance, p. 277.
13 By far the best work in English on the Orthodox Church during the revolutionary period
is John Sheldon Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950, Chaps. I and II,
which includes an excellent bibliography. Extensive, but partisan, accounts with much docu
mentation are B. V. Titlinov, Tserkov9vo Vremia Revoliutsii, and A. I. Vvedenskii, Tserkov*i
Gosudarstvo.
CHAPTER 9
Public Finance

STATE CONTROL
429. T h e E sta b lis h m e n t o f a P erm a n en t P re lim in a r y and
C u rren t A u d it and C o n tr o l
[S<?6. Uzak.t I, 1, No. 366. A measure to increase the effectiveness of audit and contiol
procedures.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Pending the publication by legislative action of the Code of Audit and Con
trol, the Provisional Government has decreed:
1. The State Controller has the right to establish, when and where he deems
necessary, a permanent preliminary and current audit. An actual verification in
individual cases may be carried out by order of the heads of conlrol offices.
2. In the event that evidence of evil-doing in the activities of supervisors or
employees is discovered during an audit of accounts, the control office shall so
inform its superiors and the appropriate public prosecutors office at the same
time so that an investigation may be carried out and criminal proceedings initiated.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 11, 1917
430. T h e In clu sio n o f Z em stvo and M u n icip al R e p r e se n ta tiv e s in
t h e L o c a l O ffic e s and t h e C o u n c il o f t h e D e p a r tm e n t
o f S t a t e C o n tr o l
[5o6. Uzak.91, 1, No. 434.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. The general offices of all institutions of the Department of State Control
shall include at the place of their location one representative each from the guber-
niya zemstvos and the guberniya (oblast) capitals, and the Council of Slate Con
trol shall include one representative each from the zemstvo and town unions.
II. The aforesaid representatives shall have a vote and in general enjoy all
rights of other members of the above-mentioned offices as well as the right, along
with permanent members, of studying all proceedings of the control institutions
and of being present during current audits and inspections and verifications car
ried out by such institutions.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 20, 1917
PUBLIC FINANCE 485
431. T h e P articipation of R epresentatives o f P ublic O rganizations
in th e A ctivities of t h e I nstitutions of S tate C ontrol
[5o6. U z a k I, 1, No. 675.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
The State Controller is authorized in all cases he deems necessary to permit
representatives of public organizations to acquaint themselves on the spot with
the status of audit and control in institutions of the State Control, as well as to
allow these representatives to participate in the preliminary audit and to be present
during the current audit of all kinds of operations of institutions and persons
accountable to the State Control.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
G odnev , State Controller
May 18, 1917

THE LIBERTY LOAN


432. T h e Issuance o f t h e L ib erty L oan o f 1917
[Sob. XJzak,, I, 1, No. 408.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Ministry of Finance is directed to issue a 5 per cent loan in graduated
series [50, 100, 500, 1,000, 5,000, 10,000, and 25,000 rubles] . . .
1. This loan shall be entered in the Book of National Debts under the desig
nation of Liberty Loan of 1917.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 27, 1917
433. Novoe Vremia on t h e L iberty L oan
[No. 14725, March 12, 1917, p. 5.]
The Liberty Loan has to be exceptionally successful. Not only is this neces
sary for us as an affirmation of our undeviating will to preserve the freedom weve
won and to conquer the threatening foe. This is equally necessary for upholding
and elevating our state credit abroad, the credit of free Russia.
The huge quantities of free cash that have accumulated in the personal and
savings accounts of banking institutionsstate, public, and privatefully guar
antee the probability of such an exceptional success of the Liberty Loan. These
free funds, which have so far found no application in the industrial and commer
cial activity of the country, amount to over twelve billion rubles. The diversion
of a more or less considerable part of these funds for the realization of the Liberty
Loan would have innumerable beneficial consequences for our state and private
economies. Besides financing the warthe chief purpose of the loanthe removal
from the money market of a large sum of free funds would eliminate the necessity
of resorting to the new issuance of paper money for the corresponding amount.
486 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
It would thereby stop the falling of the value of our credit rubleand could even
raise it, thereby reducing the high cost of living. In consequence of that, the very
expenses for defense would be subject to some reduction and thus both private
and state economies would be the gainers. . . .
434. Den9 on t h e L iberty L oan
[No. 28, April 8, 1917, p. 1.]
The task of the entire Russian democracy is to support the Provisional Gov
ernment in the difi&cult problem of conducting the war. As soon as the Govern
ment by its declaration of March 28 had categorically repudiated the annexa
tionist aims of the war and had recognized the peoples right of final solution in
the issue of war and peace, it became evident that on this most important current
issue the Government shares our point of view, the point of view of the Russian
democracy. And our duty has become the more pressing.
A great loan is being issued. Loans are the only means, or almost the only
means, of conducting the war. The old Government during two and a half years
of war issued internal and foreign loans for twenty billions of rubles, with [its]
last loans meeting no success. And for obvious reasons! For monarchy had
already reached the last days of its existence, and had already lost all iLs credit,
both political and financial.
The new loan is being issued in order to replenish the war funds. Its failure
would mean defeat in the external war and almost certainly the ruin of the new
regime. On the other hand, its success would mean the possibility of waging war
successfully and, at the same time, the consolidation of the freedom that we have
already gained. It is, in the full sense of the word, a liberty loan, and its active
support is both the political and the moral duty of every political party that
cherishes the conquests of the revolution, and of every individual who does not
want a return to the past.
435. T he A ppeal of the F ree E conomic S ociety on t h e L iberty L oan
[VVP, No. 27, April 9,1917, p. 3.]
Citizens!
The revolution has converted all the possessions of the treasury into the prop
erty of the people. Every ruble given to the Government is a ruble given to all the
people. The debt of the Government is the debt of the people, and the people
answer with all of their fortune for every ruble borrowed by the Government.
Enormous funds are needed for the completion of the war, for the establish
ment of the new order in free Russia.
The country cannot issue limitless [amounts of] paper currencythe price
of a pound of bread is being increased with the issue of every bank note. The
more paper currency there is, the more expensive goods are.
On behalf of the Russian people the Government may conclude loans in for
eign countriesexternal loans. On such loans interest must be paid; this would go
abroad. Each year it would be necessary to spend large amounts on loan payments
to foreigners.
The Government has chosen another, better way. It turns for the loan to the
Russian people themselves.
PUBLIC FINANCE 487
The Provisional Government of our free country is issuing a liberty loan.
Let everyone giving money to the Government for this loan realize that he is
giving his ruble for the cause of libertys defense, for the cause of defending our
country against German aggression.
Let everyone know that the refund of the loan and the payment of its interest
are guaranteed by the entire fortune of the Russian State.
Let everyone know that henceforth each kopeck spent is being accounted for
by the people themselves.

The responsibility of everyone to the motherland, to his fellow citizens, and


to the future of Russia is to give his savings for the great cause of freedom.
N. V. C h aik o vskii , President
of the Free Economic Society
436. T he D ebate on the L iberty L oan in t h e E xecutive C o m m ittee
of th e P etrograd S oviet
[Session of April 7, Protokoly, pp. 90-91.]
Several positions on the subject of the loan became evident in the Executive
Committee. The majority emphasized that a stand against the loan would run
counter to the entire tactical line adopted at the last conferencethe policy of
strengthening national defense and not of disrupting it. The revolution has made
national defense a cause of all the democracy, and the attitude toward financing
[national] defense must be defined in these terms; they do not deny all the im
perfections of the loan as a financial measure, but they see no other way out under
the present circumstances. If the loan is not supported by the democracy, other
methods will be found which will be even more disadvantageous to the people,
as, for example, the issuance of paper currency.
Funds are needed not only for defense but for maintaining all spheres of
national life. But, without refusing to support the Government, we must qualify
this support. We must not participate in an unconditional loan. In connection
with the loan, it is necessary to start a campaign for changing the whole financial
system of the State. The conclusions of those who opposed the loan fell into
political and financial categories. Politically, it would be wrong and inadmissible
to place the peoples money at the disposal of a government which has not re
nounced imperialistic plans. The loan is a means of prolonging the war. The
Soviets sanction under the present international situation, with the beginnings
of a movement in Germany, would be a glaring contradiction of the position taken
by the Soviet itself in its appeal to the peoples of the world.
As a financial measure, the loan is most imperfect of all. The loan is a tax
on a number of future generations and a means of enriching financial circles.
Finally, the third positionleaning, in general, toward the conclusions of the
oppositionconsidered that the Soviet should take a position of noncommitment
neither support [the loan] nor interfere [with it].
The voting gave the following results: in favor of the loan, but with stipula
tions to be worked out by a special commission, 21; against, 14; in favor of non
interference, 5. At the demand of a portion of the Executive Committee, the vote
was taken by roll call.
488 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
437. T h e S oviet R esolution in S upport of t h e L iberty L oan ,
A pril 22, 1917
fIzvestiia, No. 48, April 23, 1917, p. 2. The Soviet had made publication of its support
of the Liberty Loan dependent upon the dispatch of a note to the Allies transmitting
the Governments declaration of March 27 on war aims. On April 18, Miliukov sent
the declaration, but he attached a commentary including such phrases as victorious
conclusion and necessary guarantees and sanctions which the Soviet felt dircctly
contradicted the import of the document. This conflict marked the beginning of the
April Crisis (see Chaps. 19 and 22). On April 21, Miliukov reluctantly agreed to ex
plain his remarks to the satisfaction of the Soviet in a supplementary diplomatic note.
Irakli Tseretelli, Reminiscences of the February Revolution: The April Crisis, The
Russian Review, XIV (1955), No. 2, 102-3.]
1) The revolution is in urgent need of large financial resources for consoli
dating its gains and for safeguarding them against external attacks.
2) The consolidation of the gains of the Russian Revolution and the subse
quent development [of the revolution] are the most powerful weapons for stimu
lating and strengthening the revolutionary movement in other countries, [and]
for the rebirth of universal brotherhood in the common struggle of peoples, based
on principles of peace and democracy.
3) But this consolidation, as was recognized by the All-Russian Congress of
Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, requires the resolute defense of the
country until such time as the awakened international democratic forces compel
their governments to renounce the policy of seizures, annexations, and indemni
ties and revolutionary Russia is protected from military defeat. The absence of
necessary funds will inevitably create a critical situation both on the front and
in the rear of the revolution.
4) Therefore, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies considers that
assistance in financing the Russian Revolution is the direct duty of the revolu
tionary proletariat and the army to the country as well as to the workers of the
whole world.
5) Recognizing that the Provisional Government, erected by the revolution,
is fulfilling, as a whole, the responsibility it has assumed, and in firm belief that
the revolutionary democracy of Russia will succeed in forcing the Government
to advance further along the course of renouncing imperialistic policies, the pro
letariat and the revolutionary army are interested in placing funds at the disposal
of the Provisional Government for the realization of revolutionary objectives.
6) Inasmuch as the loan represents one of the fastest methods of obtaining
the necessary funds at the present time, and inasmuch as the failure of a domestic
loan would force the Provisional Government either, by negotiating a foreign
loan, into [the position of] depending even more upon the imperialistic circles
of France and England, or, by issuing paper currency, [into the position] of
causing even greater disorganization in the national economy, the Soviet of
Soldiers and Workers Deputies resolves to support the loan that has just been
announced.
7) At the same time, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies appeals
for even greater solidarity among the whole revolutionary democracy
(a) in order to achieve the immediate enactment of fundamental financial
reforms which would correctly have as their basis a progressive income
PUBLIC FINANCE 489
and property tax, an inheritance tax, [and] the conversion of all war
excess profits to the interest of the State, etc.
(b) in order to strengthen the democratic control of its authorized organs
over the judicious expenditure of state funds.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies appeals to the citizens of free
Russia for their support of the loan, bearing in mind that the success of the loan
will contribute to the success of the revolution.
The resolution was adopted by a majority of all the members of the Soviet
present (which was over 2,000 persons), with 112 votes opposing.
438. A n A ppeal from the A ll -R ussian C ongress of S oviets
[Izvestiia , No. 103, June 28, 1917, p. 1.]
Comrades, Citizens!
Russia is passing through difficult days. The war and the many years of
management by Tsarist henchmen have depleted the state treasury.
Under the Tsar taxes and levies were taken only from the poor. The funds
of the treasury were embezzled. The rich received profits unparalleled in any
other country in the world.
The revolutionary people of Russia can no longer tolerate such an order of
things. They demand that the enormous expenses, as a result of the war, be
covered by the rich, and not by the poor.
Your All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
worked out a whole series of measures for extracting money from those bottom
less pockets into which it flowed in a golden stream under the Tsar. The Provi
sional Government, of which our representatives are also members, has committed
itself to carry out these measures.
The Government has already issued a law on taxation of profits, with a pro
vision that persons earning the highest profits will be paying up to 90 per cent.
A whole series of bills is in the process of being worked outbills on a compul
sory loan, on property taxation, and so forth. But the money is needed right away,
each day, so that our brothers on the front will not remain hungry and unarmed,
so that the whole stale machinery will not stop and destroy the revolution.
The Government is compelled to continue issuing more and more new paper
currency. But this inflicts the greatest harm on the national economy. When too
much paper currency is circulated in the country the money depreciates, while
all goods become more expensive. This is the reason for the high prices!
The issuance of paper currency must be curtailed as soon as possible, and at
the same time the Government must immediately be given funds for urgent
expenses.
That is why we are saying to everybodypeasants, workers, and other citi
zensto everyone who has any savings whatsoever: subscribe to t h e liberty
loan .
By subscribing to the loan, not only will you lose nothing, but you will
gain: instead of paper rubles which are getting cheaper with every day, you will
receive a bondthat is, the same money, but yielding you a percentage of interest.
Whenever you need ready money, you can sell the bond.
At the same time, by subscribing to the loan, you will give money to the revo
lutionary Government for its current expenses and thereby make it unnecessary
490 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
to issue additional paper currency, thus putting a limit to the growth of higher
prices.
Comradesworkers and peasants! Citizens! Remember: the revolution needs
funds. If it does not receive funds, everything will perish. Russia will fall into
the bondage of foreign usurers.
The All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers5Deputies there
fore calls on you to subscribe to t h e liberty loan .
The Russian Revolution is the cause of labor: workers, peasants, soldiers.
They must save it in a difficult time so that it will not perish to the joy of pome -
shchiks and capitalists, on whose profits it wants to lay its hands.
T h e A ll-R u ssia n C ongress o f S o v ie ts
o f W o rk ers5 and S o ld ie r s D e p u ties

439. T h e E x ten sio n o f t h e L ib erty Loan S u b scrip tion U n t il t h e


C o n voca tio n o f t h e C o n stitu e n t A ssem b ly
[VVP, No. 100, July 9, 1917, p. 1.]
Subscriptions to the Liberty Loan have already exceeded 3 .0 billion rubles,
surpassing considerably the subscriptions to war loans of earlier issues. (The
first war loan of 1916 yielded 1.5 billion rubles and the second loan in 1916
yielded 1.6 billion rubles.)1 The country has not remained indifferent to the
fervent appeals of the Provisional Government. Ever-widening circles of ihc popu
lation are participating in the subscription, fulfilling their civic duly and invest
ing their savings in a secure investment, guaranteed by all the possessions of the
slate. Many more billions are slill needed so that the united will of the people can
complete the construction of free Russia at the forthcoming Conslituenl Assembly
on the basis of fraternity and equality. The Provisional Government is certain
that all the resources of the country have not yet been exhausted and that the free
people will carry their savings to the stale with redoubled energy, for which reason
the Provisional Government has decided to extend the subscription Lo the Liberty
Loan until the forthcoming Constituent Assembly.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. K rushchev , Acting Minister of Finance
July 7,1917
440. Opposition and A pathy T oward S ubscription to the
L iberty L oan
[Den\ No. 127, August 4, 1917, p. 1.]
We possess very interesting data, the so-called permanent references of
the State Bank regarding the realization of the Liberty Loan. [They consist]
of reports from the managers of the provincial branches and offices of the State
Bank regarding the progress of the subscription to the Liberty Loan and re
garding the placement of Liberty Loan obligations in the various regions of
Russia.
These reports began to arrive as early as the first month of the subscription
1 According to VVP, No. 160, September 23,1917, p. 3, the subscription to the loan reached
4.0 billion rubles with 900,000 subscribers by that date.
PUBLIC FINANCE 491
and continue to arrive at the present lime. Taken together, they represent rich,
objective, and very valuable material which make it possible to reply to a series
of questions connected with the realization of the Liberty Loan, the first loan
of regenerated Russia.
On the basis of these data it is possible to clarify the practical aspects of the
attitude of the wide masses of the population and of the local organs of democracy,
which are its leaders, toward the Liberty Loan. On the same basis, it is possible
to find out what precisely should be undertaken in order to bring the Liberty
Loan closer to the working class and to the peasantry, and to make it all-national
in the full sense of this word.
As early as May 4 the manager of the Orel9Branch of the State Bank reported:
Apparently the villages have withdrawn still further from the loan, being now
interested in other things, and any kind of propaganda in the villages, especially
regarding the loan, brings hardly any results. Our cooperatives have suddenly
become aloof, and we are losing our influence with them; although everything has
been done in this direction, it hardly seems possible to attract the cooperatives
toward the loan.
During the same month the manager of the Ekaterinodar Branch of the State
Bank reported: The administration is taking all necessary measures to get the
broad, popular masses to participate in the subscription. Unfortunately there are
no popular publications that clearly and intelligently explain the meaning and
the significance of loans, and, in particular, of the Liberty Loan now being
floated. It would be desirable if the Slate Bank would send its explanatory pub
lications by mail and not in parcels or bales, which usually arrive afler the loan
has been subscribed. The great majority, not only of the popular masses but also
of the intelligentsia, visualize the loan as a phenomenon completely separated
from the political life of the country; while the popular masses, which in the
Kuban region are very wealthy, remain, because of their backwardness and lack
of education, completely indifferent toward the subscription to the loan.
The mood of the peasantry and their atlitude toward the loan are described
as follows in a communication from Menzelinsk: The peasants abstain from sub
scribing, being confused by all kinds of agitators, mainly returning soldiers who
have flooded the villages. From peasants who visited the branch office we heard:
6We would have subscribed but all kinds of people explained that the papers would
soon have no value whatsoever.5
If this attitude of the rural population toward the Liberty Loan indicates
the necessity of organizing wide and energetic propaganda, both oral and written,
then it is still more interesting to study the attitude of the working class toward
the Liberty Loan. As early as April 10that is, four days after the subscription
to the loan was floatedthe manager of the Taganrog Branch of the State Bank
reported: The numerous working class, both of the city industrial enterprises
and of the mining enterprises of the Taganrog district, has as yet taken no part
in the subscription, awaiting directives from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies.
It is interesting to note that the situation in Taganrog had not changed a
month afler the inslructions from Petrograd had been received from the central
organ of the united democracy. Thus, in May, the manager of the Taganrog State
Bank, as before, noted: The numerous working class avoids subscribing, in spite
of the suggestion received from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
492 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Deputies to take a direct part in the subscription to the loan and to publicize it
favorably as widely as possible.
Not less interesting is the communication of the manager of the Riga office of
the State Bank, dated May 12: A completely inimical attitude loward the Liberty
Loan was demonstrated by the council of the Riga labor organizations; the reason
given was that the proceeds of the loan would go for the goals of war, while the
war is up to now and continues to be an aggressive war.

PLANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM


441. T h e E stablishm ent o f a C ouncil for th e P reparation of a
P lan for F inancial R eform
[5o6, Uzah., 1,1, No. 552. This law, introduced on the initiative of Tereshchenko, was
promulgated at the beginning of the government crisis which ended wilh the formation
of the first coalition government. The new Minister of Finance, Shingarev, never
convened the Council, apparently because of the commencement, at the instigation of
Skobelev, of negotiations for the formation of a supreme economic organ, which culmi
nated in the establishment of the Economic Council and the Central Economic Com
mittee on June 21. See Doc. 585.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. A Council shall be established under the chairmanship of the Minister of
Finance for the preparation of a general plan and urgent measures of financial
reform, as well as for the discussion of general principles of current financial
administration. The Council shall also take under consideration questions con
cerning the direction of state credit policy and monetary circulation.
III. The Council shall have the following membership: four delegates from
the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, four representatives from the SovieL
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, one representative from the Soviet of Officers
Deputies, three representatives from the All-Russian Peasants Union, three repre
sentatives from the Council of All-Russian Cooperative Congresses, one repre
sentative each from the All-Russian Union of Towns and Zemstvos and the Petro
grad and Moscow municipal administrations, two representatives from the stock
exchange committees, two representatives each from the Committee of the Con
ference of joint-stock banks of commercial credit and the Council of Congresses
of Representatives of Industry and Trade, two representatives each from the fol
lowing scholarly societies: the Free Economic Society, the Financial Reform
Society, and the A. I. Chuprov Society for the Study of the Social Sciences, and
one representative each from the following ministries: Trade and Industry, Agri
culture, Interior, and State Control, and two from the Ministry of Finance.
P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President
M. T ere sh c h en k o , Minister of Finance
V la d . N abokov, Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 23,1917
PUBLIC FINANCE 493
442. E ditorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on P roposed F inancial R eforms
[No. 115, May 24, 1917, p. 3. The Government decided to postpone enactment of a
property tax until 1918. A new inheritance tax bill had been drafted but not promul
gated when the Bolsheviks seized power. Michelson, Russian Public Finance, pp.
204-7.]
The Ministry of Finance is busy at present working out a plan of impending
financial reforms. These reforms will deal with all sides of our financial system,
and special attention will be paid to the reform of direct taxation. As is well
known, demands are being presented from wide masses of the population to put
into eSecl the intensive taxation of the wealthy classes, and the Ministry of Finance
is trying to meet these demands in the most receptive fashion. Thus, it is pro
posed to increase the progression of the income tax in the year 1917, and to raise
it for the higher-bracket payers to 30 per cent. Similarly, it is proposed this very
year to perform a radical reorganization of the inheritance tax by introducing
progressive taxationwith very high ratesof the entire bulk of the inheritance,
together with the progressive taxation of shares of inheritance which are received
by individual heirs, and also by limiting the right of inheritance, by law, only
to the closer relatives, and also by establishing the corresponding equivalent
taxation of the property of corporations, i.e., churches, monasteries and convents,
etc. Apart from that, it is proposed, at once, to subject to a revision the existing
law on taxing war profits. It is proposed to step up taxation of war profits to a
maximal height. In some cases, almost the entire surplus of war profits would
be alienated for the benefit of the Slate.
Further, a question will be discussed on passing some tax measures of extraor
dinary nature which will also fall, of course, chiefly on those who have large
incomes and investments. Finally, the Ministry of Finance will work out a project
of property tax and the tax on increase in valuation.
The foregoing shows how really radical are those lax reforms that are planned
for us al the present time. The reform projected by the Ministry of Finance cannot
help being considered as truly colossal, even taking into account the scale of the
present-day extraordinary evenLs. One can positively state that no country in the
world has ever put through such a large lax reform as is being proposed in our
country in such a short time.
The realization of this reform will be, undoubtedly, one of the most outstand
ing attainments of the revolution. However, one must not conceal from oneself
the fact that, in actual practice, the realization of this reform will be faced with
a number of substantial difficulties. True, one has reason to think that the re
sistance of the payers will be weaker than it might have been under different
circumstances. But, of course, even now this resistance will slill be very consid
erable. That is whyin order that the projected gigantic tax reform will not
remain only on paper but will be realized in practicea strong government is
necessary which will have authority in the eyes of the entire population. . . .
* . . In Russia we found it impossible, even before the revolution, to transfer
the entire load of taxation exclusively onto the shoulders of the wealthy classes,
simply because of our general poverty. But now, when the incomes of the wealthy
classes are drastically shrinking because of the demands of the less privileged
groups, this becomes even less feasible. Indeed, what could be collected from the
progressive taxation on land ownership when large landholdings are liquidated?
494 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
And what could be reaped from progressive taxation on industry if the profits of
the industrialists are reduced to a minimum?
In view of all this, there is so much more basis for a conclusion that at the
present time, with the exceptionally difficult financial situation of the country, we
could not manage without taxing the broad masses of the population. But it goes
without saying that the taxation of the broad masses of the population will be
justified only after the taxation of large investments and incomes has reached its
maximal height.
443. C onsideration of a Compulsory L oan
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 114, May 23, 1917, p. 1.]
The torrent of paper currency assumes dangerous proportions. Close to 12
billion rubles are already in circulation. The Provisional Government, during
the short period that has elapsed since the beginning of the revolution, has been
compelled for the second time to resort to the extension of the paper-issuing right
of the State Bank. The increase in state expenditures and the slow influx of tax
revenue are not conducive to an optimistic outlook when appraising the financial
situation of the immediate future. Under these conditions, the inundation of the
market with paper money and further depreciation of the ruble cannot grow less,
and it is not surprising that A. S. Shingarev, the Minister of Finance, speaks of
a financial crash which threatens the country.
The prospect of a possible financial crash naturally calls for the passing of
extraordinary, exceptional measures, both in the realm of taxation and in the
realm of state credit. In the realm of taxation we face an extraordinary property
levy. In the realm of state credit we are approaching the serious measure of
resorting to a compulsory loan.
The necessity for the realization of a compulsory governmental loan is dic
tated by the whole combination of circumstances of the past two months, and, for
the most part, by that nearsighted and egotistical indifference with which the
capitalist class treated the Liberty Loan. The extraordinary circumstanccs of
the time through which we are living gave reason to hope that at this grave moment
the merchant and industrial classes would understand the situation of the country
and their obligations before free Russia. These hopes were not realized. The
merchant and industrial classes did not show sufficient statesmanlike wisdom in
this question, and did not even completely fulfill the promises they gave to the
Minister of Finance. The indifference shown in regard to the voluntary govern
mental loan, which has such outstanding importance for the financial situation
of the country, is precisely the factor that necessitates introducing the principle
of compulsion into the realm of government credit. . . .
. . . The realization of a compulsory loan must be recognized as the next task
on the agenda, and the Ministry of Finance must consider questions concerning
the forms of the loan and the best methods for its realization.
444. T h e D ecision A gainst a C ompulsory L oan
{VVP, No. 71, June 4, 1917, p. 2.]
In the morning of June 2 a conference was held at the Ministry of Finance
under the chairmanship of A. I. Shingarev on the question of a compulsory loan
in Russia.
PUBLIC FINANCE 495
Professor Hensel presented his project in this regard; according to his ap
proximate estimate, the compulsory loan could yield up to 10 billion rubles.
Professor HensePs project was the object of lively debates, during which the
Minister of Finance expressed himself very definitely against the compulsory loan;
he explained his negative attitude by the fact that this form of loan represented
an extreme method to which it might be necessary to resort in most exceptional
circumstances; on the other hand, some of the members of the conference were
of the opinion that now the country was in precisely such exceptional circum
stances, and that the poor success in placing Liberty Loan obligations made it
necessary to realize a new compulsory form of loan.
However, after debates it was found that the majority of the members of
the conference considered a compulsory loan highly inadvisable and difi&cult to
achieve, all the more as the taxation of some forms of income had already reached
90 per cent.
To conclude, and bearing in mind that the time for such a loan might never
theless come later, the conference charged Professor Hensel to work out his project
in greater detail, and to submit it when ready to the Minister of Finance.2

NEW TAXATION
445. T h e E nactm ent of an E xtraordinary I ncome T ax L evy
[SoZ>. Uzak.f 1,1, No. 813. At the same time, the income tax enacted April 6, 1916, and
effective as of January 1, 1917, was amended by raising the exemption to 1,000 rubles
and sharply increasing the rates, the highest bracket reaching 30% per cent. Ibid.,
I, 1, 812.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. An extraordinary Lax shall be established for the current year, 1917, on
the following lines:
1. Persons, establishments, societies, companies, associations, artels, and pub
lic assemblies required to pay state income tax in 1917 . . . shall be subject to
the extraordinary tax if their income subject to income tax in the present year is
calculated to amounL Lo more than 10,000 rubles.
2. The extraordinary tax shall be levied on the income calculated for the
assessment of income tax for 1917 in the amounts indicated in the schedule of
receipts and rales of the income tax (Law of the Provisional Government of June
12,1917) with the exemptions mentioned in articles 3 and 4 of the present Law.
3. The amounts of tax due under the schedule menlioned in article 2 from
persons who have received income from the sources mentioned in paras. 46 of
article 2 of the Regulations on national income tax [revenues from salaries and
professional occupations], . . . amounting to not more than 50,000 rubles, shall
be reduccd by half; and in the rales of lax due from persons who have received
income noL exceeding the same amount both from the sources mentioned and from
other sources, that part of the tax shall be reduced by half which falls to the
2 The compulsory loan was never enacted, preference being given to the extraordinary in
come tax levy as a means of collecting additional revenue. Michelson, Russian Public Finance,
pp. 198-99.
496 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
income received from the sources mentioned in paras. 4-6 of article 2 of the same
Regulations.
4. If the amount of the extraordinary tax, together with the amounts of tax
due from the taxpayer for 1917 covering both state taxes (land, on municipal real
estate; industrial, on commercial and industrial enterprises; income tax; surplus
profit tax) as well as local (zemstvo, municipal, and volost) taxes on real estate,
amounts to more than 90 per cent of the income calculated for assessment of
income tax in 1917, the amount of the extraordinary tax shall be reduced so that
the total tax assessment of the taxpayers income by all these taxes and collections
shall not exceed 90 per cent of his income.
5. Rates of the extraordinary tax shall be established by the chairmen of dis
trict income tax offices.
9. Complaints concerning the calculation of the extraordinary tax by chair
men of district income tax offices may be made by taxpayers to guberniya (oblast)
income tax offices before November 1, 1917, and in case the rate schedules are
sent later than October 1, within a month of receipt. Submission of a complaint
shall not suspend payment of the tax.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. S hingarev , Minister of Finance
June 12, 1917
446. T h e In crease in t h e W ar P r o fits T ax
[,Zhurnaly, No. 105, June 12, 1917. The original law was enactcd May 13, 1916.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
On the change in the assessment and collection of the temporary tax on excess
profits of commercial-industrial enterprises and increased income from private
commercial-industrial enterprises.
[The minimum rate on excess profits was raised and the principle of pro
gressive taxation, already in effect for enterprises subject to public audit, was
introduced for enterprises and occupations not subject to public audit. The maxi
mum percentage for enterprises not subject to public audit was 60 per cent and,
for those subject to public audit, 80 per cent of their excess profits. A 90 per cent
maximum was set for the total taxation imposed upon enterprises subject to public
audit as opposed to the 50 per cent limit in the initial enactment. The tax applied
to the profits of 1916 as well as 1917. . . .]
IV. The present law (Parts IIII) shall go into effect prior to its publication by
the Ruling Senate.
447. R e so lu tio n o f t h e A ll-R u ssian C ongress o f S o v ie ts on
F in a n cia l P o lic y , June 21, 1917
[Izvestiia, No. 100, June 24, 1917, p. 6.]
Taking into consideration that the problem confronting the country of regu
lating the economy requires a definite plan for a financial policy that would be
in harmony with the democratic regime and the state of the national economy:
1) The Congress considers that the Provisional Government must carry out
PUBLIC FINANCE 497
immediately a series of reforms on the reorganization of the tax system and a
series of measures that will tend to curb the further issuance of paper currency.
2) The Congress considers that the measures published by the Provisional
Government on changes in the income tax and the war profits tax are merely the
first steps in the reorganization of the tax system.
3) The Congress considers that priority must be given to the enactment of a
high extraordinary property tax which must serve as the most important source
for covering the emergency expenses of the state.
4) The Congress considers that the Provisional Government, having rejected
the means of indirect taxation on articles of mass consumption, must carry out a
radical reform in the inheritance tax and establish a tax on the increment of values
and taxes on luxury items.
5) The Congress believes that the success of the measures which have been
put into effect, and, in general, of all endeavors in the field of direct taxation, is
intimately connected with the reorganization of all methods of tax assessment and
tax collection and with the enforcement of sweeping measures of control [designed]
to eliminate any possibilities of tax evasion.
6) The Congress believes that the correct procedure for carrying out financial
measures is for the Provisional Government to call a financial conference like the
one contemplated by the first Provisional Government, with the absolute condition
that organs of the revolutionary democracy would receive majority representation.
7) Considering the necessity of having a constant source of revenue for the
State Treasury, the Congress approves the resolution of the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers5Deputies on the Liberty Loan and considers that the imme
diate task confronting all the Soviets of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies, as well
as all the Soviets of Peasants Deputies, is to support the Liberty Loan.5
8) The Congress believes that the time has arrived when, with respect to the
loan which is based on voluntary subscription, resolute measures must be applied
calling for compulsory investment.
9) In addition, the Congress considers it necessary to state that if in the near
fuLure it becomes clear that the Liberty Loan is still not approaching the speci
fied goal, then Lhe Provisional Government must resort to a compulsory loan.
10) The Congress considers that with a view to increasing the resources of
the State Treasury, a series of measures must be passed for drawing funds into
the State Bank, which, in turn, must be reorganized.
11) The Congress believes that with a view to stopping financial speculations,
all currency transactions must be concentrated in the hands of the State. Private
credit establishments musL be subjected to strict control in order that their policies
will not conflict with the inLerests of the state; for this purpose the credit office
must be reorganized.
12) The Congress believes that at this time of historical consequences, finan
cial legislation alone, without systematic control of the entire national economy,
will not protect the country against a financial catastrophe.

448. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e F inancial R eforms


[No. 157, July 12,1917, p. 3.]
The laws of the Provisional Government on raising the rate of the state income
tax, on the exactment of an extraordinary income tax, and on the change in the
498 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
bases of collecting and in the rates of the temporary tax on excess profits of
commercial and industrial enterprises and compensations from private industrial
enterprise were published some time ago. Supplementing these acts, a law on the
radical reform of the inheritance tax will no doubt also be published in the very
near future.
Among the enacted measures, most significant undoubtedly were those changes
that the new law of the Provisional Government inaugurated in the organization
of the income tax. These changes consist, first, in raising the limit of exemption
from 850 to 1,000 rubles and, second, in considerably raising the rate of assess
ment by progressively increasing it up to 30 per cent for higher categories of
taxpayers (with an income of 400,000 rubles and over).
The raising of the rates of the income tax to such a great height in the very
first year of its existence is undoubtedly an unprecedented event in the fiscal history
of all countries. The assessment of so tremendous a tax will of course be attended
with great difficulties in practice. For this reason it is extremely important that
the public itself be well aware of its revenue responsibility and in this instance
come to the aid of the revenue administration. Counting on this enlightened
attitude of the population toward their civic duty, the Provisional Government
therefore resolved that in the current year of 1917 the taxpayers themselves,
without awaiting the receipt of income tax blanks, should be obliged to pay,
not later than August 1, one-half of the tax due on the income indicated in their
declarations.
Under the exceptionally high rates, as indicated, the income tax in itself would
be a heavy burden for the taxpayers. But during the current year of 1917 all
taxpayers of income tax, whose income exceeds 10,000 rubles, will also have to
pay an extraordinary income tax in the same amount as the income lax. In other
words, this means that during the current year of 1917, the size of the income tax,
including also the extraordinary income tax, will reach 60 per cent of the income
of those in the higher categories of taxpayers. To be sure, the extraordinary
income tax does not have to be paid at once, but in three installments: by Decem
ber 1,1917, by February 1 and by April 1,1918, in equal parts. Nevertheless we
must admit that so exceptionally high a tax is an extremely difficult problem for
many taxpayers. The industrial enterprises will find themselves in a particularly
difficult situation. Their profit for the current year may be reduced to zero.
Nevertheless they will have to pay a colossal tax in accordance with the profits of
the high-income year of 1916.
If we add to the above-mentioned two taxes (income and extraordinary) the
tax on war profits, which must now comprise for enterprises not subject to public
audit from 30 to 60 per cent of excess profit (the same scale applies to persons in
high administration in brokerages, personal trade, and agents), and for enter
prises subject to public audit from 40 to 80 per cent of this excess, it becomes clear
that the taxation of the owning classes has already reached the maximum level
in our country.
Incidentally, a provision is made in the law of the Provisional Government
on the enactment of the extraordinary income tax that if the sum of the extra
ordinary income tax, together with the sums due from the taxpayer for 1917, in
both government and local taxes, comprises over 90 per cent of the income subject
to assessment by income tax for 1917, the sum of the extraordinary income tax
decreases so that the total assessment of the income of the taxpayer will not exceed
PUBLIC FINANCE 499
90 per cent of his income. The same limitation of assessment (90 per cent) is
provided also in the tax on war profits with respect to accountable enterprises.
Is it tolerable to bring the assessment to such an exceptional level? Under
more or less normal conditions such high, such truly monstrous assessments
would of course not be tolerated. But at present the financial department has no
other choice. The financial department at present faces a dilemma: either to
increase taxes or to undermine the stability of the national credit and disorganize
yet further the system of monetary exchange by means of new issues of paper
money. Of the two evils, the firstthat is, the increase of taxesis undoubtedly the
lesser. It is the lesser even from the point of view of the owning classes of the
population, for it is precisely the owning classes, of course, who are interested
firsL of all in maintaining a system of public credit. And this system obviously
cannot remain stable if the country continues to be inundated by paper money
and the payments on new loans are not guaranteed by regular revenues.
With the inauguration of the basic reorganization of the inheritance tax, the
first step in the fiscal reform will be completed. The most important central part
of the grandiose structure of our future taxation system will be completed. A
further development of the reform will be the introduction (in place of the extra
ordinary income tax) of an income tax and tax on incomes from interest-bearing
securities or funds now projected in the Ministry of Finance, also a corresponding
reorganization of direct taxes and a review of sales taxes.
Difficult as it is to meet all these taxes, the owning classes should not evade
them. The owning classes should remember that evading the payment of taxes
under present circumstances is an act no better than the flight of soldier-deserters
from the front. However, the democracy also must realize that to take from the
owning classes more than is presently proposed by the new taxes is impossible.
And inasmuch as the returns from these new taxes will still be far from adequate,
an urgent need arises to initiate an increase in indirect taxes. This measure,
designed to increase the assessments of a wide stratum of the population, must
be recognized as extremely painful. But its initiation is called for by the vital
interests of the country. For it is better to introduce indirect taxes than to permit
a complete disruption in our currency and our entire fiscal system.3
449. O pposition to th e N ew T axation and I ts S ubsequent R evision
and P ostponem ent
[The immediate reactions of the industrialists as well as of military leaders directly
concerncd with defense needs and the supplying of essential materials to the army
and navy are reflected in the excerpt below from the minutes of the Council on Defense
of June 17, 1917. Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 228-29. Objections to the taxes as excessive
continued to be voiced through the summer. In September the Minister of Finance
submitted memoranda to the Government pointing out the difficulties experienced by
3 Increases in indirect taxation were under consideration by the Provisional Government,
but the only one of importance to be enacted was on the belter grades of tobacco. Zhurncdy,
No. 137, July 19,1917. A number of state monopolies were proposed, to raise revenue as well as
to expedite the distribution of essential items, but in this dual-purpose category only the sugar
monopoly was introduced before the October revolution. Sob. U zakI, 2, No. 1695 (Doc. 575).
See Michelson, Russian Public Finance, pp. 207-11, and Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika,
500 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the payers because of the disorganized economic and financial situation and recom
mending relief. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia politika, pp. 111-14, and Ekon. Polo-
zhenie9II, 420-22. Accordingly, the Government, on October 13, postponed the assess
ment of the Extraordinary Income Tax to 1918 and reduced the War Profits Tax. Sob.
Uzak., I, 2, Nos. 2051 and 2052.]
No. 95
June 17, 1917
. . . Member of the State Council F. A. Ivanov states that the new taxes estab
lished by the Government on enterprises will result in the inevitable shutdown
of an overwhelming majority of plants which will be deprived not only of their
floating capital but even of part of their fixed capital. . . .
General A. A. Polivanov points out that considerations of foremost importance,
namely, the needs of defense intimately related to the further and uninterrupted
operation of industry, were not taken sufficiently into account when introducing
the excessive taxation under consideration. The latter will undoubtedly have a
lamentable effect on the supplying of our army and navy.
Member of the State Council F. A. Ivanov deems it necessary to explain Ihat
in declaring their decision to forego all profits the industrialists had in mind
the profits for the current year. But the new taxes are imposed also on incomes of
last year, already paid to stockholders. Thus the industrialists are placed in a
hopeless situation.
Recognizing the justice of the considerations expressed, the Chairman states
that the extremely detrimental consequences upon industry of the measures dis
cussed have already attracted the attention of the Ministry of Trade and Industry
and that the latter is now considering the question of means to forestall the danger
that threatens the State in this respect. In view of this, the views expressed by the
Special Council call for no further action . . .

FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS


450. M inutes of a G overnmental C onference on L oans and C redits from
t h e U nited S tates
[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 534-35.]
March 26,1917
A conference, under the chairmanship of the Minister of Finance, devoted to
the question of floating a loan in America took place on March 26, 1917. Par
ticipating in the conference were the Minister of War; the Slate Controller;
Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry, B. A. Bakhmetev; Acting Assistant
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron B. E. Nolde; Assistant Minister of Finance,
S. A. Shatelen; and the Director of the Credit Office.
The Minister of Finance proposed three questions for discussion:
1. What is the estimated amount of American currency needed for the orders
already filled and for those proposed in the future?
2. What will be the effect of the proposed credit operation in America on our
financial agreement with England?
PUBLIC FINANCE 501
3. Are the conditions of the loan proposed by the American Government
acceptable to us from the point of view of our interests?
I. On the first question, the conference agreed that it was impossible to deter
mine at the present time the actual need of the Russian Government in dollars,
inasmuch as there is no exact information up to this time about the schedule of
orders in relation to the tonnage at our disposal and the transportation capacity
of our railroads. In view of this, the conference requested Prof. Bakhmetev to
form an interdepartmental commission under his chairmanship in order to estab
lish our need in dollars.
The conference further pointed out that from the total number of orders those
for railroad cars should be singled out in a special group because the transporta
tion capacity of our railroads not only depends on them but can be expanded by
them. Therefore, in the light of available information that the American plants will
turn ouL up to 150 thousand cars to fill the orders of the American and English
governments, the conference deems it desirable to raise before these governments
the question of yielding part of the above amount of cars, inasmuch as this is the
sole means of getting rolling stock in a relatively short time. In the event America
and England refuse to yield their turn to us to get the cars from the plants, delivery
of new cars for the Ministry of Transport could begin not earlier than December 1,
1917.4
II. With regard Lo the second question, to what extent our launching of an
independent credit operation will affect our agreement with England, the confer
ence decided that we are not obliged to ask the British Governments permission to
float a loan in Amcrica sincc we are bound by no formal obligation to England
in this respect. In order Lo take advanlage of all the resources in America, the
soundest thing to do is not lo refuse the dollars provided for at the last negotia
tions, but merely lo make use of the credits extended to us by England in America
with certain reservations, [namely,] lo insist that in place of dollars the British
Government increase our credits in other currenciescrowns or yenas well as
sums lo satisfy the needs of private industry and intervention.
III. In accordance with the information from the Minister of Finance, the
terms of floating a loan in America are as follows:
The American Government will permit the floating of the Russian loan for 500
million dollars, valid for a period of fifteen years, under conditions no worse than
those extended on loans lo the English and French, which are aboul to be issued
in the United Slates. The American Government will immediately, and to the
extent necessary, extend us a credit charged against the loan from the interest
it will receive itself on the exchange (3%-2) Moreover, the total sum of the
credit should not exceed 97 per cent of the amount of the proposed loan. This
credit must be canceled within one year of the ratification of the peace treaty.
Afler studying Lhe above conditions, the conference approved them as accept
able. At the same time the conference expressed the following wishes:
1. That the United States Government not only assist in the floating of the
loan but also guarantee us its distribution;
2. That the credits extended lo us may be utilized, if possible, during a long
period (nol less than two years);
3. That those sums in dollars which we shall be unable to use to make pur
4 See Doc. 609.
502 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
chases in America of some goods, because of their unavailability on the market,
may be converted at our wish into other currencyyen or crowns.
M. I. T ereshchenko , Minister of Finance
I. V. G odnev , State Controller
B. B ak h m et ev , Assistant Minister of Commerce
S. S h atelen , Assistant Minister of Finance
B aron B. N ol de , Acting Assistant Minister of
Foreign Affairs
A. Guchkov , Minister of War and Navy
K. Zam en , Director of the Credit Office

451. A merican L oans and Credits to R ussia


[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 536-37. The first credit of $100,000,000 was opened to the Pro
visional Government on May 3, 1917. Further credits were gianted as follows:
$75,000,000 on July 4, $100,000,000 on August 10, and $50,000,000 on Seplembcr 30.
An additional credit of $125,000,000 was approved on September 21, but was canceled
after the Bolshevik seizure of power. Ibid., pp. 539, 549, 554-55, 557-59. The total
drawn by the Provisional Government was $187,729,750. Michelson, Russian Public
Finance, pp. 312-14. See For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, III, 1-28, for American docu
mentation on the negotiations.]
[Telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. N. Miliukov]
April 8, 1917
I transmit below the content of the confidential talk between the Minister of
Finance [Secretary of the Treasury], McAdoo, and the Second Secretary of the
Embassy, Mohrenschildt: McAdoo told me that the law on 7 billions goes into
effect and the moment is at hand for the distribution of the 3-billion loan among
the Allies, the establishment of guarantees, and the clarification of all the details.
This question will be discussed on arrival here of the English and French dele
gations, and McAdoo has the widest plenary powers to act according to his dis
cretion. In offering her financial help, America wants to be sure that ihe money
about to be advanced will be properly used. In the absence of such assurance it
will be difficult to influence public opinion and convince persons who could say
a [good] word about the necessity of extending credit to Russia.
In connection with this, two questions arise: 1) the reorganization of the
Russian supply committee, and 2) the organization or reorganization of the means
of delivering to Russia the articles of supply ordered here. Thus, on the one hand,
it would be desirable to bear in mind the formation of something on the order of
a joint Allied Committee to which the American government would guarantee
the widest assistance in order to eliminate competition among the Allies and to
prevent a rise in prices by the plants. This committee would be composed not only
of representatives from the American government, who would participate in con
ferences and pass on the general questions, but also of inspectors and others who
could supervise the filling of the orders.
On the other hand, the reorganization of the means of transportation in
Russia is urgent. Particular attention is called by the Minister of Finance [sic] to
the Siberian Railroad as the most reliable means of transportation between Amer
PUBLIC FINANCE 503
ica and Russia. The reorganization is necessary in order to have the assurance that
supplies will actually be delivered to their destination and will not be held up in
transit, either here or in Vladivostok. Serious consideration is being given to
sending a technical mission. End of McAdoos statement.
I am notifying you of this conversation strictly for your personal information,
with the request that you do not mention the source.
[K. M.] Onu
[Charge dAffaires in the United States]

452. B r itish C red its t o R ussia


[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 541-45. Memorandum from the Minister of Foreign Affairs
(Tereshchenko) and the Minister of Finance (Shingarev) to the British Government.
The original text is in rather awkward and sometimes ungrammatical and misspelled
English.]
June 22, 1917
Afler the beginning of hostilities the first country to which the Russian Gov
ernment applied for financial help was the United Kingdom.
The first credit was opened by the British Treasury to the Russian Ministry
of Finance in the month of October 1914, and amounted to 12 000 000, whereas
the Russian Government sent to the Bank of England 8 000 000 in gold coins
and bullion, the latter amount being also pul to the credit of Russia.
This credit was chiefly utilised for payments on commands and purchases of
war material and only part of it was affected to the needs of Russian commercial
industry.
In the beginning of the month of January 1915, the British Government
granted to Russia a credit of 20 000 000.
In February 1915 there took place the first financial Conference of the Allied
Governments of Greal Britain, France and Russia, and an Agreement was signed
on February 5th, 1915, containing the stipulation of a mutual financial aid by
the said three powers and the conditions of supporting the smaller Allied States,
viz., Serbia, Belgium, Montenegro, elc., the advances to which were to fall in equal
parts on each of the ihree Great Allied Powers.
The financial aid necessitated by Russia was established at 100 000 000, out
of which sum one half was lo be borne by France. In pursuance of the said Agree
ment the British Treasury advanced 25 000 000 in June and another 25 000 000
in July 1915.
In the month of September 1915 the credits up to then opened by the British
Treasury had been completely exhausted and on a new conference, held in London,
there was signed (on September 30, 1915) a new financial Agreement on the
following bases:
1. For a term of one year (up to October 1st, 1916) the British Government
opened to Russia a credit of 25 000 000 a month, to be effected by the discount
of Russian Government Treasury Bills. This credit to be affected for payments
on bases and commands of war material in Great Britain and other countries,
France excepted. All commands of war material and payments thereon to be
previously approved by the British Government. The Russian Government under
took to ship gold to the request of the British Government and to enable the latter
504 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
to effect payments in the United States, up to an amount of 40 000 000, the
British Treasury delivering for the said gold Exchequer Bills, payable in gold
at the expiration of 3-5 years. To provide to the needs of Russian commerce a
special credit was arranged by the Bank of England to facilitate the discounL of
bills drawn by Russian banks and endorsed by the Russian State Bank (the amount
of said credit was later on fixed at 7 500 000).
The Russian Treasury Bills previously issued were to be rediscounted. All
Russian Treasury Bills were to be discounted at the rate of 1 % above llic official
discount of the Bank of England.
During the month following the conclusion of the above Agreement Lhe British
Government, taking into consideration the difficulties which arose out of the
necessity of informing the Treasury of every payment to be effected out of English
credits, agreed that out of the monthly credits 25 000 000 a sum of 2 000 000
a month should be transferred to the account of the Russian Government to be
at the absolute free disposal of the latter, the said amount to be affcclcd to pur
chases of raw material, food and commercial products, personal and charitable
payments, etc., excepting all such contracts for the purchase of melals, drugs and
rubber as may be centralized in London.
In July 1916 the representatives of the Allied Governments held another Con
ference in London, the results of which were duly exposed in a financial Agree
ment signed on October 27th, 1916, containing the following arrangements:
1. The monthly credits of 25 000 000 were granted for a new period of 6
months (from October 1916 to March 1917) subject to the same conditions as
previous, except that Russian Treasury Bills were to be discounted at the rate of
the official discount of the Bank of England, if the said rate was superior to 5%.
Out of the said credits were to be covered new orders of the Russian Govern
ment in Great Britain and other countries (France excepled) and payments on
loan, and out of same a monthly sum of 4 000 000 was to be put at Lhe free
disposal of the Russian Government2 500 000 for purchases of raw material,
food and commercial products, other than centralized purchases of metals, ma
chinery, drugs and rubber, for meeting personal and charitable payments, ctc.,
and 1 500 000 for the regulation of the rate of the rouble under control of the
Ministry of Finance. All Bills discounted under this and the proceeding fs&c|
Agreements were to be renewed up to one year after the conclusion of peace and
the British Government promised to facilitate the issue of a funding loan for their
ultimate repayment.
On their part, the Russian Government undertook to ship 20 000 000 in gold
in case the British gold reserves (at the Bank of England and the currcncy Noles
Account) fell below 85 000 000.
In view of the expiration of the above Agreement a new Conference met in
Petrograd in January 1917 and the financial desiderata of the Russian Govern
ment were expressed in a Memorandum signed on the 7/20 February 1917, which
the British Delegates on their return to England, presented to their Government,
Its chief contents are as follows:
1. War material in kind should be paid by simple deposit of Russian Treasury
Bills (following the precedent established for heavy artillery).
2. New purchases and orders of war material in Europe and America, limited
to a program examined by the Munitions Sub-Commission of the Conference, were
to be paid out [of] British credits.
PUBLIC FINANCE 505
3. Provision was to be made for the payments in 1917 of the Russian External
Debt and for the discounting and rediscounting of Russian Treasury Bills during
the same period.
4*. The free credit for commercial necessities was to be raised from 2 500 000
a month to 5 500 000.
5. The credit for the maintainance of the rouble exchange abroad was to be
raised from 1 500 000 a month to 12 000 000 (for the three months beginning
from April 1st, 1917).
6. An amount of 4 000 000 was to be granted for the purchases of silver for
the needs of the Russian Expeditionary Force in Persia.
7. The advisability of a combined loan of Great Britain, France and Japan
was taken into consideration.
Subsequent political events were the cause that a final and formal Agreement
in accordance with the above desiderata had not been signed, and since April 1st,
1917, the granting of monthly credits has ceased.
In April last the British Government established the remaining amount of
credits not earmarked for particular orders at 10 000 000-15 000 000. This sum
had remained unexpended, owing to the fact that the British Government not
always sanctioned our proposed orders in the same measure as we required. On
account of this sum and of the amounts remaining from orders which had not yet
been paid, the Brilish Government opened to us further credits for payments on
previously placed orders, and advanced, during April, May and June 1917, another
monthly sum of 4 000 000 to be at our free disposal (compte deux) .
Under such conditions and owing to several small new orders being placed
in England since April, all our sums in British currency had been exhausted
towards the beginning of July.
On the other hand there arose at the same time considerable difficulties in
respect of payments of American orders, considering that since Americas decla
ration of war on Germany and the opening by said country of credit to allied
powers, the British Government insisted on the transfer to the Federal Government
of payments on Russian orders placed in the United States, which had previously
been effected out of British credits. Among others the British Treasury ceased
to pay on Russian orders practically placed through J. P. Morgan and Co., but
the contracts of which had not been signed in view of the considerable loss of time
resulting of the formalities established by the British Government in the procedure
of placement of Russian orders.
Quite lastly the British Treasury categorically refused to effect any payments
in America on our behalf, referring to the absence of American currency at its
own disposal.
The discontinuance of our payments in America rendered our position very
awkward, as the American Government advanced to us only $100 000 000 for
payments on orders to be placed through the said Government. An export of gold
to America could not be effected, considering that we had already put at the dis
position of the British Government an amount of gold for 60 000 000 to facilitate
payments on our account in foreign currency by the British Treasury.
Under such circumstances we feel obliged to repeat our most urgent request
to the British Government, that it would advance 25 000 000 for the month of
July before a new Agreement on the terms of the Conference held in January last
had been signed and new credits granted.
506 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The opening of such a credit would not be a heavy burden to the British
Treasury, considering that after the transfer to American credits of payments on
our American orders, which has in principle been agreed upon and will be defini
tively settled only after the return of the American Delegation to the United States,
which recommended the said transfer, the British Treasury will economize about
40 000 000.
In the requested amount of 25 000 000 are included 4 000 000 to be put at
our free disposal, out of which 3 000 000 have already been granted for the
month of July 1917.
As to the expending of the said 25 000 000 we feel obliged to point out that
it would be necessary to increase somewhat the credit opened by the British
Treasury for payments in Scandinavia. During the last few months we did nol
completely exhaust 275 000 which are monthly put at our disposal for payments
in the said countries, as the amount of free credits at our disposal was so insig
nificant that we were obliged to affect them to other purposes and had to procecd
to the purchase of kronors paying for them in American currency, which had
been in our free disposal and which, now, has been exhausted.
Further on [sjc] it would be of an absolute necessity for us to rcceivc, out of
British credits, an amount for payments in Japan, as the most urgcnl payments
in said country require about 20 000 000 yen, and there is no possibility of float
ing a loan in Japan in nearest future.
As to our general requirements of British currency, it would be nccessary to
observe the following:
In comparison with the information which had been presented to the Con
ference in January, the situation has somewhat changed.
In view of the increasing difficulties with tonnage we have restricted our orders
previously proposed to be placed in England, and in view of the new American
credits part of them has been transferred to the American market.
Therefore we project very few new orders and we principally request only
sums for payments on commands not secured by British credits.
As to the credit for the maintainance of the rate of the rouble on the London
exchange, and which had been previously established at 4 000 000 a month, it
should be observed that said credit might be diminished in the case of the grant
ing by America of a similar credit.
Measures for the maintainance of the rate of the rouble recommended by the
last Conference at Petrograd have already been taken[;] regulations are issued
to prohibit the exit of roubles to foreign markets and the import of goods from
abroad.
Annexed is the program of our requirements in British credits and of pay
ments to be effected thereof.

453. B ritish R eply to t h e R ussian M emorandum 22


of J une
[.Ekon. Polozhenie, H, 54950. In October 1917 the British Treasury discounted
9,700,000 of Russian Treasury bills. The Russian debt to Great Britain then totaled
579,300,000. See Michelson, Russian Public Finance9pp. 302-12.]
His Majestys Ambassador duly communicated to His Majestys Government
the text of the memorandum handed to him on the 22nd June/5th July by Their
Excellencies the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance and he
PUBLIC FINANCE 507
has now the honour to communicate to the Russian Government the following
reply :
The Minister of Finance seems to be under a misapprehension as to the posi
tion which is much more favourable to his Government than he seems to suppose.
Under existing agreements a sum of approximately 65 million pounds is still avail
able for the Russian Government to draw in cash. As against this sum, numerous
commitments have been of course entered into already. But assuming that orders
placed in America will be met out of credits granted by the American Government,
the existing commitments of the Russian Government fall far short of 65 million
pounds; while, even if these American commitments are included, there is prob
ably still some surplus. In any case the British Treasury is acting and will con
tinue to act on the assumption that there is a sufficient surplus available to meet
all present needs. There is therefore no financial obstacle either to cash disburse
ments or to embarking on further commitments for the purchase of military sup
plies, and the Treasury would point out that the statement that the Russian Gov
ernment urgently need 25 million pounds for the month of July does not appear
to them to bear on any financial problem of which the former are aware.
The Treasury further explain that their unfortunate inability to provide
further credits in Japan was not due to the exhaustion of the sterling credits avail
able for the purposes of the Russian Government but to the fact that the British
Government is not in a position to furnish Yen credits, a situation which still
continues.
ccAs regards the Russian commitments in America, the British Government
arc still paying for all material delivered under contracts placed through Messrs.
Morgan or ordered under a British Government guarantee. If the Russian Min
ister of Finance thinks, as he apparently does, that we have ceased to pay for
Russian orders placed in America through Messrs. Morgan, he should be com
pletely reassured on this point. At the same time the British Treasury cannot view
with equanimity the prospect of one or two months [ c] elapsing before the
51
Russian Government conclude arrangements with the American Government for
the opening of credits, especially in view of the fact that both the Russian and
American Governments have apparently agreed that reimbursements to the British
Government shall constitute a first charge on such credits. In their opinion there
appears to be no reason why a preliminary credit for such a purpose should not
be arranged immediately and they consider that it need not be bound up with the
more difficult question of the conditions subject to which future credits are to be
utilized.
July 7th/20th 1917.
454. F rench Credits to R ussia
[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 556. According to Michelson, Russian Public Finance, p. 297,
the correct figure for the first credit was 625,000,000 francs, and for the increased
monthly credit 125,000,000 francs.
On receipt of the dispatch from Sevastopulo, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
quired of the Minister of Finance, M. V. Bernatskii, concerning the status of the French
credits. Bernatskii replied that it would be greatly to the advantage of Russia to have
the monthly credits increased to 150,000,000 francs, but that the Ministry had hesitated
to raise the issue for fear that the current political difficulties in Russia would prompt
objections to the request by some members of the French Government. Ekon. Polo-
508 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
zhenie, II, 557. Michelson, Russian Public Finance, p. 320, estimates the total Rus
sian debt to France at 4,000,000,000 francs, to Japan 296,000,000 yen, and to Italy
221.000.000 lira.]
[Paris,] September 4,1917
The question of credits for the payment of orders placed in France. In ac
cordance with the first financial agreement with the French Government [Feb
ruary 1915], the latter extended to us a credit of 615,000,000 [sic] francs at
75.000.000 per month. By a second agreement [October 1915] the sum of the
monthly credit was increased to 120,000,000 [sic]. Thus the Russian Government
could have received to September first of this year 3,500,000,000 francs on the
basis of both agreements. As a matter of fact, however, the sum placed at the
disposal of our Treasurywhich constitutes its indebtedness to Lhe French Gov
ernment beginning with November 1915, that is, from the time the first of the
above-mentioned agreements became effective, to September 1, 1917was 2,865,
000,000 francs. The total expenditures included all interests on discounts and
rediscounts. Consequently, the remaining unused balance of the credit to Sep
tember 1 amounted to 635,000,000 francs. The cited figures were checked by the
Ministry of Finance against the data of the Bank ol France.
The sums put at our disposal by the French Government in accordance with
the agreements were inadequate to pay for the orders we placed in France. Ac
cording to the report transmitted by General Michelson, Albert Thomas during
his stay in Petrograd stated that 1,715,000,000 francs were needed to cover lhe
deficit of credits on the records of the Central Administration for Foreign Orders.
An inquiry in Paris revealed that not all the data of the CenLral Administration
for Foreign Orders could be checked against the data at the disposal of the war
agent in France. According to the information of the latter, the deficit was 1,942,
000,000. This deficit could have been reduced had the French Government ex
tended to us the cited unused balance. However, the limitations placed on the
tonnage we need excludes the possibility of a timely delivery to Russia of the
entire amount of the ordered materials. The French Department of Supplies, in
an attempt to make the most use of the productive forces of French industry with
the maximum benefit for the common good, is also concerned lest freight remains
lying around for lack of facilities to ship it. In the light of these considerations,
the French Department of Supplies with the consent of our war agent is reducing
at the present time part of our orders placed in France. As a result of this the sum
of the deficit will be considerably reduced. To cover this deficit A, Thomas pro
posed, after negotiations with the war agent, to petition the French Government
to increase the monthly credit allocated to us to 150,000,000 francsthat is to say,
[to increase it] to the sum mentioned in the negotiations between Bark and Ribot
in July of 1916. The agent of the Ministry of Finance requested instructions from
his department, but was told to abstain for the time being from taking any steps
with regard to this question. In view of the urgency of coming to an understand
ing on the question of the assumed obligations for which we do not have any
credits, I take the liberty, with the consent of the war agent, of calling your at
tention to the desirability of having this question settled in Petrograd as soon as
possible.
[Counselor of Embassy] S evastopulo
PUBLIC FINANCE 509
THE RUBLE
455. T h e F lood of P aper M oney
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 174, August 1, 1917, p. 3. The legal issue limit
was inci eased by 2 billion rubles again on September 7, 1917, and on October 6, 1917.
Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia politika, p. 120. For a discussion of the entire problem,
see ibid., pp. 119-21, and Michelson, Russian Public Finance, pp. 377-81.]
By the law of July 11 of this year the Provisional Government again increased
the legal issue limit of the State Bank by 2 billion rubles. This expansion of the
legal issue limit is the third in number from the time of the fall of the old power.
And altogether the revolutionary government has increased the issue limit of the
Bank during the past five months since the beginning of the revolution to 6 billion
rubles. The State Bank has now been granted the right to issue bank notes in the
amount of 12.5 billion rubles.
This right has been taken full advantage of, as evidenced by the tremendous
number of bank notes circulated among the population and the unusually rapid
growth of the amount of paper money. The old power left us, as of March 1917,
bank notes to the amount of 10 billion rubles. By April 1 they amounted to 10,981
billion rubles; by May 1,11,457 billion rubles; by June 1, 12,186 billion rubles;
by July 1, 13,055 billion rubles; and by July 23, 13,916 billion rubles. Thus, at
the present moment we have passed 14 billion.
The meaning of this fact is well known. It is adequately explained in our press.
We know what such a tremendous increase in the amount of paper money means.
The connection between this and rising prices is known. It is known that the war
is the chief cause of the issuance of paper money. And it is known that as long as
the war lasts we cannot basically change this phenomenon.
But why has the revolution brought such a frightful worsening in this area? ...
Recent government reports frequently point to the reduction of state income
as the reason for the worsening of the financial condition of the country. But this
cause alone can hardly explain the threatening increase in the circulation of paper
money . . .
The exceptional increase in paper money and the ever-growing demand for
paper money, which the printing press cannot supply fast enough, must be ex
plained apparently by the growth of military expenditures. At the end of 1914
and the beginning of 1915 the cost of the war averaged 15-19 million rubles a day.
Prior to the revolution it already cost 50 million rubles. And now it is apparently
a question of an expense amounting to 70-75 million rubles a day. But if, prior
to the revolution, the increase of war expenditures was related to the increase in
the army, increased munitions, and growth of profits , now the increase of expenses
is related to the increase of wages.
Perhaps war wages have their advantages over war profils.' Be it as it
may, war profits remained in very few hands and war wages are made use of
by wider strata of the population. But from the point of view of money circula
tion, war wages can introduce far greater disruption than war profits. First
of all, war profits are more or less tangible, and even the old government knew
how to return a considerable part of profits to the treasury by means of taxes. To
a large extent it is being achieved and will be achieved by the new government.
510 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
It is quite a different matter when it comes to war wages. Spread over wide
masses, they are intangible and cannot serve as an item of taxaLion.

456. R eport of U nited S tates C onsul W in sh ip at P etrograd


on t h e C urrency C risis
[Reports to the Department of State, No. 331, June 6/19,1917, pp. 10-11. By a law
of June 5, 1917, all transfers of rubles abroad were forbidden except by special per
mission of the Minister of Finance. Sob. XJzak., I, 1, No. 734.]
The present ruble panic resulting in the continued fall in the rate of exchange
both abroad and in Finland is due to the comparative failure of the Liberty
Loan, details of which have been given in previous reports, and the slender tax
receipts, to which the Minister of Finance calls attention. Both of these necessitate
the issuance of enormous quantities of economically inconvertible paper currency.
The Russian public, more moved by the approaching panic than by patriotism,
are striving by fair means or foul to liquidate their holdings in Russia and transfer
the proceeds into foreign security or values. Money has been sent out of the
country by every conceivable means, and speculation made possible by the dif
ferences between the official Russian rate of exchange and the open commercial
foreign rate has run riot.
As soon as it became publicly known that the National City Bank in New York
was responsible for deposits made in its Petrograd branch, its deposits grew by
leaps and bounds.
American businessmen now in Petrograd are constantly approached by Rus
sians who are anxious to sell securities, concessions, and personal property on
very liberal terms on the condition that payment be made in dollars in America.
457. T h e E xchange R ate of th e R uble
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 169, July 26, 1917, p. 3. The available figures on the pre
cipitous fall in the ruble exchange rate during the Provisional Government period vary
slightly. According to the corrected figures of Michelson, Russian Public Finance,
p. 400, the percentage of value as compared with the exchange at par dropped from
5.3 per cent in March to 21.3 per cent in November for pounds sterling in London.
See also Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia politika, pp. 122-23.]
Our Allies have already had time to clarify their attitude toward the events
that are taking place in Russiathe breakthrough of the Russian front and the
paralysis of the supreme authority. The financial circles of France and England
reflected their appraisal in the new, almost catastrophic drop of the Russian ruble.
On July 20 the rate of exchange was 18 rubles to an English pound sterling; on
July 17 it was 16 rubles; on July 24, 20 rubles. In one week our ruble dropped
in England 25 per cent, and is now 50 kopecks for 100 French francs which cost
37 rubles in prewar time; a week ago, 59 rubles; and now, 74 rubles. Conse
quently in France also they give only one-half of what they used to for one ruble.
But we should be thankful to our Allies even for this rate of exchange. For
in neutral countries the rate of exchange of the ruble is even lower. Thus 100 Swiss
francs already cost 95 rubles; that is, the ruble is almost equal to a franc and is
worth 39 kopecks.
Such is the situation on the international exchange of Russia, which is on the
PUBLIC FINANCE 511
brink of ruin. Such is the evaluation of our ruin by international capital, sensi
tively following events in mutinous, tempestuous Russia.

458. T h e K erenky N otes


[VVP9No. 158, September 21,1917, p. 3. An account of the issuance of the kerenky,
so popularly called after Kerensky, and of other currency issues can be found in
Michelson, Russian Public Finance, pp. 387-88. These notes were authorized on
August 22,1917.]
The expenditure of the Russian republic has been continuously increasing.
An ever-larger amount in bank notes is required. Meanwhile, the State Bureau of
Printing and Engraving is unable to print such an enormous quantity of bank notes
of the set pattern in the required time. In order lo overcome the difficulties, it was
decided to issue a new pattern of money, a new size which would be both technically
easier and more convenient to issue in the shortest possible time. The Treasury
notes are guaranteed by all the properties, all the revenues, and all the taxes at the
disposal of the State, they are guaranteed by all the possessions of the republic, in
exactly the same way as are the bank notes with which everyone is familiar and
which have been printed until the present. The new 20- and 40-ruble bills can be
turned over to the Treasury, lo any bank, or savings bank, and [can be used] for
any financial transactions between private persons. They must be accepted and
they are accepted in shops, stores, and, in general, on all accounts and payments.
Anyone can verify this very simply by inquiring at the Treasury, in banks and
savings banks, or by asking any informed person.
The Minister of Finance announces that the value of the new notes is exactly
the same as the former notes, and that they are guaranteed to the same extent as
the ones to which everyone has become accustomed. The Minister of Finance
requests that no credence be given to those malicious persons who, having made
their way into Russia from enemy countries and trying in every way to frighten
the people, to mislead them, and to disturb iheir peace of mind, will be trying to
promote a lack of confidence in the new bank notes.
459. R eport on t h e W ork of th e F oreign S ection of the
S pecial C redit O ffice of t h e M inistry of F inance
[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 387-89.]
. . . During the period from February 27 to October 25, 1917, the work of
the Foreign Department was determined by two major considerations.
This period was characterized primarily by a considerable reduction in our
currency resources, which was the result of the nonresumption by the English
Government of the financial agreement with Russia, the inability to make full use
of the Japanese money market, complete exhaustion of the American currency on
hand, and finally, the general situation in the money market, where it became
difficult and at times impossible to acquire the currency of some neutral countries.
Although some time after the February coup detat Russia received new aid
from the American Government, this financial aid could not restore all those
resources which we had lost shortly before that.
The second decisive factor was the headlong drop which soon began in the
rate of the Russian ruble on the foreign exchange and which completed the gradual
512 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
devaluation of our currency [begun] during the preceding period. Thus the
financial department was faced with two serious tasks: to take measures to stop
this threatening situation by stabilizing the rale of the ruble and Lhen to find means
to make payments in those places where we had previously paid in rubles but
where the ruble had lost too much strength and importance as a monetary unit.
The above circumstances were so closely interrelated that the measures
prompted by them at times pursued several aims simultaneously. On the other
hand, in some instances the launching of some measures was possible only at the
expense of other aims we pursued. And a number of measures had to be employed
to coordinate their results and attain the desired ends. These circumstances should
be borne in mind in surveying and properly appraising the measures adopted by
the Credit Office.
The difficult situation in which we were placed by the shortage of foreign cur
rency made control over imports into Russia necessary in order to prevent the
acquisition from abroad of less important goods to the hindrance of the necessary
ones. To this end a law was passed by the Provisional Government on June 29,
1917, prohibiting the import of merchandise without the Governments permission.
This law simultaneously introduced the principle of concentrating government
control over all currency dealings abroad in the hands of organs competent to
pass on the degree of their importance in satisfying certain state needs.
Parallel with the reduction in the use of currency, the Ministry of Finance
also undertook new measures toward the same end. In this direction the Provi
sional Government issued a law on June 24, 1917, allowing the use of Finnish
currency in all export trade with that region and, finally, a law establishing com
mittees on barter with the East and Finland. The purpose of bolh committees was
the development of our exports with a view to gaining the greatest amount of
currency and also the control of imports in order to place them in a more satisfac
tory relationship to exports. The Ministry of Finance took a lively interest in the
negotiations with the Allied governments about the present and future exports
to these countries chiefly of Russian goods: flax, lumber, etc., centralizing the
release of these objects abroad. With respect to the export of lumber, considerably
better prices were agreed upon than in former years, when exporters under pressure
from foreigners were forced to sell lumber at low prices.
In connection with the shortage of currency, the above-mentioned difficulties
increased, namely, providing currency for our troops which operated in Persia
and Rumania and were billeted in Finland and difficulties in financing provisioning
operations in the Far East (in walled China) and Persia. In the absence of local
currency the troops were paid in rubles, and the rate of the latter had dropped
to such an extent that the local population refused emphatically to accept them in
payment.
In Finland, where the ruble was accepted as legal tender, no rapid devaluation
of the ruble was observed prior to the revolution and there was no serious problem
with Finnish currency. However, from the beginning of March the rate of the
ruble dropped considerably, and then, not without the participation of Finland,
its fall became a catastrophe, depriving the ruble of any purchasing value in
Finland.
The above-mentioned facts called for a number of measures, which differed,
depending on the nature of relations to various governments. These measures
in general were reduced to providing the troops with foreign currency, if possible
PUBLIC FINANCE 513
in the amount of their needs for actual expenses in a given country. In Rumania
this was achieved by means of two financial agreements according to which we
received 200 million leis. In Persia it was achieved by means of increased delivery
to the country of silver, selling sugar for krans, manufactured goods, and other
articles, and finally, by an agreement with the English government granting us a
special single credit to cover the most important indebtedness and a monthly
financial aid in krans to maintain the troops.
With respect to Finland, from whom we did not succeed in getting the necessary
credit in marks, the government resorted to a system of intensive exploitation of
export (the above-mentioned law of June 24) and Allied aid, in particular to a
special credit from the American government in order to obtain the Finnish
marks.5
In order to combat the inundation of the foreign money markets with rubles
and the drop in the rate of our currency, the Ministry of Finance issued a law
on June 5, 1917, forbidding money orders abroad as well as deposits of rubles
to the account of persons and institutions abroad without a special permit from the
Minister of Finance issued in special cases.
The effect of this measure extended even to the right of way of the Chinese
Eastern Railroad, where speculation in rubles reached considerable proportions.
During the indicated period the number of letters of credit in payment for
government orders directly related lo defense amounted to 625 million rubles
(according lo parity) ; for private needs it amounted to 379 million rubles; for
intervention, 1,393,000 pounds sterling was spent, for which 2,217,329,000 rubles
was boughl; and for the purchase of silver abroad, 4,302,000 rubles. At the same
lime the Credit Office received various export currency to the amount of 141,195,
700 rubles.
At the beginning of the [revolutionary] period the currency policy of the
government bore a more clear-cut character, but even then the work of the various
departments was not sufficiently coordinated. And at the close of the period the
governments work concerning currency lost even that element of firmness which
it had in the early months of the regime.

GENERAL FINANCIAL POLICIES AND REPORTS


460. B asic F inancial P olicies A pproved by t h e G overnment
[Zhurnaly, No. 147, August 4,1917.]

Resolved:
To accept as directives the following fundamental principles for the financial
and economic policy of the Provisional Government [as outlined by the Minister
of Finance]:
I. To recognize the necessity of extreme economy by all departments in spend-
e This was the purpose of the American credit of $75,000,000 of July 4.
514 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
ing the funds of the state and for this purpose to establish in particular the
following principles:
a) The present methods of spending sums out of the war fund should be sub
ject to a basic alteration; the Ministry of Finance and the Stale Controller must
be represented, with voting rights, in the War Council at Stavka and at meetings
with the [army and navy] chiefs of supply;
b) The expenditures concerning the Ministries of War and of the Navy must
be coordinated with the actual fighting capacity of the army;
c) The increase of contract costs for governmental orders must be carried
out with extreme caution;
d) For the purpose of finding a means of reducing as much as possible the
expenditures and to bring our budget into equilibrium, it is necessary Lo establish,
attached to the Provisional Government, a committee composed of a small number
of competent persons;
e) The ministries should immediately review the existing personnel staffs,
for the purpose of eliminating some institutions or functions which have lost their
previous significance.
II. To recognize that the taxes and duties are to be subject to further reforms,
bearing in mind that the taxes are the basis of the normal budget and of the
national credit. In accordance with this, to establish:
a) That the reform of direct taxation which was carried out needs correction
and development; that a reform of the inheritance tax will be worked out and a
general property tax6 introduced, and
b) That the indirect taxation will be increased, and in this connection the
form of trade monopolies (sugar, tea, matches) will be considered preferable and
that, in any case, the increase of some of the excise taxes will become unavoidable.

461. T h e O rganization of a S pecial C om m ittee for th e


R eduction of S tate E xpenditures
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1457.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1- A Special Committee is established, attached to the Provisional Govern
ment, for the reduction of state expenditures.
2. With a view to the reduction and cancellation of appropriations, the Special
Committee is responsible for: a) reviewing credits which have already been
authorized and entered in the provisional expenditure schedules of 1917 and
schedules of previous years, as well as those appropriated from the military fund
and from other sources; b) reviewing, for the purpose of bringing them closer
to the requirements of general budgetary rules, the powers of heads of departments,
as well as of all persons and institutions (councils, commissions) entitled to dispose
of credits, in the field of authorization of appropriations, disbursement of money,
and placing of orders; c) considering proposals for the allocation of sums from
the military fund for expenditures both entered and not entered in the lists of
credits for needs of the War and Navy departments determined by wartime require
6See Russian Public Finance during the War, p. 204.
PUBLIC FINANCE 515
ments; d) preliminary consideration of the financial estimates of departments and
institutions, of the draft state schedule of expenditures and revenues for the first
six months of 1918, and of annexes to the estimates on special funds of depart
ments; e) consideration of all proposals without exception made by departments
and special organs to the Provisional Government for extra-budgetary appropria
tions from the state treasury and for sources to cover such appropriations.
3. The Special Committee studies and reports to the Provisional Government
all measures generally designed to reduce state expenditures. In particular, the
Committee is authorized to make proposals to the Provisional Government con
cerning the reduction of expenditures based on laws, statutes, staffs, and schedules.
4. All proposals of departments to the Provisional Government concerning
the allocation of funds from the treasury, as well as concerning measures of all
kinds involving the expenditure of funds, are submitted, after their preliminary
elaboration and consideration under the procedure provided by existing statutes
and rules, directly to the Special Committee, with whose conclusions they are for
warded for further action to the Provisional Government. The proposals of de
partments which have been rejected by the Special Committee, however, are
forwarded for consideration of the Provisional Government only in case of dis
agreement of the appropriate minister with the decision of the Committee.
5. During the discussion of proposals and submissions of departments and
special organs, the appropriate ministers (or their assistants) or the heads of the
special organs are present in the Special Committee.
6. The Chairman and members of the Special Committee are appointed by
the Provisional Government. The Minister of Finance and the State Controller
are ex officio members of the Committee.
7. The proceedings of the Special Committee are conducted in the Ministry
of Finance.
M. B ernatskii, Acting Minister of Finance
August 22, 1917

462. The F inancial S ituation of R ussia as of M id -A ugust 1917


[Telegram from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors in Paris, London,
and Washington, Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 376-78. A report by G. D. Dementev, Director
of the Department of the State Treasury, delivered to a Conference of Representatives
of Trade and Industry in July, gives essentially the same figures. B. Romanov,
Finansovoe polozhenie Rossii pered Oktiabrskoi revoliutsiei, KA, XXV (1927),
22-23.]
August 18, 1917
At a meeting of the Provisional Government, the Minister of Finance reported
on the financial state of the country, on the proposed measures to forestall the
approaching crisis, and on the views of the Ministry on the future financial and
economic policy. In view of the scarcity of statements and the difficulty in
checking them, the data given in the report are approximate.
The financial situation: credit. During the current year the ordinary income
for the first five months was 1,655 million rubles (in 1916 for the same period it
was 1,396.5 million rubles). If, for purposes of estimating the ordinary income
for the last seven months of this year, we take [as an index] the sum of that for the
516 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
same period of last year, we will get 2,577.9 million rubles. Thus the ordinary
income for the entire year of 1917 will be 4,232.9 million rubles. We should add
to this sum an approximate figure of 500 million rubles of income tax, 80 million
rubles for the extraordinary tax levy, 105 million rubles of increased incomes of
the State Bank, approximately 500 million rubles from the increased exploitation
of incomes of government railways and other receipts. We shall then have a total
of 5,400 million rubles of ordinary income. The extraordinary income will prob
ably be comprised of 260 million rubles from the funds of the Kabinet of the
former Emperor and the udels, 20 million rubles of economic funds [of Cossack
administrations], and 6 million rubles from various other receipts, or a total of
286 million rubles. The balance brought forward from previous years budget
estimatesup to 30 million rubles. Receipts from lottery loans for the first half
of 1917: national, 3,179.4 million rubles; foreign, 1,720.2 million rubles; short
term obligations, 4,671.6 million rubles; or a total of 9,571.2 million rubles. The
sum of the above figures will give the expected receipts for 1917 as 15,287 million
rubles. To cover war expenses from the beginning of the war the receipts up to
July 1 of this year were: from floating of loansnational, 10,945 million rubles;
foreign, 7,555 million rubles; short-term obligations in Russia, 14,282.9 million
rubles, etc., or a total of 34,958.2 million rubles.
[The financial situation:] debit. According to incomplete information, the
civil departments gave their ordinary and extraordinary expenditures for 1917
as a total of 11,000 million rubles; expenditures of military and naval depart
ments, 17,500 million rubles (during the first half-year credits to the amount of
10,653 million rubles were opened to wage the war); interest on all short-term
obligations for 1917, up to 800 million rubles; or total expenditures of approxi
mately 29.2 billion rubles (expenditures called for by the war, approximately
24.4 billion rubles). To this should be added 1 billion rubles of deficit from the
previous years which was not covered by January 1917. Consequently, in order
to cover expenses we must find before the end of the current year an additional
15 billion rubles (the total for military expenditures from the beginning of war
to the close of the year will probably be 49,870.7 million rubles). Taking into
consideration the fact that various loans and other financial measures yielded
15 billion rubles over [the previous] three years of war, obtaining the same sum
during the remaining six months, is a problem of extraordinary difficulty.
So far the treasury does not have the means to cover the overexpenditurcs
anticipated by the end of this year. There is even danger that the anticipated sum
of the deficit may increase in view of the excessive demands that continue to be
made on the treasury. For example, some democratic organizations raised the
question of increasing the soldiers allowances. In this event the total sum of pay
ments would increase from the present 3 billion to 11 billion rubles. The increase
in maintaining postal and telegraphic clerks during this year gave a supplemen
tary appropriation of 141 million rubles; employees on government railroads were
paid a supplementary 540 million rubles; the increase in soldiers and sailors
pay [amounted to] 500 million rubles, and so forth. The unusual increase in the
cost of materials and the incredible demands of workers, whose wage increase is
expressed in several billion rubles, must raise considerably the prices on govern
ment orders.
The emissive work of the State Bank. In order to find means to satisfy the
demands made upon it, the Financial Department was obliged to increase the
PUBLIC FINANCE 517
issue of bank notes. From the beginning of war to July 1 of this year the issue of
bank notes amounted to 11,515 million rubles. In 1916 bank notes to the amount
of 3,488 million rubles were issued, and for the six months of this year, 4,030
million rubles. The average monthly issue for 1916 was 291 million rubles; in
1917, 671 million rubles. Short-term obligations issued and remaining against
the State Bank: in 1916, 3,634.5 rubles; for the six months of this year, 3,526.3
million rubles. The demand for bank notes is so great that the Bureau of Printing
and Engraving has no time to print them in the needed quantity, and the situation
may become critical, inasmuch as the reserves of the treasury are extremely
limited. Bank notes accumulate for the most part in the hands of peasants and
workers. And to extricate the bank notes from their owners is very difficult. As
a result, millions of bank notes are at present concentrated in the hands of the
popular masses. The question was raised of putting into circulation various sub
stitutes for money and of paying in part by Liberty Loans or short-term treasury
obligations. But these measures have been put aside for the time being. Kindly
clarify confidentially the possibility of placing and filling orders in local factories
for the printing of bank notes.
With a view lo improving the financial state of the country, the Financial
Department is forced to resort to extreme measures. According to some sources,
the rates on direct taxation were raised to the extreme, but fearing that this may
have a detrimental effect upon the future receipts from this source, it was decided
to revise the rates. In order to increase the return to the treasury of bank notes,
it is proposed to expand the issue of loans. The Liberty Loan has exceeded at
present three billion rubles. There is thought of issuing a new lottery loan,
which, in view of the small denominations, should not affect the distribution of
the Liberty Loan ; also a new joint railway 4% per cent loan guaranteed by
the government for a nominal sum of 750 million rubles.
A large new foreign loan looms as necessary not only to cover our expendi
tures on foreign orders but also to satisfy the needs inside the country. Kindly
notify [us] to what extent, in the light of local conditions, such a loan is feasible
at the present Lime.
General financial policy. The proposed agrarian policy should have partic
ularly strong repercussions upon the financial development of the country. The
new land reform program is submitted for consideration to the Provisional Gov
ernment. But it should be pointed out that, irrespective of the Ministry of Agri
cultures conjectures, the Provisional Government will never consent to an agrar
ian reform apart from the general economic program. The aim of the latter
should be the exploitation and improvement of all the productive forces of the
country. The solution of the agrarian question must take place with the preserva
tion of all the guarantees for a sound public economy. And the success of same
is intimately related to the increased new money circulation. At present, unfor
tunately, the maintenance of land committees alone costs the treasury 140 million
rubles. In view of the intimate relation between the financial and industrial devel
opment of the country, the Department of Finance proposes to introduce the basic
principle of state interference in the work of our industry. The latter is to be
regarded not from the narrow class point of view, but in the interests of the State.
Such measures, however, should not strike at the principle of private initiative, nor
should they upset the general economic condition. With a view to expanding the
exploitation of unmined natural resources and increasing the productive forces
518 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
of the country, it will be necessary to offer a greater opportunity for various con
cessions to foreigners.
The total sum of the national debt by January 1, 1917, was 33,580.8 million
rubles. By July 1 of this year it was 43,906 million rubles; by January 1, 1918,
the total sum will probably reach 60,000 million rubles. The interest alone that
we shall have to pay will amount to 3,200 million rubles. The war had tremendous
repercussions on our commerce. Our liabilities for the balance in 1914 were 142
million rubles. By the end of 1916 they were 2,128 million rubles. And the total
for 1914, 1915, and 1916 was 3,021 million rubles. This situation grows pro
gressively worse. For the first three months of this year the liabilities for the
balance were 400 million rubles, as against 262 million rubles for the same period
in 1916. This circumstance greatly devaluates our ruble abroad. And to expect
to improve its rate by means of greater export after the war, with the existing
breakdown of the entire economy in the land, is hardly possible. From all of the
above it must be concluded that the financial state of the country is in an extremely
lamentable, if not critical condition.
463. S urvey of t h e W ork of t h e D epartment of th e S tate T reasury ,
M inistry of F inance , F ebruary -O ctober , 1917
[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 382-87.]
The Department of the State Treasury [Ministry of Finance] must review
and check each request for expenditure prior to allocation of funds by the Depart
ment and, if necessary, give a written conclusion about it. Then, on allocating
the expenditure, it must assign appropriate sums to the relevant cashiers office
by means of expenditure lists or special orders. These duties make [the volume
of] work directly dependent upon the size and number of requests made to the
State Treasury, as well as upon the insistence with which they are made. As a
result of this, immediately following the February 27,1917, coup detat, with the
beginning of the revolutionary period, the Department of the Treasury was able
to conduct its work only by an exceptional exertion of efforts. By the beginning
of the revolution the war had assumed such proportions that it dominated the
entire economic life of the country. Consequently, all the energy and means of
the state were directed toward satisfying the war needs. For this reason, also, the
expenditures of the State Treasury, called forth by the circumstances of war,
reached colossal proportions by the beginning of the first revolutionary period.
It is enough to point out in this respect that in March of 1917, 2,142,200,000
rubles were allocated, an average of more than 69,000,000 rubles per day. Expen
ditures exceeding the estimates, which had no bearing on the disbursements
called forth by the war, began to rise at an unprecedented rate. Salaries of some
employees had to be immediately raised, as, for example, in the Post and Tele
graph Department; also those of teachers in elementary and other institutions of
learning. New expenses arose in the preparation of the state land reserve, as well
as in connection with maintaining land committees, militia, justice of the peace
courts, etc. In addition to all this, with the discontinuance of the legislative activity
of the State Duma beginning on February 27, the budget for 1917 remained
unconfirmed, and the Provisional Government did not find it possible to assume
the responsibility of confirming the estimates and inventories for this year. For
this reason the Department of the State Treasury was faced with the necessity
PUBLIC FINANCE 519
of covering the expenditures for the rest of the calendar year on the basis of the
temporary estimates of expenses.
Thus, during the period after February 27, 1917, the Department continued
as heretofore to participate in reviewing the expenditures called forth by the war,
as well as those that had no relation to war, exceeding the estimates. However,
because of the conditions at the time, it had to work wilh greater intensity. Like
wise the Department had to engage in the work of preparing, reviewing, approv
ing, and distributing the temporary estimates of expenses. And the most important
and urgent task was to prepare estimates for the second third of 1917, beginning
wilh May, and then special estimates for the last third, beginning with September.
Inasmuch as these estimates had to replace the budget of 1917, it was necessary
to receive from the Provisional Government special instructions about the rules
to follow in preparing the estimates and about the amount of the estimated figures
that were to be included in the estimates. In accordance with these instructions,
the Department set up special rules for the preparation of estimates, subsequently
approved by the Provisional Government and published in its Journal No. XVII
(p. 33), entitled: Basic Rules in Preparing Temporary Estimates of Expenses for
May-August, 1917. The estimates prepared in accordance with these rules for
approval by the Provisional Government were entered May 20, 1917, for May-
August, 1917, and a day prior to the October revolution for September-December
of the same year.
In examining the figures that reflect the expansion of the budgetary work by
the Department of the State Treasury for the period of the first revolution, one
cannot help noting the considerable increase in ordinary incomes of the State
Treasury. According to the tentative and incomplete information, these incomes
were expressed as follows:
I ncomes
(Millions of Rubles)
1916 19X7 Increase in 1917
March ..................................... 266.3 301.2 34.9
April........................................ 300.4 278.0 (22.4)
May ........................................ 313.7 389.6 75.9
June ........................................ 523.2 409.2 (114.0)
July ........................................ 288.2 580.4 292.2
August..................................... 304.4 472.9 168.5
September............................... 322.3 417.8 95.5
October ................................... 316.6 378.4 61.8
2,635.1 3,227.5 592.4
Thus the ordinary incomes for the eight-month period of the first revolution
grew, as compared with the corresponding period of the preceding year, 1916,
by 592.4 million rubles, or 22.1 per cent. Unfortunately, the Department of the
Treasury has not yet received a complete distribution of local income returns for
July, August, September, and October. . . . Therefore, the Department is unable
to submit detailed information about the returns of ordinary state incomes for
March to October, 1917, by separate groups of these returns and is forced to
make use here of only the incomplete information it succeeded in getting:
520 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
R eturns R eceived
(Millions of Rubles)
March-October
1916 1917 Increase in 1917
Ordinary incomes:
358.5 644.0 285.5
Indirect taxes..................................... 660.8 670.6 9.8
Post, telegraph, and telephone incomes 121.3 152.7 31.4
Incomes from capital belonging to the
Treasury and from bank operations. 124.0 227.5 3.5
Forest income.................................... 48.3 53.5 105.2
Other incomes..................................... 1,322.2 1,479.2 157.0
2,635.1 3,227.5 592.4
Extraordinary resources:
Extraordinary returns, besides loans.. No information from offices
From floating loans for war purposes.. 11,743 13,407.0 --------

New measures to increase revenues, put into effect in 1917, and in particular
the increase of income and industrial taxes, were responsible for the rise in direct
and indirect taxes. Of the sum of 13,407 million rubles gained from loans, the
short-term obligations entered from the balance in Russia amounted to 8,190.8
million rubles; abroad, 2,034.1 million rubles; and from internal long-term loans,
3,182.1 million rubles. For the corresponding period in 1916 the tolal gain from
war loans was 11,743.0 million rubles: from the balance of short-term obligations
in Russia, 4,643.7 million rubles; abroad, 3,026.8 million rubles; and from
internal long-term loans, 4,072.5 million rubles. Thus, during the period under
examination in 1917, the Department of the State Treasury accounted for more
short-term obligations in Russia than in March-October of 1916, the amount
being 3,547.1 million rubles.
It has been pointed out above that the complications in the work of the Depart
ment of the State Treasury were, among other things, the result of the considerable
increase in expenses, both those called forth by the war and those not related to the
war, which exceeded the estimates. This increase is represented in figures as
follows:
A ssigned for E xpenditures C alled F orth by th e W ar
(Millions of Rubles)
1916 1917 Increase in 1917
March......................... 1,271.7 2,142.2 870.5
April ........................... 1,063.7 1,683.4 619.7
M ay............................. 1,040.0 1,312.0 272.0
June ........................... 1,284.8 2,241.7 956.9
Ju ly ............................. 1,298.5 1,494.0 195.5
August ........................ 1,075.8 2,057.5 981.7
September .................. 1,482.7 1,387.4 (95.3)
October........................ 1,531.1 2,626.4 1,095.3
10,048.3 14,944.6 4,896.3
PUBLIC FINANCE 521
Thus, the war budget for the period under examination increased, as compared
with the corresponding period for 1916, by 48.7 per cent, that is, almost one and
one-half times.
As for expenditures exceeding the estimates and not related to the war, one
can judge of the degree of their growth from the fact that the amount assigned
for the full year of 1916 to cover such expenses was only 300.6 million rubles,
while expenditures in the same category for only eight months, March-October
inclusive, of 1917 amounted to 974.5 million rubles; that is, these expenditures
for the eight revolutionary months of 1917 were more than three times those for
the twelve months of 1916.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, on the basis also of the temporary esti
mates of expenditure for 1917, expenses showed a considerable growth as com
pared with the budget of 1916. The total, calculated, as was mandatory, according
to the provisions of article 116 of the former Fundamental Laws, was 4,302.8
million rubles as compared with the corresponding assignments for 1916 of
3,64-6.6 rubles.
The following table gives the figures on the sums assigned in March-October,
1917, for payments within the temporary estimates of expenses and for expenses
exceeding the estimates.
E xpenditures A pproved for P ayment , M arch-O ctober, 1917
(Millions of Rubles)
Withm the In Excess of Estimates
Temporary War- Not War-
Ministry Estimates connected connected Total
War ................................. ., 421.9 9,736.2 7.6 10,165.7
Navy........................ ., 71.5 922.4 16.4 1,010.3
Transportation ... .. . 719.5 1,533.8 306.7 2,560.0
Interior.................... . 80.6 2,135.0 56.0 2,271.7
Post and telegraph.. .. 64.9 68.3 163.4 296.6
Trade and industry. . 39.4 223.0 29.1 291.5
Finance ............... .. 209.6 128.8 241.4 579.8
Public education . . .. 133.3 58.1 48.8 240.2
Justice .................... . 75.3 22.3 44.8 142.4
Agriculture ............. .. 93.4 60.2 53.1 206.7
Other departments . . . 748.1 56.5 7.1 811.7
Total ................... . 27,657.7 14,944.6 974.5 18,576.6
During the revolutionary period under examination, the work of the Depart
ment of the State Treasury was not limited to current budgetary and other work
within its usual scope of duties (such as instructions to government departments
and offices of the Treasury, responsibility for their personnel, review of requests,
assignments, pensions in all departments, etc.), but in addition the Department
had to assume responsibility for preparing, reviewing, and confirming the new
budgetary procedure to replace the old system, outmoded as it was and made
completely obsolete by the revolution. A special conference for the working out
of the budgetary law was formed in the Department of the Treasury under the
chairmanship of its director. Participating in the work of the conference were
the senior employees of the Department (Vice-Director and heads of the divisions).
522 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
In addition to the men of experience, such as the older employees of the Depart
ment as well as of State Control, specialists on the theory of budgetary law were
invited to participate in this work. Temporary rules for the transition period
were also worked out for the new budget by the Department and were submitted
to this conference and subsequently to the Provisional Government. They were
approved by the Provisional Government on July 1,1917. According to the draft
of the budgetary law, the establishement of a budgetary year beginning July 1 of
that year to June 30 of the following year was anticipated. Thus, the new revolu
tionary budget, according to the assumption of the Department of the Treasury,
was to have become effective on July 1, 1918. For the period from January 1 to
July 1, 1918, a transitional semiannual budget was to be prepared.
After the rules for this transitional budget had been worked out and approved
by the Government, as mentioned above, on July 1,1917, the Department launched
energetically upon the budgetary work for the half-year period from January
to June, 1918. A special commission was organized in the former Ministry of
Finance to take care of all questions and misunderstandings that might come up
in the departments when preparing the transitional semiannual estimates. At the
same time, by means of personal and written contacts with the ministries, as well
as by participation in conferences on the drafts of the estimates which were
drawn up by the offices, the Department rendered all possible assistance to speed
up the work on the estimates for the semiannual period of January to June, 1918.
By the end of October the budgetary work for this period was well under way in
all the offices, and was drawing to an end in some. But after October 25, 1917,,
the work was given a new direction . . .
CHAPTER 10
The Agrarian Question

FIRST ACTS
464. T h e N ationalization o f t h e I m perial A ppanages
[Sob. Uzak., I , 1, No. 370. See Doc. 481fl.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government, having discussed the question of the status and
administration of the Imperial Appanages Department and the properties, enter
prises, and funds under its jurisdiction, and bearing in mind the national import
ance of the Department and its work for the needs of state defense, has decreed:
Pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly:
I. All Appanage lands and properties, enterprises and funds under the juris
diction of the Imperial Appanages Department are recognized as State (national)
property.
II. Revenues received from all these properties, enterprises, and funds shall
be considered state revenues and no disbursements from them shall be made to
members of the former Imperial House. . . .
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 16,1917

465. T h e N ationalization of t h e Kabinet L ands and P roperties


[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 439.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. All lands, forests, rivers, and lakes now held by the Kabinet of the former
Emperor are recognized as state [property] and shall be transferred to the juris
diction and administration of the Ministry of Agriculture.
II. The subsoil resources of Kabinet lands as well as Kabinet rights to subsoil
resources of lands of other owners are recognized as the property of the State and
shall be transferred to the jurisdiction and administration of the Ministry of
Trade and Industry.
III. Factories, works, pits, mines, quarries of precious and semiprecious
stones and mineral springs belonging to the Kabinet are transferred to the jurisdic
tion of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, which shall also supervise all private
factories, works, and mining enterprises located on Kabinet lands.
IV. Funds belonging to the Kabinet and in its possession are transferred to
the Ministry of Finance.
524 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
V. The Minister of Trade and Industry is empowered to prepare rules for
mining on Kabinet lands transferred to the jurisdiction of the State. . . . Pending
the publication of such rules, these lands are considered closed to new private
claims for prospecting for minerals.
VI. All taxes and money collections accruing to the Kabinet by virtue of the
relevant statutes shall henceforth be considered as revenue of the State Treasury.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
V lad . N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of
the Provisional Government
March 17, 1917
466. T h e S uspension o f th e A ctivities of t h e Zemskie NachaVniki
[Circular from the Zemstvo Section, Ministry of the Interior, to Guberniya Commis
sars, No. 92, March 20,1917, Sb. Tsirk. MVD, p. 54. The circular on the Krestianskii
nachaVnik, a similar office in the Siberian areas, is in ibid., No. 149, p. 9. For the laws
abolishing the two institutions, see Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1318, and No. 1258.]
The Provisional Government, having decided that the office of zemskii
nachaVnik is subject to abolition, directs the immediate suspension of the activities
of zemskie nachaVniki. It bears in mind that the reorganization of local adminis
tration and self-government requires time, while the administration of justice to
the population should proceed uninterruptedly. Therefore, the Provisional Gov
ernment, pending the reorganization of local courts, orders the guberniya com
missars not to interrupt the carrying on of judicial proceedings, but, having
removed the zemskie nachaVniki from the exercise of their functions, to entrust
judicial proceedings to temporary judges. These judges shall be appointed in
agreement with the uezd commissars, with the request that they proceed imme
diately upon their appointment with the exercise of their duties. The lists of the
temporary judges should be presented for confirmation to the Minister of Justice,
while a copy [should be sent] to the Ministry of the Interior for information. The
affairs of an administrative nature, which are under the jurisdiction of the zemskie
nachaVniki, are to be taken over by the uezd commissars.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE LAND COMMITTEES


467. T h e G overnment D eclaration of M arch 19
[VVP, No. 14, March 21, 1917; Zhurnaly, No. 22, March 17, 1917.]
The war and the downfall of the old regime have brought the most serious
economic problems of Russia to the fore. A systematic and expedient resolution
of these is essential to the welfare of the state.
The first and foremost among them is the land question; its resolution consti
tutes the most serious socioeconomic task of the present historical moment. Land
reformthe cherished dream of many generations of the entire agricultural
population of the countryconstitutes the basic demand in the programs of all
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 525
the democratic parties. There is no doubt that it will be on the agenda of the
forthcoming Constituent Assembly.
The land question cannot be resolved by means of any [arbitrary] seizures.
Violence and robbery are the worst and most dangerous expedients in the realm
of economic relations. Only enemies of the people can push them onto such a
perilous course, from which there can be no reasonable outcome. The land ques
tion must be resolved by means of law, passed by the representatives of the people.
Proper consideration and passage of a land law is impossible without serious
preparatory work: the collection of materials, the registration of land reserves,
[the determination of] the distribution of landed property, and the conditions
and forms of land utilization, and so forth.
The Provisional Government has recognized as its urgent duty the carrying
out of preparatory work on the land question as soon as possible in order that all
the materials and information can be made available to the representatives of the
people.
On the basis of the above considerations, the Provisional Government has
resolved:
1) To recognize the urgency of the preparation and elaboration of materials
on the land question.
2) To entrust this [task] to the Ministry of Agriculture.
3) To form a Land Committee in the Ministry of Agriculture for the purpose
indicated.
4) To direct the Minister of Agriculture to submit to the Government at the
earliest moment a plan for the establishment of such a Committee together with
an estimate of the funds necessary for its work.
P r in c e Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 19, 1917
468. E ditorial in Russkiia Vedomosti
[No. 65, March 22, 1917, p. 3.]
The Provisional Government has decided to establish a special agrarian com
mittee. Two ideas form the basis of this decision. The Government recognizes the
agrarian problem as the foremost among the serious problems, a planned and
expedient resolution of which is necessary for the welfare of the state. It must
be solved in accordance with the cherished dream of many generations of the
entire agricultural population of the country. Of course, it cannot be resolved
by means of any [arbitrary] seizures and only enemies of the people can push
them onto such a perilous course of violence and robbery. The solution of the
land problem must be posilive and satisfactory lo the aspirations of the peasants.
It can and must only be national, based on law which will be established by the
reason and will of the people themselves, by their representatives in the legislative
assembly.
The demand Land! was born among the Russian peasantry long ago. And
an especial place in the popular, peasant imagination is occupied by everything
that is connected with this word land. In the peasant decisions of 1905, evoked
by the manifesto of the 17th of October, the perplexity and distrust caused by the
526 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
fact that the manifesto failed to mention land even once were sharply reflected.
Meanwhile, as was pointed outfor example, in one of the decisions by the
peasants of Zhizdra uezdwithout land there could be no freedom. . . .
Numerous news dispatches from villages testify that, in essence, the same thing
can be observed now as well: the first question that arises among peasants as soon
as they hear about the revolution is: And what about the land? The substance
is the same. Without doubt the thoughts are the same. But the peasants them
selves are not exactly the same as they were in 1905. They are somewhat more
mature politically and somewhat better provided with organizing potentialities.
The conditions are not the same, either. It is no secret that, in 1905, the village held
little hope that the government of that time would consent to give the land.
There is reason to believe that under the present conditions, the peasants do not
view the new government as pessimistically. In 1905, the village started to solve
the agrarian problem by its own methods. Unfortunately, even recently there
have been isolated flare-ups. But in general, the peasantry has preferred to await
the reply to its question from the government. And the reply was not slow in
coming: there will be land.
The reply has been given. And, at the same time, this questionnot only
the foremost among the most serious, but perhaps the most difficult question, too
is being considered in a realistic and businesslike fashion.
469. E ditorial in Izvestiia
[No. 25, March 26,1917, p. 2.]
The Provisional Government has started to prepare materials for the settlement
of the land question.
This work has been entrusted to the Minister of Agriculture. A special com
mittee is being established under him for collecting all the essential data required
for the final discussion of this question in the Constituent Assembly.
There can be no doubt that the growth of anarchy is, at the present moment,
a very dangerous threat to the revolution. If peasants begin to burn the country
seats of the pomeshchiki, if workers proceed to break machines, if soldiers turn
their arms against officers, if actions of such a nature start occurring on all sides,
then Russias freedom, which is not yet strong, will drown in blood.
In order to consummate the revolution, it is necessary to exert all ones
strength toward preserving a regulated course of economic life.
The democracy is breaking up the old forms of state and political life. This
is the first stage of the revolution.
Subjecting the State power to its control, the democracy is systematically
carrying out lie necessary changes in the realm of economic relations. This is the
second stage of the revolution.
It will not be by means of violence, or fires, or murders and arbitrary mea
sures that the free people will achieve its will, but [rather,] by the authoritative
voice which will be heard from behind the walls of the Constituent Assembly,
elected by all the people. In this way, too, will the land question be resolved.
Pomeshchik ownership of the land is the flesh and blood of tsarism. For three
hundred years the Romanovs have been giving land grants to their sycophants.
These lands were transferred from hand to hand, subdivided, and once again
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 527
amassed into vast estates. And all this time the land was fertilized by the sweat
of the peasants, all this time the gentry reaped rich harvests at their expense. The
time has come for the people to recover what is their rightful possession. In the
hour that the crown fell from the head of the last Romanovin that hour the
funeral toll resounded for all the landed gentry in Russia.
Not only the interests of the peasantry, but the interests also of the entire
Russian democracy demand that the gentrys estates be confiscated and transferred
to the democratic state. It is in this way that Russias freedom may be guaranteed
and the opportunity for reaction, the possibility of Russias return to a monarchical
form of government, will be forestalled. Russian life is being reconstructed at
an incredible speed, right before our eyes. A month ago, the demand All land
to the people! seemed [like] a distant dream.
But a few months will pass and this dream, too, will become a reality.
The people will receive all the land.
But this should be accomplished in such a way that the transference of land
to the people will take place in a completely orderly manner, so that the interests
of free Russia will not suffer. Even without this, our bread resources are low.
And if we proceed to resolve the land question without proper order, then by
autumn there will be no bread whatsoever in the cities.
The urban democracy must tell the peasants:
Believe [us] that we will apply all our strength [to ensuring] that the people
will regain all the land that its enemies have seized from them in the past years.
In this lies our common goal. Join forces with us in the fight for consolidating
the power of the people, and the land will be returned to the people. But do not
act independently, separately, from usor you will inflict great damage on the
common cause.
And addressing the Provisional Government, the urban democracy must say:
It is not sufficient to have placed the land question up for immediate consid
eration. Make an open declaration of the stand you are taking on this question!
Announce openly and loudly that you are prepared to remedy this age-old in
justice and return all the land to the people, [the land] that has been soaked by
the sweat of the people! Announce openly and loudly that the people will receive
all the land without redemption and without new taxation, that the hour draws
near when the free tiller will till free land!
470. A ppeal of th e P rovisional G overnment C oncerning
th e L and Q uestion
[VVP, No. 38, April 23,1917, p. L]
The most important question for our countrythe land questioncan be
properly and finally resolved only by the Constituent Assembly, elected by uni
versal, equal, direct, and secret . . . suffrage.
But in order to make such a resolution possible it is necessary to gather in
formation from all regions on the land needs of the population and to prepare a
new law on land organization for the Constituent Assembly. With this object [in
mind] the Provisional Government is forming a Central Land Committee which
will perform this work in cooperation with local guberniya, uezd, and volost land
committees.
528 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
These committees shall be responsible for collecting information on local land
systems and land needs of the population and for settling disputes and misunder
standings in land matters during the course of the transitional period until a land
reform is passed by the Constituent Assembly.
All materials collected by local committees and plans for land organization
drawn up by them will be turned over to the Central Land Committee, which will
have the participation of representatives of the Temporary Committee of the State
Duma, political parties, the All-Russian Peasants Union, the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies, the All-Russian Union of Cooperatives, guberniya land
committees, and persons invited by the Provisional Government.
Only in this way, after thorough elaboration and local discussions of every
aspect, can the complicated question of land be properly prepared for resolution.
It would be a glaring mistake to think that every guberniya, every uezd, every
volost could resolve this problem on its own. All the people are bound by close
ties in this matter: every village is interested in the manner in which the land
question will be resolved in the country as a whole, and the land organization of
even a tiny village cannot be a matter of indifference to the country.
A great disaster threatens our native land should the local population take
upon itself the reorganization of the land system without waiting for the decision
of the Constituent Assembly. Such arbitrary actions carry the threat of general
ruin. The fields will remain unsown and the harvest will not be gathered. Desti
tution and hunger will descend on the country.
But this will not happen. Conscious of our great responsibility for the future
of our native land, let us calmly prepare for the arrival of the true organizer of
the Russian landthe national Constituent Assemblywhich will find an equi
table solution to the land question and will establish a new land system.
And let our valiant soldiers, defenders of the native land, be calm. Let them
rest assured that no one in their native land will start to settle the land question
in their absence and without their participation. Let them know that the people
will not tolerate self-rule in land affairs and will calmly await the new land
organization which will protect the just interests of the laboring agricultural
population.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
April 21,1917
471. T h e E stablishm ent of L and C om m ittees
[5o6. TJzak., 1,1, No. 543.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The following regulation on land committees shall be published:
I. Pending a settlement of the land question by the Constituent Assembly, a
central land committee and local guberniya, uezd, and volost land committees
shall be formed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agriculture for the
preparation of the land reform and for the elaboration of urgent temporary
measures.
II. The Central Land Committee shall be responsible for:
1. General direction of the collection and processing of information necessary
for the land reform and of measures preparatory to it;
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 529
2. The drawing up of a general plan of the land reform on the basis of the
data collected and all the views submitted by local land committees.
III. The Central Land Committee shall submit proposals to the Minister of
Agriculture and in appropriate cases through the Minister to the Provisional
Government:
1. Concerning the limitation and suspension of the effect of earlier laws, if
they are likely to hamper a systematic solution of the land question in the Con
stituent Assembly, or cause misunderstandings among the population by their
lack of coordination with the new state order, or interfere with the regular course
of agricultural life;
2. Concerning the abolition of offices and institutions previously established
for the administration of land matters, if their activity is considered unnecessary
under the new conditions, as well as concerning the distribution among other
organs of the business affairs, properties, and technical staff under the adminis
tration of these institutions and officials;1
3. Concerning the coordination of the acts and orders of organs of the pro
visional state authority in the sphere of land relations;
4. Concerning the adoption of other measures with a view to regulating land
and associated economic relations.
IV. The Central Land Committee shall include:
1. The Minister of Agriculture and his Assistant Ministers;
2. A chairman, twenty-five members, and a head of chancellery of the com
mittee, at the invitation of the Provisional Government;
3. One representative from each of the guberniya land committees;
4. Six representatives of the all-Russian peasants organizations (the All-Rus
sian Peasants Union and the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies);
5. Three representatives from each of the following organizations: a) the
Temporary Committee of the Stale Duma, b) the All-Russian Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies, c) the All-Russian Cooperative Union;
6. Eleven representatives of the political parties to be chosen by their central
organs, one from each party:
a) Socialist Revolutionary, b) Popular Socialist, c) Social Democratic (Men
shevik) , d) Social Democratic (Bolshevik), e) Trudovik, f) Party of the Peoples
Freedom, g) Progressive, h) Octobrist, i) Center group, j) Nationalist, and k)
Independent Rightist;
7. Five representatives from the most important scholarly economic societies;
8. Experts invited by the Chairman with the right of advisory vote.
Note: Representatives of government departments shall sit in the committee
with the right of advisory vote.2

VI. For the purpose of maintaining a vital link with the local land committees
and unifying their activities as far as possible, the Central Land Committee shall
be authorized to call all-Russian and regional congresses and to appoint repre
1 This article and the one preceding it had particular reference to the Stolypin agrarian
legislation and the institutions for carrying it out. The Stolypin legislation and its imple
menting institutions were suspended on June 29,1917. See Sob. U zak I, 2, No. 1242.
2This representation was clarified by the law of August 25. See Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1512.
530 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
sentatives for individual localities, as well as for the various categories of matters
under its jurisdiction.
VIII. The tasks of the guberniya and uezd land committees shall include:
1. The collection of information necessary for the land reformthe compila
tion of views and conclusions on questions related to it as well as the carrying
out of necessary preparatory activities;
2. The execution of decisions of the central authorities on land matters;
3. Agreement with local government organs on questions concerning the man
agement of lands and agricultural properties belonging to the state, and submis
sion to the Central Land Committee in relevant cases of proposals concerning
changes in the procedure for using and administering these properties;
4. Publication of compulsory regulations on questions of agricultural and
land relations within the limits of existing statutes and laws of the Provisional
Government;
5. Settlement of questions, disputes, and misunderstandings arising in the
field of land and agricultural relations, within the limits of existing statutes and
laws of the Provisional Government, [and] setting up, if necessary, chambers of
mediation and conciliation for the adoption of measures to regulate relations
which may arise as a result of the arbitrary violation of anyones rights and
interests;
Note: Cases shall be submitted to such chambers, organized on the model of
courts of arbitration, by agreement of the parties, on whom decisions of the
chambers shall be binding.
6. Halting the acts of private persons leading to the depreciation of land and
agricultural properties, if these acts are not justified by public needs and the
needs of the state;
7. Raising before the Central Land Committee questions of removing such
properties from the possession of private persons;
8. Fulfillment of the relevant decisions of the state authority, and agreements
with local committees on the food supply and [with] other state institutions on
the most expedient utilization of these properties.
IX. The duties of the volost land committees within the limits of section VIII
of the present Regulation shall be defined by the district committees.
X. Decisions of the volost and uezd committees may be appealed under ad
ministrative procedure to the guberniya land committees, and the decisions of the
latter to the Central Land Committee.
XI. The guberniya land committees shall be authorized to suspend decisions
of the volost and uezd committees pending final decision by the Central Land
Committee.
XII. Further demarcation of the terms of reference and the limits of juris
diction of the volost, uezd, and guberniya land committees, supervision of their
activities, and rules for appealing their decisions, both under administrative as
well as judicial procedure, shall be established subsequently by the Central Land
Committee.8
XIII. The guberniya land committees shall include:
3 The activities of the land committees as well as of the food committees were made sub
ject to the administrative courts by the law of September 7. See Doc. 558.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 531
1. Four members elected by the guberniya zemstvo assembly and one elected
by the municipal duma of the guberniya capital;
Note: Pending the organization of guberniya and municipal self-government
on the basis of universal suffrage, these members shall be elected by the temporary
guberniya and municipal executive committees.
2. One representative from each uezd land committee;
3. Representatives from the economic sections (agronomic, statistical, etc.)
of the guberniya zemstvo board, to be chosen by these sections and not to exceed
three in number;
4. A justice of the Circuit Court to be chosen by the general meeting of the
divisions of the court and a justice of the peace to be chosen by the district con
ference of justices of the peace of the guberniya capital;
5. A representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, appointed by the Minister
of Agriculture;
6. Experts invited by the chairman of the guberniya committee with the right
of advisory vote.
XIV. The uezd land committees shall include:
1. Four members elected by the uezd zemstvo assembly and one elected by the
municipal duma;
Note: Pending the organization of uezd and municipal self-government on
the basis of universal suffrage, these members shall be elected by the temporary
uezd and municipal executive committees.
2. One representative from each volost land committee and, in their absence,
from the volost zemstvo assembly;
Note: Pending the introduction of the volost zemstvo, these members shall be
elected by existing volost executive committees.
3. A zemstvo agronomist and a zemstvo statistician, to be chosen by their col
leagues if there is more than one in the district;
4. A justice of the peace to be chosen by the uezd chamber of justices of the
peace;
Note: In uezds where there are no zemstvo agronomists, zemstvo statisticians,
and justices of lhe peace, corresponding persons may be invited by the land com
mittees themselves.
5. Experts invited by the chairman of the uezd committee with the right of
advisory vole.
XV. The volost land committees shall consist of five members and three al
ternates, elected by the volost zemstvo assembly.
Note: Pending the introduction of the volost zemstvo the procedure for elect
ing members of the volost committee shall be determined by the uezd land com
mittee in accordance with local conditions.
XVI. All legally eligible citizens, without distinction as to sex, property status,
and place of residence at the time of election (invitation), may be elected (invited)
to be members of land committees.
XVII. Delegates of the Central Land Committee shall enjoy the right to vote
in meetings of local land committees.
XVIII. Representatives of uezd committees shall enjoy the right to vote in
meetings of volost committees, and representatives of guberniya committees shall
enjoy the same right in meetings of volost and uezd land committees.
532 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
XIX. The management of the current business of local land committees and
the carrying out of their decisions shall be entrusted to chairmen elected by the
committees themselves or to collegiate executive organs (land boards) formed by
them for this purpose.
XX. State and public institutions, officials and the militia, shall be required
to render assistance to the land committees and their executive organs in carrying
out the duties entrusted to them.
XXL Expenditures for the maintenance of land committees shall be carried
against state funds under a credit made available for this purpose by the Pro
visional Government.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
V lad . N abokov , Head of Chancellery of
the Provisional Government
April 21,1917

472. C omm ent of Russkiia Vedomosti on th e L and C om m ittees


[No. 82, April 14,1917, p. 3.]
Following the instructions received by the Minister of Agriculture, a Special
Commission under the chairmanship of Professor A. S. Posnikov has worked out
the plan for establishing central, as well as local, land committees. The most urgent
need is felt for that type of organization. Their basic task, according to the idea
of the Provisional Government, must be the preparation of the agrarian reform
for submission to the Constituent Assembly. . . . The agrarian question stands
quite in the background in the programs of the majority of the political parties.
The war and the years of reaction before it have pushed it still further back in
the order of demands presented to public opinion. It can be said without exag
geration that the revolution caught the great majority of political parties by sur
prise precisely in this area. This explains why many of the party congresses and
conferences that have taken place to date failed to reach definite decisions on the
land question or adopted their usual formula with significant reservations.
As time draws nearer for the tangible realization of the agrarian reform, life
will bring still further limitations to the party demands and will prove the im
possibility of the headlong solution of the question according to this or that
theoretical scheme. . . .
Ascertaining those conditions, collecting the necessary data, and outlining the
most expedient solution of the agrarian question for each localitythese are the
chief problems and the ones carrying the most responsibility for the land com
mittees which are being newly organized now. The creation of local organs for
the preparation of the agrarian reform means the quite proper refusal of the
government to carry out a bureaucratic solution of the question in the capital.
The Provisional Government will undertake the obligation only with the aid of
a whole network of authoritative organs, to ascertain the true opinion of the
country in regard to the land question, to collect the necessary and indisputable
materials, and to hand them over carefully to the Constituent Assembly, the sov
ereign master of the Russian land.
But the preparation of the agrarian question for consideration in the Con
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 533
stituent Assembly is not the only task of the land committees. All agree that the
right of radical solution of the land question belongs only to the Constituent
Assembly. However, the dream of land has for so long possessed the heart of the
peasant, and the stern reality of land relations is so far removed from that dream,
that he frequently finds himself powerless to resist temptation and stretches his
hand toward land, without waiting for the Constituent Assembly. From various
directions comes news concerning arbitrary seizure by the peasants of landowners
lands and implements, failure to pay rents, illegal cutting of timber, deliberate
damage to crops by cattle, disputes between tenants and owners, between Cossacks
and peasants, between members of agricultural communes and individual farmers.
What is to be counterposed and what is to counteract this elemental arbitrary
rule, which is so understandable and natural during revolutionary days? Not
force and resistance, of course, but only moral influence and authoritative per
suasion. That is the second task of the land committees, no less important than
the first.
According to the plan of A. S. Posnikovs commission, the land committees
are to be elected according to the procedure that would guarantee them authority
in the eyes of the democratic strata of the population. . . . [A]nd for one thing,
this open, public work in the preparation of agrarian reform on the part of the
committees can bring pacification to the village by creating a conviction that the
land question is indeed regarded seriously by the Provisional Government, and
will be one of the first to be solved by the Constituent Assembly. This will bring
pacification into the ranks of the army, which is being agitated by the rumors of
the alleged redistribution of landwhich is supposedly taking place in its absence.
But besides moral influence upon the population, the committees may render
it the most dircct help in emergency cases of complicated land relationships.
The commillees are granted the right to establish special arbitration courts for
the consideration of all sorts of disputes and misunderstandings in the land
question.
But committees can go even further within the confines of the existing laws
and also of the ones being newly issued. They have a right to draw up and issue
emergency decrees, take measures against arbitrary violation of anyones rights,
and raise questions having to do with stopping actions that tend to render agri
cultural property worthless. The land committees thus get an opportunity actually
to interfere with the course of local agricultural life and to correct the crying
injustices in it that cannot wait until the general plan of agrarian reform is
worked out.
On the other hand, upon the land committeesand especially upon the central
organ standing at their headan extremely responsible task is imposed. It is the
task of working out the urgent measures directed toward limitation and stopping
of the action of the previously issued laws that are out of harmony wilh the new
governmental setup; toward abolition of institutions and posts that have become
superfluous; and even toward establishment in emergency cases of the new tem
porary norms of land relationships.
All activity of this latter type on the part of land committees, in the center and
on the periphery, must be regulated by one principle and one aspiration: the
preservation intact of the land and the natural resources, handed down by the
revolution, until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and the facilitation
for the latter of the possibility of systematic solution for the agrarian question.
534 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Among the first measures of the land committees in this respect must be, ap
parently, prohibition of sale of the land until the convocation of the Constituent
Assembly, settlement of rent relations, the utilization of lands that remained
unsowed, the preservation of forests against illegal timber-cutting, the revision
of the order of the use of government lands, and the like.
By creating land committees, the Provisional Government places on the agenda
the consideration of the land question in its full scope, and it is to be hoped that
by doing this it not only will prepare the agrarian reform but will also prevent
the movement toward anarchy in the village.
473. E ditorial in Delo Naroda
[No. 31, April 23,1917, p. 1.]
A statute has just appeared on land committees to prepare the future land
reforms and the regulation of land relations for the time prior to the convening
of the Constituent Assembly.
Leaving for the future a detailed analysis of this statute with its complicated
system of recruiting the personnel of local committees, we shall limit ourselves
now to but a few words.
The formation of these committees must finally launch the preparation of a
tremendous workthe creation of a new agrarian order of our country.
Around the main central land committee a whole system of local committees
is formeda system capable of embracing, with the aid of its branches, all of
Russia and of penetrating to its remotest comers.
Let it be met then by another system raised directly from the depths of the
toilers themselvesa system of Soviets of Peasants5 Deputies.
The formation of land committees and the initiation of work to prepare the
future agrarian code must naturally serve as a new impetus for an accelerated
rate of organizing the toiling agricultural population into Soviets of Peasants
Deputies.
Just as in matters of general administration of the country we have two related
institutions functioningthe Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies, the latter realizing the control over the formerso in the
land area the land committees, organized in accordance with the statute of the
government, and the Soviets of Peasants Deputies, elected directly by the toiling
village democracy, are militant organs guarding the interests of the toilers before
landowners as well as before the legislature.
The slogan of the moment is to organize the workers toiling democracy of
the village! Organize it into Soviets of Peasants Deputies which will join as a
third section the existing Soviets of Soldiers and Workers Deputies.
In this future trinity is a priceless support and guarantee of the triumph of
democracy.
474. Izvestiia on t h e A grarian Q uestion
[No. 66, May 14,1917, p. 4.]
Russia is predominantly an agricultural, peasant country. And that is why
the attitude of the Provisional Government on the land question is of particular
significance.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 535
The views of the new Provisional Government on this question are expressed
in the 5th article of the government declaration.4

Thus the new Provisional Government is not going to undertake the final
resolution of the question of transferring land to the . . . workers. It is leaving
this decision to the Constituent Assembly.
Is this the right [thing to do] ?
Is it right that the peasants are asked to wait? Would it not be better to give
at once to the peasants all the state, Kabinet, appanage, monastery, and privately
owned lands?
Some people are suggesting just such an immediate resolution of the land
question. And it should be made clear who is bringing greater benefit to the
peasantthese people, or the new Provisional Government, which has restricted
itself to preparatory work toward the resolution of the land question in the Con
stituent Assembly.
Everybody knows that there is an extremely uneven distribution of land own
ership in Russia. . . .
One must bear in mind this irregular, uneven land distribution in the country
when the land question is being settled. In all fairness, this question can be
resolved in no other way than for the whole country simultaneously. If we start
settling the land question by separate volosts, uezds, or guberniyas, we will achieve
nothing but disturbances and new injustice.
That is why the new Provisional Government, in complete accord with the
Soviet of Workers9and Soldiers Deputies, declared that the settlement of the land
question in all its scope does not lie within its province, but rests with the forth
coming Constituent Assembly.
Such a postponement in settling the question does not jeopardize the interests
of the peasants in the least, since resolution of the question in the Constituent
Assembly can be clearly foreseen by all: it goes without saying that this question
will be decided in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. And
the will of the people is clear: all the land will be transferred to the people, and
the pomeshchiki will receive no redemptions.
Something else must also be kept in mind. At the present time the village has
become depopulated. All the laborers are at the front. Only women, old men, and
children have remained at home. In many places the village cannot cope with its
own landfields are left unplowed owing to the absence of manpower. Instead of
a shortage of (arable) land, a new disaster has fallen upon the country [namely]
a shortage of people. Under such conditions it would be wisest to delay the
distribution of land. When the war is over [and] the laborers return from the
trenchesthen only will there be a demand for land. And by that time the
4 Reference here is to the Declaration of May 5, following the formation of the first
coalition government. Article 5 reads: Leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to deal with
the question of transferring land to the toilers, and proceeding with preparatory measures
relative thereto, the Provisional Government will take all necessary steps toward ensuring the
greatest possible production of grain required by the country and toward furthering the sys
tematic utilization of the land in the interests of the national economy and of the toiling
population. VVP, No. 49, May 6,1917, p. 1. The Declaration is printed as Doc. 1095 in Vol. HI.
536 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
land question will have already been resolved in all its scope by the Constituent
Assembly.
Thus, we see that the new Provisional Government is acting in the interests
of the peasantry by leaving to the Constituent Assembly the final resolution of
the question of transferring the land to the workers.
But it cannot be permitted that land relations in the country remain on the
same terms as those established under tsarist autocracy right up to the convoca
tion of the Constituent Assembly.
It cannot be permitted that landowners receive a free hand in managing tens
of millions of dessiatines of land. . . . And if resolute measures are not adopted
to prevent this, then these land speculations will bring the most disastrous con
sequences. On the one hand, the gathering of crops will suffer setbacks in the
country, and, on the other hand, when the Constituent Assembly convenes, half
of the pomeshchik lands will turn out to be in the hands of foreigners, and this
will make it considerably more difficult to transfer these lands to the laboring
peasantry.
That is why the Provisional Government considers its immediate task to be
the adoption of resolute measures to assure the highest yield for the country,
which stands in need of it, and to regulate land utilization in the interests of the
national economy and the working people.
What should these measures consist of?
First of all, they must be concerned with proper utilization of idle pomeshchik
lands and unused livestock and equipment. Local peasant organizations are called
upon to play a big role in this connection.
Further, strictest vigilance must be maintained to prevent the pomeshchiki
from making any land transactions. And this task can be accomplished only by
local peasant organizations.
Therefore, the degree of success that the new Provisional Government will
achieve in coping with the task set before itin the land question just as in the
labor questionwill depend on the efforts and energy of the democratic or
ganizations.

THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL LAND COMMITTEE


475. T h e O rganization o f a N ational C ensus of L and , A griculture ,
and U rban P opulation
[5o6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 882. See also ibid., I, 1, No. 757.]
enactm ent of th e m inister of agriculture

1. The land and agriculture census and the urban census are to be carried on
throughout the state, with the exception of Finland; the land and agriculture
census covering rural localities, and the urban census covering cities and com
munities of the municipal type.
2. The task of the land and agriculture census is to collect materials for the
preparation, in the first place, of a general food supply plan for the 1917-18 agri-
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 537
cultural year (i.e., a plan for supplying the army and population with grain and
meat products) and, in the second place, of a plan for agrarian reform.
3. In accordance with the above-mentioned task of the land and agriculture
census, there will be all-inclusive registration by households in farms of the peasant
type and privately owned farms of: 1) number of persons and cattle and the size
of crop areas, and 2) extent of land ownership and land tenure, with a subdivision
of the land area into the various types of landed property (arable land, forests,
pastures, etc.).
4. The urban census is to pursue the same purpose as the agricultural census,
of obtaining material for the preparation of the food supply plan, and shall consist
of registration of the size of the urban population and of the cattle and crop areas
belonging to it.
5. In order to ensure the prompt carrying out of the censuses and the collec
tion of uniform material, both censuses will proceed according to identical pro
grams, compulsory for all places in the state, prepared by the All-Russian Congress
of Zemstvo, Municipal, and Government Statisticians and Representatives of
Statistical Science of April 18-21, 1917, and approved by the Minister of Agri
culture.

6. The land and agriculture census is to begin after the sowing of the chief
grain crops and will be concluded everywhere between August 15 and Sep
tember 1.
7. Upon completion of the aforesaid census and not later than September 15
a preliminary calculation of the results is to be carried out in accordance with
the program established by the Statistical Congress of April 18-21, 1917, and
approved by the Minister of Agriculture.

9. In order to settle general questions connected with the holding of the


censuses, such as the establishment of programs, the collection of information
and programs for processing materials, the preparation of a general organiza
tional plan of work for the censuses, the establishment of time limits for this work,
the preparation of general estimates of expenditure, and so forth, the Minister of
Agriculture is to convene, as required, all-Russian congresses of zemstvo, mu
nicipal, and government statisticians and representatives of statistical science (all-
Russian statistical congresses). Decisions of the congresses are to be approved
by the Minister of Agriculture.
10. The general direction of work on both censuses, within the limits of the
programs approved by the Minister of Agriculture for the collection of informa
tion and the processing of materials and of the organizational plan of work, is
entrusted to the Council on Census Matters. The Council is responsible for ques
tions of program, organization, and finance.
11. The Council on Census Matters includes the following members: four
representatives of zemstvo statisticians, two representatives of municipal statisti
cians, two representatives of statistical science, two representatives of the State
Food Supply Committee, two representatives of the Central Land Committee, three
representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture, three representatives of the Min
istry of Food, one representative of the Ministry of Labor, one representative of
538 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the Ministry of the Interior, one representative of the Ministry of Finance, one
representative of State Control, and the Director of the Census Division of the
Ministry of Agriculture, a total of 23 members. The Council elects a Chairman
and a Deputy Chairman from its members.
13. Direct supervision of both censuses throughout the state is entrusted to
the Census Division of the Ministry of Agriculture. . . .

P. V ik hliaev , for the Minister of Agriculture


May 9, 1917
476. T h e F irst S ession of th e Central Land C o m m ittee ,
M ay 19-20, 1917
[Izvestiia Glavnago Zemelnago Komiteta, No. 1, July 15, 1917, pp. 5-11.]
A. 5. Posnikov [Chairman]
. . . The tasks with which the Provisional Government charged the Central
Land Committee and the provincial committees are quite definitely and clearly
outlined. . . . The following words in the government appeal express the tasks
we are charged with: to collect information from all regions on the land needs
of the population and to prepare a new law on land organization for the Con
stituent Assembly. With this aim in view, the Provisional Government set up the
Central Land Committee, which will carry out this work with the cooperation of
local guberniya, uezd, and volost land committees.
This is one problem. In addition, we are faced with another very grave re
sponsibility: These committees shall be responsible for collecting information
on local land systems and land needs of the population and for settling disputes
and misunderstandings in land matters during the course of the transitional period
until a land reform is passed by the Constituent Assembly. This is the second
problem of high importance, particularly in the light of the events that are now
occurring. And this will constitute one of the very great concerns of the Central
Committee. . . . Gentlemen, the demand to transfer the land to the toilers is
far from being proclaimed in our country for the first time. It stands out through
all our most recent history. It was born at the peak of serfdom, during the reign
of Empress Catherine. . . .
Yes, tie idea of the land belonging to the toilers has always been advanced
in our country and has always been shared by a considerable number of leading
men in our fatherland. There is no doubt that differences of opinion which exist
or arise now among various trends of thought are, to a large degree, based on
misunderstandings. Thus, as an adherent of state land ownership, I cannot but
hail the idea [advocated] in the platform of certain parties, among them also the
Party of the Peoples Freedom, that in introducing the land reform it is unde
sirable in our country to resort to coercion, that is, the method widely employed
in our country by Stolypin and his adherents. The unwillingness to follow his
example is entirely correct. The coercion that was employed in our country by
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 539
the Ukase of November 9, 1906,5 can by no means be repeated and should not
emanate in any measure, particularly now, from the womb of the Central Com
mittee. Unquestionably all local conditions and peculiarities should be taken into
account . . . I think that after a thorough and detailed study of the land ques
tion it will be possible to reconcile local demands and peculiarities with our
over-all aims and principles. If in the old days, at the close of the 1850s, the
members of drafting commissions6 could, considering the prevailing conditions,
still create a formula which covered the methods of land transfer customary in
the guberniyas of central Russia with those, let us say, in the guberniyas of Little
Russia; if here also the land was transferred not directly to certain individuals,
but, in spite of the existence of family holdings, to the villages that distributed it
among the households, then of course a way can be found today to coordinate
the demands of supreme state benefit with the interests and peculiarities charac
teristic of individual localities . . . I have no doubt that by careful study of the
matter, we shall also be able to submit to the Constituent Assembly a proposal
reconciling the local with the national demands. . . . But guided by the prin
ciple that the national ideathe idea of the general, the wholemust be domi
nating and decisive, I must, it seems to me, tell the honored assembly about the
most outstanding delusions, which are widespread now. Thus I have heard from
many sides statements that if the land is expropriated from private owners it
should be expropriated without compensation, the reason being that it was wrongly
acquired; that the owners of the land, or their ancestors, enjoyed conditions of
life under which it was possible to take possession of often tremendous expanses
completely out of line with the true idea of right. Aside from the fact that such
reasoning, such restoration of the correct idea of right, is one-sided and related
to bul one type of ownershipland ownershipwithout extending to city owner
ship and other forms . . . the indisputable fact should be borne in mind that
more than 80 per cent of all our land is mortgaged in state credit institutions
that is, the Nobility and Peasant Banksas well as in private joint-stock [insti
tutions] and in mutual credit banks, and that the overwhelming majority of estates
are mortgaged in most cases to the limit. . . . A large body of proof exists show
ing that the majority of mortgaged estates, in addition to the first mortgage, are
burdened also by a second and a third mortgage as well as by promissory notes.
To speak, under such circumstances, of punishment for past sins committed by
persons owning lands would be idle talk. It does not exist. . . . Who, in reality,
would be shocked by such a free seizure of lands? Those persons who own the
mortgages would be shocked. Ordinarily they would be personsnot counting
foreigners, who to a large extent hold our mortageswho wish to hold papers that
are not affected too greatly by stock speculations and fluctuations in price. Mort
gages belong to this type of paper. They occupy a not-too-high but somewhat
firmer position on the exchange. Prior to the development of savings banks, they
constituted one means of public savings . . . Consequently, aside from foreign
holders of mortgages, who will not suffer because according to international agree
ments this is inadmissible, it will be the small people for the most part, who put
their savings in mortgages, that will suffer from the uncompensated seizure of
private lands. . . .
5Introducing the Stolypin reforms concerning the peasants right to appropriate his share
of the communal holdings with or without the consent of the communal assembly.
6Preparing the Emancipation Act of 1861.
540 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Likewise, I must say something about the question of exaggerated estimates
of the alleged forthcoming allocation of lands, about which there are at times the
most distorted reports. On the other hand, however, I cannot but point out that
I read with great satisfaction the comprehensive interpretation in the speech de
livered at the Congress [of Soviets] of Peasants5Deputies by the Minister of Agri
culture. In this speech a very important point was emphasized, common in argu
ments against the expansion of peasant landholdings. The point is this: it is often
heard that at most we can add one or two dessiatines per household, and then
there is the questionwhat will come of it? The importance of such an addition
will soon disappear. And soon a shortage of land will be felt again. Thus no
special gain will come from such an addition. V. M. Chernov adds a very proper
correction to this position. He points out that besides the lands that are now suit
able for tillage and cultivation, which will be subject to allotment among the
toiling people, we possess also tremendous expanses of land that are considered
worthless and absolutely unfit for agriculture. But this expression about abso
lute unfitness is at bottom incorrect, because the conversion of these now profitless
areas into cultivated lands is no dream at all. In this respect I must recall to you
the lines of Tacitus where he speaks of the worthlessness for agricultural economy
of the greatest part of Germanys lands. Thus, taking this into consideration, I
must say that the areas now considered unfit for cultivation represent, of course,
that tremendous reserve that will in time be very useful and extremely important
for future generations. As for the present, which is the question that naturally
concerns us now, the area of land of the toiling population can, at any rate, be
expanded considerably, but we should not expand it by unfulfilled promises.
That is certain . . . What has taken place during the past decade [after the law
of November 9, 1906]? The following occurred during this period: approxi
mately two million [peasants]I take the latest figures from the explanatory
note of the Minister of Finance, which represent the most recent daLaapproxi
mately two million consolidated their land into private property. Further, as is
known by the ukases of August 12 and 27, 1905, a considerable portion of state
and appanage land had to be passed into the hands of the people. And at the time,
the press hailed these ukases, assuming that the lands would go to the peasants
in need of these landsprecisely those peasants who ordinarily rented them from
the state and the appanages . But . . . owing to the new Stolypin land policy,
as a matter of fact, [the] . . . land was transferred not to the villages that needed
and rented the land, but to the individual householder as private property. Thus,
1,237,833 dessiatines of state land became private property. Further, and again
in spite of the clearly expressed need of land by the villages, in spite of what the
press continued to stress, the appanage lands transferred to the Peasant Bank to
be distributed among peasants, 1,258,273 dessiatines, were allotted by the Bank
to private owners, to individual householders. The Peasant Bank, which after
1906 was converted into a tool of the land policy of Stolypin, served the Depart
ment of Agriculture without contradiction. Until only recently, orders were issued
from this very building which converted a colossal amount of land in the custody
of the Bank to private property, and again to individual householders. Thus, of
five million dessiatines and over, bought from private owners and secured through
default payments, the Peasant Bank turned over to individual property owners
77 per cent, and to village organizations and brotherhoods only 18 per cent. Such
large-scale planting of private peasant property in the land and the strengthening
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 541
of contradictory interests among the peasants are facts of first-class importance
at the present time in the introduction of the heralded agrarian reform. Those
persons who seized as their own property a considerable portion of the peoples
wealth and thus placed the agricultural population in a difficult situation will,
undoubtedly, be those most opposed to the agrarian reform. Small wonder that
we hear now about the excesses and the conflict between them and the villages,
a conflict which must be stopped absolutely by some means and order restored.
But it should be said that this deplorable situation in itself, as I said, is quite under
standable retribution for the cruel methods applied to peasant communities and
villages by favoring individual householders and giving them personal property.
In pointing out these facts, I testify also that, owing to the creation of a class of
these property owners, the expectations that could be aroused in 1905 about the
extent of possible additions of land to the area of toiling agriculture, in my
opinion, must be somewhat lessened at the present time . . . Further, gentlemen,
our second problem at hand, the urgency and importance of which I have already
stressed, is to resolve the questions on land, these complex questions, calmly. The
first thing that the Government expected of the population in announcing its pro
gram was that it would calmly, with no arbitrary and violent acts, await the solu
tion of land questions in the Constituent Assembly. Our committees will prepare
for the Assembly all the necessary material, and the Government has declared that
only this body of representatives of the people has the right to decide, and will
decide, the land question impartially for all localities. Consequently your special
attention will now be directed to the problem of how to prevent and stop those
deplorable excesses, those inadmissible seizures of land and manifestations of
arbitrary action, about which we were apprised, particularly in recent days, and
under which, of course, it is impossible to work calmly or to have assurance that
our fatherland will not be subjected to all the suffering of civil strife and famine,
all those sufferings whichin the proper words of A. V. Peshekhonov at the
Peasant Congresscan really represent our fatherland as standing on the blade
of a knife. To avoid this, to set right this aspect of life, is a primary task of great
significance. . . .
V . M. Chernov [Minister of Agriculture]
Permit me to greet the present assembly, to greet it as a small part of the roof
of that edifice of the system of land committees which will no doubt be erected in
the not-too-distant future on the wide foundation, gracefully and symmetrically
rising upward and truly embodying the entire peoples democratic will, all the
democratic aspirations of the lower strata, the forward-looking lower strata of
the Russian village to a new land order. These land committees, to be headed by
the Central Land Committee, will achieve through their work a new epoch in the
history of the expression of the ancient, spontaneous, and elemental craving of
the peasantry for land, a craving which now expresses itself in lawful forms. It
must and it will enter upon the road of legal self-expression. . . .
Thus, if we cast a glance at what is taking place in the Russian village . . . ,
if we understand that a great many painful processes observed in this life are not
ailments leading to death, not ailments of senility, not the pains of dying but
growing pains, we need not despair. Were we to look at it differently, no doubt
542 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
nothing would remain for us but to arrive at fruitless disbelief, disappointment,
despair, and pessimism, and to fold our useless hands on our empty breast. But
if we glance at our Russian life from this point of view, I think we will be able to
see the beginning process of construction of Russian life, the flowing of the
peoples yearning for land into lawful forms, the entrance of the elemental peoples
force upon new roads of creation. And we shall look at all this with complete
hope and faith based on knowledge. When the land committeesafter they are
formed; they are as yet nonexistent (and we, the Central Land Committee, are
not yet formed; we are but a part of the roof of the future building)when, I
say, the land committees begin to function and to take a lively part in the solution
of the land question, in the entire preparation of this question for the Constituent
Assembly, then the first step will be made toward the organization of the national
forces in this work of legislation. In this construction of the national forces from
the bottom up, on the foundation of democratic zemstvo, volost, uezd, and guber
niya self-government, the national forces are urgently in need of specialists, people
of science, people of agricultural experience and practice . . . Fortunately the
Russian intelligentsia possesses its own great historic, lofty traditions; it has great
historic legacies. Of these legacies we have just been reminded by our honored
chairman. And I would suggest that you pause on them again for a moment, on
the lofty slogans of those two founders of Russian democratic thought on the land
questionHerzen and Chernyshevskii. The profound faith in the possibility of
finding in Russia, in the depths and hidden places of the village, new sources of
law, new law-forming forces, constitutes the entire lofty pathos of the works of
Herzen as well as Chernyshevskii. This idea inspired a number of workers, a whole
pleiad of workers, in the field of research in Russian popular law. . . . [It led]
to the discovery of new sources of law in the lower strata of the people. This idea,
by inspiring the intelligentsia, deprived it of its borrowed, superficial character;
it led it away from simple borrowing from the Roman law and [enabled it toj
draw from life itself new creative powers. . . . I am happy to point out that this
idea lived and developed not only in the extreme left. . . .
Passing now from past times to the present, I can state with great interest that
now, too, in the moderate part of our political intelligentsia we encounter at times
a very definite treatment of the same question, with a very brilliant and unequiv
ocal treatment of the question of land reform . . . Life followed the direction
indicated by the best precepts of lofty thought, the best traditions proclaimed as
slogans by the founders of the democratic movement on the land question, marked
by the great names of Herzen and Chernyshevskii and, formerly, by Radishchev
and Pestel. And these great legacies are now facing the mass movement. The
union of these two forces, one coming from above and the other from below, can
alone be that great legislative force that will lead new Russia upon a new road in
the sphere of the land question. . . .
[In conclusion] the following resolution was passed:7
The urgent problems of the present moment are:
1) The most rapid organization of local land committees with mediation
and arbitration chambers in connection with them.
7 The remainder of the record is taken from Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledelia, No. 18,
May 25,1917, pp. 350-52.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 543
2) The dispatch of representatives of the Central Land Committee to the
localities.
3) Wide circulation of accurate data on the land question.
4) Issuing in legislative form statutes: a) that aid in regulating relations
between landowners and peasants, such as fixing of rental prices, right to use
forests and other lands, pasture of cattle, etc.; b) that bring peace, such as prohibi
tion of sale, security, and long-term rental of lands, etc.
5) All these measures must be introduced with the national problems in view
and not in the interests of certain groups or individuals.
At the second meeting, May 20, the Committee studied the question of issuing
a declaration on the agrarian question. As a result of this discussion the following
resolution was passed:
The Central Land Committee, having begun its task of preparing the forth
coming land reform, deems it necessary to establish immediately, and as explicitly
as the transitory period permits, the general direction under which the preparation
for land reform will take place.
In keeping with the basic needs of our national economy, also with the fre
quently expressed wishes of the peasantry and with the programs proclaimed by
all the democratic parties of the land, the Central Land Committee thinks that at
the base of the future land reforms must be the idea that all agricultural lands
must be transferred to the use of the toiling agricultural population.
The project of land reforms which will be submitted for examination by the
Constituent Assembly must be developed on this basis.
Prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly the final solution of the
land question cannot be accepted, far less realized, by anyone. A correct solution
of the land question is possible only if the national plan of land settlement is
placed at its base, [a plan] which considers the interests of all the people and
not the interests and wishes of certain groups in the population or various localities.
Attempts at arbitrary gratification by the population of their land needs by the
seizure of other peoples lands present a serious hazard to the state. They will
create, in place of the anticipated solution of the land question, a great many new
problems, impossible to solve later without the greatest upheavals in the life of
all the population.
For a better preparation for the land reform, also in order to maintain peace
and order in the sphere of land relations, management of land affairs in various
places, within the bounds established by law, should be entrusted to local land
committees. And an appeal to the population should be made for an immediate
organization of such committees.
The Committee thinks that it is important to issue in the name of the Provi
sional Government a declaration on the land question in which it would proclaim
the above-mentioned basic principle of land reform and would widely acquaint the
population with the formation of the local and central land committees. And the
population must be called upon to participate actively in this.
At the same meeting the Committee approved the following Statutes of the
Council of the Central Land Committee.
1. The Council of the Central Land Committee is a permanent organ of the
Central Land Committee in charge of the work between sessions.
2. The Council of the Central Land Committee, through the intermediary of
544 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
its secretariat attached to the Central Land Committee, and the corresponding
institutions of the Ministry of Agriculture, executes the resolutions of the Com
mittee. It has charge of gathering, elaborating, and preparing materials on ques
tions placed on the agenda by the Central Land Committee; it prepares programs
of work for the next sessions and maintains contacts with local organs.
3. With these aims in view, the Council is free to organize, in accordance with
the decisions of the Committee and at its own discretion, supplementary depart
ments composed of members of the Council, as well as members of the Committee
by co-optation of the Council, also, by invitation, of well-informed persons to
participate in them in accordance with article IV, paragraph 8.
4. The Council is free to establish contact with and to attract to the work of
the Committee governmental and other institutions which, because of the materials
and organizational facilities at their disposal, can assist in the work of the Central
Land Committee.
8. The Council is composed of:
a) Twelve members elected by the Central Land Committee;
b) The Presidium of the Committee composed of the Chairman, two Assistant
Chairmen elected by the Committee, and the Secretary of the Committee;
c) The Minister and his assistant [ministers];
d) Chairmen of Commissions, if such be elected by the Committee, but elected
from the membership of the Council.
477. T h e S econd S ession of t h e C entral L and C o m m ittee , J uly 1-6, 1917
[Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledelia, No. 23, July 12, 1917, pp. 460-66.]
The second session of the Central Land Committee opened on July 1, in accord
ance with the decision adopted at the first session, in the presence of the Minister
of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov, and his Assistant Minister, P. A. Vikhliaev. More
than sixty persons were present at the first meeting of the session; more than half
were representatives of local committees (from thirty-four guberniyas). The
meeting was opened with the following speech by the President, Professor A. S.
Posnikov:
Permit me, gentlemen, to greet those gathered today and, in particular [those]
who came from the provinces, although I cannot but express my regret that the
number of those who came to this second session of the Central Land Committee
is also much too small and fails to fulfill our expectations. The participation of
local persons, experienced and well acquainted with local economic conditions
and the peoples way of life, would have been very significant. The land problem,
which we must examine here with respect to so vast a country as our fatherland,
with its diversity of climatic and soil conditions and tremendous variety of living
conditions, is terribly complex. It is important for us to realize, particularly
now, that to pretend to some sort of correct exposition of this problem from
here in Petrograd, without more or less detailed information from various places,
is definitely impossible. Thus, I repeat, it is extremely regrettable that, obviously
for reasons of time as well as because of the conditions we are experiencing, local
leaders were again unable to meet, for the second time, in the numbers that would
be desirable and were unable to participate in the meetings of an institution such
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 545
as the Central Land Committee, which is completely independentso to speak,
autonomousand designed precisely for the most active participation of local
leaders . . .
In drawing a plan for the forthcoming reform, we must take into considera
tion such factors as the density of population in certain places, the varied amount
of occupied lands there, and the amount of the lands that can be included in the
allotment. All this constitutes a great diversity and all this must be taken into
account, taken into account everywhere throughout the entire country. And if it
is unthinkable that the reform follow one form everywhere and be conducted from
one center according to one specification for all widely diverse areas, it is just as
unthinkable to carry out the reform by taking into consideration only the interests
of separate parts of the country without considering the interests of the whole.
Consequently, from the point of view of a properly conceived agrarian reform,
in which the conditions of the various localities must be taken into account in order
to construct a general plan, the separate movements which we observe in various
regions at the present time constitute a great hindrance. There are specific draw
backs for certain areas, such as Little Russia, for instance, as mentioned recently
by our co-member, N. P. Oganovskiiareas overpopulated and aspiring to separa
tion from the fatherland and thus depriving their population of the right to the
areas in Russia abounding in lands. In addition to these, we should have in mind
the harm that such separatism causes to the plan of land reform, not to speak of
the most damaging political effect, particularly at the present difficult moment for
our fatherland . . . Attempts to introduce abruptly a particular party opinion,
disregarding local peculiarities in our country, in Russia, would be, in my opinion,
a great mistake, and we would achieve no results by it. . . .
Thus, although I am fully convinced that the principles of private property
cannot be applied to land . . . I nevertheless cannot but agree with those who
point to the difficulty of applying this proposition in its pure form everywhere in
our country, and refer lo die necessity of taking inLo consideration such charac
teristics of the mode of life as we observe, let us say, in the same Little Russia, so
wrongly intent now on separation. Questions of this kind will undoubtedly be
encountered. Therefore, in introducing the land reform, we must see to it that
it be as painless as possible and with as few unnecessary difficulties as possible . . .
I pass on to our second problem. The news from various places has been
extremely alarming. Recently it has been somewhat more reassuring. . . . I am
not speaking about the fact that in any disorders, in any exhibition of force, many
injustices arise, also an entirely pointless suffering, particularly in a display of
chaotic force. I emphasize again that under such deplorable conditions it is
impossible to solve properly, to solve justly the problem of land, this problem of
greatest importance. . . . I repeatand I am willing to repeat countless numbers
of timesthat without peace and the maintenance of order locally, it is impossible
to think of achieving what we are striving for, that is, a most just, a most peaceful,
a most painless land reform, the transfer of all the land to the use of the toiling
population (applause).
Following the President, the Minister of Agriculture, V . M. Chernov, made the
following address:
Joining our deeply esteemed President in his greeting, I shall on my part
say but a few words . . . We must not forget that Russias most acute need at
the present moment is to have as soon as possible a competent organ to express the
546 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
national will. And thus, because of this, some two and a half months only separate
us from the future Constituent Assembly. This imposes upon us an extremely
urgent and responsible obligation to speed the course of our work and to make
our work yet more intensive. . . .
The land reform in prospect for Russia, not only in its sweep, not only in its
conception, as seen now, is tremendous and perhaps without precedent in the
history of land legislation. It occupies a unique position also in its method of
preparatory work, in its purely democratic principles used as the basis of the
organs preparing the reform, which [principles] must be clearly revealed in the
imminent elections to the organs of self-government and in the land committees
connected with them. The village population itself, the beloved people of the mir ,
are being drawn into a most active, most direct participation at the outset, during
the very first preparatory steps in the discussion and preparation of projects on
land reform. . . .
The Central Land Committee, more than any local leaders, can see how di
verse, how complex, how entangled sometimes the local agrarian relations are, how
many difficulties must be overcome here. And, aware of all this, we cannot be
satisfied with the tempo of work up to this time. Extraordinary efforts must be
exerted to give all possible speed to the movement of agrarian legislation. During
this session the Central Land Committee will try to take, and I hope will take, a
new step in this direction.
Fortunately, casting a backward look at the events of the current agrarian
situation, we see that the general situation is still much better than it might have
been. And this, in spite of the fact that there are a number of places in Russia
where separate, local, and not always carefully considered decisions were taken
on ripening and sore questions. Psychologically this is very understandable, in
view of the apparent delay in legislation up to this time. In spite of this, I repeat,
on the whole we can say that the Russian peasantry, the Russian village, has
exhibited tremendous political stability and balance, particularly compared with
all the critical moments of past history, with all the pictures of previous revolutions.
. . . Comparing, let us say, the agrarian movement in the Russian village with
the agrarian movement of the time of the great French Revolution, when through
out almost all of France feudal castles were ablaze, we see that the Russian village
and the Russian people truly conceal tremendous reserves of sound political and
statesmanlike sense upon which we can depend.
The peasant is first of all a master builder, accustomed to a responsible role
in organizing and managing his life. The land committees can and should depend
upon these traits of the peasant psychology. In struggle as well as in devastation
the peasant seldom forgets the creative problems. And we should not forget these
inherent traits of his psychology or confuse them with narrow private-ownership
propensities. Breaking away from the latter, the peasant does not lose the tendency
toward organizing activity.
On the other hand, from the narrow private-ownership tendency flows a whole
series of separate currents and tendencies which we have had occasion to consider
in discussing the small private owners, the otrubniks, the khutorians , or in men
tioning the separatist conservatism observed in some parts of the mighty Cossack
hosts. But I must say that each new day, all the same, brings us news of one and
the same thing: if in many places there are strong centrifugal forces in the solution
of problems, the centralizing forces not only are strong but are constantly growing
and strengthening. . . . Thus these centralizing currents facilitate the general
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 547
work of solving the land problem on a broad basis of principle on an all-Russian
scale.
This settlement, of course, must be equally removed from a desire for a uni
form pattern, disregarding all local peculiarities and imposing everywhere some
sort of absolutely uniform method of resolving the land question, as well as from
the opposite urge, which would portend pure localism and separatism. Neither po
sition is acceptable to us. And the land reform that the Constituent Assembly will
adopt must take into consideration the diversity of local conditions, which calls
for sufficient flexibility in the new law. [It will have to do this] along with the
preparation of the general basic law on land that will guarantee the stability and
constitutionality of the fuLure agrarian land code and protect the rights of the
collective units as well as those of individuals using the land . . . Such is our
guiding idea. . .
478. General P lan by t h e Central L and Co m m ittee for t h e W ork of th e
G uberniya , U ezd , and V olost L and C o m m ittees on th e P reparation of th e
L and R eform
[.Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledelia, No. 25, August 6, 1917, p. 524.]
1) The solution of the land problem lies in the jurisdiction of the Constituent
Assembly.
2) The general outline of land reform prepared for the Constituent Assembly
by the Central Land Committee in collaboration with local land committees must
be in keeping with the state-wide plan of land organization of the toiling agricul
tural population and with the populations legal concepts.
3) In discussing the question of land reform the local land committees must
take into consideration the most significant characteristics of the land system and
economy of their regions, without losing sight, however, of the demands of the
state-wide plan.
4) With a view to preparing the state-wide plan of land reform, the local
committees should begin at once the study of the problems of land reform and
should draw up approximate plans and estimates for their solution. All such
estimates should be, as far as possible, adapted to the various volosts or other
small regions differing among themselves with respect to their economies.
5) Local land committees, while cooperating in the proper execution of the
agricultural and land census being conducted at present, must at the same time
utilize, for the fulfillment of the task outlined in paragraph 4, all available local
natural, historic, statistical, survey, and other materials. They also conduct the
necessary supplementary statistical, economic, and social research. [In this con
nection] they are guided by the resolutions on this question of the second session
of the Central Land Committee. Committees also execute other preliminary work
entrusted to them by the Central Land Committee.
479. T h e T hird S ession of th e C entral L and C o m m ittee , A ugust 25-29
[Izvestiia Glavnago ZemeVnago Komiteta, Nos. 4-5, September 1-15, 1917, p. 7.]
XI. On the Current Moment
The general conference of the Central Land Committee of the third session,
which has convened to decide the next questions of current land policy and for the
548 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
preparation of land reforms, deems it its duty to report the extremely difficult
and unfavorable circumstances under which the work of the session has been
carried on.
The work of the second session of the Central Land Committee was interrupted
and prematurely stopped by the Petrograd events of July 3-5, called forth by
irresponsible groups of the Petrograd population. The work of the third session
of the Central Land Committee was [also] undermined and remains today un
finished. The insurgent actions of the former Supreme Commander, Kornilov,
which aroused alarm for the fate of our freedom and the new democratic state
hood, could not but affect the participants of the third session of the Central
Land Committee. It made them aware of all the menacing danger of rebellious
actions against the Provisional Government.
The general conference of the third session of the Central Land Committee
deems the insurgent actions of General Kornilov, which threatened civil war, the
gravest and most shameful crime before the country. At the same time, the repre
sentatives of the Land Committee deem it their duty to state that all actions that
threaten civil war, regardless of their source, undermine our freedom and state
hood, and also threaten the proper solution of the land question by undermining
the integral work locally and in the center.
In view of this, the general conference of the Central Land Committee, pro
testing against the armed insurrection and disobedience toward the Provisional
Government, calls upon each and all to combat insurgent actions against the free
Russian people and appeals for intensified work in order to restore a free demo
cratic order in the country and to repulse the external enemy. Because only under
such conditions can the cherished aspiration of the toiling masses to land and
freedom be realized.

480. A n A dverse C o m m ent on th e W ork of t h e C entral L and C om m ittee


[V. P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii, Glavnyi Zemelnyi Komitet, ARR, XII (1923), 292.
The author was the representative on the Committee from the Ministry of Justico.
Other translated excerpts from his article appear in Alexis Antsiferov et al., Russian
Agriculture During the War, pp. 265-67.]
One day in the summer, on arriving at the Land Committee before the opening
of the meeting, I went over to Posnikov; he had a few minutes to spare and began
to chat with me about the work of the Committee. I told him that I found the
work unproductive and slow because many members of the Committee, and par
ticularly the local representatives sent from the guberniyas, talked too much and
incoherently. Thus not only was it impossible to formulate some sort of law,
because of the legal illiteracy of the majority of the members of the Committee,
but at times it was even impossible to grasp the general idea of the forthcoming
land reform. To my surprise, not only did Posnikov share my views, but he
expressed himself even more emphatically. He told me very plainly: And do you
suppose, generally speaking, that anything can be achieved here? What we should
do is throw out this crowd. If anyone could do anything, it is only you and I and
those like uspeople who are truly intelligent and cultured, people wilh economic
and legal [background] and general higher education.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 549
481. T h e F oundation of t h e N ational L and R eserve
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14730, March 18, 1917, p. 13. See Docs. 464 and 465. The Gov
ernment made the first appropriation for the organization of the Land Reserve on
March 20. Zhurnaly, No. 26. On July 19, the National Land Reserve Office was estab
lished in the Department of Agriculture. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, 1411.]
The law of the Provisional Government concerning the transfer of the Imperial
appanage [udeVnye] lands, capital, and property to the State is the first step
toward creation of the National Land Reserve for the satisfaction of the just
demands of the peasantry.
These properties, which were created during the reign of Paul I for the mainte
nance of numerous members of the former Romanov dynasty, consist not only of
lands and forests but also of a whole series of industrial enterprises, factories, and
mills. . . .
The trade and industrial operations of the Appanages Department probably
equaled in profitableness the income from the exploitation of lands. These lands,
an area up to six million dessiatineswith the exception of the very highly culti
vated plots on which were grown cotton, tea, grapes, flowers, etc.were not tilled
directly by the Department but were rented to peasants. The terms of rent always
provoked numerous arguments and bickerings, which frequently led to sharp
conflicts. Now, with the transfer of those lands into the hands of the State, an
end has been put to land disputes, litigations, and conflicts. However, nationaliza
tion of the udel lands alone, not a large area, as can readily be seen, does not in
the least solve the land question. It is to be supposed and believed that by taking
into the possession of the State the udel lands, the Provisional Government is only
making the first step toward creation of a larger and more powerful land reserve
from the Kabinet lands, the monastery lands, partly church lands, and, finally,
possessional lands. The Russian peasantry, which has been for more than two
and a half years heroically protecting with its blood and sweat the Russian land
from foreign invasion, has the full righthuman and divineto this land.
482. T h e W ork of the Central L and C om m ittee s Com m ission
on th e R edistribution of t h e L and R eserve
[Glavnyi ZemeVnyi Komitet, trudy po podgotovke zemeVnoi reformy, Vypusk I, pp.
5-6, 66-67; Vypusk II, pp. 5354; Vypusk III, pp. 69-70; Vypusk IV, pp. 75-76;
Vypusk V, pp. 77-79.]
The Commission on the Redistribution of the Land Reserve has two basic
problems to consider: 1) the establishment of the land reserve and 2) its distri
bution. The fulfillment of the first problem calls for the solution of the problem
of the liquidation of capitalist landownership, as the most important, not to men
tion the transfer for this purpose of state lands, as a source for the creation of a
land reserve to be subsequently distributed among the toiling population. The
second [point] presumes the establishment of: 1) a body of holdings and persons
subject to land allocation, 2) quotas for land allocation, and 3) the manner of
allocation of lands in connection with the organization of the territory, the settle
ment and resettlement [of the population]. Each one of these problems has sub
sidiary problems, and each one of them can serve as a subject of study. Con
sidering the diversity of agricultural relations in the various parts of the Russian
Republic, it is necessary, following the general presentation of the enumerated
550 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
questions or parallel with them, to make provision for the fate of special types of
existing landownership.
Accordingly, at its first meeting on July 19, 1917, the Commission drew up
[the following list of] suggested subjects . . .
1. On the liquidation of large-scale landownership. . . .
2. On semicapitalist holdings or those using hired labor in part. . . .
3. On the quotas for the allocation of land under the forthcoming land
reform. . . .
4. On the quotas for expropriation or quotas for exemption from expropria
tion of lands for the use of former owners of semicapitalist and capitalist hold
ings. . . .
5. On the categories of the population eligible to participate in the use of the
lands. . . .
6. On the organization of the territory (land organization in the forthcoming
reform). . . .
7. On migration and resettlement. . . .
8. On special types of national landownership (lands of Cossacks, inorodtsy ,
and migratory peoples). . . .
9. On municipal, zemstvo, monastery, church, and possessional lands.
10. On the organization of the land reserve.
The proposed bases for the liquidation of large-scale land ownership are ac
cepted [on August 7,1917] in their entirety by the Commission in the following
form:
1. Privately owned agricultural lands are turned over to the toiling popula
tion.
2. The exceptions to the text in article 1 of the [proposed] statute, given
below in articles 3-4, are introduced for properties recognized as having a special
national-economic value.
3. The following properties or portions of properties are considered as having
a national-economic value: a) [those] producing products of mass consumption
by the population of the entire country or of some region which, under present
conditions, either are not supplied by the peasant holdings or are supplied by
them in insufficient quantity; b) [those] producing means of production that (in
the opinion of part of the Commission) are necessary for the peasant economy or
for its improvement; c) [those] bearing a model character with regard to tech
nique or organization of the property; d) [those] differing by a radically higher
productivity, compared with the general level of holdings in a given locality,
measured by the size of the national-economic income per unit of agricultural area.
4. To the first of the above-mentioned categories, a), belong holdings produc
ing sugar beets and holdings that sell fresh milk, fruit, grapes; to the second,
b ), holdings engaged in breeding pedigreed stock and in producing seed and fruit
tree plantings for sale.
Note: Local organizations are free to augment the categories of holdings sub
ject to [classification as having] national-economic value, based upon local con
ditions . . .
5. A list of individual properties and portions of properties falling under one
of the types mentioned in articles 3 and 4 (including the Note) is to be prepared
by guberniya land committees in collaboration with the agronomic collegium,
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 551
and each of the properties included in the list is subjected to resurvey on the spot.
Final approval of the list is up to the Central Land Committee. [These properties
may be put under the management of state organs or of local self-government.]

10. In transferring properties and portions of properties to the toiling popula


tion, their former owners reserve the right to keep from their property a plot of
land not in excess of the working norm established for lands for agricultural use.
This plot is reserved on manorial grounds of the former owner, provided it does
not devaluate in any way the land subject to transfer to the toiling population and
provided the owner does not wish to receive the plot in another place.
11. Manorial grounds with buildings erected on them may be left in the hands
of the owners provided they relinquish ownership of other land properties.
Expropriation of manorial grants under specially established considerations takes
place: 1) if the manorial grounds with the buildings erected thereon can be
utilized by the state or zemstvo for some generally useful purposes; 2) if leaving
it under the management of the owner devaluates the area subject to transfer to
the toiling population.
12. Likewise, the state and the zemstvos must reserve the right on the basis
of specially established regulations, of expropriation of the livestock and the
material inventory of holdings which are transferred to the toiling population
or to the management of the state or zemstvo. In the event the state and the
zemstvo fail to take advantage of this right, the owner may dispose of the said
holding at his own discretion.
The proposed bases for the establishment of quota for the amount of land
to be provided for the population are accepted [on August 24, 1917] in their
entirety by the Commission in the following form:
1. The establishment of the quotas should be based on the land utilization of
the average local consumer-labor holding, which is determined by:
a) an adequate satisfaction of needs (from the local point of view),
b) an adequate utilization of the working forces of a family for agricultural
work,
c) the absence of regularly hired agricultural workers.
2. In establishing the quotas in regions where trades other than agriculture
play an important role, the effect of [such] earnings on the quotas should be
taken into consideration, except in those cases where, because of the scarcity of
land, they take working hands away from agriculture but fail to give sufficiently
high and stable incomes.
3. Quotas for land are established individually for each agricultural region,
embracing the average uezd territory.
4. Establishment of quotas for uezd territories is vested in the central state
organ.
5. Distribution of land within the uezd territories is to be conducted according
to quotas established by local land institutions. . . .
The proposed bases for the establishment of quotas for the amount of land to
be left for the use of former owners of large-scale peasant holdings who employ
552 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
hired labor and of capitalist holdings are accepted [on September 26, 1917] in
their entirety by the commission in the following form:
2. Expropriation of land from large peasant holdings employing hired labor
may take place in cases where the holdings satisfy simultaneously the following
three characteristics:
a) the holding has a title deed (individual or joint) and is purchased
household allotment or communal land, received either by inheritance, as a gift,
or by prescription.
b) [the holding] employs the services of more than one permanent laborer
(irrespective of sex) for agricultural work.
c) the land owned is more than double the quota of land utilization by the
consumer-labor [norm] for the given region.
3. For holdings falling under the category indicated in the preceding point,
the amount of land over the mentioned double quota of land guarantee must be
expropriated.
The proposed bases for the establishment of holdings and the eligibility of
persons for land allocation are accepted [on September 28,1917] by the Commis
sion in the following form:
1) In each locality, land up to the full approved quota is to be granted, first
of all, for the use of: a) present agricultural holdings, b) agricultural workers who
are local residents, c) all those listed [as agriculturists], who may have aban
doned agriculture but have not lost their right to land, provided they have re
turned or will return to agriculture not later than a year from the date of publica
tion of the fundamental law on land reform.
2) If after granting up to the [full] approved quota of land for the use of
holdings and persons enumerated in article 1 . . . some free land still remains
in a given locality, it is to be used to provide land for others who desire it, in the
following order: a) agricultural workers who are not local residents but who
usually found a means of livelihood in the given place; b) migrants from among
those toiling agriculturists, who will have the right to resettlement and settlement
with the assistance of the state (article 3); c) natives of a given locality who left
the land but wish to return to agriculture, and likewise those who are not natives
of a given locality but who usually live in the given locality; d) other persons who
so desire.
3) If in some localities, because of the insufficiency of the land reserve, the
existing number of holdings and persons of the categories enumerated in article 1
. . . cannot be provided with land to the extent corresponding wilh the established
quotas, the excess number of holdings and persons of these categories may, if
they so desire, take advantage of assistance from the state when resettling or
migrating to free lands and other places. The right to the same assistance is
extended to all holdings and persons enumerated in para. 2, under categories (a)
and (b), if there is no free land to provide them within the given locality.
4) In order to provide agricultural workers and peasants of small land hold
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 553
ings who receive lands on the basis of articles 1 and 2 with the inventory and other
means necessary to carry on independent agriculture, the state will establish
special credits which must extend loans to agricultural workers and peasants of
small land holdings, in the event they appeal for such.
The proposed bases for the organization of territory in allotting lands are
accepted [on December 6,1917] in their entirety by the Commission in the follow
ing form:
1. The allocation of lands is to be accompanied by the carrying out of land
reorganization, on the basis of the following rules, to eliminate the overlapping
of agricultural lands, the strip system, and other shortcomings in the distribution
of agricultural territory, harmful to the development of the agricultural economy.
2. The forms of land organization are to be decided by the population itself,
in accordance with local, natural, and economic conditions and [in accordance]
with the already existing system of land usage in a given locality.
3. Villages, whether independent agricultural communes or part of multi
village communes, and communities of owners of private holdings, agricultural
associations, and other collectives that receive supplementary guarantees of lands
form independent land units, allotting land for individual use from the total
amount of land due them.
If, by a majority of three-fourths of the votes, the members participating in
the joint use of communal lands express their desire to retain the former communal
tenure [of the land] or if the institutions [which have jurisdiction over land
questions] deem the discontinuance of the communal tenure impossible without
a considerable violation of the economic well-being of the land, the land is allotted
to them again for communal use.
4. Portions of large villagescommunes, associations, partnerships, and
other collectiveson application of one-fifth of the heads of households com
posing them, or not fewer than fifty heads of households, with a total number in
excess of two hundred and fifty, can also be isolated into independent land units,
and the lands due them be allotted as far as possible in accordance with the needs
established in the organization of new settlements (para. 8).
5. The newly offered lands are allocated:
a) with the area of former use and all territory within one continuous bound
ary as close to the village as possible;
b) with such a composite of arable lands, forests, pastures, etc., as will answer
the normal economic needs of the given locality and, considering the particular
characteristics of the original lands, will constitute a natural supplement to them.
Note: When it is impossible to conform to the demands of points a and b of
the present clause, the land is allotted in the smallest number of well-consolidated,
separate plots, which are in close proximity, as the conditions of the economy
permit.
c) with adequate and conveniently planned roads and paths for the cattle;
d) with definitely established boundaries of delimitation from neighboring
plots;
e) by observing as far as possible conditions favorable to the further intro
ductions of [improvements in] land organization, of ameliorative and other
measures for the improvement of land usage of the toiling household.
554 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
6. The distribution and organization of newly allotted lands, as well as lands
formerly under tenure of householders who were members of communes, asso
ciations, and other collectives, are done at their discretion. Local land institutions
render assistance in decreasing [the number of] small strips and the overlapping
of strips [and] in the formation of khutor and otrub holdings on the bases indi
cated in articles 7 and 8.
7. Prior to the publication of the law on land reform, persons rightfully
owning, as their private property, lands overlapping the strips of land under the
tenure of communes or placed, on the strength of this enactment, under their
tenure are free either to join the communes or to enclose their lands, forming
independent plots. If such enclosure is regarded as violating the interests of the
commune, it is up to the land organ of the highest competency to declare as obliga
tory the inclusion of the plots of the said persons in the composition of the
communal lands.
8. The forms of the organization of land allotted for settlement are determined
by local land institutions in accordance with the needs of a proper organization of
the [rural] economy, as far as possible by agreement with persons who receive
the allotment and in accordance with the present rules. Plots allotted for settle
ment must be provided with appropriate facilities as well as water for drinking
and other household needs.

THE PROBLEM OF LAND RELATIONS PENDING THE


INTRODUCTION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM
483. R ecent S iberian S ettlers U rged N ot to R eturn to E uropean R ussia
for t h e A nticipated L and A llotm ent
[Circular of the Ministry of Agriculture to the guberniya, oblast, uezd, and volost
executive and land committees, to the commissars of the Provisional Government, to
those in charge of migration and movement of migrants, and to the heads of depart
ments of agriculture within the territory of Asiatic Russia, No. 367, June 20, 1917,
Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledelia9 No. 22, July 2, 1917, p. 430.]
Among the settlers recently established beyond the Urals, there has recently
been observed an urge to return to the motherland in the hope of receiving imme
diate allotment of pomeshchik land. Some of the settlers have even begun a hasty
sale of work-property which they have accumulated in new places; they leave the
fields they are cultivating and the hay mowing, fearing to be late for the allotment
of the pomeshchik land in European Russia.
Some of the local public committees have already directed their attention to
this. Thus, for example, the executive committee of the Semipalatinsk oblast
issued a special appeal to the settlers in this connection. The committee reminds
all those who hope to find free lands in Russia that no allotments of lands can take
place anywhere prior to a successful conclusion of the war with the Germans and
the return home of all citizens who are at the front and prior to the publication of
new laws on land by the Constituent Assembly . [The committee] consequently
appeals to all settlers to remain where they are, not to bring their households to
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 555
ruin in vain, and not to interfere by their useless movements with the overloaded
railways and waterways, which are needed so urgently at the present time.
Sharing completely [the views of] such an appeal to the population by the
Semipalatinsk committee, the Ministry of Agriculture, on its part, deems it neces
sary to explain that aside from the irreparable economic ruin to the settlers them
selves, their urge to return to the motherland at the present time must be considered
as unquestionably detrimental to the total cause of strengthening freedom . Stem
ming from such a return, misunderstandings, dangerous for the public peace now
so necessary, will undoubtedly arise between the returned settlers and those who
remained. The settlers should know that the land resources of all designations
are not so great in European Russia; that in many places even the present toiling
population cannot be adequately provided with lands in their vicinity and that
they therefore will have to receive allotments perhaps in other places. In other
words, they will, as a matter of fact, have to migrate.
In view of this, the Ministry of Agriculture appeals to all public, political, and
government organizations and individuals with the request to exert all their
authorily and influence to restrain the settlers from so thoughtless and detrimental
a step as a return migration to the motherland at this particular time. Anyone
who gave his [time and] labor to the plot of land assigned to him is obligated
as his civic duty to remain on it, at least up to the time of complete and general
clarification of the land question by the Constituent Assembly.
It should also be explained to the settlers that passes for them and their freight
from Siberia to European Russia have been discontinued.
Signed: N ik . V olkov , Commissar of the Provisional
Government, for the Minister of Agriculture
Countersigned: G. C h irk in , Head of the Administration
for the Affairs of Settlers

484. A ll L and to t h e P eople


[Izvestiia, No. 55, May 2, 1917, p. 3.]
The revolution in Russia brought the good news to the peasantry about the
realization of its old dream, about the transfer of all land to the people.
There is no place for landowner bondage in free Russia. And [the idea] that
people should start paying a ransom to their age-old oppressors for terminating
bondage is out of the question.
All the land will pass into the hands of the people without redemption. The
revolution will not permit a different resolution of the land question.
Of all questions pertaining to national life, the land question is the most im
portant. This question touches on the basic interests of tens of millions of our
citizens. And that is why all the people must be called upon to decide this ques
tion. Deciding the land question without the participation of all the people would
mean deciding the matter without the master.
The Constituent Assembly expresses the will of all the people. This means that
the right of the final decision on the land question belongs to the Constituent
Assembly.
Before the Constituent Assembly is convoked, peasants must prepare them
selves for deciding the land question. All data [necessary] for deciding this ques
556 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
tion must be worked out, land relations must be regulated, the organization must
be put in order. This is the task of the local peasant committees.
But these committees would be making a big mistake if they should proceed
to seize directly the landowners property to convert it to property of the local
peasant population. Such land seizures would lead to an inequitable distribution
of pomeshchik property among the peasants. Villages situated in the vicinity of
rich estates would seize more than they should. Other villages would receive
nothing. One part of the peasantry would begin to resent the other part. Village
would rise against village, volost against volost. This would bring great harm to
the revolution, for the strength of the revolution lies in the unity of the people and
any dissention is fatal to the revolution.
There is yet another danger in arbitrary land seizures. These seizures may
diminish the crop area and may decrease the quantity of bread in the country.
No one can be sure that each person will not take land in excess of the amount
he can cultivate! And if the crop area diminishes as a result of land and stock
seizures, Russia will be threatened with a famine. We have no surplus grain
now. Even so, the country is barely able to make ends meet in the matter of grain.
That is why peasant committees must exercise great prudence in the matter of
land seizures.
All vacant and free land must be taken immediately and subjected to com
munal cultivation. Let not one patch of land be wasted. Let the guberniya com
mittees ensure that the personal stock of the pomeshchiki is used correctly for the
needs of the people.
But it must be remembered that the final decision on the land question belongs
to the Constituent Assembly. It alone can resolve the land question in all its
dimensions and in all fairness.

485. T h e R estriction on T ransactions in L and


[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1128. The question of a restriction on transactions in land was
initially introduced by Kerensky and presented for discussion in the first Provisional
Government by Shingarev. See Otvet A. F. Kerenskago Delu Naroda,9 Volia Naroda,
No. 110, September 5, 1917, p. 1; and Rech%No. 108, May 10, 1917, p. 2. The efforts
of Chernov to receive government approval for this measure during his tenure in the
first coalition failed because of the opposition of the Kadets and the business commu
nity. See Oliver H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp. 255-56, 325. For a
strong criticism of Radkeys interpretations in general by a former leader of the
Socialist Revolutionaries, see M. Vishniak, K istorii Fevrarskoi revoliutsii, po povodu
knigi Olivera Radkey, Novyi Zhurnaly, XXXVIII (1958), 200.
See Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 2035, which exempted from the provisions of the act the
purchase by railroads of lands deemed essential to them by the Ministry of Transport.]
law of th e provisional government
With a view to ending land speculation and preventing fictitious transactions
in land, encumbering land with mortgages, selling it to foreigners, and similar
land transactions likely to hinder the Constituent Assembly in disposing of the
existing land reserve, the Provisional Government decrees:
I. The completion of title deeds in transactions involving the establishment or
transfer of the right of ownership, mortgage, or other estate right to lands used
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 557
for agricultural and forestry purposes outside of cities must be approved in each
separate case by local guberniya land committees and confirmed by the Minister
of Agriculture.
II. The present law does not affect the approval of title deeds completed on the
immovable properties mentioned in section I before March 1,1917.
III. All landed properties up for sale by public auction are reported to the
Ministry of Agriculture, which is authorized, in consultation with local guberniya
land committees, to withdraw such lands from auction and to transfer them to
the temporary economic management of divisions of the Peasants and the Nobil
itys Land Banks and the Administration of State Properties, respectively, with
the transfer to the state of current interest payments on mortgage loans pending
final settlement of the question of these lands by the Constituent Assembly.
IV. The Minister of Justice is authorized to put the present law into effect by
telegraph before its promulgation by the Ruling Senate.
A. K erensky , Minister-President
V ictor Ch ernov , Minister of Agriculture
July 12, 1917
486. T h e B an on L and T ransactions
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 172, July 29, 1917, p. 1.]
Among the ill-famed agrarian draft laws of V. M. Chernov, the first order to
be carried out was the ban on land transactions.
We regard this measure as one of the most unsuccessful actions of the Provi
sional Government.
The ban on land transactions in the law of the Government is motivated by
the need to remove the difficulties for the Constituent Assembly in administering
the land fund.
The idea as such cannot arouse any objections on the part of those who hold
the point of view that the full right of the Constituent Assembly must be preserved.
We can only welcome the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture, which up to this
time has not observed these rights too carefully, is taking the same position.
Our doubts and misgivings are aroused not by the motives of the new law
but by its content. The freedom of the Constituent Assembly to administer the
land fund could have been preserved by less severe measures than prohibiting all
land transactions down to mortgages, inclusive.
As a matter of fact, what does the banning of land transactions mean from the
economic point of view? If up to this time political conditions reduced to a mini
mum the actual demand for land, the owner of the land preserved at least poten
tially the right to sell or mortgage. Consequently, the land had a certain value.
Now the land loses all value; it ceases to be an object of sale and at the same time
its owner loses all solvency. . . . As it is, agriculture on privately owned lands is
experiencing a crisis. Depriving it of working funds will be the final blow, follow
ing which we have the right to expect also the curtailment of sowings and the
stoppage of government and zemstvo payments and dues. Information about
nonpayment of dues comes from various places and we can least of all expect an
improvement [in this situation] from the devaluated properties as a result of
banning land transactions.
558 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
But this is not all. The new law prohibits also the mortgaging of lands. The
meaning of this law, which has no direct bearing on the disposal of private
property, can be understood only in connection with that point of the Socialist
Revolutionary program that is against the redemption of privately owned lands.
If the Constituent Assembly nevertheless agrees to compensation, even includ
ing mortgages, then from the point of view of the above-mentioned program, it
is profitable to reduce to a minimum the number of mortgaged lands in order to
reduce the future redemption payments. We are leaving aside the injustice of
such a decision under which a good farmer will have to bear the highest penalty.
The number of sufferers, as a result of Chernovs measures, is much greater. For
the prohibition against mortgaging lands will be sharply felt by land banks. The
blow will fall upon hundreds of thousands of stockholders and other clients of
credit institutions. With the interdependence of various branches of the financial
economy, the collapse of land credit will lead to the disorganization of other forms
of credit.
Further, there is danger from another source. The abolition of the right of
administering landed property, the growing difficulties in conducting agriculture,
and the direction of the Governments activity in the spirit of one of the party
programs might bring about a complete paralysis of private agriculture. Not
only the payments to the treasury and the zemstvo, but also payments of interest
on land loans could discontinue.
By banning land transactions and even sales by auctions, logically the Govern
ment had to take upon itself the protection of the interests of the third parties.
According to the new law, the payment of interest on mortgage obligations of
estates designated for sale and transferred to the management of the governmental
organs devolves upon the government Treasury. Should the refusal to pay interest
assume a mass character, a tremendous financial burden will fall upon the Treas
ury, for the indebtedness of private agriculture exceeds three billion.
What are the results of the prohibition on land transactions? The disposal
of property could have been prevented by a milder measure. On the other hand,
life evades the severest laws if they contradict the basic conditions of the existing
economic order.
Speculation also blossoms most fully on the soil of monstrous prohibitions.
What then remains of the first item of the agrarian legislation of V. M. Chernov?
New difficulties in agricultural production, disruption of the credit system, reduc
tion of payments to the treasury, and the growth of government expenditures.
With the prospects of future hunger and the present financial crisis, the
results are not very consoling.
487. C hernov s I nstruction to t h e L and C om m ittees
[.Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledelia, No. 24, July 30, 1917, pp. 494-96. During both the
first and second coalitions, Chernovs attempts to strengthen the powers of the land
committees in dealing with current problems of land relationships and use were op
posed by the majority of the Government. Since he could not secure approval for the
proposed law, Chernov attempted to accomplish his purpose by the issuance of the
Ministry of Agriculture circular below. This aroused great opposition both within and
outside the Government, for the Ministries of the Interior and of Food had issued almost
simultaneous directives (Docs. 488 and 489) which appeared to contradict the intent
of Chernovs, and it was felt in certain Government circles that the Instruction had
exceeded the authority vested in the Minister of Agriculture. See Oliver H. Radkev.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 559
The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp. 325-27, and especially the citations thereon for
a discussion of this episode and the difficulties it imposed upon local authorities. It
also played an important role in Chernovs political difficulties in July. See Docs. 1197,
1201, in Vol. III.]
In view of the delayed publication of the temporary laws regulating land
relations in various places prior to the solution of the land question by the Con
stituent Assembly, also in view of the urgent need for guiding instructions acutely
felt by the land committees where they have been formed and by other organs of
revolutionary authority administering their function where no land committees
are as yet formed, I deem it desirable to give the following general instructions:
1. On detailing prisoners of war. Prisoners of war under the old order were
detailed for the needs of agriculture by the zemstvo boards of uezds preponder
antly to larger, privately owned estates. Since the revolution, such assignments
have aroused strong censure almost everywhere on the part of the peasants, who
proposed as a basic demand a rule that prisoners of war be assigned first of all to
those toiling homesteads that remained either completely without workers or with
a weakened labor force, because of the calling up of reservists. It would hardly
be possible to oppose such an entirely just demand. One could disagree with it
only from the point of view of the greatest productive utilization of the labor of
the prisoners of war in the interest of agricultural output, since in the homesteads
of soldiers wives the labor is wasted and is used in a considerable measure
unprofitably. At any rate, this assignment is entirely within the power of the
volost food supply committees, which are more competent to judge of the worker
needs of various homesteads. The central authority cannot interfere in this matter.
Complaints against their actions may be lodged with the appropriate uezd food
supply committee. Removing of prisoners of war from certain owners and trans
ferring them to families who were deprived of workers is not within the compe
tence of the land committees. According to the position of the Provisional Gov
ernment on the Ministry of Food, the establishment of the acreage under crops
and the assignment of the labor force is within the sphere of action of the latter.
Land committees consequently must direct all matters of this kind to the appro
priate food supply committees, making sure that prisoners of war are not moved
arbitrarily. This has detrimental effects upon the economy, particularly when the
owners deprived of the prisoners of war are not warned ahead of time of the forth
coming removal, when the removal is not spread over several days, so as not to
disorganize the work of the homestead or place it in a helpless position or give it
time to adjust, or when in these homesteads a certain number of qualified cate
gories of prisoners of war especially necessary to the holding is not left, and in
general when this operation of reassignment of prisoners of war is not carried out
with the consent of the owners from whom they are removed.
In order to utilize the labor of prisoners of war, it is urgently recommended
that they be formed into artels [to be placed] at the disposal of volost and village
committees and moved during work from one plot of land to another. Such
detachments of prisoners of war or other workers are particularly necessary for
the cultivation or harvesting of fields taken from private owners who are unable
to cultivate or harvest them.8
8 According to a Circular of the Temporary Administration of the Militia, Ministry of the
Interior, to Guberniya Commissars, No. 15590, April 18, 1917, Sb. Tsirk. MVD., p. 66, many
prisoners of war in agricultural work made exorbitant demands concerning their food and
upkeep, do not abide by the regulations, refuse to work, and leave for towns.
560 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
2. On plow and hay lands. In the interests of providing the country and the
army with food and fodder, local food supply organs are to supervise proper
exploitation of plow and hay lands and see to it that not one patch of plow land
(except fallow) remains unseeded, not one sheaf of grain unharvested, not one
cart of hay abandoned.
We must bear firmly in mind that this responsibility is placed upon the food
supply organs to preserve important state interests and not to arm the peasants in
their struggle with private landowners. Our state is in an extremely difficult situa
tion; it lacks bread, meat, all sorts of provisions; it lacks oats, hay, and other
fodder. And we must be extremely careful about every bit of grain, every wisp
of hay. It would be a heavy sin against the motherland, which stands practically
on the brink of destruction, to use these rules for narrow, selfish interests, to mow
the field of the pomeshchiki, taken over cheaply by the committees, and to sell the
harvested hay in the city at extremely high speculators prices, or to harvest the
grain sown by the pomeshchiki, to pillage and hide it in peasant combins and then
sell it at exorbitant prices. Whoever acts thus robs his own motherlandhis
mother during her trying year.
The local food supply organs are obliged to register all the plow land that the
owner is unable to cultivate himself, and sow it. These organs are to be guided
by the testimony of the owners themselves, by estimating the work forces and
both the livestock and material at its disposal, as well as by testimonies of the
local peasant population. All this land is placed at the disposal of the volost land
committees for public management or for distribution among peasants for culti
vation and sowing. All misunderstandings and complaints against volost land
committees are settled by appropriate uezd committees.
Rent fee is determined by voluntary agreement of tenants and owners with
the land committee as intermediary, and, in case of failure to arrive at an agree
ment, the Uezd Committee can take upon itself the fixing of such a fee. It is under-
stood that the owner may lodge a complaint against its action to the Guberniya
Land Committee. In the event of refusal of the population to pay the tenant fee
to the owner, the uezd land committees may advance this sum, on condition
that, after the deduction of taxes and other debts against the estate, the balance
is paid to the owner.
With respect to the harvesting of hay lands, meadows should be left with the
owners if they are able to harvest them with the labor force and means at their
disposal. Fields left unharvested may be distributed by the land committees
among peasants at a price agreed upon by them and the owners, wilh the com
mittees acting as intermediary, and, in the event of absence of such agreement,
[at a price] set by the committees themselves, with the right of the owners to
petition against them to the higher committees. Since, in this event, the peasants
will receive the meadows not at a market price but at reduced price, the hay har
vested from these meadows must be delivered by them through the Food Supply
Board at fixed prices, after deducting what is needed for their personal use.
The grain that the owners are unable to harvest themselves will be harvested
by the volost food supply committees with the aid of crews of prisoners of war,
soldiers detailed for this purpose, and other labor forces. The grain is sold to the
state at fixed prices; straw goes to the owner as fodder for the livestock, and out
of the money for the grain sold to the state the expenses for harvesting are paid,
with a small percentage in favor of the committee; the balance goes to the owner
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 561
to compensate him for expenses in connection with the cultivation and seed com.
Under no circumstances should there be any interference with the owners har
vesting of the grain.
3. On the question of forests. Local land committees guard against preda
tory felling of trees, or felling of trees above the norm determined and confirmed
by the plan of forest economy or permitted by the Ministry of Agriculture.
For purposes of satisfying the needs of the local population in forest materials
that have grown inaccessible to it owing to speculatively inflated prices, local
committees must enter into an agreement with the Peasant Bank, the treasury, and
private owners with regard to releasing wood to the local population to the
extent of actual need at a price comparable at least to that set by the state in
releasing lumber without competitive bidding. For needy populations, more
favorable conditions are established in releasing state lumber. Local committees
must make sure that lumber (firewood and building) is released for public insti
tutions (schools, hospitals, etc.) on the same conditions. And, in this connection,
no obstacles should be placed by the peasant population [to the efforts] to stop
wood speculation. Local committees can employ the same measures with regard
to the growing forest that should be reserved for the needs of the city population,
but on condition of supplying firewood and other wood materials to the food
supply boards at fixed prices.
4. On livestock and equipment. If, owing to shortage of work hands or for
other reasons, the owners have some work animals and equipment not in use, the
land committees in agreement with the food supply committees may register
them and rent them out to whoever may need them in order that at the present
difi&cult time human work forces, work animals, implements, and machines may
be utilized to the utmost extent possible to supply the army and population with
provisions.
5. Conservation of model farms, thoroughbred livestock, and valuable cul
tures. During the present transitional time in Russia, private model farms are in
grave danger of destruction as a result of wrong and unprofitable actions by the
local peasant population as well as the selfish actions of owners frightened by the
revolutionary movement and by conjectures as to the forthcoming land reform.
Cases are known of the sale of all the thoroughbred livestock, farm implements,
etc. The land committees civic duty is not to permit the devaluation of such
centers of agricultural progress from either side. With this in view, the com
mittees must not allow thoroughbred livestock to be either taken away by the
peasants to their homesteads or sold by the owners. Only the surplus should be
sold. The livestock must be provided with an appropriate quantity of fodder.
Consequently, under no circumstances should the peasants be permitted to take
from such estates cut hay in quantities that threaten to leave the owners livestock
without fodder. The management on such estates must not be disrupted in so far
as it is based on work with the aid of its own inventory and with the aid of perma
nent hired labor. Efforts should be made to improve the lot of the toiling popu
lation here, not by means of the allotment of the cultivated land among peasants,
but by improvement of the hired mens conditioneconomic, moral, and civic.
If, however, the owner of such an estate is completely unable to cope with diffi
culties and to continue the management of the estate, it should be taken over
intact rather than divided, and turned over to public management, such as the
uezd land committees.
562 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Likewise, dairy farms should be protected which supply milk and dairy prod
ucts to veterans hospitals, other hospitals, and the children of the cities.
The same concern should be shown by the land committees for the conser
vation of particularly valuable cultures: orchards, vineyards, sugar-beet planta
tions, medicinal herbs, etc., explaining to the population the importance of a
careful atittude toward them.
The sugar-beet crops deserve particular attention. In many places there is a
desire on the part of the population to divide the areas under sugar-beet crops.
We must bear in mind that even if these lands, after being divided, are planted
with sugar beets, the harvest in each peasant holding would prove inevitably much
lower, since the cultivation of sugar beets calls for expenditure of labor that only
a very strong peasant holding can shoulder. But precisely because of this, in the
event of the division of land, the sowing of sugar beets would considerably de
crease in area also. All this would threaten a great reduction in our sugar in
dustry, already so inadequate to satisfy the needs of the population as to threaten
the country with a sugar famine.
Land committees (volost, uezd, and guberniya) must look upon themselves
as organs of state authority and in all their measures must have the national in
terests at heart. Committees must go quite far in satisfying the just demands of
the toiling peasantry, but under the absolute condition that this does not lead to
the disintegration of the national economy, to dissipation of productive forces,
to ruin of model farms, to the lowering and loss of the crops so needed by Russia.
In this framework the land committees will find energetic support from the
Ministry of Agriculture. The latter by its legislative projects, in part already
carried out through the Provisional Government and in part subject to its exami
nation in the very near future, will clearly determine the legal competence of the
land committees. This will enable us to put an end to the existing vacillation
and vagueness in land relations, which in turn breed the same vacillations and
vagueness in the legal consciousness of the people.
V ictor Chernov , Minister of Agriculture
July 16, 1917
488. C ircular o f t h e M inister of the I nterior to G uberniya and
O blast C ommissars , J uly 17,1917
[Izvestiia Glavnago ZemeFnago Komiteta, Nos. 2-3, August 1-15, 1917, pp. 4-5.]
Information has come from many localities that the population permits
seizures, plowing and sowing of fields that are not theirs, removal of workers,
and the making of unreasonably high economic demands on agricultural holdings.
Pedigreed livestock is being destroyed, farm implements are pillaged. Model
holdings are being ruined. Private forests are being felled. Lumber prepared
for shipment and wood is held up and pillaged. At the same time, on private
holdings fields are left unsown and crops and hay remain unharvested.
Such conditions in agriculture and the lumber industry portend incalculable
disasters to the army, to the country, and to the very existence of the state. The
trials to which revolutionary Russia is subjected now demand the highest exertion
of all economic forces. We must save the country from the hostile external danger
and from famine and the exhaustion of provisions within.
Willful distribution of land introduces anarchy into land relations, lowers the
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 563
quantity of the provisions needed for Russia, and increases the danger of famine.
No less ruinous are all sorts of attempts, no matter by whom, to disorganize the
lumber industry by arbitrary interference, because [such attempts] will result in
a shortage of fuel for factories and mills that work for defense, for railroads, and
for the population, particularly the city population. Therefore, the entire eco
nomic life of the country could easily come to a stop, and weakened revolutionary
Russia would have to fall from exhaustion.
Aware of its responsibility to the revolution, the Provisional Government
cannot allow such disorganization in agriculture and forestry.
Vested with full revolutionary power, the Provisional Government has already
taken measures, in enacting the law of July 12, to keep the entire land fund in
violable until the convening of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, which will
transfer the land into the hands of the toilers. Up to that time attempts at arbi
trary realization of the land reform in various places by decisions of local com
mittees and peasant congresses must be considered inadmissible, which fact must
be announced to the population. Such resolutions on seizures and the distribution
of privately owned lands are an obvious detriment to the revolution; they dis
organize the economy and lead to internal strife, and consequently should not be
permitted. Equally inadmissible is failure by landowners of free lands and fields
to make use of [their] lands. Such instances must be regulated by food supply
committees in accordance with the law of April 11 and the instructions of the
Minister of Food on May 30.
No other committees have the right to take upon themselves the regulation of
sowing and harvesting of fields, and their resolutions are not compulsory for the
population. Calls for land seizures must be penalized with all the force of the law.
In regulating rent-land relations, the local guberniya, uezd, and volost land
committees must act in strict accordance with the law of the Provisional Govern
ment of April 21 and the Instruction of the Minister of Agriculture of July 16 of
this year, and no overstepping of their authority can be permitted. Likewise no
interference should be tolerated with their lawful competence by any other or
ganizations not established in accordance with the law on land committees.
The precarious state of the national economy and the grave danger that revo
lutionary Russia faces call for quick and energetic measures to put a stop to all
arbitrary actions in the field of land relations.
You must introduce such measures with the cooperation of the local land com
mittees and public and revolutionary organizations.
I propose, by drawing on the experience, directions, and support of all local
revolutionary forces, to proceed immediately in carrying out the above-mentioned
measures.
The present Circular is published with the complete approval of the Ministries
of Food and Agriculture, which will give appropriate instructions to the organs
under their jurisdiction.
T seretelli , Minister of the Interior

489. O rder of t h e M inister of F ood to t h e F ood S u pply C om m ittees


[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1235.]
July 18,1917, No. 18
In view of the fears manifested this spring by landowners for the safety of
their crops, the Provisional Government on April 11, 1917, promulgated the law
564 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
for the protection of crops9 . . . which entrusted the protection of crops to local
food supply committees and by virtue of which reimbursement of losses suffered
as a result of damage to crops is assumed by the state.
All surplus grain must be surrendered to the state by agriculturalists under
the law of March 25, 1917. Only in this way is it possible to achieve proper dis
tribution of grain throughout the country and thereby forestall the impending
famine.
However, according to information received, the gathering-in of the harvest
in good time and its systematic marketing are in great jeopardy. In many places
the population is undertaking forcible and unlawful acts, which hinder landowners
from harvesting and sowing their fields. Peasants are hindering the harvesting of
grains by agricultural machines; they are removing prisoners of war [and] perma
nent and seasonal workers from work on the fields of government, private, and
other estates; they are forcing owners and tenants to pay prisoners of war more
for their labor than the rate established by governmental authority; they are
forcing owners as well as permanent and seasonal laborers to raise rates for labor
earlier agreed upon by them; they are compelling owners and tenants to pay for
agricultural labor in grain and not in money; they are forcibly seizing grains and
fodder, hay, livestock, and equipment; they are hindering the collection of grains
and grasses, threshing, preparing of the fields for winter sowing, planting of crops,
etc. Local food supply and land committees not only often fail to nip in the bud
such illegal acts of the population, which disorganize economic life and are ex
tremely harmful to the interests of the state, but themselves issue orders and adopt
resolutions that spur the population on to commit the above-mentioned illegal acts,
fraught with danger to the state.
Instances have also been noted in which private landowners and tenants fail
to take the proper measures for the harvesting of grains and hay and for the
preparation of fields for winter crops and for carrying out of sowing itself.
It is essential immediately to put an end to such occurrences, which threaten
to leave the whole country and the army without grain.
For the salvation of the homeland and the revolution I enjoin guberniya, uezd,
and volost food supply committees:
1. To take immediately the most energetic and firm measures for the preven
tion and termination of the above-mentioned willful and illegal acts by the popu
lation, remembering that grain constitutes state property and that all surpluses,
after the personal and economic needs of the owners have been met, must be made
available as soon as possible for the army and the needy population.
2. Under no circumstances to adopt decisions and resolutions that furnish an
occasion to the population to commit violent and criminal acts against landowners.
Chairmen and members of food supply boards guilty of failing to carry out
the requirements set forth in paras. 1 and 2 of the present order, in addition to
removal by me from office, will be subject to criminal prosecution under the law
for negligence or for exceeding their authority.
3. To inform landowners and tenants that they are required to exert all their
efforts to harvest fields and meadows and to sow winter plow lands. If they cannot
cope with this from their own resources, they must, at the times set by the food
9 See Doc. 536. The establishment and activities of the food supply committees are covered
in Chapter 11. They were obviously closely related to the problems treated in the present
chapter.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 565
supply committees, so inform the food supply boards, which are required to take
appropriate measures for the harvesting of fields and meadows and for the sowing
of winter crops.
Landowners and tenants guilty of failure to carry out the present requirement
are subject to liability under article 29 of the Code of Penalties imposed by jus
tices of the peace, as set forth in the Law of the Provisional Government of March
17,1917 (Collection of Laws, art. 376) ,10
4. To inform the population that those guilty of willful and illegal acts, which
hinder landowners from managing their farms properly, in addition to reimburs
ing the damages caused, shall be held strictly accountable under the law; persons
guilty of such acts should be reported immediately to the judicial authorities for
criminal prosecution.
All measures for the settlement of questions concerning the sowing and har
vesting of fields must be taken solely by food supply committees and boards acting
on their responsibility, with the indispensable condition that all grain subject to
alienation be immediately turned over to the state. No other committees have the
right to take upon themselves the settlement of the above questions, and their
decisions are not binding upon the population.
A. P esh ek ho no v , Minister of Food

490. A S upplem ental C ircular from th e M inister of th e I nterior ,


I. G. T seretelli, to G uberniya C ommissars
[,Izvestiia, No. 125, July 23, 1917, p. 8. Date unknown, but obviously issued between
July 17 and 23,1917.]
In the Provisional Government program of July 8 and my telegraphic instruc
tions of July 17, it has been pointed out that a resolute struggle against every
[manifestation of] anarchy and counterrevolution through the concerted effort
of all the vital forces of the nation is the only way out of the critical position of
the country. The following communication is issued in elaboration of the above
instructions:
The Commissar, relying on the support of the united democratic organizations,
acts first of all as a representative of the central government authority. He must
be guided by the instructions of the Provisional Government and must carry out
its policy, permitting himself no deviations from it under the influence of local
or party interests. I am warning that I will consider any procrastination or inertia
on the part of commissars, which is fatal in the present days of great ordeals, as
sufficient and inescapable grounds for dismissing the representative of state power
who fails to live up to his office. Any commissar guilty of any attempts to pursue
trends that conflict with the policy of the Provisional Government, and, especially,
of any collaboration in or indulgence of land seizures, lawless activities of any
groups, or counterrevolutionary undertakings, will be brought to trial. There is
no place for hesitation or disjointed actions. Only a strong, united power can save
the country from downfall. The above instructions are to be submitted immedi
ately to all uezd commissars whose activities lie directly under your supervision
and control for strict observance by them.
10 Not printed.
566 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
491. T h e O bjections of P rofessor P osnikov to t h e I nstructions
of C hernov
[Rech9, No. 177, July 30, 1917, p. 4. According to V* P. Semenov-Tian-Shanskii,
Glavnyi Zemelnyi Komitet, ARR, XII (1923), 292, Posnikov was angered by the
Instruction because in some respects it was diametrically opposed to the course that
the President of the Committee tried to follow . . . Posnikov was indignant about the
circular, not only because of its content, but also because its publication was an
infringement upon his, Posnikovs, -work.]
During the regular session of the Council of the Central Land Committee on
July 28, P. N. Chernenkov, member of the Council, addressed Chairman S. L.
Maslov with a request to state whether or not the rumors are correct that Pro
fessor Posnikov, President of the Central Land Committee, is leaving his post and
that the Secretary of the Committee, A. P. Levitskii, is leaving with him.
The Chairman said it was true that several days ago the President of the Cen
tral Land Committee submitted to A. F. Kerensky, Minister-President, a request
to be released from his responsibilities as President of the Committee. As reason
for his request, he gave the differences of opinion, in principle, with the Minister
of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov, on questions of land policy.
The Secretary of the Central Committee, who was present at the conference
of the Council, declared that he is leaving his post as of August 1, but for purely
personal reasons.
Following a brief exchange of opinions the Council unanimously approved,
bringing the following resolution to the attention of the Provisional Government:
The Council of the Central Land Committee considers that the withdrawal of
Chairman A. S. Posnikov and Secretary A. P. Levitskii, particularly at this time,
when the Council is about to begin its most important workthe preparation for
the land reformwill result in considerable delay and disorganization in the work
of the Council. In view of this, the Council expresses a strong desire that said
persons remain at their posts.
Further, the Council resolved to express profound respect and appreciation
to A. S. Posnikov and A. P. Levitskii and to urge them in the interests of the cause
to remain at their posts.
On July 29 the Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov, and his assistants,
P. A. Vikhlaev and M. I. Rakitnikov, arrived at the Central Committee, where
they had a long conference, together with the President, A. S. Posnikov, and mem
bers of the Presidium S. L. Maslov and N. I. Sokolov, on the difficulties that have
arisen as a result of the resignation of the chief leaders of the committee.
In connection with the communication that appeared in the newspapers on
the resignation of the President of the Council of the Central Land Committee,
A. S. Posnikov, Minister of Agriculture V. M. Chernov told representatives of
the press that as a result of his negotiations with A. S. Posnikov on July 29 this
question may be regarded as entirely liquidated.
According to V. M. Chernov, it was possible to eliminate without great diffi
culty some of the interdepartmental frictions that occurred as a result of a paral
lelism in the work of the Central Land Committee and some departmental com
missions of the Ministry of Agriculture. As for some misunderstandings that
occurred as a result of the imperfection of the law on land committees, the last
session of the plenum of the Central Land Committee worked out a project on
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 567
changes of the existing law, and V. M. Chernov will render all possible assistance
for the earliest possible passage of this law.
Speaking of his personal relations with A. S. Posnikov, the President of the
Central Land Committee, Minister of Agriculture Chernov declared that during
the entire time of their mutual work these relations were most cordial, and he
hopes that this cordiality and warmth in their personal relations will also assist
in overcoming all departmental frictions.
As for the Instruction of the Ministry of Agriculture on regulating land re
lations, dated July 16, which allegedly was responsible for the frictions, although
issued hastily it conforms entirely in its content with the principles of the agrarian
policy approved during two sessions of the Central Land Committee. And its
chief aim is to instruct members of the guberniya land committees appointed by
the Ministry of Agriculture. The haste with which it was introduced was condi
tioned by the troubled times. And its urgency was called forth by the same
extreme need that dictated the publication of the famous circular of the former
head of the Ministry of the Interior, I. G. Tseretelli.
492. M andatory I nstruction of t h e S uprem e Commander on A grarian
M atters for L ocalities in t h e T heater of W ar , J uly 31,1917
[KrestHanskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu, pp. 416-17. The orders of General Kornilov
concerning agrarian affairs, first on July 8, as Commander in Chief of the Southwestern
Front, for that theater, and then on July 31, as Supreme Commander, for the entire
theater of war, added another ingredient to the confusion of local authorities in these
areas. See Doc. 497.]
On July 8 of this year I issued for the Southwestern Front a Mandatory In
struction which I considered essential for the purpose of securing a regular and
quantitatively adequate [amount of] food for the army. Railroad transportation
is disorganized. The army requires food and fodder in the lines and behind the
lines; at the present time the general quantity of food and fodder is decreasing
owing to the lack of understanding of a small part of the rural population that the
agrarian problem can by no means be solved by arbitrary means through violent
action. Considering that my duty, as Supreme Commander, is to take care of
securing food and fodder for the army, I shall not permit in the theater of war,
in the interests of the army and especially in view of the poor crop in the eastern
regions of European Russia, any arbitrary depredation of national property.
Therefore, extending to the whole theater of war the Mandatory Instruction issued
by me for the Southwestern Front, I forbid:
1) The hindrance of harvesting by agricultural machines.
2) The seizure by violence, in an unlawful way, of livestock or material in
ventory.
3) The unlawful removal from field work on estates owned by the state or by
private individuals, or on other [land] holdings, of the prisoners of war or any
permanent or migrant laborers [working] thereon; I order the return of the un
lawfully removed prisoners of war.
4) The forcing of owners and renters to pay in excess of prices fixed by the
organs of the Government for the work of prisoners of war.
5) The forcing of permanent or migrant laborers to raise the labor prices
agreed upon beforehand.
568 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
6) The forcing of owners to pay for harvesting in kind with grain, and not
in money.
7) The seizure by force of sowed or harvested grain, fodder grass, and hay.
8) The hindrance of harvesting in any way.
9) The hindrance of the cultivation and saving of winter crop fields; and
10) I order both large and small landowners to carry out, exerting all their
efforts and means, the gathering of their crops and the cultivation of their fields*
Persons guilty of failing to execute the present instruction . . . [are subject
to various penalties].
I entrust the supervision of the observance of the present order to the guber
niya and uezd commissars, who will be liable before the law for lack or excess of
authority. I request prosecutors to render in this respect every assistance to the
commissars. The courts should examine the cases arising on these grounds ahead
of schedule.
K ornilov , General of the Infantry
(C. U. M. [Central Administration of the
Militia], section 2, file No. 65)
493. M essrs . P esh ek ho no v and C h ernov
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14838, July 28, 1917, p. 4. For Chernovs later defense, see his
The Great Russian Revolution, pp. 243-48.]
On one and the same day [sc] the Ministers of Food and Agriculture have
published two circular-orders, a comparison of which is very useful.
Speaking of land seizures in the village and the ever-growing anarchy there,
Peshekhonov, Minister of Food, points out that as a result the harvesting of the
crop and its planned disposition are in great danger. He further points out that
local food supply and land committees not only fail to root out such seizures, but
instead pass resolutions encouraging seizures. He suggests that all local food
supply organizations take immediate steps to stop and prohibit all violations of
landowners properties. Otherwise he threatens the members of the food organi
zations with dismissal from their posts and prosecution. At the same time, the
Minister of Food proposes that an announcement be made to the village popu
lation that for arbitrary and illegal actions interfering with the landowners man
agement of their holdings the culprits, in addition to paying damages, will be held
strictly responsible before the law.
Thus Peshekhonov, the Minister of Food, who realizes very well the danger
to landowners of the populations self-rule, makes an attempt, although quite
late, to launch an attack upon the illegal actions of the propaganda-happy
peasantry.
But will Mr. Peshekhonov succeed, in this respect, in achieving any tangible
results if his colleague in the cabinet, Chernov, condones land seizures?
The functionaries of the Minister of Agriculture (the notorious Mr. Aksel,
for example), sent on missions to various places, not only do not protest against
the anarchy in the village but sanction the resolutions of the land committees
on seizure of privately owned land.
But in vain would we look in the circular of the Minister of Agriculture for
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 569
instructions on the necessity of protecting landowners holdings in general from
destruction and seizure, and not only the model estates.
The Minister of Agriculture, Chernov, apparently thinks that the government
must protect from arbitrary actions and destruction only such holdings as sugar-
beet plantations, orchards, vineyards, and nurseries.
And the Zimmerwaldian Chernov is not concerned about the protection of
landed property in general. What odd ideas of authority, to say the least!
But what is even more astounding: How can two ministers so diametrically
opposed in their views toward their problems remain in the same cabinet?
And can the population be expected to believe Mr. Peshekhonov, that persons
who seize other peoples land will be held responsible for their actions, if Mr.
Chernov recommends protection only of the valuable cultures ?
Finally, the very conception of valuable cultures is relative. The population,
which in the absence of authority tries in places to seize all sorts of land, will
obviously interpret literally the request to protect only orchards and truck gardens.
We are called to unity because of the menacing danger from without. But
what unity can there be when it is absent among the members of the Provisional
Government itself and when the population is being provoked to violence over
the property of landowners?
494. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e I nstruction to L and C om m ittees
[No. 177, August 4,1917, p. 3.]
On July 16, under the signature of the Minister of Agriculture, an extensive
Instruction to Land Committees was distributed. It proved to be a fairly mys
terious document because of a strange accident; it failed to appear in any of the
so-called bourgeois newspapers and was not even printed in the Vestnik Vremen-
nago PraviteVstva. The public at large knows only that the President of the Cen
tral Land Committee, A. S. Posnikov, almost resigned as a result of the Instruc
tion of July 16; that the Acting Minister of the Interior, N. N. Avinov, prepared a
whole memorandum dealing with the circular of V. M. Chernov; that the circular
will be discussed in some sort of conference of four ministers; etc.
The Instruction really merits the interest aroused in it.
First of all, the legal nature of this administrative act is not clear. The intro
duction to the Instruction states that it is being published in view of the delayed
publication of the temporary laws regulating land relations in various places prior
to the solution of the land question by the Constituent Assembly. The impression
prevailed up to this time that temporary laws are published only by the Pro
visional Government. It would seem that this was known also to Mr. Chernov,
who introduced several of his own draft bills in the second Provisional Govern
ment. Only yesterday we had occasion to talk about them on the pages of Russkiia
Vedomosti9 and we know why their approval was delayed. The Minister of
Agriculture got tired waiting. And he published the Instruction, including in it
the draft laws that were before the Provisional Government for its consideration.
If the experience of Chernov finds imitators, we can say with assurance that the
work of the Provisional Government will be greatly reduced.
The circular of July 16 is interesting, incidentally, not only for its formal
aspect. Still more curious is its content and even the form of presentation. This
is in the full sense of the word a human document. You cannot help but feel that
570 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the author had to struggle with two emotions: a desire to justify a certain sort of
phenomenon which takes place in the village, and the need to condemn its illegal
character. Hence the duality throughout the entire circular. Its content may be
interpreted in any way, depending on the mood of the reader. If the reader is
indignant over the seizure policies of the land committees, he will find in the
circular not a few consoling words which recommend a careful attitude toward
all of agriculture; which protect the rights of the Constituent Assembly and con
demn all violations of law in the village. But we imagine that even the naughty
land committees, on reading the circular, will undoubtedly feel a moral relief and
will henceforth continue their policy, basing it on the leading instructions from
the center.
As proof of the duality of the circular it is sufficient to give several examples.
The Instruction begins with the question of the distribution of prisoners of war.
The peasants everywhere try to remove the prisoners of war from privately
owned homesteads and distribute them in toiling homesteads, writes Mr. Chernov.
Of course this effort is entirely justified.
One can argue against this only from the point of view of the greatest pro
ductive utilization of the labor of the prisoners of war in the interests of agricul
tural output, since in the households of soldiers wives this labor is wasted and
is used in a considerable measure unprofitably.
But the central authority cannot interfere in this matter, says the Minister,
thus giving the local organs freedom of action.
The question of the livestock and equipment is disposed of in an analogous
manner. If, owing to a shortage of work hands (for example, caused by the
removal of prisoners of war!) [the owners have] some livestock and equipment
not in use, the land committees may register them and rent them out to whoever
may need them.
Land committees, sums up the Minister of Agriculture, must first of all bear
in mind the general national interests. The committees can go along in satisfying
the just requests of the toiling peasantry, but on the absolute condition that this
does not lead to the disruption of the national economy, to dissipation of the pro
ductive forces, to the loss of model farms, to the lowering and loss of the harvest
so necessary to Russia. Within this framework the Minister promises the com
mittees energetic support and a number of draft bills which will put an end to
the existing vaccilation and vagueness in land relations, which breeds the same
vaccilation and vagueness in the legal consciousness of the people.
Quite right. Vaccilation and vagueness in the peoples awareness of the law
is a bad and dangerous thing. But why expand it by circulars with double mean
ing? We should not take advantage of peoples ignorance in order to pursue our
own party interests.
495. R esolution of t h e K uznetskii U ezd L and C o m m ittee on
t h e N ecessity for E xplicit and U ncontradictory
I nstructions to L and C om m ittees
[Izvestiia, No. 132, August 1,1917, p. 4. For a similar complaint, see Izvestiia Vseros-
siiskogo Soveta Kresfianskikh Deputatov, No. 93, 1917, as quoted in Lozinskii, Eko
nomicheskaia Politika, pp. 160-61.]
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 571
The absence of guiding instructions from the Provisional Government that
correspond clearly and explicitly to the abrupt changein view of the revolution
and the introduction of freedom in Russiain the peasants relations to land
owners and their land, which is the only source from which the peasantry derived
land for their own (and at the same time national) needs; the Provisional Gov
ernments indecisive policy on the land problem, and the vaguely defined powers
of the guberniya land committees, have placed the committees in an impossible
position, because the frameworks and standards established by the old prerevolu
tionary laws have now been outgrown.
It is impossible for the land committees to work, finding themselves, as they
are, between the frying pan and the fire. When the peasants become convinced
that the land committees cannot answer to their aspirations, they will then lose
confidence; if, on the other hand, the committees carry out the general will of
the people that is authoritatively confirmed by resolutions of the All-Russian Con
gress of Soviets of Peasants, Workers, and Soldiers Deputies and all the socialist
parties, and thus adopt a realistic course, they will violate the letter of the dead
law and will be held legally responsible.
Taking the situation into consideration, the Kuznetskii Uezd Land Committee
unanimously resolved: to turn to the Government to Save the Country and the
Revolution and to express their deep confidence that it will not remain deaf to
the voice of the people, who are worn out with suffering, but will hasten to
announce openly, boldly, and honestly that it is executing the will of the people
and placing all the land under the jurisdiction of the land committees, granting
them the [power] to distribute the land among tie laboring [peasantry] on a
rental basis established by the Committees.
The Kuznetskii Uezd Land Committee believes that since the passage of land
laws through the Constituent Assembly would require at least two years, it is the
duty of the Government to hasten with the publication of temporary laws.

496. L e t t e r o f P r o fe s s o r P o sn ik o v t o K eren sk y C on cern in g t h e


N eed f o r Land L e g is la tio n f o r G uidance U n t il t h e
In tr o d u c tio n o f t h e A g raria n R efo rm
[Izvestiia Glavnago ZemeVnago Komiteta, Nos. 4-5, September 1-15, 1917, pp. 7-8.
Apparently sent between the 3rd and 9th of August.]
Mr. Minister-President:
By resolution of April 21 the Provisional Government entrusted the Central
Land Committee with the preparation of the land reform and, with a view to regu
lating land relations, with taking temporary measures directed toward forestalling
and solving a number of disputes and misunderstandings over land. Fulfilling
unflinchingly the responsibility imposed upon it, the Council of the Central Land
Committee deems it its duty to inform the Minister-President that the conditions
under which the local land committees must work, especially in recent days, raise
in a most acute form the question of the possibility of any positive results in their
work in the indicated direction.
From reports received by the Central Land Committee from official institutions
and from various persons it is evident that in the field of land relations in the
villages at the present time great changes have already to some extent occurred
572 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
and are occurring, unrestrainedly brought about by an elemental urge of the
population to satisfy the acute land needs.
Wrongdoings by some persons or groups of the population are frequently
complicated or find support through the actions of various community-state or
ganizations, in particular the local land committees themselves, which, in the
absence of definite guiding instructions from higher governmental institutions,
are confused at times in the face of the elemental movement and sometimes direct
their activity on a false path. Under such disturbing conditions to speak of bring
ing the committees or various persons to account for their wrong orders, which
go beyond the bounds of existing legislation, is hardly practically possible without
arousing new serious complications in local life.
Generally speaking, in the opinion of the Council of the Central Land Com
mittee, the contemporary situation in the village may be characterized as follows:
Deeply rooted in the feelings of the overwhelming masses of the agricultural popu
lation concerning their natural rights is their belief in their right to land; also
the belief that the land relations that existed up to this timein many instances
certainly very difficultwere, from the moment of the revolution, considered
ended and no longer obligatory. At the same time, the population is quite ready
to acknowledge that the final solution of the land question belongs to the Con
stituent Assembly. But at the same time it declares the need of such norms as
would help it live through the transitory period, taking into consideration the new
and changed conditions and moods.
The Central Committee deems it its duly to point out this dangerous vague
ness, created, on the one hand, by the recognitionby the declaration of the Pro
visional Government of April 21 and the orders of various ministersof the in
violability of the conditions of the use of land which have existed up to this time,
and, on the other hand, by the obvious vascillation and indecision of the Govern
ment in carrying out any legislative measures directed toward settling the newly
arisen land relations.
Bringing all that has been said to the attention of the Minister-President, the
Council of the Central Land Committee, in accordance with its resolution of
August 3 of this year, deems it its duty to declare its conviction that only a defi
nite recognition on the part of the Provisional Government of the necessity of an
immediate settlement of land relations and an introduction without delay of cor
respondingly exact rules can give assurance of the beneficial activity of the land
committees as well as the possibility of preserving order in the village, necessary
for the life of the country.
* > *

497. R eport of th e R epresentative o f t h e M inistry of A griculture


in t h e K herson G uberniya L and C o m m ittee
[M. Martynov, Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam Glavnogo Zemelnogo
Komiteta, KA, XIV (1926), 220-23.]
On August 19,1917, the Kherson Guberniya Land Committee received instruc
tions from the Ministry of Agriculture making it obligatory for representatives
of the Ministry of Agriculture to make monthly reports to the Minister of Agri
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 573
culture on the activity of the land committees in the guberniya, in accordance with
a plan to be prepared and made known in various places. Not having received up
to this time the said plan, I take the liberty of reporting what seems, to my mind,
to be interesting and pertinent in the activity of the land committees in Kherson
Guberniya.
On August 7 I returned to Kherson from the Congress of Representatives of
the Ministry of Agriculture in time to attend the second and concluding session
of the Kherson Guberniya Land Committee. The Kherson Guberniya Land Com
mittee met, in my absence, for three days, during which time chief attention was
devoted to the elaboration of a compulsory resolution on the regulation of land
relations, pending the solution of the agrarian question by the Constituent As
sembly. On closer acquaintance with the materials in the minutes of the confer
ence, I was convinced that the adopted resolutions, because of their somewhat
maximalist tendencies, portend serious consequences for agricultural economy in
the Kherson province. Judging from the motives [underlying] the mentioned
resolutions and further debates which took place during my presence, I was con
vinced anew that the underlying motive for the state of mind among the majority
of the land committee was precisely that as depicted by the representatives of the
Ministry of Agriculture, [namely,] a quite understandable desire on the part of
the local population to create, in the absence of a general state law, the lack of
which was keenly felt, some sort of personal norms that would regulate in one way
or another the entangled and complex relations. [And this] in spite of the fact
that such homespun legislation may sin against the demands of state wisdom and
against the most urgent needs of the country as a whole.
In the atmosphere of such a state of mind I was obliged to make my report.
In it I emphasized the danger of homespun legislation, and, above all, I pointed
out that, in accordance with the assurances made by the Minister-President, we
may expect in the very near future the publication of a law on regulating land
relations.13. My remarks had a considerably soothing effect. And I succeeded in
achieving a revision and change of former resolutions to the extent that the com
pulsory resolution of the Kherson Guberniya Land Committee, which I attach
herewith, in its final edition does not go, in its essence, beyond the bounds of the
rule on regulating land relations adopted by the Central Land Committee on July
29 of this year and the Instruction of the Minister of Agriculture, dated July 16,
1917.
Feeling in accord in general with the compulsory resolution, I could not as a
jurist fail to see its formal illegality (contradictions with some basic positions of
our civil law) and as a result attempted to postpone publication of the compulsory
resolution in the hope that the Provisional Government would publish, within the
next few days, appropriate norms.
As a matter of fact, news flashed in the local papers on August 10 to the effect
that the Provisional Government is taking up the discussion of land laws.12
11Kerensky reportedly informed a delegation, which waited on him around the first of
August to urge legislation on land relationships, that such laws would be forthcoming in the
very near future. Victor Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, p. 248.
12Ibid., pp. 248-49, makes reference to a special session of the Provisional Government
on the agrarian question on August 9, which concluded with no decisions taken. His source
citation of P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia toroi russkoi revohutsii, I, vypusk 1, pp. 91-92, appears,
however, to be in error and the editors were unable to find the proper reference.
574 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
This news brought tremendous satisfaction in concerned circles. During this
period we received great numbers of reports and inquiries from all sides, chiefly
from peasants and lower land categories, [asking] how to conclude lease con
tracts for the forthcoming sowing, and how, from whom, and on what conditions
and in what quantities, etc., land was to be taken, and who could take it. Every
where authoritative government instructions were awaited with the greatest im
patience. In so far as I could depend on my personal impressions, the state of
mind at that moment was such that an appropriate norm, published by the highest
state authority, even in the spirit of some sort of project of rules, etc., would find
no obstacles in its adoption.
The situation was growing more strained. And the papers continued to bring
unconsoling news that the discussion was prolonged, was postponed, and, finally,
was discontinued altogether.
Fourteen days after my arrival in Kherson guberniya, on August 21, I had
occasion to address a conference of the Odessa Uezd Land Committee. And here
I met with serious opposition. It was expressed in silent discontent on the part
of the peasants. Ever clearer expressions such as the following could be heard:
We are tired of waiting, In Piter13 they are busy talking, and we must plow,
We cant plow in the winter, We must think of ourselves, etc. The fertile
ground of such a frame of mind for all sorts of demagogy is not hard to imagine.
As a consequence I had great difficulty in securing recognition of the obligatory
character of the resolutions of the Guberniya Land Committee.
Without touching on the details of the question, I take the liberty of pointing
out that the bitterest disputes concerned the fixing of rental prices. In their present
frame of mind, of which I spoke, and, moreover, aroused by demagogic speeches
of which there is no shortage now, the peasants are opposed to paying anything
for rented lands. They offer such laughable figures as one ruble for one or three
dessiatines, whereas the state and zemstvo tax is more than three rubles. It cost me
tremendous effort to secure, in principle, a willingness to establish rental prices
that would cover payments (interest and principal) to the mortgage banks. In
general, it should be said that the complete absence of any guiding principle in
agrarian policy creates an extremely difficult situation. The general statement
that the Constituent Assembly will solve the agrarian question in the final analysis
solves nothing. In the name of their electoral organs the peasants are unequivo
cally against any money going into the hands of the owners of lands. The owners,
on tie other hand, motivated by the unrevoked right to private ownership, demand
their usual interest on the capital.
In summing up, I must repeat what I have already said at the congress of
representatives, as well as at our joint conference with the Central Land Com
mittee and personally to A. F. Kerenskywe can no longer delay the publication
of the law regulating land relations. In the light of my later impressions, I can
only add that the general political situation of the present moment is considerably
less favorable for the introduction of any measures by the Provisional Govern
ment than it was three or four weeks ago. The prestige and authority of the state
power have dropped from the culminating point they occupied immediately fol
lowing the events of July 3d, 4th, and 5th and the formation of the latest coalition
ministry.
13 Slang for St. Petersburg.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 575
Absence of any legislative regulation on land relations, aside from everything
else I mentioned above, places the work of the land committee in a very precarious
position in the event of collisions with the resolutions of the military authorities.
All resolutions of the land committee, in effect illegal, fall in their entirety in the
category of crimes enumerated in the order of the Supreme Commander dated
July 31, 1917, No. 27.
Up to this time land committees were obliged to solve all disputes and trials
by reconciling the opposing sides. Members of the land board travel through
territory and settle misunderstandings and conflicts by personal interference and
personal tact. This is a very imperfect method, but here too the committees en
counter difficulties of a purely technical character.
The committees of Kherson guberniya are placed in an extremely difficult
economic position: their budget has not been approved as yet; the treasury puts
all sorts of formal obstacles in the way of issuing funds, etc.
In conclusion, I must point out the particularly deplorable aspect of the work
in the Kherson Guberniya Committee, [namely,] the fact that up to this time
preoccupation with the settlement of conflicts prevented the launching of pre
liminary work in preparing [the necessary] materials for the forthcoming reform.
[A. V. Granov ]
Representative of the Ministry of Agriculture
in the Kherson Guberniya Land Committee
August 29,1917
498. A n A tte m p t by t h e P r o v isio n a l G overn m en t t o Find a M eans
o f C urbing A grarian D iso rd ers in L a te S ep tem b er
[M.P., Borba za zemliu v 1917 g., KA, LXXVIII (1936), 96-97. The shock of the
Kornilov Affair was evidenced in the subsequent increase in agrarian disorders as well
as in the deepening crises in other areas of national life. See Volume III for a general
coverage of this period. Although the independent and unauthorized activities of the
land committees, inspired by the peasant soviets, in Kazan guberniya had been a
source of concern to the government since late spring (see Docs. 505, 506, 509, and
512), such actions were widespread in Russia by the end of September. The effort to
institute some sort of higher special committees composed of representatives of the
central government, local self-government, and public organizations that might com
mand respect and exercise authority in controlling agrarian affairs apparently came
to naught in the few weeks left to the Provisional Government. On September 8,
Kerensky as Supreme Commander, which office he had assumed following the Kornilov
Affair, had reissued and confirmed the order of General Kornilov of July 31 (see
Doc. 492), but, perhaps significantly, without specific reference to its application only
in the theater of war. Krestfianskoe dvizhenie v 19179 pp. 420-21.]
[To the President of the Juridical Council:]
Having discussed at its meeting of September 28 of this year measures to
combat the growing anarchy in the country and particularly the agrarian dis
orders that have arisen in some guberniyas of European Russia (especially in
Kazan guberniya), the Provisional Government deemed it necessary to form in
the mentioned guberniyas special committees whose responsibility it would be
to take immediate measures to liquidate local misunderstandings and to introduce
law and order in the sphere of land relations. The Provisional Government thinks
576 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
it expedient that said committees include the local representatives from the central
authority, such as chairmen of treasury boards, prosecutors of circuit courts, rep
resentatives of the Ministry of Labor, etc., representatives of local self-government
(representatives of guberniya zemstvo boards, mayors, representatives of guber
niya food supply committees, etc.), as well as representatives of local public or
ganizations intimately related to questions bearing on the solution of land rela
tions. In the opinion of the Provisional Government, said committees are au
thoritative consulting organs, with the aid of which the guberniya commissars
and, in the event martial law is declared in the guberniya, the military authorities
with all the means at their disposal, should take the necessary steps to suppress
the agrarian disorders and to stop all violence and pillage.
The working out of an appropriate statute with regard to said committees the
Provisional Government resolved to entrust to the Juridical Council in order that
the latter might submit a project of said statute for discussion by the Provisional
Government at the earliest possible moment. . . .
[From the Office of the Head of
Chancellery of the Provisional Government]

499. A R uinous D emagogy


[Vlasl? Naroda, No. 132, October 3,1917, p. 3.]
The waves of pogroms rise ever higher. They threaten to flood all of Russia,
to sweep away all that still remains in the chaos of the breakdown of the Russian
state, to turn the great Russian revolution into a disorderly, bloody scuffle.
Drunken riots of the soldiery flare up in the cities. Rural Russia is enveloped in
a glow of fire from pomeshchiki estates. Model agricultural holdings are being
destroyed. The productive forces of the country are dying.
And those who through their demagogy prepared this natural calamity are
now flaunting new, just as demagogic, slogans. Without waiting for the Constit
uent Assembly, the peasants seize land, violate the sovereign rights of all the
people, destroy the national wealth. And the maximalists from the Bolshevik and
SR camp justify this pogrom movement and continue to follow it blindly, indulg
ing it and expanding it.
To be sure, they do not admit it. On the contrary, they attempt to prove that
the measures they propose will spare Russia from the blood of senseless pogroms
and will avert the civil slaughter which has already begun. But to prove is one
thing, and to do, quite another.
The panacea for the agrarian disorders proposed by the authors from the
Social Democrat and the authors from Delo Naroda reads: All land should be
turned over to the land committees immediately without waiting for the Constit
uent Assembly. V. M. Chernov and his Bolshevik companions-in-arms in the
field of demagogy assure us that this new peoples authority will be able to man
age the stormy popular uproar.
Is this simple lack of understanding, or deliberate demagogy?
The demagogues say: all land should be transferred to the land committees.
What does this mean? Pomeshchiki land, the land of the middle peasants, of
otrubniki, etc.? But this will lead to civil war in the village. And each land
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 577
committee will be an unlimited master of the fate of the Russian village. At its
signal a fratricidal slaughter can begin among peasants, and in the chaos of an
archy Russian liberty will be destroyed.
It is hard to combat demagogy, almost impossible if this demagogy draws its
strength from the dark and ignorant element. And perhaps by the time the Con
stituent Assembly convenes, nothing but splinters and rubbish will remain in
place of the plundered and dismembered national economy. But it would be
criminal to be silent and not protest against demagogy.

500. T h e D raft L aw of M aslov on the R egulation of A gricultural


R elations and t h e P owers o f the L and C om m ittees
[Delo Naroda, No. 183, October 18, 1917, p. 4. For a discussion of the problems and
conflicts concerning the issuance of legislation on this subject from August through
the introduction of Maslovs law for the consideration of the Provisional Government
in mid-October, see Oliver H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp. 328-34,
421-22, 425, 445-48, and citations. S. L. Maslov, a right Socialist Revolutionary, took
office as Minister of Agriculture in the last coalition, formed on October 3, following
the long political crises subsequent to the Kornilov Affair. Before his legislation could
be enacted, the Bolsheviks struck. Maslov also attempted to regulate timber cutting
and strengthen forest conservation by placing the control and use of all forests, both
public and private, under the jurisdiction of guberniya and uezd land committees
pending the establishment of new organs for forest conservation. Sob. Uzak., I, 2,
No. 1990.]
VI. On the Formation of a Temporary Land Reserve
25. The following are to be included by the land committees in the temporary
land reserve:
a) Privately owned lands usually held (for not less than three years during
the past five-year period) under rental tenure, as well as government lands and
former udel lands;
b) Privately owned lands cultivated during the last five years entirely with
rented peasant inventory;
c) Lands withdrawn from the management of their owners or lessees because
of the danger of their being devaluated or left uncultivated . . . ;
d) Lands now rented on termination of rental agreements in accordance with
section 38 of the present rules;
e) Lands voluntarily turned over by their owners to the land reserve.
26. Also included in the land reserve may be portions of agricultural holdings
cultivated at the expense of the owner, provided the land committee first estab
lishes by means of a local survey:
a) an acute need of land, in relation to the [numbers of] workers on existing
holdings operated without hired labor and
b) the possibility of withdrawing indicated portions of a holding in certain
amounts without considerable detriment to the productivity of the holding.
27. Inclusion of lands in the land reserve is carried out in accordance with
special resolutions of the uezd land committees, by asking the owners and lessees
of the land to appear and by announcing the said resolutions to the interested
parties . *
578 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
28. When including lands in the land reserve (article 25), the owner should
be allowed to retain at least enough plow land, hay land, and other lands to satisfy
his needs and those of his family, employees, and laborers, as well as to maintain
the livestock on hand.
29. Not subject to inclusion in the land reserve are: orchards, vineyards, hop
and other plantings of long-term use; lands occupied by buildings of industrial
and commercial enterprises; lands reserved by the owner for the sowing of sugar
beet and other plants which are needed for the industry of the owner; lands of
other types of agricultural use, if the exemption of such from inclusion in the
land reserve will be regarded as essential by the guberniya food organ.
30. An inventory is prepared of all land plots included in the land reserve,
indicating: owners of the plots, type of lands, their extent and location. On the
basis of said inventories the volost committee keeps a register of the land reserve
with entries of the above-mentioned data about the plots, as well as further changes
in their legal and economic status.
VII. On the Distribution of Lands of the Land Reserve
31. The volost land committees distribute the lands of the temporary land
reserve for use and cultivation to local holdings which cultivate the land by their
own labor, under the following rules:
a) The use of lands is extended to holdings that need land in relation to [the
number of] resident workers, and in order of the degree of land need. The first
to be supplied with land are holdings with less land than the average land tenure
of peasant holdings of a given locality;
b) To holdings that do not have their own inventory (livestock and agricul
tural implements) or have been temporarily deprived of work handsland may
be given only where proof exists that the land will be cultivated (loans, credit,
communal agreements about the cultivation, etc.);
c) Land cannot be given to holdings whose existing land remains entirely or
partially uncultivated;
d) Lands given to villages for pasture of livestock are distributed among
individual villages in accordance with the shortage of their own pastures and the
number of heads of livestock;
e) All lands are transferred by the committees for temporary use for a period
not longer than one year in return for a remuneration (rental fee) under special
signature given to the land committee by the head of the holding, and when trans
ferring lands to villages [under signature] of a representative of the village with
a copy to the owner;
f) Signatures, given in accordance with the previous point, have the strength
of a guarantee, the fulfillment of which the land committee, as well as the owner
of the land, has the right to exact.
Note: The transfer to rental use of lands removed from the management of
their owners by the organs of the food administration is allowed only in the event
that the food administration finds it impossible to conduct the cultivation of the
land with its own means.
32. The amount of payment for the use of the land is determined by the land
committees in accordance with the clear profit from each land plot (that is, the
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 579
balance received after deducting from the sum derived from the product usually
harvested the cost of cultivation and expenditures for sowing, depreciation of the
inventory, and payment of obligations). In establishing such profit, the commit
tees take into consideration the local rental prices on long-term rental of lands by
large sowers, the value of the land in estimating zemstvo taxes, evaluation norms
worked out by evaluating statistical institutions in line with the law of July 8,
1893, and other data that establish the clear income from the land.
33. The rental fee as specified in contracts, signed notes, and agreements
approved by the land committees is paid to the committees. The latter, after
making all necessary deductions, pay the balance to the respective owner.
VIII. On Settling Disputes with Regard to Rental Agreements in Force
35. . . . The land committees settle: 1) disputes brought forward by indi
vidual lessees; 2) collective disputes brought forward by several lessees cultivating
the land of one estate or plot or bound by one contract; 3) complaints brought
forward by representatives of villages or parts of villages not participating in the
contract but interested in the use of the lands.
37. If, in spite of the measures taken by the committee, no agreement is
reached among the disputants, the committee attempts to solve the argument
by means of a court of arbitration in accordance with paragraph 5 of section 8
of the Law of the Provisional Government, dated April 21,1917, on the formation
of land committees . . .
38. Disputes and misunderstandings with regard to the existing rental rela
tions are to be settled by the committee on the basis of the contracts concluded
between the parties . . . and the committee may:
a) discontinue the rental obligations that were undertaken because of extreme
land need by the lessee on conditions obviously unfavorable to him;
b) discontinue rental obligations and conditions of cultivation that have
assumed a character of bondage because of delinquent payments and unfulfilled
work in past years and draw up new obligations;
c) discontinue intermediary rentals of a speculative character;
d) lower the rental price on a contract concluded as a result of extreme land
need if the established amount of fee surpasses the clear income from the land
[see article 32];
e) force the lessee to make money payments instead of agreed-upon payments
in kind if the lessee refuses to make payments [in produce];
f) extend the rental payment in the event the lessee has no cash on hand;
g) determine the order and place of payment of rental fees if the payment
directly to the owner of the land encounters difficulties.
39. When discontinuing rental contracts, on the basis of article 37, the land
committees also establish the method of reimbursement of expenditures made and
not utilized by former lessees (tilling, fertilization, sowing, etc.).
40. Disputes on rental relations solved by resolutions of the land committees
on the basis of the present rules may not be brought up again in court procedures.
580 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
501. Russkiia Vedomosti on M aslov s P roposed L egislation
[No. 244, October 25, 1917.]
In rare business meetings, interrupted by conferences on Bolshevik actions,
the Provisional Government is hastily examining the extensive draft law On the
Regulation by the Land Committees of Land and Agricultural Relations.
This is an old proposal which appeared back under Chernov. Several times,
under different names, it had been submitted for the attention of the Government
and has again been returned for corrections to the Ministry of Agriculture.
The final edition of the draft law, which has remained completely unknown
to the public at large, is somewhat improved compared with the previous rough
drafts. But these improvements are of no practical value inasmuch as the land
committees, commissioned to regulate land relations, are entirely unfit for this
work. The following functions are imposed upon the land committees: 1) regis
tration of the agricultural lands, 2) watching over the changes in the rights to
the land and their utilization, 3) protection of estates from devaluation by their
owners and lessees, 4) establishing a temporary land reserve to satisfy the acute
land need of the local population, 5) settling of rental relations, 6) taking steps
to protect progressive agricultural estates, and 7) publication of compulsory
resolutions on the enumerated points of administration.
We thus see that in the new softened edition of the proposal the land commit
tees are not only organs of supervision, protection, and collection of information,
but at the same time organs of wide administrative authority as well. They enjoy
the right to actions which are nothing else than a beginning of radical land reform
and which cannot help but decide beforehand this reform in its essential points.
Should it be permitted, from the legal and political points of view, that the land
reform be initiated by the single will of the Provisional Government approxi
mately a month before the convocation of the Constituent Assembly? It would
seem that there could be no two answers [to this question]. But the authors of
the proposal, apparently, did not even think it necessary to ask themselves this
question.
But even if the proposal had not aroused the above-mentioned contradiction,
if, let us say, it were not designed for immediate implementation, but was to be
submitted to the Constituent Assembly as the first step in the reorganization of
land relations, even in that case, it would be an entirely unfit means for the con
templated purposes. . . . Highly informed organs of authority, aware of the
importance of conserving the national resources and of increasing the produc
tivity of labor, could perhaps cope with the tasks envisaged by the proposal.
But the present land committees with their quite definite reputation could by no
means deal with them.
502. L enin s A ttack on t h e M aslov B il l : A N ew D eception of t h e
P easants by t h e S ocialist -R evolutionary P arty
[.Rabochii Putt, No. 44, October 24, 1917, as translated in the Collected Works of
V. /. Lenin: Toward the Seizure of Power, XXI, Bk. II, pp. 138-43.]
In its chief newspaper, the Dyelo Naroda, for October 31 and November 1, the
Socialist-Revolutionary Party declared solemnly and before the whole people that
the new land bill of the Minister of Agriculture is a great step towards the realisa
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 581
tion of the agrarian programme of the party, that the Central Committee urges
all party organisations to carry on energetic propaganda in favour of the bill in
order to make it popular among the masses.
In reality this bill of Minister S. L. Maslov, a member of the Socialist-Revolu
tionary Party, judging by its main features in the Dyelo Naroda , is a deception
of the peasants. The Socialist-Revolutionary Party has deceived the peasants:
from its own land bill it crept over to that of the landowners, of the Cadets, to the
plan of fair valuation, with retention of the landowners property in land. The
Socialist-Revolutionary Party, at its congresses during the first (1905) and second
(1917) Russian revolutions, solemnly promised before the whole people to sup
port the peasants demand for the confiscation of the landowners lands, i.e., for
their passing into the hands of the peasants without compensation. The present
bill of Mr. S. L. Maslov not only retains the landowners property in land, but
even the peasants payments for rented lands according to a fair valuation,
the payments to accrue to the landlords.
This bill of Mr. S. L. Maslov is a complete betrayal of the peasants by the
Socialist-Revolutionary Party; it means that this party has completely become
an adherent of the landowners. We must strain all our forces, we must use every
effort to spread among the peasants recognition of this truth.
The above issues of the Dyelo Naroda call this bill an outstanding land bill
starting (!) the great (!!) reform of the socialisation (!!!) of the land. This
is charlatanism of the purest water. There is not a trace of socialisation in the
bill (except perhaps social aid to the landowner to secure his land payments);
there is nothing at all revolutionary and democratic ; there is nothing in it
outside of reforms of the Irish type usually found in European bourgeois
reformism.
We repeat, this is a bill for the purpose of saving the landowners, for quieting
the rising peasant movement by means of trivial concessions that retain the major
rights for the landowners.
The introduction of such a shameful bill by the S.-R.s into the Cabinet is an
object lesson of the unheard-of hypocrisy of those who denounce the plans of the
Bolsheviks concerning the passing of power to the Soviets as undermining the
Constituent Assembly. Only forty days separate us from the Constituent Assem
bly, is the hypocritical cry of the Cadets, capitalists, landowners, Mensheviks,
and S.-R.s! In the meantime a momentous land bill is being introduced into the
Cabinet, a bill defrauding the peasants, enslaving them to the landowners, con
solidating the landowners property in the land.
When it is necessary to support the landowners against the growing peasant
uprising, then it is possible to carry through a tremendous bill forty or even
only thirty days before the Constituent Assembly.
But when it is a question of transferring all power to the Soviets in order to
give all the land to the peasants, in order immediately to do away with land
owners property in land, in order immediately to offer a just peaceoh, then the
Cadets, the capitalists, the landowners, the Mensheviks and S.-R.s raise a con
certed howl against the Bolsheviks.
Let the peasants know how the Socialist-Revolutionary Party has betrayed
diem, how it has delivered them to the landowners.
Let the peasants know that only the workers party, only the Bolsheviks are
582 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
firmly and irrevocably against the capitalists, against the landowners, for the
interests of the poorest peasantry and all the toilers.
N. L enin
AGRARIAN DISORDERS
503. T h e A reas and I ncidence of A grarian D isorders in E uropean R ussia
[From the Introduction by M. Martynov to Agramoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po doku-
mentam Glavnogo ZemeFnogo Komiteta, KA, XIV (1926), 184-85. A map illustrating
the figures below appears in ibid., p. 225. Kresfianskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu attempts,
by adding the list of registered legal offenses, to compute the degree of peasant unrest
by months from March to September: March, 17; April, 204; May, 259; June, 577;
July, 1,122; August, 691; September, 629. These figures may or may not be significant
as they raise many questions of validity as indices.]
The table of the Central Land Committee gives a concrete picture of the
agrarian movement in various guberniyas of European Russia. All guberniyas
are broken down into six groups according to the number of peasant uprisings.
The first and lowest group, with 10 or fewer incidents, embraces the guberniyas
of Olonets, Vologda, Yaroslavl, Viatka and Ural oblast, Estland, Kovno, Grodno,
and Kavkaz. The second group, with 11 to 25 uprisings, includes the guberniyas
of Moscow, Vladimir, Kostroma, Perm, Astrakhan, the Cossack Don oblast and
Tauride. The third group, with 26 to 50 uprisings, [includes the guberniyas of]
Lifland, Petrograd, Novgorod, Tver, Kaluga, Nizhnii Novgorod, Ufa, Kharkov,
Ekaterinoslavl, Bessarabia, Podolia, Volynia, and Vilna. The fourth group,
from 50 to 75 cases, embraces the guberniyas of Vitebsk, Smolensk, Orlov, Pol
tava, Kiev, Kherson, Saratov, and Orenburg. The fifth, with 76 to 100 cases,
[the guberniyas of] Minsk, Tula, Kursk, Voronezh, Tambov, Penza, and Sim
birsk. Finally, the sixth and highest group, with 101 and more [cases], embraces
the guberniyas of Pskov, Mogilev, Riazan, Kazan, and Samara.
In the central agricultural regions [the following] have become centers of the
peasant movement: the guberniyas of Riazan5, Kursk, Tambov, Tula, and
Voronezh; in the middle Volga [region], the guberniyas of Kazan, Samara,
Simbirsk, and Penza; and in the western lake region, [the guberniyas of] Pskov,
Mogilev, and Minsk. From these centers the peasant movement drops and its
intensity decreases as it spreads in the direction of north, east, and south. Heading
the movement are regions where semi-serf methods of exploitation of peasants
were still strong. We are unable to establish, on the basis of materials of the Cen
tral Land Committee, the distribution of peasant movements by types in various
regions of Russia. . . .
504. G overnment A ction on t h e F irst D isorders in K azan G uberniya
[Zhurnaly, No. 12, March 9,1917.]
Heard:

2. Oral proposals of the Minister of War and of the Navy:


a) On the measures for the suppression of the agrarian disorders which have
broken out in Kazan Guberniya.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 583
Resolved:
1) To recognize that the use of armed force for the suppression of agrarian
disorders is at the present time inadmissible.
2) To turn to the local public organizations and persons enjoying the confi
dence of the population with the request to render assistance by explaining matters
and calming the peasants.
3) To charge the Ministry of the Interior to expedite the organization of the
local police.
4) To charge the Minister of Justice to confirm to the prosecutors offices
the necessity to prosecute plunderers for criminal action.
505. T h e S ocialization of the L and and A rbitrary S eizure
[Editorial in Delo Naroda, No. 2, March 16, 1917, p. 1.]
With the penetration into the village of the first news of the revolution, agrar
ian disorders occurred in some places. At the oblast congress of the Socialist
Revolutionary Party it was reported that in some villages peasants began to seize
landowners lands, to attack agronomists who, complying with the orders of the
old government, were requisitioning grain and hay, etc.
The regional conference of the S. R. Party9 having discussed the situation that
has arisen, sharply condemned such attempts and declared that confiscation of
cultivated udel, Kabinet, and privately owned lands may be conducted only by
legislative means through the Constituent Assembly which will grant land and
freedom to the people
The same resolution was passed also by the conference of peasant representa
tives in the Moscow Council of Workers Deputies. That resolution proclaimed:
No pogroms or arbitrary seizures of land will be tolerated.
Need we add that the decision of the party should be just this and no other?
Need we say that there is nothing in common between the socialization of land
and these arbitrary acts of seizure of lands, attacks, and pogroms?

Socialization of land strives to replace the exploitation by landowners of


their workers, tenants, and generally the entire social order by a system whereby
the tiller of the land reaps all the fruits of his labor.
Arbitrary seizure, however, merely kindles the instincts of appropriation of
somebody elses property; it stifles sensitivity to the interests of others. Briefly,
it is an expression and strengthening of the darkest aspects of ownership and
not their repudiation and replacement by lofty motives of public good.
On the strength of the above it is easy to realize why the party must condemn
sharply all such acts of seizure.

Without mentioning any other arguments, we shall conclude our article with
an appeal to all the members of the S. R. Party, to all sympathizers, and to all the
toiling people:
Guard the sacredness and success of the revolution! Do not turn the great
work into a reign of arbitrary rule and violence! Do not confuse the socialization
of land with its arbitrary seizure for personal gain! Do not tolerate any pogroms!
584 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Fight against them! Organize and be prepared for the elections to the Constituent
Assembly which must give the people both land and freedom!!!
506. A uthorization to U se T roops to S uppress A grarian D isorders
[.Zhurnaly, No. 47, April 8,1917.]
Heard:
14. The query of the General Staff reported hy the Assistant Minister of the
Interior D. M. Shchepkin with regard to whether it is necessary to give the com
manders of the troops of the districts the right to send military detachments when
demanded, for participating in the suppression of agrarian disorders.
Resolved:
1) To let the Ministry of the Interior inform the guberniya commissars
by circular that it is their responsibility together with that of the local public
committees to suppress immediately with the use of all legal means any kind of
attempt in the sphere of agrarian relations against the person or property of
citizens if such attempts have taken place.
2) To let the Ministry of the Interior inform the General Staff that necessary
instructions with regard to the question raised by the Staff have been forwarded
to the guberniya commissars who will be responsible in case it is necessary to
enter into direct contact with the military authorities concerned.

507. C ircular o f P rince L vov to G uberniya C ommissars


[From the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, No. 15409, April
13,1917, Sb. Tsirk. M V D pp. 10-11.]
In recent days numerous telegraphic and personal communications have
reached the Provisional Government regarding arrests and arbitrary actions by
individual rural communities and by volost committees, which deprive the land
owners, both large and small, of the opportunity to perform their duty toward
the country by sowing to the fullest extent the lands belonging to them.14 Consid
ering that acts of personal outrage and the arbitrary settlement of the agrarian
problem by the interested population itself, in a completely unsystematic way,
without connection with the national issues in general, are inadmissible, it is
requested that the guberniya commissars immediately notify the population at
large, through the medium of guberniya committees, the uezd commissars, and
the uezd organizations, of the inadmissibility of anyone being deprived of freedom,
outside of the decisions of the courts, and also [to inform them] of all the gov
ernmental directives providing for the food supplies of the country. With the
support of the authority of all the organized local forces, the inadmissibility of
any kind of arbitrary decisions which may undo the unity indispensable for
strengthening the new regime ought to be firmly asserted. While indicating the
desirability of establishing with the volost and uezd committees commissions of
conciliation composed of peasants and landowners, [and] while the guberniya
14 Local authorities were repeatedly ordered to keep the Government informed of all dis
orders. See for example the telegram to guberniya commissars from the Militia Administration,
Ministry of the Interior, No. 16539, May 8,1917, Sb. Tsirk. MVD, p. 408.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 585
and uezd commissars and specially assigned persons should make trips in order
to explain on the spot the inadmissibility of taking the law into ones own hands,
it is indispensable to suppress all manifestations of violence or plunder, [using]
all the force of the law and following the oft-repeated directives, to the guberniya
commissars, as the main representatives of the Provisional Governments authority
in the guberniya, bearing, together with the public committees, the responsibility
for maintaining order in the guberniya by all the measures which the guberniya
commissars shall consider it necessary to take through the medium of the com
mittee.

508. R eport on t h e A grarian S ituation in Saratov Guberniya


[To the Minister of Justice from the Vice-Chairman of the Guberniya Committee,
VVP, May 2, 1917, p. 3.]
No agrarian arsons, murders, or lootings of estates occurred in the guberniya.
Isolated instances did take place of searches and confiscation of firearms from
pomeshchiki for which charges were drawn up. Occasionally managers [of es
tates] were replaced or arrested and turned over to be dealt with by the uezd com
mittees. More often prisoners of war were diverted for work in peasant households.
The volost committees enjoy the confidence of the peasants. They issue decrees
on the area of land not to be tilled by the pomeshchiki, but in most cases they make
decisions on what plots are to be tilled. At times the rental established is too low.
In most instances, however, the amount of rental is arrived at on establishing
the yield, cost of cultivation, and the price on cereal fixed by the government.
Thereupon official estimates are prepared and turned over to the owner. The same
applies to the inventory and seeds after the needs of the economy are determined.
Isolated cases of requests occurred for the division of the land of otrubshchiki
among the communal households and otrubshchiki. Here and there thoroughbred
horses were taken from pomeshchiki [and used] for hard labor. The bans on
felling the forest were removed after the need for fuel for the army and the country
in general was made clear. Conflicts were settled by telegraphic decrees by mem
bers of the executive committee sent on official mission [for the purpose], also
by authority of the Provisional Government, the Saratov Executive Committee,
and the guberniya Peasant Congress, which were against compulsory seizure of
land and in favor of awaiting the solution of the question by the Constituent
Assembly. Frequently conflicts were aggravated through the fault of the pome
shchiki, who refused to recognize in the volost committees the legal peoples
authority vested in them by the revolution.

509. R esolution of t h e K azan G uberniya S oviet of P easants D eputies ,


M ay 13, 1917
[M.P. Borba za zemliu v 1917 g. KA, LXXVIII (1936), 87-90. See also ibid.9
pp. 89-90, 93-95.]
1) Prior to the solution of the land question by the Constituent Assembly, in
the interests of the success of the revolution and in order to provide the country
with food, the Soviet of Peasants Deputies deems it necessary, after volost and
village committees are organized, to transfer to the management of the volost
586 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
committees all plow lands and fields, pomeshchik, state, udel, monastery, church*
Kabinet, and municipal lands.
Note: Lands bought up from otrubniki (as well as forests and fields) by one
private owner are considered pomeshchik [lands].
Land is transferred to the management of only those volost committees that
are well organized.
How to organize a volost committee properly: In order to organize a volost
committee properly, it is necessary to call in each village a meeting of persons
of both sexes who have reached the age of 18 and to elect a delegate. If the villages
are too large, a delegate should be elected for each 200 persons of the population
of both sexes beginning with the age of 18. Every village, no matter how small,
must have its delegate. All elected delegates arrive at the volost congress with
instructions from the communes that elected them. The volost congress elects a
volost committee. Volost committees must have no fewer than three persons: a
chairman (who performs all the duties of the volost elder) and two vice-chairmen.
If the committee has more than three persons, then in addition to the chairman
and two vice-chairmen, there are also members of the volost committee. And it
is to the management of such a committee that all the land of the volost is trans
ferredpomeshchik , government, monastery, udel, church, Kabinet, and other.
2) All arable lands, meadows, and forests are placed under the control of the
guberniya Soviet of Workers, Soldiers5, and Peasants5 Deputies.
Volost committees are not allowed to fell the forest, or to prohibit felling if
permission for such felling has been issued by the Soviet of Workers, Soldiers,
and Peasants Deputies. The latter issues permits and controls the proper felling.
3) All the equipment, all the livestock and property of pomeshchiki must be
transferred to the management of the volost committees according to the inventory
[of same].
Inventory of the equipment, livestock, and properties must be prepared in
detail in the presence of the pomeshchik or his representative, as well as in the
presence of witnesses. The inventory should be signed by all. The inventory is
given to the pomeshchik and a certified copy remains with the volost committee.
4) For all lands placed at the disposal of the volost committees, the guberniya
congress of peasant delegates establishes the [amount] of the payments [for
their use] by those who wish [to use them] according to their share or it deter
mines the cost of their cultivation by the volost committees which must till and
cultivate [the land]. All grain and hay must be placed at the disposal of the state.
. . . No partition of land is allowed. All grain which remains in excess of
the share [distributed among the peasants] is passed on to the state through the
volost committee. The Soviet of Peasants Deputies is convinced that, if the com
mittee begins the partition of land immediately without awaiting the decision
of the Constituent Assembly, many quarrels, injustices, and unfairnesses may
result. And what will the soldiers at the front think? They will think that land
is being divided without them and that they are being left out. Therefore the
Soviet of Peasants Deputies decided that nobody will divide land but will only use
it until the decision of the Constituent Assembly through the volost committees.
5) In exceptional cases of land shortage volost committees must take care in
supplying food to those who suffer from shortage of land. If anyone has very
little land and it is hard to live on it, there still should not be any division of land,
but food from the new harvest should be supplied to them through the volost
committees.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 587
And so, comrade peasants, this is how the Soviet of Peasants Deputies decided
to deal with land. This is what we have to do temporarily prior to the Constituent
Assembly. And later we shall have new laws. And for the time being, all land
must be taken out of the hands of outsiders [nontoilers] and placed at the disposal
of volost committees elected by you.
510. R eport of th e Comm issar of t h e N ovoaleksandrovsk U ezd ,
K ovno G uberniya
[M. Martynov, Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam Glavnogo Zemelnogo
Komiteta, KA , XIV (1926), 225-26.]
June 14, 1917, No. 204
A congress of peasants of the Vilna guberniya and part of Novoaleksandrovsk
uezd, administratively joined to it, was called by the guberniya commissar in
the city of Disna, ViPna guberniya, on June 4. Approximately 400 delegrates,
peacefully disposed peasants, assembled. Speakers of the most extreme left-wing
parties (Socialist Revolutionaries) spoke at the congress. And they stirred up
the entire assembly [by the following appeals]: All land is yours, and now you
can, in accordance with the resolutions of the volost committees, take everything
you need: fields, meadows, forests, lakes, pastures, and so forth. And in order to
legalize all this and not regard it as seizure, you must pay, not to the owner but to
the volost committees, at least a minimum price per dessiatine. They advised that
all foresters be replaced by their own men in privately owned and government
forests. The fixed price for milling the grain is most insignificant, and the millers,
unwilling to suffer further losses, refuse to mill at this price. The mills are conse
quently to be taken over by the volost committees and placed at their disposal.
All waterways, lakes, and rivers are to be placed at once at the disposal of volost
committees, which are preparing to seize them and draw up new agreements, dis
continuing old tenants. Private owners are given only up to July 10 to gather in
the hay necessary for their own needs. And the owners are to galiier in the hay
themselves and not with the aid of hired hands. In a word, private owners and
tenants are, in accordance with the resolutions of this congress, completely denied
the management of their lands. Everything passes into the hands of volost and
village committees. Persons are elected to the volost, not on the basis of fitness
for their posts, but because they promise the peasants to confiscate at once the
privately owned lands and turn them over to the peasants. Private owners have a
right only to the land they can cultivate themselves. Prior to this resolution of
the congress I was able, although with difficulty, to restrain the peasants in the
Novoaleksandrovsk uezd, entrusted to me, from extensive seizures, damages to
fields caused by cattle, felling of trees, etc. At present, however, I am powerless
[to do anything]. Because, after their return from the congress, the peasant
deputies, discussing the speeches they have heard, pay no attention to my reason
ings ; they say that they have heard something entirely different at the congress.
Two days after the congress I received the following telegram: I request you to
take personally and through the volost executive committees the strictest measures
to prevent seizures, damages to and destruction of meadows and fields, regardless
of whom they may belong to. No. 10129. Vilna-Kovno Guberniya Commissar,
Balai. I was confused by this telegram. At the congress in the city of Disna,
Mr. Balai and other speakers were saying something entirely different. And on
the heels of [those speeches] they authorize me to restrain the population from
588 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
seizures. I was the more confused because at the congress the role of the uezd
commissars and uezd executive committees was reduced to zero. Not once was
it suggested that [the people] refer to the uezd commissar for any explanations.
And all resolutions of the volost committees were passed with no participation
whatsoever of the uezd commissar. Consequently, on receipt of the above-men
tioned telegram, I made the following telegraphic inquiry: To the ViPna Guber
niya Commissar. Disna. In compliance with the protocol of the peasant congress
in Disna on June 4, the volost and village committees remove the owners, take
charge of privately owned meadows, forests, pastures, etc. as if they were their
own property. They hire laborers, issue permits to individuals, as well as to troop
units and organizations for grazing of cattles in meadows, on fields of mowed
clover, and other places. Notify me how to act. Novoaleksandrovsk Uezd Com
missar Montvil5. This telegram was prompted by the fact that members of the
village committee of Ozhovsk volost, on their return from Disna, came to the
landowner of the estate of Mekian, Mr. Bortkevich, and announced that they had
rented the mowed clover to the army to graze the horses. One hundred horses
were sent out to graze and only after strenuous efforts in the headquarters of the
regiment did Mr. Bortkevich succeed in having the horses removed. Moreover*
they came to the estate, told the workers to leave, and those who wished to remain
had to be paid by the pomeshchik at the rate of not less than 5 rubles a day. Several
such complaints about the actions of volost and village committees come to me
daily. And I am powerless to restrain [the offenders] since they refer to the reso
lutions of the congress and the addresses of the speakers in Disna. The role of the
elected uezd commissars is extremely difficult. At the volost meetings, in answer
to my efforts to restrain the peasants from seizures and my explanations of the
evil [consequences] of such [acts], they shout: We elected you, and if you wont
go with us, we will throw you out. Moreover, each volost committee, in passing
any kind of resolution, does not submit it for approval by the uezd commissar.
And the resolutions are immediately carried out. I request the Ministry to make
public as soon as possible the rights and obligations of the volost executive com
mittees; [I further request] that no resolution of the volost committee be made
effective without the approval of the uezd commissar or uezd committee. All
money for confiscated lands go for safekeeping to the volost committees, so that
the private owners are even unable to pay for the labor of their workers. Army
units are forced to pay the volost committees for the [use of] pastures of private
owners. According to them, the money will be held in safekeeping by the com
mittee, pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly.
M ontvil , Novoaleksandrovsk Uezd Commissar

511. A Report from Riazan Guberniya


[Report of the Commissar of Ranenburgskii Uezd of Riazan Guberniya, July 28,1917,
No, 2613, M. Martynov, Agramoe dvizhenie v 1917 po dokumentam Glavnogo ZemeP-
nogo Komiteta, KA, XIV (1926), 187-91.]
To the Minister of Agriculture:
On May 4, under No. 1501,1 submitted a report on the agrarian movement in
Ranenburgskii uezd to you, also separately to the guberniya commissar and the
Department of State Land Properties. I now deem it necessary to add that the
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 589
spring sowing was completed on time. Only twenty dessiatines of the entire uezd
remained unsown. The average cost of sowing per dessiatine, not counting the
cost of labor, was 30 rubles.
This years crop is so poor that in many places the food and land committees
find it impossible to contract for it, standing unharvested, at 30 rubles [per
dessiatine]. Consequently, in many volosts the sowing was done by the peasants
at a loss.
The fallow field is also all plowed. Preparation of seeds is now in progress.
In spite of the rainy weather until July 20, no unharvested rye remained. Rapid
carting of sheafs and harvesting of oats go on.
The crop for the current year is three times, and in some places five times,
lower than last years. However, we can say with certainty that not much less
grain will be harvested this year than last.
It should be noted that last year the pomeshchiki grain was lost altogether on
most estates. . . .
Nothing of the sort is in evidence, nor will it occur now. Harvesting is most
thorough and careful. If we take into consideration the fact that pomeschiki
sowing equals one-half that of the peasants, the years poor harvest of the north
eastern part of the uezd will be fully covered by a timely harvesting of the grain.
Practically the same may be said of the western half of the uezd, where the harvest
is poorer. Shortages may be expected only in the south of the uezd where the
pomeshchik sowing is insignificant and where the poor harvest compared with
last year will largely affect the peasants sowing.
Turning now to movable property of pomeshchiki estates, it should be pointed
out that throughout the uezd, with few exceptions, as a result of local conditions,
almost the entire work stock (horses) and farm equipment were taken for use
by the volost committees; in the spring, by the executive [committees], and in
the summer by the newly organized food and land committees. Pedigreed cattle,
studs, and brood mares, as well as work stock three years old and under were left
inviolable. Livestock is guarded jealously, particularly on properties supplying
Moscow with milk, such as Putilov, Prince Yolkonskiis, Sleptsovs, and others.
Local committees forbid the sale of milk cows on these estates. Sale of livestock
is permitted on other properties in accordance with the decision of the uezd food
committee, within the limits of its volost, also beyond the limits of its volost with
the permission of the same food committee, but under no circumstances beyond
the uezd.
This, however, is not in pursuance of personal egotistic interests, but is for
the good of everybody. All the volosts containing within their borders pomeshchik
estates are considerably smaller than other volosts in the number of households
and population. As a matter of fact, no correct estimate of the livestock in each
uezd was made. Yet requisition of livestock for the army is made periodically.
And the requisition is arbitrarily distributed over the volosts. Consequently,
each volost strives to preserve all the livestock within its borders with a view to
supplying the army with meat and horses more readily. Farm implements and
work horses, for example, were left on the estate of P. P. Oznobishina, who pledged
to harvest on time and unaided 100 dessiatines. The estate has a stud farm. It
requires a greater amount of grain. Consequently, the pomeshchitsa was en
trusted with the harvesting of grain. However, when it was discovered that without
the pomeshchitsa farm implements and horses the peasants could not manage the
590 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
rest of the crop, Oznobishina was requested to harvest half of her crop, that is, two
or three times more than she had anticipated. This fact clearly proves that the
village, short of hands, farm implements, and work horses, resorts, of necessity*
to the use of the pomeshchiki implements, and vice versa, a [volost] relatively
prosperous in this respect, such as Prosechinskaia, on assuming the responsibility
of harvesting and plowing the fields, left the implements with the pomeshchiki.
The character and method of harvesting are also somewhat different. Thus
in Petelinskii volost the pomeshchiki grain was harvested and is now threshed by
the land committee, which hires its own farm hands. In Gaginskii volost, work
horses and implements remain on the estates. The committee takes them when
ever necessary for various work and returns them on completing the work. But
in the same volost, the village of Gagarino found this [method] inexpedient and
took everything until the completion of the field work. On the estates of Prince
Kropotkin, Karpovskii volost, Prince Trubetskoi, Saltykovskii volost, and Rogo-
vich, Troitskii volost, persons in charge of the estates were assigned by the volost
committees. The same principle prevails everywhere, namely: to leave no field
unplowed, no grain unharvested. Estates must be provided with necessary food
in accordance with the law on grain monopoly; the rest is reserved for the army.
However, failure to understand the situation led to a great many misunder
standings in this connection. Something of a commotion and fight ensued. And
many of the pomeshchiki began to sell their livestock and farm equipment at
cheap prices. Later they claimed that they were forced to do so. They accused
me and the uezd executive committee, first of inactivity, then of encouragement.
And they poured, as if from a bucket, all sorts of other accusations in the press,
and in public, and in government institutions, down to sending their hired dele
gates. All this forces me to explain the tremendous and complicated work shoul
dered by the uezd committee.
1) When early in March the decisions on arbitrary reallotment of land and
die abolition of leases were issued for approval, the committee decided to under
take the settlement of this question. Landowners were also invited to attend the
conference. At the appalling thought of the loss of practically 2,000,000 poods
of grain on properties, at the thought of idle fields and emaciated livestock pros
trated in the yards that had to be lifted by their tails and were dying on many
properties, the committee, after a two-day session, on March 25-26, passed [the
following] severe resolution: all lands and all livestock and equipment to be
transferred into the hands of the peasants; the balance of properties to be en
trusted, wherever necessary, to the management of responsible persons. I found
this resolution unacceptable and resigned my chairmanship of the committee.
This forced the committee to make a compromise. And on March 31 the question
was reopened for further discussion. This resolution excluded all small land
owners. On large estates the management of the land remained in the hands of
the owners. They were provided with not less than 30 dessiatines in the field and
permitted exceptions for proper management of the estates. Tarasov, for example,
was allowed to plow all the land and his farm equipment remained untouched.
Count Palen sowed 90 dessiatines with spring corn; Putilov, 65, etc. Resolved:
to provide properties with farm hands for all farm needs, to protect orchards, and
not to fix wages for farm hands. All lease agreements remained in force. This
resolution was strictly carried out. And wherever deviations occurred, a member
of the executive committee stepped in immediately. And in spite of provocative
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 591
work on the part of various dishonest persons who tried to hinder the work of
the executive committee, it succeeded, but for a few exceptions, in dealing with
its problem.
2) When on April 6 the Provisional Government suspended the decisions of
the committee, [the old situation] returned. Plowing took a bad turn. The com
mittee had to start its work anew. It had to settle conflicts where agreements had
been reached and work had begun. But at this point, on April 8-12, there appeared
a resolution of the Riazan congress of representatives of all committees and public
institutions, also city and zemstvo self-governments. This resolution went further
than that of Ranenburg and called for new work. In some of the volosts they
began to carry it out. The Provisional Government voted this resolution down
on May 4. On May 19 it approved it, except for the requisition of work horses.
Following the new instructions from the Provisional Government, a resolution
was passed on May 28 to plow the fallow [fields]. This resolution was accepted
also by the uezd food committee, which began the work in the proper manner
and took upon itself the protection of the sowing and plowing of fallow [fields].
At the present time the peasantry is entirely organized. Work has grown
lighter, but provocative acts are still possible. Thus, two days ago the peasants of
Petelinskii volost arrested one Makeev, who incited [the peasants] to raid the
estate of Semenov and disobey the committee. They also arrested M. N. Semenov,
from whose house Makeev emerged to deliver his speech on the pogrom. Semenov
was immediately released following telephone instructions [to that effect], and
Makeev was placed in the custody of the examining magistrate. On July 23 an
unknown man was detained in Zimarovskii volost. He attempted to interfere with
(sic!) the harvesting of grain on the estate of Count Palen. But on the way to
Ranenburg, taking advantage of the trustfulness of the man who accompanied
him, the stranger fled. At the present time outsiders are admitted to gatherings
only [on presentation] of a certificate from public organizations. The resolution
of the combined conference on June 24 of the Riazan uezd and the guberniya
executive committee, with representatives from the guberniya commissariat and
the Minister of Agriculture, Axel, was introduced easily and with no friction.
Misunderstandings occurred in but two out of 336 villages. Today, however, news
arrives about the seizure of stacks [of grain] on the estate of Obukh by peasants
from the village of Nikolaevka, Prosechinskii volost. Two members from the
Food Supply Committee and one from the Executive Committee were sent to
this village. This seizure occurred at the instigation of one peasant. Unpleasant
incidents occurred in Naryshkinskii volost, where infrequent night thefts took
place on three estates. These facts, branded as disgraceful, were publicized
throughout the entire uezd with an appeal to combat thefts. . . . It is generally
acknowledged now that reallotments are inadmissible. All newspaper reports on
this question are false. Complete unification of the peasantry has been accom
plished. Some quite common incidents did occur in this respect. In Dubovskii,
Lomovskii, and Staro-Klenskii volosts, in two or three cases peasants carried off
stacks from the fields they had leased in previous years. As in former times,
these incidents can be settled by volost courts just as are those which arise in the
course of a dispute over the right to ownership of lands in accordance with the
agreement of the lease.
Such is the general picture. If there is much ado about Ranenburgskii uezd,
I interpret it as caused by the fact that Ranenburgskii uezd was the first to take
592 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
up the agrarian question and also by the fact that, within its borders, to every
10 peasant dessiatines there were seven privately owned, also by the slander
directed against the executive committee.
Of the tremendous number of complaints, not one proved valid on thorough
investigation. And some complaints had no foundation whatsoever. Energy was
expended, also money which the committee did not have and had to borrow from
the zemstvo. And [in the end] it was proved that these expenditures were dissi
pated on false denunciations and statements. This unquestionably revealed an
attempt to discredit the committee and to sow seeds of discord among the popula
tionsomething that was easy to do during the first two months of the revolution.
T. S ukharev , Commissar of the Uezd
512. T elegram from t h e Commissar of K azan G uberniya
[M. Martynov, Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam Glavnogo Zemelnogo
Komiteta, KA, XIV (1926), 215.]
I report: First. The agrarian movement continues. In Kazan uezd, according
to the statement of the peasants from the village of Tarlashei on the Volga island
of Bekachie, peasants who owned no meadows seized the hay mowings. In Laishev
uezd the landowner Belkovich reports plundering of grain harvested on his estate
adjoining the village of Nadezhdina. On the estate of Shcherbakova in the same
uezd, according to her statement, property was looted from trunks by using
skeleton keys. Fruit was stolen from the garden. The same looting of fruit
[took place] on the estate of Garin, leased by Sokolov. In the village of Rozhdest-
vin, Astrakhan volost, plots of land [belonging to] landowner Gaidullin were
retrieved from some peasants. Members of the volost committee in the village of
Kirbi requisitioned three horses for peasants needs. In Spaskii uezd, according
to the statement of the landowner Vedeniapin, his plowed land was seized, horses
were taken away during threshing and plowing. . . . Peasants in the village of
Yashkin seized, with the approval of the volost and village committees, horses,
harness, and implements. Peasants from Abalduevka seized the church land.
In Tsivils uezd peasants from Turkyshii seized the land allotment of Solovev, a
priest of Simbirsk guberniya. In Mamadysh uezd landowner of Kliash volost,
Lebedev, reports a decision of the volost land committee to seize his land, in spite
of the fact that Lebedev had previously given 62 dessiatines to the peasants. In
the village of Dertuli plots of land were taken from two leaseholders. In Sviazh-
skii uezd, according to the manager, landowner Gerken, the volost committee en
tered the estate of Chelnov and seized the mill and dismissed the manager. In all
of the cases I contacted the appropriate uezd commissar. I proposed that he
investigate the circumstances in each case, to bring those guilty of transgression
and willful acts before a court of justice, to take energetic measures to restore,
without delay, the rights of private ownership, and to forbid excesses and com
plications. . . . In addition to delegates and emissaries, armed detachments are
ordered to points that threaten complications and insubordination. At the same
time a considerable number of deserters [is reported] within the borders of the
uezds, particularly in Kazan and Mamadyshskii uezds. Because of this, concen
trated detachments of soldiers were sent there. Second. Factory and commercial-
industrial life deteriorates steadily. Output in factories has dropped noticeably.
No visible improvements are [observed] in the matter of provisions. Shortage of
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 593
foodstuffs is acute. There are no supplies. Transport is paltry. Third. No new
instances of agitation against the Provisional Government [are in evidence],
except, however, a strong opposition to the grain monopoly.15 The guberniya
supply committee fights against this vigorously. Fourth. No arbitrary arrests
have occurred in recent times.
[July 31,1917]
K. K hasanov . 1469
For the Guberniya Commissar
513. T elegram from the Com m issar of N ovorosshsk Guberniya
[M. Martynov, Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam Glavnogo Zemelnogo
Komiteta KA, XIV (1926), 220.]
The following disturbances were registered up to August 15: in Aleksandrov-
skii uezdseizure of land, plunder of property, and arbitrary actions by peasants;
in Elizavetgrad uezdseizures on two estates of fallow fields and harvest; in
Ananevskii uezdseizures of sold hay and land; in Tiraspolskii and Odessa
uezdspeasant violations of tenant agreements; in Kherson uezdseizure of
property from church land and of harvest from the largest estates. Both the uezd
commissars and land committees are requested to take energetic steps to restore
the [land] laws and to put a stop to disorders. Requests from landowners to
interpret the land laws have increased. The Union of Landowners opened a bureau
of legal aid in Kherson to assist the victims of agrarian disorders and illegal
action by various institutions and organizations.
[October 9,1917]
U ritsyn , Chief, Guberniya Committee

514. Civil W ar H as B egun


[Novoe Vremia, No. 14887, October 3,1917, p. 3. This item and the one following from
Novaia Zhizn9 reflect the accelerated deterioration of the agrarian situation following
the Kornilov Affair, presented from two widely divergent points of view. For a general
coverage of this event, see Volume III.]
Not a day goes by that news does not appear in the press about the atrocious
pogroms which take place in the village. In the spirit of anarchy, the propaganda-
inspired masses are not satisfied to seize the lands of the private owners. They
also remove the workers from properties, fell forests, and destroy crops.
The nonresistance of the Provisional Government, which limits itself in the
struggle with anarchy to mere appeals, which naturally no one takes seriously,
has resulted in veritable pogroms by the population in its effort to seize land.
Estates of private owners are destroyed by arson and in other ways. Livestock
and equipment are seized. Various agricultural enterprises are put out of use
completely. The owners and their employees, in so far as they succeed in saving
themselves from attacks or actual murder, flee to the cities, leaving their estates
to the mercy of fate. The lands remain unsown or are sown in any way, hastily,
by the usurpers who down in their hearts realize very well their guilt and the inse
curity of the seizures. But this is beside the point now.

15 See Chapter 11.


594 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The formula of Bolshevism, peace at the front and war in the rear, now
assumes a particularly menacing character because any intensification of civil
war obviously is immediately reflected in a weakening of our resistance at the
front.
We wonder: will our provisional rulers limit themselves now also to appeals
to combat the pogroms or will they take other and more vigorous measures?
515. Novaia Zhizn on t h e A grarian D isorders D uring S eptem ber
[No. 141, September 30, 1917, p. 1.]
The young Russian revolution has endured many heavy blows and shocks.
But apparently her trials are not yet at an end.
She barely had time to manage the counterrevolutionary ulcer of the Korni-
lovshchina when a new, perhaps the most terrible, danger approacheddisorders
in the village.
From uezd to uezd, from guberniya to guberniya, like the dread ringworm,
it spreads over the body of the country, bringing devastation and preparing the
ground for all sorts of excesses.
Pomeshchiki estates are ransacked. The livestock is slaughtered. Supplies
are plundered. Agricultural machines and inventory are destroyed. Forests and
orchards are felled. Rape and murder are committed. . . .
Military units are brought to put down the disorders. Machine guns and even
artillery are sent. And the result is fratricidal chastisement, blood, violence, and
a renewed, and perhaps greater, bitterness in the subdued peasants and their
complete disillusionment in the new order and in the revolution, the name of which
is unconsciously associated in their minds with punitive expeditions and execu
tions.
And from here there is but one step to the thought of the old order, autocracy,
under which, if one did not live better, at least one lived more peacefully.
There is no need to dwell on the causes of the disorders. Even a small child
could name them. Ancient land shortage, the complete vagueness of the existing
land relations, and criminal inactivity of the Government. Those are the roots
of the muzhiks discontent which breeds pogroms.
Our village is the stepchild of the revolution.
The revolution improved to some extent the economic conditions of the prole
tariat and gave it an opportunity for further conquests. It made the soldier a
citizen. To the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia it transferred the mechanism of
state authority. But what has it given to the village?
Thus faronly fixed prices and land committees.
With such an attitude toward the village it is not surprising that agrarian
disorders are mounting in the country. Rather, one should wonder why they
practically did not exist up to this time. Apparently some cause existed which
restrained the peasants from taking action and protected the country from land
anarchy.
Those causes were unquestionably belief in the revolution, belief in the political
force of the revolutionary democracy and in its ability to carry out the proclaimed
slogans.
To the extent that the Provisional Governments absolute unwillingness to
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 595
take the course of revolutionary creativeness is being revealed, to the extent that
the petty bourgeois stratum of democracy headed by their leaders is getting ever
more entangled in the tenets of conciliation with the counterrevolutionary bour
geoisie and thus weakening the pressure from the revolution and postponing into
a distant future the solution of the problems proclaimed by the revolution, par
ticularly the land questionto that extent the peasants lose their faith in the
power of the revolution. They are overcome by despondency and marasmus.
Their belief in the ability and willingness of the Government to rise in defense of
their interests lost, the peasants take the matter of the land reform into their own
hands, and, deprived of organized means of action, they solve it by the ancient
means of Pugachevshchina.

THE COSSACKS
516. A ppeal of t h e P rovisional G overnment to th e D on C ossacks
[VVP, No. 26, April 18, 1917, p. 1.]
The coup detat in Russia cannot but give rise to profound changes in the
lives of the population in the oblast of the Don [Cossacks].
The composition of the population of the oblast varies according to the per
formance of compulsory military service and the economic structure, as well as
according to land ownership. Therefore, the reorganization of the Cossack and
non-Cossack way of life demands serious and difficult work, but most important
of all, it requires a considerable length of time.
The land question is particularly complicated and confused. [At first] the
peasantry, resettled a century and a half ago, was wedged into the basic Cossack
population; later followed an influx of tenant-agriculturalists occupying mili
tary lands and lands belonging to nomadic tribes. In addition, a considerable
part of the land in the Don oblast belonging to officers and 'pomeshchiki passed
into the hands of non-Cossacks with the rights of ownership. These land inter
relationships were formed over decades; over decades the roots grew deeper and
more entangled. Whole settlements have sprung up on military lands, pomeshchik
lands, and lands belonging to nomadic tribes . . .
This demonstrates the complexity of the land question in the Don [oblast],
and the degree of thoughtfulness and caution which is required for its proper
resolution.
Unfortunately, a certain section of the population of the oblast does not real
ize this and is hastening to settle local land matters arbitrarily, without careful
thought. Thus, in certain localities, fields belonging to others were tilled, meadows
belonging to others were seized, and timber was felled in military or privately
owned forests.
Such a rash desire to resolve the land question arbitrarily is extremely danger
ous and harmful, not only to the whole population of the oblast, but also to the
State. It is dangerous, in that undesirable clashes could occur between the Cos
sacks and the peasants as well as between the peasants and the pomeshchiki. It is
harmful in that many lands could remain unsown on account of the disputes. And
at the present time grain is Russias only salvation. Once there is grain, Russia
596 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
can strengthen her freedom and defeat the formidable enemy. Besides, arbitrary
seizures not only fail to secure the right to the land, but also bring no advantage
to the person who seizes the land for they entail payments for losses incurred to
the legal owner.
One must calmly await the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. . . .
Until the Constituent Assembly is convoked, one must pursue ones own
affairs, work calmly, and diligently fulfill ones civil duties and ones duty to the
state, bearing firmly in mind that only by this means will it be possible to preserve
the freedom won by the revolution and to defeat the external enemy.
For the purpose of settling all disputes, for achieving agreements, and, in
general, for proper formulations of various local questions, the Provisional Gov
ernment has sent its Commissar, Member of the State Duma M. S. Voronkov, to
the oblast and has organized consultative bodies and committees. The Commissar
[appointed] by the Government must be approached in all matters of dispute and
he will deliver the necessary instructions.
P rince G. Lvov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
April 7,1917
517. R esolution on th e L and Q uestion of th e C ossack C ongress ,
J une 15,1917
[Rech9, No. 139, June 16,1917, p. 4.]
In view of the fact, first, that all Cossack lands were neither gratuitously
offered nor allotted to them by anyone, but were conquered by the Cossacks them
selves, who more than once shed blood for the inviolability and safety of the lands
of the Russian State; second, that the Cossack lands were over a period of centuries
and through relentless labor of the Cossacks cultivated and settled by them, giving
Russia rich granaries in place of a wilderness; third, that the violation of the
obshchina way of land tenure, historically formed, was an irreparable blow to the
integrity and unity of over four million Cossacks, and in view of the forthcoming
agrarian reform, the All-Russian Cossack Krug deems it necessary to pass the
following resolutions: 1) All lands of Cossack voiskos, with their forests, fishing
waters, and other lands with their mineral resources constitute the historic, invi
olable, and sacred property of each Cossack voisko ; 2) the Cossack voisko as a
self-governing unit owns, uses, and manages its lands, waters, forests, and mineral
resources independently and with no ones assistance; 3) all privately owned
lands {pomeshchiki, functionaries, and officers plots, and others) expropriated
from a voisko for highest distinctions, rewards, etc., also government lands, en
closed lands, Kabinet, church, monastery, and others situated on voisko territories
must be returned into private ownership by each individual voisko on the basis of
the general principle of allotment of such lands to the toiling masses, which will
be approved by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly for all of Russia; 4) peasant
lands, those allotted and those of peasant associations of small owners, situated
on the territory of Cossack voiskos remain in the hands of the peasants and other
toilers who own them; 5) the All-Russian Constituent Cossack Congress, in mak
ing public its resolution on the solution of the land question, expresses full confi
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 597
dence that the Constituent Assembly will, in the name of law and justice, sanction
this resolution.

THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEASANTS SOVIETS16


518. R esolution on t h e L and Q uestion , M ay 2 6 ,1 9 1 7
[Delo Naroda, No. 58, May 26, 1917, p. 2. See also Golder, pp. 375-78. The Congress
was dominated by the Socialist Revolutionary Party and reflected its views. Soon,
however, the Party itself divided on the agrarian and other issues. For an account of
the growing differences, see Oliver H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism,
passim.]
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies announces to the entire Rus
sian peasantry that henceforth not only the final solution of the agrarian problem
in the Constituent Assembly, but all the preparatory work to be done by the local
and central land committees passes into the hands of the toiling people themselves.
For this reason, the first, most important, and most responsible task of the more
progressive part of the peasantry is the organization of elections to the volost and
uezd zemstvos, and the establishment of land committees in connection with these
zemstvos. The work of these committees in the preparation of land reforms is to be
based on the following principles: the transfer, without compensation, of all lands
now belonging to the State, monasteries, churches, and private persons into the
possession of the nation, for equitable and free use.
Firmly believing in the growing strength, organization, and intelligence of
the toiling peasantry, the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies is deeply
convinced that private ownership of land with its forests, water power, and mineral
resources will be abolished by the National Constituent Assembly, which will
establish a fundamental law regarding the land, the conditions of its transfer to
the toilers, and its use and distribution.
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies is also convinced that in all
land committees, from that of the volost to the Central Committee, the toiling
peasantry, taking advantage of the elective system, will see to it that all the pre
paratory work for the agrarian reform shall be carried out with the object of
emancipating the land from the bonds of private property, without any compen
sation.
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies expects the Provisional Gov
ernment to assist, as far as it lies within its power, in the free expression of the
toiling peoples opinion on the important problem of reorganization, now con
fronting Russia, and to prevent all attempts to hinder this work by persons who
put their personal and party interests above those of the country.
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies considers it necessary that the
Provisional Government issue an absolutely clear and unequivocal statement
16 The activities and resolutions of the Congress of Peasants Soviets and other peasant
organizations concerning issues other than the agrarian question are covered elsewhere under
the appropriate subject headings. Useful volumes on their work are M. Pokrovskii and Ya.
Yakovlev (eds.), Krestianskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu, and A. V. Shestakov, Sovety feres?ian~
skikh deputatov i drugie krestianskie organizatsii, Vol. I, Part II.
598 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
which will show that on this question the Provisional Government will allow
nobody to oppose the peoples will.
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies resolves that:
2) . . . all land, without exception, must be given over to the land commit
tees, which should have the power to issue regulations for cultivation, sowing,
harvesting, haying, etc.
6) The fixing of land rents and payments, the fixing of wages for agricultural
labor, and similar questions must be given over entirely to the local land com
mittees. In disputed cases, the rent is to be kept in the local state treasury.
7) Until the promulgation of national measures, the local land committees
shall be allowed complete freedom of initiative and activity in all the above
mentioned land questions. With this in mind, all interference on the part of
guberniya and uezd commissars must be removed. One-sided selection of them,
from among the landlord class, must also be done away with.
8) In order to preserve intact the amount of land available for the coming
land reform, it is necessary, under the control of the land committees, to prohibit
rigidly and steadfastly any buying, selling, willing, or mortgaging of land, until
the Constituent Assembly.
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies invites the whole peasantry
to remain peaceful, but to work with determination and steadfastness for the
realization in a legal manner of the cherished thoughts and hopes of the agricul
tural laborer, which have long since found expression in the motto, so dear to
each peasant, Land and Liberty. [The resolution was almost unanimously
adopted; two voted against, and one delegate refused to vote.]
The Congress decided in favor of the following special appeal to the popu
lation :
The All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies appeals to the peasants and
the whole wage-earning population of Russia to vote, at the elections to the Con
stituent Assembly, only for those candidates who pledge themselves to advocate
the nationalization of the land, without reimbursement, and on principles of
equality.
519. A Co m m en t on t h e W ork and M ood of th e Congress
[V. Ya. Gurevich, Vserossiiskii Krestianskii Sezd i pervaia koalitsiia, Letopis Revo-
liutsii, I (192a), 176, 192-96.]
In the local land committees, which had to prepare the ground for the reform
and collect the necessary materials in the various localities, representatives of
local peasant congresses and councils also played a prominent role. Thus the
work on land reforms was practically in their own hands. The Minister of Agri
culture also enjoyed complete confidence. It seemed to us therefore that the
peasants would be satisfied at the Congress by the declaration of the principles
of the future reform, by sending their delegates to the land committees, and the
settlement of land relations in the interests of the toilers.
However, it was soon revealed that we misjudged both the mood of the Con
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 599
gress itself and that of the peasantry as a whole. . . . [After lengthy negotia
tions and arguments] it was no longer a question of socialization, but one of pre
liminary nationalization of land. But although such a measure did not jeopardize
the future agrarian reform, it did create very serious political complications.
Moreover, it seemed to us in principle incorrect.
The difficulties of the situation were further complicated by the fact that at
the bottom of the peasants demand for immediate nationalization of the pome
shchik land was not only the desire to preserve intact their future possessions, but
a desire to take advantage, so to speak, of all of the opportunities ahead of time.
When it was a question of a bit of land, the moderate and calm delegates from the
village, who argued very logically with the soldiers about the necessity to remain
in the trenches and await peace, lost their patience and restraint completely; they
revealed maximalist demands, typical for the time. . . . In many individual
cases the claims of the peasants were entirely just, as, for example, in the sphere
of changing the conditions of usurious rent, use of pastures, and so forth. But
all these particular reasons could not justify the general demand for an imme
diate expropriation of landowners land, already cultivated at their expense.
Moreover, it was doubtful that such a general measure, introduced too hastily,
would answer the corresponding needs of agriculture, as well as the national food
supply, or even the toiling peasantry itself.
. . . Gradually voices of discontent and insistence on their demands were
heard in addresses by representatives from some regions, particularly from the
inhabitants of the Volga, which up to this time was considered almost a strong
hold of the Socialist Revolutionaries.
. . . Soon it was revealed that the tendency of the Congress to issue decrees
over the head of the Government to convert die pomeshchik lands into national
property was imposed from without. In substance the majority of the opposition
was completely loyal to the Government. Finally they abandoned the issuing of
decrees and replaced them with declarations. Prohibition of land transactions
introduced at our initiative and properly explained did, after all, contribute a
certain calm. . . . To find, with the transfer of land, an acceptable compromise
was more difficult, but we succeeded finally in arriving at a rubber formula which
reconciled all. It was resolved to transfer all land, not only that of the pomeshchiki
but of the peasants as well, under the supervision of the land committees. This
did not presuppose confiscation [of the property] as a general measure. . . .
. . . The grain monopoly and fixed prices as such, of course, did not enjoy the
approval of the peasantry, but the delegates agreed to put their stamp of approval
on government measures if barter were organized, supplying the village with
manufactured goods, agricultural implements, and inventory.
. . . In spite of the fact that there can be no doubt as to the existence of a
close connection between the Congress and all the multiracial regions of Russia
and the fact that the arrived delegates reflected the moods of the very heart of the
population, we could observe none of the centrifugal tendencies, which were so
clearly revealed later in the course of the revolution. The multiracial character
of the delegates, as pointed out above, was practically unfelt.
. . . The peasant delegates as a whole understood that the formation of
600 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
general soviets of workers, peasants, and soldiers deputies, with the preserva
tion of the autonomous sections, would only weaken their importance and subject
them to the influence of the city proletariat. Because of the same considerations
the All-Russian Peasant Congress resolved to launch its own central permanent
organthe All-Russian Executive Committee of Peasants Deputies. . . .
The Congress adjourned at the end of May, but even before its official adjourn
ment the delegates began to go home to return to the households they had left.
Moreover, some agrarian agitation and misapprehension were evident in some
places; and the peasants were hastening homeward. The delegates had to inter
pret the resolutions of the Congress and to make an attempt to channel the move
ment. But this was no easy task, the more so since the resolutions of the Congress
on land were in many instances understood as guiding directives for the peasant
class organizations as well as for land committees and volost executive commit
tees. The misunderstanding we feared proved to be in reality even more serious
than we had anticipated. In order to calm down the peasantry, to channel the
agrarian movement, quick measures were needed to regulate land relations during
the transitory period prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly. Unfor
tunately, we waited in vain to receive these measures from the Government. . . .
520. Russkiia Vedomostfs A ttack on th e R esolution
[No. 119, May 28, 1917, p. 3]
At the core of the resolution, adopted by the Soviet of Peasants Deputies,
appear the extreme demands of the party whose agrarian program is in itself
already extreme to the utmost. The resolution insists on the transfer of all the
land to the toiling population, without payment; on the introduction of equalized
possession of land and the abolition of private ownership of land within the
borders of the Russian State.
Psychologically, it is understandable that the first congress of peasant repre
sentatives reached such extreme decisions. The roster of soviet members was
being composed at the very moment when the villages were just being reached by
the first revolutionary waves. It is natural that in many cases, instead of solid
adherents of the age-old village traditions, those waves bore on their crests repre
sentatives of revolutionary parties who appeared in the village as the first heralds
of freedom, full of enticing promises. As reported in the press, half of the Soviet
of Peasants Deputies were members of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. Al
though the party affiliation of the other amorphous half has not been determined,
undoubtedly they, too, could not but be influenced by the more dramatic and
determined policy of their comrades.
Besides the party composition, the general political climate of the moment
could not help affecting the decisions of the Congress. The sign of the times is the
predominance of egotistical motives among various social groups and strata of
population. A conviction prevails that political freedom has brought with it
material well-being also. The new order is expected immediately to provide great
and abundant boons, without considering whether present-day society can afford
them, and whether these demands would not destroy the beginnings of new public
life.
And, indeed, is it not natural that the peasant delegates, assembled in Petro
grad, a city distant and alien to them, where the revolutionary organization of
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 601
the city proletariat is striving for unlimited economic demands, and is it not
natural that representatives of the village, too, have rushed to present their age-
old demands, and in the most elementary, maximalist form, at that?
The fact that the land-starved peasant mass willingly supports such slogans
is not surprising, particularly because the first part of the formula may be con
sidered to be generally accepted, and no one can dispute that in democratic Russia
the right to landownership will belong to the person who tills the land.
We are surprised by something else. We are surprised by the anti-statesman
like and demagogic flavor of the resolution adopted by the Soviet of Peasants
Deputies, regardless of its inner content. And our amazement is evoked not by the
persons who voted for the resolution but by the leaders of the assembly who com
posed the resolution, among whom, of course, are many men who are directly
connected with organs of government administration.
The formula, that the solution of the land question belongs to the Constituent
Assembly, is just as widespread as the formula of peace without annexations and
indemnities. Upon this formula are based the exhortations addressed to the
population by all the parties except that of the Bolsheviks, and they urge the
population not to commit violence and illegal seizure in the villages. It is an
indispensable element of the subject matter of all the popular pamphlets. It is
one of the most important motives bringing pacification into the village and keep
ing soldiers from deserting the front.
The Constituent Assembly is mentioned, too, in the resolution of the Soviet
of Peasants Deputies, but only in passing, in a dependent clause, and in such a
context that an impression is created that the Constituent Assembly would only
have to put its stamp of approval on the factually decided agrarian question.
The committees are lavishly granted such rights as are entirely denied to
them by law. . . .
. . . The local land committees are being transformed into organs endowed
with full range of power for the solution of the agrarian question, without waiting
for the Constituent Assembly.
The subsequent words of the resolutionto the effect that only with the observ
ance of the above conditions can the painless preparation of the reform be realized
without arbitrary illegal seizurescan only be taken as irony. If all of the land
is transferred for disposal by the committees, which are acting according to
definite party instructions, then, of course, there will no longer be any room for
illegal seizures.
Such, in general, is the plan for the solution of the agrarian question according
to the project of the authors of the resolution. The trend toward oversimplifica
tion of the infinitely complex land question is generally the distinguishing trait of
the group which has taken upon itself the leading role in the Soviet of Peasants
Deputies. Didnt one of the representatives of this group declare at the first meet
ing of the Central Land Committee that, in order to draw up a project of agrarian
reform, no investigations or commissions are necessary, and that it is sufficient
merely to merge into one those hundreds of directives and suggestions which are
at the disposal of the soviets of peasant deputies?
It is time, at last, to stop passing resolutions and exposing popular opinion
in a mass-meeting fashion. We must hurry with the organization of local com
mittees and take up the preparation of the greatest land reform in the world, com
602 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
pletely armed with knowledge, experience, and strict objectivity. Complex and
difficult work is facing us, but only with its successful fulfillment can the sacred
motto be realized: Land to the toiling people.
521. T h e Co m m ents of Volia Naroda on th e R esolution
[No. 24, May 27,1917, p. 1.]
The debates just concluded at the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies
on the agrarian question add a great deal toward the understanding of the moods
and aspirations which prevail on this question among the peasantry.
. . . The Congress proved equal to its task. It loudly and clearly declared
that it is not simply land that the peasantry wants, it is not merely to quench its
thirst for land that the peasantry strives, right now, this minute, and for the present
generation, but that it aspires to a certain land order, a toilers9 order, to be exact.
It did not merely demand the confiscation of all land, but it clearly qualified [its
demand by the statement that the land should be transferred] into the possession
of the nation, for equitable and free use. This was the first word from the dele
gates of the land. . . .
And the peasantry said one more thing briefly but resolutely and clearly
through its spokesman, the All-Russian Congress: the land must pass into the
hands of the people without redemption . This term became the touchstone em
ployed by the deputies to define their attitude toward various parties and various
persons. When Gronskii appeared at the Congress to say [a few words] of greet
ing in the name of the Party of the Peoples Freedom, and when he associated
himself with the slogan: Land to the people! but diplomatically forgot to define
his attitude toward the question of redemption, he was very undiplomatically
reminded of it by the meeting:Without redemption, of course? And after that
no considerations and no arguments were of any avail. And in general, each time
when a speaker forgot or omitted, for the sake of brevity, these words, he was
unfailingly and insistently asked again and again:Without redemption?
But besides these two points, points of principle, which were on the agenda, the
peasantry, through the voice of its deputies to the Congress, had one more point
on the question which was particularly difficult to answer. The Congress not only
had to express its general attitude, as a matter of principle, toward the question
of the future manner of land utilization, but also had to answer what to do with
the land now9 how to deal with it prior to the Constituent Assembly.
. . . But having heard all the arguments, having deliberated and weighed
all the pros and cons, the Peasants Deputies finally declared emphatically and
firmly that willful and arbitrary actions are apt to hamper and complicate the
work of the reform by civil discord and illegal actions. And this decision of
the Congress, just because all the trumps and bewitching methods were used by
the partisans of seizure, in principle should be particularly appreciated and par
ticularly emphasized.
Nor did the Congress succumb, under pressure of the importunities of the
adherents of seizure, to the demand that the Government issue a special decree
wherein it would declare immediately that the land is the peoples property.
Apparently the Congress was facing the very same tactics here as in the area of
publishing international treaties: let them publish, or else . . . And again the
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 603
Deputies weighed the matter long and carefully. However, when they were clearly
shown by Comrade Minister V. M. Chernov to what this leads and what it means,
they definitely abandoned this pressure to the left. The only thing they de
manded of the Government was a clear rather than a double-meaning declaration
that on the question of land it will not permit anyone to oppose the will of the
people.

522. D raft R esolution on t h e A grarian Q uestion I ntroduced by


L enin at t h e C ongress
[The Collected Works of V. /. Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, pp. 109-10.
It received only a very few votes.]
1. All lands belonging to landowners and other private proprietors, as well
as appanage and church lands, etc., must be immediately turned over, without
compensation, to the people.
2. The peasantry must seize all the lands immediately, in an organised manner,
through their Soviets of Peasant Deputies, and manage them economically, with
out, however, in the least prejudicing the final settlement of the land question by
the Constituent Assembly or by the All-Russian Soviet of Soviets, should the
people decide to place the power of the State in the hands of such a Soviet of
Soviets.
3. Private ownership in land must be generally abolished, i.e., the right of
ownership of all the lands must be vested in the people as a whole; the manage
ment of the land, however, must rest with local democratic institutions.
4. The peasants must reject the advice of the capitalists, the landowners, and
the Provisional Government relating to an agreement with the landlords in
each locality upon the question of the immediate management of the lands; the
management of the lands should be determined by the organised will of the major
ity of local peasants, and not by an agreement of the majority, i.e.9 the peasants,
with an insignificant minority, i.e., the landowners.
5. The landowners and the capitalists who wield tremendous monetary power,
and exercise a vast influence on the still benighted masses through the newspapers,
the numerous officials accustomed to the domination of capital, and through other
agencies, are fighting and will fight with all means at their disposal, against the
transfer, without compensation, of all privately owned lands to the peasants. That
is why the transfer, without compensation, of all privately owned land to the
peasantry cannot be completely carried out, nor made permanent unless the con
fidence of the peasant masses in the capitalists has been undermined, unless close
ties between the peasantry and the city workers have been established, unless all
state power has completely passed into the hands of the Soviets of Workers5,
Soldiers, Peasants, etc., Deputies. It is only through such power placed in the
hands of such Soviets and governing the state not through a police, nor a bureauc
racy, nor a standing army alien to the people, but through a general, universal,
armed militia of workers and peasants, that the above-stated agrarian reforms
demanded by the entire peasantry can be secured.
6. Hired agricultural workers and the poorest peasants, i.e., such peasants
who for the lack of land, cattle and implements are obtaining their means of sub
sistence partly by hiring themselves out, must strain every effort to form inde
pendent organisations, either special Soviets or special groups within the all
604 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
peasant Soviets, in order that they may defend their interests against the rich
peasants who inevitably tend towards a union with the capitalists and landowners.
7. As a result of the war, Russia, as well as all the other warring and many
neutral countries, is threatened with ruin, catastrophe and hunger because of the
lack of working hands, coal, iron, etc. Only the assumption of control and super
vision over all production and distribution of goods by the Workers and Peasants
Deputies can save the country. It is therefore necessary to begin working out
agreements between the Soviets of Peasants Deputies and the Soviets of Workers
Deputies with regard to the exchange of food and other products of the land for
implements, shoes, clothing, etc., without the aid of the capitalists who are to be
removed from the management of the factories. With the same purpose in view,
the passing of the landowners cattle and implements into the hands of peasant
committees must be encouraged, such cattle and implements to be used in com
mon. Similarly, the turning of each large private estate into a model farm must
be encouraged, the land to be cultivated collectively with the best implements,
under the direction of agriculturists, and in accordance with the decisions made
by the local Soviets of Agricultural Workers Deputies.

THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF


WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES
523. R esolution on t h e A grarian Q uestion
[Izvestiia, No. 102, June 27,1917, p. 9.]
Taking into consideration
that the question of the great land reorganization in Russia has emerged from
the stage of preliminary, strictly theoretical deliberations and has entered the
stage of directly realizing the concrete elaboration necessary for this;
that not only the final resolution of the question in the Constituent Assembly,
but also all the preparatory work in local land committees inevitably falls into
the hands of the toiling agricultural population itself;
that the will of this toiling population is in no uncertain terms expressed by
the local soviets of peasants deputies and the All-Russian Congresses of these
soviets;
that the forthcoming decision of the land question urgently demands the
greatest possible unity of all the working democracy of towns and villages, of
the front and rear lines;
The All-Russian Congress of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
speaks out for a radical breakup of the entire old agrarian system and for the
carrying out of a new agrarian code by the united forces of all the workers and
socialist organizations of the country; this code must be based on the following
principles:
1) The land with its appurtenances, [its] waters and forests must be with
drawn from commercial usage.
2) The supreme right of its disposal must belong to all the people managing
[the land] through democratic organs of self-government, beginning from the
volost zemstvos and ending with the central national authorities.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 605
3) The use of land must be assured to the toiling agricultural population under
conditions that would guarantee the growth of industrial forces and the develop
ment of cooperative and public economy.
4) The rights of users, individual as well as collective, must be guaranteed by
special legal norms [provided] under the principles of equality of citizens.
5) Local norms, terms, and conditions for usage are to be worked out and
are to be periodically reviewed by organs of self-government that are closest to
the people under the control of the higher [authorities]. The transfer of plots
[of land] by some users to others, as well as the manner of compensation for
improvements that have not been utilized, etc., are to be regulated by specially
elected organs.
6) The character of transitional measures, which the localities with the more
complex land relations require, and the duration of the effectiveness of these
transitional measures are to be determined by special legislation, worked out
locally beforehand.

THE KADET PROGRAM


524. R esolution of t h e K adet P arty C ongress
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 106, May 13, 1917, pp. 3-4. E. A. Morokhovets, Agrarnye
programmy rossiiskikh partii v 1917 godu, is valuable for the study of the agrarian
programs of the various parties.]
I. The agricultural lands should belong to the toiling agrarian population.
II. An urgent measure in this direction should be the realization of the land
reform which would have as its immediate goal provision for the land require
ments of the population engaged in agricultural work [which possesses] little or
no land (see hereunder The Main Foundations of the Agrarian Reform) .
III. In order to preserve the land for its fundamental purpose, ownership by
the toilers, measures established by law should eliminate the possibility of indi
viduals either acquiring land above the labor norm or transforming land for
agricultural use (even within the limits of the labor norm) into a source of
permanent rental income.
IV. In view of the variety of forms of the toilers land holdings, both in [the
various] regions of Russia and within the limits of these regions, the decisive
factor in this issue should be, principally, the legal concepts, the economic con
siderations, and the will of the interested population itself. In accordance with
this, the latter should be given by law wide possibilities to maintain, establish, or
develop such forms of landownership as would seem preferable to it.
V. With the elimination of class restrictions, of administrative supervision,
and of other remnants of the old regime, all the land organizations (communes,
[obshchina] communities [obshchestvo] possessing [hereditary] plots [podvor-
noe ], associations [tovarishchestvo], and so forth) should acquire the character
of private legal organizations with the rights of their members and of the unions
themselves as a whole, to be [safeguarded] exclusively by judicial protection.
The internal organization and activity of the organizations must be determined
by law and by the statutes and pacts established by it.
VI. As for the land of the commune in particular, it is necessary: 1) to elimi
606 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
nate from the existing legislation the measures of forceful destruction of com
munal ownership; 2) to eliminate the overlapping of agricultural lands between
the sectors fixed in favor of individual owners and the lands of the communes;
3) to establish an order for the withdrawal of individual members from the com
munes and for the allotment to them [of land], which would safeguard the inter
ests both of those who withdraw and receive their allotments and of the rest [of
the members] of the commune, and 4) to permit by law the individual [members]
of the commune to concede their right to participate in the communal ownership
to extraneous persons, while safeguarding at the same time the interests of the
commune.
VII. A broad organization of land settlement, and also of works tending to
prepare and arrange lands for resettlers, is essential. [Also] a public national
organization of the resettlement itself [is necessary]. [Furthermore], a system
of measures tending to raise the productivity of the toilers landholdings [is
necessary], for instance: amelioration, agricultural credit, measures of an agro
nomic nature, further development in strengthening of the cooperatives, and so
forth.
VIII. The woods should belong to the State, with the exclusion of wooded
areas that could acquire an agricultural purpose and also those in possession of
the toiling population (allotted [woods] and so forlli) or of public institutions.
The exploitation of forests should be determined on the basis of a general plan
which would both provide for the correct organization of forest economy and
satisfy the requirements of the country, [as well as] safeguard forests having
significance for defense and so forth.
The Main Foundations of the Agrarian Reform
I. For the purpose of the land reform, the existing reserve of national lands
(including the former udel and Kabinet lands) is to be increased by the lands
belonging to monasteries and churches, those belonging to the Peasants and
Nobles Banks and those which will be compulsorily confiscated from private
owners (actual or juridical persons).
II. Lands belonging to agrarian communities, all the small individual holdings
that do not exceed the labor norm, the holdings of members of associations
[tovarishchestvo], the lands belonging to town and zemstvo enterprises, and also
the lands of other enterprises which are intended for educational, public health,
scientific, or other purposes of general usefulness are not to be subject to confis
cation.
III. In the rest of the private holdings, all the land in excess of the labor
norm is subject to compulsory confiscation. In the localities where there is no
shortage of land for the normal supplying of the agrarian population [possess
ing] little or no land, those owners who work on their holdings, using their own
inventory, have the right to preserve for themselves a quantity of land superior
to the labor [norm] but not above the limit established for that purpose.
Private owners would be entitled to preserve holdings exceeding the aforesaid
limits only in cases where the competent institution recognized it as necessary to
preserve the given holding unaltered or to establish a gradual procedure for its
liquidation.
IV. With the exclusion of forests intended for preservation and those areas
of land which it will be considered necessary to leave at the immediate disposal
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 607
of governmental organs or of organs of local self-administration for purposes
of cultural development and other national or public purposes, the lands of the
general national reserve are to serve first of all to provide, in accordance with
the limits [of holdings] established for this purpose, for the needs of the local
toiling agrarian population [possessing] little or no land.
The lands of the national reserve which would be left after the needs of the
local population are provided for, according to the aforesaid limits, could serve
to provide for the further needs of that same population or for the needs of
resettlers from other localities.
In a given locality where a shortage of land reserves would [exclude] the
possibility of securing normal holdings for the local agrarian population [possess
ing] little or no land, the widest assistance of the government should be given
to those who wish to resettle in other regions.
V. The law should indicate the localities where forests, owing to their abund
ance, may be put at the disposal of the population for its agricultural needs and
should define the exact share of the forests which could be assigned for this
purpose.
VI. The aforesaid limits [of landholdings] which are to satisfy [the needs
of] the population [possessing] little or no land, the labor norms, and the limits
of the land holdings which in regions possessing a sufficient reserve of land
could be left to the owners, provided they cultivate them with their own equip
ment, are to be worked out in the various regions by the local land institutions
and later on will be determined by law.
Note: The aforesaid limits should be established in accordance with the usual
size of the holdings of a semilabor type of the given locality, that is, holdings in
which the landowners themselves, along with hired labor, participate directly in
agricultural works.
VII. The compulsory confiscation of privately owned lands is to be effected
on the basis of their purchase by the State in accordance with an estimate corre
sponding to the normal profits [yielded] by these lands, excluding from the cal
culations such elements of profit increase as are conditioned by the land require
ments of the local population, the abnormal condition of labor hiring, and so forth.
The standards of profit are also to be worked out by the local land institutions
and are to be established by law.
VIII. The lands of the national reserve are granted on a permanent [termless]
basis to the population which needs them, both to the collective unitsthe com
munes, the communities including privately owned plots, the associations [tovar-
ishchestvo ], and other unions of landownersand to individual owners, in accord
ance with the local peculiarities of the existing toilers landholdings and the
desires of the population.
IX. The purchase price for the confiscated land is to be paid to the owners by
means of certificates of purchase. The amortization of this amount and the pay
ment of a share established by law of yearly interest on the certificates of purchase
should be carried by the government. The rest of the interest payments should
be covered by a special tax on the lands allotted for the use of the population.

The present program has in view mainly the conditions of European Russia,
with the exclusion of some of its borderlands and regions which have a special
608 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
land organization (mountainous Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the lands of the inner
Kirghiz horde, the lands of the Cossacks, etc.)* For those regions which differ
sharply in their way of life and economic [setup], the thesis of the program should
be altered accordingly, preserving their general bases.
. . . The Central Committee, together with local representatives of the Party,
is entrusted with the study of the questions regarding the application of the
agrarian program to those regions and borderlands that have their own special
land organizations (the mountainous Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the lands of the
Cossacks, and so forth).
The agrarian program in its entirety was adopted by a majority, with one
against and several abstaining.

THE UNION OF LANDOWNERS


525. A C ongress of L andowners in S aratov
[VVP, No. 61, May 24,1917, p. 3.]
More than 200 people were present, among them many peasants who had
chosen consolidated strips. Count Olcyfiev chaired. The speakers criticized
sharply the program of gratuitous expropriation of privately owned lands. Many
reported that their lands were seized and that they were forced to issue receipts
to the effect that voluntary agreements existed between them and the usurpers.
A very critical attitude was observed toward the orders of Chernov to stop private
land deals. In concluding his speech, one of the orators appealed to the Congress
with the words: Greetings to you, the disinherited ones. As a result it was
decided to organize a union of landowners and to initiate a struggle against the
socialists by propagandizing the ideas of the Congress.

526. S peec h of N. N. Lvov at th e Congress of t h e U nion of L andow ners


in Moscow
IRech, No. 158, July 8, 1917, p. 5.]
During the French Revolution a priest was about to be hanged to a lamppost.
Friends, he asked, will this make the light brighter for you? We could now ask
the same question: Will it be better for the Russian people if our estates are
destroyed and private landownership abolished? The events that are presently
taking place in the country are similar to those of 1905-6. However, there exists
an essential difference. Then in the villages alcoholic intoxication reigned, which
ruined the people and enriched the treasury. Now the situation is different. First
of all, there is no more drunkenness, the main vice of the people. Then came the
agrarian reform of June 14 [1910] which created [peasant] landowners in the
country [and] a solid [rural] economy.17 During the war the influx of money
17 On June 14,1910, the Third State Duma adopted as law, with some changes, the Ukase
of November 9,1906, which had initiated the Stolypin reform.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 609
into the villages has been so great that one cannot speak any longer of the mone
tary anemia which so long afflicted the villages. There is much money in the vil
lages and we may observe another thingmonetary surpluses. In the revolution
of 1905-6 the main factor was the agrarian movement. In 1917 it was only the
result of a coup detat. Neither the agrarian nor the workers movements, but the
war, brought the catastrophe of February 1917. And of those revolutionary
political parties that took an active part in the preparation of the events of 1905-6,
hardly any participated in the events of 1917. The revolutionary parties, together
with their old slogans, not expecting the revolution, have risen to the surface
suddenly. When they proclaim these slogans, they are handing promissory notes
which, as they well know, it will be impossible to meet. Those who have risen
to the head of the administration know only how to make a revolution. They
know only how to destroy, and have not learned how to create. I shall never deny
the importance of the agrarian question in Russia. Doors should be wide open
in Russia for that yearning for land, which is inherent to the Russian peasant,
this eternal tiller. But this process must necessarily be a lengthy process. Many
years will be required for delimitation, allotment, resettlement, and migration.
What would a landless or semilandless peasant do after getting a plot of 15-20
dessiatines when he has neither livestock nor agricultural implements? Who does
not attempt nowadays to solve the agrarian problem!people who never saw a
sowing or a harvesting, who can hardly distinguish between wheat and rice.
Essential problems concerning the needs of the peasantry are solved for the sake
of abstract principles. Let the world collapse, but let the idea triumph. A narrow
minded, mean, evil tyranny is being created, which confuses and deceives people,
which violates life [itself]. What is happening here is not socialism. It is the
stimulation of the coarse and rapacious instincts of the masses. It is the coarse
egotism of classes, groups, castes. Everyone grabs for himself what he can, with
out regard for anything, while we have to wage one of the most dreadful wars
that has ever occurred. We forget that all of us have something in common which
should unite usour homeland.
Later on, the speaker said: I would not like to condemn our present-day
Provisional Government. I know that many in it voluntarily took the way to
Golgotha. But I cannot fail to perceive the passive role lately played by the
Government. I cannot fail to see how pernicious is the viewpoint that everything
shall settle itself, that the national sense of the Russian people shall triumph.
However, concluded N. N. Lvov, the situation does not seem to me hope
less. . . . The Russian army is recovering from its demoralization and is advanc
ing; likewise, it is time for us to abandon passivity, to go ahead, to move forward.

527. S ession of t h e P lenum o f t h e Central Council of t h e


U nion of L andowners , J uly 31, 1917
[0. Chaadaeva, Soiuz zemelnykh sobstvennikov v 1917 godu, KA , XXI (1927), 114.]
After opening the session, the President of the Council, N. N. Lvov, moved
that the meeting discuss the motion of the Council on the necessity to conduct a
statistical survey of land and population resources in each uezd. In the opinion
of N. N. Lvov, this survey was particularly important in order to take the dis
cussions on agrarian reform from the field of theoretic speculations into that of
610 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
practical conclusions based, not on promises of socialist parties, but on sound
given data.
In advocating their programs, the socialists give no figures. And they do not
give them because, were they to tell their listeners the truth as to the actual form
their promises will take, no one would follow them. Consequently, to fight the
socialist propaganda we must have in our hands exact information, convincing
data. On the basis of these we could explain to the population what it gains and
what it loses by carrying out the socialist programs.
Irrespective of the general work proposed by the Council, N. N. Lvov thinks,
on his part, that it would be extremely useful to conduct a survey of individual
estates with an estimate, even if in rough outline, of the efficiency [output?] of
a given estate, the cost of its equipment, and an estimate of expenditures on the
labor of local peasants and various employees and workers of the estate. Con
clusions should then be made of the populations gains in the event of the division
of the estate among the peasants and the earnings that would be lost by the people
serving the estate. If a sufficient number of such individual reports could be
made, they would constitute rich material for our representatives in the Con
stituent Assembly in their fight against socialist theories. [A motion to this effect
was carried.]

The President of the Council, N. N. Lvov, moved to begin the discussion of


the question of the participation of landowners in the elections to the Constituent
Assembly. After pointing out to the meeting the deplorable fact that up to this
time the landowners have been organized in very few uezds, and after emphasizing
the need for the most rapid organization and the necessity of combatting instances
of evasions from organizational work in various places by prominent public lead
ers, whose sacred duty it is to assume leadership of organizations, N. N. Lvov
expounded to the meeting his view on the position the landowners must take in
the forthcoming electoral campaign. We must create one great movement in Rus
sian lifea patriotic and national movement. We must consolidate all honest
and sober-minded forces of Russia in the struggle against the destructive begin
nings of socialist currents.
All must rally round this union and overcome the prejudices we still hold
against some parties which do not share our agrarian program but which are
based on a sound concept of civic-mindedness and not on principles of destruction.
We must organize a broad and bold drive against socialist parties in order to
save Russia.
The entire activity of socialist parties is based on hatred of tsarism and the
ruling classes. They have no love for their motherland and for them there are
no state problems, for they pursue but one destructive aim. Just as they have
destroyed the army by Order No. 1, so now they are destroying the economic life
of Russia. All reports from various places paint one and the same picture. All is
quiet until a congress convenes which throws out slogans of destruction. These
slogans are picked up by various volost committees and are forced upon the popu
lation. And thereupon they are sanctioned in a treacherous, sugary form by the
Minister Chernov. The terrible thing is that we have a Minister [who is] a Zim-
merwaldist, who cares nothing about Russia, for whom nothing is holy in his
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 611
native land. We have the right and obligation to march boldly in defense of our
interests, because by defending property, we defend statehood. But our task, by
submerging our personal interests, is to create a power united by love to our
fatherland and by hatred toward its enemies who are ready to sacrifice Russia,
some [of them] for the triumph of the revolution and some for German money.
We must be ready to do anything, to stop at nothing, down to risking our
life, but we must win at any cost.
N. N. Lvov added that he has already begun the work of organizing groups of
industrialists, bankers, Kadets, and others, and requests the Congress to approve
his program of action. The ardent speech of N. N. Lvov met with unanimous
and complete sympathy on the part of the session.

In closing the session, President N. N. Lvov expressed the hope that the end
of the Petrograd period in history is approaching. Russia wants to live for her
own sake and not for the sake of Petersburg, and Russia will succeed in achieving
genuine freedom for herself, and not fictional freedom, expressed in the despotism
of socialism.

THE COOPERATIVES
528. T h e N ew C ooperative C ode
[So&. Uzak., I, 1, No. 414. See also the act of June 21 concerning registration, ibid.,
I, 2, No. 907. See Kayden and Antsiferov, The Cooperative Movement During the War,
pp. 24-26, 294-97, for a discussion of the significance of this legislation. Essentially
the same act had been passed before the revolution by the State Duma but not confirmed
by the State Council. Zhurnaly, No. 13, March 9,1917.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In abrogation and amendment of the relevant legislation, the Statute on co
operative associations and their unions annexed hereto is established.
II. . . . The reorganization of these associations, institutions, and unions . . .
must be concluded within two years from the day of promulgation of the present
law.
III. The present law shall come into effect on May 1, 1917, and by that time
registration sections shall be established in circuit courts . . . and model char
ters shall be prepared by public organizations and government institutions.
IV. The Minister of Finance is authorized to take the necessary steps for the
preparation of legislative proposals:
a. Concerning the determination of economic criteria for defining the type
of cooperative-credit institutions entitled to the benefits now granted to small-
credit institutions;
b. Concerning a revision of laws dealing with mutual-credit societies;
c. Concerning the determination of general principles governing the issue by
credit institutions of mortgage certificates and bonds guaranteed by mortgaged
real estate.
612 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
V. Pending the effective date of the present law the following provisional pro
cedure for approval of charters is established.
1. The responsibility for approval of the charters of cooperative associations,
entrusted by existing legislation to guberniya committees for small-credit mat
ters, and also to guberniya governors and guberniya offices for matters affecting
societies and associations, is transferred to guberniya zemstvo councils in those
guberniyas in which they exist. In those guberniyas where the zemstvo has not
been introduced, or where, because of present conditions, it does not appear pos
sible to entrust responsibility for approving charters to guberniya zemstvo coun
cils, this responsibility is placed upon the guberniya and oblast Government
Commissars or, where for local reasons this proves impossible, upon Temporary
Committees.

V la d . N a bo k o v , Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government


March 20, 1917.
STATUTE ON COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATIONS AND THEIR UNIONS
Section I. On Cooperative Associations
Chapter I. General Provisions
1. A Cooperative Association shall be considered an association with variable
composition and capital which, acting under a special trade name, is designed to
promote the material and spiritual welfare of its members by means of the joint
organization of various kinds of economic undertakings or the labor of its
members.
Cooperative associations shall include: credit associations and loan and
savings associations; consumers societies; associations for production, for the
joint purchase, marketing, transportation, and storage of goods, for the joint
use of the means of production, for the processing of farm products; insurance
associations; associations for the joint acquisition and use of land; building
associations; societies to meet housing needs; labor and exchange artels, as well
as other similar associations and societies, and associations and societies of the
mixed type.
2. Along with economic activity, cooperative associations may, for the
achievement of their goals, carry out studies of all kinds and publish their results,
issue periodical and other publications, address petitions to appropriate institu
tions, found institutions to satisfy any needs of the association and its members,
and take any action designed to develop the association and improve the welfare
of its members.
3. Persons of either sex who are of age, as well as legal persons, may be
members of a cooperative association.
4. Permission of government authorities is not required in order to found a
cooperative association.
Cooperative associations shall be formed on the basis of charters or by
contract.
5. Cooperative associations may join together in unions and open branches.
6. A cooperative association is . . . considered a legal person and may
acquire and alienate property rights, including the right of ownership and other
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 613
rights in real estate by all legal means, may conclude contracts, assume obliga
tions, act as plaintiff and defendant in court, and also receive contributions and
inherit under wills.

Section II. Unions of Cooperative Associations


Chapter I. General Provisions
52. Unions of cooperative associations (article 5) shall be established, under
a special trade name, for the purpose of facilitating to the utmost the successful
fulfillment of the tasks of their member associations.
53. Cooperative associations with similar as well as with dissimilar tasks,
and also unions of associations, may form unions.
54. A union of cooperative associations may: . . . [carry out the functions
permitted to cooperative associations and, in addition]
2. Carry out audits of its member associations;
5. Call meetings for the discussion of questions arising out of the activity
of the cooperative associations and their unions;
8. And, in general take any action designed to develop the cooperative
movement.
Minister-President
P r in c e L vov ,
[and all other ministers]
March 20, 1917

529. C o ng resses o f C o o pe r a t iv e R e p r e se n t a t iv e s
[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1316. The activities and policies of the cooperatives in various
areas of national life in 1917 are covered elsewhere under the appropriate subject
titles.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Congresses of representatives of cooperatives are established in order to
clarify and discuss questions affecting the needs of cooperatives, to prepare and
carry out measures designed to promote their success, as well as to represent their
interests.
2. Congresses may be of the following types:
a) general All-Russian, oblast and district [ raionnyi]on questions affect
ing all types and groups of cooperatives.
Note: All-Russian General Congresses, uniting all types and groups of coop
eratives, shall be called All-Russian Cooperative Congresses.
b) All-Russian, oblast and district by groupson questions affecting indi
vidual types and groups of cooperatives.
614 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
n . PURPOSES AND RIGHTS OF CONGRESSES
3. In order to accomplish the purposes mentioned in article 1, congresses
have the right:
a) to represent the interests of cooperatives before government and public
institutions;
b) to promote the activity of cooperatives and assist in their creation;
c) to open cooperative scientific institutes, educational institutions, courses,
bookstores, information and legal offices, etc., to organize expositions, museums
and libraries, lectures and readings, to collect statistical information and publish
books, pamphlets, periodicals, etc.;
d) to seek methods for the settlement, by means of agreement and arbitration,
of disputes and misunderstandings arising on the basis of cooperative interests
between cooperatives, as well as between the latter and other institutions and
private persons;
e) to render assistance to cooperatives in defending their rights and interests
by legal and administrative action.
4. Registration divisions of circuit courts are required to deliver to the
Council of All-Russian Cooperative Congresses (general) :
a) information, in the form established by the Council, on each act of regis
tration of a charter and subsequent amendments thereto, on the liquidation of
cooperative associations and their unions, as well as on a refusal of registration
within a period of two weeks after completion of the corresponding documents;
b) one copy each of charters submitted for registration.
5. Cooperative associations and their unions of all types are required to
deliver to the Council of All-Russian Cooperative Congresses (general) their
balances drawn up at the time specified by their charters, within one month after
the time so specified, as well as their annual reports within two weeks after their
approval.
6. Congresses, after registration of their charters by the appropriate circuit
courts, may acquire property rights in their name, including the right of owner
ship and other rights to immovable property, enter contracts and commitments,
act as plaintiff and defendant in court, and possess their own seal.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF CONGRESSES
20. The administration of the affairs of congresses is entrusted to Councils,
which constitute the executive organs of congresses.
21. The composition of the Council, the number of members, the procedure
for their election, the location of the Council, as well as the procedure for admin
istration of the affairs of the Council, are determined by decisions of the congress.
24. The Council has the right to discuss legislative proposals affecting coop
eratives, and the right to make representations to the Government concerning
desirable amendments to such legislative proposals.

N . N ek r a so v , Deputy Minister-President
S. P r o k o p o v ic h , Minister of Trade and Industry
August 1, 1917
CHAPTER 11
Supply and Provisioning

THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF


FOOD SUPPLY ORGANS AND THE GRAIN MONOPOLY
530. T h e E stablishm ent of t h e S tate Co m m ittee on F ood S u pply
[5o6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 358. From February 27 to March 9, food supply was adminis
tered by a joint Commission on Food Supply of the Executive Committee of the State
Duma and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. The prerevolutionary war
time organization of food supply is described in Struve, Food Supply in Russia,
pp. 3-22.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. The activity of the Special Council on Food Supply . . . is suspended.
2. For the preparation of a state food supply plan, and of guiding principles
and general measures on food supply, a State Committee on Food Supply shall be
established under the chairmanship of the Minister of Agriculture.
3. In the matter of food supply the Minister of Agriculture acts by agreement
with the State Committee on Food Supply, the decisions of which shall be carried
into effect by orders of the Minister of Agriculture.
5. The deputies of the Minister of Agriculture, as Chairman of the Committee,
shall be two vice-chairmen elected by the Committee from among its members.
6. The State Committee on Food Supply shall have the following member
ship : four representatives from the Executive Committee of the State Duma, five
representatives from the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, five repre
sentatives from the Soviet of Peasants Deputies, four each from the All-Russian
Unions of Towns and Zemstvos, six from the cooperatives (two each from the
producers, consumers, and credit cooperatives), three from the War Industry
Committee, three from the Council of Congresses of representatives of the ex
change trade and agriculture, two from the Agricultural Chamber, and one from
the Executive Committee of the Congress of Statisticians. Representatives of
government departments shall sit on the Committee with an advisory vote.
7. Provisionally, pending the establishment of the State Committee on Food
Supply, the functions of the Committee shall be performed by the Commission
on die Food Supply of the Committee of the State Duma and of the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 9,1917
616 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
531. A n A ppea l in Rabochaia Gazeta
[No. 14, March 22, 1917, p. 1.]
As in the past, queues form on the streets in front of stores. Food is hard to
get. Everyone complains about shortages of bread, butter, meat. Has nothing
changed?
This is the thought that perhaps goes through the mind of the incredulous
ones, people unable to grasp the complexity of the problems confronting the new
regime. The former government proved bankrupt. It brought the country to the
brink of famine. But there is no relief from famine under the new government
either. The shortage of the most essential consumer goods continues. Is the new
government also bankrupt?
We of course are not responsible for all the actions of the new government.
It can and it does make mistakes. It is necessary to watch its actions closely, to
anticipate mistakes and strive to correct the errors committed. But it would be
highly dangerous and undesirable to heap upon the new government the sins
committed by the old regime, to accuse it of failure to fulfill what it cannot fulfill,
to demand that it correct and improve immediately the condition which only long
and hard work can correct.
Time is needed. A whole series of measures must be drawn up, elaborated,
and introduced into the life of the country. And the indispensable interference
of the government in economic life is already beginning. Within the next few
days the grain monopoly will be inaugurated. . . .
To introduce such a measure from the center alone, to order it from Petrograd
is no easy task. Help from the organized population is needed. Even during the
early days of the victory of the revolution it was proposed by telegraph to organize
local food committeesguberniya, uezd, and volost. And at present a law has
been drawn up with regard to these committees. The entire population will be
called upon to participate in organized assistance to the Government in the matter
of supply.
The old government feared the organization of the population, it prevented
its organization by all means, but without the organization of the entire population
nothing could be achieved in the difficult area of food during the war.
Now the entire population is being organized. Given a little time, the entire
country with all of its latent intellectual power and talents will take part in the
difficult and responsible work of food supply. And who will dare to doubt that,
once mobilized and united in its efforts, the entire country will not do everything
that is possible in time of war to improve the situation in the matter of food supply
after all the mistakes made in this area by the old government.
Let us then be patient and perseverant. Let us organize and work, and through
combined efforts we will unquestionably eliminate those calamities and sufferings
which the old regime inflicted upon us.
532. D ifficulties A ttendant upon t h e I ntroduction of
B read R ationing in P etrograd
[VVP, No. 17, March 25,1917, p. 4. The Soviet was also concerned about the situation
and issued a similar appeal. See Protoholy, pp. 70-71, and Izvestiia, No. 24, March 25,
1917, p. 1. On the first day of rationing the soldiers did not receive bread from the
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 617
army and demanded it from bakeries. As a result, many civilians were left without
bread.]
FROM THE STATE COMMITTEE ON FOOD SUPPLY
Citizens!
The rationing of bread went into effect as of March 24. However, misunder
standings are occurring in certain sections of the city, and soldiers, as well as
persons who have not received their ration cards, are demanding that bread be
released to them without ration cards.
The State Committee on Food Supply, in agreement with the Soviet of Workers9
and Soldiers9 Deputies, hereby confirms that bread should only be released in
accordance with ration cards.
Therefore, those persons who have not as yet received their ration cards must
immediately direct themselves to the representatives of their households, or, in
the event that there are no such representatives, to the district committee on food
supply, or its subdivisions. Bread shall not be released without ration cards.
Concerning soldiers, it is hereby announced that, in accordance with a clari
fication of this matter by the army supply service, soldiers receive their bread
allowance from their military units, and they must not make demands on private
stores to release bread without the presentation of ration cards. The army supply
service will provide military units with wheat white bread as well as rye bread
in accordance with established ration scales.
The procedure of standing in queues should apply to the distribution of bread9
and persons in military service are to enjoy no special privileges in relation to
other citizens.
The State Committee on Food Supply is appealing to the citizens to remain
completely calm and to abide by the regular procedure of bread sales, since it is
only under these conditions that everyone will be able to receive his required
amount of bread.
[Those] soldiers who for one reason or another are not receiving their allow
ances from military units must turn to the district committee on food supply, or
its subdivisions, for a clarification, bringing proper attestations with them.
S tate Com m ittee on F ood S u pply

533. R e p o rts fr o m t h e C om m issar o f t h e Moscow P r e fe c tu r e


( GradonachaVstvo) t o t h e C om m issar o f t h e P r o v isio n a l G overn m en t
in Moscow (N . K ishkjn) C on cern in g F ood S u p p ly
[Trodovolstvennoe polozhenie v Moskve v marte-iiune 1917 goda, KA, XXCI (1937),
129, 132.]
[March 12]
Queues are growing in front of all bakeries. The general cause of the in
creased acuteness of the food crisis is the shortage of flour. Many bakeries have
cut their output of bread in half . . .
The commissariats in the outskirts must supply the bread needs of the popu
lation outside of Moscow, which, because of the local shortage of bread, rushes
into Moscow for it. On March 12 the city bakeries were to strike and discontinue
baking bread. Private bakeries announced that they too would stop work if the
city bakeries struck. The Mayor was informed of this in time. The commissars
618 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
report that the sale of bread will undoubtedly be permitted for two hours, from
9:00 to 11:00.
Complications with respect to sugar are not as great. . . .
Disorders caused by supply problems have not occurred anywhere, but gen
eral discontent prevails. . . .
[March 16]
According to dispatches from forty-eight district commissars, the supply
situation with regard to bread continues to deteriorate. Except for three or four
satisfactory areas, the same reports arrive from everywhere: that because of the
acute situation with regard to provisioning, the population is agitated, is ex
cited, and the general mood is violent and menacing.
534. T h e E stablishm ent of t h e Grain M onopoly w it h F ixed P rices for
Grain and t h e O rganization of L ocal F ood S u pply C om m ittees
[5o6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 487. The Minister of Agriculture was authorized by the Govern
ment on March 10 to draft this law and to work out the bases for supplying the rural
population with necessary consumer goods at fixed prices. Zhurnaly, No. 14. In
connection with or supplemental to this basic legislation, the following laws were
subsequently enacted: 1) the establishment in the Ministry of Agriculture on March 28
of a section for providing agriculture with metal, implements and fertilizers and of
a section for the registration of the crop area and for providing agriculture with labor
and credit (Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 441); specific instructions issued on May 3 to the
guberniya food supply committees on the procedures for the registration, sowing, har
vesting, sale, and distribution of grain (ibid., No. 670); the law of May 3, authorizing
local food supply committees to seize grain which had been concealed or withheld
from delivery to the state (ibid., No. 669); the establishment on July 12 of fixed prices
for hay and straw (ibid., I, 2, No. 1448); the order of the Minister of Food of July 17,
permitting the processing of grain into flour or groats only by authorization of food
supply organs (ibid., No. 1130); the order of the Minister of Food of July 25, forbid
ding the shipment of grain except by authorization of the Minister of Food, his
representatives, or food supply organs (ibid., No. 1353); and the rules for the regis
tration of grain of the harvest of 1917 and of previous years (ibid., No. 1861). Several
other relevant orders and laws are printed below.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. The annexed shall be approved:
1. Law on the transfer of grain to the State and
2. Temporary statute on local food supply organs.
II. The law on the transfer of grain to the State shall be put into effect in all
places with the exception of the Transcaucasus and the oblasts of the Turkestan
Governor-Generalship.
III. For the purpose of unifying measures to provide the army and the popu
lation with food, the Department of Granaries of the State Bank and railroad
warehouses shall be subordinate in their grain operations to the Minister of Agri
culture, as Chairman of the State Committee on Food Supply.
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 619
IV, For the administration of matters pertaining to food supply, local com
mittees on food supply shall be established on the following basis:
1. The committees shall be set up pending the formation of local organs on
proper democratic foundations (a universal, equal, direct, and secret vote of the
entire adult population) and pending assumption by them of direction of the food
supply as local organs of the state organization on the food supply.

3. As the guberniya committees on food supply are formed, the special repre
sentatives on the food supply and the special representatives of the Ministry of
Agriculture on Purchase and procurement1 shall transfer all business and credits
to the chairman of the respective guberniya committee, as special representative
of the Minister of Agriculture.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 25, 1917
Annex No. I to Section I (No. 487)
I. Law on the Transfer of Grain to the State
1. All grain crops of earlier years, of 1916, and the future harvest of 1917,
less the reserve defined in articles 3 and 4 as necessary for the food and economic
needs of the owner, shall, from the time of registration of grains . . . be placed at
the disposal of the State and may be alienated only through the intermediary
of state food supply organs.
2. By grain (article 1) is meant: rye, wheat, spelt, millet, buckwheat, lentils,
beans and peas, corn, barley and oats, and all flour, bran, and by-products of
the production of the grains named as well as oil cake.
3. The amount of grain necessary for seeding the fields, for subsistence of
the producer, his family, and persons employed on the farm receiving a grain
allowance from the owner, as well as grain for economic needs (fodder for cattle),
shall be exempt from alienation.
4. Local guberniya food supply committees shall be authorized to determine
the standards by which the grain on hand from the 1916 harvest and earlier years
shall be exempted from alienation under the preceding article, on the basis of
the following considerations: [specific criteria are listed for the determination
of the amount of grain and fodder to be left each owner for subsistence, seeding,
and maintenance of livestock.]

9. Fixed prices for grain of earlier years, 1916, and the future 1917 harvest
shall be established f.o.b. station or wharf in the amounts indicated in the annex
to the present article.2 By station or wharf are meant those warehouses or prem
ises in which local food supply organs receive grain for further shipment.
1 Offices created during the war by the tsarist government.
2 The fixed prices on grain were raised by an average of 60 per cent over those prevailing
since September 1916; Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 137.
620 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
10. Delivery of grain to station or wharf shall be compulsory for owners. In
case of noncompliance, delivery may be carried out by the food supply organs and
deducted from the amount due the owner in payment for his grain.

Annex No. II to Section I (No. 487)


Temporary Statute on Food Supply Organs
1. The local food supply committees, formed on the basis of the present statute,
shall administer the food supply and the organization of agricultural production
in accordance with the orders and enactments of the Minister of Agriculture, as
Chairman of the State Committee on Food Supply, or enactments of the Assistant
Minister of Agriculture for food supply.
2. The guberniya committees on food supply shall include the following
representatives:
1. Three by election of the guberniya zemstvo assembly . . . ;
2. Three by election of the municipal duma of the guberniya capital . . . ;
3. One from the local branch of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union;
4. One from the local branch of the All-Russian Union of Towns;
5. One from the local section of the War Industry Committee;
6. Five from the local soviet of workers deputies or, in the absence of
such, from the hospital funds and trade unions;
7. Five from the local Peasants Union;
8. Six from the local cooperatives (as far as possible two from each kind
of cooperative);
9. Two from the guberniya agricultural societies . . . ;
10. Three from the exchange committees or commercial organizations
acting in their stead;
11. One representative each from the statistical organizationszemstvo
and municipaland one each from the agronomic, economic, and public health
zemstvo organizations, where such exist.

3. Uezd, municipal, and volost committees on food supply shall be organized


within the boundaries of the guberniya, acting in accordance with the decisions
of the guberniya committee on food supply.
Note 1 : The guberniya committees on food supply shall be authorized to form,
if necessary, regional committees along with or in place of uezd and volost com
mittees.
Note 2: Uezd, volost, and municipal committees shall be authorized to form
smaller committees within the boundaries of their territories, the competence of
which shall be determined in accordance with the present regulation by the com
mittee organizing them.
4. The uezd, municipal, and volost committees shall be composed of the fol
lowing representatives: [elected at the local level corresponding to those repre
sented in the guberniya committees.]

9. The procedure for the election of representatives to uezd, municipal, re


gional, and volost committees on food supply from cooperatives, the commercial
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 621
and industrial class, zemstvo and municipal employees, as well as of representa
tives of the workers (if in the respective part of the guberniya there are no local
soviets of workers deputies and organizations of agricultural workers) and of
representatives of the peasants, if there is no peasant union, shall be determined
by the guberniya committee on food supply.
10. Representatives from the various groups of the population mentioned . . .
may be elected both from among people belonging to the respective groups as
well as from among other people.
March 25, 1917
535. A nnouncem ent of the P rovisional G overnment R egarding
t h e Grain M onopoly
[VVP9No. 20, March 30,1917, p. 3.]
The difficult situation in food supply and the necessity to provide grain for
the army and the population as soon as possible are forcing the Provisional Gov
ernment to resort to the most urgent measures in the realm of food supply. Hence
forth all surplus grain reserves must be turned over to the State. This difficult
task is entrusted to local organs which are being organized for assistance to State
authorities. In accepting grain at new fixed prices in order to achieve a uniform
and equitable distribution of food supply, the Government at the same time con
siders that its first duty is to proceed at once to the establishment of fixed prices
on articles of prime necessity (iron, textiles, kerosene, leather, etc.) and to make
these available to the population at the lowest possible prices. Thus, the Govern
ment holds to the belief that the new law which is being carried into effect con
stitutes the first serious step on the road to bringing order into the economic life
of the country which was disrupted during the war by the bad government of the
old regime.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
V. N abokov , Head of the Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
March 28,1917
536. T h e L aw on t h e P rotection of Crops
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 498. See Doc. 489.]
1. The protection of all crops, which are state property according to the law
on the transfer of grain to the State, shall be entrusted to guberniya, uezd, and
volost food supply committees, which shall organize inspection and supervision
of individual farms by mutual agreement [with the owners or operators].
This inspection and supervision shall be carried out by the food supply com
mittees with the assistance of persons and institutions enjoying the confidence
of the local population.
2. Supervision and public inspection consist: 1) in determining the extent
of the crop area and 2) in overseeing the use of labor, implements, and tools of
production assigned from state sources.
622 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
3. In the event of violent damage to, or destruction of, the crops, the Provi
sional Government shall reimburse the owners of the farms placed under pro
tection and inspection for the expenditures incurred by them on the crops to the
extent of the real losses as determined by special commissions.
5. In the event of refusal by the owner to sow land, the unsown area of arable
land shall be placed at the disposal of the local committees on food supply, which
may rent it for a fair price to local landowners for the current harvest or organize
sowing themselves.
6. Rent of lands taken for sowing shall be paid to the owners of the land. Its
amount shall be determined through the intermediary of the food supply com
mittees.
7. The rules for determining and reimbursing losses, for the organization of
crop production, and for the determination of rent shall be published subse
quently by the Chairman of the State Committee on Food Supply.
The original is signed by the Minister-President and Members of the Provi
sional Government and the State Controller.
V lad . N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 11, 1917
537. C o m m ent of Russkiia Vedomosti on the L aw P rotecting Crops
[No. 85, April 17,1917, p. 1.]
The Provisional Government has just published a law guaranteeing crops
against violent damage, and concerning the method of utilizing fields that have
remained unsown. . . .
The new law has as its first and basic aim to reassure the sower psychologically
and to induce him to sow without being afraid of possible agrarian disturbances.
In order to attain this goal, the law provides two types of measures. First of all,
the sower who is apprehensive about the fate of his crops is granted the right
to entrust them to the custody of local food committees.
It may be supposed that these measures of guarding the crops will be suffi
cient to allay the fears of sowers to a great extent and to induce them to get to work.
However, the law goes even further. If the crops which are entrusted to the
control and surveillance of food organizations are still subjected to any damage
taking place as a result of popular unrest, then the Government assumes the obli
gation to reimburse the sower for the actual expendituresfinancial and material
made by him.
The principle of compensation for damages caused by popular unrest, which
has been proclaimed by the corresponding article of the law, may, of course, evoke
serious objections both from financial and from generally governmental points of
view.
However, this principle must be interpreted restrictively. The law of the
grain monopoly has given the entire crop of the current year to the State for
disposal. Each sown acre of land is thus, in essence, state property. By sowing
his fieldthe appeal of the Provisional Government stateseach citizen is only
carrying out his obligation to his free fatherland !
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 623
Under these conditions, each case of violent and premeditated damaging of
crops is both inadmissible and unforgivable. It will cause damage not to the
owner of the crop but to the true master of the sown fieldsto the State itself. . - .
But, while guaranteeing to the owner of the crops reimbursement for expendi
tures sustained by him, the newly published law turns its other facet against defi
cient sowers.
The law does not take into consideration the reasons for which the arable
land remains unsown. Whether the lack of sowing takes place because of labor
shortage, apprehension on account of possible agrarian unrest, or any other
reason, all the land that cannot be sown is handed over to the local food commit
tee. The latter can, depending on local conditions, either rent it out or organize
an independent production of crops. . . .
The last article of the lawin order to avoid misunderstandingspoints out
that the rent collected for the unsown fields is handed over to their owners. This
once more emphasizes the fact that the compulsory renting of land is a measure
of food production policy and in no way predetermines the fate of the lands in
question, the disposition of which can only belong to the Constituent Assembly.
The law on the protection of crops and the utilization of unsown lands will
undoubtedly have a beneficial effect on our food situation even during the current
year. . . .
538. Den9on th e P rotection of Crops and t h e O rganization of A griculture
[No. 36, April 17, 1917, p. 1.]
For a long time the food crisis has necessitated decisive measures on the part
of the Government. As early as last year, when a reduction of the sown area was
evidenced, the question was raised as to the necessity for the Government to carry
out an agricultural policy which would introduce the principle of compulsion and
thereby guarantee the national economy from a further disorganization of agri
culture.
Everyone remembers the fight which the landowning class carried on last fall
against fixed prices on grain. One of the main arguments of opponents of the
food policy, which was then defended by all the democratic classes of the popula
tion, was the danger that the landowners would cease to sow their lands in full,
considering the fixed prices too low.
In view of this threat, we often pointed out at that time the necessity of
organizing cultivation of lie vacant lands at the expense of the community and
the State.
Such a measure has been enforced in France for a long time. . . .
We repeat that this measure was the inevitable result of the existing state of
affairs, that its necessity was self-evident, but obviously it was impossible to
expect its enforcement under the old regime. All kinds of considerations were
advanced against this measure, not all of them of a political nature. It was con
sidered an excessive intervention in the economic process, a violation of the rights
of private landownership, and too difficult and too ambitious to be realized.
But what seemed utopian and unrealizable two months ago turned out to be
possible as soon as the people pulled down the decayed edifice of the old regime
and began to create their own life also in the sphere of national economy.
The last government decree regarding the sowing of the fields places the entire
food policy on its only correct basis. Two circumstances have rendered this deci
624 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
sion unavoidable. From the moment when all the grain was declared to be at
the disposal of the Government, it was natural that the sown areas should also
be considered the property of the State. But, having decreed that all the grain is
the property of the State as a whole, it was necessary to preserve it from deprada-
tion and squandering not only through sales at uncontrolled prices and on the
free market, but also through insufficient cultivation of the land.
It was necessary to guarantee the maintenance of the [agricultural] economy
at the required level.
After the revolution, to this reason was added another one. However justified
the peasants9 claims to the land may be, an agrarian movement, which started
in the country even on a small scale, would threaten to disorganize agriculture
and would thereby deprive the country of indispensable supplies of grain. In the
course of arbitrary seizures and of quarrels over the land and over the use of tools,
seeds, and labor, the country as a whole would also suffer.
The food policy was faced with a dilemma: arbitrary seizures could not now
serve to maintain agriculture at the required level, while the tendency of the pome
shchiki to reduce the sown acreage would threaten a reduction of the grain sup
plies.
Therefore, the Government found a way out by guaranteeing to all the land
owners protection of the area sown and by introducing compulsory cultivation
and leasing of the uncultivated lands at the expense of the community.
But the Government order of April 13 goes much further. It was not enough
merely to decree this measure. It was necessary to provide for its practical imple
mentation.
It is essential to ensure that the land actually is tilled and to establish the
causes when the lands remain idle. This control and this observation are entrusted
to the local community forces, organized into food committees.
This control includes also the use of labor, of agricultural implements, and
of tools, which the committees also have the obligation to supply. In the same
way, with the committees as the intermediary, the cost of the lease for those who
wish to cultivate the land is determined in those cases where the food committees
are not organizing the production themselves.
Thus a planned regulation of all agricultural production is being introduced,
founded on the principle of compulsory [State] control. The supply and assign
ment of labor and tools, the organization of production by the forces and at the
expense of the community, the regulation of land rent, the establishment of market
prices, the monopoly of the grain trade by the State, the projected distribution
of grain on a state-wide basis through a food card systemsuch is the orderly
organization, which the Provisional Government has quite rightly established
in agreement with the demands of democracy.
The organization of the national economy, so urgently demanded, is thus
acquiring a firm basis.
539. M easures to I ncrease t h e N umber of A gricultural W orkers
[The Rules for the Conduct of Agricultural Field Work, printed below, are from
Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledeliia, No. 11, March 27, 1917, p. 206. The practice,
begun before the revolution, of encouraging teachers and pupils in agricultural schools
to render technical and physical assistance to the local populations was continued
(ibid., p. 205), and "Rules Governing Methods of Enlisting Refugees in Agricultural
Work were issued on March 29 (VVP, No. 29, April 12, 1917, p. 1).]
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 625
With a view to rendering assistance to the agricultural economy, the Ministry
of Agriculture has hastened to elaborate special rules for the conduct of field
agricultural work in 1917 with the aid of army work crews and prisoners of war
detailed for the purpose.
In substance these rules are as follows:
The entire organization of labor done by the military personnel detailed for
field work is entrusted to the local guberniya and uezd food committees. For
immediate instructions special sections of committees (guberniya and uezd) are
to be elected consisting of three members, one of whom is a representative from
the Ministry of War.
The special sections of guberniya committees are in charge of: appointment,
with the approval of the military authorities, of army crews and their assignment
throughout the uezds; assignment throughout the uezds of prisoners of war placed
at the disposal of the Ministry of Agriculture; the fixing, with the consent of the
guberniya food committee, of the wages to military personnel, as well as to the
prisoners of war; arbitration of general questions bearing on agricultural work.
The special sections of uezd committees are charged with the distribution
throughout the volosts of military personnel and prisoners of war assigned to
each uezd, general supervision of food and sanitary conditions of military per
sonnel and prisoners of war at work, and the establishment of measures to guard
the prisoners of war at work.

In granting leaves for agricultural work to military personnel [stationed]


in the internal military districts, the following rules are to be observed:
Military personnel are released for work from crews of convalescent and
territorial reserve troops; also noncombatant personnel and in general all per
sonnel that for some reason are not qualified to be included among marching
troops. In so far as possible, leaves are granted to lower personnel and those
from reserve battalions.
Military personnel are assigned to work in crews, each one headed by a special
superior with the rank of noncommissioned officer.

Work crews of prisoners of war may be organized by volost food committees.


At the head of each such crew must be a commanding officer with the necessary
number of guardsmen.

540. A uthorization to F ood S u pply C o m m ittees to D raft t h e P opulation


for A ssistance in L oading , U nloading , and T ransporting F ood and G rain
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 569.]
ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE
April 17,1917
On the basis of articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Law of the Provisional Government
of March 9 on the establishment of the State Committee on Food Supply . . .
and in accordance with article 1 and paras. 16 and 20 of article 13 of the Tempo
rary Statute on local food supply organs . . . I propose for implementation
the following decision of the State Committee on Food Supply:
626 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
1. Guberniya food supply committees shall be authorized to require the popu
lation, in cases of real need, to perform work in cartage, as well as loading and
unloading during such cartage, of shipments of food and fodder, seeds, as well
as sacks and bags, intended for state and public needs.
2. The entire population without distinction shall be drafted for the perform
ance of compulsory cartage and the work in loading and unloading connected
with it, following a definite scale of priorities beginning with those in the strongest
economic position.
3. Evaluations of compulsory cartage as well as standards of remuneration
for loading and unloading shall be established by the guberniya food supply
committee. This committee shall be authorized to establish either general stand
ards of evaluation for the guberniya as a whole, or, on proposal of uezd, district
[ raionnyi], volost, and municipal committees, standards for separate localities
and cities of the guberniya.
9. Payment for work carried out (article 1) shall be made immediately on
completion of cartage, as far as possible at the place to which the shipment has
been delivered.
10. Persons guilty of noncompliance with the requests of guberniya food
supply committees concerning compulsory cartage shall be liable to application
of the provisions of article 45 of the Temporary Statute on local food supply
organs.
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
April 17, 1917

541. T h e E nlistm ent o f C ooperative I nstitutions , O ther O rganizations


and E nterprises , and I ndividual M erchants in t h e W ork of
P urveying Grain P roducts and F odder
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 571.]
INSTRUCTION
1. Cooperative institutions, public organizations, private commercial and in
dustrial enterprises, and individual merchants who are asked to purvey grain
products and fodder to assist representatives of the Minister of Agriculture on
a commission basis shall undertake to purvey grains not otherwise than as agents
of the local food supply committee, obeying without reservation the instructions
of the committee which has accepted their cooperation, or of a representative of
its board or agent.
Note 1: It shall be considered preferable to ask, for the work of purveying
products, unions of cooperatives rather than individual cooperatives, and a group
of merchants united for this purpose rather than individual merchants.
Note 2: In requesting assistance for the purveying of grain it is desirable
that preference should be given to cooperatives and public organizations.
[C hairm an , State Committee on Food Supply
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture]
April 17,1917
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 627
542. A ppeal of t h e P etrograd S oviet to t h e P easants
[.Izvestiia, No. 48, April 23, 1917, p. 1.]
Peasants! Your brothers and your children are soldiers and workers in the
towns. By shedding their blood they have won the freedom which will bring benefit
to the peasantry and will resolve the land question. But this freedom is in danger.
Its enemies, supporters of the overthrown Tsar, are taking advantage of the bread
shortage in the towns [a situation] which they themselves have brought onin
order to undermine your freedom and ours. They are saying that it was sup
posedly the revolution that left the country without bread. They are slandering
when they say that peasants are not bringing grain to towns because supposedly
they are against freedom, against workers and soldiers.
Peasants! If you want to preserve freedom, if you want to throw off the yoke
of zemskie nachaVniki, village police, and pomeshchiki for all timesave the
revolution! Know this: the revolution will be destroyed if the army on the front
and in the towns is left without bread, if your and our enemies succeed in killing
the new-born freedom by starvation. And without freedom there will be no land!
We will insist on the most determined confiscation, at a fixed price, of grain
reserves, hoarded and accumulated by the pomeshchiki and merchants. But we
both have a common task. We will solve it together, through our voluntary efforts.
Bring as much grain as possible to the mills and wharves at once. Every sack
of grain now is a firm stone in the foundation of the building of new Russiaa
Russia in which the toiling people will be their own master. Let this building
be built by the invincible hands of workers, peasants, and soldiers.
Your brothers in the towns and on the front are waiting for your help. Time
does not wait. Every day is valuable! Take the grain to the mills, the railroad
stations, and the wharves!
543. T h e E stablishm ent of R ationing for Grain P roducts
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 581. Further and more detailed instructions were issued on
June 26 (ibid., I, 2, No. 1081) and a Model Instruction for the organization of the
ration card system was issued on June 6 (ibid., I, 1, No. 751). A similar rationing
system was established for sugar in conformance with the orders of June 14 and 24.
See Doc. 574 and Struve, Food Supply in Russia During the War, pp. 169-73, which
concludes from the evidence available that the ration card system was implemented
throughout most of Russia by the summer of 1917.]
ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE
April 29, 1917
Art. 1. On the territory of the Russian State, with the exception of Trans
caucasia and the oblasts of the Turkestan governor-generalship, pending review
of the present law after determination of the new harvest, ration standards shall
be established for the consumption and distribution of the food products enumer
ated in para. 2 of the Law on the Transfer of Grain to the State, namely: rye,
wheat, spelt, millet, buckwheat, lentils, beans, peas, corn, and all flour and groats.
Note: For the guberniyas and oblasts of Siberia and the far north local guber
niya food supply committees shall be permitted to make exceptions to the present
law with the approval of the Minister of Agriculture.
628 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Art. 2. The products mentioned in article 1 shall be subject, through the inter
mediary of the food supply committees, to equal distribution among all the
population. Persons employed in heavy physical labor shall receive a higher
grain ration.
Note: The categories of persons performing heavy physical labor, enjoying
the right to an additional ration, shall be determined by the local food supply
committees.
Art. 3. Within the limits mentioned by the present regulations the guberniya
committees themselves shall determine the basis and means of distribution of
flour, flour products, and groats, or shall leave it wholly or partially to uezd,
municipal, or volost committees to determine these.
Note: Peas, lentils, rice, etc., shall be treated in the same way as groats.
Art. 4. In the same manner the food supply committee, depending on the
availability of products, conditions of supply, convenience of transport, etc., shall
establish the kind and quality of flour, flour products, and groats to be supplied.
Note: The Minister of Agriculture, acting on behalf of national interests,
shall be authorized to change such decisions of the food supply committees.
Art. 5. In rural settlements the maximum standards of consumption must
not exceed for all inhabitants the amounts defined in article 4 of the Law on the
Transfer of Grain to the State . . .
Art. 6. In towns and communities of the municipal type the standards of per
capita consumption must not exceed 30 [Russian] pounds of flour and 3 pounds
of groats per month. Persons employed in heavy physical labor shall without
fail be issued an additional ration of up to 50 per cent of the normal adult ration.

Art. 8. The total ration standard for supplying individual provinces with
grain, flour, and groats shall be determined by central institutions in keeping
with the total number of municipal and rural inhabitants, taking as a maximum
the average supply ration of 30 pounds of flour and 3 pounds of groats per capita
per month, excepting that part of the population which is fully provided for by
its own grain and taking into account in accordance with articles 5 and 6 of the
present law the amount of products required for the issue of additional rations to
persons employed in heavy physical labor.

Art. 11. In all towns and communities of the municipal type the sale and
distribution to the entire population of the products mentioned in article 1 shall
be carried out solely by ration cards.
Art. 12. In rural localities the procedure and form of issuing products shall
he determined by the food supply committee; equality of distribution of products
among the population must be guaranteed by some documentary means.
Art. 13. Standards for distribution to institutions, inventory of stocks, periods
of validity of ration cards, forms of inspection and accounting, registration of
the population, as well as the other aspects of establishing ration standards for
the distribution and consumption of products, shall be determined in accordance
with local conditions and in application of the special directive issued simultane
ously by the Chairman of the State Committee on Food Supply.
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 629
544. S tatute on t h e M inistry of F ood
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1073. On May 5, the Government established the Ministry of
Food, but the administration of food supply was to remain under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Finance until June 1 to enable it to complete the organization of the
grain monopoly. Ibid., I, 1, Nos. 574, 575.]
1. The Ministry of Food is the higher organ through which government meas
ures dealing with food supply and with the supply to the population of articles
of prime necessity are carried out.
2. The duties of the Ministry include: 1) procuring and supplying food
products to the army and the population, 2) assistance, in the forms established
by agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture, in the production of food products
and providing agricultural production with seeds, metal, implements, and other
means of production, as well as with manpower, 3) procuring and supplying the
population with other articles of prime necessity (metals and metal goods, leather
and leather goods, textiles, kerosene, etc.), 4) regulation of the production and
consumption, as well as of the buying and selling prices, of food products and
articles of prime necessity, 5) direction of the activity of local food supply organs,
and 6) participation in the working out of financial, economic, customs, and tariff
questions, and questions of railroad rates, foreign and domestic trade, construction
of new railroads, dirt roads, and waterways, regulation of railroad and water
transport, and local administration and self-government,
3. The Ministry of Food consists of: 1) the Minister, 2) three assistant
ministers, 3) three aides to assistant ministers, 4) an Administration for General
Affairs, 5) a Food Supply Administration, 6) an administration for the supply of
articles of prime necessity, 7) special departments: a) finance and accounts,
b) transport, c) organizational, d) statistical and economic, and e) on the organ
ization of agriculture, and 8) the Secretariat of the State Committee on Food
Supply.
4. The State Committee on Food Supply is under the chairmanship of the
Minister of Food, and functions on the basis of a separate statute.

on local food supply organs


49. Local food supply organs of the Ministry of Food are those organized
by the law of the Provisional Government of March 25, 1917, on the transfer of
grain to the State (Collection of Laws, article 487).
50. With the inauguration of the volost, uezd, and guberniya zemstvo assem
blies, on the basis of the temporary statutes on the above administrations, and
on determination by the Ministers of Food and of the Interior of the procedure
for transferring food supply duties from the volost, uezd, and guberniya food
supply committees to the zemstvo institutions, the latter constitute the local organs
of the Ministry of Food.
51. For the fulfillment of tasks assigned by the Ministry of Food for the pro
curement, storage, processing, and delivery of [food] products and articles of
prime necessity, as well as for representation in district committees for the regu
lation of shipments on the railroads and in the [offices of] district commissioners
for fuel, the following serve under the Ministry of Food: directors of procurement,
storage, processing, and delivery of [food] products or articles of prime necessity,
630 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
their agents, representatives with district commissioners of the Chairman of the
Special Council on Fuel, as well as representatives in the various committees and
commissions for the supply of articles of prime necessity, with the offices and
bookkeeping units attached to them.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
A. P eshekhonov , Minister of Food
A. K rushchev , for the Minister of Finance
V iktor C hernov , Minister of Agriculture
July 1, 1917
545. T h e R esolution o f t h e A ll -R ussian S oviet of P easants D eputies
on t h e F ood Q uestion
[Delo Naroda, No. 50, May 16, 1917, p. 2.]
Having learned the truth about the situation at the front, in the center, and
locally, the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies came to the firm conclusion
that the economic breakdown, particularly in the area of food supply, as a con
sequence of the war and the criminal policy of the old regime, brought the country
to the brink of danger and threatens the freedom that has been gained.
The breakdown is so menacing, so profound, that it is impossible to correct it
without the sacrifices and intensive work of all the liberated and organized
people to whom autocracy left this accursed inheritance.
The All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies thinks that the food question
cannot be decided by some isolated private means. It must be decided from the
all-national point of view. And Russia in this respect must be regarded as one
single national economy. In place of the play of various forces and private inter
ests, the widest organized state control must be introduced both in distribution
and in production, disregarding the monopoly of branches of industry which
serve the mass needs of the population.
The Soviet of Peasants Deputies recognizes most emphatically that the estab
lishment of stable prices and the monopoly on grain were the only solution in the
terrifying and confused situation which threatens the country with total famine.
Also at the moment of tremendous exertion of strength by the army to defend
the country, we were threatened with defeat because of lack of food and fodder.
The Soviet of Peasants Deputies urges the peasantry to support the fixed
prices and the monopoly on grain.
The Soviet of Peasants Deputies urges the peasantry not to succumb to the
propaganda of dark forces which is waged by the kulaks, merchants, and exploit
ers of the people against fixed prices and the grain monopoly.
But in spite of all the exertion of strength, further food difficulties are possible
which the Soviet hopes will be borne heroically.
At the same time, the Soviet states emphatically that the privations and sacri
fices which the army and the working people are bearing are accompanied by
indignation that the war and the food breakdown are to a great number of people
a source of profit, while the working people give their blood and life. The aware
ness of this injustice weakens the morale of the army; it poisons the last minutes
of those who give their lives. An end must be put to this injustice.
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 631
The peasantry surrenders all the produce of its labor and economy at estab
lished prices. Without further delay fixed prices must be introduced on manu
factured goods to correspond with the prices on grain. War profits must also be
cut down by means of special taxation. This must be done to correct the injustice,
also to prevent the ruin of the working peasantry.
The Soviet of Peasants9 Deputies suggests cooperative organizations as the
best organ of distribution to be introduced in connection with the food bureaus
and committees. Realizing the vicious propaganda that is waged against coop
erative organizations by capitalists and merchants, the Soviet thinks it necessary
that large credits be granted by the Ministry of Food and the State Bank to the
cooperatives to enable them to carry on the work.
546. O pposition in C ommercial Circles to t h e Grain M onopoly
and I ts I m plem entation
[Den\ No. 61, May 17, 1917, p. 2. According to Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika,
pp. 130-31, the grain merchants were particularly resentful of the Instruction of
April 17 (Doc. 541), which recommended to food supply organs that cooperatives be
given first preference in assisting in the purveyance of grain. Lozinskii also quotes
part of a letter to the Ministry of Food from a responsible official in the Ministry of
Trade and Industry supporting the merchants position. See also Ekon. Polozhenie,
II, 339-42.]
[Mr.] Rafalovich, an official on special assignment who returned yesterday
from Moscow, has submitted to the Minister of Trade and Industry a report on
the results of the All-Russian Conference on the Grain Trade in Moscow.
The Conference directed its attention principally to the organization of the
grain trade, in connection with its monopoly [by the State]. On this issue two
currents were apparent at the Conference. One group developed the idea that
the grain monopoly hinders the appearance of grain on the market, kills the
personal interest of both the producers and the traders, paralyzing at the same
time the work of the commercial apparatus. The monopoly of grain, setting aside
a whole army of experienced workers, substitutes for them new organs that are
totally unfit for the task. In the opinion of this group, the grain monopoly and
fixed prices will inflict innumerable calamities on the business of supplying the
country with food products. The representative of the other groups, and also
the representatives of the Ministry, emphatically insisted that free trade, which
is a necessity in times of peace, would be unthinkable now at a time of unprece
dented economic upheaval, and that the monopoly of grain is the only effective
means of supplying the army and the population with bread.
Further debates showed that in various regions of the empire [sic] there are
great quantities of grain which could be drawn out only by commercial circles;
for that reason [the latter] should receive their due place in the business of serv
icing the state monopoly of grain.
Following animated debates, it has been unanimously acknowledged that the
law of the Provisional Government regarding the transfer of grain to the disposal
of the State was caused by the difficult, almost catastrophic, conditions in which
the affairs of food supply, transport, and monetary circulation were found. In
view of this the Conference, while hoping that the measure is being introduced
632 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
only for the period of the war, expressed [the opinion] that the whole grain
trading class should support the Government in carrying out the monopoly. As
for the measure [tending] to reduce the existing food crisis which threatens innu
merable calamities, the Conference came to the conclusion that the trading class
should also give its material help.
547. T h e C ongress on F ood
[VVP9 No. 61, May 24,1917, p. 3.]
On May 21, the All-Russian Congress on Food opened in the Moscow Commer
cial Institute. Over 1,000 delegates attended. Among the participants in the
Congress were Ministers A. I. Shingarev and A. V. Peshekhonov. The Chairman
of the [Moscow] Soviet of Workers Deputies, L. M. Khinchuk, was elected pre
siding officer of the meeting.
Minister of Finance A. I. Shingarev addressed the following speech to the
meeting:
Comrades, permit me to welcome the Congress which has convened at a try
ing and difficult time [to discuss] a complex question of vital importance to the
present existence of the State. Beginning with the first day of the revolution, and
continuing until now, I have concerned myself with the question of food supply.
I spent the past few days in one of the richest wheat-growing areas and I tried to
find out why the problem of food supply was still not adjusted. I was in Voronezh,
Rostov-on-the-Don, Novocherkassk. I attended many gatherings and meetings
and [I was present] at the big Peasants Congress in the Don oblast. Citizens,
the question of food supply is not some kind of isolated aspect of our [national
economy] as a whole in which disorganization has come about. It is, rather, that
the entire nation is in an extremely difficult, I would say, critical situation. The
country is beginning to fall apart. Our economy is nearing a dangerous [state
of] disorganization. In many places [this disorganization] has become rampant
and widespread. The State coffers are empty. The people do not pay taxes. The
Liberty Loan is making weak [Progress], while in some areas it is making no
headway at all. The immediate problem is the critical condition of state finances
and the possibility of a temporary termination of payments. Besides, disorgani
zation and disintegration prevail everywhere. The cause of freedom can be lost
in the economic chaos, complete anarchy, financial disorder, and starvation.
The absence of a united organization, an organized power, is the root of all evils
at the present moment. There is grain in all the provinces. In the Voronezh
guberniya and the Don oblast, in the northern Caucasus, the grain reserves are
much larger than we had expected. But not enough grain has been delivered,
and not enough is being delivered, because the local organizations are not effi
cient. [We will enter] on a very difficult period in June and July. The coming
four to five weeks are the last period in which supplies could somehow be delivered
before the new harvest. Whether we will succeed in coping with the difficult and
critical situation in which we find ourselves I do not know, but I have faith that
we will succeed. But, comrades, this will be a temporary and fortuitous breathing
spell, I am bound to state that we are experiencing a grave shortage not only of
food, but of material [goods] as well. At the same time, the country is swelling
with paper currency, claims against the Treasury are mounting, and I can foresee
the terrible day when the Treasury will say to the people: There is no more
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 633
[money]. As yet, this thought is hard to accept. Citizens, the danger that faces
the country is all the more grave because the country does not have the most
elementary organizational control, and, regardless of how deep was the confidence
expressed by the masses, regardless of the endless number of welcoming telegrams
they sent to the Provisional Government, these are nothing but words. . . . All
that I have said, comrades, does not amount to despair and hopelessness. And
it is not for this purpose that I am speaking. But we must look squarely at the
truth and understand the seriousness of the danger. If the people become aware
of this danger, this will serve a medicinal purpose in the present situation. But
the dose of this medicine must be very largeotherwise we will experience the
greatest disaster.
I do not doubt that the people will extricate themselves from this misfortune,
I believe that they will emerge without a fratricidal war, without brankruptcy,
without bloodshed. This is the task before you. To this end we must direct all
the strength of our reason. Then will we be able to say that we are capable of
performing the duty that has fallen upon us. (Prolonged applause.)
V. G. Groman [Chairman of the State Committee on Food Supply] followed
Shingarev with a speech on the organization of the national economy and labor.
Next, the Minister of Food, A. V. Peshekhonov, delivered a speech in which he
argued that the only way to solve the crisis is to institute state control of all the
branches of the economy: industry, transport, exchange, distribution. There is
no other way. Taking exception to V. G. Groman, A. V. Peshekhonov pointed
out that the Provisional Government, in the person of A. I. Shingarev, has already
embarked on the policy of slate control by introducing a state monopoly on grain.
At the evening session of May 21, P. P. Maslov gave a report on the organiza
tion of food supply forces in the country. The speaker believed that the basis of
the economic crisis is the discrepancy between the volume of production and the
needs of the State.
At the close of the session, Minister A. V. Peshekhonov was asked . . . by a
group of delegates: Would the peasant deliver grain at the present fixed prices,
[and] would it not be better to abolish them? To this he replied that if fixed
prices are abolished, we may be left with no grain at all.
The reports of Groman and Minister Peshekhonov were discussed at the
May 22 session of the Congress on Food. Prokopovich expressed doubt that we
could control the national industry . . . as was recommended by the speaker.
In his opinion, this requires a strong government, which we do not have. Control
over all industry is possible in countries like Germany and England, but not here
where we have to extract the grain from the people with the assistance of special
expeditions.
548. T h e R eport o f t h e M inister of F ood (P e sh ek h o n o v ) on t h e S u ppl y
P roblem to th e F irst A ll -R ussian C ongress o f S oviets
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
[Izvestiia, No. 85, June 7,1917, pp. 11-13.]
When the revolution broke out, it may be said that we were already in the
midst of a food crisis. There were hardly any grain reserves left in the large
towns and in the army. One had to live from day to day in the first months of
the revolution. But still it must be said that the country exhibited confidence
634 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
in the new order. In general the supply of grain in the month of March was much
better than in February, the last month under the old regime. There were hopes
that supplies would increase even more. But then, in April, a big delay in the
supply of grain occurred. A whole set of circumstances was involved here: the
spring season for bad roads, and the Easter celebration, and the overflow of
rivers. In addition, with the onset of spring, certain railroad bridges were dam
aged, and the spring sowing, with which our comrade peasants should occupy
themselves [was spoiled]. All this led to the fact that in April the rate of grain
supply sharply declined and, finally, fell to 5,000,000 poods per week, while the
needs of the army, the towns, and the consumer population required 17,000,000
poods per week.
The situation became more and more critical and menacing. Moscow, in
particular, was left almost without grain. Petrograd also existed on a day-to-day
basis. It must be said that by May the situation improved considerably. The
amount of grain conveyed to the stations and delivered by the peasants had
increased. We are now in a position to supply the army with sufficient quantities
of grain. Any delays at the present time are due to the condition of the railroads.
This, by the way, accounts for the fact that only very recently the Northern Front
experienced the most serious difficulties with food supply. There was grain to
be shipped from Rybinsk and Nizhnii, but the railroads were unable to transport
it. Only very recently did they succeed in doing so. The delivery of grain to the
stations continues, the stations are provided for, and although the norm has not
yet been reached, we are able, according to rough estimates, to supply the army
and the large towns, and later, in June or July, we will be able to provide for other
needy areas. There are very serious apprehensions now concerning August,
because harvest time will begin at the end of June and the conveyance of grain to
the stations will diminish once again. But, at any rate, one cannot consider the
situation to be extremely desperate or extremely dangerous.
Concerning the outlook for the future, the situation is as follows: there was,
indeed, a decrease of sowing in certain areas, but, in general, one may consider
that there was no decrease in the crop area and that, in fact, the crop area increased
in certain areas. . . .
From the very beginning of the war we had an absolute shortage of certain
food products. From the very beginning we were short of groats. This shortage
still exists and it will probably be impossible to meet this demand completely in
the future. Similarly, there is a shortage of many meat and fat products. In this
respect the population must continue to endure scarcity and must sharply reduce
its needs.
The staple foodgrainstill does not cause particular apprehension, judg
ing by the quantity of grain available in the country. But lie problem lies in
obtaining and conveying this grain. It must be said at this point that we have
already encountered great difficulties in solving this problem in the past and
that we may again encounter great difficulties in the future.
As you know, an attempt at taking grain by the old system, with the help of
the commercial machinery, has been completely discredited during the war. No,
it is impossible to live by the old ways when the dealers obtained the grain for
us, collected it, and delivered it to us. Even the former government was forced
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 635
to come to this conclusion. It was forced to supply more and more grain to the
army, and then to the population, bypassing the dealers. During the war we were
forced to come to the conclusion that even the slightest participation of dealers
led to a sharp and rapid increase in prices. The people began to be very reluctant
to give up the grain, saying: Why should we give our grain today when the price
on it will be still higher tomorrow? Speculation began to run high; it was fol
lowed by bribery, graft in the railroads, and [the appearance of] pushers.3
We have been convinced of this sufficiently not to return to the system and, fur
thermore, to repudiate it firmly. The Provisional Government decided to reject
it and to abolish entirely the role of private commerce in supplying the country
with grain.
Now another problem is how to take the grain from the people so that the
same dealers will be prevented from taking it, while the grain, all the grain, has
been declared the property of the State. But it will only become the property of
the State when it can be registered, and in order to register this state grain and
turn it over to the army or to the needy areas, food committees have been insti
tuted. But until these food committees are established throughout the guberniyas,
uezds, and volosts, there is no possibility of registering it. And, it must be said,
one of the principal difficulties of the present time is that these committees are not
being established as quickly as was expected, and the general impression is as
follows: in areas where there is shortage of grain, where grain must be distributed,
there the committees have sprung up very quickly, but in areas from which grain
must be obtained, where it must be given up, the committees are very slow in
becoming established. . . .
. . . And now, comrades, we are facing the most difficult problem of all.
Formerly grain was taken in exchange for money, but now the people have almost
no desire to give up the grain for money, because money is cheap, and the peas
antry is holding on to the one thing that, so to speak, it has in its hands, and the
people simply have no desire to receive money with which one cannot buy anything
while the prices on all manufactured goods and on all products are rising so fast.
Therefore, in order to assure grain supplies from the village for the army
and the towns, there remains one task for the Government and for the Ministry
of Food: that of assuring the peasantry that it shall receive from the towns the
products it needs. . . .
The basic difficulty is this: the town lacks the products that could he given
to the village in exchange for grain. . . . Even if we hold the prices down in
one way or another, even if we do not allow them to spiral, the basic problem
remains that there is a shortage of very many products in the country . . .
And now, comrades, the problem is reduced to two points: . . . the first task
is to establish an even distribution of all the products in short supply.
The other task, comrades, is even more serious and difficult: to increase our
production, to try, nevertheless, to increase these products as much as possible
and to direct all our efforts in this direction. And so, it must be said that in this
respect the problem is an especially difficult one. The economic machinery upon
which our production depends has been shaken: in one place there is a shortage
8 Tolkachiindividual speculators who, taking advantage of the delays in the delivery
of certain products, went to a locality where such products abounded in order to buy up
quantities for resale in localities where such products were scarce.
636 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
of coalthis causes production to stop; in another place there may be sufficient
coal, but there is a shortage of metals; in a third place there is still another reason,
and, consequently, it often happens that our production is lower than the efforts
we put into it; but there is still one other very serious reason, and I have decided
to speak frankly about it here. Comrades, the manpower we have at our disposal
is not utilized sufficiently well. It has already been noted before that the old gov
ernment conscripted a great many more people into the army than was necessary,
and there is no doubt that there are too many men in the army now, especially
in the rear, who essentially remain with nothing to do. To utilize this manpower
is one of the tasks that confront us.
Another problem, which is again difficult to approach, is the decline in the
productivity of our workers. Once again we must admit that productivity has
fallen during the revolutionary period; we found ourselves in a situation where
our productivity was declining just at a time when there was a great scarcity of
products. Comrades, the matter stands as follows: in the course of many, many
years our working class was under pressure and this pressure was particularly
pronounced during the war period. The working class had to work beyond
measure while the wages were far from commensurate with the labor or [propor
tionate] to the national income . . . This was prior to the revolution. As you
know, the correlation of forces has changed since the revolution: the workers
received an opportunity to demand better conditions for themselves, with respect
both to working hours and to wages; but the workers movement turned out to
be much stronger and much more widespread than our material opportunities
could afford. A considerable part of the working class reasoned that since it was
possible to make demands, and since these demands could be fulfilled, then it
followed that they should be made and, moreover, they should be vast and signifi
cant in scope.
. . . Comrades, the principal difficulty we confront in resolving this problem
is our difficulty with you and with the masses which stand behind you. Com
rades, the resistance of the capitalists has apparently been broken. Evidently,
it is possible to strike at them and to go very far in this direction, almost to the
expropriation of all profits; at least, some delegates came to us and said: We
are ready to give up all our profits if only we can preserve our industry. Even
more than that, many came and said: Take our enterprises, we are giving them
awayplease, manage them yourselves. In addition, . . . the Government is
very willing to go firmly in this direction.
But, comrades, this alone is not enough. It is also necessary that the popular
masses understand, realize, and feel that they too must be called upon to make
sacrifices. They must realize that under the present conditions it is impossible
to satisfy demands completely, that under these conditions one must try to pre
vent anyone from taking more than his allotted share, so that the distribution
among the masses will be as even as possible. But one cannot go and try to obtain
better terms now; one must only try to achieve an equitable distribution, on the
one hand, and, on the other hand, to call on the popular masses to exert every
effort to increase production in the interest of improving the position of the
workers. This, comrades, is what we should strive for, this is the course we must
follow. Until such time as we reach this awareness, all our hopes for adjusting
the economy will be unattainable.
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 637
549. R esolution on t h e F ood S u ppl y Q uestion by th e F irst A ll -R ussian
C ongress of S oviets of W orkers and S oldiers 5 D eputies
[Izvestiia, No. 100, June 24, 1917, pp. 1-2. This Resolution and the report of
Peshekhonov above reflect the continuing gap between legislation and implementation
in this area.]
1. The food crisis was brought about by the war, which is draining the pro
ductive forces of the country, and by the criminal policy of the tsarist govern
ment. This crisis is manifested in the absolute shortage of certain products
(meats, fats, sugar) and the lack of organization in supplying the army and
the population with other products (such as bread).
2. In order to overcome the food crisis, the State must enforce consistent and
energetic regulation of the entire matter of food supply. It is imperative that
the announced grain monopoly be put into practice and that the established fixed
prices be firmly maintained. The consumption of these products must imme
diately be strictly rationed throughout the whole country relative to existing
reserves. The matter of supplying the population and the army with the most
important food products must be placed wholly under the direction and control
of the State.
3. At the same time the State must adopt all necessary measures for increasing
production. Agriculture must be assured of necessary manpower. The available
and forthcoming agricultural implements must be used to the fullest extent under
the control of local food supply organs. Food industries must be regulated by the
State and must be placed under its direct management and control. In addition,
the prices on these products must be strictly standardized.
4. In order to enforce all these measures, it is necessary to effect an imme
diate reorganization of food committees throughout Russia in accordance with
the law on the grain monopoly. . . . Close organizational ties must be estab
lished between the volost, uezd, and guberniya food supply committees. The
revolutionary democracy, personified by the Soviet of Workers, Soldiers, and
Peasants Deputies, must actively participate in the matter of food supply and in
exercising the full strength of its authority and organization. It must assist in
the rapid and consistent enforcement of the necessary measures. . . .
5. At the same time, the Congress considers it necessary to emphasize that
the only possibility of alleviating the food crisis to any significant degree hinges
on the condition that the Government establish fixed prices on consumer goods
in the village and organize the supply of these products to the village at the same
time as it establishes the monopoly on grain.
6. However, it is only through systematic regulation of the entire economic
life of the country that the village can be provided with the indispensable indus
trial products.
550. T elegram from th e C omm issar of S im birsk G uberniya on th e
R esistance to t h e Grain M onopoly
[M. Martynov, Agrarnoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu po dokumentam Glavnogo Zemelnogo
Kom iteta KA, XIV (1926), 218.]
Petrograd. Chief Administration of the Militia. Copies to the Minister-President
and Ministers of Justice and Agriculture.
On August 20, in the village of Chirikov, Sengileevskii uezd, the population
638 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
assaulted Lobanov, member of the Chertanovskii food supply board, while he
was on duty. An investigation is being conducted. . . . In the village of Mali-
achkin, Syzran uezd, the population refused to submit to the registration of grain
and threatened members of the food supply committee. The uezd commissar has
been requested to take urgent and most drastic measures in this matter. The
Timoshkin volost food supply committee of Sengileevskii uezd telegraphed about
the agitation of local townsmen Abdriazinkov, Baimashev, and Absaliamov
against the volost food supply committee. This agitation had a detrimental effect
upon the population and interfered with work. . . . According to information
from the Syzran uezd food supply board, the population of the uezd refuses to
surrender grain at fixed prices, which it considers too low. The situation in the
city and uezd is critical. The uezd commissar has been requested to take most
energetic measures to introduce the law on the grain monopoly, resorting, in case
of need, to armed force. The President of the Simbirsk uezd food supply board
reported to the guberniya executive committee that soldiers were sent to the
village of Ishcheevka by the chief of the garrison, in accordance with the request
of the committee, to enforce the law on the grain monopoly. On arrival at
Ishcheevka, not only did they fail to render assistance to the agents of the supply
board in requisitioning the supply of grain from the granary in order that it
might be sent to the factory of Aratsk, but they sided with the peasants and, holding
their rifles ready, stated that they would not permit the grain to be taken from the
growers. I have requested the chief of the garrison to take the most energetic
measures to make the offenders responsible before the law. No other events
occurred during the past week. 996.
R udakov , for the Guberniya Commissar
[August 28, 1917]

551. C ompulsory M axim um U tilization of A gricultural E quipm ent


[Sob. Uzak.9 1, 2, No. 1280.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. In those cases where agricultural machines and implements for soil culti
vation, sowing, harvesting, threshing, as well as mechanical movers for agricul
tural purposes, are not fully utilized by their owners on their own and other farms,
food supply committees are granted the right of compulsory utilization of such
equipment to full capacity.
2. The inability of the owner to make full use of his equipment for purposes
of agricultural production must be certified by the local food supply organs.
3. Compulsory maximum utilization of agricultural equipment by food supply
committees is permitted only after completion of necessary work on the owners
farm and on other farms where the owner agreed to use his equipment.
4. In cases of compulsory maximum utilization of agricultural equipment,
the owner is granted the right personally or through his agent to supervise and
verify the correctness of the work and the safety and good condition of the imple
ments.
5. In cases of transfer of complicated machines and implements for compul
sory maximum utilization, food supply committees have the right to require the
owners of such equipment to make available, as needed, the technical personnel
who usually operate these machines.
6. Technical personnel operating machinery, either owners or employees
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 639
and workers assigned by the owners, receive wages and maintenance from the
persons using the equipment to capacity, through the local food supply committees
concerned, in an amount not less than that they received on the farm of the owner
of the machinery.
9. The present law . . to be put into effect before its promulgation by the
Ruling Senate.
N . N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President
A. P esh ek ho no v , Minister of Food
July 26, 1917
552. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e G rowing F ood Crisis
[No. 193, August 24, 1917, p. 1.]
The food crisis has become extremely acute. The grim specter of hunger
faces the country. Popular discontent mounts with frightening force. Riots
provoked by the food situation are a common occurrence throughout the length
of the country. On the whole, the picture everywhere is the same. A riot starts
because of food and the mob arbitrarily begins a search of stores and houses. Or
they march on the food supply boards with the demand for bread and food.
They force their way onto the premises, commit violence. Intense discontent,
irritability, heightened nervousness, and suspicion are favorable psychological
ground for all sorts of rumors, and the mob falls under the power of irresponsible
agitators who conduct all sorts of violent agitation against Jews, against the bour
geoisie, and against the intelligentsia. And recently counterrevolution finds its
place here also.
Food and public organizations in various places are engaged in trying to
ascertain the causes of such a catastrophic situation in the food situation which
portends frightening consequences. In all conferences conducted everywhere
this crucial question of contemporary life is being debated. Many reasons are
advanced: disruption of transport, reduction of the sowing area, agrarian dis
orders, shortage of work hands in the village, poor harvest, inefficiency of the
personnel in organizations in charge of food, and the absence of fixed prices
on the necessities of life. But, in addition, what is stressed everywhere is the
unwillingness of the peasants in regions of crop-producing guberniyas to turn
over the grain to the Government. The Ministry of Food is inclined to regard
this, as seen from the recent speech of A. V. Peshekhonov at the State Committee
on Food Supply, only as propaganda against the grain monopoly and established
fixed prices, which has spread among the peasants. The Ministry, to be sure,
admits that in some places the established fixed prices on grain are not entirely
adequate; that in some guberniyas it was necessary to resort to force to get the
grain, but at the same time it does not think it possible at the present time to
change the fixed prices since this would result in economic and financial diffi
culties. And it thinks that with the support of the revolutionary democracy it
will be possible to deal with the problems in this area. The Ministry agrees only
to the demand for the establishment of fixed prices on the necessities of life,
although in this respect it has in mind more the psychological rather than the
economic effect of this measure because of the difficulty of actually supplying the
population with the necessities of life.
640 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION

The food organs in the hands of the revolutionary democracy upon which
the Ministry places its hope are organized extremely unsatisfactorily. They are
practically nonexistent in the crop-producing guberniyas and no census of the
grain has been taken there. There are few intelligent and knowledgeable people
in the food supply committees, and some of them are entirely unreliable, who
merely collect travel and other expenses. Not infrequently, moreover, these com
mittees are engaged not so much with the business in hand as in party politics,
etc. The intelligent element, experienced in matters of commerce, has been elimi
nated from food matters. But the chief difficulty nevertheless is that the popula
tion refuses to surrender the grain at the existing fixed prices. This is stated
everywhere. Members of the Nizhnii Novgorod, [Municipal] Duma point out
that the peasants hide grain under the roof, under the floor, in the stove; they
bury it under the ground. At night the grain is carried off into hiding places
to avoid having it recorded and seized. And, according to the members of the
Duma, the means necessary to obtain the grain from the peasants forcibly for
the State under the existing fixed prices are absent. The last resort is military
compulsory seizure. But this trump will also be beaten by the conviction of the
local people. Military detachments have already been sent to the Nizhnii Novgorod
guberniyas to seize the grain supplies. But they were met with thousand-strong
mobs of men, women, and children. And the soldiers refused to fire at them.
The same situation is stated in the reports of officials conducting the grain monop
oly in Kazan guberniya. The officials and food supply delegates report from
everywhere about their helplessness to do anything. The population refuses to
listen to them, throws them out, beats them unmercifully, and hides the grain.
The village refuses to surrender the grain at fixed prices which are twice and
even three times lower than the grain costs themselves. The village refuses to
supply grain to the city inhabited by the bourgeois and workers, who work
eight hours and then sit and smoke a cigar.
The Astrakhan Food Supply Committee regards the increase of fixed prices
the only way out of the situation in order not to remain without bread, and,
in disregard of the law, raised the fixed price in the transactions which it organ
ized. There was talk in the committee that for his violation of the law the President
would have to be put in jail. But of the two evils, either to be unmercifully
beaten by the starved population or put in jail, the President of the food supply
committee, as the Astrakhan7 Listok states, preferred the latter.
Such are the circumstances under which the food campaign is carried on at
present. The food question has become so crucial that the excesses it provokes
will inevitably grow more serious and will result in deadly consequences unless
steps are taken immediately to improve the situation.

553. A uthorization of t h e M inister of F ood to S uspend and T erm inate


the A ctivity of a F ood S upply O rgan
[S<?6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1392. Prompted by the increase in irresponsible and arbitrary
acts by local food supply committees.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of the existing statutes, the Provisional Government has
decreed: the Minister of Food is authorized to suspend temporarily or to termi
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 641
nate completely the activity both of individual food supply organs established
on the basis of the law of March 25, 1917 (Collection of Laws, article 487), and
of a group of such organs in individual localities, in those cases where this is
deemed necessary by the Minister for the purpose of protecting the interests of
the State. Likewise, the Minister of Food is authorized, without suspending the
activity of a food supply organ altogether, to relieve such an organ of the per
formance of one of the duties entrusted to it by law.
The duties of a food supply organ whose activity has been completely or
partially suspended may be entrusted by the Minister of Food either to another
food supply organ or to a person specially commissioned by the Minister.
The duties and extent of authority of a person commissioned by the Minister
of Food, as well as his official relations to other government food supply organs,
are determined in each individual case by the Minister of Food.
A. K erensky , Minister-President
A. P esh ek ho no v , Minister of Food
August 24, 1917
554. T h e G uarantee of t h e G overnment N ot to R aise t h e F ixed P rices on
G rain E stablished by t h e L aw of M arch 25
[VVP, No. 123, August 5,1917, p. 1.]
August 4, 1917
In view of the rumors circulating on the possibility of raising the fixed prices
on grain of the 1917 harvest, the Provisional Government states that all fixed
prices on grain established by the law of the Provisional Government of March 25,
1917, on the current and previous years harvest will, under no circumstances,
be raised.
If an attempt is discovered by the population in some places to hold back
delivery of grain for the army and the needy localities, the Minister of Food
will set certain dates for the delivery, at the expiration of which fixed prices on
grain will be lowered and the payment for grain, both voluntarily released and
confiscated, in accordance with article 8 of the law of March 25, 1917, will be
made at the new lowered fixed prices.
Moreover, the Provisional Government announces that, in accordance with
the government instructions, the Minister of Food is urgently at work on meas
ures to supply the population, in so far as possible, with objects of mass con
sumption (textiles, iron, kerosene, etc.) at fixed prices.
555. T h e D oubling of t h e F ixed P rices on Grain
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 1393.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Amending and supplementing the relevant articles of the law on the transfer
of grain to the State of March 25,1917, the Provisional Government decrees:
1. Fixed prices on all grain of the harvest of 1917 and of past years shall be
calculated in an amount twice that shown in Annex I to article 9 of the aforesaid
law.
642 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
3. The Minister of Food is authorized to change prices for milling and pro
cessing of grain and to establish new fixed prices for flour and groats correspond
ing to the new prices for grain and grain processing.
6. Payment for grain received in deliveries beginning on August 1 is to be
made at the prices laid down by the present law.
7. The Minister of Food is authorized to establish time limits for the compul
sory delivery of grain, at the expiry of which grain due for delivery which has
not been delivered may be requisitioned with a reduction of 30 per cent below
established prices.
8. The present law is to be put into effect by telegraph.
N. N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President
V. Ze l geim , for the Minister of Food
August 27,1917
556. T h e E xplanation of t h e G overnment for th e D oubling of
F ixed P rices on Grain
[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 343-44.]
August 29, 1917
The food situation in the army and the country is extremely grave. The
government supplies are constantly decreasing. Cities, entire guberniyas, and
even the front suffer an acute shortage of grain, although there is plenty of it in
the country. The turnover to the government authorities established by law is
very poor. Many have not turned over even those supplies which they had left
over from the previous harvest. There are also those who forbid and interfere
with others in fulfilling their duty to the motherland. The threatening danger to
the country is increased further because of the fact that in a number of guber
niyas grain in sufficient quantities could be delivered only by water route. And
if delivery is not made within the next few weeks, these regions will be doomed
to starvation in the winter. Famine brings anarchy and loss of the freedom gained
by the revolution.
The Government decided to forestall the deadly danger which threatens the
motherland. It will not stop short of the most extreme measures of punishment
against the violators of the law or against those who are negligent in fulfilling
its requirements.
Nevertheless the Provisional Government realizes that it is necessary to restore
the balance violated by the spontaneous march of events. While prices on all
articles of industry as well as cost of labor continued to rise in recent months, the
price on grain remained unchanged. Measures undertaken to standardize prices
and distribute items needed by the village could not be undertaken rapidly
enough to bear fruit now. Justice demands that prices on grain be raised lest
there be any ground for evasion in turning over the grain to the State. In de
ciding to double the grain prices, the Government is emphatic in stating that
such an increase cannot and should not give cause to other groups in the popula
tion to make new demands with a view to increasing their profits. The new prices
will merely place the agricultural workers on a par with the rest of the population.
The Government will show firmness with respect both to preventing unfounded
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 643
insistence for increased profit by the nonagricultural population and to forcing
the producers to be on time and punctual in fulfilling their duties of turning over
the grain needed in order that the army and the population do not starve.

557. T h e S oviets , t h e C ouncil of T rade U nions , and th e U nion of T owns


O bjec t to th e N onparticipation o f t h e E conomic C ouncil and t h e S tate
C om m ittee on F ood S upply in t h e D ecision to D ouble F ixed P rices on G rain
[Izvestiia, No. 166, September 9,1917, p. 8.]
Delegations from democratic organs in the Economic Council4 and the State
Committee on Food Supply sent the following communications to these institu
tions:
I
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ECONOMIC COUNCIL
According to the Statute on the Economic Council, the latter functions
continuously.
The critical condition of the economic life of the country and the associated
political crisis5 sharply emphasize the necessity of abiding by the above-men
tioned Statute on the Economic Council.
In the meantime, the Economic Council has not met a single time since the
Moscow State Conference, and the Government is putting through a number of
drastic measures which, at the same time, are far from being always sound, with
out any participation of the Economic Council.
Considering such a situation to be completely inadmissible, the Economic
Section of the All-Russian Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies
and the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions request that you summon the Eco
nomic Council and assure the regularity of its work.
II
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE ON FOOD SUPPLY
The fixed prices on grain were raised by the law of the Provisional Govern
ment of August 27 of this year. This order was carried into effect without sub
mitting it for the discussion of the State Committee on Food Supply, in spite of
the fact that the Committee was in session at that time and that it had more than
once declared its opposition, in the most unequivocal terms, to any changes in
the fixed prices on grain as established by the law of March 25.
Considering it necessary to discuss the present situation, the delegations of
the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies and the Union of Towns
request that you convene the State Committee on Food Supply in the very near
future.
4See Chapter 12.
5The Kornilov affair and its aftermath. See Volume IQ.
644 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
558. T h e P lacing of L and and F ood S upply C o m m ittees U nder the
J urisdiction of t h e A dministrative C ourts
[Sob. Uzak, I, 2, No. 1631.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment and supplement of the relevant statutes, it is hereby decreed:
1. Decisions, orders, acts, and derelictions of duty of food supply and land
committees and their boards, established by the laws of the Provisional Govern
ment of March 25 and April 21,1917 (Collection of Laws, articles 487 and 543),
may be the subject of protests by commissars and complaints by appropriate
organs of municipal, zemstvo, and volost administrations, as well as by private
persons, companies, and establishments whose interests or rights have been in
fringed by unlawful decisions, orders, acts, or derelictions of duty of a food supply
or land committee or board.
3. Cases of protests and complaints against decisions, orders, acts, and
derelictions of duty of the Central Land Committee are considered by the First
Department of the Ruling Senate.
4. Protests against decisions and orders of volost land and food supply com
mittees and boards, as well as of district [ raion] and other smaller food supply
committees and boards, are made by uezd commissars. Protests against decisions
and orders of all other land and food supply committees are made by guberniya
commissars.
5. The right to protest decisions and orders of the Central Land Committee
belongs to the Minister of Justice. Copies of decisions of the Central Land Com
mittee are communicated to the Minister of Justice.
A- K erensky , Minister-President
A. D e m ianov , Acting Minister of Justice
September 7, 1917
559. T h e Condition of 10,1917
W inter Crop S owings as of S eptem ber
[Izvestiia Ministerstva Zemledelia, No. 31, October 4, 1917, p. 659. Prepared on the
basis of over 4,300 reports received from owners-correspondents of the Department of
Agricultural Economy and Agricultural Statistics.]
The sowing of winter crops was conducted during the current year with some
delay, but on the whole it was possible to complete it satisfactorily, thanks to the
prolonged warm period. Among some of the causes that forced the owners to begin
the sowing somewhat later than usual should be mentioned, first of all, shortage of
work hands responsible for the delay in harvesting as well as in the timely prepara
tion of seed com for sowing. Moreover, in some parts of the Volga region and
partially in the south, sowing had to be done with considerable delay because of
late rains or, vice versa, because of excess of precipitation, as observed in some
parts of Little Russia and the central agricultural guberniyas. Nevertheless, be
cause of warm weather, the owners had an opportunity to complete the sowing
quite well. Consequently, on the whole, judging from reports thus far incomplete,
the winter crop area has hardly changed to any considerable degree. The winter
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 645
crop has not been quite completed in some parts of the Novorossisk region,
namely, in Bessarabia, Kherson, Tauride, and Ekaterinoslav guberniyas. There,
owing to the lack of rains in August, the early sowing was possible only in those
places where rain fell in the first half of August. The majority of owners began
to sow here after August 15-20. Consequently, part of the winter crop of the
field remained still unsown at the time of mailing the reports.
Owing to favorable weather conditions during the period of the principal
sowing, the condition of winter crop shoots on the whole throughout European
Russia presented a very happy picture by September 10. In the tremendous
region embracing all of the southwestern, Little Russian, and central agricultural
area, almost all industrial guberniyas, and, Novgorod, Petrograd, and the Baltic
guberniyas, the winter crop shoots, particularly of the early sowing, were acknowl
edged almost everywhere to be not only entirely satisfactory but very often
excellent. Over the rest of the area, black soil as well as nonblack soil, strips of
winter crops appeared in no danger. Moreover, the early sowings here also were
more often good and the later ones continued to develop satisfactorily and, thanks
to the absence of frosts before September 10, could still grow sufficiently strong
before winter. At the extreme south, as mentioned above, and in the northern
Caucasus, where sowing was still going on, shoots appeared only here and there
or were absent altogether.
In Siberia, where the sowing was done on time, the condition of the winter
crops was considered satisfactory, although the early cold weather prevented their
stronger development.

560. S ome S uggestions in Russkiia Vedomosti for I mproving t h e


F ood S u ppl y S ystem
[No. 225, October 3, 1917, p. 3.]

Our food supply policy needs immediate changes in two areas.


First of all the question ariseswhat to do about fixed prices? Their recent
doubling continues to arouse unjustified reproaches. To be sure, the stability
of fixed prices is shaken. Certainly the word of the revolutionary government
did not prove to be any more binding than the word of the overthrown govern
ment. Nevertheless, the increase was unavoidable. When standard prices were
being established in the month of March, the average coefficient of increase in
the price of food equaled approximately 3. The fixed prices on grain were ad
justed to this norm. It was supposed that the revolutionary government would
succeed in fixing prices on all foodstuffs and stop the mounting cost of living.
In reality, attempts to regulate prices suffered complete failure along the entire
line, and, above all, it was not possible to hold back the growth in wages. All
prices after the revolution suffered a tremendous increase, to which grain prices
had to be adjusted.
The fault in our food policy is not in this. Prices had to be raised, but raised
in such a way that the heavy burden to be borne by the population should at least
guarantee the presence of grain in the market. Indiscriminate doubling of prices
is least of all suitable. To be sure, more grain is being brought in, but we may
646 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
be sure that this improvement is temporary. Hope will be aroused for a new rise
in prices, the villages have lots of money, they can wait, and again they will stop
delivering grain. If we are to enter upon the road of extracting grain by high
prices, we should establish a lowering scale of increments. It is necessary to point
out that doubling of prices is effective only for a certain, quite brief time, after
which prices will gradually drop. As a matter of fact, we should adopt a system
of prices for accelerated delivery of grain.
In part, the mistake committed could still be corrected, and we must establish
as soon as possible a scale of flexible prices, dropping by spring.
Even more important is another sin of the food supply policy. The organiza
tion of our food supply work is shamefully bad. Food supply committees were
formed under pressure from party politics and under the slogan of democratization
at any cost. Gradually all elements of the population were eliminated that had any
practical experience, including those in cooperatives. A tremendous and costly
network of organs was created, perhaps faultlessly democratic, but nonetheless
entirely worthless. The volost food supply committees proved to be particularly
damaging. They adopted all the practices of the former [food supply] representa
tives of ill fame [under the Imperial regime], and added the seizure of authority
and disobedience to law. The country was divided into a countless multitude of
food supply committees which requisitioned, searched, pillaged, and were unwill
ing to think of any general plan.
A decisive end must be put to this order of things. The best thing to do would
be to eliminate all volost committees and transfer the food supply functions of
the rest of the committees to zemstvos. This same solution is prompted by the
exact meaning of the law that established the food supply committees only as
temporary organizations up to the election of zemstvos on the basis of universal
suffrage.
But, irrespective of this, we must organize an independent organization in
charge of purveyances. The latter is necessary for the simple reason that procure
ment calls for centralization and strict adherence to a general plan. Under the
prevailing anarchy of the committees, a planned procurement for the army and
the rear is entirely unthinkable. What if, in doing so, we must return to the system
of authorized agents? At worst, we can rename them commissars, but we cannot
starve the population out of respect for the democratization of food supply com
mittees.
Further, the services of the banks and private commercial apparatus must be
enlisted in the work of procurement operations. We cannot, of course, hope that
private initiative will save the situation immediately. The commercial mechanism
is disrupted and atrophied to a large degree. Nevertheless it can do something,
and it is high time to free it from unjust suspicions. Working under state control,
it can be of great use in carrying out the very same law on the bread monopoly.
And enlisting the services of the banks is necessary to facilitate the financing of
the food supply work. Otherwise the doubling of fixed prices will call for such
an increase of circulating capital as will be beyond the means of the treasury.
Such are a few pressing problems which must be solved immediately to elimi
nate the crying defects in the organization of food supply work. Consequently,
first of all and above all, we need an energetic and unrelenting warfare against
the anarchy which has permeated the food supply work in all of its stages, begin
ning with producers and ending with consumers. Here the problem of food supply
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 647
policy coincides with the basic problem of our total policythe establishment of
a stable order.
561. R eport of the M inister of F ood (S. M. P rok opovich ) on t h e F ood
S upply S ituation to t h e C ouncil of t h e R epublic , O ctober 16
[VVP9No. 179, October 17,1917, pp. 3-4. The Minister was replying to an interpella
tion from the Kadets. Rech\ No. 244, October 17, 1917, p. 3.]
Permit me, gentlemen, members of the Provisional Council of the Republic,
to answer your question by clarifying the general situation of food supply in the
country. You will now be shown maps which illustrate this years harvest. The
total amount [of grain] which the Ministry of Food has set for itself as a goal
for this year is 1,120 million poods. I will refer briefly to the Ministrys work
during all the years of the war. In the first year of the war, the amount of grain
required, including grain forage and groats, amounted to only 231 million poods,
and the procurement during this first year of the war reached 305 million poods;
in the second year of the war, 343 million poods had to be procured, and the
procurement reached 502 million poods; in the third year of the war, the required
amount was set at 1,100 million poods, but we succeeded in procuring only 540
million, or 50 per cent of our goal. This year, we need . . . 1,120 million poods
to meet our goal, of which 650 million poods are needed for the army in the field,
70 million poods for military districts within the country, 400 million poods for
the railroads and the civilian populationthus adding up to a total of 1,120
million. Can we meet this goal this year?
Permit me to cite you some general figures [showing] the average [yield]
of our harvest in the territory of European Russia that is not occupied by the
enemy. This harvest, of course, is the only one available to us . . . In general,
if we add up all the grain, including cereals as well as forage, we have the follow
ing figuresI repeat, for European Russia, for the territory not occupied by the
enemy, and for the northern Caucasus: on an average, for the last year before the
war, the yield from these crops was 3,739 million poods. Last year it was 3,242
million poods, and this year, only 2,954 million poods will be gathered. Thus, we
have a definite shortage this year. Our yield is considerably lower this year;
it is approximately 300 million poods less than the yield of last year, and it is
considerably lower than the usual average. These are the vital factors that we
have to take into account.
Next, the territorial distribution of the harvest is of extreme importance to
us . . . Next, if you look at the distribution of the guberniyas that have a surplus
[of grain] within the boundaries of European Russia and the northern Caucasus,
you will see that these guberniyas are situated in a belt along the coast of the
Black Sea. Our usual granarythe Samara and Saratov guberniyasis stricken
by a crop failure. We can obtain hardly anything at all from those areas. Accord
ing to our calculations, we will obtain nothing, but actually we might receive
something, only it would be a very small amount. As far as forage products are
concerned, you will see that we can anticipate receiving the maximum [amount]
of forage grains, once again, from the south, from the Black Sea coast; then we
might receive small amounts from the guberniyas of Tula, Kursk, and Tambov,
and finally, from [the guberniyas of] Kazan and Ufim. The [grain] reserve
from Western Siberia serves to a certain extent as a supplement to these reserves.
648 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
As you see by these two maps, Tobolsk and Tomsk guberniyas and Akmolinsk
and Turgai oblasts yield a significant [grain] surplus. The crop is excellent
there this year. . . . Turkestan . . . is now experiencing a famine which is
reaching the greatest proportions. We must send a considerable amount of grain
there in order to save the local population from starvation and so that we can
obtain cotton from there in the future. Otherwise we will get no cotton from there.
In general, for the oblasts of western guberniyas we have obtained the following
results on the two basic grains, wheat and oats: instead of the prewar average
wheat yield of 107 million poods for this region, this year there has been a yield
of 253 million poods; instead of the usual yield of 60 million poods of oats,
144 million poods have been gathered this year in this region. For all the grains
taken together, 451 million [poods] have been gathered instead of [the prewar
average of] 199 million [poods]. Thus, if we had possessed a more adequate [sys
tem of] transport, this year would probably have been no worse than last year
. . . Now, however, if we consider not the 550 million poods which, according
to the estimates of the Ministry of Food, we can obtain from the country, but the
total order of 1,120 million [poods], it is obvious that we will not be able to fill
this order, and it becomes necessary to resort to some kind of measures which
can either decrease this order or give us the means, palliative means, to be sure,
but such that would increase our ability to meet this order.
The first step in this direction would be a reduction in the portion for the
army. This has already been undertaken, and a precise registration of army per
sonnel [is being taken] in order to avoid needless waste of food products on . . .
the army. As another measure for the civilian population, the Ministry of Food
is anticipating the unavoidable introduction of substitutes into the flour, namely,
a certain admixture of corn and barley. According to the data at our disposal,
an admixture of 10 to 15 per cent of corn and barley to wheat and rye flour would
certainly not spoil the bread. The only defect that could follow from this is that
this bread might be somewhat dried. At this point I cannot fail to mention a
certain phenomenon, a completely unnecessary form of wasting grainI am
speaking of home brewingyou understand this term home brewingthe
private distilling of vodka, a phenomenon that has become extremely widespread
at the present time, not only in guberniyas which are rich in grain, but even in
those guberniyas to which we deliver grain, and a certain, far from insignificant*
amount of the grain we deliver is, undoubtedly, used for home brewing. . . .
Thus, summarizing the over-all picture of the food campaign for this year, I
must say that, in general, the situation is quite satisfactory if we compare this
year to the previous year. The Ministry of Food is hoping that, given favorable
conditionsof which I shall speak subsequentlythe procurement for this year
may reach 500 million to 600 million poods, i.e., we will fulfill our order in the
same proportion as the order was fulfilled in the previous year, . . . This year,
owing to a wide range of circumstances, the disorganization in water transport
and the difficulties in loading and unloading of barges, we made insufficient use
of water transport, and, by the month of September, our reserves became entirely
depleted. The situation was already completely obvious in the middle of August.
Owing to this desperate situation, and to the complete depletion of [grain]
reserves both at the front and within the country, the Provisional Government
was forced to resort to a drastic measure; namely, it was forced to double the
price. The situation became so precarious that there were grounds for expecting
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 649
hunger in the army if the delivery of grain did not increase within the next ten
days. We were confronted by a dilemma: either we could attempt to obtain grain
by voluntary means, by means of this doubling [of prices], or we could turn
directly to repressive measures, to the use of armed force, and confiscate the
grain from the people with the help of this force, because the people would not
deliver the grain at the old prices. We could not bring ourselves to use armed
force. And if now, after doubling the prices, we still do not obtain the grain we
need, then, of course, we will be compelled to resort to the use of force. This is
an absolutely definite statement. But if we now take the grain at doubled prices,
and take it by force at these prices, we will be free from the reproach that we do
not compensate the producer adequately for this grain, that we are taking from
the peasant by force the products of his labor at low prices. Now, after doubling
the prices, we will be completely free from this reproach, and I believe that if we
are compelled to resort to these forceful measures in the interest of the people,
then these measures will not meet with as much opposition in the country as they
would have met had the old price level been preserved.
You can judge the results produced by this doubling of the price of grain
by comparing last years procurement for September with the amount procured
this year.6 Only 19 million poods were received from vendors in September of
last year. In September of this year, according to the incomplete reports available
in the Ministry of Food, 43 million poods have been received. Furthermore, if
we bear in mind that we still have no information on a whole number of guber
niyas, approximately 14 guberniyas, then, in the opinion of the Minister of Food,
the total procurement of grain in the course of September has already reached
approximately 50 million poods. But with such a stepped-up procurement of
grain in the localities, we were able to ship somewhat differentmuch smaller
amounts from the purchase areas; namely: in the month of August, we were able
to ship out 19 million poods, and in September, approximately 23 million
[poods]. . . . I say approximately because we still do not have information
from a large number of points and I am forced to speak in rounded figures. . . .
Thus, the food situation at the present time is as follows: the purchasing is
going on at full speed; the size of the procurements is significantly larger than
that of last year. The deliveries by rail are lagging considerably behind the
purchases. I direct your attention to the fact that the figure of 23 million poods
for the month of September is the figure for [the amount] loaded, and not the
figure for the deliveries at places of destination. The filling of orders is proceeding
much more successfully in October than it did in September. Here I have a table
for the eleven days of October. According to this table, 48.8 per cent of the orders
for flour in the month of October are being filled, 57 per cent for groats, 89 per
cent for grain forage, and, finally, 114 per cent for cattle and 40 per cent for
meat. It follows, therefore, that 65 per cent of the orders for food during these
eleven days have been filled by us. . . . Unfortunately, the condition of our
railroads evidently makes it impossible for us to be more successful in loading
[the freight] and fulfilling the orders. Here we have to deal with the following
principal factors which complicate the delivery of grain to the centers of con-
8Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika,, p. 139, presents figures to show that the procure
ment and shipment of grain began to improve markedly in the second half of August before
the law doubling prices was promulgated.
650 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
sumption: 1) poor unloading, especially of war supplies delivered at points of
destination, in view of the exorbitant demands of the workers; 2) partial strikes
of railroad employees; 3) the shortage of locomotives; 4) the establishment of
a 24-hour rest period for locomotive crews on certain lines. . . . In addition,
of vital importance is the fact that, owing to this inadequate unloading at the
main points of destination and owing to the inefficient marshaling of [freight]
cars at the central junctions, we have [a situation where] there is a bottleneck
at some of the stations. . . , This semiparalysis of the Moscow junction and the
railway line of Griazi-Kozlovwhich is the most important one of allhas now
almost completely stopped the approach of food freight to Petrograd, Moscow,
and the Northern Front. Furthermore, authorized representatives of the Ministry
of Food are flooding us with telegrams from shipping points [reporting] that the
railway stations are overfilled with grain on account of the shortage of cars, and
that the peasants are threatening to take back the grain they delivered. . . .
I will now dwell on food supply to the army. I do not have with me the refer
ence for September 15 and for October 5. The picture turns out to be as follows:
on September 15, there was a 27-day supply of flour on the Northern Front; at
the present time there is only a 15-day supply of flour on this front. This same
front had a lVs-day supply of grain forage. At the present time, the grain
forage supply there has reached 1% days, and no more. You can understand,
citizens, the meaning of such a negligible reserve. . . . As concerns the Western
Front, on September 15 there was a 15-day supply of flour; now there is only
enough flour there for 11 days. [On September 15] there was enough grain
forage for only 14 days; at the present time there is enough grain forage there
for seven weeks. The Southwestern Front: on September 15 there was flour for
2 V2 days; now, for 6 days. [On September 15] there was grain forage for 3-4
days; now there is grain forage for only 1 day. The situation is somewhat better
on the Rumanian Front. On September 15 there was flour there for 8 days;
on October 5 there was flour for 7 days; [on September 15] there was grain
forage for 1% days; now, on October 5, there is grain forage for 3 days. What
do these figures mean when I tell you that the food or forage [supply] in the army
is for 1 or 2 or 3 days? After all, the army is an enormous entity; it occupies
several hundred versts along the front, and it extends tens of versts to the rear.
If, as an average for the whole army, there is forage, let us say, for 1 or 2 days,
then there is no doubt that hunger has already come to individual sectors for
individual military units. We must take this into account. Yes, in spite of the
fact that grain purchases in wheat-growing guberniyas are proceeding with ex
traordinary success, with the present condition of [food] reserves in the army,
with the present inefficiency of deliveries to the army . . . in certain units one
can observe the absence of bread, [and] soldiers must feed on hardtack. As for
the horses, if they fail to find hay locally . . [illegible] . . . they die from
undernourishment. . . .
Here is a telegram from General Cheremisov:
The situation at the front with respect to supply is catastrophic. Horses are
dying because of the lack of forage. The baking of bread is coming to a stop
because of the shortage of flour; only hardtack remains, after which there will
be wholesale hunger, with all the consequences. Every hour of delay in over
coming the crisis threatens destruction to the army. I am petitioning, in the
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 651
strongest terms, for the shipment of flour and forage to the front, not by freight
trains, but by passenger trains. There is a daily shortage of approximately 90 per
cent in the deliveries of flour and forage. Numerous solicitations by telephone
have as yet brought no results, and the shortage of supplies constitutes the chief
reason for the moral disintegration of the army. This is the state of affairs at
the present time.
The loading [of supplies] . . . as I have already told you, showed a marked
improvement at the beginning of October, and has reached 65 per cent [of
orders]. The purchase of grain . . . far surpasses the purchase norm of the
previous year. [But this grain] cannot be applied directly for feeding the army
at the present time, because between these [food] supplies and the army lies a
distance of several thousand versts, lies the anarchy which is growing in the
country. . . . However, according to reports of stores inspectors in individual
armies, if the situation on the Northern Front is as desperate as General Cher-
emisov has depicted it to you . . . then the situation on other fronts is more
favorable. The situation on the Rumanian Front is particularly good because its
location, territorially and geographically, is closest to the guberniyas that have
a grain surplus . . . One can get a picture of the situation there from the
following figures: when the average order for flour was 34 carloads, on October 1
we delivered 126 carloads there; on the 2nd [we delivered], 50; on the 3rd, 235;
then followed a one-day interruption on October 4 when almost no grain was
received, but on the 5th [we delivered] 61 carloads, and on the 6th, 106. Thus,
the filling of orders for the Rumanian Front is far above the norm; it is 2 or
3 times higher than the norm, and these orders are already reaching the stores.
Grain shipped to other fronts is still in transit, and, for the most part, has not
yet reached the stores at the front. The situation on the Southwestern Front is,
at any rate, better; we are satisfying approximately half of the norm of 48 car
loads.
The situation on the rest of the fronts is worse for the time being, [e.g.,] on
the Western Front; and the Northern Front is in a completely desperate situation.
. . . With the same [rate of] consumption as in PetrogradI think it is a little
lower; here [it is] 40, and in Moscow it is 38the supply of rationed grain reaches
259 carloads, whereas the average loadingI am citing data for the last 4-5 days
is 40 to 50 cars per day. Thus there is no crisis in Moscow. As for the situation
in Petrograd, the measures we have adopted guarantee, given the condition I
have already mentioned, that this crisis will not assume an acute form. Namely,
we have already shipped the following amounts of grain to Petrograd: 400 car
loads of grain are on the rails for Petrograd; the [following number of] freight
trains have been provided over and above the plan: from the guberniya of
Tambov, 8 trains of flour; from the guberniya of Poltava, 2 trains; from the Don
oblast, 2 trains of barley; and from Akmolinsk oblast, 1 train of grain is
being dispatched daily. Thus, you see that if we are going to judge the supply of
food to the centers, to Petrograd in particular, by the shipments that are being
made from oudying points, then the situation is not at all desperate. We can
feed these centers with the grain that we purchase and load at the shipping
points. But we have to deal with another type of phenomenon: this grain does
not reach us, and this is not the fault of the Ministry of Food. In September,
652 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
around 400,000 poods of grain were shipped to Petrograd by the Mariinskii
Canal. With this grain we could have fed the population of Petrograd for a
period of 10 days. Of these 400,000 poods, 152,000 were detained along the
Mariinskii Canal in Belozersk alone, and several more barges were looted in
other places. [Thus,] a total of around 200,000 poods was either detained or
looted. . . . You see, gentlemen, . . . the peasants in these areas are, of course,
very much in need of grain, but we could not give them precedence in satisfying
their needs, because now, in autumn, they do have vegetables, they have a certain
amount of grain they harvested. We believed that, in this difficult time, when
there are no [grain] supplies either in the army or in the centers, we should first
of all and at all costs provide food for the army and for these centers, and only
later on, after the available grain in the rural areas and localities is harvested,
would we ship grain to these places. But now we are no longer able to carry out
this reasonable plan, and the grain that is destined for Petrograd, where there
is also a lack of vegetables, where there is not even the small supply of vegetables
that is available to Novgorod and Olonets guberniyasthis grain is being looted
on the way by the peasants. Such is the general food situation in Petrograd. . . .
Now, permit me to give you a brief report on the supply [of food] to the
Donets Basin. If the feeding of workers of the Donets Basin is handled ineffi
ciently, we will be left without coal. The Minister of Food, therefore, has adopted
the most decisive measures for [assuring] an efficient supply of grain to this basin.
According to planned shipments, in September, the monthly norm of this basin
was 1,528 carloads, or 51 carloads per day. We have loaded 1,703 cars of flour
and grain for the working population of the Donets Basin. As you see, we filled
120 per cent of the order and not 50 percent, which was the average amount of
orders filled last year; 958 cars of flour and grain were loaded in approximately
the first 10 days of October, whereas only 510 cars ought to have been loaded
according to the norm. Thus, I consider that if the grain that was loaded for
the Donets Basin . . . reaches its destination, then any talk about hunger in
the Donets Basin is out of the question. This is how matters stand.
I am saying that the purchases are now going well. A few days ago I returned
from a two-month trip to the provinces and I can sayI toured approximately
10 guberniyasI can say with assurance that the organizations of food supply
are working excellently. After visiting guberniya food committees in a large
number of guberniyas, I saw how great was the energy of the people working
in food supply, how serious and practical-minded were the persons in charge of
this work, and how well this work was organized by them. . . . Everywhere
along the course of my trip I advocated vigorously the most extensive enlistment
of cooperatives and private commerce into [the field of food supply], and I must
state that I encountered everywhere the widest support in this respect. But along
side of this, still another circumstance came to light in the various local areas.
It became apparent that under the present conditions, under the present condi
tions of the railroads, the post, and the telegraph, it is extremely difficult for
local workers to settle questions which, according to the powers granted to them,
they cannot settle by their own authority. It is extremely difficult for them to
wait for the arrival of the decisions on these questions from here, from Petrograd,
from the Ministry. Therefore, the Ministry of Food now finds it necessary for
us to create local regional representatives with very broad [discretionary]
powers. . . .
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 653
562. A uthorization for t h e U se of F orce to E xpedite the
S h ipm e n t of G rain
[Circular No. 5729 of the Minister of the Interior, Kresfianskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu,
p. 425.]
To Gub[emiya] Comfmissars], to Ob [last] Com[missars]
For the purpose of carrying out the scheduled transportation of supplies for
the army and the population, I advise you to take every measure, including the
use of armed force, for organizing the guard of grain supplies, of shipments of
grain en route and in warehouses. Explain to the population the general harm
caused by delays in carrying out orders. Demand from garrison commandants
and the district commanders of troop military guards for waterways, railroads,
the convoying of freight; through especially assigned persons watch their move
ments, eliminating obstructions by every means. Explain to the soldiers of the
guard that the protection of grain and of the organs taking care of food supplies
means the defense of the country. Draw, for the organization of the guard, upon
all the organs of self-government, the food boards, the public organizations.
Charge the expenditures incurred for guarding freight and supplies to the expense
of the food supply organization, in case of misunderstanding to the expense of the
Ministry of the Interior. You can pay for the work of the soldiers when guarding
by [granting them] double their daily pay. No. 5729.
N ik itin , Minister of the Interior
October 19, 1917

THE PROVISIONING OF THE ARMY


563. D ifficulties in t h e D elivery of H ay and F odder to t h e A rm y
[Circular from the Section on Local Administration, Ministry of the Interior, to Guber
niya Commissars, No. 1239, May 9, 1917, Sb. Tsirk. MVD, p. 14.]
The Commander in Chief of the Southwestern Front, Brusilov, advises of a
considerable slackening in March and April of the delivery of hay required by
the army; he points out that the enormous deficiency in deliveries leads to the
destruction of the horses. According to information from the representatives of
the Ministry of Agriculture, the hay received for distribution has been stocked,
but cannot be brought to the railroad stations owing to the breakdown of transport
[facilities]. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that the guberniya com
missars, as the representatives of the Provisional Governments authority, render
aid to the delegates of the Ministry of Agriculture for the delivery of hay to the
stations by giving the necessary urgent instructions to the uezd commissars and
other subordinate officials. They should request the volost committees to give
horses and carts, explaining to them the necessity of an uninterrupted supply to
the front of fodder so as to avoid the dangerous consequences of the destruction
of army horses.
654 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
564. A n A ttem pt to R egularize M ilitary and C ivilian F ood S upply
in F ront A reas
[Sob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1241.]
On the original is written Approved. Brusilov, Supreme Commander, June
24, 1917; A. Peshekhonov, Minister of Food, June 30, 1917.
statute on advisory food supply bureaus at t h e front
1) With a view to the systematic supply of food products to public organiza
tions serving the army and the local population at the front, as well as for super
vision of the proper utilization and distribution of these products, Advisory
Bureaus are formed on each front under the Chief of Supply and are coordinated
by the representative of the Minister of Food at Stavka.
2) The Advisory Bureau is under the chairmanship of the Chief of Supply
of the armies and front or his deputy. The membership of the Bureau includes:
1) the front representative of the Ministry of Food, 2) the representative of the
guberniya food supply boards of the guberniyas attached to the particular front,
3) a representative of the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, 4) a representative of the
All-Russian Union of Towns, 5) a representative of the Russian Red Cross Society,
6) a representative of the local organizations of the Ministry of Transport (for
the operation of railroads, operation of waterways, construction of new roads
and road installations), 7) a representative of the officers front committee,
8) two representatives of the soldiers front committee, and 9) appropriate officials
of the Commissary Administration of the front.

4) To determine the necessary quantity of food products and fodder that


must be brought to the front, the Advisory Bureau keeps an accurate account of
persons, horses, and cattle at the front, including the public organizations and
the population.
7) On the basis of the aforesaid information . . . the Advisory Bureau es
tablishes the detailed procedure for supplying the various organizations with
food products and fodder, deciding, with respect to each of them, precisely
which products will be received by an organization from quartermaster stores
and which from stocks of the guberniya food supply committees. At the same
time the Bureau assists the timely and systematic supply of local food products
and fodder to troop units, public organizations, and the population, supervising
the proper distribution of food products and fodder by stores and warehouses.

8) The issue of food to troop units is carried out solely from quartermaster
stores. Only for those units situated in the procurement area of lie guberniya
food supply committee and remote from commissary stores may food products
be issued from stocks of the food supply committee against commissary checks
and with the special permission of the Chief of the Commissary of the front.
9) With the formation of the Advisory Bureaus, individual troop units and
organizations serving the army are prohibited from carrying out any procure
ment whatsoever both in inland and rear guberniyas, with the exception of fresh
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 655
vegetables and antiscorbutic remedies. In the rear areas of the theater of military
operations troop units and organizations are forbidden to purchase grain (rye,
wheat, spelt, millet, buckwheat, lentils, beans, peas, com, barley, oats, all flour,
bran, groats, and waste products from the production of the aforesaid grain),
oilcake, hay, cattle, meat, meat products, butter, fat, makhorka [inferior kind
of tobacco], and sugar. Troop units and organizations may procure other products
only by agreement with guberniya food supply committees. In the troop zone of
the theater of military operations, troop units and organizations may carry out
procurement of products not enumerated in the present article and also of eggs,
cattle, fat, and hay only with the permission of the Advisory Bureau.
10) The Statute on Advisory Bureaus at the front to be put into effect begin
ning July 1, 1917.

565. T h e T hreatening F ood S u pply S ituation for A ugust


[Minister of War Kerensky to the Minister of Food Peshekhonov, Ekon. Polozhenie,
H, 282-84.]
August 3, 1917
During the first twenty days of July the loading of food items for the active
army on the Western Front decreased to such an extent that with an insufficient
supply of food in the storehouses of the front, the feeding of the army in the
month of August will be critical.
There is no reason to expect that there was an improvement in loading during
the last ten days of July.
Taking into account the supply of food expected in August, it would appear
that the state of food supply on the fronts for the thirty-one days of that month
may be represented as follows (in days) :
Northern Western Southwestern Rumanian
Food Front Front Front Front
Flour.................... .............24 7 12 2
Barley.................. .............43 54 1 6
Grain fodder........ ............. 2% 14 15 7
It should be mentioned, however, that this assurance will prevail only on
condition that from July 20 to 31 foodstuffs were delivered in accordance with
daily needs, which can hardly be expecetd. Therefore we should be prepared
for a much worse state of the food supply at the front than indicated in the above
table. This is already fully confirmed at the present time by the food situation on
the Southwestern Front. The Chief of Supply points out that because of difficult
ties on the railroads, delivery of food supplies to this front was interrupted
altogether and was restored only on July 28. The food crisis on this front, accord
ing to his telegram of July 29, was the result of this situation. Consequently, the
Chief of Supply urgently requests immediate assistance in supplying the South
western Front with flour and grain fodder from the east. He also urges that
instructions be issued to increase for this same front the supply of food prepared
by the guberniya food supply committees.
656 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
In order to avoid food crises on other fronts also, I request that immediate
measures be taken for all fronts as well and that I be notified about the measures
taken.
A . K erensky , M inister of W ar
A rtillery G eneral M a nikovskii , Assistant
to the M inister of War
L ieutenant General B ogatko , Chief of Supply-

566. T h e F ood S u pply Crisis on t h e S outhw estern F ront and t h e


D ecision to R equisition G rain and F odder in t h e L ocal G uberniyas
[Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander to the Supreme Com
mander, General Kornilov, Ekon . Polozhenie, II, 284-85. See also Doc. 494.]
August 13, 1917
At the conference on food supply for the armies held at Stavka on August 12,
with the participation of representatives from the Ministry of Foodfrom the
Ministry itself, as well as from the Bureau attached to the Chief of Supply-
and of representatives of the Ministry of Transport, it was revealed: 1) the
Ministry of Food has no unassigned grain on hand; 2) it is expected that the
daily need of the front for September will be satisfied, and in quantities of daily
needs as stated, from the reserves; of the possibility of collecting the latter, the
Ministry of Food received favorable reports from its agents; 3) the needed accu
mulation of foodstuff at the present time cannot be effected because the Ministry
of Food lacks the necessary quantity of food and because of a complete break
down of the railways, as stated by the representative of the Administration of
Railroads from the Ministry of Transport. It was possible to assign in the next
few days only 20 carloads of flour a day over the Omsk Railroad to ease the situa
tion on the Southwestern Front. In view of what has been said, the conference
took into consideration that at present the reserves of grain and fodder of the
Northern and Western fronts are, in accordance with instructions from the Chief
of Field Supply, used to satisfy the needs of the Southern Front, which is cut off
from supply altogether. Moreover, according to statements from representatives
of the Ministry of Food and the decisions of the Odessa oblast and guberniya
food committees, the organs in charge of food are powerless to take the grain from
the population for the army, and the population is completely unwilling to mill
and surrender it. Further, the population grows daily more disorganized as a
result of conflicting resolutions by various local committees, including land
committees. Therefore, the conference resolved to make a requisition of grain
and fodder within the limits of the guberniyas of the Southwestern and Rumanian
fronts by order from the front advisory bureaus, the latter to determine within
what time and in what amount the supplies are to be turned over. I approved this
resolution. No. 7877. L ukom skii
567. T h e Continuing Crisis in S eptem ber
[Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander to the Supreme Com
mander, Kerensky, Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 286.]
September 27, 1917
Supplementing yesterdays statement over the apparatus, I report, for purposes
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 657
of comparison, in number of days by fronts the supply of flour from September
1 to 20. The Northern Front had [a supply] for thirty-seven days, and now for
twenty-three days. The Western Front had a supply to last for more than twenty-
three days, and now for fourteen and a half. The Southern Front had a supply
for two days, and now for three and a half, and the Rumanian Front had a supply
for ten and a half days, and now for eight days. The extremely difficult situation
created on the Western Front, which is using its very limited supply of hardtack,
arouses apprehension for the future, particularly since the information about
the loading of grain is most unsatisfactory, even from the richest regions, as for
example, the Don and Kuban oblasts and Ekaterinoslav guberniya, also Tula,
Kursk, Orlov, Riazan, Simbirsk, Samara, Viatka, Turgaisk, Ural, and Akmo-
linsk. In view of the above, I deem it necessary to take immediate steps to estab
lish a Special Bureau in Kuban and Terek oblasts and in Stavropol guberniya.
With this in view, Gavrilov, a specially authorized representative, left for Petro
grad to make a personal report to you, also to request that you point out, in the
name of the Provisional Government, to the population of the Kuban and Terek
oblasts and the Stavropol guberniya the deadly consequences of the growing food
crisis on the front as a result of the prolonged nondelivery of food.
D ukh onin

568. T h e D angerous F ood S u pply S ituation on t h e


W estern F ront in O ctober
[Telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander to the Supreme Com
mander, Kerensky, transmitting the report of the Commander in Chief of the Western
Front, General Baluev, Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 290. See also Doc. 561.]
October 19, 1917
The Commander in Chief of the Western Front reports to you that, following
threats by the starving population of the city and the uezd to pillage and burn
down the commissary storehouses, the commander of the Viazemsk garrison or
dered seven carloads of flour to be released from the commissary to the population.
Requests, supported by references to possible excesses and pogroms, are arriving
from the food supply committees in the cities near the front to release food for
the population. Thus the front, already in an extremely grave situation, is facing
a great new danger from the starving population. This portends a complete
breakdown in supply. Thirteen days have passed since the rationing of one
pound of bread and seven-eighths of a pound of hardtack. During that time
there was a 68 per cent shortage of flour. Hardtack is about exhausted. We
shall have to use the field rations, that is, deprive the front of its last supplies for
use in case of movement, which is fraught with grave consequences. The Ministry
of Food, however, apparently does not realize the gravity of the situation at the
front. It renders no concrete help, but merely confirms that the Western Front
is actually in a most lamentable situation. Alarming news arrives from the front
concerning dissatisfaction with the reduction of bread. General Baluev adds
to this that in line of duty he feels obligated to report to you the situation at the
front and in the population. He urgently requests that extra measures be taken
to provide both the front and the population with foodstuff; otherwise the most
dreadful consequences are inevitable.
658 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Copy of this telegram is addressed by the Commander in Chief of the Western
Front to the Minister of Food and to the Minister of War. I report the above. 9942.
D u k h o n in

THE SUPPLY AND REGULATION OF OTHER FOOD SUPPLIES


AND CONSUMER GOODS
569. T h e E stablish m ent of a C omm ission to E xam ine t h e Q uestion of
S upplying t h e P opulation w ith Consum er G oods
[Sob. Uzak, 1,1, No. 553.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. A Commission shall be established under the Provisional Government to
examine the situation with respect to supplying the population with consumer
goods, chiefly products of industry, such as metals and metallic goods, leather
and leather goods, sugar, tea, kerosene, soap, textiles, and paper.
II. Government institutions, public organizations, and private enterprise shall
be required to furnish to the Commission mentioned in the preceding (I) section,
at its request, all information necessary for the fulfillment of the tasks entrusted
to it by the present law.
III. The Commission to examine the question of supplying the population
with consumers goods shall be authorized to submit reports to the Provisional
Government as its work progresses, with an indication of the measures that are
desirable in the opinion of the Commission.
V. The following rules shall be established in respect of the tasks, composi
tion, and headquarters of the Commission mentioned in section I :
1. The Commission shall be assigned the following tasks: a) to make a cal
culation of the quantity of consumer goods required seasonally for the army and
the population; b) to determine the quantity of the above goods which can be
manufactured seasonally in the respective branches of industry, as well as the
existing total stocks of these goods available for distribution to the population;
c) to ascertain the organ by which it would be possible to distribute goods to
their final consumer, and d) to establish a feasible scale of fixed prices and the
procedure for regulating them.
6. In addition to the Chairman, the Commission shall consist of: five repre
sentatives of the Departments of Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Transport,
Finance, and War, one from each; two representatives of the Special Councils
on defense and transport, one from each; the Chief Commissioner on the supply
of metals, fuel, and electric power or his representative; a representative of the
State Committee on Food Supply; two representatives of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies; two representatives of the Soviet of Peasants Deputies
(or, by agreement, one representative each from the Soviet of Peasants Deputies
and the Peasants Union); two representatives of the Council of All-Russian
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 659
Cooperative Unions, and one representative each of the Peoples Bank, the Moscow
Union of Consumers Societies, the Zemstvo Union, the Union of Towns, the
Central Committee for the supply of the army of the All-Russian Zemstvo and
Town (Zemgor), the Moscow War Industry Committee, the Moscow Stock
Exchange Committee, the Cotton Supply Committee, and the Hide Committee.

P rince Lvov , Minister-President


A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
V lad . N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 24, 1917

570. T h e S ta te m e n t o f t h e G ov erm en t A n n ou n cin g t h e


E sta b lish in g o f t h e C om m ission
[VVP, No. 41, April 27, 1917, p. 1.]
The war had disrupted the economic life of the country and of our poorly
developed industry to such a degree that many articles necessary to daily life are
available for the needs of the population only in very limited quantities and at
very high prices.
In the meantime, the Provisional Government, having passed the law on the
transfer of grain to the control of the State, has pledged itself to attend to the
matter of supplying the rural population with articles of general consumption
chiefly, manufactured goods. Various strata of the urban population are also
interested in receiving these goods at reasonable prices.
Finding that such necessary articles as metallic and leather goods, textiles,
tea, kerosene, soap, paper, and so forth must, in any event, be made available to
the population at fixed prices and, if possible, in sufficient quantities, the Provi
sional Government has recognized the necessity of adopting immediate measures
to clarify the question of determining the actual quantity of these articles and
goods which can be appropriated for the civilian population, their prices, and
the most equitable procedure for apportioning this quantity among the most needy.
With the object of resolving this problem, the Provisional Government is estab
lishing a commission to clarify the question of supplying the population with
articles of general consumption.
571. Izvestiia!s C om m ent on t h e E stablishm ent of t h e C o m m ission
[N o. 54, April 30,1917, p. 4.]
During the past months a decrease has become evident in the flow of food
and fodder supplies to the market. This decrease, by the way, can be explained by
the fact that peasants found it disadvantageous to sell grain at fixed prices while
prices on all manufactured goods were rising continuously, reaching incredible
levels. And even with these fantastic prices, which, not infrequently, were five to
six times as high as prewar prices, one was often unable to purchase the most vital
necessities. In this connection, the question was raised more than once of estab
lishing statutory prices on all the most important manufactured goods, vital to
660 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the peasant farm, concurrently with a statutory price on grain. But the matter did
not go beyond the stage of general discussion. The tsarist government did not
even attempt to undertake any steps in this direction.
The Provisional Government now considers it essential to give priority to
this matter. The intensification of the food crisis and the introduction of a
monopoly on grain transactions made it inevitable that this critical question be
effectively resolved.
Judging by [its] . . . announcement, the Government intends to restrict itself
to the allotment, according to fixed prices, of the products that are left over at
the present and that will be left over in the future after the state requirements in
connection with the needs of war have been met.
In short, the solution to the problem of supplying the population with [manu
factured] goods is unavoidably that of supervising and controlling the very
process of manufacture, in addition to supervising distribution.
We do not close our eyes at all to the fact that this is a most complicated and
difficult problem. But there is no other way of averting the crisis. One must
either consider that this problem is insurmountable, refuse to solve it and let
events take their natural course, or, without dwelling on the difficulties and com
plications of the problem, immediately proceed to the gradual working out of the
appropriate practical measures. To create illusions, however, and to make
promises without the possibility of fulfilling them would only mean deceiving
oneself and others. It need hardly be said that the repercussions of such a slap in
the face would be highly regrettable and that they would not be long in coming.
If the Government seriously intends to start solving the problem of supplying
the country with the most important products of manufacture, it must provide a
wide scope to the formulation of the problem. It is necessary to establish at once
special organizations in all the principal branches of industry, which would
include the manufacturers and would have the participation of government repre
sentatives and representatives of the democracy. In branches of industry where
such organizations already exist in the form of syndicates, these should be utilized.
In branches of industry that have not been organized, some unifying organs will
have to be created. One can borrow the models even from Germany or the Allies,
modifying them to fit our present political conditions. At the same time, there
will have to be control over the activities of commercial banks, and definite direc
tion will have to be given to the policies of the banks to meet the problems at hand.
Sooner or later, these questions will inevitably become the order of the day.
The times of free enterprise, the times of a government policy of noninterference
in the economy, have passed, never to return. With an acute shortage in all of the
most important products, free trade can only result in prices reaching even more
incredible levels and in leaving many of the most important needs of the country
unfulfilled. Free enterprise can only lead us to complete economic stagnation.
The capitalists would earn huge profits, but the popular masses would be utterly
exhausted by the burden of the high costs and would be forced to eke out the most
miserable existence. High prices are not felt so keenly now on account of the
relatively high wartime earnings. After the end of the war, when earnings will
decrease as a result of the influx of new labor forces, high prices could lead to
the gravest complications.
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 661
572. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e A dvisability of F ixed P rices
for C onsum er G oods
[No. 124, June 3,1917, p. 1.]
In the final analysis, every war is a war of attritionof fighting forces, ma
terial resources, energy, and will to resist. The unprecedented war of nations which
we are living through is a particularly good illustration of that. It is natural that
by the end of the third year the signs of exhaustion began to manifest themselves
with menacing acuteness, particularly in those branches of economic life that had
had comparatively weak organization even before the war. With the predominant
agricultural nature of our country, industry has always been our weakest point.
And it is not surprising that it was most grievously affected by the economic col
lapse. The production of our industry for the internal market was insignificant
even before the war; our industrial enterprises were adapted to this situation.
When it developed that the greater portion of production must be diverted to the
needs of the armyupward of 60 per cent of cotton goods and up to 100 per cent
for woolensthe population was faced with a prospect of veritable famine in
regard to the most necessary articles of daily living. The situation is particularly
difficult at the present moment when the lack of fuel forces the curtailment of the
work of our factoriesweak at bestand when the diminution of productivity
of factory labor, which is usual during times of strong social upheaval, also begins
to assume threatening proportions. . . .
. . . We should all be aware of the fact that the country has been impover
ished in regard to consumer goods, and that for every one of us there isand can
be manufactured in the nearest futureonly an extremely limited quantity. We
all will have to skimp a bit and to limit our consumption. This is the trouble that
was brought on by die war, and it will continue with us even after the war. . . .
. . . What takes place when the market is left to the free play of private in
terests in the face of a shortage of goods? An exorbitant rise in prices, which
nothing can prevent, because, with the general shortage of necessary goods, there
will always be persons willing to pay those exorbitant prices in order not to leave
the shops with empty hands, and they are followed willy-nilly by those who have
to strain their last resources to that end.
The inflation of prices for goods during the war was intensified by another
factor which is closely connected with the war, namely, the tremendous issuance
of paper money. . . .
. . . Everyone who has anything to sell is seized by excitement, speculative
fever; by efforts to increase the price of goods, that is, by efforts to depress the
price of the ruble, the price of the paper-money unit. And it must be noted that
the spirit of this speculation infects not only the so-called profiteers, the ma
rauders of the rear, but the most respected and substantial elements of the popu
lation who have something to sellfrom a member of the stock exchange clear
down to a petty trader and peasant, reaching finally the industrial workingman,
who, within the framework of the present-day economic system, sells his labor
power as a certain type of goods, peculiar though it is. . . .
Fixed priceswhich are established according to reasonable considerations
dealing with the cost of the manufacture of goods, transportation, and overhead,
including profit, limited by certain normsform the reliable barrier against which
the insane rise of the wave of universal speculative fever must break. . . . Paper
662 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
money, saved from overpayment for goods, must be immediately utilized for the
needs of the State by means of tax levies. All classes of the population must par
ticipate in meeting the government financial needs. Everything that it is possible
to take must be taken from the wealthy classes, but that is not enough, and this
situation must be faced squarely. . . .
573. A uthorization for t h e M inister of F ood to O rganize t h e S upply
to t h e P opulation o f T extiles , F ootwear , K erosene , S oap ,
and O t h er P roducts of P rime N ecessity
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 782. On August 25, the Minister of Food was authorized to
regulate and control the distribution of textiles to consumers (ibid., I, 2, No. 1647).
On the attempt to supply the population with kerosene, see ibid., No. 1440. For docu
ments on the regulation of the manufacture of textiles, see Chapter 12. In general, the
economic and administrative difficulties prevented any significant positive results from
these measures. See Lozinskii, Ekonomichcskaia Politika, pp. 132ff., and Struve, Food
Supply in Russia During the War, passim, for descriptions and discussions of these
measures.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The Minister of Food shall be responsible for undertaking the organization
of systematic supply, within the limits of the available quantity of the respective
goods, to the population of textiles, footwear, kerosene, soap, and other products
and articles of prime necessity, with the proviso that the prices at which the above
products and articles are distributed to the population shall also include overhead
expenses involved in their procurement, delivery, and distribution.
II. The Minister of Food shall be authorized:
1) to carry out procurement of the products and articles mentioned in sec
tion I against the credits placed at his disposal by the Provisional Governments
law of May 19,1917, concerning the procedure for making working capital avail
able to the Ministry of Food (Collection of Laws, article 676);
2) to establish rules for the distribution of the above products and articles
to the population, and also, by agreement with the Minister of Finance, to estab
lish rules for distributing and using credits;
3) to draw upon local food supply organs, established by the Provisional
Governments law of March 25, 1917 (Collection of Laws, article 487), for par
ticipation in the procurement and distribution of other products and articles of
prime necessity in addition to food products, as well as to appoint specially au
thorized persons for this purpose.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. P esh ek ho no v , Minister of Food
June 7,1917
574. T h e S tandards of S ugar D istribution
[Soft. Uzak.9 I, 2, No. 950. With some changes, this order continued the system of
sugar supply in force before the revolution. See Struve, Food Supply in Russia During
the War, pp. 174-91. Further instructions on rationing were issued on June 24. Sob.
Uzak., I, 2, No. 1079.]
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 663
ORDER OF THE MINISTER OF FOOD
June 14, 1917
On the basis of articles 2, 3, and 4 of the Law of the Provisional Government
for the establishment of the State Committee on Food Supply (Collection of Laws,
article 358), I order fulfillment of the following decision of the State Committee
on Food Supply on the standards for distribution of sugar pending further pro
duction :
Art. 1. In the distribution of sugar among the various regions of the State,
the entire civilian population is divided into three categories: a) rural, b) urban,
and c) specially qualified, which includes the population of cities of more than
500,000 inhabitants as well as workers employed in enterprises connected with
defense.
Art. 2. The following amounts of per capita supply ration are established for
the categories of population mentioned in article 1: a) % pound per month for
the rural population, b) 1% pounds for the urban population, and c) 2 pounds
for the specially qualified population.
Art. 3. The determination of the rations for issue of sugar to the population
is left to the guberniya (oblast and municipal) food supply committees, with the
proviso, however, that the ration issues in no case exceed the highest ration supply
standard for the given region (article 2).
Art. 4. In addition to the total quantity of sugar allotted to the various centers
of consumption in accordance with the supply standards mentioned in article 2,
an additional allotment of sugar, amounting to 5 per cent of the total supply, is
placed at the disposal of the food supply committees for the needs of hospitals,
restaurants, tearooms, railroad and school buffets, pharmacies, and so forth, as
well as for the needs of the traveling population.
Art. 5. The surplus quantity of sugar made available in the various sectors
of consumption as a result of overestimate of the population in determining the
monthly ration issue of sugar for a particular sector, as well as the quantity of
sugar remaining from the 5 per cent additional allocation after the needs men
tioned in article 4 have been satisfied, can in no case serve as grounds for in
creasing the ration issue of sugar to the population, and is placed in the reserve
and counted toward the ration issue of the next month.
Art. 13. Rear echelons of the Zemstvo and Town Unions, the Red Cross, and
other public organizations serving the army receive sugar from the food supply
committees on the basis of general standards: the official personnel of the institu
tions according to the rations established for the remaining local population, and
wounded and ill soldiers in convalescence according to the rations established for
local military units.
Art. 14. Military personnel on furlough (including the return travel time)
receive a sugar allowance from the food supply committees according to the rations
established for the remaining local population.
Art. 15. Military personnel on leave without appropriate documents certify
ing to the validity of their leave receive no sugar allowance.
D . K o r o bo v , for the Minister of Food
664 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
575. T h e I ntroduction of t h e S tate S ugar M onopoly
[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1695. The import of this legislation was to remove sugar supply
from the general food supply organization and to create in its place a state sugar
monopoly under the Minister of Finance. Before it could be put into effect, the Bol
sheviks had seized power. See Struve, Food Supply in Russia During the War, pp.
191-93, and Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 135-36.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment, supplement, and abrogation of the relevant statutes, it is
hereby decreed:
1) The sale of sugar for consumption within the State, as well as the import
of sugar from abroad and its export abroad, is the exclusive right of the Treasury.
Note: The provisions of the present law may be applied, by agreement of the
Minister of Finance with the Minister of Food, to all products of the beet-sugar
and starch and sugar industry.
2) The general administration of the state sugar operation is concentrated
in the Central Office of Unassessed Taxes in the Ministry of Finance, and the local
administration of this operation in the guberniyas and oblasts is entrusted to
guberniya or oblast excise offices.
5) The excise duty for sugar of domestic production delivered to the Treasury
is deducted by deleting it from the accounts of the factories concerned.
7) The refining of sugar acquired by the Treasury is carried out by Treasury
orders either in private or cooperative plants on conditions laid down by the
Minister of Finance or in state plants.

10) The sale of sugar is carried out by the state administration from plants
and warehouses, state shops, and also from stores of cooperative organizations
and commercial establishments of private persons to whom the Treasury has
entrusted such sale on a commission basis.
11) Minimum and maximum sale prices are established by legislative action.
Note: Sale prices of sugar are fixed, pending further notice, within the [fol
lowing] limits: for granulated sugar, from 37 rubles 20 kopeks to 57 rubles 20
kopeks per pood; and for lump sugar, from 40 rubles to 60 rubles per pood.

13) For the duration of emergency wartime conditions, the supply of sugar
to the army and civilian population is carried out according to a plan drawn up
by the Ministry of Food and approved by the Central Economic Committee. Sugar
intended for the needs of the army, under the above plan, is placed directly at the
disposal of the War Department, and sugar intended for the civilian population
of each guberniya and oblast is placed at the disposal of the appropriate directors
of excise taxes and is distributed by them to trading places.
14) Appropriations required to carry out the state sugar operation are allo
cated from funds of the State Treasury under budgetary procedure.
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 665
Amounts realized from the state sale of sugar are entered in Treasury revenues
under the appropriate budget headings.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
M. B e r n a t sk ii , Acting Minister of Finance
September 14, 1917
576. T h e P r o d u c tio n o f C a n d y a n d P a str y
[Sob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1071. See Struve, Food Supply in Russia During the War, pp.
19495. For the measures on regulation of potato syrup production, see ibid* pp.
195-96, and Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 135-36.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. Of the products of the candy and pastry industry which require beet or
cane sugar for their production, only the following types are authorized for manu
facture: a) bar chocolate, b) hard caramel without filling, c) hard caramel with
filling, d) soft caramel, e) candied fruit jelly, and f) fruit sweetmeats.
2. The products authorized for manufacture in accordance with article 1 must
meet the following conditions: the amount of beet or cane sugar must not exceed
the following quantities: in bar chocolate, 45 per cent; in hard caramel without
filling, 40 per cent; in hard caramel with filling, 35 per cent; in soft caramel, 40
per cent; in candied fruit jelly, 40 per cent; and in fruit sweetmeats, 45 per cent.
3. The Ministry of Food, through the intermediary of the guberniya (oblast)
food supply committees and municipal committees not under guberniya jurisdic
tion, registers all enterprises engaged in candy and pastry production by the date
determined by the Minister of Food. The procedure for carrying out the regis
tration is established by a directive of the Minister of Food.
5. The Ministry of Food draws up a plan for the manufacture of candy and
pastry goods by individual procurement districts and, in accordance with this plan,
issues authorizations to the local food supply committees for the fulfillment of
orders submitted.
6. Food supply committees forward orders to individual enterprises, estab
lish permanent supervision over these enterprises, and observe the fulfillment of
orders in chronological sequence.
8. The delivery of products of the candy and pastry industry from factories,
pastry shops, and similar establishments shall be carried out only with the per
mission of food supply committees.
16. The present law . . . to be put into effect before its promulgation by the
Ruling Senate.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
A. P e s h e k h o n o v , Minister of Food
June 29, 1917
,
CHAPTER 12
Industry Transport, and Communications

GENERAL MEASURES OF THE MINISTRY OF


TRADE AND INDUSTRY
577. T h e F acilitation of t h e F ormation of J oint -S tock C om panies
and t h e E lim ination from T heir Charters of N ational
and R eligious R estrictions
[Sob- Uzak., I, 1, No. 388. Attention is directed again to Zagorsky, State Control of
Industry During the War, Parts IHI, for a description of Russian industry before
the revolution, and Part IV and Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. II, for
the Provisional Government period. The economic program of the first Provisional
Government was outlined in a speech of A. I. Konovalov before the Moscow Stock
Exchange on April 1,1917. For a translation of his remarks, see A. J. Sack, The Birth
of Russian Democracy, pp. 258-71.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The Minister of Trade and Industry shall have the right: a) to approve
under his own authority the charters of newly established commercial and indus
trial joint-stock companies and limited partnerships and to change the present
charters of already existing partnerships and companies, and b) to grant the
above-mentioned societies and partnerships deferments for the raising of basic
capital of original as well as supplementary issues, with the proviso, however,
that such deferments shall not exceed six months on each occasion.
II. Restrictive provisions concerning foreign subjects and Jews contained in
existing laws shall not apply to joint-stock companies and limited partnerships.

VI. The following article shall be included henceforth in the charters of newly
established joint-stock companies and limited partnerships, as well as in the
charters of existing companies and partnerships that do not contain the regulation
given below: The subjects of powers at war with Russia may not take any part
in the administration and management of the business or of the various enter
prises and properties of a company. . . . The complete elimination of the subjects
of powers at war with Russia from any participation whatsoever in the adminis
tration of the business of a company, as well as from any employment in it, shall
extend in its entirety to the subjects of states that went to war with Russia after
the aforesaid persons held their respective posts.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 10,1917
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 667
578. T h e E stablish m ent of a C ouncil on Q uestions R elating to the
D evelopm ent of t h e P roductive F orces of th e C ountry
[So&. Uzak., 1, 1, No. 700. See Doc. 585.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. A Council on questions relating to the development of the productive forces
of the country shall be set up under the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the
discussion of basic principles of economic policy and for a survey of general
measures for promoting the development of extractive and manufacturing in
dustry, as well as of domestic and foreign trade.
II. The Minister of Trade and Industry shall preside over the Council (sec
tion I ) , and if it is impossible for him to preside, he shall be replaced by one of
the assistant ministers or another person designated by the Minister. The Council
shall include representatives of the following ministries: Trade and Industry,
Agriculture, Transport, Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, Education, and
State Control, as well as representatives of advisory institutions on trade and in
dustry; scholarly, economic, and agricultural societies; cooperative institutions;
unions of zemstvos and towns; war industry committees, and the committee of
military technical assistance; and representatives of industrial and agricultural
labor.

P rince U vov , Minister-President


A. K onovalov , Minister of Trade and Industry
May 5, 1917
579. T h e E stablishm ent of a S u ppl y C om m ittee (ZagotoviteFnyi
Komitet) in th e M inistry of T rade and I ndustry
[So6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 753. A similar committee with less extensive duties and powers
previously operating in the Ministry of Transport was simultaneously abolished. On
the same day, a Customs and Tariff Committee was established in the Ministry of
Trade and Industry to consider questions concerning the amendment and clarification
of customs and tariff laws. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 891.]
STATUTE OF THE SUPPLY COMMITTEE
IN THE MINISTRY OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY
1. The Supply Committee in the Ministry of Trade and Industry shall be
designed to promote the regular and successful development of domestic industry
by establishing unification and planning in the matter of large-scale procurement
both at home and abroadof supplies of raw materials, semifinished goods,
and manufactured articles required to meet the needs of government departments,
zemstvo, municipal, and other public institutions, as well as industrial and com
mercial organizations.
2. The Committee shall be responsible for matters involving planned and large-
scale procurement at home and abroad, in particular:
a) ascertaining the extent of the needs of government departments, public
institutions, and commercial and industrial organizations for raw materials, semi
finished goods, and manufactured articles;
668 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
b) ascertaining to what extent these needs can be met on the domestic market
and what part of them will require the placing of orders abroad;
c) drawing up plans for allocating internal orders among domestic enter
prises;
d) ascertaining standard prices on internal orders;
e) preparing standard contracts for supplies within the country, and estab
lishing the main provisions of contracts for various large orders of supplies;
f) considering, from the point of view of the interests of domestic industry,
the proposals of all departments for government orders abroad;
g) preparing measures for the unification and reduction of prices of neces
sary foreign orders for raw materials, semifinished goods, and manufactured
articles;
h) fulfilling instructions of the Minister of Trade and Industry on matters
within the Committees terms of reference.
3. The Committee shall comprise: the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Chairmen
of sections . . . members of the Committee, and secretary of the Committee.
4. The Minister of Trade and Industry shall serve as chairman of the Com
mittee; the Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry dealing with affairs of in
dustry shall serve as Vice-Chairman of the Committee, replacing the Chairman
when he is absent.
6. The following shall sit in the Committee with rights of members: two repre
sentatives each from the Ministries of Trade and Industry, Transport, and Agri
culture; one representative each from the Ministry of Finance, the State Control,
the All-Russian Zemstvo Union, the All-Russian Union of Towns, and the Central
War Industry Committee; two representatives from the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies; two representatives from the Council of Congresses of repre
sentatives of industry and trade; and one representative from the private railways.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
May 5, 1917
580. K onovalov s D istress at P revailing E conomic C onditions
[Excerpts from an address before the Congress of War Industry Committees in Moscow,
May 16, 1917. VVP, No. 57, May 18, 1917, p. 3. The first coalition government, in
its Declaration of May 5, stated that it would fight resolutely and inflexibly against
the economic disorganization of the country by the further systematic establishment
of governmental control of production, transport, exchange, and distribution of com
modities, and in necessary cases it will have recourse also to the organization of
production. Ibid., No. 49, May 6, 1917, p. 1.]
Without false shame, frankly and honestly we must recognize that a difficult
task lies ahead of us, that the task which awaits an urgent solution from us is
absolutely exceptional in its magnitude and difficulty. You know very well your
selves that both in the center and in the provinces there is no lack of attempts to
trample roughly the rights of some and to create privileges for others, attempts
to deny the principles of liberty and right and to oppose to them the principles of
force. These antinational tendencies camouflage their real substance under slogans
which hypnotize the popular masses and lead Russia by gigantic strides toward
catastrophe. We must openly and honestly recognize that under the old regime
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 669
this catastrophe was never outlined so vividly and clearly as it is outlined now;
never during the whole course of the war was our situation at the front as threat
ening as now; never did the enemy feel his superiority over us to such a degree;
and finally, never were our Allies as alarmed by the possibility of completely losing
that which is the guarantee of a successful end of the war. And inside the country,
have we ever been as close to a catastrophe which is ready to shatter to its foun
dations and to annihilate our entire economic life, and which at the present time
we are approaching? The slogans which are being thrust into the midst of the
workers, exciting the dark instincts of the mob, are followed by destruction,
anarchy, and the annihilation of public and national life. Under the influence of
this agitation on the part of irresponsible individuals, the working masses put
forward demands whose realization would mean the complete destruction of enter
prises. The conscious kindling of passions is being carried on systematically and
insistently; demands are incessantly followed by new ones, the form of their
presentation taking an ever more insufferable and inadmissible character. The
regular course of activity of industrial enterprises has become severely hindered,
and it is necessary to exert to the extreme the energy of the nation in order to
master the disintegration, to safeguard the country from economic ruin, and to
maintain at the required level the cause of national defense. When overthrowing
the old regime we firmly believed that under the conditions of freedom a mighty
development of the productive forces lay before the country, but at the present
moment it is not so much a question of thinking about developing productive
forces as to exert every effort in order to save from complete destruction all the
embryos of industrial life that existed in the difficult atmosphere of the old regime.
And if in the near future a sobering up of the befogged minds does not take place,
if the people do not understand that they are chopping off the branch on which
they are sitting, if the leading elements of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies do not manage to master the movement and to direct it into the channel
of legitimate class struggle, then we shall witness the stopping of scores and hun
dreds of enterprises. We shall witness the complete paralysis of economic life and
shall enter into a long period of irreparable economic catastrophe, when millions
of people will find themselves without work, without bread, without a roof, and
when the agony of production will embrace one branch of the national economy
after another, bringing with it everywhere death, destruction, and misery, partly
shattering credit and provoking financial crises and everybodys ruin. Only then
will the popular masses understand into what an abyss they have allowed them
selves to be drawn, but then it will be too late. The State cannot take upon itself
the obligation to give to the working class an exclusively privileged position at
the expense of the whole population. The Provisional Government seeks measures
for the earliest possible de-electrification of the atmosphere which has now been
created between the representatives of labor and of capital. At the same time, the
Government is looking for general measures directed toward regulating national
economic life as a whole. The Government expects assistance, requests energetic
support from all those to whom the success of the revolutionary cause in Russia
is dear. If the Government possesses the necessary plenitude of power, if the feel
ing of personal responsibility for the fate of Russia is recognized by everyone,
then I have no doubt that Russia will emerge completely victorious from all the
dangers that are threatening her at the present moment.
The speech of Konovalov was met with an ovation.
670 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
581. T h e R esignation of K onovalov
[Izvestiia, No. 71, May 20, 1917, pp. 5-6. See Doc. 580 and Chapter 13 on labor poli
cies; also Docs. 1113 and 1114.]
A week ago A. I. Konovalov informed the Minister-President that, under the
circumstances which had arisen, he felt that he was no longer capable of directing
[the affairs] of the Ministry with which he had been entrusted.
On May 18, A. I. Konovalov sent a letter to the Minister-President stating that,
in view of the catastrophic conditions within the country, he had become con
vinced of the absolute impossibility of working productively in directing [the
affairs] of the Ministry with which he had been entrusted.
For this reason A. I. Konovalov requests that he be relieved of his duties as
Minister of Trade and Industry.
A. I. Konovalov declared to Prince Lvov that he cannot remain in his post
in view of his irreconcilable position with respect to the present policy trends in
the sphere of industry. Admitting that it might be necessary to accept these trends
under the present circumstances, he, A. I. Konovalov, does not feel that he is
capable of pursuing this policy.
Further, he pointed out his basic views in the sphere of commercial and in
dustrial policy. These views have been given explicit formulation in his speech
of May 16 in Moscow. The reasons for his resignation amount to the following:
A. I. Konovalov considers it impossible to remain in his post at a time when all
industry is collapsing and when he has no grounds to believe that the contem
plated measures of the Provisional Government, as set forth in the declaration
which is pending publication, are capable of averting the imminent crisis. He
does not differ, in essence, with the Minister of Labor on the majority of ques
tions. He fully approves of a series of measures in the sphere of finances, as, for
example, a higher income tax, higher excess profits tax (allowing this increase to
reach 85-90 per cent), a higher inheritance tax, and a law on property taxation
and on taxation of unearned increment of values. In the sphere of labor, he is
wholeheartedly in favor of chambers of conciliation, of the working out of collec
tive wage agreements for individual regions and branches of industry, of estab
lishing organs of the Provisional Government in large industrial centers in the
form of arbitration commissions for resolving conflicts between employers and
workers; but, at the same time, he has a skeptical attitude toward that form of
public and state control and that method of regulating industry which are now
being proposed. The introduction of democratic organs into the present-day con
ditions of Russia will amount to bringing persons who are inexperienced in eco
nomics into the majority of enterprises, and this can only lead to disorganization
instead of improvement.
Having given an account of these considerations, A. I. Konovalov pointed out
that he is fully aware of the gravity of the [present] moment, but that it is pre
cisely this gravity that forces him to take this decisive step; he cannot partici
pate in the Government if he does not believe that the contemplated measures
could ward off the crisis. The hope of preventing the crisis could only arise should
the Provisional Government finally manifest the full power it possesses and finally
take the course of restoring the discipline which has been broken.
Not foreseeing the possibility that the Government will manifest its full power,
he, A. I. Konovalov, considers it necessary to clear the way, since he believes that
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 671
one must pass to the next stage of the revolution and achieve a homogeneous, i.e.,
a socialist, ministry.
582. R esolution of t h e F irst A ll -R ussian C ongress of R epresentatives
of I ndustry and T rade , P etrograd , J une 1917
[Reports to the Department of State, No. 331, June 19, 1917 (N.S.), pp. 9-10. For
reference to the order of May 27, see Doc. 657. On labor policy, see Chapter 13.]
The fundamental cause of the present critical condition of industry is the
growing anarchy. Therefore the Provisional Government should use its full power
to introduce order, to guarantee inviolability of person, and to defend citizens5
rights.
At any rate, it is the Provisional Governments duty not to issue decrees that
increase disorder and that are not in accord with the general principles of law.
The recent circular of the Minister of Transport dated June 9 [May 27] is an
order of this sort.1
Under the present conditions of world production no economic organization
other than capitalism is possible in Russia. Therefore all private attempts to
create a partial, socialistic regime in isolated enterprises are fruitless and in
jurious. If the workmen interfere in the management or actually force the man
agement to submit to the orders of the workmen, clerks, and utter strangers, by
electing factory managers or by forcibly driving them out, or by forcing the sub
mission of the enterprise to all sorts of supervisory commissions, it will only lead
to anarchy in the business, and the withdrawal, en masse, of the necessary factory
personnel, and complete financial chaos, followed by the ruin of the business itself.
. . . Under the present high wages industry can only meet this expense by
raising prices, which is injurious to the populace and the national interests. Wages
must not only be in accord with the demands of the laborers but must also bear
a proper proportion to the prices of the goods themselves, and cheap merchandise
is one of the demands of our economic life today. . . .
Therefore, the interests of the nation and its inhabitants as a whole are opposed
to measures taken in the interests of, and under pressure from, isolated groups.
These measures, such as the eight-hour day for laborers, the six-hour day for
clerks, and the change from piecework to day wages, tend, in practice, to reduce
the productivity of labor.
. . . If the people and the Provisional Government do not realize the neces
sity of regulating wages, and if this regulation does not take place soon, factories
must be closed, independently of any such desire on the part of owners, because
the funds necessary to operate will be exhausted. This will decrease production
enormously and create unemployment. Further, it will lead to the economic
enslavement of Russia by other countries.
583. T h e L esson of t h e E nglish I ndustrialists
[Den9, No. 87, June 17, 1917, p. 2.]
The strike of the industrial class not only continues but even expands.
Every day brings news of the closing of a number of factories and plants. And
if, in certain cases, this closing is caused by shortages of raw materials and fuel,
1 See Doc. 657.
672 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
then in many other cases it is done by the businessmen on purpose in order to
frighten both the workers and the Provisional Government.
The strike started from the moment when the revolutionary democracy em
phatically demanded that state control over industry should be established. Up
to now the Provisional Government has not thought out the methods to accom
plish this control. Very drastic and stern financial measures are close to being
achieved. But this should not exhaust the imperative intervention of the State
into the economic sphere, which is so necessary now.
The anarchy of production and exchange which suits [the interests of] the
industrialists and traders should be replaced, as far as it is possible under the
conditions of a capitalistic economy, by a close state control of production and
exchange.
This demand does not represent anything either new or dreadful.
It has been carried out both in Germany and in England.
It should be clearly understood that this is not yet socialism; that, moreover,
it does not mean the weakening but, on the contrary, the strengthening of capi
talism. But something else should be understood also. Such a control presupposes
not only fixing prices and profits but also a direct intervention into the process
of production.
When, two years ago, Lloyd George explained to the English public the mean
ing of the act of June 2, 1915, regarding supplies, he said frankly: Now the
Government may say to the businessmen, You do not apply the methods, you
do not use the raw materials or the tools of production that are necessary in the
interests of developing the productive forces of the country in our present period
of economic disorder.5 And the Government can force the businessmen to do
what the Government considers to be most expedient. In spite of the popularity
of the Manchester school of thought among the English bourgeoisie, the industrial
class has obeyed and continues to obey this order implicitly.
Now all this is recognized as being so serious that the English industrialists
in Russia have, on their own initiative, now demanded similar controls in Russia*
Naturally, the English industrialists are simply meeting what is unavoidable.
And in this they have given a lesson both to the Russian businessman and to
the Provisional Government.
584. M emorandum on t h e E conomic S ituation from t h e A cting
M inister o f T rade and I ndustry to t h e P rovisional
G overnment
[M. N. Pokrovskii, Ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii pered revoliutsiei, KA, X
(1925), 86-94.]
The disruption of Russias national economy has reached its peak at the
present moment. The country is facing economic and financial bankruptcy. These
menacing symptoms appear with special vividness in the main branches of in
dustry, which have completely lost their equilibrium. In spite of the heroic efforts,
of the Government and of the public organizations to draw it into conciliatory
channels, the struggle of labor against capital takes ever sharper forms and
threatens exceptional difficulties to the cause of defense not only in its narrow
sense but as regards the very existence of the country. The dreadful situation in
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 673
transport is known to everybody; likewise the alarming prospects of agricultural
production are well known. Alongside the material manifestations of economic
disruption is, if the expression is allowed, the extremely unfavorable psycho
logical condition of almost all the public elements. Narrow class feelings are
being strenuously cultivated in the midst of the working class, and the triumph
of these feelings would make it impossible for Russia to overcome the crisis.
While the country is exhausted to the extreme by a prolonged war, and we are
confronted by enormous sacrifices in the future, the productivity of labor steadily
decreases, whereas the demands for wage increase rise as steadily. With the
extreme tightening of the market for goods, and its very scarce supply of con
sumers items, the only tangible result of this fight for wage increases proves to
be the incessant decline of the paper rubles domestic value. The principle of
socialization of production, falsely interpreted, is often manifested by the workers
seizing the management of enterprises in a purely anarchic manner, or by demands
to transfer to the State the factories and plants whose owners refuse to satisfy in
full the claims of the workers.
The industrialists, on the one hand, are living through a state of great con
fusion. Losing faith in the stability of the economic situation, they show an
inclination to suspend production.
On the other hand, many factory and plant owners easily accede to the demands
of the workers in the hope of transferring the exorbitant rise of production costs
to the consumers and primarily to the State, whereas the resources of the latter
are strained to the extreme. In any case, the energy of the industrial class, which
is essential for saving the country, is greatly weakened.
The Government should quite clearly and definitely establish the principles
of economic policy that it intends to follow now and in the immediate future.
Any vagueness or hesitation in this connection would be disastrous for the country.
The program should be outlined and put into practice with the utmost energy;
its implementation would obviously be a matter of practical [action] and would
depend mainly on the active support of the population. First of all, the Govern
ment should take a definite stand with regard to the adoption of a regime of
socialistic economy which is planned and demanded by some groups. Apparently,
neither the members of the Provisional Government nor the realistically inclined
circles of the revolutionary democracy entertain any doubts as to the impractica
bility of Russias adopting at the present time a socialistic organization of her
national economy. In order to avoid any kind of misunderstanding, an announce
ment to this effect should be made by the Government. The urgent necessity of
such an announcement is required also from [the point of view of] social in
doctrination. The thoughts and the will of the Russian public should be removed
from the sphere of concern for an ideal economic order and directed toward the
completely realistic problems of expanding at all cost the output itself of the
products required by the country, and of increasing as much as possible the in
tensity and productivity of labor. . . . The Government should be especially
sharp in its denunciation of sporadic attempts to socialize individual enterprises
on the part of workers who have seized them, for such a method not only destroys
the existing foundations of the economy but also is in direct contradiction to
socialism [in so far] as it violates the interests of the working class as a whole
in favor of fortuitous groups within the fluid masses of labor. This mode of action
represents in form, as well as in essence, anarchy in the worst meaning of the word.
674 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Besides considerations of a general nature, bringing calm into the life of in
dustry is imperative also for the following important reasons. Development of
the productive forces of the country is unthinkable without a flow of capital
toward all the branches of the national economy. Being in general poor in capital,
Russia has become absolutely devoid of it during the war and will be unable to
solve her great tasks without foreign aid. Otherwise, the whole of our economic
development will be thrown back several decades. In the face of danger we should
endeavor to attract foreign capital and to feed the main branches of our national
economy. The incautious use of socialist slogans would make it utterly impossible
not only to attract new foreign capital, but even to retain merely that which has
been invested in Russia. . . .
However, as for the present, while denying the possibility of establishing
socialism, the Government cannot recommend to the country a return to a free
economy, which up until recently was greatly desired, especially by the represen
tatives of commercial capital. The economic disorder itself does not allow a pre
dominance of private interests. The desperate conditions of transportation, the
extreme disruption of the monetary system, the exhaustion in Russia of industrial
raw materials, the tense food situation, and finally the acuteness of the struggle
between labor and capital would transform the interplay of private interests
which is admissible under normal conditions into economic chaos. There remains
only one way, that of state regulation of the main branches of the national econ
omy, with the assistance of those forces that are being brought forward by the
national economy itself, [and] without destroying the principle of private prop
erty or eliminating private enterprise, but with the subordination of both to public
interest. With the adoption of the principle of regulation [by the State], the
fundamentals of private economy, subordinated, with very careful handling, to
the control and the directives of the State, would remain, as heretofore, the main
support and the motive power of the economy. In this respect the experience of
Western Europe is sufficiently instructive: if Germany still manages to resist in
the struggle, it is due mainly to the fact that her economy has assimilated the
principle of public and state regulation; England, in spite of her traditional
inclination toward economic liberalism, had also to take the same road. Under
the old regime, Russia also moved, although unskillfully, along an identical path.
It would not be enough only to proclaim the principle of state regulation of
economic life during the present period and the next transitory one [extending]
from the end of the war to the restoration of economic equilibrium. It would be
necessary to indicate as precisely as possible, first, which exactly are the branches
of the economy to be subject to the intervention and the control of the Govern
ment, and, second, what would be the methods of governmental intervention.
. . . As a matter of fact, the task has already been accomplished in part, for a
number of products are now under the control of governmental or public
authority; besides food products (bread, meat, salt, sugar, fats, etc.), they include
textiles, leather, paper, metals, and fuels. To attempt to control the entire economy
would obviously mean undertaking a utopian venture. Apparently, state regula
tion is bound to manifest itself in full, independently of the nature of its objects,
in one spherethat of external commercial relations. All imports and exports
should remain under the strict control and be subject to the intervention of the
Government both for currency reasons and in the interest of Russian industry.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 675
The scope of its intervention once determined, the Government must select
the most suitable methods for its leadership. It might seem that the most effective
means of influencing both the output of certain products and their distribution
would be the establishment of state monopolies. It would be all the more tempting
as, at the same time, monopolies could prove of great assistance to the treasury.
However, monopolization is not always easy from the technical standpoint; but
[in the sectors] where in a certain measure the ground is already prepared (for
instance, sugar, coal, tea), the Government, prompted by the situation, could
decide to take the step. Only it should be borne in mind that monopolies in indus
tries which would involve expenditures for the equipment of the enterprises or
for compensation for them to private persons are to be excluded a priori for
financial reasons; there can only be a question of monopolies of trade. . . .
Owing to the special conditions of the railway organization and of matters of
transportation in general, the role of the Government in this sphere must of course
be appraised differently; however, here as well it would be highly advisable to
stimulate, within certain limits, private initiative.
Great energy must be shown by the Government in the matter of consolidat
ing the poorly organized branches of industry: effective control can be achieved
only provided the enterprises are sufficiently concentrated. Following the example
of Germany, the question of compulsory consolidation of the individual branches
of industry should be raised; should financial conditions permit the Government
to participate in such mergers, the Government would obtain a powerful means
of supervision and control. On the other hand, the idea of establishing special
financial and administrative organs for the control of individual enterprises
should be rejected as obviously utopian under Russian conditions.
Labor unions, which are now in a stage of intense development, are called
to defend the interests of labor. Until [the latter have reached] their full
bloom, the workers have at their disposal the committees of factories and
plants, whose establishment is provided for under the recently issued law. The
supervisory committees to be made up of workers and government officials,
which some are recommending, would be a sure means of slowing down the enter
prises. Special representatives of the Government, invested with a definite range
of authority, could be sent in exceptional cases during acute clashes between
labor and capital. While instituting compulsory regulation of industrial produc
tion, the Government cannot, of course, leave the determination of relations
between labor and capital to the struggle of the parties interested. It is quite clear
that a suspension of output for reasons of conflict is absolutely inadmissible in
the branches and in the enterprises under the control of the Government; here
the use of the rights of strike and lockout should be suspended for the sake of the
countrys good. The conflicts should be made subject to a thorough analysis and
solved by conciliatory institutions especially organized for the purpose (on the
basis of parity). If this method were to fail in reaching an agreement on ques
tions of wages, then special government commissions would determine the normal
wages for the [various] trades and regions. At the same time the Government
should frankly and emphatically declare that wage raises must have a limit,
which, first of all, is to be determined by the productivity of labor itself. On the
other hand, when fixing the wages of industrial workers, the interests of the
peasant groups, for whom the increase in remuneration has been limited by [the
676 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
establishment of] fixed prices on grain, should be borne in mind. An advantage
should not be given to one class over another.
The solution of the question of appropriate control and distribution of the labor
force demands from the Government [a display] of exceptional vigor. After
thoroughly checking both the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of the
matter, it is essential to find and to carry out the best forms of organization for
the labor market. Not one single atom of the peoples labor, especially of qualified
labor, should be left unutilized or improperly applied. The working out of a plan
for supplying the economy with a labor force should be the cornerstone of the
Governments social-economic policy.
Neither conciliatory arbitration nor a proper distribution of the labor force
would bear favorable results, unless the matter of supplying the toilers with the
necessities of life was placed on a correct footing. However, the most perfect
technique would prove powerless, should the production of goods remain in its
present miserable state. The present moment demands imperatively that produc
tion be unceasingly expanded and all aspects of labor intensified. The very legiti
mate alarm among the laboring democracy that its intensive work might favor the
egotistic interests of the well-to-do classes is invalidated by the financial mea
sures in the realm of taxation, which have already been decided upon in advance
and which are being worked out by the Provisional Government. With the help
of its apparatus, which is based on the organs of local self-government, the State
should bring forward and solve the difficult problems of supplying production
with the necessary materials, and the population with the necessary goods. The
Government of the old regime approached the solution of this problem; the present
Government to a large degree is already carrying out this task; a number of com
mittees for the various branches of industry have been formed; special regional
organizations for supplying metals and fuels have been established; food com
mittees are working for the control and the distribution of the labor force. All
these undertakings should be unified and coordinated in one form or another,
so that the work of Russian industry can proceed systematically and the require
ments of the market can be satisfied systematically and by measures corresponding
to the degree of their importance. Such a unification is necessary also for the
purpose of preventing isolated, separate attempts, which hinder the common cause
by solving the question locally. In any case, in order to prevent this undertaking
from suffering from [an excess of] abstractness, from a lack of contact with [real]
life, it is necessary to have the opinion on this subject of a special council consti
tuted by the representatives of the parties interested, by men of science, and by
neutral public organizations. This purpose would be served by forming at the
Ministry of Trade and Industry [another, more authoritative? (see Doc. 578) ]
council for [the study of] the problem of developing the productive forces of
Russia.
When proclaiming the principle of state regulation of the national economic
life, it is essential for the Government to stress that this control will not be effected
under the old bureaucratic order, but with the assistance of and, so far as possible,
through trade and the public organizations. To the Government would belong
the supreme leadership and the coordination of the individual measures.
In accordance with the considerations stated in the present memorandum, the
Government should issue a declaration on matters relating to its economic policy.
A draft of such a declaration is attached herewith.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 677
The Acting Minister of Trade and Industry has the honor to submit the fore
going to the attention of the Provisional Government.
V. S tepanov , Acting Minister
of Trade and Industry
[June 8, 1917]
[Draft declaration is printed following this memorandum. It was not accepted
by the Government for publication, largely for technical reasons.]

585. T h e S tatute E stablishing t h e E conomic C ouncil and th e


C entral E conomic C o m m ittee
[5o6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1015. The proposal for the creation of a high government organ
to deal with questions of economic control and planning was introduced by Minister
of Labor Skobelev and approved by the Government in its meeting of May 27. The
Ministers of Labor, Transport, Agriculture, Finance, Trade and Industry, and Food
were charged with drafting the legislation. Zhurnaly, No. 91. Skobelev was speaking
for the Petrograd Soviet, whose Executive Committee had, on May 16, adopted a reso
lution urging such a step. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 48. Subsequently,
the Stepanov Memorandum was presented.
The Council took the place of the Council on Questions Relating to the Develop
ment of the Productive Forces of the Country (Doc. 578), which was abolished on
June 23, and apparently also took over the work of the Council for the Preparation
of a Plan for Financial Reform (Doc. 441). At the first meeting of the Council, which
was not held until July 21, Kerensky stated that the foremost task with which the
Provisional Government entrusted the Economic Council . . . was the drawing up
of a plan for and the gradual control of all economic-financial life. Stenogram of
the Meetings of the Economic Council, No. I, as quoted in ibid., p. 56. For a discussion
of the activity of the Economic Council and the Central Economic Committee, neither
of which was able to accomplish much in its brief existence, see ibid., pp. 56-67, and
Zagorsky, State Control of Industry in Russia During the War, pp. 187-89.]
1. In order to prepare a general plan for the organization of the national
economy and of labor, as well as for the preparation of bills and general measures
for the regulation of economic life, an Economic Council is established in the
Provisional Government under the chairmanship of the Minister-President and
consisting of: the Deputy Chairman of the Economic Council, the Ministers of
Agriculture, Trade and Industry, Food, Transport, Finance, Labor, War, and
Navy, or their deputies in the person of the Assistant Ministers, the Deputy Chair
man of the Central Economic Committee, and persons elected by the following
organizations: the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, 3; the Soviet of
Peasants Deputies, 3; the Council of Congresses of Industry and Trade, 3; the
Council of Banks, 1; the Council of Congresses of Cooperatives, 3; the Council of
Congresses of the Exchange Trade and Agriculture, 2; the Council of Congresses
of Small and Medium Industry, 1; the Central Bureau of Trade Unions, 3; the
Union of Towns, 1; and the Union of Zemstvos, 1, as well as two representatives
each from the [following] academic societies: the Free Economic Society, the
Technical Society, and the Chuprov Society; the Chairmen of the Commissions
of the Economic Council, and two representatives each from the district [raion]
commissions . . .
678 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
In addition, the Chairman is authorized to invite qualified persons [experts]
to participate in meetings with the Council with an advisory vote.
At the invitation of the Chairman, members of the [Advisory] Council of the
Central Economic Committee participate in meetings of the Council with an
advisory vote,
2. Decisions of the Economic Council are subject to approval by the Provi
sional Government, except for those cases that fall within the limits of the powers
specially granted to it by the Provisional Government.
3. The Economic Council is a permanent organ, and those of its members
who do not receive remuneration from the State receive compensation according
to standards approved by the Provisional Government.
4. The Council considers questions raised at the initiative of its own members,
referred to it for decision by the Provisional Government, and, finally, those sub
mitted to it by the Central Economic Committee.
Temporarily, pending reorganization, the Special Councils [on Fuel, Defense,
etc.] and Committees are guided in their activity by the decisions of the Economic
Council.
6. For the coordinated implementation by individual departments and insti
tutions of all measures regulating the economic life of the country, a Central
Economic Committee is established under the Provisional Government.
7. The Committee consists of representatives of the following ministries,
appointed by the Provisional Government: Labor, Finance, Agriculture, Food,
Trade and Industry, War and Navy, and Transport, under the chairmanship of
the Minister-President. A person specially designated is appointed by the Pro
visional Government as Deputy Chairman.
9. An [Advisory] Council shall be set up under the Committee . . .
10. The Central Economic Committee, carrying out a program prepared by
the Economic Council and approved by the Provisional Government:
a) directs the activity of all existing organizations for the regulation of the
various branches of the national economy in their executive functions (Special
Councils and Committees);
b) coordinates measures in the various branches of economic life;
c) prepares and submits to the Provisional Government and the Economic
Council drafts of new statutes and laws;
d) carries out assignments of the Economic Council, and
e) consolidates all statistical work and technical studies concerned with cur
rent economic life.
11. The decisions of the Committee may be abrogated only by the Provisional
Government.
12. In addition, the tasks of the Committee include the reorganization of
local organizations now functioning for the regulation of the economic life of
the country, with a view to full coordination of their activity in carrying out a
single integrated plan.
13. When the Committee begins to function, the Special Councils and Com
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 679
mittees now existing must be reorganized with respect to their composition,
functions, and powers in accordance with the present provisions.
M. S k ob elev , Minister of Labor
June 21, 1917
586. Com m ent o f Rabochaia Gazeta on t h e N ew Econom ic Organs
[No. 88, June 23,1917, p. 1.]
Yesterday brought us important tidings.
As reported in the newspapers, the Provisional Government resolved to set
up an Economic Council under the chairmanship of the Minister-President, com
posed of interested ministers and representatives of socioeconomic organizations.
Its purpose is to be the elaboration of a general plan of public economy and
labor, as well as the drafting of laws and general measures regulating economic
life. It also decided to establish a Central Economic Committee composed of
representatives of various departments for the purpose of a coordinated admin
istration by the various departments and institutions of all measures regulating
the economic life of the country.
At last the step has been taken, upon the necessity of which the Supply Dele
gation of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies had been insisting from
the first day of the revolution.
Unfortunately, we are forced to admit that, as passed by the Provisional
Government, the project of the Economic Section of the Executive Committee
[of the Petrograd Soviet] suffered considerable deterioration. The membership
of the Economic Council under the Government is considerably reduced in num
bers and in quality. Both the first and the second, and particularly the second,
may noticeably affect the fruitfulness of the work. According to the Economic
Section, one-half of the seats in the Economic Council belonged to the revolu
tionary democracy (representatives from workers, soldiers, and peasants), and,
together with the cooperatives, democracy enjoyed the majority. The project
of the Government guarantees the revolutionary democracy and the cooperatives,
taken together, only half of the seats.
We shall have to fight, we shall have to strive for the restoration of the former
project of the Economic Section by introducing the necessary amendments into
the structure of the Economic Council.
But the institutions are created, although in a weakened form, and they can
and should become the bases of vigorous interference in economic life. This
should be taken care of by the revolutionary democracy with all the required
energy.
587. T h e S ta tu te Broadening t h e R ep resen tatio n in and t h e
P ow ers o f t h e F a c to ry C oun cils
[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1438. They had been established by a decree of September 10,
1915. Zagorsky, State Control of Industry in Russia During the War, pp. 99-102.]
1. For the unification of the activity of all industrial enterprises, both state
and private, and for the establishment of cooperation among these enterprises
680 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
with a view to maximum utilization of their productive capacity for defense needs
and all related requirements of the country, and for the study of questions con
cerning the conversion of defense industry to peacetime activity, district factory
councils are established by order of the President of the Special Council for the
discussion and unification of measures for the Defense of the State.
The district of each council is determined by the President of the Special
Council for Defense of the State.
Note 1: With respect to all state factories and plants specifically unified for
the entire country by orders of the central authorities, factory councils do not
undertake any executive action without agreement with the appropriate depart
ments, or chief commissioners [of the Special Council].
2. The terms of reference of the factory councils include in particular:
a) surveying the activity of enterprises with respect to utilization by them of
their technical resources both for the manufacture of articles necessary for defense
and for national needs as well as for the supply to other enterprises of the pre
requisites for the manufacture of these articles;
b) determining the orders and quantities thereof that can be filled by par
ticular enterprises for the needs of the front and the rear;
c) enlisting, for work on state needs, enterprises that can be utilized for this
purpose;
d) considering questions of authorizing new enterprises and expanding
existing ones in the districts;
e) communicating to the Special Council for Defense and supplying insti
tutions with conclusions on impending distributions and allocations of orders;
f) considering questions of the ability of enterprises to fulfill orders accepted
by them and, in connection with this, considering the reallocation among indi
vidual enterprises of entire orders, by basic operations, or by components,
considering the transfer of tools of production, instruments, materials, technical
personnel, workers, and so forth, from some enterprises to others, the allocation
of new orders among enterprises, and, in general, the cooperation possible among
enterprises in manufacturing articles for the needs of the front and the rear;
g) supervising the progress of fulfillment of orders accepted by enterprises
and of appropriate and suitable utilization of materials and technical resources;
h) ascertaining the requirements of enterprises for fuel, materials, and tools
of production, labor force and transport necessary to fulfill orders with maximum
efficiency; assistance in providing factories therewith;
i) distributing materials made available to the factory council by the corres
ponding central organizations;
j ) supervising trade in materials and articles, the turnover of which is reg
ulated by the central authorities;
k) supervision to ensure that materials and manpower required for important
state orders are not expended on orders that have no state priority;
1) ascertaining, if necessary, the cost of production of articles produced by
industrial enterprises;
m) giving assistance toward the earliest possible reconstruction and full
utilization of enterprises evacuated to the district with the agreement of the
Special Council for Defense, as well as giving assistance to enterprises or branches
thereof newly established or expanded with the consent of the factory council.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 681
3. Factory councils consist of representatives of the [following] ministries:
War, Navy, Transport, Trade and Industry, Finance, Agriculture, Food, and
Labor, in a number to be established by the departments in accordance with local
conditions, and of the following persons in a number to be determined by the
factory councils themselves: representatives of all district institutions dealing
with questions of supply; representatives of workers organizations and soviets
of workers, peasants, and Cossack deputies, as well as soviets of soldiers and
officers deputies, representatives from the employees of the factory council,
representatives from the public organizations, namely, the war-industry com
mittees of Zemgor, Zemsoiuz, and Sogor ; representatives of regional
[oblast] industrial, technical, and other organizations which have direct relation
to the tasks of the council, and representatives from subdistrict councils.
11. The factory council, after discussion, submits its views to the Chairman
of the Special Council for Defense of the State:
a) concerning the need to remove members of boards, councils, supervisory
committees, and other administrative organs of state and private enterprises, as
well as persons heading the administration of factories, workshops, and other
institutions, and separate properties of such enterprises;
b) concerning the need to order general and partial requisitions, to seize
movable and to attach immovable properties and whole enterprises, as well as
concerning the need for compulsory temporary seizure of immovable properties
with the right to use them, and, in general, concerning the need to take the meas
ures mentioned in paras. 3, 5, and 8 of article 10 of the Statute of the Special
Council for the Defense of the State.
Note: In cases that brook no delay, the Chairman of the factory council is
authorized to issue orders for the seizure of materials and tools of production
belonging to private individuals and enterprises and for the transfer thereof from
one factory to another, with the preparation of a suitable inventory, immediately,
through the intermediary of the local military or civil authorities, but with obliga
tory simultaneous notification to the requisition commission attached to the
Special Council for Defense of the State.
c) concerning the need to close enterprises temporarily, in accordance with
preliminary agreement with district institutions dealing with questions of supply;
d) concerning changes in the nature and scope of production of enterprises
and concerning the need to issue corresponding advances and subsidies or treasury
loans;
If no reply is forthcoming in the course of a month from the Special Council
for Defense to a proposal of the factory council on questions mentioned in the
present article, this proposal of the factory council is considered adopted and
shall be carried out, with the exception of decisions involving the payment of
sums of money.
- [P. P a lch in sk ii, President,
Special Council for Defense]
[June 28,1917]
682 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
588. Russkiia Vedomosti's C riticism o f t h e Second A ll-R u ssian C ongress
o f R ep resen tativ es o f Industry and Trade
[Titled: The Irreconcilable Ones, No. 178, August 5, 1917, p. 1.]
At no time has there been so much talk in our country about the need for total
unity and solidarity in the face of the catastrophe threatening our country, about
forgetting mutual grudges and personal, narrow, class interests and the need
to take a national point of view, etc., etc. And at no time, it would seem, has the
psychology of various public groups differed so widely on these appeals to unity
and reconciliation. At no time has there been so little evidence of actual sacrifice,
willingness to give up ones own narrow interests for the good of all. The mother
land is in danger. Everyone admits this in words, but practically nobody in deeds.
And no genuine concern for the future of the motherland is felt behind the loud
phrases about the impending ruin of Russia, no capacity to be wholly imbued with
concern about the exceptional responsibility called for at this moment in our
history.
Let us take, for example, the commercial-industrial Congress which opened
in Moscow three days ago. A great deal, and with emphasis, was said at this
conference about the dangers with which we are threatened on all sides, about
the breakthrough of the front, about the demoralization of the army, about eco
nomic ruin, about the absence of a stable government in the country, and so forth
and so on. But in all these speeches one cannot see any search for means to save
the motherland from the impending catastrophe. The commercial-industrialists
assembled at the Congress were settling their accounts with the Provisional Gov
ernment, pouring out their grudges for injustices caused them. And that is all.
They at all times remained commercial-industrialists, and not for a moment did
they become citizens. It is beside the point that they criticized the work of the
Provisional Government and pointed out the errors committed. Such errors, at
times very crude ones, undoubtedly did exist and they should naturally be pointed
out. But it is one thing to point out errors with a view to finding means to avoid
the impending danger, and quite another thing simply to search for the guilty
one and point a finger at him with a feeling of unconcealed gloating. And it was
precisely this that the Congress busied itself with. Not grief over the grave con
dition of the motherland, but gloating over the errors of the Provisional Govern
ment, an unconcealed animosity toward the lattersuch were the keynotes of
the Congress.
A large share of the guilt for the economic ruin which we are experiencing
falls upon the shoulders of the commercial-industrialists themselves. They forget
this and remember only the mistakes of the revolution and the Provisional Govern
ment, always exaggerating these mistakes and finding them even where they do
not exist. But the chief characteristic of the Congress is not in this objectively
not entirely correct evaluation of the causes responsible for the existing situation,
but in its irreconcilability to the Provincial Government and to the various demo
cratic organizations. The commercial-industrialists are not ready to forgive the
Provisional Government for anything or to forget anything, and least of all was
any desire felt at the Congress to cooperate in the common task. The commercial-
industrialists were imbued with the same exclusiveness and intolerance formerly
characteristic only of Bolsheviks. And the appeals for unity pouring from every
where found no sincere response at the Congress. It was doubtful even before
whether the Provisional Government would succeed in rallying around the national
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 683
cause all the public groups and whether it would achieve its aim by calling the
State Conference in Moscow. These doubts are even greater now, because it is
obvious that the commercial-industrial group eliminates itself from the combina
tion that the Provisional Government has in mind. What agreement, then, can
there be in the common task to save the motherland if the members of the Congress
are imbued with the same irreconcilably hostile feeling toward each other as the
feeling prevalent among the participants of the commercial-industrial Congress ?
Unfortunately the commercial-industrialists are no exception. On the other
front of the Russian public, among the democracy, we see the same intolerance
and hostility. . . . Here, too, we observe the same irreconcilability, the same
exclusiveness. And here the awareness of the great danger facing the motherland
cannot silence partisan considerations of mutual hostility and irritability. And
here there is no sincere desire to find ground for mutual work.

589. S ta tu te E sta b lish in g Cham bers o f Com m erce and In d u stry


[Sob. Uzak., 1,2, No. 2048.]
I. The tasks of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and the procedure for
founding them:
1. Chambers of Commerce and Industry have as their purposes: 1) the uni
fication, on a basis of self-government in the Chambers district, of persons
engaged in commercial and industrial activity, and of the corresponding enter
prises, for the representation and defense of common interests of local commerce
and industry, as well as for the organization, in conformity with the interests of
the State, of commercial and industrial activity; 2) the organization, mainte
nance, and subsidizing of institutions generally beneficial to commerce and in
dustry; and 3) assistance to the Government and to public institutions in study
ing and carrying out measures for the prosperity and regulation of commerce and
industry by means of collection and communication of factual information on the
state of commerce and industry in the given districts, and the submission of peti
tions and of opinions.
2. For the accomplishment of the purposes mentioned in article 1, the Cham
bers of Commerce and Industry shall, in general, take all measures necessary for
the development, improvement, and regulation of commerce and industry. . . .
4. As a general rule, a separate Chamber of Commerce and Industry is set up
in each guberniya or oblast. . . .
11. Membership of Chambers of Commerce and Industry; voting rights.
12. A Chamber of Commerce and Industry is composed of the number of
members and alternates specified in the charter, elected by a secret vote for three
years from persons entitled to elect members in the district; in no case can the
number of members of the Chamber be less than twice the number of groups of
voters (article 16).
The right to elect members of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry belongs
within the district to all Russian citizens of both sexes of not less than 21 years
of age and to all partnerships, companies, and institutions founded in Russia on
684 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the basis of Russian laws which take out, for independent activity in the Cham
bers district, trade licenses . . .
Foreigners and foreign companies authorized to operate in Russia shall not
have voting rights.
16. For the holding of the elections, merchant voters and industrialist voters,
each group separately, are divided into election groups by the categories of trade
licenses taken out; depending on local conditions, several categories may be com
bined in a single election group.
N. Sawin , for the Minister of Trade and Industry
October 6, 1917
590. T h e R ecom m endation o f t h e P resid en t o f t h e Econom ic C ou n cil
(S. N. T r e tiakov) T h a t t h e C oun cil Be A b olish ed
[jEkon. Polozhenie, I, 306-7.]
October 11, 1917
By the law of the Provisional Government of June 21, 1917, in order to work
out a general plan for the organization of public economy and labor, also in order
to elaborate the draft laws and the general measures on regulating economic
life, the Economic Council was established with the Central Economic Committee
as its executive organ.
At the time of its establishment, the Economic Council, organized to some
extent on a representative basis, had a certain meaning and gave hope for eco
nomic policy and legislation in accordance with the needs of the country as they
should become apparent. However, experience proved that the revolutionary sit
uation was not favorable for the work of the Economic Council, and, in fact, up
to the present time it has remained largely inactive.
In the case of the Central Economic Committee things were quite different.
Executing the plans outlined by the Economic Council, this organ acquired con
siderable independence and in many respects replaced the Economic Council.
Thus the resulting relations, as a matter of fact, call for a review of the status
of the Economic Council as well as of the Central Economic Committee. On the
one hand, the need for the further existence of the Economic Council grows ques
tionable, and, on the other hand, the need grows apparent for a revision of the
statutes on the Central Economic Committee with a view to expanding its sphere
of authority and increasing its functions.
In the next few days the Provisional Government is calling together the Council
of the Russian Republic, which is designed to bring to the attention of the Govern
ment, prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly, the opinions of various
strata of the population on questions of national life. In these days of sharpening
economic crisis and grave economic suffering experienced by the country, the
Provisional Council of the Republic will undoubtedly pay particular attention to
the economic conditions of the Republic and to the clarification of the general lines
of the necessary economic policy and will do this, of course, more fully and more
thoroughly than could the Economic Council.
Although the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic is also not organ
ized on the basis of a true representation of the population, nevertheless as a sub
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 685
stitute for such representation it stands considerably higher than the Economic
Council. And in this respect perhaps it will prove to be the organ capable of
directing the economic life of the country upon the road to restored health.
Thus, in preserving the Economic Council we would have two organs of
unequal social weight, called upon to solve the same problems. Such a state of
affairs would serve no purpose, and I would think it necessary to abolish the Eco
nomic Council from the day the Provisional Council begins its work, and to turn
over in the future all questions within its authority to the Provisional Council
for action.

591. T h e A b o litio n o f t h e Econom ic C ou n cil


[.Delo Naroda, No. 186, October 21,1917, p. 3.]
The Commission [of the Council of the Republic] on normalizing the national
economy and labor relations discussed in its yesterdays sitting the question of
abolishing the Economic Council and considered the legislative proposals con
cerning the central and regional supply committees.
It was revealed from the address by the Chairman of the Economic Council
that by order of the Provisional Government the Council has been abolished and
its functions transferred to the Central Economic Committee. The proposed mem
bership of the latter is to consist of fourteen representatives from various com
mercial and industrial organizations and only one representative each from
workers and cooperative organizations. The Government, according to the
speaker, plans to turn over the most important questions of our economic policy
for consideration by the Commission on normalizing the national economy.
Debates revealed that representatives of the democracy were sharply critical
of the proposed abolition of the Economic Council, because the transfer of its
functions to the Central Economic Committee, organized on an undemocratic
basis, represented a repudiation of the efforts to normalize the national economy
which the Provisional Government showed in passing the law on the Economic
Council.
Representatives from commercial and industrial groups, however, insisted
that the Commission must approve the order of the Provisional Government to
abolish the Economic Council and transfer its functions to the Economic Com
mittee.

METALS
592. S ta tu te on R egion al Com m issioners f o r t h e D istrib u tio n o f
M etals and F uels
[So&. Uzak., 1,1, No. 617. By a law of July 20,1917, the Chief Commissioner was given
complete control over the supply of metals and the country was divided, for the pur
poses of metal distribution, into three areascentral, Ural, and southern. See Zagor
sky, State Control of Industry During the War, p. 194.]
1. On the basis of article 5 of the Statute of August 6,1916, on the Chief Com
missioner for the distribution of metals and about the persons and institutions
686 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
under his jurisdiction in connection with the work of supplying various regions
with metals, distribution of metals among consumers, elaboration of a plan of
procuring and transporting metals to help in promoting the mining of metals in
various places, and in carrying out all sorts of instructions of the Chief Commis
sioner for the distribution of metals and fuel, the above Chief Commissioner
appoints regional commissioners, under whose chairmanship committees are
formed. Membership and procedure of action of the latter are outlined for each
region by the Chief Commissioner through special instructions.
The following regional commissioners are established:
Volga . . . with the headquarters of the Commissioner in the city of Saratov;
Caucasus . . . in Baku; Kiev . . . in Kiev; Petrograd . . . in Petrograd; Ural
. . . in Ekaterinburg; Center . . . in Moscow; South . . . in Ekaterinoslav;
Siberia . . . in Tomsk; Turkestan . . . in Tashkent; Eastern Siberia . . . in
Irkutsk; Far East . . . in Vladivostok.

3. The Chief Commissioner may grant to each of the regional commissioners


authority with respect to the supply and allocation of metals in his region as well
as allocation to other regions.
4. Regional commissioners on the distribution of metals in their regions
carry out the measures indicated in articles 2 and 3 of the Statute on the Chief
Commissioner, approved August 6,1916, by the President of the Special Council
on the defense of the country. In accordance with the instructions they receive
from the Chief Commissioner, they establish schedules for the filling of orders
by the metallurgical plants of the region.
5. Regional commissioners have the right:
a. to appeal to all local government and public institutions and government
and private persons, also to private organizations, for assistance in carrying out
the tasks imposed upon them;
b. to participate personally or through their deputies, with equal rights of
members, in regional conferences on transport, fuel, and food;
c. to inform the Chief Commissioner for the distribution of metals about any
disorganization in the work of metallurgical plants which cannot be eliminated
by local means and, in necessary cases, about the need of dismissing from service
members of administrations in named plantsdirectors, managers, and other
persons of the administrative staff.
6. Complaints about the actions and instructions of the regional commis
sioners may be directed to the Chief Commissioner on distribution of metals
and fuel.
7. The date on which the present Statute goes into effect is determined by the
Minister of Trade and Industry for each region separately and is being published
in the Vestnik Vremennago PraviteFstva.
[A. K on ovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry
Approved: May 6,1917]
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 687
593. T h e E sta b lish m en t o f Fixed P rices on M e ta ls and M e ta l Goods
[Zhurnaly, No. XXXIII, June 23, 1917. Fixed prices were established by the Minister
of Trade and Industry on July 19. Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1078.]
Resolved:
To issue the following law:
In amendment of the law approved by the Council of Ministers on September
15,1916, on the procedure for establishing the highest maximum prices on metals
. . . to decree:
I. The Minister of Trade and Industry in agreement with the Ministers of
War, Navy, and Transport is authorized:
1. To establish compulsory maximum and fixed prices for producers and
dealers on metals, on objects manufactured from metals, as well as on all sorts
of ore, flux, and heat-resistant material employed in the metallurgical industry.
2. To require that producers and dealers of metals or objects manufactured
from metals, as well as contractors and persons selling all sorts of ore, flux, and
heat-resistant material, submit all information necessary to determine the cost to
them of metals and objects produced from metals, as well as all kinds of ore, flux,
and heat-resistant material; also to request that persons and firms submit prices
at which the above objects are sold, by opening their books and documents and
by making copies and excerpts from same available.
3. To publish rules on controlling trade in metals and objects manufactured
from metals, as well as all kinds of ore, flux, and heat-resistant material.
4. To declare as invalid all agreements, regardless of when made and the date
on which they were to be executed, at prices that do not conform to those estab
lished on the basis of this law.
II. Persons guilty (1) of selling metals, objects manufactured from metals,
ore, as well as flux and heat-resistant material used in the metallurgical industry
at prices that do not conform to those established in accordance with article 1, Sec
tion I, of this law, or of making agreements at such prices, (2) of violating the
requirements provided by article 2, Section I, and (3) of violating the require
ments established by the rules of controlling trade in metals (article 3, Section I)
are subject to imprisonment of from two months to a year and four months, or
to a monetary fine not to exceed 10,000 rubles.
III. Cases of violations enumerated in Section II are to be tried by the district
courts.
IV. The present law to be implemented prior to its promulgation by the Ruling
Senate.

Resolved:
I. To authorize the Minister of Trade and Industry in agreement with the
Ministers of War, Navy, and Transport to publish the fixed prices that will be
established on metals, and objects manufactured from metals, on all deliveries of
metals and objects manufactured from them which were and are being produced
as of April 1, 1917.
II. To authorize the Minister of Trade and Industry to implement the measures
enumerated in Section I prior to its promulgation by the Ruling Senate.
688 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
594. T h e R eg u la tio n o f t h e Trade and P rices o f A g r ic u ltu r a l
M achinery
[.Zhurnaly, No. 110, June 17,1917. The purpose of the law was to improve the supplying
and distribution of agricultural machinery and tools by the elimination of the middle
men through governmental control of sales and by the establishment of maximum prices.
For the law on the compulsory use of agricultural machinery, see Doc. 551.]
Resolved:
To issue the following law:
To ratify hereby the Temporary Rules for the distribution of agricultural
machines and tools now in factory and private stock and to establish fixed prices
for them, implementing such Rules from the day of their ratification.

FUEL
595. T h e S ta tu te on t h e Tem porary C om m ittee o f t h e D o n ets Basin
[Sg&. Uzak., I, 1, No. 429. A similar committee was established for the Ural region.
Ibid., No. 430. Four days later the Government issued a law to regulate the requisition
of Donets coal. See Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War, p. 212.]
1. For the coordination and unification of the activities of the commissioners
of the chairmen of the Special Councils on fuel, transport, defense, and food supply
in the Donets Basin and for the purpose of taking immediate measures for the
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the commissioners, a Temporary Com
mittee of the Donets Basin is established.
2. The Committee includes: a chairmanChief Commissioner for Fuel; three
commissionersfor defense, transport, and food supply; four representatives of
the Congress of Mine Owners of South Russia; four representatives of the Soviet
of Workers Deputies in the Donets Basin; and the Commissars for the guber
niyas of Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav or their deputies.
Note: The representatives of the Southern and Ekaterina railroads take part
in committee work with a consulting vote.
3. The Committee has jurisdiction over mining enterprises situated in the
guberniyas of Ekaterinoslav, Tauride, Kherson, and in the Don Cossack region.
4. Orders based on decisions of the Committee are compulsory and must be
carried out through institutions represented in the Committee, as appropriate.
6. The tasks of the Committee are as follows:
Concerning extractionassistance in supplying mines with: a) metals, re
inforcing timber, leather, lubricating and illuminating oils, b) labor, c) food;
the settlement of questions concerning railway sidings to the mines.
Concerning fuel supply the establishment, on instructions of the Chairman
of the Special Council on Fuel, of plans and procedures for meeting the fuel needs
of the principal consumersthe railroads, the fleet, and metallurgical and coke
industriesand also the adoption of measures for the optimum fulfillment of con
tracts for the transportation of fuel.
Concerning transportthe adoption of measures for strengthening and im
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 689
proving the means of transportation in the Donets Basin, for their most expedient
use, and for the regulation of fuel consumption on the railroads.
[March 13,1917]
596. C oordinating t h e O rders o f t h e Chairm an o f t h e S p ecia l C o u n cil
on F u e l and o f O th e r A u th o r itie s f o r t h e A p p lication o f
Em ergency M easures w ith R esp ect t o F u e l
[Soft. Uzak. I, 2, No. 960.]
The Provisional Government, in its Journal of March 25, 1917, has decreed:
It is the duty, as a general rule, of all military and civilian authorities in all
parts of the Russian State, except zones of direct military operations or the so-
called troop zones, when applying emergency measures with respect to fuelsuch
as requisitioning fuel, seizing enterprises supplying and extracting fuel, requisi
tioning unfelled timber, permitting temporary participation in the utilization of
enterprises for the supplying and extracting of fuel, the establishment of fixed or
maximum prices for fuel, prohibition of the export of fuel, and compulsory draft
ing of the population for the supplying and transport of fuelto exercise the rights
granted to them only after preliminary agreement with the Chairman of the Special
Council on Fuel or his deputy.
The original Journal is signed by the Minister-President, the Ministers, the
Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, and the State Controller, and is counter
signed by the Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government.
597. S ta tu te on t h e R eg u la tio n o f t h e D istrib u tion o f O il
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 514.]
1. On the basis of article 12 of the Regulations on the Special Council for
the Discussion and Unification of Measures for Supplying Fuel for Transport,
State and Public Institutions, and Enterprises Working for Purposes of State
Defense, approved on August 17, 1915, a Commissioner of the Chairman of the
Special Council on Fuel is appointed for the Baku and Groznyi oil regions.
3. The Commissioner is responsible for: (a) ascertaining stocks of oil, oil
residues, kerosene, and other oil products in the possession of enterprises in fields,
stations, factories, warehouses, oil pipelines, ships, etc.; (b) maintaining statistics
on the extraction, refining, pumping, and export of oil and oil products; (c)
supervision of the implementation of compulsory ordinances and rules issued by
the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel; (d) the distribution among oil-
producing firms of orders for liquid fuel for enterprises working for defense, in
accordance with instructions of the Chief Commissioner for oil; (e) enabling
oil-trading firms to export by making available to them, if necessary, oil and oil
products by means of requisition from oil-producing firms or exporters who have
purchased or who possess stocks and extraction of oil in excess of their export
possibilities; (f) verification and supervision of the maximum possible utilization
of oil schooners on the Caspian Sea; (g) supervision of the coordination of plans
for transporting oil cargoes through the Caspian Sea with the shipping of such
690 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
cargoes up the Volga, in order to avoid unnecessary demurrage of schooners or
barges; (h) the fulfillment of orders of the Chairman of the Special Council on
Fuel and instructions of the Chancellery of the aforementioned Council, of the
Chief Commissioner for the supply of oil and oil residues, and of the Chairman
of the Kerosene Committee.
[The following articles invest the Commissioner with the legal powers neces
sary to carry out the above functions.]
8. For the discussion of questions arising in the discharge by the Commis
sioner of the responsibilities entrusted to him, a Council shall be formed under
his chairmanship with the following membership: (a) two representatives of the
Council of Unions of Baku Oil Producers, (b) two representatives to be chosen
by firms shipping oil and oil products on the Caspian Sea, and one representative
each from (c) the Ministry of Trade and Industry, (d) the Caucasian Mining
Administration, (e) the local Excise Administration, (f) the Baku Russian Tech
nical Society, (g) the Baku Exchange Committee, (h) the Baku Soviet of Workers
Deputies, (i) the War Industry Committee, (j) the All-Russian Zemstvo Union,
and (k) the All-Russian Union of Towns. In addition, individual experts may be
invited by the Commissioner to participate in meetings of the council. . . .
[A. K on ovalov, Chairman of the Special Council
on Fuel, Minister of Trade and Industry]
[April 8, 1917]
598. A p p eal t o t h e P easan ts to Aid in th e P rocu rem en t o f W ood
for F uel
[Izvestiia, No. 57, May 4, 1917, p. 1. Various measures were taken to improve the
procurement of wood for fuel, especially for the railroads. The private lumber industry
was invited to participate in a committee, Tsentroles, to coordinate procurement, and
the commissioners of the Special Council on Fuel were authorized to seize real property
in order to cut the timber on it. See Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 70;
Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War; Zhurnaly, No. 120, June 28,1917;
and Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 549.]
Comrade peasants!
The war has deprived Russia of imported coal; over 500 million poods of coal
were imported before [the war]. Railroads, disorganized by the old regime,
cannot transport the required amount of Donets coal. The entire coal deficiency
must be met by the use of firewood. This firewood is essential to: 1) railroads for
transporting food supplies, all goods, military freight, and troops, 2) factories
and plants manufacturing all that is needed for the population and for the defense
of the countrys freedom, 3) the needs of both the rural and the urban population.
Without fully providing for firewood, neither regular work within the country
nor a supply of all necessities will be possible. Railroad ties, logs, and construc
tion materials are also needed. [These materials] are being procured from state-
owned forests, but owing to the absence of working hands and the impossibility
of further transporting [these materials], it is essential that there be an increased
felling of privately owned forests lying in the environs of navigable rivers and
railroads. All the procurement will be accomplished by order of the Provisional
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 691
Government through special central and local committees. In these committees
complete control will be assured to workers, soldiers, and peasants deputies.
Besides that, the control of land committees will remain in full force.
Comrade peasants! Assist in the intensified procurement of firewood and
timber materials! Assist in transporting and floating them! This is demanded
in the interests of your native land, and in the defense of the country!
T he E xecutive Committee of the S oviet
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies

599. S ta tu te on t h e U tiliz a tio n o f W a ter P ow er


[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1570.]
The Provisional Government in its Journal of May 5, 1917, has decreed the
issuance of the following Law:
In amendment and supplement of the relevant statutes, the following Tem
porary Statute on the utilization of water power is established:
STATUTE ON THE UTILIZATION OF WATER POWER
1. The organization of plants for the utilization of the force of the fall of
water, as well as the maintenance and operation of these plants, is not authorized
otherwise than on the basis of concessions and licenses granted by the Government.
2. For the organization, development, and operation of plants of not less than
300-horsepower capacity and of those plants of less than 300-horsepower capacity
whose state or public importance has been recognized by special decisions of the
Committee on the Utilization of Water Power, as well as for the organization of
lines transmitting power from these plants to consuming areas, compulsory alien
ation or temporary seizure of properties may be carried out, and the right of par
ticipation in their use may likewise be established.
5. For the management and direction of the utilization of water power, a Com
mittee for the Utilization of Water Power is established. . . .

600. New R u les on t h e R eg u la tio n o f t h e P u rch ase o f F u e l O il


[So&. Uzak., I, 1, No. 686. This procedure replaced the statute of April 8 (Doc. 597).
On the same day new and very similar rules were issued for coal, replacing those of
March 17. See Doc. 595 and Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War,
pp. 212-13.]
1. A consumer who has a permit to acquire fuel oil and who is unable to
purchase fuel by means of private agreement shall submit a declaration to this
effect to the district Commissioner for fuel oil, showing the oil firms which the
consumer requested to sell him fuel oil and the result of the request, and also
showing the supplier who supplied fuel previously. The declaration should show
the quantity and type of fuel requested (black mineral oil, crude oil, motor oil,
etc.), as well as the dates of delivery. Hie Naval Department, railroads, and navi
gation companies on the Volga and the Caspian Sea shall make their declarations
directly to the Chief Commissioner for fuel.
692 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
2. The declaration received by the district Commissioner shall immediately
be forwarded with his recommendation to the Chief Commissioner on the supply
of oil and oil residues, who, on consideration of the aforesaid declaration, shall
submit it with his recommendation to the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel.
3. The quantity of fuel oil for which a compulsory purchase order may be
issued to one consumer may not exceed the quantity of fuel approved for the afore
said consumer in the annual distribution lists, drawn up for the period from May 1
to May 1 of the following year.
Y arkovskii, Head of Chancellery of the Special Council
[May 9, 1917]

601. S ta tu te E sta b lish in g a S ta te M onopoly o f t h e S a le


o f D o n ets C oal
ISob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1237.]
On the original is written: Approved. July 16,1917. P a lch in sk ii, Acting
Minister of Trade and Industry, for the Chairman of the Special Council for Fuel.
1. On the basis of paragraphs 5, 8, and 13 of article 10 of the Statute on the
Special Council on Fuel . . . approved August 17,1915, the Statute authorizing
the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel to declare trade in mineral fuel the
exclusive right of the State . . . approved November 22, 1915, as well as the
amendment to the foregoing approved by the Provisional Government on July 15,
1917, the following Statute on the transfer of hard mineral fuel in the Donets
Basin to the State and on the state monopoly of trade in this fuel is established.
2. All fuel held in mine warehouses and in all loading depots on the day of
enactment of the present Statute and all fuel that is extracted and produced in
the Donets Basin, in coal and anthracite pits, in briquette factories and coke
furnaces, after the enactment of the present Statute, is transferred to the State,
and with the exceptions given below (article 11) may not be alienated and trans
ferred otherwise than by the procedure indicated in the following article.

3. The mortgaging of Donets mineral fuel is prohibited from the day of enact
ment of the present Statute. . . .
4. All contracts for the delivery of hard mineral fuel in the Donets Basin (in
cluding contracts concluded with the State) cease from the day of enactment of
the present Statute with respect to any provision concerning fulfillment of these
contracts after the date mentioned. . . .
5. Advances and deposits given by purchasers to their contractors under con
tracts for the delivery of hard mineral fuel in the Donets Basin are to be returned
by the latter to purchasers, with respect to their unliquidated balance, within the
period of three months after the enactment of the present Statute.
Irrespective of this, all other claims for the fulfillment of contracts before the
enactment of the present Statute must be settled by contractors within a period of
six months after such enactment either by voluntary agreement or action in an
appropriate court.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 693
13. Fuel turned over to the State is distributed among consumers by the Chief
Commissioner for Donets fuel and by district Commissioners of the Chairman of
the Special Council on Fuel . . .
15. The acceptance of fuel from extracting and producing enterprises is car
ried out by the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel . . .
23. Payment to owners of pits, coke furnaces, and briquette factories for fuel
received is carried out on the basis of specially established purchase prices.
These prices are established by the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel
on the basis of the cost price of fuel . . .
24. The division of enterprises into groups for the establishment both of pur
chase prices and of the difference in such for the various groups is subject to
compulsory consideration in the Commission established under the chairmanship
of the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel. The Commission consists of seven
persons elected by the coal and anthracite operators, seven representatives of the
workers organizations of the Donets Basin, and two representatives of the special
institutions of higher learning who are members of the Commission . . . The
organization of elections by the coal and anthracite operators is entrusted to the
Council of the Congress of Mine Owners of South Russia and the organization of
elections by the workers to the regional Soviet of Workers9 Deputies. The divi
sion [of enterprises] into groups drawn up in this way is to be approved by the
Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel. The division of enterprises into groups
is reviewed periodically under the procedure indicated above.
31. For the consideration of claims of private persons and institutions under
state obligations arising from the implementation of the present Statute, on the
basis of the amendment to the Statute of November 22, 1915, authorizing the
Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel to declare trade in mineral fuel the
exclusive right of the State, a Special Office for the affairs of the state monopoly
of trade in hard mineral fuel of the Donets Basin is established in Kharkov . . .
34. Decisions of the Special Office may be appealed to the First Department
of the Ruling Senate within a period of two months after notification of the de
cision to the petitioner.
37. A Council for the affairs of the monopoly of trade in Donets fuel is estab
lished under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel with
the following membership:
a) the Chairman of the Kharkov Mining and Metallurgical Committee;
b) one representative from the Ministry of Transport, one representative from
the private railways, one representative each from the War Department, Naval
Department, Ministry of Food, All-Russian Zemstvo Union, All-Russian Union
of Towns, one representative from all the steamship companies of the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov and one from the Dnepr, Don, and North Donets steamship
694 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
companies, one representative from Tsentroshakhar, and one representative from
the all-Russian organization of millers;
c) one representative each from the Councils attached to the Commissioners
for fuel of the Central, Petrograd, Southern, and Kiev districts, to be chosen by
these Councils;
d) six persons to be elected by the Council of the Congress of Mine Owners
of South Russia, of whom one must be a representative of the metallurgical in
dustry;
e) six representatives of the workers of the Donets Basin, to be chosen by the
Oblast Soviet of Workers5 Deputies;
f) one representative of the State Control with the right of advisory vote.
In addition, the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel is authorized to invite
individual experts to meetings of the Council with the right of advisory vote.
38. The Council is responsible for: 1) approval of the standards . . . ; 2)
approval of the general plan for issuing orders for the shipment of fuel in accord
ance with article 13; 3) consideration of petitions from persons and institutions
extracting or producing fuel for loans to enable them to repay advances and de
posits on contracts for delivery of Donets fuel . . . In addition, the Council con
siders questions concerning the monopoly of trade in Donets fuel submitted for
discussion by the Chief Commissioner as well as questions raised by individual
members.
Disagreements which may arise between the Chief Commissioner for Donets
fuel and the Council are to be settled by the Chairman of the Special Council
on Fuel.

41. General supervision of the progress of extraction and loading, as well as


collection of necessary information and fulfillment in the field of assignments of
the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel, is entrusted to the Inspection Service
of the Donets Basin, acting on the basis of a separate statute.2
42. The composition and duties of the administration for the affairs of the
monopoly under the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel shall be defined in detail
by an Instruction of the Minister of Trade and Industry.
43. Persons guilty of violating article 2 of the present Statute, or failing to
submit to the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel information requested by him
on the basis of article 30 of the present Statute, or guilty of refusal to open to
inspection enterprises and business books and documents, are liable on the basis
of article 3 of the Law of November 22, 1915, authorizing the Chairman of the
Special Council on Fuel to declare the sale of mineral fuel the exclusive right of
the State, as set forth in the law of the Provisional Government of July 15, 1917.
Persons who are guilty of failure to carry out lawful orders and requests of the
Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel are liable under article 29 of the Code of
Penalties imposed by justices of the peace. (Code of Laws, Vol. XV, ed. 1914, as
set forth in the Law of the Provisional Government of March 17, 1917.)

2See Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War, pp. 218-21.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 695
602. A V iciou s C ir c le
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 206, September 8,1917, p. 3.]
Every fortnight Russia needs 80 million poods of coal. During the first half
of August, 50 million poods were to be shipped from the Donets region. It was
possible to ship only 35 million poods; that is, the deficiency was 17 million poods,
or 32 per cent of the coal intended for shipment.
On examination of the data on the deficiency of coal, it appears that during
the first half of August the disruption of railroad transport played no role in the
reduction of shipments. To be sure, in some railroad stations a shortage of cars
was felt. But at the same time the railroads even brought part of the reserve from
some mines. And during these two weeks the amount of coal mined was 17 million
poods below the shipping schedule.
During the first half of August 1917, 43 million poods of coal were mined.
For the same period of time in 1916 the mining amounted to 54 million poods.
During these two weeks 7 million poods of coke were manufactured, and in 1916
this period yielded 11 million poods.
Ordinarily the cause of such a drop in mining is sought in the lowering of
labor efficiency. As a matter of fact, the labor output of a miner during the first
half of August dropped to 207 poods10 poods lower than during half of July
1917 and 40 per cent lower than the output during the first half of August 1916.
But it would have been incorrect to regard the lowering of labor efficiency as
the sole cause of the coal crisis, for we are faced here with the operation of a whole
chain of much more complex causes than the simple unwillingness of the workers
to do their work well. We are convinced that one cannot reduce everything to the
ill will of the workers, first of all, by the fact that the drop in labor efficiency began
long before the revolution. Den9 makes use of very characteristic figures from the
report by Mr. Vukublin before the All-Russian Congress on Donets Fuel. In the
first half-year of 1915 the average output per worker in the Donets region equaled
4,616 poods; in the second half-year of 1915, 4,400 poods; in the first half-year
of 1916, 3,888 poods; in the second half-year of 1916, 3,537 poods; and in the
first half-year of 1917, 2,858 poods. On the average, from half-year to half-year,
labor efficiency in prerevolutionary Russia was also reduced by 9% per cent.
If we divide the half-year of 1917 into four quarters of a year, it appears that
during January-March the output of one worker equaled 1,553 poods, and for
April-June 1,355 poods; that is, the postrevolutionary period shows a reduction
of 12 per cent instead of the usual 9% per cent.
Evidently, in addition to workers disorders, the reduction in the output of
coal was caused by the sum total of conditions in the mining industry of the
countrythe breakdown of transport, disruption in the exchange of goods, and
the undermining of the foundation of industry. The special commission which
surveyed the Donets region in August, while emphasizing the importance of the
unorganized, spontaneous movement of the workers, pointed out also a number
of causes responsible for the continual breakdown of the efficiency of coal mines:
shortage of metal and coal carts, lack of lumber for the reinforcement of coal pits,
insufficient funds for exploitation work. According to the estimates of the Tor-
govo-Promyshlennaia, Gazeta, for every 10 million poods of mined coal we would
have to spend 4% to 5 million rubles in place of the 2% to 3 million rubles which
had to be spent prior to the war.
696 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
If we add to this the acute food shortages experienced by the Donets region,
we get a complete picture of the vicious circle in which the Donets industry is
trapped. General deterioration of the technique of production, together with total
inability to improve matters soon and confusion in the food situation, create
unrest among tie unenlightened working masses. War and revolution siphoned
the best elements from their ranks, replacing them with war prisoners, women,
and children whose labor efficiency does not exceed 50 per cent of the normal.
And the spontaneous movement among the workers, which takes the form of in
tolerable excesses and violence, is an added blow to the technical and financial
difficulties of the coal-mining industries.
Under the circumstances, it is futile to look for the culprits. Obviously, what
is needed is a prolonged process of restoring the industry to health and a general
raising of the cultural level of the masses.

603. M easure to E xpedite t h e Shipm ent o f O il on t h e Caspian Sea


[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1428.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The Statute of the Special Council for the discussion and unification of
measures to provide fuel for transport, state and public institutions, and enter
prises working for state defense needs (Collection of Laws, 1915, article 1760)
is supplemented with an article X1 reading as follows:
Art. X1. The Chairman of the Special Council, with a view to efficient utili
zation of the merchant marine fleet for systematic transport on the Caspian Sea
of fuel, food, and military cargoes, is, in accordance with discussion in the Special
Council, authorized with respect to shipping companies and shipowners in the
Caspian Sea:
1) To remove, if necessary, members of boards, councils, supervisory com
mittees, and other administrative organs of shipping and transport joint-stock
companies, as well as directors and superintendents of these enterprises, and to
appoint other persons to fulfill their duties or to fill temporarily vacant positions.
2) To require boards of shipping and transport joint-stock companies and
limited partnerships, as well as individual owners of shipping companies, to dis
miss company employees who are not suited to their duties.
3) To enlist shipping companies, if necessary, for compulsory transport on
the basis of the Temporary Rules for compulsory use of ships, laid down by the
Special Council for Fuel.
4) To establish maximum and fixed prices for the transport of cargoes and
the towing of ships in connection with navigation conditions, operating costs, the
type of cargoes carried and the type of ships on which cargoes are carried, if this
proves necessary, and, in general, to take all measures for the efficiency of ship
ping on the Caspian Sea.

N. N ek rasov, Deputy Minister-President


S. P rok op ovich , Minister of Trade and Industry
August 8,1917
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 697
604. E xp lan ation o f t h e R ed u ction in O il P ro d u ctio n
[Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 29.]
The reduction in the output of oil in 1917 was to a large extent determined
by the drop in drilling. In 1913,65,195 sazhen [sazhen equals 7 feet] were drilled;
in 1914, 51,987 sazh.; in 1915, 47,827 sazh .; in 1916, 43,485 sazh. The effect of
reduced drilling on the output of oil was interpreted back in November 1916 by
P. 0. Gukasov at a conference of the Central War Industrial Committee: When
we speak of the drop in output, we lose sight completely of the fact that should
be emphasizedthat the extraction of oil is composed of two parts: the cost of
exploitation, and the preparatory work necessary to maintain the output of oil
at a certain level. I have in mind here the work on drilling . .
The same thought was expressed by A. 0. Gukasov, President of the Council
of Congresses of the Baku Oil Producers. He pointed out that the ailment that
undermines the oil industry is concealed and will make itself felt in time.
Gukasov enumerated the following causes responsible for the drop in oil output:
a 40-50 per cent shortage of metals; reduction in the work of drilling; severe food
crisis; the railway breakdown; discrepancy between the compensation of the work
of laborers and employees and the mounting high cost of living. After giving a
picture of the present conditions, A. O. Gukasov came to the following conclusion:
To increase the rate of work under such circumstances or to maintain the present
rate is impossible. And in a number of other fields the breakdown in the oil
industry was a direct consequence of the deterioration of production begun during
the prerevolutionary period.

LEATHER GOODS AND TEXTILES


605. T h e E sta b lish m en t o f t h e S ta te L e a th e r M on opoly
[So6. Uzak., I ,1, No. 542. On March 8, the Minister of Trade and Industry had issued
a Compulsory Instruction, prepared by the imperial government, prohibiting the sale
or transfer of hides except through the intermediary of the State or its authorized
agents. Ibid., No. 381.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
1. All hides and skins of cattle, horses, and camels, whether raw or dressed,
available at present in the country, as well as those which may hereafter be pro
cured in European and Asiatic Russia and on the army fronts, are handed over
to the State.
2. Measures for the utilization of leather for the needs of the army, of in
dustry, and of the public are carried out through the central and regional com
mittees appointed to deal with leather.
3. The Central Committee is composed of four groups:
(a) seven representatives of public organizations;
(b) seven representatives of government departments;
(c) seven representatives of the leather, footwear, and saddleries industries
and trades;
(d) seven representatives of the regional committees.
698 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
4. The Central Committee shall:
(a) draft a scheme for the distribution of raw materials among provinces and
regions, and for the supply of dressed hides and skins to the army and to the
industry working for national defense;
(b) determine the maximum prices for leather goods, for tanning and other
materials required by the leather industry, and for manufactured leather goods;
(c) ascertain the needs of the leather industry and find means to satisfy them;
(d) permit and promote the import of raw and dressed hides and skins, foot
wear, and saddlery from foreign countries;
(e) acquire property;
(f) coordinate and control the activity of regional committees.
5. A Regional Committee is established in every province and territory.
6. The regional committees are entrusted with:
(a) the organization of the collection of raw materials in a particular region,
and their distribution according to the scheme established by the Central Com
mittee;
(b) the supervision of the carrying out of regulations relating to the sale of
leather goods and materials;
(c) the inspection and control of the tanneries, leather factories, workshops,
stores, and undertakings;
(d) the distribution of dressed leather goods;
(e) the registration of the actual stocks of raw materials and manufactured
goods;
(f) the timely supply of leather and leather goods to industrial undertakings;
(g) the sequestration and requisition of hides and skins in case of necessity.
7. The funds required to meet the expenditure for the purchase of rawhides
and skins and for the general administrative expenses of the Committee are
defrayed by the Treasury.
P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
April 21, 1917

606. A l l C o tto n and Its D istrib u tion P la ced U nder t h e C o n tr o l


o f t h e C o tto n C om m ittee
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 883. This was an extension to cover all cotton and yarn of the
law of April 28, ibid., 1,1, No. 790. For efforts to control the distribution of cotton and
other textiles to consumers, see Doc. 573.]
enactment of the minister of trade and industry
June 2,1917
I. All cotton yarn of Russian manufacture, including yam contracted for by
transactions of sale and purchase, advance sale, or delivery, is subject to com
pulsory distribution among enterprises processing yarn into finished goods on
the basis of the following rules:
1. Yarn that remains available after the requirements of state defense have
been met and that is used for the manufacture of goods for the private market
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 699
is distributed among enterprises by the Committee for the control of raw material
supplied to cotton factories (Moscow . . . ).
2. The owners of spinning millsweaving, spinning-weaving, and combined-
type millsas well as of hosiery-knitting factories and of knitted goods, ribbon,
and other enterprises processing cotton yarn are required to communicate to the
Committee for the control of raw material supplied to cotton factories, as re
quested, information concerning the equipment, productivity, and activity of the
enterprises belonging to them, as well as concerning stocks, extent of consump
tion, and movement of remnants of cotton yarn. This information must be sub
mitted to the Committee in the form approved by the Committee and at times
established by it; the Committee is entitled to verify the information submitted
to it through specially authorized persons who shall have access for this purpose
to business books and other relevant documents.

3. Determination of the procedure for registration of yam which may be made


available for the manufacture of textiles for the private market, the establishment
of standard stocks of yarn which will ensure proper utilization of enterprises, as
well as the determination of the quantity of yam subject to distribution is entrusted
to the Committee for the control of raw material supplied to cotton factories.

7. Industrial enterprises undertake themselves to sell yam which is subject


to distribution and which is registered with the Committee for the control of raw
material supplied to cotton factories at prices not in excess of the established maxi
mum, and solely to persons and firms possessing certificates . . . and in com
pliance with the procedure established by the above Committee.
8. The resale of yarn, acquired on certificates of the Committee for the con
trol of raw material supplied to cotton enterprises for purposes of subsequent
factory processing, is forbidden.

N. S a w in , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of Trade and Industry

607. T h e R ig h t o f P u rch ase o f C oarse W o o l Given E x c lu siv e ly


to M ills M anu facturin g f o r D efe n se N eeds
[SoZ>. Uzak* I, 1, No. 560. On September 28 the same rules were introduced for the
distribution of wool yarn as those for cotton in Doc. 606. Ibid* I, 2, No. 1757.]
compulsory statute of the ministry of trade and industry
April 28, 1917
On the basis of rules of supplying the cotton and wool plants with raw ma
terial, as approved July 7 and December 17, 1915, and October 17, 1916 . . .
I declare:
I. The right of purchasing coarse wool is given to owners of woolen factories,
wool-spinning mills, and other woolen enterprises working for defense; also to
700 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
private individuals and firms who receive orders to purchase wool on commission
basis from the above owners and enterprises engaged in the production of wool.
II. The above right is given only by permission from the Coarse Woolen Goods
Department of the Wool Committee and approved by the Department over the
signature of the President of the Department and Secretary of the Committee, and
with the official stamp.
III. . . . Purchase of wool without permission of the Committee is forbidden
under threat of consequences of violating the present compulsory Statute.
A. K on ovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS


608. An A p p eal t o t h e S o ld iers on t h e U se o f t h e R ailroads
[ VVP , No. 23, April 5, 1917, p. 1. The inadequacy of the railroad network, the effect
of military activity on the lines, and the impossibility of keeping repair and supply of
rolling stock equal to the transport demands all contributed to the breakdown of trans
port. Labor difficulties also complicated the problem. See Chapter 13. The document
below illustrates another difficulty faced after the February revolution.]
Soldiers! We overthrew the old regime because there was a reign of violence
and arbitrary rule. We knew that where there was no respect for the individuality
of the citizen, and where other peoples rights were scorned at every step, there
could he no order; and where there was no order, there could be no victory over
the enemy.
Now the present order, based on respect for the rights and individuality of
others, is particularly necessary on the railroads, which, through the exertion of
every effort by their employees, must deliver sufficient food supplies and muni
tions to the front. Other peoples seats are being occupied in the passenger cars,
windows are being broken in them; the cars themselves are so overfilled with
soldiers that the springs are weighted down and the axles are breaking; demands
are being made upon employeesunder threats of violencewhich contradict the
basic rules of safety in railway traffic; and there was even one case where, under
threat of a bloody reprisal, the engineer of the passenger train was forced to drive
over an eroded span.
Soldiers! You must clearly understand that every extra train which is [carry
ing] people and is moving in the direction of the front is forcing out another such
train [carrying] food supplies and munitions to the front.
If, owing to the overcrowded cars, an axle breaks while the train is in motion,
then not only will a wreck occur, sacrificing numbers of human lives, but also the
traffic will be interrupted, as a result of which it will not be possible to convey new
trains with munitions and food supplies to the front.
Thus the violence committed on railway employees will [turn into] violence
against your comrades in the trenches, while the violation of railway rules will
turn out to be attempts at disrupting the integrity of our front.
Soldiers! Convince your less socially-aware comrades that their own interests
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 701
demand a strict and unquestioning compliance with railway rules and orders of
railway employees which are based on these [rules], and that any interference
with these orders is just as inadmissible and damaging to the cause as interference
in the order established at the front by an outsider who is unfamiliar with mili
tary affairs. Show yourselves to be fully worthy of the freedom which you have
achieved, and thereby achieve victory over the enemy.
P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President
G uchkov, Minister of War and Navy
N ek rasov, Minister of Transport
April 4,1917

609. T h e D ecision o f A m erican R ailroad Car and L ocom otive


M an u facturers to Give P r io r ity t o Russian O rders
[Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis), For.
Rel. of U.S.,1918, Russia, III, 185. See also Doc. 450.]
Washington, April 16 [N.S.], 1917, 5:00 p.m.
1324. Your 1179. You may inform Russian Government that there was a
meeting to-day of the representatives of the car manufacturers and of the loco
motive manufacturers having orders for the Russian Government. They agreed
to give precedence to these orders over any orders for domestic consumption. The
railroads have agreed to help in seeing that the manufacturers obtain the raw
materials promptly and also in seeing that the orders, when completed, are shipped
promptly. It is believed that all possible speed will be given to these orders.
L ansing

610. T h e A greem en t C oncerning A m erican Aid to


Russian R ailroad T ran sp ort
[Translation of memorandum from the Russian Embassy to the Department of State,
For. Rel. of U.S.,1918, Russia, III, 186-87. Russia was asked on April 2 if she would
welcome American aid in restoring the efficiency of her railroads, and replied in the
affirmative, though apparently with some reluctance at accepting outside advice. The
draft program below was accepted by the American government as the basis for
assistance. Ibid., pp. 184-85.]
Washington, undated
(Received April 21 [N.S.],1917)
1. Since the declaration of war, the Government of the United States of
America is able to demand of all the factories in the country priority in filling
military orders; moreover, several factories will be specially adapted to the re
quirements of the war. In this manner the periods for the filling of war orders
will be considerably shortened and the amount of the orders will be increased.
2. The United States will furnish Russia a large quantity of rolling stock for
the railroads of Russia, as well as rails and other materials necessary for the
development of the Russian railroad systems. It is possible to obtain the necessary
rolling stock for Russia from the supply already completed in America, without
waiting for new orders to be filled. Furthermore, necessary changes will be made
within the shortest period enabling the Russian railroad lines to be supplied with
American locomotives and cars.
702 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
3. An adequate space will be reserved without delay at Vladivostok for the
construction of warehouses for merchandise to be sent from America. Likewise
a part of the wharf will be adapted for the simultaneous unloading of twenty-five
steamships. At the same time the workshops and storehouses at Vladivostok and
at other points will be suitably arranged with the consent of the Russian Govern
ment. The lighters, storehouses, workshops, etc., reserved for the merchandise
will be placed at the disposal of a special officer who will arrive from America
as soon as possible with the necessary staff. The legal conditions governing this
cooperation will be established later on.
4. Officers, engineers, and foremen will start at once from the United States
to examine the wharves, storehouses, and workshops at Vladivostok and Harbin
intended for the cargoes and railroad equipment from the United States.
5. American engineering experts will be asked by the Russian Government
to study the questions relating to the operation and efficiency of the railroad
companies of Ussuri, eastern China, and Siberia, and to give their opinion as to
the improvements in the Russian military supply service by the United States.
6. American engineers will be sent immediately to study the above-mentioned
railroads and elaborate measures looking to an increase in their traffic, to the
construction of a double track and sidetracks, workshops, and depots, and to
ascertain at once all the needs of these railroads and have the necessary orders
placed in the United States.

611. T h e O rganization o f t h e S teven s Commission


[Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis), For.
Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, III, 189. The Commission sailed from Vancouver for Vladi
vostok on May 14 (N.S.). Ibid., p. 191.]
Washington, May 3 [N.S.], 1917, 5:00 P.M.
1372. Mr. John F. Stevens has been requested to head a commission of expert
railroad officials which will leave for Russia within the next week via Vladivostok.
Mr. Stevens is perhaps best known by his connection with the early planning and
construction in connection with the Panama Canal. The work which he laid out
and the plans which he formulated were finally carried through to completion by
General Goethals. Mr. Stevens has also had extensive experience in the location
of railways, notably the Great Northern, which line he located across the Rocky
and Cascade ranges. He has superintended the construction also of many other
notable pieces of engineering work.
The personnel of his party will be made up of men who have had well-
recognized experience. This committee is being sent in the hope that it may be
able to ascertain ways in which this country can be helpful to Russia during this
present great emergency. It is believed that an examination of Russian railroads
will disclose methods whereby we will be able to render immediate and valuable
assistance. It is not improbable, that with slight changes, equipment now being
built for American railroads may be so changed as to fit the Russian gauge and
requirements, and it is with that thought now in mind that the commission is being
sent.
L ansing
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 703
612. M easures fo r R eg u latin g t h e T ran sp ort o f P assengers and F r e ig h t
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 711.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government, with a view to regulating the transport of pass
engers and freight in order to prevent and put an end to disturbances on transport
facilities involving infringement of inviolability of person and damage to prop
erty, and in particular for the purpose of protecting persons working on transport
facilities from any encroachment on the part of those using these facilities, as
a provisional measure, has decreed:
I. The Supreme Commander, as well as the Ministers of War and Navy, as
appropriate, shall be authorized: 1) to take measures for the temporary suspen
sion of furloughs for members of the armed forces, and then to reduce the number
of such furloughs, 2) to establish strict supervision to ensure that furlough tickets
shall not be issued in excess of the established standard, and in cases of violation
to call the guilty parties to account without fail for misuse of authority involving
serious consequences, and 3) for the purpose of detecting deserters as well as
unauthorized persons wearing military uniform, to introduce effective supervision
of members of the armed services off duty and verification of furlough tickets as
well as of other documents certifying that these persons have been authorized to
leave their place of duty.

III. The Minister of Transport shall be authorized to take measures to reduce


crowding at stations and wharves and, if necessary, to prohibit all access to such
places to persons who do not possess travel tickets; in such cases the Minister of
Transport shall be authorized to remove ticket offices from the premises of sta
tions and wharves.
IV. The Minister of Transport shall be authorized to set up at railway sta
tions and wharves, where he deems necessary, temporary peoples militia guard
committees of transport facilities. . . .
V. The temporary peoples militia guard, with the assistance of sentries and
patrols from units of the armed forces and officers of the militia, shall be entrusted
with the maintenance of order and security of movement, prevention and suppres
sion of any attempts by outside persons to interfere with the activities of employees
on transport facilities and, in particular, of encroachments on persons and prop
erty connected with transport facilities, installations on the ways of communica
tion, and freight in transit, with the use, on general grounds and in cases where
it is clearly necessary, of force to put down disturbances occurring on transport
facilities.

VTII. The Minister of Justice and the Ministers of War and Navy, as appro
priate, shall be authorized to take measures for the immediate consideration by
judicial bodies of cases of criminal acts committed on railways and waterways.
P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President
P. P ereverzev, Minister of Justice
May 26, 1917
704 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
613. T h e A p p oin tm ent o f Commissars t o t h e R ailroads
[Sob. Uzak.9 I, 2, No. 1365. A large number of administrators on the railroad lines
were dismissed because of their arbitrary actions under the old regime and the feeling
against them by the workers. According to one source, some 900 were dismissed in
the first four months of the revolution. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 32.
The dismissals, though probably necessary, undoubtedly contributed to the further
disorganization of transport, for many of the replacements had no railroad experience
or training.]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of June 7,1917:
I. The Minister of Transport is authorized temporarily, for the duration of
the emergency, by agreement with public organizations, to appoint public leaders
as Commissars for the state and private railroads, as well as for the boards of
railroad companies, to supervise the activity of the railroads and the boards,
within the limits laid down by a directive approved by the Minister of Transport
in agreement with the Minister of Finance.

614. T h e P ro v isio n a l G overnm ent A ccep ts t h e R ecom m endations o f t h e


S tev en s Comm ission f o r Im provem ents on t h e Trans-Siberian R ailroad
[Telegram from the Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State, For.
R el of U.S., 1918, Russia, HI, 195-96.]
Petrograd, August 13 [N.S.], 1917
(Received August 19 [N.S.], 2:50 A.M.)
1625. (For) Willard3 (from Stevens):
After long delays Government has approved all commissions recommenda
tions. Work on improvements starts immediately. Commission with officials
going to Siberia line to start long engineer nms and whatever can be done pending
arrival committee units. Arrange to send 12 units of 14 men each unit to consist
of 1 division superintendent, 1 master mechanic, 1 chief train dispatcher, 2 train
masters, 2 traveling engineers, 6 train dispatchers and 1 line repairer. One divi
sion superintendent at least should be thoroughly experienced in terminal work.
Ten units to be located at towns between Vladivostok and Omsk; two, Petrograd
to Moscow. Master mechanic should be experienced roundhouse foreman capable
keeping up running repairs with poor engine-terminal facilities. Also following
foremen: 10 (omission), 10 foundry, 10 boiler, 10 machine, 10 engine-erecting,
5 car-erecting, 5 paint, 20 roundhouse. Minister suggests some men speaking
Russian or French can be gotten on American roads capable filling lower ranks.
Also 2 general superintendents having practical experience in train work to rank
as majors. All above force to be organized as United States military unit skeleton
engineer regiment. Suggest division superintendent (s) rank as captains, balance
lower grade. Should have quartermasters to handle food and quarters. Also
ingenious shop superintendent skilled in rearranging antiquated shops having
electric power line driven shafts, speed up to-day machinery and output without
stopping work. He should be made a member of this commission. Also first-class
man to direct installation telephone, train dispatching and electric locking block
s Daniel Willard, Chairman of the Railroad Advisory Committee of the United States
Council of National Defense.
I I \ U U d l I X . I JLIMJJ l I U L l V d r U K . 1 /U D

signal circuits. Order 1,000 selector phones and bring along as many and other
essential appliances as can be had quickly. Can probably adapt present iron
wires. Care in selecting men of patience and policy necessary. All to act as instruc
tors to educate Russians in American methods returning to United States there
after, time depending largely upon duration of war. Expense of all this, excepting
general superintendent, to be Russian through credit of United States. While we
begin at once to try and improve things, not much can be effected before arrival
American units so hurry them along. There has been a great change recently in
official spirit here, now apparently enthusiastic for American methods which we
must make successful.
(F rancis)
615. W ork o f t h e S teven s M ission
[Telegram of the Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State, For. Rel.
of U.S., 1918, Russia, III, 202. The activities of the Commission are delineated in
documents in ibid., pp. 183-307.]
Petrograd, October 9 [N.S.], 1917
(Received October 11 [N.S.], 1:00 P.M.)
1854. Delighted to learn by letter just received from Miller,4 Vladivostok,
September 25, that our Railway Commission made excellent progress since leaving
Petrograd August 24 accompanied by Ustrugov, Assistant Minister Railways.
Reports freight accumulation Vladivostok reduced about 40 per cent since May.
Fourteen decapod engines shipped since June 23, additional coming 8 per week.
Mallet engines clearing from October 1, 5 per week and 50 decapods now
Vladivostok and Harbin. Eight hundred box cars shipped since July 1, 300 more
by October 1, 1,000 gondolas since July 1, 400 being erected Vladivostok now.
Everything good working order Vladivostok and improving rapidly over entire
Trans-Siberian as result of Railway Commissions work whose recommendations
being put in operation rapidly.
. . . These and other like advices very encouraging and enable me to success
fully refute insinuations of British and French that American Railway Commission
effecting nothing. Again I urgently request advices of shipments as made. Show
Willard.
F rancis
616. T h e R ailroads A re Stopping
[Article in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 243, October 24, 1917, p. 3.]
From February on, all of us who look upon life with open eyes, all of us who
are not captivated by hackneyed phraseology, all of us shouted as loud as we
could, and warned wherever we could that in the fall the railroads would stop;
that the railroads are perishing. Some ridiculed our fears, others spoke of delib
erate intimidation, still others accused the sabotaging bourgeoisie, the capitalists,
and so forth, and then set their minds at ease. And the man in the streetthe
man in the street listened to the terrible words, yawned, and hoped for someone,
for somethingsomeone will help; somehow, everything will turn out all right.
No one helped; things did not turn out all right. Autumn came and the rail
roads are stopping.
4 Henry Miller, Member of the Stevens Commission.
706 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Revolutionary phraseology brought much sorrow to Russia. But in addition
it also taught us not to believe words. From menacing words it was so far to deeds.
And there were so many of those shouts, hysterics, wails, resolutions, which
were forgotten by everybody the following day. And when we were saying that
the railways were on the brink of ruin, that exceptionally heroic efforts are needed
to save them, no one listened to us, no one believed us.
Autumn came and the railroads are stopping.
Get the meaning of these words.
First passenger transportation will be reduced and greatly so. Trips will be
possible only by special permission, or without any permission and even without
any tickets to characters with strong fists. The question of boarding the train
will no longer be decided by a bribe, as is frequently the case now, but by physical
force only.
But the reduction in passenger transportation will effect very little economy
in fuel, first, because it is already greatly reduced, second, because it plays in
general a secondary role in the work of the network, and third, because the bands
of discharged men returning from the front will demand, of course by means of
threats, that they be given locomotives.
Freight transport will immediately have to be reduced. And since practically
nothing (speaking of mass transport) but food supplies and fuel has been trans
ported recently, a sharp reduction in the delivery of consumers5 goods to popu
lated centers may be expected very shortly.
All this is unavoidable: trains cannot move if there is no fuel and no loco
motives. And the strictest resolutions can do nothing here.
The horrors related to the interruption of transport are clear to anyone:
riots, dissension, and the gradual dying out of the population, dying out in the
true sense of the word.
Suffering will touch everyone in equal measurethe bourgeoisie as well as
the revolutionary democracy and simply democracy. Everybody must understand
the meaning of the dreadful words the railroads are stopping, understand and
believe them. Half the work will then be achieved.
If the population will understand all the future horror, it will instinctively
rush to save itself, unless it deliberately wants suicide.
What is to be done? Specialists give a simple and clear answer. It is not a
matter of reforming, or improving the network, of working out some innovations.
Elementary measures must be undertaken to make our railroads, somehow, in
some way, move. The forthcoming mass conference at the Moscow Regional
Committee on October 26 will indicate these measures, particularly since they
are reduced to two very simple measures: we need coal and we must repair the
locomotives.
Who should undertake the measures? The Ministry, under the present cir
cumstances, can do nothing. Scores of telegrams with information about the
complete breakdown in various places, which the department receives daily,
horrify the leaders, to be sure, but they are powerless. The same problem of
authority operates here. And it is even more difficult because it is nonexistent,
but in its negative form it is passed into the hands of countless committees, unions,
etc. There can be no thought of saving the network until the authority of these
organs is clearly defined, until all authority in the field of administration and
technique is vested in the agents of the Ministry. But thus far this too is a detail.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 707
Understand that we must begin the rescue of the railroads today, because tomor
row will be too late.
The railroads are stopping.
I conclude my alarming note with an appeal: Caveant consules!
I am afraid to say: Memento mori.
P . P. Y urenev

617. T h e C ondition o f t h e P o s ta l and T eleg ra p h ic S erv ices


[Izvestiia, No. 103, June 28,1917, p. 5.]
I. G. Tseretelli, Minister of Post and Telegraph, issued the following instruc
tions to the Department of Post and Telegraph:
In the one and a half months that have elapsed since I assumed the office of
Minister of Post and Telegraph,5 I have become convinced that the generally
poor condition of the postal and telegraphic services is largely a consequence of
the technical backwardness which the government of revolutionary Russia had
inherited from the old regime, e.g., shortage of personnel, shortage of mail vans,
telegraphic apparatus, post and telegraph offices, etc. For several decades, the
technical organization lagged behind the actual demands, and it was only by
applying the sweatshop system of the old regime that it was possible to maintain
the services in a more or less satisfactory condition.
The government of revolutionary Russia cannot and does not want to use the
sweatshop method of overexerting and exhausting its employees. Therefore, when
I entered the Ministry, I applied all my efforts toward improving the position of
the employees: . . .
However, the [state of] disorganization in postal and telegraphic services
not only has failed to improve, but is continuing to grow. . . . The Ministry is
deluged with legitimate complaints . . .
While some of this irregularity I attribute to technical backwardness which
cannot be immediately overcome, I can only admit that the most conspicuous
factor, or even the principal factor, in the further deterioration of postal and
telegraphic services after the revolution has been the lack of a conscientious
attitude on the part of many postal and telegraphic employees toward their work,
which is explained by the low level of awareness and lack of civil discipline.
In view of this, I consider it my duty to issue the following instructions for
guidance and strict execution:
1. It is the duty of those who are in charge to see to it in every way that all
the employees are working with proper diligence during office hours and it
is the duty of all employees to submit to all official instructions issued by the
persons in charge and to carry out these instructions without question.
2. No meetings or conferences of trade unions, or of a political nature, can
be permitted during office hours within the premises designated for official duties.
3. Professional organizations of employees whose aim is to defend the inter
ests of their profession, raise the level of awareness of their members, and increase
their organization may only have [the right to] a deliberative vote in the admin-
6The Ministry of Post and Telegraph was established on May 5, 1917. So b. Uzak., I, 1,
No. 574. Its functions had previously been carried out in the Ministry of the Interior.
708 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
istrative matters of the postal and telegraphic services and, therefore . . . I can
under no circumstances permit any boards elected by employees to take over the
direction and management of the services, to make arbitrary appointments, or to
dismiss employees. . . . Attempts by professional organizations to interfere
with the management slow down the work, distract many employees from per
forming their immediate duties, and remove the responsibility from the persons
in charge. Arbitrary appointments and dismissals limit my power, as a Minister
who acts on behalf of the whole revolutionary democracy and is responsible
to it. . . .
Issuing these instructions to all employees, I am enjoining their strict execu
tion and am warning that in the event of any deviations from these instructions,
or in the event of apparent negligence and bad management, I, as Minister,
acting on behalf of the revolutionary democracy, will be compelled to apply the
strictest punitive measures, including dismissal from office, to those who fail to
meet the high demands placed on them in the interests of free, revolutionary
Russia.
CHAPTER 13
Labor

THE RESUMPTION OF WORK AND THE INITIATION OF


NEW LABOR CONDITIONS
618. R e so lu tio n o f t h e P e tr o g r a d S o v ie t A p provin g t h e
R esu m p tion o f W ork
[Izvestiia, No. 7, March 6, 1917, p. 1. The resolution was adopted March 5 hy a vote
of 1,170 to 30. See also Protokoly, p. 14.]
Recognizing that the first decisive onslaught of the rebellious people against
the old regime has been crowned with success and that the position of the working
class has been made sufficiently secure, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies considers it possible at the present time to begin resuming work in the
Petrograd area, providing that work may be stopped at the first signal. The
resumption of work is desirable at the present time because continued strikes
would be extremely destructive to the economy of the country, already under
mined by the old regime. Simultaneously with the resumption of work the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies calls for an immediate establishment of all
types of workers organizations and for the strengthening of existing organiza
tions for the purpose of consolidating the positions gained and achieving further
gains. [These workers organizations] will act as the base in the further revolu
tionary struggle for the complete liquidation of the old regime and for [the
realization of] the class ideals of the proletariat.
At the same time, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies considers
that concurrently with the resumption of work a program of economic demands
must be drawn up which will be presented to employers on behalf of the working
class.
With respect to other towns in Russia, the question of resuming work where
there are strikes must be decided by the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
of these towns in accordance with local circumstances.

619. Izvestiia U rg es E conom ic D em ands B e M ade by L ab or w it h t h e


R esu m p tion o f W o rk
[ Izvestiia, No. 8, March 7,1917, p. 1; Golder, 418-20.]
At its meeting of March 5, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
voted, 1,170 to 30, that it is now possible to resume work in the Petrograd area,
such work to be stopped again at the first call.
Therefore, the workers of Petrograd should leave the streets, where they have
been for a week establishing popular freedom, and return to their workbenches
710 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
and lathes, so as to revive our economic life and bring it back to its normal course.
But even this the workers cannot do successfully, except under certain condi
tions which are not yet guaranteed to them.
First of all, they should demand immediate pay for the days they spent out
side the factories and mills, conquering freedom for the whole nation. This is
their right, and he who dares to deny it covers himself with shame forever. The
workers have no savings. They spend what they earn. The champions of liberty
cannot be left without bread for themselves, their wives, and their children,
simply because they fought tsarism, and so could not work.
They should insist on collective agreements and see to it that they are at once
put into force, and that the employers live up to them. This will guarantee to
them that no worker is removed by the autocratic will of an employer from the
execution of a task appointed by the Soviet of Workers9 and Soldiers Deputies.
For the control of factory and shop administration, for the proper organiza
tion of work, factory and shop committees should be formed at once. They
should see to it that the forces of labor are not wasted and look after working
conditions in the place.
The workers should protect themselves against exhaustive and excessive labor
in those industries that are working full time. Shift work will guarantee produc
tion and will, at the same time, permit the workers to rest and to take part in
public life. In taking their places at the benches, the workers do not cease to
be citizens.
In those establishments that are forced to work only part time because of
special circumstances, for lack of raw material, etc., the workers should divide
the work equally, and so protect their comrades from the horrors of unemploy
ment.
The comrades must not forget that the refusal of an employer, for personal
motives, to go on with production cannot serve as a reason for stopping work.
In such cases, they must insist resolutely that the work be turned over to them,
under the direction of a commissar of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies, a representative of the trade union involved, and the party organiza
tion of the district.
The workers must also insist upon the immediate regulation of womens and
childrens work, which has been exploited with redoubled intensity since the
declaration of the war. The weak must find protection with the strong.
Last, the workers must bear in mind that tsarism is overthrown, but not
completely vanquished. Its followers are still trying, and will continue to try,
to harm people in every possible way by disorganizing whatever is still accessible
to their scattered forces. Therefore, the workers must guard the factories and
mills with armed forces, and coordinate such protection with the local militia and
tie general protective organizations of the capital.
With the observance of all these conditions, work can proceed at full blast.
Without these conditions, there will never be any firm ground under our feet.
620. A n Address fro m t h e M in ister o f Trade and In d u stry t o t h e W ork ers
[VVP, No. 2, March 7, 1917, pp. 1-2. Authorized by the Provisional Government on
March 6. Zhurnafy, No. 7.]
Labor is the basic productive force of the country. The welfare of the mother
LABOR 711
land depends upon labors achievements. The Minister of Trade and Industry
believes that a correct approach to and proper solution of the labor question is
a most urgent problem.
The Provisional Government foresees the need of establishing an independent
Ministry of Labor. Its function would be to make a thorough study of labor issues
and to resolve them. Until the formation of this ministry and in order not to
postpone the solution of some urgent problems, a special Division of Labor, with
a collegiate body, composed of representatives from workers, industrialists, and
public organizations, is being established in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.1
The Minister believes that the expansion of all kinds of trade unions is one
of the chief prerequisites for Russias economic revival. Moreover, he believes that
the growth of trade unions would aid tremendously in the development of arbi
tration boards, which are urgently needed to establish proper relations between
labor and capital based on law and justice.
The Minister will put forth every effort in order to promote the growth of labor
legislation in keeping with the needs of the moment.
The labor legislation is subject to revision and will be prepared in accordance
with the principles of law and justice.
The outdated articles of law on the hiring of workers, also laws about crafts
men and commercial employees, will be changed. Criminal penalties for meetings
and strikes will be abolished.
Immediate work will begin in preparing draft laws on the length of the
working day, comprehensive protection of labor, improvement and development
of workers insurance, arbitration chambers, labor exchanges, and other measures
designed to promote the workers welfare.
The cooperative movement, which, inspite of the opposition of the old govern
ment, attained considerable success, will be given every opportunity to expand.
The Minister will strive wholeheartedly to satisfy, as much as possible, the
needs of the workers. He hopes, however, for vigorous cooperation on their part.
An immediate return to normal work is indispensable in order that Russian
life may finally be rebuilt on new principles and that free Russia may defeat the
foreign enemy. Delay threatens countless calamities.
A. I. K o n ov alo v, Minister of Trade and Industry

621. A p p eal o f t h e S o v ie t t o t h e W ork ers


[.Izvestiia, No. 10, March 9,1917, p. 1; Golder, pp. 420-21. The most insistent demand
was for the introduction of the eight-hour working day. Protokoly9 p. 31.]
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies voted to recommend to all
the workers of Petrograd that they return to work on March 6, 1917. With
insignificant exceptions, the working class of the capital has shown remarkable
discipline, returning to its tasks with the same unanimity with which it aban
doned them several days ago to give the signal for the great revolution. But,
according to information in our possession, the resumption of work has been
accompanied from the very start by a series of misunderstandings and conflicts.
In some of the factories and mills, the workers presented economic demands to
1 Approved by the Provisional Government on March 5. Zhurnaly, No. 5.
712 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
their employers and, failing to obtain satisfaction, stopped work again, while
in some cases they did not return to work at all.
In adopting its resolution on the resumption of work, the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies believed that such sporadic actions in separate factories
would not take place. It was assumed that our comrades, the workers, would not
stop work in case of misunderstandings with their employers, but would move in
an orderly fashion toward the realization of their demands, with the aid of the
factory and district committees, trade unions, and, last, the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers5 Deputies. For this purpose, the Soviet decided to appoint a special
commission to prepare a list of general economic demands, to be presented to the
manufacturers and the Government on behalf of the working class. Therefore,
we urge you, comrades, in every case where hope of settlment is not yet lost, to
remain at work, to insist, at the same time, upon the satisfaction of your demands,
and to bring them to the attention of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
It goes without saying that excesses, such as the damaging of materials, breaking
of machinery, and personal violence, are absolutely forbidden, since they harm
the cause of labor, especially at the present dangerous time.
On the other hand, reports are being received of some employers who dis
charge their workers at the very first presentation of demands, and shut down
their establishments. Such an attitude toward those who fought for the freedom
of our native country is entirely forbidden, and the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies will be obliged to fight with the greatest energy against such
abuses, which are especially disgraceful in the days we are now passing through.
In cases of the closing of factories, the Soviet will be compelled to bring before
the working class, the municipality, and the Provisional Government the question
of handing over such enterprises to the municipality, or of turning them over
to the workers organizations.
T h e E xecutive Committee of th e S oviet
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies

622. T h e A greem en t on W orking C onditions in P etro g ra d


[Izvestiia, No. 12, March 11, 1917, p. 1. The committee of the Soviet which reached
agreement on these issues with the manufacturers on March 10 was also instructed
to request the Provisional Government to issue a law prescribing the eight-hour day
throughout Russia. Protokoly, p. 34. Although the Government did introduce the new
working conditions in plants and establishments under the jurisdiction of the army and
navy (Zhurnaly, No. 14, March 10,1917) and later issued legislation on factory com*
mittees and chambers of conciliation (Docs. 630, 650) which led to the widespread
introduction of the eight-hour norm by individual factory agreements (see Doc. 627),
it never universally legally implemented the eight-hour day.]
An agreement has been reached between the Petrograd Soviet of Workers*
and Soldiers Deputies and the Petrograd Association of Manufacturers on the
introduction of an eight-hour working day in factories and mills and on the
establishment of factory committees and chambers of conciliation.
I. The eight-hour working day.
1. Pending the promulgation of the law standardizing the working day, the
eight-hour working day (eight hours of actual labor), applicable to all
shifts, is introduced in all factories and mills.
LABOR 713
2. On Saturdays the working day is to comprise seven hours.
3. The reduction in working hours is to have no effect on [the amount of]
workers wages.
4. Overtime work is permitted only with the consent of factory committees.
II. Factory Committees.
1. Factory committees, elected from workers of a given enterprise on the basis
of universal, equal, and etc. suffrage, are to be established in all factories
and mills.
2. The functions of these committees are to be as follows: (a) to represent
the workers in a given enterprise in their relations with government or
public institutions; (b) to formulate opinions on questions pertaining to
the socioeconomic life of workers in a given enterprise; (c) to settle
problems arising from interpersonal relations of workers in a given enter
prise; (d) to represent workers before the management in matters con
cerning labor-management relations.
III. Chambers of conciliation.
1. Chambers of conciliation are to be established in all mills and factories
for the purpose of settling all misunderstandings arising from labor-
management relations.
Note: If necessary, chambers of conciliation may be subdivided into sec
tions, according to workshops and factory shops.
2. Chambers of conciliation are to consist of an equal number of elected
representatives from workers and from the management of the enterprise.
3. The electoral procedure for the workers is to be determined by the factory
committee.
4. Chambers of conciliation are to be in session whenever circumstances
require.
5. In the event that an agreement between workers and employers is not
reached in the chamber of conciliation, the matter is then to be carried to
and settled by the Central Chamber of Conciliation.
6. The Central Chamber of Conciliation is to consist of an equal number of
elected representatives from the Soviet of Workers Deputies, on the one
hand, and from the Association of Manufacturers, on the other.
IV. The removal of foremen and other administrative officials without examining
the case in the chamber of conciliation, and their subsequent more violent
removal (by physical force) are prohibited.
Y. The matter of employees status must be determined immediately.

623. A p p eal o f t h e G overnm ent t o t h e U r a l M e ta llu r g ic a l W ork ers


[VVP, No. 16, March 23,1917, p. 1.]
March 23,1917
Workers of metallurgical factories of the Urals, the Provisional Government
calls upon you with a fervent appeal: Exert all of your efforts, stubbornly and
uninterruptedly increase the production of metal. Restore completely work in
the mills. Do not lose a single day, a single hour. Remember that the army needs
a continual supply of new guns, shells, cartridges, rifles, and other fighting equip
ment. Remember that the manufacture of munitions requires metal in an enormous
714 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
quantity. The production of metal depends upon you, workers of the metallurgical
mills. You hold in your hands the victory and the consolidation of liberty in
Russia. The enemy constantly multiplies his stores of munitions; he prepares
for a new offensive; he strives to break down the heroic resistance of our valiant
army defending with its life the honor and liberty of the motherland. Workers, do
not leave your brothers defenseless in the trenches. Help them preserve their life,
to repulse the enemy and to ensure freedom for Russia. You can do this, and you
must do this. The Provisional Government has already launched upon an imme
diate extension of measures directed toward a rounded and radical improvement
of workers living conditions. Representatives from workers and industrialists
are drawn into this work in equal numbers and with equal rights. The Provisional
Government is convinced that the workers and industrialists, fully aware of their
responsibility to the army and the country, will exert every effort in order to
ensure an uninterrupted and proper flow of work for defense by peaceful agree
ment on all of the most important questions. We must have harmony, order, and
internal peace. Workers, fulfill your duty to Russia!
P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
[March 23,1917]

624. T h e S o ld iers C oncern O ver t h e Im p lica tion s o f t h e


E igh t-H ou r W orking D ay
[Reports to Department of State, No. 287, April 10 (N.S.), 1917, pp. 4-5.]
A special conference of great significance also took place yesterday when the
soldier delegates, elected at the front, held a session with the delegates from the
workmen of the munitions plants in Petrograd. The soldiers posed a number of
questions, among which were: If the present number of workmen is not increased,
will the amount of work done during an eight-hour day ensure a full supply of
ammunition for the army? Will work be done on holidays? Why are there
6,200 freight cars standing unloaded? Why does Petrograd not resume work at
this time when it is most needed?
Explanation was made that although the workmen made excessive and dis
organized demands at first, the Council [Soviet] of Workmens and Soldiers
Deputies was now in control, that many large factories were affected by a shortage
of fuel and material, that energetic measures were being taken, and that the
workmens demands were not excessive in view of the hardships they suffered
before the revolution.
A resolution was adopted to the effect that, since the enemy was most threat
ening, the workmen must be supplied with food, work must go on with fresh energy
and without any regard whatever for the number of hours or for overtime.
625. A R ep o rt o f W orker Irresp o n sib ility
[Article titled Can This Be possible? in Izvestiia, No. 25, March 26, 1917, p. 2.]
The newspaper Russkiia Vedomosti carried the following report from the
village of Ozer of the Kolomenskii uezd:
Among other things discussed recently in the Soviet of Workers Deputies,
was the question of the disposition of the 100,000 rubles assigned by the manu
LABOR 715
facturers F. Shcherbakov Co. and Sons for setting up a Workers Pension Fund,
as well as 100,000 rubles for establishing a savings bank for employees and 50,000
rubles for educational purposes. One of the workers leaders, B. I. Trotskii,
addressed an impassioned speech to the workers and proposed [the following]:
Comrades, seize the opportunity; combine the three amounts and divide it equally
among yourselves. It was possible to save the 50,000 [rubles] intended for
educational purposes, but the workers decided to divide among themselves the
200,000 [rubles] designated for setting up a pension fund and a savings bank.
The Company held an urgent meeting and assigned an additional 100,000 for
organizing a savings bank, and today, on March 20, these 100,000, too, were
distributed among the workers.
A revolution is taking place in Russia. Inspired by the great goals of emanci
pation, the revolutionary workers and soldiers are overthrowing the age-old
enemy of the peoplethe tsarist power. In order to consolidate their gains and
continue the policy of emancipating the people from all forms of oppression and
violence, workers and soldiers are forming Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies. These Soviets have set noble and lofty aims for themselves: they are
fighting in order to entitle the working class to an eight-hour working day and
an increase in wages; they are fighting to prevent the soldier from being a slave
in the barracks, a dummy in the hands of his commanders; they are fighting in
order that all the land may be returned to the people; they are fighting for the
establishment of a democratic republic in Russiaan equality of all before the
law.
Ostensibly, the workers of the village of Ozer have also stood up for their
interests. Apparently, they organized their own Soviet of Workers Deputies for
this purpose. Sensing that the workers have become a force [in society], the
local manufacturers have also made concessions. They assigned 100,000 rubles
for setting up a pension fund for workers, 100,000 rubles for organizing a savings
bank for the same workers, and 50,000 rubles for educational purposes, also for
the workers. It seems obvious what should have been done with this money: this
money should have been used to satisfy the public needs of the workers, i.e., to
establish institutions which all the workers benefiting by the concession of the
capitalists could use to advantage, institutions which could also benefit the future
generations of workers.
The pension fund, the savings bank, and the educational institutions should
have served as small fortresses [bolstering the position] of the workers in their
future struggle against the capitalists for improving their status. In the mean
time, the workers of the village of Ozer have done just the reverse, if one is to
give credence to the correspondent of Russkiia Vedomosti: they took the 300,000
rubles and distributed them among themselves, thereby ruining the institutions
that would have borne a public character. Is it possible that the workers of the
village of Ozer did not understand that they were squandering public funds when
they stuffed their pockets with this money?
Can this be possible?
626. W e M u st S trik e B ack
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 34, April 7, 1917, p. 1.]
And so the campaign against workers, launched by the bourgeois circles and
their press with the object of creating a split between the army and the proletariat,
716 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
has come to an end. . . . Both Reck9 and Russhaia Volia, as well as other news
papers that consistently published in their columns unconfirmed reports taken
out of thin air to the effect that workers are only concerned with their own inter
ests and that they are ruining the cause of defense, are now triumphantly
announcing: The workers are at their workbenches!59 Production is in full
swing!
This is all very good. But neither the workers nor the army should be satisfied
with the victory gained over attempts at bringing dissent into their ranks. . . .
Who is responsible for the fact that factories and plants were left without
machines, without raw materials and fuel? . . .
. . . Well, having started the campaign against workers who desired to im
prove their really hard life, did the bourgeois press then take the time to investigate
the question of the role played by capitalists in that confusion which was evident
both before and at the beginning of the revolution and which is still evident at
the present time in all [spheres] of industry?
They say nothing about the enormous profits made by entrepreneurs working
[in the interest of] defense ; they maintain a silence on robbing the masses in
the rear, which has by no means decreased even after the revolution; they are
carefully ignoring all instances of such [practices] as secret lockouts in a whole
string of factories, allegedly called forth by the exorbitant demands of workers;
they pretend that they are ignorant of the fact that trusted persons of employers
are dominating factories and plants everywhere in the same way as in the past
and are driving the workers to wrath by their despotism . . .
We cannot, of course, demand that the bourgeois press, which reflects the
interests of the ruling classes, take a stand against these classes. But we can and
must insist that the comrades-workers adopt every measure in order to clarify
the role of the capitalists in the industrial crisis which Russia is now undergoing.
We must return the blow. Only in this way will we be able to uncover the real
mainspring of the slowdown and the work stoppage in many factories and plants;
only in this way will we be able to determine the steps that must be taken in order
to assure that our industry will really start working in full swing. And only then
will the slanderous campaign against the workers, initiated by the bourgeois
classes, be really crowned with the victory of the revolutionary democracy over
its open and secret enemies.
627. S ta tem en t on t h e E igh t-H ou r D ay by t h e C hairm an o f t h e C ou n cil
o f t h e C ongress o f R ep resen tatives o f In d u stry
and Trade (N. N. K u tle r )
[Stenogramma Zasedaniia Ekonomicheskogo Soveta, No. 6, as quoted in Lozinskii,
Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 187-88.]
. . . The eight-hour day was introduced as a measuring unit in order to
establish the normal wage: for eight hours work the wage was standard. A
higher wage was established for overtime . . . but a change soon took place.
LABOR 717
Workers who heretofore accepted overtime work began to refuse it. The eight-
hour day became the accepted length of work. In view of the unusual circum
stances prevailing, it would seem desirable not only not to legalize finally the
eight-hour working day, but, on the contrary, to request that this actually realized
demand of the workers be replaced by another: a longer working day.
628. T h e F irst of M ay
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 86, April 18, 1917, p. 3.]
Today the Russian worker for the first time celebrates his May Day in liberated
Russia openly and victoriously. Without anybodys permission, he introduces,
for his own use, the new calendar and with proudly raised head he enters the
great family of the European working class movements as a member with full
rights. But it would be a mistake to speak only about the working class today.
We are present at a much more important celebration. Russian workers march at
the head of the entire Russian democracy, which regards them as its strong and
staunch protectors. Their celebration will gather all of Moscow in the Moscow
streets and squares, it will attract genuine welcome in those circles of the popu
lation which can in no way be called proletarian in any strict sense of the word.
This is not all. This day is a national holiday,2 the day of Russias coming of age,
which ought to make glad even people of a conservative frame of mind. Freedom
of associations and assemblies is as indispensable to Russia as light and air. Only
when a strong, firmly compact workers party is organized, and enters a wide,
steady channel, and the country is covered with a network of trade unions which
are strongly imbedded in the native soil; only then can the revolution be con
sidered secure; only then will the ground under the feet of the conservative ele
ments of the Russian publicwho have run to cover at presentstop shaking,
and they will cease being suspicious and will become a healthy element of Russian
public Hfe.
The West also passes and has passed the first of May in a festive mood, but
there it has never been associated with the victory of all-national revolution; it
has always remained a class celebration, which even recently generated bour
geois fear. Later, those in the West too grew accustomed to May Day, with its
populous parades, crimson banners, fighting songs, and impassioned speeches;
their impressions have become blunted a little. But in our memory the remem
brances are quite fresh of a great February-March week out of which this holiday
too was born. No matter if the azure of the Russian sky is spotted with clouds.
Our first of May, 1917, still bears the charm of novelty, bubbling youth, youthful
faith, both in ourselves and in others. Today, we greet the Russian working class
and Russian democracy with sincere joy.
629. T h e F ir st o f M ay
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 44, April 18,1917, p. 2.]
Today, for the 27th time, the international proletariat is celebrating its bright
and militant May holiday. . . .
The good tidings of the great Russian revolution that overthrew the throne
2Proclaimed by government decree. Zhumaly, No. 55, April 15, 1917.
718 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
of the Romanov dynasty at the hands of laborworkers in blouses and workers
and peasants in soldiers greatcoatshave loudly resounded through all the cor
ners of the world. This is not because this revolution can lead our poor, backward
country directly to a socialist systemwhich is only possible where capitalism has
developed and utilized the productive forces to the fullest extent. No, it is not
Russias destiny to be the first to enter the gates of the socialist kingdom!
But our revolutionit is the first movementand what a powerful one!
expresses the protest and indignation of the working masses. It instills faith in
our powers, it raises the brightest hopes of labor in all and in the most progressive
countries in the world. It awakens them and summons them to the struggle. On
its banner it inscribes the fiery May appeal for universal peace and the brother
hood of workers. At the height of the bloody war it proclaims a relentless fight
against militarism and puts this sloganalso a May slogan! into the mouths
of tens of millions of people who are armed by predatory capitalists for a mas
sacre of extermination!
With unprecedented force the revolution places even other May demands
on the order of the day [the demands for] a democratic republic and an eight-
hour working day, as the essential conditions for making the worker feel that
he is a human being, and a citizen. . . .
Then long live the bright day of the first of May!
Long live the Russian revolution!
Long live peace among peoples and the brotherhood of workers in all the
countries!

FACTORY COMMITTEES
630. T h e S ta tu te on F a cto ry C om m ittees
[Sob. Uzak* 1,1, No. 551.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. In amendment of relevant legislation the following statute on workers
committees in industrial enterprises is approved:
1. Workers committees shall be set up in private as well as in state industrial
enterprises of every kind (factories and plants, mining, metallurgical, construc
tion trades, etc.), observing the rules set forth in the following articles of the
present Statute.
2. Workers committees may be set up both for the industrial enterprise as a
whole and for its individual workshops, factory shops, departments, crafts, pro
duction lines, etc. The individual committees may unite in a central committee
according to rules established by an Instruction.
The committees shall be set up either on the initiative of not less than one-
tenth of the total number of workers eligible to elect members of the committee,
or on the initiative of the administration of the enterprise.
3. The committee shall consist of members elected by the workers of the
LABOR 719
enterprise on the basis of a universalnot excepting women and minorsequal,
direct, and secret vote.
4. For the elections to be valid, not less than half of all the workers of the
entire enterprise or the particular workshop, factory shop, department, craft,
production lines, etc., must participate in them.
5. A list of the committee members shall be communicated to the administra
tion of the industrial enterprise for information.
6. Members of the committee may be dismissed by the administration of the
enterprise only by decision of conciliatory institutions. Their removal before
such decision may occur only with the agreement of the committee. In the absence
of permanent conciliatory institutions, the question shall be settled by means of
arbitration.
7. The workers committee shall prepare an Instruction defining the compo
sition, duties, and procedure of the committee. The Instruction shall provide in
particular: 1) the number of delegates by categories, factory shops, departments,
workshops, etc., or from the entire industrial enterprise; 2) the procedure for
the election of delegates and their alternates (the method, place, and time of
balloting); 3) the term of office of delegates and their alternates; 4) the pro
cedure for the recall of individual delegates or all delegates before the expiry of
their term of office; 5) the procedure for the election of the chairman and other
members of the presidium of the committee; 6) the relations between the indi
vidual committees, if such exist, and between individual committees and the
central committee of the industrial establishment; 7) the channel of communica
tions between the committee and the administration of the enterprise; 8) the
conditions and procedure for the release of delegates from work during the time
required to perform their duties; 9) the fundamental rights and duties of dele
gates and other regulations which prove necessary, depending on local conditions.
The Instruction prepared by the committee shall be subject to approval by
the general meeting of workers and, on approval, shall be displayed in the working
premises.
Note: In the election of the first workers5committee, the number of committee
members, the procedure for their election and terms of office shall be determined
by the general meeting of the workers of the entire enterprise or its workshop,
factory shop, department, craft, production lines, etc., as appropriate.
8. The provisions of the Instruction defining the relations between the com
mittee and the administration of the enterprisein particular, the channel of
communications of the committee with the administration, the conditions and
procedure for release of delegates from work during the time required to per
form their duties, and the place and time of electionsshall be the subject of a
preliminary discussion at a joint meeting of the committee and representatives
of the administration of the enterprise, and shall be established by mutual agree
ment of both sides.
9. The duties of the workers5 committees shall be: a) representation of the
workers to the administration of the enterprise on questions concerning relations
between the employers and workers, as, for example, on salaries, working hours,
rules of internal organization, etc.; b) settlement of questions concerning in
ternal relations among the workers of the enterprise; c) representation of the
workers in their relations with government and public institutions; d) cultural
720 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
and educational activity among the workers of the enterprise and other measures
designed to improve their existence.
10. Individual workers shall not he deprived of the right to act personally
in the cases mentioned in article IX (paras, a and b ), each for himself, without
recourse to the committee.
11. The committee shall inform the workers of the results of the election, of
its activity, of forthcoming meetings, etc., by means of notices displayed on the
working premises.
12. The committee shall be authorized to call meetings of the workers. The
administration of the enterprise shall be required to set aside premises or a place
at its disposal for meetings called by the committee.
14. Meetings called by the committee shall, as a general rule, be held outside
of working hours.
15. [Managerial and clerical] employees of an industrial enterprise either
may establish separate committees, following the rules laid down in the present
Statute, or, by agreement with the workers, may participate on an identical basis
in the election of workers committees.
16. All disputes arising between the administration of the enterprise and
workers and employees in the application of the present Statute shall be referred,
at the wish of one of the parties, to conciliatory institutions for consideration.
II. [Earlier labor legislation was abrogated.]

P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President


A. K onovalov, Minister of Trade and Industry
V lad . N abokov, Head of Chancellery of the
Provisional Government
April 23, 1917
631. C ivil W ar in t h e P ipe F a c to ry
[An episode reported in Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 61, May 20, 1917, p. 3.]
The campaign launched by the Bolsheviks for the re-election of representatives
to the regional Soviet has inflamed passions. By common consent it has been
decided to conduct the re-election on Wednesday, May 17. However, owing to
the decision of the representatives of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies to have on this day a meeting in the pipe factory
with the participation of socialist ministers, the committee of elders of the factory
[factory committee] resolved to move the election to the 18th. This irritated the
Bolsheviks. Under their influence the forging shop decided not to comply with
the resolution of the committee of elders and scheduled the election to take place
on the 17th. Therefore, work was not started in the shop on the morning of the
17th. Informed of this, the committee of elders sent a representative for nego
tiations. The latter reported that current rumors to the effect that other shops
. . . had joined in the decision of the forging shop were false. And seemingly
he succeeded in explaining the incorrectness of the position taken by the forging
shop. But after his departure the committee of elders again received word about
the restless mood in the shop. Comrade Kapanitskii (S.R.), member of the Cen
LABOR 721
tral Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and representative on duty of the
committee of elders, was met in a sharply hostile manner. For his appeal to
comply with the resolution of the committee of elders, the shop decided to punish
him. A suggestion was made at first to throw him in the furnace. But they later
abandoned the plan (furnaces for other, more prominent members of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers5 Deputies) . It was decided to take Comrade Kapa-
nitskii in a wheelbarrow to the river and drown him. Whereupon the official
representative of the committee of elders was thrown in the wheelbarrow and
wheeled to the Neva to be drowned. Other shops learned about this and came
to the rescue of their representative. A fist fight ensued. The workers from the
forge shop dumped the representative of the committee of elders from the wheel
barrow. There were many other victims. Finally the workers rescued their repre
sentative from the hands of the forgers.
632. D iffic u ltie s in t h e Im p lem en tatio n o f t h e Law on
F a cto ry C om m ittees
[Letter to the Minister of Labor from the Management of the Nevskii Shoe Factory,
Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 545.]
Not earlier than June 6, 1917
We hereby notify you that on the 6th of this month we sent you the following
telegram: Your reply of June 1, No. 204, with the enclosure of a copy of the
law on workers5 committees, was received by us and we transmitted same to the
workers5 committee of elders, to which we received the following reply:
Mr. Director: We received the copy of the Provisional Governments
law on workers committees in industrial enterprises which you sent us. The com
mittee of elders, however, considers it unsatisfactory inasmuch as the ministers
who approved this law no longer exist. And now that the ministers are new, the
law should be new also. But this law which we have has already been worn out
in our pockets. So we ask you if you have the new law, and if so, send it to us.
It will be very helpful to us and we will be glad to receive it. President, A. Stepa
nov; Secretary, A. Skorodumov.
Supporting wholeheartedly from the very beginning of the revolution the
economic as well as legal betterment of the employees5 and workers5 lives, we are
forced to appeal to you with a petition to explain to the workers5 committee of
elders what their duties are.
Delay in explanation threatens the shutdown of production.55
Management of the Nevskii Shoe Factory,
Tsvetochnaia Street No. 7
P etro v , President
Sm irnov, Secretary

633. C ircu la r o f t h e M in ister o f Labor C oncerning W o rk er


In te r fe r e n c e in H iring and F iring
[VVP, No. 136, August 22,1917, p. 3.]
August 22,1917
1. In accordance with the law of April 23, 1917, on workers5 committees,
owners of plants have no right to dismiss members of the factory committees,
722 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
elected on the basis of this law, except by decision of the chambers of conciliation
or courts of arbitration.
2. The right of hiring or firing of all other employees and workers of plants
belongs to owners of these plants, unless, by mutual consent of parties involved, a
different procedure prevails of employing and dismissing employees and workers
(through mixed commissions or trade unions, chambers of conciliation, courts
of arbitration, and others).
3. Should the workers raise the question of dismissing certain persons who
in their opinion are responsible for lowering the productivity of the plant or for
its closing altogether, and if the owners do not agree to it, the dismissal may take
place only if ruled by the factory committee.
4. Persons guilty of not conforming to the rules of employment and dismissal
of employees and workers are subject to prosecution in the regular way.
5. Coercive measures on the part of workers for purposes of dismissal or
employment of certain persons are regarded as actions to be criminally punished.
The present announcement to be posted in all industrial and commercial en
terprises.
M. S k o b elev , Minister of Labor
634. T h e C ircu la r o f A ugust 28 o f t h e M in ister o f L abor on t h e
In adm issib ility o f W ork ers M eetings D uring W orking H ours
[Description from Torgovo-promyshlennaia Gazeta, September 2, 1917, as quoted in
Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 558.]
The Minister of Labor, M. I. Skobelev, issued a circular order to the com
missars of the Ministry of Labor to factory inspectors and district engineers, in
which he points out that, according to news reaching the Ministry of Labor, con
ferences and meetings are frequently held in many factories, mills, and mines
during working hours, as a result of which the work in the plants is disrupted.
The Minister of Labor notifies the commissars and factory inspectors that, in
accordance with the Provisional Governments law of April 23 of this year, con
ferences called by workers committees must take place after working hours. The
Minister reminds them that the interests of the country and the population at the
present grave moment demand the most strenuous efforts of industrial plants in
order to satisfy the demands of the countrys defense and the urgent needs of
the population.
It is the duty of every worker to devote his energies to intensive labor and
not to lose one minute of working time,
The Minister of Labor points out that the administration of plants must not
allow workers meetings during working hours which are detrimental to produc
tion in the plants. Moreover, the administration has the right to make deductions
from pay for loss of working time.
635. P r o te s t A gain st t h e A u gu st 28 C ircu lar o f t h e M in ister o f L abor
[Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 560.]
Early in September 1917
We reject with indignation the malicious slander of the Ministry of Labor
that the work of the factory committee lowers labor productivity. And after a
LABOR 723
thorough discussion of Skobelevs circular of August 23 [szc] the factory com
mittee of Langenzipen [and Company, Petrograd] . . . resolves:
1) Skobelevs circular bears a purely political character and is in substance
counterrevolutionary. It prevents the workers movement from following an
organized course and supports the organized march of counterrevolution in order
to sabotage industry and reduce the country to famine;
2) In view of the fact that the Skobelev senate interpretation8 was issued
during the days of the Kornilov march, we are forced to state that the Ministry
for the protection of labor has as a matter of fact been converted into a Min
istry for the protection of capitalist interests, and acts hand in hand with Ria-
bushinskii in order to reduce the country to famine so that the bony hand may
strangle the Russian revolution;
3) To preserve the gains of the revolution we demand that the All-Russian
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
request the immediate revocation of the circular. At the same time we declare
that, realizing the importance of the work of the factory committee, we shall con
tinue to carry on openly the work of the committee as heretofore.
Adopted unanimously by the factory committee at the general meeting of the
workers of the factory.
Ya. R ovinskii, President

636. P o lic ie s o f th e S p ecia l C ou n cil on D efen se R egarding


Labor R ela tio n s in D efen se P la n ts
[From the minutes, No. 196, of the Special Council, as quoted in Ekon. Polozhenie,
1,562-63.]
September 23, 1917
. . . Recently the labor question has grown acute in many factories. As a
result of workers demands for a wage increase and the right to interfere in the
administration of the plants, constant misunderstandings and conflicts occurred
between them and the administration of the plants. In view of this, the Special
Council was forced to intercede in the conflicts that took place in defense plants.
With the participation of representatives from the Ministry of Labor, the admin
istration of the plants, factory committees, and trade union organizations, the
representative of the Council as Chairman was able to resolve these conflicts*
Thus, thanks to the agreements, work is being carried on successfully now at
Sormovskii, Guzhon, Dinamo, and other plants. On the basis of these agree
ments the following considerations were adopted: The owner of a plant is always
at the head of the factory, and workers have no right to interfere with the actions
of plant adm inistration. Far less do they have the right to change them. In hiring
and firing of workers, the existing statutes on this matter must be strictly adhered
to. And only in exceptional instances, when, for example, members of the factory
committee are dismissed, may the case be passed for decision to the chamber of
conciliation. Contract relations with respect to wages are established by collec
3 A slurring reference to the practice of the Imperial Senate of interpreting laws to the
detriment of the rights of the people. Thus Skobelevs circular was classified by the factory
committee as a comparable interpretation of the law of April 23.
724 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
tive bargaining, worked out with the participation of the parties involved and
the Ministries of Labor and Trade and Industry. To make sure that both sides
comply with conditions, in some factories government inspectors were assigned.
The latter, however, had no executive functions but merely controlling functions.
Their responsibility was also to act as intermediaries between workers and the
factory administration in the event of conflicts. In such cases the workers were
told that if the productive work of the plant was not restored to a certain norm,
the factories would be shut down by the President of the Special Council on
Defense* The results achieved were quite satisfactory, and in plants where an
agreement had been reached, the workers transferred to piecework, which they
do not as a rule favor . . .

637. A ccou n t o f t h e A c tiv itie s o f t h e F a cto ry C om m ittees and


T h eir R e la tio n t o t h e Trade U nion M ovem ent
[Excerpts from S. M. Schwarz, Fabrichno-zavodskie komitety i profsoiuzy v pervye
gody revoliutsii, pp. 1-19. Ms. in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and
Peace,]
The collapse of the old order in Russia was accompanied by a tempestuous
awakening of public activity by the working masses. In the sphere of politics this
activity found its organized expression, first of all, in the Soviets of Workers (or
Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants) Deputies and, in the field of economics, in
trade unions and factory committees. But if the establishment of the trade unions
called, not infrequently, for a considerable amount of groundwork, and conse
quently also time, the factory committees, which satisfied the workers elementary
need to represent their interests in the enterprise, sprang up in the revolutionary
environment at once, without any preparation, and began their work at once.
The process of forming factory committees went far ahead, therefore, of the
process of forming trade unions in the early weeks of the revolution.
This was particularly clearly revealed in Petrograd, where as early as March
10 . . . 1917 an agreement was signed between the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies and the Association of Manufacturers about working condi
tions in the factories and mills of Petrograd. . . .
Among the leadership of the workers movement no serious differences of
opinion on questions dealing with the problems of factory committees were as yet
observed in March and the first half of April 1917. And when the draft of the
Statute was discussed in the Department of Labor of the Ministry of Trade on
workers committees in industrial enterprises, subsequently published in the form
of a law of the Provisional Government of April 23, 1917, a far-reaching soli
darity, for all practical purposes, was revealed among the spokesmen for the
workers in the Department of Labor representing both political wings of the
workersmovement. . . .
In actual practice, however, the factory committees were frequently obliged
to go beyond these limits [set by the law] in their work and to undertake various
problems in the field of administration of industrial enterprises. In his opening
address at the Petrograd Conference of factory committees, at the end of May,
LABOR 725
V. M. Levin, representative of the organizational bureau on calling the Confer
ence, from the very outset formulated the question quite pointedly:
The workers movement in Russia went beyond the old limits and entered
upon an entirely new road. The factory committees at the present time willy-nilly
are forced to interfere m the economic life of their mills, because otherwise they
would have stopped long ago. All the factories and mills of Petrograd are ex
periencing a coal and oil crisis. But the administration of the mills takes no steps
to supply their enterprises with a sufficient quantity of raw material and fuel. As
a result the workers may be abandoned to the mercy of tsar-hunger as unemployed.
Consequently it is up to the workers to demonstrate initiative in the area where
the industrialists-enterprisers do not. And this can be done only by a unionized
organization of factory committees.
Variations on the same thought subsequently appeared at the Conference.
In this atmosphere there could not but emerge in the ranks of the workers
directly involved in the factory committees movement a yearning for what
was known as workers control, a phrase that rapidly gained popularity. The
workers control did not yet mean expropriation of the owners of enterprises.
It was not a transfer of factories and mills into the property of workers. But at
the same time it was something a great deal more than control in the true sense
of the word. It was converting the workers committee into an organ of authority
in the mill, an organ of authority the scope of which, to be sure, remained dif
fused . . .
It should be pointed out, however, that notwithstanding the widespread opinion
[in its favor], the movement favoring the workers control during this period
did not go in practice beyond relatively narrow bounds . . .
Beginning with the second half of April, the movement favoring workers
control gained considerable support on the part of the Bolshevik Party, After
the political reorientation at its April Conference, the party (following Lenins
return from abroad) set for itself as its immediate aim the preparation for the
revolutionary seizure of power. And in their attempt to dominate the movement
of the factory committees, the Bolsheviks picked up the slogan of Workers Con
trol. At this point the nature of the frictions between the factory committees and
the trade unions began to take definite shape for the first time. At the first Con
ference of the Petrograd factory committees, held in Petrograd May 30June 1,
the emerging conflict between the trade unions and the factory committees had
already found concrete expression.
The question of mutual relations between trade unions and factory committees
was the second question around which heated debates were conducted at the con
ference of factory committees. In the early weeks of the revolution relations
between trade unions and factory committees seemed to be, on the whole, har
monious, and the factory committees were becoming actually organs of unions
at the enterprises. Beginning in the middle of April, and particularly as the in
fluence of the idea of workers control expanded, the situation began to change.
And among the leaders of the movement of the factory committees arose the idea
of creating special local and all-Russian centers of factory committees whose
726 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
activity should develop parallel with the activity of trade unions. This idea found
its reflection in the theses of the report by V. M. Levin at the Conference devoted
to the role and problems of the factory committees.
Levins theses met with vigorous opposition at the Conference on the part of
the Mensheviks. . . . But the overwhelming majority of the Conference, con
ducted under the definite influence of the Bolsheviks (the Bolshevik historians
subsequently liked to repeat constantly, not without some exaggeration, that the
Conference was conducted under the immediate leadership of Lenin, or Lenin
and Zinoviev), paid no heed to these voices and passed the following resolution:
1) In order to provide a genuine workers control over the production and
distribution of goods, the Conference resolves to elect a center composed of
twenty-five persons, representatives from factory committees.
2) This center must work in a most intimate union with the Central Bureau
of trade unions, not only in the field of introducing workers control, but also in
organizing all the militant actions of the workers in their fight for better working
conditions.
3) The Conference commissions its elected center to draw up, jointly with
the Central Bureau of trade unions, a model statute for the factory committees
and to set down in detail the organizational forms of collaboration between the
factory committees and the trade union.
The Central Council of factory committees (in Petrograd) elected by the Con
ference did not, however, result in the consequences feared by the critics of the
idea. But this did not happen chiefly because the work of the Central Council
proved to be very limited. The Bolsheviks, who entered the Central Council in
a considerable number and who, as a matter of fact, controlled it, apparently
deliberately obstructed the work of the Central Council as a center of economic
struggle on the part of the workers. They used the Central Council chiefly for
political purposes in order to strengthen the campaign to win the unions. And
as the Bolsheviks were getting entrenched in the trade unions, they openly aban
doned the thought of the factory committees independent role as organs of eco
nomic struggle of the working class . . .
History marches rapidly. At the Third All-Russian Conference of the trade
unions (June 20-28, 1917), which took place three weeks following the First
Petrograd Conference of factory committees, the question of the relation between
the trade unions and the factory committees assumed considerable clarity, and
the Bolsheviks attempted at that time not to support any more the thought of an
independent movement of the factory committees, which gave rise to its own
leading organs, parallel with the trade unions.
The Central Council of the factory committees in Petrograd was, in the mean
time, expanding its activity. Drawing the attention of the factory committees to
itself by virtue of its mere existence, the Central Council became gradually in
practice the center for settling conflicts in enterprises (as well as among the enter
prises!) which arose as a result of economic breakdown, as distinct from con
flicts arising from the normal relations between capital and labor. The solution
of the latter was the work of the trade unions. This division of functions of the
trade unions and the Central Council of the factory committees was created purely
LABOR 727
empirically, and the unions apparently were quite willingly reconciled to the idea
of taking upon themselves this thankless task [imposed upon them] by the Cen
tral Council.
For a better solution of this problem it was resolved at the Second Petrograd
Conference of the factory committees, held in August, to form sections within the
limits of the Central Council according to branches of industry and, in addition,
regional councils of factory committees. The role of the regional councils, how
ever, was in the main political. The regional councils of factory committees strove
to monopolize the leadership of all political and public life in the region and in
particular the leadership of all the mass movements in the region. In this respect
they played a certain role in the preparation of the October [revolution].

THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOR


638. T h e E sta b lish m en t o f t h e M inistry o f Labor
[A commentary in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 105, May 11,1917, p. 3. The Ministry was
established by law on May 5 (Sob. Uzak., 1,1, 574), and on May 9 the Labor Depart
ment and the various organs attached to it in the Ministry of Trade and Industry were
transferred to the new Ministry (ibid., No. 709).]
Russkiia Vedomosti welcomed at its very inception the idea of establishing
an independent Ministry of Labor; it pointed out at the time that a whole series
of problems of state importance, the solution of which would facilitate the estab
lishment of an armistice in the class warfare, could be solved correctly only if they
were handled by a special department of the Government. Now it has been estab
lished, and it is headed by a person [M. Skobelev] who has been nominated by
the Soviet of Workers Deputies; consequently, one can feel assured both of the
fact that the interests of workersuntil recently always the weakest groupwill
be protected in a proper fashion, and of the fact that the necessary measures will
be put into practice with all possible speed.
We do not mean to say that the Ministry of Labor will be able, by its decrees,
to change the economic conditions of labor at once, that it is able to make a
reality out of all the slogans put forth by workers, but its work may bring con
siderably nearer making a reality of them, not to speak of the fact that there is
a whole series of measures of seemingly secondary importance which can be put
into practice quickly and without opposition on the part of the industrialists,
frequently with their support, and which will immediately improve the way of
life of the workers. Other measures, which concern industrial life more deeply,
will perhaps demand a longer time, a more detailed study of the question, and
collection of statistical materials. Perhaps these latter measures will be finally
decided only in the Constituent Assembly, but even for them one has to work and
prepare beforehand.
The situation of the Minister of Labor is complicated by the fact that he is a
member of the Provisional Government As a member of the Government, which
is invested with full power, he stands outside parties and classes; he must take
728 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
into consideration not only the interests of workers but the interests of industry
as well. We deliberately said the interests of industry and not the interests of
capital. Capital must be prepared to make sacrifices, but the interests of industry
in the new Russia are bound to be benefited by the establishment of the Ministry
of Labor. . . -
. . . Therefore, it is natural to expect that at the Ministry there will be
organized a council of representatives of the interested parties. . . .
The most important problem of the moment is the introduction of measures
that will bring pacification into industrial life and into the midst of the workers.
They are: the organization of labor, the problems of trade unions, the factory
committees, the chambers of conciliation, the industrial courts. All this is already
being born and created, but all this needs the introduction of systematic order
and procedure, which would produce universal confidence.
639. G rievances o f t h e D o n ets W ork ers
[Protokoly, pp. 151-52.]
Comrade Sandomirskii, representing the delegation of workers from the
Donets Basin, gave a general picture [before the Executive Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet on May 16] of the sad condition of all the branches of industry
in the Donets Basin, which obviously places the existence of the country in jeop
ardy. According to the speaker, the employers are taking no steps toward recon
ditioning instruments and equipment, so that production is becoming technically
impossible. Enterprise owners are showing a definite tendency toward cutting
down production outright. Embezzlement of raw materials and products which
should be registered is evident. Manufacturers refuse to provide food for work
ers and have permitted the sanitation conditions to deteriorate to a dangerous
point. Thus, the way has been virtually paved for the cessation of production
vital to the country. All the most modest demands of the workers, like demands
for a wage increase to a level necessary for a normal standard of living, the pro
hibition of child labor, etc., meet with consistent opposition on the part of the
employers. The delegates see the immediate intervention of the State as the
only way out of the conflict, which has come to a head.
The delegation has outlined the following set of practical measures, which
have been approved by the Executive Committee:
1) Establishment of fixed prices at the current level for all products of the
mining and metallurgical industry;
2) Control over profits;
3) Establishment of a minimum wage rate and the future adjustment of
wages in connection with the supply of consumer goods to the workers at stand
ardized prices in order to guarantee an adequate standard of living;
4) To proceed to the establishment of State-controlled trusts;
5) All measures shall be put into effect through the central and local institu
tions of the Donets-Krivorozhskii Basin (for example, the Donets Committee).
These institutions must be democratic in character and must be organized with
the participation of representatives of workers, employers, governmental and
democratic revolutionary organizations.
To send a delegation to the Provisional Government with a pressing statement
on the necessity:
LABOR 729
1) To summon the Economic Council to draft a hill on general measures
for regulating and organizing the national economy and labor, with a view to sub
mitting [this bill] to the preparliament.
2) To give [legal] sanction at once to the Statute on the Central Economic
Committee and the Regional Economic Committees in the form in which it was
approved at the All-Russian Congress of Supply and to carry it into effect within
the next few days.
3) To send emissaries, and not dictators, to the Donets Basin for assisting
the local regional Economic Committee (see paragraph 2). The emissaries must
be granted special powers with respect to the organs of military and civil authori
ties, and not with respect to the population. Emissaries [must be sent] from the
Government and the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies, the Council of Trade Unions, and the Council of Factory
Committees.
4) To summon the State Committee on Food Supply at once to discuss the
question of lowering the price scale on grain in connection with organizing the
supply of industrial products to the village.
5) To instruct the Economic Section [of the Soviet] to give a report at the
meeting of the Soviet on measures to be taken in the immediate future.

640.T h e U n su cce ssfu l A ttem p t o f t h e M in istry o f Labor to End


In d u stria l C o n flic t in t h e Donbas
[jDen9, No. 67, May 25,1917, p. 1. The labor difficulties in the Donets Basin continued
throughout the tenure of the Provisional Government, a result of the economic demands
of the workers and the problems of supply, fuel, and transport which faced the owners.
By August, 77 enterprises had shut down in the Donbas and in the Ural almost one-
half the plants had closed. It is noteworthy that the average monthly output per Donets
miner declined from 535 poods in January 1917 to 442 poods in October. Of equal
significance, however, was the decline from 721 poods in January 1916 to 602 poods
in October 1916. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 26-28, 45.]
The Conference of the representatives of the industrialists and of labor of
the southern Donets industries and of the metallurgical and mining industries
ended in a stalemate. It is true that the Conference recognized the necessity to
appoint a new governmental commission which would investigate the situation
of the workers and the state of the industry on the spot and would check the
declarations of both parties. But for such a decision it was not necessary to come
to Petrograd, to be in session for a whole week, and for the representatives of both
sides to make grandiloquent speeches.
In the declaration that the labor delegation presented to the chairman, there
is a demand that until the end of the investigation prices should not be raised,
but at the same time the declaration does not say a word to the effect that the
demands of the workers cannot be satisfied during the same period. This was
further confirmed in the additional declarations that both sides exchanged during
the last plenary session. Both the representatives of labor and those of the
employers declared that they decline any responsibility for the consequences that
may arise in view of an absence of agreement, although they will try to take
measures so that tie regular course of work will not be interrupted.
In short, the situation has remained unchanged and the whole sense and mean
730 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
ing of the Conference have disappeared. And in the meantime the Conference
could have played an important role in regulating the labor question. This was
the first test of a sort of conciliatory chamber, which was the role played by a
governmental institution, the Ministry of Labor, whose task is to safeguard the
interests of the working class. The leaders of the Ministry who participated in
the work of the Conference undoubtedly tried to observe complete neutrality.
But such a neutral position does not always represent a real safeguard of the
workers5 interests. Of course, there can be no question of partiality in favor of
one side. There is a special kind of partiality that would have been especially
proper in the present instance. The Ministry of Labor is in no way obliged to
remain a passive spectator in a struggle that goes on in front of its eyes.
There are cases where an authoritative institution, which guards the interests
of the working class, should for the sake of these very interests exert energy suffi
cient to induce both sides to make concessions. Not the interests of the employers
but precisely the interests of the workers should have induced the Minister of
Labor to exert an influence on the labor delegation. For it should be conceded
that the positions of both sides are not beyond reproach.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that the complaints of employers turned
out to be exaggerated and were intended to exert influence on the weak nerves
of the leaders of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. But, on the other hand, the
calculations of the workers should have been much more accurate. Under these
conditions the role of the Ministry of Labor could have been much more active
and not limited to giving the floor to a free competition of economic interests.
This was required both by the interests of the workers and by the interests of
the national economy as a whole.
641. T h e P resid en t o f t h e S p ecia l C oun cil on D efen se U rges t h e
G overnm ent t o E sta b lish W age S ca le s
[Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 546. According to Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, 25n.,
though wages rose anywhere from 29 per cent to 70 per cent in various worker cate
gories between February and October, prices on rye bread, potatoes, clothes, and shoes
rose 150 per cent, 175 per cent, and 170 per cent, respectively, in the same period.]
June 8,1917
Dear Prince Georgii Evgenevich [Lvov] :
In view of the petitions arriving to increase the contract prices on defense
orders in the light of changed conditions of production, the Special Council sub
mitted for discussion the question of the procedure to be followed in studying
and solving the above petitions.
In the opinion of the Special Council, the only course that might stop the
ever continuing and exorbitant state expenditures in connection with defense
work is for the Provisional Government to establish a definite workers* wage
scale, if not for all of the most important types of work, then at least for the
unskilled day laborers. This should not present particular difficulties and would
serve as a firm starting point for the evaluation of skilled work. The Special
Council itself thinks that the level of workers wages reached its highest peak in
the month of May of this year. Any further increase could not be withstood by
either the private or the state economy.
LABOR 731
In the event of establishing fixed workers wages and in order to satisfy the
petitions of government contractors for an increase in the contract price,, the
Special Council plans to set limits on the amount of their profit to the average
state bank discount.
Parallel with fixed workers wages it is important, in the opinion of the Special
Council, to introduce immediately fixed prices on the basic materials of production
and on fuel.
This opinion the Special Council deems necessary to bring to the attention of
the Provisional Government.
Sharing the views of the Special Council and recognizing that the questions
raised by the Council are of utmost importance to the State and to the life of
the country, I deem it my duty to bring to your attention all of the above. And
in the event you find it convenient to do so, I beg you not to refuse to bring the
questions touched upon here to the attention of the Provisional Government.
Please accept my assurances of wholehearted respect and faithfulness.
P. P al chinskii

642. An A ppeal from th e M inister of L abor


[VVP9 No. 91, June 28,1917, p. 3.]
COMRADE WORKERS!
I am addressing you at a critical moment of the revolution. Plant production
is falling off steadily, fewer essential articles are manufactured, and peasants
remain without manufactured goods; we are threatened with new difficulties in
food supply and further impoverishment of the people.
The Provisional Government sets for itself the task of doing all in its power
to combat the economic disorganization which it inherited from the old regime.
Employing the authority of the revolutionary government, it is subordinating the
national economy to state control and regulation.
The local organs and the factory councils on fuel, transportation, and food
supply which control and regulate industry are being reorganized on the basis
of broad representation for working class organizations. Regional supply com
mittees are being created on this basis. The Central Economic Committee, which
must firmly intervene in all branches of the national economy and direct it to
a course that will best utilize the productive forces of the country, has begun to
function.
But the Economic Committee will be able to cope with its enormous problems
only if you, comrade workers, assist it in every possible way. . . .
The oppression of the police regime was swept out by the revolution . . .
The law on the freedom to strike . . . secures full freedom for the workers class
struggle. The trade unions . . . will lend a rational and planned character to
this struggle; . . .
At the present time, however, spontaneous actions often take the upper hand
over organized action; they are taken without consideration for the conditions
of the enterprise involved, . . . and bring damage to the class movement of
the proletariat. You are sometimes trying to achieve a wage increase of such
proportions that it would disorganize industry and deplete the Treasury. . . .
732 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Contrary to instructions issued by trade unions, workers often refuse to
negotiate with employers and insist, under threat of violence, on the satisfaction
of their demands. With full freedom to organize, it cannot be tolerated that
conscientious workers resort to such methods of defending their interests. When
such methods are employed in enterprises that produce articles of prime neces
sity to the State and, especially, in the railroads, the situation assumes the aspect
of a direct threat to the gains of the revolution.
[S k o b elev ]
June 27, 1917
643. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e A ppeal o f t h e M in ister
[No. 150, July 4,1917, p. 3.]
The appeal of the Minister of Labor to all the workers of Russia is an event
of tremendous importance. It holds out hope for the improvement of industry,
the crisis about which he speaks. The breakdown of industry will undoubtedly
destroy the revolution. Only by raising the productive forces of Russia, only
through concerted, selfless work can we avoid the impending financial crisis.
All the reports in the bourgeois papers were not taken seriously by the workers.
They were told that these papers are not to be trusted; that they lie deliberately
to please the industrialists. Therefore the authoritative voice of Minister of Labor
Skobelev, whom no one could suspect of partiality toward capitalists and who
has just introduced a tax that absorbs up to 90 per cent of profit, is particularly
significant. And his appeal may prove to be that turning point in the history
of the struggle between capital and labor that everybody awaited.
He points out that the output of the factories is falling off steadily He says:
Fewer essential articles are manufactured and peasants remain without manu
factured goods; we are threatened with new difficulties in food supply and further
impoverishment of the people Could even one word be dropped from this?
In the data submitted to the court of arbitration . . . it was pointed out that
the number of articles produced by factories dropped 25-30 per cent per worker.
And this in the best factories of Russia, well organized technically. The drop in
other enterprises is greater. The efficiency of the workers drops for two reasons:
they are working less and they are working badly. Therefore, a larger number
of workers is needed to do a job. Is this to be tolerated in the interests of the
country? Certainly not. And considerable peace of mind will come from the
assurance of the Minister that the Provisional Government sets for itself the
task of doing all in its power to combat the economic disorganization.55 One of
the methods in this struggle will be government control of industriesa measure
that is desirable, timely, and necessary, the more so that it opposes the advocacy
of seizing enterprises by workers themselves. Such seizure is condemned by the
Minister in the sharpest terms. He justly asserts that threats of violence represent
a threat to the gains of the revolution. But he regards as even more repre
hensible the removal of technical personnel from factories and the complete
taking over of enterprises by workers. . . . The words of the Minister give hope
* if he is listened to. And we must listen to himit is a question of saving
Russia and the new democratic order. Industry is gravely ill. The diagnosis is
ably and carefully made. This was the most difficult thing. The cure is obvious
and clear and, as a matter of fact, simple and accessible. We hope that the saving
LABOR 733
crisis in the illness will come. And then the publication day of the Ministers
appeal of June 27 will be as momentous for industry as the date of June 18 was
for the army.
644. Volia Naroda on t h e A p p eal o f t h e M inister
[No. 55, July 2,1917, p. 1. For Lenins attack on the Appeal, see Collected Works of
V. L Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Book II, 299-300, as translated from Pravda,
No. 94, June 29,1917.]
The Minister of Labor addressed an appeal to all the workers of Russia. At
the present moment this appeal represents a remarkable fact on which we should
pause.
We entered upon a period of mighty, spontaneous, and dizzy growth of trade
union-class organizations.
But there are no miracles on earth. And our young proletarian movement
could not, of course, possess that degree of organization and preparedness which
is formed and forged by years and decades. For this reason, along with positive
and economically wise actions, it revealed also a number of unquestioned defects
and errors, damaging to the working class itself.
The appeal of the Minister of Labor points out these defects and errors with
sincerity and courage. Moreover, it is these defects and errors that prompted
the appeal.
The first among those errors may be considered the demands by the workers
for increased wages, which sometimes are out of proportion to the profit of an
enterprise. . . .
Just as ruinous and devastating for the proletariat itself is its persecution
of the technical personnel and their banishment from enterprises. This in sub
stance is the ruin of an enterprise.
Finally, the proletariats refusal to settle conflicts with the industrialists in
conciliatory chambers and courts of arbitration is, in the opinion of the Minister,
intolerable.
Such are the basic defects which one can frequently observe in our young
proletarian movement and which the Ministers appeal points out. To them should
be added also the insufficient exertion on the part of labor which, in spite of the
shorter work day, may sometimes be observed. All these are the consequences
of the causes indicated above: on the one hand, they are the consequence of accu
mulated class contradictions and class hostility; on the other, the consequence of
youth and weak organization, as well as the low cultural level of our working
masses.
It is quite clear that democracy strives for constructive and not destructive
work. It wants a general rise in prosperity and not the impoverishment [of the
people]. For that reason it cannot and should not allow the weakening of pro
ductive labor. In its own interests it cannot and should not tolerate false, destruc
tive actions. Once and for all, we must abandon the idea that the struggle by means
of banishing the capitalist or the mechanic, by means of destroying the enterprise
or weakening the intensity of labor cannot give any favorable results.
734 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION

At the present moment the correctly conceived class interest imperiously dic
tates the coordinating of this interest with the interests of the wholein the
present instance, the profoundly democratic statewith the interests of other
strata of the toiling masses and, first of all, the peasantry.
Agricultural economy and consequently the work of the peasant were subject
to control in the past. Fixed prices were introduced on bread, fodder, and meat.
A bread monopoly was introduced. The work of the peasant is already controlled.
But the village, while silently accepting this control, is vitally interested in
being supplied with tools and means of production, textiles, soap, and other
necessaries of life. Both the agricultural economy as such and the State are
interested in this*
That is why every delay in industrial production is painfully felt in the village.
That is why the village is already beginning to mutiny. We can no longer deny it
and must frankly admit that unless we supply the village with the desperately
needed goods we cannot solve the food crisis that threatens the cities and indus
trial towns. That is why the interests of the working class at the present moment
are intimately interwoven with those of the peasant.
. . . At lie present time the profits of the capitalists are adequately taxed.
Fixed prices are established on food. And it would seem to us that the working
class should meet the regimentation of labor and its wages by coordinating it with
other elements of the national economy, such as consumers goods, peasants
incomes, etc.
A correctly conceived class interest of the proletariat dictates to it an or
ganized course of action, one that is in accord with the general situation of the
national economy and not a course of separate predatory actions. Upon this
road it [the proletariat] is being urged by the proclamation of the Socialist
Minister Skobelev.
N. D. K on dratev

645. T h e In stitu tio n o f L o c a l Commissars o f t h e M inistry o f Labor


[So&. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1094. Further instructions were issued on September 21, 1917,
which dealt particularly with the relations between the local commissars and directors
of regional labor exchanges (Doc. 651). Ibid., No. 1799.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. 1) Pending the establishment of the labor inspection and other permanent
local organs of the Ministry of Labor, local commissars of labor are appointed
by the Minister of Labor.
2) The area of activity of each commissar is determined by the Minister of
Labor.
3) Commissars of labor are responsible for:
a) general supervision of the fulfillment of laws concerning labor protection
and workers insurance;
b) organization of compulsory conciliation chambers and participation in
compulsory courts of arbitration, if such institutions are introduced for the pur
pose of regulating economic life;
LABOR 735
c) assistance in the organization and activity of labor exchanges;
d) participation in local institutions for the regulation of economic life with
a view to protecting the interests of labor and coordinating measures directly
affecting workers with other measures for the regulation of the economic life of
the country;
e) assistance in organizing local statistical services of the Ministry of Labor;
f) fulfillment of tasks assigned by the Ministry of Labor.
4) In conjunction with the commissar of labor, commissions (committees)
and councils may be organized from representatives of local workers organiza
tions, as well as on a basis of equal representation of workers and employers.
6) Supervision of the fulfillment of laws concerning labor protection and
workers5 insurance shall be carried out by commissars jointly with local factory
inspectors and district [okrug] engineers, according to a directive prepared by
the Minister of Labor in agreement with the Minister of Trade and Industry.
7) The commissar of labor enlists the assistance of representatives of trade
unions for participation in supervision of the fulfillment of laws concerning labor
protection.
III. The present law to be put into effect before its promulgation by the Ruling
Senate.
N . N ekrasov, Deputy Minister-President
Gvozdev, for the Minister of Labor
July 11,1917
646. T h e E nactment of N ew L egislation on W orkers M edical I nsurance
[Commentary in Rabochaia Gazeta, No. Ill, July 20,1917, p. 2. The law was issued
on July 25,1917. Sob. XJzak., I, 2, No. 1313. See also Doc. 647 below.]
On July 17 tie Provisional Government approved a project of the Ministry
of Labor to change the conditions for the protection of workers in case of sickness.
The new law places only the first stone in the foundation upon which the building
of social insurance will be erected. Only the Constituent Assembly will be able
to build this structure. But even now during the transitory period which we expe
rience, life urgently dictates the necessity of revising the prerevolutionary legisla
tion.
The five-year existence of the laws of June 23,1912, sufficiently exposed their
worthlessness.4 And the revolutionary upheaval placed them in an irreconcilable
contradiction with the new mode of life. Most characteristic of tie old law was
that spirit of employer-bureaucratic patronage and police supervision which
restrained the independence of workers in matters of hospital funds.
In this respect the new law, approved by the Provisional Government, meets
the demands of the workers and introduces complete self-management by the
4 Apparently the work of the Workers Insurance Offices established by the legislation of
June 23, 1912, -virtually ceased in the period following the February revolution, despite the
efforts of the Provisional Government to keep the laws in operation pending new legislation.
Circular from the Department of General Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, to Guberniya and
Oblast Commissars, to the Prefect of Petrograd, to the Commissar of Moscow, and to the
Prefect of Odessa, No. 1075, June 3,1917, Sb . Tsirk. MVD, pp. 36-37.
736 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
insured in administering hospital funds. . . . The workers become actual masters
of the hospital funds.
Closely related to this is the resolution of the question of combining the funds
and the organization of medical aid. According to the new law the solution of
the question of creating large funds of a city-wide type and the placing of medical
aid in the workers hands will depend upon the workers themselves. The new
law does not solve these questions because this would call for a considerable
amount of preliminary work. Instead, it leaves the entire matter to the initiative
of the workers.
Thus a wide perspective of creative work is opened to the workers now. And
if we take into consideration the expansion of the number insured, the extension
of the law to small enterprises operated by no fewer than five workers, including
handicraft and construction, it must be admitted that the hospital funds have a
tremendous task before them. With sufficient energy it will be possible to create
large city-wide funds capable of organizing model medical aid for members
and their families.
We are not mentioning other improvements introduced by the new law. We
shall touch upon them in detail in the future. But what has been said is sufficient
for the insurance workers to mobilize for the forthcoming work . . .

647, S ocial I nsurance in R ussia in 1917


[Excerpts from S. M. Schwarz, Sotsialnoe strakhovanie v Rossii v 1917-1919 godakh,
pp. 1-23. Ms. in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.]
Social insurance prior to the war was one of the few safety valves which gave
an outlet to the awakening public activity of the working class. Small wonder that
Russia proved to be the only country where, following the publication of the
laws on workers insurance (June 23, 1912), the workers insurance movement
sprang up and soon grew stronger. It assumed considerable importance in the
years 1913 and 1914 and did not abate in the years of war. And by the time of
the revolution it produced from the ranks of the workers themselves cadres of
social workers, possessing initiative, a good orientation in practical questions
of social policy, devotion to their specialized cause but at the same time also the
knowledge to deal with social-political questions in a wide political and social
perspective. . . .
The question of reform of social insurance was raised as early as the end of
the first month of the revolution. On March 25,1917, a workers group from the
council of Workers Insurance (or, according to the more popular terminology,
the Insurance Council) called a general urban Petrograd insurance conference
for the purpose of discussing the current problems facing the working class in
the field of social insurance. The workers group consisted of only Bolsheviks
and the Bolsheviks had the exclusive predominance at the conference called and
prepared by them. But differences of opinion with regard to the program were
still not too significant, and on the majority of questions the conference passed
decisions unanimously. . . .
. . . The requests outlined at the Conference . . . bore the character of
corrections to the operative legislation, corrections which had to be implemented
LABOR 737
by the decrees of the Provisional Government [there being general agreement that
a general reform should be left to the Constituent Assembly],
On March 26 the conference completed its work. Two days later the All-
Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies opened.
Questions of social policy were relegated to second place. Nevertheless, the
Conference found time to touch upon them also. On social insurance in particular
it passed the following resolution worked out by Schwarz:
Recognizing that one of the chief problems of social reform is the extension
of insurance to all forms of hired labor [with the need for a] radical reorganiza
tion of our insurance against sickness and accidents and the introduction in our
country of disability and old-age and unemployment insurance, the Conference
requests that such changes as would eliminate immediately a number of acutely
felt shortcomings in the present laws be introduced in the operative insurance law
by a decree of the Provisional Government.
These changes are as follows:
1. To grant to the hospital mutual aid funds the right to consolidate with the
general mutual funds and [to do so] without the consent of the owners of the
enterprises.
2. To concede to the hospital mutual aid funds, without the consent of the
owners of the enterprises and without any permission from the insurance offices,
the right to take under its administration the work of medical aid to workers.
3. The reorganization of the administration of hospital mutual funds on the
basis of the complete self-government of the participants in the funds.
4. Extension of the insurance to all forms of hired labor wherever it is
technically possible under the present organization of workers insurance.
5. Extension of workers insurance to all parts of Russia.
6. To have the insurance brotherhoods bear the expenses in rendering aid
to the crippled during the first thirteen weeks following accidents.
7. The reorganization of insurance brotherhoods on the basis of equal repre
sentation of workers and industrialists.
8. The democratization of the insurance offices and the Council.
The Conference thinks it necessary to call an All-Russian Insurance Congress
in order to work out a plan of complete implementation of an all-round social
insurance.
When, a month later, at the beginning of May, a government crisis arose
which ended on May 5 by the formation of the government of Kerensky [sic] with
the participation in it of Social Democrats (Mensheviks) and in part by the
creation of a new Ministrythe Ministry of Labor (M. I. Skobelev, Social Demo
crat), the above-mentioned resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the
Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democrats served the Ministry of Labor
as a program for the reform of social insurance. S. Schwarz (S. M. Monoszon),
made Head of the Department of Social Insurance in the Ministry of Labor, out
lined the following order for implementing the reform: an immediate reform
in the insurance of workers in the event of sickness, immediate reform of the
Council and Offices dealing with matters of workers insurance, immediate reform
of insurance in the event of accidents, introduction of unemployment insurance,
738 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
and preparation for the Constituent Assembly of proposals to introduce disability
and old-age insurance, and a basic reform of all social insurance, reorganizing
it into a unified and planned system.
During the five and a half months that passed from the time of the formation
of Kerenskys [szc] government to the transfer of power to the Council of Peoples
Commissars, the proposed reforms of social insurance were but partially realized.
The legislation on medical insurance was subjected to considerable revision and
the reform of the Council of the Workers Insurance Offices became law. The
latter reform, however, was not finished in time to be practically realized. The
work in drafting the reforms on accident insurance was only drawing to an end
in October of 1917. On the question of unemployment insurance the working
out and discussion of the draft law were concluded in the Ministry of Labor by
the time of the overthrow. It was the fall of Kerenskys government that brought
to a sudden stop the preparation of the explanatory note for the proposal which
had to be passed at the end of October (O.S.) to the Provisional Government for
approval.

[The Reform of Medical Insurance ]


The proposal for an urgent reform of medical insurance, worked out in detail,
was ready a week following the formation of the Ministry of Labor.
The proposal was submitted for consideration to the Council on Workers
Insurance, to be exact, to the private conference of the members of the Council,
since the convening of the Council in its old membership, that is, with a con
siderable predominance of representatives of departments, did not seem feasible.
The Insurance Council was therefore called in its elected membership from
workers and employers as well as from representatives of the Ministry of Labor.
In its conferences of June 3, 8, and 16, the Insurance Council discussed the
proposal of social insurance. Heated debates were centered chiefly on the question
of the group of persons who would be eligible for medical insurance, on dues to
be paid to the mutual aid funds of workers and owners of enterprises, on medical
aid, and on self-government of the insured.
On all these questions the Department of Social Insurance retained its pro
posal. In contrast, on a number of private questions, not questions of principle,
some small changes were added to the proposal, and on June 16 the proposal
was submitted to the Provisional Government.
The proposal was met with opposition, however, on the part of the Ministry
of Trade and Industry, which seemed to represent in the government the interests
of the industrialists. In the course of negotiations between the Department of
Social Insurance of the Ministry of Labor and the Department of Industry of
the Ministry of Trade and Industry (V. V. Groman, Head), three changes were
made in the proposal: on the participation of owners of enterprises in the revision
commission of the fund, on the right of owners of enterprises to appeal against
the resolutions of the administration of the funds at its general conference and
the resolutions of the general conference at the Insurance Office, and on limiting
the payments to be made by the owners of the enterprises for medical aid to 2 per
LABOR 739
cent of wages, bnt not less than 18 rubles annually per each insured. The Depart
ment of Social Insurance had no serious objections, as a matter of fact, to the
first two corrections. The latter limitation was viewed by the Department and
the Ministry of Labor as a serious worsening of the proposal, which they were
forced to accept in the interests of having the proposal approved by the Provisional
Government.
On July 17 the proposal was approved by the Provisional Government and
submitted for checking to the editorial committee of the Provisional Government.
On July 25 the new law was signed.
At the Second Petrograd Insurance Conference, which took place on August
21-23,1917, the law of July 25 was subjected to severe criticism by the Bolshevik
insurance men. Two points deserve attention in this criticism. The author of the
leading report at the conference, Dr. A . N. Vinokurov [later Soviet Commissar
of Social Insurance], protested with particular insistence against the new law,
which makes the transfer of medical aid into the hands of the hospital mutual
aid funds only optional and not obligatory (that is, the hospital mutual funds
have merely the right but not the obligation to take immediately into their hands
the organization of medical aid of the insured). Even more emphatic was the
repudiation of the position held by the Bolshevik insurance men at the March
conference, as evidenced in the new general line of Vinokurov that We must
stop mending the insurance law and develop a broad workers9insurance program.
Limiting the number of the insured, saving the workers9 and employees dues,
and low contributions of the owners of enterprises toward medical aid provoked
criticism on all sides, and by no means on the part of the Bolsheviks only. On
the question of medical aid the Department of Social Insurance in the Ministry
of Labor also supported this criticism. With regard to the question on limiting the
circle of the insured, the Department of Social Insurance shared in principle the
thought of the necessity for the quickest extension of insurance to all forms of
hired labor. It denied, however, that it was technically possible to realize this
reform within the framework created by the laws of June 23, 1912, and July 25,
1917, of the organization of medical insurance. The request for extending medical
insurance to commercial employees was made on all sides with particular insist
ence. And the Department of Social Insurance during the second half of the
summer worked out a draft of a special law creating an organization of medical
insurance for commercial and office employees, somewhat different from the
general organization (and in part better). The latter only subsequently, after a
broader and basic reorganization of the entire system of social insurance, had to
merge with the general organization on medical insurance. . . .
In the interests of a complete exposition, one more new statute of the Pro
visional Government should be mentioned which improved in part the old statute
on protection in the event of illness. The reform of July 25 was in the main an
organizational reform. The norms of protection were subject to but comparatively
few changes and their general revision was postponed to the future basic reform
of social insurance. However, since the convening of the Constituent Assembly,
which could undertake this basic reform, continued to be delayed, the Depart
ment of Social Insurance worked out and approved through the Provisional
Government the new statute which improved the material norms in the field of
maternity insurance (the maternity insurance was regulated by the statute on
740 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
protection in the event of sickness). According to the old law, in the event of
childbirth the insured received a subsidy two weeks prior and four weeks after
childbirth (with individual estimate of each of these lengths of time, that is,
reducing it to less than six weeks if the future mother stopped working later than
two weeks prior to childbirth). According to the new statute of October 18,1917,
the grant-in-aid because of childbirth had to be paid for eight weeks, also for not
less than six weeks following childbirth. In addition, the new statute granted to
the funds the right to issue a grant-in-aid to the nursing mothers for twenty
weeks following the limit of the grant for childbirth and to the extent of up to
one-quarter of the earnings of the insured.
The leading idea, which determined the entire content of the reform of insur
ance in the event of illness as it was worked out by the Department of Social
Insurance of the Ministry of Labor, was the idea of a broad social self-government,
self-government of those directly interested, that is, in the case of medical insur
ance, the self-government of those insured. Proceeding from the same idea of
social self-government, the Department of Social Insurance also prepared the
reform of accident insurance, having outlined a future intricate organization built
on the bases of self-government of the insured and of owners of enterprises . . .
But in order to improve the self-government of the insured (or in certain instances
also owners of enterprises) it was not enough to reorganize the insurance organiza
tions (hospital mutual funds and insurance brotherhoods) on the basis of self
government. It was necessary to guarantee the predominating influence of repre
sentatives of insurance organizations in the organs of state control also over
social insurance . . . In this way each separate insurance organization, that is,
each hospital mutual aid fund or insurance brotherhood, would, it would seem,
fall under the collective control of all insurance organizations.
The proposal submitted at the beginning of July to the Provisional Govern
ment did not meet with the approval of the majority, and early in August it was
returned to the Ministry of Labor to be revised. What seemed most valuable to
the Ministry of Laborthe reorganization of state control in implementing social
insurance on the basis of self-governmentseemed to be a dangerous innovation
to a considerable part of the Government. The Ministry of Labor waited more
than a month to allow for the ironing out of disputes within the Provisioned
Government. And in the second half of September it submitted again the draft
for approval, having somewhat reduced the representation of insured and owners
of enterprises. . . .
On October 11 this proposal was approved by the Provisional Government, but
there was no time for it to receive any practical implementation.

648. R estrictions on N ight W ork for W omen and Children


[Sob. Uzak* 1 ,2, No. 1421.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment and supplement of the relevant statutes, it is hereby decreed:
1. Minors under the age of 17 and women may not be employed in any manu
facturing-industrial, mining, and metallurgical enterprises for work during the
LABOR 741
following times: when one shift is worked, between 9:00 p . m . and 5:00 A .M ., and
when two or more shifts are worked, between 10:00 P .M . and 4:00 A .M .
2. For the duration of the war, the Minister of Labor, in agreement with the
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of War or Navy, is authorized
to allow night work of women and minors in those enterprises or branches of
industry in which this exception is justified by the needs of defense.
II. The present law to be put into effect beginning October 1, 1917.
N . N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President
M at . S kobelev , Minister of Labor
August 8,1917
649. Izvestiia U rges th e E stablishm ent of Cham bers of Conciliation
[.Izvestiia, No. 33, April 6, 1917, p. 2.]
A deep contradiction of interests between the ruling and the oppressed classes,
the exploiters and the exploited, is the fundamental trait of the capitalistic system.
This gives rise to a class struggle between representatives of labor and capital
which is seething everywhere, in all the countries of the capitalist world.
This struggle sometimes demands considerable sacrifices from both sides.
The employers do not hesitate to close down factories and plants in order to
strengthen their power over the workers and break down their resistance. The
workers resort to strikes in attaining their goals, although a strike will often
signify hunger and the loss of wages.
The contradiction of interests between labor and capital is not eliminated
during times of war or during a revolution. . . .
But the struggle between workers and employers under the circumstances of
revolution and war cannot be conducted wholly in the same manner as under
normal peacetime conditions.
The point is that the wartime situation and the revolution force both sides
to exercise extreme caution in utilizing the sharper weapons of class struggle
strikes and lockouts.
These circumstances have made it necessary and possible to settle all disputes
between employers and workers by means of negotiations and agreements, rather
than by open conflict. Chambers of conciliation serve this purpose.
Under ordinary circumstances, chambers of conciliation play a relatively
insignificant role in the labor movement. It is a rare case where they succeed in
averting or eliminating conflict between labor and capital. More often than not,
both sides prefer an open struggle to negotiations.
But, as we have pointed out, the situation changes under the conditions of a
war or a revolution. The ground is laid for the substitution of agreements for
open conflicts. And it is clear that workers, no less than employers, are interested
in the broadest possible development of such agreements.
General problems must be resolved by an agreement reached between an asso
ciation of employers and elected organs of the proletariat. Individual problems
must be resolved by an agreement reached between the workers of the individual
enterprises and their employers. Only in this way can the disorganized actions
742 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
of individual groups of workers be preventedactions that often conceal great
danger and cause irreparable damage to the cause of labor.
Consequently, the establishment of a system of courts of conciliation becomes
an urgent necessity.
And both sides must abide unquestioningly by decisions delivered by the
chambers; without this, chambers of conciliation would lose all sense and meaning.
This does not mean that workers have resigned from a class struggle against
capital. No! Workers are continuing to build their trade unions; they are con
tinuing to consolidate their ranks. They are even reserving their last means of
fighting against capitalthe strike. But workers are trying to avoid resorting to
this sharp weapon unless it is absolutely called for.
Let us be prepared to fight against capital for our vital needs!
But before entering the fight, let us carefully weigh every situation and take
care that our action does not harm the cause that is more important to us than
anything elsethe common cause of the proletariat and our Great Revolution.
Let us build and strengthen our trade unions!
Let us, at the same time, everywhere establish chambers of conciliation!

650. T h e O rgan iza tio n o f C ham bers o f C o n c ilia tio n and A r b itr a tio n
ISob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1327.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. The present law on institutions of conciliation is enacted in order to pre
vent and settle disputes between workers and administrations of industrial enter
prises.
2. Institutions of conciliation are organized in the form of chambers of con
ciliation (in individual enterprises, by branches of industry, and by districts),
as well as in the form of chambers of arbitration.
3. Employers and workers are authorized to apply orally or in writing to
the local labor commissar concerning their wish to refer a controversial question,
which may lead or which has already led to a dispute, for consideration by a
chamber of conciliation. The labor commissar informs the other party without
delay concerning the receipt of this application and proposes that, before the
expiration of 48 hours after receipt of the notice, it communicate its agreement
to refer the controversial question for consideration by a chamber of conciliation.
In cases which brook no delay, the labor commissar is authorized to reduce the
aforesaid period.
In case agreement is obtained, the labor commissar assists, by all the means
within his power, organization of the chamber of conciliation as soon as possible.
In case of refusal, the labor commissar so informs the party that has applied
to him and immediately makes known in the local press the application of one
party and the refusal of the other to refer the dispute to a chamber of conciliation
for consideration.
4. The labor commissar is also authorized to propose on his own initiative
to the contending parties that they refer the dispute to a chamber of conciliation
for consideration. In case this proposal is refused by one or both parties, the
labor commissar immediately makes this known in the local press.
LABOR 743
5. In addition to organizing special ad hoc chambers of conciliation, the labor
commissar, in case of application by one or both parties, takes all necessary meas
ures for the organization of permanent chambers of conciliation, functioning for
a specified period of time, for the consideration of disputes between the parties
concerned. In case of refusal by one of the parties, the commissar makes this
refusal known in the local press.
6. Chambers of conciliation consist of an equal number of representatives
of the workers and the employers.
The Chairman is selected by members of the chamber from their midst.
7. In rules governing the activity of a chamber of conciliation, prepared
preliminarily by the representatives of both parties, the procedure for organizing
the chamber and for the conduct of its business is laid down.

9. Meetings of a chamber of conciliation are public. In individual cases, by


unanimous decision of the chamber, meetings of the chamber may be held in
private. Records are kept of all meetings of the chamber.
10. In deciding questions in the chamber, the representatives of the workers
and the employers enjoy the same number of votes. Questions are decided in the
chamber by a simple majority vote.

13. If no majority can be obtained in the chamber, and no decision is taken


by the chamber, it may propose to the parties to refer the dispute to a chamber of
arbitration for settlement and, if the parties so wish, lend its assistance in organ
izing a chamber of arbitration.
14. A chamber of arbitration consists of several members, in equal numbers
from the employers and the workers, and of a chairman, unanimously elected by
the members of the chamber of arbitration from outside persons.
15. The chamber of arbitration may summon the parties for explanations,
may invite witnesses and qualified persons, and may require the parties to the
dispute to submit information necessary for the clarification of all aspects of the
case as well as written evidence, provided commercial and industrial secrecy is
maintained.
16. A decision of the chamber of arbitration is taken by a majority vote of
members of the chamber and the chairman and communicated not later than the
following day to the persons concerned and, on receipt, must be immediately
displayed in the working premises of the enterprise for the information of the
workers.

19. Special institutions of conciliation, applying the rules of the present law,
may also be established for the reconciliation of the parties in disputed questions
between employers and employees [sluzhashchie], as well as between employees
and workers.
N . N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President
P. K olokol n ikov , Assistant Minister, for
the Minister of Labor
August 5,1917
744 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
651. T h e S tatute on L abor E xchanges
[Sob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1475.]
1. With a view to regulating the demand for labor and the labor supply, local
and regional labor exchanges are established.
2. Local labor exchanges are established on the basis indicated below by
municipal administrations and zemstvo institutions in communities of not less
than 50,000 inhabitants.
By order of the Minister of Labor, municipal administrations and zemstvo
institutions may also be commissioned to open local labor exchanges in commu
nities of less than 50,000 inhabitants.
3. The Minister of Labor is authorized to establish the timetable for the open
ing of labor exchanges by the appropriate municipal administrations and zemstvo
institutions.
4. In order to accomplish the purposes mentioned in article 1, local labor
exchanges: a) register the demand for labor and the labor supply, b) act as
intermediaries in hiring, c) keep current statistics of the demand for labor and
the labor supply, d) collect other information on the state of the local labor
market, e) take other measures which assist in regulating the demand for labor
and the labor supply.
5. The administration of the local labor exchange is entrusted to a committee
consisting of an equal number of representatives of professional organizations
of workers and employers and of a chairman elected by the municipal duma or
by the appropriate zemstvo institution.
7. For the unification and coordination of the activity of local labor exchanges*
regional labor exchanges are to be organized by the Ministry of Labor.
8. The services of labor exchanges are free of charge.
9. Local and regional labor exchanges suspend their intermediary activities
with respect to enterprises in which a strike or lockout is in progress.
A. K erensky , Minister-President
M at . S kobelev , Minister of Labor
August 19,1917
652. A C onference on t h e O rganization of L abor E xchanges
[ VVP , No. 158, September 21, 1917, p. 3.]
A Conference of heads of regional and large local labor exchanges has con
cluded in the Ministry of Labor. The Conference passed a number of resolutions
embracing a plan for an extensive organization of labor exchanges. After dis
cussing the question of creating a unified labor exchange, the Conference found
that in view of the impossibility, under the existing circumstances, of concen
trating all supply and demand for work in the labor exchange, it is necessary to
strive to have information in the labor exchange on all concluded and dissolved
transactions on hiring in order to have as complete a picture of the labor market
as possible. Approving in substance the suggestion made to the Conference on
achieving such concentration by means of including in the system compulsory
LABOR 745
loose-leaf discharge books, the Conference proposed that the Labor Market De
partment take measures for legislative implementation of this proposal.
On the question of the structure of the labor exchanges, the Conference recog
nized as urgent the establishment in the exchange of the following departments:
1) skilled labor, 2) unskilled mens labor, 8) unskilled womens labor, 4) white-
collar work, 5) labor of invalids, and 6) child and adolescent labor. At the same
time, the Conference recognized as advisable the establishment of trade sections
in the department of skilled labor and the attraction, so far as possible, of the
appropriate trade unions of workers in the direct work in these sections.
In order to guard the interests of the workers and enterprises of various
national groups who come to the labor exchange, the Conference, while deeming
it inadvisable to form special national sections, recognized the necessity of having
employees among the staff members of the labor exchange who could help persons
in their native tongue.

653. A dditional L egislative P roposals of t h e M inistry of L abor


[.Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 140, August 23,1917, pp 1-2.]
A special committee composed of representatives of employers and workers
is convening today at the Ministry of Labor for a preliminary discussion of those
draft laws that the Ministry intends to submit to the Provisional Government.
These draft laws can be broken down into two groups. The first will comprise
those reforms that must guarantee to workers in the future an opportunity to have
a voice in the application of the legislation on labor protection. There are two
such laws. One refers to labor inspection and the other to chambers of arbitration .
According to the project, the new labor inspection will differ in three basic
ways from the former factory and mine inspection. First, supervision of inspec
tion will be extended to all forms of hired labor and not merely to factory-mill
and mine workers. Second, representatives of workers in sufficient numbers will
participate in inspection. And finally, third, labor inspection will he conducted
under the leadership and control of labor boards composed equally of representa
tives of employers and workers. These labor boards must replace the old ones
composed of bureaucrats and industrialists, which always operated to the dis
advantage of workers.
The second draft law is devoted to chambers of arbitration, to which all cases
must go dealing with violation of agreements of hire. In contrast to the regular
courts, the chambers of arbitration will be composed equally of employers and
workers. They fire superior to regular courts partly because cases will be tried
by persons more competent in matters of labor than are the regular justices of
the peace. Their chief advantage is that judges elected by workers will defend
the interests of workers better and more honestly than judges of nonworker origin.
. . . Thus the action of the labor laws at all stages will be carried on with
the participation of workers9 representatives. Herein lies the best guarantee that
the laws will exist, other than on paper, provided of course that workers5 organi
zations and professional unions will at the first be able to take advantage of the
opportunities opened to them by the Ministry of Labor.
746 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The purpose of the second group is to satisfy the urgent needs and requests
of workers. This includes two lawsone on child labor and the other on un
employment relief.
The first of these extends legislative protection of child labor not only to fac
tories and mills but to handicrafts, trade, and transport. The draft law prohibits
child labor up to the age of 14; it establishes a six-hour workday for youths from
14 to 17 years of age and prohibits night, holiday, and overtime work. The draft
law introduces a number of measures designed to prevent evasion of the law. How
urgent the introduction of this projected law is at this particular time, when
predatory exploitation of child labor has increased during the war years, is clear
to anyone who has a genuine interest in helping, as well as talking about, the de
velopment of productive forces in our ruined and war-ravaged country.
And, finally, the projected law on relief to the unemployed brooks not one
day of delayso close is the new calamity of mass unemployment, about to
descend on the heads of the workers. The law proposed by the Ministry is based
on the principle of insurance. It is planned to have the insurance dues distributed
among employers, workers (2 per cent of the wages), and the State, which does
not at present have the means to assume the entire expense. Unemployment relief
is issued to the unemployed registered at the labor exchange, with the closest
participation of trade unions. It should be borne in mind, however, that for the
time being the proposed law will not apply to all branches of industry, but only
to those deemed necessary by the Ministry of Labor.
Such are, in general outlines, the new ministerial law projects. They are not
without some defects. But it must be admitted that they represent nevertheless a
great step forward as compared not only with what we had before the revolution
but also with many workers laws in effect in western Europe, particularly if one
takes into account the grave condition of our national economy.

THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT


654. T h e A ll -R ussian Conference of T rade U nions and the S oviets
o f W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
[Izvestiia, No. 102, June 27, 1917, p. 12.]
A few days before the close of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers*
and Soldiers Deputies, the All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions began its
work. . . . The Conference summed up the enormous creative work of unifying
the proletariat into trade unions, and the results of this work deserve the scrutiny
of all those who value the revolution: a new social force has been created, imbued
with the consciousness of its responsibility to the revolution and to the future of
the proletariat.
For the first time since the beginning of the revolution, the vanguard of the
Russian proletariat, organized in trade unions, took a stand on all questions of
Russian life. Its position is to be found in the resolutions of the All-Russian
Conference. . . .
LABOR 747
. . . And after the All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions we can confi
dently say:
A spirit of courage added to realism reigns in our trade unions in the same
way as it reigns in the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
It was not without cause that the Conference recognized that the trade unions
of Russia will only be able to achieve their aims if, while preserving the unity of
the workers movement, they wholeheartedly and in every way support the actions
of the Soviets of Workers9 and Soldiers9 Deputies, which are directed at consoli
dating and expanding the gains of the revolutionary democracy!
It was not accidentally and not without a struggle that this formula was
adopted by the Conference.
Opponents of the tactics of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
objected energetically to this formula. But in vain they proposed a conditional
form of supportin so far as. The Conference did not follow them and re
jected their proposal.
The Conference recognized that the trade unions and the Soviets of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies must have one single common banner. And the great merit
of the Conference lies in this recognition. Henceforth the falsity of the accusa
tions, initiated by the enemies of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
that the Soviets have allegedly broken away from the proletariat, have deviated
from the aims of a workers class policy, and are pursuing a petty bourgeois con
ciliation policyis evident to everybody.
Thus the All-Russian Conference corrected the harm that was inflicted on the
unity of the workers movement and the unity of the revolutionary forces by the
thoughtless, adventitious decisions that recently have often been carried out by
individual groups of workers.
Along with solving their immediate problems, the Conference did everything
possible toward the resolution of the fundamental, common problem that faces
all the democratic organizationstoward [achieving] solidarity and unification
of the forces of democracy in the name of the ultimate triumph of the revolution.
655. T he T rade U nions in R ussia in 1917
[Excerpts from P. Garvi, Profsoiuzy Rossii v pervye gody revoliutsii, pp. 7-19.
Ms. in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.]
The Third All-Russian Conference on Trade Unions took place in St. Peters
burg June 20-28. Its entire work was marked by an awareness of the exceptional
importance of the questions confronting the young trade union movement under
the difficult, complex, and contradictory conditions of war and revolution. The
Conference accomplished a tremendous amount of work. It laid the foundation
for the All-Russian Union of Trade Unions and gave an impetus to the all-Russian
organization of homogeneous unions according to trades or industries.*
By the time of the Third Conference, Russia numbered 967 unions and 51
* A number of consultations were held at the Conference by its delegates (metal workers,
printers, textile workers, needle workers, and food industry workers) on the question of
establishing all-Russian organizations, and the first steps were taken toward their organization.
748 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Central Bureaus. These unions had approximately one and a half million mem
bers (1,475,429). Of these, in the organizations that as yet had no ties with the
interunion organizations there were 455,610 members. In their organizational
forms the young unions were distinguished by their very motley character. Along
with production unions (metal workers, printers, and others), there were shop
organizations (smelters, stokers, lithographers, etc.). The Conference unani
mously recognized (following the address by P. N. KolokoPnikov on organiza
tion) that workers must be organized, not according to shops and trades, but
by industries, in such a way that all workers in an industry9 even though belong
ing to different trades or even enterprises, should enter the unions. The same
resolution pointed out that a professional organization must be built on the
principle of democratic centralism, which would provide an opportunity to every
member to participate in the affairs of the organization and at the same time to
achieve unity in the guidance of the struggle.
For the completeness of its trade union representation and the importance of
its work, the Third All-Russian Conference must be recognized as the first con-
stituent congress of the trade unions. The mere enumeration of the resolutions
adopted speaks for the tremendous importance of the work accomplished by the
Conference in laying the foundation of principle and organization for the reborn
trade union movement in Russia: on problems of the trade union, on organiza
tional structure, on economic struggle, on the control of production, on mutual
relations between unions and factory committees, on the eight-hour working day,
on freedom of coalition, on womens labor, on combating unemployment, on the
Constituent Assembly on the policy of workers, on conciliation chambers, pro
ducers courts, inspection of labor, local organs of the Ministry of Labor and
workers secretariats, on the cultural and educational activity of the trade unions,
on national sections and the language of general meetings, on the trade press, on
the municipal policy of the trade unions, on workers cooperation, on the organi
zation of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions [VTsSPS], and on the
statute of the First All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions.
These resolutions, as well as the addresses and debates which preceded their
adoption, reflected, of course, the political passions which seethed in the country
and particularly in the capital, where the Conference was in session.*
Many of the adopted resolutions bear the obvious stamp of a compromise
between the opposing tendencies. No matter how strong the political differences
of opinion among the participants of the Conference, the awareness prevailed
among all that the preservation of the lofty succession and fine traditions of the
Russian trade movement, and especially the preservation of its unity, [were the
things to strive for] above all.

The sharpness of the differences on the question of new problems of the trade
unions (controlling and regulating production, the role of factory committees)
was therefore interpreted as a basic difference of opinion in the evaluation of
* The Third Conference of Trade Unions was in session at the same time as the First
Congress of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers* Deputies. But for the most part it did not
follow the course of the general political debates on war and peace, on seizure of power by
the Soviets, on the formation of the Third International, toward which part of its Bolshevik
delegates pushed it. This was the only way to avoid a split.
LABOR 749
general perspectives in the evolution of the Russian revolution. But on questions
of old traditional problems of the trade unions, on the methods of economic
struggle, on the organizational structure of the unions, the same two currents
came into conflict at the Third Conference. It is enough to pause on the question
of the methods of economic struggle. In his report KoPtsov (Menshevik) empha
sized that while the strike is an extreme and most effective means of economic
warfare, it is not the only weapon in the hands of trade unions. Therefore a
strike should be preceded by attempts to settle conflicts by peaceful means [con
ciliation chambers, etc.], particularly in view of the conditions of war, economic
breakdown, and revolution. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, asserted that a
strike is the only revolutionary method and consequently is the cornerstone in
the economic struggle of the trade unions. The conciliation chambers and other
methods of peaceful settlement of conflicts were regarded by the Bolsheviks only
as supplementary methods for the struggle. The difference is not in substance,
but in the shadings. The Conference adopted unanimously the Menshevik reso
lution, with certain corrections.

According to the statute on VTsSPS adopted by the Conference, an Executive


Committee was appointed from those present at the conferences of June 26 and 27.
The committee was composed of seven members of the VTsSPS from Petrograd
and two from Moscow (5 Mensheviks and 4 Bolsheviks). A presidium was elected
from the membership of the Executive Committee. . . .
The [party] composition of the VTsSPS and its Executive Committee, almost
on a parity basis, impeded in the extreme the work of the newly formed all-Russian
center of the trade union. The trade union movement continued to grow at a
tempestuous rate, but its leadership from the center was greatly complicated both
by the mixed composition of this center and by political events (the July uprising
of the Bolsheviks, the Kornilov revolt in August, and the October revolution)*
The organizational and financial ties of the VTsSPS locally were very weak. The
trade press was in its inception. The publication of the VTsSPS, Professionalnyi
Vestnik, appeared very seldom. In various places the good, neighborly relations
between the local Trade Union Councils and the Labor Sections in the Soviets of
Workers9 Deputies were not infrequentfy violated by conflicts. Locally, relations
between trade unions and factory committees also very frequently were charac
terized by sharp conflicts. Purely professional problems were pushed into the
background by the political news of the day, or were distorted under the influence
of the acute political struggle, which naturally in the tempestuous course of the
revolution engulfed all workers organizations and the trade unions first of all.
In the leading organs of the trade union, both in the center and locally, accord
ingly, attention was centered not upon that which would unite the leaders of the
trade unions in the vital practical work of the trade union movement, but on what
divided them along the line of political differences. . . .
The events of July 3-5 in Petrograd had already sharpened relations within
the trade unions. In August and September of 1917 the crisis of the coalition
Provisioned Government, as is known, led to the attempts to solve it by drawing
various political, trade, and social and political unions into the study of the re
organization of the government. As a result, the VTsSPS was forced to participate
in both the Moscow State Conference and the Petrograd Democratic Conference.
750 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The sharpest contradiction was naturally revealed within the almost evenly divided
trade union center. At the Moscow State Conference in August it was still pos
sible somehow to agree, although it was necessary to have two speakers, Grinevich
and Riazanov. But at tie Petrograd Democratic Conference in September, where
the immediate question of the reorganization of power was discussed, the dif
ference of opinion within the VTsSPS went so far that it aroused a crisis with
regard to the President: When it was clear that the political position which the
majority of the trade union delegation took (against the coalition with the bour
geois-democratic elements) did not coincide with his political position, Grinevich
resigned from his duties as President of the VTsSPS and was replaced by Chirkin,
also a Menshevik but a Martovetsenemy of coalition.
Thus the political discords within menshevism weakened its position in the
trade union movement and in the trade union center in particular, bringing to
nought that weak majority of one voice which the Mensheviks had in the Execu
tive Committee of the VTsSPS. At this very time the politically ill-assorted ele
ments which gravitated toward the Bolsheviks were falling ever more under the
influence of bolshevism and adopted its chief political slogan to undermine the
coalition government and transfer the power into the hands of the Soviets. The
resolutions of the Third Conference of the Trade Unions ceased to be a general
platform of the entire trade union movement, drawn into the whirlpool of the
bitter political struggle. Under the double influence of political events (Kornilov -
shchina ? the unavoidable crises of coalition government, delay and vacillations in
the struggle for peace) and the aggravated economic disintegration and the change
to the offensive by capital (sabotage and concealed lockouts), a spontaneous move
toward the left was taking place inside the working class and in the trade union
organizations, which could not but be felt in the weak and unstable VTsSPS.
The October revolution was approaching.
The role of the trade unions in the preparation and realization of the October
revolution has not been sufficiently well clarified. The initiative and leadership
of the insurrection and seizure of power on the eve, immediately before the open
ing of the Second All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, were at any rate entirely
the work of the Bolshevik Party. Although it depended upon the sympathy and
in part also upon the assistance of the wide circles of workers, this revolution
bore the character of a military conspiracy. The Petrograd Garrison, and not the
workers organizations, was the means of seizure of power. . . . The trade unions
of Petrograd as a general rule did not participate actively in the actual prepa
ration and carrying out of the revolution, although the majority of the unions
no doubt sympathized at the moment with the transfer of power into the hands
of the Soviets. Thus, for example, the Metal Workers Union in Petrograd assigned
50,000 rubles to the Military-Revolutionary Committee organized by the Execu
tive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers Deputies, where the majority
were already in favor of the Bolsheviks.
The Petersburg Council of Trade Unions participated more actively than other
unions in the revolution. The leading role in it belonged to the Bolsheviks and
the elements close to them . . .
The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions,
whose activity was to a large degree paralyzed by the balanced character of its
membership (adherents of unity and independence had in it a majority of one
LABOR 751
voice) as such, had no part and could not have any in the preparation and reali
zation of the October revolution. But unquestionably the Bolshevik members of
the Executive Committee of the VTsSPS and those who were close to them, in
particular Acting President Riazanov and Secretary Lozovskii, assisted as much
as they could in the success of the revolution. . . .
The factory committees and their organizationsthe Petersburg Council and
the Central Council of the Factory Committeeswhich were almost completely
under the influence of the Bolsheviks, took a more active part in the revolution
as well as in the organization of the Red Guard.
Not all the trade unions, however, were in sympathy with the revolution of
October 25. The administration of the Petrograd Printers Union at the meeting
of October 30 passed the following resolution: Having discussed the situation
created in connection with the political upheaval that has occurred, the adminis
tration 1) demands that an immediate stop be put to the fratricidal slaughter,
2) demands that the Military-Revolutionary Committee restore im m ediately free
dom of the press, 3) demands that all socialist parties come to an understanding
on the organization of power, and 4) states that in the event of nonfulfillment of
the present demands it will bring to bear all means of pressure that it has at its
disposal. This resolution characterizes well both the general political situation
and the political mood of the Printers Union on the day following the October
revolution. It was also at that time that the Printers Union took a most active
part in the Committee to fight for the freedom of the press. Its appeal pro
testing against the suppression of the free word by the new power, which had
occurred from the very first, was signed by the Printers Union, by the Central
Committee of the R.S.D. (consolidated), the Central Committee of the Party of
Socialist Revolutionaries, the Petrograd City Duma, and others.

WORKERS COOPERATIVES
656. T h e W orkers Cooperatives in 1917
[Excerpts from P. Garvi, Rabochaia kooperatsiia v. pervye gody Russkoi revoliutsii
1917-1921, pp. 4-18. Ms. in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.]
Independent workers cooperatives did not make their appearance until after
the revolution of 1905 . . . The first step in St. Petersburg was taken by the
Trudovoi Soiuz, actively participating in which were the Mensheviks (M. L.
Kheisin, Mark Isaevich Broido, and others), the Independent Socialist V. Posse,
and the Radical M. S. Ermolaev, one of the founders of the Russian coopera
tives. . . .
It should be pointed out that the workers cooperatives did not gain recogni
tion as the third form of the workers movement immediately. In the period of
the first revolution and the onset of reaction, the Bolsheviks looked in general
upon open and legal forms of the workers movement skeptically and at times
with marked disapproval. But even among the Mensheviks, who as a general rule
took the initiative in the direction of utilizing the legal opportunities created by
752 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the semivictorious revolution of 1905, there were those who expressed doubts
about the timeliness and propitiousness of speeding up the work of forming
workers cooperatives as a third form of the workers movement.
. . . While still remaining within the framework of a general consumers
cooperative, drawing upon the ideas and the experience of the workers coopera
tive movement of the West, the workers5cooperatives introduced a new, idealistic,
and militant stream, socialist in principle, into the general cooperative movement.
At the head of it, beginning in 1898 as an all-Russian center, was the Moscow
Union of Consumers Societies (known from 1917 on as Tsentrosoiuz).
At the First All-Russian Cooperative Congress, opened in Moscow in 1908,
the workers9cooperatives had already formed a special group, which, besides rail
way companies, included workers consumers organizations. . . .
Following the First All-Russian Cooperative Congress of 1908, the develop
ment of the workers cooperatives moved at a more rapid tempo.
The very promising development of the workers cooperatives, constituted as
the third form of the workers movement, encountered on its way the ever-
increasing distrust of the government, which ever more frequently resorted to
repressions and illegal restrictions. . . .
During the war the development of the general and workers5 consumers
cooperatives proceeded most rapidly in spite of the government repressions and
attempts to introduce the most minute control over the cooperatives. The grow
ing high cost of living and the aggravated food situation led to a tremendous
increase of membership in the existing cooperatives and the growth of new ones.
Within a short time, for that time truly giant cooperatives with 20,000-30,000
members and more came into being.* On the one hand, the tendency toward
merging small consumers organizations was increasing, and, on the other, large,
many-store cooperatives emerged at once. Thus came into existence the Petro
grad Union of Workers Consumers Societies and the Moscow Union of Asso
ciations of Workers Cooperatives. Because of food difficulties the authorities
were forced to tolerate this tempestuous growth of the cooperatives, which earned
for themselves an important place as a social factor in the struggle with the eco
nomic and food breakdown, in part relieving the government itself of the re
sponsibility for the failure in supply. The disruption in the monetary system
helped toward a more stable infiltration in the activity of the cooperatives of the
basic Rochdale principles of cooperation (selling only for cash, etc.). The
stream of independent workers cooperatives in the general impetuous torrent of
development of consumers cooperatives continued to increase and with it the
* On the eve of the revolution, in 1916, the average number of members in each organiza
tion was as follows: railway workers, 4,520 (in 1912, 3,896), factory workers, 1,200 (in 1912,
626), independent workers, 1,763 (in 1912, 431), miscellaneous, 1,429 (in 1912, 285), and
agricultural, 255 (in 1912, 138). The ranks of cooperative workers grew with remarkable
rapidity. The organizational and material achievements of cooperatives, city and village, were
tremendous. The sphere of their activity and influence grew without interruption, creating
even a cooperative inflation, that is, an unhealthy growth of the cooperatives.
LABOR 753
desire of the workers cooperatives for self-determination and their independence
from the general cooperatives.
This became possible only following the February 1917 revolution, which
brought, first of all, complete freedom of organization and, as a consequence of
this, the liberation of the cooperatives from the restricting chains and fault
finding wardship of the government. The workers cooperatives as well as the gen
eral civic cooperatives met the revolution enthusiastically and tried to promote its
success in every way, and particularly in the matter of overcoming the disastrous
situation in food supply in the center [of the country] and locally. On March 20,
1917, the Provisional Government issued a law on cooperatives, a draft of which
had been worked out by the cooperators themselves back in 1912. The Statute
on Cooperative Associations and Their Unions changed radically the legal status
of the cooperatives, allowed free formation of consumers associations, as well as
the presence of such associations in each locality and in such numbers as desired
by the population itself. It also freed all forms of cooperatives from petty control
by the authorities, etc. This law of the Provisional Government was a genuine
charter of freedom for the cooperative movement.6
The Moscow Union of Consumers Societies, renamed the Tsentrosoiuz,
launched upon a broad program, on the basis of the new law, of combating the
disastrous food supply situation. The cooperatives were drawn in every way pos
sible into collaboration with the government organs in regulating its economic
life, particularly in the matter of food supply and in preparing and distributing
the products.
The politization of the cooperatives, unavoidable under the conditions of
the revolution, led to their differentiation. The all-class (consumers) and peas
ants (credit and agricultural economic) cooperatives supported the Provisional
Government on questions of national and foreign policy. They thus formed some
thing of a middle stratum between the revolutionary democracyunited by the
Soviets and led at the time by Mensheviks and S.R.sand the city and village
petty-bourgeoisie. There had even been attempts, in connection with the pre
parliament, to form a special Cooperative Party.6 Such a proposal was made, to
be sure without any success, by E. D. Kuskova at the First Congress of the Work
ers Cooperatives in Moscow.
In the meantime, the workers cooperatives finally asserted themselves as a
branch of the general class workers movement. From the very outset the Moscow
Union of Workers Cooperatives set as its aim the [formation of an] all-Russian
union of workers cooperatives and its emancipation from the Central Union.
The same aim was pursued by the Petrograd Union of workers consumers or
ganizations, formed following the February revolution.
Even before the First All-Russian Congress of Workers Cooperatives, sched
uled for August 1, 1917, the basic principles of the workers cooperatives were
outlined at the Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions in the resolution
on the proletarian consumers cooperatives.
The First All-Russian Congress of Workers Cooperatives convened early in
August of 1917. Over a half-million members of the workers cooperatives were
represented at the Congress. The party composition of this Congress was as f ol-
5See Doc. 528.
6See Volume III, Chap. 30.
754 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
lows: Social Democrats of various tendencies, 83 (64.3 per cent); Socialist Revo
lutionaries, 23 (17.8 per cent); and nonparty members, 27 (17.1 per cent).
The First Congress of the Workers Cooperatives rejected at once the bour-
geois'Cooperative doctrine of social peace and harmony of interests. This did not
prevent the Bolsheviks, however, from branding the workers5 cooperatives imme
diately thereafter as petty bourgeois and tied to the apron strings of capital
. . . The workers9 cooperatives in their spirit [the Congress stated] must be
militant organizations; that is, they should not limit their activity to one definite
economic task.9 While wholeheartedly supporting the Soviets as organizations
of revolutionary democracy, and assisting in the preparation for the Constituent
Assembly, the workers9 cooperatives, without proposing their own candidates,
must help elect the candidates proposed by the Socialist party organizations and
their bloc. (The Congress thus rejected the idea of [the cooperatives] forming
their own cooperative party, derived from the circles of the bourgeois-demo
cratic and peasant cooperatives.)
Politically the Congress took a definite class-militant position. However, it
decided to maintain a party neutrality. The workers9 cooperatives decided to be
not only apolitical but also nonfactional. In view of the division in the political
workers9 movement in Russia, this was the only means of preserving the unity
and independence of the workers9cooperatives.
At the Congress its own ideological center was formedthe All-Russian
Council of Workers9 Cooperatives. But economically the united workers9 co
operatives continued to remain, even after the Congress, members of the Central
Union. The struggle for the freedom of the dependent factory consumers organi
zations was waged at an increased rate following the Congress. Soon the number
of workers9cooperatives, including both the dependent and the independent, had
reached 1,500, with a membership of approximately two million.
The October revolution introduced a radical change in the status of the
workers9 cooperatives. In Moscow the revolution took the form of bloody street
battles, which lasted for many days. The workers cooperatives, in view of their
party neutrality, did not wish and were not able to take an active part on the side
of the Bolsheviks in their struggle to seize power under the banner of All power
to the Soviets! After long and passionate debates the workers cooperatives in
Moscow resolved to take a position of friendly neutrality toward the Soviets
on the barricades. This friendly neutrality was evidenced in the fact that the
workers cooperatives continued to supply the workers suburbs with food during
the battles.

Occupied in the early days with the problems of consolidating their power,
organizing the Soviet administrative machinery, and particularly with the prep
aration for a separate peace, the Bolsheviks paid litde attention at first to either
the general village or the workers cooperatives. These, as a matter of fact, con
tinued to operate independently. But faced with the food catastrophe, Lenin was
LABOR 755
forced to pay attention to the only powerful and skillful purchasing and distrib
uting apparatus of consumers5 cooperatives, which was widely branched and at
the same time democratically centralized.
The policy of the Bolsheviks toward the cooperatives, as in other areas, pro
ceeded from two considerations: 1) their theoretic conceptions, and 2) their op
portunistic adaptability in facing reality.

THE RAILROAD WORKERS7


657. T h e E sta b lish m e n t o f P r o v isio n a l S u p ervisory C o m m ittees
on t h e R a ilroad s t o D e a l w it h L abor R e la tio n s
[So5. TJzak* I, 1, No. 478. Concomitant with the need to improve the administration
of the railroads in order to overcome the technical breakdown in transport facilities
was the necessity to better the strained labor relations on the lines. From the beginning
of the revolution, railroad committees were formed, and as early as March 5 the Gov
ernment officially recognized the problem by authorizing the Minister of Transport
to create special organs to settle misunderstandings between the administrations and
the workers. Zhurnaly, No. 5, March 5,1917.
On May 27, Minister of Transport Nekrasov issued Circular No. 6321, authorizing
the railroad committees and the Union of Railroadmen to exercise rights of super
vision and control on the railroads. This measure met with strong opposition from
private railroad managements, though Nekrosov assured them that the powers granted
did not extend to control over administrative authority. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia
Politika, pp. 83-84; Avdeev, II, 215. The editors were not able to locate a text of the
Circular.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of the relevant statutes it is decreed:
1. The Minister of Transport shall be authorized to organize, in the central
and local establishments of the Ministry of Transport, on lines of railroads in
operation and in construction, and in the boards of private railroad companies,
provisional supervisory committees for the consideration of complaints of em
ployees and workers of the above-mentioned establishments and railroads against
acts of persons in authority, as well as statements of these persons concerning
improper acts and offenses of employees and workers.
2. The composition of the provisional supervisory committees mentioned in
paragraph 1, their rights, duties, and procedure, as well as the rules for the elec
tion of members to the aforesaid committees by employees and workers, shall be
established by the Minister of Transport in instructions and rules to be issued
by him for the committees.
3. The provisional supervisory committees . . . shall have the right to issue
for employees and workers, serving within the committees areas of jurisdiction,
special ordinances on subjects affecting the service and work of the above-men-
7 The labor movement among the railroad workers was of particular significance because
of its importance to the crucial problem of transport and because of its political ramifications.
756 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
tioned persons, as well as on questions of maintaining the regularity, continuity,
and safety of railroad service. . . .
For violation of the special ordinances of the committees, the following pen
alties may be imposed: a) reproof, b) reprimand, c) demotion to a lower post
or salary, d) dismissal from service, and e) during wartime, imprisonment for
a period not exceeding three months.
The special ordinances of the committees may not deal with acts provided for
by criminal law and punishable by judicial proceedings.
5. In conformity with the establishment of the provisional supervisory com
mittees, the Minister of Transport shall be authorized to define the extent of the
rights of persons in authority in the Department of Transport to impose penalties
on employees and workers on their own responsibility.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
April 8, 1917
658. T h e O rganization of a C ommission on t h e E conomic C ondition
of R ailroad W orkers
[Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 30, April 13,1917, p. 3.]
The first administrative meeting of the Commission for the improvement of
the economic condition of railway employees and workers took place under the
chairmanship of the Minister of Transport. The Commission was composed of
five appointed members and five members of the Railway Commission of the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. On open
ing the meeting, the Minister asked the Commission to establish immediately a
minimum wage necessary for subsistence, no one of the employees or workers
to receive less than the established minimum.
At the recommendation of the public representatives, the Commission unani
mously resolved to have G. V. Plekhanov assume the duties of chairman. Mem
bers of the Railway Commission of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
were requested to call that same day on Georgii Valentinovich and to request him
to assume these duties.

659. T h e T hreat of a R ailroad S trike


{Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 187, August 17,1917, p. 6.]
We have received the following telegram:
A Strike Committee of the Union of Locomotive Operating Crews was formed,
in view of the failure to satisfy up to this time the legal and economic demands
of the all-Russian trade union of locomotive operating crews [engineers, assistant
engineers, firemen], worked out by the All-Russian Congress of locomotive oper
ating crews on May 20 and and adopted with minor changes in June by the Labor
Commission of the Ministry of Transport, where representatives of all interested
ministries and organizations participated, and in view of the fact that these de
mands were not implemented, in spite of the infrequent negotiations with the
changing ministers of transport, who evaded a direct answer in every way pos
LABOR 757
sible. The Strike Committee requests the editorial office to bring to the attention
of all citizens that, beginning at 12:00 oclock midnight on August 20, transpor
tation of long- and short-distance passenger trains, in the first instance, on Moscow
and Petrograd junctions is being suspended. Long-distance trains that left the
points of departure on August 19 will terminate their route on August 20 by
coming to a stop at the first first-class station, where they will await the solution
of the conflict. Only mail trains carrying military officials under the supervision
of the Union of Locomotive Operating Crews and local Soviets of Workers* and
Soldiers Deputies will remain in operation, provided they have expressed their
consent to this effect. If the demands are not granted by 12:00 oclock noon on
August 21, the suspension of transportation will extend to official and supply
trains. From August 21 to August 22 all freight and shunting trains will be dis
continued; also the electric station on the Moscow-Lublino line will shut down,
as will others of the Kursk Railroad, whose representatives joined the strike com
mittee. Military and medical trains will continue to run at all times. The Strike
Committee.
660. T h e S ettlem ent of t h e T hreatened S trike
[Russkoe Slovo, No. 189, August 19,1917, p. 3.]
A Telegram from the Supreme Commander
Mogilev, August 17.The railway strike intended for August 20 has seriously
alarmed the army, which already suffers so much because of the disorganization
of transport.
Defending the interests of the army and of the humble railway workers, who
have won with their sweat and blood the right to a better life, the Supreme Com
mander, General L. G. Kornilov, sent today to the Minister of Transport the fol
lowing telegram:
661 have received the declaration of the Committee of locomotive operating
crews explaining the circumstances that incite the railroad workers to support
their demands by a strike.
I consider it necessary to express my opinion to the effect that the engineers,
who are highly qualified workers and have valorously fulfilled their duty during
the entire war and especially in the period of 1915, painful for the army, are on
the whole working with resignation up to ten hours a day including holidays;
that is, they do not follow the example of others who take advantage of the diffi
cult situation of the country. At the same time, taking into consideration their
really hard, nerve-racking, and very responsible work, I believe it only fair that
the railway engineers, the results of whose work are obvious to all, be paid in
any case not less than those workmen of Petrograd and Moscow junctions who
have already been taken care of by the Government, in accordance with the known
telegram of the Deputy Minister of Transport, Engineer Ustrugov.
The Telegram of the Minister of Transport
Minister of Transport Yurenev has addressed to all the chiefs of railways the
following telegram:
The Union of Locomotive Operating Crews threatens a strike. In reply to
this threat I give a clear and direct reply: 1) I know that the locomotive oper
758 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
ators bear unselfishly a heavy load of labor, which is comparatively less remu
nerative than that of those in related work. 2) I do not find it possible to satisfy
individual demands amounting to hundreds of thousands of rubles without taking
into account the general state of the Treasury. 3) Individual petitions must be
considered in the Commission, which continues to function under the chairman
ship of Plekhanov. The decision of the question depends entirely on the general
state of the Treasury. 4) I cannot believe that the railroad men would decide
to strike a cruel blow at their motherland at the moment of deadly danger. This
cannot and will not happen. And the Government will not be forced to exercise
its plenary power in defense of national property.
Report on the Strike at the Railway Congress8
Yesterday at the general meeting of the Congress of Railroadmen in Moscow
a delegation of five members of the Congress, headed by Mr. Zimmerman, pre
sented a report on the negotiations with the strike committee of the Union of
Locomotive Operating Crews. The report revealed that the strike committee is
prepared to make concessions and enter into an agreement with the Congress
of Railroadmen. A joint meeting, composed of a group of persons from the
presidium of the Congress of Railroadmen and representatives from the strike
committee of the locomotive operating crews, took place in the evening. Nego
tiations are being carried on successfully, and, unless something unforeseen
occurs, an agreement should take place. In the words of the Secretary of the
Congress of the Workers Section, A. A. Fadeev, the representatives of the Union
of Locomotive Operating Crews themselves do not believe in the possibility of
a strike.
661. T h e A p p ea l o f t h e M in ister-P resid en t t o t h e R a ilroad m en in
C o n n ectio n w it h t h e T h rea te n ed S tr ik e o f S ep tem b er
[VVP, No. 159, September 22, 1917, p. 1.]
In view of information received that, in some sections of the railway network,
employees and workers plan to declare a strike, I hereby wish to state that the
Provisional Government is undertaking the most vigorous measures for the
quickest improvement in the economic condition of the railway employees and
workers, and will within the next few days establish a new scale of wages. In
taking this step, the Provisional Government deems it its duty to warn that the
introduction of a new scale of wages is possible only with the immediate increase
of railway rates, because of the complete impossibility of adding this new expense
to the State. At the same time, I make it known that no waiverings, no shake-ups
in the normal work of railways can be tolerated by the Provisional Government.
A railway strike will unavoidably result in immeasurable suffering in the army
and among the population of large cities. It will constitute a grave crime against
the motherland and the army. I hope that the Provisional Government will not
be forced to resort to those severe measures that by law are due for disobedience,
in time of war, to orders given by railway authorities. I have no doubt that in
this decisive hour the railway men will not stop their work. I propose that, in
our awareness of great responsibility to the motherland, all appeals for a railway
8 Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 189, August 19,1917, p. 2.
LABOR 759
strike be immediately discontinued. I feel confident that in these days of heavy
trial the railway men will not betray their motherland.
A. K erensky , Minister-President and
Supreme Commander
September 21, 1917

662. T h e S trike M ovem ent in S eptem ber


[.Izvestiia, No. 180, September 24,1917, pp. 4-5.]
On September 23, under the chairmanship of A. V. Liverovskii, the Acting
Minister of Transport, the question was discussed of the extent to which the
demands of the railroadmen should be satisfied. M. V. Bernatskii, Minister of
Finance, K. A. Gvozdez, Deputy Minister of Labor, and M. D. Skipetrov, Assist
ant State Controller, participated in this conference. The conference discussed
the methods and the extent to which the demands of the railroadmen should be
satisfied.
The conference did not find it possible to establish the ranks of railroadmen
and to fix their wages, asserting that the decision on such questions is in the
province of the Constituent Assembly. However, in order to satisfy at least part
of the demands of the railroadmen, the conference designated a certain sum for
[wage] increases through the current year, i.e., until January 1,1918.
Then the conference outlined a number of measures for improving the food
supply situation of railroadmen.
The question contemplated by the conference of assigning funds for compen
sating railroadmen and the rest of the measures will be determined, in their final
form, by the Provisional Government.
Telegram from the Strike Committee
The following telegram signed by Savin, the Chairman of the Strike Commit
tee, and sent by him to all the principal railroad committees of the Russian railway
network, was received by the Ministry of Transport:
In this terrible hour, when our native land is in peril, when the army of the
central provinces is starving, when a wave of refugees is coming into Russia from
areas recently occupied by the enemy, when intensive preparations are under way
for moving army echelons, we, railroadmen, are preparing to stop work, to stop
the traffic because the Provisional Government has refused to satisfy our demands
for the immediate introduction of living wages as determined by the All-Russian
Congress of Railroadmen, which met in Moscow.
Our Central Committee in Moscow understands that at a time like this a
strike could ruin the country and the revolution. Therefore, having presented
an ultimatum to the Government, it is with a heavy heart that the Central Com
mittee is compelled at the same time to take over the leadership of the strike
movement in order to prevent a total strike on the railroads, which might include
the termination of military and food supply transport, and to conduct this strike
with minimum ill-effects. We do not want our strike to force all Russia into
starvation. In order to meet this grave step as becomes representatives of the
organized democracy, we have formed a Strike Committee, which is in full con
tact with the regional committees of the Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants*
760 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Deputies in western Siberia. We, the Strike Committee, are taking upon ourselves
the responsibility of safeguarding the interests of the railroadmen in this threat
ening hour. We will keep you informed of all the details of the movement, and
until all methods for averting a strike are exhausted, we call upon you to main
tain complete calm and not to terminate work without a summons from the Strike
Committee, which is acting in accordance with the directions of the Central Com
mittee. In this connection, all instructions of the Strike Committee shall be signed
by specially authorized persons. These persons are Savin, Shcheglov, and Lisov-
skii. Guard the lines; property is valuable. Do not believe absurd rumors, do
not provoke the inhabitants in your area, for all this may threaten railroadmen
with excesses from the inhabitants and the military units. Direct all inquiries to
the Strike Committee. Send commissars to all the lines.
Telegram from Central Organizations
The following telegram was sent to all the railroad lines:
To All Railroad Employees:
Comrades, we have assumed the responsibility of defending the interest of
railroad employees in the matter of wage increases for all categories of workers
and employees. We are convinced that we will achieve the goal we have set within
the next few daysas soon as the government crisis, which is paralyzing all deci
sions, is resolved. We therefore ask that you refrain from taking any independent
action. Otherwise, we shall decline all responsibility. The strike is disastrous to
the cause of the revolution.
F. D an , Central Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies
B reshko -B reshkovskaia , Executive Committee of the All-Russian
Soviet of Peasants Deputies
L ozovskii, All-Russian Council of Trade Unions
Resolution of the Central Organizations
An urgent meeting of delegates from the Union of Railroadmen was held
yesterday, together with representatives of local railroad committees of the All-
Russian and Petrograd Councils of Trade Unions and members of the Soviet of
Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies and of factory committees.
Having deliberated at great length on the impending railroad strike, the
meeting passed the following resolution:
The meeting has resolved to support the decision of the All-Russian Central
Council of Trade Unions and the Petrograd Council of Trade Unions to postpone
the strike until a definite reply is received from the Provisional Government, and
requests the All-Russian Council of Trade Unions and the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Workers5and Soldiers Deputies to exert firm pressure
on the Provisional Government for a definite reply to the demands of the railroad
workers by the specified date of September 26.

The Announcement of the Strike


According to reports that arrived during the night, the Executive Committee
LABOR 761
of the Moscow Central Railroad Union resolved by a majority of 19 votes to 16
to announce a strike along the entire network of Russian railroads.
The movement of trains must stop at 12:00 midnight on September 24.
In accordance with this resolution, not a single train departed from the
Moscow junction after 12:00 oclock at night.
Long-distance trains that departed before midnight will be taken to the termi
nal station of their destination.
The strike has gone into effect in Petrograd. The train that was due to leave
at 12:59 A.M. by the Northern Railway did not depart.
663. T h e S ettlem ent o f t h e S e ptem ber S trike
[.Izvestiia, No. 182, September 27,1917, pp. 5-6.]
On the eve of September 26 all the members of the Moscow Executive Commit
tee, together with members of the Executive Committee of the Moscow Soviet of
Workers3 and Soldiers Deputies and Comrade Maistriukov who is in charge of
military transport, departed for Moscow to attend a joint conference with mem
bers of the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Union of Railroadmen
on the subject of the Provisional Governments decree and the changes that were
proposed to the Provisional Government, in the presence of Comrade Chkheidze,
by the Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Union of Railroadmen, the
representatives of the Moscow Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, and
Comrade Maistriukov.
These changes, approved by the Provisional Government under the signature
of Liverovskii, the Minister of Transport, consisted of the following:
1) The recognition, in accordance with the decree of the Provisional Govern
ment, of the right of the All-Russian Union of Railroadmen to participate in all
revisions and changes that concern the needs of the railroad workers [and
employees].
2) The abolition of the bonus system and the introduction of a locomotive
crew paid on an hourly basis.
3) The transfer of the [management of] food supply to the All-Russian Union
of Railroadmen.
At 8:00 p . m . on September 26 the above-mentioned conference passed a reso
lution to call off the strike as of 12:00 midnight on September 27 and to resume
work on all the railroads.
After carrying out this decision, the conference turned to the discussion of
whether the strike should be considered canceled definitely or only pending the
convocation of the All-Russian Congress of Railroadmen, which has been set
for October 10.
After 12:00 midnight on September 27, all long-distance trains will run accord
ing to the normal schedule.
As of this date, tickets for all trains without exception will be sold at all the
stations.
The satisfaction of all the principal demands of the railroad workers, with the
exception of the changes in administrative structure and wage scales, adopted by
762 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the Commission under the chairmanship of K. A. Gvozdev, served as the reason
for calling off the strike.
The Central Executive Committee of the All-Russian Union of Railroadmen
did not find it possible to continue the strike merely because of having failed to
settle this one question and resolved to submit this question for the consideration
of the All-Russian Congress of Railroadmen.
Another important reason for terminating the strike was the decision of the
Provisional Government to satisfy the needs of the railroad workers with respect
to food as well as clothing, which will be taken from the commissariats ware
houses at fixed prices paid by the State for state purchases.
The All-Russian Railroad strike proceeded normally on the entire network.
Order was maintained everywhere and the instructions of the Central Strike
Committee were carried out with exactitude. There were no excesses at any time.

664. T he A ll -R ussian U nion of R ailroadmen and th e B olsheviks


[Naglovski, Zheleznodorozhniki v Russkoi Revoliutsii 1917-1920 gg. pp. 1-7; ms.
in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.]
Up to the February revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks had practically no influ
ence among the railroadmen. The Bolsheviks had no ties with the railroadmen.
And, except for a small number of members of the intelligentsia, such as the
author of the present outline, the Bolsheviks did practically no work among them.
But gradually, during the war, this situation began to change. And as early as
the eve of the revolution the Bolsheviks had a feeling that the railroadmen should
be considered seriously.
On the same day that the February revolution started, Engineer Bublikov
sent telegram 114 along all the railroad lines, announcing that the Ministry
of Transport had been taken over and that only orders of railroad committees
were to be carried out, the formation of such committees to be begun immediately.
The effect of this telegram upon the railroadmen was twofold. The telegram cut
them off from the Ministry of Transport, which was completely isolated from
the railroads. And from the bottom a feverish organization of committees began.
These railroad committees were formed even in the military zone and at Stavka,
where as early as the third day following the February revolution a committee
was formed. These committees played no small role in the early days of the
revolution.
During the first moments of the February revolution the railroadmen were
unanimous in their sentiments: all the railroadmen in a body rose spontaneously
on the side of the revolution and the Provisional Government just formed.
The First All-Russian Congress of Railroadmen took place at the end of
April 1917. The overwhelming majority of the delegates to the Congress were
Social Democrats, Socialist Revolutionaries, and Internationalists. Characteris
tically even the engineers and middle [nontechnical] personnel sent left delegates
to the Congress (Engineer Stamo and Malitski, employees Grunin, Kirsanov,
LABOR 763
Volkovskii). The Bolsheviks sent to the Congress several delegates from the
workers, headed by Rogov. At this Congress the All-Russian Executive Com
mittee of Railroadmen (VIKZheP) was elected.
From the moment of the creation of VIKZheP the period of disorganization
of railroad administration set in and a competition began between VIKZhel
and the Ministry of Transport. VIKZheP demanded the transfer of authority
over railroads to the railroad committees; and the Ministry, headed by Nekrasov,
aware of the war needs and the general deplorable state of transport, defended
the principle of a single authority.
The Bolsheviks, who did not as yet enjoy any popularity among the railroad
men, decided to profit by the difficult conflict to increase their influence among
the railroadmen. With this end in view, they organized a special District Com
mittee in Petersburg (on Ligovka), which was autonomous within the framework
of the Petersburg Organization. The chief purpose of this District Committee
was propaganda and agitation among the workers and employees of the Peters
burg railroad junction.
The work of the Regional Committee and its cells was reduced in the main to
spreading suspicion about the engineers and the Ministry of Transport, as well as
about the railway committees, among the railroadmen. The latter were accused
of delay, indecision, and lack of perseverance and energy in introducing the
electoral principle in the railroads.
However, in the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party there were even
then men who realized that by their very nature railroads must be administered
from one center (Stalin, Trotsky, Dzerzhinskii) and that caution should be
exercised here not to unleash social demagogy. Even then the question was being
discussed in the Central Committee of how best to bring the tempestuous railroad
complex into the framework of a single authority. But, on the other hand, it was
obvious to the Bolsheviks that they could increase their influence among the
railroadmen only by supporting the most radical and syndicalist sentiments and
slogans.
For the purpose of leadership in the work among the body of the railroadmen
and for elaborating appropriate directives, the Central Committee of the Bolshe
viks created in July of 1917 a special commission under the chairmanship of
Stalin and three membersShliapnikov, Lvov, and Engineer N. Reports on the
work of this commission were made to Lenin by Stalin alone or together with
Shliapnikov. Stalin believed that such one-man management should be intro
duced among the railroadmen as soon as possible after the seizure of power by
the Bolsheviks. He realized the necessity of dominating this most important
apparatus. In the opinion of Stalin, the resistance of the railroadmen could be
quickly reduced to zero by repressions, on the one hand, and by promises of
various privileges with respect to food supply, on the other. Shliapnikov main
tained a precisely opposite point of view. He insisted on the introduction of demo
cratic principles on the railroads in order to put the commissions own adherents
in all committees and thus get control over the railroad body from within. He
emphasized the extreme danger of strict measures, which might repel the railroad
masses from the Bolsheviks and thus create the danger of either a strike or
sabotage, because at that time the railroadmen were completely under the influence
of other socialist parties. The other two members of the commission took the
764 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
middle-of-the-road point of view. Without repudiating the need of a one-man
authority in the railroads, they thought that this was a question for the future, at
which time the railroads should be won from within. They believed that slogans
should be used which the masses could understand and which could aid the Bol
sheviks in their struggle with the Provisional Government and VIKZheP. The
Central Committee of the Bolsheviks approved the latter tactics and charged the
commission with working out a statute of railroad administration, based on a
wide application of the electoral principle, with the ultimate aim of introducing
one-man management as soon as possible without detriment to the work of the
railroads. The Central Committee adopted this decision at Lenins suggestion.
Lenin believed that as long as the railroadmen were not imbued with the Bolshe
vik propaganda and no sufficiently strong technical apparatus existed to admin
ister the railroads from the center, the most demagogic slogans had to be used
until the moment when the authority of the Bolsheviks in the center was sufficiently
strong. . . .
At the Second All-Russian Congress of Railroadmen, which took place in
August of 1917, the Bolsheviks were unable to put through any of their candidates,
in spite of their energetic propaganda. The draft of their statute fell through.
Instead, the statute worked out by VIKZhel was approved, with its basic prin
ciple that elections were to be conducted only at the All-Russian Congress.
VIKZhel5reserved the right to call, whenever necessary, congresses of individual
roads, which elected their executive committees for the given railroad. And then
this committee worked out forms of collaboration between the administration of
the railroad and the entire apparatus. The statute of VIKZhel, adopted at the
Second All-Russian Congress of Railroadmen, represented a compromise between
the idea of centralization and the centrifugal hopes of the railroad masses. In
spite of its failure at the Second Congress, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik
Party recognized its former policy to be correct and resolved to carry it on further.
At the moment of the October revolution, although they had some ties with
the railroadmen (in Petersburg region and in Moscow), the Bolsheviks never
theless were quite aware of the fact that winning the railroadmen to their side
was no easy matter and that employing totalitarian tactics with the railroadmen
might meet with strong resistance. At the suggestion of Stalins Commission of
the Central Committee of the Party, they decided to continue the game of playing
on the democratic strings of the railroadmen. . . .

THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT


665. T h e Confiscation of th e G uzhon F actory
[Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 96, July 2,1917, p. 1.]
The leading editorial in Pravda of June 30 published the decision of the
Economic Section of the Executive Committee, through which the latter notified
the Provisional Government of the critical situation in Moscow industry. And
immediately on citing it, [the editorial] broke into abuse addressed at the Men
LABOR 765
sheviks and S.R.s. It ridiculed their naive hopes of achieving anything through
the existing Provisional Government.
The Guzhons and other capitalists, with the assistance of Parchinskii and
his kind, are deliberately (this word belongs to the Economic Section) leading
us toward the cessation of production. The Government is on their side. The
Tseretellis and Chernovs are mere ornaments or simple pawns.
Thus Pravda assured its readers. But before the above article saw the light,
there had already been, as it proved, a decision of the Special Council on Defense
on the confiscation of the Guzhon factory. In carrying out this decision, Assistant
Minister Palchinskii issued an order to the Moscow Factory Conference to
organize immediately a temporary factory administration to maintain its work
without interruption. To fully appreciate this fact, it is necessary to take into
consideration the following circumstances. First, Guzhon is not a nobody. He
is a recognized leader of the Moscow metal industry. The Guzhon factory is of
exceptional importance to the Moscow region, supplying 85 per cent of its metal.
The administration of this factory decided to stop work following the decision
of the court of arbitration organized by the Factory Council Conference on the
question of workers wages. Both the workers and the administration of the
factory bound themselves to submit to the decision of the court.
But after the decision was made, Guzhon replied to it with the statement closing
the factory, beginning July 1. This was a challenge to the organized, enterprising
masses of the metal industry of the Moscow regionto the workers and their
democratic organ, the Factory Conference, whose authority the workers recog
nized.
The challenge was accepted. Democracy launched a battle and gained a
victory. The voice of the Economic Section of the Executive Committee and
[that] of the Moscow democratic organization of supply proved in the Provisional
Government to be stronger than the voice of the industrialists.
The working masses of the Moscow region can celebrate a great victory. And
this victory, in spite of the assurances of Pravda, proves that the Provisional
Government can and actually does serve the interests of democracy-

666. A R e so lu tio n on L ock ou ts by t h e C on feren ce o f F a c to ry


C om m ittees in Moscow
[Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 410.]
July 24-28,1917
The aim of the lockouts at the present time is not only to wage an economic
war with the workers. It is also a political struggle intended to weaken the forces
of the working class as the bulwark of the revolution.
In the event of a successful outcome of lockouts, this method of employers
warfare may become widespread. Consequently we must wage an energetic
struggle with every single case of lockout at the very outset.
In view of the fact that at the present time every plant is very important in
serving the country, the trade unions must in case of mass dismissal demand that
the appropriate organs of the government investigate whether or not such dis
missal is necessary. The rule should be that no plant may be shut down without
the consent of the local organ of supply.
766 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The economic breakdown and insufficient control in economic life make it
possible for lockouts to be carried out secretly.
In view of this, it is urgent to introduce general control over production as
soon as possible and, in the event a lockout is discovered, to apply the most
resolute measures to ensure regular work in the plants, including the confiscation
of the plant by the State.
667. L abor D isputes in B aku and on the V olga
[Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 124, August 4, 1917, p. 2.]
Among the numerous industrial conflicts of the current moment, two of them
in Baku and on the Volgaattract particular attention. The two conflicts have
something in common. In both, the struggle is not being carriedout spontane
ously but in an organized fashion. In both, the question has to do withconcluding
a collective [bargaining] agreement.
In Baku, negotiations have been carried on for the past four months between
employers and workers on wage scales. Twice these negotiations, which seemed
to be nearing completion, were interrupted, and the responsibility for their inter
ruption must be placed on the representatives of capital. The situation in Baku
at present is extremely acute. The industrialists refused to accept the wage scales
in their final form* They thus exposed the country to the hazard of a strike and
complete stoppage in the oil industry. Fortunately the spirit of civic duty and
revolutionary responsibility are strong in the Baku workers. They did not permit
themselves to be carried away by an impulse of spontaneous feeling. They did
not strike. Instead they appealed to the Ministry of Labor with an urgent request
to intervene in the conflict and bring it to a peaceful conclusion without resorting
to extreme measures. On July 31, M. I. Skobelev left for Baku to liquidate the
acute conflict on the spot. Let us hope that his mission will be crowned with
success.
The situation on the Volga is somewhat different. The consolidated unions
of shipping employees and workers of the Volga Basin submitted to the consoli
dated companies of shipowners a number of demands of an economic and legal
nature. The conflict assumed extremely acute forms. The shipowners refused
at first to negotiate with the organizations of the opposing camp. Mutual tension
was mounting, irritation was increasing, and a strike on the Volga seemed un
avoidable. To speak of the disastrous consequences of such a strike for the country
and the revolution is of course superfluous. It is self-evident. At this point the
Ministry of Labor interceded. It telegraphed from Nizhnii Novgorod to the
representatives of the disputing parties to come to Petrograd and offered them its
mediation to settle the conflict.
Conferences of the conciliatory commission on the Volga conflict have been
taking place at the Marble Palace since July 26. The work of the commission
is proceeding satisfactorily. A large number of points of difference have already
been taken up and agreement reached. The [two] sides had difficulty coming
to an agreement on sailors wages. It has been resolved to transmit the matter
for final decision to the state authority represented by the Minister of Labor.
The decision of the Minister, judging from available data, proved acceptable
both to the workers and to the employees. There is every reason to assume that
the Volga conflict will be liquidated by peaceful means. Thus Russia will be
LABOR 767
spared an acute shock in the sphere of water transport, so important at the present
time.
668. T h e Question of S hutdowns and U nemployment
[Ekon. Polozhenie, I, 412-13. Report of the Council of the Association of United
Industry.]
August 19, 1917
In view of the desire on the part of the manufacturers of the Shchelkovskii
Company, as expressed at the general meeting of August 14, 1917, to clarify the
Provisional Governments attitude on the question of the shutdowns of factories
and the dismissal of workers as a result of shortages of fuel and raw material,
it was decided to discuss this question with the Minister [of Trade and Industry],
S. N. Prokopovich. At a private conference of manufacturers A. M. Dobrov and
A. Ya. Neuman were delegated to carry on the negotiations.
The Minister received them in the office of the Moscow Mayor at 5:30 in the
evening. A. M. Dobrov addressed to him the following question:
In view of the fact that the situation in the textile industry of the central
region has recently been and continues to be at the moment quite hopeless with
respect to the supply of fuel and raw material, what has the Ministry of Trade
and Industry planned to do in the matter of regulating the relations of workers
and employers, inasmuch as, irrespective of the wishes of the owners, a great
number of plants were shut down and will be unable to resume work? This is a
most crucial question because, from July 1 to August 14, during the shutdown
of factories conflicts were brewing and some are already in evidence.
The Minister expressed himself as follows: The matter of regulating the rela
tions of workers and employers is within the jurisdiction of the Minister of Labor.
An exhaustive reply to this question can be given only after a mutual discussion
with Minister Skobelev on his return to Petrograd.
S. N. Prokopovich himself promised to render all the assistance possible in
the matter of fuel and cotton supply. Moreover, objective data indicate that
transport must improve in September and that the supply of raw material and
fuel will rise by 10-15 per cent.
When the Ministers attention was called to the fact that this question must be
resolved immediately, inasmuch as beginning August 17 the workers will arrive
to claim payment for the idle time, S. N. Prokopovich stated that, as Minister
of Industry and not of industrialists and workers, he will do everything to protect
the industry from complete ruin . . .
It is intolerable that plants, forced to shut down for five or six months, should
be obliged to maintain the workers. Aid to the workers should come in the form
of public works, unemployment insurance, and so forth. And plants unable to
operate should close in accordance with article 104, and article 105 of the Statute
on Industry, which has not been abolished as yet.
To the question whether it is permissible to post an announcement about the
cancellation of the contract on the basis of the Statutes on Industry, the Minister
pointed out that it is quite legal to post such an announcement, but it is necessary
to take into consideration the appropriate moment and preserve a certain amount
of tact. In his opinion the solution of the questions on shutdowns must be reached
in collaboration with the commissar of labor. If the industrialists assert that
768 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
they cannot afford to pay the workers for the idle time, this must be proved with
figures in hand. It is high time we cease to be afraid of publicity; in such cases
we must open the books and prepare balances . . . We must refer to figures not
only in these instances but when making various demands also. Only by com
paring fiures does he hope to restore some peace in industry. In so far as wages
are increased, the Minister will increase payments for government orders, and
where it is impossible to do so, wages will be standardized.
In conclusion, the Minister suggested that a conference be called in Moscow,
on the basis of equality, of representatives of labor and representatives of industry,
inviting to this conference representatives of the Ministry of Trade and Industry
and the Ministry of Labor. At this conference of a conciliatory nature the funda
mental statutes should be elaborated on the basis of which the plants could be
shut down. But at any rate the Minister excluded emphatically the necessity of
paying for idle time.
T he Council

669. C ommunication from the F rench E mbassy to the P rovisional


G overnment Concerning the D angers of L abor U nrest to F rench
I nterests in the D on B asin
[Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 470-71. The Ministry of the Interior announced in VVP> No.
175, October 12, 1917, as quoted in ibid.> II, 472, that the most energetic measures
(were being taken) to protect the enterprises of foreign subjects, also the safety of
both the owners and their employees.]
August 31, 1917
The French Consul in Kharkov has directed the attention of the Embassy
to the fact that the general situation is growing very dangerous throughout the
guberniya and in particular in Makeevka. The workers are armed and openly
threaten the heads of the plants where the interests of the French are involved.
Everything leads to the belief that the militia and the soldiers are in conspiracy
with the leaders of the movement and will do nothing to prevent it unless they
receive immediate and specific instructions from the Government.
On the other hand, many workers declare that a strike is inevitable. In that
event one hundred French families will be in danger.
Finally, the Ekaterinoslav Mining Company will be forced to shut down one
of its mines and will announce a cut in wages for others. Consequently the workers
threaten the company.
The French Consuls in Kharkov and Rostov-on-Don appealed with a petition
to the local authorities to take measures that might stop the disturbances. But
the situation assumes a threatening character, which surpasses everything that has
taken place in the guberniya up to now. Therefore the French Embassy in Petro
grad has the honor to request the Provisional Government to send as soon as
possible emphatic instructions to the commissars in various places, inviting them
to take the necessary steps to prevent disorders and to guarantee the protection
and safety of individuals and property of the French citizens under all circum
stances.
LABOR 769
670. P olitics and E conomics
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 213, September 19, 1917, p. 3.]
There is no government in Russia, no law, no political actions; instead, an
abundance of political words. Countless congresses and conferences [are held],
and speeches made at each of them. They all persuade or attack each other, and
they talk and talk. The man on the street, who lives under the weight of economic
factors of everyday life and who looks daily to a change for better or worse, on
opening the paper every day finds the same torrent of speeches. He finally suc
cumbs to the hypnosis of political words and with them forgets about the ap
proaching threat of economic facts. Meanwhile the effect of economics on life
is making itself felt ever more severely and painfully. There is no fuel; we shall
freeze this winter; everybody knows this. Well, what of it?we will close the
schools. There is no bread; there will be faminewell organize house commit
tees, etc. The hypnosis of words is so great that we fail to see the worthlessness
of the measures taken and are ready to live following the principle: the day went
by and thank God!
There is no bread, and to get it we must give the peasant manufactured goods:
textiles, metals, shoes, etc. Disregarding the fact that before giving these goods
they must be manufactured, we introduce all sorts of monopolies, we prohibit
export, etc. We shout with glee that we succeeded in distributing several million
yards of calico and put our minds at ease more or less. Monopoly will kill specu
lation, and the crux of the matter is in speculation and in the vicious intentions
of merchants who conceal goods. But there are no goods and they must be manu
factured. And to do so we must put an end to meetings and speeches, abandon
words and get busy.
It grows clearer daily that unless we rescue industry, unless we raise it to a
height unheard of in Russia, we shall not find a way out of the impasse. And
the state of industry grows worse daily.
With the new upsurge of the Bolshevik wave in Petrograd, the number of
outrages and excesses in factories and mills has risen. Again persecution of
the administration of factories has begun, dismissal of managers and engineers,
insults and arrests. Persons who withstood the six-month revolutionary tempta
tion are forced to leave their positions and the prevailing slogan now is: Our
own workers control of production.
Let the engineers, if they so desire, take their places at the lathes; the manage
ment will be in the hands of an elected workers committee. Training and technical
knowledge are reduced to nought. A factory or a mill can, of course, continue to
run on its momentum for some time without any technical supervision. A clock,
too, is wound up once a week and goes by itself. But let something, ever so
slight, happen and the technical organism, complex and valuable, will be destroyed,
and much time will be needed to set it right. The Minister of Labor attempted
to introduce some order on this problem and declared that violations will be
prosecuted. But one of the factories, in referring to the laws and the possibility
of prosecution, gave this official response of the factory committee: By decrees
of the Russian Republic all old laws were abolished. This is how the Petrograd
political speeches are interpreted.
And here is another new slogan: The firing and hiring of the workers in
factories is done by the workers. That is, no matter how poor the workers attitude
770 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
toward his responsibilities, even if he should spend his entire eight-hour day
smoking, he cannot be fired and consequently he cannot be reprimanded, because
a reprimand without the right of firing provokes only insults and threats. As a
matter of fact, even now it is impossible to fire a worker. Should the manager
attempt to do so, it is very likely that he himself will be removed for counter
revolution.55 Nevertheless, legally he retained this right, and it more or less
retained this shattering discipline. Now the workers insist on repudiating this
legal right also. A widespread strike of leather workers makes an issue of this.
If we point out in addition the demand for piecework wage, we get a picture of the
planned campaign with a view to gaining the right to laziness, the right to get
paid for attending the factory, for being present at the meeting, etc.
Moreover, this pay must be high, and to the extent that it rises, the demands
for its increase grow further.
Thus, according to the testimony of S. N. Prokopovich, workers5wages in the
textile industry were raised to the extent of a loss in production. The workers
are preparing new demands, according to which, so it is rumored, wages must
be doubled.
Exorbitant demands by the workers, together with the low productivity of
labor, lead to high prices and to the absence of goods on the market, with con
sequent famine and utter defeat of the revolution outside and within the country.
The workers are in ecstasy about the expansion of the revolution59 and are
blinded by hostility toward the bourgeois55; they know not what is done, and
they may be forgiven for this. But what about their leaders? After all, they
understand, they see where they are pushing Russia and the entire people. They
cannot but understand and see. Why then do not they, who are trusted, tell the
workers that the time has come for self-restraint; that the time has come for
sacrifices and work, intensive, selfless work; that in the face of total danger, ruin,
anarchy, famine, and foreign invasion, we must all take up our work, friendly
and hand in hand; that we must save our life and motherland.
But these leaders merely make speeches at conferences. And if among them
the braver ones are found who in their speeches use phrases about the urgent
necessity to organize,55 these words against the background of their activity
sound insincere and unconvincing. And they are silenced by the demagogic
speeches of those who promise everything free, without any effort. Although in
the end they will give nothing, they are believed nevertheless and listened to.
And when the hour strikes, when these leaders also see light and understand,
when they want to say a sobering word, they will realize that they have no words
that can awaken hearts; that they themselves have shattered the most sacred
conceptions. They will not be obeyed, and in place of words they will have just
the facts of economics, and the masses will understand only these. But how much
suffering could be spared Russia if some prophet were found who would know how
to read and translate in time, in a speech intelligent to all, the stem writing on
the wall.
CHAPTER 14
Education and Welfare

ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS


671. T h e T each ing o f U krainian and t h e R em oval o f t h e Jew ish Q uota
[Zhurnaly , No. 18, March 14, 1917. The quotas on Jews in the schools were removed
by Government decision on March 4. Ibid* No. 4.]
Resolved:
To permit instruction in the Ukrainian language in the educational institu
tions of the Kiev Educational District, on the condition that measures be taken
to protect the interests of the minority of the students.
672. C riticism o f t h e N ew M in ister o f E ducation
[.Izvestiia, No. 30, April 1,1917, p. 3.]
At the meeting of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, held in
Petrograd on March 18, the question of the activities of the Ministry of Educa
tion and the necessity of firmly controlling it were touched upon among other
subjects under discussion. At the same time, the readers of Den learned that
Minister of Education Professor Manuilov, upon asking the well-known peda
gogue Gerd to fill the office of Director of Education of the Petrograd district,
refused to accept his services after he was informed of Mr. Gerds demands.
[These demands] could be summed up as defining the aims of the department
in terms of democratization and decentralization. Negotiations were broken off
and the Minister of the new order stated that such a program was inadmissible.
This is a strange Ministry, indeed! Others have already announced their princi
pal aims, have by their actions indicated their blood ties with the new [social]
order, but what is this? [This Ministry] leaves everything as it was before.
Having removed the notorious reactionary, the Moscow Curator, Tikhomirov,
the Ministry is trying to decide on someone else from the old guard whom it might
take out of circulation, forgetting what a dangerous force these servants of the
old regime represent, even in the capacity of instructors in secondary schools.
Professor Manuilov feels secure in his judgment of those of his colleagues who
were placed in influential positions by the liberal Ministry of P. N. Ignafev,
but this he should not feel. In addition to the fact that the Ignatev trend [of
thought] far from corresponds to the spirit of the present moment and to the
democratic future of our native land, many leading educators and people active
in education in their localities (in the management of school districts, in inspec
tions, on the board of directors) are people who were brought up under the
former condition of slavery, and they are organically alien to the new de
mands. . . .
772 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies must take steps to establish
a school-life atmosphere that corresponds to the nature of the new order. The
traditional methods that have had a disastrous effect on schools must be radically
abolished, so that the objects of educationthe pupils, the subjects, the teachers
can get a breath of the fresh air that the revolution brought with it, instead of
languishing as previously in an atmosphere of prohibition, rules, oppression,
deprivation of rights, and deadening subordination. Let there at least be a control
committee appointed until there is a change in the entire governing personnel.
Otherwise what kind of new wine is this in old, moldy bottles!
In characterizing the Ministry under Professor Manuilov, it is interesting to
note his order on granting those teachers who were removed on account of their
political convictions permission to teach, and appointing them to the available
openings for teachers.
What is all this about? Show some heart, Citizen Minister! It is true that in
your casea person who was in his time removed from the university on political
groundsthe ministerial post turned out to be free; but who was it that freed
this post from your predecessor if not the people who were persecuted for their
convictions? And not last among them were those who, by virtue of their profes
sion, transmitted their convictions to the youth, and created feelings of dissatis
faction with the regime.
It seems sufficient to you if people who have been handicapped by the old
regime are given hope of returning to their earlier work in the event that an
opening arises. An original method of exercising power!1

673. T h e In crease m t h e S a la ry o f E lem en tary S c h o o l T each ers


[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 994.]
According to the official records of March 28, 1917, the Provisional Govern
ment decreed:
I. To increase as of March 1,1917, the basic salary rate of elementary school
teachers of all designations in schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Education, and, equally, of substitute teachers at these schools, who are receiving
subsidies from the State from 360 rubles to 600 rubles per year.
III. To direct the Minister of Education to issue grants in suchamounts as
to bring the salaries of the above-mentioned (section I) teachers up to 600 rubles
per year, to zemstvo and municipal organs of self-government, village associa
tions, and military and military-economic administrations of Astrakhan5, Oren
burg, Ural, Siberian, Amur, and Ussurii Cossack forces; where such establish
ments do not exist and for teachers in ministerial schools,2 [the grants shall be
issued to] the directors of elementary schools. . . .
IV. To instruct the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod to givecon
sideration to the question of corresponding salary increases for teachers in church-
parochial schools.
1 See Doc. 691.
2As contrasted with schools under the jurisdiction of zemstvos and municipal organi-
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 773
674. T he R egional Congress of th e A ll -R ussian T eachers U nion
in P etrograd
[.Den9, No. 29, April 9,1917, p. 5.]
Yesterday at the session of the All-Russian Teachers Congress, Ya. Ya. Gure
vich reported on the part taken by the organized teachers in the reorganization of
the school. In particular, the reporter considered it necessary to simplify the
orthography and to eliminate Church-Slavonic and foreign languages as compul
sory subjects. As a general measure the democratization of the schools should
be recognized, i.e., the schools should be uniform, accessible to all, and close to
the population. Then the next task should be to form an advisory board attached
to the Ministry, consisting of representatives from the teachers, from the Peasants
Union, from the Soviet of Workers and Peasants Deputies, from the coopera
tives, and from the local organs of self-government. This board will have to
direct the activity of the Ministry and will be an organ linking the department
with the teachers.
Many teachers participated in the debate on this report who were generally
in agreement with the reporters views and who merely introduced some amend
ments.
At that point the Minister of Education, A. A. Manuilov, made his appearance
in the conference room and was met with loud cheers.
Taking the rostrum, the Minister addressed those present in the following
words:
You are surely interested in how the Ministry understands its duties. We are
but provisional executives. We must contribute to the expression of the popular
will, to the clearing of the path for freedom. All the rest must be entrusted to the
Constituent Assembly. But we also have work now which cannot be delayed.
We must immediately take a number of urgent measures necessitated by the
reform of the schools. Reform of the schools I understand to be, first of all, the
democratization of the schools, i.e., their adaptation to the needs of a democratic
Russia.
The reforms should be carried out at the earliest date, so that the new school
year can start under the conditions of the democratic school. In order to achieve
this reform immediately, the Ministry intends to convene at the earliest possible
date a special conference, attached to the Ministry and composed of elected per
sons having direct contact with national education. I promise you, gentlemen,
that the school reform project worked out by the conference will be submitted by
the Ministry to the Provisional Government unaltered, the Ministry reserving
for itself only the right of criticism. I hope that this conference will meet in the
second half of May. Rest assured that the labors of this congress, as well as the
labors of other teachers conferences, will be taken into consideration by the
Ministry and will serve as directives for its work.
Replying to the Minister, V. I. Chemolusskii, chairman of the conference, said:
It is my duty as a citizen to tell you the whole truth. The teachers would like
to help the Minister, as their fellow worker for the cause of national education,
but we must state in all frankness that we are alarmed and resentful; the revolu
tion has taken place in the country, the country has received freedom, but there
is no freedom within the walls of the schools. Yesterday, the Curator of the
Petrograd District, A. A. Voronov, appealed to our patience. But life does not
wait. Formal law should step aside before the demands of life. It is impossible
to wait one single day. It is necessary to put into practice immediately a number
774 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
of reform measures. The major urgent demands dictated by life itself are the
following: such odious institutions as the black committees and scholarly censor
ship, and also such organs as the direction and the inspection of public schools,
should be abolished immediately; school committees, which life has, in fact,
almost eliminated, should also be officially abolished; the School Council attached
to the Holy Synod should be abolished immediately; the Ministry must imme
diately proclaim complete freedom for teachers organizations, conferences, and
unions. The basic salary of the teachers, which has been raised to 600 rubles a
year by the present Ministry, cannot be considered adequate, etc.
The teachers entertain a negative attitude toward the personnel of the present
Ministry. We entertain no feelings of anger. We do not seek revenge. With
brotherly love we shall accept in our midst all those who wish to work with us;
but we doubt that persons brought up in the spirit of the schools5 oppression and
who were the executors of such trends could work in the new direction. We
believe in the necessity of immediately creating at the Ministry an organ that
would solve all the urgent measures and would prepare the future basic reform
of the schools.
Replying to the address by V. I. Chernolusskii, A. A. Manuilov pointed out
that the Ministry is not satisfied with the raise in teachers salaries, but that at
present nothing more can be done. . . . Further, the Minister stated that he
welcomes criticism of the departments work; that the success of the work depends
on criticism* . . . To be sure, outwardly it would appear that few changes
occurred locally, but actually changes did take place. No circulars from the old
times are now in effect. They are merely left on paper* All that remains is to
abolish them formally. Accusations that people have not been replaced are without
foundation . . . We must eliminate everything that hinders the proper develop
ment of the schools. But we should not introduce radical reforms with one stroke
of the pen. The Ministry purged the higher schools of the element placed there
from the top. It reconstituted the personnel of the curators of the educational
districts. But very likely the entire institution of curators will be replaced by
other organs.
So far as the personnel of the Ministry itself is concerned, the assistants to the
Minister were replaced. Other persons were also removed. And gradually the
personnel will be changed. Only those will remain who can and are willing to
work under the new conditions and in the new direction.
We must not forget that the Constituent Assembly will hardly deal first with
school matters. We should be prepared to face the fact that the school will have
to continue its work under the conditions created now.
*

The Congress responded with no particular enthusiasm to the speech of the


Minister.

675. Commentary on th e D emocratization of the S chools


[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 76, April 7,1917, p. 3.]
. . . In Russia, the foundation of elementary education was laid by zemstvos
and municipalities, whereas the State, in the persons of the Ministers of Educa
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 775
tion, until the turn of the present century, appropriated for public schools com
pletely insignificant sums. While giving nothing to zemstvos and municipalities
for the task of public education, the Ministry of Education, during the last third
of the past century, enmeshed the zemstvo and municipal schools in a thick net
of restrictions and subjected them to the educational-police control of government
inspectors who acted not so much as pedagogical agents but rather as agents for
watching the loyalty of the teachers and the conformity of the course of instruc
tion to the views and interests of the autocracy. The inspectors of public schools
succeeded in evoking the extreme dislike of both teachers and zemstvo workers
in the realm of elementary instruction.
Having laid a foundation of universal education, the zemstvos and munici
palities found themselves unable, because of lack of means, to finish in any fore
seeable future this huge structure without help from the State Treasury. And
beginning with 1908, the State has been helping the zemstvos and municipalities
in the task of elementary instruction by granting government funds for the remu
neration of teachers and for erecting school buildings. These funds gave great
assistance to the task of universal education. Russia quickly began to be covered
by a network of elementary schools, the growth of which proceeded at a fabu
lously fast tempo. The years 1908-14 will be marked in the realm of elementary
education in Russia as the epoch of the fast forging ahead in the development of
elementary education. It is only fair to mention the generosity with which the
Third and Fourth Dumas appropriated money for the task of universal education
in Russia.
But the government appropriations to zemstvos and municipalities for uni
versal education also increased the power of the agencies of the Ministry of
Education over the elementary schools, and the power of the Ministry of Educa
tion over the elementary schools was always borne by the zemstvos and municipali
ties of Russia as a heavy burden. And it was also such a burden for the teachers.
That is why, when the old regime fell and the chains of autocracy were broken,
the very first regional teachers congress in Moscow loudly proclaimed: Down
with the hated inspectors of public schools! Down with the school councils! All
power in the schools to the teachers! In certain localities, by the will of the
teaching personnel both the school councils and inspectors of public schools
were abolished, and the leadership in the business of public instruction was
assumed by school committees of teachers.
All these manifestations are quite understandable as a painful reaction against
the age-old oppression by the old regime. But it would be a mistake to adopt the
described means as a way out. If teachers are to take part in the administration
of elementary schools, then it ought to be alongside representatives of the zemstvo
and municipal self-government and horribile dictaalongside the organs of
state power in the persons of the officials of the Ministry of Education. The
central governmental power, which spends huge sums for elementary education,
cannot be eliminated from participation in the administration of elementary
schools. It must be remembered, however, that that power is in the hands of its
new representatives, to whom one must not transfer the feelings that had been
evoked by the old regime.
Nowhere in the world are public schools in the hands of self-governing
teachers. Such a situation will not prevail in Russia either, of course. The road
to the reform of elementary education does not lie in the capture of power by
776 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
teachers committees, nor in the abolition of regional boards of education with
out authority ( ! ) but in the issuance by the Provisional Government of a new
statute of elementary schools which must be published not later than July, by
the opening of the next school year. The energy of the Russian teacher body at
the present time must be directed precisely toward cooperation in the task of
working out this new law on elementary schools.
676. T h e B r o a d en in g o f V o c a t io n a l E d u c a t io n
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 702.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment and supplement of existing statutes concerning industrial
schools and the Department of Industrial Schools of the Ministry of Education,
it is decreed:
A. Concerning vocational schoolsclasses, courses, and institutions for the
dissemination of vocational knowledge.
I. Vocational schools: classes and courses as well as various institutions pro
moting the dissemination of vocational knowledge shall be under the jurisdiction
of the Department of Vocational Education of the Ministry of Education.
II. On vocational schools:
1. Vocational schools shall be divided into 1) technical colleges, 2) trade
colleges, and 3) trade schools.
2. The educational institutions mentioned in article 1 shall have the follow
ing purposes: a) technical collegesto train persons who will be theoretically
and practically expert in a definite branch of technical knowledge; b) trade col
legesto impart applied knowledge and skills necessary for practical work in a
definite industry; and c) trade schoolsto train, primarily by means of practical
instruction, expert and skilled workers in definite industries or crafts.
3. The course of study in technical colleges shall last four years, in trade col
leges not less than three years, and in trade schools in accordance with the specialty
and tasks of each school.
4. Admission to the first class shall be as follows: a) technical colleges
graduates of at least the upper primary school, b) trade collegesgraduates of
at least the two-year elementary school, and c) trade schoolsgraduates of at
least the one-year elementary school under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Education. All the above vocational schools may also admit persons by exami
nation in the curriculum of the respective schools named above.
5. Vocational schools may be either mens, womens, or coeducational.
6. In each vocational school supported completely by Treasury funds or with
assistance from local sources, and in each of the divisions of the technical col
lege, from 20 to 50 government scholarships shall be made available: in the tech
nical college amounting to 300 rubles, in the trade college to 240 rubles, and in
the trade school to 180 rubles per year each.
7. School councils shall confer the following titles on graduates of vocational
educational institutions: a) of the technical collegetechnician of the respective
specialty with the right to perform work in this specialty from plans prepared by
an engineer, b) of die trade collegeforeman, and c) of the trade schoolap
prentice. After successful practical work in their specialty for three years, the
above persons may receive from the school councils of the appropriate vocational
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 111

school the following titles: the firstengineer in the specialty studies with the
right to perform corresponding work, the secondforeman-technician, and the
thirdforeman; persons in the second and third groups, on reaching the age of
21, shall enjoy the rights granted to foremen who have received this title from
trade boards.
12. The positions in vocational schools mentioned in the schedule annexed
hereto may be filled by either men or women . - .
13. The organization, method of administration, and curriculum of voca
tional schools, and the composition and duties of school and supervisory councils,
in accordance with local conditions and needs as well as with the tasks and
specialty of the educational institutions, shall be determined by their founders,
observing the requirements of the present law, and shall be approved by the
Minister of Education.
III. On courses and institutions for the dissemination of vocational knowledge :
1. Vocational courses shall be designed to impart information and skills in
one or more branches of technical knowledge.
2. In addition to courses of special technical knowledge and skills, permanent
and temporary courses may be set up for the training of teachers and directors
of vocational schools and courses.
3. The organization and method of administration of courses, the extent of
instruction in subjects, as well as the degree of previous preparation required of
persons entering the courses, shall be determined by special rules prepared by the
founders in conformity with the tasks of the courses.
IV. Vocational schools: classes, courses, and institutions for the dissemina
tion of vocational knowledge may be organized and maintained by funds of the
Treasury and of zemstvo, municipal, and other institutions of public administra
tion, social classes, societies, commercial and industrial associations, various
establishments and bodies, and private persons. If local funds prove inadequate,
the Minister of Education shall be authorized, using appropriations specially re
quested under the estimate, to grant the institutions mentioned interest-free loans
and assistance from the Treasury both for organization and equipment and for
their annual maintenance to the extent necessary, but not more than three-fourths
of the total expenditure required for each of the needs mentioned. The procedure
for granting the assistance and loans mentioned, as well as for the repayment of
the latter, shall be determined by rules laid down by the Minister of Education
in agreement with the Minister of Finance and the State Controller.
11. For the discussion of questions of an educational nature, as well as with
a view to cooperation between the central administration and the representatives
of local instruction and practical technique, a committee on vocational education
shall be formed in the Department of Vocational Education on the following lines:
(a) this committee, under the chairmanship of a special person appointed by the
Minister of Education, shall include: (1) one representative each from every type
of vocational school, all to be elected for one year by their respective colleagues
under a procedure to be determined by the Minister of Education; (2) persons
known for their activity in the field of practical technique or vocational education,
778 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
at the invitation of the Minister of Education; (3) representatives of public ad
ministrations and organizations during the discussion of matters affecting voca
tional education in the given area; and (4) the director, vice-directors of the
Department, and representatives for matters of vocational education . . .
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 9, 1917
677. A R ecommendation for V ocational Courses in the
S econdary S chools
[Article in Izvestiia, No. 44, April 18, 1917, p. 3.]
Izvestiia has already pointed out the strange phenomenon that Mr. Manuilov,
who was promoted to the post of Minister of Education by the revolution, appar
ently ignores those responsibilities that have been made incumbent on him by the
confidence of the democratic forces. Professor Manuilov offers generalities and
that is all. In the meantime, democratic Russia definitely wants a complete re
organization of the elementary, secondary, and higher systems of education. . . .
Russian democracy is also interested in having a uniform secondary school sys
tem, which would not merely serve as a preparatory step toward university edu
cation, but would offer a well-rounded education and would turn out people who
are adjusted to life. Our secondary school must be a trade and labor school. On
a level with subjects such as Russian, literature, arithmetic, and geometry, which
must all be taught by completely different methods, as well as new languages,
hygiene, natural sciences, logic, psychology, economic geography, history of social
thought, political economy, statistics, accounting, bookkeeping, and marketing,
courses must be given in all types of trades, and every graduate of the school must
be in perfect command of no less than two [such trades]. Let there be ten grades
in the school and let the course of studies take eleven years, but at least let it then
have some meaning.
Only such a school will turn out useful citizens. The products of such a school
will not be frightened by the red phantom of social revolution which society will
create and in which there will be no place for parasitic gentlemen of leisure.
B. G.
678. T he E stablishment of C oeducation in the Gymnasia,
Pro-Gymnasia, and Real S chools
[Sa6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 563. For a description of these schools, see Ignatiev et al.,
Russian Schools and Universities in the World War, p. 28fL]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of existing statutes it is decreed:
I. The Minister of Education is authorized to establish from Treasury funds,
within the limits of the amounts appropriated under the estimate, gymnasia, pro
gymnasia, and real schools for the coeducation of children, and to permit zemstvo,
municipal, and other institutions of public administration, social classes, parishes,
societies, associations, and private persons to open such schools with their own
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 779
funds. Existing statutes governing boys9gymnasia, -pro-gymnasia, and real schools
shall apply to the aforesaid educational institutions, with the following exceptions:
I. All positions in coeducational institutions, with the exception of the posi
tion of teacher of religion, may be held by women.3
3. Women appointed to positions in coeducational institutions must have the
same education and teachers9 credentials as are required of men holding corre
sponding positions in boys9 educational institutions. They shall enjoy the rights
to salary, increments, and pensions designated for the positions held by them . . .
and shall receive, during official travel and travel to their place of duty, travel
and subsistence allowances and payments on the same basis and in the same
amounts as are established for men holding corresponding positions.
II. The Minister of Education shall be authorized, on petition of the school
authorities, confirmed by a resolution of the local public administration, to trans
form existing gymnasia , pro-gymnasia, and real schools into coeducational in
stitutions of the corresponding type.
P rince L9vov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov , Minister of Education
V lad. N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 24, 1917
679. A pproval of the E stablishment of F our-Y ear (S enior )
Gymnasia and Real S chools
[S<?5. Uzak., 1,1, No. 600. See Ignatiev et al., Russian Schools and Universities in the
World War, pp. 6-7, 28-29, and Doc. 683, for a discussion of the need for these
changes.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of relevant statutes it is decreed:
I. The Minister of Education is authorized to establish four-year gymnasia
and four-year real schools either completely from Treasury funds, within the limits
of the amounts appropriated, or with assistance from local sources, and to permit
zemstvo, municipal, and other institutions of public administration, social classes,
parishes, private institutions, and persons to open such schools from their own
funds, with or without assistance from the Treasury. Existing statutes governing
boys9gymnasia and real schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Educa
tion shall apply to the aforesaid schools.
II. Students who have completed the course of the upper primary schools shall
be admitted to the first class of the four-year gymnasia and the four-year real
schools without further examination. All other persons wishing to enter the first
class of the four-year gymnasia and real schools shall be admitted only after an
entrance examination covering the course of the upper primary school.
III. The assignment of instruction in subjects of the school curriculum and
8 The appointment of women to certain teaching positions in boys secondary schools was
authorized by law, April 28,1917. Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 601.
780 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the number of lessons by classes of the four-year gymnasia and real schools shall
be determined by the Minister of Education.
IV. The number of persons employed and the amounts of their remuneration
and of the funds required for the maintenance of the four-year gymnasia or the
four-year real school shall be determined by the organization tables attached
hereto.4
V. Graduates of the four-year gymnasia and the four-year real schools shall
enjoy all rights of graduates of the eight-year boys9gymnasia and seven-year real
schools, as appropriate.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov , Minister of Education
V lad. N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 28,1917
680. N ew S tatute on T eacher T raining S chools
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 873. Institutions for the training of elementary school teachers.
See Doc. 689 on teachers* colleges.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of existing statutes concerning teacher training schools, it
is hereby decreed:
1. Teacher training schools are secondary educational institutions and con
sist of four classes; they may be mens, womens, and coeducational.
2. One or two preparatory classes, parallel classes, and dormitories may be
established in teacher training schools.
3. Graduates of two-class elementary schools5 are admitted to the preparatory
class of the training school; graduates of upper primary schools or equivalent
educational institutions are admitted to the first class; students who have passed
an examination covering the curriculum of the respective schools may also be
admitted to the preparatory and first classes.
4. In order to furnish students with an opportunity for practice teaching, two-
class elementary schools with a six-year curriculum are established in conjunction
with the training schools.
5. The director (directress) and men and women teachers of scientific sub
jects are chosen from Russian subjects with higher education. Men and women
teachers of local languages, graphic arts, physical exercise, singing and music,
and manual labor, as well as women teachers of needlework, are chosen from Rus
sian subjects with at least secondary education who have, in addition, obtained
* On June 14, 1917, 5,415,714 rubles were appropriated for the opening of one hundred
four-year gymnasia and real schools, five teachers colleges, twenty-five teacher training schools,
and an unspecified number of upper primary schools (see, however, Doc. 683) in 1917. Sob.
Uzak., 1,2, No. 863. On June 17,1917, the Minister of Education was authorized in appropriate
cases to reorganize eight-year gymnasia and seven-year real schools as four-year schools and
to use the funds made available by the discontinuance of the lower classes for the expenditures
connected with the reorganization and further arrangement of four-year secondary schools.
1UL, No. 877.
5 For a description of the one-class, two-class elementary schools, see Ignatiev et al.,
Russian Schools and Universities in the World War, p. 3.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 781
teachers credentials for the above-mentioned subjects and arts in secondary edu
cational institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Men
and women teachers of the elementary schools attached to the training schools are
chosen from Russian subjects, graduates of teachers colleges or teacher training
schools, and also from persons with secondary education who have qualified as
men or women elementary school teachers and who have completed pedagogical
courses (classes).
6. Teachers of non-Orthodox religions and religious doctrine in those training
schools where students learning the aforesaid religions or religious doctrines make
up not less than half of the entire student body are chosen from Russian subjects
with at least secondary education and enjoy all salary and pension rights indi
cated in the organization table of teacher training schools.
7. The subjects of instruction in teacher training schools and the scope of the
curriculum, which shall be not lower than the level of the curriculum in subjects
of general instruction in secondary educational institutions, are approved by the
Minister of Education. The detailed programs of study and immediate organi
zation of the academic section are determined by the school council of the training
school or by a conference of training school inspectors of the guberniya or other
academic-administrative district.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. Manuilov , Minister of Education
June 14, 1917
681. T he I ntroduction of th e N ew Orthography
[Circular No. 6717, June 22,1917, of the Minister of Education, Zhurnal Ministerstva
Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, LXXI (September 1917), 41-43.]
By instructions in Circular No. 5456, dated May 17, the Ministry of Educa
tion informed you that a special conference at the Academy of Sciences, under
the chairmanship of Academician A. A. Shakhmatov, recognized that it was timely
and expedient to conduct a simplification of Russian orthography and proposed
that you adopt, without delay, as of the commencement of the forthcoming school
year, measures for carrying out the reforms as outlined by the above-mentioned
conference.
I request that you accept the following guiding principles when enforcing the
present legislation in the schools:
1. The reform in orthography shall be carried out gradually, beginning with
the lowest division of the elementary school. In this division the application of
the new orthography shall immediately be compulsory in reading instructions;
in this connection teachers should familiarize the children with the [four] ex
cluded letters (ft, I, 0, V), but only when the teachers may find this appropriate
after the new orthography has been mastered. In the upper division of elemen
tary schools, in upper primary schools, and in secondary schools it shall be neces
sary only to recommend that students change over to the new spelling.
2. The projected reform must be carried out in full and cannot be imple
mented piecemeal, by applying separate parts in the course of the forthcoming
school year.
3* In carrying out the reform it is necessary to avoid coercion of the pupils;
782 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
therefore compulsory relearning for those who had already mastered the rules
of the former orthography cannot be permitted; in this connection, the teacher
must be patient with the spelling of the pupils and, while encouraging the whole
class to change to the new orthography, must not force individual pupils in the
class to do so against their wishes. Accordingly, every class may have two groups
those writing in the old and those writing in the new orthography. There must
be no third group; a disorganized combination of both systems cannot be tol
erated, as it would run counter to the accomplishment of the reform in its totality
and would destroy the very basis of orthography itself.
4. With respect to persons taking entrance examinations, it is necessary to be
guided by the following instructions:
a. For them the only spelling requirements remaining in force are those that
are common to both the old and the new orthography, and only violations of
these rules shall be counted as mistakes.
b. Those preparing for examinations on the new orthography must not be
expected to meet the requirements of the old orthography.
c. All instances of writing that do not violate the rules of either the new or
the old orthography cannot be considered as mistakes.
5. When the new orthography is introduced in the school during the present
year, it will be necessary to consider the unavoidable circumstance that no primers
adapted to the new orthography, so desirable at least for the lowest division of the
elementary school, will be at the disposal of the school, and therefore that, in
teaching reading, it will be necessary to use old primers. The new orthography,
however, shall be introduced in teaching writing by making extensive use of
alphabet cards, after having eliminated the extra letters from them, and by neces
sarily devoting greater time to writing.
6. In order to clarify the purpose of the reform and enlist the confidence of
the public, the parents, and the pupils in the present legislation of the Ministry,
which has been worked out by a special conference at the Academy of Sciences
and supported by the State Committee of the Ministry of Education, it is neces
sary to make it clear in every possible way that the present simplification of
Russian orthography by no means aims at introducing an arbitrary, fanatical
system of writing, but that, on the contrary, the new orthography represents a
scientifically based system, which preserves all the old foundations of our orthog
raphy and aims only at establishing a correspondence between writing, on the
one hand, and the phonetic components and etymological construction of the living
literary language, on the other hand. Small brochures, articles expounding the
new rules of orthography and giving a brief but at the same time scholarly justi
fication for them, publication of samples [of writing using] the new orthography,
little reference dictionaries, as well as discussions with and lectures for pupils
could serve this purpose. Concurrently with the work that the Ministry plans to
carry out in this field, it would be desirable to draw university groups working
on linguistics, the Society of Russian Language Teachers, and, in general, all
persons working in this field into participation in this work.
7. Despite the attempt to provide for all possible situations connected with
the introduction of the new orthography, difficulties may nevertheless arise which
the teacher will be unable to resolve; these should then be resolved locally in the
Russian Language Teachers Committees and in Pedagogical Councils.
Confident that teachers will give proper attention to the present reform and
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 783
will exert all their efforts to implementing it in the most effective manner, I request
that you issue the necessary instructions for the acceptance of the above guiding
principles when introducing the reform in Russian orthography into schools
during the forthcoming school year.
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education

682. S upport for th e O rthographic R eform


[Article in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 123, June 2, 1917, p. 2. Some of the criticisms of
the reform are discussed in ibid., No. 147, June 30, 1917, p. 5, and No. 206, September
8, 1917, p. 2.]
Newspapers have informed their readers that the Minister of Education has
directed the curators of school districts to take steps to realize the orthographic
reform, beginning with the next school year. This is a fact of exceptional impor
tance. The Russian school has tensely awaited it for more than fifteen years. And
nowthe longed-for moment is at hand. . . .
. . . Serious thinking began concerning the necessity of simplifying Russian
spelling as early as 1901. It was spoken of first in the Moscow Pedagogical Asso
ciation, and, since 1904, this question has been worked over in a special commis
sion at the Academy of Sciences. The project of the reform has long since passed
all the preliminary discussion stages; it has successfully weathered the storm of
opposition; and, in spite of all the sharp vacillations of our political barometer,
it more than outlived the statute of limitations, not only keeping its supporters
but gaining lasting sympathies of school workers and friends of education. Not
to go too far, I shall bring to attention here the resolution of the First All-Russian
Congress of Public Education (Petrograd, 191314) and the First All-Russian
Congress of Teachers of the Russian Language in Secondary Schools (Moscow,
1916-17). In the first place, they waited for the commission of the Academy of
Sciences to wind up its work formally; second, and more important, everyone
waited for a favorable attitude toward the measure to form at the top. It was no
secret to anyone that reactionary Ministers of Educationand other ministers,
toowould not support this reform, as they did not support anything that tended
to benefit the common people. A last, the revolution created the necessary climate.
The Academy gave a favorable reply to the petition of the Congress of Teachers
of the Russian Language, and at the head of the Ministry were men who were able
to understand the interests of Russian education. On May 11 a conference on
orthography took place at the Academy of Sciences, under the chairmanship of
the member of the Academy, A. A. Shakhmatov, with Assistant Minister of Edu
cation 0. P. Gerasimov and many representatives of science, literature, and edu
cation participating. The conference sanctioned the project of simplification; the
Ministry immediately assumed the task of realizing the reform within the confines
of the school. Such is the genesis of the published Circular of the Minister.
Of course, one has to weigh very carefully all the practical difficulties that the
reform will face. The order of its realization must be considered by competent
pedagogical and public institutions. According to my information, the Ministry
intends to proceed in precisely that way. There is no doubt at all that the reform
of orthography will meet with complete sympathy on the part of Russian teachers.
. . . More than that: the reform merits widest public support. Its scholarly and
784 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
pedagogical bases have been discussed many times with such painstaking care
that tibe possibility of serious blunders is eliminated. . . .
. . . The simplification is not being undertaken for the benefit of little-edu
cated people, but primarily for scholarly and pedagogic consideration. Orthog
raphy cannot be for either lord or peasant; it must be the same for all who write.
But, at the same time, the simplification of spelling belongs to the most demo
cratic reforms: liberating writing from traditional barnacles, it will, in the most
substantial way, facilitate the learning of Russian spelling and will give an oppor
tunity to the school, particularly to the peoples school, to utilize the spiritual
forces of pupils in other, more fruitful directions. And that circumstance, as
everyone can easily understand, will be beneficially reflected in the growth of our
culture. In connection with the peoples school, the reform has colossal signifi
cance. Only the plan for universal education can be placed higher.
But is it timely to undertake the reform of spelling now? Is it proper to be
occupied now with orthography? The war, the revolution . . . ; wouldnt it be
better to wait until everything becomes a little calmer? Such skeptical and timid
speeches remind us of the perennial argument of the former government that first
of all comes pacification andafterwardreforms. For that very reason this
reform took thirteen whole years. No, all of us realize that the question of the
peoples education faces us with particular sharpness precisely at the present
moment. People need not only land and freedom, but enlightenment as well. The
aim of the reformers is not to realize the reform on the sly, but to supply an
answer to one of the most pressing needs of the country. Everything is valuable
in its proper time. Any delay would only be harmful. . . .
P. S akulin

683. A S ummary of th e F irst T hree M onths of R eform in E ducation


[Article in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 144, June 27,1917, p. 3.]
In some newspaper articles and in certain resolutions we have come across
reproaches aimed at the present Ministry of Education for lack of energy in the
matter of revitalizing our educational system. Yet, during the short period of its
existence, this Ministry has realized a most important reform of the whole system
of public education in the most profoundly democratic direction.
Something has been accomplished to which, vainly albeit persistently, our
advanced public elements have aspired for the past nine decades. The educational
institutions of various levels have been linked into a single chain, and this has
finally removed the obstacles that so greatly hampered the access to higher schools
by elementary school pupils.
Long ago, during the reign of Alexander I, we had a system in operation in
which schools of various ranks formed a continuous ascending ladder. In the
reign of Nicholas I this system was demolished, and afterward down to the
present year, a directly opposite order of things prevailed which placed an im
penetrable barrier between the elementary and the secondary school. . . . And
now, thanks to the measures of the present Ministry of Education, which have just
been confirmed by the Provisional Government, a radical change of that order
has been effected, making a decisive step on the road to true democratization of
the entire system of public education in Russia. State-supported schools, accord
ing to the just-approved legislation, will be arranged in the form of two parallel
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 785
laddersgeneral educational schools and professional schoolsin such a way that
from every rung there will be completely free access either to the next rung of
the same ladder or to the corresponding rung of the other ladder. Thus, the sys
tem of general educational schools begins with elementary schools. The pupil of
an elementary school can either transfer into the lower trade or professional school
or continue general education by entering the upper primary school, correspond
ing to the first four classes of the present-day gymnasia . Therefore, the present-
day eight-class gymnasia will be subject to gradual transformation into four-class
ones, with the first four gymnasia classes changing into upper primary schools.
From the upper primary school there will be free access, at the students choice,
either into the secondary trade and professional school or into the four-class
gymnasia which will correspond to the last four classes of the present-day gym
nasia (fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth). Finally, there will be free entrance, from
the four-class gymnasia, either into the university or into the higher technical and
professional schools. Thus, this reform removes all barriers between separate
steps of education, and places at the disposal of all classes of people equal free
dom in passing through all these steps, as befits a free democratic state. . . .
. . . In direct line with this democratization of education is the reform of
spelling. This reform is being commented on in various ways by many persons.
They see in it some sort of political measure, and they either praise or denounce
it from that point of view. And yet, the reform of spelling resulted from purely
scholastic considerations, with no relation whatever to politics. . . . But, speak
ing in practical terms, the reform of orthography will undoubtedly facilitate the
preparation of elementary school pupils for transfer to higher schools, releasing
immediately for more serious studies a great deal of time formerly spent on the
intricacies of orthography, which, however, had no scholarly justification.
The present reform is supplemented by other important innovations too. They
are the transfer of parochial schools into the care of the Ministry of Education,6
the abolition of all restrictions in selection of books and texts for schools and
libraries,7 and the establishing of complete freedom of private family instruc
tion.8 . . . The order of management of elementary and secondary schools is
also radically changed: supervision over them is transferred in its entirety to the
organs of local self-government.9 The Ministry still outlines the general plan of
instructional affairs, systematically gathering data on the progress of these affairs
and arranging various demonstration museums, exhibits, and the like, which might
serve as model guides.
In regard to higher education, already a number of changes in the university
statutes have been introduced which have been suggested in the recent conference
of professors. . . . A new procedure in electing professors has been introduced
which represents a unique combination of competition and recommendation; rules
have been adopted providing for participation of instructors and lecturers in the
councils of the faculties; a policy of encouraging students to participate in various
commissions which deal with certain aspects of university life has been adopted.
The power of curators of educational districts [popechiteli uchebnovo okruga]
6The legislation and other documentation on this issue are to be found in Chapter 15.
7Zhurnaly, No. 110, June 17, 1917.
s Ibid.
9Ibid., No. 72, May 8,1917, and Doc. 686.
786 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
over the universities has been abolished altogether. The higher courses for
women are transformed into universities.10
Such are the organizational measures realized by the Ministry. As the reader
can see, they add up to a most important reform which embraces all stages of
public education and gives a strong impetus for its further development on free
and democratic principles. Regarding the increase in the number of educational
institutions, the establishment of a polytechnical school in Tiflis and universities
with technical departments in Irkutsk and Tashkent must be noted. The Perm
branch of the Petrograd University is reorganized into an independent university.
Besides that, with the new school year, 100 new four-class gymnasia are to be
opened (before this there were fewer than 700 government gymnasia altogether),
as well as 250 new upper primary schools (there were only 1,660 before).
Let us also note that all these measures have been realized within the course
of three months.
A. K iz e v e t t e r
684. T h e S ta t e C o m m it t e e o n E d u c a tio n a n d A. A. M a n u il o v
[.Izvestiia, No. 106, July 1, 1917, p. 6. The State Committee was established at the
Ministry of Education and charged with the preparation of reforms. In addition to the
groups and organizations mentioned below, teaching staffs of elementary schools,
parents5organizations, the All-Russian Union of Railwaymen, university students, and
specialists in education were also represented. Ignatiev, Russian Schools and Univer
sities in the World War, pp. 121-22, and Rech\ No. 170, July 22, 1917, p. 4. The
resignation of Manuilov in connection with the beginnings of the July political crisis
eased the conflict between the Ministry and the Committee and contributed to the
growth of the latters influence. P. P. Preobrazhenskii served as Acting Minister until
the appointment of S. F. Oldenburg. Ibid.]
Public education must occupy a foremost place among the problems that con
cern the democracy. . . . Unfortunately, in the heat of the revolutionary struggle,
in the turmoil of military anxieties, and with the necessity of exerting every effort
to combat economic disorganization, our democratic organizations could not until
now devote sufficient attention to demands for the reorganization of the Russian
school [system]. This accounts for the sad phenomenon, which is common knowl
edge, that everything in the school world has remained the same as in the past,
the same as it had been under the autocracy. . . .
There is no need to look for the parties responsible for this sad situation.
There is no need to argue about the reasons for this deathly lull which prevails
in our school world. . . . One must try to find a way out of the situation so that
the lull . . . will be supplanted by a streak of intensive, creative work.
It is from this point of view that one must examine the recent conflict between
the State Committee on Education and the Minister of Education.
The State Committee consists of representatives of many organizations which
command authority, [such as] the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the
All-Russian Teachers Union, the Executive Committee of the State Duma, the
Council of All-Russian Congresses of Cooperatives, the All-Russian Union of Zem
stvos, the All-Russian Union of Towns, the Union of Academies, and the Bureau
of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies. Two days ago this Committee
10 For documents on higher education, see section following.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 787
adopted unanimously a resolution which stated that continued collaboration be
tween the Committee and the Minister is futile under the present conditions, and
the Committee can no longer bear the responsibility for the progress of reforms
in education. In accordance with this resolution, the Committee suspended its
activities in order to enable the representatives to obtain instructions from their
respective organizations on the possibility of future participation in the Com
mittees work and on the conditions governing such work.
A joint meeting of the Bureau of the All-Russian Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and the Executive Bureau of the Com
mittee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies will be held today. Demo
cratic members of the Provisional Government have been invited to the meeting.
In deciding the question of the relationship between the Committee and the Min
ister, the meeting will, essentially, be deciding the future of Russian education.
Needless to say, the importance of the decisions that will be adopted at todays
meeting cannot be overemphasized.
The passive, apathetic attitude of the democracy toward education without
any doubt paved the way for the conflict in the Ministry of Education. And we
appeal to all democratic organizations to give serious thought to this problem
and to take steps so that they will not be held responsible for the ignorance and
intellectual darkness which reign in the country to the present day.

685. T h e S tate Committee on E ducation and S. F. O ldenburg


[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 175, August 2, 1917, p. 3.]
In his address of welcome before the State Committee on Education on July 26,
the new Minister of Education, S. F. Oldenburg, emphasized the urgency of the
most vigorous development of public education. He also pointed to the absence
of differences of opinion, in principle, between the Ministry and the Committee
on questions raised by the latter in its recent work. Taking his departure from
this [statement], Pinkevich, member of the Committee, expressed the hope in
Novaia ZhizrC, No. 86, that the relationship of S. F. Oldenburg with the Com
mitteean organization put under suspicion by Manuilovwill adjust itself.
And, moreover, by this adjustment the author means the duty of the new Min
ister to exert tremendous effort and energy in pushing through all the draft bills
worked out by the Committee . . . within the remaining month before the
opening of the school year. The State Committee, in the words of Mr. Pinkevich,
has done and continues to do everything to give the country a new system of
public education. The word and the deed are up to the ministers now.
No matter what tremendous effort and energy are exerted by the Ministry,
it cannot do the impossible. And if, in spite of this effort, the condition of confi
dence in the new Minister is the fulfillment of the evident, unfulfillable task, it is
not difficult to anticipate that in his relation with the Committee the same fate is
awaiting the new Minister that befell A. A. Manuilov.
It also merits attention that under the circumstances the Minister is relegated
to the role of an assiduous and obedient tool executing the plans outlined by the
State Committee, although, in essence and in accordance with its statutes, worked
788 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
out by the Committee itself, the latter is merely a deliberative organ attached to
the Minister.
But aside from this, it would be strange, to say the least, for the Minister
who is responsible for the reorganization of the school workto be confronted
with an ultimatum to accept the infallibility of the State Committee, which is
merely a deliberative and consequently an irresponsible organ. We, on our part,
in the interests of the school and the cause of public education, express the hope
that the State Committee will abandon this ironclad and irreconcilable stand in
defending its positions, which, after all, cannot he infallible. The most important
concession that the State Committee must make is in the expediency of executing
its measures, for vigor in introducing reform is by no means equivalent to haste
and rashness. The State Committee must reconcile itself to the fact that it is
impossible to achieve a reorganization of the entire school in time for the opening
of the school year. This is a chimera and a utopia. And a stubborn pursuit of its
realization will result not in benefit to educationwhich of course is what the
Committee hopes forbut in chaos and ruin, particularly in the field of the
secondary schools. Instead of undertaking the complicated and unrealizable task
of even a temporary enforcement of the new legislative standards in the admin
istration of public education and the schools, it would be well for the State Com
mittee to work out, in the short time that remains before the beginning of the
school year, those urgent measures which could, under the present circumstances,
help maintain a more or less normal course of school life, [and] protect it against
possible conflicts, seizures, and violations.
686. T h e T ransfer of the A dministration of U pper P rimary S chools
to the J urisdiction of L ocal Government
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1811.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In abrogation, amendment, and supplement of the relevant statutes, it is hereby
decreed:
1) Pending the abolition of the offices of directors and inspectors of public
schools, directors and inspectors are relieved of their duties of administration
and supervision of upper primary schools.
2) The administration and supervision of upper primary schools, existing
and to be opened on the basis of the legislation in force . . . as well as of addi
tional classes and courses in them, are entrusted to guberniya zemstvos and, in
cities set up as independent guberniya units, to municipal administrations; in
localities in which zemstvo institutions have not been introduced, pending their
introduction the aforesaid administration and supervision are entrusted to the
appropriate public administrations established by the Provisional Government.
Guberniya zemstvos are granted the right, by agreement with uezd zemstvos and
municipal administrations, to transfer the exercise of the duties entrusted to them
by the present law to uezd zemstvos and municipal administrations.
3) Credits . . . allocated from funds of the State Treasury for the mainte
nance of upper primary schools and capital, special funds, and immovable prop
erties that belong to these schools are placed under the administration of the
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 789
appropriate guberniya and uezd zemstvos and municipal administrations, respec
tively, and any capital or properties designated for a special purpose are retained
for such.
5) The offices of honorary curators of the upper elementary schools estab
lished by the statute on higher elementary schools are abolished.
6) The transfer of matters of administration and supervision of upper pri
mary schools is carried out immediately on promulgation of the present law.
A. K onovalov, Deputy Minister-President
S ergei Saiazk in , Minister of Education
September 26, 1917
687. T he P roposed R eorganization of th e A dministration of
S econdary S chools
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 228, October 6, 1917, p. 4.]
The Ministry of Education has submitted to the Provisional Government a
proposal for a radical reorganization in the administration of secondary schools.
The official title of this legislation is as follows: On establishing an electoral
method of appointment to teaching training posts in the upper primary schools,
pro-gymnasia , real schools, teacher training schools, and institutes; and on some
changes in the membership and rights of the school councils of said educational
institutions. Let us outline the basic points of the new system, which introduces
a broad decentralization in the work of the secondary school.
Henceforth the immediate administration of all the educational institutions
enumerated above will be entrusted to the school councils. The membership of
these councils is defined in the proposal as follows: in addition to the teaching
personnel of a given institution and the school doctor, two persons are included
with the voting rights representing the organs of local self-government, also repre
sentatives from parents5organizations wherever such exist. However, the number
of parents must not be in excess of one-third the number of teachers. In addition,
in the cases of institutions maintained not at the expense of the State but by private
or public funds, directors of such schools, or persons authorized by them, may be
members of the school council in the number of not more than two.
The school councils have the right, first of all, to invite new teachers to join
their staff, also to select the director, headmistress, headmaster, and inspector of
a given institution, on condition that the candidates for teaching and administra
tive posts proposed by them are approved by the local educational authority.
In the event of its refusal, new elections are conducted, and, if protested again,
the vacancies are filled at the discretion of the authority. But in addition to the
right to extend invitations, the school council also has the right to dismiss from
its staff persons from the teaching personnel. This constitutes a particularly
unique characteristic of the proposed new order. The dismissal is subject to the
following conditions:
At the close of the academic year (and in exceptional cases before the end,
with the approval of the local educational authority), as a result of a written state
ment signed by not less than one-third of the members of the school council, any
one of the teaching personnel may be subject to re-election. And if not less than
790 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
two-thirds of the votes are against him, he is considered excluded. In the event
the excluded teacher registers his protest, the case is turned over to the local edu
cational authority. If it refuses to sanction the verdict of the majority of the
council, the council itself can lodge a complaint against it with the Ministry. The
right to raise the question of conducting a reballoting in the school council on
persons from the administrative and teaching personnel in institutions maintained
by private and public funds is extended also to persons who maintain such insti
tutions and to their representatives on the school council. In addition to the above
procedure, teachers may be dismissed from their posts by order of the local edu
cational authority for reasons transmitted to the school council. The latter re
serves the right to protest against them to the Ministry.
Organized on the basis of election, the school councils of newly opened gov
ernment schools are formed as follows: their organizers are guberniya zemstvo
boards or uezd and municipal boards authorized by them. The board invites the
director or generally a person who will head the school, and this person later
suggests to the board candidates for teaching posts. In newly opened institutions
maintained by private or public funds, the owners are afforded, for the time being,
broad rights in selecting their teaching personnel. But three years from the time
of receiving equal rights with the government schools, the influence of the owner
upon the internal life of the school founded by him is reduced merely to raising
said question in the school council about reballotings or appealing to it with peti
tions about the dismissal of teachers or other members of the staff. And in the
event of the refusal of the school council, the matter is decided by the local edu
cational authority.
Organized in this fashion, the school councils are provided with the widest
plenary powers in the administration of school life as well as in the pedagogical
work of the school. They are, to be sure, bound by the same general courses of
study approved by the Ministry, but the question, for example, not only of pro
motion examinations but of final examinations is left entirely to the discretion
of the councils. They are free to preserve or eliminate them. And only in such
matters as the reorganization of the school according to a new type, the introduc
tion in the curriculum of subjects other than those included in the courses of study
approved by the Ministry, introduction of coeducation, or of a semester system
in all these matters, the decisions of the council are referred for approval to
the local educational authority. In minor matters the council is the final authority.
It divides its authority, in schools maintained by local funds only, with the councils
established in connection with them and which patronize them. It should be
pointed out that the councils are free to invite to their membership, for the pur
pose of working over pedagogical, administrative, and financial questions, stu
dents of teacher training institutes and upper-class students of gymnasia , real
schools, and seminaries.
As requested by the law, this reform must be carried out during the current
academic year. . . .
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 791
HIGHER EDUCATION
688. I n c r ea sed S e l f -G o v e r n m e n t f o r t h e A cadem y o f S c ie n c e s
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 642. Revisions of articles in the Charter of the Academy.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

36. 1. The President of the Academy shall he elected by the General As


sembly of regular academicians for a term of five years.
2. When a vacancy occurs, the General Assembly shall hold elections for Presi
dent by secret ballot.
3. The number of members present in the General Assembly must be no less
than two-thirds of the total number of regular academicians. The person who has
received not less than two-thirds of the votes of all members present at the As
sembly and more than half the number of all regular academicians shall be con
sidered elected.
4. The procedure for electing the President shall be governed by an instruc
tion prepared by the General Assembly.
5. The person elected President shall be confirmed in that office by a ukase
of the Provisional Government to the Ruling Senate.
40. The President shall inform the Provisional Government of all decisions
that require the publication of ukases and enactments of the Provisional Gov
ernment.
41. In regard to remuneration or exclusion from the Academy of officials
serving in it, the President shall act in accordance with the procedure laid down
by law.
42. In case of a breach of the peace and internal regulations, the President
is authorized, in order to restore the peace, to take measures in conformity with
the laws, the importance of the case itself, and the circumstances.
43. In important cases extraordinary Academic Assemblies shall be called
both on the initiative of the President and on the written request of not fewer than
ten academicians.

84. The number of correspondents shall not be defined. They shall be ad


mitted by a majority of votes in the Academic Assembly on nomination by one
of the regular members.
92. These meetings shall be intended solely for the reading of reports of
academicians and also of internal and external correspondence, for the considera
tion of compositions, machines, and inventions, proposed for the Academys
opinions, and for other learned consultations. In particular cases which require
the combined efforts of many academicians, the Assembly shall appoint a com
mission.
94. The Assembly must not be distracted from learning occupations by sub
jects related to administration and finance; but, if time permits and if the Presi
dent deems it necessary to request the views of the Assembly on these subjects,
792 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the Assembly shall also consider such matters as are proposed to it under this
head.

P rince Lvov, Minister-President


A. Manuilov, Minister of Education
May 9, 1917
689. N ew Statute on T eachers Colleges
[Sob. Uzak., 1 , 2, No. 975.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of existing statutes concerning teachers colleges, it is
hereby decreed:
1. Teachers colleges may be mens, womens, and coeducational.
2. Parallel classes may be opened in teachers colleges.
3. Graduates of teacher training schools, boys gymnasia, or real schools
with an additional class are admitted to the first class of teachers colleges, as
well as graduates of seven classes in girls gymnasia, graduates of institutes of
commercial schools and of diocesan girls schools and equivalent government
educational institutions, as well as students who have passed an appropriate
examination. Those who have served as teachers for a period of not less than
two years are admitted.
4. In order to furnish students with an opportunity for practice teaching, an
upper primary school is established in conjunction with each teachers college.
5. The course of study in the college lasts three years and is divided into a
general course, compulsory for all students, and a special course, in accordance
with the group of subjects elected by each student for teaching. The syllabus of
theoretical and practical studies is established by the Minister of Education.
Note: The special course may be in the following departments: a) literature
and history, b) physics and mathematics, c) natural history and geography.
6. Directors (directresses), teachers of religion and religious doctrine, and
men and women teachers of science in the college are chosen from persons who
have been graduated from an institution of higher learning. Men and women
teachers of manual arts, physical exercise, singing, and music, and women teachers
of needlework are chosen from persons with at least secondary education who
have, in addition, obtained teachers credentials for the above-mentioned subjects
in secondary educational institutions according to rules specially issued for this
purpose by the Minister of Education.
7. Persons who successfully complete the course of a teachers college receive
credentials as teachers in an upper primary school in the subjects of the special
department completed by them.

P rince Lvov, Minister-President


A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 14,1917
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 793
690. T he F ounding of the U niversity of th e D on and O ther
I nstitutions of H igher L earning
[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1227. A polytechnical institute was founded at Tiflis (ibid.,
No. 970), and the Perm9 branch of the University of Petrograd was organized as a
separate University of Perm (ibid., I, 1, No. 752).]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of May 5, 1917:
I. To be founded beginning July 1,1917, in the area of the towns of Rostov-
on-Don and Nakhichevan-on-Don a university consisting of four faculties:
history and philology, physics and mathematics, law, and medicine, and to call
it the University of the Don.
II. The University of Warsaw, presently located in Rostov-on-Don, is abol
ished, with the observance of the following rules:
1. All students and auditors of the University of Warsaw are granted the
right to transfer to the corresponding faculties and courses of the University of
the Don.
2. All personnel of the University of Warsaw, teaching, administrative and
nonacademic, are transferred to corresponding positions in the University of
the Don, persons in elective office for the term remaining to them under the
University of Warsaw. Persons who hold the position of docent in the University
of Warsaw at the time of implementation of the present law or persons who are
acting as docents in this university at the time of their transfer to the University
of the Don are confirmed in the position of adjunct professor or appointed acting
adjunct professor, respectively. Persons who do not wish to transfer to service in
the University of the Don are placed on the unattached list on general grounds.
4. All property belonging to the University of Warsaw now in the city of
Rostov-on-Don is placed temporarily at the disposal of the University of the
Don pending determination of the further disposal of this property.
5. Special funds of the University of Warsaw which have not been expended
by the time of dissolution of the university remain untouched pending determina
tion of their further disposal.
III. The provisions of the general charter and staff lists of Russian universities
are applied to the University of the Don.

691. T h e A brogation of G overnmental Controls Over the S election and


U se of B ooks and O ther T eaching M aterials
[5o6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1017. One of the first acts of the Ministry was to remove the
quotas on Jews in institutions of higher learning and to reinstate students who had
been expelled for political activities. Zhumaly , No. 4, March 4, 1917, and Doc. 137.
Professors who had been dismissed or had resigned under pressure because of their
political activities under the old regime were made eligible for re-election to faculties,
and those who had been appointed in their places were dismissed. According to Ig
natiev et al.9 Russian Schools and Universities During the World War, p. 231, this
decision was taken by the Government in its meeting of March 11. But examination
of the Zhurnaly for that date and neighboring dates failed to provide evidence of the
action. Other evidence, however, confirms that it was taken about that time. There
was considerable criticism of the permissive character of the re-election of the faculty
members who were dismissed or had resigned under the Imperial government. See,
794 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
for example, Doc. 672. Ignatiev et al., op. cit., confirms the fact that very few were
re-elected.
The changes in the administration of institutions of higher learning that are covered
in the following documents were worked out by the Ministry in collaboration with
committees and conferences of representatives of the faculties. Ibid., pp. 232-33. The
provisions of these statutes were extended to all institutions of higher learning, both
state and private, under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Education. Sob. U za k I, 2,
Nos. 977 and 1085.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment and abrogation of the relevant statutes it is hereby decreed:
II. . . . Provisions limiting the use in educational institutions and libraries
attached to these institutions of only those books, school manuals, and textbooks
approved by the Ministry of Education (or organs subordinate to it) and the
religious department, respectively, are abrogated.
III. Provisions . . concerning the obligation of teachers councils to sub
mit their conclusions on the choice of books, school manuals, and textbooks for
the approval of higher authorities are abrogated.
IV. Teachers of religion and religious doctrines in educational institutions
are authorized to choose books, school manuals, and textbooks for the study of
the catechism [Zakon Bozhii] or for the teaching of the respective religion or
religious doctrine, both for class use and for extracurricular reading.
V. The present law to be put into effect before promulgation by the Ruling
Senate.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 17,1917
692. T he P rocedure for A ppointing P rofessors to V acant P osts in
I nstitutions of H igher L earning
[Sob. Uzak.91,2, No. 913.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of relevant statutes it is decreed:
1. When a vacancy occurs for a professorial post, the appropriate faculty
makes a public announcement concerning the vacancy as well as the conditions
for filling it, and draws this specifically to the attention of institutions of higher
learning and the Academy of Sciences. Persons who wish to obtain the vacant
post may make application to that effect to the dean of the faculty within the period
established by the faculty, from one to three months. The members of the faculty
and of the council [of the institution], as well as holders of similar chairs in other
institutions of higher learning and the Academy of Sciences, may, in the course
of the same period, propose candidates on their behalf for the above vacancies*
The same persons are entitled to communicate their detailed views concerning
the scholarly merits of all candidates who have applied to the faculty. At the end
of the application period, the faculty, having discussed the merits of all candidates
who have applied to it, votes on them and then submits the results of the elections,
accompanied by all the proceedings, to the council. The council, after discussion
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 795
of the matter, votes on the candidate who has received the highest absolute
majority of votes in the faculty and, if there are several candidates who have
received the same majority of votes, votes on all these candidates. If none of these
candidates is elected, the council at the same meeting votes simultaneously on
all candidates who have received not less than half of the votes in the faculty.
The candidate who has received the highest absolute majority of votes in the
council is considered elected. If there are several candidates who have received
the same highest absolute majority of votes, these candidates are voted on again
by the council at its next meeting. If the second vote also gives the same results,
the question as to which of these candidates shall be considered elected is decided
by lot.
2. Faculties are granted the right to invite to their meetings for discussion of
the merits of candidates for a professorial position both professors in other insti
tutions of higher learning and members of the Academy of Sciences as well as
other authoritative persons, and also to request of all the above-mentioned persons
written opinions concerning the candidates who have applied.
3. The person elected by the council to the post of professor is nominated
for approved by the Minister of Education. If the Minister refuses to give such
approval, such a refusal must be accompanied by a statement of reasons and
communicated to the council within two months after nomination of the person
elected. If within this period no refusal of the Minister is forthcoming, the person
nominated is considered confirmed in office. If the Minister does not approve
the person elected by the council, new elections are called, which may be held
invalid by the Minister only on grounds of a violation, committed during the
elections, of the electoral procedure laid down by law, even in the event that the
former candidate is elected.
4. If the faculty does not elect a candidate to a vacant post of professor within
two years, a professor is elected to this post by the council, voting on candidates
proposed by members of the council.
6. All proceedings involved in filling vacant professorial posts, including the
views of faculties as well as the opinions and testimonials heard at meetings of the
faculty and the council and the results of the votes, are made public in the press.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A . M anuilov , Minister of Education
June 17, 1917

693. T he E stablishment of the P osition of D ocent in


R ussian State U niversities
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 980.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. Positions of docent are established in all Russian state universities on the
following basis:
1. Docents receive maintenance of 2,400 rubles per year, including 1,600
rubles salary, 400 rubles food allowance, 400 rubles quarter allowance, and are
entitled to two five-year increments in maintenance of 350 rubles each, and are
in Class VII by position.
796 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
2. The increments in maintenance mentioned in article 1 are granted after
service of five and ten years in the position of docent, including in the increment
period service in other teaching positions in universities or corresponding posi
tions in other institutions of higher learning.
3. A pension for docents is fixed according to the rules of the teaching
service . . .
II. . . .
2. Positions of docents are filled by faculties from among persons having doc
tors or masters9degrees, or from among persons who, although they may not have
these degrees, meet the requirements for admission to teaching as privatdocent,
and have in fact taught not less than three years in institutions of higher learning.
The election of docents is made by faculties from candidates submitted by members
of the faculty, and the person who has received the highest absolute majority of
votes is considered elected. The person elected by the faculty is confirmed in the
position of docent by a vote of the Council [of the institution].
3. Docents are required to teach on a basis of a four-hour norm. Docents
participate in faculty meetings with a full vote in all cases except on questions
concerning the election of professors. Docents enjoy the use of auxiliary academic
institutions and may direct them, by decision of the faculty, with the approval of
the Council. Docents attend meetings of the Council with the right of advisory
vote.
5. Docents who are not on the regular staff perform all the duties of staff
docents and enj oy all rights granted to the latter, including the right to pensions.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov , Minister of Education
June 24, 1917

694. T he E xtension of M embership in U niversity Councils and


F aculty Meetings
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1041.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of the relevant statutes, it is hereby decreed:
I. In addition to professors and docents, the following are admitted to faculty
meetings in Russian state universities: 1) privatdocents who have been commis
sioned by vote to fulfill the duties of a vacant professorial post or to teach required
courses, provided they teach on the basis of the four-hour norm; 2) senior and
junior clinical assistants, dissectors assistants and calculators, if they meet the
following conditions: a) if they have occupied an academic position in universi
ties or other institutions of higher learning for not less than three years, b) if
they devote not less than 18 hours a week to duties in the department to which
they are attached, and c) if they possess one of the higher academic degrees of
master or doctor, or have passed an oral examination for the degree of master
or doctor, or have carried out scholarly work recognized by the faculty as satis
factory on the basis of testimonials submitted concerning such work.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 797
The persons mentioned in (2) are admitted to participation in meetings of
the faculty by vote.
II. The persons mentioned in section I enjoy the right to vote in faculty
meetings, with the following exceptions: they do not participate in the elections of
professors, nor do assistants participate in the election of docents nor in the
granting of higher academic degrees unless they possess such themselves.

IV. The presence of at least one-half of the available staff of professors and
docents is required for a quorum at faculty meetings.
V. Privatdocents, assistants, dissectors assistants, and calculators admitted
under the procedure set forth in section I of the present law to participation in
faculty meetings with a full vote have the right to attend council meetings with
an advisory vote. Other privatdocents are invited to council meetings on grounds
to be determined by the council.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 24,1917

695. T he I mprovement of the F inancial P osition and A cademic R ank of


F aculty M embers of H igher T echnical I nstitutions
[Soft. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1322. On June 11, 1917, the Government authorized the admis
sion of women to higher technical institutions. Ibid., No. 1296.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. Amending and supplementing the existing staff lists of the Petrograd,
Kharkov and Tomsk Technological Institutes, the Moscow Higher Technical
School and the Riga Polytechnical Institute, the temporary schedule annexed
hereto of salaries and allowances for persons employed in the above institute
and schools is established.
II____
1. The Academic Committees of the Petrograd and Kharkov Technological
Institutes, of the Moscow Higher Technical School, and of the Riga Polytechnical
Institute are renamed the Councils of these educational institutions, and the
[existing] council of the Riga Polytechnical Institute [is renamed] the Trustees
Committee; professors of the aforesaid educational institutions are renamed
professors-in-ordinary, and adjunct professors, professors-extraordinary. The
title of faculty is conferred on the divisions of the aforesaid educational institu
tions, and the titles of rector and pro-rector are conferred accordingly on the
positions of director and assistant director of these educational institutions.
2. The councils and the educational institutions mentioned in the preced
ing (I) section include both ordinary professors and extraordinary professors.
3. Immediate responsibility for the academic and scientific aspects of the
faculties mentioned in article 1 of the present section are entrusted to meetings
of the faculties under the chairmanship of the deans.
798 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
17. The institutes and schools mentioned in section I of the present law are
authorized to establish special committees with a view to bringing about closer
contact between these educational institutions and industry and practical technical
fields, as well as in order to promote the development of extracurricular practical
work by students of the aforesaid educational institutions in industry and techni
cal occupations. The special committees may include representatives of the above
educational institutions, public administrations, and scientific, technical, and
industrial organizations, practical technical fields, as well as individual leaders of
industry. The aforesaid committees function on the basis of separate regulations
drawn up by the councils of the educational institutions and confirmed by the
Minister of Education.
18. The inspection service in Petrograd, Kharkov, and Tomsk Technological
Institutes and the Moscow Higher Technical School is abolished, and persons
holding offices in this service are placed on the unattached list on general grounds.
19. Responsibility for handling student affairs in the institutes and schools
mentioned in section I of the present law is entrusted to the secretary of student
affairs and his assistants, elected by the council.
20. In order to receive the degree of engineer, scientific agronomist, or master
of business administration, students must: 1) complete the entire course of study
and examinations in the curriculum of one of the departments or subdepartments
of the appropriate faculty of the educational institution and 2) complete and
defend the projects and work established by the curriculum as a requirement for
the diploma. The defense is carried out in a meeting of the faculty or in a special
examination commission elected by the faculty and confirmed by the council.
The above-mentioned degrees are awarded by meetings of the faculties.

21. The positions of teachers of religion in the educational institutions men


tioned in section I of the present law are abolished.
N. N ekrasov, Deputy Minister-President
S ergei Ol denburg, Minister of Education
July 26, 1917
696. N ew S ta tu te on Student-A dm inistration R ela tio n s
[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1040.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of the relevant statutes, it is hereby decreed:
I. The university council is authorized to approve: rules for matriculated
and nonmatriculated students, rules on the procedure for granting allowances and
stipends to students, rules on trying disciplinary cases concerning students, rules
on exemption from the payment of fees and rules on the management of student
dormitories and dining rooms.
The aforesaid rules are drawn up by special commissions of the council and
the faculties; students may be called upon for participation in the work of these
commissions on a basis to he established by the university council. These rules
may authorize students to participate in the distribution of stipends and allow
ances, in exemption from the payment of fees, in the consideration of disciplinary
cases affecting students, and in the management of dormitories and dining rooms.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 799
II. The council and rector have control over the use of university premises,
within the limits of the rules prepared by the council.
On the basis of the rules approved by the council, students may participate
in supervising the observance of external order on university premises.
III. Assemblies of matriculated and nonmatriculated students as well as
meetings of various students societies and organizations within the walls of the
university are allowed in accordance with rules established by the council.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 24,1917

WELFARE
697. T he I ncrease in P ensions
[So>. Uzak., 1,19No. 491.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In view of the increased cost of living caused by the war, percentage
increases in pensions shall be made available from the Treasury on the basis
indicated in the following sections for persons receiving such pensions: 1) from
State Treasury funds; 2) from special funds [such as those for] Disabled Persons,
the Committee for the Care of Retired Civil Servants, Cossack forces, church
schools, parochial teachers and tutors; 3) from savings banks for deferred pay
of the Ministry of War and Navy, of transport and mining engineers, and of the
Ministry of Justice; 4) from the savings bank for deferred pay of the provinces
of the Kingdom of Poland; 5) from pension funds for teachers in church-parochial
schools, for village teachers, and for persons employed in the state-controlled sale
of liquor, from the former pension fund for employees in the Bureau of Printing
and Engraving [Ekspeditsia Zagotovlemia Gosudarstvemvykh Bumag ], and from
the savings and credit bank for employees in public railroads, and 6) from credit
banks of mining and metallurgical associations of state metallurgical works and
mines. The present section shall apply to all pensions from the enumerated sources
included in the budget of the Department of the State Treasury and other depart
ments and institutions, as well as to pensions for voluntary employees and workers
on public railroads, derived from a special pension fund, consisting of monthly
benefits of 3 and 6 rubles.
II. Pensioners whose pension rates do not exceed the rates indicated below
(section III) have the right to receive percentage increases, with the exception
of those who are residing abroad or in localities under enemy occupation, as well
as pensioners who are subjects of states that are hostile to Russia.
III. The determination of the pensioners percentage increases shall be depend
ent upon their place of residence, which shall be defined according to [the break
down into the three cost-of-living area categories on] the attached list, and also
upon the pension rates received, and shall consist of the [following percentages]
. . . [The increases ranged from 60 per cent to 40 per cent, depending upon the
800 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
cost-of-living area, for pensions up to 600 rubles and from 30 per cent to 20 per
cent for the highest pensions affected, i.e., 3,000 rubles.]11
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
April 11,1917
698. T he T ransfer of the D epartment of the E mpress M ariia and of the
Charitable S ociety to the M inistry of W elfare
[ZhuTncdy, No. 76, May 12, 1917. The Ministry was established on May 5. On Au
gust 5 the Charitable Society was abolished and its functions taken over directly by
the Ministry of Welfare. Ibid., No. 148. The Trusteeship of Workers Aid was trans
ferred to the Ministry from Interior on May 16, ibid., No. 80; the Romanov Committee
and the Skobelev Committee for aid to disabled soldiers on June 17, ibid., No. 110; and
the Division of Public Health and Social Welfare and its funds on August 5, ibid.,
No. 148. The Supreme Council for the welfare of families of persons called up for
military service as well as families of servicemen killed or wounded in action was
abolished on July 25 and its functions assumed by the new Ministry. Sob. Uzak., I, 2,
No. 1181.]
Resolved:
I. To approve the following law: The institutions under the jurisdiction
of the Department of the Empress Mariia and the Charitable Society, transferred,
in accordance with the law of the Provisional Government on March 4, 1917, to
the Ministry of Education,12 to be included under the Ministry of Welfare.
II. To extend to the Ministry of Welfare, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Education, the right to transfer to the Ministry of Education those institutions
under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Empress Mariia and the Charitable
Society that are subject to the jurisdiction of the latter Ministry, and in each case
to make the fact known to the Provisional Government.
699. T h e E xtension o f Support fo r S old iers Fam ilies
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1019.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of the relevant statutes, the provisions of the rules . . .
concerning the welfare of soldiers families are extended to common-law wives,
children, mothers, to common-law brothers and sisters of soldiers, as well as to
the adopted children of soldiers, with the following changes and additions:
1) Common-law wives of soldiers who have children, as well as those who are
pregnant, enjoy, both for themselves and for their children, the right to a ration
on the same basis as legitimate families of soldiers.
2) Common-law wives of soldiers without children acquire the right to a
ration only if they lived together not less than a year before conscription and
were supported by the labor of the conscripted soldier.
3. Common-law wives and children may be included in the list of those
11 See also M. G. Fleier, Pensionnaia praktika Vremennago PraviteFstva, KA, VTTT
(1925), 246-50.
12Zhumaly, No. 3.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 801
receiving rations, provided the soldier submits a written petition requesting a
ration for his common-Iaw family. This petition is submitted to the institution
responsible for rationing at the place of residence of the soldiers family or for
warded there through his immediate military superiors.
4) If there is a legitimate personal family, the common-law family does not
enjoy the right to any rations.
5) Common-law mothers, as well as common-law brothers and sisters of
soldiers, receive a ration if they were supported by the latters labor.
6) Foster children of soldiers, who have not been adopted but who were
taken into their families before conscription, are entitled to a ration if they were
supported by the labor of their foster fathers before the conscription of the latter.
7) Issues of food allowances (rations) to common-Iaw families and foster
children of soldiers made before the publication of the present statute are not
subject to recovery.
II. The measures mentioned in the preceding (I) section to be put into effect
beginning June 1, 1917.
III. The present law to be put into effect before its promulgation by the Ruling
Senate.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
D. S hchepkin , for the Minister of the Interior
June 22,1917

700.T he E stablishment of a T emporary N ational Committee and


L ocal Committees to A id D isabled W ar V eterans
[Sob* Uzak., I, 2, No. 984.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. All matters affecting aid to disabled war veterans are centralized in the
Ministry of Welfare, and a Temporary National Committee to aid disabled war
veterans is formed for this purpose in the Ministry.
II. The Temporary National Committee includes: 39 representatives of the
All-Russian Union of disabled war veterans; 5 representatives from the All-
Russian Union of Towns; 5 representatives from the All-Russian Zemstvo Union;
1 representative each from the All-Russian Soviets of Soldiers, Officers, Workers,
and Peasants Deputies; 3 representatives from the Ministry of Welfare; 1 repre
sentative each from the Ministries of War, Navy, Interior, Finance, Education,
Post and Telegraph, Foreign Affairs, and State Control; 1 representative each
from the Central Military Medical Administration, Central Medical-Sanitary
Council under the Provisional Government, Russian Red Cross Society, Siberian
Society for Aid to War Victims, Caucasian Society for Aid to Disabled War
Veterans, and Russian Technical Society, and 2 representatives from the Com
mittee for Military-Technical Assistance.
IV. The Temporary National Committee is responsible for:
1) working out plans for aid to disabled war veterans and discussing measures
for the implementation of this aid throughout the country, as well as unifying
and coordinating it;
2) informing the Minister of Welfare concerning needs in the matter of aid
802 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
to disabled war veterans and concerning the funds necessary for this purpose, as
well as for distribution of funds made available and supervision of their expendi
ture, and
3) preliminary preparation, for submission by the Minister to the Provisional
Government, of bills on all questions of state aid to disabled war veterans and
revision of existing legislation on pensions to disabled war veterans and on other
types of aid to them.
V. The Minister of Welfare, in case he disagrees with decisions of the Com
mittee. may submit disputed matters for setdement by the Provisional Government.
VI. The matter of aid to disabled war veterans in the localities is entrusted
to the organs of zemstvo and municipal self-government, which are required to
establish for this purpose zemstvo and municipal committees for aid to disabled
war veterans, consisting of representatives of these administrations and repre
sentatives of local unions of disabled war veteranswhere these unions exist
the latter being granted the right to raise the number of their representatives in
the Committee to a number equal to that of the remaining representatives in the
Committee.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
P rince Dm. S hakhovskoi, Minister of Welfare
June 29,1917

701. A Conference on the Organization of S ocial A id to Children


[VVP, No. 125, August 8,1917, p. 3.]
The opening of the All-Russian Conference on questions of organizing social
aid to children will take place on Thursday, August 10. Called at the initiative
of the Minister of Welfare, the Conference will last five days, from August 10 to
August 14.
The Conference is scheduled to begin at 3:00 oclock in the afternoon at the
headquarters of the Nikolaevskii Orphanage Institute, on Moika 48. The first
day will be devoted to a general meeting, A report will be heard on the general
principles of social aid to children that governed the activity of commissions in
the Ministry working on the groundwork for the Conference and on the drawing
up for the Constituent Assembly of certain questions of social aid.
Further work in the Conference will be conducted through [the following]
sections:
I. On the protection of mothers and children.
II. On the protection of normal children from preschool age to adulthood.
III. On the protection of defective and sick children.
IV. On the care of juvenile legal offenders.
Invited to attend the Conference are representatives of zemstvos and cities,
soviets, educational commissions, regional dumas, public and private organiza
tions concerned with the protection of children, as well as representatives of the
press and various public leaders in the field of social aid to children.
CHAPTER 15
Religion

INITIAL REFORMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORTHODOX


CHURCH AND OFFICIAL POLICIES ON RELIGIOUS MATTERS
702. T he R emoval of the R asputinites from the H oly S ynod
[Rech, No. 56, March 7, 1917, p. 5.]
By order of the Oher-Procurator of the Holy Synod, V. N. Lvov, Metropolitan
Pitirim of Petrograd and Metropolitan Makarii of Moscow were permanently
retired. Bishop Isidor also was permanently retired.
The retirement of Bishop Isidor, personal friend and ardent admirer of
Rasputin, occurred when Ober-Procurator V. N. Lvov on March 5 came to the
chambers of Bishop Isidor and proposed he sign a prepared petition for his
permanent retirement.

703. T he A ppeal of the H oly Synod for S upport of the


P rovisional Government
[VVP9No. 5, March 10,1917, p. 1.]
By the grace of God, from the Most Holy Ruling Synod to the faithful brethren
of the Orthodox Russian Church.
Grace unto you , and peace, be multiplied .
I P eter 1:2
The will of God was done. Russia entered upon the road of a new state life.
May the Lord bless our great Motherland with happiness and glory on her new
road.
Beloved brethren of the holy Orthodox Church!
The Provisional Government assumed the administration of the country at
a grave historic moment. The enemy is still entrenched upon our land, and great
efforts are still ahead of our glorious army. At such a time all loyal sons of the
Motherland must he imbued with universal enthusiasm.
For the sake of the millions of best lives laid down on the battlefield, for the
sake of countless sums spent by the Motherland in defending herself against the
enemy, for the sake of many sacrifices made to gain civil liberty, for the sake of
saving your own families, for the sake of the Motherlands happiness, put aside
at this great historic time all disputes and differences, unite in brotherly love
for the good of Russia. Trust the Provisional Government. All together and
each one individually, put forth all efforts in order that, with work and great
heroic deeds, with prayer and obedience, you may lighten its great work of
bringing about a state life based on new principles, and by combined effort lead
Russia out upon a road of true freedom, happiness, and glory.
The Most Holy Synod earnestly prays to the Almighty Lord; may He bless
804 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the work and efforts of the Provisional Government of Russia; may He give it
strength, firmness, and wisdom, and may He lead the obedient sons of the great
Russian Power upon the road of brotherly love and glorious defense of the Mother
land from the enemy and lead them to a serene and peaceful life.
[Members of the Holy Synod]

March 9, 1917 No. 1380 With reference to the appeal to the brethren of
the Orthodox Church
The Most Holy Ruling Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church discussed an
appeal to the brethren of the Orthodox Russian Church with a message of appro
priate content regarding present events, and issued this order: We have dis
cussed the draft of this message and order its transmission, together with circular
ukases, to diocese bishops, asking them to give orders that it be read in churches
simultaneously with the acts of abdication of the former Emperor Nicholas II for
himself and his son from the throne of the Russian Empire and of Grand Duke
Michael Aleksandrovichs declining to assume Supreme Power until the estab
lishment by the Constituent Assembly of the manner of rule and new basic laws
of the Russian State.

704. T he U rgent N eed for a Church -State A ct


[Editorial in Rech% No. 57, March 8,1917, p. 2. See also tkThe Tragedy of the Church,
in ibid., No. 60, March 11, 1917, p. 2, which commented on the dominance of reaction
ary and self-seeking elements in the Church under the old regime, and expressed the
hope that the progressive and enlightened members of the clergy would now come to
the fore.]
The attitude of the Orthodox Church to the new regime will be determined
only after the new basic laws are ratified. Nevertheless the very conditions under
which the Provisional Government was formed indicate the manner in which the
question will be solved. As soon as the abolition of class, religious, and national
discriminations ceases to be of purely declarative character and is implemented,
the governmental-legal position of the Church will change radically. And un
doubtedly among the temporary regulations guaranteed by the Government in
its declaration of March 6 will be the immediate elaboration and publication of
the rules which will regulate the position of the Church in one way or another.
This regulation must be based on the principle that under the new regime
the Church should enjoy complete freedom and should consequently also be
separated from the State.
By its very nature the new State cannot be confessional. Consequently all
state acts must be freed of Church flavor. In the light of this, we cannot, under
any circumstances, grant the wish of the Moscovites to replace all petitions to and
mention of the former Tsars family in litanies, etc., with prayers for the Great
Russian Power. At the present time the Government must remove completely
from the entire Church ritual any connection of the Church with the State. Sub
sequently, when the legal status of the Church is clarified, it can, since it will enjoy
complete internal freedom, revise canonically the rite of divine services. But at
present it must he completely neutral The dignity of the Church as such and
RELIGION 805
the dignity of the new Government demand it. Under the new order all citizens,
irrespective of their confessional differences, participate in the political life of
the country. And the Church as such must be free of any politics. . . .
In connection with this, the new form of oath, which it is necessary to intro
duce, must be strictly civil. No ones religious conscience should be violated,
particularly since any oath is in sharp contradiction to the basic principles of
Christianity.
A tremendous task of self-purging opens up to the Russian Church, a summing
up of its actual and not paper strength. The calling of the Church Sobor is no
longer the question of the day . Concretely the calling of the Sobor is possible
only after the Constituent Assembly, when the State clarifies exactly and definitely
its relations to the Church. And now the Church leaders as free citizens can
arrange merely private conferences and congresses with no juridical power either
for the Church or the State.
Nevertheless, one Church-State act of tremendous importance should be pub
lished immediately.
The fact of the abdication of Nicholas II was sanctioned by an appropriate
document which, under the old regime, would have been called a manifesto. An
analogous act must follow also in the Church form . Just as during coronation
the Church by an act of sacerdotal anointment recognized the Emperor as chosen
by the Church, the Lords anointed, so now this coronation act must be annulled
in one way or another. Abdication is a form of juridical death. It must be sancti
fied by the Church. . . .
705. T he A b olition o f R estrictions on th e R igh ts o f th e C lergy W ho
V o lu n ta rily L e ft E cclesia stica l Orders or W ho W ere U nfrocked
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 407.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of the relevant statutes, it is decreed:
1. Priests of the secular clergy who have voluntarily left ecclesiastical orders
with the permission of the ecclesiastical authorities as well as those who have been
unfrocked by an ecclesiastical court shall, upon their return to lay status, main
tain rights of status by origin, education, service, honors, and academic degrees
received by them both before entering ecclesiastical orders and during their
ecclesiastical service, as well as ranks received by them in state service.
2. Members of monastic orders who have voluntarily left such orders with
the permission of the ecclesiastical authorities as well as those expelled from such
orders by an ecclesiastical court shall, upon their return to lay status, maintain
rights of status by origin, education, service, honors, and academic degrees
received by them both before taking monastic orders and during their service in
such orders, as well as ranks received by them in state service.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 25, 1917
806 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
706. U kase o f t h e P rovisional Governm ent Dism issing A l l B ut Two
Members o f th e H o ly Synod and Appointing N ew Members
[.Zhurnaly, No. 54, April 14, 1917. Earlier, the Government had decided to change the
composition of the Synod gradually (ibid., No. 14, March 10, 1917), but the growing
conflict between the new Ober-Procurator V. N. Lvov and the membership of the Synod
prompted more drastic action.]
Following the dismissal of members of the Holy Synod the Right Reverend
Metropolitans Pitirim of Petrograd and Makarii of Moscow, and on completing
the winter session of the Holy Synod, the Provisional Government resolved:
1) to release from attending the Holy Synod the Right Reverends: the first mem
ber of the Holy Synod, Metropolitan Vladimir of Kiev; Archbishops Arseni of
Novgorod, Tikhon of Lithuania, Michael of Grodno, Ioakim of Nizhnii Novgorod,
and Vasilii of Chernigov; and protopresbyters Alexander Dernov and Georgii
Shavelskii; 2) to retain for the summer session of the Holy Synod its present
member, the Right Reverend Archbishop Sergii1 of Finland; and 3) to call to
attend the Holy Synod the Right Reverends: Archbishopsmember of the Holy
Synod Exarch Platon of Georgia and Agaphangel of Yaroslav, and Archbishops
Andrei of Ufa and Michael of Samara; archpresbyter of the Moscow Bolshoi
Uspenski Cathedral, Nikolai Luibimov; and ArchpriestsProfessor Alexander
Rozhdestvenskii of Petrograd Theological Academy; members of the State Duma,
Professor Alexander Smirnov of Petrograd University and Theodor Filonenko.

707. V. N. Lvovs E xplanation o f th e D ism issal o f Synod Members


[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 132, June 13, 1917, p. 4. For an account of the Congress,
see Doc. 708.]
At the recent meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen,
V. N. Lvov, Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod, delivered a long address. He
said: When, by the will of the people, I was given the post of Ober-Procurator,
my uppermost desire was, just as it had been before during my ten-year work as
President of the Church Commission in the [Third and Fourth] State Duma, to
see the establishment of freedom of the Church. I must say that under the old
regime the administrative apparatus was not the only enemy of the freedom of
the Church. The Church authority itself followed the same course and forced
the Church along this course. I saw that only the revolution could free the Church.
And in this respect we must not separate the interests of the Church from those
of the State, because they are intimately related. We had to defend this freedom
hand in hand. I clearly realized that as long as the episcopate fails to follow the
course of Church freedom, as long as the priests refuse to get along with the
parish under new conditions, the restoration of Church life will remain but a
dream. The old regime exerted a pernicious influence. And it seemed to me
that, deep down, everything in the Church was covered by a kind of stagnation.
How then could the Ober-Procurator introduce freedom of the Church when there
was no vitality within the Church itself? First of all, the Church had to be roused
to activity. And I followed this course in achieving the purpose. But those who
tried to hold back the first shoots of this life remained in top offices of the Church.
1 Elected Patriarch in 1943.
RELIGION 807
I realized that, should a conflict occur between the Church and the episcopate, the
life of the Church was threatened with anarchy. And yet I did not wish, in so far
as it was possible, to exert any pressure upon the Synod. I openly appealed to
the old members of the Synod to follow the course of achieving freedom of the
Church. Unfortunately their conception of freedom was different and leaned
in the direction of servitude. The old Synods conception of freedom was that,
once authority was granted to the Synod, it could act as it chose. Rumor had it
that I allegedly dismissed the archbishops through my own authority. Such was
never the case. I shall not call your attention to the dark blemishes of the past
in the higher church spheres, lest I offend your ears by the accounts and pictures
of the past. I shall merely say that if [Metropolitan] Makarii of Orlov is brought
to trial, and if the case of [Bishop] Vasilii of Chernigov is tried, this means that
the state authority has reason for doing so. Never shall criminality he tolerated
in the Orthodox Church.
Lvovs speech was greeted with applause.

708. A D iocesan Conference in N izhnii N ovgorod


[ VVP, No. 61, May 24,1917, p. 3. Many such conferences were held in 1917 to discuss
church affairs under the new order.]
On May 21 the work of the Nizhnii Novgorod Diocesan Conference was sus
pended until fall.
At the recent meeting of the All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen,
together for the first time,2 a tendency to conciliate the Orthodox with the Old
Believers, as well as to make Orthodoxy take the first step toward the Old Believers,
became manifest. It was suggested that a joint conference or sobor of Orthodox
and Old Believers be convened to abolish the anathema of the schism proclaimed
by the Orthodox Church in 1667, and to restore a series of ancient Church rites.
The debates still taking place between Orthodox and Old Believers, which, in the
words of the layman member of the presidium, remind one of horse races, were
condemned. Contemporary missionary activity, built on wrong principles, was
acknowledged to be unsatisfactory. Further, the Conference planned a reform of
the parishes and of the diocesan administration, so that the parish priests, the
[clerical] ecclesiastical superintendents, and the bishops would be elected to their
offices by the clergy and the laymen. The proposal to establish parochial councils
consisting of clergy and laymen, to be attached to [clerical] ecclesiastical super
intendents, was welcomed. It was considered possible to preserve temporarily
the existing Church consistories, after reinforcing their membership with priests,
deacons, and laymen. For the purpose of handling diocesan administration, the
creation of a special committee consisting of clergymen and laymen and possess
ing inspection, judicial, educational, and administrative rights was planned.
[Also] planned was the establishment in all the uezds of bishoprics, which would
be only canonically subordinate to the archbishop of the region. . . .
2 This was a result of the decision of the Holy Synod of May 5, 1917 {VVP, No. 49,
May 6, 1917, p. 2), urged by the Government (Zhumedy, No. 8, March 7, 1917), authorizing
greater participation of laymen in church administration.
808 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
709. T he A ll -R ussian Congress of Clergy and L aymen
[B. V. Titlinov, Tserkov9vo vremia revoliutsiL pp. 62-64. The writer was editor of the
church journal he quotes and leader of the liberal forces in the Church, which called
the Congress.]
. . . The All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen took place in Moscow
early in June of 1917 . . . The declaration adopted by the Congress flatly de
clared: We hail the accomplished political coup detat . . . As citizens we
honor the memory of those who selflessly suffered and died for the rights of the
people, and we bless the names of the living who took their place at the head of
the peoples movement to overthrow the former government, discredited in the
eyes of everybody. Although the Christian Church can exist under any form of
state organization, we think, nevertheless, that a state administration under which
the peoples rights are fully realized is more in keeping with the professed Christian
conception of human personality and the church principle of sobornost . . . We
understand that with the fall of the tsarist autocracy the supreme power passed
on to the people and that prior to the convening of the Constituent Assembly the
country is to be administered by the Provisional Government. As Christian
citizens we regard subordination to it as obligatory to all. Further, the declara
tion contained points on the transfer of land and waterways to the working
people, also on the establishment of fair relations between the workers and the
capitalists. But in the same declaration, although definitely progressive, we read
also the following positions: From the peoples rule, whatever form it may take,
we of the Christian Orthodox Church expect a declaration and a consistent carry
ing out of liberty of conscience and worship, as well as the creation of all the neces
sary legal and material conditions necessary for the realization of its aims; also
the recognition of the Orthodox Christian faith as first among other religions pro
fessed in the State. Further, in its resolution on the question of the relation of
the Church to the State, the Congress expressed itself emphatically on the inad
missibility of the separation of the Church from the State and on the granting
to the Russian Orthodox Church of a pre-eminent position. The Congress was
just as emphatic in its declaration on the inadmissibility of the transfer of the
church schools under the administration of the Ministry of Education and insisted
on the compulsory teaching of religion.3 In the course of the debates in the
Congress on all these questions, it was revealed that the majority of the Congress
could not even imagine the new position of the Church in any other way. In vain
some of the progressive leaders advanced, in principle at least, the idea of the
separation of the Church from the State. Their voice was drowned in the general
[tumult of the] majority. In vain also did the representative from the workers
cautiously warn, with reference to the church schools, that the stubbornness of the
clergy, by maintaining its old position, upholds here the division between the
clergy and the people. The Congress would not even hear of the transfer of the
church schools.
Thus it is clear that the advanced Congress, generally speaking, in adopting
and hailing the new political wineskins, poured into them, however, much of
the old wine. In due course, the Vserossiiskii Tserkovno-Obshchestvennyi Vestnik ,
an organ of liberal church thought, rightly summed up the frame of mind of the
clergy as revealed at the Moscow meeting during the discussion of the concrete,
3 See the following section*
RELIGION 809
and not the declared, Church-State questions. The foremost negative aspect in
the sentiment of the contemporary clergy, wrote the paper, is revealed to us
with all clarity, namely, its excessive conservatism in the treatment of the most
important problems of public, state, and fundamental Church character. It
grieves us to state that the majority of the clergy here lives by and breathes the
traditions of the old regime.

710. T h e Law on Freedom o f C onscience


[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1099.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment to, and abrogation of, the relevant statutes, it is hereby decreed:
1. Every citizen of the Russian State is guaranteed freedom of conscience.
Accordingly, the enjoyment of civil and political rights does not depend on any
religious affiliation, and no one may be persecuted nor have any of his rights
whatsoever restricted for his convictions in matters of faith.
2. The religious affiliation of minors under the age of nine is determined by
their parents. In the absence of agreement on the part of the parents, minors
follow the fathers religion. In cases of separate residence of the parents, children
follow the religion of the parent with whom they live.
3. In case the parents are dead or unknown and it is impossible to establish
the religious affiliation of minors under nine years of age, the religious affiliation
of the minors is determined by their adoptive parents or guardians.
4. In order for persons who have reached the age of 14 to pass from one
religion to another or to have it recognized that they are not affiliated with any
faith, no authorization or declaration of any authority is required. Legal rela
tions arising from affiliation with the given religion are ended by a written or
oral statement to the local court by the person leaving a religion.
5. A statement received under the procedure mentioned in the preceding (4)
article is communicated by the local court immediately to the parish or religious
community with which the person was affiliated. The appropriate organ of local
self-government is notified of persons who consider themselves unaffiliated with
any faith.
6. Minors under the age of nine may be transferred to another religion at
this time by both parents or by the surviving parent. If, however, one of the
parents changes religion and there is no agreement between the parents, minors
under the age of nine maintain their affiliation with their former religion.
7. The religion of minors over the age of nine may not be changed without
their consent.
8. Civil documents of persons who are not affiliated with any religion are
kept by organs of local self-government according to the rules contained in articles
39-51 of part II of the Imperial Ukase of October 17, 1906, concerning the pro
cedure for the organization and functioning of Old Believers and sectarian com
munities and concerning the rights and duties of members of Old Believers com
munities and sectarians who have left the Orthodox Church (Collection of Laws,
article 1728).
9. The present rules do not apply to the fanatical teachings mentioned in
article 96 of the Penal Code (Code of Laws, Vol. XV, ed. 1909).
810 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
10. The present law (articles 1-9) to be put into effect before its promulga
tion by the Ruling Senate.
N. N ekrasov, Deputy Minister-President
Saltykov, Assistant Minister, for the Min
ister of the Interior
July 14, 1917

711. T he E stablishment of the M inistry of Confessions


[The first item, an interview with A. V. Kartashev, is from Rech\ No. 177, July 30,
1917, p. 4. Kartashev was Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod from July 25 to August 5,
when he assumed the newly created post of Minister of Confessions. The law on the
creation of the Ministry is from Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 1134.]
A
A. V. Kartashev, the new Ober-Procurator of the Synod, in an interview with
our correspondent, spoke of reforms of the governmental organs in charge of
spiritual matters.
The new Provisional Government has decided to establish a new ministry,
that of confessions . . .
The Ministry of Confessions will be . . . in charge of all the establishments
of the Synod . . . until a decision is taken by the Church Sobor and the Con
stituent Assembly.
The tasks of the Ministry will be to remove from the Orthodox Church the
bonds that burden her, and to secure for her a free internal life, inasmuch, of
course, as it is compatible with the interests of the State and insofar as the Church
does not exceed the limits of her own religious affairs.

The statutes of the Ministry will be temporary. They could not be otherwise.
In Russia 70 million people profess the Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy has been
the historical religion of the country; only abstract dreamers may [imagine that
it would be possible to] break away forever from Orthodoxy as the religion of
the nations majority. Because of that fact alone, it should occupy the leading
position among the other religions professed in the country. And, at the same
time, this predominant religion, unlike any other, was deeply enmeshed in the
web of the police.
Now, there are no anointed [rulers], there is no anointed power, and it is not
even obligatory for the power to be Orthodox. Precisely this makes it imperative
to re-examine the relations between the Government and the Orthodox Church,
and vice versa.
A. V. Kartashev defined his position at the future Church Sobor as that of a
friendly adviser, who would prevent rash and tactless decisions from being taken
with regard to the State. In the opinion of A. V. Kartashev, any other interven
tion of the Government in the activities of the Sobor would be inadmissible.
A. V. Kartashev agreed that the Ministry of Confessions would be in the nature
of a registry office, but besides [taking care of] registration, it should contribute
to the plenitude of spiritual culture.
A. V. Kartashev concluded by expressing his optimistic conviction that he
RELIGION 811
would succeed in accomplishing a great deal in the realm of the countrys spiritual
culture.
B
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The Ministry of Confessions is established on the following lines:
1) The Ministry of Confessions consists of the Minister, two Assistant Min
isters, the Department for Affairs of the Orthodox Church, the Department for
Affairs of Other Religions, and the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Ministry.
2) The Minister of Confessions and his assistants are appointed from persons
belonging to the Orthodox religion.
3) The Ministry of Confessions has jurisdiction over matters (a) concerning
the Department of Orthodox Religion, temporarily to the same extent to which
they are now subject to the jurisdiction of the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy
Ruling Synod, and (b) concerning other religions which heretofore have been
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Ecclesiastic Affairs of Foreign Re
ligions in the Ministry of the Interior.
4) Pending the reorganization, on lines to be worked out by the All-Russian
National Sobor, of church administration, and pending a fundamental re-exami
nation of the relations of the state power to religions under the new order, the
Minister of Confessions, with respect to the matters provided in article 3 of the
present (I) section, is assigned the rights and duties belonging to the Ober-
Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling Synod and the Minister of the Interior,
respectively,
II. The following are transferred to the Ministry of Confessions: 1) the Chan
cellery of the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling Synod with Legal Ad
visers Office, this Chancellery being renamed the Department for Affairs of the
Orthodox Church of the Ministry of Confessions, and the position of Legal Adviser
to the Ober-Procurator being renamed Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Con
fessions, and 2) the Department of Ecclesiastic Affairs of Foreign Religions, this
Department being renamed the Department for Affairs of Other Religions of the
Ministry of Confessions.
III. The institutions mentioned in section II, pending further reforms, retain
all appropriations presently allocated both from the State Treasury and from spe
cial funds for the maintenance of these institutions, as well as other allowances.
IV. The offices of Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling Synod and his
Assistant are abolished.
A. K erensky, Minister-President
N. A vksent ev , Minister of the Interior
A. K artashev, Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod
August 5, 1917
812 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
CHURCH SCHOOLS
712. T h e Grant to C ouncils o f T h eo lo g ica l Sem inaries and S ch o o ls
o f th e R igh t to S e le c t Candidates fo r A dm inistrative
and Teaching Positions
[VVP, No. 14, March 21, 1917, p. 1. For the granting of autonomy to the Moscow
Theological Academy, see ibid., No. 58, May 19, 1917, p. 3.]
The Most Holy Ruling Synod has decreed:
Pending the elaboration of a new statute on theological seminaries and schools,
the selection of candidates for newly opened administrative and teaching positions
shall be left to the decision of teachers5council meetings of theological seminaries
and schools, with the participation of council members from the clergy . . . The
primate of the diocese shall report on the selected candidates to the Most Holy
Synod or to the Ober-Procurator of the Synod, as appropriate. The appointments
of administrative and ordained persons shall be confirmed by decisions of the
Educational Committee of the Most Holy Synod, while [the appointments] of
others [shall be confirmed] by the official journals of the Educational Committee,
subject to the approval of the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod. In cases
where candidates for one or another office do not present themselves, the vacancies
shall be filled, after considering the opinion of the Educational Committee, by
the Most Holy Synod or by the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, as
appropriate.
[March 18, 1917]

713. T he S eparation of Church and S tate and the S eparation


of Church and S chool
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 13, March 12, 1917, p. 2.]
The insurgent people and the army must strive to achieve all those liberties,
all those human and civil rights without which, as without air, we cannot live in
the world. One of these essential rights is the right of every person to religious
liberty; i.e., the regime that must be established in our State should assure the
right of every person to believe in whatever he wishes and in whatever manner
he wishes, without anyone interfering in his faith. In addition to full legal guar
antees of religious freedom for every person, we must also all have the freedom
to have no faith. Religion must be a personal matter of the individual. Under no
circumstances should the law invade this domain of an individuals life. No
church, creed, or cult should be connected to the State or the authorities, or be
upheld or condemned by the State. The free expression of ones faith is neces
sarily accompanied by the equally free association of persons of similar faith (or
of no faith) into groups, societies, churches, communities. These churches or
communities, which collect donations from their own members, must establish
their own funds for supporting the needy parishioners, paying the salary of the
clergy, renting or building places of worship, and covering the expenses of pub
lishing books, pamphlets, etc. The State must not spend a single kopeck on the
Church. The authorities must not support the activities of any priest. In general,
the Church must be completely separated from the State .
It stands to reason that no church should have the right to teach its doctrines
RELIGION 813
in the schools. There must not be a single school under the jurisdiction of any
clergy. All church revenues, churches, church furnishings and vessels, etc., must
become the property of the State. The right to use all this State property may
be given to this or that Orthodox community; thus, members of the Orthodox
Church who become organized and express the desire to remain in the same parish
where they lived before will receive from the Government for their disposal those
churches to which they have become accustomed and, if they wish, will have the
right to build new ones. The education of the rising generation must be placed
wholly under the jurisdiction of civil authorities, civil institutions or societies,
and also private laymen. Should parents wish to impart religious concepts and
doctrines to their children, they must take care of this themselves and acquaint
their children with these matters by private means. Thus, schools throughout
Russia must be separated from the Church. These two compulsory rules in our
living will insure us against the constant, intrusive dominance of the clergy, which,
for the most part, is [in the camp of the] Black Hundred, and has always assisted
the overthrown government in its villainous activities. No wonder the priests were
everywhere called gendarmes in surplices. The clergy always preached the vilest
ideas of hatred of mankind from their pulpits, trying through schools to influence
the youth in the same direction, infusing the young, naive souls with the noxious
poison of Black Hundred ideas. A definite end must be put to this. The time is
fully ripe for a national reform on separating the Church from the State and the
school from the Church; it is extremely necessary at the present time.
It stands to reason that civil marriage and civil buriallong awaited by free-
thinking peopleshould follow from this fundamental reform. Any person who
wishes to marry will have to be registered in the municipal government or its
branches, and this would be the extent of the marriage ceremony in terms of legal
requirements. Of course, those who wish may, in addition, have a wedding in
one church or another, but this would be a matter of their personal wishes, and
the church wedding would in no way give them any additional rights. Similarly,
we may bury our dead by a civil procedure in any cemetery, without the partici
pation of the clergy. Those who wish may have an old-fashioned funeral, with
the clergy, but the compulsory [regulation] for such funerals must be completely
abolished.
714. T h e T ra n sfer o f C h urch P a r o c h ia l S c h o o ls t o t h e Jurisdiction
o f t h e M in istry o f E ducation
[Sob. U z a k I, 2, No. 1014. Additional documents on this controversial issue will be
found in the section on the All-Russian Sobor of the Orthodox Church.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of existing statutes it is hereby decreed:
1) For the effective and systematic achievement of universal education, all
elementary schools included in school systems or receiving Treasury funds for
their maintenance or for compensation to teachers, including church elementary
schools under the Department of Orthodox Religion [of the Holy Synod], as well
as church teachers and two-class schools, are transferred to the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Education.
2) All Treasury funds now allocated to school councils attached to the Most
Holy Synod and to diocesan councils and their subdivisions for the maintenance
814 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
of overseers of church schools and for school construction needs, for needs of
public education under the budget estimates of all jurisdictions to elementary
schools, including church schoolselementary, teachers, and two-class schools
as well as sums in the Emperor Alexander III church-school building fund are
transferred to the budget estimate of the Ministry of Education.
II. The Minister of Education is authorized to establish:
1) In agreement with the appropriate departments, the procedure for the
transfer of the schools mentioned in article 1 of the preceding (I) section to the
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education;
2) The procedure, conditions, and time for transfer of the elementary schools
unified under the Ministry of Education to organs of local self-government.
III. The law of July 3, 1916, on the establishment of a pension fund for
teachers of church-parish schools (Collection of Laws, article 1661) shall be abro
gated, and the sums in the aforesaid fund are transferred to the estimate of the
Ministry of Education and to the pension fund of state school teachers, respec
tively, under the Ministry of Education. All teachers in the elementary schools
mentioned in article 1 of section I of the present law are required to participate
in the pension fund of state school teachers under the Ministry of Education, and
those joining this fund are entitled to the benefits of the law of June 1,1910, under
which all service previous to affiliation with the fund is covered by contributions
from the Treasury (Collection of Laws, article 1014).
IV. The present law (sections IIII) to be put into effect before its promul
gation by the Ruling Senate.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 20, 1917
715. A Clerical Commentary on the R eform of Church S chools
[Rech9, No. 169, July 21,1917, p. 2; No. 170, July 22,1917, p. 2.]
I
I am going to speak about the basic reform of the secondary church schools
for boys and for girls which is now being carried on. . . .
The history of the contemporary church school starts, in a certain sense, with
the Statutes of 1867-69. The unforgettable authors of these Statutes laid down
two fundamental principles as a basis for educational matters: in the sphere of
syllabus the broadest possible lay education to precede specific theological studies,
and autonomy in the sphere of the schools external existence. In accordance with
the general pattern of church schools, the local diocesan authorities assumed
the position of benevolent trustees, while the actual direction of education and
tuition was centered in the hands of the Educational Committee of the Holy Synod.
In accordance with the course system adopted for the school, its pupils were com
pletely free to choose any path of life, and we have still among us outstanding
workers of secular science who have graduated from church schools and have
completed their education in a higher lay institution.
The Statutes of 1867-69 were for the church school of recent years a blessing
about which it could only sigh and dream. The 1884 regulations of unfortunate
memory, and the recent activities of the Synod in 1910 and the following years,
RELIGION 815
which are something more than fresh in our memory, reduced to nothing the
salutary principles of the 1867-69 Statutes. . . . The principles consistently in
troduced by the latter-day organizers of the church schools in the sphere of edu
cation curtailed lay courses to the utmost and in the schooPs external life cur
tailed the undivided authority of the diocesan bishop delegated to the adminis
tration of the school. Its pupils were accordingly driven by force onto a single
path, the path of pastoral ministry, which, it would seem, should be the conse
quence of free choice. Naturally, it was not just by chance that, contrary to all
divine and human laws, the carrying out of all this system was entrusted to
learned monks, who could hardly be described as such otherwise than ironically.
With such a school the church entered the period of the great revolution.
However, it is necessary to note two circumstances. The church school was
not damaged irreparably. . . . Both teacher and pupil of the church school, being
alike experienced in conflict and adversity, somehow found their way to a genuine
theological and lay education, in spite of all the obstacles erected by the authorities
who energetically directed the school. Furthermore, through recent years, lay
society has not lost its old interest in the church school. Perhaps because perse
cutions bring closer the persecuted, perhaps also for other reasons, the pupils of
the church schools, for all the good-natured jokes regarding their science, con
tinued to be welcomed as students in the lay school. If in fact they were few, it
was not through any fault of lay society.
In no other area has the revolution which we are experiencing opened such
broad vistas for reform as within the Orthodox Church. No other aspects of
Russian life were as demoralized by absolutism as the ecclesiastical and religious.
I believe that it is precisely for this reason, and not because of our special talents,
that nowhere does reform proceed so evenly and fruitfully as in the bosom of
the Church: a severe ailment together with accurate diagnosis has its advantages.
Educational affairs in the Orthodox Church are on the broad road of radical
reform.
A plan of the reform is already completed and will be submitted for the ap
proval of the All-Russian Sobor. The outer course of the reform is as follows:
Since May a Commission for Education has been organized, attached to the Edu
cational Committee [of the Synod]. The local unions of church school teachers,
who were organized by that time, sent their representatives. Together with the
elected professors of church academies and some invited representatives of uni
versities and secondary lay schools, they worked till June 5, when the All-Russian
Conference of Church School Teachers was opened in Moscow. At the Confer
ence the educational problem, worked out in the Commission and locally, was
discussed in all its aspects. The All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen,
which also took place in June, organized a special church school section, which
is working on reform problems. The Commission for Education, which inter
rupted its work for the duration of the conferences, resumed it after their con
clusion, and only recently completed it.
The plan was approved by the 10th section of the Pre-Sobor Council and will
shortly be submitted to its plenary session.
II
The history of the church schools clearly and definitely indicates the path of
their reform, regarding both the problems and the fundamental direction.
816 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
The first question which drew the attention of the Commission and of the con
ferences was that of the education to he provided hy the church school of the
future.
On this point there were no differences of opinion: beginning with the ele
mentary requirement for the free growth of personality, which presupposes that
an extensive general culture should precede specialization, it was unanimously
agreed that the minimum general knowledge to be required in a church school
should be the same as the minimum required in the lay high school. . . . At the
same time, the school will preserve its individual character . . . as a Christian
school by the thorough study of Scriptures and elective courses in some disciplines
preparatory to higher theological education (philosophical subjects, Christian art,
selected passages from the writings of the Church Fathers). It is most gratifying
to note the unanimity with which both the teachers of the church schools and
those of the lay institutions insisted on the necessity of creating precisely this type
of school. . . . Compared with these speeches, how barren seem the utterances,
which have been brought to my knowledge, of some responsible persons that future
Russia will require only technical schoolsthat they are not in the least in
terested in the development of the humanities!
The working out of the schools autonomy proceeded simultaneously with the
work on the basic organization of the school. It has also been completed.
According to the plan, the school, in the persons of its teaching staff, becomes
the master of its own life. Being autonomous within the framework of the obliga
tory norms established by law, the teachers corporation obtains ample scope for
its pedagogical activity, together with the opportunity for individual development
in accordance with local requirements and living conditions. Local school-super
vising organs are being set up within the dioceses, their members being drawn
from both the elected representatives of the teachers unions and the representa
tives of public church organizations. The tasks [of this local organ]the School
Board of Trusteesinclude the supervision of the general course of education
within the diocese and the care of its material conditions. The Educational Com
mittee of tie Holy Synod remains the central school-supervising organ, unifying
all educational activities. Its task is the general supervision on the highest level
of the regular course of school life, the working out of scientific and pedagogic
problems, and, finally, the solution of problems or school conflicts which may
have been left unsolved on the local level.
I have not spoken of what seems to me to be self-evident: appointment of all
teaching staff is being replaced by the elective principle.
Ill
The whole course of the church school reform raises a question that is of the
utmost importance for the Church: Should the school, in its administration and
higher supervision, remain under the jurisdiction of the Church, or should it pass
to the Ministry of Education?
Both at the All-Russian Teachers Conference and at the Congress of Clergy
and Laymen this subject provoked differences of opinion. Although it was decided
in the sense of leaving the school under the jurisdiction of the Church, the de
cision was far from unanimous.
The crux of the matter lies in the schools legal and economic competence,
RELIGION 817
with special emphasis on the latter, were it to remain under the jurisdiction of
the Church. With the establishment over the church schools of a ministerial
control similar to the one exercised over the private gymnasia, which enjoy a
plenitude of rights, one can drop any misgiving regarding the legal rights of the
church school teachers and pupils. On the other hand, the economic element may
cause misgivings.
At the present time the State Treasury grants for the church school as a whole
seven and a half million rubles, which are spent exclusively on church schools for
boys. The Church, from its own special funds, adds up to six million rubles, if
the returns from dioceses, which are being spent locally, are included.
Obviously, only the seven and a half million should be brought under dis
cussion.
I affirm that the fate of the school is of the greatest importance for the Church,
and consequently for the State as well. The compelling need of the present moment
is to equip those who serve the Church with higher education. This can be achieved
only through the existence of secondary schools having a Christian and humani
tarian character. And the existence of the latter presupposes the jurisdiction of
the Church.
There is no other way, at least for the time being, to achieve our ancient dream
to have educated priests in our villages.
If that is so, then the old question of whether or not the existence of an edu
cated clergy as a mere cultural force is in the interest of the State is still very
much with us. Obviously there cannot exist two opinions [on the subject], and
consequently the State itself has an interest in maintaining the school under the
jurisdiction of the Church.
There is also another side to the matter which has been given little attention.
The combination of the grant from the State (seven and a half million) with
the special funds of the Holy Synod (up to six million) has greatly reduced the
cost of church school education and thereby made it democratic. Here is a fact
that speaks for itself. Thirty-five years ago, out of 150 pupils in the Evremov
church school there was only one who did not belong to the upper classesthe
author of these lines, a peasants son. At the present time, in spite of all the con
straints in this respect, 20 to 30 per cent of the church school pupils are peasant
children* It goes without saying that now the doors of the schools are wide open
for all classes. Tell me of a school more accessible for the peasantry than the
future reformed church school. The cultural and educational significance of the
future church school will be so high I feel certain that the State will be granting
its assistance in a far greater measure than ever. Slogans of a certain nature
which are [now] being heard do not frighten me: for one must believe that states
manlike reasoning will finally triumph over the cries of the mob, however loud
and powerful they sound to us at the present moment
A rchpriest K onstantin A ggeev
President of the Educational Committee of the Holy Synod
818 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOBOR OF THE RUSSIAN
ORTHODOX CHURCH
716. T h e R esolution of th e P re-S obor Council on the R elations
B etw een C hurch and S tate , J uly 13, 1917
[B. V. Titlinov, Tserkov* vo vremia revoliutsii, pp. 80-82. The Pre-Sobor Council,
called to deal with a variety of problems, issued, on August 12, a long list of issues
and recommendations for the consideration of the Sobor. The report is to be found
in A. I. Vvedenskii, Tserkov5 i gosudarstvo, pp. 68-70. For a description of the com
position of the Pre-Sobor Council, see Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet
State, pp. 26-27. The following is the full text of the first point.]
The Orthodox Church must occupy the first and most privileged public ju
ridical position among all other communions in the Russian state. As the greatest
national sanctuary of remarkable historic and cultural value, also as the con
fession of the majority of the population, it is entitled to this position- In accord
ance with the liberty of conscience and religious confession declared in the new
state order of Russia, the Orthodox Church must enjoy this freedom to the full
extent. These basic principles should be expressed in the following points:
1. The Orthodox Church in Russia is independent of the state authority (au
tonomous) in matters of its constitution, legislation, administration, judiciary,
doctrine, and moral precepts, ritual, inner ecclesiastical discipline, and outward
relations with other confessions.
2. The enactments passed by the Orthodox Church for her own use, and in a
manner established by herself, are accepted on the part of the State as legal norms
which are obligatory, from the moment of their publication by the ecclesiastical
authority, for all persons and institutions belonging to the Orthodox Church
located in Russia as well as beyond the border.
3. The acts of the organs of the Orthodox Church are subject to state over
sight only in regard to their conformity with the laws of the State, but these organs
are responsible to the State only in accordance with judicial procedure.
4. The State recognizes the ecclesiastical hierarchy and ecclesiastical institu
tions formed on the bases of church decisions. The State recognizes the force of
administrative and judicial acts of these church institutions and persons in charge
in accordance with the powers granted to them by church enactments in so far
as these acts do not violate the laws of the State. Control with regard to con
formity to law of the acts of church authorities is carried out by judicial procedure.
5. Clergymen, monks, and sacristans who have completed the course of study
in theological schools or special schools for this purpose, also specially prepared
sacristans of the Orthodox faith, are exempt from all military service and all
civil duties.
6. Whenever at least one of the parties to a marriage belongs to the Orthodox
Church, a church marriage ceremony according to the Orthodox rite is recognized
as the legal solemnization of the marriage.
7. Ecclesiastical juridical pronouncements in matters of divorce or illegality
or invalidity of a marriage are recognized as valid juridical decisions.
8. Registries of births have the weight of civil acts if they are executed in
accordance with the laws of the State.
RELIGION 819
9. Freedom of professing and preaching the Orthodox faith and the right to
conduct open divine service shall be recognized and protected by the State.
10. The twelve most revered Church holidays, Sundays, and days specially
honored by the Orthodox Church shall be recognized by the State as days of rest.
11. The head of the Russian State and the Minister of Confessions must
belong to the Orthodox Church.
12. On all occasions of state life when the State appeals to religion, the Ortho
dox Church shall be favored.
13. The Orthodox Church shall organize lower, middle, and higher schools
for specifically theological as well as general education. These schools shall enjoy
the same rights as the government institutions of learning.
14. In all secular state and private schools where children of Orthodox parents
attend, the teaching of religion shall be compulsory. Teachers of religion in state
schools shall be maintained at the expense of the State.
15. All institutions of the Orthodox Church shall enjoy the property rights
of legal persons. The existing administrative offices of the Orthodox Church shall
retain the property which they possess at the present time; moreover, they may
not be abolished, and their property may not be confiscated, without the consent
of the ecclesiastical authorities.
16. Church properties bringing no net income are free from taxation.
17. The Orthodox Church shall receive from the State Treasury annual sub
sidies within the limits of its actual needs, on condition that it submit a report
about the sums received.

717. A Commentary in Russkiia Vedomosti on the P osition of


the Church and th e T asks B efore the S obor
[No. 186, August 15,1917, p. 2.]
The All-Russian Church Sobor opens today in Moscow. Under other circum
stances such a Sobor, which has not been called in Russia for two and a half
centuries, would arouse deep and intense interest in the entire country. At present
very little attention is devoted to it; most of the population seems to be indif
ferent to it. This is explained in part by outside causesby the fact that now all
the attention of the public is turned to political questions, to events at the front,
to the economic and financial breakdown. But there are other reasons as well.
They are rooted in the internal order of the Russian Orthodox Church, and they
too played a role in weakening the interest in the Sobor.
Orthodoxy was the dominant religion in Russia. It enjoyed the powerful
support of the State, which placed the Orthodox Church in an exceptionally privi
leged position. But this support was bought at too high a price: the outward
official esteem, generous appropriations from the coffers of the State Treasury,
the protection of the privileges of Orthodoxy by police measures, the introduction
of various limitations and bans on Old Believers and adherents of sects, etc. For
all this, Orthodoxy paid by complete abdication of internal independence and the
complete renunciation of a free church life. The Orthodox Church was the domi
nant church in Russia only outwardly. In reality, however, no other religious
820 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
organization had so little freedom in our country as the Orthodox Church. From
a free church it was converted into a simple tool of state powermoreover, state
power in the form of the police order detested hy everybody. And this, of course,
could not but lead to the gradual ruin of the Orthodox Church and to its de
generation.
According to passports, even up to this time the overwhelming majority of
the population in Russia are listed as adherents of Orthodoxy. But these many
millions of Orthodox adherents are for the most part people who are indifferent
to questions of faith and who perform certain rites as a matter of tradition. The
more vital elements gradually broke away from Orthodoxy, joined various sects:
the Old Believers, Catholicism, and even Islam. The Orthodox priesthood was
powerless to combat this exodus by moral influence. . . . At the top, infinitely
removed from the parishioners, stood the bishops, upon whom Rasputinism had
cast its shadow, and at the bottom the village priests, whom the population
despised. All one needs is to become acquainted with Russian folklore, published
in recent times, to be convinced that the peasantry treats no other class with such
animosity as it does the priesthood. The Russian folk tale is capable of treating
with tolerance and neutrality, at least occasionally, the -pomeshchik, the merchant,
the functionary, the policeman. But it will never fail to attribute all sorts of vices
to a priest, a deacon, a monk. Is it necessary to mention the hostility of the people
toward the priesthood now, after the revolution, the first days of which were
marked by mass instances of arrest by the peasants of priests along with the
policemen?
The profound drop in the vital religious feeling in Orthodoxy and the very
low ebb of the authority of the Orthodox priesthood are the chief reasons that
the convening of the Sobor did not arouse the profound interest that could have
been expected under different circumstances. And the same conditions make the
problems facing the Sobor extremely difficult. It is forced to work on the creation
of a completely new church life in Russia, removing at the same time the outward
forms of this life and pouring into it a new vital content. As to the direction this
work must take, it is clear. Orthodoxy must renounce its privileges but restore
its inner freedom.
718. G reetin gs t o t h e Sobor upon Its C onvocation
[A. I. Vvedenskii, Tserkov9 i gosudarstvo, pp. 74-85. For the decision of July 5 of the
Holy Synod, communicated to the Government July 12, calling for the Sobor to con
vene in Moscow on August 15, see Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 908. The membership of the
Sobor is discussed in Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, p. 27.]
August 16,1917
[Second Session]
The holy liturgy was celebrated in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour by
Tikhon, Metropolitan of Moscow and Kolomna, assisted by the Most Reverend
Suffragan Bishops Dmitrii of Mozhaisk and Arsenii of Serpukhov, by the fathers,
members of the Sobor, and by the clergy of the Cathedral.
After the end of the liturgy the bishops, the members of the Sobor, having left
the altar through the Tsar Gates, took their places in their vestments on special
benches covered with red cloth, in the middle of the Cathedral, while all the other
RELIGION 821
members of the Sobor took their places to the right and to the left of the bishops.
The session was opened under the presidency of the senior member of the
Holy Synod, Vladimir, Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia. The Sobor sang the
canticle We Are Gathered Today Through the Benefaction of the Holy Ghost.
1. The Sobor was greeted by the Minister of Confessions, A. V. Kartashev,
on behalf of the Provisional Government.
The Provisional Government has charged me to declare to the Holy Sobor
that it is proud to witness the opening under its aegis and protection of this solemn
ecclesiastical occasion; what the power of the old regime was unable to give to the
Russian national church was easily and gladly granted by the new government,
which has the duty to implant and to strengthen in Russia genuine liberty. The
Provisional Government does not visualize the present Sobor as the usual congress
of a private association, of which there are now so many; it sees in the Sobor of
the Russian Orthodox Church the authoritative organ of church legislation which
has the right and the authority to present for the consideration of the Provisional
Government bills concerning the new form of the administrative institutions of
the Church and regarding the alteration of the relationship between the Church
and the State.
The Provisional Government considers that, until the Constituent Assembly
works out the new fundamental laws, it stands very close to the affairs and the
interests of the Orthodox Church. Up to now it has had in its membership an
Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church (and not
of any other confession). If this office has been recently abolished (although up
to this time its rights and duties have not been abolished), it is only because, in
view of the [forthcoming] Church Sobor, the Government did not wish, for the
sake of the symbolic liberty of the Church, which it asserts, to preserve a name
which in the minds of churchmen has become synonymous with the painful de
pendence of Church on the State.
The Provisional Government awaits the moment when the Sobor presents it
with a new plan of church administration, and then it will readily abolish among
the powers of its Minister of Confessions his rights and duties as Ober-Procurator
concerning matters of internal church administration, leaving it to him to exer
cise the more external supervision with regard to legality. . . .
. . . The Provisional Government on August 11 approved an explicit law
consisting of two points:
1) To reserve to the National [Pomestnyi] Sobor of the Russian Church
opening on August 15 the right to work out and to introduce for the considera
tion of the Provisional Government a bill concerning the new order of free self
administration in the Russian Church.
2) To leave, until the national government accepts the new organization of
the higher church administration, all matters concerning internal church admin
istration under the jurisdiction of the Holy Ruling Synod and the institutions
attached to it.4
Having fulfilled my duty by making this declaration on behalf of the Pro
visional Government, I do not dare to complicate my speech any further by dis
closing the feelings of anxiety that animate me with regard to our Church and
4Sob. TJzak^ 1,2, No. 1252.
822 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
our fatherland. Together with you. I will simply make the broad Orthodox sign
of the cross.
6. The President of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, spoke on behalf of the
State Duma:
An ardent greeting to the All-Russian Church Sobor and a low bow from the
State Duma to all its participants. The thought of the Sobor and of organizing
the Church on a Sobor basis arose and was always supported in the Third and
Fourth State Dumas. This deeply felt hope of organizing the Church on a Sobor
[basis] has now been realized; it has been realized in the troubled times through
which we are living.
The State Duma is absolutely convinced that the Sobor of prelates, pastors,
and faithful, irrespective of the tasks of organizing the church institutions imposed
upon them, will be capable of contributing to the conciliation and unification of
all the Russian people. The Church is capable of strengthening the spiritual forces
of the people. Religious feeling is distinguished by its power to unite everybody.
8. The Mayor of Moscow, V. V. Rudnev (S.R.), spoke on behalf of the Mos
cow municipality:
The Moscow Municipal Duma, representing the population, greets the mem
bers of the clergy and the laymen who have gathered for the purpose of organiz
ing a new, free Church. Here in the heart of Russia, in the heart of the mother
of the Russian towns, in the center of the [national] spiritual and religious quest,
now resounds the voice of the free Church; on the ruins of the administration of
dismal memories the first stones of the living Church are being laid. The bases
of spiritual and religious life are eternal, and while the Russian people live, their
ardent faith and sincere religiousness will live, together with a complete tolerance
toward those who think differently. In its forthcoming labors and cares regard
ing the future, the Orthodox Church must respond and with all its forces par
ticipate in the great task of saving and uniting the homeland.
The Sobor sang the great Gloria in Excelsis, after which the session was closed.

719. A M essage from the S obor to General K ornilov ,


A ugust 17,1917
[A. I. Vvedenskii, Tserkov9i gosudarstvo, p. 92. Sent in response to Kornilovs greet
ings to the Sobor. On August 26, the Sobor decided to send a special mission to Stavka
with a message from it *to all the soldiers who really defend their motherland and die
for it. Novoe Vremia, No. 14863, August 26,1917, p. 2.]
. . . The All-Russian Sobor of the Orthodox Church is deeply touched by
your greetings and invokes the Lords blessings upon you, upon the valiant army
and the fleet.
We pray to the Almighty for the regeneration of the spirit of supreme love
for the Church and the Motherland among our Christ-loving army and for the
conferring of victory upon Russian arms. May the army and the people join in
a prayer for long-suffering Russia in strong hope for the Lords help. May the
RELIGION 823
revival of sobornost now beginning in the Russian Church serve as a pledge of
strength and fortitude of the Russian Power!
T ikhon , Metropolitan of Moscow,
President of the Sobor

720. M essage of the S obor Ordering P rayers for the Salvation


OF THE RUSSL4N POWER
[Russkoe Slovo, No. 211, September 16,1917, p. 5- The message was issued on August
24. A. I. Vvedenskii, in Tserkotf i gosurdarstvo, p. 92, commented: The political
situation in the country attracted the attention of the Sobor also in its further work,
reducing to nought the purely church questions of the Sobor. To be sure, these
questions were debated too, but only incidentally. This was not close to the heart of
the Sobor.]
The Sobor orders the organization on September 14 throughout all of Russia
of national prayers of repentance for the salvation of the Russian Power, at which
time the following message shall be read:
The Holy Synod of the Orthodox Russian Church to all Orthodox Russians:
. . . Orthodox: lofty is our calling and great is our responsibility before God!
But to our shame, be it said, we have dimmed the triumph of the Church of Christ
by our great sins. They are responsible for the unheard-of grief with which we
live. Total ruin is approaching. The horrors of unprecedented famine are ex
pected to befall the army and the cities. Already factories are being shut down
for lack of fuel. Soon millions of workers will remain without work and without
means of livelihood. In the winter the city population will freeze in unheated
homes. And during this time the Motherland, lacerated by cruel discord, remains
unprotected against the enemy, which threatens both the Petrograd and Kiev sanc
tuaries. Beloved brethren, hear the voice of the Church. The Motherland is dying.
And the cause of this is not some misfortunes over which we have no control, but
the depth of our spiritual fallthat devastation of which the Prophet Jeremiah
speaks: For my people have committed two evils; they have forsaken me the
fountain of living waters, and hewed them out cisterns, broken cisterns, that can
hold no water (Jeremiah 2:13). The peoples conscience is obscured by teach
ings contrary to Christianity. Unheard-of blasphemy and sacrilege take place.
In some places pastors are banished from temples. People of all ranks and posi
tions strive to exploit the peoples misfortune for easy profit. The audacity of
plunderers grows daily. Seizure of other peoples property is sanctioned. People
who live by honest labor become the object of ridicule and slander. Oblivious
of treason, soldiers and whole military units flee from the battlefield, plundering
peaceful inhabitants and saving their own lives. In the meantime the horror of
civil war gathers over Russia. Our Motherland has become proverbial, an object
of abuse among foreigners, for the greediness, cowardice, and treason of her sons.
Orthodox! In the name of the Church of Christ, the Sobor entreats you: Awaken,
come to your senses, cast away your hatred and internal strife, rise in defense of
Russia! Fulfill the word of warning, the word of the Forerunner of Christ: And
now also the axe is laid unto the root of the trees: every tree therefore which
bringeth not forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire (Luke 3:9).
824 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Do not suffer the Motherland to be insulted and come to a disgraceful end. Repent
and reap worthy fruits of your repentancepurge yourselves with fasting. May
the temples be filled with worshipers. But first of all, and above all, may your
hearts be inflamed with the love of Christ. Prove this by your deeds for long-
suffering and tormented Russia. Help her for the sake of Christ. Those of you
who wield power, make the sign of the cross, and, in the spirit of holy love for the
people, serve Russia and not a party. Those of you who own wealth, sacrifice your
possessions. Workers, toil without sparing your strength, and subordinate your
personal needs to the welfare of the Motherland. Landowners and land-tillers,
help her with grain. Do not let the army and the city die of famine. And you,
young, healthy, and strong men, sacrifice your life. May the fainthearted flight
of the army in the face of the enemy stop. And may the country provide moral
support and not be the source of spiritual depravation. May the blessing of the
great zealot intercessors for the Russian land be with you . . . In days of great
danger and of her total collapse [in the past] Russia was saved more than once
by their holy prayers. May the memory of these great zealots of ours combine
with the sacred sign of Christian hope. May the unconquered power of the life-
giving Cross of our Lord shine upon us in these sorrowful days. May Holy Rus
be resurrected in the great deed of abnegation and love of Christ.
721. T h e S obor and the K ornilov M ovement
[B. V. Titlinov, Tserkov* vo vremia revoliutsiU pp. 69-70. A. I. Vvedenskii, Tserkov9
i gosudarstvo, pp. 98-99, confirms this version of the relations between members of
the Sobor and the Kornilov movement.]
When in the latter part of August information concerning General Kornilovs
attack suddenly reached the Sobor, one had only to see the excitement that gripped
groups in the Sobor in order to establish exactly the Sobor orientation:* the
more so since it was something more than mere news. General Kornilov did
nothing more nor less than send his envoys and request the Sobors support of
his undertaking. To the Sobors political aspiration this request was very flatter
ing, alluringly promising the Sobor the halo of political fame, should Kornilovs
scheme succeed. But just as obvious was the risk of the Sobors action on so
purely political a matter. This meant throwing itself openly into the political
whirlpool, where nothing but splinters would remain of the Church. The Sobor
was going through a truly dramatic internal struggle. The sympathies of the
Sobor majority carried them irresistibly to the support of Kornilov, or at least to
express to him their sympathy in some way, but caution prompted them to think
first before deciding to take the open step. In private gatherings of members of
the Sobor the situation was discussed with animation. Members of the Sobor
followed feverishly the course of Kornilovs actions and eagerly accepted all
rumorswhich for the most part distorted realityof the successes of Kornilovs
armies. After two weeks of wavering, a closed meeting of the Sobor was finally
called for a general discussion on the relation of the Sobor to the Komilovshchina.
But while the Sobor was deliberating, Kornilovs venture was liquidated. By the
time the above-mentioned meeting was to be held, it became definitely known that
* The writer of these lines was himself a member of the Sobor and, in general, an intimate
witness of church events in 1917. That is why one encounters in the present book expressions
that are characteristic of eyewitnesses only.
RELIGION 825
the Kornilov detachments were stopped. The Provisional Government declared
Kornilov a traitor and his chances for success nil. The following day everything
was finished. The Sobor was therefore spared the temptation to cross the political
Rubicon, and stopped short of a venturesome action. The question was scratched
off. But the Sobor nevertheless responded to the events by sending the Provi
sional Government a telegram urging the Government not to shed blood and not
to be carried away by a feeling of vindictiveness. . . .

722. T h e A ppeal of the S obor to the P rovisional Government


F ollowing the K ornilov A ffair
[.Rech\ No. 206, September 2,1917, p. 3.]

Fratricide should cease completely through an armistice between the two


opposing camps. There should be no place for unworthy actions; there should
be no bloody vengeance.
. . . The abandonment of biased points of view of class or party is an essen
tial condition to this end.
The Government should not be a party government but the government of
all the people. And a national Russian government can be only a government
inspired by the faith of Christ. . . . The Sobor expects from the Government
those great deeds and that love which would make it worthy of the blessing of God.
[September 1, 1917]

723. T h e S ob or R eq u ests th e R ep eal o f t h e Law T ransferring O rth od ox


P a r o c h ia l S c h o o ls to t h e Jurisdiction o f t h e M inistry o f E ducation
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 222, September 29,1917, p. 5.]
The draft law on church parochial schools was reviewed yesterday at the
session of the Sobor. The speaker was Archpriest P. I. Sokolov.
As is known, by decision of the Provisional Government, all church parochial
schools included in the school system and receiving grants from the Treasury are
transferred to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. This decision was
protested by the Synod, which is requesting its repeal and, at least, a delay in its
implementation, pending a decision on the question at the All-Russian Church
Sobor and in the Constituent Assembly. However, the request of the Synod
remained unanswered and the law on the transfer of the church school is going
into effect.
At the conclusion of the address, the following resolutions were submitted
to the Sobor:
A. To request the Provisional Government to: 1) repeal the section of the
law governing the transfer of the church parochial schools to the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Education, the closing of the pension fund for men and women
teachers of church parochial schools, and the transfer to the Treasury of the funds
which heretofore were allocated for the maintenance of the schools; 2) raise the
basic salary of teachers to the standards of the Ministry zemstvo schools with the
appropriate supplementary credits from the Treasury, and 3) in view of the fact
826 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
that work in church parochial schools is soon to begin and in some of them has
already begun, issue urgent instructions to stop the transfer of local church schools
to the Ministry.
B. After the repeal of the law: 1) all church parochial schools and grammar
schools to be transferred to the jurisdiction of parishes in accordance with the
rules of the Church Sobor, with the exception of monastery schools, theological
seminaries, etc.; 2) the Synod school councils and the diocese councils to be
reorganized on the bases of elections; 3) teaching in church parochial schools
introduced into the system to be conducted according to courses of study not
lower than those in schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry; and 4) . . .
to explain to the bishops through the Synod that the Church cannot get along
without schools.
Further it was decided to send a delegation of members of the Sobor to the
Provisional Government to renew the petition to repeal the law of June 20 about
the transfer of church parochial schools to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of
Education. The members of the delegation are Archbishop Kirill, Archpriest
Stanislavskii of Tambov, N. D. Kuznetsov, and a representative from the peasant
group.
724. T he M eeting w ith A. F. K erensky of the D elegation of the
S obor on the Church S chool Q uestion
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 233, October 12, 1917, p. 4.]
A delegation of the All-Russian Church Sobor, consisting of Archbishop
Kirill of Tambov, Archpriest Stanslavskii, the attorney Kuznetsov, and the
peasant Utkin, called today on the Minister-President, A. F. Kerensky, and trans
mitted to him a resolution of the Sobor to repeal the law transferring the church
parochial school to the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. In their argu
ments, the delegates pointed out the urgent need for the Orthodox Church to
maintain its schools, which, reorganized in keeping with the spirit of the time,
could have a tremendous significance on the moral education of the people.
A. F. Kerensky replied that, inasmuch as the Church has complete freedom now,
it has of course the right to open its schools, but the Provisional Government
cannot under any circumstances deviate from its decision called for by the needs
of the State. There could only be a matter of reducing the frictions and irritation
aroused by the transfer of the church schools to the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Education. Further, Archbishop Kirill informed A. F. Kerensky of the resolu
tion of the Sobor on the question of compulsory teaching of religious education in
the schools. Attorney Kutznetsov submitted a petition on affording to participants
of the Sobor who are in government employ an opportunity for further work in
the Sobor by granting them leaves with pay. A. F. Kerensky promised to submit
this information of the delegation to the consideration of the Provisional Govern
ment. A. V. Kartashev, Minister of Confessions, was present at the interview with
the delegation.
725. T h e R estorers of the S hades of th e P ast
[Editorial in Volia Naroda, No. 132, September 30, 1917, p. 1.]
The Church Sobor resolved: 1) that compulsory teaching of religion in all
schoolselementary, secondary, and higheris necessary; 2) to continue to
RELIGION 827
strive to abolish by legislative means the right of children who have reached the
age of 14 to change their faith, as stated in the law of July 14 on freedom of
conscience; 3) to protest against the transfer of church parochial schools to the
administration of public education.
Such resolutions by the Sobor were to be expected. Too long had the Orthodox
hierarchy been under the training of the autocratic regime to rid itself readily
of all the methods and habits of the past.
But the more vigorous should be the public rebuff to such pretensions of the
Sobor, which disgrace in essence the Orthodox Church, which attempt to revive
coercive-police patronage over religious conscience, and which contradict the
inalienable rights of man and the citizen.
The school must be separated from the Church. This is the ABC of contem
porary democracy. And no compromise with the fathers of the Church is to
be tolerated here.
Likewise no compromises are to be tolerated with respect to the limitation of
freedom of conscience, declared by the law of July 14. As is known, it established
the right of anyone to belong to any religion or to none. On reaching the age
of 14, children had the right of free choice or of change to any religion. Likewise,
paragraph 9 of this act gave the right to apply not to the Church but to state
institutions for the sanctioning and the giving proper form to a number of civil
and legal acts which heretofore were under the administration of the Church
(divorce, marriage, birth certificate, death certificate, etc.).
The Sobor is now attempting to reduce to nought the implementation of this
act. Even from the point of view of a religious man such a pretension is shamefuL
From the social and political point of view it calls for a most vigorous rebuff.
If our revolution stops short of nothing to introduce radical social reforms, the
more so should it not hesitate to introduce political reforms. There can be no
question in this respect about any step backward. On the contrary, the public has
the right to insist that the government implement as soon as possible the laws
following the act of July 14, which affect, in particular, a number of acts of
civil-legal importance heretofore administered by the Church.
The same should be said with regard to the question of leaving the church
schools under the administration of the Church. They have already been trans
ferred to the Ministry of Education. The Sobor wants now to return them to the
administration of the Synod. To grant such a request would mean an obvious
detriment to the cause of public education. It is known that the church schools
were the worst schools, and much worse than the schools under the ministries and
zemstvos. The well-founded criticisms of them were countless. Moreover, they
pursued a Black Hundred policy of the worst kind. An attempt was made not
so much to teach children something as to coach them with a certain brand of
politics. It was no teaching but the distorting of childrens souls, and there are
no reasons to renew this corruption of the child. . . .
726. T h e R e fu sa l o f t h e Sobor t o P a rticip a te in t h e P rep a rlia m en t
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 224, October 1,1917, p. 5.]
At the beginning of the session Prof. N. D. Kuznetsov submitted a petition
of over 42 signatures from members of the Sobor on the question of the participa
tion of its members in the Council of the Russian Republic which is opening. It
was proposed in the petition to elect 25 members of the Sobor. After studying the
828 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
petition, the Sobor Council found the proposal of N. D. Kuznetsov in substance
acceptable and resolved to decrease the number of representatives of the Sobor
to 9. A number of speakers, among them Prof. B. V. Titlinov, N. I. Astrov, and
S. N. Bulgakov, spoke against sending members of the Sobor to the Preparlia
ment. In his speech, S. N. Bulgakov stated that the Sobor had already accepted
the appeal to the population on the Constituent Assembly. The appeal declared
that the Church stands above parties and politics.5 The forthcoming Preparlia
ment, however, is a purely political institution. If members of the Sobor beg
to participate in it, they will thereby belittle the importance and dignity of the
Sobor, which is the highest church authority and organ of government expressing
the highest conscience of the Church. Therefore it does not behoove the Sobor
to knock at the door of the political Preparliament on a level with political parties.
Prof. N. D. Kuznetsov made a long speech in defense of the petition.
Member of the Sobor Bulgakov, said the speaker, summons you to some
sort of elevated position and thinks it unfit for the Sobor as a supreme court of
conscience to request representation in the Preparliament, [a body] which, in
his opinion, will play a melancholy role. The Church has always carried its teach
ing into every phase of life and has disdained nothing in order to save the people
and now in order to save the Russian State itself.
No one knows what role the Preparliament will play. At any rate, the moral
significance of its resolutions is accepted in advance by the Provisional Govern
ment.
At the close of the debates the question of sending representatives of the Sobor
to the Preparliament was put to a vote. By a majority of 177 to 115 votes, the
Sobor resolved not to send its members to the Preparliament.
727. T h e Conflict B etween the L iberals and the
C onservatives in the S obor
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14887, October 3,1917, p. 3. Titlinov was removed as editor soon
thereafter and resigned from the Sobor. Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet
State, p. 35.]
Todays very lively session concluded with a serious scandal. The publish
ing department, through the lecturer Prof. L. I. Pisarev, proposes to relegate
the editing of the Tserkovno-0 bshchestvennyi Vestnik to the editorial committee,
which should include the present editor, Prof. Titlinov. And [it further proposes]
to organize the publication of leaflets and brochures illuminating current events
for the people. But a number of recent articles by Prof. Titlinov cast aspersions
on the activity of the Sobor and created a hostile attitude toward him by the
majority in the Sobor. Several orators made speeches against any kind of partici
pation by Titlinov in the publishing department of the Sobor. . . . A. V. Vasilev
calls the baiting of the Vestnik church bolshevism. Count V. A. Bobrinskii com
plains that thieves have penetrated into the Sobor and are pillaging the holy of
holies of the Church. Bich-Lubenskii makes a speech replete with venomous
sarcasm. He compares the articles of Prof. Titlinov on the monarchical sentiments
5 The appeal called for the election of "men loving the holy church and their native land.
Though there was liberal opposition within the Sobor to this action, the proposal for an
appeal was adopted and the document read to the Sobor on September 30. Curtiss, The
Russian Church and the Soviet State, pp. 32-33.
RELIGION 829
of the Sobor with the activity of the volunteer okhranniki in Kharkov. Titlinov,
unable to contain himself, casts a coarse insult at the address of Bich-Lubenskii.
A storm ensues in the Sobor. Demands are heard to remove Titlinov. The tested
remedy for tranquilizing is resorted tosinging a prayer. The session closes.

728. T h e D eb ate on t h e E sta b lish m en t o f t h e P a tr ia r c h a te


[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 236, October 17,1917, pp. 5-6. The debates began on October
14 and continued until a decision was reached on October 28.]
[Session of October 16]

Apparently the majority of the members of the Sobor are in favor of restoring
the Patriarchate in Russia. Some express themselves against it since they regard
the Patriarchate as a monarchical venture.
The discussion of the question began with a declaration by Prof. N. D.
Kuznetsov, who criticized the report of Bishop Mitrofan of Astrakhan on the
Patriarchate.
N. D. Kuznetsov stated that the report failed to make clear and to formulate
the question on the Patriarchate. It is not known what church institutions will
be headed by the Patriarchate. There may be one and there may be several. The
report states that the Patriarchate will be responsible to the Sobor. Precisely
what it means and to what extent the Patriarchate must give a report to the admin
istration are unknown. Only general considerations are mentioned in the report.
Consequently they cannot be subjected to a vote inasmuch as it will not solve
but confuse the issue.
V. G. Rubtsot, member of the Sobor, made a speech directed chiefly against
the episcopate. In his opinion the salvation of the Russian Church resides not
in the Patriarchate but in greater democracy and the elective factor, in the total
vote of the Church and in a wide Sobor administration.
Prince Chagadaev, member of the Sobor, stated in his speech that individual
authority in church life is not suitable. All church matters and all church measures
must be weighed and discussed collectively.
The opponents of the Patriarchate were opposed by a great many speakers.
Bishop Mitrofan of Astrakhan said that the essential church question now is the
question of restoring the Patriarchate in Russia since this institution is profoundly
bound with the church life of Russia. The Patriarch is the president of the Sobor
and of the Synod. He calls the Sobors, both the periodic ones and the extra
ordinary ones. He is a vital part of the Church. The Patriarch has a place at the
Sobor and after the Sobor. The Patriarch is an executive organ of authority
at the Sobor, but he is not an embodiment of the entire authority. Thus in
church life the Patriarch is a hierarch, as are his colleagues the bishops. The
Patriarch is responsible to the Sobor: he reports to it of his activity and of the
activity of the organs of Sobor administration. And the best guarantees that
the Patriarch will be unable to be despotic and absolute are the Sobor and the
Synod,
In view of the late hour, the discussion of the question is postponed to the
next session of the Sobor.
830 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
729. T he R estoration of the P atriarchate in R ussia
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 245, November 8, 1917, p. 3.]
The All-Russian National Church Sobor under the influence of recent events
[the October Revolution] hastened the discussion of the question of restoring
the Patriarchate in Russia. It was proposed to stop the debates, and the question
of the Patriarchate was put to a vote [October 28].
By an overwhelming majority of voices, almost unanimously, a resolution
was adopted, according to which:
1) The periodically convoked Sobor enjoys in the Russian Church the
supreme authorityjudicial, legislative, and executive.
2) The Patriarchate is being restored and it will head the administration of
church affairs in the Russian Orthodox Church.
3) The Patriarch is the first among the bishops, who are equal to him.
4) Together with the organs of church administration, the Patriarch is respon
sible to the Sobor.
The Election of the Patriarch
On the basis of this resolution, election of the Patriarch took place in the
Cathedral of Christ the Saviour [on October 31]. Three candidates chosen by
the Sobor were on the ballot sheet: Antoni, [Archbishop] of Kharkov, Arsenii,
[Archbishop] of Novgorod, and Tikhon, the Moscow Metropolitan.
Metropolitan Tikhon received the greatest number of votes [sc; on the third
ballot Tikhon received enough votes for nomination with the other two candi
dates],
[On November 5] the paper with his [Tikhons] name was drawn from a
box [the final choice was by lot] by the monk, elder Aleksei. The election of the
Patriarch was distinguished by great solemnity. The Metropolitan Vladimir with
the assembly of the bishops conducted the service.
The inauguration of the Patriarch is planned for November 21. Moscow has
been chosen as the place of residence of lhe Patriarch.
730. T h e S obor and the O ctober R evolution
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 246, November 9, 1917, p. 3.]
Yesterdays session of the Sobor was full of reverberations of the events we
are experiencing. Present at the Sobor was Assistant Minister of Confessions,
Prof. S. A. Kotliarevskii. He departed from Petrograd following the arrest of
the members of the Government It was resolved to notify the population by a
special address in the name of the Sobor of lhe elections and naming of the
Patriarch and to outline the history of the question, also the considerations that
led the Sobor to express itself in favor of restoring the Patriarchate. The prepara
tion of the draft of the address was entrusted to Anastasii of Kiev, Archbishop
Illarion, and several professors. It was resolved to photograph and describe the
damaged Kremlin holy objects. The commission to inspect the Kremlin was
composed of the bishops who were in the Kremlin during the troubled days . . .
In discussing the question of renewing publication of the Tserkovno -
Obshchestvennyi Vestnik the thought was expressed of the need to submit a
petition in this respect to the Military-Revolutionary Committee [of the Soviet].
This thought met with a sham rebuke from Prince G. P. Trubetskoi who was sup-
RELIGION 831
Military-Revolutionary Committee as a fact, but to petition it would lower the
dignity of the Sobor. We can deal with [it] as we dealt in the bygone days with
the Golden Horde.
It was resolved to form a commission to work out a text of the message of
the Sobor which would be a response to the events of the day. . . .
Prof. L. I. Pisarev made a report on the difficult property and financial situa
tion of the Church in connection with the declaration by die new authority on
confiscation of church and monastery lands. Government appropriations can
hardly be expected. We must look for new sources of income because the economic
condition of the clergy is nearing catastrophe.
Metropolitan Platon made a report on his negotiations in connection with the
assignment from the Sobor with the Military-Revolutionary Committee. Metro
politan Platon requested the Committee to neutralize the Kremlin in the future
and to take measures to protect the Kremlin holy objects. The first request was
received by the Committee favorably. The Metropolitan was told that the
Military-Revolutionary Committee has already raised the question of disbanding
the arsenal and the barracks in the Kremlin. The Military-Revolutionary Commit
tee agreed to have the holy objects protected by the clergy of the cathedral
together with the patrols.
Appeal of the Sobor to the Orthodox Russian Church
News has reached the members of the Sobor, which rouses their heart and soul
to indignation, that junkers and other defenseless persons in Moscow and other
parts of Russia are threatened by lynching and other forms of violence and bloody
dealing on the part of the armed mob.
The Holy Synod declares publicly: Enough shedding of brothers blood!
Enough malice and revenge!
Revenge should never exist anywhere; the more so is it intolerable against
those who, without being on a militant side, responded only to the will of those
who sent them.
Victors, no matter who you may be and in whose name you have shed blood,
do not profane yourselves by shedding your brothers blood, by killing those who
are defenseless, by tormenting those who are suffering. Do not cause new grief
and disgrace to the tormented country, stained as it is with the blood of her sons.
Think of the unfortunate mothers and families and do not add new tears and
cries to the spilled blood.
Even those who have repudiated God and the Church, who remain deaf to the
voice of conscience, stop at least in the name of love of mankind.
The Sobor appeals to you also, leaders of the movement: exert all of your
influence to curb the bloodthirsty cravings of those who revel in their fratricidal
victory.

THE OLD BELIEVERS


731. A C on feren ce o f O ld B eliev ers
[ VVP, No. 4B, May 5, 1917, p. 3.]
An All-Russian Conference of Old Believers of the Pomor Rite was held in
Moscow. With regard to the form of government, the Conference joined the voice
of the Russian peasantry, which demands the establishment of an all-national
832 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
republican government with one chamber. Furthermore, the Conference decided
that the principle of adequate economic security should form the basis for expand
ing the land areas [of the peasants whose] land holdings are too small. To this
end a land fund formed by means of the requisition of State, udel, Kabinet, and
granted lands, and also of lands belonging to large landowners, should be created.
The lands of the large landowners are to be requisitioned on the basis of a fair
price, and not on the basis of market value. Furthermore, the Conference agreed
that the State should put into effect complete juridical and political equality of
all religious organizations; it decided to elect an all-Russian political council of
the Pomor Rite Old Believers to be the representative all-Russian political organ
of the Old Believers.
732. T h e P etition for a L aw on the O ld B elievers
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 184, August 12, 1917, p. 4.]
The delegate of the Moscow Old Believers, M. I. Briliantov, arrived yesterday
in Moscow. He went to Petrograd to petition the Provisional Government to
introduce as soon as possible a law on the Old Believers Church. M. I. Briliantov
participated in the sessions which took place in the Ministry of the Interior under
the presidency of A. V. Kartashev, Minister of Confessions, and with the participa
tion of his assistant, S. A. Kotoliarevskii. Altogether there were three sessions on
the Old Believers Church under the presidency of A. V. Kartashev. In addition
to M. I. Briliantov, the following participated in the sessions: the Moscow Arch
bishop Miletii, [Archbishop] Inokentii of Nizhnii Novgorod, Archbishop Gerontii
of Petrograd, President of the Old Believers Council of Congresses D. V. Sirotkin,
P. A. Golubin, representatives of the Ancient Orthodox Church, which accepted
the Belokrinitskii hierarchy, also delegates from the Fedoseevtsy, Pomortsy, and
Belopopovtsy. The law on the Old Believers Church was presented by the repre
sentatives of the Old Believers of the Belokrinitskii hierarchy. It was subjected to
a detailed discussion, revision, and additions. According to M. I. Briliantov, the
law will undoubtedly pass. The other three sects did not submit their draft laws.
They were given a time limit to work out a separate law. The proposal of the
Belokrinitskii Old Believers is reduced to freedom of the church, freedom of
administration, recognition of Old Believers hierarchs, sobors, congresses,
parishes, episcopal congresses, Old Believers monasteries, permission to teach
the catechism by the Old Believers priests, etc.6

733. T he A pproval in P rinciple of the N ew L aw on the


B elokrinitskii Old B elievers
[Zhumaly, No. 181, October 3, 1917.]
Heard:
3. The recommendation of the Ministry of Confessions of August 31, 1917,
No. 4429, on the change of the operative law with regard to the Old Believers
who had accepted the Belokrinitskii hierarchy.
6 A Congress of Old Believers was held in Moscow at the end of August with representa
tives of various rites attending. Significantly, one of the major questions discussed was the
solution of the land problem. Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 192, August 23,1917, p. 5.
RELIGION 833
Resolved:
I. To approve in substance the assumptions in the said recommendation, but
to delete from the draft of the Rule on the Ancient Orthodox Church of the
Belokrinitskii hierarchy article 48 which provides for the right of said Church
to receive material aid [from the State].
II. To refer the present case to the Juridical Council of the Provisional
Government for preparation of a final edition of the law indicated in I (above).

THE GEORGIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH


734. T he A utocephaly of th e A ncient Orthodox Georgian Church
[5o6. U z a k I, 1, No. 440. The Georgian Church had been absorbed by the Russian
Church in the nineteenth century.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government, without going into the canonical aspect of the
restoration of the autocephaly of the Ancient Orthodox Georgian Church headed
by the Katholikos of Mtskhet, proclaimed by the Holy Council of the Iverian
Apostolic Church on March 12 of this year, considers it necessary to determine
the legal implications of such a restoration. Accordingly:
1. The Provisional Government recognizes the national Georgian nature of
the autocephalous Georgian Church without limiting it to a definite territory. All
Russian and other non-Georgian Orthodox parishes shall remain under the
jurisdiction of the Orthodox Russian Church.
2. The Provisional Government leaves it to the Georgian Church to elaborate
as soon as possible the fundamental principles of its legal status in the Russian
State, which must be submitted for the approval of the Provisional Government.
4. The final determination and ratification of the legal status of the Orthodox
Georgian Church in the Russian State shall belong to the Constituent Assembly.
The Provisional Government expresses its firm assurance that the ratification
of the church-canonical foundations of this great act of self-determination of the
Georgian Church will be completed in a spirit of church peace and love, by agree
ment of the Georgian Church with the Orthodox Russian Church.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 27,1917

735. T he E stablishment of T emporary R ules on th e S tatus of the


G eorgian O rthodox Church
iS o b .U za k.,\2 ,m . 1180.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The temporary rules annexed hereto concerning the status of the Georgian
Orthodox Church in the Russian State are established.
834 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
II. A special commission, the composition of which is determined by the
Provisional Government, is authorized to work out questions on the removal of
the church institutions concerned from the jurisdiction of the Georgian Exarch
for transfer to the jurisdiction of the Georgian Katholikos, as well as questions
concerning the amounts and standards for allocation from the State Treasury
of funds for the maintenance of the Georgian Orthodox Church, with the proviso
that the conclusions of the commission be submitted for consideration by the
Provisional Government.7
III. Pending the definitive organization of the Georgian Church, in accord
ance with the present law, and pending the establishment of the Ministry of Con
fessions, the rights that belonged to the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling
Synod with respect to the Georgian Exarchate are retained with respect to the
Georgian Church.
A. K erensky , Minister-President
A. K artashev , Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod
July 25, 1917
Temporary Rules
on the Status of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the Russian State
1. The Georgian Church includes all Orthodox Karthlians [pertaining to
the population of Georgia proper] living throughout the Russian State.
2. Parishes of Abkhazians and Transcaucasian Ossetians may be included,
at their wish, within the Georgian Church.
3. Clergymen of the Georgian Church may minister to the religious needs of
the Orthodox of non-Georgian nationality who so request, as all Orthodox priests
may likewise minister to the needs of Georgians.
4. The Georgian Church is divided into eparchies [dioceses], and subdivided
into parishes, the number of both to be determined by a special schedule approved
by the Government.
5. The Georgian Church is headed by the Archbishop of Mtskhet, the Katho
likos Patriarch of all the Georgians, who is elected according to the rules of the
Georgian Church.
6. The election of the Katholikos Patriarch is subject, prior to his elevation
to that office, to approval by the Supreme State Power.
7. The Katholikos Patriarch, together with the council of the Georgian
Church headed by him, possesses full Church authority, which is exercised by him
with the assistance of the organs of church administration and in accordance
with the laws.
8. The Katholikos Patriarch has his residence in the city of Tiflis.
9. On church matters the Katholikos Patriarch communicates with all auto-
cephalic churches situated outside the confines of the Russian State through the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
10. The church institutions of the Georgian Katholikosate, the superior
hierarchy, the cathedral, parish, and monastery clergy receive maintenance from
7 By the law of October 6, 1917, the Georgian Exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church
was renamed the Exarchate of the Caucasus, and the parishes, properties, and institutions
of all types of the former Georgian Exarchate were to be divided, according to their religious
connections between the Georgian Katholikosate and the Russian Exarchate of the Caucasus.
Sob. Uzak^ 1,2, No. 2017.
RELIGION 835
funds of the State Treasury; the sums required are allocated to the Katholikos
Patriarch on a basis and in amounts that remain to be established by law.
11. Institutions of the Georgian Church enjoy the rights of legal persons as
laid down in general civil legislation.
12. Institutions of ecclesiastical education of the Georgian Church may be
granted the rights of government educational institutions.
13. The internal proceedings of all institutions of the Georgian Katholikosate
and instruction in institutions of ecclesiastical education are conducted in the
Georgian language.
14. In matters of marriage and in maintaining documents of civil status, the
Georgian Church is guided by the general laws.
A. Kartashev , Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod
July 25,1917

THE R0MA2s CATHOLIC CHURCH


736. N ew L eg isla tio n on t h e Roman C a th o lic C h u rch
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1287.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Amending, supplementing, and abrogating the relevant statutes, it is hereby
decreed:
I. The following rules are established:
1. With respect to church construction and collections for religious needs:
1) The building of new, and the restoration of decrepit or accidentally
destroyed, Roman Catholic churches and chapels, as well as the expansion of such,
are authorized by Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authorities and carried out accord
ing to plans submitted for preliminary approval of the organ exercising functions
of technical construction inspection in the guberniya.
2) The repair of Roman Catholic churches and chapels, the installation
of domestic chapels and movable communion tables, as well as the celebration of
mass on portable altars, are authorized by Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authority;
in the aforesaid cases construction work may be carried out without submitting
plans for approval of the organ exercising functions of technical construction
inspection in the guberniya.
3) The collection of voluntary contributions for the construction, restora
tion, expansion, and repair of Roman Catholic churches and chapels, as well as
for other religious needs, is carried out as follows: within a diocese, with the
permission of the appropriate Roman Catholic diocesan authority, and outside
the diocese, by agreement of the local diocesan head with the Roman Catholic
ecclesiastical authorities of those dioceses where the collection of contributions
is planned.
2. With respect to the establishment of new Roman Catholic parishes: the
establishment of new Roman Catholic parishes within a diocese, as well as the
division of existing parishes, is carried out with the permission of the appropriate
836 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Roman Catholic ecclesiastical authorities, which shall inform the local civil
authority accordingly.
3. With respect to filling Roman Catholic ecclesiastical offices and elevation
to ecclesiastical ranks and honors:
1) The Roman Catholic Archbishop Metropolitan, diocesan bishops,
suffragan bishops with the right of succession (cum jure successions), and
apostolic administrators are appointed by the Holy See by agreement with the
Russian Government. Candidates for the aforesaid offices are submitted to the
Roman Curia, according to canon law, by local ecclesiastical authorities (bishops,
chapters, etc). Preliminary agreement with the Russian Government is not re
quired for elevation in rank of other bishops, or for awarding honorary papal
titles (prelate, infulate, prothonotary, etc.).
4. With respect to the establishment of new Roman Catholic dioceses: the
establishment of new Roman Catholic dioceses within the State, in so far as this
is not connected with the expenditure of funds from the State Treasury, as well
as the names to be given to such dioceses, is the prerogative of the Apostolic See.
5. With respect to Roman Catholic religious organizations: The freedom of
association established by law of the Provisional Government applies, without
exception, to all Roman Catholic religious societies, brotherhoods, ecclesiastical
congregations, and monastic orders, and their registration in appropriate cases
(paragraph 6 of the Law of the Provisional Government on meetings and asso
ciations of April 12, 1917, Collection of Laws, article 540) is carried out under
the general procedure, on application of the Roman Catholic ecclesiastical
authority.
6. With respect to schools founded by Roman Catholic clergy, parishes, and
monasteries: The organization of schools by Roman Catholic clergy, parishes,
and monasteries is carried out according to the general standards established by
law for private educational institutions.
7. With respect to the Order of Jesuits: Jesuits are allowed to enter the state
without restrictions, on general grounds.
9- With respect to Roman Catholic theological seminaries:
1) Seminaries are under the complete and exclusive jurisdiction of the
appropriate Roman Catholic diocesan heads, in accordance with canon law.
3) Seminaries admit persons with an educational qualification of not
less than four classes in government institutions of secondary learning or equiva
lent schools.
4) A student who has entered with such (paragraph 3) an educational
qualification is required, during his seminary course or on graduating, to pass,
in the presence of a representative of the government, an examination in Russian
literature, and in the history and geography of Russia, covering the fifth and sixth
classes in secondary educational institutions (paragraph 3), if he has completed
only four classes before entering the seminary, and covering the sixth class if he
has completed five classes. Those who have completed six classes and more are
not required to take the aforesaid examination.
RELIGION 837
10. With respect to the Roman Catholic Theological Academy:
1) The Roman Catholic Theological Academy is a special institution of
higher ecclesiastical learning for the education of the clergy.
2) The higher administration and general direction of the Roman Catholic
Theological Academy . . . are the joint prerogatives of all diocesan bishops of
the Mogilev Metropolitanate.
3) The immediate administration and detailed supervision of the Academy
is the prerogative of the Archbishop Metropolitan.
5) The Academy admits students who have completed the course in
diocesan seminaries.
11. With respect to the rights of Roman Catholic diocesan heads in the matter
of supervision of instruction in the Roman Catholic religion in educational
institutions: The Roman Catholic diocesan head, personally or through individuals
specially designated by him to this effect, exercises the right of supervision of
instruction in the Roman Catholic religion in all educational institutions in his
diocese.
12. With respect to the appointment to educational institutions of teachers
of the Roman Catholic religion: Teachers of the Roman Catholic religion in all
educational institutions under all departments are appointed by the appropriate
educational authority only after nomination by the local Roman Catholic diocesan
head.
13. With respect to determining the language of instruction of the Roman
Catholic religion in educational institutions: teaching of the Roman Catholic
religion is carried on in the native language of the students, as determined by
written statement of the parents or guardian of the student.
14. With respect to the establishment of instruction in the Roman Catholic
religion in educational institutions: In all educational institutions where instruc
tion in the Roman Catholic religion does not exist, such instruction is to be
introduced at the wish of parents or guardians of students.
N . N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President
N. A vksent ev , Minister of the Interior
July 26,1917
737. A Conference R egarding the A ffairs of the R oman Catholic Church
[VVP, No. 174, October 11,1917, p. 4.]
The last session of the Conference was attended by Professor V. A. Kartashev,
Minister of Confessions; Professor S. A. Kotliarevsldi, Deputy Minister; Roman
Catholic Bishop Tsepliak for the Diocese of Mogilev, together with other high
[ranking] representatives of the Roman Catholic Church, and also the repre
sentatives of departments. The question of altering the regulations on the pro
prietary rights of the Roman Catholic Church and on mixed marriages between
Catholics and persons of other faiths was submitted for discussion. After a
838 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
thorough discussion of these issues, the Conference acknowledged the advisability
of giving the Roman Catholic Church complete autonomy in proprietory matters;
in conformity with this [it was considered advisable] to place under the jurisdic
tion of the competent ecclesiastical authorities of the said Church the acquisition
or alienation of properties [belonging] to Roman Catholic churches, monasteries,
and other religious establishments, and to free these authorities from the now
existing obligation to request preliminary authorization from the local authorities
on questions of the aforementioned character.
In accordance with the wishes expressed by the Catholic clergy, the Confer
ence, opposing the existing regulations with regard to mixed marriages, con
sidered it advisable that marriages between persons of the Catholic faith and
persons of other faiths administered solely by Catholic priests be recognized as
valid; the validity of the [prospective] law should be retroactive. Moreover, in
the case of marriages between persons of the Catholic and other faiths, the Catho
lics should possess the right to carry on their divorce proceedings in the courts
of their own religion.

OTHER RELIGIOUS FAITHS AND SECTS


738. C oncerning t h e U n iate M etro p o lita n
[,Zhurnaly, No. 11, March 8,1917.]
Resolved:
To liberate immediately from detention the Metropolitan of Galicia, Count
Sheptitskii, and to ask the Minister of Justice to form, in agreement with the
Ministers of War and Navy, a special commission for the purpose of verifying
whether the reasons for expelling Galician subjects [sic] in Russia were sound.
739. T h e A p p roval o f t h e R etu rn o f t h e D ukhobors
IZhurnaly, No. 19, March 15,1917.]
Heard:
10. Telegram from Peter Vering from Canada, reporting the petition of the
Dukhobors, numbering 10,000 persons, concerning their desire to return to Russia
as agricultural and truck-garden workers.
Resolved:
To deem the return of the Canadian Dukhobors to Russia as desirable. The
general question concerning their military service to be referred for decision to
the Juridical Council of the Provisional Government.
740. T h e L u th eran C hurch
[Zhurnaly, No. 61, April 24, 1917.]
Heard:
1. b. On the petition raised by the Evangelical Lutheran General Consistory
to call a Protestant Church Council to discuss urgent questions of church life.
RELIGION 839
Resolved:
To make formal acknowledgment that there is no objection on the part of the
Provisional Government to the convening of the Protestant Church Council.
741. R egarding th e Skoptsy in R umania
[So&. Uzak., 1,2, No. 1363. A sect which engaged in sexual practices declared criminal
under Imperial law.]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of May 31, 1917:
1) Followers of the sect of skoptsy9 residing in Rumania, are permitted to
resettle in Russia and, as a general rule, are assigned places of residence in the
empire in the areas set aside for the settlement of Rumanian refugees.
2) Russian consuls in Rumania and other persons acting in their stead are
authorized to issue passports to skoptsy for travel to Russia and to places other
than those mentioned in article 1, but with the proviso that the persons issuing
such passports inform the Department of Ecclesiastical Affairs accordingly, as
well as the guberniya commissars of the Provisional Government or prefects,
respectively.
3) The skoptsy who have come from Rumania are permitted, in the places
assigned for their residence (article 1), to organize private prayer meetings in
closed premises exclusively for persons belonging to the sect of skoptsy The
organizers of such meetings are required to inform the head of the local militia
of the time and place of meetings three days in advance.
4) The Minister of the Interior is authorized to allow skoptsy returning to
Russia, in especially deserving cases, both temporary absences from places of
settlement and resettlement in other localities. (Proposed August 11, 1917.)
742. T he B uddhists
[Sob. Uzak., 1,2, No. 1372.]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of June 30, 1917:
In amendment of the relevant statutes, it is hereby decreed: Persons profess
ing the Lamaist faith shall be referred to henceforth in official documents as
Buddhists.
PART IV
Military Affairs and Operations

The conduct of the war, which played so important a role in the advent of the
revolution, continued to influence its course and outcome. The tragedy of 1917
was that Russia, at last free to solve her historical economic, political, and social
problems, found her energies and resources simultaneously committed to the
struggle against an external enemy. Either World War or revolution and reform
would have taxed her to the utmost and demanded the greatest national sacrifice
and responsibility to avoid catastrophe. Together, they constituted an overwhelm
ing burden.
In the first days of the revolution, the activity of the Petrograd Garrison and
the temper of the army and the navy necessitated immediate consideration of
military questions. The unexpected mutiny of the reserve battalions of the guards
regiments in the capital was a decisive blow to the tottering monarchy. With the
issue as yet unclear to the Duma and the Soviet, both took steps to provide leader
ship to the officerless troops, to protect them from retaliation by their commanders,
and to assure their support against a possible counterattack. It was in this atmos
phere that the Military Commission of the Temporary Committee of the Duma was
organized, that Colonel Engelhardt issued his order against disloyal officers,
and that Order No. 1 to the Petrograd Garrison was hastily drafted by the soldiers9
section of the Soviet.1
On the front and in the Baltic Fleet the accumulated grievances and prevail
ing disillusionment provided fertile soil for an immediate reaction against the
harsh system of military regulation, deteriorating living conditions, and inept and
inconsiderate commanders. As word of the events in Petrograd filtered to the
active forces in official announcements, in Soviet declarations and rumor, anarchic
outbursts flared among the troops aboard ships. Mingled with bewilderment at
the disappearance of the fountainhead of authority and the desire to revenge old
wrongs was an understandable upsurge of hope for peace, stemming from war
weariness, humanitarian principles, and the early pronouncements of the Soviet.
In an effort to restore discipline, which was threatened by this elemental
movement, War Minister Guchkov gave prompt sanction to the most urgent re
forms, in most cases already spontanously introduced, and established a special
1 See VoL I, Docs. 33-46, on EngeThardts order and the Military Commission of the Duma,
and elsewhere in Part I for other documentation on the attitudes and activities of the army and
navy during the February Days. Attention is directed again to the surveys by N. N. Golovin,
The Russian Army in the World War, and Youri Danilov, La Russie dans la guerre mondiale
as well as to the military memoir material and Razlozhenie armii, excerpted and cited in this
Part.
842 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
commission under the chairmanship of General Polivanov, charged with the con
sideration and elaboration of further changes. Through March and April the
Commission proposed and Guchkov issued a series of enactments designed to re
gain the confidence and loyalty of the soldiers through the abolition of injustices
and the introduction of more democratic procedures in military life. Many of
the reforms were long overdue: the wisdom of others was questionable. Some
were supported by the progressive and realistic commanders; others occasioned
doubts and direct opposition, prompted by sincere reservations concerning the
degree of freedom permissible in a military organization. Naturally, there were
also officers, conditioned by their narrowing profession, who fought every change
and refused to alter their methods. Guchkov removed a number of the most re
calcitrant and incapable generals, which was resented by certain of their con
freres as another blow to the authority of the officer corps.
Whatever the merits of Guchkovs program of concession to the demands of
the soldiers, it did not succeed in halting the tide of dissolution. By the end of
April he had gained neither the support of the men nor the confidence of the of
ficers. Symbolic of his dilemma was the question of issuing the Declaration of
Soldiers Rights, drawn up by the Polivanov commission, representing its furthest
efforts toward democratization, and recognizing many de facto practices. It was
vehemently opposed by the high command and labeled inadequate by the most
revolutionary elements. Guchkov refused to promulgate the Declaration and soon
resigned from his hopeless position with a public attack upon the Government.
Meantime, the enemy, always desirous of reducing the pressure on one front
in order to triumph on the other, seized the opportunity to take advantage of the
complete passivity of the Russian army during the first weeks of the revolution
by organizing on the Russian front a campaign of disobedience, defeatist propa
ganda, and fraternization. As a result of these activities and the armys continuing
preoccupation with internal reorganization and domestic developments, the de
facto armistice was prolonged, promoting a further slackening of morale and
combat effectiveness among the soldiers and an increase in desertions, much
to the satisfaction of the Germans. During this period, one revealing shock did
serve, however, to slow the drift toward disintegrationa successful local sur
prise attack on the Stokhod River, by which the Germans seriously weakened the
credibility of their peaceful professions. Aware of their error, the German High
Command forbade a repetition of such incidents.
It was under these circumstances that A. F. Kerensky accepted the War
portfolio. By this time the experience of the Stokhod, which had a sobering effect
upon the soldiers, combined with the beginnings of doubt within the revolutionary
democracy regarding the practicability of expecting any sincere German moves
for a just peace, had perceptibly influenced the climate of opinion. If peace was
not in sight, then Russia must continue to defend herself. In fact, for varying
reasons an offensive was urged from several quarters. To some the object of an
advance was to honor Allied obligations and hasten victory. To others it was
a means of saving the country and the army from defeat, of strengthening the
internal regime, and of improving Russias international position in order to
put pressure on the Allies for a revision of war aims.
The Allied Conference at Chantilly in November 1916 had agreed upon a
joint attack on all fronts in early spring. When General Nivelle requested the
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS 843
promised cooperation in March, General Alekseev pointed out the impossibility
of compliance in view of the recent upheaval in Russia and the difficult climatic
conditions presented by the spring thaw. Alternatively, he suggested that the
Western Allies delay their attack until Russia was ready to assist. Nivelle refused,
and the failure of his ill-timed and poorly planned offensive is well known.
In early April Alekseev agreed to mount an offensive in May or June. The
reactions of his commanders varied according to their attitude toward the new
army and the quality of their troops. After Kerensky took office, the preparations
accelerated along several lines: planning, the concentration of artillery and muni
tions, the formation of shock battalions (a proposal of General Brusilov reluctantly
approved by Alekseev), and exhaustive efforts to raise the morale of the soldiers.
The last task was undertaken principally by Kerensky himself. In the first days of
his tenure, he signed the Declaration of Soldiers Rights, but with important
amendents calculated to restore the authority of the commanders in the field. Soon,
he acted to bring the commissars, appointed earlier by the Soviets, under the
direct control of the Government. On the other hand, he prohibited the resigna
tion of commanding personnel angry over the democratization process and
especially the recent promulgation of the Declaration. Above all he went to the
front and carried out an extensive and intensive tour among the troops to explain
their obligations as revolutionary soldiers of free Russia and to instill in them
the necessary will to fight for their newly won liberty. In this he was aided by
some commanders, officers, and committees, who attempted to strengthen and
deepen the effects of his message.
The offensive opened on June 18, and was greeted by almost universal approba
tion, only the Bolsheviks and their allies voicing opposition. Initially, the advance,
at least on the Southwestern Front, was successful and substantial. But, on July
6, the Germans struck back and launched a counterattack that halted the Russians,
then drove them into retreat and confusion. In an effort to save the day, General
Kornilov, whose units had been among the few to maintain discipline in the face
of the advancing Germans, was appointed Commander in Chief of the South
western Front, and, in time, the line was stabilized after the loss of almost all of
Galicia. Needless to say, the reverse shattered morale already shaken by the
repercussions of the almost simultaneous July uprising in Petrograd.
Following the rout at the front and the suppression of the Bolshevik insurrec
tion in the capital, the Provisional Government sought remedies for the military
situation. The death penalty was restored in the army, military censorship tight
ened, and the institutions of commissars and committees more carefully defined
and regulated. In a memorable meeting at Stavka on July 16, Kerensky, now
Minister-President as well as War Minister, listened to the bluntly expressed fears
and criticisms of his commanders and gave heed to their recommendations. The
impressive performance of General Kornilov in the field and the character of his
report sent to the meeting at Stavka were factors in the Minister-Presidents de
cision two days later to give him the Supreme Command, replacing General Brusi
lov, who had succeeded Alekseev some time before the offensive.
With his assumption of command, Kornilov demanded of the Government, in
a manner which, under less desperate circumstances, would no doubt have brought
his dismissal, additional measures to strengthen authority in the army and the rear.
In the event, his proposals continued to be the basis for discussions between Stavka
844 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
and the Government through August, reflecting the growing dissatisfaction of in
fluential members of the high command and, in the light of subsequent develop
ments, the conspiratorial activity in train at Stavka.
Meanwhile, conflicting reports circulated concerning the condition of the
army. On the one hand, reports from commissars, committees, and some com
manders gave evidence of an improvement in its mood and efficiency. On the
other hand, communiques from Stavka emphasized the signs of progressive de
terioration and hinted at approaching new disasters. To add to the publics con
fusion, documents were published to show that the regiments that were disgraced
for cowardice in the Galician campaign and whose conduct had been cited by the
high command as proof of its claims had in fact fought bravely. Clearly, by
Augusts military matters had become inextricably connected with the development
of counterrevolutionary movements, centered at Stavka and personified by their
leader-designate, General Kornilov. When the blow from the right came on
August 27, it was to be fatal in its effects upon both the army and the country.2
Yet, despite these ominous signs, the army continued through the summer to ful
fill the vital function of preventing a decisive blow in the West by holding 86
German divisions on the front, more than at any previous period of the war.
2 See Volume m .
CHAPTER 16
The Revolution in the Army and bavy

DEMOCRATIZATION AND MORALE


IN THE FIRST MONTHS
743. T h e P roclamation of th e Mezkduraionnyi Committee
to th e S oldiers
[V. Zenzinov, Tevralskie dni, Novyi Zhurnal, XXXV (1953), 223-25.]
Early in the morning of March 1this was not later than 6:00 A.M. when I
was in the room of the Soviet (No. 13 of the Budget Commission of the State
Duma), B. 0. FlekkeP (a great friend of mine and a member of the S.R. Petro
grad organization) ran up to me in excitement and held out a copy of a proc
lamation which was just issued and several packages of which were just delivered
to the room of the Soviet. Read it! Read it! he said, almost crying. Scanning
its contents, I agreed at once with B. O. Flekkel5that a proclamation of this nature
cannot be permitted. It was signed P[ress] B[ureau]. The Mezkduraionnyi
committee of the RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers Party] (an
organization in which Yurenev, the Bolshevik, played the principal role) and PB.
Committee of the Socialist Revolutionaries (a fictitious organization headed by
Aleksandrovichit would be more correct to say that he alone belonged to it).
Written almost in the style of a Pugachev proclamation, it was addressed to the
soldiers.1 Comrade Soldiers! It has happened! You have revolted, the op
pressed, enslaved peasants and workers have revolted, and the autocratic govern
ment has fallen to the ground with a crash and with disgrace. . . . Soldiers! Be
on your guard lest the lords of the nobility deceive the people! Go to the Duma
and ask it: will there be land for the people, will there be freedom, will there be
peace? . . . In order not to be deceived by the noblemen and officersthis
Romanov gangtake the power into your own hands. Elect your own platoon
commanders, company commanders, and regiment commanders, elect company
committees for taking charge of food supplies. All the officers must be under the
control of these company committees. Accept only those officers whom you know
to be friends of the people . . . Soldiers! Now that you have revolted and won,
former enemies will come to you along with your friendsofficers who call them
selves your friends. Soldiers! The tail of a fox is more to be feared than the
tooth of a wolf. Our only loyal friends and brothers are the workers and peasants.
Get into closer contact with them! . . . Your representatives and workers
deputies must become the Provisional Government of the people and from this
government you will obtain land an freedom! . . . The proclamation was
marked March 1917.
1 The complete text of this proclamation is given in Appendix 24 to A. Shliapnikov,
Semnadtsatyi God, 1,261-62.
846 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
It seemed to me then (and so it seems to me now) that a proclamation of this
kind could at that moment and under those conditions entail the most terrible con
sequences. . . . A communication on this subject from the Executive Committee
appeared in the special issue of Izvestiia of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers
Deputies of March 3 . . .2
744. T h e G enesis o f O rder No. 1: Rodziankos V ersion
[M. V. Rodzianko, Gosudarstvennaia Duma i FevraFskaia goda Revoliutsiia, ARR,
VI (1922), 74-75. The Temporary Committee of the State Duma published their ver
sion of the origins of the Order in Rech9, No. 177, July 30,1917, p. 4, which is substan
tially the same as Rodziankos, in answer to the document of the Executive Committee
of the Petrograd Soviet printed below.]
On the evening of March 1, an unidentified soldier came, on behalf of the
elected representatives of the Petrograd Garrison, to the Military Commission
created under the chairmanship of member of the State Duma Engelhardt of the
Temporary Committee. He demanded that an order should be elaborated which
would regulate the mutual relations between officers and soldiers on a new basis;
Engelhardt replied with a sharp rebuff, indicating that the Temporary Committee
considered the publication of such an order inadmissible.
Then the soldier declared to Colonel Engelhardt: If you dont want to, then
we can dispense with you.
During the night of March 1-2, the Order was printed in a huge number of
copies by order of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies whom the workers
of all the printing houses of Petrograd implicitly obeyed; by an order unknown to
the Temporary Committee, the Order was sent to the front.
When the matter came to the knowledge of the Temporary Committee, while
the Provisional Government did not as yet exist, the Committee decided that the
Order should be considered invalid and unlawful.
A sharp discussion with the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies took
place, and as a result the latter published in one of the issues of its Izvestiia
another order which declared for the information of all that Order No. 1 was
obligatory only for the Petrograd Garrison and the troops of the Petrograd Dis
trict.
But, of course, the wrong had already been done.
745. T h e G enesis o f O rder No. 1 : T h e V ersion o f t h e
E x ecu tive C om m ittee o f t h e P etrograd S o v iet
[.Izvestiia, No. 125, July 23,1917, p. 6. N. D. Sokolov, who drafted the Order, described
the events in Ogonek, No. 11 (1927).]
In view of the fact that during the past days the content of Order No. 1 of
the Petrograd Soviet and the circumstances that accompanied its publication were
reported and interpreted incorrectly in various institutions and meetings, the
Executive Committee thinks it necessary to reprint this Order, by way of reference,
and to state in the most condensed form the history of the appearance of this
2 See N. N. Sukhanov, The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed. and trails., pp.
128-30, and Doc. 747.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 847
document which, in the opinion of the Committee, played a beneficial role in the
matter of organizing the Russian army under the conditions of revolution.
The Order was issued (by agreement between the Temporary Committee of
the State Duma and the Executive Committee of the Soviet) on March 1, that is,
prior to the creation of the Provisional Government, and consequently cannot be
considered as an order competing with the authority of the latter.
The Order was addressed exclusively to the Petrograd Garrison.
The Order was signed by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers
Deputies and was drawn up at the first session of the Soviet in full membership,
that is, with the participation not only of workers but of its soldiers section as
well.
The deputies of the Petrograd Garrison wished at the very first meeting to
formulate the bases of the social organization of the soldiers and introduced dur
ing the conference a number of suggestions on regimental and company com
mittees, on abolishing the compulsory salute, on soldiers civil rights, etc. And it
was these suggestions in their sum total that comprised Order No. 1.
Neither the Executive Committee, as such, nor its individual members (as seen
from the minutes of the meetings printed in Izvestiia for March 2) introduced at
the meeting either the draft of the Order or even the draft of its individual points.
The Order was published on the third day of the revolution, when its military-
technical period had not yet been completed. And a notice was published on
the first page of Izvestiia for March 1 about the necessity of bringing to the
Mikhailov Riding School all the machine guns in order to liquidate the shooting
from roofs.
The alarm was increased by rumors that in some regiments officers were be
ginning to disarm the soldiers. . . .
It is natural, therefore, that the representative organ of the Petrograd soldiers
wanted, on the one hand, to calm the soldier masses and, on the other, to protect
the Russian revolution in a critical period by [preventing] the disarming of the
basic military force. This desire was expressed in point 5 of the Order.
On March 4 the War Department, reporting through General Potapov that
Order No. 1 was in some instances incorrectly interpreted, appealed to the Execu
tive Committee with the request to issue an explanation of the Order that would
remove the possibility of any false interpretations. Moreover, General Potapov
requested that this explanation also be published in the form of an order to
give it greater authority.8
To edit the requested explanation the Committee appointed a Commission
which worked out, together with the Military Commission [of the Duma], under
the presidency of General Potapov, an explanatory Order No. 2.
[Order No. 2 was signed by] Acting President M. I. Skobelev, for the Presi-
8See Protoholy, pp. 10,11.
848 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
dent of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies;
General ML Potapov, President of the Military Commission of the Temporary
Committee of the State Duma; and War Minister A. Guchkov.
In conclusion, the Executive Committee points out that most of the points in
Order No. 1 have already been enforced as law, in part during the time when
Minister of War A. I. Guchkov was in office and in part under A. F. Kerensky.
As for regimental, detachment, and other committees, the thought about which
was first expressed in Order No. 1, their role was regarded as sound and organiz
ing, not only by public institutions but also by many representatives in the high
command.
T he E xecutive Committee of th e P etrograd S oviet
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies

746. Order No. 1


[Golder, pp. 386-87; Protokoly, p. 290.]
To the garrison of the Petrograd District, to all the soldiers [and sailors] of
the guard, army, artillery, and navy, for immediate and strict execution, and to
the workers of Petrograd for their information:
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies has resolved:
1. In all companies, battalions, regiments, parks, batteries, squadrons, in the
special services of the various military administrations, and on the vessels of the
navy, committees from the elected representatives of the lower ranks of the above
mentioned military units shall be chosen immediately.
2. In all those military units that have not yet chosen their representatives to
the Soviet of Workers Deputies, one representative from each company shall be
selected, to report with written credentials at the building of the State Duma by
ten oclock on the morning of the second of this March.
3. In all its political actions, the military branch is subordinated to the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and to its own committees.
4. The orders of the Military Commission of the State Duma shall be executed
only in such cases as do not conflict with the orders and resolutions of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
5. All kinds of arms, such as rifles, machine guns, armored automobiles, and
others, must be kept at the disposal and under the control of the company and
battalion committees, and in no case should they be turned over to officers, even
at their demand.
6. In the ranks and during their performance of the duties of the service,
soldiers must observe the strictest military discipline, but outside the service and
the ranks, in their political, general civic, and private life, soldiers cannot in any
way be deprived of those rights that all citizens enjoy. In particular, standing at
attention and compulsory saluting, when not on duty, is abolished.
7. Also, the addressing of the officers with the titles Your Excellency, Your
Honor, etc., is abolished, and these titles are replaced by the address of Mister
General, Mister Colonel, etc. Rudeness toward soldiers of any rank, and,
especially, addressing them as thou [ty] is prohibited, and soldiers are required
to bring to the attention of the company committees every infraction of this rule,
as well as all misunderstandings occurring between officers and privates.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 849
The present Order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regiments, ships
crews, batteries, and other combatant and noncombatant commands.
P etrograd S oviet of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
March 1,1917
747. T he Officers and the S oldiers
[.Izvestiia, No. 4, March 3,1917, p. 2.]
Order No. 1 of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, cited in yester
days issue of Izvestiia9 very accurately defines the relationship between soldiers
and officers. Nevertheless there are people who, in this important historical
moment, endeavor to destroy the unity which has been reached at the cost of so
many sacrifices. We are speaking about the proclamation signed by the names
of two socialistic parties, which, fortunately, did not obtain a wide circulation.4
Let us compare these documents.
The Order puts the officers in their place, giving them authority only in duty
hours; in formation, during drill, during military operations, soldiers and all
servicemen in general are to observe military discipline. Outside of service, out
side of formation, an officer does not have any authority in respect to the soldier.
The soldier becomes a citizen , he ceases to be a slavethis is the meaning
of the order. As a citizen, he has the right to organize his existence independently,
to participate in unions and parties, to form company and battalion committees,
under whose orders and supervision are to be all kinds of weapons, which would
not be issued to officers even at their request, because weapons are the property
of all the soldiers, of all the citizens. From now on the soldiers must form their
self-governing associations, which would in all independence supervise their econ
omy [food, etc.]. There is no doubt also that such free associations require for
specifically military matters educated leaders, and precisely the officers represent
such leaders. In such a situation those relations between soldiers and officers which
constituted one of the dark sides of the prerevolutionary organization of the Rus
sian army become impossible. Even if some misunderstandings were to arise,
they would be easily solved by the authority of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies.
Thus, the new soldier, the Citizen Soldier, self-supporting and independent,
the Warrior Soldier, who for the sake of the cause consciously subordinates him
self to discipline and to the leadership of authoritative officers, is very clearly out
lined before us.
If in the Order we see a correct and clear understanding of the relationship
between soldiers and officers, then, on the other hand, in the aforementioned proc
lamation we note a strange animosity toward all the officers, even the officers who
have passed to the side of the people, who are our real friends, all are being
suspected by the authors of the proclamation indiscriminately, without any ex
ceptions.
We do not doubt, we believe firmly that the conscious comrade-soldiers will
not he influenced by these appeals and will not follow the thoughtless authors of
the leaflet A great and difficult task is being accomplished under our eyes and
*Doc. 743.
850 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
with our participation, so we should not introduce dissent within the ranks of
the army, within the ranks of the glorious army of the Russian Revolution.
748. O rder of General A lekseev Concerning R evolutionary D etachments
P roceeding T oward the N orthern F ront on th e R ailroads
[V. I. Nevskii, Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni revoliutsii, KA, V (1924),
222-23.]
Sent from Pskov March 4 ,1 5 hours; received in Petrograd March 5
I communicate for your information and guidance a copy of telegram No.
1266/6 from General Kvarsev: By order of the Chief of Staff of the Northern
Front I transmit for execution a copy of the telegram from General Alekseev.
Following a telegram from the Chief of Staff of the Western Front that a deputa
tion of the new authority [consisting of] 50 men is proceeding from Velikie Luki
toward Polotsk and is disarming the gendarmes, an inquiry on the subject has
been made to the President of the Duma, who reports that no deputation was ever
sent. It appears, therefore, that unruly bands from Petrograd, of a purely revolu
tionary character, which endeavor to disarm the gendarmes on the railroads and
which later on mil undoubtedly endeavor to seize power both on the railroads
and in the army rear and probably will try to penetrate into the army itself, have
already made their appearance. Most drastic measures should be taken, by estab
lishing observation in all the railway junctions and in the rear and by having these
stations garrisoned by reliable units under the command of firm officers. At the
appearance anywhere of such self-styled delegations, it is inadvisable to disperse
them, but one should endeavor to seize them and when possible to appoint
on the spot a court martial whose sentences should be executed immediately.
March 3, 1917, 11 hours 25 Alekseev. Pskov March 3 1266/6. Boldyrev
No. 10621.
749. R equest of A lekseev that the Government T ake M easures to
R estore O rder in th e A rmy and R eaffirm the A uthority
of Commanding Officers
[Addressed to the Minister-President, with copies to the President of the Duma and the
Minister of War. V. I. Nevskii, Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni revoliutsii,
K A,V (1924),226-27.]
Received March 5,22 hours 6 minutes
By my telegram No. 1964 of March 5 I informed the Minister of War that
declarations from the Commanders in Chief of the fronts stated that the arrests
of military commanders within the limits of the theater of war by persons calling
themselves delegates of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies or by public
municipal committees were inadmissible; that also inadmissible was their disarm
ing at the railway stations and in the towns situated within the regions sub
ordinated to the Commanders in Chief of gendarmes and the disarming of officers
and guards posted for the protection of railroad stations and railroad buildings.
Wholeheartedly supporting the declaration of the Commanders in Chief, I have
addressed myself to the Minister of War, requesting his energetic assistance, in
order that the Government may take drastic measures to prevent the infection and
the decomposition which are beginning to be manifest in the rear from con
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 851
taminating the active army and from completely ruining its fighting capacities.
Today I have received an order from the Supreme Commander, in which His
Highness [Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich], being in complete agreement with
the Commanders in Chief of the armies, declares that unless the Government
issues in all haste to the troops under military command an unequivocal and con
vincing appeal for order, and unless it provides for the cessation of the occurrences
taking place in the rear of the armies, both His Highness and the Commanders in
Chief cannot vouch for the maintenance of order and discipline; [this situation]
would result in an unavoidable loss of the war. Literally speaking, every moment
lost threatens a fatal catastrophe. For the good of the cause, any modification of
the existing rules and military regulations made within the army other than by the
Supreme Commander and without his consent, is inadmissible. It is essential that
the Government [issue] an announcement, that it did not and does not send any
delegations or deputations for negotiations with the troops, and that people of
this kind appearing in some places are sent by the enemy in order to create dis
order in Russia, since only through disorder can Russia be defeated and con
quered by the enemy; further, that one should believe only those who appeal for
order and for making every effort to defeat the external enemy. Besides, I would
add that delay in dispatching the text of the oath of allegiance and in administering
the oath to the troops will lead to catastrophe. According to information arriving
from all sides, the fermentation has spread among the troops stationed nearest to
the rear. This unrest can be explained entirely by the fact that for the masses of
the simple people the real attitude of the Government toward the commanders in
the army is unclear and that they do not believe that the latter are acting in
accordance with the directives and the decisions of the new Government. For the
sake of saving the army and thereby our fatherland, I beg [you] not to lose one
moment. No. 1977.
General A lekseev

750. O rder N o . 2
[Golder, pp. 388-90 ; Protokoly, pp. 396-97.]
To the troops of the Petrograd district, to all the soldiers of the guard, army,
artillery, and navy, for strict execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for in
formation :
In explanation and amplification of Order No. 1, the Executive Committee of
the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies has resolved:
1. Order No. 1 of the Soviet of Workers Deputies proposed to all companies,
battalions, and other military units to elect committees (company, battalion, etc.),
appropriate to each particular unit, but that Order did not provide that these com
mittees should elect the officers of each unit. These committees are to be chosen
in order that the soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison may be organized and en
abled, through their committee representatives, to share in the general political
life of the country and, specifically, to make known to the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies their views regarding the necessity for action of any kind. The
committees must also attend to the general needs of each company or other unit.
The question of the limits within which the interests of the military estab
lishment may be compatible with the right of the soldiers to choose their own
commanders has been submitted for consideration to a special commission.
852 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
All elections of officers up to the present time and confirmed or submitted for
confirmation by the army authorities must remain in force.
2. Pending the time when the question of elective commanders is definitely
settled, the Soviet grants to the committees of the various units the right of objec
tion to the appointment of any officer. Such objections must be addressed to the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies, by whom they will be
laid before the Military Commission [of the Duma], in which representatives of
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, together with other public organi
zations, are participating.
3* Order No. 1 showed the significance of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies as an institution directing all the political actions of the soldiers of Petro
grad. To this elective organ of their own choice, the soldiers are bound to submit
in matters of their public and political life. The soldiers are bound to submit
to all orders of the military authorities that have reference to the military service.
4. To remove the danger of an armed counterrevolution, the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies presented the demand that the Petrograd Garri
son, which won for Russia her political liberty, not be disarmed, and the Provi
sional Government has assumed the obligation to prevent such disarmament, in
accordance with its official declaration. In conformity with this declaration, com
pany and battalion committees are required to see to it that the arms of the Petro
grad soldiers are not taken from them, as was indicated in Order No. 1.
5. Reaffirming the demands made under points 6 and 7 of Order No. 1, the
Executive Committee notes the fact that some of these are already being carried
into effect by the Provisional Government.
The present Order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regiments, ships
crews, batteries, and other combatant and noncombatant commands.
T h e E xecutive Comm ittee of th e P etrograd S oviet
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
This is a true copy of the original:
T h e Chairm an of the M ilitary C om m ission of t h e
P rovisional Government
March 6,1917
751. A lekseev O bjects to t h e M ethod of T ransm ission , S ource , and
C ontent of O rder No. 2
[V. I. Nevskii, Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni revoliutsii, KA, V (1924),
228.]
Sent March 6, 23 hours 50 minutes, received March 79 0 hours 45 minutes
By order of the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front, Order No. 2 of
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, which
has been received by the Commander in Chief, has been transmitted to me. I am
compelled to request once more that orders of a general nature should not be sent
directly to the fronts, but always through the Staff of the Supreme Commander,
as only the Supreme Commander may decide on questions of a general nature
which are to be announced to the troops. I repeat that issuing orders directly to
the Commanders in Chief is inadmissible, creating disorganization and disorder
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 853
in the administration of the armies. Only the orders of the Government can be
valid for the army, whereas the orders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, which is unknown and does not belong to
the framework of governmental authority, are not valid and will not be an
nounced to the troops. To my grief I have to add that my numerous addresses to
the Government on analogous issues remain unanswered, that the activity of in
stitutions extraneous to the army is developing, that similar orders penetrate by an
elusive process into the units of the active army, threatening to ruin its morale
and its fighting capacities, [and] placing commanders in the infinitely painful
position of bearing responsibility before the country for the maintenance of the
moral stability of the armed forces, while lacking the means to counteract the flow
of instructions similar to Order No. 2. We should be either shown confidence or
replaced by others who would be capable of leading the army even in the presence
of factors that undermine at the root the foundations of a well-organized soldiery.
No. 2015.
A lekseev

752. O rder No. 114 of t h e M inister o f W ar A bolishing Certain P ractices


and R estrictions A pplied to E nlisted P ersonnel
[VVP, No. 2, March 7, 1917, p. 1. A clarification of this Order, dated March 22 and
published in ibid., No. 17, March 25,1917, p. 1, pointed out that the right of enlisted
men to use transportation of all classes did not include exemption from the payment
of fares.
This Order, as well as Order No. 115 and that of March 9, which follow, were
prompted by the confusion caused by the dissemination of Orders No. 1 and 2 to the
army outside Petrograd and by the necessity for official governmental action on military
reforms and the concomitant maintenance of discipline. See Protokoly, pp. 17, 18, and
297.]
I order:
1. The abolition of the designation lower rank ; the substitution, in proper
cases, of the rank and designation soldier.
2. The abolition of the use of honorific forms of address; the substitution of
forms of address [such as] : Mr. General, Mr. Colonel, Mr. Captain . . . [etc.].
3. The employment of . . . [the formal second person plural (vy) ] in ad
dressing all soldiers both on-duty and off-duty.
4. The abolition of all restrictions established for lower ranks . . . which
prohibit smoking on the streets and in public places, attendance at clubs and meet
ings, the use of [the inside of cars on] tramways, participation as a member in
various unions and societies organized for political purposes, etc.
I request the Central Administration of the General Staff to proceed at once to
the revision of the corresponding articles of military regulations in compliance
with the instructions of the present order. I am leaving it to the same administra
tion to clarify all questions and misunderstandings which may arise during the
enforcement of the present order.
The order shall be read in all companies, squadrons, Cossack troops, batteries,
and all combatant and noncombatant military detachments.
A. G uchkov , Minister of War
March 5,1917
854 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
753. O rder No. 115 E stablishing a C om m ission to R evise the
L aws and S tatutes on M ilitary S ervice
IVVP, No. 3, March 8, 1917, p. 1. For the recommendations of this Commission and
the enactments that resulted, see Doc. 770 and those following.]
The establishment of a new state order demands an immediate revision of
all legislation that has heretofore governed military service procedures and the
mode of life in the army.
The most important and most urgent changes in mutual relations between
officers and soldiers, as well as the abolition of certain restrictions in the rights
of a soldier as a citizen, have been announced in my Order No. 114 to the Ministry
of War, on March 5.
I am appointing a committee under the chairmanship of General of the
Infantry Polivanov, for the purpose of revising statutes and regulations in precise
conformity with the new legal norms.
Among the questions that may arise during the work of the above-mentioned
committee, prime importance must be attached to:
1. Establishment of the procedure for attaining the first officer rank and the
rank of noncommissioned officer in the army; revision of the procedure for recruit
ing civil servants into the army.
2. Determination of the general conditions obtaining for the terms of office of
military personnel of all categories.
3. Coordination of the internal order in military units with the new legal
norms.
4. Establishment of civil rights for military personnel of all categories.
5. Elaboration of proposals on methods for improving the official and material
position of all persons in military service.
The composition of the committee will be announced following this [writing],
A. Guchkov , Minister of War
March 6,1917

754. M anifesto to t h e S oldiers and Citizens , M arch 9, 1917


[ VVP, No. 5, March 10,1917, p. 1. A much shorter Order to the Army and Navy in the
same vein was also published in ibid.]
Soldiers and Citizens of Free Russia: New trials menace our fatherland. A
grave peril, coming from our enemies, is impending. According to information
received, the Germans are accumulating their forces for the purpose of delivering
a blow on our capital. The seizure of Petrograd would bring about the rout of
Russia, would put an end to the new regime, would bring the restoration of the
old one with the addition of the German yoke. The secular work of the great
Russian nation would vanish from the face of the earth. At the dawn of freedom,
we are under the threat of being turned into German hirelings. Let it not be!
Let everyone realize the necessity of our unity, the necessity of restoring order,
of the citizens returning to their peaceful, arduous labors, and the army to its
combat tasks. The army cannot wage war without complete calm in the rear.
Soldiers, you must be fully convinced that without solid military discipline, with
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 855
out obedience to the commanders there cannot exist a battle-fit army. Without
strict order the army would turn into a mob which would represent danger for its
own fatherland. It would cease being dangerous to its enemies and would become
their easy prey. Anyone who tells you otherwise, who calls for disorder, for dis
obedience to commanders, is a traitor to his country, working in favor of the
Germans, for the ruin of Russia and of our beloved army. The Provisional Gov
ernment declares that the army has the obligation to obey the orders of its mili
tary commanders, and believes that the soldiers will understand it and will form
a close circle around their officers, seeing in them the leaders who have always
led them to victory. Only by obeying their officers may the soldiers break the
resistance of the enemy and deny him victory over free Russia. Soldiers, you are
called to complete the great historical task of our fatherland. Follow your officers
and remember that without respect for the person and the honor of your officer,
there can be no unity, there can be no victory. Any manifestation compromising
the dignity of the officers undermines their authority, leads to the disintegration
of our beloved army. Those who have been in the trenches know that the ad
versities of combat existence are equal for soldiers and officers, that bullets and
shells maim both equally. Also hunger and bad weather make no distinction.
Many heroic officers have died the death of the brave, inspiring the soldiers by
their personal example; the blood of soldiers and that of the officers have joined
in a common stream, creating a great monument of which the sons of Russia
should be proud. Officers, continue to direct your units. Respect the honor and
persons of your soldiers, try to gain their trust. You as chiefs and elders are called
to lead the army to victory over the foe; you are called to show by your example
that you understand the greatness of the present moment. The enemy observes us
intently. The enemy watches for every false step of ours, would take advantage
of our least disorders or the lack of solidarity within our ranks. If we were now
to stumble, the enemy would finish us. He would deliver on us his deadly blow.
Streams of blood of the best sons of our country have been shed for a great cause;
history and Russia would never forgive us if it were to prove that this blood was
shed in vain, that the errors of the current days had brought our sacrifices to
nought, and that they had led to a shameful peace. We are bound to preserve a
great Russia and the creative achievements of our ancestors, who have given her
her present greatness; beware of being branded with dishonor by posterity, for
the victory of the enemy would bring the return of the old, obsolete regime. There
is no more bitter calamity than historical dishonor, and, therefore: (1) the Pro
visional Government, aspiring to definitely consolidate the liberty of the Russian
people and seeing a threat to the greatness of Russia and to her new regime in her
domination by her hated foe, the secular defender of absolutism, entertains the
unswerving resolve to bring the war to a victorious end and calls all the gallant
Russian warriors to unite around their chiefs for the sake of expelling the enemy;
(2) the Provisional Government emphatically states that it considers as deeply
regretful and absolutely inadmissible any kind of arbitrary and outrageous actions
against the officers who have heroically fought for Russia and without whose
assistance it would be impossible to consolidate the new regime. Similar phe
nomena, which are not permitted in any army, undermine at its roots the military
discipline which is essential both in peace and in war and without which an army,
however great and valorous, could have no strength of resistance, nor could it
obtain for the fatherland the desired victory over the enemy. The restoration of
856 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
good and friendly relations between officers and soldiers, and a strengthening of
discipline, are among the major cares of the Provisional Government.
Such is the fervent appeal that the Provisional Government, placed by the
confidence of the people to safeguard Russias interests and her [very] existence,
addresses to the population, to the army, and to the navy.
Only in possessing the plenitude of power, with a corresponding plenitude of
trust, can it fulfill its sacred duty.
Multiplicity of power would inevitably cause a paralysis of power and would
again bring the country to the brink of a grave and a ruinous disintegration.
And let the dreadful responsibility before the fatherland and history fall on
the shoulders of those who would hinder the Provisional Government in this matter.
A . G uchkov , Minister of War and of the Navy
G eneral of t h e I nfantry A lekseev , Chief
of Staff of the Supreme Commander
755. A n A ppea l from V. G. K orolenko
[Izvestiia, No. 14, March 14,1917, p. 4.]
We received9 through P. V. Gerasimov, member of the State Duma, the fol
lowing appeal from V G. Korolenko , transmitted by telegraph :
The telegrams from the Minister of War and from the Provisional Govern
ment sound the alarm. Danger is approaching. Be prepared. [Be prepared] for
what? For the triumph of freedom? For rejoicing, for building immediately for
the future? No. For combat, for battles, for shedding our own and other people9s
blood. This is not only menacing, but also terrifying. It is terrifying that we have
to listen to these appeals not only from the military, whose profession is the san
guine affairs of war in defense of the native land, but also even from us writers,
whose voices sound more natural in appeals for love and peace, for social brother
hood and solidarity, who have always aroused in us the noble dream of a time
when people, forgetting their conflicts, would unite in one great family.
Even now this distant, cherished dream still lives [within us]. But it has
grown even more distant, dimmed by a haze of smoke and blood, but we, writers,
who have merged the love of mankind with the love of our native land in our
souls, are [now] forced to take up the cry of alarm of those [people] whom fate
has placed on guard over our native land in the most trying times of her life.
The alarm sounds, spreads, and envelops the country. I would want the voice
of the press to sound like a trumpet at dawn, picking up [the alarm], transmitting
it further , carrying it everywhere to the most distant corners [of the land], touch
ing the least sensitive hearts and the most indifferent souls.
I have not, until now , written a single word containing an appeal such as this9
but this is not because I had not previously considered it obligatory to defend our
native land.
True, I consider the insane fighting among peoples . . . to be a heinous crime,
and not a single government, not a single state, is free from the responsibility for
it. And when the time comes to negotiate for peace, then it is my deep conviction
that this truth must lay the cornerstone for preventing the recurrence of this
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 857
horror. One must guard the greatest, the most treasured possessionpeace, which
the governments of kings and diplomats were unable to preserve for us. . . .
Often an idea that is initially weak can eventually conquer the world. But now,
when it is weak in reality, it can serve as a crutch for noble dreams, a consolation,
but not as a means of defense. It is a [guiding] distant light, but it gives us no
direction of the immediate course to be taken in view of the terrible danger.
But we are speaking precisely about that which is moving in our direction
that which is already imminent, that which is extinguishing our light, [and] which
demands an immediate answer. It may lay a heavy yoke on the lives of genera
tions for centuries to come. . . . Russia has just accomplished a great task, she
threw off the age-old yoke. There is one less despotism [in this world ], there is
one more freedom.

This is what the defense of our native land signifies to us. It is always needed,
is now needed twice as much. We are defending the new freedom which is being
threatened by an invasion from withouta dangerous, fatal threat. If the German
banner now unfurled over our land, then everywhere alongside of it the somber
banner of restoration would also unfurlthe banner of the restoration of des
potism. . . .
Can it be that this is not clear?
In order to avert this danger, Russia must stand at her threshold with re
doubled, with ten times as much energy. Let us forget the discords in face of this
storm, let us lay aside our arguments about the future. Down with party prece
dences ! Down with the calls for dissension! Let the crucial moment in history
find Russia prepared. Let everyone look in one direction only, the direction from
which resound the heavy trampling of the German [6oo&] and the rumbles of
his guns. The immediate task of today is to repel the invasion, to guard our native
land and its freedom. . . . Work on the front and in the rear, everywhere, until
the danger has been averted, to the end of the great war.
Perhaps this time is already close; the day is nearing when the delegates of
Russia will arrive at the great peace conference, with the family of European
peoples, and will say:
We entered the war as slaves, but at the end of the war we come as a free
people. Hear then the voice of free Russia. She will not speak the words that
would have been spoken by the tsarist diplomats. Free Russia has something
to say at the great conference of peoples which must lay the foundation for a firm
and lasting peace.

756. T h e D ism issal o f Grand D uke N ikolai N ikolaevich as S uprem e


C omm ander and a R eport from General A lekseev C oncerning
t h e M ood o f t h e A rm y at t h e F ront
[Fevralskaia revoliutsiia 1917 goda, KA, XXI (1927), 68-69. The dismissal was
announced in the Petrograd press on March 12. Izvestiia, No. IS, p. 2. See also VoL I,
Docs. 117,130. The appointment of General Alekseev as Supreme Commander met with
opposition ranging from Rodzianko to the Soviet, which cited his record of conservatism
and his disapproval of the democratic changes in the country and the army (Golder,
pp. 403-6). He was replaced by General Brusilov on May 21.]
858 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
March 11, 1917
From 14 hours 40 minutes
to 15 hours 30 minutes
Conversation by direct ivire between General Alekseev and Prince Uvov
[Alekseev:] I have the honor to greet you, Georgii Evgenevich. General
Alekseev at the apparatus.
[Prince Lvov, Minister-President:] How do you do, Mikhail Vasilevich.
I have just received a telegram from Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich that he has
arrived at Stavka and has stepped into his functions as Supreme Commander.
In the meantime, after negotiations with you regarding this question, the Pro
visional Government had the opportunity to discuss often this question in the face
of rapidly changing events and has come to the definite conclusion that the Grand
Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich cannot be the Supreme Commander. Having received
from Rostov a telegram that he will be at Stavka on the 11th, I have sent an officer
to meet him with a letter indicating the impossibility of his being the Supreme
Commander and expressing the hope that for the sake of his love for his country
he will himself relinquish this high office. Apparently the messenger was not in
time to meet the Grand Duke on his way, and therefore the telegram received from
the Grand Duke concerning his taking office has become known in Petrograd and
has caused great confusion. The tranquillity which was achieved after much effort
is threatened. The Provisional Government is obliged to declare immediately to
the population that the Grand Duke does not hold the office of Supreme Com
mander. I ask you to assist us in a common cause, both you and the Grand Duke.
The decision of the Provisional Government cannot be canceled in its essence;
the whole question resides in the manner of its fulfillment: we would like to have
him relinquish the office of Supreme Commander himself, but unfortunately, owing
to an accident, the messenger did not see the Grand Duke and this was not pos
sible. I ask you for an urgent reply.
[Alekseev:] The question may be considered as satisfactorily solved. Your
letter was received by the Grand Duke this morning. Two telegrams have already
been sent today; one to you, advising that the Grand Duke, obeying the desire
expressed by the Provisional Government, himself relinquishes the office and trans
mits the temporary fulfillent of his functions, according to Article 47 of the Field
Statute, to the Chief of Staff [Alekseev] until the Provisional Government ap
points his successor. The second telegram was for the Minister of War, with the
request to relieve the Grand Duke. I think that there should be no obstacle to an
immediate announcement of all this for everybodys knowledge, which would put
an end to the confusion. Independently [from the foregoing] the Grand Duke
asked me to request you to guarantee to him and to his family free passage to the
Crimea and a free life there. For the period of his trip he requests you to send
to him your commissar or a member of the State Duma. The sooner the question
is settled, the sooner the Grand Duke will leave Mogilev, and the better it will
certainly be in every sense. I am asking you this most fervently, adding that the
family of the Grand Duke is in Kiev.
[Lvov:] Thank God. The question regarding the further movements of the
Grand Duke will be decided toward 6:00 oclock, and the decision will be imme
diately communicated to you. The Minister of War has left for the Northern Front.
Please advise me of the general situation and the morale of the troops at the present
moment.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 859
[Alekseev:] On the front lines the overwhelming majority of the units are
absolutely calm, the morale is good; an exception is the Grenadier Corps, where
events have upset its equilibrium and where a certain fomentation and distrust
toward the officer personnel are noticeable. Measures for the explanation of events
and for elimination of the fomentation have been taken. I hope that the situation
will take a favorable turn and that the proximity of the enemy will help it. The
situation of the army units and of the reserve regiments in the rear of the army
is far different; the scarcity of officer personnel and energetic agitation bear their
fruits, and here and there local disorders flare up which express themselves in
arrests of officers and in attempts to adopt in certain places the electoral principle.
I am negotiating with the Commanders in Chief regarding the organization of
special committees, with the participation within their membership of the more
reliable and moderate representatives of the Soviet of Workers Deputies, of the
workers of the zemstvo and town unions, and of the officers. It would be desirable
that these committees visit the army units, that they establish contact between the
troops and the Soviets of Deputies, and that they be ready, if any kind of fomen
tation arises, to send their members in order to have explanations and conversa
tions with the soldiers. Personally, I have such an organization already formed.
However, I am expecting to receive the agreements or the objections of the Com
manders in Chief to this proposal and also to two other proposals, which are for
the purpose of establishing greater mutual understanding between officers and
soldiers and of eliminating the causes of the phenomena which are now witnessed.
As soon as I receive the replies, I will submit to you my proposal in the hope that
you will support it. Likewise, I would suggest your appointing a commissar of
the Provisional Government who would reside at Stavka and would establish moral
and practical ties between the Staff and the Government. I will conclude with the
request to put the earliest possible end to the transitory period in the matter of
the Supreme Command, by appointing a definite person who would have full
authority to take over the difficult task of leading the troops. . . .
[Lvov:] . . . We will make every effort to help you and we hope that you
will continue to carry on the functions of Supreme Commander.

757. T h e R eports of D uma M em bers N. 0. Y anushkevich and


F ather F ilonenko on a V isit to t h e F ront
[Heard by the Temporary Committee of the State Duma at its meeting of March 13,
1917. Razlozhenie Armii, pp. 43-50. An interesting series of letters from an officer at
the front appears in Iz zapiskoi knizhki arkhivista, KA9 L (1932), 196-209.]
Yanushkevich: When we received the proposal to go to the front, we were
afraid that what we saw would make a very bad impression on us, that we would
see a painful picture. But what we saw when we neared the front, at the very be
ginning of our trip, affected us in a completely opposite way. After leaving Petro
grad we noticed that as soon as our trip became known, crowds of people and
soldiers began to gather at each station to greet us. For instance, before arriving
at Pskov we were welcomed; greetings were sent to the State Duma, to the Presi
dent of the State Duma, to the Provisional Government, and so forth. Finally we
reached Pskov and went to see General Ruzskii, who told us that our presence, or
that of anyone else, as members of the State Duma, is essential. At the present
moment the wave which has swept Petrograd and Russia has reached the front,
860 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
and at certain places certain misunderstandings have occurred in connection with
Order No. 1 and with all kinds of leaflets and proclamations which, in spite of
everything, are penetrating into the army. . . .
We found out that the famous Order No. 1 and all sorts of rumors have created
some disorganization in the green53 units, composed of peasants. In the more
revolutionary units nothing similar has occurred. There, the relations with the
officers are also quite good. We have noticed one trait: although the Provisional
Government exists, although the revolution is an accomplished fact, there are those
among the higher officers who behave tactlessly. Everywhere we had to hear the
complaint that the red bow, when it is worn, is torn away. We were also told that
the portraits are not being removed; the soldiers enter and see that the Emperors
portrait is on the wall; it arouses their indignation. At certain places we received
definite information that there were threats of execution by firing squad in the
event of the portrait being removed. This tactlessness has created a dreadful at
mosphere. In certain places we were asked to take the necessary measures for the
removal of the portrait, as the unit was excited and killings were possible. How
ever, it should be noted that the soldiers show a certain restraint. They expect
something, being extremely interested in what is happening now. We were ques
tioned on all sorts of subjects. First we expressed our greetings, and then we
explained that the basic issues would be decided upon by the Constituent As
sembly. . . .
In some units the commander is trusted, but in many others we had to persuade
the soldiers that a return to the old order was out of the question. As for the
general morale of the troops, near to the front lines it is so gay, joyful, and good
that it makes you happy. There we saw truly revolutionary regiments completely
disciplined and in complete unity with the officers. They understand that discipline
should be observed not for fear but for love. They all have the same attitude;
everyone understands that one must fight in order to defend freedom. In general,
the more to the left the unit, the more correctly the questions were put. German
proclamations stating that the revolution was made by England, that England has
deprived us of bread, greatly helped matters. The deception was so blatant that
it brought exactly opposite results.
. . . On the whole, morale is high. We were favorably impressed by it. We
expected something different. Discipline exists but should be organized on the
basis of the new principles. At several meetings we talked with officers. Some of
them understand their task, but others do not wish to realize that the old life has
been destroyed, that they must change themselves. They consider that they have
been very badly treated; they are indignant at the orders, including Guchkovs
regarding politeness; they say that it will ruin the morale of the army, that all
this is done by people of the rear who have nothing in common with the army.
. . . Moreover, one should note that both officers and soldiers entertain exag
gerated hopes with regard to the rear. They say that their food should be im
proved, that they are fed up with lentils, and they expect that the rear will take
care of it; and if it does not do it, it will mean that something is wrong. The
soldiers accuse their commanders of everything, and it took much effort to explain
to them that it was the fault of the old regime, that their immediate superiors had
nothing to do with it.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 861
. . . In certain units we were asked to intercede in order to organize a purge
of the commanding personnel. Even officers who were experienced in combat told
us: 4wWe do not trust [them] ; by their former activities they have so thoroughly
disgusted the soldiers that now, after the revolution, the soldiers have no confi
dence [in them], and this creates disorder and makes excesses possible. We cannot
guarantee that these units will confidently follow this commander in combat.
We have noticed that the officers who endeavored to explain to the soldiers the
change that has taken place were forgiven their past errors, that they seemed to
grow in the esteem of the soldiers; but [in the instances] when things were hushed
up, when soldiers were not called together, when the events were not explained or
where the explanation was biased, the ground for dreadful distrust has been
created. In a certain way the old distrust was weaker, while the new one is terrible.
On the other hand, in the units where soldiers were called together and the events
explained, confidence was immediately restoredeven in those units where it
previously did not exist. These units would go through fire and water.
The question of participating or not participating in the elections to the Con
stituent Assembly is taken very seriously by the soldiers. They told us: Nobody
can decide for us.
We were asked: Will we participate? At our own risk we answered:
Surely, in one way or another, your opinion will be voiced.
They wanted to know whether we would have a republic or a monarchy. We
replied that the issue would be solved by the Constituent Assembly. I must state
frankly that, as far as I have seen, the attitude is entirely in favor of a republic.
I was asked: Are Romanov and his family arrested? As soon as we said that
he was arrested, they started to shout Hurrah to toss us in the air, and so forth.
In this connection, I should mention that some of the commanders were most
tactful.
We had occasion to talk with many officers, with the high command personnel.
Many of them fail to understand the situation, and ask: Why did you not ask
the army before making a revolution? We replied: It just happened that way.
And you, yourselves, after awakening, would you not have recognized Petrograd?
They cannot imagine that it could be like that. They are displeased that it has
been done without their being asked, that it has been done hastily, by civilians,
who have shown no regard for them. Sometimes their attitude toward all this and
toward all the orders is negative, and the soldiers comment: He is an enemy of
the new regime!
Father Filonenko: . . . When we had finished the official part of our visit,
they usually began to ask questions. Sometimes the questions came from the
crowd; sometimes people came up close to us, sometimes they asked that the
officers withdraw. The questions were most varied, and we tried to give satisfac
tory answers. Both officers and soldiers have no clear idea of what the Provisional
Government or the Constituent Assembly is. Many think that the Provisional
Government will grant everything immediately. We explained everything . . .
The extent to which we were welcome guests may be illustrated by the follow
ing occurrence: Having talked with them until 2:00 A.M ., we thought that it was
862 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
our last conversation and boarded a car on the narrow-gauge railroad. It turned
out that a railroad company was stationed on the way, and in spite of the night,
at every station shouts of Hurrah resounded as we approached. It was to the
south of Dvinsk, between Dvinsk and Molodechno. Finally, at 7:00 A.M., terribly
exhausted and completely voiceless, we reached a station where we had to change
to a broad-gauge railroad. Here a whole railroad battalion stood in formation.
Again we thought that everything had ended, but no sooner had we entered the
car than a crowd of soldiers carrying their rifles burst into [our compartment].
At first we were even frightened and could not understand what was the matter.
And they, completely out of breath, said: We hear that you were here and spoke,
but at the time we were on sentry duty and could not listen to you. For Gods sake,
speak to us also. We have no time. Just a couple of words. At that moment
the train started. They shouted Hurrah, while we, already on our way, were
saying a few words to them. They have a terrible thirst for it. Elsewhere there
were regiments where we were received with more restraint, but in the great
majority of cases the general impression was such that after an exchange of
greetings, after a series of such talks, they raised us on their arms and carried us
to our sleighs. The farewells were endless. They kissed our hands and feet. When
we thought ourselves already on our way, we found ourselves surrounded by a
crowd; the horses got impatient; we feared some accident.
In general our impression is excellent, and if only the officers will manage to
reorganize relations in accordance with the new principleswhich is absolutely
necessarymatters will be settled. In our opinion, the way in which the officer
corps accomplishes its task is the most critical issue of the present moment.

758. L etter of G eneral A lekseev D escribing t h e R eactions of the


A rm y and N avy to t h e R ecent E vents , M arch 14, 1917
[V. I. Nevskii, Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni revoliutsii, KA, V (1924),
233-35. For a description of the reception of the revolution on the Rumanian Front,
see General A. I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil, pp. 57-63, and for the Northern Front,
see The Diary of General Boldyrev and G. E. Vulliamy and A. L. Hynes, From the
Red Archives, pp. 189-226, translated from KA , XXIII (1927), 250-73. In the Black
Sea Fleet, Admiral Kolchak was able to maintain a considerable degree of order for
some months; Elena Yarneck and H. H. Fisher, The Testimony of Kolchak and Other
Siberian Materials, p. 53 ff. But in the Baltic Fleet the first days were marked by vio
lence, including the murder of the Commander, Admiral Nepenin, and were followed by
continual unrest and revolutionary activity. See FevraTskaia revoliutsiia v Baltiiskom
flote, KA, XXXH (1929), 99-115. Probably, the difference in mood of the two fleets
can be attributed to the relative inactivity of the Baltic Fleet and its proximity to the
Petrograd political scene. See Docs. 764-66. Later the situation in the Black Sea Fleet
also deteriorated. See Doc. 783.]
D ear P rince Georgii E vgen evich ,
I dispatch for your information a summary of the communications received
from the commanders in chief of the fronts and the commanders of the Caucasian
army and the Baltic and Black Sea fleets regarding the impression made on the
troops by the change of the regime and by recent events.
On the Northern Front the change that took place and the abdication of the
Emperor were received with calm and composure.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 863
Many showed sadness and regret for the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II
and the renunciation of the throne by Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich.
According to some data, it may be concluded that many soldiers do not under
stand the manifestos and cannot as yet find their way among the events that have
occurred.
A whole series of questions were raised in the 2nd Siberian Corps of the 12th
Army as to the consequences that may arise. Some voiced the opinions that it was
impossible to get along without a Tsar and that a Tsar should be elected as soon
as possible; that one should not have Jewish officers; that it was necessary to
allot land to the peasants through the Peasant Land Bank.
In the 5th Army some soldiers saw the events that have occurred as leading to
the end of the war, others as bound to improve their rations; some of them showed
indifference.
In all the front armies many soldiers are sincerely indignant at the declaration
of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies that the republic represented the
wish of the people, and they said: Why do they not ask us about it? Many local
inhabitants expressed the same opinion.
Among the officers there are clear signs of discontent, indignation, and appre
hension at the fact that a self-appointed group of politicians, presenting itself as
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, delegated neither by the people nor
by the armies, acts as a usurper in behalf of the country, interferes with the orders
of the Provisional Government, and even acts and issues orders against the wishes
of the latter.
Especially disturbing are the attempts of the Soviet to interfere in the rela
tions between officers and soldiers and to regulate them, ignoring the existing
unabolished laws and the lawful military commanders.
There is a desire to stop the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies from
interfering in the administration of the state, as not being a delegated representa
tive of either the people or the army, but an extreme political party which should
be kept in its place.
There are also signs of discontent at the formation out of the Petrograd Gar
rison of a kind of privileged section of the army, and wishes are expressed also
that the troops of this garrison should be sent to the front. Its endeavors to remain
in Petrograd are seen as shirking under an honorable pretext from fulfilling its
civic duty to defend Russia.
In the opinion of the combat line troops, the merit of forming the new Govern
ment does not belong to the Petrograd Garrison, but to the members of the State
Duma who are the representatives of the people, to the people themselves, and to
the army, which has welcomed all that has happened.
From the new Government an improvement in living conditions and the estab
lishment of order are expected.
On the Western Front the act of abdication was accepted with calm and serious
ness, by many with sadness and regret.
Along with this, for many the change of regime is connected with a faith in
the restoration of order. The soldiers welcome the new regime in the belief that
the confusion in the food situation will be eliminated and that the families left
behind will be granted rations corresponding to their actual needs.
There is a conviction that German penetration [into the life of Russia] will
cease.
864 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
In the 9th, the 10th9 and the composite corps of the army, the manifesto was
met in part with surprise and in part with pity for the Emperor.
Apparently many were astounded at the unexpectedness and the rapidity with
which the events have occurred.
In the Siberian Cossack division of the composite corps the manifestos caused
consternation.
Some expressed the hope that the Emperor would not abandon his people and
army and would come back to it.
For part of the soldiers the impression was softened by the fact that Emperor
Nicholas II had indicated as his successor the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandro
vich, and that Russia was not yet a republic of which they spoke in the negative.
However, the fact itself of the transfer under a new authority was accepted by
the Cossacks of the Siberian Cossack division with complete submissiveness.
The attitude toward the excesses committed by the mobs against officers in
Petrograd, Moscow, and other cities at the time of the crisis is negative; among
the officers they are considered the result of a pernicious desire to disorganize the
army and harm Russia.
The morale of the troops is good. There prevails a sense of the necessity of
bringing the war to a victorious conclusion, making it essential to maintain com
plete calm at the front and to work intensively in the rear.
On the Southwestern Front the proclamation of the manifesto was met calmly,
with a sense of the importance of the present moment, with a feeling of satisfac
tion, and with faith in the new Government.
Here and there doubts are being expressed among the officers as to the new
Governments ability to control the extreme revolutionary elements.
On the Rumanian front the changes that have occurred have been accepted
with calm.
The abdication of Emperor Nicholas II made a most painful impression on
the officers of the 9th Army.
In the 4th Army the majority express their admiration at the high patriotism
and the self-sacrifice of the Emperor, manifested by the act of abdication. Here
the manifesto of the Grand Duke Mikhail Aleksandrovich caused perplexity and
a good deal of talk and even alarm regarding the future regime.
A more nervous attitude toward events is being felt in the 3rd cavalry corps,
where there is an inclination to consider the transfer of the throne to Grand Duke
Mikhail Aleksandrovich as his investment with a regency until the majority of
the Grand Duke Aleksei Nikolaevich, who is regarded as the legitimate heir.
In the Caucasian Army the change of the regime was accepted with calm.
In the Baltic Fleet the transition to the new regime was accepted enthusi
astically.
In the Black Sea Fleet the recent events were met with calm and with the
realization of the importance of the moment. Work did not and does not cease.
The appointment of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander
was welcomed, and even joyfully welcomed, on all the fronts. For many his taking
over the Supreme Command brought hope for a speedier and a victorious con
clusion of the war.
Only in the 5th Army of the Northern Front was the question raised: By what
right and on whose order has Grand Duke Nikolai Nicolaevich occupied the post
of Supreme Commander?
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 865
To conclude, I deem it necessary to point out that the population in the rear
of the Northern Front, especially in the small [Jewish] settlements, fears pogroms;
the Commander in Chief of this front has already started to receive petitions for
the dispatch of troops for the protection of the inhabitants security.
Accept the assurance of my esteem and of my attachment.
M ik h . A lekseev

759. T h e S oviet D ecision to A ppo int C ommissars to M ilitary


C ommands , M arch 19,1917
[Protokoly, pp. 61-62. See also Docs. 807 and 873.]
Instructions to the Military Committee
1. For the purpose of establishing firm and permanent relations between the
troops and their organs and the Soviets of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies in
order to achieve quick and systematic solutions of problems arising in the internal
and political life of the army and to expedite the transmission of directives, as
well as for the purpose of preventing any wrong steps on the part of the organs
now in charge of army life, the Executive Committee, with the consent of the
Provisional Government, shall appoint commissars to be attached to: a) the Min
istry of War, b) Stavka, c) commanders in chief of individual fronts, d) fleets
(at Helsingfors, Kronstadt, and Revel) . . .
2. The commissars shall act on the grounds of an order, affirmed by the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. The Ministry of War, for its part, will give
the said commissars credentials guaranteeing them the cooperation of military
authorities in the performance of their duties.
3. No instructions, orders, proclamations, etc., on questions relating to the
internal or political life of the army and to the local population in the areas under
their jurisdiction can be issued without the consent of the commissar and the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
4. The commissars shall take part in examining all demands, complaints,
declarations, etc., that concern the internal life of military units, their food sup
plies and quarters, as well as relations between the troops and the local population.
5. The commissars shall do everything within their power to remove the fric
tion between officers and soldiers, clarifying current events to the military units,
and to satisfy the needs of the troops without delay in so far as the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies and its allied organizations can be of assistance.
6. The commissars shall fulfill the tasks listed above with the assistance of
persons assigned to them by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and
of the persons they shall enlist with the consent of local Soviets of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies. All aforesaid persons shall act on the basis of the general
instructions and directives issued by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Depu
ties. The distribution of the work and personal instructions of a practical nature
shall be entrusted to the commissars.
It was resolved to adopt them in the following form:---------5
5 The Protokoly notes that the original is incomplete.
866 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
760. T y pical M ilitary D emonstrations at t h e D uma
[.Izvestiia, No. 17, March 17, 1917, pp. 1-2. The same issue, p. 3, reported the arrival
of a delegation of officers, sailors, and port workers from the Black Sea Fleet, pledging
their support for the War to victory and for the Provisional Government.]
On March 15 a reserve battalion of the Life Guards of the Semenovskii Regi
ment, headed by their commander, Colonel Nazimov, arrived in full military array,
with musical accompaniment, at the State Duma. The regiment carried in front of
it a large, red banner bearing the inscription: The Free Semenovites. Individual
units of the regiment carried red banners bearing the following inscriptions: Vic
tory Over Wilhelm Means Preservation of Liberty!55 Soldiers, to the Trenches
Workers, to the Benches,55 War to a Victorious End,55 Long Live Freedom
and Liberty,55 Land and Liberty,55 Long Live Free Russia, Long Live the
Republican System!55
In Ekaterininskii Hall N. S. Chkheidze was the first to deliver a speech to the
Semenovites, in which, among other things, he explained the meaning of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers5 Deputies address to the workers of the world and, in
particular, to the German proletariat.
We suggested to the German people, said N. S. Chkheidze, that they do as
we have doneoverthrow the old regime and Wilhelm along with it. Until such
time . . . our bayonets will be turned against Germany. Prove that you are lions
of the revolution, Semenovites, and that whoever encroaches on our freedom will
be repelled by us. Be ready for action, both on the front and here [at home].
Long live the army in which there is discipline, based on mutual understanding
between officers and soldiers.
In the subsequent political portion of his speech, N. S. Chkheidze called for a
cheer of Hurrah for the Constituent Assembly and for the democratic republic.
The hall resounded with a simultaneous, loud Hurrah for the Semenovites. After
this, the elected commander of the battalion delivered a short address commend
ing the State Duma for having undertaken the struggle against the old, cursed
regime that enabled the people to overthrow the detested regime. In addition, the
Semenovites want to show everyone that they have become well organized and
[that they] now represent a force which is capable of protecting the freedom and
the happiness of Russia against her internal and external enemies. The colonels
words were drowned in thundering, prolonged cheers of Hurrah and the music
of the Marseillaise.
The Semenovskii Regiment was met by a delegation from the State Duma,
consisting of 20 deputies headed by M. V. Rodzianko. The appearance of the
President of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko, gave rise to loud ovations. Ad
dressing the Semenovites, M. V. Rodzianko said: Thank you, brave Comrade
Semenovites, for having come here to demonstrate your strength and your will
ingness to stand guard over the happiness and freedom of Mother Russia.
Rodziankos speech, which closed with an appeal to the army to fight against
Russias deadliest enemy, Germany, stirred immense enthusiasm in all die sections
of the hall.
Rodzianko was followed by N. S. Chkheidze, member of the State Duma, who
suggested once again that the soldiers ask Rodzianko what he thought about the
convocation of the Constituent Assembly, about the democratic republic, and,
above all, about land. These words were immediately picked up by one of the
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 867
soldier-orators; he spoke on this subject at great length and finally reached the
point of suggesting that soldiers believe neither Rodzianko nor the State Duma.
The President of the State Duma reappeared immediately and. in answer to these
words, delivered the following speech:
Gentlemen, both I and the State Dumaall of uswill make every effort to
convoke the Constituent Assembly as soon as possible. We will not allow anyone
to prevent this Constituent Assemblywhich will be the genuine expression of
the free popular willfrom deciding who shall rule Russia. We will humbly
submit to its decision and will defend with all our strength the [political] system
which will be introduced in Russia in conformity with the will of all the people.
As concerns land, I am stating on behalf of the State Duma that if the Constituent
Assembly should rule that the land must be transferred to all the people, then this
decision, too, will be carried out without the slightest resistance. Comrade-
Semenovites, do not believe anyone who tells you that either I or the State Duma
will stand in the way of Russias happiness and freedom. This is not true; we
will do everything we can [with only one purpose in mind] : that the Russian
people may live the way they wish.
These words created an enormous impression on the audience. The over
whelming ovations did not subside for a long time. When the President of the
State Duma descended from the balcony he was picked up by the soldiers and
carried across the hall to thundering cries of Hurrah.
Subsequent attempts by some obscure persons to undermine this spirit came
to no avail.
An hour and a half later, the 3rd Rifle Regiment, headed by its commander,
Colonel Semenov, approached the Tauride Palace in formation accompanied by
choral music which continuously performed the Marseillaise. The banners of this
valiant regiment bore the words: War Until Final Victory, Comrades, Load
Your Guns, We Will Die for Freedom, Long Live Free Russia.
The regiment was met by welcoming speeches from N. S. Chkheidze, member
of the State Duma, and M. I. Skobelev. The leaders of the working class called
upon the soldiers for organization and discipline and asked them to listen only
to people that they have known or heard about, and not to unknown speakers.
An unfortunate incident almost marred the welcome extended to the riflemen: a
totally unknown lady delivered a speech to the riflemen which ended with the call:
Down with the War. This slogan provoked a burst of indignation among the
soldiers. Shouts were heardAway with the speaker; give her to us for our
bayonetsand the speaker was hissed. The excited soldiers were calmed down
by the speech of their commander, who indignantly called upon his comrades to
give no credence to any speeches by people who turn up from nowhere and to
ignore their harmful appeals. The soldiers surrounded their commander, lifted
him up [on their arms] and carried him out to the exit with loud cries of Hurrah.
Another group of soldiers rushed to the balcony from where the woman had
spoken, surrounded her, and there was a moment when she was threatened with
a brutal lynching. However, prudence took the upper hand and the soldiers only
demand was the immediate arrest of this woman and the establishment of her
identity and the identity of those on whose behalf she spoke. It was with difficulty
that the speaker was finally escorted through the infuriated crowd and sent to the
Bureau of Investigations, where they proceeded to establish her identity.
868 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
761. Pravda E ditorial by S talin Calling for t h e A rm y to S tand
at I ts P osts and M aintain D iscipline
[Pravda, No. 9, March 15, 1917, p. 1. This was the line taken by Stalin when he took
over the direction of Pravda following his return from Siberia. It was a far cry from
Lenins position before and after his arrival in Petrograd on April 3.]
The war goes on. The great Russian revolution did not interrupt it. And no
one entertains the hope that it will end tomorrow, or the day after. The soldiers,
the peasants, and the workers of Russia who went to war at the call of the deposed
Tsar, and who shed their blood under his banners, have liberated themselves, and
the tsarist banners have been replaced by the red banners of the revolution. But
the war will go on, because the German army has not followed the example of the
Russian army and is still obeying its Emperor, who avidly seeks his prey on the
battlefields of death.
When an army stands against an army, the most absurd policy would be to
propose that one of them lay down its arms and go home. This policy would not
be a policy of peace but a policy of slavery, a policy which the free people would
reject with indignation. No, the free people will stand firmly at their posts, will
reply bullet for bullet and shell for shell. This is unavoidable.
The revolutionary soldiers and officers who have overthrown the yoke of tsar
ism will not quit their trenches so as to clear the place for the German or Austrian
soldiers or officers, who as yet have not had the courage to overthrow the yoke of
their own governments. We cannot permit any disorganization of the military
forces of the revolution! War must be ended in an organized way, by a pact among
the peoples which have liberated themselves, and not by subordination to the
will of the neighboring conqueror and imperialist.

762. R e o rg a n iza tio n o f t h e C iv il A d m in istration o f t h e C ossacks


[Order of March 14,1917. VVP, No. 12, March 18, p. 2. See also Vol. I, Docs. 264, 265,
269, 390, 394. Under the Provisional Government, the Cossacks resumed the control of
their internal affairs, which had been taken from them by the Imperial regime.]
Statutes applying to the civil administration of the Cossack population contain
different kinds of restrictions in the civil rights of this population. Moreover,
these restrictions in rights not only have no justified basis in the established cus
toms, but are also in direct contradiction to the historical past of the Cossacks.
The following has been planned in view of the establishment of the new state
order:
1) The earliest abolition of all restrictions in the rights of Cossacks which
are not justified by the special conditions of their military service.
2) The reorganization of local administration by Cossack voiska on the basis
of the most comprehensive self-government, as answering fully to the historical
past of the Cossack troops.
But inasmuch as it would require a considerable amount of time to work out
the corresponding statutes, it is considered necessary to establish congresses of
delegates from Cossack stanitsy in every Cossack voisko, according to the example
existing in the Ural Cossack voisko ; apart from their participation in discussing
current local affairs, it is intended that these congresses will be requested to discuss
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 869
the basis of the future self-government of Cossack voiska as a whole, as well as
the Cossack communes (stanitsa, settlement, or farmstead).
3) In addition, for the purpose of alleviating the burden of Cossacks in equip
ping themselves for military sendee and in view of the very significant increase,
due to wartime conditions, in the prices of horses and items for equipping and
outfitting the Cossacks, the question of increasing the amount of allowances issued
at the time they enter service during the war has now been taken up for resolution,
and discussions have commenced on the question of a corresponding increase of
the same allowances in peacetime as well, and of the establishment of these allow
ances for the Ural Cossack forces for whom no peacetime allowances have here
tofore been established.
A. Guchkov , Minister of War
763. L etter of General L u k o m sk ii , Q uartermaster G eneral at S tavka ,
to G eneral K aledin , Comm ander of t h e 8 t h A rm y , A dvising
R estraint in O pposing D emocratization
[Iz zapiskoi knizhki arkhivista, KA, XXXV (1929), 214. See also Razlozhenie Armii,
pp. 58-59.]
Restricted
[March 20, 1917]
D ear A lek sei M a k sim o v ich :

For the Provisional Government at the present time to take a firm stand in
opposition to or to take any kind of resolute measures against the Union [sc:
Soviet] of Workers and Soldiers Deputies would be quite absurd; the Govern
ment had to tailor its orders to the demands of the moment.
There is no doubt that the measures of the Provisional Government concern
ing the relationship between officers and soldiers, which sharply alters the regular
organization of the internal life of the army, cannot fail to have a painful effect
on the latter.
The problems of the current moment urgently demand that this painful process
in the army should proceed gradually without severe shocks and in accordance
with the new national regime.
For the purpose of promoting a correct understanding and explanation of
national life at the current moment it would be extremely useful to organize special
committees from elected officers and soldiers. [In these committees] the officers,
maintaining the necessary contact with the mass of soldiery in the person of its
trusted representatives, could have a moral influence on them and show in full
measure the force of their moral, intellectual, and purely military authority, with
out being hindered with discipline in such moments of mutual discussion.
On the other hand, to advance, at the present transitory moment and in view
of the forthcoming operations and the troubled situation in the rear, any kind of
slogans which would be contrary to the policy of the Provisional Government
would be an act of political lunacy. . . .
Any drastic measures or demands could at the present time ruin everything
and would only create a nightmarish, bloody internecine war and, as a result,
our subordination to Germany.
870 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Now it is essential to act with extreme caution and to calm the army by means
of moral indoctrination.
Only thus can the army be saved and, together with it, the honor and the future
of Russia.
A. L ukom skii
764. S t a t u t e o f t h e S e b a sto p o l5 M ilita r y C o m m ittee on t h e O rgan iza tio n
o f O ffic e r s, W a rra n t O ffic e r s , S a ilo r s , S o ld ie r s, and o f W o rk ers
E ngaged on D e fe n s e W orks
[Izvestiia, No. 26, March 28,1917, p. 4.]
The present Statute shall remain in force only until such time as it is superseded
by the promulgation of a corresponding law . . .
The Central Military Executive Committee considers the principal aims of
the new Statute to be [as follows] :
1. To preserve everything that is essential to fighting strength, to strengthen
discipline and increase the legitimate authority of the leaders whose will and
intellect will lead the navy and army to victory.
2. To create conditions in the . . . lives of officers, sailors, and soldiers
under which they will be able to breathe freely, where there will be confidence
that every legitimate desire will be given a normal outlet, that violence and in
justice will be exposed, and so that there will exist generally recognized lawful
means for ensuring the triumph of justice and liberty.
3. The officer and the soldier are to be brought into a close relationship
through teamwork during their off-duty hours. They are to be placed side by
side and forced to get to know and like one another, and discipline is not to be
based on fear alone, as was once the case, but on love and confidence and on
the basis of service to the great ideals of righteousness and truth.
The principal difficulties that the Central Military Executive Committee en
countered were in connection with that age-old distrust which has separated the
soldier from the officer since the times of Arakcheev. Alienated from one another,
living in separate quarters, not knowing one another, the officer and the soldier
stood on the opposite sides of a deep gulf which had developed between them, and
they ceased to understand one another. The soldier began to see the officer as a
warder and an oppressor, while the officer saw only helplessness, mendacity, and
an incapacity for any independence whatsoever in the soldier and [saw] no
remedy against this. Very few succeeded in bridging this gulf. Only in battle,
when faced with death, did the soldier and the officer in a simple way come to
gether once again and perish on the distant fields and seas for the sacred, beloved
mother country.
Now when, by a miracle of God, this gulf has closed, the soldier and the officer
have taken their places side by side, and during these holy days we are now passing
through, the officer perceives the soldier as a mature person possessing large and
correct political intuition, while the soldier recognizes the officer as his older
comrade, a friend approaching him with an open heart and an outstretched hand.
6 A. A. Arakcheev (1769-1834), reactionary officer and statesman noted for the severe
discipline he imposed in reorganizing the army under Alexander I.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 871
The Central Military Executive Committee has recognized that the principal
means of achieving the above-mentioned goals is by introducing the elective
principle into the internal life of regiments and ships, enabling the elective officers,
soldiers, and sailors to settle the frictions and disagreements which inevitably
arise in life, to provide for educational needs, to control the commissioned per
sonnel in charge of supplies, and to fight against hooliganism and provocation.
The Central Military Executive Committee has striven to establish a mode of
life that would make it possible to work simply, without the formality and con
ventions which, under the old, bureaucratic system, did not allow one to live
and fight against evil.
Confirmed and released for execution by the
Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet.
V ice -A dmiral K olchak
March 19,1917
Sebastopol
L ieutenant Colonel V erkhovsky , President,
Sebastopol Central Military Executive Committee

765. A dm iral K olchak on Conditions in t h e B lack S ea F leet


[Reck*, No. 91, April 20,1917, p. 3. The attitude of the Black Sea Fleet at this time was
reflected in its dispatch of delegations to the Baltic Fleet and to Petrograd to urge unity
and discipline in the struggle with the enemy. Den\ No. 46, April 29,1917, p. 3.]
At the present time,Admiral Kolchak, Commander of the Armed Forces of
the Black Sea, isin Petrograd. In a conversation with the parliamentarynews
papermen, the Commander of the Black Sea Fleet declared:
The general situation of the Black Sea Fleet in combat and other regards is
quite normal. The combat activity of the Fleet has not been interrupted for one
moment during the revolution. There were no cases of crews refusing to fulfill
the duties imposed on them. The Black Sea Fleet maintains as heretofore the
strictest blockade of the Anatolian shores. The olds forms of inner discipline have
fallen. Instead of them, new forms of discipline are being formed based on the
consciousness of duty and civic responsibility. The relations between the com
manding personnel and the crews as a general rule are established on the basis
of mutual trust. There are almost no cases of antagonism between the command
ing personnel and the crews of the Black Sea Fleet, perhaps because before the
revolution the relations between sailors and officers were somewhat different
from those that existed in the Baltic Fleet. One could feel a certain coolness be
tween sailors and officers but no hostility. This has eased the painless passage
from the old form of discipline to the new one. Even the question of saluting in
the Black Sea Fleet was in no way acute, and the sailors continue now to salute
and exchange greetings with the officers. The question of the uniform was never
raised by the Black Sea Fleet; neither sailors nor officers attached to it the slightest
importance and with us the uniform was changed only when the order of the
Minister of the Navy regarding the alteration of the uniform was issued.7 There
7 Shoulder boards were abolished in the Navy by order of Guchkov on April 17. VVP, No.
84, April 18,1917, p. 1.
872 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
were individual clashes between sailors and officers, but they were solved in a
most loyal way and had serious reasons underlying them.
The Central Military Committee, which was formed in the very first days
of the revolution, out of the representatives of workers, sailors, soldiers, and of
ficers, rendered a tremendous service in the matter of adjusting the new order of
things.

766. T h e R esolution of a N aval O fficers M eeting in R evel


[VVP, No. 19, March 29,1917, p. 3.]
The following series of resolutions was adopted on March 24, 1917, at the
first general meeting attended by approximately 400 naval officers stationed in the
town of Revel5. . . .
The Political Platform of the Officers
1. The officers consider it an obligation of honor and conscience to defend
free Russia to their last drop of blood against her external enemies and against
any attempts at provoking a counterrevolution the aim of which is to revert
the Russian people to its earlier state of lawlessness and to restore the over
thrown regime.
2. [They shall consider it an obligation] to submit to the Government which
commands the confidence of all the people and which is leading the country to
the Constituent Assembly, to be convoked on the basis of universal, direct, secret,
and equal suffrage. The decision of the Constituent Assembly, representing the
expression of the peoples will, to which the sovereign power shall have been
transferred, will be accepted incontrovertibly.
3. Right up to the time that the decisions of the Constituent Assembly are
carried into effect, there shall virtually exist a republican form of government in
Russia, It is the duty of every officer, conscious of his duty to his native land and
of the paramount importance of national defense, to recognize the established
order pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly, without any qualifications
and without the slightest attempts to change the order.
For this reason [those present at] the meeting consider it necessary to de
clare that any officer having the intention of changing the established system is
considered an enemy of the native land and, being a harmful element to the
cause, cannot be allowed to remain in the company of officers.

The Attitude of Officers to the Crews and to [ Their ] Official Duties


The meeting considers that under the new social order the principal duties
of officers should consist of the following:
1. To recognize that the new discipline must be based exclusively on mutual
confidence, mutual respect, and a clear awareness that each person must perform
his duty in his official capacity and in combat.
2. To recognize that out of service both officers and sailors have equal rights
as citizens of Russia.
3. To forget all offenses incurred during the period when the crews had mis
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 873
givings about the sincerity of the officers change of allegiance to the side of the
people.
4. [To achieve] the closest possible relationship with the crews, in accordance
with the new principles of citizenship and comradeship, through discussions on
subjects of interest to the crews.
5. To uphold the authority of the recognized organs of self-government of the
crews (for example, ships committees and ships divisional committees) and to
assist them in every way in fulfilling their functions.
6. To be courteous and correct toward everybody both on and off duty,
thereby setting an example for the sailors.
7. To be very scrupulous in the performance of ones official duties, in order
to set a worthy example.
8. To renounce all right and duty to inflict any kind of punishment, sub
mitting all cases regarding the conduct of subordinates, depending on their
gravity, to committees or courts which are founded on democratic principles.
Conditions Required for Effective Performance of Duty on the Part of Officers
In order that officers be able to perform their duty to the native land, the
following [conditions] are necessary:
1. Complete order must be established on ships and in all naval establishments,
along with the strict performance of duty on the part of every person.
2. The authority of elected committees must be recognized and supported by
their commands.
3. All arbitrary decisions and acts of violence must be excluded from the life
on ships and in other establishments. All requests of crews must be made solely
through the channels of the elected committees.
4. In times of war, questions of appointing and transferring officers and
sailors must be decided solely by the commanding staff. Filling the complement of
naval units and [ensuring] their preparedness for combat would otherwise be
impossible.
5. Sailors are not to be allowed to interfere in the realm, of operational, com
bat or combat-training work of officers.
6. Sailors must not interfere in the private lives of officers and in their
interpersonal relations, remembering that officers, enjoying full rights as citizens,
are exercising the same self-government in their lives as the sailors do in theirs.
7. Energetic measures must be adopted through the channels of ships com
pany and ships divisional committees to curb those sailors who, as a result of
their lack of awareness, do not want to submit to any kind of regulations.
8. Sailors are to respect officers as citizens and as older comrades.
9. The necessity on the part of everyone, without exception, must be recog
nized of giving all ones strength to the fight against the enemy, forgetting ones
own personal interests.
10. There must be a complete end to squaring personal accounts with one
another and a mutual agreement to forget all past offenses.
The meeting expressed its unanimous opinion that only a strict adherence to
the indicated requirements will enable the officers to perform their duty to their
native land.
874 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
The meeting considers that an elected organization of the Revel naval officers
should be charged with the responsibility of elaborating the details of putting the
above-mentioned principles of the meeting into practice. This organization will
be requested to maintain close contact with th e---------.8
767. T h e S oldier and t h e W orker
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 25, March 26,1917, p. 2. See also Derf, No. 22, March 30,
1917, p. 1, and Doc. 624.]
The soldier and the worker marched ahead of everyone in the peoples fight
for freedom in the Great Russian Revolution.
The revolution emerged victorious because the soldiers and the workers
acted in close union and friendship. Had there been no such alliance, Nicholas
Romanov would be sitting on the throne to this day. The workers would have
achieved nothing without the support of the soldiers. And neither would the
soldiers have achieved anything if the democratic labor forces had not taken the
initiative in the revolutionary struggle and had not won the following of the army.
Finally, the revolution would not have triumphed if the revolutionary workers and
soldiers had not joined forces and assumed vigilant control over the Provisional
Government.
In the fraternal alliance of soldiers and workers lies the surety for a better
future of the country, the surety for strengthening the freedom which the people
had won.
But during the past days, a slight friction has become evident between workers
and soldiers.
The workers feel slighted by the soldiers seeming indifference to matters re
lating to the economic fight that the proletariat is waging against the capitalists.
The soldiers are expressing dissatisfaction with the workers on the grounds,
it seems, that they are not working energetically enough for defense and that they
seemingly care little about the needs of the soldiers and peasants.
This is not the time for such misunderstandings.
Solidarity of forces and complete mutual confidence are as essential to us as air.
We have no doubts that both the workers and the soldiers have definitely kept
this in mind.
Fighting for their own class needs, the workers are demonstrating by their
every act that they are not forgetting the interests of other groups of the Russian
democracy. It was precisely through their struggle, even back in the years 1905-6,
that the workers forced the issue of transferring the land to all the people, while
at the present time all their efforts are directed to obtaining a just resolution of
this question. In the same year, 1905, it was the struggle of the workers that
compelled the tsarist government to adopt at least a modicum of measures for
improving the position of the soldiers. At the present time, the workers are sup
porting the soldiers with all their might in bringing about a reorganization of
barracks life and a fundamental improvement in the position of soldiers. The
workers are also giving their strongest support to the cause of improving the posi
tion of soldiers families.
On the other hand, the revolutionary army, through its armed strength, is
8Omission in text.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 875
ensuring the triumph of a democratic republic in Russia; the republican order,
in its turn, enables the workers to defend their rights, realize their just demands,
and fight for the establishment of a socialist system, under which, in addition to
political equality, economic equality will also prevail.
None of us should for a minute forget that the salvation of Russia depends
on the binding strength [prochnost] of the alliance between workers and soldiers.
Let the free soldier and the free worker march step in step to the end!
Let nothing destroy this fraternal alliance, welded by righteous blood in the
fire of the revolution!
768. T elegram of Guchkov E x jo ining the M aintenance of D iscipline
[Den\ No. 29, April 9,1917, p. 5.]
The Commander in Chief of the Northern Front has ordered the widest possi
ble distribution of the following excerpt from War Minister A. I. Guchkovs tele
gram No. 6870 of March 29:
Any refusal of the troops to carry out a combat order of the command, any
manifestation of lack of confidence, the elimination of a commander, and the elec
tion of [commanders] by subordinates are considered by me as inadmissible. By
following this path, the army will be ruined. Russia will become Germanys slave;
our fields will be flooded with blood.
Have patience, have faith in us, in the Provisional Government, which is
ready to give its own life for the happiness and freedom of Russia. Remember
that all individual manifestations which upset the firmness of the army bring joy
to our enemy. Only a few weeks remain before the beginning of severe engage
ments. Each hour counts. Therefore, carry on your hard duties to their gallant
end. Work in harmony with your commanders. Let your children bless rather
than curse you for violating your duty toward the country!
769. G uchkov s O rder on t h e Criteria for t h e A ppo intm ent of
S enior O fficers , A pr il 2,1917, No. 32
{VVP, No. 23, April 5, 1917, p. 2. See General A. I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil,
pp. 146-51, for an unfavorable comment on Guchkovs removal and retirement of some
150 senior officers.]
When making appointments to important posts in the army and navy, the
old regime followed the principle of seniority complicated by much formalism and
red tape. The old regime not only did not seek but even avoided employing
people of great talent, of dynamic energy, of strong character and will or of firm
convictions. But when it was necessary to reckon with favoritism the old regime
did not hesitate to violate this principle of seniority and qualification which it had
itself established and which allegedly was to be equal for everybody.
Such a system very often promoted to responsible posts in the army, in the
navy, and in the central administrations persons of little capacity, often completely
unfit to fulfill heavy duties, carrying great responsibilities to the fatherland.
It is obvious to everybody that without a commanding personnel which is
gifted, knowledgeable, energetic, and which enjoys the trust of its subordinates,
neither the army nor the navy is in a condition to demonstrate in full measure the
entirety of its might.
876 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
It is necessary to alter at its root the procedure for appointments applied by
the old regime of the country. The matter should not be delayed, for in order to
obtain the victory which is now so essential over the enemy, who strives to deprive
our native land of the liberties she has conquered, we must utilize in full measure
not only the material resources of the country, not only her technical means and
everything that can be used for combat and for servicing the population, but also
the spiritual forces of the nation, its talents, its enthusiasm, and its readiness for
self-sacrifice, while as the leaders we should utilize all the best sons of our Great
Motherland.
Motherland, army, and navy are now living through an ordeal. Work should
be entrusted to the best men, to youthful forces of unflinching energy. All those
who have outlived themselves, who are not fit for dynamic action, should step
aside and yield their posts.
Favoritism must have no place in the regenerated armed forces of a Russia that
is now free. Only great talents, tested by service, should give the right to promo
tion to higher posts.
The obsolete principles of seniority and of term in service should be replaced
by the principle of the advancement of the most worthy.
The task confronting our combat forces is enormous, and for its solution a
great and unanimous effort of all the workers is essential. In order to achieve
this unanimous effort mutual confidence is [absolutely] necessary, and therefore,
from now on the senior commanders will be authorized to voice their opinion in
the matter of selecting their immediate aides.
I have a profound belief in the might of our free armies and fleets, and I trust
that new and better men will henceforth lead them along the right path toward
an early victory.
A. Guchkov , Minister of War and of the Navy
770. O rder of G uchkov on E lective M ilitary O rganizations
and D isciplinary C ourts
[VVP, No. 35, April 20, 1917, p. 2. Ibid., No. 39, April 25, 1917, p. 2, published a
supplemental order dated April 19 extending the application of this order to the central
administration of the War Ministry. It is also noteworthy that soldiers pay was in
creased on April 25. Sob. Uzak, 1,1, No. 566.]
The reorganization of the national army and navy required the establishment
of new principles in troop organization as well as in the internal mode of life and
mutual relations of commanders and subordinates.
Realizing the whole difficulty and urgency of carrying out this task under
conditions of immediate proximity to the enemy, I am turning to all officers,
soldiers, and sailors with a demand that they apply all their efforts toward putting
the new order into practice as soon as possible with complete composure and
without undermining for an instant the fighting strength of the armed forces of
the country.
While preserving the fundamental principles governing combat and the prep
arations for combat which demand strict and unquestioning execution of the com
manders9orders, the new organization of the armed forces introduces a system of
elective military organizations guaranteeing every soldier the exercise of his civil
and political rights.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 877
These Organizations Are:
1) Committees: of a company, regiment, or army.
2) Disciplinary courts.
Functions of the Committees:
1) To unite the whole Russian army into a single organization.
2) To ensure the observance of discipline and order in its units.
3J To control the supply work in its units.
4) To take legal steps against abuses and excesses of authority on the part of
officials in its units.
5) To resolve questions concerning the internal mode of life in the units.
6) To settle misunderstandings between soldiers and officers,
7) To assist in education and in developing sports among soldiers and sailors
in its units.
8) To make preparations for elections to the ConstituentAssembly.
The Tasks of the Disciplinary Courts Are [as follows] ;9
1) To maintain discipline in the units.
2) To resolve disputes and misunderstandings whicharise among soldiers
or sailors.
All these organizations shall be elected on the basis of universal, direct, equal,
and secret suffrage.
Their rights and duties are [given] precise definition in statutes announced
with this [order].
Illegal acts of these organizations or of their individual officials shall be ex
amined according to the general procedure in military courts.
General meetings of military units must not interfere with combat work, in
struction, or special work in the unit.
The announced statutes shall go into effect immediately upon receipt of this
order. In those units where committees have already been elected, the general
meetings shall have the right to prolong their competence until the expiration of
the three-month period from the day of their elections, provided that they be
guided in their work solely by the present statutes.
The application of the fundamental principles of the present order to the
special conditions of service and mode of life aboard ship and in naval shore
commands shall be assigned to a special commission with the participation of
sailor delegates from the whole navy.
The statutes on military committees and disciplinary courts have been adopted
by a special commission with the participation of representatives from the army
in the field and the navy and delegates from the Petrograd Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers9Deputies and the All-Russian Conference of Soviets of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies.
A. Guchkov, Minister of War
April 16,1917
9 See Docs. 787, 788.
878 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
771. D raft of a R esolution of th e P etrograd S oviet on S oldiers
R ights , M arch 9,1917
[.Izvestiia, No. 15, March 15, 1917, p. 6. Ibid., No. 17, March 17, 1917, p. 1, warned
the public that this document was only the draft of a resolution which was to be dis
cussed further by the Soviet. Compare with Doc. 773.]
I
Soldiers are to enjoy all the rights of a citizen.
1. Every soldier has the right to become a member of any political, national,
religious, economic, or professional organization, association, or union.
2. Every soldier has the right to freely and openly express and to profess by
word of mouth, in writing or in print, his political, religious, social, and other
views.
Note: The holding of general prayers with compulsory attendance is abolished,
together with other restrictions in religious freedom.
3. Officers as well as soldiers in rear units have the right to wear civilian
clothes when off duty.
4. All censorship on letters and telegrams that is not of a strictly military
nature is to be immediately abolished.
5. All publications, periodicals, and other printed matter must immediately
and without question be delivered to the addressees.
II
The attitudes of officers toward soldiers and of soldiers toward officers must
be in keeping with their dignity as citizens.
1. The designation of lower rank is to be abolished and is to be substituted
in all relevant cases by the designation of soldiers.
2. All the expressions customarily employed in accordance with military regu
lations under the autocratic regime prescribing the manner in which to reply (as,
for example, exactly so [tak tochno ], never so [nikak net], glad to do our
best [rady starafsia ], we wish you good health [zdravia zhelaem ], etc.) are
to be substituted by replies of common usage, such as no, dont know, all
right, we will try, how do you do?, etc.
3. The institution of batmen [den9shchiki] is to be abolished: (a) in army
units which do not constitute a part of the active armyto be effective uncondi
tionally as of the publication date of this order; (b) in units of the active army and
navy[to be effective] in the form of an exception, permitting a voluntary agree
ment with soldiers in their units who are willing to assist officers in household
work, but only providing that there is an agreement on wages for services rendered
and that there is not more than one such soldier to an officer.
Note: Stablemen tending to soldiers and officers horses are to be retained for
the entire period of the present war, providing that no officer has the services
of more than one stableman. It is prohibited to demand the fulfillment of other
duties on the part of these orderlies [vestovye] such as had once been included
in the duties of officers servants [den shchiki] , the institution of which is presently
abolished.
4. All acts of salutation on duty and off duty on the part of individual persons
as well as detachments are to be abolished.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 879
Note: (1) The paying of military homage on the part of detachments and
units at funerals, ceremonies, and other such occasions is to remain in effect. (2)
The command Attention 155 shall remain in effect only as a preliminary com
mand.
5. The practice of addressing by titles is to be abolished and is to be substi
tuted by forms of address as Mr. General,55 Mr. Ensign,55 Mr. Platoon Com
mander,55 etc.
6. Officers and soldiers are obliged to observe all codes of mutual courtesy.
In addressing each other on duty and off duty, officers and soldiers are obliged
to employ you55 [vy ]. Thou55 \ty\ is to be completely abolished.
III
Soldiers have the right to organize themselves.
IV
A soldier cannot be subjected to punitive measures or prosecution without a
trial.
1. All punishments that offend the dignity and honor of the soldier, as well as
those that cause pain and are obviously detrimental to his health, are to be
prohibited.
Note: (1) Of the punishments mentioned in the disciplinary code, the fol
lowing are to be abolished: fa) Standing at attention with a gun, fb) reduc
tion [in rank] without a trial,55 (c) unqualified for promotion to the rank of
officer.55 (2) The following examples of punishments which are not mentioned in
the disciplinary code will be considered [in the category of] criminal tortures:
long repetitions of one and the same gymnastic exercise, such as 30 deep knee
bends,55 stand at attention until I tell you otherwise,55 or instructions until a
breakdown from fatigue occurs, such as running in place.55 Those guilty of
such acts must definitely be brought to trial and, prior to trial, must be immediately
discharged from their duties.
2. Noncommissioned officers or instructors who strike a soldier on duty or
off duty must be brought to trial and, prior to the trial, be discharged from their
duties.
3. Corporal punishments are to be abolished in all cases, without exception.
Under no circumstances should any case of infliction of corporal punishment,
either in the rear zones or on the front, remain unpenalized. Effective as of the
publication date of the present order, any officer who orders that corporal punish
ment be inflicted on a soldier, regardless of his rank, must be prosecuted, charged
with torture of a subordinate, and immediately discharged from his duties. Should
he be found guilty, the court should designate a penalty, no lighter than a
demotion to the rank of private.
V
Roll call should be conducted only in the mornings.
VI
Rules on military discipline and order (as expounded in corresponding stat
utes) are to remain in effect only with reference to the time on duty and to rela
tions between commanding officers and their subordinates. All articles in such
880 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
statutes and all orders, injunctions, instructions, and announcements,
without exception, which contradict the clauses of the present order, or orders, or
directives issued by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies on the subject
of the rights and duties of soldiers are to be abolished.
772. T h e R eactions of G eneral A lekseev and O th er S enior
O fficers to t h e P roposed D eclaration of S oldiers R ights
[Admiral Kolchaks account from Elena Vameck and H. H. Fisher, The Testimony of
Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials, p. 67. This meeting apparently took place late
in April.]
I had returned to Petrograd with Alekseev at the suggestion of Guchkov, to
gather at his house for the purpose of discussing under his chairmanship the so-
called Declaration of the Soldiers [sic] Rights. This declaration had been
worked out by a special commission which was attached to the Petrograd Soviet
of Workers Deputies and which consisted of representatives of the army and
navy.10 The Assistant War MinisterI believe it was General Manikovsky
made a report on this subject. At the beginning of his reading Manikovsky said:
I am duty bound to report that I essentially disagree with this kind of document
which has now been worked out and which it is intended to put into practice, but
I would like everyone present to make his observations and possibly we shall
succeed in introducing certain corrections.
Thereupon Alekseev, who sat at Guchkovs right, rose and said: I, as Com
mander-in-Chief [Supreme Commander], cannot discuss the question of the means
by which the army which I command shall be finally destroyed; I therefore refuse
to discuss the question and refuse further participation. Thereupon all those
present declared that they concurred in the opinion of the Commander in Chief
and considered it useless to discuss that document. If it had been decided to in
troduce it, let it be introduced; but they would not deliberate on it. At this the
reading of the document ended. General Manikovsky said: I had decided to
make this report only in the hope that we might succeed in making certain cor
rections, in softening what is said in this document; but so long as everyone con
siders discussion superfluous, I cannot do anything more. Thereupon all arose
and took leave of each other.
773. O rder No. 8 on t h e R ights of S ervicemen (D eclaration
of S oldiers R ig h ts ) , M ay 11,1917
[VVP, No. 54, May 14, 1917, p. 1. On May 1, Guchkov tendered his resignation as
Minister of War, maintaining that he could no longer hold his post in good conscience
as the Provisional Government did not exercise real authority. For documents on this
event, see Volume HE. Immediately before this, on April 29, he expressed his forebod
ings in a speech before the Conference of Delegates from the Front, as did also
Kerensky (Doc. 801), who was to succeed him in the War Ministry.
Among Kerenskys first acts was the publication of the Declaration on Soldiers
Rights which had been prepared by the Soviets and the Polivanov Commission, but
which Guchkov had refused to sign because of his fears, shared by many senior officers,
of its effect upon military discipline. Before issuing the Declaration, Kerensky restored
article 14, which Polivanov had excluded under pressure from the Soviet, and revised
10 The Polivanov Commission. See Doc. 753.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 881
article 18 to give commanders the exclusive right of appointment and dismissal of
officers. For Kerenskys account of the circumstances of his appointment and first acts
as Minister of War, see his Catastrophe, pp. 182-92.]
I order the implementation of the following regulation for servicemen in the
army and navy, in accordance with paragraph 2 in the Declaration of the Pro
visional Government of March 7 :X1
1) All servicemen enjoy all rights of citizens. But at the same time each
serviceman is obliged to guide his conduct strictly according to the demands of
military duty and military discipline.
2) Every serviceman has the right to be a member of any political, national,
religious, economic, or professional organization, society, or union.
3) Every serviceman when off duty has the right freely and openly to express
or profess orally, in a written or printed form his political, religious, social, and
other opinions.
4) All servicemen enjoy freedom of conscience. Therefore no one can be
persecuted for professing any faith or be forced to attend services and religious
rites of any one religion. Chapel participation is not obligatory.
5) All servicemen must conform to rules general for all citizens in matters
of their correspondence [during the war].
6) All printed matter without exception (periodical or nonperiodical) must
be delivered to the addressee without any interference.
7) All servicemen are granted the right to wear civilian clothes when off duty.
However, military uniform remains obligatory at all times for all servicemen sta
tioned in the active army and in military areas, located in the theater of military
operations.
The right to grant permission to servicemen to wear civilian clothes in some
large cities situated in the theater of military operations is reserved to the Com
manders in Chief of Fronts or the Commanders of the Fleets. Mixed or partial
uniform is under no circumstances permitted.
8) Mutual relations of servicemen, while strictly maintaining military disci
pline, must be based on the feeling of dignity of citizens of free Russia and on
mutual confidence, respect, and courtesy,
9) Special expressions employed as obligatory when making responses by in
dividual persons and units outside of or in formation, as for example exactly so
[tak tochno ], never so [nikak net], its not for me to know [ne mogu znatf],
glad to do our best [rady staratsia ], we wish you good health [zdravia
zhelaem ], I humbly thank you [pokorno blagodariu], etc., are replaced by ex
pressions generally used, such as yes, no, do not know, we shall try,
greetings, etc.
10) The assignment of soldiers as batmen [den shchiki] is abolished.
As an exception in active armies and the fleet, in regions under the adminis
tration of fortress commanders, camps, ships, and during maneuvers, also on
the borderlands, in places where it is impossible to hire servants (in the latter
instance the matter is determined by the regimental committee), officers, army
doctors, army functionaries, and chaplains are permitted to have an orderly
[vestovoi] for personal services, who is employed by mutual consent between him
self and the person to whom he is assigned, with wages also agreed upon. How
II Doc. 134, para. 3, dated March 6, but published March 7.
882 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
ever, not more than one orderly to each of the enumerated categories is allowed.
Men who take care of officers9 own horses needed in line of duty are permitted
in the active army as well as in internal districts and are assigned on the same
bases as the orderlies for personal services.
11) Men assigned for personal services are not released from combat duties.
12) Compulsory saluting by individuals as well as by units is abolished.
A voluntary mutual greeting is established for all military personnel in place
of the compulsory salute.
Note: (1) l i e paying of military homage on the part of detachments and
units at funerals, ceremonies, and other occasions is to remain in effect. (2) The
command Attention! remains in effect in all instances provided for by the
military statutes.
13) In military regions which are not located in the theater of war, all service
men have the right during their time free from service to leave the barracks or the
ships in harbor, provided they notify the appropriate superiors and have received
the necessary identifications,
A monitor squad or watch (or a unit corresponding to it) must remain in every
unit. Moreover, in every company, troop, and battery, etc., its own guard should
remain.
In roadsteads only those members of the crew who are not needed in the event
the ship must immediately weigh anchor and sail into the open sea are allowed
to leave the ship.
14) No serviceman may be subjected to punishment or penalty without trial.
But under combat circumstances the commander has the right on his own respon
sibility to take all measures, down to applying armed force inclusive, against his
subordinates who fail to carry out his orders. These measures are not considered
to be disciplinary penalties.
15) All punishments which degrade the honor and dignity of servicemen
as well as cause suffering and are obviously injurious to health are not tolerated.
Note: Among punishments mentioned in the disciplinary code, standing at
attention with rifle is abolished.
16) Use of punishments not enumerated in the disciplinary code is a criminal
offense and those guilty of it should be tried. Likewise any commander who
strikes his subordinate whether in formation or out of it should also be tried.
17) No serviceman should be subjected to corporal punishment, not excluding
those who serve their term in military jails.
18) The right of appointment to duties and of temporary suspension of of
ficers of all grades from duties in instances provided by law belongs exclusively to
commanders. Likewise they alone have the right to give orders with regard to
combat activity and the preparation for battle of a unit, its training, its special
duties, duties in the [departments] of inspection and supply. But the right of
internal self-administration, imposing of punishments and control in precisely
defined instances (orders of the War Department, April 16 of this year, No. 21312
and No. 274 of May 8) belongs to elected army organization$9 committees, and
courts .
In announcing the present general regulations, I prescribe that they be taken
(as well as the rules established by order of the War Department of this year, No.
12 Doc. 770.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 883
114)13 as a basis in reviewing the statutes and laws which define the internal life
and duties of servicemen, as well as their disciplinary and criminal responsibility.
A . K erensky , Minister of War and Navy

774. P roclamation of t h e P etrograd S oviet on th e


D eclaration o f S oldiers R ights
[Izvestiia, No. 66, May 14, 1917, p. 2. On May 9, Kerensky sent a personal request to
the Soviet for the publication of an appeal to servicemen to continue saluting as a
voluntary greeting after the issuance of the Order on the Rights of Servicemen. Ibid.,
No. 62, May 10, 1917. This rather noncommittal proclamation apparently represented
their compliance.]
Comrade-Soldiers!
For two months we have been waiting for this day when the rights which we
attained by revolutionary means have received the force of law and become com
pulsory for all men in military service.
By entering the ranks of revolutionary fighters, we liberated ourselves from
the tsarist yoke.
The revolution has made everyone equal: now, by law, the soldier has become
a citizen.
The difference between soldiers and officers during off-duty hours has been
eliminated.
The 12th point of the Declaration of Soldiers Rights says that the old re
quirement of giving a salute no longer exists.
Henceforth the soldier-citizen has freed himself of servile salutation and, as an
equal, can freely greet whomever he pleases.
Long live the free, conscious citizen-soldier. May the united and strong free
peoples army live and grow stronger.
The discipline of the revolutionary army will exist through popular en
thusiasm and through the awareness of duty to a free country, and not through
compulsory salutes.
We, soldiers, will be able to prove that the free army of cidzen-soldiers is
much stronger than the army of the old regime.
E xecutive C om m ittee
S oviet of W orkers and S oldiers
D eputies

775. T h e R eply of Izvestiia to Pravda!s A ttacks on t h e D eclaration


[No. 75, May 26,1917, p. 2.]

Those who worked on drafting the Declaration throughout the period of its
preparation approached their task carefully and conscientiously: the draft of the
Declaration was worked and reworked thoroughly for a long time by the Soviet
of Soldiers Deputies, while its fundamental principles were formulated by the
is Doc. 752.
884 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
April conference of representatives of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies
But all this did not in the least prevent the newspaper Pravda from attacking
the Declaration. We are not even speaking of the fact that Pravda saw nothing
positive in the Declaration; more than that, it at the same time performed a series
of operations on the Declaration which served as grounds for the polemics in
which we are interested.
The Declaration was published under the signature of the Minister of War and
Navy, A. Kerensky. Pravda converted the Declaration of Soldiers Rights into a
declaration of the deprivation of a soldiers rights and turned it into a wholesale
act of accusation against Kerensky. The most elementary sense of justice, regard
less of ones attitude toward the Declaration9would have required that an indica
tion be made of the fact that the Declaration, signed by A. Kerensky, was drawn
up by the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers Deputies, while the most important prin
ciples on which the Declaration is based were worked out by the All-Russian Con
ference of Representatives of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
Pravda found it possible to pass over all this in silence.14
Taking individual articles of the Declaration, the lively pen of the Pravdist
described the situation in such a way as to convey, for example, that disciplinary
punishments, which have remained in force up to the present time, shall be imposed
by the commander. In reality, however, they shall be imposed by the elected court
of the company . Besides, as V. Utgof points out in Delo Naroda, In articles which
provide for punitive measuresin the 14th and 15th points of the Declaration
the order merely executes the will of the sender, i.e., the Soviet of Soldiers
Deputies.15
The newspaper Pravda also brought its anger to bear on the 18th point of
the Declaration. This point, as is well known, establishes the procedure for ap
pointing and discharging officers. The elective principle as applied to officers has
been excluded. According to Pravda1s interpretation, this point is one of the
principal bases for the deprivation of rights of a soldier, which was supposedly
introduced into the army of revolutionary Russia by means of the Declaration,
by A. Kerensky. But with reference to the strong words used in Pravda, V. Utgof
points out:
The Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers Deputies and the All-Russian Conference of
Soviets, taking into account the condition of the army, totally rejected the applica
tion of the elective principle to commanding officers of all ranks and their replace
ment by army committees, reserving to the military organizations only the right
to submit reasons for the rejection or removal of a commanding officer.
Dwelling on the same point, Golos Soldata (No. 14) writes:
What do the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies say on this subject?
There is not a single resolution of the Conference of Delegates from the Front de
manding the establishment of the elective principle in the army. But we do know
very well that the All-Russian Conference of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies (in the month of April) definitely resolved that elections of the com
14 Of course, it also passed through the Polivanov Commission which concerned itself
principally with the style and judicial aspects of the project.
15 Utgof was an officer and a member of the S-R Party who took an active part in all the
work on drawing up the declaration. His article cited is in Delo Naroda, No. 55, May 21,
1917, p. 1.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 885
manding staff are not to be permitted. In the military section of this Conference
there was not a single voice raised in favor of implementing the elective principle.
The newspaper Pravda is maintaining a diligent silence about all this also.
But in compensation, Pravda elucidates to the soldiers that the point con
cerning the appointment of officers has been introduced into the Declaration
in order to avoid giving all the power into the hands of the workers and peasants,
that it has been introduced because Kerensky is preparing the army for an of
fensive, for conquest (!) and also because he is afraid that the peoples army
will force the capitalist and the pomeschik to start speaking a different language
from the one now spoken.
Such, according to Pravda!s depiction, is the nature of the activities of the
Soviet of Soldiers Deputies and of the Conference of representatives of the Soviets
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, because it is these organizations, after all,
which worked out the Declaration. But Pravda does not restrict itself to concealing
the role of the Soviet and the Conference from its readers; it finds it possible to
put the question gravely:
Why did not Citizen Kerensky, before publishing the Declaration of Rights,
ask for the opinion of soldiers, the opinion of the conferences of soldiers from the
front?
But most characteristic of all of Pravda is the way in which it dispensed with
the 10th point of the Declaration. This point abolishes, as is well known, compul
sory service as servants [derCshchiki]. But, in the form of an exception applying
to those areas where there is no possibility of hiring servants9 officers, army physi
cians, military officials, and the clergy are permitted to have an orderly [vestovoi]
for personal services according to an agreement reached between the orderly and
the person to whom he is being assigned. It is completely clear that the focal point
here lies in who precisely decides the question of the impossibility of hiring
servants. The Declaration very definitely establishes that The impossibility of
hiring servants is to be established by the regimental committee.
Pravda found it possible to omit entirely these last words and found it possible
to declare: It amounts to nothing more than a change of name: a den9schik will
be called a vestovoi. Only a change of namethis is said when the com
pulsory service as den9schik is being completely abolished!
The newspaper Den called the operation performed by Pravda on this point
of the Declaration a forgery, and the author of the operation a dishonest person.
And such is the actual case.
And now tens of thousands of copies of these words of poisonous lies are cir
culating on the face of the Russian land, circulating in trenches where the army of
revolutionary Russia is carrying its heavy cross, where, we repeat, there is end
less bloodshed and death is directing its funeral feast and where somebody, per
haps, pays with his life for every careless word, and even more, for every lying and
slanderous word.
776. T h eses on t h e D eclaration by t h e A ll -R ussian C ongress of S oviets
[Session of June 23. Izvestiia, No. 104, June 29,1917, p. 5.]
1. Order No. 8 to the Army and Navy provided a firm basis for the democrati
zation of the Army. However, some of the highly essential rights and duties of
a soldier-citizen have not as yet been confirmed by governmental order; other
886 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
rights have been established subject to limitations which do not conform to dem
ocratic requirements. In view of this, it is necessary to revise and supplement
Order No. 8 in accordance with the present theses.
2. In the field of civil rights in general, the right of every serviceman to
participate in, and to organize, any kind of meeting must be proclaimed in the
supplement to Order No. 8. The restriction on the freedom of speech to the time
when off duty must be abolished.
3. The right of the commander to use force of arms against insub ordinates
(Article 14) must be excluded from the Declaration.
4. In revoking Article 18 of Order No. 8, it must be declared that the soldiers5
organs of self-government shall have the right to challenge or recommend [ap
pointment] of persons in command, as well as the right to participate in army ad
ministration on a basis prescribed explicitly in regulations.
777. T h e D ism issal of G eneral G urko as C omm ander in C h ie f
o f t h e W estern F ront
[VVP, No. 64, May 27,1917, p. 1.]
By the Order to the Army and Navy of May 5,16 I announced that when the
fatherland is in danger, each person must serve regardless of all his burdens and
that no resignations sent in by members of the high command which are prompted
by the desire to avoid responsibility will be tolerated.
The Commander in Chief of the armies of the Western Front, General Romeiko-
Gurko, submitted a report on May 15 to the Supreme Commander and forwarded
a copy to the Minister-President in which he requested that the Provisional Gov
ernment be informed that in view of the conditions in the army which have arisen
as a result of the publication of Order No. 8 to the Army and Navy on the declara
tion of rights of military personnel, he is relieving himself of all moral respon
sibility for the satisfactory performance of the duties entrusted to him.
Such a declaration is absolutely inadmissible at the present time. The Com
mander in Chief has been granted a high degree of the Governments confidence
and, with the support of this confidence, he must direct all his efforts toward ac
complishing the tasks which have been laid on him.
The declination of all moral responsibility testifies to the disparity between
General Gurko and the [demands] of his profession as well as to his evasion of
the duty to carry out an assignment to the best of his knowledge and ability.
The fatherland is in danger and this places an obligation on every person in
m ilitary service to perform his duty to the end without setting a harmful example
of weakness to others.
Without a sense of moral responsibility to his native land, General Gurko
can no longer hold his high and important office.
The Provisional Government has decreed the removal of General Gurko from
tie office of Commander in Chief of the armies of the Western Front and has in
structed me to contact the Supreme Commander regarding the immediate appoint
ment of this general to a post no higher than that of commander of a division.
The Provisional Government found it possible to limit itself to such action only
16 Issued to forestall resignations as a result of the publication of the Declaration of
Soldiers' Rights.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 887
in view of General Gurkos commendable record in combat. In the future, how
ever, actions by persons of the commanding staff comparable to the statement of
the above-named general will be punished with even greater severity to the extent
of appointing [such persons] to the lowest offices.
A. K erensky , Minister of War and Navy
778. T h e D isbandm ent of F our R egim ents
[VVP, No. 64, May 27, 1917, p. 2. See also ibid., No. 66, May 30, 1917, p. 3, on the
difficulties experienced by General Shcherbachev in disbanding regiments.]
The following telegram from the Commissar of the Provisional Government
with the 7th Army was received addressed to A. F. Kerensky, Minister of War and
Navy:
In the 12th division, the 48th regiment has moved to forward positions in full
combat strength, the 45th and 46th regiments moved forward with their com
panies at half strength, the 47th refuses to move forward. In the 13th division the
50th regiment has moved forward in almost full strength. The 51st regiment
promises to move forward tomorrow; the 49th regiment did not move forward on
schedule, while the 52nd refused to move forward and arrested all its officers. I
am awaiting your instructions as to how to act with regard to the men who have
not fulfilled the combat order and also with the men who have arrested their
officers. Besides, I request your instructions as to how to act with regard to the
individual officers who have incited the men to insubordination.
In answer to this telegram Colonel Yakubovich, Assistant Minister of War,
temporarily fulfilling the functions of Minister of War, has sent to the Commissar
of the 7th Army the following telegram:
After my report regarding the events in the 12th and 13th divisions, the
Provisional Government has ordered the 45th, 46th, 47th, and 52nd regiments to
be disbanded. Those officers and soldiers who incited to insubordination are to be
prosecuted. The measures should be taken immediately. The results should be
reported to the Minister of War.

779. Izvestiia9s C omm ent on t h e D isbandment of R egiments


[Editorial in No. 78, May 30,1917, p. 2.]
The Provisional Government decreed the disbandment of the 45th, 46th, 47th,
and 52nd regiments, which refused to carry out the order to advance.
It is a severe measure. How should the revolutionary democracy of Russia
react to this measure? How should the Army react to the decision of the Provi
sional Government?
It is not difficult to answer these questions. One needs only to understand
whose interests were violated by the refusal of the four regiments to obey the order
issued to them.
We are speaking about the refusal of the regiments to relieve their comrades
in the trenches. A replacement of units is unavoidable on the front . . .
The 45th, 46th, 47th, and 52nd regiments received an order to march. They
had to replace four other regiments in the trenches. They disobeyed the order.
883 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS

Such a refusal is a stab in the back of a tired brother. . . . And the decisive
measures adopted by the Provisional Government against these regiments will be
met with a feeling of deep satisfaction by the army. . . .
The Provisional Government gave instructions that the instigators be brought
to trial. Let them stand---------17 public trial before the revolutionary peoples
court. The verdict pronounced by this court will be the verdict of the revolution
against the people who have betrayed the revolutionary banner.
The newspaper Pravda interprets the resolute measures of the Provisional
Government against those who disobeyed the regimental orders as the beginning
of the aggressive phase of the counterrevolution. This is not true! The revolution
was betrayed by those who placed their own personal interests above the common
interest.
Those who push the soldiers into taking such a path are serving the counter
revolution, while those who are fighting against this are serving the revolution
and are drawing their strength for the fight from the revolution, from the support
of the democracy.

780, P enalties I m posed for t h e C omm ission of M ilitary C rimes


[VVP, No. 68, June 1,1917, p. 1. See also Doc. 792.]
Reports have been received from the front concerning several instances of the
gravest military crimes committed by individual persons and groups, as well as
by whole army units. [Such crimes include] disobedience reaching the point of
resistance and open revolt, voluntary abandonment of a position or assigned posts,
refusal to carry out combat orders or otherwise participate in combat, and incite
ment to these crimes.
All these acts constitute grave violations of a soldiers duty.
Persons guilty of these violations shall be punished by exile to penal servitude
and shall be deprived of all civil rights. The latter entails the loss of the right to
serve in any public or official capacity, the right to participate in elections, the
right to own property, movable and immovable, and, consequently, the right of
land ownership, while the family of the convicted person shall be deprived of the
right to [receive] rations and allowances from the state.
Army units which have dishonored themselves by forgetting their duty to their
free native land and the revolution shall be subject to immediate disbandment.
The Provisional Government orders that all persons guilty of the acts listed
above shall be strictly prosecuted and that all army units must be [made] ac
quainted with the present law.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. F. K erensky , Minister of War
A* P ereverzev , Minister of Justice
May 30,1917
17 Omission in text
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 889
781. A rbitrary A ction by M ilitary Co m m ittees
[Order to the Army and the Fleet, VVP9 No. 70, June 3, 1917, p. 1.]
General of the Infantry Myshlaevskii, Commander of the Troops of the Kazan
Military District, reported on May 23 by telegram that the Bugulma Military
Committee has ordered the release on leave until July 15 of nine replacement
companies assigned to be sent to the front.
This arbitrary action of the Bugulma Military Committee is intolerable. This
is not a reasonable use by citizens of the liberties acquired by them, but a dis
gusting anarchy which is prejudicial to the revolution and to Russia.
I instruct General Myshlaevskii: 1) to order the immediate dispatch to the
front of the aforementioned replacement companies; 2) to appoint an investiga
tion of the BuguPma Military Committee which should be carried out as early as
possible with the participation of the representatives of military and public organi
zations of the Kazan5 Military District. Those guilty are to be brought to trial
for punishment according to all the strictness of law.
I feel certain that I will not have to receive any more similar reports about
facts which dishonor Russian liberty.
A. K erensky , Minister of War and Navy
May 30,1917

782. R egulations on t h e A uthority of O fficers and C om m ittees


in t h e N avy
[.Izvestiia, No. 74, May 25, 1917, p. 1. Promulgated by Kerensky as Minister of the
Navy. On June 4, Kerensky announced that he was also reorganizing the central
institutions of the Navy Department in order to include representatives of the officers
and sailors and of the workers and management of ports and naval plants. Izvestiia,
No. 83, June 4,1917, pp. 1-2.]
Petrograd, May 22,1917

A. K erensky , Minister of the Navy


I. Definition of the Jurisdiction of Officers and Committees
A. The jurisdiction of individual officers:
1. The command of his unit in military, navigation, and technical respects
during combat as well as under all conditions when not in combat.
2. Command of the military and naval training of the ship as a whole and of
its individual units.
a. Training of personnel in all branches of military and naval service.
b. Control of the ships boats and training in connection with the ships
boats.
c. Control of ships schedules and alarms.
Note: The work schedule, however, shall be drawn up jointly by the officers
and the committee*
3. During the war the officers shall have complete charge of all means of com
890 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
munication, such as the semaphore, flag signals, projectors signals, the telephone,
and the radio telegraph.
Note: During the war the committee has the right, in urgent cases, to use
these means of communication with the consent of the commander. In times of
peace, however, the committee shall use the means of communication on an equal
basis with the commander, abiding by the existing regulations for the given sea.
4. The establishment of dates when the ship is ready to go to sea.
5. The issuance of orders for the performance of work necessary to the mili
tary life of the ship, as well as of work which, if delayed, could bring damage to
the unit, and, consequently, jeopardize the state.
Note: Without interrupting his work, any person on the ship may lodge a
complaint, through the ships committee, against officers who abuse their right
to order necessary work. The ships committee shall decide whether the complaint
is justified.
6. The registration of persons going ashore.
B. The jurisdiction of the committees:
1. Supervision over every persons conscientious performance of his official
duties and the maintenance of discipline on the ship.
2. The direct administration of meals for the ships company and the manage
ment of all the public funds of the ship.
3. Economic control with respect to finances, materials, and supplies which
are the property of the state.
4. Responsibility for instruction and political education (library, lectures,
newspapers, etc.) as well as the arrangement of cultural and sports entertainments.
5. Care of health.
6. Supervision over decorous behavior and [control] over absences without
leave.
7. The reception and examination of requests, declarations, and complaints
of any kind, and the conduct of investigations of them.
8. The settlement of misunderstandings and, in the event of failure to reach
an agreement, the implementation of decisions to refer the case elsewhere.
9. Supervision of schedules for those going on leave and those going ashore.
10. The distribution of various privileges available to the entire personnel.
C. The joint jurisdiction of officers and committees:
1. The participation, with the right to a deciding voice, in negotiations of
contracts by the ship or the port for work on repairing or reconditioning the given
ship; the participation in commissions for returning the ship to the state or de
livering it to a port, as well as in commissions on defective [ships].
2. Supervision over work on given duty details.
3. The initiative in recommending awards of merit or promotion shall belong
equally to the committees and the officers.
Note: Recommendations cannot be referred to higher instances without a
preliminary agreement between the committee and the [commanding] officer.
4. Recommendations for changing the table of organization of a given ship.
5. The struggle against provocation and counterrevolutionary attempts.
6. The assignment of duties for work on the ship shall be done by the senior
officer and the boatswain in the presence of a committee member on duty.
7. The establishment of the standard percentage of personnel who may be
permitted to go ashore or on leave.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 891
8. All the ships correspondence, with the exception of correspondence re
lating to the separate activities of officers and committees, shall be signed by the
[commanding] officer and by one of the members of the presidium of the com
mittee.
V. L ebedev , Chairman of the Commission on Drafting
Statutes on the Relations and Conditions of Naval Personnel
A. S okolov , Secretary of the Commission
T. K lim enk o , Reporter of the Editorial Commission

783. T h e M utiny in t h e B lack S ea F leet


[M. I. Smirnov, Admiral A. V. Kolchak vo vremia revoliutsii v Chernomorskom flote,
Istorik i sovremennik, IV (1923), 27-28. Smirnov was Kolchaks Chief of Staff. The
Admiral was ordered to transfer his command and proceed to Petrograd to report on
the mutiny in the fleet, which he describes in Elena Vameck and H. H. Fisher, The
Testimony of Kolchak and Other Siberian Materials, pp. 75-83.]
At around midnight [on June 10] Admiral Kolchak and I left for Petrograd
by fast train. We were accompanied to the station by Vice-Admiral Vasilkovskii,
Chief Commander of the Port of Sebastopol, and many officers of the Fleet, who
staged an ovation for the Admiral while the train was leaving. . . .
The Admiral was in an extremely depressed mood. In the car he told me that
the accusation against him by the Provisional Government had deeply offended
him; that the feeling that he, who was entrusted with the command of the Fleet,
was being removed at the demand of rebellious sailors was very painful for him;
that he could not reconcile himself to the idea that he would not participate actively
in the great war, on the outcome of which depended the whole future of Russia.
I tried to calm the Admiral down; I was myself feeling badly for Russia, but I
deeply despised the Provisional Government.

Several days after our arrival in Petrograd, Admiral Kolchak and I were
invited to the meeting of the Provisional Government in the Mariinskii Palace,
in order to report on the events in the Black Sea Fleet.
At the meeting the Admiral stated that the armed forces, owing to the anti
national agitation tolerated by the Government, were disintegrating and were no
longer fit for war; that there existed only two solutions, either to conclude peace
or to stop the criminal agitation by introducing the death penalty and restoring
order within the armed forces.
After the speech of the Admiral, Prince Lvov asked me to state my views.
I said that the Government accused us of tolerating the mutiny, but that the
mutiny was permitted not by us but by the Government itself, and in particu
lar by Kerensky, Minister of War and of the Navy. I pointed out that in my
previous service I had occasion to sail with the British and French fleets, which
belong to so-called democratic countries; their discipline was stricter and their
punishments were more cruel than they were in our Fleet under the imperial
regime; [I told them] that the armed forces were built on strict law and strict
penalties for misdemeanors. On the other hand, the conscious discipline pro
892 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
claimed by the Provisional Government was beyond the reach of the masses; it
would be possible only for isolated people of high culture. Close to me at the table
during the meeting sat Kerensky, Chernov, and Tseretelli. After my words Prince
Lvov, addressing himself to Admiral Kolchak and to me, said: Thank you. We
shall discuss it. We left the meeting.

MILITARY JUSTICE
784. T h e A bolition of F ield C ourts -M artial
[So6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 814. The courts were initially abolished and the procedure for
reviewing cases previously tried by them was established by the War Ministrys Orders
of March 13 and 14, ibid., Nos. 393, 387. Many of those tried by courts-martial were
civilians who came under their jurisdiction because of the imposition of extraordinary
security measures or of martial law in large areas behind the actual theater of military
operations. These cases were to be transferred to the civil courts. Ibid., No. 765. See
also ibid., No. 564.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government, in amendment of the relevant articles of the
Military-Judicial Code . . . has decreed:
I. Field courts-martial shall be abolished.
II. Persons convicted by field courts-martial: their relatives and kinsmen shall
be granted the right to petition for a review of their cases by military circuit courts
under the rules laid down by War Ministry Order No. 106, [March 14,] 1917.
III. In those cases in which the accused is apprehended on the scene of the
crime, which is palpable, and when because of the importance and circumstances
of the case the need arises for its immediate consideration, an accelerated trial
procedure shall be established in military circuit and army-corps courts according
to the following rules:
1. Preliminary written proceedings shall not be required in a case tried under
accelerated procedure.
2. If the crime is committed at the place of location of the court, the accused
may be sent directly to the military circuit or army-corps court with information
to the military prosecutor on the nature of the crime and witnesses thereto and
with a statement that the case requires consideration under accelerated procedure.
3. The military prosecutor, if he finds it possible to dispose of the case under
accelerated procedure on the basis of the information received from the military
authorities, shall immediately draw up a brief indictment, with a description of
lhe charge and the witnesses to be called, and shall submit it to the court.
4. The presiding judge of the court, immediately on receipt of the case, shall
proceed with it and shall announce the indictment to the defendant . . . and at
the same time shall fix a hearing of the case, calling or allowing the appearance
of those witnesses indicated by the defendant and appointing a defense attorney
for him.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 893
5. Cases shall be considered by the full membership of the court with military
jurors and observing the general rules of trial procedure.
IV. This law shall be put into effect by telegraph.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. K erensky , Minister of War
June 13,1917
785. T h e A brogation of t h e R ig ht of M ilitary C ommanders to
I ncrease D uring W artime t h e P enalties E stablished by L aw
[Soft. Uzak., 1,2, No. 961.]
The Provisional Government, in its Journal of April 12, 1917, has decreed:
I. The effect of articles 90 and 901 of the Military Code of Penalties . . . on
the right of higher military commanders to increase in wartime the severity of
penalties as established by law, as well as the effect of all orders issued on the
basis of the above articles of law, are abrogated.
II. All convicted persons whose penalties as established by law were increased
on the basis of the orders mentioned in the preceding (I) section shall have their
sentences reduced to the maximum penalty established by law for the act commit
ted by them, with the proviso that the law of the Provisional Government on
alleviating the lot of persons who have committed criminal acts be applied to these
persons, depending on the penalty imposed after such reduction of sentence.
The original Journal is signed by the Minister-President, the Ministers, the
Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, and the State Controller, and is counter
signed by the Assistant Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government.
786. T h e S pecial C ommissions for t h e I nvestigation of M alfeasance
in t h e W ar and N avy M inistries
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 539. One of the principal objectives was the reopening of the case
against General Sukhomlinov. He was retried, found guilty, and sentenced to hard
labor.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. For the investigation of abuses in armament supply and maintenance of
the battle strength of military and naval forces and for the detection of the official
and private persons guilty of these abuses, two Special Commissions of Inquiry
shall be established under the chairmanship of Senators [Nikolai Nenarokomov
for the investigation of the Navy Department and Vladimir Balts for the investiga
tion of the War Ministery], consisting of six members each, appointed by ukases
of the Provisional Government.
2. The members of each Commission shall be a member of the State Duma, a
member of the civil judicial department, a member of the military or naval judicial
department, a representative of the bar, a representative of the Soviet of Officers
Deputies and a representative of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 14,1917
894 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
787. T h e O rganization of E lected R egim ental Courts
[Soi. U zak1 , 1, No. 541. Similar temporary naval courts 'with jurors were established
by a law of May 6, 1917. Ibid., No. 603.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I.
The following provisional rules shall be established concerning the organiza
tion of regimental courts during peace and war:
1. Regimental courts shall be set up in every regiment and in other separate
troop units, as well as in noncombatant detachments, establishments, administra
tions, and offices of the War Ministry, the heads of which have a rank not lower
than the rank of regimental commanders. These courts shall be named after the
unit to which they are attached.
2. The regimental court shall consist of six regimental judgesthree officers
and three soldiers.
3. Regimental courts shall be elected by officers and soldiers of the regiment
according to the rules laid down in the following articles.
4. Each company or detachment of the regiment shall elect by secret ballot two
electors each from among soldiers of the company or detachment.
In the same manner a general meeting of officers and civil service men of the
regiment shall elect from its midst officer electors of a number equal to half the
electors of the soldiers.
5. Persons who are under investigation or trial, as well as those who are
restricted in their service rights and privileges, may not participate in the election
of electors of regimental judges.
6. Electors may not be persons who do not possess the right to participate in
the election of electors (article 5) and, in addition, may not be soldiers who have
been in service less than one year, as well as illiterates.
Note; In wartime electors may he soldiers who have been in service not less
than three months.
7. A general meeting of electors shall elect from its midst by vote or by lot
six regimental judgesthree from the officers and three from the soldiersand
four alternate judgestwo from the officers and two from the soldiers.
8. The regimental judges shall elect a chairman of the regimental court and
his deputy from among the officer regimental judges; in case of a tie vote, the
question of the election of a candidate shall be decided by lot.
10. The old regimental court shall supervise the observance of the require
ments laid down for the election of electors of the regimental judges (article 6),
and shall proceed to consider the question of the legality of the election both on
its own initiative and on communication from the regimental commander. If
the regimental court finds the elections illegal, the regimental commander shall
order new elections to be held in order to replace the persons improperly elected.
In case of disagreement with the decision of the regimental court, the question
of the legality of the election shall be referred by the regimental commander for
final settlement to the military-circuit court.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 895

18. Regimental courts shall be set up in wartime on the lines laid down above
in articles 1-17 of the present rules but with the proviso that: 1) alternate mem
bers shall be elected in the number of three from the officers and twelve from the
soldiers, and 2) the duties of the military-circuit court . . . shall be fulfilled by
the military-circuit court of the theater of hostilities or by the army-corps court, as
appropriate.
11. Pending the preparation and publication in the immediate future of new
rules for trying cases in regimental courts, and in amendment of the laws now
in effect, the following rules shall be established:
1. Legal grounds for starting action in a regimental court shall be: (a) Com
munications of the regimental commander, regimental and company committees
and submissions of company disciplinary courts, (b) Communications of judicial,
military-judicial, and administrative organs and officials, (c) Complaints of in
jured parties, and (d) Personal appearance and confession.
2. If legal grounds exist for starting action, the regimental court shall immedi
ately discuss the question of referral of the case and shall decide: either (a) to try
the case if it finds that it has jurisdiction, or (b) to refer the case to the proper
jurisdiction if it is not subject to the regimental courts jurisdiction, or (c) to
carry out an inquiry or supplementary inquiry if it does not appear possible from
the information available to the court to determine jurisdiction in the case, or
(d) to terminate the case if there is no indication . . . of the existence of a
criminal act and the case does not call for consideration under disciplinary pro
ceedings.
3. . . . If extenuating circumstances exist, the court may on its own authority
reduce the penalty due under the law . . .
5. The sentence of a regimental court shall enter into legal effect without ap
proval by the regimental commander. [See No. 564.]
III. The rules set forth above shall also apply, with corresponding changes,
to the Navy Department.
P r in c e Lvov, Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 17, 1917
788. J u d ic ia l P r o c edu r e in R e g im e n t a l C o urts
[Sob. Uzak.,I, 1, No. 788.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. On Jurisdiction
12. In the troop zone of the theater of war the regimental court shall have
jurisdiction over cases of criminal acts provided for both in the Military Code of
Penalties and in the general criminal laws, except for those which are under law
punishable by or commutable to retirement from the service, reduction to the
ranks, expulsion from the service, and penalties involving the loss of some special
rights and privileges.
896 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
V. Arrangements Preliminary to Trial
51. If legal grounds for instituting proceedings exist . . . , the regimental
court shall immediately discuss the question of the disposition of the case . . .
54. At the same time that the regimental court decides to try a case itself, it
shall decide to consider the case either under criminal precedure, as defined by the
present rules, if a criminal act is charged as provided by the Criminal Laws, or
under disciplinary procedure according to the Statutes on Disciplinary Courts
(Order of the War Ministry, 1917, No. 21318) if the subject of the case is a
disciplinary offense.

58. If the defendant was arrested for purposes of security and order (article
3 of the Statutes on Disciplinary Courts) during the commission of the criminal
act, he shall be delivered to the regimental court within 24 hours after detention
with an explanation of the reasons for detention. The regimental court shall be
required not later than 24 hours after the delivery of the prisoner to interrogate
him and to decide either to release him immediately or to continue to hold him
under arrest, pending the arrival of an examining magistrate or the referral of the
case to proper jurisdiction in the instances mentioned in the following article 59.
59. The court may order preventive custody only in those cases where, in a
case subject to the jurisdiction of the military-circuit or civil criminal court, there
are reasons to fear that the suspect will flee, cover up the traces of the crime,
or influence witnesses or accomplices. In this connection, account shall be taken
of the nature of the criminal act committed, the severity of the impending punish
ment, the strength of the evidence, the state of health, age, service position of the
prisoner, and other circumstances.
60. An order for preventive custody in a case under the jurisdiction of a
military court may be appealed to the military-circuit court.
62. The accused, from the time when the court takes the case for consideration,
shall have the right to study the entire case file.
63. The accused shall have the right to inform the court of the summoning
of additional witnesses and of the defense attorney chosen by him.
67. In the troop zone of the theater of war the examination and summoning
of witnesses living outside of the place of trial shall not he compulsory, if com
munication with them proves difficult because of wartime conditions.
68. The accused may choose his defense attorney from military personnel,
from attomeys-at-law, their assistants, and other persons whom the law does
not prohibit from pleading clients cases . . .

74. Maintenance of an accusation in court may be entrusted: (1) by the regi


mental commander to any one of the ranks subordinate to him; (2) by regimental
and company committees to one of their members; (3) by officials of the civil
is Doc. 770.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 897
administration to a person authorized by them; (4) by an injured party to any
one of the persons admitted as defense attorney in a regimental court (article 68).
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. K erensky , Minister of War
May 28,1917
789. T h e I ntroduction of M ilitary J uries
[5o6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 789. See also ibid., I, 2, No. 1045, on the institution of military
field prosecutors to replace directors of military-judicial sections in the armies at the
front.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. The designation of temporary members to military-circuit courts, army-
corps courts, and other courts of comparable jurisdiction shall be abolished.
II. Military jurors shall be called for participation in the consideration of
cases in the above courts, and the following additions and amendments shall be
introduced into the Military-Judicial Code . . .
Concerning Military Jurors
1. Military jurors shall be summoned to military-circuit and army-corps
courts during the consideration by them of criminal cases.
2. Military jurors shall be selected in equal numbers from (a) officers and
military officials and (b) soldiers.
5. The general officers lists of military jurors shall include generals, staff
and field officers, and military officials serving at the time of compilation of the
lists in troop units, establishments, administrations, and offices of the War Min
istry.
6. The following shall not be eligible for inclusion in officers lists of military
jurors:
(a) corps commanders, and military commanders comparable and superior
to them in authority;
(b) in wartime, regimental commanders, and all comparable and higher com
bat commanders and staff com m anders;
(c) members of the staffs and administrations of an army commander, com
mander in chief of armies, and Supreme Commander;
(d) heads of central administrations of the Ministry of War;
(e) officers of the military-judicial department and officers of the military
penitentiary establishments;
(f) officers training in military academies and special military schools;
(g) doctors of hospitals and, in wartime, all military doctors in the theater of
military operations;
(h) in wartime, all ranks whose exemption from the duties of military juror
is recognized as necessary in the interests of the service by the authorities pre
paring the list.
898 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
On the Procedure for Reaching and Announcing Verdicts
With the Participation of Military Jurors
74. On completion of the debate of the parties concerning the consequences
of the guilt of the defendant, the jurors, together with the presiding judge, shall
retire to the conference room to determine the punishment for the defendants.
75. Weighing the questions concerning guilt against the replies to them, the
presiding judge shall determine, on the basis of the criminal laws, the precise
criminal act of which the defendant has been found guilty, the penalty due for this
act under the law, and the limits within which this penalty may be either reduced
or increased for the defendant.
76. In case the defendant is found to deserve leniency, the penalty due him
under the law must be reduced by not less than one degree, but may also be re
duced by two degrees.
77. The choice and mitigation of the penalty shall be carried out by the
jurors together with the presiding judge by a majority vote; in case of a tie vote
the view which is more lenient to the defendant shall be adopted.
III. In amendment of the relevant articles of the Military-Judicial Code and
the Code of Criminal Proceedings, the following rules on jurisdiction of military
courts shall be decreed:
1. Military courts shall have jurisdiction over (a) military personnel and
military officials on active military service . . . and (b) persons not on active
military service: members of the army reserve, persons belonging to the territorial
force [ opolchenie], and serving Cossacks in case of perpetration by them of the
same criminal acts while on training musters.
In other cases, the persons mentioned in the present article shall be subject
to the jurisdiction of civil criminal courts.
4. During wartime members of the armed services and military civil service
men shall be subject to the jurisdiction of military courts for all criminal acts
perpetrated by them in the troop zone of the theater of military operations as well
as abroad. [Also prisoners of war and inhabitants of occupied territory of the
enemy.]
IV.
1. The exclusive right of the military authorities to institute criminal prosecu
tion against military personnel shall be abolished.
2. Legal grounds for instituting cases by military prosecutors shall be:
(a) communications of military authorities and troop organizations;
(b) proposals of military prosecutors;
(c) communications of administrative and judicial officials and bodies;
(d) complaints and statements of military personnel and private persons;
(e) personal appearance and confession.
V. The right of military commanders to refuse to forward cases for cassa
tion shall be abolished.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 899
VII. The printing of reports of cases tried in military courts shall be per
mitted on general grounds.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. K erensky , Minister of War
May 28,1917

790. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e R eform of M ilitary Courts


[No. 136, June 17,1917, p. 1.]
The Provisional Government has published a law on a new organization of
military-circuit courts and of the army corps military courts, and on the procedure
in them. It is an important reform of military court organization and court pro
cedure. It is a matter of widespread knowledge that serious defects were present
in our military courts. They lacked many elementary safeguards of justice. Their
decisions possessed no guarantee of independence. Their judgments were fast,
even too fast, but they were not very merciful or just. The brevity of all court
terms, the limitations in calling witnesses, curtailment of the rights of defense,
the enormous difficulties placed in the way of reconsideration of decisions which
depended on the personal judgment of the commanding general, who might permit
or refuse the further movement of submitted appealsall these shortcomings de
prived the verdicts of military courts of the guarantees of just judicial decisions.
The reform being introduced now is directed toward removal of these defects.
There was a great deal of injustice in the courts of the old regime, states the
order of War Minister A. F. Kerensky concerning the new statute on military
courts. Russia expects impartial truth and strict justice from the new military
courts.
From now on, the administration of law in the army is being built on entirely
new principles. Elective courts are being organized. Earlier, a new statute was
published on the organization of elected regimental courts consisting of elected
representatives from among officers and soldiers. The present statute reorganizes
the military-circuit courts which deal with the most serious military crimes.
From now on, these courts will handle their cases with the participation of
military juries elected from equal numbers of officers and soldiers. They are to
participate in all cases over which the military-circuit and army-corps military
courts have jurisdiction; they also take part in judicial investigations, determining
questions of guilt and deciding the extent of punishment.
The rights and duties of military jurors and the whole procedure of the
formation of such elective judicial collegiums are defined as being similar to the
corresponding rules of our now-operating civil court arrangement and court
procedure with the necessary changes in regard to the collegiums of the juries
consisting of the special military personnel. . . .
. . . This by no means exhausts all the procedural changes brought in by
the new statute. . . .
Without proper administration of law no society and no army can exist,
states the above-quoted order of the War Minister. Demonstrate to the whole
world that freedom does not mean disorder, that the independent conscience of
900 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
the warrior will give the troops the just court. Justice is now guaranteed to
military courts. A tremendous and responsible task is entrusted to them: to lay
firm legal principles in the life and daily existence of the army. In the past they
were not applied sufficiently; events of recent times only tended to disorganize
legal relations. A number of reforms which are being introduced now must put
an end to the disorganizing phenomena. The new elective court is charged now
with that lofty mission also. Let it bring in the same salutary principlesthe
safeguarding of the law and administration of the lawwhich are laid at the
foundation of the court procedure in the general courts in the form of trial by jury.

DESERTION AND FRATERNIZATION


791. A ppeal o f th e P rovisional G overnment
to D eserters and S hirkers
[VVP, No. 23, April 5,1917, p. 2. Den\ No. 29, April 9,1917, p. 5, reported that up
to two hundred thousand returning deserters were traveling on the southwestern
railways daily.]
By law of the Provisional Government of March 1819 of this year, all [persons]
who have been called up for military service up to the present time but have
evaded it, all men in the territorial force, and the reserves who have not reported
for military duty during all the partial mobilizations in the past, as well as
soldiers and sailors who are at present in flight or on absence without leave,
with the exception of those who have deserted to the enemy, have been granted
full exemption from trial and punishment, -provided that all these persons vol
untarily report for military duty before May 15 of this year. All these persons
shall be exempt from trial and punishment even if they have, in addition, com
mitted before March 18 any fraudulent acts or have damaged their own health for
the purpose of evading military service, and, with regard to soldiers and sailors,
if they have, in addition, committed before the same date intentional damage,
squandering, or any other form of alienation of state property or arms issued to
them (i.e., sale, abandonment, etc.).
All persons who do not voluntarily report [for military duty] by May 15 of
this year shall answer [for this] and shall suffer the full consequences prescribed
by military and general criminal laws.20
The Provisional Government, anxious to increase the combat strength of the
army in every possible way, is turning to all the citizens of free Russia, to all who
hold valuable the greatness, freedom, and happiness of their native land, with an
appeal to assist in directing these persons to the armed forces.
Let all whose husbands, sons, and brothers are standing honorably in the
ranks of the army, ready to give up their lives at any minute for [the sake of]
their native land, come to the assistance of local authorities and help them to as
semble all those who have already been called up for military service but who
have not taken their places in the ranks of the armed forces or who have will
19 This is a typographical error in the text of the VVP. It should read March 17.
20 See Doc 792.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 901
fully deserted. Every man is valuable to the army, and may every man be filled
with shame who, out of faintheartedness or personal interest, has betrayed the
sacred duty of defending his native land.
Report to the nearest military commander.
Minister-President and the Minister of War
792. E xtraordinary P enalties for D esertion
[Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 683. Guberniya commissars were instructed to take the most
resolute measures to find deserters and turn them over to the military authorities.
Circular from the Temporary Militia Administration, Ministry of the Interior, May 18,
1917, No. 17071, Sb. Tsirk. MVD., pp. 73-74. Special courts to try deserters were
established on June 5, Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 767, and special commissions to clear the
capitals of deserters and check deferments were organized under military control in
Moscow and Petrograd on June 28. Ibid., I, 2, No. 1046. See also Doc. 780.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
1. Persons who have absented themselves from the ranks of the armed forces
without leave and who have failed to report to their units by May 15, 1917, irre
spective of the penalty to which they are liable under law: (a) shall be deprived
of the right to participate in elections to the Constituent Assembly and to organs
of local self-government; [in addition] (b) their deprivation of the right to re
ceive land during the land reform shall be recommended to the Constituent
Assembly.
2. The families of the persons mentioned in article 1 shall be deprived of their
right to receive a ration pending the return of the latter to their units.
3. The persons mentioned in article 1 who have reported to their units after
May 15, 1917, may be restored, pending trial, to the rights mentioned in paras,
(a) and (b) of article 1 and completely exonerated of responsibility for desertion,
if by courageous performance of their duty they expiate their crime against the
motherland.
4. The present Law shall also apply, for the duration of the current war, to
those persons who have absented themselves without leave from their units after
May 15, 1917, or who shall do so henceforth, as well as to persons who without
lawful cause fail to appear for new mobilizations or calls to military service.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
P. P ereverzev , Minister of Justice
May 26,1917
793. E xcerpts from a R eport on F raternization at the
F ront B etw een M arch 1 and M ay 1,1917
[Razlozhenie Armii, pp. 37-38.]
5th Army
April 22
In the region of the v[illage] Antoniny (in the direction of Sventsiany, 137th
division sector), a party of Germans, which attempted to start conversations with
our soldiers, were dispersed by our fire.
902 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
10th Army
March 25
In the sector of Kolodino-Stakhovtsy (to the south of Lake Naroch, 67th divi
sion sector, now included in the 3rd Army), a party of Germans twice left its
trenches carrying white flags and with their hands and hats beckoned to our
soldiers; both times the Germans were chased back to their trenches by our rifle
and machine-gun fire.
April 2
On the sector near the v[illage] Ushivtsy (12 versts to the northeast of
Smorgon5, the sector of the 20th Corps5 29th division) the Germans exchanged
bread and sausages with our soldiers, while on the sector of the 16th Mingrelia
Regiment (1st Caucasian grenadier division, 2nd Caucasian Corps near Smor
gon9) the Germans managed to hand proclamations to two of our soldiers. All
those who gathered were immediately dispersed by our artillery fire.
April 29
On the sector Shalduki-Kunava (2nd Caucasian grenadier division, 2nd
Caucasian Corps) both our soldiers and German soldiers attempted to get out
and meet, but both were dispersed by the fire of our light battery.

12th Army

March 27
To the west of Ikskuhl bridgehead the enemy tossed proclamations with ex
cerpts of the [German] Chancellors March 16 speech and attempted to talk with
us, but we opened fire against him.
March 30
All along the front of the 12th Army Germans attempted to start conversa
tions with our troops; for this purpose they got out of their trenches in groups
carrying white flags, but they were chased back into the trenches by our aritillery.
April 1
On the front of the 43rd corps, near the seashore, two Germans approached
our trenches for the purpose of starting negotiations; both Germans were seized.
At the 2nd Siberian Corps, Germans, wishing to start negotiations, went out with
white flags, but were chased back into their trenches by our fire.
April 25
On the sector of the 21st Corps, three of our soldiers of the 129th Regiment
took a boat for the purpose of visiting the Germans, but turned back following
admonitions and threats on the part of their comrades.
C olonel B azarevskii
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 903
794. O rder of General G urko C oncerning F raternization
[VVP, No. 38, April 23, 1917, p. 3.]
Reports regarding the number of casualties from enemy fire bear witness
that, apparently on some sectors of the front, friendly relations have been estab
lished between our troops and the enemy; this is absolutely inadmissible especially
now, when the fraternal blood of our Allies is shed in profusion for the common
cause of liberating the small nations which have been subjugated and ruined.
Through their relations with our troops which have lately been observed, the
Germans are able to determine with the utmost accuracy the whole grouping of
our troops, the entire disposition of our forces; undetected by those who converse
with them, they manage to obtain necessary information regarding our army.
Having achieved a lull on our front, the Germans thereby have freed both their
hands for a decisive struggle against the French and the English. This lull relieves
the Germans of any threat [over here] and permits them to concentrate over there
the whole of their attention, all their free forces and means. And when the fight
dies out over there, our front, lulled by conversations and false promises of peace,
will not be completely battle-fit for withstanding the enemy as it should. [Then]
the Germans will throw all their forces against us.
Further on, speaking of the falseness of the Germans love for peace and of their
disregard for any treaties, Gurko turns to the military situation and says: Their
peace talks are the results of weakness and of their being unable to wage war on
two fronts as successfully as before. Under these conditions, a lull in combat is in
favor of the Germans; they aspire to it as they aspire to achieve by every means
a bloodless victory. Furthermore, the Order states that three divisions have been
transferred from our front and that the transfer of other divisions, and also of
artillery and aircraft, is under way. With the lull that has been established, even
a weakened front does not represent a threat for the Germans.
Giving an example of the credulity which is being abused by the Germans,
Gurko cites a letter from the commander of the [German] 81st infantry division
which has been sent to our soldiers; in it it is suggested that our 75th division
should surrender in its entirety, as in 1812 the German corps of General von York
surrendered to our troops. Another method of the Germans consists of threat
ening us with an offensive, should we not conclude peace at a given time. The real
meaning of these German attempts is an endeavor to separate us from our allies,
to get rid of us, and to dictate to us such conditions as they please.
Troops: For the sake of liberty, for the sake of liberating subjugated na
tions, for the sake of saving ourselves from subjugation, we must firmly and un
swervingly fulfill our duty toward liberated Russia and toward our allies. We,
the contemporaries, says the General, concluding his Order, we are creating
the first pages of regenerated, liberated Russia. It will depend on us what will be
written on these opening pages. Let them be bright and great, let them be written
in our blood, but let this blood remain sacred for the generations to come.

795. L enin s A rticle on T h e M eaning o f F raternisation


[Published in Pravda9 No. 43, April 28, 1917. Collected Works of V. L Lenin: The
Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 13-15. See also other articles on this subject written by
Lenin before the revolution. Ibid., The Imperialist War9 XVUE, 160-61, 197-202.]
904 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
The capitalists either poke fun at fraternisation, or wrathfully attack it with
lies and calumny, reducing it all to deception practiced by the Germans upon
the Russians; they threatenthrough their generals and officersto punish
severely all those guilty of fraternisation.
From the point of view of safeguarding the sacred property right of capital
and profits, this policy of the capitalists is quite sound: indeed, in order that the
proletarian Socialist revolution be crushed at its very inception, it is necessary to
regard fraternisation in the light in which the capitalists regard it.
The class-conscious workers and the vast masses of semi-proletarians and poor
peasants who, guided by the true instinct of oppressed classes, follow in the steps
of class-conscious workers, regard fraternisation with the deepest sympathy. It
is obvious that fraternisation is a road to peace. It is obvious that this road leads
not to the capitalist governments, not to harmony with them, but, on the con-
rary, it leads against them. It is obvious that this road develops, strengthens, con
solidates the feeling of brotherly confidence among the workers of various coun
tries. It is obvious that this road is beginning to undermine the damnable
discipline of the barrack prisons, the discipline requiring the absolute submission
of soldiers to their officers and generals, to their capitalists (for officers and
generals are for the most part either members of the capitalist class or defenders
of its interests). It is obvious that fraternisation is the revolutionary initiative of
the masses, that it is the awakening of the conscience, the mind, the courage of
the oppressed classes, that it is, in other words, one of the links in the chain
of steps leading towards the Socialist proletarian revolution.
Long live fraternisation! Long live the rising world Socialist revolution of
the proletariat!
To expedite fraternisation, to make the attainment of our goal as easy and
certain as possible, we must take care that it be well organised and based on a
clear political programme.

It is well that the soldiers curse the war. It is well that they clamour for peace.
It is well that they begin to feel that the war benefits the capitalists. It is well
that they, breaking the prison discipline, themselves begin to fraternise on all the
fronts. It is all very well.
But this is not enough.
It is necessary that fraternisation be accompanied by the discussion of a
definite political programme. We are not Anarchists. We do not think that war
can be terminated by a simple refusal to fight, a refusal of individuals, groups,
or mobs. We hold that the war should and will be brought to a finish through
a revolution in several countries, i.e., through the conquests of state power by a
new class, not the capitalists, not the small proprietors (invariably half-dependent
upon the capitalists), but proletarians and semi-proletarians.
In our proclamation to the soldiers of all the warring countries we presented
our programme for a workers5 revolution in all the countries: transfer of all
state power to the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies.
Comrades, soldiers! Discuss this programme among yourselves together with
the German soldiers! Such discussions will help you discover the true, the most
effective, and shortest way for the termination of the war and the overthrow of
the yoke of capital.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 905
Just a few words about one of the servants of capital, Plekhanov. It is pitiful
to see how low this former Socialist has fallen! He puts fraternisation next
to treason !! His argument is that fraternisation, if successful, will lead to a
separate peace.
No, Mr. Ex-Socialist, fraternisation, carried on by us on all fronts, will lead
not to a separate peace among capitalists of a few countries, but to a universal
peace among the revolutionary workers of all countries, despite the capitalists,
against the capitalists, for the overthrow of their yoke.

797. Izvestiia! A ttack on Pravda?s Call fo r F raternization


[Izvestiia, No. 55, May 2,1917, p. 2.]
Comrade soldiers at the front!
We are addressing this ardent appeal to you on behalf of the revolutionary
democracy of Russia.
A heavy burden has fallen to your lot. You paid with the high price of blood
for the crimes of the Tsar who sent you to fight and left you without arms, muni
tions, or bread. . . .
The working people did not need the war. They did not start it. It was started
by the tsars and the capitalists in all die countries. Every extra day of war
means an extra day of sorrow for the people. Having dethroned the Tsar, the
Russian people set their immediate task to be the earliest termination of the war.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies addressed an appeal to all
peoples for terminating the massacre. It addressed the French, as well as the
Germans and Austrians.
Russia is waiting for an answer to this appeal.

Our appeals will turn into blank sheets of paper if they do not have the
backing of the whole might of the revolutionary people, or if the triumph of
Wilhelm Hohenzollem asserts itself on the ruins of Russian freedom. The destruc
tion of free Russia will be an enormous, irretrievable disaster, not for us alone
but for the workers of the whole world as well. Comrade soldiers. Defend revolu
tionary Russia with all your might.
Russias workers and peasants are wholeheartedly striving for peace. But this
peace must be a universal peace, for all peoples, [and concluded] by general agree
ment. What would happen if we wanted peace, a separate peace, for ourselves
alone? What would happen if the Russian army today laid down its arms and
said that it did not want to fight any longer, that it was not concerned with what
was happening in the rest of the world?
What would happen is that, after having crushed our allies on the west,
German imperialism would descend on us with its whole force of arms. What
would happen is that the German emperor, the German landowners and capital
ists would place their heavy heels on our neck; they would seize our towns, villages,
and lands and they would lay a tribute on the Russian people.
Then is this the reason we threw off the yoke of Nicholasin order to bow at
the feet of Wilhelm?
906 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are now standing
guard over Russian freedom. It is not the Tsar, or the Protopopovs and the
Rasputins, or the rich landowners and capitalists, that you are now staunchly
defending. You are defending the Russian revolution, you are defending your
brother workers and peasants. Then let this defense be worthy of the great cause
and the great sacrifices which you have already endured. The front cannot be
defended by deciding to sit in the trenches without moving, come what may.
Sometimes it happens that an enemy advance can be repelled or prevented only
by an attack.
Sometimes waiting for an attack means waiting submissively for death. Some
times it is only by assuming the offensive that you can save yourselves and your
brothers in other sectors of the front from destruction and annihilation.
Remember this, comrade soldiers. Having pledged yourselves to defend free
dom, do not refuse to take the offensive if the tactical situation should so demand.
Russias freedom and happiness are in your hands.
In defending this freedom, beware of provocation, beware of traps. The
fraternization which is becoming widespread at the front can easily turn into such
a trap. Revolutionary troops may fraternizebut with whom? With an army that
is equally revolutionary, that is equally determined to die for peace and freedom.
But the German and Austro-Hungarian army is not such an army yet, regardless
of how many conscious and aware individuals it may contain. There is still no
revolution over there. There the army still follows Wilhelm and Karl, the land
owners and the capitalists, and it aims at seizures of foreign territories, at pillage
and violence. There the military staff will take advantage not only of your gulli
bility but also of the blind submissiveness of its own soldiers.
When you go to fraternize, you go with an open heart, but you are met by an
officer from General Headquarters who comes out of the enemy trenches, dressed
in a soldiers uniform.
While you talk sincerely to the enemy, his superiors are photographing the
locality. When you stop firing in order to fraternize, artillery is being shifted from
one place to another behind the enemy trenches, fortifications are erected and
troops are being transferred.
Comrade soldiers! It is not through fraternization that you will achieve peace,
or through the silent agreements which are concluded at the front by individual
companies, battalions, or regiments. Neither a separate peace nor a separate truce
will save the revolution, or assure the triumph of peace throughout the world.
People who are assuring you that fraternization is the road to peace are leading
both you and Russian freedom to destruction. Do not believe them.
The road to peace is different. It was indicated to you by the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies. Support it. Sweep aside everything that may
bring disintegration into the army or a fall in morale. Your fighting strength
serves the cause of peace. It is only by relying on you that you will not permit
a military devastation of Russia, that the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
can do its revolutionary work and put all its strength into expanding its fight for
peace.
Comrade soldiers! Workers and peasants of Russia and of the whole world
are looking to you with confidence and hope. Soldiers of the revolution, you
will prove worthy of this confidence knowing that your combat work serves the
cause of peace!
In the name of the happiness and freedom of revolutionary Russia, in the
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 907
name of the forthcoming brotherhood of nations, you will perform your military
duty with unflinching determination.
797. Izvestiia's A ttack on Pravda's Call for F raternization
[No. 59, May 6,1917, p. 4. See also the strong editorial in No. 55, April 30,1917, p. 3,
against the Bolshevik resolution urging fraternization.]
In defiance of the decisive appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies about stopping the fraternization on the front lines, the newspaper
Pravda is asking soldiers to continue to fraternize.
The newspaper Pravda is attempting to undermine the confidence of the
soldiery in the Soviets appeal. And for this purpose it is ascribing motives to
the Soviet which it never had when it spoke out against fraternization.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies knows perfectly well that those
who go out to fraternize are not traitors, hut are tired people, worn out with
suffering by the war. The Soviet knows that fraternization did not come about
as a result of the agitation of Leninists but [rather as a result of] war weariness
and the aspirations of the soldiers for peace.
And Pravda is missing the mark when it advances these arguments against
the Soviet in defense of fraternization.
The point is not what causes fraternization. The point is, where does it
lead to? And it leads to the collapse of the army.
Fraternization is a separate truce on individual sections of the front. With
fraternizations one integrated powerful army disintegrates into individual regi
ments and individual companies. Every military unit begins to think only of itself.
Fraternal blood is being shed in the neighboring section of the front; one verst
away from the trenches to the left and half a verst away to the right a battle is
going on, while in between, peace negotiations are being conducted.
Is this the road to universal peace?
No! We must act as a united army, as a united people! We cannot permit
workers and peasants in France and England to regard us as traitors because
separate little groups of soldiers are fraternizing with the enemy.
The newspaper Pravda proposes to arrange organized fraternization. This
proposal is an obvious contradiction. Organized fraternization can only he
possible after the conclusion of universal peace. This is exactly where the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is leading Russia. But in order to achieve
universal peace, the front must be defended with gun in hand. And the fraternizers
are ruining this defense!
Comrade soldiers!
It is a bad army in which every soldier makes up his own mind as to what
he should do, where he should go, or whether he should fraternize or not.
If you believe in your Soviet, then abide sacredly by its its appeal to stop
fraternizing !
The Soviet turned to you with this appeal for the sake of saving the army,
for the sake of saving the revolution.
Show that in this question as in all other questions that have arisen before
you, you will all unanimously, as one man, follow your Soviet!
908 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
ARMY DELEGATIONS AND CONFERENCES
798. P o litic s a n d t h e A r m y
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 77, April 8,1917, p. 3.]
Inside the army at the present time tense organizational work goes on. A
congress of military and workers delegates of the armies and of the rear of the
Western Front opened yesterday, April 7, in Moscow; the opening of the all-
Russian Army Congress is scheduled for April 15; on April 25 the Petrograd
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is calling a congress of representatives
of soldiers and workers organizations. Hurriedly, committees of separate units
are being formed, beginning at company level and ending with the largest units*
Not only have many of these committees formed, but they have united among them
selves ; they send delegations and declarations to the Provisional Government, to
the State Duma, to the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, etc., etc. In
a word, organizational work is progressing at top speed, and, along with it, the
question is being placed on the agenda concerning the role that the army can and
must play in the further development of events inside Russia, in the determination
of the destiny of her political life. This question is, of course, far from immaterial;
more than that, it cannot at all be denied a certain pointedness. After all, the
army is a power capable of enforcing its decisions, and who will deny that precisely
its action on February 27 decided the fate of the Russian revolution. This
event is so fresh in everyones memory that thoughts involuntarily turn to the
possibility of new action by the troops for the solution of questions of internal
life in the country. Some people are frightened at that prospect, others, on the
contrary, are perhaps pinning their hopes on it, but everybody weighs it with
almost the same degree of importance, which explains the strong desire for an
alliance with the army, a desire to subjugate it to ones own influence and to
secure its cooperation or, at least, friendly neutrality. . . .
If we want the army not to interfere in our internal squabbles, then we our
selves must not interfere in its internal life; we must not drag it into the political
struggle, must not strive to subjugate its organizations to our influence. Every
attempt at interference from one side inevitably clears the way for interference
from the other side. . . . As long as in some cases unauthorized or usurpatory
action is manifested, as long as we continue to appeal not to law but to the real
relation of forces, we should always keep in mind the danger that the army too
will follow this road. The whole country must be educated politically, and only
then will the army be educated with it. Only when the whole country is permeated
with respect for law will this respect permeate the army too. Only then will the
danger of the solution of internal arguments by the armed might of the troops
be completely removed.
799. K erensky s A ddress to t h e D elegation from t h e 7 t h A rmy
[Izvestiia, No. 40, April 14,1917, p. 2.]
On April 12 representatives of the 7th Army visited the Mariinskii Palace and
approached the Minister of Justice, A. F. Kerensky, with a request that he answer
a series of questions which have disturbed the army.
The state of mind of the army was conveyed in a speech by Lieutenant Stepun.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 909
The Speech of the Representative of the 7th Army
The armys principle has always been, and will continue to be, unity and soli
darity. This principle of ours is at the present moment becoming absolutely
essential to creative, constructive work in Russia. It is precisely you, Citizen
Minister, who represents to us the living embodiment of this principle. We wel
come you as the link and the solder between the Provisional Government and the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, [and] as Comrade Kerensky. We
firmly believe in this unity, but we still nourish doubts as to whether it will survive
the turmoil of the present times. It is essential that we have your answer to justify
that faith which we have brought here from the trenches.
A . F. Kerensky s Reply
The main task of the Provisional Government at the present time is to assist
in furthering the unity of the nation during the decisive moment of its existence.
Nothing now threatens to prevent the fulfillment of this task.
The Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Depu
ties are completely united in [their] aims and tasks. If there are some divergent
[views], then they concern only questions of tactics, questions of what can be
accomplished today and what can be postponed until tomorrow. But even tactical
differences such as these are being reconciled and will continue to be reconciled
by means of mutual agreement.
The Provisional Government possesses full power, but . . . we took power
into our hands at a time of the greatest internal disorganization, and we must
fulfill two tasks: in the first place, we must strengthen freedom, democratize the
country, and lead it to the Constituent Assembly, which, I have no doubt, will
express itself in favor of a democratic republic; and, in the second place, we must
not allow our front to be broken, as this would destroy the vital forces of the state
and would deprive us of freedom.
We need criticism and control in fulfilling these tasks. Therefore, do not be
disturbed and do not think that the criticism and control by sociopolitical circles
is interfering with our work. We need all the more the control and criticism of
the Soviets of Soldiers, Workers, Peasants, and Officers Deputies which repre
sent the people and the Russian democracy. . . .
You asked about the eight-hour working day. The Provisional Government
considers that the eight-hour working day must be the working norm for all
working people and for all the working class, but the problems of defense demand
the utmost exertion of strength. That is why the eight-hour working day does not
signify a decrease in productive labor, because the workers have agreed to work
overtime in order to provide the army with all that it requires.
If now we are not giving the army the full extent of everything it needs, then
this is not because we do not want to, but because we are not able to do so. The
old regime was able to give everything, but did not want to.
The old regime left everything in a disorganized state. . . . It is impossible
for the new power to create everything out of nothing immediately; we believed
that the people, on becoming masters, would themselves work with an understand
ing of state needs. We were not deceived in our faiththe people immediately
proceeded to the organization of life, and if the army is not receiving everything
[it needs], it is at least already receiving more than it was under the old regime.
910 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
As concerns the question of land, on my part, according to my views and
convictions, I adhere to the slogan land and freedom. The people must receive
land and freedom in their full measure. The Provisional Government has com
mitted itself to definite obligations in this respect. We consider it necessary to say
that the question of land, the question of new forms of land ownership must be
decided only by the Constituent Assembly. . . . In the meantime our task is to
collect and prepare all the material in order that the peoples representatives may
deliver their opinion calmly and in full knowledge of the matter. And so that no
one can predetermine the land question to the disadvantage of the people prior
to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government will
issue a law curtailing the excessive transactions in private property.
Let me assure you that the question of land will not be resolved without the
agreement of the front, that not a single arshin of land will be given over to any
one until such time as the views of the people are expressed, and especially the
views of the army, which is entitled to a preferential right and a deciding voice
on this question, for it is the army that is shedding its blood for the people, for
freedom and land.
There are few who can visualize the grandiose sweep of events which we are
experiencing; we have been accustomed to wait for many centuries without re
ceiving anything, and now we want to receive everything without waiting for a
single day. . . . That is why our immediate task should be the organization of
the masses. Only organized masses can pursue their goal as people who are
building a state and who know how to build it, and not as dreamers. Bear in mind
that the final result will depend on your self-control and composure.
You must not be disturbed by talk of a counterrevolution. There is no possi
bility of any counterrevolution, for there is no madman who would bring himself
to rise against the will of the whole army, the whole peasantry, the whole working
democracy, against the will of Russia. And even if someone should attempt to
rise, where would he find supporters? Guns would not fire, trains would not run
and the insane attempt would not leave the study and spread to the streets, and,
even if it did, at that very moment there would be nothing left of the madmen.
People who know their own value are going boldly ahead, without fear, without
insulting their own intelligence by suspicions that someone may again enslave
them.
We will achieve everything if we are able to repel the one existing danger
to repel those who may want to extend a hand from the outside and from there
help the lurking reaction, or those who may want to crush freedom after they
crush the front.
The first words that the Provisional Government spoke about the war con
cerned the renunciation of territorial aggrandizement, of predatory aims, of what
is called imperialism, but we are demandingand whoever will not hear this
demand we will force to recognize itthat we have the right to a free life, to our
own place in the world, which we will not relinquish to anyone.
Let it not be thought that free Russia signifies disintegration, that democracy
signifies corruption and anarchy. Whoever thinks that is wrong and has already
been proved wrong. Therefore, go back to the front and perform your dutya
very heavy, almost unbearable dutyand we will do everything to end this ter
rible massacre as soon as possible, but to end it in a way that will be worthy of a
free people, to end it in such a way as to make the present war the last one.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 911
If until now our enemies were able to say that they were waging a war for
freedom, because the East brought them nothing but the whip and the knout, then
now they should know that the East brings them brotherhood and peace. We must
defend our country as the hearth of democratic freedom for us, for Europe, for
the whole world.
There is not one soldier or one sailor in any state who possesses the rights that
you possess. You are completely free when you are off duty. But large rights
impose large responsibilities also. I have no doubts that you will fulfill these re
sponsibilities and your duty to the state and democracy.
I have faith in the reason of the people; the national masses are an inexhaust
ible storehouse of political wisdom and creative power.
The free people will raise the dignity of man and of his labor to unequaled
heights.
After the speech of A. F. Kerensky the representatives of the 7th Army, deeply
aroused, declared:
The faith with which we arrived was a premonition; after your speech it
turned into a firm realization, into certitude. May God help you. The army will
help you.

800. R esolution of the R egional Congress of the Caucasian A rmy


[Adopted April 29. Tiflisskii Listok, No. 96, as quoted in Nikolaevskii.]
The First Congress of the delegates of the Caucasian Army, while declaring
their readiness to support the Provisional Government which has been promoted
by the will of the revolutionary people in its measures tending to consolidate all
the gains of the revolution, stresses that this support can be rendered only as long
as the Government firmly and unflinchingly implements the program which it has
proclaimed and while its activity in the realm both of internal and of foreign
policy relies on the toiling democracy organized within the All-Russian Soviets
of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies whose supreme will is expressed
by the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.

801. S peeches of Guchkov and K erensky B efore th e F irst Congress


of D elegates from the F ront
[The speeches of Guchkov and Kerensky are from VVP, No. 44, April 30, 1917, p. 2.
The remainder of the document is from Rech9, No. 100, April 30,1917, p. 4.]

[Guchkov]
I want to greet you, gentlemen, on the occasion of the Congress of Delegates
and to wish you success in your work for the good of the army and of the father
land. . . . Tomorrow I will come to you in order to answer in detail all your
questions. Today I will speak of the general situation.
Gentlemen, if the upheaval which has created the conditions for a new life for
Russia passed painlessly, it must be explained by the fact that all levels of the
population realized that the old regime was leading us to ruin. . . .
But after the upheaval, new creative work started. It was not sufficient to sweep
912 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
away the regime; it was necessary to begin the organization of all our armed
forces, and I can say that the work was carried out by us with the exertion of all
our energies. If you only knew what a miserable and ruined military organization
we received from the old regime! And as for supply, we have in a large measure
already coped [with the situation]. Matters are better now than two months ago.
Dont forget that the improvement was achieved under difficult conditions in a
disorganized country and with a disorganized industry.
. . . But, as for fodder . . . , I must tell you that the situation is tragic.
I could prove this to you with figures, but I think that everyone who was at the
front will confirm it. (Voices from the benches: Correct. True. Applause.)
Previously the lack of shipments was explained by the disorganization of trans
port. Now we have regulated transport, and the lack of shipments is to be ex
plained by the intentional or unintentional refusal of the country to deliver to the
army what the army requires.
In this regard the voice of the people and especially your voice would be ex
tremely valuable if you would say to the country: Help us to obtain what we
need. . . .
. . . One of the basic problems which faced me and the Provisional Govern
ment was the problem of revitalizing the leadership of the Russian army. The road
should be opened to talent. I believe that among the masses there is no shortage
of talented people and that one need only help them to arise.
This was our immediate problem. I knew our command cadres and I knew
that they contained many people who were getting too oldhonest people, excel*
lent soldiersbut people who did not know the methods of modern warfare,
who were not capable of being imbued with the new relationship. . . .
Certainly I could make mistakes as any man can make mistakes, but I took
the advice of knowledgeable people and I made my decisions only when I felt that
they coincided with the general mood.
As a result, all those within the command cadres who were talented were pro
moted by us. And here also I did not take seniority into account. There are people
who started the war as regimental commanders and now command armies; there
are regimental commanders whom I have promoted directly to the command of
divisions, bypassing all the other stages. Because of this we achieved not only an
improvement in the command cadres but also another not less important [achieve
ment] . Duty to the fatherland, gentlemen, is a strong feeling, but when one has
to work under the conditions that previously prevailed, people, although fulfilling
their duty honestly, do it without enthusiasm. And the fact that we have pro
claimed die slogan Make way for talent, the fact that Everyone is the forger
of his own happiness, and that every soldier carries, as the French say, the baton
of a marshal in his knapsack have brought into the souls of everyone a feeling of
happiness, have forced people to work with enthusiasm, with inspiration. . . .
I am a strong partisan of the democratization of our army. The army is a
singular organization. If on our road we sweep away all vestige of authority, the
result will be the opposite.
Gentlemen, the most valuable quality in a man is his feeling of personal re
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 913
sponsibility. Every man should know that he is answerable for all his words and
deeds. And if we bind this man in a net of committees, then where is this respon
sibility? For if I am a commander of a division and intend to make this or that
important decision, then, if I am a faithless man who does not care for his home
land, a man who is a coward, willing to conceal himself behind the backs of others,
then for me the easiest thing would be to convene a conference of 50 people and
to compel them to take this or that decisionfor then I will not be responsible
for the results.
If we smother and extinguish this feeling of responsibility, then we will return
to the old regime when people acted irresponsibly. To smother this feeling of
personal responsibility is a very dangerous matter.
Gentlemen, I am not trying to frighten anyone. I merely spoke of what I had
suffered for three years and of what I have experienced these last two months.
Gentlemen, if the country will rise, if the army will not drop the weapons from
its hands, and if everyone will unite in a harmonious effort, not only will we lead
Russia on the path of victory, we will lead our fatherland toward its greatness.

[Kerensky]
Two months have elapsed since Russian liberty was bom. I did not come here
in order to greet you. Our greeting was sent to you in the trenches a long time ago.
Your pains and your sufferings were one of the reasons for the revolution. We
could not suffer any longer the senseless and negligent squandering of your blood
by the old regime. These two months I have considered, and I still consider now,
that the only force that can save the country and lead it on a path of light is the
consciousness of the responsibility of all of us without exception for our every
word and our every deed. And here, to you, the representatives of the front, I
must say this:
My heart and my soul are now disquieted. I am in the grip of anxiety and I
must state it frankly, whatever accusation is thrown in my face and whatever the
consequences resulting from it. The processes of the regeneration of the creative
forces of the country, the organization of the new regime, are based on liberty
and on the sense of responsibility in each and every person. Matters cannot
proceed as they are now, and it is no longer possible to try to save the country
in such a manner. The greatest part of the guilt for this lies in the old regime.
A hundred years of slavery not only corrupted the regime but also destroyed in
the people itself the consciousness of its responsibility for its own fate, for the
fate of the country. And at the present time, when Russia proceeds directly and
boldly toward the Constituent Assembly, when she stands at the head of the demo
cratic countries, when every one of us has the possibility of freely and frankly
voicing any kind of conviction, all the responsibility for the destiny of the country
falls fully and integrally on the shoulders of all and of each in particular. At the
present time there is not and there cannot be a man who could say: I speak but
I do not answer for my words.
. . . At the present moment, through the triumph of the new people, through
the creation of a democratic country in Europe, we could play a colossal role in
914 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
world history, provided we are able to compel other peoples to follow our road,
provided we can force both our friends and our foes to respect our liberty. But
to this end it is necessary that they should realize that it is impossible to fight
against the ideals of Russian democracy. We can proceed along this road only as
a national body which is organized strong, imposing respect, and united. But if
we, behaving as unworthy slaves, do not become a strong and organized state,
then there will come a gloomy, bloody period of internal strife, and our ideas will
be thrown under the heels of the political principle that might is right and not
that right is might. Every one of us, from soldier to minister, from minister to
soldier, may do everything that he wishes, but he must do it with open eyes and
place the service of the general cause above the service of private interests.
Comrades, for ten years you knew how to suffer and be silent. You knew how
to fulfill the duties imposed on you by the old, hated regime. You knew how to
fire at the people when the regime demanded it. And what happens now? Now
cant you suffer any longer? Or is it that the free Russian state is a state of re
bellious slaves? (Intense movement on all the benches.)
Comrades, I do not know how, and I am unable, to lie to the people and to
conceal truth from the people.
I came to you because my strength is at an end, because I do not feel in myself
the former boldness. I do not have the former conviction of being confronted not
by rebellious slaves but by conscious citizens who are creating a new country with
an enthusiasm worthy of the Russian people.
We are told: the front is no longer necessary . . . over there fraternization
goes on, but does the fraternization take place on both fronts? Does the fraterni
zation take place on the French front? No, comrades. If one fraternizes, then one
should fraternize on both sides. Are not the forces of the enemy already trans
ferred to the Anglo-French front, and is not the offensive of the Anglo-French
already stopped? We have no Russian front, we have only a single allied front.
(Applause.)
We are going toward peace, and I would not be within the ranks of the Pro
visional Government if the will of the people regarding the ending of the slaughter
were not the problem of the whole Provisional Government; but there are ways
and ways. There are wide-open roads, but there are also dark, dim alleys in which
one can lose both honor and life. We would like to bring nearer the end of the
fratricidal slaughter. But to this end we should follow open and clear ways. We
are not an assembly of tired people, we are a state. There are ways. They are
complex and lengthy. Tremendous self-control and calm are needed. If we offer
new war aims, then it is necessary that we should be respected by both enemies
and friends. No one respects a powerless man.
I am sorry that I did not die two months ago; then I would have died with
the greatest of dreams: that henceforth and forever a new life had dawned for
Russia, that we could without whip or club mutually respect each other and govern
our state not as the despots ruled it heretofore.
Well, comrades, this is all that I wished to tell you. Of course I may be in error.
Perhaps I have not correctly diagnosed the illness, but I think that I do not err
as much as it may seem perhaps to others. My diagnosis is the following: If the
tragedy and the desperateness of the situation are not realized now, if it is not
understood that upon all of us now lies a responsibility, if our national organism
does not function as regularly as the mechanism of a well-adjusted clock, then
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 915
everything which we dreamed, everything to which we aspired, will be thrown
back for several years and perhaps drowned in blood.
I wish to believe that we will find a way out of our situation and that we will
move forward along that same open and clear road of a democratic state which
will be forged by a consciousness of civic duty and firm will; I wish to believe
that everything which our predecessors have transmitted to us, all our secular
culture, everything that Russian genius has given us, we will be able to carry
lovingly to the end and give over to the Constituent Assembly, this one and only
master of the Russian land. But to this end it is necessary not only to believe, but
also to have the desire to act.

Beware! There is the judgment of man, there is the judgment of history. . . .


The moment has come when each, in the depths of his human conscience, must
realize where he himself is going and where he leads others, where he leads those
who through the fault of the old government, which held the people in darkness,
even now take every printed word for truth. It is possible to play with such ele
ments, but the game may become very dangerous.
I did not come here on my own, I was invited. I came here because I have
preserved for myself the right of telling the truth as I understand it. People who
under the old regime openly went to death, such people cannot be frightened.
(Tumultuous applause.)
The destinies of the country are in your hands and she is in great danger.
We have drunk liberty and we are slightly intoxicated. However, we do not need
intoxication but the greatest soberness and discipline. We must enter history so
that on our graves it will be written: They died but they were never slaves.
(Tumultuous, lengthy applause.)
Then A. F. Kerensky answered a series of written questions which had been
sent to him by members of the Congress.
[Question of /. G. Tseretelli]
I have a question. You speak of the anxiety that grips you. You say that there
are people who are unconscious of the responsibility that is theirs. I suppose
that this does not concern the organized democracy, the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies?
[Reply of Kerensky]
Comrades, for the time being I am still a member of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies. And if my words were meant for the organized and re
sponsible democracy, then, before saying them, I would have resigned. But there
have been questions asked which are the result of irresponsible agitation which
attempts to suggest to the popular masses that I do not fight sufficiently well and
boldly against the representatives of the old regime, and it may bewho knows
what is going on in my soul? . . . Doubts are expressed whether I keep a suffi
ciently strict control over the representatives of the old regime in the Peter and
Paul Fortress. If one has confidence in me, as Minister of Justice, such questions
should not be put to me. And if there is a basis for them, then please tell me.
916 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS

[Remarks of I. G. Tseretelli on Behalf of the Executive Committee of the


Soviet of Workers9 and Soldiers Deputies]
I am asked why I put the question to Comrade A. F. Kerensky and whether
this question should be understood as an expression of lack of confidence in Com
rade A. F. Kerensky. I categorically state that I have put this question knowing
beforehand how A. F. Kerensky would answer me. I did it because in the country
now there are irresponsible circles of bourgeoisie which are sowing trouble by
their conversations to the effect that between the Provisional Government and the
Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies dissension reigns and that the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies hinders the Provisional Government. When
putting my question I wished to throw his answer into the face of these partisans
of the old regime and these creators of trouble. The anxiety of which A. F.
Kerensky spoke reigns also among us. But it is not the anxiety for the future
happiness of our homeland which is close at hand, but that holy anxiety which
has its origin in the grand problems which the organized democracy has to solve.
We have one dangerthe danger of disorganization and confusion. But we be
lieve in the single will of the revolutionary democracy and look ahead calmly,
being deeply convinced that we are proceeding toward a better and brighter
future. . . .
The second question is our attitude toward the Provisional Government. We
are perfectly aware of the necessity for Russia to have a strong government. But
the force of this government should consist in its revolutionary progressive move
ment forward. The Russian government must make the revolutionary slogans of
democracy its own. It must fulfill the demands of the revolutionary people. It
must lead Russia toward an early, lasting peace worthy of a great people. Our
Provisional Government stands on this road. The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies, and together with them the whole of the responsible organized democ
racy, gives its support with all the will and authority which characterize it. Our
control is the foundation we are laying under the Provisional Government, giving
it thereby strength and solidity. . . .

802. A larming S peeches


[Article in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 97, May 2, 1917, p. S.]
In the great and menacing days through which Russia is living now, the
speeches of two members of the Provisional Government rang out like the sum
moning peals of an alarm bell. These men are War Minister A. I. Guchkov and
Minister of Justice A. F. Kerensky.
Two men, so different in everythingin temperament, in ideals, in their entire
livesboth said one and the same thing: The fatherland is on the brink of
catastrophe! . . .
Different premises and impressions produced the same conclusion. The War
Minister was speaking about the critical situation in supplying the army and in
transport, about the destruction of the fighting might of the army. The first Min
ister of Justice in the peoples government, after the experiences of the last two
months, posed a frightful question: whether the Russian free state is perhaps a
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 917
state of rebellious slaves, and not of conscious citizens who are building a new
Russia. . . .
. . . [His] words reveal the terrible personal tragedy of a man who had com
plete faith in the force and majesty of freedom, who is completely devoted to the
interests of the people. All of us know very well what it was that Kerensky did
during the revolutionary days, when he, even before the decision of the State
Duma, without the slightest hesitation, with a heart full of faith and enthusiasm,
took the side of the revolution. All of us remember very well the role he played
in those first days when he, risking his own life, was saving the lives of the men
of the former government. Not a single drop of blood must be shed in the State
Duma.55
But if the events of these months are such that it is easier to give ones life
in order to spare Russias living through them, then there is no longer any per
sonal tragedy here. It became fused with the tragic situation of Russia and dis
solved in it. . . .

One thing is clear: the danger is great, no one can estimate its extent. Perhaps
it is seen clearest of all by the men before whom, in their capacity as members of
the Provisional Government, is unfolding the entire threatening picture of the life
of the people and of the army.
And for us, the Russian citizens, there remains only one thing: to heed the
threatening peals of the alarm bell while the last measure has as yet not, perhaps,
overflowed.

803. W ords T h a t A re N eed ed


[ Volia Naroda, No. 2, April 30,1917, p. 2.]
A. F. Kerensky5s speech, delivered at the meeting of the delegates from the
front, and printed below, deserves the attention of our readers.

The socialist Minister had the courage to tell the people the whole truth and
to tell it in the way that very, very few could do.
Read these words. What truth they contain! What strength! What frankness!
What courage!

Few can speak such words, but all to whom the interests of the revolution are
dear, all of them will subscribe to them . . .
These are portentous, truly historic words. Russia will understand them and
the country will appreciate them. Let the demagogue surround them with bustling
noise. Theirs will hardly be a rich harvest. The country in whose midst there
are persons who can speak thus to the people may be proud of itself and its Min
ister. And as long as there are such people the country is not lost, no matter how
menacing the clouds that envelop it.
918 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
804. T h e R u ssian R e v o lu tio n and t h e L ast S p e e c h o f K eren sk y
[Article by N, S. Rusanov in Delo Naroday No. 38, May 2,1917, p. 1.]
. . . At the meeting of the Congress on April 29, Kerenskys speech was per
meated with such profound pessimism that his sincere friends who shared his ideas
could only be astounded and saddened by this radical change in the mood of the
socialist Minister of Justice. And they cannot pass in silence these words which
fell like a rain of lead upon the souls of those who up to this time have marched
in the same ranks with Kerensky.
We can understand, we can explain as temporary weariness that cry of an
overworked man which was emitted at one point in Kerenskys speech: I am
sorry that I did not die two months ago; then I would have died with the greatest
of dreams: that henceforth and forever a new life had dawned for Russia, that we
could without whip or club mutually respect each other and govern our state not
as the despots ruled it heretofore. But still one asks himself: Does this pathetic
call upon death express the true state of affairs? . . .
And again: Is it possible that the free Russian state is a state of rebellious
slaves ?
What then has occurred during that time to account for the pathos of despair
in Kerenskys address to the delegates from the front? What has happened is that
the Provisional Government was unable to withstand with sufficient firmness the
personal aggressive policy of Miliukov; that having confronted the toiling de
mocracy with the accomplished fact of the dispatch of the note of April 18, it
itself caused the rift in relations between the executive power and the representa
tive organ of the masses which was so painfully felt by all in the days of April
20 21.21
-

Again in another place in his speech, speaking of the approach to peace,


Kerensky points with great absurdity and vagueness to two roads to the desired
goal: There are wide-open roads, but there are also dark, dim alleys in which
one can lose both honor and life. We should like to know what these dark, dim
alleys are where one loses so much.
At any rate, the toiling democracy of Russia did not march through such
alleys. On the contrary, it chose the wide-open road of appeal to the toiling
democracy of the entire world, a road directed to the Provisional Government
with the request to notify the allied countries of the definite peace-loving program
of revolutionary Russiathe Russia of thought and labor.
The dark, dim alleys were used by Miliukovs policy . . .
805. Com m ent o f Izvestiia on K erenskys A ppointm ent as
M in ister o f W ar
[No. 58, May 5,1917, p. 2.]
During the war the composition of the army has undergone a change. Not
only the soldiers but the officers as well have changed. The present officer corps
21 See Volume HI on the April Crisis.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 919
is different from what it used to be. Many students, volunteers, and persons with
a higher education have joined the officers ranks.
The revolution also laid the foundation for reorganizing the high command.
Those to whom doors were closed under the old regime now occupy responsible
posts. Those who were so well off under the old regime that they did not want to
recognize the revolution were forced to depart from the scene.
Under Minister of War Guchkov, new changes in the officer corps were not
always and everywhere brought about with sufficient speed. As a result of this,
soldiers did not have a firm understanding as to how they should look upon offi
cers. Now the situation must change. From now on, the Ministry of War will be
headed by a minister who is a revolutionary to whom the army can blindly and
without reservations entrust its fate. And should the army have any doubts
on this score, the army knows that the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
stands behind the socialist ministers.
From now on, the people who remain in officers posts will be those in whom
the country and the army can believe. From now on, the soldier will know that
the officer is his comrade and a brother-in-arms.
The army must become deeply conscious of the fact that there is no place for
mutual distrust, suspicion, or hostility in its ranks. Soldiers and officers must
learn how to trust one another. Only then does the possibility arise for restoring
discipline in the armynot the old, slavish discipline, but a conscious discipline.
And the birth of such a discipline is the only path to a regeneration of the army,
to a restoration of its undermined fighting strength.
We firmly believe that in a short time our army will be able to overcome the
discords which have been corroding it.
The new Minister of War will purge the officer corps of its unworthy elements.
And then the soldier and officer will extend their hands to each other as brothers
of one family, and nothing will interfere with them in their friendly work in
common.

806. R esolution of t h e C onference of D elegates from t h e F ront


[VVP, No. 48, May 5,1917, p. S.]
To the comrade soldiers of the rear:
Comrades: Reinforce our thinning ranks in the trenches and stand with us
shoulder to shoulder in the defense of the homeland.
Comrade workers: By your harmonious and steady work, support us in our
last struggle for the general peace of [all] nations. By strengthening the front,
you will strengthen liberty.
Citizen capitalists: Be the Minins22 of your homeland. Open your treasuries
and give your money for the needs of liberated Russia.
To the peasants:
Fathers and brothers: Give your last crumbs for the support of the weakening
front. Give us bread and give oats and hay to our horses. Remember that future
Russia is yours.
22 Cosmo Minin, national hero during the Time of Troubles.
920 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Comrade intellectuals: Come to us and bring the light of knowledge into the
gloom of our trenches. Share with us the hard task of consolidating liberty, and
educate us, the citizens of new Russia.
To the Russian women: Sustain your husbands and sons in the fulfillment of
their civic duty before the homeland. Replace them where it is within your power.
Treat with contempt those who evade serving the homeland in this difficult period.
807. A n A ddress of t h e 8 t h A rm y to t h e P rovisional G overnment
[VVP, No. 49, May 6, 1917, p. 4. With reference to point 5, after his appointment as
Minister of War, Kerensky made the commissars sent to the army by the Soviet (Doc.
759) responsible to the Provisional Government; Doc. 873.]
The delegation of the 8th Army addressed itself to the Provisional Govern
ment with the following declaration:
1) Proceeding from the democratic principle that every genuine government
should be responsible before the people, we express the conviction that in order
to safeguard the unity of power until the All-Russian Constituent Assembly is
convened, the activities of the Provisional Government should be carried on in a
close, organic contact with the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies as the
only real force and a true reflection of the worker and of the peasant, these basic
elements of the Russian democracy.
2) While welcoming the honest abandonment by the Provisional Government
of any aggressive aims and while wholly adhering to the proclamation of the
Soviet of Workers5and Soldiers5Deputies to all the peoples of the world as to the
bold voice of genuine humanism and of noble selflessness, while welcoming it as
a bright dawn of the liberation of the whole of humanity from the bloody residues
of the gloomy past, we, on behalf of the 8th Army, are proud and happy to promise
the uncomplaining sacrifice of our lives for the liberty and happiness of New
Russia until the enemy will definitely abandon his aggressive aspirations.
3) Considering that the obsolete idea of monarchism was buried by the shame
ful actions of its servants and defenders, we can acknowledge for our future form
of government only a democratic republic as responding to the just interests of
the popular masses.
4) While expressing to the Provisional Government our warm gratitude for
lie rapid and resolutely accomplished liberation of the army from the shameful
legacy of tsarism, we do not doubt that in the near future new genuinely civic
relations between officers and men will forge the army into a single, integral,
mighty and healthy family of firm defenders of our dear fatherland.
5) For the purpose of establishing a close contact between the active army
and Petrograd, and in order to prevent arbitrary and unlawful actions of isolated
representatives of the high command, it is necessary to create at the front with the
army and corps staffs a special commissariat from representatives of the Provi
sional Government and of the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies.
CHAPTER 17
The Offensive and the German Counteroffensive

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THE PREPARATION


FOR AN OFFENSIVE
808. T h e D isposition of R ussian and E nem y F orces
at th e B eginning of M arch
[Letter of N. B. Bazili, representative of the Foreign Ministry at Stavka, to P. N.
Miliukov, March 12, 1917. M. Pokrovsky, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del,
KA9 XXX (1928), 20-21. General A. I. Denikin gives a concise description of the
strategical position of the Russian army at this time in his The Russian Turmoil,
Chap. XIV.]
Secret
D ear P avel N ikolaevich ,
I have the honor to bring to your attention as briefly as possible the informa
tion in the possession of the Staff of the Supreme Commander which can throw
light on the intentions of the enemy at the present moment.
The enemy forces are now distributed in the following manner: On the West
ern Front there are 140 German divisions. On our front, including the Rumanian
front, there are about 75 divisions.1 Adding to the latter 43 Austrian, 6 Turkish,
and 5 Bulgarian divisions, the total number of enemy forces on our front amounts
to 127 divisions. On the Salonika front there are 15 Bulgarian, 2 German, 2 Aus
trian, and 2 or 3 Turkish divisions. Taking into account that the Bulgarian divi
sions are approximately one and a half times stronger than other divisions, the
enemy forces on the Salonika front are not weaker than General Sarrails army,
which now totals up to 25 divisions. On the Italian front from 32 to 35 Austrian
divisions are stationed.
Besides the units enumerated, there have lately been formed within Germany
about 23 new divisions, of which 13 are first-rate and about 10 are second-rate.
All these new forces have hardly been used at the front and, for the time being,
are concentrated within Germany, with the exception of the aforementiond 10
second-rate divisions, which are stationed near the Dutch frontier.
The movement of enemy forces since the time when the enemy offensive on
the Rumanian front ceased., i.e., since the middle of last January, is outlined as
follows: The enemy forces on this front have been weakened by the transfer of
some German units on the Western Front and of some Bulgarian units on the
Salonika front. Because of that, the total number of enemy troops on our front,
which amounted on last January 1 to 133 divisions, was reduced, as indicated
1 General Buat in his UArmee Allemande pendant la guerre de 1914r-1918 gives the follow
ing figures for the number of German divisions on the Russian front in 1917: January, 71;
February, 68; March, 72; April, 72; May, 75; June, 78; July, 85; August, 86; September, 82;
October, 81; November, 74; December, 61.
922 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
above, to 127 divisions. On the Western Front a concentration of enemy troops
was lately observed in the region of Alsace and at the rear of the front in Belgium.
On other sectors of our front, enemy troops removed from the Rumanian front
were not observed.
N. B azili
809. L e t t e r o f G e n e r a l A le k s e e v t o G u ch k ov on O r g a n iza tio n a l
and O th e r D if f ic u lt ie s in t h e A rm y
\Razlozhenie armii, pp. 28-30. During the latter part of 1916 and the beginning of
1917, Alekseev was on leave of absence in the Crimea for reasons of health. In his
absence, while General Gurko was Acting Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander,
the organizational reform referred to was undertaken. It consisted of reducing the
number of battalions in each regiment from four to three, with a proportional reduction
in artillery per division, and the creation therefrom of an additional, third division with
artillery in each army corps. The plan no doubt had merit in terms of greater mobility
and flexibility of forces, but in wartime and under the prevailing conditions its accom
plishment was extremely difficult and led to the problems described below as well as
to others that weakened and disrupted the army. Commanders, not surprisingly, tended
to select the worst elements in their units to be sent to the new divisions. Thus, both the
equipment and the morale of the third divisions proved to be inferior. Youri Danilov,
La Russie dans la guerre mondiale, 1914-1917, pp. 518-19; General A. I. Denikin, The
Russian Turmoil9 p. 128. The weakness of the new divisions was so evident that, in
May, Stavka authorized the disbandment of some of them and the distribution of the
personnel to other units. But the opposition of the troops in many cases discouraged
the implementation of the order. An instance, when the disbandment was carried out
in the face of a virtual mutiny, is described in a dispatch from General Shcherbachev
of May 27 in Razlozhenie armii, pp. 39-41.]
Restricted, to he delivered in person
D ear A leksandr I vanovich ,
I have taken due note of your letter No. 33 of March 9. In my turn, I must
inform you that the material condition of the active armies is deteriorating be
cause of the vast organizational reform begun last January regardless of my views,
which I made known from Sebastopol. [This reform has for its purpose] the
reduction of all infantry regiments to three battalions and the formation of 60
new infantry divisions at the expense of those now in existence. The suspension
in the flow of replacements and horses has resulted in the majority of both the old
and the new divisions meeting the most important spring period understaffed and
with their transport disorganized. It seems superfluous to mention that all these
new infantry formations which have no artillery cause a gradual decrease in the
number of artillery pieces per 1,000 soldiers, while the enemys [ratio] is con
stantly on the increase. It will hardly be possible to bring the number of machine
guns, especially in the new divisions, to eight per regiment, and this without the
necessary means for their transportation; now, apparently, rifles also will not
reach us in the quantities fixed, and, as a consequence, part of the men, especially
on the Rumanian front, will remain unarmed; moreover, we shall have no rifles
at all in reserve for the advent of inevitable losses in combat, and it is possible
that we will return to the painful and desperate situation of 1915.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 923

It is too late to speak now of operational plans worked out by me and our
allies, for the decisions were made at the conference in Chantilly on November
2 and 3, 1916, and at the conference in Petrograd in February 1917. At those
conferences we accepted certain obligations, but now the situation is such that we
must either postpone the fulfillment of our obligations or completely abandon
them with a minimum loss of our dignity in the face of our allies.
Our obligations are the following: The Russian armies have engaged them
selves to attack the enemy resolutely not later than three weeks following the be
ginning of the Allies5 offensive. We have already given notice that, owing to
organizational work and to the disruption of transportation and of supplies, we
will be unable to begin our active operations before the first days of May.
The data contained in your letter show that we will be unable to fulfill even
this modified obligation. It is unthinkable to start any kind of large-scale oper
ation without filling the complement [of our units]. Using various plausible pre
texts, it becomes necessary to explain to the Allies that they cannot count upon us
before July.
I will do it, but I cannot take upon myself the responsibility for the conse
quences that may arise from shirking our obligations. We depend so much on
our allies, both with regard to materials and financing, that a refusal of the Allies
to assist us would place us in a still more difficult situation than the present one.
I believe that the Provisional Government should take care of an agreement cover
ing this contingency.
Thus, circumstances force us to conclude that for the next four months our
armies must sit quietly, without undertaking any decisive, large-scale operation.
However, in war one is forced to take into account not only one5s own desires,
but also the wishes of the enemy. If the enemy were to attack us, we would have
to put up a stubborn and lengthy fight, in order to prevent him from gaining
advantages which would have fatal consequences for the army itself9 as well as
for Russia.

Certain measures should be taken immediately. If the morale of the reserve


units has disintegrated, then, for the present, it will be necessary to select the
better elements within them and send them to the army in order to form special
battalions to be attached to the regiments. . . .
Moreover, resolute measures should be taken to return to service the numerous
men who have willfully abandoned their battalions, have returned home, or have
turned to peaceful55 activities in the cities. It would be especially desirable to
find the recruits of the last draft, for they represent the best combat elements,
which could still be salvaged from disintegration; they could be trained to become
reliable replacements and in part sent to the fronts. To make it short, it is essen
tial to secure for the army replacements for at least some hundred thousand men;
otherwise, our cadres will be destroyed.
An especially acute need is felt in food supplies for the army. The question
of food acquires a special significance in days of moral unrest. A soldier who is
well fed feels that he is being taken care of by his superiors and is more inclined
to obey the voice of reason, which calls him to order, to obedience, to maintaining
924 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
the moral strength of his company and of his regiment. At the moment we are in
a constant state of food crisis and live from day to day.
Yours truly,
M ik h . A lekseev
12/111, 1917. No. 2188. Stavka.
810. M emorandum of General L ukom skii on t h e F ighting Capacity
of t h e A rmy
[Razlozhenie armii, pp. 10-11. Lukomskii, at that time Director of Military Operations,
drew up the memorandum following a conference at Stavka. At the same time, the
commanders of armies of the Western Front reached similar conclusions, with greater
emphasis upon the morale factor as a deterrent to an advance. There appears to have
been some difference of opinion, however, concerning the battle-readiness of the troops,
with certain commanders quite optimistic. The consensus of the Western Front com
manders was that their forces would not be ready for an offensive for one or two
months. Ibid., p. 27. On the other hand, note the confidence shown by the commanders
on the Southwestern Front in the next document. See Golovine, The Russian Army in
the World War, pp. 262-64, for a discussion of such contradictions in the attitudes
and reports of various military leaders.]
A. The reports of the representatives of the main branches of the service have
been compiled.
1) Commissary services: the food reserves of the country are not sufficient
to supply all the army needs.
Not only can we not build up food reserves at the front, but we will not receive
enough for daily needs.
It is necessary for the army either to cut down the number of men and horses
or to reduce rations.
The latter is dangerous, therefore the number of men should be reduced.
2) Army services: owing to the lack of coal [and] metals, the disruption of
transport, and the events we are living through, the output of shells (large caliber),
cartridges, rifles, and artillery pieces will be considerably reduced.
The formation of artillery units will be considerably delayed.
3) During the next months it will be impossible to bring replacements of
personnel to the front in sufficient numbers, owing to the unrest existing in all
the reserve units.
4) Replacements of horses will be delayed, because all the requisitions of
horses have been postponed owing to the conditions of internal transport and the
needs of agriculture.
B. Railway transport is seriously disrupted, and even if supplies were available
we would be unable to bring to the front simultaneously both the supplies in
tended for daily consumption and those intended for the building up of reserves;
without the latter (were they only to cover the needs for two weeks) no kind of
operations can be undertaken.
Furthermore, the conditions of the railroads do not permit the simultaneous
conveyance of large units for operational purposes and the delivery to the front
of the necessary supplies.
C. The Baltic Fleet has lost its fighting capacity and there is no hope of bring
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 925
ing it to order in the near future. The delivery of mines (for mine fields) is quite
inadequate, and in the spring of 1917 the mine defense in the Baltic Sea will not
be in a proper state.
D. The state of the army. The army is undergoing [a period of] sickness. It
will take probably two or three months to readjust the relations between officers
and men.
At the present time one observes low spirits among the officer personnel, un
rest among the troops, and a great number of desertions.
The fighting capacity of the army is lowered and at the present time it is
difficult to anticipate an improvement. Thus:
1) It is now impossible to carry out the offensive operations which had been
planned for the spring.
2) Relying no longer on the Baltic Fleet, it will be necessary to strengthen
the defenses of Finland and the approaches to Petrograd, which will require the
strengthening of the Northern Front.
8) Until order is re-established in the rear and the necessary stocks are built
up, it is necessary to pass to the defensive on all fronts.
4) It is essential to take radical steps in order to reduce the number of food
consumers at the front. For this purpose it is necessary to remove from the
fronts all the non-Russians and the prisoners of war and to cut drastically the
number of men and horses in all the establishments of the rear.
5) The Government should quite definitely and clearly advise our allies of all
this, pointing out that now we are not in a position to carry out the engagement
entered into at the conferences of Chantilly and Petrograd.
6) It is necessary immediately to stop shipping wheat to the Allies, for we need
it ourselves.
L ieutenant G eneral L uko m skii
March 18,1917

811. T elegram from General B rusilov to t h e M inister of W ar


on th e F easibility of an O ffensive
[Razlozhenie armii, p. 30.]
V. urgent, v. restricted
2116.2216.2203. Today at a military council of all the commanders on my
fronts [held] under my presidency, it was unanimously decided: 1) The armies
wish to and can attack. 2) The offensive is quite feasible. It is our obligation to
ward the Allies, toward Russia, and toward the whole world. 3) This offensive
will deliver us from the countless consequences that might result from Russia
shirking her obligations; at the same time, it will deprive the enemy of its free
dom of action on other fronts. 4) Certain deficiencies will merely compel us to
contract somewhat the scope of the offensive. 5) First of all, it is necessary to
organize the food situation and regular transportation; this is within the means
of Russia, and should be done. 6) We urge no steps be undertaken before the
Allies in the sense of refusing to fulfill our obligations. 7) The army has its own
opinion, and the opinion of Petrograd as to its state and morale cannot solve the
926 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
question; the opinion of the army is obligatory for Russia; its real force is here,
in the theater of war, and not in the rear.
B rusilov , B alanin , S hcherbachev , K aledin , B alnev

Endorsement:
From the Quartermaster-General:
What luck it would be, if reality were to justify these hopes.
18/111 1917. No. 1061

812. C opy of a M em orandum from General J anin , C h ie f of t h e F rench


M ilitary M ission , to G eneral A lekseev T ransmitting N ivelle s
R equest for t h e O pening of th e O ffensive
[M. Pokrovsky, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 28-29.]
Stavka, March 8, 1917
The Chief of the Mission, General Janin, has the honor to greet His Excellency
General Alekseev, Chief of Staff of the Russian Army, and to transmit to him the
following telegram which has just been received by him from General Nivelle,
Commander in Chief of the [French] Northern and Northeastern Armies.
I request you to communicate to General Alekseev the following: in accord
ance with the agreement with the English High Command, I have set for April
8 (according to the new style) the beginning of the joint offensive on the Western
Front. This date cannot be postponed.
The enemy has begun to withdraw on a part of the front of the English of
fensive and is actively preparing for a further development of his withdrawal on
a part of the front of our offensive, showing by this his intention to avoid com
bat through a maneuver that would allow him to gather new and considerable
forces.
Therefore it is essential that we start our offensive as soon as possible, not
only to clarify the situation, but also because to postpone our offensive would
mean to play into the hands of the enemy and to bear the risk of his outstripping us.
On the 15th and 16th of November 1916 [N.S.] at the Chantilly Conference
it was decided that the Allied armies would endeavor in 1917 to break the enemy
forces by means of a simultaneous offensive on all fronts, with the use of all
means which each army could put into action.
For the offensive on the Western Front I will use all the forces of the
French Army, because I will try to obtain decisive results, the achievement of
which cannot be postponed in the present period of the war.
Therefore I ask you also to start the offensive of the Russian troops around
the first or middle days of April (according to the new style). It is absolutely
necessary that your and our operations should start simultaneously (within a
period of a few days), otherwise the enemy will preserve for himself the freedom
to dispose of his reserves, which are sufficiently important to enable him to stop
our offensives at the very outset, one after another.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 927
I must add that the situation was never as favorable for (the Russian)
troops because nearly all the German forces available are on our front and their
number is growing here every day.
T h e C omm ander in Ch ie f
In a telegram received since this one, General Nivelle draws my attention to
the fact that the aforementioned request is entirely in accordance with the agree
ment reached by the Allies on the fourth question discussed at the last conference
in Petrograd and requests me on the basis of this agreement to urge Your Excel
lency to satisfy the latter completely.
J anin

813. E laboration of G eneral A lekseev on t h e I nability o f t h e


R ussian A rm y to L aunch an O ffensive B efore J une or J uly
[M. Pokrovsky, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 29-30.
Two weeks later, in a memorandum to General Janin, General Lukomskii emphasized
also the impossibility of beginning operations until after the spring thaw, which prom'
ised to cause exceptionally difficult conditions that year. Ibid., pp. 34-35.]
In addition to my letter of March 9, No. 2095, and while paying my respects
to the Chief of the French Military Mission in Russia, I deem it my moral duty
to express frankly my opinion so as to avoid the painful consequences which could
result from omissions.
1) A letter just received from the Minister of War2 shows that the internal
political upheaval which goes on in Russia has substantially affected the morale
of our reserve units (depots) in all the internal districts. The morale of these
units is disrupted and they cannot furnish the active army with replacements for
three or four months, that is, before June or July.
2) The same basic situation also affects the entire army in the replacement of
horses.
3) All this compels us to look events straight in the eye and to state frankly
that we cannot start an offensive even in the beginning of May (old style) and
that our extensive participation in the operations can be counted upon only in
June or July.
4) This situation gives our enemy the possibility of either assembling all
his reserves on the Anglo-French front or of rushing upon us with considerable
forces in order to take advantage of this period of our temporary weakness.
5) I think that this circumstance should bring about certain alterations in
the considerations regarding the operations of the near future and should in
fluence the decisions of the French High Command. [In this connection], the
communication of General Nivelle of March 3 (16), with regard to the fact that
for the offensive on the Western Front he will put into action all die forces of the
French Army and will endeavor to obtain decisive results merits special attention.
In my opinion the forced and unavoidable inactivity of the Russian Army during
the next months, which is necessary for the purpose of preserving it for the future,
obliges the French Army not to exhaust itself until the decisive moment and to
2 See Alekseevs answer, Doc. 809.
928 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
maintain its reserves until the moment when by joint efforts we will be capable
of attacking the enemy on all fronts.
6) Under the conditions of our forced relative inactivity, I think that it
would be more expedient for the Anglo-French army to continue only slow, cau
tious movements, following the withdrawing enemy and occupying new and strong
defensive lines.
7) It is my opinion that these considerations make inadvisable a general de
cisive attack by the Anglo-French against the enemy who undoubtedly withdraws
to strongly fortified lines and who perhaps has the intention of carrying out wide-
open field maneuvers where the free maneuvering of the reserves could present
to one or the other side some fortunate opportunities. But in this operation the
enemy, relying on fortified positions prepared [in advance], would enjoy in
dubitable advantages.
G eneral A lekseev
Correct: T ikhobrazov , Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff.
March 13, 1917

814. G enerax N ivelle s R eplies to A lekseev s M essages


[M. Pokrovsky, Stavka i ministerstvo inostraimykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 30-31,
33-34. General Palitsyn was the Russian military representative at the French High
Command.]
The reply of the French Commander in Chief is as follows:
A
At the present time it is impossible to bring about any alterations in the
operations and the preparations for the offensive which are being carried out now.
Therefore in accordance with the decisions of the Chantilly Conference of Novem
ber 3,1916 (old style), and in accordance with the obligations which were taken
on later, I request the Russian army to render the greatest possible assistance in
the operations which have already been begun by the Anglo-French armies and
also in the operations which they will presently undertake at other points. I would
take the liberty of adding, on the basis of the arguments which I have already
submitted in this respect to General Alekseev through General Janin that, in the
interest of the operation of the coalition and particularly taking into account
the general morale of the Russian army at the present time, the best solution
would be for this army to start its offensive operations as soon as possible.
March 15,1917
B
General Nivelle requests me to transmit to you: he takes into account and
understands the extraordinary difficulties of our situation. Serious operations will
take place here in May also, provided individual attacks and preparations behind
the front retain German forces and correspond to the common interests and to
the course of the operations. . . .
The Franco-English High Command, represented in the person of Nivelle,
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 929
cannot delay the beginning of its operations because they are already in progress.
Not only he but the whole army and the English are convinced that a day of delay
is a minus for them and a plus for the enemy. To this should be added the general
fighting spirit which has been provoked by the vandalism of the Germans. Believ
ing in your efforts to carry out the operations in complete agreement and in the
fact that everything within human power has been done by you, he does not count
on an immediate decisive action on our part owing to what has been stated here
above. On this front, the beginning of the operations does not represent the mani
festation of one single will but has become unavoidable because of the existing
military and political situation. The blows that are now being delivered by the
Anglo-French armies will guarantee the participation of the Russian army in the
operations also. . . . No. 101.
P a l it sy n
March 18,1917
815. T h e D efeat on th e S tokhod
[Who is Responsible for the Defeat on the Stokhod, Rabochcda Gazeta, No. 32,
April 15, 1917, p. 2. Taking advantage of the spring thaw, which isolated the Russian
beachhead on the western bank of the Stokhod River, the Germans interrupted their
inactivity on the front, maintained since the revolution to encourage Russian disinte
gration and agitation for a separate peace, and launched a successful local attack,
seizing the bridgehead and taking some 10,000 prisoners. The result was to disabuse
the Russian troops of Germanys proclaimed good will and to restore a considerable
measure of fighting spirit. Recognizing the implications of the events, the German
government ordered the High Command to minimize the success of the operation and
undertake no further action. General Ludendorff, My War Memories, pp. 431-33;
General von Hoffmann, The War of Lost Opportunities, pp. 471-76. See also General
A. I. Denikin, The Russian Turmoil, pp. 132-33.]
We have received from Minsk the following telegram from Comrade Pozem,
Chairman of the Western Front Congress:
. . Some people in Moscow have been publicly blaming the Soviet of Work
ers and Soldiers Deputies for the defeat on the Stokhod. The sentiment has been
frequently voiced in some of the newspapers. We, the undersigned, having been
in the immediate proximity of the field of battlemoreover, some of us having
actively participated in the battlehereby testify that such an accusation is a
malicious calumny upon the combatants as well as upon the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies. All the military ranks comprising the corps that occupied
the base on the left bank of the Stokhod, from privates to commanding officers of
regiments and chiefs of divisions inclusive, recognized that it was impossible to
remain at the base until spring. It was necessary either to advance and widen the
base or to retreat to the right bank of the Stokhod and surrender without losses
what would cost many casualties in the spring with the overflow of the Stokhod.
However, the high command ignored the pressing request of the subordinates,
and the corps remained in its original position. The tragedy followed as everyone
had foreseen. The overflow of the Stokhod reduced communication with the left
bank to but a few ferryings, but even this was curtailed by the curtain-fire of the
enemy. The defenders of the left bank of the Stokhod were completely cut off and,
930 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
in spite of their heroic and stubborn resistance, were annihilated by the overwhelm
ing forces of the enemy.
On numerous occasions some of us saw regiments counterattack, only to be
swept away by the advancing columns of the enemy. According to the reports of
some of the wounded who reached the right bank of the Stokhod, all of the officers
as well as soldiers of the units defending die heart of the hill paid for their stubborn
resistance by being bayoneted by the enemy.
Thus the horrible 24-hour stubborn battle of March 21 at the Stokhod con
firmed that the fighting discipline in the units has not been shaken. Both the sol
diers and officers fulfilled sacredly their oath to defend the free fatherland.
Generals Lesh and Yanushevskii, who bear the guilt for this tragedy, have
been removed from their posts and an investigation into their guilt is under way.
The above document is signed by 25 officers and soldiers, delegates of the Con
gress. The inspector of the front artillery declared at headquarters that no one
accuses the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies of undermining the disci
pline and causing the defeat at the Stokhod.
P ozern , Chairman of the Congress

816. A lekseev T entatively S ets t h e O ffensive for t h e


B eginning of Ma y
[Letter to Miliukov from the representative of the Foreign Ministry at Stavka. M.
Pokrovsky, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 36-37. The
considerations involved in determining the advisability and the timing of an offensive
in discussions at Stavka are outlined by General Denikin, Assistant Chief of Staff during
April and May, in his The Russian Turmoil, Chap. XV.]
Very secret.
Stavka. April 8,1917
D ear P avel N ikolaevich ,
As I had the honor to report to you, General Alexseev is again inclined to think
that offensive operations are necessary. On March 30 he gave directives in this
sense, and, for the time being, the first days of our May have been set for the offen
sive. At the same time, the Commanders in Chief have been warned that they may
rely only on the forces that are now at their disposal.
In particular, on the Rumanian front Brailov has been chosen to direct the
blow. The Black Sea Fleet has been instructed in advance to support the ground
forces on the lower Danube and in Dubrudja.
N . B. B r a z iu

817. T h e F ormation of V olunteer S hock B attalions


[Telegram to the Minister and the Assistant Minister of War. Razlozhenie armii, p. 64.
The proposal was supported by the Western Front Congress. Ibid., pp. 64-65.]
Secret, urgent
The Minister of War during his stay in Kamenets agreed that General Brusilov
should take the necessary steps to form on the Southwestern Front shock battalions
composed of volunteers. The Commander in Chief [of the Southwestern Front]
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 931
requests that instructions he given permitting a delegation of the Black Sea Fleet
headed by Ensign Batkin to visit all the reserve regiments of the Petrograd Gar
rison and of the immediate outskirts, and later on those of the Msocow Garrison;
they should be permitted after a fervent appeal to summon those who wish to join
these battalions. The volunteers should be withdrawn [from their units] as quickly
as possible, formed into battalions and sent in echelons at the disposal of General
Brusilov as soon as possible. The delegation leaves for Petrograd on May 18 or 19.
It is desirable to start the action before the return of the Minister of War, for each
day is precious.
D enikin
April 18,1917 No. 3743

818. G eneral A lekseev s O bjections to the F ormation


of S hock B attalions
[Telegram to General Brusilov. Razlozkenie armii, p. 65.]
262068 and 262069. I definitely do not share your hopes regarding the bene
fits of the projected measure as far as a bold, self-denying, valorous, and skillful
fight against the enemy is concerned. I give my authorization only because of your
support of it. The military schools are not subordinated to me, and I cannot au
thorize recruitment which necessitates agreement and orders from the Minister of
War, to whom I am wiring; however, I consider that we have no right to use our
future officers, whose replacement becomes more and more difficult, as rank-and-
file forces. Recruitment from the personnel of the Black Sea Fleet would paralyze
the navy, as the ships crews are [already] understaffed. I cannot permit the de
struction of our naval forces; however I am asking Admiral Kolchak to indicate
the number he could spare, although I foresee that his reply will be in keeping with
mine, for I am aware of the number of the fleets personnel. . . . I am requesting
the Minister of War to authorize wide propaganda and a call for volunteers for
shock battalions from among the reserve battalions and regiments of Petrograd
and the immediate outskirts, and also from those of Moscow, in order that the
battalions thus formed can be sent in all haste for your disposal for indoctrination
and reliable training. I am asking Admiral Kolchak to place at your disposal what
remains of the Black Sea division, provided it is reliable. Is it possible that a front
which has 900,000 men at its disposal cannot find 1 or 2 per cent of men who are
righteous and for the sake of whom the large sinful mass could be spared? Because
2 per cent would yield 18,000 men better trained than those who would come from
reserve regiments or from the navy, and, in any case, better than totally untrained
volunteers. I would ask you to take first of all into consideration the honest
elements of your own front, without relying too much on being saved from the
outside. All that the country could give would not arrive quickly.
These elements, though perhaps full of enthusiasm, have to be indoctrinated
and trained. I am of the opinion that by taking certain measures it would be pos
sible to find within the front itself the elements for 12 battalions, if this is all that
is needed to guarantee general salvation.
A lekseev
May 18,1917 No. 3738
932 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
819. R eport of G eneral B rusilov on t h e O rganization
o f S hock B attalions
[Telegram to the Minister of War and the Supreme Commander. Razlozhenie armii,
pp. 66-67. A female death battalion was also formed under the aegis of Madame
Bochkareva and sent to the front. Ibid., pp. 71-72.]
Secret
3738. The measures intended to create shock groups at the front of the armies
are already being carried on by me on a large scale and in close contact with the
Front Congress of the armies9 delegates; I have reason to count upon success. I
give my support to the idea of forming special revolutionary shock battalions in the
rear as well, because I consider useful everything that tends to uplift morale and
to awake better sentiments at the front and in the rear during the present decisive
hour. Units of the Black Sea division and volunteers from the Black Sea Fleet will
constitute the nucleus and the head of the battalions now being formed, whose suc
cessful recruitment depends, of course, on enthusiasm and propaganda in this
sense in the rear. After obtaining the support of the Petrograd Workers and Sol
diers Deputies, the recruitment will start. Now, in accordance with your author
ization, I give preliminary, technical instructions for the formation, in the first
instance, of 12 battalions, to be organized on the pattern of the separate Lettish
battalions as per Supreme Commanders Order No. 688 of 1915. I have selected
a region south of Proscurov, [the sector of] the 290th infantry reserve regiment, as
the locality for the formation.
B rusilov
May 20,1917. No. 262113

820, E ditorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e N eed


for an O ffensive
[No. 96, April 30,1917, p. 3. The Congress of the Party of the Peoples Freedom passed
a resolution on May 9, urging offensive operations. Ibid., No. 104, p. 4.]
From a military point of view, there can be only one opinion in this case. We
must undertake an offensive, and only in that way can we bring the end of the war
closer, only in that way can we guarantee a quick and, at the same time, not shame
ful peace. Admitting that we wage a defensive war, still, the defensive aims of the
war do not contradict the possibility of a strategic offensive. The most indisputable
example of a purely defensive war is the Boer War; nevertheless, the Boers at
tempted to conduct an offensive because the offensive is not only the best but the
only sure means of defense. One cannot defend oneself standing in one spot. In
order to defend onself, one has to move and move forward, not backward. The
principles of the International and of the universal peace are all very good, but they
cannot be counterposed to German cannons. Whether the Stockholm Conference
has any results, whether in Germany a revolution similar to ours takes placethat
no one knows, but we are engaged in a war (at least at the present moment), and
we have to impress not only the German Social Democrats but Wilhelm II and
Bethmann-Hollweg as well. But the last named turn a deaf ear to the appeals of
the International and for universal peace and can only bow down to force. Since
we are waging a war, we must wage the war in earnest. But the present standing in
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 933
one place at best only prolongs the war indefinitely and, at worst, may bring us to
an irreparable catastrophe. The resumption of active operations on our part is
indispensable, and everyone who sincerely wishes a speedy and honorable peace
must insist on the necessity for our offensive. The war indeed must be ended.
821. L oyalty to t h e A llied D emocracy
[Editorial in Den9, No. 47, April 30, 1917, p. 3. Editorials similar in tone appeared in
Volia Naroda, No. 7, May 6,1917, p. 1, and Delo Naroda, No. 49, May 14, 1917, p. 1.]
The World War broke out because of the clash of imperialistic interests and
the aggressive tendencies of the ruling classes, but from the very first day of the
war the working class of each country was confronted by the danger which threat
ened their fatherland and the economic development of the country in case of de
feat. For a long time now this potential danger has been a real one for Russia.
The Russian proletariat and the whole democracy must now protect, together with
the conquests of the revolution, the integrity of its territory.
Who at the present time is actually helping the peoples of Russia to open a way
for themselves to a better future? The French and English democracies, who are
dying over there on the battlefields of France.
If our allies had not undertaken an offensive on the Western Front and even
prior to the date fixed, could one guarantee that the Germans would not have come
down on us with all their might to take advantage of the anarchy and confusion
which were unavoidable at the beginning of the revolution and which had weak
ened our front?
Of course, Germany had a number of reasons compelling her to adopt in her
own interest a policy of temporization. The necessity of [adopting an attitude of]
friendly neutrality toward revolutionary Russia was suggested to the ruling classes
by hopes of an unavoidable disintegration of Russia, a struggle between liberalism
and democracy, by the weariness of the masses and the pacifism of the socialists, no
less than by considerations of domestic and international policy.
As the hopes for an immediate disintegration of Russia and for a separate peace
were fading, the sword was bound to sink with all its might into the vascillating
politicians.
If Russia does not want a separate peace, it must be imposed upon her.
The blood of the Allies is shed on the Western Front for the liberty of the
French and of the Russian democracies, but it is impossible to hoist on the shoul
ders of England and France the whole burden of the struggle. From the standpoint
of the treaties, we must actively support our allies by an offensive.
We must proceed from another point of view, from that of the interests of the
Russian democracy, which has emerged from the Russian revolution and which
is placing itself at the head of the international struggle for peace; also from this
point of view, we realize that our duty remains tie same.
It is indispensable to attack on our front. It is indispensable to carry ones
share in the common struggle against Germany. One must not allow Germany
to transfer her forces to the points which are the most dangerous for us.
Today it is the Western Front. But having secured her positions there, Ger
many will rush, will be bound to rush, against us.
934 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Is it possible that we will wait until the moment which Germany considers the
most favorable to crush us?
To whom would we then appeal for help?
And with what right?

822. L enin on an O ffensive


[A Virtual Truce, Pravda, No. 52, May 9,1917, as translated in the Collected Works
of V. /. Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 61-63.]
The Novaia Zhizn of May 18 publishes interviews with the Ministers of the
new government. Prime-Minister Lvov has declared that the country must
express its mighty will and send the army into battle.
This is the essence of the new governments programme. An offensive, an
offensive, an offensive!
Defending this imperialist programme, now accepted by the Chernovs and the
Tseretelis, Minister Lvov in tones of deepest moral indignation rages against the
virtual truce that is being established at the front !
Let every Russian worker, let every peasant think well over the offensive laid
out in the programme; let them think well over those thunderous diatribes against
a virtual truce.
Millions of people have been killed and maimed in the war. Unheard-of suffer
ings have fallen to the lot of the people, particularly the toiling masses, in conse
quence of the war. While the capitalists are reaping scandalously high profits, the
soldiers are being cruelly maimed and tortured.
What wrong is there in a virtual truce? What harm is done if the slaughter
ceases? What wrong is there in the soldiers getting a brief respite?
We are told that truce has been made on one front only, and that it carries the
danger of a separate peace. The objection is clearly without any foundation. If
neither the Russian Government, nor the Russian workers and peasants want a
separate peace with the German capitalists (our party, through the Pravda and in
resolutions passed by the conference which spoke in the name of the party as a
whole, has repeatedly protested against such a peace)if no one in Russia wants
a separate peace with separate capitalists, how then, from where, by what miracle
can such a peace come? ? Who can impose it upon us?
The objection is clearly a baseless and evident fiction, an attempt to throw
sand into our eyes.
Moreover, why does a virtual truce on one front necessarily imply the danger
of a separate peace on that front, and not the danger of such a truce spreading
to all fronts?
A virtual truce is, by its very nature, unstable and transitional. This is incon
trovertible. Where does a truce lead? It cannot lead to a separate peace so long
as there is no mutual consent between two governments or two peoples. But why
could not such a truce lead to a virtual truce on all fronts? Surely this is exactly
what all peoples agree to, despite all or most of their governments!
Fraternisation on one front can lead only to fraternisation on all fronts. A vir
tual truce on one front is hound to and will lead to a virtual truce on all fronts.
The nations would thus gain a respite from the carnage. The revolutionary
workers in all the countries would raise their heads still higher; their influence
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 935
would spread; faith in the necessity and possibility of a proletarian revolution in
all the advanced countries would become strengthened.
Is there anything bad in such a change? Why should we not help to accomplish
this change as far as it is in our power?
We may be told that a virtual truce on all the fronts would at the present
moment aid the German capitalists, for they have gathered in more loot than the
others. This is not true, for the English capitalists have grabbed more loot (the
German colonies in Africa, German islands in the Pacific, Mesopotamia, part of
Syria, etc.) and, unlike the German capitalists, have lost nothing. This is first.
And secondly, even if the German capitalists should evince a greater stubbornness
than the English capitalists, the growth of the revolution in Germany would only
be accelerated. The German revolution is rising. An offensive by the Russian
army would hamper its growth. The virtual truce hastens the rise of the Ger
man revolution.
Thirdly, from the point of view of hunger, ruin, and devastation, Germany is
worse off than any other country. It is in desperate, hopeless straits, particularly
since the United States has entered the war. A virtual truce would not remove
this fundamental source of Germanys weakness; on the contrary, it is rather likely
to better conditions in the other countries (freedom of transporting supplies) while
affecting the situation of the German capitalists for the worse (no chance for im
ports ; greater difficulty in hiding the truth from the people).
The Russian people has the choice of two programmes. One is the programme
of the capitalists, adopted by the Chernovs and the Tseretelis. This is the pro
gramme of the offensive, the programmes for continuing the imperialistic war,
continuing the slaughter.
The second programme is the programme of the revolutionary workers of the
world. In Russia it is advocated by our party. The programme says: stimulate
fraternisation (but do not permit the Germans to deceive the Russians); fraternise
by means of proclamations; extend fraternisation and virtual truce on all fronts;
aid the growth of fraternisation in every possible way; accelerate thereby the pro
letarian revolution in all the countries; thus bring at least temporary respite to the
soldiers of all the warring nations; hasten in Russia the transfer of power to the
Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies; hasten thereby the conclu
sion of a really just, universal peace for the benefit of the toilers, and not for the
benefit of the capitalists.
Our government, together with the Chernovs and Tseretelis, the Narodniks and
the Mensheviks, is for the first programme.
The majority of the Russian people and of all the peoples within Russia (and
out of Russia), i.e., the majority of the workers and poor peasants, are undoubtedly
for the second programme.
Every day brings the success of the second programme nearer and nearer.
823. K erensky s O rder to t h e A rm y and N avy A fter A ssum ing
O ffice as M inister of W ar
[VVP9 May 14,1917, p. 1.]
Warriors! Officers, soldiers and sailors. In this great and menacing hour in
the life of our fatherland, I am summoned by the will of the people to stand at
the head of all the armed forces of the Russian State. Although the burden thus
936 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
assumed is infinitely heavy, I have implicitly, as an old soldier of the revolution,
obeyed the call of stern duty and have taken, before the nation and the revolution,
the responsibility for the army and the navy. All of you, warriors of liberated
Russia, from soldier to general, all of you fulfill the hard but glorious duty of
defending revolutionary Russia. Do only remember this duty of yours. But by
defending Russia you are fighting also for the triumph of the lofty ideals of our
revolution, for liberty, equality, and fraternity. Not a single drop of blood will
be shed for a wrong cause. It is not for the sake of conquest and violence but
for the sake of saving free Russia that you will go forward where your commanders
and the Government lead you. It is impossible to expel the enemy by standing
still. On the points of your bayonets you will bring peace, right, truth, and justice.
Free sons of Russia, you will move forward in serried ranks, united by the
discipline of duty and by your supreme love for the revolution and your home
land. Without discipline there can be no unity of action, without discipline there
can be no salvation. The fate of our freedom depends on whether the army and
the navy fulfill to the end their duty toward their country. In overthrowing the
tsarist regime, the army has performed a great feat, for it has shown how one
should love freedom and fight for it; but I believe that both the army and the
navy will accomplish even more, that they will be the first to show how one
should understand liberty, how one should guard it, how one should die for it.
Let the freest army and navy in the world demonstrate that freedom is strength,
not weakness, let them forge a new ironclad discipline of duty, raise the fighting
might of the country, and convey to the popular will that authority of strength
which will bring nearer the realization of the peoples hopes. Forward to liberty,
land, and freedom. Remember that those who look back, those who stop and go
back will lose everything. And do not forget, warriors of the revolution, that your
names will be accursed if you do not accomplish the feat of defending the free
honor and dignity of Russia. Your duty is hard, but you will fulfill it with the
proud realization that you accomplish the will of the revolution. Your names and
your sufferings will be sacred to free Russia. Your grandchildren will remember
with pride and exaltation the army of our revolution. By the will of the people
you must purge the fatherland and the [whole] world of violators and invaders.
I am summoning you for this feat; is it possible that you will not heed my voice?
Comrades, the thoughts and the heart of revolutionary Russia are with you; let
the awareness of this fact breathe new determination into your hearts. Brothers,
on behalf of the great Russian revolution I greet you, on behalf of the free Russian
people I bow to you deeply.
This order to be read in all companies, squadrons, troops, and batteries, on all
ships and in all the military detachments of the ground forces and of the navy.
A. K eren sk y, Minister of War and Navy
May 12,1917
824. T h e S p eech op t h e A ssista n t M in ister o f W ar on t h e O ffe n siv e
[.Den\ No. 60, May 16,1917, p. 2.]
On May 14 Colonel Yakubovich, Assistant Minister of War, spoke at the Con
ference of the Delegates from the Front in the Tauride Palace.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 937
The fate of Russiasaid Colonel Yakubovichand the consolidation of the
newly acquired freedoms are closely tied in with the offensive. At the present
moment all is perfectly quiet on the Russian front. Taking advantage of this, our
enemy now transfers his forces to the front of our French and English allies. He
is even transferring heavy artillery over there, replacing it on our front by our
own artillery pieces, of old make, taken at Osovets and Kovno.
The Ministry of War is aware of this transfer in detail, down to a single divi
sion. Our allies are exhausted, they appeal for our aid, which we can give only
by means of a powerful offensive, by striking on our front. The Allies say very
definitely, Without your help we will not hold on, we will be crushed and will have
to conclude a separate peace with Germany and then let Russia do what she can.
It is clear to the Ministry of War that the only way out of this situation is an
offensive, and everything is ready for it, except the spirit. It is impossible to con
ceal that since the revolution the morale of the army and its fighting capacities
have fallen. Temporarily the army is disorganized. The supplying of the army
with food and fodder is being hindered. It is certain that the Provisional Gov
ernment will cope with this, but not without the help of the Soviets of Peasants,
Workers, and Soldiers Deputies.

825. H ow L on g S h a l l W e W a it?
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 109, May 17,1917, p. 3.]
On the Western Front of the war, battles unprecedented in their persistence
and fury have been raging for many weeks. . . . Now it is our turn; now we
should be giving a helping hand to our allies and bringing to the desired end
the task begun in common.
Never since the beginning of the war has the situation at the front been so
favorable for our offensive. The Germans have removed all their best troops from
our front and have left opposing us almost exclusively their Landsturm units,
which are stretched out in a thin thread and are unable to show proper resistance
to any strong blow. The enemy now confidently removes from Eastern positions
and transfers to the West even his heavy artillery, which formerly constituted the
mainstay of the German front. In front of us is only a thin curtain, and, at the
same time, we ourselves are abundantly supplied with everything that we need.
According to the Assistant War Minister, Colonel Yakubovich, we have enough
ammunition now for half a year of the most intensive fire. In that respect, we have
never been as favorably situated as at present. Nevertheless, our offensive is still
not materializing. For that, as the same Colonel Yakubovich says, we have every
thing ready but the spirit.
The task of preparing this spirit has been assumed by the new War and Navy
Minister, A. F. Kerensky. He has undertaken a trip to the front in order to restore
military discipline and raise the spirit of the fighting units by means of personal
contact with them. . . .
. . . All the information that is reaching us unanimously testifies to the fact
that A. F. Kerenskys appearances have been immensely successful everywhere.
Everywhere he was greeted with ovations, everywhere he was carried out of meet
ings on the hands of the audience, and, in response to his exhortations, solemn
938 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
oaths have resounded to do ones duty and to die for free Russia.3 But it stands to
reason that the task of restoring the spirit of the army is too much for any one man,
he it even A. F. Kerensky. Only by united efforts of the whole nation, only by way
of a systematic effort of the heart of the country upon the front could one restore
discipline in the army and rouse the army to undertake an offensive again. . . .
. . . And precisely here is where the inadequacy of support shown to A. F.
Kerensky inside the country is felt very strongly. It stands to reason that the army
can undertake active operations and an offensive only in case it sees clearly the
necessity of such an offensive, only if it sees clearly the necessity of striving for
victory. But how can one demand from the army the understanding of that neces
sity when all sorts of doubts in regard to that reach it from the rear? What sort
of effect must the declaration of V. M. Chernov, the new Minister of Agriculture,
have upon the army when he proposes to say enough to the civilian exhorta
tions of the army for an offensive? In what way must the army be affected by the
comments of certain newspapers which accuse anyone who speaks about the neces
sity of an offensive of imperialist designs, even though he renounces all aspirations
for conquest? . . .

826. An O ffensive or P reparedness for an O ffensive ?


[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 68, May 17,1917, pp. 1-2.]
In the appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies to the army,4
in the declaration of the new Provisional Government, in speeches of the new
Minister of War and Navy, A. F. Kerensky, in his orderseverywhere, in recent
days, one catches glimpses of one and the same word, offensive. This can easily
create the impression that an offensive was the principal concern of the new
Provisional Government and of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, as
though the main purpose behind the change-over in the government was to have
our armies on the front assume the offensive. But such an impression is a serious
error.
It is completely untrue that we are organizing an offensive on the front. An
offensive is not organized by resolutions, declarations, and speeches; an offensive
is prepared in deep secrecy and not publicly, in everybodys sight. When an at
tack is contemplated, it is not talked or argued about. And the fact that the ques
tion of an offensive is offered for public discussion, this fact alone gives a
sufficiently clear indication that an offensive is not the practical issue of today or
tomorrow.
The immediate question is not an offensive, but creating the possibility of an
offensive . It is precisely the possibility of an offensive which we need in order to
stop the German staff from transferring divisions from our front to the Anglo-
French front. It is precisely the possibility of an offensive which is needed to
stop the process of disintegration which is beginning in our army. It is precisely
the possibility of an offensive which is necessary to Russia in order that, during
3 See Docs. 827 and 851.
4 Doc. 796.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 939
peace negotiations, she can speak with Germany not as a defeated country speaks
with a victorious country, but as an equal to an equal.
. . . A whole program of legislation relating to the most diverse aspects of
policy is dictated to the Government by preparations for the possibility of an
offensive. And let not a single soldier think that the new Provisional Government
will send him on an offensive without having first carried out the given program.
This program must be carried out. The salvation of the state demands this. Only
to the extent that this program is carried out does the army become capable of
active operations. And without this capability, without the capability of assuming
the offensive, an army, as a fighting power, ceases to exist.
827. R eport of General B rusilov to A lekseev on th e R esults of
K erensky s V isit to th e S outhwestern F ront
[Razlozhenie armii, p. 91. Brusilov was appointed Supreme Commander on the date
of this dispatch.]
3760. The Minister of War has visited the areas of the 7th and 11th Armies.
The commander of the 7th Army reports on the influence which his visit had on
the morale of the troops: The arrival of the Minister of War had a favorable in
fluence. In a general way it would seem that the relations between officers and
soldiers are getting more stable. The majority realize the necessity for an offensive.
As conditions for the offensive, the majority of the units demand adequate artillery
preparation, the reinforcement of the companies up to their normal complement,
the divisions to be in possession of reserves of manpower, the issue of underwear,
of clothing; some units demand to be sent for a rest before beginning the offensive.
Cases of opponents of the offensive appearing at meetings and assemblies have
not been noted. For the time being, the corps and divisional commanders
do not consider it possible to judge the stability of the atmosphere which is
being created. I believe that the delegates from the units, who are now closing
the Front Congress, will contribute to an improvement in morale on the spot.
Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks exist; their speeches at the Congress were met very
unfavorably, but there is no doubt that on the ignorant masses their influence con
tinues to be harmful and struggle against it is difficult.
The Commander of the 11th Army reports: Excellent and favorable. As for
my personal opinion, I have reported on May 17, No. 1954.
B rusilov
May 22,1917. No. 2036.
828. K erensky S peaks to the S oviet on th e Q uestion of the O ffensive
[Article in Rech\ No. 119, May 24,1917, p. 2. The Petrograd Soviet notified Kerensky
on June 6 that it considers it inexpedient to issue orders regarding the offensive prior
to a decision of the Congress (of Soviets) regarding the offensive. Protokoly9 p. 182.
On June 12, the Congress passed a resolution that until the war is brought to an end
by the efforts of the revolutionary democracy, the Russian revolutionary democracy is
obliged to keep its army in condition to take either the offensive or defensive. . . . The
question whether to take the offensive should be decided from the purely military and
strategic point of view. Golder, p. 371. Kerensky immediately left for the front to
direct the planned offensive.]
940 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
A. F. Kerensky, Minister of War and Navy, having just returned from the
front, came before the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies with a speech in
his defense. . . .
Regarding the question of the offensive, A. F. Kerensky was not especially
categorical. He is, so to speak, certain of the results of his trip a priori, and
not a posteriori ; he is certain, because he at all times believes in the creative
power of the revolution. He admits having difi&cult moments, but also in such
moments this faith does not deceive me. However, the War Minister stressed
that immediately after his departure, wherever he appeared, energetic activity
aiming at the destruction of the results he had achieved was being carried on.
For reasons that I fail to understand, in all places where I was and am influential,
there immediately starts an especially energetic campaign directed against the will
of the maj ority of the Russian democracy. We have witnessed this activity
here, and not only in the organs of the Bolshevik press, but even in the organ of
the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies itself. The partisans of the latter
will certainly catch hold of the cautious andcoming from Mr. Kerenskyeasily
understandable sentence: As to when we shall start the offensive, I do not know:
that is the business of military commanders; my business it to take care of the
combat preparedness of the army. However, it should be added that the replace
ment of the cautious and self-controlled Gen. Alekseev by Cavalry Gen. Brusilov,
who is inclined to take chances, shows that for A. F. Kerensky the question of the
offensive is not merely a matter for military commanders.
How does the War Minister reconcile his views on the necessity for an of
fensive with his views on the necessity for an early peace? As all reasonable
people, he does it very simply: the offensive is necessary precisely because peace
is necessary; peace cannot be concluded without allied diplomatic action, and
allied diplomacy can be influenced by a Russia that is strong and supported by a
battle-fit army* The actual problem A. F. Kerensky poses to allied diplomacy may
be seen from the last view he expressed before his departure, to which he proposed
that the comrades accompanying him subscribe. Long live the future brother
hood of international democracy. As the Minister of War has concisely pointed
out, the problem is both simple and difficult. It was precisely because of this
difficulty, he added, that he accepted the portfolio of the Ministry of War. Here
we are facing Kerenskys singleness of outlook and ideology. Even if, together
with his comrades, A. F. Kerensky errs as to the limit up to which he can lead
international democracy, he nevertheless understands better and more clearly
than his comrades that the only way to influence our allies is to preserve the
military value that we have for them. If A. F. Kerensky were able to bring his
partisans to this view, it would mean a victory of perhaps no lesser importance
than the one he may achieve on the front through introducing discipline from
above. . . .
829. R ep o rt o f G en eral D enikin, Comimander in C h ief o f t h e W estern
F ro n t, on t h e G en eral C ondition o f H is A rm ies on t h e Eve
o f t h e O ffen siv e
[RazLozhenie armii, pp. 89-91.]
On June 9 1 invited the army commanders for a conference. It was ascertained:
Third Arm y . The membership of the army committee is satisfactory; the ex-
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 941
treme trends of political thought have found no sympathizers, and some decisions
of the front committee are often boycotted because of this circumstance* The divi
sion committees are well-intentioned and act as the assistants to the division com
manders. Disciplinary courts do not function. As for morale, artillery stands
higher than the rest; it would welcome the offensive. The morale in the infantry
varies. . . .
Tenth Army. The membership of the army committee is quite satisfactory.
Corps committees exist everywhere except in the 2nd Caucasian corps, and on the
whole they are useful. The best morale is to be found in the artillery. . . . The 2nd
Caucasian corps feels the transition from the old to the new regime with especial
acuteness; according to the opinion of the army commander, the 2nd Caucasian
grenadier division, the 51st division, and the 134th division are not battle-fit as
far as their morale is concerned; the 1st grenadier division is better than the
others. . . .
In addition to political causes, the reduction of the number of soldiers in the
companies reflects very harmfully on the morale of the troops. The army continues
to show a noticeable decline in numbers.
The attitude of the soldiers of the 10th Army toward the offensive is in gen
eral rather negative. This circumstance explains a series of excesses which oc
curred during the assignment of the troops (especially in the 2nd Caucasian corps)
to their combat sectors . . .
Second Army. The army committee is composed of poorly educated people,
but it wishes to show independence and follows the front committee blindly, even
in its extreme manifestations; constant and vigilant attention and authority on the
part of the army commander is indispensable. Under the influence of the Minsk
committee both the army committee and the corps and division committees show
a tendency to interfere with the operative work of the staffs. The disciplinary
courts do not function. The morale is quite good in the artillery, in the infantry
it is varied but, in general, much worse than in the other armies. . . . To con
clude, the morale of the 2nd Army is worse than that of the other armies and, ap
parently, considerably worse than the army commander imagines.
Desertions from the front have almost stopped. Fraternization occurs seldom,
involving only individuals. Replacements reach the front so unsatisfactorily that
shortage of manpower is developing in a threatening manner: for instance, in the
10th Army, in thousands: May 1,16; May 16,46; June 1, 63.
Upon my return from the 10th Army I will send an additional report.
L ieutenant General D enikin
M ajor General M arkov, Acting Chief of Staff
M ajor General S amoilo , for the Quartermaster General
Comment: Is it worth while to prepare a blow there with such morale?
B rusilov
June 11,1917
942 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
THE OFFENSIVE
830, K erenskys Order for the O ffensive
[VVP, No. 84, June 20, 1917, p. 1, as translated by Golder, pp. 426-27. An appeal to
the navy, enjoining it to fulfill its duty and exert its best efforts, was issued by the
Provisional Government on June 19. VVP, No. 84, June 20,1917, p. 1.
The course of the offensive and the German counterattack from the Russian side is
described in Golovine, The Russian Army in the World War, p. 272 ff., and Danilov,
La Russie dans la guerre mondiale, 1914-1917, pp. 540-49; from the German side in
Von Hindenburg, Out of My Life , pp. 69-81; Ludendorff, My War Memories, pp. 433
40; and Von Hoffmann, The War of Lost Opportunities, pp. 182-86.]
Russia, having thrown off the chains of slavery, has firmly resolved to de
fend, at all costs, its rights, honor, and freedom. Believing in the brotherhood of
mankind, the Russian democracy appealed most earnestly to all the belligerent
countries to stop the war and conclude a peace honorable to all. In answer to our
fraternal appeal, the enemy has called on us to play the traitor. Austria and
Germany have offered us a separate peace and tried to hoodwink us by fraterniza
tion, while they threw all their forces against our allies, with the idea that after
destroying them, they would turn on us. Now that he is convinced that Russia is
not going to be fooled, the enemy threatens us and is concentrating his forces on
our front.
Warriors, our country is in danger! Liberty and revolution are threatened.
The time has come for the army to do its duty. Your Supreme Commander [Gen
eral Brusilov], beloved through victory, is convinced that each day of delay merely
helps the enemy, and that only by an immediate and determined blow can we
disrupt his plans. Therefore, in full realization of my great responsibility to the
country, and in the name of its free people and its Provisional Government, I call
upon the armies, strengthened by the vigor and spirit of the revolution, to take
the offensive.
Let not the enemy celebrate prematurely his victory over us! Let all nations
know that when we talk of peace, it is not because we are weak! Let all know that
liberty has increased our might.
Officers and soldiers! Know that all Russia gives you its blessing on your
undertaking, in the name of liberty, the glorious future of the country, and an
enduring and honorable peace.
Forward!
K erensky , Minister of War and Navy
June 16,1917
831. A ppeal from the P rovisional Government
[ VVP, No. 84, June 20,1917, p. 1. A similar appeal was addressed to the population
by Kerensky, dated June 16. Ibid.]
Citizens. The army of free Russia has started the offensive.
By defending the liberty and the independence of the fatherland they are
selflessly fulfilling their duty before the country.
In this awe-inspiring historic hour when the fate of Russia depends on the
combat might of the army, on the might and the ardent enthusiasm of all the coun
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 943
try, the Provisional Government addresses to you an appeal to strain all your will,
all your strength, and, welded with the army in one common and lofty effort, to
save the revolution and the fatherland from mortal danger.
In the face of great sacrifices and sufferings, [and] after the Russian people
had done everything to avert them from itself and from all the peoples of the world,
the Provisional Government calls upon you to realize your exceptional responsi
bility, and to renounce everything that disunites you and that is caused by a
different understanding of the ways toward identical lofty goals, dedicating all
your forces to the defense of liberty and of Russia.
Let the army of Revolutionary Russia know that while going to defend the
revolution, while going to die for the eternal ideals of freedom, it has behind it
the whole people of Russia which, like itself, is ready to perform the dread feat.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
June 20, 1917
832. K erensky R equests H onors for the R egiments
L eading th e Offensive
[Rectf, No. 142, June 20,1917, p. 2.]
A. F. Kerensky, Minister of War, has addressed to Prince G. E. Lvov, Minister-
President, the following telegram:
Today is the great triumph of the revolution. On June 18 the Russian revolu
tionary army with great enthusiasm has started an offensive and has proved to
Russia and to the whole world its supreme fidelity to the revolution and its love
for liberty and the fatherland.
Ignoring the small groups of the fainthearted in a few regiments, and leaving
them contemptuously in the rear, the free Russian soldiers assert by their offensive
the new discipline based on the feeling of civic duty.
Whatever happens later, today has put an end to the malicious, smearing at
tacks on the organization of the Russian army, which is built on democratic prin
ciples. I urgently request that I be allowed on behalf of the free people to hand
to the regiments who have participated in the battle of June 18 the red banners of
the revolution, which during the battle have already been flying at the initiative
of these attacking regiments themselves, and to award to all the regiments that
started the offensive the style of Regiments of the 18th of June.
A. K erensky .

833. M essage of Congratulations to K erensky and th e A rmy from


th e T emporary Committee of th e S tate D uma
IRech, No. 143, June 21,1917, p. 3.]
On behalf of the Temporary Committee of the State Duma, M. V. Rodzianko
sent on June 20 the following telegram:
To the active army. To A. F. Kerensky, Minister of War. The 18th of June,
the day of the beginning of the victorious offensive of our gallant revolutionary
944 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
troops, is a day of triumph for all the citizens for whom the happiness and the
greatness of our free fatherland are foremost.
In admiration before the sublime gallantry and the fervent love for the father
land which were shown by the regiments on June 18, the State Duma will always
remember that it is precisely you who, with your ardent words and personal ex
ample, have kindled the hearts of the soldiers and have awakened in them the
consciousness of the necessity to fulfill their duty in defending the liberty won by
the revolution.
Let God Almighty give you the force and courage to continue the great cause
which you have begun of saving Russia from shame and the task of satisfactorily
ending the war at the earliest possible moment in close contact and faithful unity
with our gallant allies.

884. A ppeal of th e A ll -R ussian Congress of S oviets and the


E xecutive C ommittee of the A ll -Russia.n C ongress
of P easants9 D eputies
[Izvestiia>No. 96, June 20,1917, p. 4, as translated by Golder, pp. 427-28.]
Soldiers and Officers:
The Provisional Government of revolutionary Russia has called on you to
take the offensive. Organized as you are, on the foundations of democracy, welded
in the fire of the revolution, you boldly moved forward to fight. The All-Russian
Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and the Executive Com
mittee of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Soviets send their fraternal
greetings to you who are shedding your blood on the field of battle in the cause of
the revolution and universal peace.
A long time ago the Russian revolution called on the peoples of the world to
fight for a general peace. Until now our call has remained unanswered. It is not
our fault that the war goes on. Your offensive, organization, and might will add
weight to the voice of revolutionary Russia in its call to enemies, Allies, and
neutrals, and will bring nearer the end of the war. Our thoughts are with you,
sons of the revolutionary army.
In this decisive hour, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets of
Peasants Deputies appeal to the country to gather all its strength and come to
the help of the army. Peasantsgive bread to the army. Workmensee to it
that the army does not lack ammunition. Soldiers and officers in the rearbe
ready to go to the front at the first call. Citizensremember your duty. In these
days no one dares to decline to do his duty to the country. The Soviets of Workers,
Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies will continue to stand guard over the revolution.
Soldiers and officers, let not your hearts be in doubt. You are fighting for the
freedom and happiness of Russia, for universal peace.
Hearty greetings to you, brothers.
Long live the revolution; long live the revolutionary army!
A ll -R ussian Congress of S oviets of
W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
E xecutive Committee of the
A ll -R ussian S oviets of P easants D eputies
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 945
835. T w o V ictories
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 139, June 21, 1917, p. 3. An editorial under the
same title appeared in Novoe Vremia, No. 14807, June 20, 1917, p. 3, and another in a
similar vein in Rech\ No. 142, June 20,1917, p. 1. The second victory had reference
to the dampening effect of the offensive on the agitation accompanying the demonstra
tion of June 18 in Petrograd. See Volume HI.]
An advance of Russian troops on a considerable section of our front has
started. During the first two days it has already brought us victories, both on the
battlefield and inside the country. Even before receipt of official communiques
from headquarters and of newspaper dispatches, rumors of successful operations
at Zlochego and Brzezhany struck the cities like an electric spark, and the feeling
of a deep sense of relief spread throughout the country and people. In the light
of events now happening at the front, all arguments and bickerings which had
agitated us during recent days have faded away, and the voices which had been
exhorting us to civil war suddenly appeared to be insignificant and miserable.
And in the main streets of Petrograd new banners began to wave, with new and
old slogans of victory. The country suddenly felt, with joyous tenseness and care
ful apprehension, that the great hour of testing peoples powers had come, that
hour on which the countrys future depends. Under the muffled rumbling of
cannons, it has felt intensely the true direction of its will.
Almost four months have passed since the beginning of the revolutioneach
month equal to a year of ordinary living. The army at the front, joyously greet
ing the revolution; masses of people and military units who were led to believe in
the proximity of easy attainment of universal peace; fraternization at the front
and the visible disintegration of the army; refusal of separate units to move and to
obey the orders of their superiors; exhortations of the new War Minister, creation
of shock battalions; the search for a new organization and discipline in the army
in this whirlwind of contradictory facts and phenomena, even the experienced
eye of people close to the front frequently could not discern the general direction
of events. While, on the one hand, people who were blinded by a naked theory and
devoid of love for their country were ready to repeat triumphantly: the advance
of the Russian army is perilous and impossibleon the other hand, even people
who value above all the future of the fatherland have at times felt a doubt in
their hearts: are the Russian people and the Russian army able to protect them
selves victoriously in this huge and inexorably continuing war of nations ?
But together with disintegration, construction went on too: the spirit of the
country was being strengthened even at the moment of the great collapse. The
inspired words of the War Minister ran through the troops at the front. Granted
that even those words could not at one blow electrify the men, exhausted by three
years of war, who remembered the previous betrayal and treason, the wasted sacri
fices and loss of thousands of Russian soldiers; granted that those words could not
inspire those into whose ear both friend and enemy kept drumming that the best
and nearest way to peace was to lay down their arms at once. But there is no way
to figure and count the influence of this limitless moral enthusiasm! Hesitant ones
took up arms again, and the daring and certain ones became more daring and more
certain. Within the army itself forces were found for the slow, persistent work
toward its own regeneration. Officers and soldiers at the front, civilians of various
views and political parties in the rear, took upon themselves this heavy, and at
times self-denying, work and went against the current which, it seemed, was
gaining an upper hand.
946 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Time and events helped to demolish childish illusions and let the entire
menacing dangers of the countrys position be felt, if not always understood, by
everybody. For it was becoming ever more obvious that the government could not
establish order in the rear and would not save the country from disintegration if
the Russian army remained inactive or was defeated.
At that point the advance of Russian troops began. And it was marked by
victory. It is unimportant for us to know at this moment the number of prisoners
and captured guns. The whole greatness of the moment is not measured by
strategic results alone. The country snddently realized that it had an army
which wants to protect it; the army, in its turn, realized that it can protect the
country, that it is capable of an advance. And in this lies the great genuine
victory of the new Russia and of the Russian people with their thousand-year-old
history.
Perhaps still new and heavy trials await us. But at this moment the Russian
people are experiencing great happiness; after the threatening months of hesita
tion, the will to fight for the great future of free Russia has been rewakened
in them.
836. T he T wo P oints
[Editorial in Delo Naroda,, No. 79, June 20,1917, p. 1. Volia Naroda, No. 44, June 20,
1917, p. 1, and Den\ No. 89, June 20,1917, p. 1, greeted the offensive with equal if not
greater enthusiasm.]
Thanks to the Lord!The offensive has begun, was the sigh of relief emitted
from the breast of all the people, of all the bourgeoisie, of all the patriots, down
to those tinted red. Thomas the doubter finally had an actual opportunity to
touch the wounds and be convinced of what disturbed his wavering, weak soul.
The magic color of the revolution startled them and, forgetting for a moment
the front, they yielded to it. But they did not, they could not have a firm, in
domitable faith in its victorious outcome. The Philistine as well as the bourgeoisie,
and even the social patriot, all of them wanted fairy tales, and only fairy tales.
But the revolution showed them its true face full of great hopes and great wrath.
And they were embarrassed. Later they became excited, and finally they grew
angry, and they got angry at both the revolution and the army. . . . Only in the
presence of absolute unbelief in the might and beauty of the Russian revolution
and the Russian army, which is organically welded to it, is such a vacillation possi
ble from hope to despair, from pessimism to optimism.
Yes, the fighting efficiency of our army is a fact, and all talk about the
horrors allegedly taking place at the front proved to be the fruit of a frightened,
sick fantasy and empty, purely unscrupulous twaddle.
The offensive has begun. The solidarity of the strategic front, about which
so much has been said recently, has begun to be realized. Excellent. We were
always inclined to think that the matter of the offensive is the concern of our
strategists: they should have a freehand. What has always interested us and con
tinues to interest us now is something else: the solidarity of the political front.
The Russian revolutionary army launched an offensive, it launched it with
red banners and gained victory. Her slogans are well known to us: they stood out
clearly yesterday on numerous banners and, with no distinction, on placards of all
currents of the revolutionary-socialist democracy. Peace to the entire world!
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 947
Peace without annexations and contributions! Freedom to all peoples! Has this
call gone over to the armies of our allies? Are their governments aware of the
fact that there are no other slogans any more capable of inspiring our army ? Is
it not time for those governments to pause and think precisely now, at the moment
of the restoration of the unity of the strategic front, about the urgent need to join
irrevocably and with no qualifications revolutionary Russia in the conception of
the problems and slogans of the political front ? This is a pressing matter. We
must not delay it. The Russian revolutionary army awaits with impatience the
decisive response to the infinitely alarming and disturbing question. What use
would the Allies like to make of her success? And when it receives it, precisely
in the sense in which it is long awaiting it, it will sigh with relief and say: Thanks
to you, the Great Russian Revolution, deliverer of peoples! Then the strategic
front, inspired by one slogan, with proud awareness of its righteousness, will say
to the enemy: Down with arms! And if the brotherly outstretched hand once again
remains hanging in the air with no response, only one course remains: to wage a
war, a revolutionary liberating war until, leaning on the offensive strength of the
revolutionary army of new Russia, it will be able to give a yet stronger impetus to
the liquidation of the war in terms corresponding to the slogans of the Great
Russian Revolution.
837. T he O ffensive
[Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 85, June 20,1917, p. 1.]
On June 16 Kerensky issued an order to the army and navy about the offensive.
On June 18 the offensive began.
The question of the offensive has been a subject of heated discussion in recent
times.
Now one may expect a new outburst of argument around the actual fact of the
offensive.
Let us leave aside the bourgeois camp. We expect a stormy triumph of the
bourgeois press, a chauvinistic ringing of all the Kadet bells, a jeering at the dis
graceful Zimmerwaldists, the fastening of Miliukovs aggressive aims onto the
offensive which has begun. Not that we regard this uproar as harmlessnot at
all! We always knew and said that an offensive unavoidably arouses mounting
chauvinistic moods.
We must therefore launch a most vigorous campaign of propaganda to lift the
fog spread by the bourgeois press. Its attempts to attribute aggressive aims to the
offensive should be exposed.
But it is not the bourgeoisie that interests us now.
We anticipate a new explosion of bitter arguments and passions in the camp of
the revolutionary democracy. Plekhanov and those with him, like weather vanes
keeping up with the bourgeois press, will attempt to interpret the offensive as the
beginning of a revolutionary march of the Russian army for the purpose of de
stroying Austro-German imperialism.
Lenin, Trotsky, and others, on their part, will sound the alarm, representing
the offensive as a betrayal of the cause of the International, as a made-to-order
execution of the will of the imperialist circles of England and France.
But the majority of the revolutionary democracy, we are sure, will go its own
way.
948 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS

Life dictates the point-blank question: what to do now, side by side with the
tireless struggle for peace? What to do now , when the democracy of other warring
countries has not yet broken away from its imperialist governments, has not
merged with us or among themselves into one mighty torrent which sweeps away
in its course all obstacles toward peace? Our only answer is not to relax for a mo
ment the struggle for peace. The revolution must be defended against all encroach
ments from outside. And if, for reasons of strategy, an offensive is necessary, it will
be up to the strategists to determine the proper moment for it.
It should finally be understood that the fortunes of the Russian revolution are
not, should not be, guided exclusively by the plans of the German command as to
how long to preserve the truce on our front.
It should finally be understood that this separate truce expressed by inaction
or fraternizing at the front interferes with the process of sobering up from the
chauvinistic stupor of the Allied democracies; that it increases the appetites of the
Austro-German chauvinists.
Our revolution cannot live by the grace of German imperialism. Taking ad
vantage of the weakness of our front, the German staff transfers troops to crush the
Anglo-French armies, only to transfer them later to our front and to dictate their
terms to the Russian revolution.
We do not know what the future course of the offensive by the Russian army
will be. But as long as Russian democracy has the power to shape the international
policy of the Provisional Government, as long as it exerts all effort in the struggle
for universal peace on a democratic basis, as long as it subordinates problems of
strategy to peaceful policyas long as all this continues, Russian democracy and
its army will be unanimous. And no cries that the offensive is intolerable can em
barrass it.
838. T he M ovement in G ermany and our O ffensive
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 104, June 30,1917, pp. 5-6. An editorial in No. 98, June 22,
1917, pp. 6-7, pointed out that the offensive indicated the vitality of revolutionary
Russia and should give the government the strength to carry out necessary internal
reforms, disregarding the opposition of the bourgeoisie.]
While a lull still reigned on our front, while the question of an offensive was
discussed at workers5 and soldiers meetings as a more or less remote possibility,
the objection to the offensive most often raised was that it would force the demo
cratic elements of Germany and Austria-Hungary to rally closer around their
imperialistic, ruling classes, thus playing into the hands of the Austro-German im
perialists and strengthening their domination over the democracy.
The offensive of our armies has now begun. The results of the ten-day heroic
efforts of our revolutionary regiments are in full display. . . .
In Allied countries the contemptuous, almost hostile attitude toward the Russian
democracy has given way to enthusiastic faith in the Russian revolution. Once
again our voice is being heeded, and they are hastening to tone down the harsh
words which were directed at us during the weeks of the lull, when from day to day
they had expected us to conclude a separate peace with the imperialists of the Cen
tral European Powers. The voice of the Russian revolution once again gained
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 949
force in Allied countries, enabling it to demand that the Allied democracies fight
for revisions of agreements and for peace.
What, then, is happening now in Germany and Austria-Hungary ? . . .
Public opinion in Germany attributed the lull on our front largely to the
shrewdness of Hindenburgs General Staff. The absence of losses on the Eastern
(Russian) Front and Germanys opportunity to concentrate all her forces against
tie French and British armies were explained by their military genius. In this way,
the lull on our front generated the confidence of the German and Austro-Hungarian
population in the supreme commanding staff of the army and the leaders of the
Austro-German policy. This lull also generated hope among the populations of
both countries that the war would soon end by running its own course without any
need for the governments of the Central European Powers to renounce their war
aims of [territorial] seizures.
The offensive of our armies killed this hope. The working people of Germany
and Austria-Hungary have become convinced that the lull on the Eastern Front
depended not on the genius of their generals but on temporary, transitional con
ditions. The German and Austro-Hungarian workers have become convinced that
the policy of their ruling classes gives them no ground to hope for an early and
lasting peace. The offensive of our armies confronts them pointblank with the
question of their future. . . .
The working people of Germany and Austria-Hungary thus found themselves
at the crossroads. The choice of one or another road is up to them; their choice
will decide the future of the Central European countries.
The present internal unrest in Germany and Austria-Hungary, the consolida
tion of the opposition in both countries, and the declaration of the German Social
Democrats, imbued with profound political wisdom and an understanding of pres
ent events, which was published by us yesterday, give us reason to hope that the
German and Austro-Hungarian workers will choose the road that will lead them,
and all mankind, to a universal peace.
The fears of those people who tried to dissuade us from an offensive, ostensibly
because this offensive would strengthen the imperialists hold over the Central
European democracies, proved to be illusory and absurd. Within ten days it has
become absolutely clear that our offensive is unleashing the forces of the revolu
tionary movement in Germany.
In this sense we can say that on their bayonets our revolutionary troops are
carrying freedom and the slogans of the revolution to Germany.
839. T h e O ffensive
[Editorial in Novaia Zhizn\ No. 54, June 21, 1917, p. 1. The description here of the
Bolshevik attitude certainly does not correspond to the categorical opposition to the
offensive expressed in Lenins two articles translated in the Collected Works of V. I,
Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 271-72, 274-76.]
The Russian revolutionary troops have taken the offensive.
According to reports received thus far, military operations proceed satis
factorily.
A powerful new factor has been added to the difficult situation created by the
Russian revolution. We must establish clearly and fully its significance, its force,
950 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
and the consequences that flow from it in the sphere of the foreign and domestic
policy of the Provisional Government.
That the offensive which is now taking place is by no means a mere military-
strategic maneuver, that its origin and consequences have and will continue to
have a tremendous, purely political significancethis our newspaper has already
stated more than once.
The international pressure from the imperialist governments that are Russias
allies, the international treaties that bind the Provisional Government with the
Allies, the unstable internal situation, the desire to consolidate its power and in
fluence, the desire to lower the revolutionary temperature of the massessuch in
our opinion are the main reasons that forced the Provisional Government to launch
action at the front.
The offensive is a product of complex calculations of national and foreign
policy. In this light and only in this light should the question of evaluating its re
sults be viewed. The fact of the offensive by itself as a military operation does not
apparently arouse any differences of opinion. All parties down to the Bolshevik
are in agreement that once begun the offensive must be brought to an end.
To think otherwise, to throw out slogans that will hinder the combat operations
of the army and lower its fighting readiness, would mean to sow discord among
various units of the various armies. It would mean waging a profoundly pernicious
work of disorganization.
We never have been and never will be disorganizes. Therefore we say: the
offensive has begun and must continue, and the more successful, the better for the
army and the country.
But while the bourgeois press, for purely political reasons, maintains silence
as to the meaning of this slogan, we add that, parallel with the offensive on the
German front, the Provisional Government must launch immediately and just as
energetically an offensive on the international front. It must launch immediately
upon a war against the aggressive designs of the allied imperialists, a struggle
for peace on conditions already not infrequently confirmed by the Russian
revolution.
Kerensky is already attacking. It is Tereshchenkos turn now.
The rest of the ministers of the coalition government, who hold the threads
of internal policy, must also assume an offensive. A resolute break with the
policy of compromise and looking to the right, in the camp of Kadetism, an ener
getic struggle with the disorganizing work of our native imperialists and large-
scale bourgeoisie, firm resolution in the matter of organizing the rear and the
public economy, organizing a genuinely democratic government with the support
of the wide strata of the revolutionary democracysuch are the consequences
which flow from the fact of the offensive, such are the conditions under which it
can both strategically and politically lead to a genuine victory of the revolution.
Without these conditions an offensive becomes a dangerous adventure
fraught with the most deplorable consequences.

840. A ppeal of th e 12 th A rmy to the P etrograd Garrison


[Izvestiia, No. 99, June 23,1917, p. 2.]
Our delegates who returned from Petrograd informed us [of the following] :
1) that the Petrograd reserve units are overflowing with men;
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 951
2) that there are many hundreds of machine guns and munitions in special
units which are not being put to use;
3) that work is poorly organized in the reserve units and many persons are
idling; ^ ^
4) that streets, gardens, resort places are overcrowded with promenading
soldiers and that many of them are selling cigarettes on the streets, offering their
services as porters in railroad stations and so on, and that there is complete social
disintegration in the units;
5) that there are numerous and persistent cases of entire units criminally re
fusing, under various pretexts, to go to the front.
In the meantime the ranks of the field forces are thinned from scurvy and other
diseases, and the people are exhausted from the three-year war. Every soldier
and every machine gun is of account and the army must have the assistance of the
country.
In the meantime, blood has already begun to flow on the frontthe sacred
blood of the sons of the revolution.
Tens of thousands of young, healthy people are strolling around in Petrograd
and do not want to go to the front. This is a crime against us, it is a betrayal of the
whole cause of freedom. This is treason, because as a consequence of this there
may be new unknown dead on the front, new victims from the thinning ranks of
the heroes, abandoned by the country.
We, the 12th Army, are defending the approaches and the roads to Petrograd,
we are defending your peaceful life with our bloodand, therefore, we have the
right to make demands.
We are addressing ourselves to the responsible elements of the garrison of revo
lutionary Petrograd and demand drastic measures for arresting the social disinte
gration of the garrison.
At a critical moment in the life of the country we demand immediate assistance
to the army and the immediate dispatch of reserve units to the front.
There must be no delay, no lame excuses.
In the hour of life and death for the freedom that was won, we are sending this
demand from our trenches to the whole garrison of revolutionary Petrograd.
E xecutive C om m ittee of the
S oviet of S oldiers D eputies , 12 t h A rmy

841. R esolution on t h e O ffensive and t h e P olitical S ituation by


t h e F irst I nfantry R eserve R egim ent in P etrograd
[I. Tobolin, Iiulskie dni v Petrograde, KA, XXIII (1927), 47. These attitudes and
actions, particularly those of the First Machine-Gun Regiment (see Doc. 842) were a
prelude to their activities during the July Days. See Volume III.]
I. jR egarding the Offensive
We consider the offensive as a blow against the development in Europe of a
democratic revolutionary movement which alone could bring peace acceptable for
all peoples. The offensive can be stopped by organized [action].
The problem of the offensive should be solved not by the commanding per
sonnel but by the soldiers themselves at the front. A front congress, elected on a
952 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
democratic basis, should be convened immediately. Only such a congress of the
representatives of the front can stop the offensive.
II. Regarding the Machine-Gun Regiment
Having examined the telephone message of the Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, we declare that any kind of suppression
of liberty of speech and the prohibition of propaganda are a resurrection of the
odious methods of the old autocracy. We will not prevent the freedom of prop
aganda and will not serve as a weapon in the hands of the Provisional Govern
ment, if it summons us to suppress the proletariat and the peasantry.
III. Regarding the Existing Situation
Recognizing the situation as too important and responsible for leaving the
power in the hands of the bourgeoisie we demand that all power should be trans
ferred into the hands of the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies,
that the ten ministers from the bourgeoisie should be immediately removed, that
the secret pacts should be immediately published and reviewed.
V . S h ish a k in , Chairman of the Commission
M em bers: V ladimirov , Gavrilov , S trazh , U st vol skii
The General A ssem bly of the First Infantry Reserve Regim ent
S ublieutenant S akharov , Chairman
I. O sipov , Secretary
June 22, 1917
842. Izvestiia on t h e A p p ea l of t h e 1 2 th A rm y and t h e A c tio n s
of t h e P etr o g r a d G arrison
[No. 101, June 25,1917, p. 7.]
. . . Issue No. 99 of Izvestiia carries the address of the Executive Committee
of the Soviet of Soldiers Deputies of the 12th Army to the Petrograd Garrison.
Every conscious revolutionary must give serious thought to this address. It clearly
reveals the basis of the destructive discord between the two powerful camps in the
revolutionary democracy.
For one cannot close ones eyes to the truth: during the past few days and weeks
individuals and irresponsible groups in the Petrograd Garrison have permitted
certain actions that have undermined the armys deep respect for revolutionary
Petrograd.
The revolutionary regiments of Petrograd must make a determined effort to
disassociate themselves entirely from these groups. The revolutionary regiments
must prove to the front and to all of Russia that they have nothing in common
with those manifestations of hooliganism and anarchy for which they are widely
held responsible.
And this must be done as soon as possible while the discord between the front
and revolutionary Petrograd has not yet turned into a permanent rift disastrous
to the revolution.
Loyal to their revolutionary banner, the Petrograd troops will do this, carrying
out the resolutions of their representatives regarding the offensive.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 953
All reserve units must go to the frontsuch is the slogan of the revolutionary
army in the days of the offensive; this slogan has been consecrated by the decision
of representatives of the revolutionary democracy of Russia. And the Petrograd
regiments are sensitively attuned to this slogan. We are certain that there will not
be a single regiment of the Petrograd Garrison which will want to support the
resolution of the First Machine-Gun Regiment adopted on June 21 and published
in issue No. 89 of Pravda .
Having received the proposal of the Executive Committee of the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies to send 30 companies of machine-gunners to the
front, this regiment left its old decision to send ten companies to the front in
force, and resolved: to inform the Executive Committee that henceforth we will
send companies to the front only when the war assumes a revolutionary char
acter, which is possible only if the capitalists are removed from power and the
power is transferred to the democracy as personified by the All-Russian Congress
of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies.
How will the army react to this resolution and this kind of advice? It will in
terpret it as a stab in the back. For it rightly considers that all the machine guns
and all the munitions in the rear belong to the army. And when the army is asking
for reinforcements, not a single regiment should have the audacity to bargain or
name its terms, [saying, in effect, that] if it is on our terms, we will send rein
forcements, and if not, then we wont send them.
The resolution of the First Machine-Gun Regiment creates a particularly strong
impression on the army by virtue of the fact that this resolution contains brazen
threats directed at the Provisional Government and the Soviets of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies.
Yes! Having adopted their absurd resolution on the question of sending
companies to the front, the regiment had the nerve to threaten the Provisional
Government and the organizations that support it, such as the All-Russian Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, with the force of arms!
The revolutionary troops of Petrograd will censure the comrades who forgot
their duty to the army and blatantly violated every code of revolutionary discipline.
In this way and by steadfastly fulfilling its duty, the Petrograd Garrison will avert
the possibility of further intensifying the discord between its comrades at the front
and itself.
Note: The above article was already set in print when the news arrived that
the First Machine-Gun Regiment consented to send 500 machine guns and the
necessary number of men to the position.

843. T h e B eating of S okolov and Other M embers of the P etrograd


S oviet E xecutive Committee by S oldiers at the F ront
[Izvestiia, No. 100, June 24, 1917, p. 8. See a more detailed description in Golder,
pp. 432-34]
On June 21,1917, members Sokolov, Verbo, Yasterbov [Yasaitis], and Rosen
berg of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies, while visiting the 703rd infantry regiment of the 2nd Caucasian grena
954 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
dier division, suffered violence at the hands of the soldiers; as a result, they could
not fulfill the mission assigned to them by the Committee and the Minister of War.
Filled with indignation at this violence and expressing my heartfelt sympathy to
those who suffered for the common cause of strengthening the combat power of
the army, I hope that this unfortunate incident will force all those who call them
selves free citizensand who yet, in their ignorance and abuse of freedom, reach
the point of taking the law into their own handsto revise their thinking. Steps
are being taken against the violators.
K iselevskii, Commander of the 10th Army

844. R e s o lu tio n of t h e 1 0 th A rmy C o m m ittee on t h e


S o k o lo v In cid en t
[Izvestiia, No. 100, June 24,1917, p. 8.]
The general meeting [on June 21] of members of the Army Committee of the
10th Army, together with representatives of corps, division, and regiment com
mittees, having discussed the incident, disgraceful to the revolution, which took
place in the 703rd infantry Suramskii regiment and assumed the form of a beat
ing and arrest of members of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies, comrades Sokolov, Verbo, Rosenberg, and a
member of the army committee, Yasaitis, arrived at the following conclusions:
1) The heating and arrest of members of the Executive Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers and Workers Deputies are a challenge thrown at
the whole revolution as personified by its respected representatives.
2) At the historical moment when the country, for the sake of defending free
dom and the revolution, is demanding coordination and united action of the
democratic people and its revolutionary army, a savage attack on individuals
who were calling for the defense and freedom of the revolution has been com
mitted.
3) The lower elements [of society], the pitiful cowards, joined by the ravishers
of tsarist Russia, which crumbled into dust at the hands of the revolution, united
in one aspiration aimed at the destruction of freedom and the revolution.
All means are acceptable to such traitors to freedom as long as their vile, base
ends can be achieved. Defeatist propaganda, psychological and physical coercion
over any person calling for the protection and strengthening of freedomsuch is
the underlying basis of the beliefs and convictions of these traitors to the country.
4) From the very first days of freedom the history of the 703rd Suramskii
infantry regiment is a disgraceful page in the history of the Russian revolutionary
army. . . . Actions that were disgraceful to the revolution and freedom occurred
more and more frequently in the history of the regiment. Neither the admonitions
nor advice of representatives of other army units, directed at saving the Suramskii
regiment from perilous demoralization, brought any results. . . .
5) The events that transpired in the 703rd Suramskii regiment are a crass
violation of the freedom of speech and assembly.
6) The 703rd infantry regiment must not be permitted to remain in the revo
lutionary army.
7) To express deep and sincere sympathy and condolences on behalf of the
army to comrades Sokolov, Verbo, Rosenberg, and Yasaitis.
On the basis of the above, the meeting resolved that:
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 955
The 703rd Suramskii regiment must be immediately disarmed and disbanded.
The instigators and inciters of said regiment must be given up and subjected to
severe punishment. The case involving all these persons guilty of treason to the
revolution and freedom must be immediately submitted for examination by the
Provisional Government and the Minister of War. . . .
N. Golovinskii, Deputy Chairman
R. R ubinstein , Secretary
845. Izvestiia on th e S okolov I ncident
[No. 100, June 24,1917, p. 8.]
In reporting on this highly regrettable incident, we cannot but express the
feeling of deepest indignation at the senseless, savage behavior of the soldiers of
the 703rd infantry regiment.
This manifestation of the dark instincts of the irresponsible masses of soldiers
is a visible testimony of the amount of work that still remains to be done in
inculcating into the very heart of our army a true understanding of the meaning
of the new principles on which the Russian revolutionary army is being built.
In addition, the violence inflicted on members of the Executive Committee
vividly demonstrated the criminal danger lying in the irresponsible and dema
gogical agitation on the part of those who throw slogans at the masses which
undermine the authority of the recognized and authorized organs of the revolu
tionary democracy.
Let this incident serve as a stern warning for them; let it open their eyes to
that abyss into which they are pushing the Russian democracy.
846. V itriolic L etters to K erensky and B rusilov
[,D e n No. 95, June 27,1917, p. 2. Khaustov was the editor of Okopnaia Pravda and an
agitator in the 7th Army.]
The following letter has been received by the Minister of War:
We, the riflemen of the First Company of the Siberian Regiment, 214 men
strong, have approved the following resolution: we request the immediate re
lease of comrade First Lieutenant Khaustov and his return to his unit.
In the event of our resolution not being complied with, we will be in Petro
grad three men strong from the company, and we will take resolute measures
against you, Mr. Kerensky, using armed force. You will be killed as a dog that
is not yet sufficiently gorged with blood. You are the betrayer of our liberty; you
want to be the despot of Russia, but no, you cannot be, for you are too stupid.
Down with you, Kerensky, author of ironclad discipline; you want to restore
everything as it was before. Leave your post before it is too late; for us three,
death in a struggle for liberty would be beautiful. Down with Kerensky I Down
with Kerensky! Long live the Soldiers and Peasants Deputies! Down with the
whole of the Provisional Government, which consists of accursed bourgeoisie!
Down; leave while its not too late! Down with the nasty beast!
Down! Down! Down with Kerensky, the disbander of regiments!
The Riflemen of I Company of the Siberian
Rifle Regiment, 214 men strong
956 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
A second letter was addressed to A. F. Kerensky and to General Brusilov:
You have asked us to advance against the Germans. No, we will not advance
against the Germans, but we will advance very soon against the Russian bour
geoisie; we will pierce them all with our bayonets and at the same time we will
pierce General Brusilov and Kerensky. Kerensky and Brusilov, await your death!
847. T he D ecision to S end S kobelev and L ebedev to the F ront
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 148, July 1,1917, p. 3.]
Today the Minister-President, Prince G. E. Lvov, called an urgent meeting
of the Provisional Government in the Main Telegraph Building, in view of the
fact that the questions subject to discussion at this sitting called for an immediate
urgent contact with Stavka and with Kiev, where Ministers M. Tereshchenko,
A. F. Kerensky, and I. G. Tseretelli are at the present moment.5
First under discussion was the telegraphic communication to Minister-Presi
dent Prince G. E. Lvov, which arrived late last night from Minister A. F. Kerensky
and Supreme Commander Brusilov, suggesting the desirability of sending a mem
ber of die Provisional Government to the 5th Army, where some disorder has been
observed among the soldiers. In particular, the communication mentioned the
desirability of commissioning Minister of Labor Skobelev.
In opening the sitting, the Minister-President reported that telegrams on the
same subject had been received that morning by the Provisional Government from
the Commissar of the Provisional Government attached to the 5th Army, Khodo-
rovskii, and from the President of the Army Committee, Bogoslovskii. These tele
grams also stressed the desirability of the arrival of M. I. Skobelev in the 5th Army.
Having discussed the information contained in the above-mentioned telegrams
on the prevailing mood in the 5th Army, after contacting Stavka on the direct
wire, and after a further exchange of views, it was resolved to request the Minister
of Labor, Skobelev, and Y. I. Lebedev, in charge of the Ministry of the Navy, to
go today by special train to the 5th Army. M. I. Skobelev and V. I. Lebedev
accepted this commission of the Provisional Government. Moreover, they stated
that in the event of need, they would personally lead the 5th Army into the offen
sive. Before 2:00 oclock in the morning M. I. Skobelev and V. I. Lebedev left
the meeting, and at 2:00 oclock they departed from Petrograd for the front by
special train.
848. German P ropaganda at the F ront
[Izvestiia, No. 107, July 2,1917, pp. 2-3.]
Day in and day out, white sheets of paper carrying German proclamations are
pouring into our trenches. They were pouring in under the old regime, they were
pouring in during the first days of the revolution and during the months of sepa
rate truces and fraternization, and they are pouring in even now when the lull on
a part of the front has changed into a headlong offensive.
Soldiers have varying attitudes toward the German proclamations. The ma
5 The ministers were in Kiev to carry on discussions with the Ukrainian leaders. See
Doc. 354.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 957
jority are clearly aware of the lies contained in them and regard them as a trap.
But there are ignorant people in every regiment who are prepared to believe every
word of the Germans. And even now one can still meet soldiers on the front who
believe the German proclamations more than they do the Petrograd newspapers.
The German General Staff acted through these gullible and ignorant people
to enmesh our army in a web of provocation and espionage.
And the soldiers left the trenches, made their way behind lines of wire ob
structions, and returned to their companies and batteries, loaded down with Ger
man newspapers and proclamations.
Before us lies a batch of such proclamationshere are hectographed appeals,
circular letters on bond paper containing Russian and German texts, and special
newspapers such as Nedelia, Russkii Vestnik (in two different editions), and Pos-
ledniia Izvestiia . . . .
What do the publications of the German General Staff have to say to the
soldiers ?
At first glance, it might seem that they have a little to say about everything,
without following any pattern.
At first glance, one might be surprised at the absence of selfish motive in the
way the German General Staff worked at providing our soldiers with all this
reading matter.
But let us read the German newspapers with greater careand their motive
will become clear.
The Viennese Nedelia is systematically inciting Russian soldiers against Eng
land and France.
After reporting on Russias economic dependence on America, the newspaper
waxes indignant: Thus, it is money for blood! In passing, the newspaper tells
of the way the British are using the bones of the fallen soldiers for fertilizing fields,
how England is dreaming of a counterrevolution and a dictatorship for Russia,
and of many more things in a similar vein.
Russkii Vestnik follows the same policy as Nedelia.
And one can say, without exaggerating, that this constitutes the political pro
gram of all the publications which the German General Staff is circulating among
our soldiers on the front. Their common goal can be expressed in four words:
preparation for separate peace.
Open radio-telegrams, newspapers, proclamationsall this arsenal was un
leashed by the German General Staff in order to bring discord and demoraliza
tion into our army, in order to undermine in our army that which constitutes the
strength of every armyits internal solidarity and discipline.
But all this seemed insufficient to the German General Staff. Our army, in the
opinion of the German generals, was not deteriorating fast enough. Hindenburgs
headquarters then thought of a new form of provocation: the corps and division
commanders of the Austro-German army were instructed to enter into negotiations
for a peace, or truce, with our regimental committees.
958 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS

We will not stop to analyze or refute this literature. There is nothing to analyze
or refute herethe matter is only too clear, and the game too crude.
We will draw but two conclusions from the documents examined:
1) We see how questions of war and peace are being interpreted by the cor
rupt pen-pushers of the recent spies and provocateurs in the service of the German
General Staff. Then let us keep it firmly in mind that such views on these questions
benefit the German General Staff; they benefit the German imperialists.
We will keep this in mind even when such views on questions of war and peace
are advanced to us by persons whose position is independent of the German Gen
eral Staff. We will remember this not for the purpose of accusing anyone who
opposes war of provocation and treason, but in order that we may be able to catch
the mistakes committed by those persons who want to be internationalists but, in
practice, are proposing absurd measures which can only serve the interests of
German imperialism.
2) We have seen that the German General Staff will take advantage of the
ignorance of our soldiers and of their hunger for the printed word in order to
achieve its own ends. Then let us see to it that our revolutionary regiments receive
their intellectual food from our hands and not from the hands of the enemy! Let
ns send to the trenches the newspapers which the soldiers crave! . . .

849. B olshevik S ubversion at the F ront


[Editorial, A Stab in the Back, in Rabochaia Gazeta, No. 97, July 4,1917, p. 1. This
and several of the documents following should be read with reference to the July
Uprising, covered in Volume III.]
Sad things are taking place in the army. At the moment when the offensive
has begun, when thousands of people are perishing, in some units at the front
ignorant, criminal individuals, all sorts of rogues, released criminals, former
policemen and gendarmes, German spies, and others clearly call upon the soldiers
not to obey combat orders. They incite the uninformed soldiers against the Pro
visional Government, particularly against Minister Kerensky, and against the
entire revolutionary democracy as represented by the Soviets of Deputies, etc.
In all their activity this criminal band hides behind Pravda and Soldatskaia
Pravda, which day after day also turn the soldiers against the Government and
the Soviets, against the socialist parties, against all elected organs of democracy.
With the support of Pravda, the newly arrived Bolsheviki, the agents of
counterrevolution, do their dark and traitorous work. Not only do they them
selves refuse to attack, not only do they employ all means to bring disorganization
into the ranks of the army, but they lead away to the rear whole units, leaving
their attacking comrades, and expose the front and destine the soldiers who re
mained true to the revolution to destruction and utter defeat.
Moreover, there were cases where these traitors threatened to machine-gun
those of their comrades who advanced.
And all this is veiled by the revolutionary words from Pravda and Soldatskaia
Pravda.
An end must be put to this.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 959
If the Leninists do not immediately take the most vigorous and energetic
measures to disassociate themselves once and for all, and not in words but in
deeds, from this treacherous work at the front which grows ever more insolent
and shameless, then the whole weight of the consequences will fall upon them.

850. A rmy R eports on B olshevik S ubversion at the F ront


[Excerpts from a survey based on reports to Stavka. Vera Vladimirova, Bolshevizatsiia
fronta v prediiuTskie dni 1917 g. KA, LVIII (1933), 86-100.]

File No . 3, Part I
1) A telegram from the Rumanian front of June 9, among other things, states:
X DivisionThe spirit of the troops has improved, but, according to the words
of the division commander, as before, however, there is no absolute certainty
that an order to attack would be obeyed . . . In X Corps the influence of the
Bolsheviks has lately noticeably increased, aided by the wide distribution of the
newspaper Pravda. . . . The normalization of life and service, which has been
accomplished in some units with much difficulty, is being destroyed in a few days
by agitators, arriving with reinforcements. June 7, 1917. No. 14*26 10/p.
Signed: Golovin . (Sheets 1-2.)
6) Sheet 64 contains the printed resolution of June 15, 1917, of the General
Conference of the 168th Infantry Divisions Regimental Committees, which runs
verbatim as follows: Having discussed the domestic and foreign policy of the
Provisional Government, the joint session of the 169th Divisions Committees
finds it detrimental to revolutionary democratic Russia, demands the immediate
convocation of the representatives of the field army, which would be re-elected
again on democratic principles by equal and secret ballot, in order that they,
together with the Soviets of Workers and Peasants Deputies, can take the power
into their own hands. At the present time, with the existence of treaties con
cluded by the old Government with the imperialistic governments of the Allies,
an offensive of the revolutionary Russian army would be a betrayal of the slogans
proclaimed by our revolutionary democracy. At the same time, in view of the
incomplete organization of the army and its insufficient democratization, such a
step could bring with it the transfer of power into the hands of counterrevolution
ary forces, and, therefore, at the present time there can be no offensive. The
Chairman of the General Assembly: (signed). The Secretary: (signed).
9) Sheet 83 contains a copy of secret report No. 615 of June 15, 1917, from
Colonel Maerskii, Commander of the 675th Infantry Regiment of the field army,
to the Commander of the X Infantry Division. This report shows that on June 13,
after a long debate, the regimental committee decided: 1) We have no confi
dence in the Provisional Government, which carries out the policies of the bour
geoisie, and suggest that the socialist ministers, in order to stop deceiving the
people, should either quit the cabinet or cease to call themselves socialists. 2)
We demand that the power be transferred into the hands of the Soviets of Soldiers,
Workers, Peasants, hired laborers, and other deputies. But after speeches by
960 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
officer-deputies of the regimental committee, it was agreed to discuss this decision
at a regimental meeting, which was set for June 14 at 13 hours. A tower was built
for the meeting and a placard was hung bearing the words: Down with the
Provisional Government and the bourgeoisie! Long live peace and the rights of
the people.5 When medical corpsman Yaroshenko spoke for the offensive, he was
beaten up and it was decided to reduce him to private, in the 32nd Company, which
was put into effect. Officers had no chance to speak at the meeting; only soldiers
spoke, all of them Bolsheviks. The sharp change in the mood of the regiment is
to be explained by the fact that lately the regiment reads only the newspaper
Pravda , does not wish to read other newspapers. With the report is enclosed the
resolution adopted at the meeting of the 675th Konotop Infantry Regiment. The
resolution contains the same two points referred to in the report. Among other
things, point 5 demands an equalization of soldiers and officers salaries: an
ensign to receive 25 rubles, and an additional 5 rubles for each promotion in rank;
point 6 demands the return of the former division commander and his appoint
ment to a reserve company of the 675th Infantry Regiment; point 9 contains the
demand to review and to amend the treaties concluded by the old Government
with the Allies; and point 10 says: There cannot be any kind of offensive; there
must be defense only. (Sheet 84.)

18) A telegram of June 23, signed by Vakhrushev, contains the report of the
5th Army Commander, who advises that the troops of this army, [because of]
their moral condition and state of ferment, cannot be considered ready for an
offensive. Among other things, this telegram says: It is impossible to have
orders executed because of the fierce agitation, coming apparently from the rear
and particularly from Petrograd, carried on against the offensive. The task of
improving the conditions in the army should begin by improving conditions in
the rear. Danilov. In addition to this, the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army has
communicated to me, also by phone, some following details of the conditions under
which the regrouping for the operation takes place: in X Corps the order was not
carried out; in X Division, which had refused to extend its front to the left, indi
vidual companies of X Regiment set out for the positions, while 1,067 men refused
to go; in X Regiment one battalion refused to move. In the rest of the regiments
the situation is as tense, and disorders can be expected when their turn of relief
arrives . . . In X Regiment the order has not been carried out by five companies;
all officers, without exception, have proceeded. Regiments X and X set out guards
and did not permit their officers and those soldiers who wanted to go to the posi
tions [to do so] . . . X Division and X Regiment of another division are in
reserve, and these units also refuse to move forward. In X Corps, under the influ
ence of agitation in X Division, one battalion of X Regiment broke away from
the regiment and remained on the spot with a strength of about 400 men. In
X Corps, X Division broke away from its staff and artillery, gathered around
X Regiment, elected, according to the X Division Commanders report, its own
revolutionary staff, and is sending out agents into other units for propaganda . . .
In some regiments of the 36th Division they declare that they have no authorities
but Lenin. The morale of the army is considerably weakened by the inclusion
in it of X and X Corps, which brought with them solidly built Bolshevik organi
zations. Svechin. It is further communicated: After [hearing] the aforesaid
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 961
report, the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front ordered the Commander
of the 5th Army not to cancel the orders to attack and to energetically continue
to influence the soldiers. At the same time the Commander in Chief of the North
ern Front asked the Supreme Commander to telegraph immediately to Petrograd
to send to the 5th Army without delay commissars of the Provisional Government
and delegates of the conference or of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies for agitation to counterbalance the underground and the open
agitators of Leninist tendencies . . (Sheets 173, 177.)

File No. 3, Part II

33) Telegram received on July 7 from the Rumanian front, signed by Regi
mental Commander Reko, that on July 4 the 8th Company of the Regiment refused
to go out to positions for the offensive, and only after lengthy exhortations and
admonitions did the regiment set out on the night of the 6th in the strength of
eight companies with an insufficient number of riflemen. (Sheet 137.)
36) Telegram of July 10 from Molodechno, signed by Markov, with a sum
mary of the information regarding the mood of the units to July 10. Among other
things, it says: X Regiment has refused to relieve X Regiment (a n o th e r ) The
First Company (of X Regiment) has refused to relieve another [company] of
(another) X Regiment. On July 7 the Second and part of the Fourth Company,
having taken the supplies, started to leave the positions, where only the officers
have remained. The company committees of X Regiment have taken the de
cision to cease fire immediately, which does not bring any advantage to the father
land and takes many lives, and, if our artillery refuses to cease fire, to silence it
by force. In X and X (two) Grenadier Regiments the morale is falling again,
under the influence of news about the unrest in Russia. . . .
[37) ] d) X Infantry Regiment: The regiment has flatly refused to attack
under the influence of Bolshevik agitators and N.C.O.s who have arrived from
reserve units for replacement and who have not been in combat. (Sheet 158.)
40) Copy of the report No. 1783 of July 2, 1917, from the Commander of
the 37th Army Corps to the Commander of X Army, in which, among other things,
is stated: X Division: At the beginning of the revolution the division was placed
in the army reserve in Riga, where it was subjected to intense propaganda from
the Bolsheviks of the Novoladoga Regiment, from which came First Lieutenant
Khaustov, the editor of Okopnaia Pravda and the defamer (in absentia) of War
Minister Kerensky during the latters stay in Riga. With the arrival of the division
on the shores of Riga Bay, its character became clear: committees composed almost
entirely of Bolsheviks, vehement preaching of hostility toward officers and espe
cially toward generals (bloodsuckers in zigzag epaulets) , destruction of land
owners manors, carried out on the route of the regiments march from Riga and
symbolized by the inscription on the red banners: Peace for the hats, ruin to
the palaces.
962 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
851. K erensky on the F ront
[.Izvestiia, No. Ill, July 7,1917, pp. 2-3.]
At a time when certain army units in Petrograd were demanding the removal
and even the arrest of the Minister of War, A. F. Kerensky, and were shouting,
Down with the offensive!6 A. F. Kerensky was touring the regiments of the
revolutionary army of the Western Front, calling upon them to fulfill their duty
to the country and the revolution.
Rumors about events in Petrograd had already reached the front, and the
soldiers, as if in response to the demand of the Petrograd regiments, met the Min
ister with particular warmth and enthusiasm. The Minister did not receive such
an enthusiastic welcome in the regiments of the Southwestern Front. There was
complete unison between the Minister and the regiments of the Western Front
which had thrown out all the cowardly and worthless elements from their midst.
This was the unity of the will of the majority of the Russian democracy about
which the Minister spoke before committees of the Petrograd Garrison units on
June 13, on the eve of [his] departure to the Southwestern Front. At that time
he expressed assurance that the entire Petrograd Garrison would submit to the
will of the majority and would not inflict blows on the back of its Minister of War,
who was placed on the frontand, moreover, by the revolutionary armyto
perform his duty.
The Ministers hopes were not justified. Some Petrograd units, protesting
against the war and the offensive, raised their armed hands . . . against their
own brothers and stabbed them in the back.
By a strange coincidence the events in Petrograd were foreseen by our enemies
long before these events took place.
Here is what the newspaper Tovarishch, published in Vilna, writes in an
article entitled Russia and the Offensive, marked Petrograd, July 3 / June 20.
(P.T.A.) :7
According to news from Russia, the Russian offensive in Galicia aroused
strong feelings of indignation among the Russian people. Crowds of people are
gathering in all big towns protesting against the mass murder of Russias sons.
Indignation against the British, whom everyone considers to be the instigators
and the ones responsible for prolonging the horrors of war, is growing every day.
Kerensky is plainly called a traitor of the people. An enormous demonstration
was staged in Moscow, where Cossacks were summoned with the object of sup
pressing the indignant people. The present situation cannot continue for any
length of time.
Russkoe Slovo reports that the state of siege in Petrograd has intensified
during the past days. During the past weeks very many extreme left-wing social
ists have been arrested. The newspaper reports that leaders of the extreme left
must leave Petrograd and depart for the interior of Russia.
This is what the German newspaper writes. This newspaper is distributed
among our troops at the front by airplanes.
On July 3, at 7:30 p . m ., A. F. Kerensky left Petrograd for the front and on
6 The reference here and elsewhere in the document is to the July Uprising. See Vol. IU.
7 Kerensky cites this article in Tovarishch in his Catastrophe, p. 244, as evidence of the
Germans* foreknowledge of the July Uprising and of their collaboration with the Bolsheviks.
P.T.A.: initials of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 963
July 4 he was already in Molodechno, where he talked with some regiments. The
Minister was compelled to interrupt the tour of the front as a result of telegrams
he received from Petrograd, and left for Mogilev for talks at Petrograd. On the
morning of July 5 the Minister left Mogilev for Molodechno, where he arrived
at 7:00 p . m .
Here the Minister was given an enthusiastic welcome by a crowd of many
thousands of soldiers, expressing their sincere joy at the return of the popular
Minister to the front. With exalted shouts of Hurrah from a crowd of soldiers
that accompanied him, the Minister drove closer to the front-line trenches where
combatant regiments of the division, intended for battle, were lined up for his
arrival in a big pine forest. The regiments were lined up according to field train
ing regulations, with the regiments banners, the red banners of the revolution,
and the bands on the right flanks. All the trees from top to bottom were filled
with soldiers who did not enter the formation. . . .
When the regiments gathered around the automobile and arranged themselves
in an amphitheater [formation], A. F. Kerensky addressed the following words
to them:
I greet you on behalf of the free revolutionary people. I am happy and proud
to have the honor to be among you and to endure with you all the anxieties of
these great days. Having thrown off the chains of slavery of the tsarist power,
the Russian people have become the freest people in the world. The people are
now fighting for the happiness and freedom of the broad, working masses, for land
and freedom, for the honor, independence, and dignity of the great free Russian
people. Fighting in the name of the right to live freely, you are carrying, on the
points of your bayonets, a message of the brotherhood of all peoples, of the tri
umph of the great principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity. The Russian
people have many enemies. Foreign and domestic enemies are trying to sow dis
cord and mutual distrust in the ranks of the revolutionary troops . . . Comrades,
fight those who whisper words about distrust to you. . . . Great are your heroic
feats, great are your sufferings. The whole Russian people bows before your . . .
feats. . . . If we are unable to defend freedom, it will perish, the red banners
will fall, and the great day of celebration for the working masses will disappear.
New generations will live in suffering and will curse the names of those who were
unable to stand in the defense of freedom.
We will not let this happen was heard from all sides.
With strong, prolonged shouts of Hurrah from the crowds of many thousands
of soldiers, the Minister, escorted by a mounted reconnoitering detachment, drove
off to the next regiments, situated considerably closer to the front lines. On the
way there, rumblings of artillery fire were heard constantly, ever closer and closer.
The shots were becoming more and more audible. When the Minister was ap
proaching the place where the units were stationed, the firing became considerably
intensified and explosions from enemy shrapnel were visible from the hillock.
Regiments from two divisions carrying red banners were lined up in the glen and
met the Minister with amazing warmth and sincerity. Here, too, were lined up
the regiments of the Caucasian grenadier division which had thrown out from
their midst all the worthless and cowardly [elements] which had been disrupting
the normal course of life in the division.8
8See Docs. 843-45.
964 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
The Minister, met by the Marseillaise and strong prolonged shouts of Hur
rah, walked to the front, greeting the troops. Then the regiments gathered in two
places. At the first place, the Minister, standing on a two-wheeled camp cart, spoke
before a crowd of ten thousand soldiers. The appearance of the Minister . . .
was met with a storm of applause and strong prolonged shouts of Hurrah.
Your welcome and your applause, comrades, said the Minister, testify to
the fact that you are, with all your heart and soul, at one with the Russian de
mocracy in its drive for equality and fraternity. You have welcomed and met me
as a brother and a comradenot out of caprice, or by a tsarist order, but by the
will of the revolutionary people, by the decision of the revolutionary Government,
which has assumed the responsibility for the valiant, brave Russian revolutionary
army.
Exalted cries of Hurrah.
Whatever happens to you tomorrow, continued the Minister, today, calmly
and bravely, with chests bared, we will go forward in the name of freedom,
equality, and fraternity. Think, comrades; before us awaits a completely free,
happy life . . . Can one really be sorry to suffer and to give up ones life for
such a life? Can there really be even a single coward and traitor who could forget
his duty? I call on you, comrades, commanders, officers, and soldiers, as the
valiant vanguard of the revolutionary armyforward! Carry the ideas of free
dom, equality, and fraternity on your banners to those who do not recognize them.
I have heard that even among you there have been discords. There were people
who broke away from the common cause, who thought of themselves, of saving
their own little lives. These people are serving the enemies of the people. . .
When the shouts of Hurrah quieted down, the commander of the army corps
declared:
Comrades, let us swear an oath that as soon as there is an order to advance,
we will go, as one man, loyal to duty and to the appeal of the revolutionary leader,
Minister Kerensky. From the bottom of our heartshurrah to Comrade Ke
rensky!
A member of the Executive Committee spoke:
It was not only the Minister of War who spoke to us, but Comrade Kerensky,
who has dedicated his whole life to the fight for land and freedom. As a revolu
tionary fighter, he has the right to demand that we execute his will. Then let us
give him our word that at his order we will advance without fear or doubt!
We give [our word], we give [our word] was heard from all sides. Com
rade, Minister, lead us; we are ready to advance!
The Commander of the Potiiskii Regiment, holding in his hands a red and
black banner, on one side of which was inscribed God is with us and The sal
vation of free Russias honor, and on the other Better death than see the down
fall of Russia, turned to the Minister with the following words:
I am happy that the lot fell to me of expressing to you, Mr. Minister, on behalf
of the whole regiment, the gratitude, love, and respect for the labor, pains, and
suffering you have endured for the good of the Russian people. We, an infini
tesimal part of the Russian people, ask you to give us, with your firm, strong, and
honest hand, this banner behind which we will march with our last drop of blood.
Comrades of the Potiiskii Regiment, let us shout a friendly, heartwarming Hur
rah to Minister Kerensky, the chosen representative of the people.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 965
A powerful Hurrah resounded in answer.
A. F. Kerensky took the banner and, turning to the Potiiskii Regiment, said:
Comrades of the Potiiskii Regiment! With all the strength of the love and faith
in the selfless valor of the revolutionary troops, I, in the name of the free people,
am entrusting your shock battalion with this banner. I believe that this banner,
flying over your regiment, will not lower before anyone and your new feats will
cover your valiant regiment with new glory. Allow me, on behalf of the free
people, to bow to the ground before die great suffering of the Russian army, our
brothers and comrades.
In deathly silence, the Minister bows to the ground before the regiments.
A highly tense atmosphere was created, which was cut by the powerful cries
of Hurrah after a common soldier, having accepted the banner from the Min
ister and raised it high above his head, declared:
For three years I havent gone out of the trenches, four times my blood flowed,
and I am ready to continue to stand in the ranks of the army for the defense of
liberty, equality, and fraternity. With this proud banner we will show the enemy
that our army is alive and not dead. . . .
Thousands of people joined in shouting Hurrah and carrying the banner
throughout the vicinity.
Then A. F. Kerensky turned to the regiments with the following words:
. . There is no need for me to coax you, or convince you. There is no need
to say that we must fight for the happiness of our native land. Courageously,
bravely, and calmly, go and fulfill the great duty and the immortal heroic feat.
May your hand not hesitate. Do not listen to those who are trying to confuse your
hearts. Those are traitors, cursed by all the people. They alone cannot feel the
sacredness of the heroic feat which you are achieving in the name of Russias
freedom. All Russia, all the people, all those who love the native land, are with
you. In order that you may feel and know this, the revolutionary government
sent me to you so that I, together with you, could pass through these terrible days.
Believe, Commander, that the army will fulfill its duty. . . .
With strong, prolonged shouts of Hurrah, the soldiers accompanied the
Minister to the automobile and followed him for a long while, carrying red ban
ners. A mounted reconnoiter and artillery detachment escorted the Minister to
the train.
Here the Minister was informed of the necessity of returning immediately to
Petrograd. When the soldiers, and especially the army committees, found this out,
they expressed regret with regard to the unexpected departure, as still many more
regiments were impatiently awaiting the arrival of their revolutionary leader.
Around 2:00 P.M. on July 6, the Ministers train, seen off by exalted cries of
Hurrah, left in the direction of Petrograd.
At one of the smaller railroad stations, the Minister met an echelon of artillery
men going to the front. Leaving his compartment, the Minister greeted them and
addressed them with the following words:
. . I must note that from the very beginning of the revolution, the artillery
troops have at all times exhibited the height of awareness of their civil and mili
tary duty. And there wasnt a single case among them of succumbing to the in
fluence of the traitorous dark forces of the country, which even today, when
fraternal blood is flowing on the front, are trying to destroy the results of this
966 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
offensive. Russian artillerymen have recently fulfilled their duty in the capital
when, in the name of the revolution, in defense of equality and fraternity, they
had to shoot some shells in order to suppress the enemies of freedom. . . . The
life of the country is following its normal course. There may he a change of people
in government posts. And your Minister of War, appointed by the will of the
revolutionary people, is performing his duties according to the dictates of his
conscience and his sense of duty, but the moment may arrive when he, too, may
have to leave. Remember then, comrades, that one must serve an idea and not
persons. Remember that the idea of saving the native land and the revolution
comes first and is the highest of all. The strength of the army does not lie in
individuals but in the idea of and love for the native land. Long live the revo
lutionary artillerymen!
Accompanied by cries of Hurrah, the Minister proceeded farther in the
direction of Petrograd.

THE GERMAN COUNTERATTACK


852. T he A ppeal of the G overnment to the A rmy
[VVP, No. 100, July 9,1917, p. 1. The German counterattack began on July 6.]
Three weeks ago on the orders of the Minister of War the armies of the South
western Front, under the command of the Supreme Commander, undertook the
offensive with a powerful revolutionary spirit. Thirty-six thousand prisoners,
more than 90 guns, and more than 400 machine guns were captured by these
armies. The glorious designations of Regiments of July 18 will henceforth be
recorded in the annals of the revolution. These heroes placed above their own
lives the honor and existence of a free country and the safety of the Russian revo
lution threatened at the front by the bayonets devoted to Wilhelm and at the rear
by treacherous mutiny. The disorders in the interior were suppressed by the power
of the people, but a great danger still threatens the revolution. Having concen
trated his forces, the foreign enemy has, in his turn, assumed the offensive. May
his treacherous plan of simultaneously breaking our front and of striking a blow
from the rear unite all those to whom Russia and her liberty are not empty words.
Troops of the revolutionary armies! Your brothers who have gone to fight
with red banners call upon you to join them and to fight with them in the defense
of liberty and in the name of just conditions for a lasting peace.
In accordance with the will of the revolutionary people, as the first order of
your military leaders, advance in serried ranks, taking no notice of cowards and
of traitors to the motherland.
Save liberty! Save the motherland!
July 8, 1917
853. T h e A ttack on th e W estern F ront : th e M lynovskii R egiment
[Official communique, VVP, No. 99, July 8, 1917, p. 2. See Doc. 860.]
During the entire day there was an active artillery duel in the direction of
Vilna.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 967
After strong artillery preparation the enemy attacked several times on the
Peniki-Garbusov front, 30 versts to the south of Brody, but at first all the attacks
were repulsed.
At 10:00 oclock the 607th Mlynovskii Regiment, which occupied the sector
Batkus-Manaiuvi (in the same region), arbitrarily left the trenches and withdrew
to the rear; as a result, its neighbors also had to withdraw, which gave the enemy
the opportunity to follow up his success. Our failure is to be explained to a con
siderable degree by the fact that under the influence of Bolshevik agitation many
units, having received combat orders for the purpose of supporting the units under
attack, gathered at meetings and discussed whether the orders should be obeyed;
at the same time some regiments refused to accomplish their combat assignments
and withdrew from their positions without any pressure on the part of the enemy.
The efforts of the commanders and of the committees to incite the troops to fulfill
the orders proved to be fruitless.
[July 7, 1917]
854. T he A ttack on the S outhwestern F ront : the 11 th A rmy
[Telegram from the Executive Committees of the Southwestern Front and of the 11th
Army and the Commissars of the Provisional Government to the Minister of War, the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Peasants Deputies, and the Supreme Commander. Russkiia
Vedomosti, No. 156, July 11,1917, p. 3.]
The German offensive, which began on July 6 on the front of the 11th Army,
is assuming the character of a disaster which threatens a catastrophe to revolu
tionary Russia. A fatal crisis has occurred in the morale of the troops recently
sent forward against the enemy by the heroic efforts of the conscientious minority.
Most of the military units are in a state of complete disorganization, their en
thusiasm for an offensive has rapidly disappeared, and they no longer listen to
the orders of their leaders and neglect all the exhortations of their comrades, even
replying to them with threats and shots. Some elements voluntarily evacuated
their positions without even waiting for the approach of the enemy. Cases are
on record in which an order given to proceed with all haste to such-and-such a
spot, to assist comrades in distress, has been discussed for several hours at meet
ings, and the reinforcements were consequently delayed for 24 hours. These ele
ments abandon their positions at the first shots fired by the enemy.
For a distance of several hundred versts long files of deserters, both armed
and unarmed, men who are in good health and robust, who have lost all shame
and feel that they can act altogether with impunity, are proceeding to the rear of
the army. Frequently entire units desert in this manner.
The members of the aforesaid Committees and the Commissars of the Gov
ernment unanimously recognize that the situation demands extreme measures and
extreme efforts, for everything must be risked to save the revolution from a catas
trophe. The Commander in Chief on the Southwestern Front and the Commander
of die 11th Army, with the consent of the Commissars and Committees, have today
given orders to fire on deserters and runaways.9 Let the country know the truth,
9 On July 17, Kornilov, the newly appointed Commander in Chief of the Southwestern
Front, also forbade meetings of any kind in the theater of military operations on his front.
968 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
let it act without mercy, and let it find enough courage to strike those who by their
cowardice are destroying and selling Russia and the revolution.
July 9, 1917
855. K erensky s O rder to the A rmy and N avy, N o. 28
[VVP, No. 101, July 11,1917, p. 2.]
From the reports that I have received on events transpiring on the South
eastern Front and, in particular, on the grievous events in the 11th Army, I con
sider it my duty to note once again the consistently valiant conduct of the com
manding staff, bearing evidence of their devotion to freedom and the revolution
and of their supreme love for the fatherland.
I order that military discipline be restored, implementing the full force of
revolutionary power, including recourse to force of arms, in order to save the
army; the disintegration of the army cannot be permitted.
It is imperative that army units be purged immediately of all criminal elements
advocating, through the press or by agitation, insubordination to authority and
violation of combat orders.
In accordance with the Provisional Government Law of July 6, all [parties]
guilty of appealing, in the course of the war, to officers, soldiers, and other military
personnel to disobey the laws, which are operative under the new democratic
organization of the army, and the orders issued by military authorities in accord
ance with these laws shall be prosecuted and sentenced for high treason.
I enjoin all commanders, and all conscious elements in the army and the navy,
as represented by their elective committee organs, to unite in the face of the enemy
in a struggle against traitors who are consciously leading the army into defeat
and the country into disgrace.
This order shall be read in all companies, batteries, squadrons, and ships
crews and companies.
A. K erensky, Minister of War and Navy
July 8, 1917

856. R eport of the Commander of the 11 th A rmy to S tavka


[Vera Vladimirova, Bolshevizatsiia fronta v prediuiTskie dni 1917 goda, KA, LVIII
(1933), 97-98.]
By the will and trust of the Government I accepted the 11th Army. On arrival
I immediately went to the location of our corps at the battle front which determined
the fate of our defense on the Tarnopol sector. On learning the sentiments of the
troops, I am horrified at the disgrace and ruin which threaten Russia and the
revolution . . . In general the army is on the run. It is even hard to conjecture
where the enemy might be stopped. The entire commanding and officer personnel
Izvestiia, No. 120, July 18, 1917, p. 7. Later, he gave orders to shoot without trial a]l those
who rob, use force on, or kill peaceful citizens, and all those who refuse to carry out military
orders. I will stop at nothing, he wrote in the Order, to save the country from destruction
due to the despicable behavior of traitors, betrayers, and cowards. Rech\ No. 170, July 23,
1917, p. 3.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 969
is powerless to do anything short of self-sacrifice . . . [ellipses in text]. The
tragedy of the high command lies in the fact that instead of sending the loyal de
tachments against the enemy it has to direct them to suppress the mutinying com
panies and whole divisions in the rear and to stop marauding and pillaging. The
need of depending on numbers of loyal troops and companies to restore order
leads to dissent within the army, which in turn results in its further demoraliza
tion. As a loyal son of Russia who has given his life to the service of his mother
land, I feel duty-bound to inform the Government that Russian democracy and the
revolution are dying. I think it urgently necessary to declare the army nonpolitical
and to prohibit the troops from holding all meetings and discussions of political
questions, to restore in full measure the disciplinary authority of commanders and
courts-martial with the application of the death penalty.10 I regard the abolition
of the latter in the active army incorrect: if the Government sends men to death
from the bullets of the enemy, why does it make it possible for betrayers and
traitors to avoid this death? With such measures, if the offensive is stopped
on all fronts, and if our valiant allies divert the attention of the enemy from us,
we can still hope to save the army, to introduce order and train it, but only on
condition of court-martialing all who propagandize among the troops against war
and the offensive and incite them to disobedience. Only such literature should
be permitted among the troops which is passed by the Soviet of Workers5 and
Soldiers Deputies and committees of the fronts and the armies. Although these
measures cancel some freedom granted to the citizen-warriors, this is the only
means to restore some degree of order in the army and thus save the motherland
from ruin, and with her also the revolution. Kremenets. July 12 No. 4443. Baluev
(11 192-197).

857. B reakthrough in th e R ear and at the F ront


[Editorial in Den\ No. 104, July 8,1917, p. 1.]
During the past days, Russia has lived through a regular nightmare; we
scarcely become accustomed to one horror when our nerves are assailed with
something new, and the preceding horrors pale when compared with the new ones.
When during the first days of the revolution the pages of Pravda resounded
with the appeal: Down with the war at the front and long live civil war in the
rear, we did not want to believe that anyone was capable of preaching such ideas
in their literal sense.
It was impossible to imagine that people could be found who could be drawn
on this senseless path.
Four months have passed and we are confronted with the Leninist ideas be
coming a reality.
While here in Petrograd the Bolshevik regiments, under the leadership of ex
perienced plotters, were advancing in complete combat order, their spiritual com
panions in arms were retreating at the front, leaving their positions to the enemy
without fighting.
We think that Stavka has never communicated such horrifying information
as today. The 607th Mlynovskii Regimentwe readarbitrarily left the trenches
10 See Chap. 18 on the restoration of the death penalty in the army.
970 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
and withdrew to the rear, as a result of which its neighbors also had to withdraw,
which gave the enemy the opportunity to follow up his success.
The estimate of the final logical conclusions of Leninism gives no rise to con
troversy. Everybody is confronted, in an almost tangible form, with the betrayal
of the revolution and of Russia.
Another question that arises: How can one fight these phenomena? There is
only one answer: By definitely abandoning the policy of building up the state
on the bases of Tolstoyism.
Up to now we have witnessed not a democratic system of government but a
specifically Russian anarchical Tolstoyan system.
By relying on the will of the revolutionary people, the Government in Petrograd
has started to subordinate the unruly, without hesitating in extreme cases to use
armed force.
The imperious tone which this Government will take at the frontand we do
not doubt that it will nownot only will not cause bloodshed, but on the contrary
will safeguard the life of many faithful defenders of the revolution.
The disorganization of the front began in the rear, and there is no doubt that
now when the trenches hear the news of the revolutions victory over the betrayers
in Petrograd, of the ruin of the Bolshevik attempt to break through the internal
front, our army will find in itself a new source of strength for the liquidation of
bolshevism at the front.
It should not be forgotten that under the most favorable conditions of develop
ment, during a lull in the fighting, the Bolsheviks have managed to contaminate
only an insignificant proportion of our soldiers.
A healthy statesmanlike instinct and the realization of the necessity to defend
the conquests of the revolution from the external foe have saved our army.
Let Petrograd remember that the firmness of the revolutionary regime is the
foundation of the regeneration of the front.
Every victory of the counterrevolution in Petrograd, even of modest degree,
threatens the front with catastrophe.

858. A ppeal to the A rmy from the E xecutive Committees of the


S oviet of W orkers' and S oldiers D eputies and the
S oviet of P easants D eputies
\_Izvestiia, No. 114, July 11, 1917, pp. 1-2. The internal political crisis was still in
progress and simultaneous appeals in connection with it and the military threat were
issued by the Soviets to the general population, the workers, and the peasants. See the
sections in the July Days in Volume III.]
Comrade S oldiers !
One of our armies faltered. The regiments ran before the enemy. Part of
the front has been broken through. Wilhelms hordes are sweeping down into the
country, carrying death and destruction with them.
Where does the responsibility fall for this disgrace?
The responsibility falls on those who were disorganizing the ranks of the army,
who were undermining its discipline.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 971
The responsibility falls on those who, in a moment of danger, disobeyed the
battle orders, who wasted time on fruitless discussions and arguments.
Many of those who abandoned their ranks and tried to save themselves by
flight paid for their disobedience with their livesthey were mowed down by
enemy fire.
Comrade soldiers!
If this bloody lesson does not teach us anything, then there will be no saving
Russia.
Enough words! The time has come to act without hesitation.
We have recognized the Provisional Government as the Government to Save
the Revolution. We have recognized its unlimited authority and unlimited powers.
Let its orders be law for everyone!
He who disobeys in battle the order of the Provisional Governmenthe is a
traitor. And there will be no mercy shown to traitors and cowards.
Comrade soldiers!
You need a lasting peace. You need land and freedom. Then know that only
by a persistent fight will you win peace for Russia and for all peoples. By retreat
ing you will deprive yourselves of both land and freedom. You will also deprive
yourselves of peacethe victorious imperialists of Germany will force all of you,
time and again, to war in the defense of their interests.
Soldiers at the front!
Let there be neither traitors nor cowards in your midst! Let not a single one
of you retreat a single step before the enemy! There is only one road open to
youthe road ahead.
Soldiers in the rear!
Be prepared, everyone, to go to the front in support of your brothers, forsaken
and betrayed by regiments who fled from their positions.
Gather all your strength for the fight for a lasting peace, for land and freedom!
Without hesitation, without fear, without destructive argumentsexecute all
battle orders!
Comrade soldiers!
The workers of Russia and of the whole world are looking to you with hope.
The destruction of the Russian revolution spells destruction for everyone.
Gather all your courage, perseverance, and discipline.
Save our native land!
Save the revolution!
Central E xecutive Committee of the S oviet of W orkers and
S oldiers D eputies and the E xecutive Committee of the
S oviet of P easants D eputies

859. T he S ituation on th e Galician and R umanian F ronts


[Rech\ No. 162, July 13,1917, p. 1.]
To wage war, said Napoleon, means to take into account all possibilities.
No maxim could now be more fitting to characterize the activity of our Supreme
Command.
In general, in war the most difficult thing is to make the right decision which
completely corresponds to the total situation. And now, when the Supreme Com
mander does not possess any data to enable him to estimate even the forces of
972 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
his own army capable of resisting, to make such a decision is even more difficult.
At the same time our command now has to take immediately the most extreme
strategic decisions in order to save the army. This is especially difficult concerning
the Galician front.
Because of the hasty withdrawal which recalls the flight of General Erdelis
9th Army, the units of the 2nd and 4th Austrian Armies have deeply enveloped
the right flank of our 7th Army of General Selivachev, who, as a consequence, is
obliged to carry out a very complicated withdrawal march on the flanks.
To the honor of General Selivachevs army it should be noted that it has
maintained order the whole time; its flank rear guards are very successfully
holding the onslaught of the 2nd Austrian Army and make possible the painless
withdrawal of the main forces from combat.
The 7th Army of General Cheremisov finds itself in a somewhat better situa
tion; under cover of the troops of General Selivachev it retreats along those fields
where only recently it so brilliantly advanced under its gallant leader, General
Kornilov. It finds itself obliged to abandon Galich, which so recently was occupied
by us, and even Stanislavov, which was the whole time in our hands; all our
positions on the rivers Lommitsa and Bystritsa are abandoned and the troops of
the 8th Army are withdrawing to the east on the entire front from the Dniester
to the Carpathians.
Such is the blueprint of the Galician front. In order to ease this extremely
difficult situation of our retreating armies, the Supreme Commander, taking into
account possibilities, has decided to move the Russian-Rumanian troops to the
offensive. By his order the united armies of General Raffoso and the Rumanian
troops of General Averesko have been moved forward in Rumania in the southern
part of the Carpathians. Not expecting a blow on this front, the enemy was not
prepared and suffered a serious reverse on the very first day.
The blow on the Rumanian front is bound to influence the situation in Galicia.
For it is not the external resistanceas General von Schlieffen wrotebut an
inner contact between operations which makes the combat on one battlefield con
tribute to victory on another. Here General Brusilov has quite correctly taken
into account the possibilities, and the blow inflicted by the steadfast troops of
the Rumanian front will partly repair the catastrophe on the Galician fields.
Judging by todays communication from Stavka, the onslaught of the armies
of General Bem-Ermoli (2nd and 5th Austrian armies) against the troops of
General Erdeli on June 11 was not especially aggressive, and in certain places
our units, without pressure from the enemy, abandoned the positions of their own
volition and retreated. Thus also the important strategic junction of roads at
Ternopol was abandoned, where the Izmailovskii, the Jaeger, the Moscow, the
Grenadier, and the Finland guard regiments shamefully abandoned their positions
and left.11 Likewise the 74th, the 113th, and the 153rd infantry divisions have
behaved shamefully on the Seret; as a consequence of their withdrawal, our units
had to retreat toward Trembovli and almost to Buchach itself, toward the village
of Petlikovtse lying ten versts to the north of the town just mentioned.
The enemy also approaches Buchach from the west, where, having broken
through our front in the sector of Przhevloka-Ezerzhany, he has already reached
the small town of Barishch, which lies eight versts to the west of Buchach.
See Doc. 861.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 973
This last reverse places the units of General Selivachevs 7th Army, which
occupied the region of Monastergisk, in an exceptionally difficult situation; their
retreat has now been complicated to the extreme. It is terrible to think that all
this has happened because of the withdrawal from their positions of those base
cowards, the men of the Mlynovskii Regiment. Saving their own lives, they sacri
ficed tens of thousands of their more worthy comrades.
Passing to the examination of the particulars of the engagements on the Ru
manian front, one should take note of the success of our allies in the region of
the village of Bemnurile-de-Sus which is situated on the sources of the Sushitsa
River, a right tributary of the Seret, where the Rumanian troops have attacked
the units of General Artzs last Austrian Army, and somewhat more to the south
between the Supitsa River and Putna, where our troops took possession of Gen
eral Artzs positions on the Geurede-Voloshkane front. These positions are 30
versts to the northwest of Fokshany.
There is no doubt that the show of our activity on the Russian-Rumanian
front must alarm the Austrians, who in the beginning of the Galician operation
transferred all their reserves on the Rumanian front to Galicia and now will be
compelled to begin again the transfer of these reserves to the Rumanian front.
Now the strategic blueprint of General Brusilov is clear to us. He systemati
cally harasses the enemy everywhere where there is the slightest possibility of so
doing. He is active near Dvinsk, or in the direction of Smorgonik or on the
Rumanian front; he inflicts pricks on the enemy, endeavoring to avail himself
of the right moment and to bring toward the Seret the still organized army of
Generals Selivachev and Cheremisov.
The events of the last days, especially the valor of the Preobrazhenskii and
the Semenovskii Regiments, of the 194th Infantry Division, of the 3rd and 5th
Motorcycle Battalions, and of the Polish Uhlans, show that the valor of the
Russian soldier is not yet extinguished, that as yet there are many faithful sons
of the people among the army who are ready to defend liberty and the nation with
their blood. No, not only sons, but also daughters, because in the combat of the
last days the womens battalion has shown exceptional valor, having replaced
cowards and repelled the onslaught of the enemy by brilliant counterattack.
Perhaps the example of honest service to the homeland and the revolution
will shame the cowards and will induce them to take themselves in hand!
860. T he V indication of th e 6 th Grenadier D ivision and
the M lynovskii R egiment
[Izvestiia, No. 147, August 18,1917, pp. 2-3.]
Copy from copy.
A
I communicate the order to the 6th Grenadier Division of July 31, 1917,
No. 157/B. Copy.
The Division was accused of betrayal and arbitrary withdrawal from the
battlefield during the engagement of July 6. The Division was threatened with
shameful disbandment.12 A strict investigation has been carried out on the sub
12 Upon assuming the Supreme Command (see Chap. 18), General Kornilov moved to
disband the regiments accused of desertion in the face of the enemy. Novoe Vremia, No. 14836,
July 26,1917, p. 7.
974 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
ject by Lieutenant General Ilkevich and Major General Goshtoft, who were com
missioned by the Supreme Commander, by the Commander in Chief of the
Southwestern Front and by the Commander of the Army.
The investigation has definitely established the valorous behavior of the
Division in the aforementioned engagement and Major General Goshtoft has ad
dressed to the commanders of the 25th and 11th corps the following telegram:
I deem it my pleasant duty and as an old soldier am happy to let you know that
according to the result of the investigations I am reporting that the 607th Infantry
Mlynovskii Regiment and the whole 6th Grenadier Division cannot be accused
of betrayal, treason, and arbitrary withdrawal from positions. On July 6 the
division fought and died. 2513. Major General Goshtoft.
The original was sent by Major General Gavrilov.
Witnessed by Acting Chief of Staff Captain Kolesnikov.
B
Appendix No. 3 to Telegram No. 2513. Copy
According to the data of the investigation that took place with regard to
the actions in combat on July 6 of the 6th Grenadier Division, and in particular
of the 607th Infantry Mlynovskii Regiment which is part of it, it was established
with absolute evidence and with documents that there was no treason or betrayal
on the part of the Division; likewise there was no arbitrary withdrawal from
positions by the 607th Infantry Mlynovskii Regiment or by the whole division.
In view of the accusations that were raised against it, the Division was in
tended for disbandment, but it should be acknowledged that although it has
suffered a defeat it has fulfilled its duty honestly and conscientiously in the
measure of its forces and possibilities.
The Division was wiped out by enemy artillery fire of more than 200 guns
while it had only 16 guns, and out of its very weak strength before the battle
(3,400 effectives) it suffered losses numbering 95 officers (including two com
manders of regiments) and up to 2,000 soldiers.
Izvestiia comments: The Mlynovskii Regiment became the victim of calumny.
Before an enemy that was five times stronger and superior to it in armament
the regiment did not flee. The thin ranks of the Division were wiped out by
the fire of 200 enemy guns. The division even fought with its bare hands, but
it did not flee, and it perished.
And this calumny is not accidental! It represents a scheme!13

861. I n D efense of the A ctions of the Guards


[The first item is from Izvestiia, No. 131, July 30,1917, p. 7; the second and third from
ibid., No. 164, September 7, 1917, p. 8.]
13 The implication here was that General Kornilov and Stavka were attempting to malign
the morale and discipline of the troops in order to justify the restoration of severe disciplinary
measures in the army and the rear and even the initiation of counterrevolutionary political
action. See the comment at the end of the following document, which was published after the
Kornilov affair; also the controversy concerning the circumstances of the German capture of
Riga (Chap. 18), and the sections on the Kornilov affair in Volume III.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 975
A
In view of the wholesale accusations against the entire Guard of arbitrary
withdrawal from positions, the Commander of the 2nd Guard Corps requests
the publication of his order to the Corps for the purpose of rehabilitating the
units of the 2nd Guard. We reproduce excerpts from this order:
The regiments when they were in reserve suffered in various degree with
the disease that was common to all the armies: the reluctance to fight actively on
foreign territory, and so forth.
The Corps went through its most acute crisis in the region of G. B. Kh.,
when only the officers, the artillery, the Litovskii and the Volynskii Guard Regi
ments, almost all the regimental commands of machine gunners and of scouts,
the noncommissioned officers cadres, and individual companies and batteries, etc.,
of the other regiments preserved their military morale. Nevertheless the position
at G. was firmly defended by the Corps.
The unfit element, the Keksgolm Guard Regiment, having been isolated
with the assistance of the Assistant Commissar of the 7th Army, Tsipkevich, the
Corps began to recover rapidly, thanks to the combined efforts of the com
manding personnel and the military committees: the Petrograd Guard Regiment,
the First Strelkovyi Guard Regiment, and the 4th Strelkovyi Guard Regiment
threw out the unworthy individuals themselves, and unanimously all of the
regiments began to prepare themselves for the attack on the enemy posi
tions at B.
The elemental retreat of some corps compelled the high command to withdraw
also the 2nd Guard Corps from its positions in order to transfer it to the more
imperiled region of Ya. B. S.
For five to six days the Corps had to perform a difficult flank march on roads
filled with supply columns of other units. The Corps accomplished this com
plicated combat task brilliantly, with hardly any losses either in men or in
materials, except those supplies of weapons, equipment, and so forth, that were
destroyed in P. and T. because, owing to the rapid withdrawal of the army and
the absence of means of transportation, there was no possibility of removing them.
Out of 20,000 men, about 230 men were really enfeebled and lagged behind, and
about 30 men, the majority of whom were instigators hostile to the regiments
because of egotistic interests, deserted. It was necessary to cover 35 to 40 versts
daily without halting in order to occupy new positions which sometimes had to
to be done by force, as, for example, by the 1st Strelkovyi Regiment on July 11,
on the front of M. P. or by the 3rd Guard Division near Ch. on July 13 on the
river S.
The Corps has not retreated from any position without orders and now, stand
ing firmly on the borders of the homeland, it has delivered several short blows
to the enemy, costing him serious losses and the capture of prisoners and machine
guns; [thus it] forced four enemy divisions to temporarily abandon active opera
tions and to pass to passive defense.

B
Rumors are circulating widely among the population and the army con
cerning the allegedly disgraceful conduct of the Jaeger Guards Regiment both
976 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
before and during the Ternopol9 Operation, that the Regiment opened up the
front, that the Regiment was in flight, reproaches for cowardice, etc.
The Commander of the Jaeger Guards Regiment asserts categorically that:
1) The break-through on the Galician front occurred in a section that was
never occupied by the Regiment. Besides, the Regiment was already replaced.
Therefore, the accusation against the Regiment of opening up the front is false.
2) The Jaeger Guards Regiment was retreating in complete order, following
only orders of the command. Rumors regarding the Regiments flight are false.
3) The dispatches that appeared in certain newspapers to the effect that
the Jaeger Guards Regiment did not bring kitchen supplies [to the front] out
of cowardice and that, as a result, there was no hot food for three days during
the battles under Godov are a complete fabrication.
A special committee is currently investigating the circumstances surrounding
the retreat of the 1st Guard Corps in connection with the report of Stavka, dated
July 12, on the voluntary abandonment of positions at Ternopol by the 1st
Guard Corps. The Jaeger Guards Regiment does not doubt that the official data
obtained from the inquiry will only serve to confirm that during all the action
in June and July the Regiment was not guilty of disobeying combat orders.
The inquiry will yield ample material for demonstrating the tendentious at
tacks on the Guards which have been evident in recent times.
We request other newspapers to reprint [the foregoing] in the interest of
establishing the truth.
K hakhaev , Chairman of the Regimental Committee
S halavin , Secretary, Junior Noncommissioned Officer
C
The regimental commander and the officers of the Guards of the Finnish
Reserve Regiment, hand in hand with their Regiment in the field, vigorously
protest against the slanderous attacks on the Finnish Regiment, especially since
a whole series of official telephoned telegrams, orders, and reports of the Supreme
Command bear witness to the complete lack of correspondence between the news
paper reports and what in fact occurred. Involuntarily, one comes to the conclu
sion that this is ostensibly the deliberate work of some criminal hands. Otherwise,
how is one to explain the fact that on the one hand there exist official confirmations
by the Regimental Commander, the Commander of the Division, and the Corps
Commander of the valiant conduct of the Finns in the battles during the retreat
from Galicia (a bayonet battle of the 3rd battalion in the streets of Ternopol),
whereas on the other hand there are the reports in the press that the Regiment
took flight, abandoning its positions, confiscating horses from the officers, forcing
them to be content with soldiers rations, etc. A large number of officers and
soldiers who took part in the battles testify that nothing of the sort occurred.
Regimental Commander . . .
Chairman of the Regimental Committee . . .
Regimental Adjutant . . .
By whom and why all this slander on the army was needed at this time, after
all that has been endured, after the Kornilov revolt, there is no need to say.
CHAPTER 18

Efforts to Strengthen the Army After July 1

MILITARY CENSORSHIP, THE DEATH PENALTY,


AND MILITARY COMMISSARS
862. A ppeal from the General S taff on th e P ublication of
M ilitary I nformation
[ VVP, No. 93, July 1,1917, p. 1. Similar appeals had been issued earlier by the Govern
ment. Ibid., No. 9, March 15, 1917, p. 1, and Sb . Tsirk, MVD, p. 65.]
In Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii PraviteVstva, under date of August
12,1916 (No. 215), a list of information and descriptions is published bearing on
the external safety of Russia and her military sea-and-land defense, the publication
and dissemination of which in the press is forbidden.
With the revolution which took place in Russia some of the censorship limita
tions were themselves eliminated. However, the above-mentioned list, which
guards the safety of the Russian state, by its very nature cannot be added to the
number of such abolished enactments of the old regime.
In military affairs every detail may suggest much to the opponent and may
lead him to a number of correct conclusions to the deteriment of our interests.
Therefore the Central Administration of the General Staff, while fully sympa
thizing with the desire of the press to illuminate extensively and fully the events
at the front and the life of the army and the activities of those in the rear engaged
in defense work, nevertheless deems it its duty to call attention once more to the
unconditional need to comply with the instructions of the said list and to request
the newspapers to refrain carefully from publishing the information mentioned
in the list and particularly to avoid mentioning the numbers and names of military
units, as well as their combat power and the place of their operations.

863. E xplanation from the G overnment on the R eimposition


of M ilitary Censorship
[VVP, No. 105, July 15,1917, p. 1.]
A few instances have been observed recently of the printing of military in
formation in the press, which affected the course of military action in a detrimental
manner, serving at times as direct aid to the enemy. In view of this the Provisional
Government, conscious of its duty to the motherland, deems it necessary to intro
duce immediately new rules on military censorship.
While appealing to the patriotism of the citizens of the entire nation with
the suggestion that they do not divulge information detrimental to our army, the
1 The Kornilov affair and the military events following it are covered in Volume III.
978 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Provisional Government at the same time deems it necessary to issue at once, with
out waiting for the implementation of the law on military censorship, temporary
legislation2 prohibiting the divulgence of military secrets in the press and estab
lishing criminal responsibility for such divulgence.
July 14, 1917
864. R ules on M ilitary Censorship
[Sob. Uzak, I, 2, No. 1230.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of the Temporary Statute on military censorship (Collection
of Laws, article 2057) approved on July 20,1914, for the duration of the present
war until ratification of the peace treaty, the Temporary Rules on special military
censorship of the press annexed hereto are established.
II. . . . 10124. Anyone guilty of publishing a work which, under the law, is
subject to examination by the military censor, without submitting such work to
the latter, or of publishing a work submitted to the military censor but not yet
examined by it, whether or not he is liable to a more severe penalty for the work
published, is subject to imprisonment for a term of from eight months to one year
and four months, or to detention for a term of from three weeks to three months,
or to a fine of 300 to 10,000 rubles.

N. N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President


Savinkov , for the Minister of War
July 26, 1917
TEMPORARY RULES: ON SPECIAL MILITARY CENSORSHIP OF THE PRESS
Chapter I. General Provisions
1. Military censorship is an emergency measure and is intended to prevent
in war time and throughout the Russian state the publication and dissemination
by the press of information that may be harmful to the military interests of the
Russian state and of the states allied with it.
2. Military censorship of the press in the theater of military operations re
mains in force and is carried out on the basis of the rules set forth in the Temporary
Statute on military censorship of July 20,1914 . * .
3. Military censorship consists of the preliminary examination of works of the
press intended for publication, when they contain information included in the list
annexed hereto, and of preventing the publication in the press of information
contained in that list which may prove harmful to the military interests of the
state.
4. The list mentioned in Article 3 is to be amended by legislative procedure.
5. Information communicated to the press by duly authorized representatives
of departments, as well as publications of legislative and government institutions,
is not subject to military censorship.
6. Institutions and officials with responsibilities for military censorship of the
2 Issued the same day. Sob. Uzak, I, 2, No. 1129.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 979
press are guided in appropriate cases by instructions of the Chief of the General
Staff or the Chief of the Naval General Staff.
S avinkov , for the Minister of War

865. T he Order to D iscontinue th e P ublication of Pravda , Okopnaia


Pravda, and Other S ubversive N ewspapers
[Russkiia Vedomsti, No. 161, July 16,1917, p. 4. A detailed account of the publication
history of Pravda from July 6 to October 27, when it resumed its original name, can
be found in Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the World War9
pp. 762-63. It appeared and was suppressed successively under the names Listok
Pravdy, Rabochii i Soldat, Proletarii9 Rabochii9 and Rabochii Put9.'}
On July 12 of this year the Provisional Government resolved: In pursuance
with the change and amendment of the law of the Provisional Government of April
27,1917,3 periodical publications which advocate disobedience of orders by mili
tary authorities and refusal to fulfill military duties, and which contain appeals to
violence and civil war, are punished by being shut down and the editors responsible
are prosecuted in the appropriate manner.
I order: 1) On the basis of the above-mentioned law of the Provisional Gov
ernment, the discontinuance of the newspapers Pravda9 organ of the Central Com*
mittee and the Petrograd Committee of the S. D. Workers Party [Bolshevik],
and Okopnaia Pravda, organ of the military organization connected with the Riga
Committee of the Social Democracy of the Latvian region. 2) All commanders and
commissars of the Provisional Government in the active army are to be very
vigilant about the distribution in the army of periodical publications and, in the
event that newspapers which advocate one of the acts enumerated in the law of
the Provisional Government make their appearance, to report the fact with the
request for an immediate discontinuance of such organs. I call upon all army
committees to render their commanders and commissars full support.
A. K erensky , Minister of War and Navy
Petrograd, July 15, 1917
866. A L etter from the F ront Concerning the R estoration
of M ilitary Censorship
[Published in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 163, July 19,1917, p. 2.]
A few instances have been observed recently of the printing of military news
in the press which affected the course of military actions in a detrimental manner,
serving at times as direct aid to the enemy. In view of this the Provisional Gov
ernment, conscious of its duty to the motherland . . . restores military censor
ship and decrees criminal responsibility for publication of war secrets.
And it is about time. . . .
Many barriers were demolished with the coming of the revolution. It was then
* Doc. 207.
980 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
also that military censorship ceased. And to our shame, a reign of chaos followed
immediately in the press.
People wrote what they wished; they tried to outshine each other by releasing
details which, at another time, the enemy would pay his agents fabulous sums to
obtain. Resolutions of corps, divisions, and regiments were cited, giving their
numbers, even if those were numbers of re-established formations and even though
no one needed their names. Moreover, the articles indicated the places where
various divisions were located, which of them were in reserve, which were in
position, and where.
As a matter of fact, beginning with the month of March, the Austrians and
the Germans had no need for an intelligence service. It was enough to get all
the Russian papers. From them it was possible to re-create a complete picture
both of the location and the condition of all Russian army corps.
This was stupid, it was excessive, and it was, from the military point of view,
a tremendous disgrace.
And again this dis-ease spread to Stavka. And thus long before June 18 un
necessary details that violated the need to maintain secrecy began to appear in
reports from Stavka and particularly in semiofficial organs connected with the
army and front staffs. But following the offensive of June 18 this procedure
blossomed fully.
Our communications from headquarters were unrecognizable. What has hap
pened to reticence and silence? Everything was reported in fullnumbers of
armies and army corps, numbers and names of companies. Our reports to the
press began to resemble communiques exchanged between army staffs.
Psychologically, to be sure, such frankness was understandable. A demoraliza
tion was felt in the army, and when in spite of it part of the army advanced, we
hastened to point out to be known by all that we were still in possession of an
army, and we hastened not only to point this out, but to prove it as well by mention
ing the companies.
As if to say, see how many genuine and efficient units we still have!
But having taken this course, we overstepped all bounds. And had military
censorship existed then, the first thing it should have done was to censor reports
from Stavka itself.
The Russian public during that period really knew everything9 but then our
enemy was just as fully informed.
Now we are again returning to censorship. Its about time. But for Gods
sake! let us not return to pre-reform censorship, and may God preserve us,
this time at least, from all excesses.
K. K iro v

867. L etter from B rusilov to K erensky U rging th e R eintroduction


of the D eath P enalty and the I nstitution of F irm D iscipline
[N. Bukhbinder, Na fronte v predoktiabrskie dni: po sekretnym materialam Stavki,
Krasnaia Letopis, VI (1923), 1617. Kornilov made a similar demand immediately
after his appointment as Commander in Chief of the Southwestern Front, as did Boris
Savinkov, newly appointed Commissar of the Front. Alexander F. Kerensky, The
Catastrophe, pp. 302-3, and Golder, p. 429.]
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 981
Stavka
July 11, 1917 Restricted
No. 499
To the Minister of War
A. F. Kerensky
D ear A leksandr F edorovich ,
History repeats itself. The lessons of the great French revolution, which we
have partly forgotten, come nevertheless unfailingly hack to mind, giving even
greater stress to our mistakes.
We have forgotten that the French, inspired like ourselves by love of their
fellow men, turned the first manifestations of their revolutionary will toward the
reform of the army on the principles of humanity and softheartedness. The result
was the same. Both with them and with us, the army started to decay rapidly and
threatened to become a dangerous crowd of armed people.
We have to take this circumstance into account as an already existing fact.
Not wishing to recognize that several million men cannot exist without firm
leadership and that an authority which does not depend on force is nonexistent,
we hurried on the road of fantasy, smothering the voice of caution and without
looking back on history.
One should have the courage to say these decisive words, and these words are
death penalty.
The French came to the same conclusion and their victorious banners made
the rounds of half of the world. Let us remember this historical lesson.
The democratic armies of France, Belgium, and America, which are infinitely
more cultured than ours, have the death penalty in their legislation.
It is time for us too to come to our senses.
I, as Supreme Commander, responsible before the people and history, can
guarantee all the conquests of the revolution, provided that the people themselves
give me the power and the possibility to compel their fainthearted sons to fulfill
their duty toward the fatherland.
Time does not wait. It is necessary to restore immediately iron discipline
in all its plenitude and the death penalty for traitors.
If we do not do it at once, without delay, then the army will perish, Russia
will perish, and we will sink in a dishonor created by our own hands.
In case this demand of mine is not satisfied by the Government, I will relieve
myself of all responsibility for the consequences, and as Supreme Commander I
declare absolutely, definitely, and firmly that if the death penalty is not introduced
in the theater of military operations, then I will not be in a position to further
direct the military operations and to remain in the post which I occupy.
I beg you to accept the expression of my respect and devotion.
A. B r u sil o v
Correct: S akharov , Colonel of the General Staff.
[P.S.:]
The unbridled liberty of the army has created disorganization not only at the
front but still more in the rear, where hordes of senseless, unruly soldiers introduce
complete disorganization in the life of the country as well, and hinder the work
of the state.
982 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
If the revolution is on the brink of destruction, it is the result of the complete
decay of the army.
Along with this, it is absolutely necessary to restore in its completeness the
authority and the disciplinary powers of the commanders without which the
fighting capacity and order in the army will not be restored and Russia will not
be saved.
868. K erensky s E xplanation of the R estoration of the D eath P enalty
[VVP, No. 103, July 13, 1917, p. 2. The decision to approve in principle the proposal
of the Supreme Commander was made on July 11, and the law was approved on July 12.
Zhurnaly, Nos. 128 and 129. At the session of July 12 the Government also decided to
call the Moscow Conference. See Volume III.]
Referring to the restoration of the death penalty during the war to apply to
servicemen for some of the gravest crimes, the Minister-President, A. F. Kerensky,
explained that the Provisional Governments chief purpose at present is the preser
vation at any cost of the fatherland and the revolution. With this in view, the
Government has sufficient courage, fully aware of its duty, to suppress everything
that threatens the destruction of the state.
The restoration of the death penalty in the theater of military operations was
prompted by the fact that the Government was faced with a tragic choiceeither
to sacrifice the army to cowards and traitors or to restore the only penalty that
can frighten them. Only in order to preserve the priceless lives of heroes who
would selflessly die fulfilling their duty to the motherland, and in order to fore
stall the ruin of the country, did the Provisional Government adopt, jointly with
the entire army, this painful decision.
869. T he R estoration of the D eath P enalty in W artime for
M ilitary P ersonnel and the E stablishment of
M ilitary -R evolutionary C ourts
[So6. Uzak, I, 2, No. 974. The law was extended on July 30 to apply to the navy. Ibid.,
No. 1248.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The disgraceful behavior, both at the rear and at the front, of certain troop
units that have forgotten their duty to the homeland, thus placing Russia and the
revolution on the brink of disaster, compels the Provisional Government to take
extraordinary measures to restore order and discipline in the ranks of the army.
Fully conscious of the grave responsibility it bears for the fate of the home
land, the Provisional Government deems it necessary: 1) to restore the death
penalty in wartime for military personnel convicted of certain heinous crimes;
2) to establish military-revolutionary courts consisting of soldiers and officers
to try such crimes immediately.
In accordance with this, the Provisional Government decrees:
I. To establish the death penalty by firing squad for military personnel in the
theater of military operations, as capital punishment for the following crimes:
military and state treason; . . . desertion to the enemy; flight from the battle
field; willful desertion of ones post during battle and refusal to participate in
battle; . . . incitement, instigation, or agitation to surrender; fleeing or failing
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 983
to resist the enemy; . . . surrendering as a prisoner without resisting; . . .
willful absence without leave from guard duty in the face of the enemy; . . . acts
of violence against persons in authority, officers, or soldiers; . . . refusal to carry
out military orders and instructions of a commander; overt mutiny and instigation
to such; . . . attacking a sentry or military guard; armed resistance to or willful
murder of a sentry; . . . and, with respect to willful murder, rape, brigandage,
and robbery, . . . only in the troop zone of the armies.
Enemy spies . . . are subject to the same punishment.
II. The following rules are laid down for the establishment of military-
revolutionary courts in the theater of military operations:
1) Military-revolutionary courts may be established in divisions, by order of
division commanders or higher commanders, for the consideration of cases of
the most important crimes provided in Section I of the present law, if these crimes
are so obvious that they do not require the holding of a preliminary investigation.
2) The court consists of three officers and three soldiers, who elect a chair
man from among themselves.
3) The members of a military-revolutionary court are selected for the con
sideration of a particular case or group of cases by lot from among the officers
and soldiers registered in the lists of military jurors of the unit in which the court
is established . . .
Note : In those cases where the selection of a court from lists of jurors proves
impossible, judges may be selected in the number required, also by lot, by regi
mental and divisional committees from among their members.
4) The military-revolutionary court tries officers and soldiers of the division
to which the court is attached; members of those units to which no court is at
tached may be handed over to the court of the nearest division.
5) Legal grounds for starting proceedings in military-revolutionary courts
are communications of division and higher commanders, division and higher
committees and commissars, authorized by both the Provisional Government and
the Minister of War. Regimental commanders and committees are granted the
right to petition division commanders for the establishment of a military-revolu
tionary court.

9) Cases in the military-revolutionary court are tried under the rules estab
lished for regimental courts, with all possible speed.
10) Under the same rules the participation in the case of the prosecutor and
defense lawyer is permitted.
11) Cases are decided by a majority vote, and in case of a tie vote preference
is given to the opinion favorable to the defendant.
12) If in considering a case the court finds that it requires clarification, it
refers the case for preliminary investigation, after which the case is expedited
further under the general rules of judicial proceedings.

14) A sentence takes legal effect immediately after it has been pronounced in
court and is carried out without delay.
15) If the court deems it necessary to reduce the penalty imposed beyond the
limits of its authority, it submits a petition to this effect to the Commander in Chief
984 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
of the armies of the front, and the carrying out of the sentence is postponed until
the petition has been acted upon.
III. The present law to be put into effect by telegraph.
A. K erensky , Minister-President and Minister of the Navy
Iv. Y efremov , Minister of Justice
M ajor G eneral Y arkovskii, for the Minister of War
July 12,1917
870. K ornilov R equests a M itigation of the T erms of the Law
on the D eath P enalty
[Rech\ No. 180, August 3, 1917, p. 3. The name of the second soldier here rendered
Kanunnikov is spelled three different ways in the Rech9 account.]
The Active Army, July 31
In accordance with the petition from the Commissar of the Southwestern Front
Gobechiia to the Supreme Commander, the sentence of the military-revolutionary
court regarding the death penalty to which three soldiers of . . . the Warsaw
Infantry Regiment, Kuk, Kanunnikov, and Emelianov, were condemned was
reduced and replaced by a life sentence.
The Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, has sent to the Minister of War
the following telegram:
On July 22 I sent to the commanders in chief [of fronts] a telegram in which
I pointed out that the sentences of the military-revolutionary courts are to be
valid only after being confirmed by the commissars of the respective armies. As
one of those who bears the moral responsibility for re-establishing the death
penalty in the army, I consider it absolutely necessary to condition its application
by the most effective possible guarantees, and therefore, in supplement to para. 14
of the Government decree of July 12, I petition the Provisional Government to
make it compulsory for the sentences to be confirmed by the commissars and to
alter accordingly the wording of para. 15 in the sense that the Commander in Chief
be authorized to mitigate the penalty, by means of the respective army commissar,
who is to give his conclusions. Therefore I took it upon myself to give the order
contained in the text of the aforementioned telegram that when the question is that
of human life, it is a duty of conscience to act without delay, I hope the Provisional
Government will find it possible to confirm my order, as I was guided by con
siderations of humanity and at the same time, as Supreme Commander, under
standing exactly the limit of the severity of the punitive measures which are
necessary for the restoration of discipline in the army, I resolved to take the
aforementioned step immediately upon accepting the post which I now occupy.4
General K ornilov
The Deputy Commissar of the Northern Army Chekotillo has addressed to
4 Paras. 14 and 15 of Doc. 869 were amended on July 29, 1917, Sob. Uzak, I, 2, No. 1247
to require confirmation of death sentences by the commander of the army and the commis
sar of the Provisional Government attached to it and, in case of disagreement between them,
by the commissar attached to the Supreme Commander. If there was no commissar attached
to the army, the first instance of confirmation was the Commander in Chief of the front and the
corresponding commissar.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 985
Filonenko, the Commissar attached to the Supreme Commander, the following
telegram:
Considering myself unauthorized to confirm the sentences of the military-
revolutionary courts, I leave to your discretion the petition of the defenders of
the soldiers of N. regiment, Kuk, Kanunnikov, and Emelianov, who have been
condemned to death, stating that the condemned were the victims of the irre
sponsible agitation of bolshevism, that they themselves were of low intelligence,
and that while perpetrating the crime they actually didnt know that they could be
prosecuted by a military-revolutionary court. I have proposed to the President
of the court not to execute the sentence of the court until you make a decision. It
is my belief that in order to sustain the authority of the court the sentence should
be confirmed.
Filonenko, the Commissar attached to Supreme Commander, sent to Chekotillo
by telegram the following answer:
If you found it impossible to take upon yourself the confirmation of the
sentence in the case of the condemned Kuk, Kanunnikov, and Emelianov, and were
at the same time consistent, you could not have postponed the execution of the
sentence and submitted the case to my decision. But as this has been done and as
the expectation of the delayed sentence has left these people in sorrow and grief,
waiting for the hour of death, and passing from hope to desperation, I do not
consider it possible that this martyrdom which is worse than death should end in
an execution. I do not give my consent for the execution of the sentence. I request
that the condemned be brought to Stavka where I will petition the Supreme Com
mander with regard to reducing their penalty.
871. T he P etrograd S oviet D emands th e A brogation of the
D eath P enalty
[.Izvestiia, No. 148, August 19,1917, p. 4. In view of the sponsorship of this resolution
by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the opposition to the law even by some Party
members of the right, Chernov was embarrassed to have Kerensky later disclose that
the decision of the Government had been unanimous, including Chernov as Minister of
Agriculture. Oliver H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp. 348-50.]
N. S. Chkheidze was Chairman.
The questions under discussion concerned (1) the death penalty and (2)
arrests. Comrade Martov delivered a report on the first question, and comrades
Yurenev, Yakovlev, Volodarskii, and Tseretelli were the speakers.
The [following] resolution, submitted by Comrade Yakovlev on behalf of
the Socialist-Revolutionary Faction, was carried by a majority of votes.5
Taking into consideration 1) that the death penalty as a means of fighting
crime is rejected on principle by all the socialist parties and by all democrats
who are to any degree consistent; 2) that the death penalty has a degrading
effect on the population, and especially on those unfortunate sons of the people
who are forced, directly or indirectly, to participate in its implementation; 3)
that the death penalty, introduced by the new regime under the pretext of com
batting crime, is beginning to take form with ever greater clarity as a means of
frightening the soldiers with a view to subjugating them to the officers; 4) that
5 According to Den9, No. 141, August 20,1917, p. 1, only four members voted against the
resolution, including Tseretelli, who argued that it was a blow against the authority of the
Provisional Government.
986 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
in the eyes of all who are working for the counterrevolution, the introduction of
the death penalty at the front serves merely as a prelude to its establishment as
a normal measure of repression throughout the country; 5) that the disorganiza
tion of the army can be successfully counteracted not by brutal measures of re
pression, but solely by a consistent process of democratizing the army and inspir
ing it with the awareness that it is defending its native land and the revolution; the
Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies resolves to protest against
the introduction of the death penalty at the front as a measure which could be used
for counterrevolutionary aims, and to demand of the Provisional Government its
abrogation.
872. Den on the S oviet A ction
[No. 141, August 20, 1917, p. 1. See also Lenins article on the resolution in Rabochii,
No. 2, August 26, 1917, as translated in the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin: Toward
the Seizure of Power, XXI, Bk. 1,114-17.]
The Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies has approved a
resolution of protest against the death penalty.
By demagogically accusing the Government of being counterrevolutionary
while knowing beforehand that the accusation was false and that the Provisional
Government could not under the present circumstances abolish the death penalty,
the Petrograd Soviet did not in the least strive for this aim, but wished merely
to wash its hands [of the question]; it was thus willing to face the fact that the
Government would pay no attention whatsoever to its resolution.
The complete deprivation of the Soviet of any political significance, which
is so very much desired by every reactionary, is now being accomplished by the
Soviet itself.
This is not an accident, and in this lies all the danger of the Soviets political
gesture.
The masses which follow the Bolsheviks and the Internationalists have al
ready withdrawn from the revolution; objectively they are counterrevolutionary;
and this they express, in an original form it is true, by charging that the leaders
of the revolution are counterrevolutionary. They have correctly determined that
between them and the revolution there is nothing in common.
They have started the struggle against the revolution by [trying] to destroy
in one way or another both its conquests and its very basis.
When these elements get their hands on some organ or another of the revolu
tionary democracy, they transform it from a weapon of struggle for the revolution
into a weapon for the destruction of the revolution; thereby they doom this
weapon to ruin.
The resolution of the Petrograd Soviet against the death penalty [represents] a
dangerous symptom.
873. T h e E sta b lish m en t and Jurisdiction o f M ilita r y Commissars
o f t h e P ro vision a l G overnm ent
[So>. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1259. A formalization of the change instituted by Kerensky in
the status of the commissars, originally appointed by the Petrograd Soviet alone. See
Docs. 759 and 807.]
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 987
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
1) In order to promote the reorganization of the army on democratic prin
ciples and the reinforcement of its fighting capacity, as well as to oppose any
counterrevolutionary attempts, the office of Military Commissar assigned to the
Commander in Chief of the front is hereby established.
2) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief is appointed by the
Provisional Government with the knowledge of the Central Executive Committee
of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the All-Russian
Soviet of Peasants Deputies, and the Supreme Commander.
3) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief has the right of
direct access to the Provisional Government, the Minister of War, and the Supreme
Commander. The Commissar submits reports on the situation in the armies of
the front to the Minister of War.
4) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief must be informed by
the staff on the preparation and progress of operations.
5) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief, guided by instruc
tions received from the Minister of War, accordingly takes uniform action to
settle all political questions arising within the zone of the armies and the rear
of the front.
6) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief acts in close liaison
with troop organizations (regimental, divisional, army, and front, and other
committees), and assists in coordinating the work of army commissars assigned
to armies by mutual agreement of the Minister of War and the Central Executive
Committee.
7) Army commissars (assigned to armies) and the Front Commissar (as
signed to the Commander in Chief of the front) constitute within the zone of the
Front a joint board, directing and coordinating the work of the army commissars.
8) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief periodically (at least
once a week) submits reports to the Supreme Commander and the Central Execu
tive Committee on his activity and on the situation in the armies of the front.
9) A Military-Political Department is set up under the Military Commissar
to the Commander in Chief and consists of the following: a) a section for intro
ducing new conditions of life in the army; b) a section for eliminating misunder
standings and disputes and vestiges of the police regime; and c) a section for
general matters and the press.
10) Appointment of Military Commissars to Commanders in Chief of the
fronts is announced in the orders of the Minister of War to the Army and Navy.
11) The present law is to be put into effect without awaiting its publication
by the Ruling Senate.
A. K er e n sk y , Minister-President
M a jo r G en e r a l Y a k u b o v ic h , fo r th e M in ister o f W a r
July 15,1917
874. Rabochaia Gazeta on th e N ew M easures for the A rmy
[No. 120, July 30, 1917, p. 1.]
Yesterday all the papers carried information on the measures to be introduced
for the restoration of the revolutionary army as proposed by Savinkov, Assistant
988 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Minister of War. Savinkov declared that he considers it necessary to purge the
entire high commanding personnel of all persons lacking a sense of civic respon
sibility. He puts great hopes in the institution of commissars, who are appointed
by the War Ministry in accordance with the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. These commissars must be empowered
with the strictest control in the application of the death penalty.
In Petrograd, however, a special council will he created in the War Ministry
composed of representatives from the Soviet of Workers9 and Soldiers9 Deputies
and front troop organizations.8
Such is the plan of the War Ministry, and the entire revolutionary democracy
can only welcome it, since it is based on a correct democratic principle. With the
organization of the institution of commissars according to Savinkovs plan, the
high commanding personnel reserves the right to operational combat responsi
bilities only." The entire general political life of the army will be in the hands
of commissars selected, to be sure, from people loyal to the revolution.
The latest papers testify that Savinkovs declarations will not remain empty
words, but are already being put into practice.
In addition to the well-known order by the Supreme Commander, Kornilov,
about the need to respect the army organizations, we have also one of his orders
that the uverdict of the military revolutionary court goes into effect only on ap
proval of same by the commissar of the corresponding army and that military
commanders who permit the execution of a death sentence without confirmation
from the commissar . . . must be brought to strictest accounting
Further, the War Ministry strictly forbids army commanders to dismiss army
committees and schedule new elections.
If some members of committees, found guilty of criminal acts, are brought
before the court and if necessary arrested, then also it is proposed to act through
commissars/
Finally, the commanding officer of one of lie armies, General Danilov, in his
order on the restoration of combat discipline, deems it necessary to point out
that these measures should under no circumstances assume a reactionary char
acter and should not suggest a return to the old regime. Commanding officers
should not forget themselves and use a rude tone; they are obliged above all to
see in each of their subordinates a soldier-citizen.
The War Ministry has entered upon a correct revolutionary course. Unless
the character of its work changes, the restoration of revolutionary discipline in
the army will no longer be associated with the threat of counterrevolutionary
designs.

6 Created on August 3 by Order No. 36 of the Minister of War. VVP, No. 127, August
10,1917, p. 2.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 989
THE CONFERENCE AT STAVKA ON JULY 16
AND THE VIEWS OF THE
COMMANDING STAFF
875. E xcerpts from the P rotocols of th e Conference of Government
and M ilitary L eaders at S tavka at M ogilev on July 16
[Appendix, Krasnaia Letopis, VI (1923), 19-51. Accounts of the situation and atti
tudes at Stavka from March to September can he found in General A. I. Denikin, The
Russian Turmoil, and General Loukomsky, Memoirs of the Russian Revolution, passim.']
present :
Kerensky, Minister-President and Minister of War and Navy
Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Brusilov, Supreme Commander
General Alekseev
General Ruzskii
General Klemhovskii, Commander in Chief of the Northern Front
General Denikin, Commander in Chief of the Western Front
General Lukomskii, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander
General Romanovskii, Chief of the General Staff
General Romanovskii, Quartermaster General attached to the Supreme Com
mander
General Markov, Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Western Front
Admiral Maksimov, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Supreme Commander
General Velichko, Field Inspector of the Corps of Engineers
Colonel Pliushchevskii-Pliushchik, Second Quartermaster General attached to the
Supreme Commander
Colonel Baranovskii, Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of War
Nemits, Captain of the First Rank, and Muravev, Senior Lieutenant
Savinkov, Commissar of the Southwestern Front
Secretaries: Lieutenant Colonel Tikhobrazov, Lieutenant Colonel Pronin
The conference began at 2:40 P.M.
minister kerensky . The present conference was called at my initiative. It
was necessary for the Provisional Government to clarify the three following ques
tions: 1) the military and strategic situation, so that the people may be prepared
in time for the events of the immediate future; 2) the general situation, so that
we may be oriented when making demands and requests to the Allies; 3) an
analysis of military organization, for the Provisional Government must know by
what measures, in the opinion of those present here, the combat potential of the
army can be restored.
As President, I would like to hear the objective conclusions that persons ex
perienced in military affairs have reached after examining the above-mentioned
questions.
I consider it my moral duty to express my deep conviction that we are united
by the single thought of saving our native land and not surrendering the conquests
of the Russian people.
990 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
general brusilov . Pursuant to the instructions of the President of the Coun
cil of Ministers, I will report on the situation at the front. As far back as last
winter it was decided to assume the offensive on the Southwestern Front, and my
predecessor, General Alekseev, [ordered] that the forces and equipment be
allocated accordingly. When I assumed the office of Supreme Commander I made
no changes. But one major change occurred. The fighting capacity of the forces,
primarily of the infantry, decreased; discipline had unquestionably fallen off to
such a large degree that men could not be forced to undergo training or to work
on fortifying positions and bases. Consequently, we assumed the offensive not
in May, but considerably later.
However, all the steps were taken for the offensive. The Minister of War him
self made trips to the front and did much to help the cause, explaining the necessity
of the offensive to the troops.
Since the commanding personnel had no authority, they had to turn to the
agitators of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies; the commissars worked
in the same way and their work brought good results. Finally, the army com
mittees displayed intensive and fruitful activity; many of them even went into
attack together with the men and shed blood.
Nonetheless, discipline was not being restored, and no success is possible in
the present drawn-out battles without discipline and without the authority of
the commanders.
Wherever there was strong artillery, wherever there were intensive prepara
tions, a breakthrough occurred, but then the attack would fizzle out, and the
men would return to their positions under pressure from the enemy, or even
without it.
The restoration of the fighting capacity of the army must be the first con
sideration at the present time, for no plans or decisions will have any meaning
without it.
In order to restore the fighting capacity of the army, there must be discipline
among the men. It is impossible to restore the former discipline entirely, and it
is now desirable to discuss measures which could increase discipline, enhance the
authority of the commanders, and make the men obey. It now requires a day, or
more, to persuade units to go to the rescue of their comrades. During recent battles
the men bargained, held meetings for days on end, and sometimes resolved not to
go to the assistance of neighboring units. As a result, there was complete failure.
Divisions would scatter under the least pressure, without any discussions, without
listening to persuasions or threats. All this came about because the commanders,
from the detachment commander to the Commander in Chief, had no authority.
The work of the committees and the commissars has failed, because they can
not replace the commanders.
History shows that there is a limit to the amount of freedom that can exist
in an army, beyond which an army turns into a bad militia, untrained, disobedient,
and out of the control of its commanders.
On examining the three questions raised, I consider that the third question
indicated by the President, i.e., to analyze the measures necessary for restoring the
fighting capacity of the army, should be the first to be examined.
With your permission, I will ask those present here, beginning with the
youngest, to speak.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 991
general denikin .7 It is with great anxiety that I speak here, and I apologize
beforehand for speaking bluntly, but I shall speak before the autocrats of the
revolution in the same way that I used to speak under the tsarist autocracy.
I found the Western Front in a state of complete disintegration. I admit that
this surprised me. Neither from the reports of the Commander in Chief, which I
received during my tenure as Chief of Staff [to the Supreme Commander], nor
from General Gurko when I was taking over the front from him, could I have
drawn information depicting the true situation on the Western Front. But every
thing soon became clear. The men were obedient up to a pointwhile our line
of action was passivebut as soon as the men were required to be aggressive,
the full extent of disintegration came to light.
In the course of between two and three weeks we succeeded, by the extraor
dinary work of the commanding personnel, in deploying the 10th Army, but
under what conditions: 48 battalions refused to go into combat. One of the three
shock corps was deployed, it took two to three weeks to deploy another one, while
the third was not deployed at all. Insubordination, robbery, and looting swept
through the units, and distilleries were ravaged. Certain units, like the 703rd
Suramskii Regiment, for example, disintegrated and have left me bitter memories
for the rest of my life.
The situation required that the front assume the offensive, since the enemy had
already withdrawn four divisions from the Western Front. I decided to attack,
come what might. I withdrew all the unfit troops from the front (30,000 in all)
and transferred them to the rear.
I moved the 20th Corps to replace the right flank corps, because I considered
it to be the best one. However, as soon as it received an order to advance, one
of its divisions marched 30 versts in the very first night, but then returned to its
original position. Another division refused to advance altogether. After lengthy
negotiations it was finally deployed.
With respect to morale, the troops were prevailed upon by the senior com
manding personnel. There was the Minister of War; the Supreme Commander,
General Brusilov, also toured [the Front].
I do not know what impressions they carried away with them, but the situa
tion was as follows: when the Minister of War was with the 28th and 29th Divi
sions, everyone pledged to fight and, in general, he was met with enthusiasm.
When the Minister of War left, however, the delegates arrived at the station to
announce that after the Ministers departure the regiments passed a resolution
not to advance.
7 [The following footnote appears in Krasnaia Letopis\ pp. 52-53.] In the Protocol of
the Conference Denikins speech was given in an abbreviated form, but a copy of his com
plete speech was found among the papers of Stavka, and, in view of greater historical interest,
we are citing it in full. It was sent by Denikin to Kornilov. Kornilov sent him the fol
lowing letter in answer [July 27, 1917]: Dear Anton Ivanovich! It was with sincere and
deep satisfaction that I read your speech delivered at the conference held at Stavka on July
16. I would sign such a report with both my hands. I respect you deeply for it and I admire
your courage and your resolution. I firmly support the measures you have proposed for bring
ing the army and the rear to a normal state. I am insisting categorically that the Provisional
Government pass a whole series of resolute measures and have grounds for being certain that
much will be done in this direction in the nearest future. May I assure you of my deepest
respect.
992 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
I was present at the moving scene when the red banner was handed over to
the Potiiskii Regiment and the soldiers swore by it to go out to meet death; one
hour before the attack the very same Potiiskii Regiment retreated 15 versts.8
In touring the front the Supreme Commander received the impression that
the soldiers were good, [but] that the commanders were frightened and had per
mitted their authority to slip out of their hands. This is not quite correct.
Authority did not slip out of the hands of the commanders, it was torn out of
their hands.
The most enthusiastic reception accorded to the Supreme Commander was at
the meeting of the 1st Siberian Regiment, but when the Supreme Commander
departed, the meeting continued and the Supreme Commander was abused. They
said about him: Why do you listen to this old bourgeois? and they reviled him
in every way. The audience applauded and shouted Hurrah, just as they had
earlier to the Supreme Commander.
Another cause for disintegration in the army is the commissars. Perhaps there
are black swans among them who are beneficial, but generally speaking the institu
tion is incompatible with the army. There cannot be dual authority in the army.
The army must have one head and one authority.
In particular, I must give a characterization of the Commissar of the Western
Front. A young man, not only having no knowledge of the army, but being un
acquainted with life, he has a great craving for power. He announced to the
commanders that he possessed such power that he could remove anyone he pleased
from office. He said: Kerensky is the Minister of War for Russia, and I for
the Western Front. I severed relations with this commissar.
Then there is the army commissar who verges on menshevism and bolshevism,
the very same one who gave the report that the Declaration [on Soldiers9 Rights]
has done little to disintegrate the army, that Art. 14 must be stricken out, that
the prohibition of freedom of speech while on duty must be stricken out!9
The third commissar is a man who is not Russian, who despises everything
Russian, but who perhaps is of value. He abuses the soldiers in language un
known to them when they received abuse under the tsarist regime. Responsible
citizens accept this abuse as appropriate.
Thus, this institution cannot be tolerated in the army.
A further cause for disintegration in the army is the committees. There are
individual committees, and individual members of committees, who are devoted to
their duty, there are people in them who are giving up their lives for the salvation
of our native land, but as a whole, as an institution, these committees are harm
ful. They reveal a tremendous aspiration for power. Thus, for example, the com
mittee demands that governmental authority be transferred to the local committees.
The committee of the 2nd Army demands the right to act on behalf of the central
committees. Half of the members of the Front Committee have stricken out Section
14 of the Declaration, the other half have demanded that an order be introduced
which would provide that all coercive measures apply not only to the soldiers, but
to the commanders as well.
Vengerov adheres to the view that organs of soldiers committees must have
the right to challenge the appointment of their commanders. In general, it must be
noted that committees aspire to seize power.
s Doc. 851.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 993
Now I shall turn to the preparations for comhat.
On June 8 the Front Committee passed a resolution not to advance. On June
18 it passed a resolution to advance. It had completely changed its colors in 10
days. This was also true of the Committee of the 2nd Armyon June 1 it decided
not to advance, and on June 20 to advance. By a majority of 132 votes against
72, the Minskii Committee passed a resolution not to advance, pointing out that
the offensive was a betrayal of the revolution. This was how the committees work
in morally preparing the troops revealed itself. If committees permit things of
this sort, they cannot be tolerated.
The committees are removing commanders. Thus, they removed the Com
manders of the Corps, the Chief of Staff of the Corps, and the Commander of the
1st Siberian Division of the 1st Siberian Corps. I did not give permission for
this removal, but the Commander of the Corps came to me crying and sobbing
and I had to let him leave.
I have statistical data at my disposal; there were 50 cases of commanders be
ing removed from the front.
Detachment and regiment committees enter into discussions of virtually every
question. For example, a reserve regiment was despatched in full force to the
front, and only 300 officers and 150 soldiers arrived as appointed, the rest were
allowed by the committee to go on leave with instructions to report at the end of
their leave at the points of destination of the regiments.
The committees are one thing, and the members of the committee are another.
There is absolutely no committee discipline. Let us assume that there is a com
mittee consisting of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks which adopts some decision, but
this will not prevent committee membersBolsheviks [for example]from ad
vocating their own point of view differing from the one adopted by the com
mittee.
The committees bring multiple authority into the army, and discredit, rather
than strengthen, the authority of the commanders.
This was the kind of preparation with which the troops went into combat.
The training of the artillery began. In all the three years of war I had not seen
such wonderful work of the artillery. The spirits of the troops began to rise. Even
the infantry, which had higher demands for the artillery, remained satisfied. The
infantry of the 38th Corps refused even to continue the training of the artillery,
considering it completely accomplished.
The units moved into attack, they passed two or three enemy trench lines in
a parade march, visited its batteries, brought back gun-sights from the enemy,
and . . . returned to their trenches.
(General Denikin read excerpts from reports on the operations.)
The campaign miscarried. In reporting on the campaign, the Commander of
the Corps sobbed bitterly.
The troops suffered losses, primarily during the retreat. Ten thousand wounded
passed through the casualty wards of the Army, 20,000 through [the casualty
wards] of the front. Twenty-five hundred of these were seriously wounded, 7,500
with wounded fingers, and 10,000 with miscellaneous wounds, the nature of which
has not yet been established.
And thus the campaign miscarried. On the 19-verst sector of the front, I had
184 battalions and 900 pieces of ordnance; the enemy had 17 battalions on the
front line and 12 in reserve, and 300 pieces of ordnance. One hundred thirty-eight
994 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
battalions were brought into action against 17 [of the enemy] , 900 pieces of
ordnance against 300.
Morale may have now improved, but this is only because we have once again
changed to passive defense.
I gathered together several army commanders in my headquarters and posed
the following questions to them:
1) Could the armies resist an enemy offensive that is in the slightest degree
serious? The answer was: no.
2) Could the armies resist a counteroffensive of the enemy at the present
time? The Commander of the 10th Army answered that the army could resist it.
The Commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armies could not decide on the answer to
this question. The 10th Army has stronger artillery which explains the Com
manders reply. The army commanders declared that they have no infantry. For
my part, I will say that we have no army and that we must create one.
We were given new laws. The government says today what we were saying
yesterday, only then it was called a betrayal of the revolution.
(To the question of General Ruzskii as to what laws he was speaking about,
General Denikin explained that he was speaking of the death penalty, the revolu
tionary courts, and so forth.)
I have heard that bolshevism has destroyed the army. I deny this. Bolshevism
is worms in a festering wound of the army. The army was destroyed by others, by
those who have recently passed military legislation destructive to the army, by
people who do not understand the mode of life and the conditions necessary for
the existence of the army. At the beginning it was the yoke of the Soviet of Sol
diers5and Workers5Deputies, which was then an anarchistic institution, and later
a fatal mistake.
In a discussion with me during his first trip through Mogilev, the Minister of
War said: The process of revolutionizing the country and the army has ended.
Now the constructive work must begin.
I remarked that the revolutionary process had ended, but too late.
We received the Declaration [on Soldiers Rights] although all the military
commanders had expressed their opposition to it. They all said that the Declara
tion would ruin the army. General Alekseev stated graphically that the Declaration
was the last nail driven into the coffin of our army. Describing the bad condi
tion of the army on his front, the former Commander in Chief of the Southwestern
Front said that he still had hopes for improvement if only the Declaration was not
introduced.
But the Declaration was issued. The freedom to express ones political views
in the army was announced. But then the 2nd Caucasian Grenadier Division was
disbanded for the exercise of this same freedom of political views, and I can under
stand why the soldiers were bewildered.
When I intended to disband the 169th Division, which censured the Provisional
Government and demanded immediate peace, I encountered the opposition of two
commissars; the commissars could see no crime from the legal standpoint in the
actions of the 169th Division.
But for some, even the Declaration was insufficient. A section of the Military
Congress [sic: see Doc. 776] demanded freedom of speech even during the dis
charge of duties.
Art. 6 of the Declaration permitted a wave of piratic and defeatist literature
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 995
to flood the army, the best evidence for which is given in the account of the Mos
cow Bureau of Literature Supply, subsidized by the Government. (He cites the
data in the account.)
Section 14 reads that no serviceman can be punished without a trial. This is
to be observed only with respect to soldiers. It does not, evidently, apply to the
commanders since punishments are applicable to them without a trial, and they
can be ousted from the service. This paragraph has completely abolished punish
ment in the forces. The Central Military Court Administration has advised us
that the activities of the army corps courts and military-circuit courts must be
terminated, except in cases of treason. Thus, the courts have virtually ceased
to function. Disciplinary courts which are boycotted by the soldiers have been
introduced in their place. Soldiers do not select the members of the court just as
they did not select the jury in the army corps courts. I am afraid that the same
will happen with respect to military-revolutionary courts.
The stipulation concerning the sentence being delivered by the committee is
equally unfeasible, since committee members who pronounce sentence would
hardly remain in its membership.
Authority was abolished, the officers were humiliated. Officers up to and in
cluding the Commander in Chief were expelled like servants. The Minister of War
once made a passing remark on the Northern Front that he could disperse the en
tire high command within 24 hours. In his speech addressing the soldiers, the
Minister of War said: Under the tsars you were driven into battle by knouts
and machine-guns. The commanders led you to the slaughter.
I was standing at the foot of the rostrum on which the Minister of War spoke;
I listened, and my heart was wrung at the offense, because what he said was not
true.
My Iron Sharpshooters captured 60,000 prisoners and 43 pieces of ordnance,
but I did not drive them with knouts, nor did I fire machine-guns at them.
But I was willing to put up with everything in the Minister of Wars speech
if only the troops could thereby be moved to attack.
When Sokolovs deputation was beaten up in the 703rd Suramskii Regiment,
the Minister of War sent a telegram of sympathy. I will cite another parallel to this.
A modest hero, armless General Noskov . . . (He recalls this heroic general dur
ing the episode of capturing the hill 803.) This hero was summoned by two
companies for explanation, and they killed him . . .
I ask the Minister of War, did he descend with the full force of his authority
on the murderers of General Noskov, did he send a telegram of sympathy to the
grief-stricken family of the hero? . . .
When the commanders were demoralized, a telegram was thrust at them threat
ening with dismissal those who exhibit weakness and indecisiveness in the use of
armed force against the insubordinates.
No, he who goes into battle, who is willing to perish, will not be frightened
by this . . .
As a result of being badgered, the commanders fell into three categories: offi
cers of the first group continue reluctantly to perform their duties; others, folding
their arms, are drifting with the current; and [those of the third group] are fran
tically waving red flags, and crawling on their bellies before the gods of the revo
lution, just as they had once crawled before the tsars . . .
The officers corps is in a terrible position . . . Sokolov, after touring the
996 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
army, said: I could never even have surmised that the officers would be such
martyrs.
Yes, they are martyrs . . . They are abused . . . they are beaten. Yes, they
are beaten. Hiding in their tents, they sob, but they will not tell about this. They
are being killed.
There is only one honest way out for the officersit is death. One has to read
reports such as this: There was no success in moving the skirmish line into attack.
All the officers then formed a skirmish line (around 20 men) and attacked a re
doubt. None of them returned.
Let their blood fall on the heads of those deliberate and unwitting hang
men . . .
In order to regenerate the army, it is necessary that:
1) The Provisional Government acknowledge its fault and its mistake in fail
ing to understand the officers, considering them to be enemies of freedomthey
who received the news of the revolution with joy.
2) Petrograd, which is alien to the army and which does not understand its
life, cease its military legislation; full power in this respect must belong to the
Supreme Commander.
3) Politics be completely excluded from the army.
4) The Declaration be abolished.
5) Commissars and committees be abolished.
6) Authority be restored to the commanders.
7) Discipline be introduced.
8) Persons having combat and service experience be appointed to the posts
of senior commanders.
9) Select units be available for supporting the authority of the commanders,
as well as for using armed force against insubordinates, should the necessity arise.
10) The death penalty be introduced not only in the theater of war but also
in the rear where replacements are stationed. Revolutionary courts must be estab
lished for the reserve regiments as well.
Ask me if these measures will produce favorable results. Yes, they will, but
not soon. It was easy to destroy the army, but it requires time to rebuild it.
In spite of the complete disorganization of our army we have to fight the enemy
to the end, even if we have to fight on distant frontiers.
Do not let our Allies count on our offensive. But we must continue to fight so
that the enemy will not withdraw all his forces from our front and, fixing [his
attention] on our Allies, crush them and after that crush us too. The continuation
of the fight is an arduous crusade.
There is yet another coursethe course of treachery, of betrayal of our Allies.
Perhaps it would offer a temporary relief to our native land, but it will not bring
happiness to it, and it will ultimately be followed by moral, political and economic
slavery.
I am turning to the Provisional Government as personified by the Ministers
present here: lead Russia to truth and brightness under the red banner of freedom,
but give us the opportunity to lead our troops under our old banners that have
been winnowed with victories, whose tattered ribbons thousands kiss reverently
in taking their oath of allegiance to the fatherland and behind which they have
marched to victory and glory . . . Do not fear the remnants of autocracy in
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 997
scribed upon it: they have long ago been erased by our hands. It is you who have
stamped them into the dirt, our glorious banners of battle, and it is you who must
pick them up if you have a conscience . . .
(Greatly agitated, General Denikin asked the Chairman for permission to leave
for a short while. The Minister-President shook General Denikins hand and
thanked him for a frank and truthful expression of his opinion.)
general klembovskii. . . . Concerning the committees, I subscribe to the
opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Western Front. It is not to boast that
I say this, but I have the best relations with all the committees, and the commissars
say that they have heard the most complimentary reports about me. It is not bit
terness that prompts me to speak, but only the desire to benefit the cause. If, how
ever, it is found necessary to allow them to remain, then it is imperative to deline
ate strictly their authority and to exclude from their sphere of competence their
control over commanders.
They are unquestionably striving for such control at the present time. . . .
We are constantly receiving resolutions of committees which read, we demand
the removal, and conclude, and we demand to be informed in regard to the lat
ter. These phrases indicate that the committees are in a false position. They can
still request, but as for demandingthat is too much.
The frame of mind found in the committees of the Northern Front is better,
but the better the committee, the sooner its authority falls in the eyes of the sol
diers. And sometimes one hears statements such as you should all be raised on
bayonets, that would serve you right, directed at such committees. . . .
I will now turn to the commissars. I have heard no complaints about them from
commanders. I myself work hand in hand with them, but my commissar requested
me to increase the authority, concentrating it in the sole hands of the Commander
in Chief. But since under the present circumstances the Commander in Chief is
compelled to take frequent trips, the commissar finds that it is necessary to have
a second person with whom the Commander in Chief can share authority. This
was the opinion of the commissar, but I ask you where should the line be drawn
between the authority of the Commander in Chief and that of the commissar. Our
relations are excellent, but if this measure is accepted, if it is accepted for all the
fronts, such good relations will not exist everywhere and, moreover, relations be
tween the Commander in Chief and the commissar may deteriorate.
It has been suggested that a triumvirate be established in the army, consisting
of the Commander in Chief, the commissar, and a soldier. To my question, why
a soldier, I received the answer: for greater confidence. But this, after all, is a
fallacy. If he, the soldier, goes hand in hand [with the triumvirate], then he will
lose the confidence of the other soldiers; in their eyes he will become a bourgeois
who must be raised on bayonets.
What motivates the soldiers? Idealism? No. As the Commander in Chief
of the Western Front correctly expressed it, bolshevism is worms in a festering
wound. The soldier has an inspired and thoughtful look about him until the ques
tion of self-interest is touched. As soon as this question is touched, it becomes an
entirely different matter. It is this very chord that the Bolsheviks are playing upon
and that is why they have such influence.
What can help? The death penalty? But is it really possible to execute entire
divisions? Prosecution? Then half the army would turn out to be in Siberia.
998 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
You will not frighten the soldier by penal servitude. Penal servitude? So what?
After five years I will come back, they say, and at least I will be uninjured. As
you see, it is all a question of self-interest.
If one were to restore the authority and the rights of the commanders, restore
discipline, abolish meetings, and cancel the Declaration, then the situation could
still be corrected; but if all of this cannot be accomplished, then the army is lost
beyond redemption.

At the present time the officers are the only stronghold of freedom and of the
revolution. No measures must be taken against them, all measures must be aimed
exclusively against the soldiers.
I am constantly receiving anonymous letters containing photographs of me cut
out of magazines, with my eyes punctured and with corresponding threats at
tached. This is nothing to me, since they will not be able to reach me; but how is
it for the officers? One has to go into the trenches to understand what is going
on in the souls of the unfortunate officers.
[Telegrams from General Shcherbachev and General Kornilov ]
At the request of the Supreme Commander, general lukomskii read the tele
grams from Shcherbachev, who pointed out the necessity of restoring the authority
of the commanders, and from Kornilov (dated July 6, No. 4254), who considered
that the following measures were necessary to increase the combat potential of
the army:
1. To restore the death penalty and revolutionary field courts-martial within
the theater of military operations, and the internal military districts with respect
to servicemen having committed the offenses indicated in the law.
2. To conduct as soon as possible the most thorough and ruthless purge of the
entire officers corps.
3. To restore the disciplinary authority of commanders, from the company
commanders on up, granting them the right not to promote, to demote, and to
order arrests and indictments.
4. To strengthen the authority of the commissars in the army, bringing them
into the corps, and to grant them the right to confirm death sentences.
5. To establish, in specific terms, the sphere of competence of army commit
tees, entrusting them only with economic and routine matters. Any interference
by committees in questions pertaining to operations or changes in the command
ing personnel must be absolutely prohibited [and made] subject to severe
penalties.
6. To prohibit, by law, for the entire duration of the war, the organization of
meetings, gatherings, and card games in all military units.
7. To prohibit the importing and distributing of literature and newspapers
with a Bolshevik slant in the area where the army is stationed.
8. To prohibit the entry into the area where the army is stationed of any dele
gations, deputations, and agitators without permission obtained beforehand from
appropriate military authorities.
9. Realizing the unjust attitude it permitted itself to adopt toward the entire
corps of officers, in the sense of undermining their authority and lowering their
respect in the eyes of the whole people and the masses of soldiers, the Government
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 999
must declare honestly and forthrightly that during all recent engagements of in
fantry units it was almost exclusively the officers, with minor exceptions, who dis
played military valor, devotion to the cause of our native land, of freedom, and of
the revolution, and who sealed with blood and death their endless courage and
their loyalty to the oath of allegiance. There were frequent cases when officers
and some non-commissioned officers, abandoned by the panic-stricken mob of
indoctrinated soldiers, were left alone at the positions, and marched, outnumbered,
into glorious battle, paying with their lives for the mistakes and crimes of others.
The officers corps, realizing the difficult financial position of our native land, has
not mentioned anything to this day about improving the material position of its
families in view of the increasing high cost of living.
The Government must not take advantage of the civic valor of a whole class
of the population under the guise of maintaining the economy . . . and must
draw up at once a bill for improving the position of the families of heroes who
perished in the war.
COMMISSAR SAVINKOV. If I have been summoned to express my opinion, I
must express it just as fully and frankly as the preceding speakers.
I, as everyone, dearly love our native land, but I cannot agree with the opinions
of the Commander in Chief of the Western Front and the Commander in Chief
of the Northern Front.
The Commander in Chief of the Western Front said that the committees
should be abolished in view of their uselessness or, perhaps, harmfulness. How
ever, it must be noted that members of army organizations have often gone into
battle themselves and perished; they accomplished much in the matter of evacua
tion when the commanding personnel did not everywhere or always issue the
necessary instructions. It cannot be denied that army organizations bring un
questionable benefits. They attend to the maintenance and supply needs [of the
units]; they explain public events to the soldiers from a democratic point of view;
they realize the legitimate rights of the soldier as a Russian citizen. But I cannot
help welcoming the measure of the Government with respect to [preventing them
from] interfering in operational questions and from removing commanders. Of
course it is necessary to define their sphere of competence, and once such a delinea
tion is made, the army organizations can bring nothing but benefit. If there has
been friction, it was accidental and was due to the fault of personnel in the
organizations and of individuals in command.
Similarly, I cannot agree with the Commander in Chief of the Western Front
in regard to the commissars.
The Russian army is a democratic, republican army; the high command, how
ever, was appointed by the old government. If this were not the case, I would be
the first to assert that commissars must be abolished at the first opportunity, but
one cannot do without them under the aforesaid circumstances of the present
time. Soldiers who do not trust their commanders often trust the commissars,
and the commanders work through them. The commissars act as the third party
who often provides the opportunity for smoothing out differences and misunder
standings which arise between the two sides.
As long as there is a revolutionary authority in Russia, the eyes and ears of
this authority must be present in the army.
However, the commissars have shown that they, too, can provoke the soldiers.
1000 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Shklovskii and Sukhomlin, for example, perished at the hands of Russian
soldiers.
During the retreat and disorganization, when the high command could not
use force to restore order, the commissars were able to muster this force and
use it. When the commissar of the 7th Army was bringing order behind the
front, he intercepted up to 15,000 deserters.
For fear of belaboring the attention of this exalted meeting, I will limit
myself only to what has already been said in order to confirm that the com
missariat is both a logical and unavoidable [institution] at the present time and
that it must be realized in practice.
I agree with the Commander in Chief of the Western Front that great dis
cretion should be exercised in selecting persons for the responsible office of com
missar, and relations between the representatives of the revolutionary authorities
and the commanding staff should be just as thoroughly worked out. Until the
present time, the selection of the commissars has been completely random.
If I were to look at our position through the eyes of the Commander in Chief
of the Western Front, I would have to say that we have lost the war. But I cannot
agree with this; I say that we must end the war without disgrace.
It is true that our position is difficult, but it is not hopeless. By a series of
reasonable and resolute measures we will bring our army to a condition which
is no worse than was that of the old army.
I subscribe almost completely to the opinion of the Commander in Chief of
the Southwestern Front. I would have subscribed in full, if it were not for the
question of disciplinary authority. I subscribe, in principle, to his opinion re
garding the necessity of restoring the disciplinary authority of the commanders,
but is the time ripe for this? The adoption of this measure will bring no appre
ciable result in combat, but the disturbances will be enormous and the measure
will encounter the opposition of the soldiers. The time is not yet ripe for the
introduction of this measure.
I consider it necessary to introduce the death penalty in the theater of war,
but it should apply to commanders as well as soldiers.
general lukomskii remarked that the death penalty should apply to civilians
who are corrupting the army.
general alekseev . Everything has already been said about the condition
of our army. The fate of Russia is now at stake; the army must be regenerated,
otherwise all will be lost, all the gains of the revolution will be lost. It is impos
sible to save the army without restoring discipline.
There can be no doubt that the measures of the Government have shattered
the army. First there was Order No. 1, then the Declaration. . . .
The Declaration appeared, as I saidthe last nail to be driven into the coffin
of the valor, steadfastness, and discipline of the Russian army.
I fully subscribe to the measures which have already been proposed for raising
the fighting capacity of the army, but it is absolutely necessary that they apply
also to the rear.
I am familiar with the life and the activities of the rear units. We are feeding
an enormous number of idlers. All the reserve units are literally doing nothing
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1001
from morning to night. (As an example, General Alekseev quoted his conversa
tion with soldiers from reserve units stationed in Smolensk.) There is no training,
no education in the reserve units, utter debauchery [prevails].
If we are going to raise the spirit and the valor of the army without paying
attention to the replacements, they will nullify our work and will continue to
bring disintegration into the army.
To change the [officer] personnel would be to undermine the army even more.
It is necessary, of course, to remove the unfit, but it is inadmissible to throw out
at once 120 generals among whom there were many good ones.
It is necessary to pay the most serious attention to the hospitals. They are
overcrowded. Take even the very same [hospital of] Smolensk. If a physician
maintains that any one person is in good health, he is subjected to abuse: What
does he understand, a soldier who undergoes an examination would say, my
whole insides ache.
g e n er a l l u k o m s k ii remarked that here, at Stavka, Doctor Sokolov is re
questing [a transfer] to the ranks on account of the abuse to which he is subjected
by patients who have to be reexamined.
g e n er a l ALEKSEEV (continued). Corrupting literature is flooding the army
and arrives there sooner than other [literature]. It is inconceivable to struggle
against it under such circumstances.
I am in full agreement with the measures proposed by the Commanders in
Chief for raising the fighting capacity of the army.
With regard to the committees I will say that no matter what orders are
written, the committees will always be interfering in everything. It is necessary
to abolish them. Of course, this cannot be done at once; one must come to it
gradually. . . .
But, I repeat, these committees cannot be abolished at once, a [plan] for a
gradual transition must be worked out.
I regard the commissariat as a temporary measure. It cannot last long, be
cause it is incompatible with the organization of armed forces. Military history
is already familiar with the institution of commissars in the times of the Direc
torate, and even then they brought nothing but harm. The small value gained
from their activities does not compensate for the great harm which comes from
dual power.
g e n er a l r u z s k ii reiterated the grievances of his colleagues.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . There can be no two views regarding the necessity of
strict discipline. An example is Germany which is surrounded by enemies and
is still holding out, thanks only to discipline.
Of course, it is not just a question of whether we will have a republic or a
monarchy; discipline is always essential, no army can exist without it. I will by
pass the reasons for the disintegration of our army; I will only say that Russias
misfortune lies in an undisciplined army. We have no army, either on the front or
in the rear. There is only one reason for the difficulties which the Provisional
Government experienced in Petrograd, and for all the disasters within Russia
namely, the absence of an army.
The dissatisfaction within the country and the failures at the front stem from
the fact that we have no discipline.
1002 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS

Discipline must be maintained not only on the front but also in the rear.
There has always been, and always will be, distrust. But, in general, the
soldiers have trusted the officers. I say this without partiality. The recent dis
trust of the soldiers arose as a result of their having received freedom not from
the Government, but in spite of it. This, precisely, is what had brought about the
distrust.
Perhaps the Provisional Government (I am speaking of the former one) did
not have this in view, but this is how it turned out. The soldiers began to suspect
that the officers wanted to deprive them of their rights. They were christened
bourgeois. But the officer, basically, is not a bourgeois but a real proletariat.
GENERAL r u z sk ii rem ark ed th a t th e g en erals, to o , a re p ro leta ria ts.
general brusilov (continued). If anyone has wealth at the present time,
it is the peasantry.
The officers were more revolutionary than the soldiers who became revolu
tionary because of the promises of land and freedom.
I repeat that perhaps the Government did not intend to put the question so
sharply, but that is how it turned out to be. I have served in the army for a long
time and I know that there was no distrust toward the officers.
Thus, discipline must be restored in the army, the commanders must be
vested with authority. As for the military committees, they cannot be abolished,
but they must be subordinated to the commanders, who may, if necessary, dissolve
them. I do not speak out of a feeling of bitternessI have always worked well
with the executive committee. But some succeed in doing this and others do not.
The committees cannot be permitted to do whatever they wish. For example,
Romm, the chairman of the executive committee of the 12th Army, addressing
me directly by telegram, finds that the resignation of General Radko-Dimitriev
from the post of army commander is untimely. I did not even have in mind the
replacement of General Radko-Dimitriev, but I consider it inappropriate that the
committee should interfere in this matter.
It is desirable to have the commissars at the present time, but the extent of
their powers should be defined. I consider it a matter of honor to make a note
of the useful work of the Commissar of the Southwestern Front. The commissars
may have to be abolished later on, but they are needed at the present time. The
commanders themselves are asking for commissars and agitators, but they cannot
replace the commanders and must assist them.
I always hear the statement that the commanding personnel was appointed by
the old government. No one has the right to say this. All the soldiers, all of you
were also under the old government. Everyone in Russia was. Similarly, all of
us were not revolutionaries before. Now I serve this revolution, I serve it honestly,
and no one has the right to assert that I was appointed by the old government. It
must be considered that we are all appointed by the new government and dot
the i 5s once and for all.
There is no army in the world in which the subordinate does not salute his
superior. For example, FranceI do not even speak of Germany. The act of
saluting is a form of greeting exchanged between persons belonging to one and
the same organization. For our common people, not to salute someone means
to spit upon him. Of course, when both persons are in civilian clothes, there is
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1003
no question of saluting, but when both are in uniform, failure to salute cannot
be tolerated.
MINISTER KERENSKY. In regard to the question raised by General Ruzskii about
taking a vote on the measures proposed for raising the combat potential [of the
army], I feel that this should not be done. What is most important and valuable
to the Government is to hear the opinions of the commanders and the military
authorities.
I will not reply to the attacks and enter a realm which bears the character of
a political argument and of a squaring of accounts with the present political
system.
General Ruzskii says that the new government is to be blamed for everything.
Previously, in the words of the General, there were no outstanding losses, but now
the people are being led to the slaughter. But there were no great losses during
the last operation. Newspapers of a certain trend have persistently adhered to
the idea that the offensive of Kerensky and Brusilov caused losses such as the
troops have never known before (Russkii Vestnik, Tovarishch [German propa
ganda papers] and others). But this is not true.
Much that has been said I cannot refer to myself. It was not I, after all, who
wrote the Declaration, but the commission under General Polivanov. However,
it was suggested here that it was written by civilian persons.
g en er a l r u z sk ii remarked that he said that it was written by persons who
were not familiar with military life, and General Polivanov did not know military
life, because he had spent his whole life in offices.
m in is t e r k e r e n sk y (continued). When the Declaration was announced, we
were forced to endure a whole campaign from the Left because the Declaration ap
peared inadequate. I am not defending the Declaration, and had I been the
Minister [of War] at the time it was drawn up, the Declaration would not have
been issued. I am compelled to liquidate many things that I received as a legacy.
Concerning the interference of committees, I will say that I have not confirmed
a single appointment in accordance with committee resolutions. I have always
referred the requests I received to the proper authorities. That is why I completely
reject this part.
I understand that many cannot reconcile themselves to the present state of
affairs and are trying to return to the old ways, but the Russian people will find
enough strength to fight against attempts to restore the old regime.
If we were to adopt the maximal program of General Denikin (I know how this
General works, and I know that this is not an attempt to restore the old regime),
we must expect tremendous disorders. Personally, I have nothing against relieving
myself of the duties of Minister of War and Navy, recalling the commissars, and
closing down the committees. But I am convinced that on the very next day, a
state of complete anarchy would start spreading over Russia and the commanding
personnel would start being butchered. Such sharp transitions must not occur.
Then it was indicated at the conference that the Provisional Government
undermined the authority of the officers.
g e n er a l ALEKSEEV and g en er a l r u z s k ii declared that no such accusations
were made against the Government
1004 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
minister kerensky (continued). Distrust of the Government is a common
ailment that has remained after the old regime. In the army this was manifested
in attitudes toward officers for which reason it was necessary to appoint civilian
persons as commissars.
The same [ailment] told on the workers, and similar distrust of authority
was manifested in intellectual circles. I experience this myself. [People] now
address themselves to the new government in forms which they never would have
dared to use with respect to the old government in the past. This is a common
phenomenon and it holds just as true for the soldiers; it is the result of a process
through which the country is passing.
Ever since I entered the Ministry, all my aspirations added up to creating
a combat potential in the army, adjusting relations between officers and soldiers
and between the front and the rear, but at the same time taking into considera
tion the historical moment and what is possible at the present time.
As for the proposed measures, I believe that General Denikin himself will
not insist on their immediate implementation. It must be noted that the most
unsuccessful commissars and committees happen to be on the Western Front,
under General Denikin.
General Denikin correctly said that he had never, from any person, heard
about the real situation on the Western Front. General Gurko was saying that all
was well. General Gurko was the author of the establishment of the third divisions
in the corps, the very divisions from which disintegration stemmed.
The dismissal of General Gurko was not a mistake. He took the liberty of
addressing himself in the rudest form to the Provisional Government, declaring
that under the conditions that had arisen he could not carry the responsibility
for the work assigned to him.
As long as I am in power, such actions will not be tolerated.10
I can understand General Denikin, who suddenly found himself facing such
difficult conditions.
I did not appoint commissars until the Southwestern Front requested that I
give them support. When other fronts started to make the request, I did not have
another Savinkov and I sent whoever was at hand.
I toured the front not only to hold meetings, as General Ruzskii said, but also
because the majority of the commanders could not manage without outside help.
Who was the first to suppress the Siberian sharpshooters? Who was the first
to shed his blood for suppressing the recalcitrants ? My protege, my commissar.
I repeat that had I been Minister of War at the time, there would have been
no Declaration. But when I entered the Ministry, the Declaration was already
drawn up by Polivanovs commission, and I was compelled to sign it.

I will formulate my attitude toward the measures and desires that were voiced
here: everything that is required for strengthening discipline must be introduced,
but in a way that will not affect the basic gains of the revolution, so that the people
will not think that we were returning to the pre-February regime. Therefore, I
think that some things must be discarded, because their implementation might
appear as a rejection of new forms, while other things must be carried out, and I
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1005
will do everything in my power to carry them out. The Provisional Government
is now acting with resolute measures, which will probably have to be increased in
strength, and I think that almost all of them, with a few exceptions, can be carried
out in a short time.
Mikhail Vasilevich [Alekseev] speaks of appointments of young persons. But
appointments without regard for rank is a resolution of the Provisional Govern
ment which affects all the ministries. Appointments without regard for rank can
not be rejected because this is called for by the conditions of the moment.
I am younger than Guchkov; however, I did not dismiss 120 generals. The
only thing I did was to relieve the commander of the 7th Army [sic: Lukomskii,
1st Army Corps] and appoint him Chief of Staff, as a person who is familiar with
current operations, and who is therefore the most suitable in my eyes.
general ruzskii noted that an appointment of this nature complies with the
law which provides for such cases.
general Alekseev . The appointment of ensigns to posts of commander of a
brigade is an abnormal phenomenon. Appointments cannot be made straight off
the cuff, since only carefully considered appointments can produce good results.
minister kerensky . Are you hinting at the appointment of Zmiev to Nichnii
Novgorod? Yes, but urgent measures had to be adopted then in order to prevent
disorders, and this appointment was recommended by Verkhovskii, who man
aged very well with his duties in Moscow; he suggested Zmiev, and I confirmed
the appointment.
general brusilov . Then he must be promoted to general.
minister kerensky . Myshlaevskii brought disintegration into the troops of
the military district of Kazan. I even spoke in the Duma about the necessity of
tightening [the discipline] in that military district. And I think that the appoint
ment of a colonel there will help matters, he will tighten [the discipline] of the
district.11
general oenikin . On the matter of appointments, we have been stressing the
necessity of appointing persons with comhat and service experience.
general ruzskii. Polivanov has never been on active duty, he spent all his
time in offices, he has had no combat or service experience. Recently he has been
under strong pressure from the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
general denikin . There was a soldier in his commission who exerted very
great influence.
general alekseev . There was a group of seven persons in the commission
who controlled everything. One of the members of this commission said that
all these people had brains that were turned inside out.
general ruzskii. How, for example, was the question of saluting settled?
The abolition of saluting altogether would even have been preferable to this
saluting when one so desires.
minister kerensky . Of course, everything has its negative aspects. Now
everything is in an abnormal state. Could I, a civilian, have been a Minister of
War? No. Could a change be made in everything at the present time? No, it
cannot.
As for my not having sent a telegram expressing sympathy to Noskovs family,
ii Doc. 781.
1006 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
this was an oversight on my part. But the assertion that I supposedly want to
humiliate the officers is unfair. I give the officers their due for their valor, but
the officers, too, have not always been up to their mark. There was practically
no unit which betrayed its duty that did not have an officer who conducted the
propaganda. There are many examples: the case of the 7th Army, Khaustov,12
Lieutenant-Colonel Popov. Wherever there were no officers of this kind, the situa
tion was easy to handle. Another category of officers, primarily in positions of
command, are those who do not want to take the present situation into account
and who stake an Italian strike. They leave everything up to the committees until
everything disintegrates. It has seemed to me for a long time that Radko-Dimitriev
is not up to his mark, he has given way too much to the soldiers; I want to remove
him, but he incites the committees against me.
It must be noted that the responsibility of everyone is so interdependent that
one cannot place everyone into either the group of those who are inciting or the
group of those who are subjected to incitement. One must act according to the
dictates of ones conscience. He who cannot reconcile himself to the new order
should not force himself, let him resign. There is talk that some measures are
premature, but if the contemplated measures were to be carried out by legitimate
channels, i.e., by sending them from one person to another, awaiting opinions and
conclusions, it would take too much time and the work would fail. But events are
flying at the present time. This urgency has both a positive and a negative aspect.
But I am at your disposal as a machinery which wields vast powers.
. . . I speak in this way not because I am opposed to the measures indicated,
but because I must consider the mood of the masses. One can now expect this
mood to shift.
general ruzskii. Aleksandr Fedorovich, there is no need for you to take
everything as a personal reference. Of course it is difficult to correct what has
been spoiled. It was not you who spoiled everything; but still corrective measures
must be taken, otherwise Russia will perish.
It would be a very good thing if the Government would finally get rid of its
fear of returning to the old. There can be no fear, because there can be no return
to the past.
We have all served for decades in military service; it hurts us to see what is
going on around us, and that is why we express our thoughts in such a heated
manner.
In regard to the democratization of the army, I will note that the army began
to be democratized from the end of 1914. I made a report about this to the
former emperor. The enormous replacement of persons that has occurred in
the army can be seen even from the example of the regiment in which I commenced
my service. Forty-four thousand replacements have gone through this regiment
since the war.
minister Tereshchenko . I would like to say just a few words now as a
member of the Government. The reproaches directed against the Government
are unjust, because the Government is in the process of drawing up measures
some of which go even further than what has been proposed by General Denikin.
Speaking of measures, it is necessary to point out the noteworthy fact that the
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1007
present conference is taking place at a time when, due to the conditions which have
developed, these measures can be carried into effect.
One must become reconciled to the commissars, albeit reluctantly, for they
cannot be abolished at the present time.
Only a month ago it seemed impossible to introduce the death penalty. Now it
is accepted unanimously by the Government, and its introduction did not give
rise to difficulties, and the people accepted it with calm.
However, the death penalty cannot now be introduced in the rear. The masses
must be made aware of the necessity of the measure as soon as possible.
To abolish the committees, as everyone is suggesting, cannot be done now.
This must be approached gradually.
I must say that in certain respects, the Government has gone further than the
measures proposed here. A measure is now being drawn up for prosecuting
organizations which adopt criminal resolutions and decisions.
In general, now is not the time to reproach one another, we must work to
gether for restoring the combat potential of our army. All measures must be
carried out gradually, rather than all at once, keeping in step with the wakening
of national sentiment which has grown noticeably during the past six or eight
weeks. Everything that can be done now, will be done.
A break was announced at 8 P.M. The Conference was resumed at 10 P.M.
minister Tereshchenko . Our offensive, even though unsuccessful, has in
creased the Allies5 confidence in us, and for many, including the Americans, it
came as a surprise, because they did not think that we would turn to active opera
tions before autumn. At any rate, the Allies saw in our offensive the material
[evidence] of our desire to advance.
The question that interests me now is the possibility of joint action with the
Allies provided the combat potential of our army is restored.
As you know, the British were supposed to have started the offensive today,
and the French should follow them in a short time. I would like to know the
proper policy for me to pursue when the Allies question me about our future
actions.
When our offensive was launched, and when it developed successfully in its
initial phase, the Allies sent us the most optimistic telegrams, to which, however,
I replied with extreme reserve, pointing out that we^ have not yet exerted the
pressure that should yield decisive results.
general brusilov . At the beginning of the campaign I pointed out that one
should not rely too heavily on its success. In any event, the size of the offensive
we conducted was within our capacities under the given circumstances.
As concerns our future operations, we will not be prepared for them until
next winter. Rather, not even until spring. The conditions of a winter campaign
are such that this campaign would be even less successful than the last one. We
might find it possible to conduct a minor campaign on the Rumanian or the
Caucasian Front, but one cannot speak of this now with certainty. As concerns
the Southwestern Front, this Front is so disorganized that one cannot count on
a campaign on this Front before next spring.
minister Tereshchenko . The commitments we make to the Allies will orig
inate from here, and not from Petrograd. I need the information referred to for
1008 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
my personal orientation in order to know the policy I should pursue. The
Rumanians are highly disturbed at the present time.
g e n e r a l BRUSILOV. Yes, the Rumanians have done comparatively much; they
were successful. But in view of the general situation on our front, I have sent a
telegram to General Shcherbachev ordering him to halt any further advance. I
am afraid that we may not be able to hold out in Kirlibab.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . Our principal concern must be to hold the section
of Rumania which is now occupied by our troops. The Rumanians are now
worried about [the possibility of] having to evacuate Rumania. This circumstance
gives rise to two problems: 1) the necessity of shifting the Rumanian army to
Russian territory and of moving the Rumanian royal family to Russia, which
presents certain inconveniences in view of the establishment of a republic in our
country; and 2) the fact that England and France are afraid that Rumania, in the
face of the aforesaid circumstance, may conclude a separate peacewhich can be
expected.
g e n e r a l br u sil o v . Yes, it is possible, because our troops are behaving ex
tremely tactlessly with respect to Rumania, interfering in her internal policy.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . They demanded the abolition of the death penalty,
they interfered with local legislation. Repressive measures against all this have
been adopted.
g e n e r a l BRUSILOV. I telegraphed General Shcherbachev that interference by
committees is out of place.
I think that the Rumanians would very gladly join the German coalition, but
the presence of our troops in Rumania prevents them from doing so because they
do not feel strong enough to fight against them.

m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . Let us now turn to the question of materiel losses.


general lu k o m sk h . In regard to materiel, we did not lose as much artillery
during the retreat as we did during combat.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . I wrote about this as far back as June 19. Be
sides, the Allies have still not filled 15 per cent of the orders. It would be desirable
to establish what our need is for materiel received from abroad.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . We must ask the Allies to give as much as they can.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . The Allies release the materiel according to the
situation on the front. Have you been able to establish our losses of heavy artillery
during the campaign just concluded?
g e n er a l br u sil o v . The losses have not yet been established.
g e n er a l a l e k s e e v . Certain data are already available. According to my in
formation, up to 35 pieces of heavy artillery have been lost. [He enumerates the
categories of ordnance.]
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . I ask you to inform me of the schedule of our
unquestionable requirements and also regarding the [supplies] which we must
deliver to you immediately.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . I would ask you to insist on the shipment of aviation
equipment to us. We are in a bad and weak [position] in this regard.
m in is t e r Te r e sh c h e n k o . A large part of our freight is lying in Allied ports
owing to the absence of tonnage,
I will not speak about Persia now. One could speak about Poland in the
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1009
event our offensive proves successful. In general, I will say that there is serious
dissatisfaction with Germany in Poland; hatred of Germany is growing among
the people, because the screws of political and economic repressions are tightening
more and more.
I would now like to hear about our strategic position on the fronts.
GENERAL BRUSILOV. Regarding the strategic position, I can say the following.
It is obvious from reports of the Commanders in Chief of the Northern and West
ern Fronts that we cannot rely on any particular resistance on these fronts, espe
cially in the region of Riga, since the 12th Army is worse than the 5th.

I do not know where the Germans intend to halt their offensive. Now that
the attack is going to commence on the French front, the Germans, in my opinion,
having occupied Galicia, will hold back. However, one should not lose sight of the
possibility that our PodoPskaia guberniya, which is rich in food supplies, may
attract their attention.
m in is t e r k e r e n sk y . In view of the possibility of further failures, it becomes
necessary to discuss the following three questions:
1) The question of evacuating the inhabitants. Our central guberniyas are
very much disturbed by the possibility of their having to accept the wave of
evacuation and request that such evacuation be directed not to Moscow, but to
the Volga.
2) It is necessary to discuss, as a matter of foresight, the question of evacuating
Petrograd and its environs.
3) The question of purveyance of state papers, since the Bureau of Printing
and Engraving cannot be evacuated.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . Aleksandr Sergeevich [Lukomskii] and I recommend that
the inhabitants remain where they are. No particular disasters will follow from
this and there is no need, in fact, for evacuation. If the question is decided in
this way, there will not be many evacuees.
The North (Petrograd) should be relieved of factories, but there is no direct
threat to Petrograd. The Germans need four, five or six free corps in order
to occupy Petrograd. This is a time-consuming operation. By the time the Ger
mans amass the necessary troops the season for bad roads will begin. This is
such a big obstacle that the enemy wiE not have sufficient troops. My opinion is
that Petrograd is out of danger. It would be interesting [to hear] what Mikhail
Vasilevich has to say.
g e n er a l a l e k s e e v . Formerly I was of the opinion that Petrograd was out
of danger, but at that time we had an army; now, however, aE that remains is
human dust. One cannot vouch for anything. But a campaign against Petrograd
is very complicated. Operations against Riga and Polotsk are another matter,
they are feasible. It is possible that our front wiE be broken through at these
points, which will force us to withdraw from the Dvina. The enemy will now
aim his blows at the right flank of the Rumanian front in order to cut us off from
Rumania.
1010 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
I agree. Yes, Petrograd is out of danger. But the enemy can threaten Riga,
Polotsk, and the Rumanian front.
g e n e r a l b r u sil o v . Most likely, one should expect the Germans to attack on
the Northern Front.
g e n e r a l ALEKSEEV. Owing to the establishment of a united Latvia, her last
third, too, will pass into the hands of the Germans. The possession of Riga and
lower Dvina has far too great an importance for the Germans.
g e n e r a l BRUSILOV. We are presupposing all this, but we cannot say how it will
turn out in practice. At any rate, I do not advise you to start evacuating Riga,
because if the Germans find out about this, they will strike for a certainty. More
over, Riga has already been almost completely evacuated. Of course, certain un
wieldy things can be sent out now.
m in is t e r k e r e n s k y . In other words, no steps should be taken.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . Concerning Finland, there is nothing in particular
to fear. The change in mood of the navy has affected the mood in Finland. The
measures that have been adopted for maintaining order will prevent any possibility
of an open revolt.
g e n e r a l r o m a n o v sk ii (Chief of General Staff). Five regiments of the Petro
grad Garrison have been disbanded. The instigators are being brought to trial
while the passive elements will be sent to the front with their salaries reduced to
the old rate. A total of around 90,000 persons will be taken out of Petrograd.
m in is t e r k e r e n s k y . Summarizing what has been saidthe soldiers of the
Petrograd Garrison must be formed into a company for a regiment, or must be
sent to the Caucasus.
g e n er a l l u k o m s k ii . One cannot send everyone to the Caucasus.
g e n er a l Ve l ic h k o . But workers are needed for the rear lines in the sector
of the 1st Army.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . We are not in a position now to strengthen our rear lines.
In Germany, everyone up to the age of 60 has been [called up for service] while we
are unable to enlist the 40-year-olds. Commissar Savinkov has made a correct
assertion that they cannot be left in the rear.
MINISTER k e r e n s k y . Then this means that they must be sent to the front?
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . Yes, to the front and to the Caucasus.
g e n er a l r o m a n o v sk ii (Chief of the General Staff). Fifteen thousand to each
front.
The Conference closed at 11 P.M.
876. L e t t e r to K e r e n sk y f r o m A l e k s e e v
[Ya. Ya. Slavik, Iz dnevnika Generala M. V. Alekseeva, Russkii Istoricheskii Arkhiv,
I (1929), 29-33.]
July 20, 1917, No. 24
D e a r A l e k sa n d r F e d o r o v ic h ,
Lack of time at the conference of July 16 in Mogilev prevented me from sub
mitting for discussion some of the most vital questions, the successful solution
of which will determine the future course of the war.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1011
Circumstances point to the inevitability of a fourth winter campaign in 1917
18. In carrying it out we shall encounter difficulties entirely unknown before.
Those privations with which the entire personnel of the army in action inevitably
has to deal were shouldered by our soldiers only when the discipline was depend
able and firm, when lack of food, slow and delayed supply of warm clothing, as
well as difficult climatic and atmospheric conditions were tolerated as an inevitable
evil to be borne in the name of the sacred duty to ones motherland.
The wretched picture of the actual state of discipline among the soldiers was
revealed to you on July 16. Information received by me shows that the roads in the
rear are covered with deserters on the Western Front as well as (and in particular)
on the Southwestern Front. And this in the summer during a favorable time of
year when the army is completely provided with provisions. To launch the winter
campaign with such a demoralized soldier who has forgotten his duty and
discipline will be difficult: the escape to the rear will be so great that it will be
totally impossible to overcome it in time with reinforcements. Trenches will be
occupied by army units so undermanned that it will be difficult to hold the position
against partial and even light thrusts by a disciplined and stubborn enemy.
Even in the event that the measures suggested by the military members of the
conference on July 16 are carried out by you immediately and with a bold and
vigorous stroke, the desired results of restoring the morale and the vanished
discipline in the army will take approximately three months. And this would re
quire calm but unrelentingly stubborn work of the commanders of all ranks . . .
The work, moreover, would have to be carried on not only in active but in
reserve units, scattered over the entire territory of the country. Only within
such an approximate period (at best) could we restore moral resiliency to the
soldier and a certain fighting strength to the army. The end of this period coin
cides with the onset of winter. Consequently, the highest good of the country,
the necessity of its salvation, urgently demands that the orders outlining the needed
measures for the education of the soldier and the restoration of discipline, and
the absolute repeal of the notorious Declaration of Rights should be carried out
without delays and hesitations. Courage will achieve its salutary task. And I
do not share the misgivings expressed at the conference that orders will be issued
today and tomorrow will see a slaughter of officers and the high commanding
personnel. Events in Petrograd of July 35 showed clearly that the more profound
the moral degradation of the mob, the more cowardly it is, and the more readily
does it surrender . . . when it meets decision and bravery.
Excesses may occur in some places. They can and should be crushed with a
ruthless hand. This . . . will subsequently preserve hundreds of thousands of
lives and prevent the possibility of a recurrence of insurrections.
A no less important question to be decided is that of providing the army
with food. . . .
This year the conditions of procurement of provisions and fodder for the
army have changed radically. . . . The anarchy which is gradually gripping our
village radically changes the condition for the . . . procurement of grain.
As a result: (1) Russia will receive a considerably smaller quantity of grain
and fodder this year than in previous years; and (2) the supply on hand will
be for the most part scattered throughout small peasant holdings. And the peasant,
particularly now, is not inclined to give up his grain to the state, especially at
fixed prices. To some extent this is not without justification: he will give away
1012 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
the grain at fixed prices, but will be unable to buy at fixed prices, or for the most
part be altogether unable to find on the market such commodities as cotton goods,
sugar, kerosene, sickles, and scythes.
To requisition grain from the large-scale owner is simple and easy. But just
try to carry this measure out . . . with the peasant who now prefers to bury a
considerable part of his grain.
Perhaps some sort of instructions have already been issued for the transfer
of the harvest into the hands of the state and for the elimination of concealment
and speculation. But locally nothing has as yet been done. Consequently for all
practical purposes the question . . . should be considered unsolved. What may
be done afterwards may prove too late to remedy matters.
I have already had occasion above to express the opinion that the former
soldier knew how to endure privations. The soldier of today is not capable of
doing so. And shortages of food will increase desertion and lead to grievous dis
orders.
Finally, we must pause on yet another question of utmost importance for
the entire country in general and for the army in particular. Recently collected
data point to the fact that our transport is deteriorating daily. If this continues,
by October or November of this year the railroads will be unable to fulfill even
one-half of the demands made upon them.
You may say that I am not in a position to speak of the national significance
of the impending breakdown in transport . . . which is now in its final stages.
But I cannot be silent about the terrifying conditions which will result in the
active army when the railroads prove helpless to bring provisions to the troops
and fodder to the cavalry units, and to carry out transport operations without
which it is impossible to conduct serious operations of any kind.
On both of these questionsguarantee of provisions and preservation of the
function of . . . railroadsurgent and planned work is needed as well as the
urgent implementation of a number of practical government measures.
I cannot pass in silence my talks of July 17 with the representatives of the
Allied armies at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander. On the strength of
relations established with them earlier, I had the opportunity to hear their frank
misgivings about the fitness of our army as a result of the grievous and complete
loss of discipline and any kind of fighting spirit, all of which might result in the
possible worthlessness of Russia . . . as an ally, unless measures are taken for
the reconstruction of the army.
As one who has over many years, and particularly during the war years,
given all my strength in the service of the country, I deeply feel the great mis
fortunes and trials which have befallen our long-suffering Russia.
God has given you much. You hold in your hands now tremendous power and
the opportunity to introduce into life measures to save our motherland, to give
her back the strength to gain victory and to initiate creative work that will heal
those wounds and afflictions from which our motherland suffers as she never
suffered in her long history.
Perhaps you may still inspire your collaborators with the ability to do
practical and fruitful work for the good of the motherland, which up to this
time it has neither seen nor felt. . . . And the motherland . . . passionately
awaits such work. The curse of the people will fall upon your head if her ex
pectations are betrayed, if you, holding so high and important a post do not make
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1013
a heroic effort to save the motherland hy forcing your collaborators to forget
everything else and be inspired with but one thought and wishto bring tangible
practical benefits to Russia.
But first of all, the army must be restored. Without the army the ruin of
the motherland is inevitable. The measures for her regeneration are known. They
are in your hands, and all that is honorable, steadfast, unhesitating, and disin
terested awaits their quick and final realization. To you then will belong the
gratitude of your contemporaries and posterity.
I beg to, etc.
[M. V. A lekseev ]

877. L etter to R odzianko from A lekseev on the Conference of July 16


[Ya. Ya. Slavik, Iz dnevnika generala M. V. Alekseeva, Russkii Istoricheskii Arkhiv,
I (1929), 43-47.]
July 25,1917
[D ear M ikhail V ladimirovich ,]
The affairs of Russia, our motherland, [in the hands of?word omitted in
text] responsible and, for the most part, irresponsible masters of our destiny,
daily grow more grave and more melancholy (sic!). All is not well at the front.
The strategic situation in the south may bring a great shock to our self-esteem
and [menace] our central guberniyas. Things are bad also in the rear of the
army where the people feed more than a million idlers and often disgracefully
behaving loafers. Things are not well at all in the rear, with no government, no
leaders who can rise above the interests of their party and cast an impartial, non
partisan, and competent look at the needs, wishes, and aspirations of long-
suffering Russiaof the Russian people as a whole and not at one favorite and,
moreover, corrupt class.
On July 16 a conference took place in Mogilev. Permit me to enumerate the
measures that all military representatives of the conference insist must be im
mediately realized. Only these measures will make it possible to restore to health
within three months the sick organism of the army. Or, to be more exact, to
create some sort of army, capable of fighting, because at the present moment we
have no army. We have individual units that have preserved loyalty to duty. We
have officers and a small number of soldiers ready to perish and sacrifice them
selves. But we do not have a united soldiery, welded together by discipline and
faith in their superiors, inspired with a desire to fight and be victorious, able
to show courage and stubbornness.
Here are the measures:
1. To have the Provisional Government admit its error and guilt for under
estimating the officer personnel of the army, whom it humiliated, degraded, and
consciously and deliberately deprived of authority and importance. It must
admit its error because it is precisely this that has, in the main, destroyed the army.
2. To recognize that the leaders of Petrograd know nothing about the army
and consequently should discontinue military legislation and transfer this work
into the competent hands of the Supreme Commander.
3. To banish all politics from the army, to abolish the right of meetings, be
cause the entire army has been transformed into an endlessly meeting-happy mob.
1014 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
The common sense, honor, and loyalty of the Russian soldier have been drowned
in meetings.
4. To abolish the Declaration of Soldiers Rights, accepted and passed by
Kerensky with too light a heart.
5. To abolish the army committees and the commissars whom Kerensky
considers the eyes and the ears of the Provisional Government. These two in
stitutions have removed without trace the authority of the military commanders
of all ranks and given birth to multipower and multi authority, a most dangerous
thing for any army .
6. Consequently to restore as soon as possible the individual authority and
responsibility of commanding officers. To restore confidence [in them] from
above without which responsible senior officers cannot devote all the strength
of heart and mind to carrying out combat assignments. It is inadmissible that
the commanding officer should be harassed by the eyes and ears of a man
who, for the most part, has not the slightest knowledge of military matters but
who wants to meddle in everything and in addition to his eyes and ears wants
to stick his nose everywhere also.
7. To restore genuine discipline. To establish for this purpose courts-mar
tial (for some reason it has been found necessary to rename them military-
revolutionary courts) and capital punishment not only at the front but through
out the entire rear, inasmuch as the arriving reinforcements are depraved and
undisciplined to such an extent that the appearance of each fresh detachment of
reinforcements in the regiment immediately destroys all the work achieved by the
commanding officer, notwithstanding the altogether murderous conditions for
such work.
8. To create at once selected units to exert influence upon the soldier masses
during combat; to hold them in reserve and for the purpose of maintaining
order during the period of mobilization. (Personally I regard the action of Gen.
Brusilov and other commanding officers of sending shock battalions ahead a great
mistakenobody followed them. This action has uselessly destroyed the best
men and a great number of officers. The shock battalions should comprise a
reserve to spur on the faint-hearted who have lost their conscience.)
Personally added by myself: 9. Not to change commanding officers as a
capricious and rich woman casts off her gloves. Drive out the weak ones who
failed to rise to the call of their duty in combat. But dont drive them out because
of shady testimonials, as Guchkov had done. He broke down the commanding
officer corps. He had hoped to arouse by his wholesale banishment of command
ing officers an explosion of enthusiasm in the army. 10. To return to the army
those honest and steadfast servants driven out of units in recent months by the
depraved soldiery.
The demands of Kornilov are known to you from the newspapers.
When, at the Conference, after a brief enumeration of the above measures,
Gen. Ruzskii proposed a careful consideration and elaboration of each one of
them separately, Kerensky replied that this did not enter into the scope of the
Conference, that the latter must voice its opinion only; the elaboration of the
measures belongs to Petrograd, and in elaborating the measures the principles
gained for the armies by the revolution must not be touched (?). On further
insistence by the military representatives, Kerensky replied that he is prepared
to resign from the post of War Minister after signing any order approving the
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1015
measures outlined. However, he is convinced that if the order reaches the soldiery
today, tomorrow will see the slaughter of officers and commanding personnel.
Today, as I write this letter to you, ten days have passed from the time of the
Conference, and no measures for restoring the army to health have been taken
or announced, even the mildest ones. And yet the loss of every day is irretrievable.
On July 20 I sent a letter about this to Kerensky; I expressed in it my conviction
that there is no need to fear possible violence on the part of the soldiers. In the
first place, such violence is widespread as it is. In the second place, courage will
achieve its salutary aim. And I do not share the misgivings expressed at the
Conference. Events in Petrograd of July 3-5 showed clearly that the more pro
found the moral degradation of the mob, the more cowardly it is and the more
readily does it surrender when it meets with decision and bravery.
Of course my voice cannot carry any weight now, although I deemed it my
duty to raise it, not only at the Conference but by letter as well.
It is sad that the voice of Kornilov, too, ringing more resolutely and in
sistently, it would seem, because of the catastrophe at the frontsomething I did
not have on leaving Mogilevalso fails so far to rouse the leaders of our destiny
from their sweet slumber. What are they waiting for? Perhaps the Committee
of the State Duma will ask this question. Perhaps an accounting will be demanded
by that element of the Russian people that as yet has not wallowed in party strife
and the social dragnet which drives Russia and the motherland into the back
ground. It should be definitely settled that erratic runnings-around and speeches
are of absolutely no use. Here is a comment from one of the combat officers of a
regiment who had the honor to hear a speech of Kerensky: This is opera bouffe
The dark soldier masses have not and do not recognize Kerensky. I should add
that they will never recognize anyone who comes with speeches and words but
without authority, force, and the fist.
One more thing. Recall the debauchery that resulted from the loud preach
ings and loathsome actions of Lenin, Zinoviev, Trotsky, Lunacharskii, Kamenev,
Kollontai, and others. Those scoundrels were immune. Appeals to riot by word
of mouth or in the press, seizure of somebody elses property . . . were no offence.
Fight them through words! . . . as long as they have not committed a crime
(as if they had not!). This is what it means to be under the patronage of the
committee of crimes, that is, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
And yet with what ease, in what shameful outward circumstances they arrest
General Gurko, who has dedicated his entire life to the motherland! It was not
a matter of an order from Kerensky. One letter (!) proved sufficient for such a
step. And what about his activity, his service? Who cares . . . there was a letter!
It is either petty cowardice of people who see everywhere and in everything
the threatening specter of counterrevolution ormay I be forgivenpetty venge
ance toward a man whom one does not happen to like and whose name one can,
by virtue of ones power, smear before Russia with impunity. I am inclined to
think that personal dislike played in this case a greater role than anything else.
Has not the same motive overthrown Brusilov? Within the army both the
strong and the weak sides of his character were well knownhis ability to be
come flustered during difficult critical moments. The commanding and officer
personnel met his appointment without confidence. Perhaps he was not altogether
blameless for the break-through at Ternopol. But everyone regarded this as a
moral catastrophe, an unrestrained desertion of the army, demoralized as a con
1016 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
sequence of the laws of the recent four months. Why then has Brusilov been so
unceremoniously removed? It seems to me that injured pride was the decisive
factor here. . . .
I beg to, etc.
[M. V. A l e k s e e v ]
P.S. At a closed conference of the Committee of the State Duma the opinion
was expressed that the criminal Order No. 1 of the Soviet of Soldiers5 and Work
ers5 Deputies was issued thoughtlessly . . . rather than with any intention to
cause harm. On May 4, at the conference in the Mariinskii Palace, at the opening
of which you were present, to my comment that this order had laid a firm foun
dation for the demoralization of the army and upon my insistence that those who
had demoralized it restore it, Tseretelli replied that he had repudiated the guilt
of the Soviet because Order No. 1 answered the needs of the moment.55 Conse
quently, even on May 4 the leaders of the Soviet . . . firmly believed that the
demoralization of the army was necessary to meet the needs of the moment.55
This expression will go down in history with the famous expression After us the
deluge.55 That the order consciously pursued definite aims is also loudly confirmed
in Stockholm now.
878. T h e D emands of the Central Committee of the
O fficers U nion of the A rmy and N avy
[Novoe Vremia, No. 14833, July 22,1917, p. 4. Organized at Stavka in May, the Union
was to play a significant role in the Kornilov Affair. See Volume IIL]
The following telegram was sent to all the ministers and commanders of all
the armies by the Central Committee of the Officers Union of the Army and Navy:
The catastrophe on the Southwestern Front, with the horrifying pictures of
plunder and disgraceful desertions from the battlefield of hundreds of thousands
of soldiers, anarchy inside the country, complete helplessness of the government,
and the unrestrained current of betrayal, arbitrary rule, and violence, threatens
to destroy Russia in the very near future. Hourly, hundreds of men of arms
officers and soldiers who appeal to those who in throngs desert the battlefield
perish, victims of violence by the unrestrained mobs who have lost all sense of
honor and discipline. We, representatives of the Officers Corps, who for cen
turies have defended Russia with our blood, and now, under the gravest circum
stances, having preserved the presence of mind and sober view of our environ
ment, we, the Central Committee of the Officers Union of the Army and Navy,
request the Provisional Government to take exceptional measures to save the
motherland. We emphatically demand the immediate publication by telegraph
of the order to introduce the death penalty as a temporary measure for all traitors
of the motherland who desert the battlefield and deliberately evade combat duty.
Simultaneously, we insist on the return of complete authority and discipline, the
right of commanders of all grades, unlimited by irresponsible collective organs.
This authority must be restored to the commanders in the name of the Provisional
Government by means of a solemn act addressed to all the people, the army, and
the navy. Only this vigorous measure can restore the authority of the Govern
ment, a sense of order, lawfulness, and discipline among the troops. Particularly
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1017
so since the officers, thousands of whom have already died after June 18 for the
liberty of their country and thus confirmed further their unfailing loyalty to the
motherland, proved with their blood that from the very first days of the revolu
tion they demanded authority in the army not for themselves but for the salvation
of the motherland. And if these emphatic laws are not published at an early
moment, the responsibility for the possible consequences of the devastating course
of events will be removed from the officers of the army and the navy and fall
with its full force upon the heads of those people who are now in power.

879. Careless W ords


[Article in Vlast9Naroda, No. 71, July 20,1917, p. 1.]
The Central Committee of the Officers Union of the Army and Navy published
in the newspapers and sent to all the units in the army and the navy a telegram
making certain demands on the Government. One of these demands, for courts-
martial (military-revolutionary courts) and capital punishment, was implemented
by the Government apart from and before receiving the telegram of the Unions
Committee. It came too late. As is known, the initiator [of this demand] was
General Kornilov, whose arguments were unquestionably more convincing and
well grounded. Thus, there is nothing more to be said about this aspect of the
demands.
But another demand of the Unions Committee forces us to pause longer. The
question is that of restoring complete authority to military commanders, while
simultaneously eliminating the interference in their actions of irresponsible col
lective organsto be more exact, the elected committees.
The inevitable impression of this point suggests something unquestionably
greater than the actual content of the phrase. In so painfully crucial a question
it would have been advisable to be more cautious and more exact in expression.
It is absolutely indispensable to restore and strengthen the authority of the
commanders. But in this vitally important and urgent matter it is just as neces
sary to take into account the new psychological and political situation we are in
and which cannot be ignored altogether. . . .
At present Russia values particularly those morally sound army units that
fearlessly go into battle, have friendly relations with their officers, realize all the
stern grandeur of the moment and the need for voluntary boundless sacrifices.
In these units the committees and their members were ahead of everybody in
battle as well as in constructive work. Try and tell these troops our sole and
last hopethat their committees are not needed and must be silenced or merely
reduced to debates. You will turn away the troops forever from the entire officer
corps and even from their combat superiors, with whom they mixed their blood
in battle.
I know that very many officers are of the same opinion and will not follow
dangerous proposals, because they themselves say that the normal activity of the
committees is a tremendous help in the difficult work and service of the troops
and the commanding personnel.
It is indisputable that a large part of the officer corps from whose midst so
many sacrifices were made during this terrifying month may be dissatisfied with
many aspects of the present state of military life. But then, there are not a few
1018 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
soldiers who are dissatisfied with the same. For three months and over, the mili
tary family has been poisoned by both deliberate and unintentional traitors.
But the Bolshevik, German, or Black Hundred propaganda is one thing, and
the existence and the work of army committees quite another. The army was
disrupted by the antistate and antirevolutionary forces of German agents and by
dark forces of reaction, guided by someone, and not at all by the committees
as such.
Let us leave aside those units of the army where the committees are powerless
or even serve as the organized expression and conductors of treacherous and
mutinous designs. There they should be temporarily suspended as a penalty, in
accordance with the decision of older committees, government commissars, and
commanders, because it should be remembered that the self-government granted
by the revolution to the troops is a sign of civic honor.
And everywhere in other instances their authority should be increased as much
as possible within the bounds of law and reason. . . .
But all that has been said above is too far from that call which is heard in
the telegram of the Committee of the Officers Union. This call, couched in the
form of a demand, conceals unquestioned harm to the cause of raising the morale
of the peoples army, restoring wise discipline and friendly relations, [in a word]
for the whole cause of creative revolution.
That is why, to all those who unwittingly or deliberately allow such words to
be voiced, we must say: Be more careful. And understand that there are things
that may be changed but which we no longer can escape now.
A. Zhdan -P ushkin
The Active Army July 14, 1917
P.S. The Central Committee of the Union at headquarters, having submitted
its demands to the Government, threatens that the officers will decline all respon
sibility. A strange and untimely threat? As a body, the officers will never threaten
the Government of the Revolution, which delivered all of us from the hateful yoke
of accursed tsars, of their ministers and gendarmes, of the humiliation of the
soldiers and officers in the face of the wild willful actions of the bourbons, of
the club and lawlessness. To threaten at this moment the Government of Russia
means to undermine it. And to undermine the Government means to destroy both
the army and Russia.
A. P.

880. R esolution of the Central Executive Committee of the S oviet


of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies and th e E xecutive
C ommittee of the S oviet of P easants D eputies
[.Izvestiia, No. 120, July 18,1917, p. 5.]
Having heard the report of representatives of army committees and taking
into consideration the enormous role which these committees have played and
are playing in organization, discipline, and restoration of combat efficiency of
the army;
Recognizing that attempts are frequently being made at the present time to
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1019
destroy these organizations under the pretext of restoring combat efficiency and
discipline;
Considering a strong and comprehensive organization of the popular masses
to be one of the most fundamental tasks of the moment;
And seeing the greatest danger to the defense of the country and to the gains
of the revolution in the campaign launched by counterrevolutionary and bourgeois
circles against representative organs of workers, soldiers, and peasants,
The Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies and the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants
Deputies call upon workers, soldiers, and peasants to maintain revolutionary dis
cipline, fulfill their revolutionary duty, and make the necessary great sacrifices,
and to achieve the closest solidarity around their representative organsthe
Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputiesand declare that no en
croachments on the rights and the freedom of action of these organs must be
permitted, especially with regard to army organizations, since their work repre
sents an absolute condition for the restoration of discipline and the combat effi
ciency of the army.

THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERAL KORNILOV AS


SUPREME COMMANDER13
881. T h e A ppointment of K ornilov as S upreme Commander and
of S avinkov as A ssistant M inister of W ar
[Rech\ No. 168, July 20,1917, pp. 2 and 3. Kerensky had retained the post of Minister
of War and Navy when he became Minister-President.]
July 18,1917
The Commander in Chief of the Southwest Front, General Kornilov, is ap
pointed Supreme Commander.
The Military Commissar of the Southwest Front, Savinkov, is appointed As
sistant Minister of War, with the duty of replacing Kerensky during his absences
from Petrograd.
882. Novoe Vremia on the K ornilov A ppointment
[No. 14831, July 20,1917, p. 4]
General Kornilov has been appointed the Supreme Commander.
Our enemies, who took advantage of a temporary ebb in the morale of our
army, will learn that the new head of the Russian army is the general who two
years ago was confined in the Neutenbach Castle near Vienna, and a few months
later fled from the Kesek hospital.
It is difficult, or even impossible, to find a more suitable person for the role
of leader of the troops and of the supreme authority in these days of mortal danger
13 Subsequent military developments and relations between Kornilov and the Government
were closely related to the background of the Kornilov affair, which is covered in Volume HI.
1020 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
through which Russia is living. His entire past; his entire life, full of hard work,
unselfishness, self-denial, and self-sacrifice; his entire character, that of a man
who is persistent, full of will power, hardy, bent on reaching his goals despite all
obstacles, self-abnegating and courageouseverything speaks in favor of this
choice. . . .
. . . Few military leaders thought in the Kornilov fashion. Most of them
hurried first to save their own skins, little thinking of their troops.
Now Kornilov is the Supreme Commander. We intentionally omit the brief
and joyless period of his services in Petrograd, where, in his role of commander
of the troops, he had to conduct the struggle against corrupters of the garrison,
against those who had been preparing the present shameful retreat of the Russian
troops.
At the head of the army is a man who has experienced the whole war at first
hand, all the shortcomings of the commanding personnel, all the weaknesses of
organization, the whole flabbiness and treachery of the rear, both in the past and
in the present. General Kornilov assumes the No. 1 military post in immeasurably
grave circumstances. . . .
. . . The Provisional Government had to make a choice between the mass
meetings at the front, the disintegration of the army, and rout in the south of
Russia, on the one hand, and the salvation of the country, on the other. And it
found within itself sufficient courage and decisiveness to make that choice.
General Kornilov was appointed the Supreme Commander.
883. S tatement on th e S ignificance of the K ornilov A ppointment
[.Izvestiia, No. 122, July 20,1917, p. 5.]
Regarding reports that have appeared in the press that the appointment of
General Kornilov as Supreme Commander must be interpreted as a recognition
by the Provisional Government and the Minister of War of the necessity of
diminishing the importance of military committees and depriving them of actual
influence in the organization of the army, the following explanation is given from
authoritative sources:
Neither the Provisional Government, nor the Minister of War, nor General
Kornilov denies in the slightest the absolutely exceptional role of army organiza
tions in the organization of the army. All measures directed at restoring the fight
ing strength of the army and at combating its disintegration will be adopted in
close union with army organizations. General Kornilovs order concerning a
partial recall of military personnel from public and party organizations must in
no way be interpreted as a diminution of the rights of army committees.
Concerning the reasons for the resignation of General Brusilov, the same
sources report that it was the result of a fundamental difference between the gen
eral views and intentions of General Brusilov and the general policy of the Gov
ernment to Save the Revolution.
The newly appointed Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, is considered
in government circles to be one of the most talented leaders of the revolutionary
army; the Provisional Government has no reason to doubt his complete devotion
to the new order.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1021
884. Russkiia Vedomosti on th e P roposals of General K ornilov
[No. 172, July 28, 1917, p. 3.]
. . . The protracted political crisis, the absence of well-organized govern
mental authority, delayed the answer to the Supreme Commander. And his pro
posals for the necessary reforms in the army have so far not been resolved. But
time does not wait.
We do not know all the details of the negotiations between Stavka, the
Commissar of the Provisional Government, and the War Minister. Among the
published proposals on the reorganization of the army suggested by General
Kornilov, there are points of purely military organization dealing with the rights
of the Supreme Commander, his independence in appointing assistants, and free
dom in operative orders. But along with these, General Kornilov made one request
that, under the present circumstances, assumes not only military but also political
significance. He states: It is imperative to extend the measures adopted recently
at the front to the rear also, where the army reserves are located.14
There should be no room for any inaccuracy or misunderstanding in this
important and basic question. The demands of General Kornilov refer to the
extension to the rear units of those severe measures of repression that recent events
forced us to adopt at the front.
Without an affirmative response to the proposal submitted by General Korni
lov, there can be no salvation for the motherland, said Rodichev at the Congress
of the Party of the Peoples Freedom. The government that solemnly vowed to
the country that it will not be deterred by any difficulties and obstacles in con
cluding the struggle worthy of the honor of the great people and upon the out
come of which depends the future of Russia must also assume all the respon
sibility for carrying out the indicated measure. It must do everything that is
needed for the restoration of the army and the salvation of Russia from the danger
of the reign of the unbridled soldiery, the danger which at the present time cannot
be regarded as eliminated.15
885. K ornilovs F irst M eeting w ith th e P rovisional Government
[Rech\ No. 181, August 4,1917, p. 3. Izvestiia, No. 136, August 5,1917, p. 3, reported
that the majority of the ministers opposed some of Kornilovs proposals, especially
the extension of the death penalty to the rear.]
On the morning of August 3, the Supreme Commander, General Kornilov,
arrived in Petrograd. From the Tsarskoe Selo station he went to the Winter
14 The conditions which Kornilov presented to the Government on accepting the Supreme
Command were: (I) that he be responsible only to his own conscience and the whole people,
(2) that there be no interference with his orders or military appointments, (3) the extension
of the recently introduced disciplinary measures to all areas in the rear where army reserves
were stationed, and (4) the acceptance of his proposals telegraphed to the conference at
Stavka on July 16 (Doc. 875). Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 306-7.
15 Sir George Buchanan wrote in his My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories,
II, 162-63, that on July 29, in a conversation with Kerensky, he had advised him that the
British military authorities would be unlikely to grant Kornilovs request for more guns unless
they were assured the Supreme Commander would be given full powers to restore discipline.
He added that it would help reassure my Government could I inform them that Petrograd
had been included in the front zone and placed under martial law.
1022 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Palace, where he was received by the Minister-President, A. F. Kerensky. At noon,
at the home of Kerensky, he met Savinkov, Nekrasov, and Tereshchenko, and
reported on the situation at the front. Later, Kornilov attended a session of the
Provisional Government at the Winter Palace. . . .
Kornilov gave the following interview to the reporters:
Thanks to the decisive measures of the Government, the condition of the army
is satisfactory . . . but this does not mean that everything has been done to put
the army in a healthy state. There is still much to be done to bring the army up
to the point where it should be.
General Kornilov proposed certain measures for the improvement of the army.
He is convinced, and feels that the Provisional Government is of the same mind,
that without these measures, the publication of which he expects in the next few
days, it is impossible to restore the fighting ability of the army. . . . It is very
necessary that the Provisional Government confirm these measures. . . . In
regard to the relation of the Supreme Commander to the elected soldiers com
mittees, General Kornilov remarked that for the present he did not care to go into
details of the matter, other than to say that he recognized these organizations but
had proposed to the Provisional Government that they be reformed and put on
a different basis.16 . . .
At three oclock in the morning, General Kornilov returned to Headquarters.

886. O pposition to the R umored D ismissal of K ornilov


[A. F. Kerensky, The Prelude to Bolshevism: The Kornilov Affair, pp. 90-92. Izvestiia,
No. 183, August 6, 1917, p. 3, announced that the rumors concerning Kornilovs dis
missal were without foundation.]
On the 6th of August, the Council of the Cossack Troops League decided to
inform the Provisional Government and the Minister of War, and to publish in
all the daily papers, that: (1) . . . (2) General Kornilov cannot be removed,
being a true leader of the people and, in the eyes of the majority of the population,
the only general capable of regenerating the armys fighting force and of extri
cating the country from an extremely serious situation; (3) the Council of the
Cossack Troops League, as representative of all Russian Cossackdom, declare
that the removal of General Kornilov will inevitably suggest to the Cossacks the
fatal idea of the futility of all further Cossack sacrifices, in view of the Govern
ments not desiring to adopt effective means for the salvation of the motherland;
(4) the Council of the Cossacks Union think it their moral duty to state to the
Provisional Government and to the people that they do not hold themselves re
sponsible, as they were until now, for the behaviour of the Cossacks9 army at the
front and in the rear in case of General Kornilovs discharge; (5) the Council
of the Cossacks Union loudly and firmly declare their complete and absolute
devotion to their heroic chief, General Lavr Georgievitch Kornilov.
On the 7th of August, the Central Committee of the League [Officers Union]
of Army and Navy Officers telegraphed to the Minister of War, to the Commanders
of groups of armies of different fronts, and to the Commanders of armies, their
16 In connection with Kornilovs proposals, Izvestiia, No. 135, August 4, 1917, p. 45, com
mented that the sympathy of the democracy is not on the side of General Kornilov.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1023
decision about General Kornilov, which was very diplomatically drawn up and
concluded thus: We summon all honest people and all Russian officers to declare
their full confidence in him without delay. We do not admit the possibility of
interference by any institutions or persons whatever in his acts sanctioned by the
Government, and are ready to assist in the fulfillment of all his lawful demands
TO THE LAST DROP OF OUR BLOOD.
Late at night, on the same day and at the same place, the Union of Knights
of St. George carried the following resolution:
(1) The Conference of the Union of Knights of St. George, having deliber
ated on the Cossacks Councils resolution at their special meeting on the 7th of
August, has unanimously decided to support this resolution and firmly announces
to the Provisional Government that, if they should allow calumny to triumph and
General Kornilov to be discharged, the Union of the Knights of St. George would
immediately call to arms all the Knights of St. George for joint action with the
Cossacks. Similar resolutions were carried by the Military League and other
organizations.
. . . The following was telegraphed to Kornilov by Rodzianko: The Con
ference of Public Workers [Leaders], welcoming you, the Chief Leader of the
Russian Army, declare that they consider all attempts to prejudice your authority
in the army and in Russia to be criminal and join their voice to the voice of offi
cers, Knights of St. George, and Cossacks. In the terrible hour of heavy trial, all
thoughtful Russia looks to you with hope and faith.

887. K o r n il o v s S eco nd M e e t in g w it h t h e P r o v isio n a l G o v e r n m e n t


[Izvestiia, No. 141, August 11, 1917, pp. 2-3. On this occasion Kornilov was accom
panied by his Tekintsi bodyguards who were armed with machine guns.]
The Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, arrived in Petrograd on August
10. He was immediately received by the Assistant War Minister, B. V. Savinkov,
and together they went to the meeting of the Provisional Government. The coming
of the General was closely connected with the conference at Moscow. At this
meeting of the Provisional Government, military questions were discussed, bearing
on the proposals made by General Kornilov in his report, which he, with B. V.
Savinkov, submitted to the Provisional Government. Both Kornilov and Savinkov
insisted that the institution of commissars be considerably developed and their
power increased in the strengthening of the army. General Kornilov came out
in favor of greatly reducing the influence of the army committees on military life.
He thought that it was necessary to take all questions that had any bearing, direct
or indirect, on military operations out of the hands of these organizations.
Savinkov, in his report, insisted that the authority of the commissars should be
strengthened to the point where they, only, would be the voice of the Provisional
Government. General Kornilov agreed that the revolutionary democracy could
not wholly trust the High Command, but thought that the commissars were quite
capable of taking the place of the committees in their work of controlling the
command. Some of the other measures of Kornilov and Savinkov touched con
ditions not only at the front but even more so in the rear. In his report, General
Kornilov strongly emphasized the fact that the chaos in the rear, the complete
1024 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
disorganization of the regiments in the rear, the total unpreparedness of those
who are sent as replacements to the front, and, what is even more serious, their
lack of discipline, demoralizes the active army. . . . General Kornilov insisted
that definite measures be taken at once against this chaos in the rear. He cate
gorically demanded that the military-revolutionary courts, which are functioning
at the front, be set up in the rear, with authority to inflict the same punishment
as at the front, including the death penalty. On this point General Kornilov was
supported by Assistant War Minister Savinkov.
General Kornilovs report also had to do with food at the front and the neces
sity of taking steps to regulate transportation. Owing to the lawless acts of the
soldier masses, the railways have completely broken down. He thought that the
railways and factories working for the army should be militarized. If this were
not done, he feared that the army and navy would be left without food and ar
tillery supplies.17
Attention has already been called to the fact that General Kornilovs pro
posals, especially those relating to decisive measures in the rear, are meeting with
bitter opposition from the left wing of the Provisional Government.
In any case, the Provisional Government thinks that it must come to a de
cision which will make it possible for those at the head of the War Ministry to
carry out the measures necessary for strengthening our front.
At 10:30 P.M., the members of the Government met with General Kornilov
in Kerenskys office. After an exchange of opinions, it was decided that the Su
preme Commander should lay before the Moscow Conference such measures as
he thinks are needed for strengthening the front.
At 1:00 a .m ., General Kornilov left Petrograd on an express train for Stavka.

888. Delo Naroda on the R umored I ntroduction of N ew R epressive


M easures in the R ear
[No. 133, August 22, 1917, p. 1.]
Widely circulated rumors about the introduction of strict repressive measures
in the rear will soon become reality. Much is said, and persistently, about this as
about a thing backed by decisive experience. And since recently almost nothing
else is discussed that might clear our polluted atmosphere, we are led to think
that repression is regarded as a panacea for all of our numerous ailments.
The same old history is repeated.
There was a time when the disintegration of the army was ascribed almost
wholly to Bolshevik-anarchical propaganda, and when means to combat this dis
integration were proposed, the first named remedy was the struggle with the
malignant Bolsheviks. The prescription is a very tempting one by its simplicity.
And we must admit the truth. The government saves the army energetically and
in a planned manner . . . by means of the arrest of Bolsheviks.
Repression, again repression, and only repression!
17 Kerensky disapproved of Savinkovs role in the formulation of Kornilovs proposals,
which contained a new demand concerning the militarization of railroads and factories. Sav
inkov submitted his resignation, but the disagreement was settled and he remained as Assistant
Minister. Rech\ No. 188, August 12, 1917, p. 4, and Izvestiia, No. 147, August 18, 1917, p. 2.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1025
Really, one might think that the chief cause of our breakdown is in the evil
will of some persons, that the population of Russia for the most part is composed
of criminal types.
It would seem that after even brief experiment in the army the value of re
pressions could not be too high.
It would seem that the reception accorded this measure by the revolutionary
democracy, upon the support of which the Provisional Government must and
wants to depend, would suggest the need to stop and pause before extending the
death penalty to the rear. And we understand this move: irrespective of the ques
tion of the desirability of the death penalty, of its so-to-speak objective value, it
has become a definite symbol. We were all raised to be repelled by this type of
punishment and we instilled this repulsion in others. Apparently the lessons were
not in vain. They are the more memorable because among the victims of execu
tion in our country were so many names dear to us . . .
It would seem therefore that it is high time to think of other measures for the
salvation of the revolution and the motherland. But we fail to see any attempts
to find other means. We do not see, for example, those broad measures in the
economic policy of the country which would close the ever-deeper growing
precipice in our industry.
Lost somewhere are the reforms which would ease the transfer to new forms
of land utilization.
Where are the vigorous measures for the democratization of the army?
In a word, where is that positive, creative work which must create a new life
in the vacuum that remained after the prerevolutionary epoch?
We do not see it. Practically nothing is said about it. Small wonder that their
own means are beginning to be employed among the lower classes, at times
very dangerous from the legal point of view, and even means that make our hair
stand on end.
Naturally, under such circumstances, only one thing remains to the govern
ment: repression.

889. Savinkov on t h e Arm y C om m ittees


[.Izvestiia, No. 151, August 23, 1917, p. 2.]
Before the Assistant Minister of War, B. V. Savinkov, left for Stavka to attend
a conference with commissars and representatives of army organizations, the
Chief of the Political Department of the Ministry of War, F. A. Stepun, issued
the following [statement] to the representatives of the Committee of Journalists
in the Ministry of War on behalf of B. V. Savinkov:
It is evident that the people and the army are not sufficiently well aware of
the fact that B. V. Savinkov is a staunch supporter of army organizations. Any
rumors to the contrary are false. As a commissar who had gone through the
school of cooperation between the commissariat and the army organizations, B. V.
Savinkov understood that the voice of the commissar could not penetrate the army
without assistance from the organizations, and, therefore, the Assistant Minister
could not adhere to the view that as long as there are army organizations it is
impossible to restore the discipline and lie combat potential of the army.
In his report, General Kornilov has taken a definite and categorical stand in
1026 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
favor of strengthening and affirming the army organizations. For example, the
report states:
It must appear strange and surprising when one considers how seldom these
young elective institutions deviated from the proper course and how often they
turned out to be in command of a situation, sealing their valiant military activities
with blood. The abolition of the committees is out of the question.
Pointing out that the committees, enjoying the confidence of the soldiers, serve
as a potent means of instilling civic consciousness among the soldiers, General
Kornilov continued:
By their very existence, which symbolizes the revolution in the eyes of the
masses, the committees guarantee a calm attitude toward measures that are
necessary for the salvation of the army and the country, on the front and in
the rear.
In the opinion of the Assistant Minister of War, none of the improvements,
the restoration of order and discipline or the increase in the combat potential of
the army, could have been achieved without the organized soul of the army
without the army committees.
The new features which are now being introduced in regard to army com
mittees amount essentially to converting them into legal persons, into state in
stitutions.18

REPORTS OF IMPROVED MORALE AND DISCIPLINE


AT THE FRONT
890. T h e S outhw estern F ront
[Russkiia Vedomosti, July 20,1917, p. 3.]
July 18
The Assistant Commissar of the Southwestern Front, Gobechiia, hastened to
report the following to the Minister of War: I am happy to report that the armies
of the Southwestern Front, led by General Kornilov, and in particular the 11th
Army, which recently arbitrarily left the front, are now valiantly repulsing all
attempts of a strong enemy to penetrate our territory. German prisoners were
taken in fierce engagements in the region of Gusiatino under swift counterattack
by the 7th Army. A decided change in the morale of the troops is evident. This
gives reason to hope that the army will fulfill the obligation imposed upon it by
die revolution
18 On August 13, the Executive Committee of the Southwestern Front reported that the
newly appointed Commander in Chief, General Denikin, and his staff were displaying an
openly hostile attitude toward the committees and restricting their rights and activities.
Razlozheme armii, pp. 62-63.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1027
891. A n I m provem ent in t h e A ttitude of t h e A rm y
[,Izvestiia, No. 131, July 30,1917, p. 4.]
The Committee of Journalists [attached to the Provisional Government] re
ceived the following telegram from the Commissar of the Provisional Govern
ment, Khodorov, with the forces in the field:
Corps conferences are taking place in the army with the participation of the
commanding personnel, the commissariat, and the elective organizations, includ
ing the regimental [committees]. There is a general consensus about a turning
point in the mood of the broad masses. Drills and work are proceeding at a
stepped-up pace. Coordinated work between the elective organizations and the
commanding personnel, with the active cooperation of the commissariat on creat
ing the combat potential of the army, is being outlined. The immediate intro
duction of a new statute on committees establishing their precise rights and duties
and raising the prestige of the commanding personnel is required as well as the
restoration of meetings in the army, prohibiting only the discussion of strategical
questions.
C ommissar K hodorov

892. Izvestiia on E vidences of R ehabilitation of t h e Army


[No. 135, August 4,1917, p. 2.]
The crushing defeat of the revolutionary armies on the Southwestern Front
has brought about a significant turning point in the attitudes of the soldiers and
their responsible leaders.
Prior to the military defeat which descended upon us like a thunderbolt from
a cloudless sky, the thoughts of the soldiers were focused on general political
issues. The soldiers thought and spoke of the war as an accursed legacy of the
old regime, as a legacy of which they must rid themselves as soon as possible. The
soldiers tried not to think of the war as a grave duty. And among the questions
that aroused the soldiers anxiety, the anxiety over the combat potential of the
army, as such, occupied one of the last places.
But the thunder burstand like a bright flash of light came awareness of the
necessity to concentrate all their strength on fulfilling the immediate tasks of the
army, to concentrate all their attention on fighting the enemy and on defending
the frontiers of our native land. A certain interest arose in the cause of the war,
and an attitude developed which made possible the restoration of training pro
grams and studies, which, in turn, offered the possibility of restoring discipline
and the combat potential of the army.
Such a change in attitude is beginning to show in the leading soldiers or
ganizations.
Thus the Bolshevik organizations of the 12th Army renounced the customary
slogans of bolshevism.
On July 28, the army committee of the 12th Army (Isokol) issued an appeal
to the soldiers which set forth a series of practical steps necessary to raise the
combat potential of the army to a proper level.
1028 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
After describing the general state of affairs on the front and the danger from
the German side threatening the Northern Front, the Committee declares:
1) Fraternization cannot be tolerated at the present time. Any contact with
the Germans constitutes betrayal and treason. The last vestiges of fraternization
must be stopped immediately. Those who continue to fraternize with the enemy
are pronounced traitors to the revolution and the country.
2) The failure to execute orders ruined the southern army. As of this day
there is to be strict and unequivocal execution of all combat and official orders;
no discussions; urgent work on reinforcing positions. Special commissions,
elected by the soldiers and attached to all headquarters, will watch over everyone.
They will defend your interests and the interests of the revolution. With complete
composure and firmness, the soldiers of the 12th Army must put an end to all
breaches of military duty.
3) For the sake of your own salvation, all individual units of the 12th Army
must promote responsibility by purging its ranks of all hooligans and disorganizers
who are stigmatizing the revolutionary soldiers by their crimes against the whole
army. There is no room for toleration of these crimes! These people will destroy
the army at a crucial hour.
We demand that these criminals be prosecuted!
The appeal closes with a repetition of the three demands set forth by the
Committee:
Stop fraternization immediately!
Carry out orders immediately!
Throw the hooligans, disorganizers, and traitors out of the units!
All the large revolutionary organizations of the 12th Army, including the
organizations that lean toward bolshevism . . . endorsed the appeal of the army
committee. This appeal should be noted as a characteristic indication of the
abrupt change [in attitude] that has recently taken place in the army.

893. T h e R umanian F ront


[Izvestiia, No. 150, August 22,1917, p. 5.19]
The Political Department of the Ministry of War received the following tele
gram from the Commissar of the Rumanian Front, Tizenhausen:
The enemy conducted persistent attacks on the Oknin and Fokshan lines,
throwing a large quantity of artillery and troops into action. Thanks to the
tenacity and courage of the Rumanian forces and our own, the enemy could
advance only five to six versts with heavy losses. The morale of the men is grow
ing stronger. In general, the mood in the infantry is fairly stable, and in the
19 The same issue of Izvestiia, p. 3, published a protest from the Central Executive Com
mittee of the Rumanian Front, the Black Sea Fleet, and the Odessa Military District against
malicious charges and irresponsible attacks in the bourgeois press, belittling, or some
times passing over in complete silence, the incredible feats of the Russian army on the
Rumanian Front. Citing statements by General Shcherbachev and Tizenhausen confirming
the valor and self-sacrifice of the troops, the Central Committee asked the Provisional Gov
ernment and the Soviet to investigate the causes of the misleading reports emanating from
Stavka, to publicize the courage of the troops on the front, and to terminate the attacks in
the press.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1029
cavalry and artillery units it is excellent. The indignation against deserters and
Bolsheviks in the army reaches the highest proportions. Soldiers themselves,
everywhere, are turning in the Bolsheviks. We have received resolutions from
many soldiers organizations regarding their firm decision to carry out stead
fastly all the orders and demands of the Government. There is no fraternization
with the enemy.55

THE FALL OF RIGA


894. Novoe Vremia on t h e Loss of R iga
[No. 14862, August 25, 1917, p. 3. An editorial in No. 14859, August 22, 1917, p. 3,
warns that the penultimate moment has arrived to take drastic measures to restore
discipline and order in the army and the country.]
The loss of Riga was prophesied.20 The Riga region was abundantly equipped
with arms, artillery, military provisions, and a large garrison. It was fortified
according to the last word in battle technique. Under the circumstances one could
expect that an attempted offensive by the Germans would receive a severe rebuff.
And yet experienced military leaders warned that nothing would help unless mili
tary discipline was restored in the northern army.
This prediction was justified. Riga was surrendered at the first onslaught,
after a few hours. Nothing helpedneither the strong defenses, nor the mighty
artillery, nor the numerous defenders. Everything was in vain because the north
ern army, devoid of military discipline, was no army at all but a simple aggre
gate of armed men. Even if it consisted to the last man of heroes ready for any
sacrifice but not welded into one combat mechanism responsible to the single will
of the commander, it would not have held Riga against enemy attacks. Acting
each one of them at his own discretion, the heroes would have been destroyed one
by one and their heroism would have been no help but would have precipitated
death.
895. Russkoe Slovo on R iga
[No. 191, August 22,1917, p. 1.]
The enemy already knocks at the gates of Riga, and if the instability of our
army makes it impossible for us to hold the shores of Riga Bay, the road to Petro
grad will be open.
Thus spoke the Supreme Commander on August 13 before the deathly silence
of the State Conference . . .
And now, after six days, this terrible warning has already become a cruel,
fatal reality: Riga has fallen! . . . General Kornilov knew what he was talking
about before the high assembly: in every word one could sense that he was con
scious of his great responsibility and of his feeling of duty to the homeland, of
20By Kornilov in his speech at the Moscow Conference. See Volume HI. See also the
discussion on Riga in the conference of July 16 at Stavka, Doc. 875.
1030 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
his feeling that the moment had come when truth, however terrible, could not be
concealed.
As soon as the Conference was closed, treacherous rumors regarding coun
terrevolutionary plots and military conspiracies began to creep around the country,
and these obscure rumors have already begun to wind up into a poisonous knot
around the name of the Supreme Commander himself. From somewhere the rumor
started, now categorically denied, of General Kornilovs retirement, of the return
of General Alekseev, of some secret designs on the part of the Union of the
Cavaliers of St. George, and so forth.
To put it briefly, instead of uniting around the Provisional Government and
the Supreme Commander, and instead of assisting the army in every measure in
such a dangerous moment, the atmosphere around the leaders of the country and
of the army has become one of destructive suspiciousness and treacherous
smearing.
Moreover, unfortunately, the voice of the Supreme Commander not only
remains unheeded by our revolutionary democracy, but is far from having the
necessary effect even within the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
Therefore, the position of the Supreme Commander becomes tragic indeed.

896. Volia Naroda Calls for N ew S acrifices and A ttributes the


D efeat to G erman S uperiority
[No. 99, August 23,1917, p. 1. An editorial in Delo Naroda, No. 134, August 23, 1917,
p. 1, took the same position in regard to the course of the defeat but with a more
alarmist view of the danger from the right and with no mention of compromise.]
The grave news from the Riga front claws at the mind and the heart and tears
them to pieces. How will Russia, the broad peoples Russia, react to the news?
Will it ring the tocsin, stirring her to energy, arousing a spontaneous desire to
action, a militant ardor which unites everybody in the urge to resist by common
efforts the calamities which threaten everyone alike? Or will she react to it as to
the knell at the funeral of the motherland and the revolution, helplessly dropping
her hands? Everything depends on this now.
To be aware of the gravity and the significance of the misfortune that befalls
us is the source of effective enthusiasm and sacrifice, those basic conditions of
any victory.
News from the Riga front, sinister as it may be, still leaves some hope for
salvation. Our troops fought heroically, defending their positions inch by inch.
There were no instances of willful mass desertion of positions as there were during
the breakthrough of the Southwestern Front. Some units, according to newspaper
reports, counterattacked under the heavy fire of the enemy with flying banners
and singing the Marseillaise. Our retreat in the region of Riga was not due to
faintheartedness and cowardice of the regiments of revolutionary Russia. It was
due to the overwhelming superiority of the enemys artillery. These reports con
tain something that raises the spirits and strengthens the faith in revolution,
because it was not the iron discipline that turns people into automatons that
accounted for the steadfastness of the soldiery in the battles under Riga. Un
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1031
questionably it was that awakened realization of duty to the free motherland
and, perhaps, the great spirit of freedom that gave wings to heroic deeds.
The fate of the revolution is now being decided at the front. The Russian
revolution could have killed the war, had our army and our people understood
at once the intimate relation between a victorious defense and freedom. Then the
mighty pressure of the revolutionary people of Russia could have created such
a power relation in the international arena as would have forced the capitulation
of the German emperor and the imperialists of all countries. Then the revolu
tionary authority would not have had to use repressive measures and curtail the
freedoms it had won. But in our country this relation was not understood imme
diately. And the doctrinaires of utopian internationalism spared no efforts to
extinguish the embers of such understanding . . . For that reason all those who
love freedom must direct their efforts to defend the motherland even at the sacrifice
of their principles, just as all those who love the motherland must help strengthen
freedom, no matter how much it contradicts their class ideology. In this hour of
great anxiety and danger the workers5Russia and the privileged classes of Russia
must proffer their hand to each other. United they shall form an iron wall around
the Provisional Government, which must shoulder the greatest responsibility ever
known in history.
We have heard authoritative appeals to such tactics from the revolutionary
democracy and its leaders. At yesterdays session of the S.R. and the S.D., Com
rade Bogdanov tried to prove that the enemies of the revolution will attempt to
make use of the defeat at the front for their own ends and to strike a blow against
the revolutionary democracy and the Provisional Government. Therefore, the
Provisional Government must be assured of the support of the democracy.55 Com
rade Tseretelli calls for collaboration with the bourgeoisie. He argues that his
tory knows no parallel of a victorious proletariat if the entire bourgeoisie is
against it.
We hear no such appeals as yet from the right. Even the shattering news from
the front failed to force Rech9to abandon its stubbornly implacable position. The
Kadet semiofficial organ continues to criticize bitterly and savagely the opposite
side. It continues to demand that the Government make its choice. Such tactics
have but one thing in viewto deprive the opponent of collaboration in the
name of the common cause and make him powerless to defend it. He will drop
under the weight beyond his strength. And then victory over him can be cele
brated. But are the Kadets certain that they will not celebrate victory over the
cold corpse of their mother country! If the liberal bourgeoisie is not certain of
this, if the sentiment of patriotism has not yet died in its breast, it must support
the coalition and the Government which depends upon it. It must repudiate its
implacability. Both sides should compromise.
897. Rabochaia Gazeta W arns o f C ounterrevolutionary A ttem pts
[No. 139, August 22,1917, p. 1.]

Not even the July breakthroughs in the front, in which the Austro-German
troops poured through our lines, were as heavy a blow to revolutionary Russia.
1032 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Riga is one of the most important political, industrial, and cultural centers
of Russia. It is her chief outlet to the Baltic Sea and the center of the Baltic region.
The loss of Riga in itself is a grave defeat. But it is a tremendous calamity because
of possible consequences.
The Dvinathe mightiest of natural barriers to the onslaught of Austro-
German troops still obedient to their emperorsis forced. The taking of Riga
exposes considerably the approaches to Petrograd.
The entire country must be roused from the blow.
Not one minute of despondency! No yielding to panic! In a moment of grave
danger the country must preserve complete self-possession.
The duty of the organized proletariatthat vanguard of the revolutionary
peopleis to set an example of self-control and restraint. The dark forces of
counterrevolution lie in wait for the moment of weakness of the revolution in
order to inflict upon it a deadly blow. These new defeatists, defeatists of revolu
tionary Russia, will undoubtedly attempt to profit by any confusion, panic, and
thoughtless statements in order to restore the shattered stronghold of tsarism on
the misfortunes of the land. Thereforecomplete self-possession and merciless
warfare against counterrevolutionary intrigues!

898. Izvestiia U rges U nityin t h e D emocracy to Save R ussia


and th e R evolution
[No. 150, August 22,1917, pp. 1-2.]
At the time that we were conducting an active campaign for peace, the German
General Headquarters threw its last divisions against our Northern Front and,
having broken through it after overcoming the valiant resistance of our army, oc
cupied Riga. It is no coincidence that Wilhelm and his generals concentrated all
their forces against us, even though Russia had solemnly declared that on her part
she seeks neither conquests nor indemnities and has no intention of encroaching on
the independence of any people, including the Germans, and even though we had
not attacked German territory while the German troops are standing on ours.
The grievous event on the Northern Front once again confirmed an obvious
truth to us: we will not achieve peace by kind words alone. Our appeals for peace
are aimed at the people, but it is guns, and not words, which we must aim at Wil
helms government. He who desires peace without slavery must defend freedom
with all his might, with gun in hand.
At this ominous time for the native land and for freedom, the duty of every
citizen is to put aside all other affairs and desires until this most important task
is fulfilled. Nothing must interfere with defense. Any citizen, any group or class
of citizens, would lower themselves in the eyes of all the people if they were unable,
in the grave hour when the whole country is in danger, to place the interest of the
fatherland, the interest of all the people and their freedom, above their own per
sonal interests.
In times of danger, the weak lose their presence of mind and the criminals take
advantage of their panic. Like thieves in turmoil, the counterrevolutionary agita
tors will try to take advantage of the political confusion of the unstable elements in
order to attack freedom. We must bear this danger in mind and be always pre
pared to meet it. Now, more than ever before, the democracy must unite around its
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1033
central organizations: the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers, and Peasants Deputies.
All the party and factional discords must now be dropped. Everything that
used to divide the parties must recede to the background. The time for these dis
putes will comewhen we have coped with the danger of a military debacle. No
further progress of the revolution, no creative realization of the freedom that has
been won, is possible as long as the danger of utter defeat at the front and uncon
trollable panic within the country hangs over the country.
The fatherland and the revolution are in danger. Let all the revolutionary
forces unite for their salvation!
899. T he R eport of A ssistant C om m issar V oitinskii on th e
B reakthrough of A ugust 19
[Izvestiia, No. 150, August 22, 1917, p. 2.]
I
On August 19, the enemy, under cover of drumfire, succeeded in crossing over
to the right shore of the Dvina. Our arms could not have hampered the crossing,
since most of them covering the region of the crossing were put out of action by the
enemy. Our beachhead was covered with shells and bombs containing asphyxi
ating gas. The troops were forced to retreat five versts from the Dvina along a front
stretching ten versts.
I testify before all Russia that this misfortune was no disgrace to our army.
The troops honestly carried out all the orders of the commanders; in some places
they turned to bayonet charges and went out to meet certain death. There were
no cases of desertion or betrayal by army units.
Representatives of army committees were with me in the field of action.
V ladimir V oitinskii , Assistant to the Commissar attached to
the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front, member of the
Central Executive Committee.
II
The [following] detailed report on the August 19 events in the region of the
breakthrough is given in supplement to the army commanders report on the course
of operations and the measures adopted for rescuing the army from the dangerous
situation. After concentrating the overwhelming forces of the artillery against
the position of the division, the enemy partly incapacitated and partly asphyxiated
by chemical shells all the forces with which we were covering the strip. The front
lines of this division were demolished by artillery fire and the divisions regiments
were forced to retreat, sustaining enormous losses. In addition, certain units of
the division were scattered. This gave the Germans an opportunity to lay bridges
and make their way across to the right shore, almost without any losses. The prob
lem of liquidating the breakthrough and preventing further penetration by the
enemy was assigned to General B. The problem gained in complexity by the enor
mous length of the breakthrough, the complete disruption of communications be
tween units, and the total absence of artillery. While other forces were organizing
for defense on the second lines of the trenches, the remainder of the above division
and a new division were transferred to the vicinity of the beachhead captured by
the enemy for a counterattack against the units that had crossed [the river]. Both
1034 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
divisions fought until late at night, and individual units frequently resorted to
bayonet charges, crowding the enemy into the river. The men fought honestly and
valiantly, especially the regiments XX.
One regiment fought almost the whole day with all communications cut off
from the rest of the regiments in the division. The greater part of the men of an
other regiment were killed, wounded, or gassed, and the regiment has almost been
obliterated. The third regiment was crowding the enemy, which was superior in
forces, along a stretch of several versts. The X artillery division withdrew from the
position, together with the last lines of the infantry, but was forced to leave eight
artillery pieces behind it in view of the enormous loss of men and horses. Our
losses are considerable, but the spirit among the troops is high. Soldiers carried
their wounded comrades and officers for ten versts. The vast majority of the
wounded arrived at the aid stations with guns in their hands. Nowhere in the field
of action did I encounter scenes of panic and only along the roads in the rear did
I stumble across isolated groups of deserters. Measures are being adopted for as
sembling these groups.
Ill
I consider it my duty to make a note of the harmonious work between the com
mittees and the commanding officers. The situation continues to be extremely
serious. The possibility of new failures is not excluded, particularly in view of the
incoming reports on the further expansion of the breakthrough. May the intermi
nably difficult hours experienced by the army give rise to neither panic nor despair.
Together with the commanding officers I testify once again that the army is hon
estly discharging its duty and that the failure is no mark of disgrace on those units
that bore the brunt of the enemys blows.
V . V oitinskii , Assistant to the Commissar of the Northern Front.

900. P rotest o f C ommissar S tankevich A gainst S tavka s


C om m uniques C oncerning R iga
[Izvestiia, No. 152, August 24,1917, pp. 4-5.]
Minister-President A. F. Kerensky has received a detailed telegram from First
Lieutenant Stankevich, the Commissar attached to the Commander in Chief of the
Northern Front, which advised him of the situation on the Northern Front. First
Lieutenant Stankevich, without concealing the sad facts relating to a complete lack
of firmness of some of the units and a considerable number of deserters, categori
cally protests against official communiques published at Stavka in which, since the
first days of the engagements on the Riga front, tendentious and in some cases ab
solutely incorrect explanations are given of the situation on the Northern Front.
Some members of the Provisional Government have often suggested that the
Staff of the Supreme Commander should be more cautious when compiling its
official communiques concerning the situation on the fronts.
The official communiques regarding the events near Riga have confirmed the
supposition of some members of the cabinet that Stavka by its communications
is carrying on a definite political game against the Provisional Government and
the revolutionary democracy. It is clear that a nucleus of counterrevolution has
built itself a solid nest at Stavka, hoping by open and direct agitation against the
Provisional Government to obtain certain results; as the soldiery will not follow
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1035
them, [it endeavors] to terrorize the Provisional Government with terrible hap
penings at the front and, if not to overthrow it, at least to compel it to accept a
series of measures directed openly or in a concealed way against the revolutionary
democracy and its organizations.
B. V. Savinkov, Assistant Minister of War, has been asked to learn in Mogilev
all the details of what is going on in Stavka. He will be charged by the Provisional
Government to take the measures proposed by the Provisional Government for
the purpose of liquidating the counterrevolutionaries at Stavka.
Events on the Northern Front continue to inspire serious apprehensions. While
the units defending the shores are withdrawing to positions prepared beforehand
in complete order and without pressure from the enemy, the units proceeding to
ward Kolmar are continuously carrying on desperate rear-guard engagements.
Many units have been totally destroyed. Individual regiments have been sur
rounded. . . .
Certainly with such serious engagements there were also those who were cow
ardly and fainthearted. There were regiments that covered themselves with eternal
shame and turned out to be completely unfit for battle. As with every even small
retreat, in the rear of the fighting units a large number of men have collected who
do not wish to fight and who dodge combat in one way or another. The number
of such men has grown considerably during these huge battles, and it is under
standable that they first of all crowd the highways so as to flee more conveniently
and that owing to this they hinder the regular withdrawal of the active regi
ments. . . .

901. G en eral D a n ilo v D enies Rum ors D erog atin g t h e 5 th Arm y


[Izvestiia, No. 153, August 25,1917, p. 6.]
The Bureau of Journalists in the Ministry of War received the following pro
test from the Commander of the Fifth Army, General Danilov:
The morning issue of Birzhevyia Vedomosti of August 22 carried an item
that rumors were spreading in Petrograd to the effect that the reason for the griev
ous events on the Riga front is the betrayal of our forces and, in particular, the
5th Army, which had supposedly concluded a separate peace with the Germans.
These rumors had evidently spread so widely around the town that it required an
authoritative refutation of them by B. V. Savinkov in an interview with the jour
nalists. With the deepest indignation I declare that the above rumor derogating
the 5th Army is based on sheer slander. The whole 5th Army, as one man, will
learn of this despicable slander with an inexpressible feeling of indignation and
will see it only as the malicious desire of malicious persons who concealed their
names in the crowd to defame those who have succeeded in maintaining order and
who are bravely, honestly, and dauntlessly continuing for the fourth year to guard
our great native land and her welfare. Living through a difficult, internal crisis at
the dawn of a new, bright life, the Russian forces may, of course, suffer occasional
military setbacks, but betrayals by entire military units, and especially by an army,
Russia has not known, and of course will not know.
General D anilov , Commander of the 5th Army
1036 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
902. T elegram from t h e E xecutive C om m ittee of t h e 12 t h A rm y
R efuting A ttacks on I ts Combat P erformance
[Izvestiia, No. 154, August 26,1917, p. 3.]
The Central Executive Committee received the following telegram:
A section of the press has started a brazen agitation in connection with the
retreat on the Riga front. Malicious attacks have been recommenced against the
army organizations which are blamed for the nonexistent deterioration of our
army. They cast aspersions on the soldiers who are heroically fulfilling their
weighty duty. They are blaming them for the absence of moral fortitude in the
12th Army, they are inflicting treasonable stabs in the back of the 12th Army at a
time when it is sacrificing thousands of lives for the defense of Russia. All the
officers and commanders confirm in one voice the amazing staunchness and the
dauntless courage of the men in enduring the unprecedented drumfire, who re
treated only after suffering enormous losses and failing to receive reinforcements.
The frequent counterattacks of our infantry are sufficient confirmation of the com
plete falseness of the assertion about its demoralization. In spite of heavy losses
our units often rushed into combat, expressing regret when they received the order
to retreat. It is criminal to speak of the retreat of our forces as a disorderly flight.
In every retreat there are persons who fall behind, who break away from their
units, especially when the retreat takes place under conditions as difficult as ours.
We have men who have fallen behind and have lost contact, but the units, as such,
have remained in order and are ready for further combat, for further sacrifices.
And at this time, when the long-suffering army has every right to expect moral
support from the whole country, it is being slandered and attacked. At the present
time a campaign against the army can only serve to bring about the demoraliza
tion of which this press speaks and to produce a disastrous effect on the cause of
national defense.
On behalf of the entire 12th Army, the Executive Committee rises to the de
fense of the soldier who has been slandered and disgraced by the enemies of the
revolution and appeals to all the rear forces of the country in the death hour of
the fight for freedom to uphold the honor and dignity of the truly revolutionary
army.
K u ch in , Chairman of the Executive Committee
of the Soviet of Soldiers5 Deputies of the
12th Army
B elousov , Secretary

903. B ut W h ere Is the T r u t h ?


[Editorial in Delo Naroda, No. 136, August 25, 1917, p. 1.]
It is most urgent for the entire democracy, for all strata of the population loyal
to the revolution, who do not wish a return to the old, the accursed order, to know
the truth of the causes for our defeats. Because only then can we hope for a suc
cessful fight to defend the revolution from the onslaught of monarchist-capitalist
Germany.
But there is something not only wrong but also mysterious about this question.
The Supreme Command, the supreme organ of the military authority which is en
trusted with the fate of the army and the country, circulates news that does not cor
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1037
respond to reality. The defeats suffered by our army during the last months are
explained in all the official telegrams from Stavka by the instability of our troops,
their refusal to execute combat orders, and unjustified retreat before an enemy
five times smaller in number. Frightening accusations are made, and they are
made officially, about some units for disgraceful desertion from the field of battle,
whereas subsequent investigations prove that these accusations are false.
Thus by a telegram from Stavka of July 7, the 607th, the Mlynovskii Regiment
was publicly disgraced before the entire country; it arbitrarily left the trenches
and withdrew to the rear, as a result of which its neighbors also had to withdraw,
which gave the enemy the opportunity to follow up his success.21 Documents,
published in No. 147 of Izvestiia . . . irrefutably establish that . . . the 607th
Mlynovskii Regiment returned from the battle on July 6, with 12 officers and 114
soldiers, having lost 75 per cent of its men . That the Sixth Grenadier Division,
of which the Mlynovskii Regiment was a part and which also was publicly accused
by Stavka of cowardice, was wiped out by the enemys artillery fire of over 200
guns, while it only had 16, and that it lost 95 officers (among them two command
ing officers of regiments) and up to 2,000 soldiers . . .22
The same slander of the army is carried on by Stavka in its reports about the
Riga breakthrough. While the telegrams from Stavka for August 20 find it neces
sary to emphasize that some of our units willfully left their positions and re
treated to the north, and the telegrams of August 21, that the disorganized
masses of soldiers in an irresistible stream took to the Pskov highway and to the
road to Bider-Lemburg, there is not one word about the courage and heroic valor
of our retreating army. Assistant Commissar of the Northern Front V. Voitinskii
telegraphs about the crossing of the Dvina by the Germans: I testify before all
Russia that this misfortune was no disgrace to our army. . . .
In the face of such facts, the democracy, disturbed by our defeats, naturally
raises the question, but where is the truth?
. . . It is necessary to appoint, for the democracy, an authoritative commis
sion to expose the causes of the Ternopol5 and Riga breakthroughs. It is necessary
that the revolutionary government take immediate steps to eliminate the very pos
sibility of the appearance of false official news about the state of our army. We
must know the truth, and democracy will succeed in getting it. Because the mother
land is in danger, the meaning of life for our generationthe democratic republic
is in danger.
904. T h e E nigm a of R iga
[By the special correspondent of Le Temps in the issue of September 17, 1917 (N.S.).
Other articles by him in the same journal later added information which he claimed
absolutely confirms our first article. Ibid., November 10,1917. An interesting article
in the Frankfurter Zeitung of September 4 (N.S.) commented that the Russians knew
the attack was coming, and continued: In this connection it must seem strange that
Kornilov, who is defending the threatened mountain positions south of Ocna, in Mol
davia, so strongly, and who, thereby, as well as by his well-conducted retreat in East
Galicia, furnishes proof that his troops are not in such a state of confusion as Russian
reports make out, should have allowed the Dvina line and Riga to go after only short
Doc. 853.
22 Docs.860,861.
1038 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
battles. The German attack was certainly extraordinarily fierce and irresistible, but
still Kornilov had time, troops, and skill. What is he getting at? . . Daily Review
of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 36, September 12,1917, p. 330.]
Four hundred to six hundred cannon, many of 8- to 9-inch caliber, against
180 cannon, of which the more numerous were of 3%-inch caliber! Precise fire
on known targets which were marked and specified long ago by an espionage facil
itated by prior fraternization55! But above all, a fire directed by a swarm of avia
tors flying in their armored aircraft above the Russian batteries which received
little or no aid at all from their aerial observers! In four hours all the Russian bat
teries of Ikskiul without exception were annihilated by an unprecedented shower
of asphyxiating missiles which gassed men and horses! Then this preliminary task
having been accomplished, the fire of the German batteries was directed with the
same precision on the trenches sheltering the 186th Russian Division. The latter
witnessed in consternation the destruction of the artillery which protected it; hence
forth it had no support; and it was implacably crushed by the infernal shower.
The 186th Division, already greatly reduced, was driven out of its water-filled
foxholes; disjoined, it withdrew. Immediately the Germans launched 300 boats,
threw up one bridge, two bridges, three bridges, and crossed the wide river almost
without striking a blow; the remains of the 186th Division attempted a few counter
attacks, then finally drew back ten versts, followed by the enemy. The deed was
done! The Dvina was conqueredRiga doomed. But did the 186th Division
shamefully flee, as it was said in the beginning? No, it let itself be slashed to pieces,
for only fragments of it remain. What then ? What had happened ?
The Germans attacked Riga with only seven divisions, and in infantry strength
they were in a proportion of one against three; on the other hand, in technical
means, they secured a colossal superiority. With variations, what has happened in
Riga has happened fifty, a hundred times on the Russian front. The Germans have
gained this victory exactly as they gained nearly all their other victories prior to
the revolution: by an overwhelming superiority of artillery fire at a well-chosen
point. It is true that serious failings have occurred among certain troops that
participated in the battle of Riga; we will speak of them later on. But it remains
to be proved that these failings were much more serious than certain other cases of
discouragement which occurred before March 1917. Was it the revolution that
lost Warsaw, Grodno, Kovno, Vil5na, Przemysl, Lvov? Were there not already
two million Russian prisoners in Germany before the downfall of Nicholas II?
Were cases of mass surrender unknown at the time of the Emperor? . . .
It is by straining ones will, by rising to a great loftiness of views, that one can
establish the objective truth, the true truth in a country agitated by political pas
sions and divided into two camps, which henceforth are inclined to consider the
facts only in the measure in which they can serve against their opponents. But we
who are not Russian, let us rise above those hates. For usloyal Alliesthere are
no Russian parties: there is Russia. To deny that the revolution has dangerously
hampered discipline would be an error. But it would be another error to impute
to the revolution all the reverses suffered in 1917. For instance, now it has been
definitely proved that on various points of the front during this year the troops
which were once lightly accused of faintheartedness had on the contrary retreated
only after having suffered enormous casualties. . . .
PART V
Foreign Affairs

The revolution was greeted by the Allies with mixed feelings of hope and
apprehension.1 The internal disintegration of the last months of the monarchy
had severely shaken their confidence in Russias ability to continue as an effective
military force, and they hoped that the revolution was a manifestation of popular
dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war and of a determination to see it prose
cuted more efficiently and effectively. But they were also disturbed by the evidences
of war-weariness, the shattered economy inherited by the new regime, and the
rapid emergence of political elements that labeled the war imperialist and pro
posed to work for its early conclusion by a negotiated peace, preferably through
the united action of the peoples of the belligerent states. From the beginning,
therefore, the Allies tempered their sympathy and support for the Provisional Gov
ernment with admonitions against any revision of war aims, little understanding
or appreciating, in most cases, either the shadings within the democracy on this
issue or the difficult and delicate task the Government faced in dealing with this
problem.
The members of the first Provisional Government were unanimous in their
view that Russia should continue the war to a decisive victory in close collabora
tion with her Allies for the sake of vital national interests. However, most of the
ministers, after familiarizing themselves with the provisions of the secret treaties
concluded by the Allies during the previous war years, recognized the need to
change the formulation of Russias war aims. This was done in the Governments
declaration of March 27, which reflected opinions widely held by the public and
supported by a majority of the Soviet.
Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. N. Miliukov, consistently fought all
attempts within and without die Government to modulate or modify Russias
objectives. In particular, his vocal reiteration in the face of public antagonism
that Russia continue, even after the declaration of March 27, to demand the Straits
and Constantinople, and his covert attempt, in opposition to the convictions of
Guchkov and Alekseev, to revive plans for their military seizure, became the
touchstones of his policy. His statements and activity undermined confidence in
1 Russian diplomacy during the First World War to the revolution is described in C. Jay
Smith, Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917, and for the revolutionary period to
Brest-Litovsk, in Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution. Both contain very
useful bibliographies on sources. Of the memoir material, special mention should be made
of Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, 2 vols., and
Maurice Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande guerre, 3 vols.
1040 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the entire Government, and following his dispatch of the note of April 18 to the
Allies, precipitated the first major internal crisis of the regime.
The first coalition government was formed soon after the April days and
resulted from the Soviet decision to accede to the pressing demands of the Provi
sional Government to permit its members to accept ministerial appointments. In
its first statement of policy, the new Government endorsed in its entirety the
declaration of March 27, that is, the determination to continue the struggle for
the defense of Russia, the maintenance of Allied unity, and the decision to work
for a peace without annexations or indemnities. As spokesman for the Govern
ment, Miliukovs successor, M. I. Tereshchenko, did not make a specific unilateral
renunciation of the annexations promised in existing agreements; rather, he pro
posed that all the Allies counsel together in the near future for the revision of
war aims. But Allied reluctance and the subsequent failure of the June offensive
combined to delay the meeting and to weaken Russian chances of success at the
conference table.2 Only in October was a date definitely setNovember 3by
which time the Allies had indicated that the conference would deal only with the
conduct of the war and, in any case, the Bolsheviks had seized power in Petrograd.
Almost from the beginning of its existence, the Government was beset by
Allied demands for a more active prosecution of the war and by indications of
the deteriorating position of Russian representatives in Allied councils. Decisions
of importance were taken among Britain, France, and Italy without consulting
Russia and with only token post factum reference to her wishes, even in cases in
which her vital interests were involved, such as the Sixte affair, the partition of
Asia Minor, and intervention in Greece. In September the Allied ambassadors,
excepting Francis, who had not received instructions, took the unusual step of
expressing their governments alarm over the internal and military situation fol
lowing the Kornilov affair in a sharp joint note that not unnaturally aroused the
ire of Kerensky and Tereshchenko.3 Meantime, supplies from the Allies, including
munitions, fell below the promised quotas and were found, in some instances, to
be defective.4
2The hope the Government placed upon a successful offensive to strengthen their diplo
matic hand is indicated in many places, among them a telegram of July 20 from Kerensky at
the front to Tereshchenko. Kerensky wrote: Hasten the convening of the Allied Conference.
An increase in tempo and greater clarity are essential in Allied diplomacy. The struggle on
the front should be exploited by every means in view of the situation of the country and of the
army of which you are well aware. Remember that every step at the front costs us tremendous
effort. Only through the combined and simultaneous action of diplomacy and the army will we
consolidate the situation and avoid collapse. Sbormk sekretnykh dokumentov, No. 44, p. 113.
8This demarche and the Russian reaction is covered under the Kornilov affair in
Volume HI.
4 Although Ambassador Bakhmetev in Washington was of the opinion that the failure
of the Allies to ship to Russia all that was promised could be ascribed to the great shortage of
tonnage, his colleague in London was convinced that it was principally the consequence of
Allied misgivings concerning the course of events in Russia. A conference of Allied repre
sentatives in Petrograd in late June, which met to consider the question, gave lack of tonnage
as the official reason, at the same time offering advice on the improvement of Russian transport
and industry. Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 475, 484, 495-97, 521-22. See also Lozinskii, Ekonomiche
skaia Politika, p. 33. In his telegram from the front to Tereshchenko on June 20, Kerensky
reported that the heavy artillery delivered by their [Allied] governments apparently comes,
in large measure, from defective stocks as 35 per cent have not resisted two days of moderate
firing. Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov, No. 44, p. 113.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1041
From the other side, the Soviet campaign for a more aggressive approach to
peace, which began with the March 14 Appeal to the Peoples of All the World,
continued. Further appeals were supplemented by consultation and collaboration
with foreign socialists in an effort to call a conference at Stockholm to outline a
program and initiate action toward a negotiated peace without annexations or
indemnities. To the extreme left, the Bolsheviks proposed far more radical
solutions.
The Stockholm Conference did not materialize, owing to differences in the
ranks of international socialism and the refusal of the Western Allies to grant
passports to the delegates. The Bolshevik exhortations to revolution abroad failed
of their purpose. Yet, these activities inaugurated or stimulated by Russian groups
certainly did nothing to diminish the Allies anxiety over Russias future or to
soften the tenor of their flow of advice to the Provisional Government. At the same
time, the Allies were either unable or unwilling to move in the direction that might
have assisted the democratic regime to stay the rising opposition to the war under
the old dispensation and to retain powerthat is, toward a revision of war aims.
Clearly, the Provisional Government found itself between the upper and nether
stones of domestic impatience and Allied intransigence.
A third road was that of separate peace. But the Government remained firm
in its belief that a separate peace would be a dishonorable betrayal of Russia and
her allies, opening the way to the dismemberment of the country and to a German
victory in the west.
Since 1915 the German Government had been attempting to make a separate
peace with one of the great Allied powers, and especially with Russia. Before
the revolution, Berlin tried, without success, direct approaches to the Emperor and
various intrigues in the right-germanophile circles of Petrograd society and the
Rasputin clique. After the disappearance of the Romanovs, the German Govern
ment completely changed its separate-peace tactics in Russia. Confronted by more
and more pronounced difficulties, internally and on the front, the Central Powers
intensified their efforts to free their eastern front by undermining Russian morale,
encouraging internal division, and even provoking civil war. The German Gov
ernment took advantage publicly and privately of all the opportunities offered to
promote the idea of a separate peace, especially among the soldiers at the front
and in the rear. In official manifestos, by fraternization, by front-line pourparlers,
and in secret contacts with some Russian political circles, it tried to further its
aim. But probably the most effective weapon in its psychological warfare was
financial and other support of the defeatist Bolshevik movement.
For an understanding, therefore, of the diplomacy of the Provisional Govern
ment, attention must be given to the external interference and pressures from
both friend and foe, as well as to the prevailing internal conditions and political
currents.
CHAPTER 19
The Period of the First Provisional Government

THE ALLIES AND THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION


905. T he Government s I nitial S tatement on F oreign P olicy
[From Miliukov to Russian diplomatic representatives abroad, Adamov, Konst. i
prolivy, I, 466-67. On March 8, in a supplemental telegram to representatives in
Allied countries, Miliukov emphasized that this statement also referred to all the
agreements concluded among the Allied powers during the present war/5 and asked
the Allies to confirm their obligations under the agreements, which they quickly did.
Ibid., I, 467-76.]
March 4/17,1917
No. 967
The news communicated by the Petrograd telegraph agency has already in
formed you of the events of the last days and of the downfall of the old political
regime in Russia . . .
In the sphere of foreign policy, the cabinet, in which I accepted the portfolio
of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, faithful to the promises given by Russia, will
strictly observe the international obligations contracted by the fallen regime. We
shall steadfastly strengthen the relations which bind us to the other friendly and
allied nations, and we feel certain that these relations will become still closer and
still more solid under the new regime established in Russia, which will follow the
democratic principles of consideration toward the small and the great nations, of
freedom of their development, and of good understanding among peoples.
But the Government does not for a minute forget the painful external circum
stances under which it assumes power. Russia did not want the war that has
stained the world with blood for almost three years. However, being the victim
of a long premeditated and prepared attack, she will, as heretofore, fight against
the aggressive plans of a predatory race, which is carried away by the dream of
establishing an inadmissible hegemony over the adj oining peoples and which has
attempted to force twentieth-century Europe to live through the shame of being
dominated by Prussian militarism.
Faithful to the treaty that binds her by indissoluble ties to her glorious Allies,
Russia, likewise, has decided to establish at all cost an era of peace among peoples
by the creation of an international organization which will be lasting and will
guarantee respect toward right and justice. Shoulder to shoulder with them we
shall fight our common foe to the end, unswervingly and indefatigably. The Gov
ernment, of which I am a member, will devote all its energy to the achievement of
victory and will make every effort to correct as rapidly as possible the errors of
the past, which may have paralyzed up to now the enthusiasm and the spirit of
sacrifice of the Russian people. [The Government] is firmly convinced that the
great exaltation which now animates the whole nation will multiply [its] forces
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1043
and bring nearer the hour of the final triumph of regenerated Russia and of her
glorious Allies.
I ask you to communicate to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the contents of
the present telegram and to leave a copy with him.
M iliukov

906. T h e R eco g n itio n o f t h e P r o v isio n a l G overnm ent


by t h e M a jo r P o w e rs
[Note from Sir George Buchanan to Miliukov, Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, I, 468-69.
Because of a temporary indisposition, Sir George was not able to confer formal recog
nition in a meeting with the Council of Ministers until March 11, at which time the
British diplomatic mission was accompanied by the French and Italian Ambassadors
and their staffs. The two dates on the note apparently reflect the time lag between
Buchanans initial authorization to recognize and his decision to do so, following
unofficial reassurances from Miliukov, on March 5, regarding the Provisional Govern
ments determination to restore discipline in the army and to continue the war. Bu
chanan, My Mission to Russia , II, 90-92; Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars , III, 269-71.
In the meantime, Ambassador Francis, who had received similar authorization, was
received by the Ministers on March 9, making the United States the first nation to
recognize the new Government officially, a source of great satisfaction to Francis.
David R. Francis, Russia from the Ameiican Embassy , pp. 93-94.]
March 4/17, 1917
Now I have the honor to inform your Excellency that my government, upon
learning that the Provisional Government of Russia, newly formed under the
Presidency of Prince Lvov, is ready to observe the engagements, undertaken to
gether with the allied governments by its predecessor and especially [those] con
cerning the continuing of the war until its victorious conclusion, delegates me to
recognize it and to enter into official relations with your Excellency.
George B uchanan
Petrograd, March 22, 1917 [ n .s .]
907. A m erica Join s t h e A llie s
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 66, March 23, 1917, p. 3. In his address to
Congress asking for a declaration of war, President Wilson spoke of the wonderful
and heartening things . . . that have been happening in Russia, and termed her a
fit partner for a league of honor. For . Rel. of U.S ., 1917, Supp. I, The World
War, 200.]
. . . And so, the last of the Great Powers which had remained neutral re
nounced its neutrality and took her position against Germany. To the United
States, fate meted out some sort of role as judge in the great dispute among the
European states. No matter how this dispute ends, there is little that the United
States can gain for itself by taking part in the War. Considering only its own in
terests, it is almost a matter of indifference which side gains the victory, and if
the United States, even previously, did not remain an indifferent onlooker of the
events taking place in Europe, and now is ready to take an active part in them, it
is being pushed on that road mainly by considerations of principle. It has fulfilled
1044 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
more valuable for us at the present moment because it has been rendered by a
democratic republic and with the direct participation of the peoples represent
atives.1
However, not only moral considerations make us welcome the action of the
United States. We also value it as a companion in arms who can render active
support.
. . . The decisive action on the part of the United States does not yet mean
the termination of the War, but it makes this termination nearer, and it hastens
the moment of victory over Germany. Energy is still necessary; it is necessary to
maintain firmness for some time to come, and the enemy will be defeated, and the
cause of justice will triumph.

908. P ress In terv iew w ith M iliu k ov


[_Rech\No. 70, March 23,1917, p. 2.]

The Minister dwelt further on the formula peace without annexations, a


German formula that they endeavor to pass off as an international socialist one.
The question arises, said P. N. Miliukov, whether the aspiration of the Allies to
realize the ideal of liberating the small nationalities and of creating the forms
that will guarantee the world from further wars in the future can be considered
annexation. In any case, we do not consider as annexation the endeavors of
the Allied powers to alter the map of Europe in accordance with the ideas of
Woodrow Wilson, especially her southeastern map, so as to make possible the
triumph of the national aspirations of the nationalities now oppressed by Austro-
Hungary and Turkey.
As it has been quite correctly formulated in the reply of the Allied powers
to the address of Woodrow Wilson,2 our task is the reorganization of Austro-
Hungary with the liberation of the nationalities she oppresses, and the liquidation
of European Turkey. In particular, our tasks include the solution of the Czecho
slovak question, i.e., the creation of an independent Czecho-Slovakian slate that
will act as a barrier against the advance of the Germans toward countries with a
non-Slavic [sic] population, the return of Italians to Italy, of Rumanians to Ru
mania, the natural unification of the Serbian people, and also the union of the
Ukrainian population of the Austrian regions with the population of our own
Ukrainian regions. This task, as well as the task of keeping the German preten
sions within a framework that will guarantee peace, is in complete harmony with
the ideology advocated by the President of the United States. The more restricted
Balkan problem will be solved later on in accordance with the results of the war.
Besides the aims indicated, one of the major aims of the Allies and of Russia in
particular is the liberation of the Armenians from the Turkish yoke. We cannot
1On March 21, 1917, Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of Labor,
had sent a message to the Soviet urging responsible use of the new freedom. For. Rel. of
U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 18, 21. But, by May 2, Consul North Winship informed the State De
partment that the Socialist press had paid no attention to this and other messages from
American labor and SociaUst leaders and had passed over her (Americas) entrance into
the war in complete silence. Reports to Department of State, No. 304, May 15 (N.S.),
1917, p. 3.
2The reply of the Allies on January 10, 1917 (N.S.), to Wilsons request of December
20, 1916 (N.S.), for a definition of their war aims.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1045
permit Armenia to remain under the domination of the Turks. Besides, the fate
of other nations such as the Arabs, who are also under the domination of the Turks,
should be decided in a favorable manner. In this fashion the principle of nation
alities should be carried out firmly and consistently. Speaking of liberating the
nationalities suffering under the domination of Turkey, the Allies have no desire
to oppress the Turkish people. As to the question of Constantinople and the
Straits, it cannot be considered as involving the interests of the Turkish nation,
because the Turkish nation, in spite of five hundred years domination, has not
spread its roots deeply there. Up to the present day Turks remain an alien element
there, resting exclusively on the right of the conqueror, the right of the strongest.
The transfer of the Straits to us would in no way contradict the principles ad
vanced by Woodrow Wilson when he spoke of the possibility of transferring their
ownership. The possession of the Straits is the protection of the doors to our
home, and it is understandable that this protection should belong to us, while
a neutralization of the Straits, especially a complete neutralization providing for
a free passage into the Black Sea of men-of-war of all nations, would be even
less acceptable to us than their remaining in the hands of the Turks. . . .

909. T he P rovisional G overnment s D eclaration of


M arch 27 on W ar A ims
\Rech\ No. 73, March 28, 1917, p. 2, as translated in Golder, pp. 329-331. Following
the publication of the Appeal of the Petrograd Soviet to the Peoples of all the World
(Doc. 942), which was a completely unofficial act, the Soviet began to press the Gov
ernment to issue a declaration renouncing any annexationist views. In meetings be
tween the Liaison Commission and the Government, Miliukov made clear his opposition
to the proposal. But some of the ministers, including Kerensky, Tereshchenko, and
eventually Prince Lvov, believed that such a statement should be issued, and they
were able to enlist a majority of their colleagues on their side. The resulting document,
drafted reluctantly by Miliukov with the aid of several of his associates and issued
after further negotiations with the Soviet, was a compromise between his views and
the stronger wording demanded by the Soviet. Also, it was published as a domestic
statement, not a diplomatic note. See Nikolai Sukhanov, Zapiski o revoliutsii, II,
336-70, and The Russian Revolution, 1917, Joel Carmichael, ed. and trans., pp. 246-54;
P. N. Miliukov, Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, I, vypusk 1, 84-87; and V. Nabokov,
Vremennoe Pravitelstvo, ARR, I (1921), 58-60.
The German government published in the Norddeutsche AUgemeine Zeitung of
April 15, 1917 (N.S.) a vague statement in reply to the Declaration, which suggested
agreement with its war aims and was a veiled bid for a separate peace.]
Citizens: The Provisional Government, having considered the military situa
tion of the Russian State, and being conscious of its duty to the country, has
resolved to tell the people directly and openly the whole truth.
The overthrown government has left the defense of the country in an utterly
disorganized condition. By its criminal inactivity and inefficient methods, it dis
organized our finances, food supply, transportation, and the supply of the army.
It has undermined our economic organization.
The Provisional Government, with the active and vigorous assistance of the
whole nation, will make every effort to remove the dire consequences of the old
regime. But time does not wait. The blood of large numbers of the sons of our
fatherland has been flowing without limit during these two and a half years
1046 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of war, and still the country remains exposed to the blows of a powerful enemy,
who has seized entire provinces of our country, and is now, in the days of the
birth of Russian freedom, menacing us with a new, determined assault.
The defense of our own inheritance at any price, and the liberation of our
country from the invading enemy, constitute the foremost and most urgent task
of our fighters defending the nations liberty.
Leaving to the will of the people, in close union with our Allies, the final
solution of all problems connected with the World War and its conclusion, the
Provisional Government considers it to be its right and its duty to declare at this
time that the aim of free Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure
of their national possessions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but
the establishment of a stable peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples.
The Russian people does not intend to increase its world power at the expense
of other nations. It has no desire to enslave or degrade any one. In the name of
the loftiest principles of justice, it has removed the shackles from the Polish
people. But the Russian people will not permit their fatherland to emerge from
this great struggle humiliated and sapped in its vital forces.
These principles will be made the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional
Government, which is unswervingly executing the will of the people and defend
ing the rights of our fatherland, fully observing at the same time all obligations
assumed toward our Allies.
The Provisional Government of free Russia has no right to withhold the truth
from the people. The State is in danger. Every effort must be made for its salva
tion. Let the answer of the nation to the truth here revealed be, not fruitless
despair, not discouragement, but a concerted effort to create a single national will.
This will give us fresh strength to carry on the fight, and will lead us to salvation.
In this hour of severe trial, let the whole nation find within itself the strength
to consolidate the freedom it has won, and work tirelessly for the welfare of free
Russia. The Provisional Government which has taken a solemn oath to serve the
people, firmly believes that, with the general and unanimous support of each
and every one, it will be enabled to do its duty to the nation to the end.
P rince G. E. Lvov, Minister-President

910. Novoe Vremia on the D eclaration


[No. 14737, March 28, 1917, p. 5.]
In its appeal to the people the Provisional Government gave a complete and
dignified answer to the question of war aims that has been asked of late with
increasing frequency.
The protection of our national fortunes and property and the deliverance of
the country from invasion by the enemythis is the first, direct, and unequivocal
task of our troops and our people.
The Provisional Government is not alone in thinking thus. All the strata of
Russian society are animated by the same feeling. This is attested by statements
coming from all corners of the Russian land and particularly from the front,
where our warriors, not sparing their own lives, defend the country from the
enemy.
While working for victory, the Provisional Government at the same time de
clares that neither the ambition to dominate other peoples, nor the taking away
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1047
of their national patrimony nor yet the violent seizure of anothers territory or
enslavement and humiliation of our adversaries, constitute the aims of Russia.
But, at the same time, the Russian people will not allow our country to come
out of the struggle humiliated and sapped of its vital forces.
The Provisional Government, in defining its war aims in this fashion, is at
one with the Russian people.
However, the final peace terms will not be worked out by the Provisional
Government but by the authoritative organ of power that will be created by the
Constituent Assembly and that will act in agreement with our Allies.
The Russian people do not seek unfair gain. At the same time, they will
not evade the task of creating such international conditions as would safeguard
them, and all of Europe with them, from a new invasion of wild hordes.
For precisely that circumstance constitutes the main problem for the sake
of which the democracies of the whole world are struggling against Germany
and her vassals.
In order to safeguard the peace, it is necessary to pull the teeth and break
the claws of the brute.

911. E ditorial in Rech9 on the D eclaration


[No. 73, March 28,1917, p. 2.]
By its inner significance and its future results, the Declaration of the Provi
sional Government that was published today will probably prove to be one of its
most important acts. It will resound not only over all Russia but over the whole
world, and it certainly will become a most essential factor in the future course of
events. It concerns our vital interests and those basic issues of war and foreign
policy which are most deeply and painfully disturbing the country. The Declara
tion answers these questions in a definite and clear way, which excludes any am
biguous interpretation.
Before touching on the substance of this document, it is impossible not to dwell
on what is perhaps its most striking aspect: its general tone and its style. Even the
least sensitive ear cannot fail to perceive here something quite new and unprece
dented. Certainly the old government did not use such language, but it is also new
to diplomacy. From its very first words the Declaration places itself on a founda
tion of truth, which is straightforwardly and frankly expressed to the people; it
returns to that same idea of the necessity of absolute truth in its conclusion. This
truth is hard; outlined in a few words the situation inherited from the regime
which has been overthrown is really threatening and gloomy. . . .
. . . But as regards the Declaration of the Provisional Government, it is quite
evident that only those irreconcilably prejudiced and those of obvious bad faith
could interpret its clear and categorical statements in the spirit of the accusations
that have lately appeared in a certain part of the press. By proclaiming the will
of the people, whose decision on all problems connected with the World War and
its completion shall be final, the Provisional Government thereby defers the ques
tionwhich, alas! is a long way from being placed on the agendaof the actual
terms of the peace. But it has very definitely established the principles of its own
policy, having categorically stated that the Russian people do not aspire to domi
nate other nations in order to take away their national patrimony, or to seize their
1048 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
territories by violence; nor do the Russian people seek to increase their might at
the expense of other nations, nor do they entertain any conquering aims; but, at
the same time, the Russian people will not permit their own humiliation, the wreck
of their vital forces, a curtailment of their rights. And of course the Provisional
Government confirms that all the obligations toward the Allies will be observed.
To abandon these ideas would mean to take a path leading lo a rupture wilh our
Allies; as a consequence, it would mean the necessity of accepting a shameful
separate peace from the hands of Germany, which would not only eliminate Russia
from among the Great Powers, but have a fatal effect on the whole of her existence,
and above all, on the conquests of the revolution. The Russian democracy will
not take this suicidal road.

912. Delo Naroda on t h e D eclaration


[No. 11, March 28,1917, p. 1.]
The Declaration of the Provisional Government on the aims of the war has
been made public. We meet this new step of the Government with a deep feeling
of moral satisfaction, and we have no doubt that it will be appraised in the same
way by all of thinking Russia.
It is not our affair to analyze the reasons that prompted the Government to once
again go hand in hand with the demands of the people. But it is our affair to point
out that it acted correctly by adding its authoritative statement to the voice of the
peoples conscience, previously proclaimed . . . Thus in the name of her people,
in the name of her Government, Russia solemnly declares her repudiation of all
annexations.
. . . All annexational demands are abandoned from now on, and the loyalty
given to the obligations means negatively only the inability to conclude a separate
peace. On the positive side it means the fulfillment of civic and moral obligations
and the striving toward the achievement of peace without annexations on either
side.
Russia has fulfilled her duty. Her word has been said. The future of peace
and war does not depend upon her now.
What we could and had to do was done.
If our call is not heard by those to whom it is directed, and if war is not ended
in the near future, Russia is not henceforth responsible.
We decline our responsibility before the world and future generations.
Let us hope that the enemy will realize its responsibility also. Should it, how
ever, falsely interpret our action as an indication of weakness, and fail to renounce
its annexationist aspirations, there is but one way out: we will truly fight as
revolutionaries fight. Russia has said her word. The effect of the revolution has
gone beyond our borders. Its action is becoming universal.
Now it is up to Germany and her allies.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1049
913. Rabochaia Gazeta T erms the D eclaration a V ictory of D emocracy
[No. 19, March 29, 1917, p. 1. For the reaction of the All-Russian Conference of
Soviets, see Doc. 948.]
The Government Declaration on the war that has just been made public forces
us to admit with great satisfaction that realizing its responsibility to the country,
the Government took an important step toward meeting the aspirations of
democracy.
This introduces a current of fresh air into the atmosphere of imperialistic
strife reigning in Europe. Inspired by its democracy, the government of Russia
sets an example to the warring powers, allied as well as hostile, of repudiating all
aggressive plans and aspirations. It remains now for the international democracy
to see to it that, by means of energetic and united efforts, this example is followed
as soon as possible by the governments of other warring powers.
This is the task of international democracy, but at the same time this is also
our urgent problem.
We have received from our Government far from all that we can or must
demand.
Even in the matter of repudiation in the name of Russia of aggressive aspira
tion, the appeal of the Provisional Government could have been in our opinion
more definite and more unqualified.
This declaration of the Provisional Government did not, at any rate, do away
with the aggressive program of the Allied powers, nor did it cancel the obliga
tions of Russia to fight for this program.
By rejecting a separate peace, by striving for peace on an international scale,
we must see to it that the first step of the Provisional Government is followed by
a second one; that leaning upon the Russian democracy, the Provisional Govern
ment should exert pressure on the governments of the Allied powers; that it
should obtain from them a collective repudiation of the aggressive program
which they developed in answer to Wilsons note.
Granted that the Declaration of the Provisional Government said far from
all that should have been said in order to disarm the annexationists among the
powers at war with us. But stemming from the Government, this Declaration
confirms and strengthens the Appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies.3
It testifies to the fact that the Appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies to the Peoples of the World is backed by the indestructible wall of the
Russian democracy and that it contains within itself sufficient strength to direct
the will of the government of the country toward the achievement of peace
acceptable to all the warring peoples.
1050 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
914. A ttitu d e o f t h e B r itish G overnm ent Toward t h e Russian S itu a tio n
[From Charge dAffaires in London to Miliukov; Adamov, Konst. i prolivy, I, 477-78.]
No. 239 March 29/April 11, 1917
In their appreciation of Russias situation at the present moment, the [British]
statesmen take into consideration the following factors on the basis . . ,4 military
and of the reports of newspaper correspondents. On the one hand, they fully
realize the decisive influence that the revolution in Russia had in America and,
as a consequence, the [amount of] material aid received by the Allies as a result
of the revolution. The Government is animated by a sincere desire to render,
within the limits of its ability and taking into account its own needs, all possible
aid and assistance to the Provisional Government of Russia; their willingness is
based on their complete faith in the ardent patriotism and the political wisdom
of the men who now are guiding the destinies of Russia. On the other hand,
because of information regarding the compromising policy of the extreme par
ties, there is very definite concern over the stability of the present provisional
regime. The military representatives report on the continuing agitation among
the troops in favor of a separate peace, on a direct decline in the output of fac
tories producing armaments, on the temporary impotence of the Baltic Fleet.
The consensus of the newspaper information points at dualism of authority,
and complete reliance of the English public on the military might of Russia may
not be expected until it becomes clear that the Provisional Government has for
itself a single---------[omission] and is able to paralyze the harmful influence of
the extreme parties and of their organ [s]. I consider it my duty to express to you
these considerations, being compelled to bear them in mind when discussing our
urgent and universal interests and needs with the [British] statesmen. Public
opinion and the press [show] a lively interest in the issue of Constantinople. As
regards the texts of the Declaration of the Minister-President and of the Kerensky
statement,5 which have appeared today in the newspapers, it is pointed out that
both the statement and the principles voiced by Kerensky lack conformity with the
declarations regarding the observation of engagements formerly concluded with
the Allies, and also with the contents of your interview regarding Constantinople.
I direct your attention to the editorial of the Daily Mail which the agency com
municates today to Petrograd, and request your instructions.6
N abokov

915. T he R eception of the B ritish and F rench S ocialists


[Den*, No. 26, April 6, 1917, p. 3. The Socialists were Ernest Lafont, Marius Moutet,
and Marcel Cachin from France, and John OGrady, Will Thorne, and William S.
Sanders from Great Britain. The French delegates were all members of the Chamber
of Deputies; OGrady and Thorne were union leaders, and Sanders was Secretary of
4 Omission in text.
5From the beginning, Kerensky had made clear his disagreement with Miliukovs policy
toward the Straits and Constantinople (see Doc. 922). The reference here was, no doubt,
to his latest statement of the view that the Straits should be internationalized, published
concurrently in the British Press. See Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1917 (N.S.), p. 4.
6 On April 4, Nabokov telegraphed Miliukov that the Government and the press discern
in this statement [the Declaration] an abandonment of our rights to Constantinople and
other territorial acquisitions. Adamov, Konst, i Prolivy, I, 480-81.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1051
the Fabian Society. Their objective was to exercise a modifying influence on the
foreign policy aims of the Soviet, but their efforts were coolly received there. See
Doc. 950. By the time they left, Arthur Henderson and Albert Thomas had arrived
to pursue roughly the same end, but in more official capacities.]
Yesterday at the Mariinskii Palace the Provisional Government received the
representatives of the French and English Socialists, who have arrived in Russia.
On behalf of the Provisional Government P. N. Miliukov replied to the English
and French Socialists:
[Only] a short time has elapsed since we saw you in England and in France,
but while discussing with you matters relating to the war, we felt that you trusted
us only because you knew us personally. Behind us stood absolutism and mon
archy, and we felt that your trust in us was clouded by your distrust of the dark
forces of tsarism.
Now everything has changed. Our common desires have been fulfilled. A
new force in the person of free Russia has joined the democratic union of Europe.
When you return to your country, please say that free Russia has doubled its
strength, that thanks to the democratization of her institutions she will bear all
war-time hardships, that in spite of the revolution we have preserved the main
purpose and the meaning of this war. We can say that the Provisional Govern
ment will make still greater efforts to annihilate German militarism, for our ideal
is to prevent the possibility of any war in the future. Our present task is to organ
ize the forces of defense, which have been shattered by the revolution. We are
doing it. And we are ready to meet the enemy with redoubled strength, certain
that the hour of victory is near.
After P. N. Miliukov, A. F. Kerensky spoke: Comrades, may I greet you on
behalf -of Russian democracy and of the Russian Socialists. I am alone in the cabi
net and my opinion does not always coincide with the opinion of the majority.
Up to now you have not heard the voice of the Russian democracy, because on be
half of the Russian people you were addressed by the representatives of the ruling
classes. We were not among those who went to see you in England and in France
and who spoke to you in the name of the Russian people. At that time the Russian
democracy, the Russian people were compelled to remain silent, for they could
not say a truthful word about the war. The problems of the Russian people were
too distant from Russian tsarism. You must have understood our silence.
We could not speak, but within the country we demanded the immediate over
throw of tsarism for the sake of the salvation of liberty and of the ideals of
democracy all over the world.
Comrades, you should know that at the present time the Russian democracy
is the master of the Russian land. We have decided to end in our country, once and
for all, any attempts at imperialism or aggression, for we, the Russian democrats,
do not wish the subjugation of anyone, we do not wish any conquests, we are
serving the ideal of the liberty, equality, and fraternity of all peoples. . . .W e,
the Russian democrats, will stand to the end on the positions formulated in the
Declaration of the Provisional Government regarding the purposes of the war and
in the Appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies to the Peoples of
the World.
Never under any circumstances will we permit a return to the old aggressive
purposes of war. We ask you to tell the French and English workers and your
1052 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
governments of the true feelings of the Russian people and of the Russian democ
racy. We ask you to believe that the interests of the French and English democra
cies are close to the heart of the Russian people and we expect that you will exert
on the other classes of your countries populations the same decisive influence as
the one we have exerted here, inside Russia, on our bourgeois classes, which have
now declared their repudiation of imperialistic aspirations.
916. T h e A b se n c e o f R u ssia n R e p r e se n t a t iv e s a t A l l ie d M e e t in g s
[Telegram from Nabokov to Miliukov; Adamov, Razdel, pp. 323-24. The next day,
Nabokov repeated his complaint to Lord Cecil, remarking on the somewhat reserved
attitude toward Russia within the British Government. He also suggested to Miliukov
that Rodzianko be sent as a special representative to Great Britain if the Provisional
Government deemed it impractical to delegate one of its own members. A. Popov,
Diplomatiia Vremennogo Pravitelstva v borba s revoliutsiei, KA, XX (1927), 7.
After the death of the Ambassador, Count Benckendorff, on December 31, 1916, Nabo
kov served as Charge dAffaires. Sazanov had been appointed by the Imperial Govern
ment to succeed Benckendorff, and his appointment was confirmed by the Provisional
Government, but it was revoked at the time of Miliukovs resignation before he had
left Russia to assume his duties. Two other candidates were successively proposed
Baron Meyendorff, formerly Vice-President of the Duma, and Prince Gregorii Trubet
skoiand accepted by the British Government, but neither arrived to relieve Nabokov.
C. Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, pp. 82-84, 125, 169-70. Nabokovs book is
a valuable source for information on British-Russian relations during this period.]
No. 272 April 13/26, 1917
Very confidential. At the latters initiative, I had today a long conversation
with Lord Milner. Among the issues on which we exchanged ideas, and while
I was expressing only my own personal opinion, was mentioned the question of
periodic conferences of the heads of the Allied governments. Milner told me that
the minutes of the Petrograd Conference [of the Allies, January 1917] con
tain a tentative resolution on the subject, which is subject to discussion by the
cabinets; Milner intends to persuade the cabinet to put this resolution into prac
tice. Actually, a conference of the three premiers already took place a few days
ago in Savoy [St. Jean de Maurienne],7 while the presence of Balfour and of
the French representatives in Washington bears a similar character. At these
conferences there was no Russian representative. When replying to Milner, I
found myself in a somewhat awkward situation, being completely unaware of
when the arrival in London of the new ambassador may be expected. I expressed
to him my personal opinion that the presence of a Russian representative who
would have the authority to speak on behalf of the Provisional Government would
be most advisable. I take the liberty of saying to you personally that in the
present political situation it seems to me essential that the voice of Russia should
be heard at the Allied conferences in order to counterbalance influences endeavor
ing to exploit our absence for their own egotistic purposes. In a few days Sonnino
is expected to arrive here. From Izvolskiis telegram you are aware of Italys
claims. I believe it is quite certain that here Sonnino will also insist on his [views].
Our internal situation permitting, I think it would be very important for Prince
Lvov or one of the Ministers to come over here, even for a short stay. Otherwise
the idea of periodic conferences of the premiers will be carried into practice
7 See Doc. 928.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1053
without the participation of Russia. . . . From my talk with Milner, I got the
impression that in the cabinet he represents an element that bases its attitude
toward Russia on a strict utilitarian basis, i.e., that he evaluates the situation from
the point of view of Russias participation in the common cause; in this sense
Milners influence may in a certain measure be prejudiced, by no means owing
to reasons of a personal character or to narrowmindedness, but merely because
Englands tasks in this war actually become more and more complicated from
day to day. I think that the presence over here of a statesman who would be
able to convey to England the right outlook and to impress upon the government
a broader point of view would be important not only in the interest of the present
moment, but also for the whole future. It goes without saying that these con
siderations would in part lose their significance if Sazonov were to arrive here
within the next days.
N abokov

917. A merican Concern over R ussian F oreign P olicy


[From Lansing to Ambassador Francis, A. Popov, Inostrannye diplomaty o revoliutsii
1917 g . KA, XXIV (1927), 132.]
Washington, April 8/21, 1917. No. 1337.
The Congress has passed a $7 billion war loan, of which $3 billion are to be
assigned to Russia and the Allied governments. The political reforms of the
Russian state have been met here with great enthusiasm. However, the latest
reports, widely disseminated by the press, of the Government being under the
influence of extreme socialist parties that aim at a separate peace for which Ger
many yearns so intensely, are doing much damage to the Russian interests here;
if these communications do not cease, they might prevent Russia from obtaining
her share of the loan assigned to the Allies. As far as propriety permits, please
widely inform the Russian leaders of this and insist that measures should be
taken in order to redress the unfortunate bad impression produced on the Ameri
can people. There is no way of overestimating the feelings of enthusiastic friend
ship which will be brought into being over here and the open unlimited possi
bilities for their development after the war if the new Government is able to
maintain order and successfully carry on the war. A separate peace would pre
clude the possibility of any kind of assistance on the part of America. . . .
[L ansing ]

918. R ussian D iplomatic R epresentation in W ashington


[Nabokov to Miliukov; Adamov, Razdel, pp. 327-28. The Imperial ambassador in
Washington was Georgii Bakhmetev. On April 25, the Government decided to send
a special mission to the United States, led by B. A. Bakhmetev, who was to have the
rank of ambassador and replace his namesake, who was not related. Zhurnaly, No. 62.
See Doc. 979.]
No. 286 April 19 /May 2,1917
I refer to your telegram No. 1714.
Personal. . . . As regards the state of affairs in Washington, your instruc
tion received by me today bears witness to the pitiful state of our present repre
sentation in America. . . .
1054 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
inertia and strike. I deem it my duty not to conceal from you that the absence
at the present moment of an energetic chief at the head of the embassy, one
acquainted with the situation, capable of directing the press, and informed of
the political and financial relationship between Russia, America, and England,
impresses the Americans themselves as a misfortune that should be remedied as
soon as possible. Please excuse me for intervening in a sphere which is outside
of my competence [but] which is based on data received here.
N abokov

919. B r itish R efutation of R eports of P ossible Japanese O ccupation of


S iberia if R ussia L eft th e W ar
[Buchanan to Cecil, A. Popov, Inostrannye diplomaty o revoliutsii 1917 g., KA,
XXTV (1927), 140-41. The official denial of the British Embassy was published in the
Russian newspapers on April 29. Den\ No. 46, p. 3. The Japanese Ambassador in
Petrograd also reported the newspaper article to his government, adding that though
obviously mere rumors, such statements were a useful pressure on the Russians,
and intimating that they had been initiated by the newspapers and some politicians
to back up the Government. Popov, Inostrannye diplomaty, p. 138.]
Petrograd, April 29 /May 12, 1917. No. 675.
I have learned from the Consul General in Moscow that a newspaper has
published an interview with------, where it is said that------told me that in the
event Russia discontinued military operations and shifted the whole burden of
the war on the Allies, she would meet a serious menace on the part of Japan, be
cause, in accordance with a treaty existing between the Allies, in such an event
Japan would be entitled to occupy the whole of Siberia up to the Urals. As this
communication has made a great impression here, I have instructed the Press
Bureau to publish that such a treaty does not exist and that the Allies have never
contemplated asking Japan to intervene in order to put pressure on Russia. Never
theless, I would appreciate it if His Majestys Government were to make public
an official refutation.

THE STRAITS AND CONSTANTINOPLE


920. S ummary of th e A greements A mong the A llies Concerning the
S traits and Constantinople
[Memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adamov, Konst. i prolivy, I, 463-65.]
I
On February 19/March 4,1915, the Minister of Foreign Affairs transmitted to
the French and British ambassadors a memorandum expressing the desire that
the following territories should be annexed to Russia as a result of the present
war: the city of Constantinople; the western coasts of the Bosporus, the Sea of
Marmora, and the Dardanelles; southern Thrace up to the line Enos-Media; the
coast of Asia Minor between the Bosporus; the Sakarya River and a point off the
Gulf of Ismid to be determined later; the islands of the Sea of Marmora; and the
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1055
islands of Imbros and Tenedos. The special rights of France and England within
the limits of the territories indicated would be maintained.
But the French and the British governments declared their willingness to
satisfy our wishes, contingent upon the successful conclusion of the war and the
satisfaction of a whole series of Frances and Englands claims both within the
boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, and in other places.
These claims, as far as they concern Turkey, may be reduced to the following:
The recognition of Constantinople as a free port for the transit of goods not pro
ceeding from or to Russia, and the free passage through the Straits for merchant
men.
The recognition of the rights of England and France in Asiatic Turkey, to be
determined exactly by means of a special agreement among France, England, and
Russia.
The maintenance of Moslem Holy Places and of Arabia under an independent
Moslem rule.
The inclusion into the sphere of English influence of the neutral zone of Persia
established by the 1907 agreement between England and Russia.
Having recognized that, in general, these demands should be given satisfaction,
the Russian government has nevertheless made some reservations.
In order to formulate our desires concerning the Moslem Holy Places, it is
necessary to ascertain, as of now, whether these places shall remain under the rule
of Turkey, with the Sultan preserving the title of Caliph, or if it is intended to
create new independent states.
In our opinion, it would be desirable to separate the Caliphate from Turkey.
In any case, the freedom of pilgrimage should be maintained.
Although agreeing to the inclusion of the neutral zone of Persia in the sphere
of English influence, the Russian Government considers that it would be fair to
stipulate that the regions of the towns of Isfahan and Yezd should be under Russian
influence, and also that a part of the neutral-zone belt, which wedges between the
Russian and the Afghan borders and comes up to the Russian border at Zulragor,
should be included in the Russian sphere of influence.
The Russian Government considers it desirable to decide at the same time the
question of northern Afghanistan adjacent to Russia in the sense of the wishes
expressed during the negotiations of 1914.
After the entry of Italy into the war, our desires were made known also to the
Italian Government, and the latter expressed its agreement, contingent upon a
victorious conclusion of the war, the satisfaction of the Italian claims in general
and those in the east in particular, and the recognition on our part for Italy,
within the limits of the territories conceded to us, of rights equal to those of France
and England.
II
In its memorandum of February 19/March 4, 1915, to the French and British
embassies, the Imperial Government expressed to the two Allied governments
the necessity of a final solution of the question of the Straits and of Constantinople,
in the sense of annexing to Russia Constantinople, both banks of the Bosporus,
and the islands of Imbros and of Tenedos. By the same act the Imperial Govern
ment expressed its readiness to meet in an equal measure the execution of the
1056 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
plans, which the two powers should formulate in the future with regard to the
other parts of the Ottoman Empire and in other places.
The initial reply of the French Government was made in the memorandum of
the French embassy of February 23/March 8, 1915. The French Ambassador
declared to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that in the question of Constantinople
and of the Straits, the Imperial Government could rely on the good will of the
Government of the Republic. This question, as well as the questions relating
to the French and English interests in Turkey, the settlement of which in terms
of the desires expressed by these two powers was agreeable to the Imperial Govern
ment, should be decided in the peace treaty, in accordance with the declaration of
September 5,1914, under the terms of mutual discussion and simultaneous signing
by the three powers.
In a number of telegrams the Imperial Government continued to insist upon
the advisability of a more precise declaration by France concerning the agreement
to give full satisfaction to our wishes, such as had been given by the British Govern
ment in its memorandum of February 27/March 12, 1915. In this memorandum
the British Embassy stated that, contingent upon victory and the satisfaction
of the desires of Great Britain and France in the Ottoman Empire and other places,
as indicated in the Russian memorandum of February 19/March 4, the English
Government would answer by agreeing to our memorandum regarding the Straits.
Our insistence resulted in a reiterative reply from the French Government by a
verbal note from the embassy of April 10 N.S. The Government of the Republic
stated its agreement with the contents of the memorandum concerning Constanti
nople and the Straits transmitted by Izvolskii on March 6, identical to the one
we had transmitted in Petrograd on February 19/March 4, provided that the war
should be waged to a victorious end and that France and England achieve their
plans in the East and in other places, as stated in the Russian memorandum.
921. T he B riand-P okrovskii A greement on the F uture W estern
B oundaries of R ussia and the E astern B oundaries of F rance
\_Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov, No. 42, pp. 106-7. Doumergue suggested that since
his Government had agreed to Russias receiving the Straits and Constantinople, it
would like Russia to agree to the commitments outlined below. Great Britain was not
informed of the agreement. See also Alexandre Ribots account of the episode in
Journal d?Alexandre Ribot et correspondances inedit es, 1914-1922, pp. 93-95, and
Adamov, Konst . i prolivy, I, 452-55, 460. For the later controversy over the publication
of the agreement, see Docs. 992 and 993.]
The Secret Archive of the Minister Strictly Confidential
AGREEMENT WITH FRANCE IN 1917
During his sojourn in Petrograd at the Allied Conference in January of 1917,
the First French Delegate, Mr. Doumergue, communicated Frances desire to as
sure for herself at the close of the present war the return of Alsace-Lorraine and a
special position in the Saar River valley, also her desire to achieve the political
separation of her trans-Rhine regions from Germany, and their organization so
that the Rhine River in the future should become a solid strategic barrier against
German invasion. Mr. Doumergue expressed the hope that the Russian Govern
ment would not refuse to consent to these proposals.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1057
In this connection the Minister of Foreign Affairs, N. N. Pokrovskii, tele
graphed to the Ambassador in Paris that by agreeing to satisfy the desire of our
ally, he deems it his duty to recall the point of view expressed by S. D. Sazonov
as early as in February 1916 to the effect that by granting France and England
full freedom in determining the western boundaries of Germany, Russia expects
the Allies on their part to extent to her equal freedom in her settling of boundaries
with Germany and Austro-Hungary.
The Paris Cabinet shared the above view whereupon the exchange of the fol
lowing two diplomatic documents took place:
1. In his note of February 1/14, 1917, N. N. Pokrovskii notified Mr. Paleo-
logue of Russias approval of the French intentions with regard to the settlement
of Germanys western boundaries.
2. On February 26/March 11, 1917, the Ambassador in Paris, G. IzvoFskii,
communicated the text of the note by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs to the
effect that France grants Russia full freedom in the matter of establishing her
western boundaries.
922. K erensky s I nterview A dvocating the I nternationalization
of th e S traits
[Nabokov to Miliukov; Adamov, Konst. i prolivy, I, 468.]
March 9/22,1917
The Williams8 interview with Kerensky, which has appeared today in the
Daily Chronicle [and] in which the latter expressed himself as to the advisability
of internationalizing Constantinople, may give rise to agitation in a certain part
of the [British] press and parliamentary circles. To a query from the editorial
office of the aforementioned newspaper, I replied that Kerensky had merely ex
pressed his personal opinion and scarcely spoke in this instance on behalf of the
new Government.
N abokov

923. E ffect in B ritain of K erensky s S tatement


[Nabokov to Miliukov; Adamov, Konst. i prolivy, I, 474. Miliukov replied approving
Nabokovs proposal to clarify the question in the British press. Ibid., I, 475. Similar
reports were received concerning the reaction in France to Kerenskys interview. Ibid.,
1,479.]
March 14/27,1917
No. 196
Yesterday one of the evening papers published an editorial which states that
Russia is temporarily weakened as a consequence of the revolution, and that
Germany is bound to make every effort to transform the revolution into anarchy,
which would give it the opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to Russia. Further,
speaking of the Turkish theater of war, the newspaper declares that the new
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs has reduced Russias claims with regard
to Turkey. This statement is not confirmed by any other newspaper communica
tions; on the contrary, your official declarations bear witness to the intention of
8Harold Williams, a British journalist who specialized in Russian affairs.
1058 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
adhering to all the agreements concluded under the former regime, and, therefore,
also to the agreement regarding Constantinople. Therefore, I presume that the
newspaper has in view the words of Kerensky regarding internationalization. In
view of the fact that my supposition regarding the agitation these words might
provoke here has already received confirmation, I request your directions as to
whether I ought to make clear to [British] public opinion, by means of the press
and in the form I would judge adequate, that your declarations do not contain
indications with regard to a reduction of Russias claims. If the thought of
relinquishing the rights over Constantinople secured for us under the agreement
with France and England were to arise, it goes without saying that this waiving
[of our claims] could take place only following a re-examination of the agreement
by means of diplomatic negotiations, and not in the form of a unilateral an
nouncement on our part.
N abokov

924. M iliukov s D enial that th e G overnment H as R enounced


th e A greement on C onstantinople and t h e S traits
[Miliukov to the embassies in Rome, Paris, and London; Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, I,
479. See Doc. 908.]
April 1/14,1917
Articles have recently appeared in the English and French press in which the
statements of individual members of the Provisional Government, [made] in con
nection with the opinions voiced by the parties of the extreme left, have been
commented on in detail in the sense of our allegedly renouncing the 1915 agree
ment regarding Constantinople and the Straits.
The last declaration of the Provisional Government regarding the basic prin
ciples of our foreign policy mentions, among other things, the strict observance of
the engagements undertaken with regard to our allies. In view of the fact that
these engagements are bilateral, we by no means renounce the securing for Russia
of the vital interests stipulated in the respective agreements.
Excepting the extreme social-democratic organs, whose propaganda is now
considerably weakened and undermined owing to the aforesaid Declaration, the
serious press and all the broad public circles of Russia share our aforementioned
point of view, which also finds a sympathetic response in the army.
M iliukov

925. M iliukov T ries to R evive the P lan fo r an E xpedition


A gainst t h e S traits
[M. Pokrovskii, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 24-26.
The possibility of an expedition against the Straits had been considered by the Russians
as early as the fall of 1914. The Foreign Ministry was hopeful that the seizure of the
Straits might be accomplished to guarantee their promised cession after the war. But
the prevailing military view was that such an undertaking was impossible because of
the need for every effective unit on the German and Austrian fronts and the shortage
of available military transport in the Black Sea. Indeed, after the entrance of Bulgaria
into the war, General Alekseev urged a separate peace with Turkey and the abandon
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1059
ment of all hopes for the Straits and Constantinople. What can we do?One should
accept the inevitable, he told Prince Kudashev, then the representative at Stavka of
the Foreign Ministry. In February 1916 he repeated his advice, following the Russian
capture of Erzurum, which he felt offered an excellent opportunity to initiate peace
moves. Finally, just before the revolution, in February 1917, when Foreign Minister
Pokrovskii, echoing the arguments of his predecessors, urged an occupation of the
Straits, Alekseev once again declared that only after the defeat of our principal and
strongest enemy can a campaign against Constantinople be undertaken. Adamov,
Konst. i prolivy, I, 206-8; Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov , No. 1, pp. 12-14; M.
Pokrovskii, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, 18-20. See also Michael T. Flo-
rinsky, A Page of Diplomatic History: Russian Military Leaders and the Problem
of Constantinople During the War, Political Science Quarterly, XLIV (1929), 108-15.]
Stavka, March 23,1917
Very secret
Private
D ear P avel N ikolaevich ,
Since your trip to Stavka and the conversation in which [naval] Captain
Bubnov and myself had the honor to report to you on the plans concerning the
landing operation in the region of the Straits, an order has come which upsets
these plans completely.
As you will see from the attached copy of the telegram from A. I. Guchkov,
Minister of War and Navy, to the Chief of the Naval Staff, in view of the crisis in
our railway transportation it was found necessary to stop the preparatory work
of equipping transportation for the landing operation that was planned to seize
the Straits. As per copy enclosed, General Alekseev has instructed the Staff of the
Black Sea Fleet accordingly.
N. B azili9

926. Continued H ope f o r an E xpedition


[Bazili to Miliukov, M. Pokrovskii, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX
(1928), 35-36.]
Stavka, April 8,1917
Absolutely restricted
D ear P avel N ikolaevich ,
In my letter of March 23 of this year I had the honor to advise you of the
state of affairs in relation to the preparatory measures concerning the realization
of the intended Bosporus operation.
Yesterday, in a conversation with General Denikin, the new Chief of Staff
of the Supreme Commander, I availed myself of the opportunity to find out his
attitude toward this issue and, in particular, toward the preparation of the means
of transportation for the aforesaid operation. General Denikin told me that the
troop ships which were already equipped for the landing would remain so, while
preparations for equipping the remaining means of transportation would be
carried on, however, only in so far as these means of transportation could be
9Representative at Stavka of the Foreign Ministry.
1060 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
simultaneously used for conveying freight in accordance with the instructions of
the Minister of War and of the Navy contained in his telegram attached to my
aforementioned letter. Thus the situation of which I have written to you remains
unchanged: from the moment when it is decided to undertake the Bosporus
operation, a period of two months will he required for the completion of the
preparations. A few days ago, by order of General Alekseev, a telegram to this
effect, of which a copy is enclosed, was sent to the Chief of Staff of the Black
Sea Fleet. As you will see from this telegram it is intended gradually to remove
our means of transportation from their runs for fitting out and to replace them by
corresponding tonnage of Rumanian vessels; the Rumanian Government has
agreed in principle to the transfer of these vessels to our disposal.
I would like to add that General Denikin realizes perfectly well the importance
of the Bosporus operation; a most cooperative attitude toward this plan may be
expected from him, much more so than from General Alekseev.10
B azili

927. B azili S uggests an A greement with T urkey as an A lternative


to a S traits E xpedition
[Bazili to Neratov, Assistant to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Pokrovskii, Stavka
i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 40-43. Neither this proposal nor
the plan for an expedition was carried any further. See also Docs. 986, 993, 995-97,
and 999.]
Stavka, April 11,1917
D ear A natolii A natolievich ,
As I have already had the honor to report, we are forced to give ever-increasing
consideration to the fact that for internal reasons, and especially for technical
reasons, we may not succeed in actually capturing the Straits before the end of the
war.
Not less than two months are required to carry out the Bosporus operation
and to consolidate the troops landed on the shores; consequently, the operation
ought to begin not later than July, as after the middle of September the season
of storms begins on the Black Sea, and a beachhead which was not consolidated
before this season might be deprived of supplies for lack of ports of debarcation.
As I have already had the honor to report, after receiving the orders a further
period of two months would be necessary for the preparation of all the necessary
transportation; therefore, the deadline for making the decision would be the
middle of May or the beginning of June at the latest. I communicate this informa
tion to you on the basis of what I was told by General Denikin.
Is there a hope that at the very beginning of the summer we would be able to
detach our attention from the Western Front, start our final preparations for the
Bosporus operation, and spare the troops required for it? According to informa
tion received from various sources, the Germans have decided to start an energetic
offensive on our front precisely in the middle of May, expecting that by that time
the repercussions of the internal events, and also the disorder in transportation and
in the food situation, would be felt to a sufficient degree in the army. Therefore,
10 General Denikins later account of tbis episode in The Russian Turmoil, pp. 144^45,
appears to belie this appraisal of his attitude.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1061
it is to be feared that the operation started in the main theater in the middle of
May would continue for not less than two months, i.e., at least until the end of
June, which would be the last moment for the beginning of the Bosporus opera
tion on the Black Sea. Moreover, what will be our situation following the forth
coming enemy offensive and will we be able to undertake a new operation [ ? ] On
the other hand, if we were not to capture the Straits in the course of the forth
coming months, there is every reason to suppose that the war would end without
our acquiring them.
All this makes me wonder whether it would not be useful, while in no way
rejecting the intention of carrying out the Bosporus operation and, on the con
trary, while insisting in every way on its importance, to envisage, nevertheless,
another solution to the problem of the Straits. In this connection I am taking the
liberty of giving the following considerations as my personal opinion.
If we could succeed in bringing Bulgaria to our side before the end of the war,
it might, perhaps, still be possible to hope that with her help we could capture
the Straits. In particular, in such a case, the impossibility of carrying out the
operation beyond a certain date would cease to exist. The discontinuance of con
tacts between Turkey and her allies would put an end to her resistance. However,
apparently this is hardly to be expected. It seems to me it should be recognized
that without our capturing them, the only solution to the problem of the Straits
which would be in any way acceptable to us would be an agreement with Turkey
providing for Turkey to retain her sovereignty over Constantinople and its region,
but providing for us to obtain the indispensable virtual guaranteethe military
controlin respect of the Straits, i.e., a solution which would be close to the
attempt made by the conclusion of the Unkiar-Skelessi Treaty.11 It is obvious that
it would be easier to achieve such a solution prior to the peace conference. The
critical situation of Turkey, which becomes more and more evident, gives reason
to expect that under certain conditions she probably could be detached from our
opponents. Therefore I think that if it became evidentwhich I hope will not
happenthat the Bosporus operation could not be carried out by us during this
summer, then we should immediately make every effort to conclude a separate
peace with Turkey on the basis of her recognition of our control over the
Bosporus and the Dardanelles. As a matter of fact, if we were to decide that
we could not obtain the domination of the Straits by means of force, then the
continuation of the fight against Turkey, which does not represent a threat to
us, from the standpoint of our interests could have only one meaningto force
her to abandon our enemies and to grant us control over the Straits.
It has often been pointed out that such a solution is infinitely more advan
tageous for us than the neutralization of the Straits, for which our circles of the
extreme left manifest such an unreasonable inclination. It should suffice to note
that in the event of neutralization, the seizure of the Straits from both sea and land
would be facilitated merely by the leveling of the fortifications. The guarantee
which it would give to the freedom of navigation from the Black Sea to the Mediter
ranean would be purely fictitious. Furthermore, the neutralization not only would
not solve in any manner the problem of the defense of our Black Sea coasts, but
would not even free us from the necessity of keeping considerable forces in the
Black Sea; without them the neutralization would turn against our [own interests].
11 Of 1833, by which Russia gained a virtual protectorate over Turkey.
1062 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
However, the necessity of disposing of large forces in the Black Sea would exist
also, although maybe to a lesser degree, in the event of the control, which would
be effective only in so far as it would be backed by an actual threat. Finally, an
official recognition of the international importance of the Straits of Constantinople
would erect new obstacles in the way of reaching at a later date a solution that
would better correspond to our exceptional interests on the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles.
It seems to me that the aforementioned disadvantages related to the neutraliza
tion of the Straits should induce us to take every measure to create an accomplished
fact prior to the peace conference; this would eliminate the danger of such a
solution of the problem at the conference. As a matter of fact, there is a serious
reason to beware of this in view of our pretended abandonment of Constantinople
and the inclination toward neutralization manifested by our public opinion. If
it should prove impossible to create such an accomplished fact by means of captur
ing the Straits, the question would arise whether it should not be accomplished by
means of a conference with Turkey.
N. Bazili

THE ASIA MINOR AGREEMENTS


928. T h e M eetings a t F o lk e sto n e and S t. Jean de M aurienne on t h e
I talian D emands
[Izvolskii to Miliukov; Adamov, Europeiskie derzhavy i Gretsiia, p. 184. At the begin
ning of 1916, the French and the British had concluded the Sykes-Picot Agreement
regarding their respective interests in the Ottoman Empire after the war. When Rus
sian consent was requested, objections were raised in Petrograd to certain provisions
of the Agreement, notably to French claims in northeastern Syria. After considerable
discussion among the three Allies and within the Russian Government, a supplemen
tary agreement was approved by the French and Russians on April 13, delineating their
interests in eastern Anatolia, and by the British and Russians on September 3, 1916.
In the meantime, the Italians had learned of the existence of these arrangements and
demanded their share of partitioned Turkey. Reluctantly, the other Allies agreed to
discuss an Anatolian zone for Italy. When the Italian demands were presented in
October, they included all of southern Anatolia, including Smyrna, which Russia did
not want to see in Italian hands because of its proximity to their Straits zone, and the
towns of Adana and Mersin, which had already been assigned to the French. Diplo
matic discussion and correspondence on the question continued through the fall of 1916
and led to the convocation of a conference in London in January 1917. There, the
Italians were asked to exclude Smyrna and the towns of Adana and Mersin from their
demands. The Italians were willing to give up one of the two claims, but not both. The
conference adjourned at the end of February without result, but Nabokov correctly
predicted that increasing pressure would be put upon Russia to give way on the Smyrna
issue, a development which was to be facilitated by the revolution. Smith, The Russian
Struggle for Power, pp. 358-82, 418-31, 453-59. The deliberations at Folkestone, on
March 29/April 11, and at St. Jean de Maurienne, on April 6/19, which did lead to the
promise of Smyrna to Italy, technically subject to Russian approval, also dealt with the
peace feelers of Prince Sixte de Bourbon-Parma (Doc. 934) and the Greek question
(Chap. 20). See the account of the meeting in Ribot, Journal, pp. 66-73.]
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1063
April 11/24,1917
Copy to London
Have just seen Ribot who read me in full the minutes of the conferences with
Lloyd George and Sonnino in Savoy [St. Jean de Maurienne]. The contents of
the minutes coincide in a general way with the information I have received from
Ribots assistants, although the latter contained a few inaccuracies. Thus, Son
nino demanded not only Smyrna, but the whole Smyrna vilayet, while Ribot and
Lloyd George answered his urgent requests only by promising to bring them to
the knowledge of their governments. Moreover, Ribot told me that he had already
transmitted to Paleologue by telegraph a detailed extract from the aforesaid
minutes, instructing him to communicate it to you. The complete wording of
the minutes will be communicated to you in due course. Ribot added that he
very much regretted that the condition [ommission in text] had prevented you
from participating in the conference, which consequently could not take definite
decision on those questions. Such decisions could be made only following your
consent, and Paleologue has been instructed to make you a declaration to this
effect.
I zvolskii

929. M iliukov P rotests the F ailure to I nform R ussia B eforehand


of the Conferences at F olkestone and St. J ean de M aurienne
[Miliukov to IzvoPskii, Nabokov, and Onu, Charge dAffaires in Washington; Adamov,
Razdel, p. 322.]
April 13/26,1917
In my conversation with the ambassadors concerning the recent meetings of
the statesmen of France, Great Britain, and Italy in Folkestone and at St. Jean,
I have expressed to them my great surprise that the Russian Government was not
notified beforehand of either the forthcoming conference or its subject, and was
advised only afterwards of the decisions that took place. On the other hand,
not only current affairs, but also matters of paramount political importance, in
which, as in the question of Asia Minor, Russia is directly interested, were dis
cussed at the aforementioned conferences.
Apparently, negotiations of equal importance between the governments of
France, Great Britain, and the United States are soon to take place in Washing
ton, in which, as it has already been announced and indicated in the press, it is
intended to dwell on matters concerning world politics.
The fact that we are not participating in these negotiations and are even
uninformed with regard to the subject of the forthcoming conferences may pro
duce a very unfavorable impression on our public opinion and even occasion
undesirable rumors of frictions and disagreements between the Allies.
Please talk with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in a confidential and friendly
way in the sense indicated above and telegraph the results.
M iliukov
1064 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
930. R ibot s R eply to M iliukov s P rotest
[Izvolskii to Miliukov; Adamov, Razdel, pp. 325-26. Ribot repeated these statements
in a formal communication to Miliukov on April 27. Ibid., pp. 332-33.]
April 17/30,1917
Copies to London and Rome
. . . Today I saw Ribot and advised him in a confidential and friendly way
of the contents of your telegram. . . . In general he confirmed the explanations
given to me by Cambon,12 namely, that the purpose of the meeting at Folkestone
was to get into personal contact with Lloyd George and to discuss with him the
Greek issues in which France and England are directly interested; that the trip
to Savoy [St. Jean de Maurienne] had for its object those same Greek issues,
in respect of which Sonnino showed direct opposition to France; that the question
of Asia Minor was brought up by the Italians quite unexpectedly for him; and
finally, that on that [last] question no final decisions were made at the conference.
Paleologue has been instructed to declare to you that such final decisions could
be made only following an agreement with you. As for the rumors of the negotia
tions allegedly to take place in Washington between the French, British, and
American governments, Ribot was most positive in assuring me that this rumor
has no foundation whatsoever, and that Mr. Viviani had not been entrusted with
any kind of negotiations concerning political matters. Ribot read to me Mr.
Vivianis telegrams from America received up to this morning and told me that
these telegrams will be sent to Petrograd for your information. They actually
bear no trace of any political negotiations and do not even contain a confirma
tion of the news that appeared in the press of declarations allegedly made by the
President of the United States to Mr. Viviani regarding the reasons for which
America wages the war. To conclude, Ribot once again expressed his deep
regret that circumstances of time and space have prevented him from inviting
you either to the last conference or to the one which he will hold in a few days
with Lloyd George. As you already know, the object of this conference will be
the Greek issues, and also the problem of the Salonika army, which the British
Government strives energetically to reduce because of the difficulty of supply
ing it.
I zvol skii

931. T he A mbassador in R ome R eports on the St. Jean A greement


[Giers to Miliukov; Adamov, Razdel, pp. 328-29.]
April 21/May 4,1917
Urgent
Confidential. In a private conversation Sonnino told me that he has received
from the British Government a note18 in which the Italian wishes are accepted,
but which insists on the recognition of Smyrna as a free port and in vague terms
makes Italys participation in the military operations against Turkey the con
12Jules Cambon, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry.
18 See Doc. 932.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1065
dition of the English consent. Sonnino replied that he had no objections to de
claring Smyrna a free port, but that he did not accept any collateral conditions,
all the more so [because] he had already repeatedly confirmed Italys obligation
to contribute by every means to a successful conduct of the war. Then the British
Ambassador explained to him that he misunderstood the English note and that
in effect England did not stipulate any new conditions. The note concerned only
England, and the consent of France was not mentioned. Sonnino considers that
in principle France is in agreement and that it only remains to reach an under
standing with her, in respect of the point west of Mersin from which the line
of the Italian zone [should be drawn]. In Savoy [St. Jean de Maurienne] Ribot
and Lloyd George made the reservation that their personal agreement must be
confirmed by their governments. In Savoy the reservation was made that any
agreement must be submitted for Russias approval.14 . . .
932. R ussian R ejection o f t h e I talian P roposal
[Sir George Buchanan to Lord Robert Cecil, Acting Foreign Secretary, Adamov,
Razdel, pp. 329-30. In a telegram to Nabokov on April 26, Miliukov emphasized that
the Russian viewpoint on Smyrna remained unchanged. Ibid., p. 331. Russian assent
was never given, though the matter continued to be discussed through the summer and
fall. In August, Tereshchenko tried to enlist American support in resisting the Italian
demands. Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, I, 403-4. See also Doc. 988.]
April 22/May 5,1917
. . . Yesterday I communicated to the Minister of Foreign Affairs telegram
No. 7 from the Foreign Office to Rome. He did not consider it possible to enter
into a detailed discussion of its contents, but declared that it has placed the new
Government in a somewhat awkward situation and has every chance of being
rejected. Although he could not so state at the moment, he nevertheless let me
understand that the Government cannot agree to the Italian proposal and would
have preferred to have been consulted by us on the subject at an earlier stage
of the negotiations.

APPROACHES FOR PEACE


933. T h e K olyshko -E rzberger N egotiations
[Klaus Epstein, Matthias Erzberger and the Dilemma of German Democracy, pp. 170
72. The entire episode is covered in detail by Epstein, pp. 164-81. According to Erz
berger, Joseph von Kolyshko was a liberal newspaperman and former Russian bureau
crat residing in Stockholm. Before returning to Russia after the revolution, he had
requested an interview with Erzberger to discuss possible peace terms for referral to
vaguely identified persons in high places in Petrograd. The first meetings were held
i* When the minutes of the meeting at St. Jean, containing the Asia Minor agreement, were
sent to Russia, Sonnino advised the Italian ambassador that it is of the greatest importance
to avoid an [unfavorable] Russian reply. It would be better for us not to receive any Russian
answer than to receive an answer unfavorable to the Italian aspirations. Adamov, Razdel,
p. 343.
1066 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
in Stockholm, March 13-15. Erzberger came back to Germany optimistic about the
prospects for fruitful negotiation, and Kolyshko proceeded to Russia. The second
meeting was held in Stockholm on April 6, at which the armistice agreement printed
below was drafted. Bethmann-Hollweg was rather favorably impressed with it, but
Ludendorff, whose annexationist views were prevailing in German policy-making, vio
lently objected to its terms and was able to forestall any further meetings. In any case,
it would appear that Erzberger was taken in by Kolyshkos self-proclaimed credentials
and influence in Russia. Kolyshkos assertion that he was returning to Russia to take
a position of importance in the Provisional Government was certainly false. His asso
ciations in Russia, far from being liberal, appear to have been from the most reactionary
circles. Apparently Erzberger was also unaware of Kolyshkos earlier contacts with
German officials, dating from 1915, and of his contemporary activity under German
financial auspices to influence the Russian press in favor of a separate peace, all of
which are described in Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915
1918, p. 92 n., on the basis of documents from the Archives of the German Foreign
Ministry. Kolyshko was later arrested, released on bail, and then re-arrested by the
Provisional Government on a charge of collaboration with the enemy. Russkiia Vedo
mosti, No. 188, August 18,1917, p. 5.
The bracketed materials in the document are Epsteins paraphrases of Erzbergers
commentaries to Bethmann. All dates are New Style.]
A general six-week armistice between all the armed forces of Germany and
Russia with Rumania shall be effective from th e ------of May 6:00 a . m . until
th e------of June 1917, 6:00 A.M . It is understood that the troops of both sides
will remain in the position they occupied the day that the armistice became
effective. The purpose of the armistice is to negotiate an honorable peace settle
ment acceptable to both sides upon the following basis:
[Germany is understood to secure Bulgarian, Turkish, and Austrian concur
rence.]
1. The Russian Boundaries will be restored as of August 1, 1914, except for
frontier corrections.
[Frontier corrections are understood to be on a Russian, i.e., considerable,
scale. Erzberger warned Bethmann against talking of annexations.]
2. The frontiers of a new Polish state will be determined by agreement be
tween Russia, Germany, and Austria. A plebiscite ofall male Polish inhabitants
above the age of 25 is to be held before th e----- of June 1917 to decide if the
Poles wish to remain under Russian sovereignty orbecome a free republic or
a hereditary monarchy.
[Erzberger noted that the influence of the Polish clergy would bring a result
favorable to Germany, i.e., for a hereditary monarchy closely tied to the Central
Powers.]
3. Russia agrees to the abolition of the Turkish capitulations, while Germany
will offer her good services in the Dardanelles and Armenian questions.
4. All private legal relationships between Russian and German citizens will
be restored as they existed on August 1, 1914. If they cannot be restored in
nature , there is to be full replacement in natura; if this proves physically im
possible, both parties will submit their claims to the Swiss Supreme Court sitting
in Lausanne.
[Erzberger noted that points 2, 3, and 4 had already been arranged during
his March 26 conference with Kolyshko.]
5. The commercial treaty in force between Germany and Russia on August
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1067
1, 1914, will be continued until a new treaty can be negotiated. Both states are
prohibited from enacting emigration restrictions, export embargoes, or transit
difficulties.
[Erzberger was told by Kolyshko that Russia would insist upon negotiating
a new commercial treaty because she had signed the old one under the unfavor
able circumstances after her defeat in the Russian-Japanese war. Erzberger de
sired the complete abolition of export taxes but Kolyshko insisted that Russia
must tax her grain exports for fiscal reasons.]
6. Each of the two countries will bear its own war costs and repair its
own war damages.
7. All other questions will be settled in the definitive peace treaty.
8. Russia and Germany obligate themselves to support an international lim
itation upon armaments.
9. Both states agree for the future to submit any question at dispute between
them to international arbitration before taking any measures preparatory to war
(proclamation of war emergency, mobilization, etc.).
[Kolyshko wanted to make this more concrete by naming specific arbitra
tors: the Spanish King, the Pope, and the President of Switzerland, but Erzberger
rejected this.]
10. Germany declared herself to be willing, upon the behest of Russia, to
sign an armistice with the other belligerent powers at any time for the purpose
of negotiating a general peace settlement.
[This point was especially important to Russia for the sake of avoiding the
odium of signing a separate peace. Erzberger described points 8 to 10 as being
vital for securing the concurrence of the idealistic5 Russian peace treaty center
ing around Kerensky.]
The properly authorized instruments embodying this treaty are to be ex
changed as quickly as possible at Stockholm, but in no case later than in four
weeks, that is May 18,1917.
Erzberger added in his general commentary on the terms that Russia would
insist upon Germany keeping her present level of forces on the Eastern Front
during the period of the peace negotiations, since a German attack in the West
with troops drawn from the East would poison Russias relations with her old
allies. Kolyshko had agreed that Russo-German trade could be resumed during
the armistice period, with Russia providing grain and manganese in return for
German coal and chemicals. But he refused to include this offer in the written
terms for fear that England and France would immediately complain about
Russia aiding their common enemy.

934. T he P rince S ixte A ffair


[Izvolskii to Miliukov; Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, I, 481. Early in March, Prince Sixte
de Bourbon-Parma, the brother-in-law of the Emperor Charles and an officer in the
Belgian army, was persuaded by the Emperor to act as his intermediary in transmitting
to Poincare for the Allies tentative separate peace proposals which he wished kept
secret from his German ally. Ribot informed Lloyd George of their content at the
Folkestone meeting of March 29/April 11, which he requested principally for this
purpose. Lloyd George was enthusiastic about the possibility of negotiating with
Austria, but the Italian claims to Austrian territory, accepted by the Allies in the Treaty
1068 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
of London of 1915, stood in the way of further progress. It was decided to meet with
the Italian Premier and induce him to accept compensation elsewhere, namely, Smyrna.
However, at St. Jean de Maurienne, Sonnini was able to gain the provisional promise
of Smyrna without renouncing Italys Austrian demands. The Premier claimed that
even if he and his King were willing to accede to the modifications desired, the Italian
people would never accept them. Although there were further exchanges between
Charles and Poincare, it was clear after St. Jean that little hope remained for suc
cessful negotiations, much to the disgust of Lloyd George. The existence of Austrian
proposals was known in a general way to the Russians, as witnessed by Izvolskiis dis
patch, but their substance and that of the discussions among the other Allies was ap
parently not disclosed at that time to the Russians, a source of considerable irritation
later to members of the Provisional Government who were trying scrupulously to carry
out their obligations to the Allies. Raymond Poincare, Au Service de la France, IX,
68-70, 85-90, 111-12, 134^35, 140-45; Ribot, Journal, pp. 66-73; G. de Mantayer
(ed.), Austria's Peace Offer ; Alexander F. Kerensky, The Crucifixion of Liberty ,
pp. 338-39; Docs. 928, 929. Kent Forster, The Failures of Peace, covers this and other
major peace moves during the war.
A separate peace proposal from Austria-Hungary to Russia on the eve of the Bol
shevik seizure of power was later reported by Kerensky. See Doc. 940.]
April 12/25,1917
Very confidential
Yesterday my conversation with Ribot touched also upon the military and
political situation in general. . . . Now it is clear that the present [Nivelle] offen
sive cannot give decisive results; it will continue mainly in order to consolidate
the positions that have been taken, but it cannot lead to the end of the war, which
will depend not only on material, but also on moral factors. Regarding the latter,
the insistent agitation of our adversaries in favor of peace, denoting their extreme
exhaustion, should not be lost from sight. In certain circles heremainly in news
paper circlesthere is agitation in the same sense, and the advisability and possi
bility of starting peace negotiations with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey,
each in its turn, are being pointed out. The question of the Austro-Hungarian
peace proposals [transmitted by Prince Sixte] were discussed at the conference
in Savoy [St. Jean de Maurienne], where it was suggested that meeting these pro
posals halfway would be undesirable and dangerous. It is impossible to find a
basis for peace with Austria because Italy would object to any reduction of her
claims. At this point I mentioned that neither did I see a possibility for Russia to
find a basis for [coming to] an agreement with Austria. The matter of inducing
Bulgaria is exclusively in the hands of the Russian Government; he, Ribot, is in
sincere sympathy with this endeavor but is skeptical about the possibility of suc
cess. Finally, there is no doubt that Turkey ardently desires peace, but here the
obstacles on the road are the promises made to Russia with regard to Constanti
nople; Russia has recently reiterated her claim regarding the annexation of Con
stantinople, and France shall without fail remain faithful to her promise. Even
if Russia were to renounce Constantinople and Germany were to agree to restore all
the parts of the territory she occupies, it would hardly contribute to the cause of
peace, because after the sacrifices made and the huge devastation perpetrated by
the Germans on French territory, France could not be satisfied even by the restitu
tion of Alsace and Lorraine, being obliged to demand adequate guarantees for the
future. All this convinces Ribot that neither the course of military action in the
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1069
theater of war over here nor the opening of any kind of negotiations for peace
could bring peace in the near future. In conclusion I feel bound to make it clear
that my long conversation with Ribot was of an intimate character and that the
above words which I have reported as precisely as I could should not be visualized
as official declarations, but as the reflection of the general state of feelings of the
aging French premier.
I zvoi/ skii

935. A pproaches T hrough Copenhagen


[Affidavit by Mr. Ilia Trotsky, June 8, 1957, New York. The original is in the Hoover
Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.]
Early in October 1914 I moved from Copenhagen to Berlin, where I had been
correspondent of the Moscow daily newspaper, Russkoe Slovo, for eight years.
In Copenhagen I represented Russkoe Slovo as chief correspondent for the
Scandinavian countries.
At the end of March or at the beginning of April 1917, George Kleinov, whom
I knew from Berlin, telephoned to me at my home in Copenhagen. George Kleinov
was a prominent German journalist who lived for many years in Russia and had
an excellent command of the Russian language. Prior to World War I, in 1914,
George Kleinov edited the journal Grenzbote, which devoted much attention to
Russo-German relations. At the beginning of the war Mr. Kleinov was enlisted to
work in the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an expert on Russian affairs.
The telephone call from Kleinov startled me because no relations of any kind
existed between the Russian journalists and the German journalists or function
aries. George Kleinov informed me that he had come to see me on a very im
portant matter and that he would call on me at live oclock in the afternoon. With
out awaiting my reaction, George Kleinov hung up the receiver.
I immediately went to the Russian Legation and informed Baron MeyendorfE
who was fulfilling the duties of envoy, requesting him for instructions as to how to
act.
Baron Meyendorff got in touch with the envoys of Great Britain, France, and
Italy, and they arranged to meet in the British Legation immediately after lunch
in order that I might receive instructions before five oclock in the afternoon.
Baron Meyendorff notified me that it had been recognized as desirable that
I receive and hear Kleinov, notifying Baron Meyendorff of the results.
At five oclock in the afternoon George Kleinov came to see me. He began the
conversation with the question whether I thought that the Provisional Government
would agree to a separate peace with Germany? To my reply that he was not ad
dressing the question to the proper person, Kleinov remonstrated that Miliukov
and Kerensky, persons who held the same views as I, were now at the head of the
government and that I could play a great role in bringing about peace in Europe.
He appealed to me, stressing the fact that if the fates of Russia and the future of
the revolution were dear to me, I must help in concluding peace.
I asked Kleinov for an explanation of the fact that at the beginning [of the
conversation] he spoke of a separate peace and then seemed to have in mind gen
eral peace?Very simple! replied Kleinov. By obtaining a separate peace with
the new Russia it would be easy to open the way for a general peace.
1070 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Further, he hegan to assure me of the vicious distortion by the Allied propa
ganda of the food crisis in Germany and Austria-Hungary, of the futility of further
bloodshed because England, France, and Italy were powerless to defeat the Triple
Alliance.
Further, Kleinov emphasized that Germany was ready to offer the Provisional
Government such conditions as would in no way diminish the prestige of Russia
as a great power. He added that he would give me detailed conditions only on re
ceipt of a consent to peace negotiations from the Provisional Government. He also
told me that while Germany had no designs upon parts of Russian territory, she
would like to receive some concessions in the Baltic.
In taking his leave, Kleinov remarked that he would telephone me in a few days.
I transmitted all of the above mentioned immediately to Baron Meyendorff.
Later he told me that he sent a cipher telegram about this to Petrograd, with a copy
to the Allied envoys.
A short time afterward Baron Meyendorff invited me to see him and informed
me that a reply was received from the Ministry [of Foreign Affairs] in which I
was permitted to meet Kleinov in the future, to listen to him, but to give him no
promises.
However, Kleinov did not telephone me any more, or come to see me.
In 19211 moved again from Copenhagen to Germany. One day, by accident,
I ran into George Kleinov on one of the streets in Berlin. This meeting explained
his mysterious behavior in Copenhagen. Kleinov revealed to me that he went
to Copenhagen in 1917 on a mission from the German Minister of Foreign Affairs,
who, however, did not warn the German envoy in Denmark, Count Brockdorff-
Rantzau, about his mission. On learning of Kleinovs call on me, the laLter pro
tested sharply against his mission to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as to
the high command. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau pointed out that for the purpose of
preparing the ground for a separate peace he arranged a trip to Russia for one of
the leaders of the Danish social-democracy, Borgbjerg, who agreed to accept this
mission. Brockdorff-Rantzau thought that parallel actions by Kleinov might in
jure the mission of Borgbjerg, who had great chances for success. As a conse
quence of Count Brockdorff-Rantzaus protest, George Kleinov received an order
from the Ministry to return to Berlin immediately.
According to my information the trip of Borgbjerg did take place in due time.
However, his mission had no success.15
I lia T rotsky

936. German E vidence of I nformal S eparate P eace T alks on the


F ront in th e F irst P art of A pril
[Freiherr von Lersner, Foreign Office representative at General Headquarters, to For
eign Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, April 29,1917 (N.S.). On April 25, 1917 (N.S.),
Ludendorff requested specific instructions on what to tell Russian negotiators concem-
15 Borgbjerg traveled to Russia to invite the Russian socialists to attend the Stockholm
Conference (see Doc. 1016), but he also carried with him some general peace terms from the
German Social Democrats, given him, with the approval of the German Foreign Office, by Ebert
and Scheidemann in Copenhagen. He was also authorized to tell the Russians that Germany
would undertake no offensive against them. Neither the Soviet nor the Government responded
to the proposals. Philipp Scheidemann, The Making of New Germany, I, 360-66.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1071
ing peace terms, and relayed the views of the Austrian Supreme Command that official
negotiations should be initiated. Apparently, about the same time, he suggested the
conditions below. GFO, File 1498, frs. D627679-80 and D627706. An extremely valu
able account of the German-Austrian discussions on war aims and of the Russian nego
tiations, which uses other pertinent materials in the German Foreign Office Files, may
be found in Klaus Epstein, The Development of German-Austrian War Aims in the
Spring of 1917, Journal of Central European Affairs, XVII (1957), 24-47. His article
and the sources it cites on German-Austrian peace efforts should be consulted in con
nection with the documents printed here. No references to these negotiations or to
those on the Desna River (Doc. 937) were found in Russian sources.]
In accordance with todays telephoned instructions, I have transmitted to Gen
eral Ludendorff Your Excellencys concurrence in the following conditions to be
handed the Russian negotiators at the front:
1) To demand an armistice of three to four weeks from the Russians for their
participation in elections [to establish a government able to negotiate peace].
2) No interference in Russian affairs. Hence refraining from an offensive
even if the Russian army should lose its ability for action.
3) Good offices in the settlement of the Dardanelles and extra-European ques
tions in the event of Russias renunciation of the conquest of Constantinople, as
announced by the Russian press.
4) Financial support for the development of Russia and active commercial
relations. No war indemnities, but rectification of the frontiers, in so far as Ger
many is concerned, of Lithuania and Courland.
5) Poland shall become an [independent] State.
L ersner

937. U nofficial R ussian -German T alks on the F ront


S outh of th e D esna R iver
[Von Lersner to the Foreign Office, May 7, 1917 (N .S.) , GFO, File 1499, fr. D627769-
73.]
In reference to telephone report: The Commander in Chief, East, has tele
graphed the Supreme Army Command as follows:
Report of the Military Intelligence officer of the Eichhorn16 on a conversation
with two Russian representatives which took place to the south of the Desna:
The two representatives stated that two couriers had been sent to Petrograd on
May 4 in order to induce Steklov, the chief representative of Chkheidze, to come
here for Chkheidze, who is himself unable to do so; that Steklov is inclined to a
compromise, so that they considered it would be of value if we, on our part, could
also send party comrades. In answer to a question about the reaction to the chief
points in our propaganda, the deputies declared that they would never admit an
nexations on the part of the Germans. If the Germans agreed to this, the Russians
had no need to consider the Entente, but would conclude a separate peace. Russia
requested financial indemnity for the majority of its prisoners of war.
General Ludendorff begs Your Excellency to appoint a reliable Social Democrat
16 Army group in Courland, known by the name of its commander, Generallater Field
Marshalvon Eichhorn.
1072 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and, for balance, a member of a national party (Free Conservative) to participate
in the negotiations. On the part of the army the former military attache in Paris,
Colonel von Winterfeldt (now chief quartermaster in Mitau) might be considered
to conduct the negotiations. Your Excellency may wish to attach to him a younger
diplomat conversant with the proceedings.17
General Ludendorff considers a neutral locality out of the question. Mitau,
Riga, or some place between the lines where telegraph lines could be laid for the
negotiations would be suitable.
I imparted to General Ludendorff Your Excellencys reflections on the union of
Lithuania and Courland under a Duke. He will get into touch with the Commander
in Chief, East, on the subject. The word annexation should be replaced by
frontier rectification.
The General asks to be informed of Your Excellencys position.
L eksner

938. O ffic ia l German A p p roval o f t h e N eg o tia tio n s Proposed by


U n o ffic ia l Russian R ep resen tativ es S o u th o f t h e D esna
[Freiherr von Griinau, Foreign Office representative with the Kaiser, to Foreign Office,
transmitting LudendorfFs orders to Commander in Chief, East, to proceed with nego
tiations. GFO, File 1499, fr. D627792-93. Apparently, neither Steklov nor any other
Russian representative appeared to meet the German delegation.]
General Ludendorff to the Commander in Chief, East.
1) The Russian proposal to negotiate with Steklov is accepted.
2) Mitau or a locality in front of the 8th Army and between the lines is to be pro
posed to the Russian negotiators, and a neutral place or one within the Russian
lines is to be declined in view of English plots.
The place of negotiations shall be convenient for telegraphic communications
with respective Governments.
3) On die German side, the conductor of negotiations is Colonel V. Winterfeldt,
of 8th Army HQ; the participants are a representative of the Foreign Ministry,
Social-Democratic Deputy David, and a member of a bourgeois party yet to be ap
pointed. The three participants will leave immediately and advise the 8th Army
High Command of their expected arrival in Mitau.
6) The renunciation of the territories of Courland and Lithuania is to be facili
tated for the Russians in the following manner:
a) By referring to Russias financial indemnity for the excess of over one
million prisoners of war which we hold as against the number they hold.18
b) By stressing our intention of respecting to a wide extent the national as
pirations of the Lithuanians and Courlanders by the manner of their incorporation
in Germany.
17 Bethmann-Hollweg approved of the negotiations and von Winterfeldts appointment on
May 7 (N.S.), and added Eduard David, a right-wing Social Democrat, and Privy Councilor
von Rosenberg, as Foreign Office representative, to the delegation. GFO, File 1499, fr. D627674.
18 General LudendorfFs contribution to the terms. He calculated, in a dispatch of May 9
(N.S.), that the cost of maintaining these prisoners was some 22% billion marks, which could
he written off in return for Lithuania and Courland. GFO, File 1499, fr. D627795.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1073
The terms annexation and frontier rectifications are to be avoided.
7) The question of a general peace conference is not to be mentioned. Germany
and Russia will more rapidly agree alone.
Grunau

939. A B ulgarian P eace P roposal A ddressed to M axim Gorky


[Novaia Zhizn\ No. 26, May 18,1917, p. 3.]
This foul and stupid letter was tiansmitted on May 15 to the editorial office
of Novaia Zhizn5 by an unknown person. The letter is in duplicate copy, both
copies are addressed to me and sealed by the seal of Rizov. It goes without saying
that I will not answer Rizov , considering it quite sufficient to make public his
insolence.
Rizov made my acquaintance in 1913 in Rome9 ivhere he was then Minister
of Bulgaria.
The originals of the letter are kept in the editorial office of Novaia Zhizn.
M. Gorky
M ost respected and dear A leksei M aksimych ,

Shuddering before the frantic horrors of this dreadful war, I, on my own


initiative, as early as the end of January of the current year, addressed myself
to the Russian ministers in Christiania and Stockholm, whom I know personally,
proposing to the Russian Government the conclusion of an honorable peace be
tween Russia and the powers at war with her. I was not delegated by anyone to
make this proposal; but my official position as Bulgarian Minister to Berlin gave
me the opportunity to learn the attitude in our Allied countries on this question and
it goes without saying that my proposal could not but be a momentous one.19 How
ever, the then Russian Government did not respond to my proposal, probably being
afraid to discredit itself completely by the conclusion of a peace without victory,
thus hastening a revolution which in any case was rapidly fermenting.
During the first days following the Russian revolution I addressed myself again
to my old and good friend, Mr. K. N. Gulkevich,20 asking him to let Mr. P. N.
Miliukov, the new Minister, know of my proposal to conclude an honorable peace.
. . . In reply to my new endeavor, Mr. Gulkevich transmitted to me the words
of Mr. Miliukov that separate peace was out of the question. . . .
My appeal of today to you . . . is my third and last attempt to contribute to
the conclusion of an honorable peace between Russia and the states which are at
war with her. I am making this attempt, considering you to be the interpreter of
the sentiments and trends of all those Russian people who, in accordance with their
own convictions, are the enemies of the present World War. I have the courage to
advance the subject for the third time, being firmly convinced that the common
19 See M. Pokrovskii, Stavka i ministerstvo inostrannykh del, KA, XXX (1928), 41 n.,
and A. NekludofE, Diplomatic Reminiscences Before and During the World War, 1914-1917,
pp. 459-63, for accounts of the contacts in Stockholm and Christiania and of those later in
March and April in Salonica and Bern. See also Doc. 940.
20 Russian Minister to Norway.
1074 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
sense of the Russian people and the critical intellect of the Russian intelligentsia
cannot fail to triumph ultimately over the egotistic instigations of the Russian
allies.
As a matter of fact, what are you still at war for? After your revolution and
after the rejection by the Provisional Government of annexations, your war has
become absolutely pointless.
Your partisans of the continuance of the war in order to justify their policy
put forth several theses which are either false, or erroneous, or unable to stand
up to any criticism.
The first of these theses is that one should fight in order to expel the enemy
from ones territory. But the enemy is ready to evacuate your territory, which he
has occupied, without shedding a drop of blood, if you would agree to a peace with
honor for you: for this purpose there is no need to kill the still undestroyed Russian
people. And this is all the more important since it is far from certain that you
would succeed in driving the enemy away, even if once again you succeeded in
leading the Russian soldiers to slaughter.
The second thesis, that Germany has already concentrated new military forces
on your Northern Front and intends to undertake an offensive by land and sea in
order to take Petrograd and restore tsarism, is an English invention. I may assure
you that since your revolution Germany has not sent one single soldier to any of
your fronts, has not prepared her fleet for any attack against you, and, what is
most important, does not intend to undertake any offensive in the future against
free Russia obviously so long as Russia does not start an offensive on one of her
fronts herself. As for the well-known attack on the Stokhod, it was a local [attack]
and of a reconnaissance nature, as is proved by the fact that it was stopped immedi
ately; furthermore, the road from the Stokhod does not lead to Petrograd.
The third thesis, that the continuation of war is necessary for the defense of
the recently gained Russian freedom is simply unworthy of serious people. . . .
The fourth thesis, that you should destroy Prussian militarism, is insincere
and unfounded. . . .
The fifth thesis, that one should honestly fulfill ones engagements as Allies,
is the only thesis meriting consideration. But the truth is that one of Russias
allies, namely Italy, not only did not follow Germany and Austria when they
started fighting after a defensive and offensive alliance [which had existed for]
33 years, but even threw itself on one of them, Austria, when she thought that
the latter was in agony. It would seem that this action was dishonest and immoral
to a high degree, but it never caused any indignation among those who now preach
Russian loyalty toward the Allies . . . Another Russian ally, Rumania, is guilty
of the same sin, but Rumania also has not provoked any indignation among anyone
(in the camps of the Russian allies) by her vile aclion. All this is true, yet never
theless from the honest Russian people everyone is entitled to expect honest deeds.
However, both in relations between individuals and in relations between nations,
there arises at times an uncontrollable force, which renders impossible the
fulfillment of any kind of engagements. In respect to Russia, the Russian revolu
tion is such an uncontrollable force. It can perfectly well excuse and justify
the cessation of the Russian war, which, as any war, is the antithesis of a revolu
tion. Moreover, it would be infinitely more immoral for the present Russian rulers
to impose on the Russian people, unasked, their own will and their own opinion
in such a vital and bloody matter . . .
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1075

. . . It is necessary only to take the two following steps :


1) To conclude an armistice immediately with the powers at war with Russia, on
the condition that the troops remain on the positions now occupied. And 2) To
convene at the earliest date the Constituent Assembly, to which would be left the
decision of the question of continuing the war.
. . . You, more than any other Russian personality, have the moral right and
moral obligation to tie your revered name to this historical cause. Thus will you
save the Russian revolution which, like the great French revolution, runs the risk
of being absorbed by the war. And the martyrized Russian people have shed
enough blood to merit enjoying the liberty which has dawned upon it. . . .
If you deem it necessary to talk over with me personally the question of the
armistice, I would be ready to come at your first telegram to a meeting in Sweden
(at Stockholm or any other Swedish town, at your convenience).
However, if for some reason it is impossible for you to come to Sweden in per
son, I would be ready to meet there a representative of yours, naturally some
person of authority.
Please believe me that I am writing to you not as the official representative of
a country at war with Russia, but as a man who has the right to speak of Russia,
because, in the words of Nekrasov, of a drop of blood in common with the
Russian people.
With sincere respect and affection,
D. Rizov

940. T he P ossibilities of a S eparate P eace W ith T urkey


[Russian Charge dAffaires in Switzerland to Miliukov; Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, II,
324. Russian interest in the possibilities of a separate peace with Turkey was reflected
in earlier dispatches from Onu on the subject, including the dispatch of April 21, which
reported that a new Turkish minister had been appointed to Stockholm to watch the
developments of the Russian revolution and to try to conclude an agreement or a pre
liminary separate treaty in the event [in the words of the Turkish Minister to Switzer
land] a durable and strong government is established in Russia. Ibid., II, 322-24.
In The Catastrophe, p. 323, Kerensky later wrote that on the eve of the Bolshevik seizure
of power the Austro-Hungarian government . . . addressed to the Provisional Gov
ernment a request for a separate peace. The move was made without knowledge of
Berlin. It was particularly significant because Foreign Minister Tereshchenko had
long been preparing, with the cooperation of the diplomatic representatives of the
United States in Bulgaria and Turkey, a plan for negotiations that would have meant
the exit of Bulgaria and Turkey from the war. There could he no doubt, with Austrias
example before them, that similar peace proposals would have followed soon from Sofia
and Constantinople.]
May 3/16,1917
The Turkish Minister to Bern in his conversations with intimates expresses the
conviction that Russia will soon be forced to come to terms with her enemies, be
cause, according to the information of the German general staff, the anarchy in
Russia has allegedly reached extreme proportions, [with] soldiers abandoning
the front in mass. This statement of the Minister seems to me to be quite sincere,
1076 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
because, all along, he has not ceased to discuss the possibility of a separate peace
of Turkey alone with Russia, to which, according to him, Germany would not
object.
Onu

THE SOVIET APPEAL TO THE PEOPLES OF ALL THE WORLD AND


THE RESOLUTION ON WAR AIMS
941. T he D ebate in the S oviet on the A ppeal
[.Izvestiia, No. 16, March 16,1917, p. 4.]
A meeting of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies was
held on March 14 in the large hall of the Naval School. N. S. Chkheidze was
Chairman. The enormous hall and the galleries were packed. The rostrum of
the Chairman was erected at the pedestal of the monument to Peter the Great.
Before the beginning of the meeting the Naval School orchestra performed The
Marseillaise, repeating it many times,
A large part of the meeting was devoted to the question of the Appeal of
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies to the Peoples of all the world.
Opening the debates on this question, N. S. Chkheidze pointed out that the
Russian people have acheived the greatest accomplishment in having made Rus
sia free and in having made our country a part of the whole cultural world. In
concluding his speech, N. S. Chkheidze called for a world-wide announcement
by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies concerning the occurrence of
this event of paramount significance.
Following N. S. Chkheidze, Yu. M. Steklov took the floor.
The significance of the Russian Revolution, stated Yu. M. Steklov, ex
tends beyond the boundaries of Russia. The last stronghold of autocracy has
fallen. We have emancipated not only ourselves, but the whole world as well.
[The power of] all the surviving royalty is faltering and will not hold out for
very long. [Messages of] good will are already streaming to us now from all
parts of the world. But the cause of the revolution, regardless of the success,
is not yet concluded for us. Dark forces are still in existence. The reactionaries
are attempting to convince the soldiers of the impermanence of the gains of the
Russian revolution. Such people must be considered traitors to the common
cause. The people themselves must consolidate the gains of the revolution. It
can be assumed that the leading role in the Constituent Assembly will belong
to the Russian democracy. It will decide all state questions regarding both domes
tic and foreign policy, and we must fight against the gentlemen gold-plated diplo
mats who have been deciding the fate of our people. The responsibility of deciding
the fate of the war now lies upon us. The proletariat throughout the world is suf
fering on account of the war, it is shedding blood and being dissipated. If we all
join forces, the war can be brought to an end. But we must not forget that the
enemy is on our land. That is why we must use a special approach to the workers
of Austria and Germany.
In concluding his speech, Yu. M. Stekov proposed that the text of the Appeal in
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1077
the name of the Soviet of Workers5and Soldiers Deputies to the peoples of all the
world be adopted in the form in which it was published on the front page of Izves
tiia . . . issue No. 15.

After a series of speeches, N. S. Chkheidze once again took the floor.


Our proposal, he declared, is not sheer altruism; it is not a dream. In ad
dressing the Germans, we do not let the rifles out of our hands. And before speak
ing of peace we are suggesting that the Germans follow our example and overthrow
Wilhelm, who led the people into war9 in exactly the same way as we have over
thrown our autocracy. If the Germans pay no attention to our appeal, then we will
fight for our freedom tdl the last drop of blood . We are making this proposal with
guns in our hands. The slogan for the revolution is cDown with WilhelmI999
A. I. Chkhenkeli, attending the meeting for the first time since his recovery
[from illness], also spoke in support of adopting the appeal.
The text of the Appeal to the Peoples of All the World, proposed on behalf of
the Executive Committee, was submitted to a vote and was adopted unanimously.

942. S oviet A ppeal to th e P eoples of A ll the W orld


[Izvestiia, No. 15, March 15,1917, p. 1.]
March 14,1917
Comrade-proletarians, and toilers of all countries:
We, Russian workers and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies, send you warmest greetings and inform you of a great
event. The Russian democracy has overthrown the age-old despotism of the Tsar
and enters into your family [of nations] as an equal member, and as a powerful
force in the struggle for our common liberation. Our victory is a great victory
for universal freedom and democracy. The chief pillar of reaction in the world,
the Gendarme of Europe, is no more.
May the earth lie as a heavy stone upon its grave! Long live freedom! Long
live the international solidarity of the proletariat, and its struggle for final vic
tory!
Our work is not yet finished: the shades of the old order have not yet been
dissipated, and not a few enemies are collecting their forces against the Russian
revolution. Nevertheless our achievement so far is enormous. The peoples of
Russia will express their will in a Constituent Assembly, which will be called
very soon on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And it
may already be predicted with confidence that a democratic republic will triumph
in Russia. The Russian people now possess full political freedom. They can
now assert their mighty power in the internal self-government of the country
and in its foreign policy.
And, appealing to all people destroyed and ruined in the monstrous war, we
say that the time has come to begin a decisive struggle against the acquisitive
ambitions of the governments of all countries; the time has come for the peoples
to take into their own hands the decision of the question of war and peace.
Conscious of its revolutionary power, the Russian democracy announces that
1078 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
it will oppose the policy of conquest of its ruling classes by every means, and
it summons the peoples of Europe to common, decisive action in favor of peace.
We also appeal to our brother proletarians of the Austro-German coalition,
and, above all, to the German proletariat. From the first days of the war, they
assured you that by taking up arms against autocratic Russia, you were defend
ing the culture of Europe from Asiatic despotism. Many of you saw in this a
justification of the support which you gave to the war. Now even this justification
is gone; democratic Russia cannot be a threat to freedom and civilization.
We will firmly defend our own liberty against all reactionary attempts both
from within and from without. The Russian revolution will not retreat before
the bayonets of conquerors, and will not permit itself to be crushed by foreign
military force.
But we appeal to you: Throw off the yoke of your semi-autocratic rule, as
the Russian people have cast off the Tsars autocracy; refuse to serve as an in
strument of conquest and violence in the hands of kings, landowners, and bankers
and then by our united efforts, we will stop the horrible butchery that is a
stain on humanity and is darkening the great days of the birth of Russian freedom.
Toilers of all countries: extending our hands as brothers across the mountains
of our brothers corpses, across the rivers of innocent blood and tears, across
the smoking ruins of cities and villages, across the ruined treasures of civiliza
tion, we appeal to you to restore and strengthen international unity. In this is
the pledge of our future victories and of the complete liberation of humanity.
Proletarians of all countries, unite!
PETROGRAD SOVIET OF WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES

943. Rech9 o n t h e A p p e a l
[Editorial in No. 63, March 15,1917, p. 2.]
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies has unanimously approved
the text of the appeal To the Peoples of All the World proposed by its repre
sentatives. . . .
It is a great pity that these powerful and vivid words [of Chkheidze] were
not included in the wording of the Appeal.21 If it had been done, then, of course,
no one could interpret the Appeal as essentially a proposal addressed to the
proletarians of all the world to overthrow their governments, to whom agres-
sive tendencies are being ascribed just because they are bourgeois govern
ments. N. S. Chkheidzes comments stem from the perfectly correct idea that
now the fight goes on between the victorious democracy and a regime of the
iron fist, rather than between socialism and the bourgeoisie. And, of course,
this idea is shared by all the democracymore than thatby the whole Russian
nation. And the Appeal, which began in such typically pacifist tones, essentially
develops into an ideology which is common to us and to all our allies. This ob
vious [and] sudden change of thought makes the Appeal To the Peoples of All
the World an extremely important and symptomatic human document. We do
21At the end of the debate on the Appeal. See Doc. 941.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1079
not know whether it will have the effect on which its authors count so firmly,
but in any case it will serve another purpose: it will bear witness before the
whole world that the Russian revolution is in firm hands and that those of our
enemies who would build on it their hopes of an easy victory would commit a
grave error. It now remains for us to address ourselves to the authors of the
Appeal [and] appeal to them to be thoroughly consistent. Those [who have stated
that they] do not wish to let the guns out of their hands, that they are ready
to defend the revolution against restoration attempts by Wilhelm, have thereby
declared that they do not wish to weaken military discipline nor reduce the fight
ing capacities of the Russian army. It goes without saying that we subscribe
with both hands to this result of the Appeal.
944. Izvestiia's Comments on the A ppeal
[Editorial entitled Two Positions, No. 18, March 18,1917, p. 2.]
The Appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies of March 14,
expressed clearly and without double meaning the thought and will of the Rus
sian revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary army. The attitude toward
the war as expressed in the Appeal differs radically from that of the bourgeois
parties and that part of the democracy that allies itself with them.
Nevertheless, the bourgeois press and the democrat-guardians pretend that
nothing in particular has happened. While quoting with approval our declara
tions to the effect that we favor a rebuttal to the aggressive aspirations of the
Austro-German coalition, the bourgeois newspapers attempt to gloss over the
fundamental difference between the position of the Soviet and that of the im
perialistic bourgeoisie. And they continue to proclaim the slogan: war to a
decisive victory.
It is time once and for all to put an end to this vagueness and to contrast
definitely two fundamentally different positions with regard to the war.
One position was held and continues to be held by all the bourgeois im
perialist parties of the belligerent powers and, unfortunately, by some representa
tives of the democracy. In Russia this was the position of all the bourgeois parties
and even that of some Socialist parties. In England, France, Germany, Italy,
and Belgium this position was upheld by all the bourgeois parties and some of
the representatives of the labor parties who supported their imperialist govern
ments.
The official phraseology and declarations employed by the champions of the
first position to justify war to a decisive victory may be summed up as follows:
The bourgeois press and its minions in England, Russia, France, and Italy
assures us that Germany and Austria wanted to bring all of Europe under their
domination, to extend their possessions, and to subject the free democracies of
Europe, England, France, and Belgium to the German iron fist. Inasmuch as
from this point of view, with the victory of the Austro-German coalition the na
tions of the opposing coalition are threatened with the danger of economic
slavery and loss of former freedom, the adherents of this position deem it
necessary to defeat once and for all the Austro-German coalition. And in order
to protect themselves against attacks by Austro-Germany in the future, final
victory is necessary, that is, the complete crushing of the enemy and the destruc
tion of his military might.
1080 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The German and Austrian bourgeois press and its allies from the democratic
camp (the party of Scheidemann and others) asserts to the contrary: treacherous
England, barbaric Russia, degenerate France, and traitorous Italy are
conspiring to efface the Austro-German states from the earth. Hence follows the
deduction that a decisive and stable victory over England, France, Russia, and
Italy is necessary.

This lie and hypocrisy is revealed only when the principal position of chauvin
ism is uncovered. And in substance it is as follows. The present war was the result
of the rivalry of the ruling classes of the European states. The ruling classes of
England, France, Italy, Russia, Germany, and Austria tried to seize and bring
under their domination foreign lands and peoples. During the past two or three
decades these attempts have become more and more vigorous, and since neither
side yielded, both sides armed with intensity. . . .
In our country it is undisputed that the Austro-German coalition has aggres
sive designs. Russia and her allies revealed the same aggressive designs during
the war.
Russia has made known her desire for Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Galicia,
Armenia, and the recovery of liberated Poland. The English imperialists seized
and wish to annex the German colonies and intend to seize Mesopotamia. France
demands Alsace-Lorraine and part of Germany up to the Rhine, also Syria and
part of Asia Minor. Italy demands the Tyrol and the Trentino and some territories
in the Balkans. And all the allies taken together want the dismemberment and
subjection to their influence of Austro-Hungary and the Balkans.
And all these aggressive aspirations Messrs. Chauvinists refer to as decisive
victory over the enemy.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies took another position with
regard to the war. This is the position of the Zimmerwald and Kienlhal Confer
ences of representatives of the Socialist parties of Europe and of the left wing
of the labor parties of Russia, France, England, Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzer
land, the Balkan states, Rumania, and some Bulgarian and Serbian Socialists. . . .
The main points of this important position were made clear in the Appeal of
March 14. The Appeal opposes aggressive aspirations and declares war on war.
The Workers and Soldiers Deputies appeal to the peoples of Europe to force
their ruling classes to renounce conquests and declare die self-determination of
nations.
We do not aspire to conquer foreign lands. We want to guarantee liberty to
the peoples, and, first of all, liberty to the peoples inhabiting Russia.
We shall fight, arms in hand, against everything that stands in the way of
this liberty.
Hence follows our attitude toward the Austro-German coalition. We strive for
a final victory not over Germany, but over her rulers. And as soon as the peoples
of the Austro-German coalition force their rulers to lay down their arms and
renounce the idea of conquest, we shall also lay down our arms.
It is obvious that our attitude toward the war is quite different from that of
the bourgeoisie.
And no matter how much the bourgeois press may try to gloss over these
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1081
differences, the popular masses will no longer succumb to this chauvinistic propa
ganda.
Our guarantee of this is the freedom of speech we have gained, in the light of
which it is easy to scatter the poisonous fumes of chauvinism.
945. S ecret D iplomacy
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 18, March 18,1917, pp. 1-2.]
The revolution has torn off the heretofore impenetrable shroud that hid the
many secrets of the tsarist regime. It showed the people that the autocratic power
which headed the regime was rotten to the core and that its representatives were
not only indistinguishable from ordinary robbers and murderers, but were im
measurably more dangerous, since their robberies and murders extended to all
the people and assumed mass proportions.
But even now far from all that is secret has become known. Until now, Russia
has been fed primarily with scandalous exposes of acts pertaining to the countrys
internal affairs under tsarism. She still knows very little about what the bearers
of the supreme power did in the sphere of international relations.
But in the meantime, the ripe and painful question of the further course of
the war peremptorily demands a many-sided illumination of its origins, i.e., pre
cisely the mystery-laden, behind-the-scenes diplomatic work of Messrs. Sturmer,
Izvolskii, Sazonov, and other servants of tsarism that for two and one-half years
has been very efficiently concealed from the Russian people under the shroud of
military secrecy.
Secret diplomacy is the natural offspring of autocracy. It is afraid of light
and prefers to hatch its dirty plots in darkness, carefully protecting itself from
public control. [This is] because such diplomacy has only the interests of the
ruling class in mind and is always directed against the people.
Now, thanks to the revolution, we have been given the opportunity to estab
lish accurately the role played by secret diplomacy in the present war. Without
even glancing at the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anyone can say
with certainty that the secret diplomacy of Nicholas Romanov, Gregorii Rasputin,
Protopopov, Sturmer, Sukhomlinov, Izvolskii, Miasoedov, and other greater or
lesser personages, representing or serving the power that has now been demolished,
could not have served [the interests of] the people. They defended the interests of
the gang of tsarist bandits, the most dishonest, deceitful, and predaceous [gang]
in the world.
You cannot pour new wine into old bottles. The new power, created by the
revolution, must also make a decisive break with the traditions of the Izvolskiis
and the Stunners in the realm of foreign policy. But it will only be able to prac
tice new methods of diplomacy openly before the whole world if it renounces the
traditional policy of conquest.
The revolutionary people has already expressed its will in the Appeal to the
Peoples of the World [issued] by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
on March 27, In that now historical document, the revolutionary proletariat and
the revolutionary army renounced in a loud voice all conquests and oppression
of other peoples. Only on the foundations of a new foreign policy can a new
1082 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
diplomatic system be built, answering to the principles of freedom, and worthy
of such a people.
Clean dealings require clean hearts.

946. T seretelli A nswers Objections to H is R esolution on W ar


A im s S ubmitted to the A ll -R ussian Conference of S oviets
[.Izvestiia, No. 31, April 2,1917, p. 2.]
T seretelli : Comrades, in my concluding remarks I will dwell on the basic
argument advanced against the resolution of the Exceutive Committee. Comrades,
no one present raised objections to the first part of this resolution, but it was said
that the second part of the resolution was not a necessary derivation from the first
part, that the conditions of which the second part of the resolution speaks have not
as yet come into existence. In the resolution that we have directed to your atten
tion, we are declaring, comrades, that the Russian democracy has no desire for
conquests, that, on its part, it renounces annexations of foreign territories, and
that this rupture with the imperialist ambitions of the old regime has been pro
claimed by the new Provisional Government. We are declaring that the Russian
democracy considers it necessary for the Provisional Government to enter into
negotiations with the Allied powers for the purpose of working out a general
agreement on this platform, and that it invites other peoples in every country to
do the same. After this, we pass to the second part of the resolution and we
declare that the Russian democracy is sacredly fulfilling its duty to Russia and
to all the peoples of the world and will continue to fulfill this duty, but as long
as its aspirations remain unrealized both in Russia and in other countries, it
considers it its debt of honor to stand in the defense of the country, and it views
the present war in the light of those conditions under which it is being waged
under the ascendancy of Russian democracyas the cause of Russian democracy.
We are told: our Provisional Government has announced its renunciation of
annexations and indemnities, our Provisional Government may perhaps enter into
negotiations with the Allies for the purpose of working out a mulual agreement;
but the moment has not yet arrived when all the Allies, united in a common cause,
can propose such a platform of peace, or when Germany would reply to it. And
then they say: until this time has come to pass, until Russia as well as all the
Allies accept these conditions, we cannot regard the war that Russia is now waging
as a democratic cause, or as a cause of revolutionary Russia. I am saying, com
rades, that within the available scope of action inside Russia, we have already
accomplished the most important thing. Through the voice of the Provisional
Revolutionary Government we are declaring that Russia renounces all plans of
conquest, and we will continue to abide by this commitment. But, comrades, until
the time comes when the same results have been achieved in other countries as
in Russiawhich is what Russian democracy must doand if, comrades, we on
our part are performing our duty at a time when democracy has triumphed in
Russia, when in its foreign policy the democracy has succeeded in adopting a
course it considers to be the only course of salvation, if at that moment, comrades,
Russia should be defeated, would not the whole Russian democracy then be de
feated, and I will say more, would not world democracy be defeated? Of all the
warring nations, Russia was the only country to prove capable of advancing the
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1083
platform we upheld, the platform of renouncing indemnities and annexations.
This is a turning point, a shift in the course of the whole World War. If at this
moment the country which first realized this, which first ushered in this turn of
events, should fall under the blows of the enemy, then would this not signify,
comrades, that democracy fell under the blows of imperialism? (Storm of
applause.)

947. T s e r e t e lli Speaks A gain st an A m endm ent C a llin g f o r th e


P u b lica tion o f S e c r e t A greem en ts
[Izvestiia, No. 51, April 27,1917, p. 3.]
I consider this amendment to be totally unacceptable, and if the comrades who
are the authors of this amendment knew its real meaning they would reject it them
selves. The amendment states: to demand that the Provisional Government pub
lish its agreements. Comrades, we are working toward this, but by sounder
means. We are saying, let the Provisional Government propose treaty standards
and let it make this proposal known not only to the Russian democracy but to all
the people of the Allied countries. And let this proposal act as a stimulus to popular
movements not in our country alone but in others as well. If we follow this path,
not only will we succeed in having the agreements published, but, with the help
of other people, we will succeed in having them revoked. But we can only achieve
this goal with the help of other people. Should the Provisional Government decide
to publish agreements right awayand it has no right to publish them without the
consent of the Allied countriesdo you know how this would be used by the im
perialist governments of the neighboring countries? Do you know what national
chauvinism would arise [directed] against the Russian Provisional Government
acting under our pressure, and what results we would obtain, comrades, if we force
our Government to take premature action? We would risk antagonizing the im
perialist circles as well as the national masses, who would not understand what it
is that we are demanding and what it is that their governments must do. Is this
what we want to achieve? No! We think that the way in which we formulated the
question will open the eyes of the people, just like the eyes of the revolutionary
people of Russia were opened, and it will bring the result toward which we are
striving. But by following the path that has been proposed to us, we will achieve the
opposite result: the consolidation of the militaristic forces in the countries at war
with us.
[The proposed amendment was defeated overwhelmingly.]
948. T he R esolution on W ar A im s of th e A ll -Russian
Conference of S oviets
[Izvestiia, No. 29, March 31,1917, p. 3. The Resolution carried by a vote of 325 to 57,
with 20 abstentions.]
In its appeal to the people of the world on March 14, the Soviets of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies declared that in the realm of foreign policy the Russian
democracy was firmly determined to carry out the same principles of liberty and
justice that it had proclaimed with respect to the internal affairs of Russia.
1084 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The numerous meetings of workers, soldiers, and citizens throughout Russia
have confirmed this determination and have expressed the resolution of the people
that while defending their own freedom they would not allow their revolutionary
enthusiasm to be exploited for oppression of other peoples, or for obvious or con
cealed seizures of territory or indemnities.
The Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
approached the Provisional Government to indicate the need for a public renunci
ation on the part of free Russia of all the tsarist plans of conquest.
On March 28 the Provisional Government published an address to the citizens
of Russia. . . .
The Russian democracy attaches tremendous significance to this action of the
Provisional Government and views it as an important step toward the realization
of democratic principles in the realm of foreign policy. The Soviets of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies will give their most energetic support to all the steps that
the Provisional Government takes in this direction, and appeal to all the peoples,
in our Allies countries as well as in the countries at war with Russia, to exert pres
sure on their governments to renounce their programs of conquest. At that same
time, the peoples of both coalitions must insist that their [respective] governments
persuade their allies to join in the renunciation of annexations and indemnities.
On its part, the Executive Committee emphasizes the necessity for the Provisional
Government to enter into negotiations with its allies for the purpose of working
out a general agreement along the lines indicated.
The revolutionary people of Russia will persist in their efforts to bring about
an early conclusion of peace on the basis of the brotherhood and equality of free
peoples. An official renunciation of all programs of conquest on the part of all
governments is a powerful means of terminating the war on such conditions.
As long as these conditions have not been met, as long as the war continues,
the Russian democracy recognizes that the downfall of the army, the weakening
of its resistance, its strength, and its combat potential, would be the heaviest blow
to the cause of freedom and to the vital interests of the country. For the purpose
of [achieving] the most energetic defense against all external attacks on revolu
tionary Russia, and against attempts at interference in the further successes of the
revolution, the Conference of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies calls
on the democratic forces in Russia to mobilize all the vital forces of the country in
all the spheres of its national life to reinforce the front and the rear. This is an im
perative demand, dictated by the present moment in the life of Russia; it is es
sential to the success of the great revolution.
The Conference of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is now call
ing on all the workers in factories and mills, in railroads, in mines, in postal and
telegraphic service, and in other enterprises working for the army and the rear to
perform their work with the greatest intensity. The economic gains of the working
class and its aspirations to further reforms must serve not only to maintain their
productive capacity but to raise the productivity of their labor to its highest degree
in the interests of providing the population and the army with all the basic
necessities.
The Conference of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies directs the
attention of all citizens, and particularly those engaged in agriculture and trans
port, to the danger of a food crisis, which is the legacy of the old regime, and ap
peals to them to exert all their energies in order to overcome it.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1085
The Conference of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies sends its
greetings to the soldiers and the officers of the revolutionary army, defending free
Russia inside the country and on the front,
949. L en ins F a r e w e ll L e t t e r t o t h e Swiss W o rk ers
[Collected Works of V. L Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. I, 82-88. These ex
cerpts from Lenins letter of April 8 (N.S.) written upon his departure for Russia are
included here as a contrast to the almost simultaneous resolution of the All-Russian
Conference of Soviets. See Vol. Ill, Chap. 1 for his April Theses, expounded soon after
his arrival in Petrograd. The first thesis dealt with the war.]
Comrades, Swiss workers:
Leaving Switzerland for Russia, in order to continue the revolutionary-inter
nationalist work in our country, we, members of the Russian Social-Democratic
Labour Party united under the Central Committee (in distinction from another
party bearing the same name but united under the Organisation Committee), wish
to convey to you our fraternal greetings and expression of our profound comradely
gratitude for your comradely attitude to the political emigrants.
We remain unconditionally loyal to the declaration which we made in the
central organ of our party, No. 47 of the Social-Democrat (October 13, 1915
[N.S.]), published in Geneva. We stated there that should the revolution prove
victorious in Russia, and should a republican government, a government intent on
continuing the imperialist war, a war in league with the imperialist bourgeoisie
of England and France, a war for the purpose of seizing Constantinople, Armenia,
Galicia, etc., etc., find itself in power, that we should be most resolutely opposed to
such a government, that we would be against the defence of the fatherland in such
a war.
A contingency approaching the above has now arisen. The new government
of Russia, which has conducted negotiations with the brother of Nicholas II with
regard to the restoration of the monarchy in Russia, and in which the most im
portant and influential posts have been given to the monarchists Lvov and Guch
kov, this government is trying to deceive the workers by the slogan, the Germans
must overthrow Wilhelm (correct, but why not add: the English, the Italians,
etc., must do the same to their own kings; and the Russians must remove their mon
archists Lvov and Guchkov?). This government, by using the above slogan, while
refusing to publish the imperialist, predatory treaties concluded by the Tsar with
France, England, etc., and confirmed by the government of Guchkov-Miliukov-
Kerensky, is trying to represent its imperialist war with Germany as a war of de
fence (i.e., as a just war, legitimate even from the point of view of the proletariat)
is trying to represent a war for the defence of the bloodthirsty, imperialist, pred
atory aims of capitalRussian, English, etc., as the defence of the republic
(which does not yet exist in Russia, and which the Lvovs and Guchkovs have not
even promised to established).
The task that we outlined in No. 47 of the SociaLDemocrat is of gigantic pro
portions, it can be solved only by a long series of great class conflicts between the
proletariat and the bourgeoisie. However, it was not our impatience, nor our
1086 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
wishes, but the objective conditions created by the imperialist war that brought
humanity to an impasse, that placed it in a dilemma: either to allow the destruction
of more millions of lives and utterly ruin the entire European civilisation, or to
hand over the power in all the civilised countries to the revolutionary proletariat,
to realise the Socialist overturn.
The great honour of beginning the series of revolutions caused with objective
inevitability by the war has fallen to the Russian proletariat. But the idea that the
Russian proletariat is the chosen revolutionary proletariat among the workers of
the world is absolutely alien to us. We know full well that the proletariat of Russia
is less organised, less prepared, and less class-conscious than the proletariat of
other countries. It is not its special qualities but rather the special coincidence of
historical circumstances that has made the proletariat of Russia for a certain, per
haps very short time, the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat of the whole
world.
The objective circumstances of the imperialist war make it certain that the
revolution will not be limited to the first stage of the Russian Revolution, that the
revolution will not be limited to Russia.
The German proletariat is the most trustworthy, the most reliable ally of the
Russian and the world proletarian revolution.
When in November, 1914, our party had put forward the slogan Turn the
imperialist war into a civil war of the oppressed against the oppressors for the
attainment of Socialism, this slogan was met with the hatred and malicious ridi
cule of the social-patriots and with the incredulous, sceptical, meek and expectant
silence of the Social-Democratic centre. David, the German social-chauvinist
and social-imperialist, called it insane, while Mr. Plekhanov, the representative
of Russian (and Anglo-French) social-chauvinism, of Socialism in words, im
perialism in deeds, called it a dream farce (Mittelding zwischen Traum und
Komoedie ) . The representatives of the centre confined themselves to silence
or to cheap little jokes about this straight line drawn in empty space.
Now, after March, 1917, only the blind can fail to see that this slogan is correct.
The turning of the imperialist war into civil war is becoming a fact.
Long live the proletarian revolution that is beginning in Europe!
N. L enin

950. Russkiia Vedomosti on t h e General D iscussion of P eace T erms


[Editorial in No. 85, April 17,1917, p. 1.]
In their recent articles the organs of Moscow socialist organizations lifted a
corner of the curtain and showed a part of the content that they put into the misty
formula of peace without annexations. And it has immediately proved that be
tween socialist and bourgeois views there is no impassable abyss. It has proved
that the words without annexations are understood in a narrow, restricted sense,
and that, conversely, the substantial meaning is reserved for the concept of self
determination of peoples. By annexations is meant only those acquisitions of
territory that do not follow from the freely declared will of the inhabitants of that
territory, that is: forcible acquisitions. Also, definite indications were made of the
need to arant an opportunity for self-determination to the population of the Prus
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1087
sian and Austrian parts of Poland, of Alsace and Lorraine, and of Turkish
Armenia. One can only rejoice at that. . . .
The businesslike discussion of the terms of the future peace has in reality
already begun. But it is being conducted not so much by professional diplomats
in their elegant drawing rooms as by the leaders of political parties at their noisy
meetings, and in modest quarters of political committees of various kinds. Neither
the collapse of the International, nor the sharpening of national hostility, nor the
growth of patriotic feelings in socialist circles has hindered the working class
from raising its voice with a force such as it has never before attained during the
concluding periods of previous wars. The demand that peoples take into their
own hands the solution of the questions of foreign policy contains a healthy grain
concealed in a utopian capsule. In international relations, there is a very tech
nical side that will always remain the province of specialists. But the general
leading principles of foreign policy can and must be established in accordance
with the expressed will of broad circles of the population. That is why we ardently
welcome the arrival of Socialist delegates from the countries allied with us for the
purpose of conducting business talks with the leaders of our workers5 organiza
tions. This arrival is very important, if for no other reason than because it will
help the workers of Russia, England, and France to find out about each other and
to understand each other, to comprehend the agreements and disagreements in
their views of the road toward the brotherhood of peoples. The working classes of
England and Francehaving been brought up in the healthy school of genuine
democracy, and having been accustomed to political influence and political re
sponsibilitydo not believe words and dreams, and consider it necessary to
struggle against Germany with all their might until German governments and the
social groups that stand behind them renounce their aggressive intentions. . . .
And Russian socialist parties must reckon with the firm will of their French and
English comrades. But the working class of England and France, too, must find
common ground with the ideas and dreams of the Russian proletariat. The im
pressions gained in Russia must reaffirm in them the determination to oppose in
their own home countries all sorts of aggressive attempts, which, incidentally, are
much less evident in France and even in England than in Germany.

THE RETURN TO RUSSIA OF POLITICAL EXILES22


951. T h e S oviet P rotest A gainst t h e D etention by th e B ritish
of T rotsky and O t h e r R evolutionaries
[Izvestiia, No. 36, April 9, 1917, p. 5. Trotsky, who was in New York when the Febru
ary Revolution occurred, was taken off the ship on which he was returning to Russia
22 A good general account of the repatriation of the exiles may he found in Warth, The
Allies and the Russian Revolution, pp. 37-43. Because of British control of sea transport, Lon
don became the center for organizing the return of the emigres. Nabokov, on instructions from
Miliukov, set up a committee of representatives of the various political shades of the emigra
tion to work with the embassy in screening the applicants for repatriation with reference to
their loyalty and in organizing their return. The Provisional Government supplied very sub
stantial sums of money to facilitate the operation, which is described in Chap. V of Nabokovs
Ordeal of a Diplomat.
1088 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and detained, together with his family and several other revolutionaries, by the British
authorities at Halifax. Miliukov first demanded their release, then changed his mind
and requested that they continue to be held, and finally asked that they be permitted
to continue their trip. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, II, 121.]
On April 8 the Executive Committee decided to send the following telegram
to the British Government and the British press regarding the detention of Trotsky,
Chudnovskii, Mukhin, Fishelev, Romanchenko, and Melnishanskii by the British
authorities in Halifax:
The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
learned that the following Russian political emigrants were arrested on the ship
Christian-Fjord in Halifax by the British authorities: Mukhin, Fishelev, Trotsky,
Romanchenko, Chudnovskii, and MeVnishanskii.
The revolutionary democracy in Russia is awaiting with impatience the
return of its champions of freedom and invites all those who have devoted their
lifetime efforts to paving the way for the overthrow of tsarism to come under their
banners. In the meantime, British authorities are permitting some emigrants to
leave for Russia and are detaining others, depending on their convictions. The
British Government is thereby committing an inadmissible interference in the
internal affairs of Russia and is insulting the Russian revolution by depriving it
of its loyal sons.
The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
protests against such conduct on the part of the British Government and invites
the British democracy to support this protest. It requests the Minister of Foreign
Affairs to adopt urgent measures assuring the return of all political emigrants,
without exceptions, to Russia.
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers9and Soldiers9Deputies
In accordance with the decision of the Executive Committee of April 8, this
telegram is being sent to the British Government and the British press and is being
reported to the British delegation in Petersburg [sic] and the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Miliukov.

952. S tatem ent by t h e P rovisional G overnment A bsolving t h e


B ritish o f R esponsibility for t h e D etention of E migres
B ecause of P olitical A ffiliation
[Izvestiia, No. 51, April 27, 1917, p. 3. The British gave the shortage of transport as
the reason for the detention of Trotsky and the delay in returning other exiles from
western Europe. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, 11,120, and A. Popov, Diplomatiia
Vremennogo Pravitelstva v borbe s revoliutsiei, KA, XX (1927), 7. However valid
the explanation, and there is no question that transport was a major factor in the speed
of repatriation from Europe, it was true that Miliukov, not the British Government, had
been responsible for the continued detention of Trotsky. Because anti-British feeling
was running high over the issue, Buchanan demanded a statement from the Provisional
Government, and Miliukov complied. Buchanan, II, 121.]
The Executive Committee received the following document from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs:
The British Government has never refused to endorse the passports of any
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1089
Russian political emigrants on whose behalf a Russian Embassy or Consulate has
requested permission for the return to Russia.
Not a single Russian emigrant was denied a visa on grounds of his political
beliefs . . .
Cases of denials of visas were not induced by political considerations, but by
difficulties in transportation by sea owing to German submarine warfare.
Only a very limited number of ships per month can receive effective protec
tion, and, naturally, priority must he given in the use of these ships to citizens of
Allied nations on official missions. Private British subjects are similarly denied
visas when a shortage exists in the means of transportation.
However, desiring to do everything possible in order to comply with the
wishes of the Russian Government and to demonstrate the existing sympathy of
the British Government toward free Russiawhich, it is hoped, is beyond any
doubtand to the Russian victims of persecution under the old political regime
the sympathy which, in view of the hospitality that has been extended from time
immemorial to all political emigrants in England, should have been placed above
any doubt or criticismthe British Government has issued a special order for
sending to Bergen 50 Russian political emigrants on a special ship. The British
Admiralty has also taken steps for the future to send an additional 50 persons on
a special ship for which every measure of defense has been taken against attacks
by German submarines.

FROM THE editor : In publishing the above-quoted communique from the


British Government, we consider it necessary to say the following:
We, of course, greatly welcome the decision of the British Government hence
forth to assist Russian emigrants in their return to Russia. We hope that this
decision will be implemented in a manner that will (1) actually expedite the
passage of emigrants, and (2) dispel all ideas that the priority for departure is
dependent upon the political convictions of the comrades who are eligible to depart.
We would like to believe that cases of denials of visas were not induced by
political considerations, but we cannot help but marvel at the fact that the diffi
culties in transportation started right at the time when emigrants who advocate
the struggle for international peace were to be transported, and, conversely, that
all difficulties significantly diminished when the departure of emigrants of other
convictions was in question.
We have to marvel even more at this blind game of chance, since it was only
recently that Mr. Miliukov was explaining everything in terms of control lists
and not at all in terms of that difficulty in transportation to which the British
Government is referring.
953. T h e R equest of L enin and H is A ssociates for T ransportation
T hrough G erm any
[Z. A. B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, p. 25. The High Command
approved the proposal on March 25 (N.S.). Ibid., p. 26. This document and the follow
ing four documents reprinted from Zeman represent only a fraction of his coverage of
this episode. His entire documentation should be consulted. For an account of Lenins
trip, see Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, Memories of Lenin, II, 200-212; also W. Hahlweg,
Lenins Riickkehr nach Russland 1917. The dates in the following five documents are
New Style.]
1090 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The State Secretary to the Foreign Ministry Officer
at General Headquarters
Telegram No. 461
AS 1125 Berlin, 23 March 1917
The Imperial Minister in Bern has sent the following telegram: Federal Coun
sellor \Bundesrat\ Hoffmann has been told that leading Russian revolutionaries
here wish to return to Russia via Germany as they are afraid to travel via France
because of the danger from submarines.23 Please send instructions in case appli
cations to this effect should be made to me. Romberg.5
Since it is in our interests that the influence of the radical wing of the Russian
revolutionaries should prevail, it would seem to me advisable to allow transit to
the revolutionaries there. I would therefore support the granting of permission.
Would Yonr Excellency please inform the High Command of the Army and ask
for their opinion in this matter?
ZlMMERMANN

954. L enin and Z inoviev A sk for I mmediate T ransportation


[Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, p. 35.]
The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram No. 603
AS 1301 4 April 1917, 5:35 p .m .
Received: 4 April, 7:20 p .m .
In continuation of telegram No. 601:
Platten, the secretary of the Social Democratic party, came to see me on behalf
of a group of Russian Socialists and, more particularly, of their leaders, Lenin
and Zinoviev, to voice a request that a number of the most important emigres9
twenty to sixty at the most, be allowed to travel through Germany immediately.
Platten states that matters in Russia are taking a turn dangerous to the cause of
peace, and that everything possible should be done to get the Socialist leaders here
to Russia as soon as possible, as they have considerable influence there. . . .
R omberg

955. T h e C onditions for t h e P assage T hrough G ermany


[Zeman, Germany and the Russian Revolution, p. 38.]
The Minister in Bern to the Chancellor
Report No. 970
AS 1317 5 April 1917
I have the honour to present the enclosed draft of the conditions for the
passage of Russian emigres from Switzerland to Stockholm, given me by Herr
Platten.*
R omberg
23 In a telegram on March 31 (N.S.), Romberg wrote Zimmermann that travel through
the Entente countries was impossible, quite apart from the danger from submarines, because
the Entente would only allow those emigres to travel who were in favor of continuing the war.
Zeman, Germany and the Russian Revolution, p. 29.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1091
Enclosure:
Basis for discussions concerning the return of emigres to Russia
1. I, Fritz Platten, will conduct the carriage carrying political emigres wishing
to travel to Russia, through Germany, bearing full responsibility and personal
liability at all times.
2. All communication with German organisations will be undertaken exclu
sively by Platten, without whose permission absolutely nobody may enter the
carriage, which will be locked at all times.
The carriage will be granted extra-territorial rights.
3. No control of passports or persons may be carried out either on entering
or on leaving Germany.
4. Persons will be allowed to travel in the carriage absolutely regardless of
their political opinions or their attitude towards the question of the desirability
of war or peace.
5. Platten will buy tickets at the normal tariffs for those travelling.
6. As far as possible the journey shall be made without stops and in a through
train. The emigres may not be ordered to leave the carriage, nor may they do so
on their own initiative. The journey may not be interrupted except in case of
technical necessity.
7. Permission to make the journey is granted on the basis of an exchange of
those travelling for Germans and Austrians imprisoned or interned in Russia.
8. The negotiator and those travelling undertake to exert themselves, publicly
and especially among the workers, to see that this condition is fulfilled.
9. The time of departure from the Swiss frontier for the Swedish frontier,
which should be as soon as possible, shall be agreed immediately.
BernZurich, 4 April 1917
F ritz P latten

956. T h e N eed for E xtreme D iscretion in t h e A rrangements


for th e T rip
[Zeman, Germany and the Russian Revolution, p. 41.]
The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram No. 631
AS 1349 8 April 1917
Dispatched: 9 April, 1:00 A.M.
Received: 9 April, 4:10 A.M.
In reply to telegram No. 401 :24
The emigres expect to encounter extreme difficulties, even legal prosecution,
from Russian government because of travel through enemy territory. It is there
fore essential to their interests that they be able to guarantee not to have spoken
with any German in Germany. Platten will explain this to Janson. It is absolutely
essential also that the German press ignore the affair as long as it is not discussed
24 Of April 7 (N.S.), in which the Foreign Office took exception to Point 2 of the condi
tions (Doc. 954) informing Romherg that Janson, a representative from the German Trades
Union, had been granted the privilege of accompanying the carriage. Zeman, Germany and
the Russian Revolution, p. 40.
1092 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
abroad. If discussion becomes unavoidable, it should not pin any hopes on the
affair such as might compromise the emigres. On no account should Swiss role
of mediation be mentioned.
Departure is to take place tomorrow according to plan.25 At least twenty-nine,
possibly up to thirty-seven, Russian members of various groups of the Lenin wing
will travel. It is still uncertain whether or not Social Revolutionaries will travel.
R omberg

957. M artov and O ther L eading M ensheviks A lso R equest the


R ight of T ransit T hrough G erm any
[Zeman, Germany and the Russian Revolution, p. 51. Permission was granted and the
Menshevik group arrived in Petrograd on May 9.]
The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram No. 742
A 13733 27 April 1917, 12:45 p . m .
Received: 27 April, 1:47 p .m .
The secretariat of the organising committee of the Russian revolutionary
emigres in Zurich has asked me, through the intermediary of a reliable Swiss Social
Democrat, to get permission for its five membersMartov, Martin [one syllable
garbled ], Axelrod, Semkovski, and Astrovtogether with their associates, to
travel through Germany to Sweden immediately, under the same conditions as
Lenins group. Having failed in its efforts to get a guarantee of travel through
the Entente countries from the provisional government, the committee has decided
to throw aside all its worries and considerations on the score of being compro
mised. They are unconditionally in favour of immediate peace and, next to Lenin,
are the most important revolutionaries here. . . .
R omberg

958. Novoe Vremia on L enin s T ransit T hrough G ermany


[No. 14745, April 7,1917, p. 4.]
Our Provisional Government makes absolutely no distinction among the po
litical exiles who removed themselves from Russia under the old regime. It opens
wide the borders to everyone wishing to return to his motherland, whether he is
a true fighter for liberty or a known agent of the German government. The title
of political emigre covers the past and opens the best opportunities in the future.
The German and Austrian governments regard the Russian political workers
differently. Those who are useful to Germany they deliver in special trains to the
Russian borders. Those who are useful to Russia are kept in prison or killed.
They conveyed Lenin and Co. in safety to Russia, while a ship [the Zara]
with Russian emigres who did not enjoy the favor of German authorities was
blown up on the way from England to Bergen.
Lenin has been installed now in the palace of the mistress of a Grand Duke
25 The group arrived in Petrograd on April 3.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1093
and is conducting propaganda against the Russian peoples army which is pro
tecting Russian freedom. Karpovich, Yansen, and their comrades, who did not
wish to join the triumphal procession of Lenin through Germany, are resting on
the bottom of the sea.
How convenient it is, right up to the present time, to be friends of the enemies
of Russia. They are given a safe and free-of-charge passage through all Germany.
In Russia they are given military honors, royal chambers are opened for them
at railroad depots, and they are ensconced in a luxurious palacealso free of
charge.
A land of unlimited possibilities used to be said about us when the Stunners,
Shcheglovitovs, and other friends of Germany resided in the palaces. We still
remain a land of wonders, even now.

959. Rech9 on L enin s A rrival by W ay of G ermany


[No. 78, April 5,1917, p. 3.]
It is not only natural but most desirable that the leaders of our leftist parties,
who were forced for such a long time to languish in foreign lands, should hasten
home in order to take part in the great struggle. Such universally recognized
leaders of our socialist parties as Plekhanov and Lenin should now be present in
the arena of contest, and irrespective of the opinion one has of their views, their
arrival in Russia may be welcomed.
It is a great pity that the conditions of the Bolshevik leaders arrival are such
that even in the socialist camp they can provoke at the best only a feeling of dismay.
Mr. Lenin demands the conclusion of peace at any cost, and it is probable that
among the tasks he has set for himself, an important place has been reserved pre
cisely for agitation among the masses on this tendency. . . . No citizen of Russia
deems it possible to manifest his love of peace by rendering services to an enemy
who is ravaging his country, or by accepting any kind of favors from the enemy.
This elementary rule of ethics is acknowledged by all the socialists, irrespective
of their political shade. And a special scrupulousness is required on the part of
those who advocate the conclusion of peace. It would seem that precisely the
ideological position of these pacifists should oblige them to avoid everything which
could be interpreted as a manifestation of personal sympathies or of personal
ties. . . .
While hastening to Russia, Mr. Lenin and his comrades should have asked
themselves, before choosing the way through Germany, why the German Govern
ment was ready to render them this unprecedented favor; why it had deemed it
possible to transport over its territory citizens of an enemy country on the way to
their homeland. It seems that the answer would have been clear. The German
Government hopes that an early arrival of Mr. Lenin and his comrades will be
useful to the German interests; it believes in the Germanophilism of the Bolshevik
leaders . . . Mr. Lenin and his comrades did not wish to take this into consider
ation, and this shows either [their] complete estrangement from their own country
or an intentional bravado, which would be incompatible with a serious attitude
toward a war in which the blood of our people is flowing in streams.
1094 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
960. Rabochaia Gazeta D enounces the A ttacks on L enin
[No. 33, April 16,1917, p 1.]
. * . The baiting of the adherents of a certain trend of socialist thought, the
leader of which is N. Lenin, is growing ever more pressing in our country. This
baiting is beginning to assume the character of a pogrom-like persecution.
Day in and day out such newspapers as Russkaia Volia wage an attack upon
him based not on differences in ideas but rather on personality abuse. They thus
appeal to the meanest emotions of the politically ill-informed. And in the stump
speeches with which our streets now abound, these editorials are repeated with
all the s dotted.
. . . They speak of the bribery of Lenin by the Germans (the exact sum of a
million and a half rubles is even mentioned); they speak of even more outrageous
slanderous things.
All this is thrown into the midst of the alarmed crowd of our days and naturally
arouses uneasiness. . . .
We have not infrequently sharply criticized in the pages of our paper the posi
tion taken by Lenin on questions concerning the political tactics of our day. More
than once we have pointed to the danger, during our troubled time, of speeches
and articles in the extreme Lenin spirit. We proposed to replace the clamorous
demagogy of the communists with self-restraint and stubborn and consistent
pursuits of the aim within the framework of our life.
The more energetically must we speak now when the conflict in ideas is threat
ened to be replaced by an organized massacre. The more vehemently must we
renounce all attempts to introduce into the struggle elements of absurd slander,
such as an accusation of bribery.
The warfare against Leninism can and should be waged purely on the basis
of differences in ideas. To explain the fallacy, even the harmfulness, of his point
of view and at the same time to oppose most vehemently the attempt to replace the
power of persuasion with the power of the fistsuch is the course all our comrades
should follow.
961. D iscussion in t h e E xecutive C omm ittee of th e P etrograd S oviet
on th e S tatus of th e E migrants in S witzerland
and L enin s M ode of R eturn
[Session of April 4,1917, Protokoly, pp. 72-74.]
A number of political emigrants have been deprived of the opportunity of
taking advantage of the amnesty and returning to their native land, especially
those of them who happened to be in Switzerland or Allied countries at the time
of the amnesty. Apart from the technical difficulties [associated with] the passage,
another obstacle is the so-called control listslists compiled by agents of the
old regime with the participation of delegates from the British and French General
Staffs, ostensibly for combating war espionage, but in reality including [names of]
many prominent Internationalists, adhering to the views of Zimmerwald and
Kienthal. While he was still in residence in Copenhagen, Zurabov, as one of the
persons included in these lists, informed the Executive Committee in the person
of Comrade Chkheidze of this by telegraph, and owing to his pressure, the Russian
Ambassador in Copenhagen informed Miliukov by telegraph that the Russian
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1095
emigrants are insisting that these lists not apply to them. Miliukovs reply, favor
able in the section that concerned Zurabov himself, once again confirmed the
demand that consuls take these lists into account when issuing permits for re
turning [to Russia]. Comrade Zurabov further conveyed the Swiss comrades
request that the Executive Committee assist them by exerting pressure on the Pro
visional Government to enter into negotiations with the German Government per
mitting transit through Germany to political [emigrants] in exchange for internees
and prisoners-of-war.
comrade zinoviev told about the obstacles created by the British and French
authorities. He gave an account of how the plan to travel through Germany had
originated. Initially it was contemplated to [accomplish this] by an exchange
for internees, but the red tape associated with this would have postponed the
departure for many months. With the assistance of the Swiss socialist, Platten,
they succeeded in expediting the transit through Germany, in which connection
the persons who were departing promised to bring influence to bear on the workers
masses in order that an equal number of German subjects interned in Russia
Otto Bauer, the Socialist, above allwould be returned on the basis of an ex
change. Written terms were drawn up at the time of departure which Comrade
Zinoviev promised to furnish as soon as they are delivered by mail in Petrograd.
He proposed that the Executive Committee adopt a resolution approving the ex
change of political emigrants for internees.
comrade lenin proposed that the Executive Committee subscribe to the
resolution.
comrade tseretelli . There is agitation against the Executive Committee.
The resolution could be used against us. Rumors may arise that Germany is trans
porting revolutionaries to our country for its own objectives. I propose that an
other resolution be adopted that would direct the attention of the Provisional
Government to the obstacles in obtaining travel permits which confront our com
rades in Switzerland, without pre-indicating the procedure for their return to
Russia.
COMRADE Bogdanov proposed the approval of the resolution on grounds of
principle. If the Executive Committee approves the resolution on transit through
Germany there exists the danger that the bourgeois press, which has already
launched a campaign against the transit, would link the position of Lenin to the
position of the Executive Committee. He proposed to exert pressure on the Gov
ernment for obtaining transit permits through England and France, for censoring
in a resolution the policy of the French and British governments, and at the same
time, for censoring the conduct of those Russian emigrants who had arbitrarily
decided to travel through Germany.
comrade len in . In order to stop the lies that are being spread in the bourgeois
press, it is necessary to adopt the resolution proposed by Comrade Zinoviev. He
proposed to declare that emigrants of all [political] shades be given passage. We
have made no commitments. We only promised that upon returning we would
turn to the workers for assistance in promoting the exchange. If you recognize
the exchange as being correct, you will thereby refute all the lies. In the opposite
case you will feed insinuations and slander.
The delegate of the Executive Committee (a soldier) opposed the resolution
and the transit through Germany.
SHLIAPNIKOV insisted on the adoption of the resolution and developed Lenins
1096 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
position. The army has greater confidence in the Executive Committee than in
the dark forces, he concluded.
comrade zurabov proposed that without adopting the resolution for the tim e
being, a detailed account should be given in the press of the factual side of the
matter in order to avert attacks.
comrade bogdanov proposed to lay the full facts before the Government and
place a notice in the newspapers to the effect that the Executive Committee had in
formed the Government of the obstacles [standing] in the way of [obtaining]
transit permits and, specifically, the difficulties regarding the incident with Com
rade Lenin.
The Executive Committee instructed a delegation to raise the question of po
litical emigrants with the Government, not to adopt for the time being the resolu
tion on passage through Germany, to publish in Izvestiia all the factual material
pertinent to the problem, and to publish an item in the next issue of Izvestiia about
the report given by Comrade Lenin on the day of his arrival concerning the
circumstances surrounding his passage through Germany.26

THE MILIUKOV NOTE OF APRIL 1827


962. T h e N ew spaper R eports on the D rafting of a
W ar A im s N ote by th e G overnment
[Item A is from Rech\ No. 85, April 13,1917, p. 3, and item B is from VVP , No. 31,
April 14,1917, p. 1. The first report was given out by Kerensky in order to force de
velopments toward the clarification of relations between the Soviet and the Government
and toward the consideration of Miliukovs position in the cabinet. But rather than
reading that the Government was preparing to consider the question of dispatching a
note, the printed version gave the impression that the note was being drafted. This,
being untrue, was officially denied. The denial provoked a reaction that forced the
Government to draft and dispatch a note. Kerensky, The Catastrophe, pp. 133-34.]
A
The Provisional Government is at present preparing a note which it will sub
mit to the Allied powers within the next few days and in which it will elaborate
its views on the problems and aims of the present war in keeping with the Decla
ration on this question that has already been made public by the Provisional
Government.28
26The reports of Lenin and Zinoviev and the documents they presented to the Executive
Committee are printed in the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk.
1,91-93; and Bk.n, 381-86.
27 Only the diplomatic skeleton of this episode is included here. See also Docs. 972-77.
The documents covering the internal struggle which the note precipitated, including the April
Crisis, the subsequent resignation of Miliukov and other ministers, and the formation of a
coalition government, will be found in Volume III, Chap. 21.
28 Doc. 909.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1097
B
News appeared in the press to the effect that the Provisional Government is
at present preparing a note on the problems and aims of the war which it will
submit within the next few days to the Allied powers.
The Provisional Government herewith states that this news is not true.
963. M iliukov s Contemporary A ccount o f t h e Origins of t h e N ote
[Miliukov to Izvolskii; Adamov, Konst. i prolivy, I, 484. For Miliukovs account in
Istoriia vtoroi russkoi revoliutsii, see I, vypusk 1, 92-93.]
April 17/30,1917
Private .
Confidential The arrival of Albert Thomas coincided with the resumption
by the Soviet of Workers Deputies of their insistent requests to the Government
for the transformation of the Declaration to the citizens on the aims of war, issued
by the Government, into a diplomatic document, which would serve as a motive for
re-examining the views of the Allies on war aims. Summoned for an exchange
of ideas with Kerensky and Chernov, Thomas declared that the French Govern
ment is officially unaware of the Declaration, [a statement] that strengthened in
his interlocutors the desire to inform the Allied governments of the Declaration
in an official way. In my private and confidential conversation with Thomas, I
pointed out that the Declaration is in the nature of a compromise between two
tendencies; that an official communication to the Allies would be impossible with
out a clarification of the precise meaning of the Declaration; and that if the Decla
ration were to be explained as an invitation to the Allies to renounce annexations
and contributions, I did not think that Thomas, as a French Minister, could
acknowledge the possibility of such a revision. Thomas answered that he would
talk again with Kerensky and clarify the official standpoint of his Government re
garding the impossibility of a revision. This was done, but had no practical suc
cess. In the meantime, Paleologue, having been unofficially informed of the exist
ing frictions, has advised his Government, as he told me himself, that it would be
advisable to issue immediately an official statement regarding the impossibility of
revising the agreements existing among the Allies. Had it been made in time, such
a statement might have been useful in the sense of clarifying the situation, but at
the present time it [would] arrive too late. As a compromise, Thomas suggested a
few days ago that I should communicate the Declaration of the Government to the
Allied powers. I told him that I would agree to do it, only provided I were certain
that the contents of the Declaration would not cause misunderstandings, particu
larly with regard to our alleged willingness to renounce the Straits. Yesterday I
again saw Thomas and, for my part, indicated the possibility of communicating
the Declaration to the Allies together with an accompanying note of mine, which
would eliminate the possibility of interpreting the Declaration to our detriment.
This compromise, which is acceptable to me, shall be discussed at an early date
by the Government. I direct your attention to the fact that the conversations of
Thomas with our leftist elements and the conclusions drawn by the latter, have in
effect already altered the situation, for which alteration part of the responsibility
falls upon [the shoulders] of Thomas.
M iliukov
1098 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
964. T h e N ote of A pril 18
[.Rech\ No. 91, April 20,1917, p 4 ]
In a telegram of April 18,1917, the Minister of Foreign Affairs instructed the
Russian representatives attached to the Allied powers to transmit to the govern
ments to which they are accredited the following note:
On March 27, the Provisional Government published an appeal to the citizens
which contains an exposition of the views held by the Government of free Russia
on the problems of the present war.29 The Minister of Foreign Affairs requests
me to transmit said document to you with the following remarks
Our enemies have tried recently to introduce discord into inter-Allied rela
tions by spreading absurd rumors that Russia is supposedly ready to conclude a
separate peace with the central monarchies. The text of the attached document
contradicts better than anything else such inventions. You will note that the gen
eral considerations expressed by the Provisional Government fully correspond to
those lofty ideals which have always been voiced by the most outstanding states
men of the Allied countries and which have found particularly vivid expression
in the pronouncements of the President of our new ally, the great transatlantic re
public. The government of the old regime was of course unable to comprehend
and share these thoughts about the liberating character of the war, about estab
lishing durable bases for the peaceful coexistence of peoples, about the self
determination of the oppressed nationalities, and so forth. But liberated Russia
can at the present time use a language understandable to the advanced democracies
of contemporary mankind and she hastens to add her voice to those of the Allies.
Imbued with this new spirit of liberated democracy, the pronouncements of the
Provisional Government naturally cannot give any reason to think that the revo
lution which has taken place will lead to the weakening of Russias role in the com
mon struggle of the Allies.
Quite the contrary, the general aspiration of the whole people to bring the
World War to a decisive victory has only been strengthened by the realization that
the general responsibility is shared by each and every one. This aspiration has
become more effective since it is concentrated on a current task close to everyone
the repulsion of the enemy who has penetrated the territory of our motherland.
It goes without saying, as stated in the attached document, that the Provisional
Government, while defending the rights of our motherland, will fully observe the
obligations taken with respect to our Allies.
While continuing to have complete confidence in the victorious conclusion of
the present war, in complete harmony with the Allies, the Provisional Government
is quite certain also that the questions raised by the war will be solved by the
creation of a solid foundation for a lasting peace, and that imbued with similar
aspirations, the leading democracies will find a way lo establish those guarantees
and sanctions which are required to prevent new bloody encounters in the future.
965. Reck7 on the N ote
[No. 91, April 20,1917, p. 2.]
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has sent to the Allied powers the well-known
address of the Provisional Government to the citizens [regarding the purposes of
29 Doc. 909.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1099
the war] together with a note, the text of which has heen published today. The
contents of the note are strictly within the limits of what at the present time is ad
missible in our relations with the Allies. It is obvious that the system of pacts and
agreements which binds us to our Allies and defines the common purposes of the
present war cannot become subject to sharp alterations without provoking stresses
in Allied relations themselves. It is especially important to maintain the stability
of these relations precisely at the present moment when, after 33 months of gigantic
efforts and sacrifices, we are nearing the time to reckon the totals. Russias share
in these totals is large enough, and should not be weakened nor reduced during the
remaining period of the struggle. . . . The note is quite categorical also in point
ing out that both the obligations and the rights that bind us to our Allies should be
and shall be strictly observed . . . Whatever ones views on the eventual modifi
cations of the aims of the war, it is quite obvious that at the present moment, when
the military success of the struggle cannot as yet be considered as definitely ascer
tained and when none of the belligerents has abandoned the hope of turning the
scales in his favor, it would be absolutely premature to raise the issue of these
modifications that concern all of the Allies. Under these conditions, a modification
of the issues already set and mutually agreed upon would mean to put into doubt
in advance the degree of their success and thus bring into the struggle a debilitating
psychological factor. The proclamations that our enemies are scattering from their
trenches tend by every means to achieve this aim. It is evident that the Russian
press should not help them in this activity, and that the Russian Government has
even less right to do so.
The note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs abides strictly by this obligatory
line. But within the limits of what is possible and admissible, it formulates in all
frankness the general view of the liberated nation on the purposes of the struggle.
Does this view essentially differ from that of our Allies? Quite rightly, the
note replies to this question in the negative. . . . The note of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs points this out, and also [the fact] that the declarations of Presi
dent Wilson represent the most vivid expression of the views common to all the
Allies. In the conclusive part of the note these views are formulated once again
in a manner which excludes any doubts. In full agreement with Wilson, Gray,
Briand, and others, the creation of guarantees and sanctions for a durable inter
national coexistence, which would exclude the repetition of bloody conflicts, is
openly established as the next practical task.
This point of view ought to give satisfaction to everybody, with the exception,
perhaps, of the partisans of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, who desire to re-establish
the third international in the very midst of the war. This point of view is the
point of view against bourgeois governments in general. It is the well-known
view of socialistic utopianism and of blanquiism, which cuts itself loose from con
temporary reality. It is unfortunate that our opponents of the war and our parti
sans of peace without contributions and annexations only too often lose sight
of the fact that their practical demands are inseparably linked to this utopian
doctrine.
It goes without saying that the diplomacy of the Provisional Government could
not adopt this point of view.
1100 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
966. T he G overnment s E xplanatory N ote of A pril 22
[ VVP, No. 37, April 22, 1917, p. 1. Prompted by the Soviet opposition to the phrase
ology of the original note.]
In view of the misunderstandings that have arisen over the interpretation of
the note by the Minister of Foreign Affairs which accompanied the transmission
to the Allied governments of the Declaration of the Provisional Government on
the aims of the war (March 27), the Provisional Government deems it necessary to
explain:
1. The note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs was the subject of careful and
extended discussion by the Provisional Government and its text was approved
unanimously.
2. It goes without saying that when speaking of a decisive victory over the
enemy the note has in mind the attainment of the aims set forth by the Declaration
of March 27 and expressed in the following words: The Provisional Government
considers it to be its right and its duty to declare at this time that the aim of free
Russia is not domination over other nations, or seizure of their national posses
sions, or forcible occupation of foreign territories, but the establishment of a
stable peace on the basis of the self-determination of peoples. The Russian people
does not intend to increase its world power at the expense of other nations. It has
no desire to enslave or degrade anyone. In the name of the loftiest principles of
justice it has removed the shackles from the Polish people. But the Russian people
will not permit their fatherland to emerge from this great struggle humiliated and
sapped in its vital forces.
3. By guarantees and sanctions for a lasting peace, mentioned in the note,
the Provisional Government has in mind the limitations of armaments, interna
tional tribunals, etc.
The above explanation will be transmitted by the Minister of Foreign Affairs
to the representatives of the Allied powers.80

967. S oviet A cceptance of the Governments E xplanation , A pril 21


[Izvestiia, No. 47, April 22,1917, p. 3, as translated in Golder, pp. 336-37.]
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies congratulates most heartily the
revolutionary democracy of Petrograd. Its meetings, resolutions, and demonstra
tions have focused attention on questions of foreign policy and the danger that
this policy might follow the channels of the old imperialism.
The wholehearted protest of the Workers and Soldiers of Petrograd has
made it clear to the Provisional Government, and to the nations of the world,
that the revolutionary democracy of Russia will never agree to a return of the
tsarist foreign policy, and that it [Russian democracy] is working and will con
tinue to work for international peace.
As a result of this protest, the Provisional Government has made a new
explanation which has been published for general information and which has been
handed to the ministers of the Allies by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This ex
planation puts an end to the possibility of interpreting the note of April 18 in a
80 There appears to be no evidence that the explanation was officially transmitted to the
Allied diplomatic representatives.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1101
spirit foreign to the demand and interests of the revolutionary democracy. The
fact that the question of renunciation of forcible annexation has been brought
forward for international consideration should be regarded as a great victory for
democracy.
The Soviet is determined to continue to fight for peace along this line, and it
calls on the revolutionary democracy of Russia to rally closer and closer around
their Soviets. It firmly believes that the peoples of all the belligerent countries
will break the opposition of their governments and compel them to begin peace
discussion, on the basis of no annexations and no indemnities.
CHAPTER 20
May to October

FIRST STATEMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY BY THE


COALITION GOVERNMENT

968. I n te r v ie w w it h P rin ce Lvov


[jRech\ No. 106, May 7, 1917, p. 4. The new ministry was organized on May 4 and
issued its program the following day. In its declaration, the Government rejected
any idea of a separate peace, but adopted the aim of a general peace without an
nexations or indemnities and promised to take steps toward bringing about an
agreement with the Allies on the basis of its declaration of March 27. See Chapter
22 for the Declaration and other documents on the formation of the first coalition.
Also on May 5, the Government approved a measure to create a special council within
the Government to deal with questions of foreign policy and to be composed of
Minister-President Prince Lvov, Foreign Minister Tereshchenko, and Minister of
War Kerensky. Zhurnaly, No. 69.]

The Government deems it its duty to declare clearly and unequivocably that
it openly strives for the earliest possible peace which will give the right of self
government to all peoples. But when one speaks of peace without annexations
and indemnities, one should at the same time declare unequivocally that it must
not be understood as passive defense. Free Russia will not consent to leave under
the domination of German militarism the lands that have been given away because
of the old Governments criminal negligence toward the fatherland and the army.
Valuing highly its alliance with the great democracies of the West, which have
suffered the horrors of German invasion [and] have borne incalculable sacrifices
under the heavy tread of the conqueror, the Russian people cannot remain indif
ferent to the fate of Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania or forget its obligations toward
them. I cannot imagine how one could come to accept the fact that tens of thou
sands of free citizens of France and Belgium have been turned into the slaves of
German imperialism.
In order to pass on an honorable name to future generations, in order to hold
her head high within the ranks of the great democracies, it is essential that revo
lutionary Russia should raise the might of her army to an adequate level, and all
the efforts of the Government will be directed toward this purpose.
The virtual armistice that has been established at the front and that permitted
the German Chancellor to formulate the suggestion, insulting to Russia, of a pos
sible separate peace with her, should cease.
The country must express its imperative will and send its army into combat.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1103
969. C om m unique to the P ress from F oreign M inister T ereshchenko
M ay 6, 1917
[As translated in For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 75-77. See also FTP, No. 51, May 9,
1917, p. 3. Izvestiia, No. 62, May 10,1917, p. 3, commented: Not a single word in M. I.
Tereshchenkos program could be construed as a return to aggressive war aims. . . .
All these . . . points (in his statement) are included in the peace program of the
revolutionary democracy.]
You ask what is my program? You can read it in the declaration of the new
Provisional Government called to power by free Russia. This program is short
but significant; namely, the reestablishment as early as possible of universal peace:
a peace which aims neither at domination over other peoples, nor a seizure of their
national patrimony, nor a taking by force of foreign territories, a peace without
annexations or indemnities, based on the principle of the rights of peoples to dis
pose of themselves, a peace concluded in close and indissoluble union with the
Allied democracies. Free Russia, like every country which has made a great reno
vating revolution, is moved by two motives profoundly idealistic. The first is an
aspiration to give a just peace to the entire world, not to injure any nation, not
to create after the war a hatred, an estrangement which remains always when one
nation comes forth from the struggle enriched at the expense of the other nations,
when the latter are crushed and obliged and accept humiliating conditions of
peace. We have seen a sad example of that in 1870. The wounds dealt to France
by Germany remained open for forty-five years. The hope of the people of Alsace-
Lorraine for a better future is not dead up to the present and they have now a
right to hope for the realization of their ideal. Outrage and injustice are not
forgotten, violence creates hatred. Liberated Russia does not wish that either for
herself or for others.
The second motive is the consciousness of its ties with the Allied democracies,
consciousness of the duty which these ties have imposed on her. Revolutionary
Russia cannot and ought not to break these ties sealed by blood; for her it is a
question of revolutionary honor which is so much the more precious to her now.
The great revolution which stirred the public ocean to its greatest depths could
not but influence the army, which was unable to immediately accommodate itself
to the suddenly changed state of affairs. At the same time the democracy of the
west continued to accomplish with tenacity its warlike work which was for us a
powerful aid. The Allied armies of whom the great mass is composed, as with us,
of peasants and workmen, carried on without stopping the struggle against the
enemy, diverting his strength and by their heroic effort are saving the Russian
revolution from an external defeat. The success of the Russian revolution is also
bought by their blood; it is with a sentiment of profound satisfaction that I must
state that in free Russia in spite of a divergence of opinions of the democratic
parties, there has not been a single party, a single organization, as there was in
reactionary Russia, which would have made a propaganda for a separate peace.
I know, however, that there exists a question capable of stirring the emotions of
the numerous groups of the Russian democracy, that is the question of the treaties
concluded by the old Russian regime. This question stirs up the passions. But
I believe nevertheless that I ought to touch upon this question, expressing my
entire and true opinion, for the Russian people has the right to expect and expects
that the Provisional Government should only tell it the truth. The Russian de
1104 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
mocracy is afraid that bound by these old treaties it will be made to serve purposes
of annexation which are foreign to it. This disturbs its revolutionary confidence,
diminishes its spirit and enthusiasm. That is why demands for the immediate
publication of all the treaties concluded by the old regime are being made. I think
that in this case the sentiments which bring forth these demands are highly hu
manitarian, but I am convinced that the question is raised in an entirely ei roneous
manner and that should be understood by the Russian democracy.
It ought absolutely to understand that in the name of the safety of the Russian
revolution and Allied democracies, the immediate publication of the treaties is
equivalent to a rupture with the Allies and will result in the isolation of Russia.
Such an act will necessarily bring on a separate situation and for Russia will be
the beginning of a separate peace. But it is exactly this which the Russian people
repudiates with all its force and not only by a feeling of honor. It understands
that the international war can only be ended by an international peace. It is only
this peace which could guarantee this justice, this right of the people to dispose
of themselves which is ardently desired by liberated Russia. Other ways must be
chosen, for new Russia must look forward and not backward. Now the world at
war is confronted by some new facts; namely, the great Russian revolution and
the entry into the war of the great American Republic, which hailed wilh en
thusiasm the Russian revolution and has united itself without hesitation to the
Allies after the disappearance of Russian absolutism. We must start from these
facts and these facts cannot but be counted on by the Allied democracies. Personal
intercourse with representatives of the western democracies, as for example,
Mr. Thomas, makes near and clear to all the aims which are now placed before
Russia and before the world as a result of the Russian revolution. In basing one
self on this intercourse I notice the growth of a reciprocal confidence with the
Allies which will permit the Russian Government to undertake preparatory
measures for an agreement with the Allies on the basis of the declaration of
March 27/April 9, and I will apply every effort to hasten the process of rapproche
ment of mutual understanding and agreement. But to attain this aim with success
free Russia must prove that she is accomplishing faithfully her fundamental en
gagement that she has taken towards the Allies, the engagement of united struggle
and mutual help.
She must inspire an unlimited confidence in herself, and prove that her ideal
ism is not derived from weakness and that she renounces annexations not because
she cannot realize them. It is precisely the reason why in the name of the demands
of the democracy, in the name of a peace rapid and just, it is necessary to re
create the military power of new Russia, to strengthen it by all the force of her
revolutionary enthusiasm and to prove really the existence of this force. The
Russian Army proved its heroism, its great self-denial, even when it was sent to
the field of battle by the old regime. At present being subjected only to a discipline
freely accepted it must understand and understands that it [is] struggling for what
it holds most dear, for the integrity and the safety of its freed country aspiring
to a new life. It understands also that a defeat will annihilate this liberty and
that new life. And that ought to be the only aim to animate it. It is ridiculous
in fact to speak at the present moment of the annexationist plans of the Allies as
of a real menace to peace, just when Russia, Belgium, France and Serbia are
themselves occupied in whole or in part by the enemy. Now it can only be a
question of an active defense with a view to defending the national independence
MAY TO OCTOBER 1105
and liberty. As for the future the Allied democrats in their evergrowing confi
dence must count with the desire and tendency of all. It is not for nothing that
Russian liberty comes to the world and that its consequences and influences are
spreading in a large and powerful wave across the civilized world. That is all
that I can say for the moment in regard to what will serve me as a basis for my
activity and the measures that I propose taking.

970. L enin s I nterpretation o f t h e G overnm ent s S tatem ent


[One of the Secret Treaties, Pravda, No. 53, May 10, 1917, as translated in the
Collected Works of F. I. Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 66-67.]
Everybody knows that the first statement made by the revolutionary Pro
visional Government on its foreign policy was the declaration that all secret
treaties concluded by the former Tsar Nicholas II with the Allied capitalists
remain in force, and that new Russia shall regard them as sacred and inviolable.
Futhermore, it is well known that our defencists vehemently support the
refusal of the Miliukov followers to publish the secret treaties. These wretched
Socialists have come to the point where they are defending secret diplomacy, the
secret diplomacy of the former Tsar, to boot.
Why do the supporters of the imperialist war watch over the secret treaties
so diligently?
Do you wish to know why, comrades, workers and soldiers?
Familiarise yourselves with at least one of these noble treaties: we are referring
to our treaty with Italy {i.e., with the Italian capitalists) signed in the beginning
of 1915.
The bourgeois democrat, Mr. V. Vodovozov, basing himself on the material
published in the Novoie Vremia, informs us in the Dien (May 19, 1917) of the
contents of that treaty:
The Allies, he writes, have guaranteed Italy Southern Tyrol and Trient, the
entire coast-line, the northern part of Dalmatia with the cities Zara and Spalato,
the central part of Albania with Valona, the islands in the Aegean Sea near Asia
Minor; in addition to the above Italy receives a profitable railroad concession in
Asiatic Turkey,this is the blood money which Italy exacts from the Allies. These
territorial annexations exceed many times any national claims ever advanced
by Italy. . . .
Of all the treaties dealing with the present war, this is the only one the con
tents of which we know, and this treaty is barbarously predatory. Whether similar
predatory instincts are or are not reflected in the other treaties, we do not know.
At any rate, democracy which inscribes on its banner peace without annexations
is entitled to have this very important information.
Is it true that we do not know to what extent the other secret treaties are
predatory? No, Mr. Vodovozov, we know it very well: the secret treaties concern
ing the partition of Persia, Turkey, the seizure of Germany, Armenia are just as
vile and predatory as the rapacious treaty with Italy.
Comrades, soldiers and workers! You are told that you are defending free
dom and the revolution ! In reality you are defending the shady treaties of the
Tsar, which are being concealed from you as one conceals a shameful disease.
1106 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
971. T e r e sh c h e n k o s M essage t o t h e U n ited S ta te s
S e c r e ta r y o f S ta te
[For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 74-75. In his reply, in ibid., p. 85, Lansing recip
rocated the Foreign Ministers sentiments and emphasized that the present business
is to defeat the designs and machinations of the German autocratic Government. To
accomplish that result the United States will apply all of its physical, moral and in
tellectual forces, and I am happy to feel assured that the great democracy of Russia
will keep step with us until our common aims shall be successfully accomplished.
Tereshchenko sent notes to the other Allies, but without the significant reference to
the similarity of war aims.]
Petrograd, May 21 [N.S.], 1917
In taking over the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I hasten to say
to you how highly the whole Russian democracy is inspired with the sentiment of
full solidarity with the great Republic, which, true to its traditions of liberty, has
espoused the cause of the coalition for the defense of justice and right. Like the
United States, emancipated Russia is not seeking conquest or any covetous end in
the present contest. The war is carried on to secure the freedom of nations and
achieve universal and lasting peace effectively guaranteed against all later attack.
I am glad to find that those lofty principles which were so eloquently formulated
in America are striking a warm unanimous echo in Free Russia now mistress of
her own destiny.

ALLIED REPLIES TO THE NOTE OF APRIL 18, WILSONS


MESSAGE, AND THE AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN
SPECIAL MISSIONS
972. T h e B ritish R eply
[Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 3, No. 58, June 13, 1917, p. 467. The answer
was initially handed to the Russian Charge dAffaires in London on April 26, but the
Provisioned Government refused to publish it until some of the terms were altered
and made more acceptable to Russian public opinion. Sir George Buchanan and
Arthur Henderson, member of the British War Cabinet on a special mission to Russia
(see Doc. 981), revised it several times over the next weeks before a version was drafted
which was approved by their Government and agreeable to Tereshchenko. It appeared
in the press on May 27. VVP, No. 64, May 27,1917, p. 2; For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia,
I, 86-95; Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia, II, 126, 129, 133; and Adamov,
Konst, i prolivy, I, 499. Shortly after delivering the note to Tereshchenko, Buchanan
had a long conversation with Tseretelli, Chernov, and Skobolev on war aims. Ibid.,
132-35.]
On May 3 [N.S.] his Majestys Government received through the Russian
Charge dAffaires a Note from the Russian Government declaratory of their war
policy.1
In the Proclamation to the Russian people, enclosed in the Note, it is said that
Free Russia does not propose to dominate other peoples or to take from them
1 Dispatched and dated April 18/May 1. See Docs. 962-67.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1107
their national patrimony, or forcibly to occupy foreign territory. In this senti
ment the British Government heartily concur. They did not enter upon the war
as a war of conquest, and they are not continuing it for any such object. Their
purpose at the outset was to defend the existence of their country and to enforce
respect for international engagements. To those objects has now been added that
of liberating populations oppressed by alien tyranny. They heartily rejoice, there
fore, that Free Russia has announced her intention of liberating Poland, not only
the Poland ruled by the old Russian Autocracy, but equally that within the domin
ion of the old Germanic Empires. In this enterprise the British Democracy wish
Russia god-speed. Beyond everything we must seek for such a settlement as will
secure the happiness and contentment of the people and take away all legitimate
causes of future war.
The British Government heartily join their Russian Allies in their acceptance
and approval of the principles laid down by President Wilson in his historic mes
sage to the American Congress. These are the aims for which the British people
are fighting. These are the principles by which their war policy is and will be
guided. The British Government believe that broadly speaking the agreements
which they have from time to time made with their Allies are conformable to these
standards. But if the Russian Government so desire they are quite ready with
their Allies to examine, and, if need be, to revise, these agreements.
B uchanan

973. T h e F rench R eply


[VVP, No. 64, May 27, 1917, p. 2. The document is dated May 13/26. The French
reply was apparently subjected to the same criticisms by the Provisional Government
as was the original British answer, forcing Albert Thomas, who had replaced Maurice
Paleologue as Ambassador in early May, to revise the text. It would appear to have
still been less acceptable to the Russians than the British note. For. Rel. of U.S., 19IS,
Russia, I, 86, 89, 91, 92, 95.]
It is with entire satisfaction that the Government of the French Republic has
taken cognizance of the proclamation of the Russian Provisional Government of
27 March/9 April, which the Russian Ambassador was instructed to communicate
to it. . . .
Rebuffed in all the efforts which she made to maintain peace, forced to reply
by arms to the most unjust of aggressions, France entered the war only to defend
her liberty and her national patrimony and to assure henceforward in the world
a respect for the independence of peoples.
Just as Russia proclaimed the restoration of Poland to her former independ
ence, so France hails with joy the effort that is being carried on in different parts
of the world by peoples still tied by the bonds of a dependence which has been
condemned by history.
Whatever their aims, be it to conquer or recover their national independence,
to assert their rights to the respect of an ancient civilization, or to shake this Ger
manic tyranny ready to weigh so heavily on peoples less advanced on the path of
progress, the only end of the war which France looks to is the triumph of right
and justice.
For herself, France desires the return of her faithful and loyal provinces of
1108 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Alsace and Lorraine, which were snatched from her in the past by violence. With
her Allies she will fight until victory in order that they may be assured of the
complete restoration of their territorial rights and their political and economic
independence, as well as of reparatory indemnities for the long toll of inhuman
and unjustified acts of devastation and of indispensable guarantees againsL a re
currence of the evils caused by the incessant acts of provocation of our enemies.
The Government of the Republic, like the Russian people, remains convinced
that it is only by drawing inspiration from these principles that the foreign policy
of Russia will attain the aims of a people enamored of justice and liberty, and
that only after a victorious struggle will the Allies be able to create a solid and
lasting peace founded on right.
The Russian Provisional Government may be assured that the French Govern
ment desires to come to an understanding with it not only regarding the means
for continuing the struggle, but also regarding the means for ending it, by exam
ining and determining, by common agreement, the conditions in which they may
hope to reach a final settlement in accordance with the ideas by which their con
duct in this war is directed.

974. T h e I talian R eply


[VVP, No. 72, June 6, 1917, p. 1. The note is dated April 27/May 10.]
I had the honor to receive the note of April 20/May 3, 1917,2 under No. 766,
by which you notified me of the Declaration of the Russian Provisional Govern
ment of the 27 of last March to the citizens, and in which were outlined the views
of the Government of free Russia on the aims of the present war.
The Royal Italian Government received with a feeling of the greatest satisfac
tion the statement of the Russian Government which thus gives new proof of the
unshakable will that inspires the great Russian nation to bring the World War to
a decisive victory.
The Royal Government likewise took into consideration the fact that Russia
resolved to redouble its efforts toward the liberation of the territory of Poland
and to restore her unity and independence.
These assertions will not fail to repulse the attempt of our enemies to sow doubt
about Russias intentions. The most sincere and permanent agreement with her
allies will give free Russia a priceless guarantee for her general development.
Under this condition Russia, in full agreement with the free and democratic na
tions of the world who are her allies, will achieve her aimsto create a firm basis
for a permanent peace which will guarantee the world an era of justice and free
dom.
On her part Italy entered the war in the name of the triumph of the sacred prin
ciples of freedom of peoples and the assurance of their independence. Any design
of conquest and domination is excluded from her policy. Italy, whose national
constitution is inspired by democratic principles, happily greets the Declaration
which the Russian Government instructed you to transmit to me and expresses
through me its firm belief in the final victory over our common enemies.
Please accept, etc.
S onnino
2 Date of receipt by the Italian Government.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1109
975. P resident W ilson s M essage
[.For. Rel. of U.S., 1917, Suppl. 2, I, 71-73. The message was transmitted to Francis
on May 9 and was assumed by him and by Tereshchenko to be a reply to the Note of
April 18. After first accepting it as satisfactory, the Foreign Minister reluctantly
and informally asked the Ambassador if certain sections which might be misinterpreted
could be changed or deleted. The war has begun to go against Germany might
be used to show that no Russian offensive was required, and The day has come to
conquer or submit and That status must be altered could be considered appeals
for a dictated and annexationist peace. Francis was informed that the message was
sent independently, was not a reply to the Miliukov Note, and was not subject to
change. Accordingly, it was published unaltered on May 28. For. Rel. of U.S., 1918,
Russia, I, 86-97.]

The war has begun to go against Germany, and in their desperate desire to
escape the inevitable ultimate defeat those who are in authority in Germany are
using every possible instrumentality, are making use even of the influence of
groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just
or fair or even tolerant, to promote a propaganda on both sides of the sea which
will preserve for them their influence at home and their power abroad, to the
undoing of the very men they are using. The position of America in this war is
so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no
material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage
or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the
aggressions of autocratic force. The ruling classes in Germany have begun of late
to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only to preserve the power
they have set up in Germany and the selfish advantages which they have wrongly
gained for themselves and their private projects of power all the way from Berlin
to Baghdad and beyond. Government after government has by their influence,
without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue
directed against nothing less than the peace and the liberty of the world. The
meshes of that net must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already
done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever
again being rewoven or repaired.
Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for
their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the
restoration of the status quo ante. It was the status quo ante out of which this
iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within
the Empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that Empire.
That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing
from ever happening again.
We are fighting again for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated
development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this
war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be
righted, and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being com
mitted again. Remedies must be found, as well as statements of principle that
will have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only
by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjust
ments will; and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.
But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must
1110 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory
must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair
chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that
constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must
be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the
future welfare and happiness of its peoples.
And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in a common cove
nant, some genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their
force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The
brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase: it must be
a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and
effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of auto
cratic and self-pleasing power.
For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are
the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out the blood
and treasure now and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering
force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or
submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we
stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We
can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or
omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

976. Delo Naroda on t h e A llied R eplies


[An article by S. D. Mstislavskii (pseud, of S. D. Maslovskii), a representative of
the left wing of the Socialist Revolutionaries, entitled Wilsons Response, in No. 61,
May 30,1917, p. 1.]
Following the English and the French, the United States sent its note in reply
to the Declaration of the Russian Government. As should have been expected, the
American note contained nothing new as compared with what the governments of
England and France have already told us. It fully confirms the former aims and
purposes of the Allies as set by them in the pre-war and war-time treaties that
have been concluded.
To be sure, Woodrow Wilsons reply is couched in even more cautious expres
sions than the reply of the English, the international substance is even more camou
flaged in it by good, peace-loving sounding words. It is so well concealed that
in a hasty, unthoughtful reading of the note one may gain the impression that
there are no sharp differences of opinion between the appeal to the peoples of the
world of our Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies and the statement of the
North American Republic. For the statement says that the Allies have no other
aims than the struggle for the liberty, the self-government and the undictated
development of all peoples." But a few lines below the real political essence of this
document is revealed. No territory, says Woodrow Wilson, should change
hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair chance of life
and liberty . . . This qualification is sufficient to legalize any annexation. For
in the history of annexations, has there been even one annexation that was not
interpreted precisely thus: in the interests of those who are being taken over and
annexed? . . .
MAY TO OCTOBER 1111

And further the note states: No indemnities must be insisted on except those
that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. But again we shall askwhen
and where did a civilized contemporary state demand of a conquered enemy a
contribution unless for paying for manifest wrongs done to the state of the
conqueror? . . .
Wilsons note also mentions the urgency of a common covenant, a genuine
and practical collaboration which would combine the strength of free peoples of
the world to guarantee peace and justice in the relations between nations.
But, in the first place, the author of this phrase himself has apparently no
conception, even approximately, how such a pact and such collaboration
could be effected. . . . In the second place, the remark and supplement to the
point about the forthcoming common covenant is that the union of the peoples
is assigned to the future. . . .
Perhaps in the West such treatment of the question may sound convincing.
But with us Russians our experience in this respect is too memorable. This first
and then is the exact repetition of the notorious Stolypin program: first sooth
ing and then reforms. And if then the peoples conscience opposed this pro
gram sincerely and passionately, it must now refuse the proposal made by the
American President: first we shall shed blood until one of the belligerent coun
tries is bled to death, redivide her lands, exact from her the just retribution, and
after we do all this, then later we will organize some collaboration, then we
will unite people into a brotherly union . . . [based] on blood!
The American [note] gives us nothing new, nothing that would lighten what
has been said in the notes of England and France. It only confirms, as we have
already said, the firm decision of the Allies to end the war on the same condition
on which it was started.
Consequently the international situation is quite clear: we can make a decision
with no fear of being wrong. And we must make it without delay because we must
not prolong the tension which exists at the front.
And on the threshold of this decision, in words valuable for this decision, words
from the same note of Woodrow Wilson, words not bearing on the business part
of the note, [we can say]: The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces
of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is
certain and the liberty which victory will secure . . .
We are putting a different meaning in these words than Woodrow Wilson did
when he was writing them. But we can repeat them for ourselves, for one revolu
tionary democracy with greater force than he addressed them to the Allies. For
truly the day has come for us to conquer or submitto raise yet higher, yet
more victoriously the banner of the revolution, or to salute with it the rising forces
of the old, to lower the great banner of the toilers to the feet of those who dictate
to us their will of the ruling classes ; to capitulate, to be at the mercy of the
victor, or to continue to struggle, even at the price of the highest, the final strain.
We are certain that there could be no two answers to such a question for the
Russian revolution. And if we make the decision calmly and firmly, and especially
calmly , without any unnecessary passion and self-willed haste, bound by one
national desire, if we stand together, then victory is certain, and this victory
will guarantee our freedom.
1112 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
977. Izvestiia on t h e A llied R eplies
[No. 78, May 30, 1917, p. 1. Even more unfavorable reactions were expressed in
Novaia Zhizn9, No. 34, May 28, 1917, p. 1, and No. 35, May 30, 1917, p. 1. Lenins
violent criticism in Pravda, No. 69, May 31, 1917, is translated in the Collected Works
of V. /. Lenin; The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 164-66.]
In reply to the Declaration of the Provisional Government, dated March 27,
France and England sent notes to the Government, while the President of U.S.A.
sent a special message.
There is no need to speak very much about this message. President Wilson is
mistaken if he thinks that such thoughts can find acceptance in the hearts of the
revolutionary people of Russia. The Russian revolutionary democracy knows only
too well that the path to universal peaceso fervently awaitedlies only in a
united struggle of all the workers in the world against world imperialism. It
therefore cannot be led astray by any vague, high-flown phrases. And it is easy
to understand the kind of feelings which will be aroused by the strange pretense
that the growing revival of the spirit of brotherhood and peace in international
socialism is . . . the result of German intrigue. This is not the language that
Russian democracy speaks.
The French and British notes will also undoubtedly fail to evoke enthusiasm
among the Russian revolutionary democracy. Both notes, it is true, speak of solid
arity with the Russian Government and people regarding the principles that inspire
their foreign policy.
However, the principle that both the Government and the people of revolu
tionary Russia firmly uphold has been proclaimed openly and more than once.
It is a peace without open or veiled annexations and indemnities, a peace based
on the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination.
Russian democracy does not see the embodiment of this principle in the notes
from France and England. On the contrary. Alongside the recognition of the
principles it sees a tendency to subsume under this principle the old aims that
are contradictory to it.

. . . Let this recognition which is as yet a purely verbal recognition, demon


strate that one can no longer use a different language when speaking to the people.
But even more important is the consent of the Allied powers to a revision of
agreements in accordance with the principles proclaimed by our Provisional Gov
ernment.
Our Government will be able to draw the proper inferences from this consent.
The whole revolutionary democracy of Russia will support it in its attempt to
convert the revision of agreements into a radical application of these agreements
in the direction demanded by revolutionary Russia.
It is the responsibility of the peoples of France and England, as well as of the
Russian people, to help, while suffering under the burden of war, in realizing the
desires of all the workers. [The assurance] that the agreements binding these
countries to Russia will be purged of everything that could offer refuge to imperi
alism depends most of all on the peoples of France and England.
The word rests with the people.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1113
978. T h e A im s of t h e R oot M ission to R ussia
[Lansing to Francis, For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 110-11. Published in VVP,
No. 57, May 18, 1917, p. 3. The special mission, headed by former Secretary of State
Elihu Root, arrived in Vladivostok on May 21, and proceeded to Petrograd, which
it reached on May 31. Its members carried on discussions with Government officials,
military leaders, and representatives of political parties and public organizations in
the capital and elsewhere. During their visit and upon their return they made recom
mendations to Washington concerning material and moral aid to the Russians. The
mission sailed from Vladivostok on July 8. For documents and accounts of their
activities and reports, see For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 107-53; Philip C. Jessup,
Elihu Root, II, chap. 43; and America's Message to the Russian People.]
Washington, May 22 [N.S.], 1917,5 p .m .
1428. You may state to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the information of
his Government that the High Commission now on its way from this country to
Russia is sent primarily to manifest to the Russian Government and people the
deep sympathetic feeling which exists among all classes in America for the ad
herence of Russia to the principle of democracy which has been the foundation
of the progress and prosperity of this country. The High Commissioners go to
convey the greetings of this Republic to the new and powerful member which has
joined the great family of democratic nations.
The commissioners, who will bear this fraternal message to the people of Rus
sia, have been selected by the President with the special purpose of giving repre
sentation lo the various elements which make up the American people and to show
that among them all there is the same love of country and the same devotion to
liberty and justice and loyalty lo constituted authority. The commission is not
chosen from one political group but from the various groups into which the
American electorate is divided. United, they represent the Republic. However
they may differ on public questions, they are one in support of democracy and in
hostility to the enemies of democracy throughout the world.
This commission is prepared, if the Russian Government desires, to confer
upon the best ways and means to bring about effective cooperation between the two
Governments in the prosecution of the war against the German autocracy which
is today the gravest menace to all democratic governments. It is the view of this
Government that it has become the solemn duty of those who love democracy and
individual liberty to render harmless this autocratic Government whose ambitions,
aggressions, and intrigues have been disclosed in the present struggle. Whatever
the cost in life and treasure this supreme object should be and can be attained
only by the united strength of the democracies of the world, and only thus can
come that permanent and universal peace which is the hope of all people.
To the common cause of humanity which Russia has so courageously and
unflinchingly supported for nearly three years, the United States is pledged. To
cooperate [with] and aid Russia in the accomplishment of the task, which as a
great democracy is more truly hers today than ever before, is the desire of the
United States. To stand side by side, shoulder to shoulder, against autocracy
will unite the American and Russian peoples in a friendship for the ages.
With this spirit the High Commissioners of the United States will present
themselves in the confident hope that the Russian Government and people will
1114 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
realize how sincerely the United States hopes for their welfare and desires to
share with them in their future endeavors to bring victory to the cause of de
mocracy and human liberty.
L ansing

979. T h e B a k h m e t ev M ission to t h e U nited S tates


[The Russian Charge dAffaires in Washington to the Secretary of State, For. Rel.
of U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 154-55. The Russian mission arrived in Seattle on June 2
and proceeded to Washington, where Bakhmetev presented his credentials to the
President on June 22, thus becoming the new permanent Ambassador to the United
States. See Doc. 918. For documents and accounts of the work of the mission, see
ibid., 1,153-58, and A. J. Sack, The Birth of Russian Democracy, pp. 391-404.]
Washington, May 9 [N.S.], 1917
The object of the Special Mission is to express the gratitude of the Provisional
Russian Government for the initiative taken by the great Allied Republic in the
official recognition of the democratic regime which has been established in Russia.
Prof. B. A. Bakhmeteff [sic], Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry,
shall be placed at the head of the Extraordinary Embassy which will include spe
cial delegates of the Ministries of War, Commerce, Finance and Foreign Affairs.
Mr. J. Korostovets, ex-Minister in Peking, is designated as delegate of the Min
istry of Foreign Affairs.
The special mission, composed thus of competent delegates of different depart
ments, will be empowered to confer and to negotiate with the Government of the
United States on military, naval, financial and railway matters, pertaining to the
present world war. The detailed list of the members of the Extraordinary Embassy,
the time of the departure from Petrograd and the route which will be chosen shall
be communicated later.

THE QUESTION OF THE REVISION OF WAR AIMS


980. R esolution on t h e W ar and W ar A im s by t h e A ll -R ussian
C ongress of S oviets of P easants 9 D eputies
[Delo Naroda, No. 47, May 12, 1917, p. 2. The resolution was passed with only 12
deputies opposing and 16 abstaining. Ibid., No. 49, May 14, 1917, p. 2.]
The toiling peasantry, part of the great army of labor, strives for a just peace
with no disinherited and injured; a peace without annexations and retributions,
with the right of every nation, no matter where, to decide its fate independently;
in other words, a peace without annexations and indemnities and on condition of
self-determination of peoples. And this peace should not be based on the occupa
tion of any lands by the troops of belligerent states but on the will of the popula
tion of disputed areas itself, expressed by its free vote.
No one-sided conditions forcing one country into economic dependence upon
another are to be tolerated.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1115
In the future all international relations and all treaties must be concluded
under the control of the interested peoples themselves.
All disputes between states should be settled by a special international court
and not by armed force. An end must be put to the so-called armed peace preva
lent heretofore, as well as to irresponsible secret diplomacy.
Such a peace can be achieved only when the workers of the world unite and
have the power to carry out their will as mightily as the Russian working people
can. The struggle for a just peace can only be international.
Therefore the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies repudiates with indig
nation any thought of a separate peace. In the international struggle for a just
peace, the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies welcomes all steps of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies to unite the workers of the world and draw
them into the struggle.
On their part the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies tenders a brotherly
hand to the peasants of all lands and urges them to force their governments to
renounce their demands of annexation and indemnities. The All-Russian Soviet
of Peasants Deputies decided to participate in the Congress of the workers of the
world called at the suggestion of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
But at the same time, for the sake of the success of the same struggle for a just
peace, and until the union of workers is achieved, the All-Russian Soviet of Peas
ants Deputies thinks it a primary duty for the working people of revolutionary
Russia to defend the country most actively, to stop at no sacrifices, and to take
most energetic steps to improve the combat effectiveness of the army both for de
fensive and offensive actions.
As long as the revolutionary Russian army fights the armies led by emperors,
it fights for the salvation of the great heritage of the Russian people, for the Russian
revolution, for the land, and for the right of the Russian revolution to develop and
to influence all other nations.
The All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies appeals to all its brothers and
sons in the army with warm greetings and urges them, while submitting to free
discipline, to defend revolutionary Russia and to bear in mind that in this heroic
struggle all the toiling peasantry will be with them; that they bless them in this
struggle and and shall never forget the blood they shed for this great work.
981. A rthur H enderson B efore t h e E xecutive C om m ittee
of t h e S oviet
[Izvestiia, No. 78, May 30,1917, p. 3. As a Labour member of the British War Cabinet,
Henderson was sent to Russia to establish closer contact with the socialist elements
in and out of the Government and, if advisable, to take over Buchanans post as Am
bassador. But after acquainting himself with the difficulties of the situation and after
satisfying himself on Buchanans ability and acceptability to the Government, he wrote
Lloyd George recommending the Ambassadors retention. He arrived in Petrograd on
May 20 and returned to England at the beginning of July. For his activities in connec
tion with the proposed Stockholm Conference, see Docs. 1019-20.]

In his speech delivered on Saturday in the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers


Deputies, Arthur Henderson staled that although he is a member of the British
Government and is now in Russia in the capacity of a representative of the British
1116 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Government, nevertheless he speaks here in the Soviet as a representative of the
British workers and soldiers movement. . . .
Since his arrival in Petrograd, continued Henderson, he is continually being
beseiged by questions concerning the attitudes of the British proletariat toward
the present war. First of all, he would like to emphasize the fact that the British
proletariat has always protested adamantly against war. It fought against the
South African War, and when in August 1914 the [present] war became unavoid
able, the British proletariat fought for the preservation of peace until the last mo
ment. This attitude only changed when the neutrality of Belgium was violated and
when there was no room left for doubt that Germany and Austria were striving
for hegemony in Europe and the whole world, especially when German Social-
Democrats voted in the Reichstag for the military budget. The British proletariat
from the very beginning did not support this war as a war of conquest and to this
day it continues to hold the same point of view. British workers are fighting only
to defend their country and to force the respect of international agreements. Of
course they are striving for peace, but this peace must be such as to provide hap
piness and prosperity to the people and to remove all legitimate reasons for future
wars. The British workers are therefore speaking out against any kind of a peace
treaty that would provide for the domination of one nation over another, the
seizure of national possessions, or the forceful usurpation of foreign territories.
Together with their Russian comrades they are declaring that the peace treaty
must contain no terms for annexations and indemnities, but must be based on Lhe
right of nations to self-determination.
In accordance with such a point of view, the peace treaty must have as its goal
the establishment of unity, independence, autonomy, security, and freedom of all
nations, large and small. The question of Poland, its unification and independence,
must be decided in accordance with the desires of the Polish people; the complete
reinstatement of Belgium as an independent state must be absolutely guaranteed.
Furthermore, in the interests of maintaining peace in the future, the population
of Mesopotamia and Africa must be liberatedat least with the assistance of spe
cial international commissionsfrom the yoke of Turkish and German rule. Im
portant reorganizations must also be affected in Turkey in the interest of the se
curity of Armenians and Arabs. Constantinople, if possible, must be converted
into a free port, and the Dardanelles must be internationalized.
Ways and means must be found for a more satisfactory and just solution to
the Balkan problem. The British proletariat, of course, desires peace and will
welcome peace, but it must be a peace with honor, it must be an efficacious pcace,
it must be a peace that would preclude the possibility of the ascendancy of brute
force in the future. Professor Bergson said: we must live not by the ideals of
strength, but on the strength of our ideals. These are the factors which induced
the British proletariat in 1914 to speak out in support of the war. These are the
ideals in which it believed in 1914 and which it can not betray in 1917, especially
since they have now been consecrated by the blood of our sons.
982. A ddress of A lbert T hom as to the E xecutive C o m m ittee
of th e S oviet
[.Izvestiia, No. 79, May 31, 1917, pp. 2-3. Thomas, a socialist and Minister of Muni
tions in the French cabinet, was sent to Russia for much the same reasons as Hender
MAY TO OCTOBER 1117
son. Arriving on April 9, he soon relieved Paleologue as Ambassador and served in
that capacity until his return to France in the beginning of June. Joseph Noulens
came to Petrograd as permanent Ambassador in mid-summer. During his stay in
Russia, Thomas worked closely with the Government and the Soviet, trying to help
them find common ground, especially in the matter of war aims. He was prepared to
go further than his own Government in the direction of revision, though at the same
time he strongly urged and supported the Russian plans for an offensive.]
The French socialist minister Albert Thomas attended the Executive Commit
tee meeting on May 29, In a speech addressed to members of the Executive Com
mittee, A. Thomas noted that he has more than once had the opportunity to express
the attitude of the majority of French socialists toward the present war. Such an
exchange of views between French and Russian comrades had resulted in an
agreement that consisted of a commitment by French socialists to adopt all possi
ble measures in order to force the French Government to renounce imperialistic
war aims. The French socialists assumed this obligation on the condition that
Russia would not conclude a separate peace and would adopt measures to preserve
the effective strength of her army. We abided by our commitments, said A.
Thomas, although it meant the expense of great efforts. It led to the complete
isolation of French socialists from the rest of the democratic trends in France. It
was under the influence of the French socialists that Ribot announced his re
pudiation of secret agreements.
The resolution of the French Chamber [of Deputies] was subjected to serious
attacks by Russian comrades, but they did not take into account the fact that it
included a renunciation of imperialistic aims of the war.
So far as concerns a plebiscite and Alsace-Lorraine, it must be remembered
that the French socialists expressed themselves in favor of a plebiscite a long
time ago.
Thomas, in his turn, emphasized that Russian socialists have honestly fulfilled
the obligations they assumed. The answer to the German radio-telegram3 and
other practical measures have confirmed this beyond any doubt.
We are waiting for further real steps. But just recently alarming news has been
appearing. A. Thomas considers the article in Izvestiia Without Annexations
and, most of all, the text of the invitation of the Soviet to the Stockholm
Conference,4 which spoke of terminating the policy of national unity, to be
such news.
In any event, A. Thomas would like to receive definite answers from Russian
comrades on all current issues before he leaves Russia.
Members of the Executive Committee assured A. Thomas that he will be given
such answers at the earliest possible moment.
983. V andervelde B efore the F irst A ll -R ussian Congress of S oviets
[Izvestiia, No. 90, June 13,1917, p. 5. Emile Vandervelde and Henri de Man, Belgian
socialists, arrived in Russia on May 5 and made a five-week tour of the country and
the front, speaking for the continuation of the war until German militarism should be
destroyed. In his reply to Vanderveldes speech, Chkheidze rather obviously reminded
him that the Russian democracy wished to see the liberation not only of Belgium, but
of the proletariat of all belligerent countries by their united action in the direction of
8 Doc. 1006. 4 See Docs. 1018-20.
1118 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
a peoples peace. Ibid. For Vanderveldes opposition to the Stockholm Conference,
see Doc. 1020. After his Russian visit, Vandervelde published his impressions in Three
Aspects of the Russian Revolution.']
Comrades, in 1914 I came to Petersburg in order to greet the socialists on
behalf of the socialist workers of Belgium. I came to advocate a unification of
socialist forces. Now this union among socialists is more necessary than ever.
Russia is passing through a critical period. All the evils that were generated
by tsarism and that led to the revolutionthe disorganization of finances, eco
nomic chaos in the countryall these pose a great problem to the revolutionary
democracy and demand a unification of all its forces for a super-human effort.
This is a critical hour. But it is not only for you that it is criticalit is critical
for the whole world. The question now stands as follows: will despotism triumph
in the world or will the people be able to breathe the air of freedom after all these
years of suffering and struggle[?]
I would like to believe that it is possible to have this international union among
all who sincerely want to provide the people with the opportunity for self-determi
nation, the opportunity to become masters of their own destiny and be independent
of external and internal masters.
We are in complete agreement with your aim. Like you, we would renounce
any war, with the exception of a war of liberation, or a war which, by its nature,
is one of legitimate self-defense. Like you, we do not want to encroach on the na
tional property of other peoples, whether in the form of territorial seizures or in
the form of imposing any indemnities.
There is an agreement on aims between us, but we disagree on the means [of
achieving these aims]. . . .
But what do our differences amount to in comparison to that which unites us:
the [idea of] internationalism, which lives in the hearts of the Belgian workers, in
your hearts, in the hearts of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, who are in
carcerated because they rose against German imperialism, [and] in the hearts
of the revolutionaries of the great country of France which overthrew the Bastille.
For three years now Belgium has endured days of hardship, but this year social
istic Belgium experienced a day of great joyit was the day when Russia over
threw the yoke of tsarism. It is true that our joy became intermingled with certain
feelings of anxiety as the question arose in our minds: will the revolution be able
to fulfill the task with which it is confronted? Now, as I depart, I carry away a
favorable impression. Before my eyes the coalition government was formed and
now acts as a Committee of Public Safety. Before my eyes, Kerensky worked on
the organization of a revolutionary army. And now, I see before me the Congress
of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputiesthe organ which must consummate
the cause of the revolution. We know from history that in the course of its develop
ment any revolution goes beyond the boundaries of the country that gave birth to
it. The French revolution liberated Europe. The Russian revolution will liberate
the whole world. . . .
984. T rotsky s Com m ents on th e E ve of th e F irst A ll -R ussian
C ongress of S oviets
[Izvestiia., No. 82, June 3,1917, p. 4. For Lenins similar views, see his article in Pravda,
No. 75, June 13,1917, translated in the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin: The Revolution
of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 224-25.]
MAY TO OCTOBER 1119
I consider it necessary, first of all, to insist on the class character of the war
now being waged.
The war now being waged is an imperialist war, and democracy must conduct
the bitterest fight against this imperialist war. After all, the Russian revolution
has in no way changed its imperialist character. As before, the whole state ap
paratus lies in the hands of the bourgeoisie, permeated throughout with imperialist
ambitions. If the bourgeoisie remains in power, it will apply all its efforts to
achieving its imperialist goals.
Thus, the present war is imperialistic. The tactics of the Petrograd Soviet
[and] its efforts to create an efficient army are therefore only playing into the
hands of the ruling bourgeoisie.
Its pressure on the Allied government is absurd. It is answered by one slap in
the face after another. The occupation of Albania by Italy, the coercion of Greece
by England and France, testify to this. And I assert (says Comrade Trotsky) that
a separate peace will be a consequence of the policy which the Provisional Govern
ment is pursuing with the support of the majority of the Petrograd Soviet.
What is now happening in the army, i.e., fraternization or actual truces, is a
spontaneous occurrence, a product of the revolution, and no efforts on the part of
the Soviet to create an efficient army will create fighting efficiency, since spon
taneity cannot be stopped.
And the international conference, is it going to liquidate the warthe war of
the imperialists? I will answer you: nothis is self-deception, this is an illusion.
Only a European revolution, only a ruthless fight on the part of all the proletariat
against their bourgeois and imperialist governments will end the war. And this
revolutionary ferment is growing day by day throughout Europe.
And only by seizure of power will the proletariat once and for all insure itself
against imperialism.

985. R eso lu tio n on t h e W ar by t h e F ir st A ll-R u ssian


C ongress o f S o v iets
[Reck9, No. 136, June 13,1917, p. 4, as translated in Golder, pp. 370-71.]
The present war was brought on by the ruling classes of all countries in their
imperialistic attempts to get new markets and bring small and weak states under
their economic and political control. This conflict is leading all countries and
peoples to economic exhaustion and the Russian revolution to ruin. The destruc
tion of millions of lives and milliards of property threatens to increase the disorder
left by the old regime, drives Russia to famine, and prevents the carrying out of the
necessary measures for strengthening the revolution.
The All-Russian Congress of Soviets realizes that an early end of the war is the
most important object of the revolutionary democracy. It is needed for the sake
of the revolution and for the sake of the laboring classes of all countries. They
must reestablish the fraternal union and work together for the full freedom of
humanity.
The All-Russian Congress resolves (1) That to end the war by the destruction
of one group of belligerents would merely lead to new wars, would intensify the
hate between peoples, would lead to complete exhaustion, famine, and ruin; (2)
That a separate peace would strengthen one of the belligerents, make possible a
victory over the other, encourage the predatory ambitions of the ruling classes,
1120 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
would not free Russia from the clutches of world imperialism, and would make
difficult the international union of labor. For this reason the Congress is cate
gorically opposed to all attempts aiming to bring on a separate peace or a separate
truce.
In view of the fact that war can be brought to an end only through the united
efforts of the democracies of all countries, the Congress regards as essential (a)
that the Russian revolutionary democracy, through its organ, the All-Russian
Soviet, should address itself to the democracies of all States, asking them to join
in the rallying cry: Peace without annexation and indemnity, and on the basis of
self-determination of peoplesand try to influence their governments along these
lines; (b) that it [Russian democracy] should make every effort to reestablish the
revolutionary international and call together an international Socialist Congress
to reestablish the international labor solidarity, to work out definite peace terms,
and means to put them into force; (c) that it should call to the attention of the
democracies of all warring countries that their failure to contradict with sufficient
energy the last declarations of their governments on the question of war aims
puts die Russian revolution in a very difficult position and stands in the way of
international labor union. ,
In order to accomplish these tasks, a mission should be dispatched at once
to the Allied and neutral States to invite them to send to Russia representatives
of the different Socialist groups. The Congress firmly protests against the obsta
cles placed in the way of Socialist delegations by the imperialist governments.
Realizing that the Provisional Revolutionary Government has made the foun
dation of its foreign policy the carrying out of the democratic program of peace,
the Congress urges the Government to do all that it can . . . to persuade the
Allies to accept this program.
The Congress urges that the Government should now do all that it can to have
a re-examination of the treaties with the Allies wilh a view to abandoning the
policy of conquests. In order to hasten this step, it is necessary lo change the diplo
matic and foreign office personnel, with a view to making it more democratic.
The Congress takes the stand that until the war is brought to an end by the
efforts of the international democracy, the Russian revolutionary democracy is
obliged to keep its army in condition to take either the offensive or defensive. The
destruction of the Russian front means defeat for the Russian revolution and a
heavy blow to the cause of international democracy. The question whether to take
the offensive should be decided from the purely military and strategic point of
view.
986. T h e F oreign M inister s N ote of J une 3 P roposing an A llied
C onference for t h e R evision of W ar A im s
[VVP, No. 70, June 3, 1917, p. 1. Printed also in Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, I, 501-2.
The note was handed to Albert Thomas before his return to France and was commu
nicated to all the Allies. In a dispatch to Nabokov in London on May 24, however,
Tereschenko, wrote that at the present moment it would not be in our interest to
call for an immediate exchange of views on this matter with our Allies. This moment
will come when, as we firmly believe, the present efforts of the Provisional Government
to restore the situation at the front are crowned with success. Ibid., I, 498. On
May 21, Premier Sonnino had telegraphed the Italian Minister in Rumania that, having
heard nothing more from Petrograd concerning a review of agreements, he assumed
MAY TO OCTOBER 1121
that the Russian Government did not wish to take the responsibility for this under
taking which would touch first of all on the concessions made by the Allies with regard
to Constantinople. He continued with the assertion that the Royal Government can
not permit any review of the treaties formerly concluded with the Allies that would
reflect on the advantages lawfully acquired by it owing to its participation in the war.
Ibid., I, 495.
Almost simultaneously with the dispatch of this note, Tereshchenko vigorously pro
tested the British-French inspired coup in Greece which led to the abdication of King
Constantine and Crown Prince George in favor of the second son, Prince Alexander,
and the subsequent entry of Greece into the war on the Allied side on July 2 (N.S.)-
Tereshchenko resented the lack of Allied consultation with Russia and feared the
action would further complicate the war aims controversy. Adamov, Evropeiskie der-
zhavy i Gretsiia, pp. 193, 201, 204, 211-12.]
The Russian revolution represents not only a radical change in the internal
regime of Russia, but also a powerful ideological movement, expressing the will of
the Russian people in its aspiration toward equality, freedom, and justice both in
the internal life of the country and in the sphere of international relations. The
Russian revolutionary Government draws its strength from this will, and its duty
and task is to serve it.
Defending the great principles of freedom by its external struggle, Russia
strives to achieve general peace on a basis that would exclude all violence from
whatever source, and also all imperialistic designs, whatever form they assume.
She herself does not nourish any aggressive tendencies and resolutely opposes any
kind of attempt in this direction. True to these principles, the Russian people has
firmly decided to fight the open or concealed imperialistic tendencies of our ad
versaries, in the political sphere as well as in the economic and financial spheres.
Even if differences of views may arise between our Government and [the gov
ernments] of our allies with regard to the aims pursued in the war, we do not doubt
that the close unity between Russia and her allies will fully guarantee general
agreement on all issues, founded on the principles proclaimed by the Russian
revolution.
While remaining unswervingly loyal to the common Allied cause, the Russian
democracy welcomes the decision of those Allied powers which have expressed
their willingness to meet the desire of the Russian Provisional Government to
revise the agreements concerning the basic aims of the war. We propose the con
vocation for that purpose of a conference of the representatives of the Allied
powers, which could be held at an early date, as soon as the circumstances become
favorable. Only the agreement signed in London on September 5 (N.S.), 1914,
and since made public, which excludes the possibility of any power concluding
a separate peace, should not be subject to discussion at the conference.
May 31/June 13,1917

987. Izvestiia *s Comment on N ote


[No. 83, June 4,1917, p. 2.]
Yesterday the Provisional Governments note on foreign policy questions was
published. This note gives a completely clear outline of the paths the Provisional
Government intends to follow in its fight for the earliest conclusion of peace.
1122 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
This broad, international formulation of the question of the Russian revolu
tions fight against a system of world imperialism is not weakened, but on the
contrary, is confirmed by the determination of the Russian people to fight against
any open or veiled imperialistic schemes on the part of its enemies. Without such
a determination the Russian revolution could not claim that it carries the banner
of the struggle for universal peace.
The note ends with statements on the ways and means of revising agreements
concluded between Russia and her allies. A conference of representatives of Allied
countries must be called for this purpose. The conference must take place as soon
as favorable conditions present themselves.
When will such conditions arise?
We assume that such conditions can arise only as a result of an international
struggle of democracy against world imperialism. Only such a struggle can in
duce the governments of England and France to comply with the demands of the
Russian revolution. The international conference to be convoked in Stockholm
at the initiative of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies must play a decisive role in the development of such a
struggle. . . .
Thus, the Provisional Governments note, published yesterday, marks a deci
sive change in Europes approach to international politics. For the first time, the
Russian revolution will take full advantage of the possibility of exerting influence
on Europe by means of the diplomatic apparatus that was made available to it
by the creation of the revolutionary coalition government.

988. B a k h m etev U rg es A m erican P a rticip a tio n in t h e C o n fe ren ce


[Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, I, 402.]
July 11 /24,1917
No. 409
Urgent
Very secret
The mention in the last declaration of the reconstructed Government of its in
tention to convene an Allied conference for the discussion of war aims makes it
necessary to take in this connection and without any delay some steps with regard
to the American government. The newspapers are already discussing whether
America will be invited to participate and what the nature of this conference will
be. I am deeply convinced that any delay in the matter of proposing American
participation in the conference, and especially an invitation to join it simply on
the general basis of the participation of all the powers waging war against Ger
many, would be a grave political mistake. Such a method of handling the matter
would deprive us of the opportunity at this conference to avail ourselves of Amer
icas direct support for the new democratic direction of our foreign policy. The
voice of Russia might find a powerful seconding in the United Slates of North
America if we addressed ourselves in time with the request that they work with
us hand in hand in the elucidation of the purposes of war. I request a prompt an
swer and the authorization to make such a declaration to America. However, I
must forewarn you that in view of the importance of the situation, I would be
MAY TO OCTOBER 1123
obliged to express myself in the affirmative, should I receive some enquiry on the
part of America before obtaining your answer.
B ak h m et ev

989. T ereshchenko A pproves B ak h m et ev s R ecommendation and


A dvises that the Conference M ust B e P ostponed
[Adamov, Konst. i prolivy, I, 402-3.]
July 15/28,1917
No. 3181
I have received telegram No. 409.
I share completely your views regarding the importance of drawing America
into close cooperation on the general issues of foreign policy, in particular in the
forthcoming inter-Allied conference for the elucidation of war aims. However,
at the present moment, in view of the latest events at the front and the situation
within the country,5 I deem it necessary to postpone somewhat the proposed con
ference and, suspending for the time being all negotiations with respect to future
peace conditions, to concentrate all our attention on the continuance of the war.
Of course, this circumstance should not interfere with your proceeding in your
endeavors tending to secure the active support of America in favor of the basic
principles of our foreign policy. For your personal information I would add that
up to now we have not approached any country through diplomatic channels with
an invitation to take part in the conference.
T ereshchenko

990. R ussian M essage to the A llies F ollowing the F ailure of the


O ffensive and the D isorders of th e July D ays , July 19
{VVP, No. 108, July 19,1917, p. 1.]
Russias Message to Her Allies
At the moment, when new and grave misfortunes are threatening Russia, we
consider it our duty to give our allies, who have shared with us the burden of
the trials of the past, a firm and definite explanation of our point of view as to
the conduct of the war.
The great tasks of the Russian revolution correspond to the magnitude of
the upheaval it has caused in the life of the state. Reorganization of the entire
governmental system in the face of the enemy could not be effected without serious
disorders. Nevertheless, Russia, convinced that there existed no other means of
safety, has continued common action at the front in accord with her allies. Fully
conscious of the difficulties of her task, Russia has taken up the burden of con
ducting active military operations during the reconstruction of the army and of
the Government. The offensive by our armies that was made necessary by the
strategical situation encountered insurmountable obstacles, as much at the front
as in the interior of the country. The criminal propaganda of irresponsible ele
ments was made use of by enemy agents, and provoked a revolt in Petrograd. At
the same time, part of the troops at the front, seduced by the same propaganda,
8 The failure of the offensive and the July Days.
1124 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
forgot their duty to the country, and made it easy for the enemy to pierce our
front. The Russian people, stirred by these events, showed, by their Government
created by the revolution, an unshakable will, and the revolt was crushed, and its
instigators brought to justice. All the necessary steps have been taken at the
front for restoring the combat strength of the armies. The Government intends
to bring to a successful end the task of establishing an administration capable
of meeting all dangers and of guiding the country on the path of revolutionary
regeneration.
Russia will not suffer herself to be deterred by any difficulty from carrying
out her irrevocable decision to continue the war to the final triumph of the
principles proclaimed by the Russian revolution. In the presence of the enemy
menace, the country and the army will continue, with renewed courage, their
great work of restoration as well as of the preparation on the threshold of
the fourth year of war, for the coming campaign. We firmly believe that Russian
citizens will combine all their efforts for the fulfillment of the sacred task of
defending their beloved fatherland, and that the enthusiasm which lighted in their
breasts the flame of faith in the triumph of liberty will direct the whole invincible
force of the revolution against the enemy who threatens the country. We know
that our liberty, as well as that of all humanity, depends on the issue of this
struggle. The fresh trials imposed on it by the crimes of traitors can only
strengthen still more the consciousness felt by the Russian people of the necessity
of concentrating all its forces and all its possessions on one supreme effort for
the salvation of the fatherland.
Strong in this consciousness, we are convinced that the retreat of our armies
will be only temporary, and that it will not prevent them, reorganized and re
generated, from resuming at the appointed hour their onward march in the name
of the defense of the fatherland and of liberty, and that they will victoriously
finish the great work for which they have been compelled to take up arms.
T ereshchenko

991. N abokov s A ccount of R ussian T reatment at O ne of the


P eriodic A llied Conferences
[C. Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, pp. 126-30.]
At the end of July, 1917, an Inter-Allied Conference was to be called in
London. These Conferences took place at regular intervals, about once in a
month, when questions cropped up which made it necessary to reaffirm and to
foster complete solidarity by means of personal consultations between the Prime
Ministers and Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Powers. Two days before the
appointed date, the French Charge dAffaires (Monsieur Cambon was away on
a short leave) informed me of Monsieur Ribots arrival, and expressed surprise
at my not having been invited to take part in the Conference. He added that he
would not fail to inform the French Prime Minister. On the morning of the day
when the first meeting had been fixed for noon, I received instructions from
Petrograd which required that I should have a personal interview with the
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. I rang up the Foreign Office at about
11:15 and received the reply (it was a Monday) that Mr. Balfour would be
unable to see me before Thursday, as he was very busy attending the Inter-Allied
MAY TO OCTOBER 1125
Conference. I thanked my informant for the very interesting news that an Inter
Allied Conference was sitting in London. The Russian Representative naturally
finds this information particularly interesting, as Russia is one of the Powers
of the Entente. A few minutes later I was requested to attend the Conference
at 10, Downing Street. Time was short so that I was unable to conform with the
etiquette and don a morning coat. 1 just managed to get there in time by jumping
into a taxicab. Everybody had already arrived, when I reached Downing Street.
The entire British Cabinet was present, as well as Lord Bertie, the British
Ambassador in Paris. The French Cabinet was represented by the Premier,
Monsieur Ribot, Mr. Painleve, Monsieur Albert Thomas, Marshal Foch and
others. Baron Sonnino, Marquis Imperiali and an Italian General were also
present.
Mr. Lloyd George presided. Before starting the discussion on the matters
which formed the object of the gathering, the Prime Minister suggested that a
stern protest be sent to the Russian Government against the continuation in
Russia of disruption and anarchy. After the French Prime Minister and the
Italian Foreign Minister had spoken, Mr. Lloyd George addressed to me the
remark: I should like to hear the views of the Russian Charge dAffaires in this
matter. I must confess that at this moment the thought flashed through my
brain: no wonder no Russian Ambassador has had the courage of tackling this
job. To ask the representative of an Allied country what he thought of a col
lective protest being addressed to his country by her Allies was indeed an un
precedented predicament.
As a result of the deliberations that followed, Monsieur Thomas was requested
to draft a message to the Kerensky Government, and the message was approved
by the Conference and dispatched in the following terms:
Les Representants des Gouvernements Allies reunis a Londres le 7 Aout,
saluent de tout leur sympathie 1?ardent effort de reorganisation que poursuivent
dans la Russie libre le Gouvernement Provisoire et son chef.
Ils constatent avec satisfaction quen cette heure tragique toutes les forces
russes se serrent autour du Gouvernement pour renforcer son pouvoir et que la
volonte populaire, exprimee sous des formes de jour en jour plus sures et par
une representation plus complete, proclame tres haut la necessite de la defense
nalionale.
Ils adressent leurs voeux les plus chaleureux a Monsieur Kerensky et a ses
collaborateurs et expriment une ferme confiance dans leur autorite croissante et
dans le retablissement dune stricte discipline, indispensable sans doute a toute
armee, mais plus encore aux armees des peuples libres. Cest par la discipline que
Farmee Russe assurera tout a la fois la liberte populaire, Thonneur de la nation,
et la realisation des buts de guerre communs a tous les Allies.
Such was the strong protest.
The lesson given to Kerensky in this message is, of course, perfectly ob
vious, but it is administered in terms which exclude the possibility of any feeling
of slighted national honour.
The incident is illuminating. Also, it should be noted that the matters dis
cussed at the subsequent meetings of the Conference were purely military. No
Russian military representative, however, was invited to attend, and my opinion
was asked merely as a matter of courtesy. General Dessino, who was then the
representative of the Russian General Headquarters with the British High Com
1126 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
mand, was very angry with me for not having insisted upon his participation
in these deliberations. It was by no means an easy task for me to persuade him,
that by avoiding any mention of Russian military representatives at the Con
ference I had merely saved him the humiliation of hearing remarks about the
Russian army which would have not been to his liking.
992. R ibot , A lleging R ussian O bjections , R efuses the R equest for
P ublication of th e B riand-P okrovskii A greement
[Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 44, September 21 (N.S.), 1917, p. 419.
This controversy apparently began with the disclosures and accusations of the German
Chancellor Michaelis in the middle of July concerning the February agreements (Doc.
921). Ribot replied in the French Chamber of Deputies with an account of the cir
cumstances and a promise to publish the documents. Ibid., Ser. 3, No. 99, July 31
(N.S.), 1917, p. 815, and Ser. 4, No. 2, August 2 (N.S.), 1917, pp. 13, 14. Teresh
chenko gave his consent, but cautioned Ribot that the disclosures would no doubt
reflect unfavorably on the attitude of our public opinion toward France unless France
simultaneously modified her claims contained in the agreement. Adamov, Konst, i
prolivy, I, 506-07. Ribot seized upon this mild demurrer, as seen below, to retract,
on September 6, in the Chamber, his earlier promise.]
I said several months ago with the approval of the whole Chamber that we
had no secret diplomacy, and that France was ready to say everything because in
her terms of peace she was actuated by no spirit of covetousness, but demanded
only justice. I said that I would publish the documents which formed the subject
of diplomatic agreements. The documents are ready. I can publish them tomor
row, but that does not depend upon me alone. We have allies. We must walk
with them hand in hand with unreserved confidence. The nearer we approach the
end of the war the more careful must we be to baffle the manoeuvres attempted by
the enemy with the object of separating the Allies. We shall be victorious if we
remain united. Germany knows it, and the sole aim which she now pursues is to
separate with the object of weakening us. It is from Petrograd that the request
reached me to defer publication. In the difficult situation in which our great ally
now finds herself I must not add to her difficulties. Have I not spoken with suf
ficient clearness? Is there any doubt about our peace conditions, about what we
demand, and about what we shall obtain (for if we were not to obtain it, death
and dishonour would be the result for this country) ? We did not enter the con
flict with warlike designs. For forty-five years we desired peace notwithstanding
the bleeding wound in our side. And today, after all the French blood that has
been shed during this long struggle which was imposed upon us, what do we
want? Justice.

993. T ereshchenko D enies R ibot s A llegations and I nforms F rance that


R ussia H as No O bjection to the P ublication of A ll A greements
[Adamov, Konst, i prolivy, 1, 510-11. After his statement of September 6 in the Cham
ber, Ribot told the Russian Charge dAffaires in Paris that Tereshchenko had informed
Noulens that the publication of the February agreement would oblige the Provisional
Government to state its views on the Straits agreement, which would be inadvisable
under the existing circumstances. Ibid., I, 510. Tereshchenkos telegram below is in
reply to the Charges report of his conversation with Ribot.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1127
In the course of these exchanges, the Charge advised Tereshchenko that Ribot felt
the Asia Minor agreement stood apart, meaning that since it was not yet completed,
it was not subject to possible publication. Tereshchenko misunderstood the phrase to
imply that the agreement was not connected with the Straits agreement, and dispatched
a heated and revealing reply in which he stated that its [the Asia Minor agreement]
execution depends on the execution of the agreement concerning the Straits. . . .
the Asia Minor agreement cannot be contemplated apart from the agreement concern
ing Constantinople, and, contrariwise, any alteration in the latter will unavoidably
reflect, in one way or another, on the former. . . . You are requested to adhere strictly
to the above point of view in the event of a further exchange of ideas with the French
Government. Ibid., I, 511-13.]
September 11/24,1917
No. 4223
I refer to your telegrams Nos. 947 and 952.
The explanations Ribot gave you with respect to his declaration in the Cham
ber on the February agreement concerning the eastern borders of France were
unfortunately not quite sincere. Neither in my exchange of notes with Paleologue
nor in my verbal explanations to Noulens has the question of a connection between
this agreement and the one concerning Constantinople and the Straits been raised.
Noulens suggested to me that at the same time as the agreement regarding the
French border was published, the treaties which had been concluded before the
war, in fact, the Franco-Russian military convention might be published. To this
I remarked that the publication of such a widely known treaty would cause the
greatest perplexity in public opinion and new entreaties for making public agree
ments entered upon during the war, whose publication, in particular the Italian
and Rumanian agreements, is apparently considered inadmissible by our allies.
In any case, it is far from our intention to create difficulties for France in this
matter, or to place Ribot in a still more awkward position. However, to avoid
in the future misunderstandings similar to those which have already occurred
twice, owing to statements made by him in the Chamber, I ask you to declare
officially to the French Government that there are no objections on the part of
Russia with regard to making public all the agreements in general, concluded
either prior to or during the war, provided the consent of the other interested
Allies is obtained. As regards the Asia Minor agreement, I will let you know my
views later in a separate telegram.
T ereshchenko

994. T h e R e v iv a l o f P la n s f o r an A llie d C o n fe ren ce


[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 183, September 28, 1917, p. 1. After several postponements
in the summer and early fall, the conference was scheduled to convene in Paris on
November 3, though earlier Tereshchenko had expressed his preference for London.
A. Popov, Inostrannye diplomaty o revoliutsii 1917 g., KA, XXIV (1927), 157-58.
Tereshchenko was to attend as Russias principal delegate and General Alekseev as
the military representative. The declaration referred to was that of the last coalition
ministry of the Provisional Government and is printed in Volume III, as is the Declara
tion of July 8, which had also promised that Russia would include among her dele
gates a representative of the revolutionary democracy.]
The declaration [of September 25] of the Provisional Government once again
speaks of revising the agreements concluded among the Allies. The Paris con
1128 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ference to be convoked for this purpose has been postponed more than once, and
has again been postponednot for long, we hope. In any case, the Central Execu
tive Committee is busy with the selection of its delegate whose appointment will
be confirmed by the Provisional Government, and who will go to Paris together
with the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the capacity of a representative not only
of the Russian democracy, but of the Russian republic as a whole.
This will be the first case in the history of diplomacy of a representative of
a nation not being a member of the Government, but a member of a central revolu
tionary organization* The Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, in the
person of their representative, are finally receiving a real opportunity to exert
their influence on foreign policy, and, moreover, at a most opportune time and
on a vital question.
After not only the democratic press, but even Baron Rosen, the former am
bassador of Nicholas II, expressed doubts whether our allies have no desires in
compatible with our program of peace, it is time to put an end to any uncertainty
on this question. It must be stated clearly and openly that we want a democratic
and just peace, and it is equally necessary to ask whether our allies want the
same thing and receive a clear answer to this. It is necessary to ask themand
to receive their answerwhether they are willing to enter into peace negotiations
if the opposing side will accept peace without annexations and indemnities on
the basis of the right of nations to self-determination as the basis for the nego
tiations.
Until now we have been committed to our allies by secret agreements con
cluded under Nicholas II. We do not know the contents of these agreements, but
we suspect that they do not correspond to the principles of the resolution. Such
agreements are not worthy of a free country. They must be destroyed and a
new agreement must be concluded in their place. It must, above all, be public
and open. It must state explicitly that the Allies strive neither for annexations nor
for indemnities, that they desire only a lasting peace, guaranteed not by the
Government but by the peoples themselves.
Will our allies consent to conclude such an agreement? We think that they
will, once they see that the Russian democracy firmly adheres to its policy.
In France, England, and Italy, the vast majority of the people are striving for
the very same peace for which we are striving. This aspiration is not as strong
everywhere as it is in our country, but it exists everywhere. And the delegates
of the Russian republic will find firm support for their policy in this fact. The
previous policy of the Central Executive Committee has already found safe
grounds [for this support] and it may be used as a firm basis for the policy of
peace.
If the agreement will be revised in the spirit of our revolution and will be
made public, it will serve as an impetus for entering immediately into peace
negotiations. For in the countries at war with us there exists just as strong a
movement for peace without annexations or indemnities as in our own country.

995. I nstructions D rawn Up by the Central E xecutive Committee


for the S oviet D elegate to the A llied C onference
[Published in Izvestiia, No. 191, October 7,1917, as translated in Golder, pp. 646-48.
For a summary of the unfavorable reactions of Allied governments to the possibility
MAY TO OCTOBER 1129
of a Soviet delegate at the Conference, see Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revo-
lution, pp. 150-51.]
The Central Executive Committee has accepted the following outline of in
structions, which is to guide its delegate on his mission [Interallied Conference
at Paris].
The new agreement should come out clearly and openly on war aims. It
should be based on the principle peace without annexation, without indemnity,
and on the basis of the right of national self-determination.
Territorial Questions
1. As an unfailing condition to peace, the Germans must evacuate Russian
territory occupied by them. Russia offers full self-determination to Poland, Lith
uania, and Latvia.
2. Turkish Armenia lo receive full autonomy and later, when it has a local
government and international guarantees, the right of self-determination.
3. The Alsace-Lorraine question should be settled by the inhabitants of that
country, under conditions that would give them full freedom of voting. The elec
tion should be organized by the local self-government after the troops of both
belligerents have been removed.
4. Belgium to have her old frontiers and compensation for damages, to be
made from an international fund.
5. Serbia and Montenegro to be restored and to have material aid from the
international assistance fund. Serbia should have access to the Adriatic. Bosnia
and Herzegovina to be autonomous.
6. Disputed areas in the Balkans to have temporary autonomy to be followed
by plebiscites.
7. Rumania to have back her old frontiers, with the obligation to give Do-
brudja temporary autonomy at once and the right of self-determination later.
Rumania to bind herself to put into force immediately the clauses in the Berlin
Treaty about the Jews and to give them equal rights with citizens of Rumania.
8. To have autonomy in the Italian parts of Austria, to be followed by
plebiscites to determine to what State they should belong.
9. To give back to Germany her colonies.
10. To reestablish Greece and Persia.
Freedom of the Seas
To neutralize all straits which give access to inland seas; also the Suez and
Panama Canals. Merchant marine to be free. Privateering to be prohibited.
Torpedoing merchant ships to be prohibited.
Indemnities
All belligerents to renounce war indemnities, either in open or hidden form
(such as for taking care of prisoners). All levied contributions during the period
of the war to be paid back.
Economic Conditions
Commercial treaties not to be made a part of peace conditions. Each country
to be free to follow out its own commercial policy, and the peace treaty is not
to dictate to any State whether it should or should not conclude this or that
1130 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
treaty. All States to bind themselves not to carry on economic blockades after
the war, not to make separate tariff unions, and to grant the most favored na
tion terms to all States without distinction.
Guarantees of Peace
Peace is to be made at the peace congress by the plenipotentiaries selected
by the organs of popular representation. The terms of peace are to be confirmed
by the parliaments. Secret diplomacy is to be done away with. All States to
obligate themselves not to make secret treaties. Such treaties are to be declared
as against the law of nations and void. Without legality, also, are all treaties not
ratified by parliaments.
Gradual disarmament on land and sea, and the going over to a system of
[citizen] militia.
The proposition of Wilsons League of Nations could become a precious
conquest for international law only under the following conditions: 1. That all
States participate on an equal footing; 2. That foreign affairs be democratized
as indicated above.
The Way to Peace
No matter how concretely the war aims may be formulated, the Allies should
make it clear and publish in the agreement, that they are ready to begin peace
negotiations just as soon as their opponents will agree to it on the basis of all
parties renouncing all [territorial] seizures by force.
The Allies bind themselves not to begin secret peace negotiations and to con
clude peace only at a congress and with the participation of all neutral countries.
In addition to the above, the delegate is given, also, the following instructions:
All obstacles placed in the way of the Stockholm Conference to be removed
and, in particular, passports to be given to delegates of all parties and factions
who agree to take part.

996. T eresh ch enko s A ppearance B efore t h e F oreign A ffairs


C o m m ittee of t h e C ouncil of the R epublic ,
O ctober 12
[Komissiia po inostrannym delam, Byloe, VI, No. 12 (1918), 9-23.]
. . . Chairman M. I. Skobelev announced that the Minister of Foreign Affairs
intended to make a report of an informative nature, the contents of which can
not be made public. In view of this, the meeting of the Committee must be closed
and only members of the Committee and members of the Presidium of the Coun
cil may attend.
The Chairmans request was accepted by the Committee and the Chairman
then gave the floor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
M. I. Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, pointed out that he intended
to give a sober and frank appraisal of our international position at the present
moment; only by basing oneself on such appraisal could one count on finding a
way out of the difficult position into which our foreign policy has lapsed as a
result of all the reverses within the country.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1131
First of all, it is necessary to give a concrete formulation to the question of
the possibility and desirability of peace. There exists the opinion that peace could
now be concluded under more favorable conditions than if we were to wait until
spring, when our position could prove to be more difficult. In order to answer
this question, it is necessaryif only from the desire to ensure Russian national
interests in the best possible wayto evaluate the conditions and attitudes in
all the countries at war. In this connection, it is necessary to consider the psycho
logical danger that might arise from a premature address containing statements
on peace. The point is that in the face of conditions which, although not fully
satisfactory, were still in any conceivable way acceptable to her, Germany would
readily enter into negotiations in order to utilize her unquestionable strategic
advantages and the general war weariness for bringing about a conclusion of
peace that is favorable to herself. Such an outcome is all the more likely since
the very differences of opinion on peace terms are gradually being ironed out.
Under such conditions the countries who have been weakened the most by war,
and Russia in Particular, would stand to lose the most. . . .
Turning to an appraisal of the positions of the countries at war, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs remarked that in the camp of our enemies Turkey and Austria
were in the most difficult position.
. . . Turkey, having fallen under German domination, receives but a minimum
of the assistance necessary for her existence; even in financial respects, Germanys
support is extremely insignificant. The Turkish troops are in a state of disinte
gration. . . .
The general war weariness in Turkey is so great that it even penetrates the
ranks of the Germanophile party of the Government. Highly indicative in this
respect is the recent conference of the party of Unity and Progress, at which
many of the resolutions turned out to be unfavorable and even hostile toward
Germany; thus, the conference declared itself opposed to the resettlement of 60,000
families of German colonists in Adana, and the party adopted a similar position on
questions of railroad concessions. But most characteristic in this sense was that
the conference even raised the question of changing the orientation of Turkish
policy in the direction of the Allied powers; the votes split in half on this question,
and il was only at the insistence of the party leaders that it was decided to retain
the former orientation.
In turning to Austria, the Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that our in
formation about her is quite complete inasmuch as almost everything that happens
in that country becomes the property of the press. Apart from extreme difficulties
in food supply as a result of a large crop failure, the country suffers most of all from
national discord. Dissatisfied with partial concessions, waves of oppressed national
feelings are mounting higher and higher. [This national unrest] has spread not
only to Slavic countries like Poland, Czechslovakia, and Croatia, but even to a
part of Hungary. . . .
In Bulgaria there is no evidence of a direct anti-Government movement or of
any real change of attitude in our favor. Nevertheless, a significant degree of war
weariness and a lack of sympathy toward war aims are felt even there; in this re
spect it is significant that only infantry units of the Bulgarian [forces] have been
1132 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
left on the Rumanian front; all the special detachments, however, consist of
Germans.
The position of our chief enemyGermanyis also extremely difficult. Her
manpower reserves are being exhausted, as can be seen from the fact that the older
age [classes] of 1887 and 1888 are being called up for military service, while the
available forces are compelled to travel constantly from one front to the other and
back.
As for the mood, it can be judged from the interrogation of the 20,000 prison
ers-of-war captured in France. All of them complain more or less unanimously
about undernourishment and reveal a fervent desire for peace.
It would be a great mistake, however, to overestimate the significance of the
difficulties noted, since the internal discipline and the general submissiveness to
the Government have not as yet been undermined. . . . One cannot attribute
much significance even to such an unprecedented event in Germany as the mutiny
in the navy: the mutiny was easily suppressed, and in a short while the same fleet
was in action against us in the Gulf of Riga.
The war is having a dire effect on France, especially with respect to her man
power reserve. It is sufficient to say that France has lost 1,400,000 in dead alone,
i.e., the same amount as Russia. The shortage of labor is very keenly felt within
the country. Measures are now being adopted to alleviate this problem by return
ing servicemen of the older age classes, provided that the consequent reduction of
cadres at the front can be compensated by British and American forces. With
respect to war aims, the attitudes in the country cannot be called uncompromising;
thus, for example, the desire entertained at one time in certain circles to take
possession of the left shore of the Rhine has now been rejected even by the Gov
ernment. There is one question, however, to which the attitude of the public is
over-scrupulous, even to the extent of being somewhat unhealthy, and on which,
regardless of party affiliations, it will tolerate no concessions: this is the question
of returning Alsace-Lorraine.
In Italy, it must be admitted, the attitudes are somewhat ambivalent. As is
well known, Italy has suffered less than other countries from the war, because she
is striving to obtain maximum results with the least possible expenditure of effort.
The problems of food and fuel are rather acute. As concerns the attitude toward
the war, there is a rather strong trend of opposition [to it] in the party of official
socialists. However, the above-mentioned difficulties do not give grounds for as
suming a weakening of the countrys will to fight.
England, who entered the war later than the others, has naturally preserved
her manpower and material reserves most of all. The difficulties caused by sub
marine warfare were at one time felt very keenly, but they have now been con
siderably alleviated, thanks to the current methods applied to combatting sub
marines. The acuteness of the food crisis is being allayed by disciplined rationing
comparable to what is taking place in Germany.
With respect to war aims, the position of England is the least clear of all, and
her statesmen exhibit great reserve in defining their desires; only the principle
of defending smaller nations and of national self-determination, proclaimed from
the very beginning as the chief aim of the war, remain entirely firm.
The conditions in the United States are very favorable. The attitude toward
the war is quite unanimous, if one discounts the rather insignificant resistance of
MAY TO OCTOBER 1133
certain Irish elements. Preparations for military activities are assuming vast pro
portions, which is witnessed, for example, by the size of the military budget for
the year 1917-18, which reached 22 billion, i.e., 105 billion rubles at the present
rate of exchange. The preparations are timed for July 1918. It is quite natural that
such energetic preparations [on the part of] America add new strength and energy
to France, which has been weakened by the war.
Turning to Russia, the Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed the opinion that
notwithstanding all the difficulties we are experiencing, our position, objectively,
still includes enormous resources, both with respect to manpower reserves and
food supplies. There is no doubt that we are in better circumstances than other
countries with respect to food; the difficulties, however, arise from the shortage
and the poor functioning of transport. That is why much of what is happening in
our country is completely incomprehensible to foreigners, be they our enemies or
our allies.
At any rate, it is clear that the principal reason for our difficult position lies
not in the material conditions, but in the change in the psychology of the people,
to which we bear witness.
Turning next to a special aspect of foreign policy, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs remarked that, in his opinion, the correctness of the point of view expressed
in the declaration of May 6 [sic] in which the Government rejected P. N. Miliu
kovs former policy, not only on grounds of the principles involved, but also on
the basis of an appraisal of the actual situation, has been fully confirmed by the
present course of events. It is now necessary to put the question directly: what
must Russia try to achieve from the standpoint of her national interests? In this
respect, we ought to establish a minimum of the most essential conditions without
which peace cannot be concluded.
Access to the Baltic Sea must, above all, be included in such conditions. The
creation of autonomous buffer states which gravitate toward Germany would
spell the ruin of Russia. The German press has long ago raised the question of
forming new independent states of the Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania
along the western boundary of Germany- At the present time, the military situa
tion has made it possible to speak about the practical execution of this plan, and
Germany is doing everything in her power to carry it out. It scarcely needs ex
planation that the realization of this plan, closing Russias access to the Baltic
Sea, and, consequently, to free economic intercourse with the West, would be ex
tremely unfavorable to our interests.
Furthermore, it is just as vital to secure our access to the southern seas. This
may be obtained in several ways; apart from the so-called imperialistic plan as
sociated with the acquisition of Constantinople and the Straits, the way has been
opened for various solutions based on agreements. Without predetermining the
question as to which of the alternatives would be most advantageous to us, it is
only necessary to emphasize that the so-called neutralization of the Straits would
be acceptable only if the idea of universal disarmament is realized; otherwise the
situation would turn out to be even worse than prior to the war, because any strong
fleet could cut us off at any time from passage through the Straits.
The third most important condition of peace is the assurance of our economic
independence. Reasoning soberly, we should weigh what is more profitable in this
respect: an economic rapprochement with Germany or with the Allies. In con
1134 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
sidering the possible consequences of this or that decision, it is not difficult to see
that ties with Germany would lead to our complete economic enslavement. Having
an enormous quantity of goods at her disposal, Germany would find an enormous
market for them in our country; under these conditions, and bearing in mind that
Germanys economic expansion is always accompanied by an emigration of her
surplus population and by the attempt to establish political influence, one cannot
but come to the conclusion that Russia, as a result, would become a German colony.
As concerns England, and particularly America, these countries are character
ized by a surplus not of goods but of free capital which cannot earn a sufficient
profit in its own country. It is quite natural that in trying to find profitable invest
ments, this capital could be used for developing our industry and for creating new
fields of industry. This would benefit us, since it corresponds to our own aspiration
for developing our productive forces. Thus there can be no doubt that the preser
vation of economic ties with the Allies would provide us much greater assurance
of economic independence.
Continuing his report, the Minister of Foreign Affairs dwelt on the question
of active preparations for peace, promised by the Provisional Government in ils
declaration of May 6 [sic] . In this respect, the Government has not heard rebukes
for its slowness during the summer months, because the country, not excluding the
democratic elements, understood that the center of gravity in the struggle for peace
lay in the activities of the army and it had channeled its efforts correspondingly.
For this reason, the Allied governments, too, paid careful attention to the state
ments of Russian diplomats as well as to the action on the front. In particular,
the June 18 offensive produced a somewhat exaggerated appraisal in the Allied
countries, whereas our leaders did not attach undue hopes lo the . . . offensive
when they embarked upon it.
Subsequently, when the Government announced in its declaration of July 8
that a representative of the democracy would participate in the Allied conference,
the democracy nevertheless did not insist on the earliest possible convocation of
the conference, believing that preparations must be made for gaining the accept
ance of public opinion in Allied countries which had a poor understanding of our
ideology. This need made itself felt in particular when the rejoicing over our suc
cesses was replaced by a disillusionment occasioned by the terrible failures that
followed.
In the situation that developed, the Ministrys policy with respect to the Allies
consisted of informing them sincerely and frankly about the events, avoiding both
overly gloomy and overly optimistic evaluations. This attitude produced a lively
response on the part of Allied diplomats and established their complete confidence
in us. It stands to reason that the same attitude must form the basis of the forth
coming . . . conference.
As concerns the tasks of [this conference], they will first of all consist of ques
tions of defense, and then the revision of existing treaties and agreements. How
ever, it is ncessary to give a definite warning that the work of the conference
should under no circumstances be regarded as direct preparations for peace, as is
apparently thought at the front.
Pausing on the question of treaties, the Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that
one ought to differentiate between treaties, in the strict sense of the word, and
simple agreements. To the category of treaties one must first of all refer the Rus
sian-French Convention of 1892, which is a fundamental act in defining our rela
MAY TO OCTOBER 1135
tions with France and in providing for mutual commitments in the event of an
attack by a third power. Then there follows the well-known London Treaty of
September 4,1914, on not concluding a separate peace, and, later, the agreements
that conditioned Italys and Rumanias entry into the war. There are still other
agreements, [concluded] independently of these treaties, which bear the character
of an exchange of views or wishes in the event of a successful outcome of the war.
It follows from this that there is no need whatsoever of working out a new Allied
treaty at the conference.
After hearing the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was resolved, at
the suggestion of the Chairman, to postpone the debates on the report until the
next session which was to take place after the Minister had spoken at the general
meeting of the Council. In the meantime the members of the Committee were to
confine themselves to brief questions and clarifications.
P. N. Miliukov, referring to the Ministers words about differences of opinion
in the first composition of the Provisional Government on attainable limits with
respect to war aims, asked for a clarification of the exact substance of these dif
ferences of opinion. As far as the speaker could remember, there was no evidence
of such differences of opinion at the sessions of the Provisional Government.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs did not deny that an official difference of
opinion between P. N. Miliukov and some other members of the Government
was not apparent, but he pointed out nonetheless that the difference of opinion
in regard to feasible war aims was constantly felt. For instance, even A. I.
Guchkov, who announced, essentially, his complete support of P. N. Miliukovs
policy, believed, however, that the actual state of affairs and, in particular, the
deterioration of morale in the army, did not permit a formulation of broad aims,
and that one should therefore not speak about them.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that the views on war aims were
continually changing depending upon the successes or failures in the theater of
war. In this respect, particularly indicative was the mood of General [N. 0.]
Yanushkevich, the former Chief of Staff under the Supreme Commander in Chief,
who at one moment was advocating the most extensive plans of conquest [and]
at the next was prepared to give up Russian territory.
P. N. Miliukov believed that General Yanushkevichs vacillations had no
bearing on the question he raised and that at any rate they could hardly have
influenced the actions of our diplomats. As far as the diplomats are concerned,
it is important to know just what is the significance of the agreements they have
concluded and whether these have been revised during M. I. Tereshchenkos tenure
in office. If not, it must be assumed that they have remained in force.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs confirmed, on his part, that the aforesaid
agreements have not been subjected to revision.
Yu. 0. Tsederbaum [L. Martov] asked about the possibility of reviewing the
agreements wiLh Italy and Rumania. The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that
this issue should be formulated in very concrete [terms]. As is well known,
1136 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Rumania and Italy place great value on even the formal aspect of the agreements
they have concluded, which guarantee them certain advantages in return for their
actions. However, Italys war aims are so vast and disproportionate to the efforts
she is expending that an agreement with her cannot be considered firm. Thus,
for example, her occupation of Albania on the grounds of protective rights over
steps even the formal bounds of the agreement. On the other hand it is no secret
that Italys aspirations conflict to a certain extent with the establishment of an in
dependent state of Yugoslavia, which has encountered widespread support in Rus
sia. Under these conditions, the Minister does not doubt that Italys demands can
and will be a subject of discussion at the Conference.
Yu. 0. Tsederbaum asked whether one could count on England to relinquish
the German colonies and Mesopotamia and [abandon] the threat of an economic
boycott, and whether there were any grounds for fearing that these points might
entice the Allies to conclude peace at the expense of Russia.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that all the pluses and minuses of
the Allies, in the military sense, add up to something of a common whole, ensuring
each one of them against possible disadvantages in concluding peace. In view of
this, an economic blockade is a very vital factor in the negotiations, [one] that
could balance the disadvantages in the position of the Allies; for instance, our
military failures. In this respect, the Minister is authorized, even by Allied am
bassadors, to declare that this unity will under no circumstances be broken, and
that therefore, the interests of Russia should not suffer as a consequence of her
strategic position.
Next, in answer to a question raised by I. Z. Steinberg, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs replied that Austria had not made any official peace proposals to us, but
that she had attempted to start negotiations by way of Polish representatives.
P. N. Miliukov raised the question of whether the vital interests of Russia
were exhausted by those three esssential points that the Minister discussed in his
report, i.e., access to the Baltic Sea, ties with the southern seas, and assurance
of economic independence.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs explained that the above-mentioned points
constitute the minimum [demands] from which Russia can under no circum
stances retreat.
P. N. Miliukov asked what was the basis for the choice of time for revision
of agreements, and would it not have been sounder to postpone it until a more
favorable time, especially if one bears in mind that, according to the Ministers
own words, the sum total of the successes of the Allies ensures us against dis
advantageous peace terms. If the present moment is unfavorable for revisions,
then it should be vigorously opposed.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that here one has to enter the
realm of guesswork. The question of revising agreements must be settled as soon
as possible, if only for the reason that not once since the beginning of the revo
lution have our policy leaders conferred with the Allies, whereas the national
psychology has undergone a great change in this period and it is necessary to
explain it frankly to the Allies. It is much more expedient to establish clear and
explicit aims of war than to risk a cooling in the attitudes of the Allies as a result
MAY TO OCTOBER 1137
of [their] lack of understanding. It should be added that France also desires a
personal exchange of views.
Returning to the question of agreements in regard to Turkey which have al
ready been made public in the German Reichstag, Baron B. E. Nolde said that
he doubted that it would be so easy to force the Allies to renounce their claims.
England has never announced a rejection of [her claims on] Mesopotamia; did
the Minister believe that he would succeed in curing the British of their so-called
imperialism?
The Minister of Foreign Affairs remarked that one cannot put this question
outside of the conditions of time and space, and that one must take into considera
tion the changes in the national psychology. From this point of view, it is neces
sary to induce others to make concessions, since it is dangerous to assume the
initiative of rejecting [earlier claims]. This last can be seen from the recent
example of Ribots statement that he is ready to publish all the treaties with the
agreement of the other Allies; one must assume that this statement was made on
the assumption that Russia was prepared to make concessions in regard to her
war aims. However, when M. I. Tereshchenko answered by consenting to the
publication of the treaties, but stated, at the same time, that Russia had not
raised the question of concessions, Ribot took his statement back, pleading lack
of circumspection. After this, we pointed out once again that the publication
of the treaties was not in our interest, because we did not know the intentions
of the enemy.
As concerns England, the Minister did not think that he would succeed in
effecting a cure in the sense that Baron Nolde indicated, but he considered it
possible and necessary to bring her . . . closer to an understanding of our form
ula for peace.
Baron B. E. Nolde remarked that he doubted that it was possible to operate
so freely and easily with the general interests of the Allies.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized again that it was extremely im
portant to clarify thoroughly the question of Asia Minor and to review it from
the standpoint of our interests. On his part, he would be willing to throw some
light on this subject at a special meeting.
N. 0. Yanushkevich raised a question about the present position of Lithuania
in connection with Germanys plans and the formula for the self-determination
of nations.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that Germany is doing every
thing possible on her part to draw Lithuania into her sphere of influence; a
special elective organ has been instituted with this aim in mind, but it must be
noted that the elections, as always in such cases, were accompanied by certain
pressure. However, in spite of this activity of Germany, which is unfavorable
to us, there are grounds for believing that the extremely difficult economic posi
tion of Lithuania is undermining her gravitation toward Germany. As concerns
the application of the principle of self-determination to Lithuania, here one must
take into account the presence of other nationalities . . . in Lithuanian guber
niyasnamely, Belorussians, Poles, and Jews. In general, the formula for the
self-determination of nations is not a single one, and it allows for very different
applications in practice.
1138 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
9 9 7 . T e r e s h c h e n k o s S p e e c h B efo r e t h e C o u n c il o f t h e R e p u b l ic o n
F oreign P o l ic y a n d in O pp o sit io n to S k o b e l e v s I n s t r u c t io n s ,
O c to ber 16,1917
[VVP, No. 179, October 17,1917, pp. 2-3.]
Proceeding, at the request of the Provisional Government, to an account of
the considerations by which the Provisional Government guides itself in foreign
policy, I must first of all note with deep satisfaction that for the first time a
representative of the Government, responsible for the leadership of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, is being presented the opportunity to speak publicly about
what he is concerned with every minute and every hour. At the same time I
cannot fail to note that the sequence you established on the agenda, namely, the
discussion first of national defense, and second of foreign policy questions, em
phasizes, perhaps by mere coincidence, the direct relationship that exists between
our national defense and our foreign policy.
These two concepts are intimately connected, both in substance, and by some
of their distinctive features. And if you find it necessary to hear some of the
reports on the problems of national defense at a closed session, since you know
that publicity on [such matters] could do harm to our native land, we, in foreign
policy, are confronted by the very same problems. We are clearly aware that
public opinion in the countries at war, including our allies, is keenly following
not only our strategic position at the front, but, also . . . every change, every
fluctuation in the public opinion of our country. This was expressed with undis
guised frankness by von Kuhlmann, Germanys Minister of Foreign Affairs, who
declared in one of his recent speeches that: Paying close attention to the public
opinion in the countries at war constitutes one of the essential tasks of German
diplomacy. It should spare Germany from extending a soft hand when [the situa
tion] is firm and inflexible and, on the contrary, from turning out to be too firm
when the ice has broken. And it is this direction, toward the influencing of public
opinion, that the work of German diplomacy will take.
. . . I would like to speak here, first of all, in completely dry and concrete
terms, without reference to national honor and dignity, but only in terms of
national expediency. And from these considerations of national expediency, it
seems to me that we can and must draw the following simple conclusion: the
foreign policy of Russia must be guided by a correct understanding of the national
interests of Russia. These national interests dictate that Russia cannot remain
isolated, and that the present alignment of forcesleaving aside, again, the ques
tion of commitments and honoris expedient for Russia. [They indicate] further
more that in Russia, just as in the world at large, everyone now is yearning and
aspiring for peace, but that no one in Russia would tolerate a peace that would
be humiliating for Russia and would violate her national interests. Such a peace
would be the greatest historical mistake, [and] they who permit it will answer
for it and be denounced for having thereby retarded for many yearsfor decades,
if not for centuriesthe triumph of democratic principles in all the world. Second,
this peace would not give us what we rightly needa peace thal would not soon
be destroyed again by another war.
These are the points that have guided Russian foreign policy for the past
months, and one of the extremely important tasks of the head of the Ministry
was to arrive at an agreement with all those who may be considered to be repre
MAY TO OCTOBER 1139
sentatives of the Russian nation, and to adhere to a definite program which, in
the opinion of the Government, would correspond to the interests of the state,
and not to keep revising the program under the influence of unexpected events,
or fortuitous successes and failures . . . because there is no single domain in
which a careless, haphazard move would have such long-term and far-reaching
repercussions as in foreign policy.
When future historians study the history of our revolution, they will see to
their dismay that during the first months of the revolution the man who headed
the Ministry of War, who gave all his thoughts and attention to the army and
desired its success more, probably, than any other civilian in Russia, affixed his
signature to a series of documents which undoubtedly wrought harm to the army.
And they will see, with the same dismay, that in the same period, when at the
head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there stood a man who, probably more
than all the rest of the Russian people, was both thinking and writing about the
power and greatness of Russia, Russia approached closest to concluding a separate
peace. I am stating this as a fact.
On taking over the leadership of the Ministry at the beginning of May, the
first thing which I had to come up against was the spontaneous, unrestrained
mood, an elemental wave, which ran counter to the real tasks, to the real interests
of our native land, and which was carrying Russia toward completely unforesee
able ends. . . .You remember the days in May, when the truce that was estab
lished on our front was threatening to bring an end to the war under the pressure
of spontaneous forces by a simple cessation of all military action on the front,
and was propelling the country with uncontrollable force toward a disgraceful
separate peace that was repudiated then, just as now, by all the parties. You
rememberor perhaps it was not clear to you thenwhat efforts and what pains
it cost all the leaders of the various departments . . . and Ministries of the
Provisional Government, to inspire the soldiers at the front with the realization
that this was not the way in which the Russian state must conclude the war or
secure the interests of Russia. And I will say that this period, from May until
the middle of June of this year, was the most difficult and trying period for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
What courage, what strength, filled the speeches of our representatives, in
spired by the offensive and the success which in the beginning of June and in the
middle of July gave wings to our army, and which, by the strength and power
of its thrust, was carrying the idea of the Russian revolution to the countries of
our enemies, and [instilling in them] a fear of it. Perhaps you do not know that
in this period the Austrians had already evacuated the entire area beyond [the
River] San. You remember the fall of the Clam-Martinic Cabinet merely because
it did not make broad enough concessions to the aspirations for vast autonomous
and independent unifications within the framework of the Austrian state. You
remember the rapid changes that took place in the German Government at that
time, and you know, from the delegates of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies who visited the countries of our allies at that time, what an impression
was created in these countries by the powerful thrust of the Russian revolutionary
army.
If this thrust had not been stopped, we would already have peace. But those
profound changes, for which I am not blaming anyonethis is not in my province
but which we apparently inherited from the old regime, owing to ignorance
1140 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and the absence of a sense of responsibility for ones words and actions, succeeded
in undermining our armies and ushering in the next stagethe stage of bitter
disappointments and defeats. And again, speaking in the words of those persons
who were commissioned . . . by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
to familiarize themselves with the attitudes . . . of our allies, to acquaint them
with the goals and aspirations of the Russian democracy, they sensed the tre
mendous disillusionment which our defeat created in all these countries; [they
sensed] the bewilderment and confusion [which seemed to say:] how is it that
the Russian revolution which only in March had appealed so loudly to all the
peoples for fraternal peace, how is it that it has weakened, and not strengthened,
its peoples? And on returning to their comrades, [the delegates] bluntly said
that if the voice of the Russian democracy is to be strong, if it is to be understood
that the declaration renouncing aims of conquest does not stem from weakness
or from the inability to occupy this or that territory, but [is based] on the will
and the ideals of the Russian democracyit is necessary that Russia gain at
least a few victories, somewhere. These were the words which the delegates of
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies brought back with them from
their trip.
According to our foreign policy, the aims of which were clearly defined in
May, these aims as well as the slogan that was formulated must be considered as
consisting of the following, equally important parts: the renunciation of aims of
conquest, the renunciation of the imposition of penalties on the enemy, and, con
sequently, the renunciation of all such penalties being imposed upon us, or our
lands being taken away from usall this is indissolubly connected with the
second part of this program, which thus guarantees that people striving for inde
pendence and self-determination have the possibility of obtaining this independ
ence and this self-determination. Both the Provisional Government and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider it equally impossible to renounce either
part of these slogansits negative part or its positive part. Both parts constitute
a whole, and that is why it is so difficult to understand the recent tendency to
speak only about the first part without mentioning the second.
This tendency is particularly noticeable in all statements which, in one way
or another, are associated with the Central Powers. This slogan exists there, but
it is without the second part. The Russian democratic policy has insisted and
continues to insist on a slogan [made up] of both these parts: the right of nations
to self-determination is just as vital as the renunciation of the aims of conquest.
. . . The whole sphere of the war consists of three parts: strategical problems
to be solved by the armies; political action; and economic relations, both at the
present and in the future. . . .
I would like to say a few words about the present conditions in the camp of
our enemies. In reply to the question . . . are the Central Powers going to win,
I assert emphatically that no, they are not. A victory means the realization of
a definite plan to overwhelm the enemy. They have not succeeded in doing so,
they failed in this a long time ago, when, by the joint action of Russian and
French forces, they were stopped at the approaches to Paris during the battle
of the Marne. Since then the enemy has turned to aggressive defense, but the
realization of the tasks he had set for himself has now become impossible for
him to achieve. . . . And the German people are clearly aware of this situation.
If you follow closely what their press is currently writing, you will see that it is
MAY TO OCTOBER 1141
only the extreme conservative organs of the press that still dream of overwhelming
successes. And even those ordeals which we now have to endure in the strategical
sense, and those ordeals to which our ally, Italy, is now subjectedthey are
[mere] episodes in the over-all struggle, and they will not bring the desired
successes and victories to the Central Powers. And they realize this, and in realiz
ing it, they are making those repeated attempts that now provide an increasingly
clearer picture of their ultimate goals. I believe that never since the beginning
of the war has so much been said about peace and around peace in the countries
at war as at the present time by governmental and public bodies in Germany. . . .
. . . What then are the aims of this [German] group which exerts the pre
dominant influence at the present time and which has advanced the anti-annexa
tionist slogan? What are these aims which cannot be called non-imperialistic,
but which still do not seem to carry the odious term of territorial conquest?
Of all the countries at war, Germany is the only one that had an industry
adapted to war aims long before the war, and that possessed a highly developed
civilian industry; all the other countries, and the countries of the Allies in par
ticular, were compelled to adapt their civilian industry in the course of the war
to the aims of war. And, strictly speaking, there is no civilian industry in France,
England, the United States, and Russia at the present time. All industry has
been geared to military needs, while Germany has retained both [civilian and
war industries]. The civilian industry and the war industry are both functioning.
The war industry has been increased at the expense of the civilian, but both exist.
Germany is a productive country, but it lacks capital. She does not have the
capital that would enable her to develop the countries she is colonizing. These
countries act as markets for her, they are places to which her surplus population
can emigrate and resettle. . . . It is important to Germany that Russia become
isolated from the West, isolated . . . not by annexation, but by a peaceful sepa
ration of certain buffer units which, although very weak economically, would
gravitate toward Germany thus creating a barrier, a curtain, which would separate
Russia from the entire west.
This would at the same time remove the threat of an alliance between Russia
and the Western powers for the purpose of exerting concerted pressure against
Germany. This would also create the possibility of peaceful conquest by the
penetration of German goods and German labor into Russia. And in these pro
grams which are advocated by a whole group of outstanding German scientists,
in the parties which receive the support of not only representatives of the Reichstag,
and of moderate parties, but also of certain representatives of the German Social
Democratic majorityin these programs, the separation of independent buffer
states has been given the foremost place. Having occupied several sections of
the Russian state, Germany is seeking to organize them . . . in such a way that
her influence, her pressure, will tell as soon as the war is over in order that these
states, created as buffer states, can serve her as a lever against Russia. She may
succeed in this in some parts, but on the whole she will not, and the first example
of this is Poland.
Germanys desire to create out of Poland a country that is friendly to her, is
doomed to failure both for economic and political, or rather, national, reasons.
Of all the regions bordering on Russia and Germany, Poland is economically the
strongest and, therefore, she will gravitate toward an economically weaker, rather
than an economically stronger, country. Moreover, she can also colonize, being
1142 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the most densely populated country, and the aspiration for free economic inter
course with Russia does not present any danger for her in this respect. We see,
therefore, that of all the states, Poland has the least sympathy for Germany, and
inspires in Germany the least desire to carry out her aims.
Germany has directed her efforts with far greater energy toward the two
regions that are economically weak and purely agricultural, toward Lithuania and
Kurland. . . . In giving precedence to her economic aims, Germany at the same
time cannot help but experience serious concern over the unfavorable political
developments in these countries. Her economic sway in these countris, and, pri
marily, the [material] exhaustion which these countries are made to endure in
fulfilling the needs of Germany are strongly inciting all the masses against Ger
many, which they now regard . . . as their chief enemy. . . . And in this respect,
how can the Russian people and the Russian democracy, which has so widely pro
claimed on its banner the self-determination of nationalities and peoples, observe
with calm and without anxiety how certain nationalities, under conditions of
severe oppression threatening exile and even death, are trying to achieve the
triumph of their independence.
It is precisely in Austria that this movement is particularly strong. We see
it among the most educated elements and among the . . . working population of
the Slavs, who do not fear oppression and who are trying to obtain this self
determination at the present time; I am referring to Czechoslovakia. And we
see the same thing in the south. There is a constant succession of revolts and riots
in the region of Zagreb. The Yugoslavs consider that this war must provide for
them a solution to the tasks which confront them, the tasks which have been
handed down to them by their forefathers. They cannot reconcile themselves to
the fact that Serbia has been dispossessed. They consider that Serbia must be
reinstated, that these heroic people have a right to this. They aspire for a free
existence, for free unification, and we cannot help but sympathize with this.
I wanted to outline the internal conditions that now exist in the countries at
war with us in order to point out that accidental strategical successesand I
emphasize accidentalare not the deciding factors in determining whether a
country has been defeated or is victorious. In this respect, the whole situation
is such that one can understand Germanys continual efforts to achieve, first, a
split among the Allies, to bring about a definite breach in their [friendship],
which she would proceed to widen with an experienced hand, and then to achieve
the earliest possible conclusion of this war while the difficult internal conditions
in Germany have not yet materialized beyond a shadow of a doubt. , . .
It is necessary to instill in the Russian people the kind of realization and the
determination that will tell them that all the material forces and the manpower
at their disposal must be used for the defense of the state, for the salvation of
the native land. . . . And at this point, speaking about the future and the destiny
[of Russia], I would like to point out why, out of purely practical considerations,
it is so important to remain a member of the present Entente, and not to become
isolated.
Russia has vital interests in both the political and the economic spheres; in
the political sphere I can declare with absolute certainty that there are no grounds-
for the misgivings, expressed by certain Russians who are keenly aware of the
disintegration and disorganization [of the country], that the Allies might take
advantage of this situation to make us shoulder the whole burden of the war and
MAY TO OCTOBER 1143
the solution of its problems. We have received very definite, official statements
to this effect from our Allied representatives, and I can declare, even now, that
the entire war and all the aims which are being realized by this warboth the
pluses and the minuses of the warmust be regarded as a single entity in which
Russias role is an extremely large one. And we must understand this, we must
remember that it is not the government that is waging the war, but the Russian
people, and we must remember that everyone knows how great and how difficult
is the task which Russia is trying to accomplish. On this question, no misunder
standings exist among the Allies. They understand this and they know this.
The second part concerns the ultimate solution to our economic problems.
I have already discussed the fact that our neighbor and enemy looks upon Russia
as a country which provides a good market for her products. . . . If this is so,
if the anti-annexationist program which turns the eyes of Germany upon us is
dangerous for us, if, finding ourselves at war, we must now continue this war with
the countries with which fate has brought us together, with the powers of the
Entente, then would it not be right to formulate the questions of war and peace
as clearly as possible and to establish the closest possible coordination with the
countries fate has thrown us together with in this war? And this explains why
the question of an [Allied] conference was raised so long ago, and why this
question is about to be solved at the present time.
The task of this conference has been clearly defined by Lloyd George. It only
remains for me to add to his statement that the same order will be followed at
the conference as you have chosen to establish in your deliberations and which
has also been uppermost in the resolutions of almost all the parties represented
here. Questions of defense and coordinated action will be placed on the agenda.
At the same time, the aims which, as Lloyd George said, determine the end to
this terrible bloodshed will undoubtedly be established. All these questions are
of extreme importance, and it is the first time since the beginning of the war
that the responsible leaders of foreign policy in the Allied countries have met.
Since the very beginning of the war, this has not yet happened.
But I must make myself absolutely clear at this point in order to avoid any
misunderstandings from any quarter. All these questions will be examined at this
conference of governments, but Russia must be represented as a single entity. . . .
I cannot fail to express my views on those assumptions, which are interpreted by
one of the democratic groups as instructions, by which the delegates to the con
ference, in agreement with the Government and the parties represented in the
Government, must be guided. There have been very many definitions of war aims
in recent times, and, by the way, only very recently instructions to this effect were
published by the Scandinavian-Dutch Commission, which was organizing, or was
intending to organize, the Stockholm Conference. The same point of view was
expressed [in these instructions] with respect to individual questions concerning
this or that country or concerning the future organization of a lasting peace.
As concerns the character of the Stockholm Conference, there has never been
any difference of opinion between the Government and the representatives of the
revolutionary democracy. This conference was regarded as a conference of par
ties, its decisions were to represent an important expression of the public opinion
of significant classes, but they could not have decisive importance for the state
power and the governments. And, in this respect, it is extremely curious to com
pare some of the points [in the instructions given to the Russian delegates] with
1144 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the democratic party program of the Scandinavian-Dutch group, which, as you
know, the democratic representatives of the Allies distrusted, fearing that it might
relegate the interests of the Entente to the background in favor of the interests
of the Central Powers. . . .
In the first place, [let us take] point No. 2 [sic] [of the democratic instruc
tions] which is not found in the Dutch-Scandinavian instructions: the complete
self-determination of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. If we understand the right
of full self-determination for Poland to mean definitely her independence, then
it is difficult for us to understand the self-determination of Latvia and Lithuania
to mean something other than their independence. But I can already see from
the attitudes at the present meeting that our aims in the northern Baltic Sea
are clear and understandable to everyone. Without an ice-free port in the Baltic
Sea, Russia will be thrown back to the times preceding Peter the Great. . . .
Therefore, I consider that this point conflicts with Russias interests, and the
Russian delegates should not be committed to raise this point. They will be con
demned by the Russian people.
Next, I will take up the most vital points for Russian interests: one cannot
speak out of the context of time and place. Certain abstract formulae, certain
principles, involve practical consequences. . . . And thus, the question of neu
tralizing the Straits, and, at the same time, the failure to effect complete disarma
ment, constitute another violation of the interests of Russia. It represents a
return to a position which would be infinitely worse than the status quo ante. . . .
Therefore, I say that the coalition which exists in the Government, that har
mony of views, must also be present at the conference. We must speak the same
language, we must speak within the context of time and place, and we must strive
for the earliest possible conclusion of peace, but, as I have said, of a peace that
would satisfy the national interests of Russia, those interests which demand the
inviolability of her territory, and conditions offering Russia the opportunity for
economic development in the north and the south. [These national interests]
should have legal guarantees. . . . Any precipitous action may bring us damage
not now perhaps, but in the future, and our children and grandchildren will
be saying that we were either right, or wrong, in appraising the tasks of our great
country. We do not want these doubts to exist, we do not want to be seized by
an inner feeling of panic in the course of our struggle in spite of the gravity of
the situation. Russia is a great state, and she will remain a great state regardless
of what happens to her; we must all defend her together. * . .
998. F urther D iscussion of S kobelev s I nstructions in t h e F oreign A ffairs
C om m ittee of t h e C ouncil of t h e R epublic , O ctober 17
[Komissiia po insotrannym delain, Byloe, VI, No. 12 (1918), 23-28. Tereshchenko
was considerably discomforted about this time by the statements in the House of Com
mons by Arthur Bonar Law, Chancellor of the Exchequer, that the Paris Conference
would not discuss war aims, but only the conduct of the war. Buchanan, My Mission
to Russia, II, 202 and Parliamentary Debates, XCVTII, 1187,1487.]
M. I. Skobelev, Chairman, opened the meeting at 9:50 P.M.
V. I. Gurevich noted that it is evident from newspapers that one wing of
the French press has launched a campaign against the participation of a repre
MAY TO OCTOBER 1145
sentative of the Russian democracy in the forthcoming Allied conference; thus,
Clemenceau and Pichon have openly declared that this representative must not
be admitted [to the conference]. On the other hand, in a speech yesterday the
Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly testified to his profound disapproval of the
mandate which the democracy is giving its representative. An extremely ambigu
ous situation has arisen as a result of this, and it would be desirable to find out
the Ministers attitude on this subject.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the newspaper campaign men
tioned is conducted only by organs of tie rightist French press and cannot influ
ence the decisions of the Russian Government. The forthcoming conference of
the Allies will be one of governments and not of parties, and, as such, the person
who joins the Russian delegation under instructions from the democratic organs
will, in the eyes of the whole world, be the same kind of a Russian representative
as her diplomatic and military representatives. Under such circumstances, the
dignity of the Russian Government requires it to assure the acceptance of the
democratic representative, and there is no doubt that the Government will be
able to do this. But in order that the Russian delegation can come to the confer
ence as a united and authoritative body, it is necessary right now to come to an
agreement on how it should act. Meanwhile, the text of the mandate is encoun
tering objections not only from bourgeois circles but from a significant section
of the democracy. Thus, as far as the Minister knows, the Executive Committee
of the Soviet of Peasants Deputies and the cooperative organizations adhere to
somewhat different views.6 Under such circumstances, the representatives of the
democracy must be clearly aware of the meaning of the mandate and the extent
of its constraining powers and they must find ways of reaching an agreement
with the Government.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that he will refrain from entering
into an argument on whether the mandate reflects the views of the entire revolu
tionary democracy or of only certain of its sections. Whichever is the case, he
considers it his duty to say frankly that if the revolutionary policy consists of
causing damage to Russia, then no agreement can be reached under such circum
stances; nonetheless, in his speech of October 16, the Minister criticized the
mandate in extremely mild terms in spite of the fact that this mandate secured
worse peace terms for Russia than those which the Dutch-Scandinavian Com
mittee and the minority of the German Social-Democratic Party were prepared
to offer.
As concerns the publicity given to the criticism of the mandate, it was pro
voked by the circumstance that the Central Executive Committee itself had pub
lished the mandate without giving any warning to the Government and, in so
doing, had caused great alarm in diplomatic circles and in the public opinion
of Allied countries. After this, it cost the Ministry of Foreign Affairs great effort
to persuade Rumania not to abandon the front and lo assure her that we are not
intending to conclude a separate peace. The Russian democracy must consider
the possible consequences of its steps; from this standpoint, a divergence of views
between [the democracy] and the Government is a logical step toward recognizing
the necessity of a separate peace.
Doc. 1003.
1146 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Dissatisfied with the explanations of the Minister, V. I. Gurevich stated that
before the Government publicly criticized the mandate, it should have secretly
reached an agreement with the democratic organs.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that his public reply was pro
voked by the equally public statement on war aims in the aforesaid mandate. It
would seem that the revolutionary democracy, which rebelled so passionately
against secret diplomacy, should not have objected to this procedure.
M. I. Skobelev inquired whether there were any statements issued recently
by the Allies in regard to the composition of the delegation.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the mandate has wrought the
deepest confusion in Italy, France, and England, and has even provoked objec
tions against the participation of the representative of the Russian democracy in
the forthcoming conference. However, the Russian Government has parried these
objections by falling back on the fact that it will assume responsibility for the
composition of the delegation; but in order to justify this statement, in essence,
it is necessary to achieve a harmony of opinion in the delegation, but this is
impossible if the mandate given by the democracy to its representative must be
regarded as binding.
V. I. Gurevich perceived in the Ministers objection an unwillingness on the
part of the Government to understand the point of view of the democracy. The
mandate does not in any way contain compulsory terms for a peace treaty; it
merely outlines answers to questions which might arise at the conference, and
in this respect it does not in any way differ in substance from the broader pro
grams outlined, for example, by the French and British democracies. . . .
Further, V. I. Gurevich raised a question about the date of the conference and
about the reasons for its constant postponement. In addition, it would be inter
esting to know whether the Allies would agree to make an announcement of their
willingness to start peace negotiations provided that the enemy, on his part, would
relinquish all annexationist aims, and whether the Minister intends to encourage
the publication of such a declaration by the Allies.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the conference has been called
for November 3. This date was not reported ahead of time, and correctly so, in
view of the necessity of keeping the delegates trip a secret from the enemy; that
such a precaution is not unwarranted can be seen from the example oi Lord
Kitchener.
To the question about the Allies willingness to enter into peace negotiations
in the event that the Central Powers announce their rejection of annexationist
aims, M. I. Tereshchenko replied in the affirmative. However, the point is that
to date there have been no statements on the part of the Central Powers about
rejecting annexations.
On the subject of the reference made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to
I. G. Tseretelli, M. I. Skobelev remarked that Tseretellis request not to hurry in
calling the conference took place as far back as under Prince G. E. Lvov; besides
at that time it was contemplated to set the conference for August.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs explained that the delay was caused by our
heavy failures at the front; this was understood by everyone and provoked no
objections from any side. That is why, in speaking about the international situa-
MAY TO OCTOBER 1147
tion at the Moscow State Conference, I. G. Tseretelli made no mention of the
date for which the conference had been set.
Developing the arguments of Yu. O. Tsederbaum [L. Martov], M. R. Gotz
pointed out the extreme war weariness experienced in France, which is literally
bleeding to death, and in Italy, where a big military failure has recently been
added to the disorganization of food supplies and the general dissatisfaction in
the country. Under such conditions, can one count on the entry of the United
States to create the slightest change in the correlation of forces of the warring
nations?
The Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that he does not in any way close
his eyes to the difficulty of the situation and that he is ready to base his appraisal
on the most unfavorable assumptions. Thus, he does not hope for a sufficient
restoration of the fighting capacity of our army and he does not exaggerate the
difficulty of the position of our enemies. However, with all this, and also taking
into account the moral uplift which has no doubt occurred as a result of the
latest military successes of the enemy and, in particular, his victory in Italy, he
still believes that the strength of moral resistance and endurance in the Central
Powers wanes faster than in the Allied countries. In Austria and Turkey, espe
cially, the general disintegration has progressed too far, as can be seen from the
detailed facts presented by him at the previous session. Under such conditions
the active participation of the United States, which will have 800,000 men ready
for the front by May of 1918, will be an enormous factor in material and moral
strength.
999. M il iu k o v s R e p l y to T e r e s h c h e n k o a n d A t t a c k U p o n S k o b e l e v s
I n str u c tio n s in t h e C o u n c il o f t h e R e p u b l ic
[Rech9, No. 246, October 19, 1917, pp. 3-4. Closely related to the debate on foreign
affairs was the testimony of War Minister General Yerkhovskii in the joint meeting of
the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committees on October 21, which is found in
Volume III.]
The Minister of Foreign Affairs began his speech with the declaration that
there existed a close, indissoluble link between the defense of the country and
the issues of foreign policy. This assertion is correct, and from this point of
view it would be useful to note that the voting on questions of the countrys
defense has created a relative majority in favor of that opinion within the Pro
visional Council, which from our point of view represents the only statesmanlike
point of view with regard to the issues of the defense. . . . It seems that now
it has been recognized by all that the defense of the country at the present time
is the main task and that for the success of this defense it is necessary that
discipline be restored in the army and anarchy stopped in the country, that order
and the normal course of economic life of the nation be restored. It seems it has
become clear that in order to achieve this, a strong government is essential, [a
government] capable of daring, that is, of acting by compulsion and not only by
those methods of persuasion and moral influence about which once again we
heard from this rostrum from the Minister-President at the first session of the
Provisional Council. Finally, apparently it becomes clear that such a government
could only be a government independent of the external influence of private
1148 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
organizations incapable of rising to a statesmanlike point of view. But there is
a realm into which these ideas penetrate especially slowly and incompletely. That
is the realm of foreign policy.
The root of all our evilsof the disintegration of the army, of the disintegra
tion of the government, and of the disintegration of the countryboils down to
the original, purely Russian view on the problems of our foreign policy, which
view pretends to be the Internationalist view. Formally, if you wish, this view
has been brought to us from abroad and it pretends to bloody ties with the
International. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that originally this view
was exported abroad from Russia and that abroad, in Germany and in Switzer
land, where these things are better understood, it is considered to be a specifically
Russian product, a product of the overheated atmosphere in which the circles
of our emigration were revolving.
Among the genuine foreign products of socialist thinking you will not find
this doctrinaire absolutism or this absolute doctrinairism, this policy of Principi-
enreiterei, as the Germans say, you will not find this readiness to build a house
of cards in a vacuum or to split hairs into four parts. Even if it is a German
method, its application in the case that interests us is genuinely Russian. The
nobleman Lenin only repeats the nobleman Kireevskii or Khomiakov7 when he
asserts that from Russia will come the new word which will regenerate Lhe worn-out
West, which will tear the old banner of scientific socialism and place in its stead
the new banner of direct unparliamentary action of the starving masses, an action
which immediately by physical force would compel humanity to finally break
open the doors to social paradise. . . . They were sincere when they said that
for them the disintegration of Russia would be but a beginning, only a means by
which and with the help of which the disintegration of Germany, France, England,
and of the whole bourgeois world would follow. For them the Russian revolution
is not a goal in itself but only a means, and this should be borne in mind in order
to be fair to them and in order to understand what in the final analysis constitutes
the meaning of this unconscious betrayal.
The formula of the revolutionary democracy is simple: no kind of foreign
policy is necessary, no diplomatic secrets are necessary, immediate, so-called demo
cratic peace is necessary, and our allies should be compelled to adopt the point
of view of Lenin and Trotsky and to declare as they do: we do not want anything,
we do not need anything, we have nothing to fight for. Then also our enemies
would declare the same and the brotherhood of peoples would become an accom
plished fact. (A voice from the left : This is the Satirikon.*) I am sorry, but
it is not my fault that your way of thinking is so similar to the Satirikon . (Ap
plause from the right.)
Our descendants will have difficulty in believing that such lunacy not only
could be presented as the last word of human culture, but could even meet a
certain timid and hypocritical encouragement among the Allied socialists who
have undertaken to play the role of diplomats, that it could indeed become, it is
true in a curtailed form, the program of the Russian Governments foreign
policy. . . .
7 Prominent Slavophiles of the nineteenth century.
8 The leading satirical journal in Russia.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1149

Now we are faced with a new product of this inner contradiction and of this
official hypocrisy. I mean the mandate of Skobelev, of democracys delegate to
the Paris Conference. . . .
[There follows a long and bitter criticism of Skobelevs mandate which Miliu
kov ends with the following conclusion:]
My conclusion from all these parallels is obvious and incontrovertible. In all
those cases in which the Stockholm document and the Russian document speak
of the same thing, the Russian document always sides with the German solution
of the question. ( Voices from the right: Correct, True.) And with such a
mandate you are sending a delegate of the revolutionary democracy to our allies
in Paris. ( Voices from the right : Shame,) . . . Can the representative of
the Russian democracy sit with such an instruction beside the representatives of
the Government without abasing the dignity of Russia. I affirm: No! (Loud
applause from the right.) I am glad to see that the question itself, of whether
the question of the conditions of peace will be discussed in Paris, is for the present
not yet decided.
Now I pass to an analysis of the Minister of Foreign Affairs speech. . . . I
will not blame the Minister for being afraid to speak about the honor and dignity
of Russia, or for speaking of her national interests with much caution (voice from
the left: Stop speaking of it yourself.) No, I will not stop. Each vegetable
has its own season. Perhaps in a period of official hypocrisy the style of Teresh
chenko also is a necessity (laughter on the left). But the Minister, while bowing
to the Left wing of this assembly, nevertheless tried to save what he could. He
attempted to liberate the Government from the harmful hypnosis of the Soviets.
The Minister does not wish Kurland and Lithuania to be wrested from us. He
wishes that the territory of Russia should remain inviolable and that Russia should
not lose her exit on the Baltic Sea. This is modest but I thank him nevertheless.
And on this point it will be necessary to quarrel with the Soviets and you will hear
what they will say on the subject! Further, the Minister dared to express an even
bolder idea. He wishes also that the south of Russia be given the opportunity to
develop its economy. This is already a very serious and daring idea. (Laugh
from the right.) Evidently it concerns the Straits and the Minister repeats one
of my ideas. He said that the neutralization of the Straits without total disarma
ment would mean infringement of the interests of Russia; it would be a return
to a situation which would undoubtedly be much worse than the one which existed
before the war. . . .
The Russian interests in the south will be protected only when the desire of
the Minister that the south be given an opportunity to develop its economy is
gratified, only when we obtain military control over the Straits. ( Voices from the
left: Oh! Oh!) If we knew how to say in Paris not what you advise Skobelev
to say, but that the Straits, our military control over them, are as necessary for
us as Alsace-Lorraine is necessary for France, then we would accomplish our
national task.
. . . I assert that a revision of the agreement is not imposed on us by any
objective necessitythat it is imposed on us exclusively by the Soviet ideology
that is constantly repeated here: It is essential for the soldier to know for what
1150 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
he fights and then he will fight. It is true, gentlemen, that the soldier does not
know for what he fights. But you told him that there is nothing to fight for, that
our national interests are nonexistent, and that we are fighting for the interests
of others. Well, refute what you have said, tell the Russian soldier that he has
something to fight for, that he does not fight for France or for England but for
Russia. . . . I am very happy that for all that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
has not fallen so low, that he has understood our interests in the war not only in
the sense of realizing our national interests of which I spoke, but that he has
come to the defense of our allies. . . . He even supported the self-determination
of the Czech people, which fights within our ranks, and declared that the
Russian democracy could not envisage with calm the oppression of nationalities
aspiring to independence. If it is so, then I am even ready to forgive the Minister
his inexact information with regard to German political parties and with regard
to the goals of colonial policy. And when the Minister is asked whether it is
possible that we will continue the war for the sake of Rumanians, Serbs, and
Czechs, I hope that he will say, as I did myself in my speech, not from the point
of view of the honor and dignity of Russia, but from the point of view of expedi
ency: another [kind of] peace would delay in the whole world the triumph of
democratic principles and would entail very soon another war. I welcome this
declaration, it is almost what the Allies are saying. It is almost word for word
what Asquith said in his recent speech in Leeds, when he insisted on fixing as
the result of the war the map of Central and Eastern Europe in such a way that
the aspirations of the nationalities would not be in contradiction with the artificial
borders dividing them, that this can be done only by giving satisfaction to the
legitimate demands of Italy, Rumania, and the Slavic countries. Only then the
causes of concealed warfare [represented by constant] rearmament would be
removed, and humanityI am again citing Asquithfor the first time in history
would be able to take a step toward realizing an ideal and toward creating a world
policy which would unite the peoples in an alliance with justice as its basis and
liberty as its cornerstone. (Noise and laughter from the left, and a voice: But
you cannot believe all this yourself.) This is the essence of my conviction, I have
believed and I believe in it and I have proved it in the course of the whole war.
I will say only one more thing: only those aims of foreign policy which are
based on military might are real, and fortunately for us such are the aims of our
allies, because their real might does exist. And from the sad sight of what is
going on on our front, I would like for a moment to divert your attention to those
French and Flemish villages where the blood of our allies is being shed not in
a civil war, inside the country, but in the trenches, and where, in engagements
against the enemy, the foundations of justice and liberty in the world are being
laid. We should not boast before them of our democratic superiority. It is not
for us to give them lessons they do not need. It is better to bow our heads in
respectful admiration both before those who, like England and France, reap on
their battlefields the brilliant fruits of three years of effort on the part of their
whole nations, and before those who, like Rumania, Serbia, and at the present
time also poor Italy, take upon themselves blows which formerly were intended
for us. . . . And [also] before this new energetic allyAmericawho tirelessly
prepares new weapons and new legions of soldiers wilh which even if we be com
pletely enfeebled, the cause of humanity will nevertheless prevail. (Tumultuous
MAY TO OCTOBER 1151
applause on the right and in the center, which culminate in an ovation for
America.) I would like to generalize my greeting somewhat. Ending my speech
I would like to say: Long live the flower of humanity, the advanced democracies
of the West, which have long ago covered a considerable part of the journey on
which we have just embarked with halting steps. Long live our gallant allies.
(Tumultuous applause which culminates in an ovation for the Allies: someone
from the left cries : Long live the revolution ; the left rises and covers this shout
with applause.)

1000. Den o n T e r e s h c h e n k o s A d d r ess to t h e C o u n c il o f t h e R e p u b l ic


[No. 191, October, 17,1917, p. 1. An editorial very similar in tone appeared in Rech\
No. 244, October 17,1917, p. 1.]
Yesterday a very complicated problem faced the Minister of Foreign Affairs.
He was pronouncing his first parliamentary speech regarding the external policy
of democratic Russia. It was expected that he would give an account and reveal a
program, it was expected that he would sum up the totals of the past and would
outline the prospects of the future. During the six months that M. I. Tereshchenko
has directed Russian foreign policy many questions requiring clarification have
accumulated. This lack of clarity of our immediate past also throws a shadow
on our future.
It is not clear where the Minister is leading the country, and it is even ques
tionable whether he is really leading it anywhere, or whether his policy is being
moved by the force of a current which draws Russia toward unknown shores.
. . . He let it be understood that in order to achieve successful negotiations
with the Allies it is necessary that Russia win somewhere; however, he did not
develop this thought strongly and fully enough, while a mere hint in this instance
was not very convincing. For in its present, far from brilliant condition, Russia
nevertheless draws upon itself considerable German forces and, therefore, she
does not represent a quantity which could compel consideration for itself only in
the future, in the event of military successes.
There should be no misunderstanding on this issue. With both hands we sub
scribe to the declaration of our Minister that the success of our summer offensive
would have been the surest way toward peace. And, of course, in the presence of
such a success the task of the Minister of Foreign Affairs would have been much
more simple. The diplomatic art has always picked up its laurels on the battle
fields of victory. But no one asks M. I. Tereshchenko to come crowned with
laurels. It was only required that he explain his efforts in the accomplishment of
the tasks he took upon himself when he replaced Miliukov.
If we turn from what remains behind us to the political situation that we are
now experiencing, then here also the speech of Tereshchenko has left many things
unexplained and some things have been explained with insufficient accuracy.
It is difficult to say what the financial might and the national wealth of various
countries will be after the war. But if one takes the last years before the war, then
the assertion that Germany did not export capital was quite accurate, while the
assertion that she exported men was absolutely incorrect.
Precisely the German imperialists, and in addition, those who are ready to
1152 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
profit at the cost of Russia . . . have tried to prove that Germany needed markets
for its goods and orders for the replacement of her capital, but that she did not
need colonies for her settlers.
Also the assertion that the German annexationists strive for conquests in the
west, whereas the anti-annexationists direct their attention toward the east, was
not quite correct. The annexationists look both ways, and among the anti-annexa
tionists the real opponents of any kind of conquest are in the majority.
By encumbering his speech with useless and sometimes not quite accurate
details, M. I. Tereshchenko has kept the light from several very important and
valuable thoughts.
The game which the German Government is playing in Kurland and in Lithu
ania on the basis of the principle of self-determination merited a much more
circumstantial analysis and precisely from the point of view that Tereshchenko
has so fortunately stressed: from the point of view of the necessity for Russia to
preserve an exit to the sea.
Unfortunately the whole construction of the speech was unsuccessful and less
ened in advance the value of what was positive in the Ministers declaration. As a
result, even those who in principle shared his views on the immediate tasks of
our foreign policy, who applauded some of his declarations, and who approved
the patriotic tone of his declaration, could not acknowledge that it represented
a satisfactory explanation of the foundations of our foreign policy.

1001. P r o fe sso r T h o m a s M a sa r y k o n t h e I n str u c tio n s to S k o b e l e v


{Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 237, October 17,1917, p. 2. Masaryk was to become the first
President of Czechoslovakia in 1918.]
We have received from Kiev the following telegram from Professor Masaryk,
containing his statement to the Soviet of Workers Deputies on the instructions
to Skobelev:
Comrades! I received the complete text of your instructions only on the way
from Rumania. The instructions contain the principles of the future organization
of the entire world and indirectly also of our people. Consequently I have the right
to express myself about them. I feel it my duty, since they sin against the prin
ciples of self-determination of peoples as adopted by the Russian revolution, and
against democracy.
The instructions, as a matter of fact, adhere to the principle of self-determina
tion of peoples. They establish autonomy even for Dobrudja (250,000 Turks),
but they are silent about the Czechs and Slovaks, who number ten million. The
people of Huss and Comenius, a people no less than their oppressors, are forgotten!
Forgotten are the Austrian Rumanians (over three million) and the Yugoslavs
(almost six million)!
At the same time Bosnia and Herzegovina, part of the Yugoslavian people,
are disassociated from their people.
The principle of self-determination presupposes not only the freedom but also
the consolidation of peoples. Here the instructions are in sharp contradiction to
the interests of a whole series of peoplesPoles, Czechoslovaks, Rumanians, Yugo
slavs, Italians.
Thus the instructions pay only lip service to the principle of self-determination
MAY TO OCTOBER 1153
of peoples. In reality, however, they recognize the determination of people only
through the existing states. They thus adopt the German view of the superiority
of the state over nationality.
Therein really lies the basic view of German imperialism, which contradicts
even the teachings of socialism about the state, chiefly the teachings of Engels
and Marx. This corresponds also to the German absolutist definition of the con
cept of autonomy as the right granted by the state. The democratic concept of
autonomy, characteristic of free Western peoples, recognizes the right of inde
pendent corporations along with and irrespective of the state. The instructions
do not recognize the rights of the peoples in this form. They forget that nationality
as such is social, because an enslaved people is reduced to the state of a cheap
working class. Therefore socialists of all lands recognize nationality. Only
Scheidemanns and Bauers are inclined to the view of German imperialism.
By the very terminology of self-determination of nations, the instructions
violate the meaning of the principle proclaimed by the Russian revolution.
The instructions protect Austria-Hungary, forgetting that it is precisely this
country that is the cause of the present ferocious war as a result of its dishonest
Balkan policy. The authors of the instructions do not know that during the war
Austria-Hungary executed from 30,000 to 40,000 people. They do not know that
all political leaders and deputies in the parliament from the Czech, Italian, and
other [minority] peoples were imprisoned and sentenced to death. They do not
know that the Germans and the Magyars maintain their domination in elections
and in the government by means of brazenly unconcealed force. They do not
know that the peoples of Austria and Hungary have for centuries been fighting
for freedom and independence. Austria-Hungary represents an obvious organiza
tion of violence by a minority over a majority. And the instructions defend this
medieval artificial state. They defend a dynasty which holds seven millions in
slavery with the aid of an army and militarism, in alliance with the exploiting
aristocracy, with Germans and the Magyars. With the opportunity to make a
choice between a degenerated dynasty and the freedom of seven peoples, number
ing over 30 million, the instructions took the side of the dynasty! Likewise the
instructions defend Prussia with its militarism, at the sacrifice of the Poles and
the Danes.
Europe and mankind were delivered from Russian tsarism. But Prussian and
Austrian tsarism is being preserved!
The instructions want to restore Belgium by creating an international fund,
as if the Allies were responsible for the war in equal measure with Germany and
Austria. The instructions are completely wrong in failing to make a distinction
between an aggressive and a defensive war.
Without going into further criticism, I suggest, in contrast to the instructions,
the communique of the Allies lo Wilson and Wilsons explanations to Briand,
Asquith, Lloyd George, and other political leaders who understood the meaning
of the war caused by German aggression and quite rightly declared the democratic
principle of equality of all nations, not only the great but the small ones as well.
Permanent peace is not possible until German imperialism and Austrian imperial
ism are crushed. The division of Austria-Hungary into her natural national parts
is the basic aim of the war. And the danger of German imperialism is that it has
at its disposal the Hapsburgs and their empire. I hope that on my return to the
1154 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
capital the Executive Committee will give me an opportunity to present a more
detailed view of the Czechoslovaks about conditions for a truly permanent, just,
and democratic peace.
P r o fe sso r M asaryk
President of the Czechoslovak National Council
1002. Izvestiia o n t h e F o r eig n P o licy C o n tr o v er sy
[No. 203, October 21,1917, p. 1.]
We direct the attention of the reader to the speeches delivered in the Council
of the Republic on the most important question at the present timeon war and
peace. The Central Executive Committees mandate to Skobelev stands at the
center of the struggle. This mandate was given priority in the deliberations of
the Provisional Council of the Republic not by the democracy, but by opponents
of the democracy, and not without calculation. . . . To opponents of the democ
racy, but not in any way to the democracy itself, it is now advantageous to switch
the argument to individual personal issues in order to detract attention from the
most important subject of the argument, i.e., Lhe steps which our Ministry of
Foreign Affairs must take in order to achieve the earliest possible conclusion of
peace.
After all, the Council of the Republic was created not for discussing the actions
of the Central Executive Committee, but for discussing affairs of stale. In the
present case it is the affair of the state to convoke the Paris Conference on which
many hopes have been placed and whose significance is now being substantially
undermined by the statements of the British Government made in the House of
Commons. The mandate of the Central Executive Committee has a direct bearing
on this conference, but the heart of the mandate, as Comrade Dan emphasized
in his speech, is not a project for the concrete settlement of territorial questions,
but the general principle of a democratic peace and the joint action of the Allies
in making a proposal for peace negotiations on the basis of this principle. That
is the point.
There are two fundamental policies here. One of them, the Miliukov policy,
maintains that at the present time Russia does not need to revise the treaties, or
publish them, or convoke an Allied conference, or speak about peace. Only war
is needed, war and war until the complete subjugation of the enemy to her will.
Another point of view, which is at the heart of the mandate to Skobelev, main
tains that our people need peace, peace, and [more] peace. The people need it
to such an extent that even the war itself is not possible other than as an abso
lutely necessary means for achieving peace. . . .
This is the central point in the differences of opinion. The democratic repre
sentatives in the Council would permit themselves to be led by the nose if they
were to permit the struggle for peace to be drowned in the argumenl on the
particulars of the future peace treaty instead of trying with all their mightto
hasten this moment. The best peace terms are useless if there is no questionof
peace itself.
In the order of state affairs, there stands a possibility of making a big sLep
forward in the direction of peace. At the Paris Conference, Russia can and must
make every effort to persuade the Allies to recognize in an Allied treaty the prin
MAY TO OCTOBER 1155
ciples of a democratic peace and to impel them to come forward before all man
kind with an open willingness for peace negotiations on such a basis. This is the
concrete task of our foreign policy. It is the duty of the Council to point out this
task to the Government and to outline in this respect an instruction to the repre
sentatives of Russia at the Paris Conference.
It seems to us that the democratic section of the Council can find, without diffi
culty, a common formula in this respect and give our wavering foreign policy a
direct and firm course.

1003. T h e D r a ft o f I n st r u c t io n s to S k o b e l e v b y t h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e
o f t h e A l l -R u ssia n S o v ie t o f P ea sa n t s D e p u t ie s
[.Izvestiia, No. 202, October 20,1917, pp. 3-4.]
A week ago the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants
Deputies rejected the instructions given to M. I. Skobelev by the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, and elected a special
commission for drawing up a draft for the new instructions.
Yesterday the Bureau of the Executive Committee was studying the draft of
these instructions, which will be submitted in the following form for consideration
at the general meeting of the Executive Committee:
I. a) The formula for peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis
of national self-determination, proclaimed by the Russian democracy, represents
the one condition that guarantees the security of future peace and aims at remov
ing the defects and inequities in the life of peoples that have led them to the present
war: b) future international relations must be based on principles that truly
guarantee to all people an opportunity for peaceful, organized cooperation be
tween nations, the adherence to principles of an open foreign policy, the gradual
restriction of arms, and compulsory, preliminary international arbitration; c) the
Allies pledge themselves not to start separate peace negotiations, and, likewise,
not to conclude a separate peace; and d) all nations must pledge themselves not
to organize an economic blockade after the war. Every country is free [to pursue]
its own commercial policy and the peace treaty may not dictate [to a country]
any commitments to conclude or not to conclude this or that trade agreement.
II. 1) An absolute condition of peace is the evacuation of troops of both
coalitions from territories occupied by them during the present war.
2) The territory of the State of Russia must remain inviolate. The peoples
of Russia must reserve the right of self-determination, and the final decision of
this question shall lie within the competence of the All-Russian Constituent
Assembly.
3) The independence of Russian Poland is recognized (Act of the Provisional
Government, March 17, 1917); as concerns the Polish Legions in Germany and
Austria, they shall be entitled to the right of self-determination under an inter
national guarantee.
4) Belgium must be rehabilitated. All losses sustained by Belgians in the
form of indemnities, requisitions, or other forms in violation of the Hague Con
vention, must be compensated by Germany. An international fund [shall be estab
lished] for compensating general losses [sustained] by Belgium as well as other
countries.
1156 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
5) Serbia and Montenegro, as well as other small states, shall be rehabilitated,
and compensation for their losses shall be carried out according to point 4. Serbia
must have access to the Adriatic Sea.
6) Rumania shall be rehabilitated. Rumania shall pledge to carry out at once
the decision of the Berlin Treatise on Jews.
Note: Any restrictions [imposed on] the rights of Jews or other nationalities
shall not be tolerated in any state.
7) The Alsace-Lorraine question must be setded by means of a plebiscite
under the condition of an international guarantee. Persons [who are] in the
service of the German Government and who are not natives of Alsace, as well as
their families, shall not participate in the plebiscite.
8) Turkish Armenia shall receive complete autonomy under the condition of
an international guarantee. The question of the final [state] organization of
Armenia shall be settled by the Armenian National Assembly under a similar
guarantee.
9) All national and territorial questions arising as a consequence of the pres
ent war or in connection with it, such as the Yugoslav, Transylvanian, Czech, and
Italian questions in Austria, shall be settled by means of a plebiscite with an
effective guarantee for free elections.

1004. Den9 o n the I n st r u c t io n s o f t h e P e a sa n t s D e p u t ie s


[No. 195, October 21,1917, p. 1.]
Following the unfortunate mandate No. 1, another mandate has now been
issued which is infinitely better worded and comes from the Soviet of Peasants
Deputies. The multitude of organizations often brings a lot of confusion in our
public life, but now one can only rejoice that the initials C.E.C.S.W. and S.D.
can be contrasted to the initials E.C.P.D.
The Peasants mandate shows that as a matter of fact it was not difficult to
compile a decent declaration which the representative of the democracy will not
feel ashamed to appear with at the conference of the Allies. One can object to
certain individual statements of the Peasants mandate, one can doubt the possi
bility of complying with some of its demands, but in any case it is free from those
defects which give a solid basis for humorous [?] attacks.
The authors of mandate No. 2 had before their eyes the arguments of biting
criticism that had been directed against their predecessors. This served them as
a good warning and therefore their personal merit is not great. But the mandate
of the Soviet of Peasants Deputies has nevertheless the extremely valuable merit
of showing the way out of a dead end into which the first mandate had brought us.
M. I. Skobelev is in an equal degree the representative of both Soviets, and
therefore he is tied to both mandates.
But as there is no essential contradiction between them, then there remains
nothing else but to reconcile the two mandates. This is not difficult because the
defects of the first mandate were mainly the result of thoughtlessness, and there
exists no insurmountable contradiction of principle between the two mandates.
One must form a conciliatory committee and work out a common wording for a
mandate from both Soviets.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1157
1005. ReclfC o n t h e I n st r u c t io n s o f t h e P e a sa n ts D e p u t ie s
[No. 249, October 22,1917, p. 1.]
The promise torn from the Provisional Government to admit a representative
of the revolutionary democracy to the Paris Conference continues to bear its
evil fruits. In the Council of the Republic, speeches regarding foreign policy are
flowing. At the same time, beyond the rooms of the Council, in the high spheres
of the Winter Palace and the Smolnyi Institute, an obscure struggle goes on with
regard to the formation of the Russian delegation and the instructions to be
given to it. Mr. Tereshchenko bargains with Mr. Skobelev, who has unexpect
edly appeared in the role of the Soviet Talleyrand, and the Minister-President is
apparently becoming inexhaustible in his efforts to harness to one cart a horse
and a timid deer at all costs.
The case of the Russian delegation is rendered more complicated by the large
number of plenipotentiary organs of the revolutionary democracy. Our democ
racy, which undermines the unity of the revolutionary government, itself in its
turn suffers from inner duality. The Central Executive Committee of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies shares its revolutionary authority with the
Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies. On the
basis of this competition of the two plenipotentiary organs there even arose the
question of sending to Paris, besides Mr. Skobelev, a special peasant ambassa
dor. Fortunately this complication could be adjusted by means of uniting in Mr.
Skobelev both revolutionary democratic mandates. [But] if the duality of
person has been eliminated, the duality of instructions has remained. The Peas
ants Executive Committee composed its mandate for Mr. Skobelev and, as it
started its work after a comprehensive discussion of the first mandate in the press
and an exhaustive speech by P. N. Miliukov had taken place, it avoided certain
of the most crying and scandalous errors and omissions of the document compiled
in the Smolnyi Institute. This mandate No. 2 is now often cited in the newspapers
(apparently it seems that its final text has not yet been approved) and, with an
indulgence that is typical for our sad times, the statesmanlike understanding and
the patriotism of its authors is being approved. Actually one cannot deny that
mandate No. 2 is more decent than mandate No. 1. . . . It does proclaim the
principle of the inviolability of the territory of Russia. At least it proposes to
impose on Germany part of the losses sustained from German military plunder.
The principle of self-determination of nations is interpreted in it somewhat more
boldly and fairly. In a word, the difference between it and mandate No. 1, is
that a Russian citizen can read and analyze it without burning with shame.
However, one cannot expect much from the plenipotentiary organ of the
peasant democracy. The spirit of Zimmerwald reposes on the peasant depu
ties as well as on the deputies of the workers and soldiers and it is not for
nothing that Mr. Chernov is himself a peasant deputy. Mandate No. 2, like
mandate No. 1, is a dull variant of the Zimmerwald formula of peace without
annexations or indemnities. And this formula obviously does not take into
account the vital interests of the Russian people and no support can be found
in it for defending the dignity of Russia as a great power.
1158 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MORE APPROACHES FOR PEACE
1006. T h e S e pa r a t e P eace O f f e r o f M a y 22 fr o m t h e G e r m a n C o m m a n d e r
in C h ie f o f t h e E a ster n F r o n t
[.Izvestiia, No. 76, M ay 27,1917, p. 2.]
On May 22 our radio-telegraphic stations received the following radio-tele
gram from General Hindenburg [sic] :
The order to the army, published on April 29 (May 12) by the Russian Com
mander in Chief, gives an account of negotiations that took place in Dvinsk be
tween General Dragomirov and three German officers. However, this account was
based on a record of the conversation which, unfortunately, was not given to the
officers. The German officers are accused of going to General Dragomirov appar
ently without any real reason, inasmuch as they were unable to relay any specific
statements. For this reason, they are being called pseudo-parliamentarians who
were sent, allegedly, on instructions to investigate the Russian positions and the
mood of the Russian Army, notwithstanding the fact that they were blindfolded.
Such an account of the affair loses sight of the fact that the three German
officers referred to above came to General Dragomirov upon the invitation of
Russian officers. . . .
When the German Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front was informed
that General Dragomirov expressed his willingness to accept proposals and terms
from our side, but that he had not himself made any proposals, he proposed by
a letter to General Dragomirov that both sides should send their authorized repre
sentatives, inasmuch as field officers, who come to them from the trenches, cannot
act as responsible negotiators. The German and Austro-Hungarian representa
tives were already selected. They were authorized to indicate the way in which
hostilities between Russia and us could be terminated without a rupture between
Russia and her allies.
However, representatives of the Russian Army found it more convenient to
ignore our proposal. General Dragomirov, it is true, signed a receipt of the
letter, but there was no reply. If due attention had been paid to this letter, it
could have become the first significant step toward achieving peace. But until
now, neither the Russian Army, nor the Russian society has been informed about
this letter. However, they ought to know that in agreement with her allies, Ger
many in the person of the Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front has expressed
her willingness to meet the reiterated desire of the Russian soldiers deputies and
to end the bloodshed. This willingness exists even now, as has already been
proven by the fact that since Easter the armies of the Central Powers on the Eastern
Front have almost completely terminated hostilities. Russian bulletin reports
about our attacks and operations that include the use of asphyxialing gas do not
correspond to the truth: the Central Powers are jointly announcing that they are
ready to conclude a local peace for both sides, the terms of which will have to be
worked out in detail by special agreementa peace that would restore the good
neighborly relations of the past and would give economic support to Russia for
the good of all the people concerned.
This is the great goal that the Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front
wanted to indicate in his letter to General Dragomirov. The truce proposal, trans
MAY TO OCTOBER 1159
mitted on May 6/19 by the Headquarters of the Commander in Chief to the front
line units of the 8th and 9th Russian armies had the same goal in mind. The
united Central European powers are repeating for everyone to hear: Let Russia
send authorized representatives if she wishes to know the details of our terms.
But let Russia reject the demands for a public announcement of these terms as
long as she considers herself committed to the secret agreements concluded by
the previous Governmentagreements which had as their object the destruction
of Germany and her alliesas long as she herself is fighting, and as long as Eng
land, France, and Italy are assuming the offensive in order to achieve their aims
of conquest. These states are still planning to wrest Alsace-Lorraine and the colo
nies from Germany, the port of Trieste and the region adjoining Trieste from
Austria-Hungary, and Constantinople from Turkey, and negotiations among these
states are being conducted concerning the partitioning of Asia Minor. In addition,
one of the war aims of the above-mentioned states is considered to be the payment
of enormous indemnities by the united Central European states. These are the
aims for the sake of which Russia, according to the thinking of her allies, must
fight and shed blood; and on other fronts the fighting continues day in and day
out and demands an enormous number of victims.
The powers of the Entente have spread the rumor in the Soviet that the Central
Powers can only defend their Western and Southwestern Fronts if their troops
on the Eastern Front are transferred to the West. This is a fabrication. More
than once have we successfully shown resistance to both simultaneous attack and
general pressure on all fronts and have at the same time defended and expanded
our occupied areas in Volhynia and Rumania, and on the Isonzo and the Somme.
Consequently, we have no need to resort to a measure such as stripping our Eastern
Front. If the united Central European powers will have to continue the war and
continue bearing the brunt of enormous military expenditure, then, of course,
their war aims will inevitably become more extensive.
[P r in c e L e o p o l d o f B av a r ia ]
Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front
1007. O r d e r t o t h e A rm y a n d t o t h e N a v y in R e p ly t o t h e G erm a n O f f e r
(May 30,1917, No. 15)
[VVP, No. 70, June 3,1917, p. 1.]
On May 22 our radio-telegraphic stations received a German radio-telegram
in which Prince Leopold of Bavaria, Commander in Chief of the German Eastern
Front, declares that the powers fighting against us are ready to conclude peace
and in which he proposes that Russia, apart from her allies, send delegates and
representatives for negotiating the conditions of peace.
Answering this attempt of the leader of Wilhelms armies and of his kinsman
to raise doubts within the ranks of our revolutionary troops, the Petrograd Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies has issued the following proclamation:
The German Commander in Chief of the Eastern Front has addressed to
our troops a provocative appeal. What does the General of the German Emperor
propose to the troops of Free Russia? He alleges that he offers to our troops
what they are thirsting for and awaitinga path toward an honest peace. He
says it because he knows that the Russian democracy would accept no other
1160 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
peace but an honest one, but for us an honest peace could only be a peace
without annexations and contributions. And what the General of the German
Emperor understands as an honest peace is eloquently shown by his silence. The
German Commander in Chief alleges that he will indicate to our troops the way
to cease military operations without breaking away from the Allies. He speaks
thus because he knows that an open proposal for a separate peace with the German
Emperor would be indignantly rejected by our revolutionary troops. But what
besides a separate peace does the General of the German Emperor propose? A
separate armistice! Secret negotiations with the commanders of the German troops
on the Eastern Front. The German Commander in Chief says that a separate
armistice does not present any advantages for Germany. But is it true? Let the
radio-telegram of the German General answer this question, because he would
not have started a provocation if the prolongation of a separate armistice were
not a part of the plans of the German General Staff. The German Commander in
Chief speaks of the inactivity of his armies on our front. But he has forgotten
what Russia remembers, he has forgotten the Stokhod. He has forgotten that the
Russian troops know where the German divisions and their heavy artillery have
been transferred from our front. He has forgotten that the noise of the bloody
combats on the Anglo-French front reach Russia. He has forgotten that Russia
knows that the defeat of her allies would mean the beginning of the rout of her
own armies. And the rout of the revolutionary troops of Free Russia would mean
not only new common graves but also the ruin of the revolution, the ruin of
liberty, the ruin of Russia. Let us avoid the provocative snares of the German
General Staff.
The revolutionary democracy of Russia proceeds along its own way to its
goal of general peace. It proceeds to this goal calling upon all the toilers, all
those oppressed to fight for peace. Its allies in this fight are the friends of Fried-
riech Adler condemned to death by Austrian judges, and Karl Liebknecht, Lede-
bur, and Haase, who steadfastly fight against the imperialistic circles of Germany,
against the circles whom the German General Staff serves. Its allies are the toilers
of France and England who have declared themselves against the aggressive aspira
tions of their ruling classes. Russia has taken upon herself the task of uniting the
democracies of all the belligerent countries in a struggle against world imperial
ism. This task will not be fulfilled if the German imperialists are able to avail
themselves of its aspirations for peace in order to tear her away from her allies
and if they inflict a defeat upon her army. The revolutionary democracy of
Russia, by means of the International Socialist Conference and a direct appeal
of the Government created by it to the governments of the Allied countries, paves
for humanity the way toward peace. Let the army by its steadfastness add might
to the voice of the Russian democracy, both in the face of the Allied countries
and in the face of those who fight against Russia! Revolutionary troops of Free
Russia! Only one worthy answer exists to the provocation of the German General
Staff. Unite more closely around the banner of the revolution! Double your
energy in a harmonious work for the restoration of the combat might of Russia!
Remember that Russia needs this might not for conquests but for the defense of
her liberty, but for her fight for general peace!
Thus the Russian revolutionary democracy replies to the crafty servants of
Wilhelm.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1161
The present order to be read in all the companies, squadrons, sotnias, and
batteries, on all vessels, and to all military personnel of the ground and sea forces.
A . K er e n sk y
Minister of War and Navy
1008. A S epa r a t e P e a c e O f f e r to K e r e n sk y
[Affidavit by Mr. Jacob G. Frumkin, New York, April 19, 1957. The original is in the
Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. This episode is typical of many little-
known efforts in the direction of peace in 1917, whose origins, official or unofficial, are
now unclear.]
Affidavit
At the end of May, or during June of 1917,1 together with my wife, left St.
Petersburg (Petrograd) for the Grankula Sanitarium near Helsingfors in Finland,
to be treated for an illness. In the same sanitarium in the Fall of 1916, Mr. Alex
ander F. Kerensky, who had become seriously ill, underwent medical treatment.
This sanitarium was headed by Dr. Runeberg, who gave Mr. Kerensky special
attention which to a great degree was responsible for his recovery.
Dr. Runeberg was an excellent physician. However, he was interested not
only in medicine. He was highly interested in history and politics, and possessed
a large library on these topics. Later, after Finland gained its independence, Dr.
Runeberg was for some time Minister of Finland to Denmark. I often discussed
with Dr. Runeberg the situation in Russia and particularly the activities of Mr.
Kerensky whom we both knew very well.
In July 1917, a moustached gentleman arrived at the Grankula Sanitarium and
Dr. Runeberg introduced me to him. He told me that this man was a psychiatrist
from Stockholm who intended to go to St. Petersburg. Dr. Runeberg afterwards
went there with him. Coming back after a short absence, Dr. Runeberg told me
that he saw Mr. Kerensky in St. Petersburg and brought me his greetings. Neither
Dr. Runeberg nor the gentleman who came to Grankula mentioned to me the
purpose of their trip to St. Petersburg. I assumed that they visited Mr. Kerensky
together although Dr. Runeberg did not mention it to me.
Many years later, rather not very long ago, Mr. Alexander F. Kerensky in a
conversation with me about the events of 1917, mentioned that in the summer of
1917 Dr. Runeberg came to him in St. Petersburg and told him that a man came
to Dr. Runeberg to transmit an offer by Germany of a separate peace. I then told
Mr. Kerensky what I stated above about the arrival in Grankula of the Swedish
physician. Mr. Kerensky replied to me that only Dr. Runeberg came to see him.
Mr. Kerenskys reply was that if this person will come to St. Petersburg he will
be arrested.
It was obvious that the man to whom Dr. Runeberg introduced me was the
same whom Dr. Runeberg mentioned in his conversation with Mr. Kerensky.
1009. 19 (N.S.)
T h e R eic h st a g P ea c e R e so l u t io n o f J u l y
[Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 3, No. 88, July 18,1917 (N.S.), p. 720.]
As August 4 [N.S.] will be the threshold of the fourth year of war, the German
nation endorses the words contained in the Speech from the Throne: We are not
1162 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
animated by the lust of conquest. Germany took up arms in order to defend
liberty, independence, and territorial integrity. The Reichstag stands for peace
and understanding and for the lasting conciliation of nations. Annexations, po
litical, economic, and financial oppressions are contradictory to such peace. The
Reichstag rejects all plans which aim at economic separation and the instigation
of hostility amongst nations after the war. The freedom of the seas must be
guaranteed. Only an economic peace will prepare the soil for friendly relations
between nations. The Reichstag will energetically foster the creation of the or
ganisations of international law. As long, however, as hostile Governments do
not accept such a peace, as long as they threaten conquest and violence against
Germany and her Allies, the German nation to a man will be united and will stand
unshaken fighting until right of existence and evolution are secured for it and
its Allies. The German nation in its unity is invulnerable. The Reichstag knows
that it agrees in this respect with the men who, in a heroic struggle, are protecting
this country. The lasting gratitude of the whole of the nation is assured to them.

1010. E rzberg er s E x p l a n a t io n o f t h e M o tiv es B e h in d t h e


P ea c e R e so l u t io n
[M. Erzberger, Souvenirs de guerre, pp. 307-9.]
In the beginning of 1918 I was officially asked to sum up the reasons which
had inspired the resolution of peace [for which Erzberger was the prime mover].
Afler describing the purely humanitarian reasons for ending a horrible slaughter
and the sufferings of war, I wrote:
1. Before beginning the unrestricted submarine warfare, the administration
of the navy had categorically declared that by sinking four million tons England
could be brought down or at least compelled to demand peace. The effecl was
to be obtained after six months of unrestricted submarine warfare, that is, Loward
the end of July 1917. This assertion did not come true although the Admiralty
had declared then to have sunk a tonnage greater by 50 per cent. The question
of how to bring about peace, a question which up to now had been answered by
invoking the effect of the submarine war, had therefore become more pressing
than ever, all the more since all the apprehensions conceived with regard to this
submarine war had come true (declarations of war on the part of America, Brazil,
China, etc.). All that remained was to consider a conciliatory peace.
2. The prolongation of the war reinforced our adversaries continuously.
Lieutenant-Colonel Bauer of the Great General Staff told me confidentally that
the superiority of our adversaries in artillery was 4 lo 1 and that at the best it
was to be expected that the next spring this proportion would be 6 to 1.
3. The Emperor and the Chancellor having started an action in favor of
peace in December 1916 [N.S.], it was necessary that the representatives of the
German people, that is, the Reichstag, also take their stand and support the Gov
ernments policy by affirming to the whole world Germanys loyal will for peace.
4. By this declaration the Reichstag took the responsibility for a peace that
would not respond to the hopes of many Germans and took its stand before the
crown and before the Government. All the discontent that the resolution of the
Reichstag arouses today would have turned, at the time of the conclusion of
peace, against the crown itself. Consequently, the resolution of the Reichstag rep-
MAY TO OCTOBER 1163
resented the best protection for the monarchy. It was particularly valuable that
the social democracy had adhered to it.
5. In view of the great want, it was necessary from the point of view of the
internal situation to tell to the people that the Government and the Reichstag
disavowed the aspirations for conquest prevailing in certain circles. Such a mani
festation aimed at consolidating the public will to hold on.
6. In July 1917 it was clear that the Social Democrats, and not only the
Independents, would refuse to vote war credits and would pass into opposition.
This would have impaired the fortitude of the German people. Before the vote
on credits, the Social Democrats wished to propose a motion inspired by the
Russian formula, neither annexations nor contributions, [and] the right of self
determination of peoples.9 If this motion were rejected they certainly would not
vote the credits. Therefore it was necessary to prevent a division and to find a
formula that would allow the Social Democrats to vote the credits and at the same
lime would not tie the Reichstag and the Government to the rigid formula of the
Russians.
As regards the allies of Germany, the Reichstag wished to convey to them
that the annexationist campaign, which had recently been particularly violent, did
not have the approval of the Reichstag majority. It was necessary that our allies
should know that the German people remained faithful to the imperial words
which were contained in the resolution: We are not animated by the lust of
conquest.0
Those were the considerations which inspired the resolution of July 19. The
success which the majority expected actually did materialize: 1. The internal
front was strengthened. 2. The Social Democrats did not pass to the opposition.
3. Our allies greeted this resolution gladly. As a result the alliance was strength
ened as proved by the speeches of Count Czernin and of the Hungarian Minister-
President Dr. Weckerle. 4. Among the neutrals Germany did not lose sympathy;
on the contrary after July 1917 she made important moral conquests. 5. In the
enemy countries the disposition toward pacifism greatly increased after July 1917.
It would have increased even more rapidly had there not been observed on
our side after the advent to the Chancellory of Mr. Michaelis regrettable hesitan
cies, an inclination mixed with repugnance toward the resolution for peace. 6.
The Russian pacifist movement, which has resulted in the armistice of Brest-
Litovsk, could make progress only after this resolution, after one could say to
the Russian people that the Reichstag was ready to conclude a peace which was
not contrary to the Russian program.
1011. Izvestiias C o m m e n t o n t h e R e so l u t io n an d t h e P a pa l P ea c e N o t e
[Izvestiia, No. 169, September 13,1917, p. 1. On August 1 (N.S.), the Pope, after pre
vious consultation with Germany and Austria concerning their receptivity, presented a
Note to the western belligerent powers proposing peace on the basis of no indemnities
and the restoration of occupied territory, with special mention of restitution and guar
antees to Belgium and a word of sympathy for occupied Poland. The British and French
replies referred the Pontiff to the Allied reply to Wilson of January 10, 1917 (N.S.)*
After some consideration of definite statements on Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine in a
Ciown Council and with Reichstag leaders, the German Government replied to the
9 The Austrian Foreign Minister Count Ottokar Czernin explains his role in promoting
the resolution in his In the World War} pp. 173-74.
1164 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Pope with a vague document that called attention to the Reichstag Peace Resolution and
made no mention of territorial questions. The Russian Government was indignant at not
being included among the Popes addressees and at the general neglect of Russias prob
lems in the Note. In his speech before the Moscow Conference, Kerensky characterized
the Note as an attempt to promote a separate peace in the West at the expense of Russia.
The speech is found in Volume III.]
The Popes Peace Note is separated by a period of one month from the peace
resolution of the Reichstag, adopted at the initiative of the Catholic Center. The
distance in time is so negligible that the connection between these two actions
suggests itself.
In content, the Papal Note differs from the Reichstag Resolution in its practi
cality. It put out feelers for a realistic basis of agreement. And in this respect
the complete silence on Russia was glaring. Did the Pope take Belgium and
Poland under his protection because these were Catholic countries and forget
Russia because from his point of view she is a heretical and revolutionary country,
i.e., three times as heretical?
That religious differences have no decisive weight in the practical policy of
the Vatican was demonstrated long, long ago when the Pope kissed the banker
Rothschild on the mouth (orthodox Catholics kiss the Popes shoe and not his
lips). The antipathy to the revolution is stronger, of course, but a revolution in
a foreign country has never frightened a ruler. No, the Popes silence on Russia
had another meaning. The Pope was putting out feelers for a separate peace be
tween our allies and the Central Powers at our expense.
This will some day be established with documentary finality. And it is not
surprising that the Popes Note was followed by a German offensive on our front,
nor is it surprising that rumors were born, persistent rumors, about a definite
proposal by Germany according to which she abandoned all demands in the West
but retained all demands in the East with the exception of Poland. A similar,
or lesser degree of independence, was intended for LiLhuania under German
trusteeship, and a direct annexation for Kurland. The whole atmospherein both
military and political respectsindicates that the German Government, having
failed to obtain a separate peace with Russia, is now aiming at a peace at the
expense of Russia.
The notes of the German and Austrian governments in reply to the Pope said
nothing about the territorial question. This is astounding and, at the same time,
highly suspect. After all, the question of peace is primarily one of prohibiting
annexations, especially as applied to Germany, who has seized more foreign terri
tory than that which belongs to her. It would seem that if she wanted a just peace,
she would first of all declare that she is willing to return the alien lands she has
seized.
Telegrams report that this question was discussed in Wilhelms General Head
quarters and that it was decided to relinquish all claims on Belgium. The claims
on Northern France were much weaker and were not supported by the German
Government itself, so that one might say that the German Government had no such
claims. But then again not a word was said about the lands which Germany seized
from us.
Or, rather, what was said is the direct opposite of what we would like to hear.
They intend to proclaim the independence of the Lithuanian duchy : Wilhelm
will install one of his younger sons (since he has a big reserve of them), or a
nephew, as a little king in Lithuania.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1165
While between Lithuania and Russia lies Kurland which will then fall into
the hands of German imperialism like a ripe fruit that has nowhere else to fall.
The offensive on Riga was undoubtedly undertaken for the purpose of encircling
this fruit.
Everything else, everything that is said in the German Governments note,
will be an empty phrase with such an outcome of the war.
In the article Stockholm and Rome, written on the subject of the Popes
peace proposal, the central organ of the German majority was filled with enthu
siasm at the thought of peace, it makes no difference whether it comes through
Rome or through Stockholm.
It makes no difference! To them, Court socialists, it makes no difference
whether it will be a democratic peace, concluded at the initiative of the socialists,
or an imperialistic peace, concluded by the bourgeois governments of Western
Europe at lhe expense of the only revolutionary countryRussia.
This behavior of the central organ of the German majority should remind us
once again of our apparent position in the outside world. Revolutionary Russia
is still far from being adequately defended by the German proletariat, for mere
verbal protests by the German minority, no matter how sincere they are or how
much we appreciate them, do not constitute an adequate defense. We do not have
sufficient defense from any other side either. Let our allies now reject Germanys
proposal for a separate peace; peace negotiations will commence at some time in
the future and we ourselves hope that they will commence as soon as possible.
But if these negotiations for peace are conducted by imperialistic governments,
whether for a separate peace or otherwise, we will in any event be the party to
suffer the greatest injury, because under the present self-interested policy it is
the weakest side that always suffers the most. Therefore, in appealing to the
Western European democracies we must not at the same time forget that we
ourselves must defend our country against the danger threatening it of a peace
at its expense.
1012. S ta te m e n t o f T e r e sh c h e n k o on t h e Germ an R e p ly
t o t h e P a p a l N o te
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 211, September 16,1917, p. 4.]
Petrograd, September 14.In his talk with the representatives of the press,
the Minister of Foreign Affairs said that the replies of the German and Austro-
Hungarian governments to the Popes peace proposal is further proof of the stub
born refusal of our enemies to take any sincere steps toward peace. As before,
both notes are reduced to hypocritical assurances of constant love of peace and
readiness to accept the principle of the reduction of armaments. However, their
replies fail to contain the slightest hint as to the bases of future peace. On the
contrary, one is forced to conclude that the German Government by no means
renounced the proposal of a German peace that basically contradicts the principles
of right and justice.
The actual meaning of the German reply is revealed even more clearly in the
concluding words, which express the hope that Germanys enemies will see suffi
cient grounds in the Papal Note to begin the preparation for peace on terms in
1166 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
keeping with the spirit of justice and the situation in Europe. Mention of the
situation in Europe leaves no doubt that Germany intends to enter upon peace
negotiations only on the basis of the war map, that is to say, keeping all the terri
tory she has invaded. The reply maintains silence even on the crying question,
from the point of view of justice, of withdrawing from and restoring the heroic
small powers. The reply makes not the slightest change in the present state of
affairs. The common aims of the war pursued by the Allied democracies are
clearly formulated in President Wilsons note. Regenerated Russia has pro
claimed the principle for which the free people of Russia are fighting. But the
Central Powers continue to conceal their game. While loudly professing that the
right is greater than might, in reality they await the moment when at the expense
of right they will succeed lo consolidate their conquest which they achieved by
force. As heretofore the word is up to Germany. The further continuation of
the terrible war depends upon her reply.
I cannot pass in silence Germanys recent steps on the Polish question. The
published rescript and the new regulations on the administration of Poland must
be regarded as substantial concessions to the Poles.10 They were the result of
Germanys difficult situation. But these concessions can hardly satisfy the Poles
whose motherland remains disunited. Russia counters this policy by the declared
principle of self-determination of peoples. The Provisional Government reaffirms
its unflinching intention to try to realize the principles of the declaration to the
Poles on March 17 of re-establishing on the basis of free self-determination of
the Polish people, while preserving the ethnographic principle of the independent
Polish state, all lands which are predominantly populated by the Poles. The
Provisional Government proposed to the Allied powers to put on the agenda the
question of publishing a special act that would sanction the basic principles of
the March 17 declaration. Along with this Russia is concerned lhal ihe future
independent indivisible Polish state be guaranteed the conditions necessary for
its economic and financial regeneration. This does not eliminate the question of
indemnities to Poland for losses as a result of the enemys invasion.
In conclusion I would like to express the hope that in the future Russian policy
will no longer be the policy of paradoxes that has cost us so dearly in recent
months. We came out in favor of peace but in reality we created conditions as
a result of which war was prolonged. We wanted to see the reduction in casuahics
but as a result we only increased the bloodshed. We worked for a democratic
peace but instead we precipitated the triumph of German imperialism. Such
misunderstandings are intolerable . . .
1013. A M ore S y m p a t h e t ic V ie w o f t h e G er m a n P ea c e S t a t e m e n t s
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 214, September 20,1917, p. 3. Here and in another article in
Rech% No. 218, September 16, 1917, p. 2, Nolde reflected the view of certain conserva
tives, alarmed by internal conditions after the Kornilov Affair, that peace should be
given serious consideration to permit the restoration of domestic order.]
The article by Baron B. E. Nolde, The German Peace Offers which we
print below differs considerably from the appraisal of the recent German pcace
note in most of the publications of the Allied press, including the Russian. The
10 An attempt in September by the German Government to make their puppet regime
more palatable to the Poles.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1167
points of view expressed in the article by its honorable author are not faultless
to our mind. But the arguments developed in the article at any rate deserve very
serious attention.
The German Peace Offers
. . . In the summer of this year the majority of the Reichstag passed a reso
lution in favor of peace on the basis of consent and the firm agreement of
nations. A number of influential parties and organizations, conservatives, na-
tional-liberalsall Germansmet this resolution with unconcealed hostility as a
program of renunciation (Verzichtfrieden ) . From that time on the struggle has
been waged tirelessly and intensively with a nervousness which is unusual and
strange for Germany. This peripatetic struggle is not difi&cult to follow, and we
must follow it, for it concerns the fate of the question basic and fundamental for
all mankind and for Russia, for it is the question of peace.
Russian diplomacy, if we are to judge by the interview with M. I. Tereshchenko,
apparently wrongly evaluated the meaning of the outcome in the struggle of the
two currents on the question of war and peace in Germany. Nevertheless, by
reading the documents in connection with other decisions adopted simultaneously
by the German government, one may arrive at this outcome with no great effort
In its reply to the Papal Throne the German Government stated quite clearly that
it takes the position of the Reichstag Resolution. What the German majority tried
to achieve from its new Government has been achieved. It bound itself to it and
withdrew from the military imperialism of the right groups. It is of no impor
tance whatsoever whether or not the German note is hypocritical. Its political
significance lies in the fact that it represents a triumph of peaceful currents in
Germany. At this moment I am not interested in the question of what practical
deduction can be made from this triumph, and whether or not it finally brought
international peace closer. I merely wish to point out that it would be short
sighted to ignore the meaning of what has occurred. The oral note of Kiihlmann
underlies with complete clarity the already clear meaning of the German decision.
On no other question was there such a sharp difference of German public opinion
as on the question of Belgium. Taking possession of Belgium was the basic de
mand of the German right wing, and the possibility of withdrawing from Belgium
irritated it more than anything else. The German Government now declares its
decision to withdraw from Belgium. To be sure, some qualifications were made,
but these qualifications are timid and modest. . . . But this is not the only decision
of the German Government. Early in September the German Government finally
recognized Polish statehood, and here, in another form, it made a decision parallel
with that on Belgium. This decision is not as full, because Poland remains dis
united. However, the decision is not offered by us, but by the Germans, and from
their point of view there should be no consolidation of Polish lands. Again, I do
not speculate whether or not this decision brings peace closer. I merely state the
fact of the second refusal by Germany, a refusal to establish in Poland a German
province in the fictitious form of a kingdom. Finally, a third decision is being
contemplated. It concerns Lithuania and Kurland and testifies to the fact that
yielding in the West, Germany wants to win in the East. Not so long ago the
commission of the Reichstag, about which I spoke, expressed itself in favor of
organizing a new government in the two above-mentioned provinces, and the
1168 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
German Government is already taking steps to realize these decisions which por
tend the separation from Russia of several guberniyas.
Of course the circle of fundamental questions which divide mankind is far
from completed in these decisions by Germany. Nothing is said on the most
important one of themthe question of Alsace-Lorraine. But if this word is
uttered, by force of things the world will enter upon a new phase of historic
development, and with the rest of the world, Russia also, and on conditions which
by their disadvantages are unprecedented in our country.
B a r o n B . E. N o l de

1014. G er m a n P ea c e F e e l e r b y W a y o f M adrid
[G. Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, pp. 167-69. Other unsuccessful approaches to
the Allies were made by both Germany and Austria during the fall of 1917.]
About the middle of September, the Representatives in London of the Great
Powers of the EntenteMr. Cambon, Viscount Chinda, Mr. Page, the Italian
Charge dAffaires and myself were invited to the Foreign Office to a Conference
with Mr. Balfour. The Secretary of State informed us that a telegram had been
received from His Majestys Ambassador in Madrid containing the following
information. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs had told Sir Arthur Har-
dinge that in conversation with the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, a high
personage stated that Germany would be glad to know on what conditions Great
Britain would be prepared to enter into negotiations for peace. Mr. Balfour, upon
reading this telegram, added that he had invited us to discuss this matter confi
dentially. I took the liberty of addressing the chairman of our small Conference
before Monsieur Cambon had spoken. I said: All those who are present here
know that the pressure of the extreme parties and of the Bolsheviks, inspired by
their German masters, upon the Government at Petrograd is growing daily. I
must frankly warn my colleagues at this meeting that it is my duty to send to the
Russian Foreign Minister a full account of todays proceedings. At the same time,
I am painfully aware of the fact that I cannot guarantee that secrecy will be pre
served at the other end of the telegraph wires. If the Soviet get wind of the
German peace offer, which in reality is nothing but an attempt at creating dis
sensions, the agitation in Russia is likely to cause considerable trouble. I therefore
request that these circumstances be kept in mind in the course of the discussion.
The exchange of views revealed our unanimity in considering this kite as a
mere attempt at fostering differences of opinion among the Allies, and it was
decided that an evasive reply should be given. The German Government was to
be told that no conversations were possible unless the Powers of the German Coali
tion addressed themselves to all the Powers of the Entente and presented definite
proposals. This information I transmitted to Tereshchenko in a strictly confi
dential message which was subsequently made public when the Bolsheviks dis
closed the diplomatic correspondence of Russian representatives abroad. A
couple of months later I was told on good authority that my message had been
interpreted in Petrograd as meaning that peace negotiations were to begin shortly
in Madrid. This would seem incredible. The fact, however, remains that M. A.
Stakhovitch was sent [as Ambassador] to Madrid in order that a prominent
Russian politician should fce present at the peace p o u r p a r le r s Such, at any
MAY TO OCTOBER 1169
rate, was the explanation given to me by Mr. Stakhovitch himself of this belated
debut in the diplomatic career. . . .

1015. T h e W est er n A l l ie s D e n ia l o f A n y S epa r a te P eace P la n s


[Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 55, October 4,1917 (N.S.), p. 515]
The Russian Press having displayed concern lest the Allies, impressed by the
temporary military weakness of Russia, should make peace at Russias expense,
the Petrograd News Agency has been authorized (Oct. 1) [N.S.] to state that
the British, French, and Italian Governments deny categorically the intention
attributed to the Allied Powers of taking advantage of the difficult situation in
the west of Russia in order to assure their own interests. The British Ambassador
states officially that Great Britain will never agree to such a policy. The French
Ambassador informed the Provisional Government that recently a personage
occupying an important diplomatic post in Germany made overtures to some
French politicians with a view to a discussion of questions interesting France,
but that Lhe German attempt was indignantly rejected. The Italian Ambassador
declared to the Provisional Government that Italy would continue her co-operation
in the common cause and that she rejected all thoughts of peace negotiations
which neglected Russias interests.

THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE AND THE GRIMM AFFAIR11


1016. T he D ebate on A pril 25 in the Soviet E xecutive Committee on
Calling an I nternational Socialist Conference
[Protokoly, pp. 127-28. An attempt early in 1917 by neutral socialists affiliated with
the International Socialist Bureau to organize a conference was unsuccessful. But in the
spring their efforts were renewed, led by Dutch and Scandinavian socialists and inspired
by the Russian revolution and the activities of the Soviet. Anxious to gain the support
and participation of the Soviet, which had already discussed the possibility of such a
conference, the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee sent Frederick Borgbjerg, a prominent
Danish Social Democrat, to Russia with an invitation to join in the movement and attend
the conference. The majority of the Executive Committee approved the resolution to
issue a call for a conference, but the Bolsheviks opposed the move on the grounds that
the majority socialists in enemy countries, who were to be invited along with the
minority socialists, were but agents of their governments, and that Borgbjerg was, in
fact, acting for them and German imperialism (see Doc. 935). Later, on April 27, the
Berne International Socialist Committee issued a call for a Third Zimmerwald Con-
11 The attempt to organize the abortive Stockholm Conference, the background and meeting
of the Third Zimmerwald Conference in Stockholm in late August, 1917, and the Grimm Affair
are described and documented in Olga Hess Gankin and H. H. Fisher, The Bolsheviks and the
World War, Chap. 7, and discussed in Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World
War, and Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution, Chap, 4. These works all have very
usefid bibliographies. Despite the interest and participation of the Russian socialists in the
Stockholm movement, it played a much larger role in the life of Western socialist parties, no
doubt because the Russians were so preoccupied with internal developments during this period
and also because they were not faced with the open opposition of their Government, including
passport refusals, as were their Western comrades.
1170 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ference. Although there was some inter-relationship between the Dutch-Scandinavian,
Soviet, and Zimmerwald calls, the Soviet and the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee
joined forces in late June to promote the Stockholm Conference, while plans for an
independent preliminary Zimmerwald Conference proceeded (Doc. 1022). The new
Russian-Dutch-Scandinavian Committee issued a call from Stockholm inviting parties
affiliated with the International Socialist Bureau, the Berne International Socialist Com
mittee, and the Trade Union International to a general conference beginning August
2 to consider 1) the World War and the International, 2) the peace program of the
International, and 3) ways and means of realizing this program and of bringing the
war to an early end. Report of the Seventeenth Annual Conference of the Labour Party,
1918, pp. 43-44.]
Session of April 25
Almost all the . . . speakers agreed that the Soviet, as the organ of the Rus
sian revolution, must take the initiative in calling the Conference. Disagreements
arose around the question of the composition of the forthcoming Conference. The
minority [Bolsheviks] found it impossible to participate in a conference in which
the majority parties have shown themselves during the war to be following blindly
behind their governments, having severed their ties with the [Second] Interna
tional and having guided their actions primarily by their national interests. Inas
much as the forthcoming conference will be confronted by the problem of peace
without annexations or indemnities, a peace dictated not only by the interests of
the Russian revolution, but also by the interests of the international proletariat,
such a conference must enlist the participation of only those parties and groups,
namely, the so-called minority, which, in their countries, have fought against
aspirations for annexations and the imperialistic ways of their own governments
and those of their servants, the socialist patriots.
In order to assure the success of the cause of peace, the majority of the Execu
tive Committee considered it necessary on the contrary to enlist the widest possible
participation of the proletarian masses; only if all the parties and groups compris
ing the International were invited would the conference be sufficiently competent
and strong to realize the ideals of peace.
Following the debates, the resolution submitted by Comrade Dan, and pub
lished in the Izvestiia of April 27, was adopted by an overwhelming majority.

1017. T h e S o v iet C a l l fo r a n I n te r n a t io n a l S o cialist C o n f e r e n c e , A p r il 25


[Golder, pp. 339-40. The bracketed portion of point 2 was left out of the final version.]
At the session of the Executive Committee on April 25, the following resolution
was adopted:
1. The Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
takes upon itself the initiative of calling an International Socialist Conference.
2. All parties and factions of the proletariat International [that are ready to
accept the platform which was adopted by the Soviet on March 27 in its Call to
the People of the World] should be invited.
3. The Executive Committee considers an essential condition of the confer
ence, the possibility for all socialist parties and factions without exception to come
to the place of meeting. The Executive Committee calls this to the mind of the
governments and most categorically demands from the majority factions an open
MAY TO OCTOBER 1171
and energetic insistence that their governments should allow the minority delegates
to come to the conference.
4. The place of the conference should be in a neutral country.
5. To prepare for the conference and to lay out a program, a special body, The
Commission for the Calling of the Conference, is being organized, in connection
with the Executive Committee. This commission is made up of members of the
Executive Committee, and representatives of parties who are members of the Inter
national and, at the same time, members of the Executive Committee.
6. A call should be issued at once to all peoples, and in particular to the social
ists of these countries and with the delegation at Stockholm for the purpose of mak
ing preparations for the conference.
1018. A p p e a l by t h e P etrograd S o v ie t to t h e S o c ia lists o f A l l C o u n t r ie s
[Golder, pp. 340-43. On May 20, the Soviet Executive Committee resolved to send an
appeal to socialist parties and trade union organizations of the whole world, emphasiz
ing the need for an international conference whose principal object should he to bring
about an agreement by the socialistic repi esentatives of the pioletariat to liquidate the
policy of national unity with the imperialistic governments and classes which make a
struggle for peace impossible. The Conference was to meet in Stockholm on June 25.
Izvestiia, No. 72, May 21,1917, p. 3. On the same day, the Soviet Executive Committee
received woid from Marius Moutct and Marcel Cachin, who had returned to France (see
Doc. 915), that the French National Council of Socialist Parties had unanimously ac
cepted the invitation to participate in the international conference to be convened by the
Russian revolution. Ibid., No. 73, May 24, 1917, p. 5. But on May 21, following the
lead of Lhe United States on May 9, lhe French Government refused to issue passports
to delegates attending the Conference. The Italian Government took the same action
some days later. In the meantime, the Independent Labour Party in Great Britain en
dorsed the Soviet program and appointed a delegation, headed by Ramsay MacDonald,
to go to Petrograd for discussions with Soviet leaders. After some hesitation, Lloyd
George approved their trip and the issuance of passports, but the Seamens and Fire
mens Union refused to man ships transporting anti-war socialists. These develop
ments, plus the delay in the decision of the British Labour Party necessitated continued
postponement of the Conference.]
T o t h e S o c ia lis t s o f A l l C o u n tr ie s
May 2,1917
co m rades:
The Russian Revolution was born in the fire of the world war. This war is a
monstrous crime on the part of the imperialists of all countries, who, by their lust
for annexations, by their mad race in armaments, have prepared and made inevi
table the world conflagration.
Whatever the vicissitudes of military fortune may be, the imperialists of all
countries are equally the victors in this war; the war has yielded and is yielding
them stupendous profits, concentrates in their hands colossal capital, and endows
them with unheard-of power over the person, labor, and the very life of the toilers.
Just because of this, the toilers of all countries are equally losers in this war.
On the altar of imperialism they lay many sacrificestheir lives, their health, their
liberty, their property; on their shoulders rest unspeakable burdens.
The Russian Revolution, the revolution of the toilers, workers, and soldiers,
is not only a revolt against tsarism, but also against the horrors of the world
1172 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
butchery. It is the first outcry of indignation, from one of the detachments of the
international imperialism. It is not only a national revolution,it is the first stage
of the world revolution, which will end the baseness of war and bring peace to
mankind.
The Russian Revolution, from the very moment of its birth, realized clearly
the international problem that confronted it. Its empowered organ, the Petrograd
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, in its appeal of the 14th of March, called
upon the peoples of the whole world to unite for the struggle for peace. The Rus
sian Revolutionary Democracy does not want a separate peace, which would free
the hands of the Austro-German Alliance.
The Revolutionary Democracy of Russia knows that such a peace would be a
betrayal of the cause of the workers democracy of all countries, which would find
itself tied hand and foot, impotent before the world of triumphant imperialism.
It knows that such a peace might lead to the military destruction of other countries,
and thus strengthen chauvinistic and revanche ideas in Europe, leaving it an armed
camp, just as after the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, thus inevitably precipitating
a new bloody conflict in the near future.
The Russian Revolutionary Democracy desires a general peace on a basis
acceptable to the workers of all countries, who do not seek annexations, who do
not stand for robberies, who are equally interested in the free expression of the
will of all nations, and the crushing of the might of international imperialism.
Peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination
of peoples is the formula adopted without mental reservations by the proletarian
mind and heart. It furnishes a platform on which the toiling masses of all countries
belligerent and neutralcould and should come to an understanding, in order
to establish a lasting peace and, with concerted effort, heal the wounds caused by
the bloody war.
The Provisional Government of Revolutionary Russia has adopted this plat
form. The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals first to you, Socialists of
the Allied countries. You must not permit that die voice of the Provisional Gov
ernment should remain a lone voice among the Allies. You must force your Gov
ernments to state definitely and clearly that the platform of peace without annex
ations and indemnities, on the basis of self-determination of peoples, is also their
platform. By doing this, you will add weight and strength to the stand of the Rus
sian Government. You will give our Revolutionary Army, that has inscribed on
its banner, Peace among peoples, the assurance that its bloody sacrifices will
not be used for evil purposes. You will enable it to carry out, with all the fervor
of revolutionary enthusiasm, the war tasks that are falling to its lot. You will
strengthen its faith, if you enable it to realize that while defending the conquests
of the Revolution and our freedom, it is at the same time fighting for the interests
of International Democracy, and thus cooperating in the hastening of the desired
peace. You will put the Governments of the enemy countries in such a position
that they will be forced either to repudiate irrevocably their policy of annexation,
robbery, and violence, or else openly to confess their criminal projects, thus bring
ing upon themselves the full and just indignation of their peoples.
The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals to you, Socialists of the Austro-
German Alliance: You cannot allow the Armies of Your Governments to become
the executioners of Russian liberty. You cannot permit the Governments of your
countries to take advantage of the exultant spirit of liberty and fraternity with
MAY TO OCTOBER 1173
which the Russian Revolutionary Army is imbued, to move iheir troops to the
West, in order to crush, first, France, next Russia, and, finally, you and the inter
national proletariat in the grip of world imperialism.
The Russian Revolutionary Democracy appeals to the Socialists of the belliger
ent and neutral countries and urges them to prevent the triumph of Imperialism.
Let the work for peace, started by the Russian Revolution, be brought to a con
clusion by the efforts of Lhe international proletariat.
In order to unite these efforts, the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies has decided to take the initiative in calling for an international confer
ence of all the Socialist parties and factions in every country. Whatever the dif
ferences of opinion which have disrupted Socialism for a period of three years of
war may be, not a single faction of the Proletariat should refuse to participate in
the general struggle for peace, which is on the program of the Russian Revolution.
We believe, comrades, that all Socialistic groups will be represented at this
conference. A united stand by the proletariat international will be the first victory
of the toilers over the imperialist international.
Proletarians of the world, unite!

1019. T h e L e t t e r o f H e n d e r so n , T h o m a s , an d V a n d er v eld e to t h e
P etro g rad S o v ie t R egarding t h e A p p e a l o f M ay 20
[Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 3, No. 54, June 8,1917 (N.S.), p. 434.]
We have been very much surprised by the appeal for an international con
ference which was published on Sunday in the Izvestia [.sic], the organ of the
Council [Soviet] of Workmens and Soldiers Delegates [Deputies].
During last month British, Belgian, and French delegations had conversations
with the Council on the subject of the eventual convocation of a conference of
the Socialist Internationale. The negotiations thus begun were not concluded.
You had asked the Belgian delegation for a note, which was sent you, and to
which you have not yet replied. You have also invited the British Majority and
Minority organisations to come and discuss with you the conditions upon which
the convocation would be made.
We could not expect that you would convoke a conference under conditions
which the previous negotiations did not allow us to foresee.
During these negotiations we showed our agreement with you on the peace
formula of the Council of Workmens and Soldiers Delegates on the express con
dition that this peace formula should be clearly defined, and drawn up in such a
manner as to exclude neither the liberation of territories in accord with the wish
of the inhabitants nor reparation for the damage caused to invaded countries.
On the other hand, we formally declared that it was impossible for us to
support a plenary conference before having drawn up, in common agreement, a
series of conditions definite enough to remove all doubt, to discourage all diplo
matic manoeuvres by our enemies, and to repudiate the Socialist factions which
would not be willing to co-operate in the work of anti-imperialism for which you
are convoking the Internationale.
We are more than ever convinced that a plenary meeting to which would be
admitted those who are supporting the present policy of the Majority Socialists
in the Central Empires would be harmful and dangerous, and would leave the
1174 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
doubt that a just and permanent peace is possible before the imperialism of
aggression has been destroyed.
The letter adds that it is only possible to think of common action when the
German Socialists have issued a declaration proclaiming a rupture with the Im
perialism of aggression and with the Kaiser, and concludes:
Finally we draw your attention to the passage in your declaration concerning
the political liquidation with Imperialist Governments and classes. We are in
complete agreement with the Council in affirming the necessity for a rupture
between Socialism and the Governments or classes whose war aims are tainted
with imperialism; but we have not ceased, and we shall not cease, to consider that
a national union against aggressive imperialism is a duty incumbent upon all
classes, and one from which the Socialist proletariat could not hold aloof without
abdicating and compromising the vital interests of democracy and Socialism.
We shall be glad to attend a meeting in order to explain ourselves more fully.
[May 22,1917]
1020. T h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e s A n sw e r to C o m r a d es V a n d er v el d e ,
T h o m a s , a n d b e B ro u c k er e
[.Izvestiia, No. 81, June 2,1917, p. 5. The absence of Hendersons name and the addi
tion of de Brouckeres (he was a member of the Belgian Socialist delegation) is not
explained. Subsequently Henderson strongly supported the conference and Thomass
position was one of cautious approval, but the Belgian representatives refused to go
along with the movement.]
D ear C o m r a d es .
In your letter of May 22, 1917, you raised several fundamental questions to
which you want to receive an answer.
The formula of universal peace without annexations and indemnities based
on the right of peoples to self-determination expresses this aspiration for a lasting
peace, whose terms will be formulated exclusively in the interests of the workers.
If workers of all countries will be guided solely by their own interests, brushing
aside all the manifest or concealed pretenses of imperialists and militarists, who
so often hide their true faces behind beautiful masks, they cannot help but arrive
promptly at a firm agreement.
Only with such an attitude on the part of the participants of the conference
can it become a turning point in the dreadful epoch of the three-year-old fratri
cidal slaughter of civilized peoples. Only with such an attitude can the conference
draw mankind nearer to the desired peace. But given such an attitude, it is out
of the question that the questions you raised could serve as an apple of discord
or as a cause for prolonging the war.
Having recognized the right of nations to self-determination, the conference
members will easily come to an agreement on the course to be adopted in deter
mining the fate of Alsace-Lorraine as well as of other regions; this question has
been brought sharply into focus by the World War. The population and the
democratic parties of these regions want to put the question of their national
independence, or of their inclusion into one or another state, to a national vote.
In exactly the same way, representatives of working masses, who have freed
MAY TO OCTOBER 1175
themselves from the mutual distrust and suspiciousness generated by imperialists
by having realized the communality of their inLerests and [having been] united
in a struggle for peace, will not find it difficult to agree among themselves on
the methods and amounts of compensation to be extended to the population of
countries which have been especially devastated and ravaged by war, as, for
example, Belgium, Poland, Galicia, Serbia, and others. . . .
As for your reference to the fact that it is impossible for us to rupture the
union sacre [the political truce among all parties in France for the defense of
the nation], this reference is based on an obvious misunderstanding. Without
touching here on the question of the analogy between the participation of the
Soviet in the Provisional Government and the participation of socialists of other
countries in their governments, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
points out that it does not demand of any one party that it renounce the policy
it is pursuing as a prerequisite for receiving an invitation to the conference.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies expects the conference of so
cialists from all warring and neutral countries to arrive at an international agree
ment which will enable the workers of all countries to fight concurrently, coordi
nating their methods, for a universal peace on the above basis, [and] which will
allow them to sever the ties binding them to governments and classes that are
permeated with imperialist aspirations and stand in the way of achieving peace.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is certain that the conference
will reach a complete agreement on all these questions. Therefore, the Soviet
considers it inexpedient for individual parties to require other parties to accept
beforehand certain obligatory decisions as a condition for their participation in
the conference. This could create the appearance of irreconcilable contradictions
where, during a general discussion, the spirit of proletarian solidarity would be
instrumental in seeking out a decision that would be equally acceptable to all.
As to your desire to reach a complete preliminary agreement among socialists
of the participating states, according to our formulation of the question, such a
preliminary conference appears unnecessary. The coordination of the struggle
for peace particularly envisions the coordination of socialist activities in the
warring countries with the common platform of the struggle for peace. We be
lieve, however, that the conference will be successful only if the socialists regard
themselves not as representatives of the two warring sides, but as representatives
of one movement of the working class having one common goal, that of a uni
versal peace.
E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e o f t h e S o v ie t
o f W o r k e r s a n d S o l d ier s D e p u t ie s

1021. Russkiia Vedomostts C o m m e n t o n t h e A c c ept a n c e b y t h e G e r m a n


M in o r it y a n d M a jo r it y S o c ia lists o f t h e S t o c k h o l m I n v it a t io n
[No. 146, June 29, 1917, p. 3. The acceptance of the majority was received in early
June, and that of the minority in late June, the former with less enthusiasm than the
latter. Izvestiia, No. 87, June 8,1917, p. 9; No. 90, June 15, 1917, p. 5; and No. 103,
June 28, 1917, p. 5.]
On the heels of the majority of the German social democracy, the minority
also published its memorandum prepared for the Stockholm Conference. In their
1176 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
general formulas, beginning with the formula of peace without annexations
and indemnities on the basis of the self-determination of peoples, the documents
coincide in many ways. But this does not prevent them from being separated in
spirit by an impassable abyss. Just as the Scheidemann memorandum is diplo
matic and full of low-grade opportunism, so is the program of the independents
consistent in introducing the principles preached by the party. And it does not
stop short of taking a utopian stand.
By speaking thus, however, we do not at all wish to say that we fail to recognize
any practical value in the position of the minority of the German social democ
racy. True, without the aid of weapons Europe cannot hope to achieve a just
and permanent peace at this time. But it is clear that the might of weapons alone
is also incapable of achieving the desired aim. To arrive at it we need an ideo
logical shift that would lead to an internal reorganization of governments back
ward in their political systems. And the democratization of the Central Powers
is, as recently stated by Lloyd George, almost the main premise for fruitful peace
ful negotiations. And of course such appeals as the memorandum we have analyzed
help this process, this replacement of one ideology for another in the wide strata
of German society. When the question of the Stockholm Conference was raised
in the Allied countries, many evinced hostility toward it. It was feared lest it
prove to be a trap; lest it serve eventually as a weapon for the German govern
ment to intensify within Russia a pernicious discord of the various organs of
revolutionary authority. From the very outset we looked upon these fears as
exaggerated, and without exaggerating its possible results, we thought the con
ference as a very desirable phenomenon. But now we are forced to say that if
the German Government which treated the conference with such suspicious cor
diality really hoped to turn it into a trap, it was caught in its own nets. When the
party of Scheidemann was forced to emerge into the light of international publicity
from the parliamentary backstage where it exchanged whispers with the Chan
cellor, this did not add to its prestige and forced it to grow quite furtive. Only
recently it bowed and thanked the Emperor for the Easter red egg presented
by the Emperor to the people in the shape of a half-way reform of the Prussian
representative system following the war. And this turnabout was of course con
ditioned by the necessity to cut a respectable figure in the eyes of the international
democratic world. We have said that it would be naive to exaggerate the extent
of the direct influence of the minority of the German social democracy on the
attitude of the majority on the question of conditions of peace. We must not,
however, underestimate its social importance. Among all the German people an
increased internal ferment is prevalent, directed against the present governmental
leadership of the destiny of the state. And the memorandum of the Independent
Socialists, in spite of the presence in it of an utopian element, will play its role
in the future course of this process, which should be watched with the greatest
attention.
1 02 2. T h e S o v ie t E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e s C o n d it io n a l A p p o in t m e n t o n
M a y 29 o f a D el eg a te to t h e T h ir d Z im m e r w a l d C o n f e r e n c e in S t o c k h o l m
[Protokoly, p. 170. As it turned out, no representative of the Soviet attended the Con
ference, though representatives of the Mensheviks, Menshevik Internationalists, and
Bolsheviks did. See Gankin and Fisher, chap. VIL]
MAY TO OCTOBER 1177
1. In regard to the telegram concerning the Conference of the minority to
be held in Stockholm, the Executive Committee adopted the [following] resolution:
To send one delegate with the following instructions: the delegate shall an
nounce that he has come to the conference because he regarded it as preliminary
to the convocation of the conference at our initiative, and [he] shall participate
in it in so far as it does not contend with ours; otherwise, he shall remain solely
for purposes of information.
Comrade Skobelev was elected as the delegate to Stockholm.

1023. G e r m a n A ppr o v a l o f R o b er t G r im m s D e p a r t u r e f o r R u ssia


[ZA.B. Zeman, Germany and the Revolution in Russia, 1915-1918, p. 46. The pur
poses of Grimms journey, which included also discussion of the proposed Third Zim
merwald Conference, are outlined below. He was Chairman of the International
Socialist Committee. The German Foreign Minister, Zimmermann, approved the pro
posal on April 15 (N.S.), then tried, too late, to stop Grimm on the advice of Schiede-
mann and Ebert, who advised him that Grimm was definitely pro-Entente. Ibid.,
pp. 48-49.]
The Minister in Bern to the Foreign Ministry
Telegram No. 663
AS 1456 14 April [N.S.] 1917,11:45 p . m .
Received: 15 [N.S.] April, 4:46 a .m .
The Socialist National Counsellor Grimm has asked Federal Counsellor Hoff
mann for his help in getting permission to travel to Stockholm and back. From
Stockholm, he might possibly travel on to Petrograd. Grimm believes that his
presence is necessary to counteract Brantings activities against peace, that it is
essential that the opportunity to conclude a separate peace be exploited, and that
general peace would then follow. Although Hoffmann is a personal opponent of
Grimm, of whose character he has a poor opinion, Hoffmann is inclined to recom
mend that permission be granted. Although it is well known that Grimm has
bitterly attacked us, he has nevertheless stood resolutely in opposition to war;
he played a leading part at Zimmerwald and at Kiental, and has close connexions
with the extreme left in Russia and France and with the Liebknecht group. As
far as his work for peace is concerned, Hoffmann considers him to be absolutely
honest, and says that he is working to secure for the Proletariat the credit for
having restored peace to the world. It must be added, however, that the Socialists
in our government have no use for him.
Grimm made the same request to me personally today, expressing himself
extremely intelligently.
He would like to achieve the following in Petrograd:
1. Procure permission, either official or at least from the Committee, for the
Russian emigres in Switzerland, especially the Social Revolutionaries, who would
have great influence on the peasants, to return to Russia through Germany. With
out a cover of this kind, they do not dare to make the j ourney.
2. Sound out the possibilities of peace, and, if possible, give us his impressions
through the Swiss Legation in Moscow.
He said that action must be taken quickly, and that, in his opinion, moderate
members of the German workers community, such as Kautzky, Mehring, and
1178 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Haase, should be given permission to have talks with Russians in Stockholm. He
further believed that an official German counter-announcement should be made
to the Lvov manifesto, announcing our renunciation of annexations and war repa
rations, in order to strengthen the peace party in Russia. I would add here that
we are gambling on the revolution resulting in Russian military disorganization.
Thus, they say, the publication of the Kaisers congratulations to Stochod, Field-
Marshal Hindenburgs alleged statements that the revolution was serving his own
ends, and statements in the press such as Reventlows article in the Deutsche
Tageszeitung of 12 April have all done incalculable damage.
Both Hoffmann and President Schulthess appear to be particularly nervous
as a result of the American declaration of war, and they seem worried that the
opportunity of making peace with the Russians might not be exploited. They
suggest that we might perhaps renounce annexations in the East and satisfy our
selves with the creation of frontier states with guaranteed autonomy. In these
circumstances, I feel that I should recommend that Grimm both be given permis
sion to make and actually make his journey, even if our Socialists should express
opposition. Since Grimm successfully organized the journey of Lenin and his
comrades, which was of great value to us, and since he has also lately been
maintaining the attitude we would have him maintain in the Tagwacht and the
Swiss National Council, it would be hard to understand if we were to try to
prevent him from making this journey. As he is very ambitious, he would take
it as a grave insult and would be in a position to do us a great deal of damage
through his connexions with the revolutionary camp in every country. He asks
for an assurance that he will be allowed to travel both ways unobstructed, taking
a number of proclamations and other publications with him. I feel that we should
allow him to enjoy the same treatment as the emigres from Brussels. He can
do no damage on the military side, and he may be decidedly useful politically.
What is certain is that the Russian revolutionaries will listen to Grimm, a Swiss
whom, as one of the men of Zimmerwald, they like and trust, rather than to
German Socialists, especially those of Scheidemanns group.
I request a decision as soon as possible.
R o m be r g

1024. Gr im m s T elegram to S w iss F ederal Councilor H offm ann


[Gankin and Fisher, p. 621.]
Petrograd
May 26/27,1917 [N.S.]
Affaires etrangeres9 Berne
National Councilor Grimm, who is staying at present in Petrograd, requested
us to transmit to Federal Councilor Hoffmann the following telegram:
There is a general desire for peace. The conclusion of peace is urgently needed
for political, economic and military reasons. This is recognized by the authorities.
France causes delay and England creates obstacles. Negotiations are in the air at
present and the prospects are favorable. During the next few days the exertion
of a new and increased pressure is to be expected. Only a German offensive in
the east could possibly spoil the negotiations. But should this offensive not take
place, the liquidation [of the war] might be carried out in a relatively short period.
An international conference called by the Soviet of Workers deputies is a part
MAY TO OCTOBER 1179
of the peace policy of the new government. The holding of this conference is cer
tain, so long as the governments do not present obstacles to the obtaining of pass
ports. All countries have agreed to attend. Inform me if possible about the gov
ernments war aims known to you, since this would facilitate the conducting of
negotiations. I shall slay about another ten days in Petrograd.
Swiss Legation: O d ie r
1025. T e leg r a m f r o m t h e L e g a t io n in B e r n to t h e
G e r m a n F o r eig n M in ist r y
[GFO, File 1499, fr. D627925. In a subsequent telegram, the Legation advised Zim-
mermann that Hoffmann felt Grimm should not be given specific data as he might
take on the role of semi-official mediator to which his position did not entitle him.
He should rather be given a few general points of view which he would utilize to
strengthen the peace parly in Russia. Ibid., File 1499, fr. D627930.]
Berne, May 29,1917 [N.S.]
Very secret!
No. 938
Federal Councilor Hoffmann read me a telegram from National Councilor
Grimm sent through the Swiss Minister in St. Petersburg, textually as follows:
Authoritative circles in Petersburg see clearly that due to political, economic
and miliLary reasons peace must come. France will retard matters and England
place every obstacle in the way. Renewed pressure in the direction of peace can
be expected in the near future.
The question of the Workers Conference in Stockholm is developing favorably.
The growing inclination toward peace in Russia could only be destroyed if Ger
many were to undertake an offensive against Russia. He, Grimm, asked Federal
Councilor Hoffmann to inform him of our war aims in the event that he knew them.
B e t h m a n n -H o l lw e g 12

1026. T h e G e r m a n P eace P rog ram f o r H o f f m a n n s T r a n sm it t a l to G r im m


[GFO, File 1499, fr. D627931-32. On June 2, 1917 (N.S.), Bern informed Zimmer-
mann that Hoffmann would transmit the program in far less detailed form . . . and
only as a general impression from his conversations in order to avoid the impression
of a mandate. Ibid., File 1499, fr. D627944.]
Immediate
Berlin, May 31,1917 [N.S.]
Very secret!
T el in cipher
Answer to Telegrams No. 938 and 956
You may inform Federal Councilor Hoffmann in strictest confi
dence of the following general aspects of our peace program for
We wish to transmittal to National Councilor Grimm through appropriate local
content telegraph facilities. It might be advisable for H. not to refer to any
ourselves official declaration of the Imperial Government but rather to the
12 Probably a kinsman of the Chancellor at the Legation at Bern.
1180 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
with undoubtedly reliable impression he has gained from the numerous
moderate conversations he has had with you and the other authoritative
conditions Germans.
if peace 1. An honorable peace for both parties as basis of a lasting
with Russia friendship between Germany and her Eastern neighbor. Financial
comes now. support of Russia for her reconstruction; close economic and trade
[Hand relations.
written 2. No interference in internal affairs.
annotation] 3. Friendly understanding over Poland, Lithuania, Kurland,
having due regard for the peculiar national speech, culture, and
religion of their inhabitants. At the regulation of Polands eastern
frontier, return of occupied territory to Russia, who on her side
returns territory of German allies which she now occupies.
4. No English establishments in Oesel, Dago, Livonia, or other
Russian areas.
ZlMMERMANN

1027. T h e I n t e r c e p t e d H o f f m a n n -G r im m T eleg r a m , G r im m s F ir st
E x p l a n a t io n , a n d t h e D ec isio n o f t h e P rov isio na l G o v e r n m e n t
T h a t G r im m M u st L eave R ussia
[VVP, No. 70, June 3,1917, p. 1J
From the Provisional Government
A source of unquestionable reliability informed the Provisional Government
of the following telegram:
From the Political Department
To Mr. Odier in Petrograd
Bern, June 5,1917 [N.S.]18
Federal Councilor Hoffmann authorizes you to relay the following verbal in
formation to Grimm:
Germany will undertake no offensive operations so long as there appears to
be a possibility of concluding an agreement with Russia. After repeated discus
sions with authoritative persons, I am convinced that Germany is seeking to con
clude a peace with Russia that would be honorable for both sides and would pro
vide for close trade and economic relations and financial support for the rehabili
tation of Russia. [She seeks] no interference in the internal affairs of Russia, a
friendly agreement in regard to Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland with recognition
of equality of peoples. The restitution of occupied territories in return for the
Austrian provinces captured by Russia.
I am convinced that should Russias allies so desire, Germany and her allies
would be willing to begin negotiating immediately for peace. In regard to Ger
man war aims, read the report in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which, con
curring with Asquith on the question of annexations, it is asserted that Germany
desires no territorial aggrandizement with a view to expansion, or any economic
or political acclaim.
On the subject of this document, the Provisional Government instructed I. G.
13 In Gankin and Fisher the date is given as June 3 (N.S.).
MAY TO OCTOBER 1181
Tseretelli and M. I. Skobelev, members of the Provisional Government, to demand
an explanation from the Swiss citizen, Robert Grimm. As a result, R. Grimm
handed the following explanatory document to G. I. Tseretelli and M. I. Skobelev:
1) Shortly before my departure, Ministers Tseretelli and Skobelev informed
me that a Swiss minister in Petrograd had allegedly received a telegram from
Bern containing instructions to inform me of several German plans for peace.
I maintain that no such information was given to me either by the Swiss min
ister directly, or through the mediation of anybody else.
2) The contents of the telegram must be interpreted as a German attempt to
use my Petrograd speeches, in which I advocated the restoration of international
socialist relations and a universal peace, for the interests of the German govern
ment, its diplomatic plans, and the separate peace which it is trying to secure.
Such an attempt represents a crude maneuver.
3) Even in Bern when I went to the German Embassy to have my passport
validated for the trip, I avoided all political discussions, whereas during my trip
to Stockholm I even avoided all contact with representatives of the German social
ist majority parly.
4) In regard to the part played by the Swiss Government in this affair, I can
only establish the real facts of the situation on the spot.
5) As a Social Democrat, I will not permit myself to be used as a transmitter
of imperialistic peace plans between governments. I will ruthlessly expose any
attempts of this nature.
Petrograd, May 31 (June 12) 1917
R o ber t G r im m
I. G. Tseretelli and M. I. Skobelev considered this explanation unsatisfactory.
The Provisional Government ruled that R. Grimm must be requested to leave
the territory of Russia.
R. Grimm left Russia.

1028. T iie D e b a t e o n t h e G r im m A f f a ir in t h e A l l -R u ssia n C o ng ress


o f S o viets , J u n e 3
[.Izvestiia, No. 83, June 4,1917, pp. 4-5.]
Tseretelli3s Speech
I. G. Tseretelli goes up to the rostrum and is met by prolonged applause which
turns into an ovation.
. . . I must point out to the comrades that R. Grimm was permitted to enter
Russia, on the one hand at the insistence of the revolutionary democracy, and on
the other, as a result of a personal guarantee by Comrade Skobelev and myself.
The Soviet of Soldiers and Workers Deputies, the revolutionary democracy, and
finally we socialist Ministers demanded that Grimm be permitted to enter the
territory of the Russian revolution. We were saying exactly what Comrade Martov
has been trying to maintain here in countering our argument. We were saying
that a leader of Swiss democracy who raised the banner of struggle against imperi
alism, a socialist who is leading the revolutionary struggle against both his own
government and world imperialism, has a right to enter the territory of the Rus
sian revolution where the democratic struggle against imperialism has become
the banner of the whole Russian revolution.
1182 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The Russian revolution could not tolerate for a minute that on its territory,
under its protection, there was a person who had not the courage to dissociate
himself openly from the imperialistic methods of his own government and of the
governments at war with us, at a time when these governments were trying to foist
on him the role of an agent provocateur.
That is why we considered that the explanations given by R. Grimm were
unsatisfactory. We stated that he will have the opportunity at some future date
when he finds himself on Swiss territory and gets rid of the fears he speaks about
hereto take a resolute stand against his Minister of Foreign Affairs and against
the German Government, which has slandered his good name as a socialist.
. . . We told R. Grimm that once a situation such as this has arisen, he could
not, of course, remain on Russian territory. . . .
The Congress Approves the Actions Taken by Tseretelli and Skobelev
Tseretellis speech was followed by a series of speakers: Zinoviev,14 Abramo
vich, Lieber, Skobelev, Kerensky, and Gotz.
Then Martov and Tseretelli delivered the closing speeches.
The [following] resolution was adopted by a majority of 640 for, 121 against,
with 14 abstaining:
Considering that the actions taken by Comrades Tseretelli and Skobelev in
the Comrade Grimm affair correspond to the interests of the Russian revolution
and international socialism, the All-Russian Congress of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies also welcomes their decision to publish a detailed report
on all the circumstances surrounding this case, and, in particular, the reasons
which compelled them to declare Comrade Grimms explanations to be unsatis
factory.
The results of the vote were greeted with prolonged applause.

1029. G r im m s A d m issio n
[Gankin and Fisher, pp. 626-27. Hoffmann submitted his resignation as a Federal
Councilor on June 6. A subsequent investigation by the Federal Council exonorated
him of a willful attempt to violate Swiss neutrality, but accused him of bad judgment.
Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 37, September 13, 1917(N.S.), p. 344.]
This inquiry was made at Berne according to my desire and my commission.
I described in a few words the general state of affairs and begged to be informed
of the war aims of the governments which were known to Mr. Hoffmann. I ex
pressed this wish in a general way. I spoke neither about special aims of the war
nor the conditions of a separate peace. Previously there had been no agreement
whatsoever to that effect between Hoffmann and me. Besides the known telegram
we exchanged no telegraph messages. Hoffmann did not communicate to me any
proposals or terms. The suspicion that I am an agent of Germany because I
received a reply to my inquiry is absurd. I have no reason to defend myself against
these suspicions.
14 See Gankin and Fisher, pp. 623-26.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1183
[Further on, Grimm says as follows]:
I wish to reply immediately to two questions which I may rightfully be asked
from the point of view of the Zimmerwald movement: what has impelled me to
pose this question and why have I posed this question to Hoffmann? The answer
to this question is that our parly, in agreement with the Zimmerwald resolution,
has taken upon itself the responsibility of acting in favor of a general peace.
Proceeding from this resolution our parly approached the Swiss government ex
pressing a wish that it would aid in lhe establishment of peace and, in particular,
in all negotiations for peace. The first question, on the other hand, can find an
answer only in the present internal situation of Russia. In order not to be sub
jected to accusations of transmitting facts which might be utilized by another
belligerent government in its own interests, I must refrain from giving details.
However, I shall betray no secret if I remark that every day in the chauvinist
press there is a statement of the fact, which is to a certain degree being ratified by
the Provisional Government itself, that the present situation, from the military,
economic, and social points of view, is intolerable and that reorganization is
necessary, which, however, cannot be accomplished for several weeks. But whereas
some persons demand reorganization in order to continue the war, others desire
it in the interests of an early peace. This is not merely my own conviction but
also the poinl of view of a large majority of socialists with whom I have had the
opportunity to speak. This reorganization, which could alone prevent a final
catastrophe, is a premise for an early termination of war, and only a hastening
of peace may save the revolution, consolidate its results, and resist the counter
revolution.
1030. T h e L a b o u r C o n f e r e n c e D e c is io n t o A t t e n d t h e S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r
e n c e , t i i e R u ssia n T e le g r a m t o N a b o k o v , H e n d e r so n s R e s ig n a tio n , a n d t h e
B r it is h G o v e r n m e n ts D e c is io n N o t t o I ss u e P a s s p o r ts t o
S to c k h o lm D e le g a te s
[The documents below arc from the Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 14,
August 17,1917 (N.S.), p. 125, and No. 16, August 20,1917, p. 146. Henderson, back in
England, went before the Labour Party Conference on August 10 (N.S.) to recommend
it accept the Stockholm invitation, which it did by an overwhelming majority. In
the meantime, Nabokov had received, at his request, a telegraphed statement from
Tcreshchenko that although the Russian Government does not deem it possible to
prevent Russian delegates from taking part in the Stockholm Conference, they regard
this Conference as a party concern and its decisions in no wise binding upon the
liberty of action of the Government. With Tereshchenkos authorization, the text of
this note was communicated to Arthur Balfour, who laid it before the Cabinet, in
cluding Henderson. When Henderson made no reference to it in his speech before the
Conference, Lloyd George, who had asked that he do so, requested and received Hender
sons resignation from the War Cabinet, publishing the correspondence between them
in the press. In his letter accepting the resignation, Lloyd George quoted the above
excerpt from Tereshchenkos telegram, having received permission to do so from
Nabokov on Nabokovs own initiative. Lloyd George had also received a telegram
from Thomas in Paris that Kerensky ne veut pas de Conference. The source of
Thomas information is not clear.
These revelations, plus the decision of the British Government, announced on
August 13 (N.S.), that it would not issue passports to the Stockholm delegates, caused
considerable excitement in Russia and embarrassment to the Provisional Government,
1184 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
as the following documents indicate. For Nabokovs description of this episode, see
his Ordeal of a Diplomat, Chap. VII.]
With regard to the statements which have appeared in the foreign newspapers
on the subject of the Provisional Governments attitude towards the Stockholm
Conference, the following statement is made (Aug. 15) [N.S.] from an authorita
tive source:
The Provisional Government considers that the solution of questions affect
ing war and peace appertains exclusively to it, in union with the Governments
of the Allied countries, supported by the Allied democracies.
The Socialist conference at Stockholm, as the Russian Government has
pointed out on various occasions, is a conference of particular political parties,
and, as such, can lay no claim to formulate decisions which could in any way
bind the Government.
The Government has always been far from intending to refuse Russian So
cialists passports for Stockholm, its view being that it is useful that questions
concerning war and peace should be submitted for discussion to the Socialist
Internationale, and in the person of the Prime Minister as well as of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, has similarly informed the Allied Governments that it con
siders it undesirable to raise any obstacles whatever to the participation of So
cialist organisations in the Conference.
Nevertheless, while not denying the political bearing of the Socialist Confer
ence with a view to the clearing up of the fundamental questions which have been
raised by the war, the Provisional Government cannot admit that the decisions
formulated by the conference can have a character which must exclusively and
solely beyond [sic] to the decisions of the Allied Governments.
In this connection it may be noted that Kerensky stated, in the course of an
interview with a British journalist, when asked if it were true that he was opposed
to the Stockholm Conference:
There has been serious misunderstanding. They are drawing a wrong deduc
tion from our Note. We meant simply to state our position. We are a Coalition
Government and, therefore, since the Conference is a party matter, we cannot, as
a Coalition, be bound by its decisions. Our Conference, the Conference of Gov
ernments, is the London Conference.16 The Swedish Conference is a Conference
of Labour Parties. That is all we wished to say. That does not mean we are
opposed to it. It is not our business to be opposed to it or in favour of it.
I said: But it has been said that M. Albert Thomas declared you said that you
personally are opposed to the Stockholm Conference.
Nothing of tie sort. I think it of great importance, although personally I
think it would have been of greater importance if it had taken place while we
were advancing instead of it in the present conditions. But I am not opposed to it.
No. I have insisted again and again that any opposition offered to it by the Allied
Governments, any difficulties put in the way of the delegates, is simply playing
into the Germans hands.
I asked, May I telegraph this?
Mr. Kerensky replied, Certainly. You can telegraph that I said it to you in
the presence of M. Oldenburg as a witness.
15 The Inter-Allied Conference, scheduled for the fall, was later shifted to Paris.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1185
He laughed, and then continued seriously:
Say this. Say that the Russian Government regards the Swedish Conference
exactly as you regard itthat is as a Conference not of Governments but of par
ties. As a Coalition Government we can be neither for nor against the Conference
called by one of the parlies which are in coalition. For that reason, personally as
President of the Coalition, I have made no speeches about it. But we consider
that no obstacles should be put in the way of it, and we shall regard the Conference
itself as an extremely important and significant expression of public opinion. It
is an entirely wrong deduction to say that we are opposed to the Conference.
. - . Tereshchenko has now informed journalists, whom he received on
Aug. 16 [ N.S.], that the views of the Government on the question were well known
in diplomatic circlcs and also to the Allied Socialist leaders, Vandervelde, Thomas,
and Henderson. In the course of the interview he made the following statements:
Neither I nor the Government have changed the views we expressed as long
ago as May last. The correspondence between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Hen
derson mentioned a letter from the Russian Charge dAffaires in London which
accompanied the official communication from the Russian Government regarding
the Conference. The text of the letter is known to me only through the Press.
I have sent an inquiry to London as to its contents. I have no hesitation in saying
that the comments of our Charge dAffaires arose exclusively through his own
interpretation of what appeared in certain English papers regarding Russias rela
tions with the Stockholm Conference. Kerensky never sent a letter respecting the
Conference. On the contrary, Kerensky and I both spoke to the Allied Ambassa
dors on several occasions, emphasizing the necessity of issuing passports to Allied
Socialists for Stockholm.
u. . . The discussion of questions touching the aims of the war at this Con
ference, he says, will be looked upon by the Government as an expression of
views on that question of the parties and organisations which take part in the
Conference. As for official discussion of questions connected with the war, it
will take place at the coming inter-Ally Conference. The attitude of the Govern
ment towards the Stockholm Conference has never changed. We stand on a
known platform, and that platform must remain unchanged.
Questioned as to whether the Russian Government intended to make any
further friendly representation to the Allied Governments, M. Tereshchenko an
swered that they must await particulars from London. He considered that it would
be a mistaken policy to change the Governments policy towards the Conference
owing to events which had taken place at the front
According to a Petrograd wire, Kerensky and Tereshchenko once more pointed
out to the Allied Ambassadors on Aug. 15 [N.S.] the desirability of removing the
formal difficulties to the journey of delegates to Stockholm.
1031. Rabochaia Gazetas C o m m e n t s o n t h e H en d e r so n E piso d e
[No. 125, August 5, 1917, p. 1. Izvestiia had an editorial similar in tone in No. 135,
August 4,1917, pp. 1-2.]
The alarm caused among the entire revolutionary democracy of Russia by
the communications in the English House of Commons concerning some sort of
1186 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
letters or telegrams of A. F. Kerensky regarding the Stockholm Conference for
tunately proved to be a false alarm .
According to the categorical declaration of our Minister of Foreign Affairs,
neither he nor A . F. Kerensky wrote any letters in which disapproval of the con
ference or desire that it would not take place was expressed. The attitude of the
Government toward the conference did not change, and, as late as August 2,
friendly representations were made to the Allied ambassadors concerning the
undesirability of causing obstacles to it.
Our Provisional Government proved innocent of the desire to undermine
the conference. On the other hand, the governments of the four Allied coun
tries, seeing that all their efforts to morally discredit the conference, that all their
stratagemswith the aid of the apocryphal and non-existent letters of Kerensky
to involve in this affair the Government of revolutionary Russia and to throw its
prestige in the balance, that all this does not work, decided to use naked force in
opposition to the constantly growing desire for peace on the part of the wide
masses of the organized proletariat. They declared that they would not issue
passports to the delegates to the conference.
But this act of violence must not evoke in us fear for the fate of the conference.
It only signifies the break of that union sacre which existed, up till the last mo
ment, between the governments and the socialist majorities of the European
countries.
It is a declaration of war on the part of the imperialist bourgeoisie against the
entire socialist proletariat of Europe. . . .
1032. T h e I n t e r -A l l ie d S o c ia list C o n fe r en c e in L o n d o n ,
A u g u st 28-29,1917 (N.S.)
[Izvestiia, No. 152, August 24, 1917, p. 3. This meeting was one of the last gasps
of the unsuccessful Stockholm movement. The Third Zimmerwald Conference did
meet in Stockholm on September 5-12 (N.S), but its consequences were negligible.]
On August 19 the Soviet delegation sent the [following] telegram:
The Conference of Socialist Parties of Allied countries was called at the initia
tive of the British Labour Party. Influenced, evidently, by the Soviets resolu
tion that its representatives might attend the Allied conference for informational
purposes, the British invitation stated that the conference would be deliberative
in character. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation could not be certain that the
conference would carry out the view expressed in the invitation of the Labour
Party and consider itself a purely deliberative body. Therefore, while awaiting
a final and thorough clarification of this question, the Russian delegation an
nounced when the conference opened that it was participating only for purposes of
information.
Chairman Henderson then declared that the conference would be purely de
liberative, that the various declarations and proposals would only be registered,
and that the conference will not adopt any binding resolutions. The conference
unanimously confirmed the declaration of the Chairman. Finally, Vandervelde,
speaking on behalf of the Organizational Bureau of the conference, declared that
the conference would be deliberative in character.
On the other hand, from the very beginning of the conference it was made clear
to the Russian delegation that if it attended the conference merely for purposes of
MAY TO OCTOBER 1187
information, and was therefore barred from participating in the deliberations of
committees and general meetings, then not only would the platform of the Soviet
fail to receive the defense due it, but it might happen that [some] trend which was
far removed from the platform [of the Soviets] would gain ascendancy.
Taking into account the composition of the Conference, all the members of
the British and French minority insisted that the Russian delegation take an active
part in the Conference. The moral victory of the majority could have placed the
minority in a difficult position. In view of all this, the Russian delegation declared
that it would lake part in the conference on an equal footing with the rest of the
delegations.
Thanks to this participation, the results of the Conference turned out to be
favorable for the platform of the Soviet. Thus, Leindmans resolution proposing
to refuse to take any pari in the Stockholm Conference obtained 4 votes from rep
resentatives of the British National Parly [sic], with 55 opposing. MacDonalds
resolution in favor of participation in the Stockholm Conference received 43 votes
against 33. His resolution protesting against the refusal of passports and appealing
to socialist organizations to continue pressing for the issuance of passports re
ceived 54 votes against 2.
Representatives of the majority submitted a resolution proposing to form in
London a permanent Allied Socialist Committee that would be informational in
character. This resolution received 50 voles against 40.
The Russian delegation and representatives of the Italian and British socialist
parties voted against the Allied Committee. The attempt made by the initiators
of the conference lo draw up a common draft for peace terms ended in complete
failure. The Russian delegation which opposed the very idea of working out the
Allies peace terms submitted a declaration of a general character. It was sup
ported by a large part of the French minority and the British Socialist Party.
In spite of the fact that the Conference demonstrated that the chances for
convening the International in the near future were negligible, the conference was
a complete moral victory for the platform of the minority. After the Conference,
the Russian delegation took part in conferences with groups which were in com
plete agreement with the position of the Soviet and which constituted the majority
at the Conference. From the views that were exchanged it became clear that should
the Soviet, Ilalian, and British socialist parties agree to join the Allied Committee,
a majority would be formed which shared the Soviet platform. Representatives of
the Italian parly and the Russian delegation declared that they would consult with
their organizations on this point and give their answer subsequently.
Source Abbreviations

Adamov, Evropeiskie derzhavy i Gretsiia E. A. Adamov (ed.), Evropeiskie dershavy


i Gretsiia v epokhu Mirovoi Voiny po sekretnym dokumentam b. ministerstva ino
strannykh del
Adamov, Konst. i prolivy E. A. Adamov (ed.), KonstantinopoV i prolivy po sekret
nym dokumentam b. ministerstva inostrannykh del
Adamov, Razdel E. A. Adamov (ed.), Razdel Asiatskoi Turtsii po sekretnym doku
mentam b. ministerstva inostrannykh del
ARR Arkhiv Russkoi Revoliutsii
Avdeev N. Avdeev and others, Revoliutsiia 1917 goda (Khronika sobytii)
Dimanshtein S. M. Dimanshtein (ed.), Revoliutsiia i natsionaVnyi vopros
Ekon . Polozhenie Ekonomicheskoe Polozhenie Rossii Nakanune Velikoi Oktiabrskoi
Sotsialisticheskoi Revoliutsii
For. Rel. of U.S. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States
GFO Records of the German Foreign Office received by the Department of State
Golder Frank Alfred Golder, Documents of Russian History, 1914-1917
Gos. Sov. M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917 god v dokumentakh
materialakh. Vol. IX: Gosudarstvennoe Soveshchanie
KA Krasnyi Arkhiv
Krestianskoe dvizhenie v 1917 godu M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.),
1917 god v dokumentakh i materialakh. Vol. V: Krestianskoe dvizhenie v 1917
godu
Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika Z. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika Vre-
mennago Pravitelstva
Nikolaevskii B. I. Nikolaevskii (ed.), A Collection of Extracts from Menshevik
Newspapers, 1917-1920
Osobyi Zhurnal Osobyi Zhurnal Zasedanii Vremennago PraviteVstva
Padenie Padenie tsarskogo rezhima
PR Proletarskaia Revoliutsiia
Protokoly M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917 god v dokumentakh i
materialakh. Vol. I : Petrogradskii Sovet Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov; Pro
tokoly zasedanii IspolniteVnogo Komiteta i Biuro I.K.
Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917
god v dokumentakh i materialakh, Vol. VII: Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu
Razlozhenie armii M. N. Pokrovskii and Ya. A. Yakovlev (eds.), 1917 god v doku
mentakh i materialakh. Vol. VI: Razlozhenie armii v 1917 godu
Reports to the Department of State North Winship, U.S. Consulate Reports: Petro
grad Revolution, Mar.-July, 1917
1190 SOURCE ABBREVIATIONS
Sb. Tsirk . MVD . Sbornik Tsirkuliarov Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del za peiiod Mart-
Hun91917 goda
Sbor. Ukaz. Sbornik Ukazov i Postanovlenii Vremennago PraviteVstva
Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov iz arkhiva byv-
shago ministerstva inostrannykh del
Sob. Uzak. Sobranie Uzakonenii i Rasporiazhenii Pramtel9stva
VVP Vestnik Vremennago PraviteVstva
Z Dok. Chwili Z Dokumentow Chwili
Zhurnaly Zhurnaly Zasedanii Vremennago PraviteVstva
Glossary

Appanage lands See udel lands.


Chin Rank or grade in the Table of Ranks established by Peter the
Great. All offices in the military or civil service were arranged
in a hierarchical order of 14 classes. The first eight grades in
the civil service conferred hereditary nobility, which was grant
ed with the attainment of lowest commissioned rank in the
military service.
Dessiatine A Russian unit of area equal to 2.7 acres.
Duma The Imperial State Duma was the national assembly created
in 1906, and elected by limited suffrage. Four Dumas were
elected before the February revolution. The municipal dumas
were town councils, also chosen by limited suffrage. In the
larger cities there were district dumas as well.
Gendarme Corps A special police corps directly under and responsible to the
Ministiy of the Interior at the call of civil authorities for main
taining order. Also investigated political crimes, acted as rail
road police, and supervised political prisons.
GradonachaVnik Town governor, or prefect, principally in charge of police
matters, appointed only to the capitals and several other cities
or areas.
Guberniya A major administrative division of the Empire. Subdivided
into uezds.
Hectare A unit of area equal to 2.471 acres.
Inorodtsy Russian subjects belonging to the following groups: the moun
tain peoples of the northern Caucasus, all Jews, the Siberian
nomads, the Samoeds, the nomads of Stavropol guberniya,
natives of the Komandorskie Islands, the Kalmyks, and the
Ordynsty of the Transcaspian oblast.
Kabinet His Imperial Majestys Kabinet. A section of the Ministry of
the Imperial Court that was in charge of the Emperors prop
erty, including lands, thus, Kabinet lands.
K.D.s Constitutional Democrats.
Khutor Settlement on self-contained enclosed holdings, including the
house and farm buildings of the peasant. The final step in the
Stolypin agrarian program to abolish the commune in favor of
individual farms.
1192 GLOSSARY
Krai A large administrative unit on the borderlands, composed of
several guberniyas or oblasts and headed by a Governor Gen
eral, as, for example, the Turkestan Krai.
Krug Elected council of the Cossack Voisko.
Mezhduraionyi The Mezhduraionyi Komitet was an autonomous organization
of workers and professional revolutionaries in Petrograd,
which included Tiotsky, Lunacharskii, and Riazanov and
which joined the Bolsheviks in July.
Oblast A large administrative division, in the Caucasus, Central Asia,
and the Far Eastern territory.
Obshchina The peasant commune, sometimes called the mir.
Okhrana The tsarist secret police.
Order of St. George Founded by Catherine II for military service on land and sea.
Had four classes, including one for noncommissioned officers,
the St. George Cross.
Otrub The consolidation of the individual strips belonging to a peas
ant, with the exception of his village plot and house. A step in
the Stolypin reform to abolish the commune and establish in
dividual peasant farms.
Pomeshchik Originally a person granted land by the Tsar in return for
service to the state. By 1917 used loosely to denote any land
owner of the gentry class.
Pood A Russian weight equivalent to 36.1 pounds avoirdupois.
Possessional lands Term used to designate Tsars lands in the western part of
Russia (Poland and Belorussia) which were rented.
P.S.R. Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries.
S.D.s Social Democrats. The two main branches of the Social Demo
cratic Workers Party were the Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks.
Senoren konvent The Council of Elders or steering committee of the State Duma
and later of the Provisional Council of the Russian Republic.
Composed of the leaders of each of the parliamentary factions.
Sosloviia Social classes or estates, see p. 210n.
S.R.*s Socialist Revolutionaries.
State Control A ministry which checked all ministerial estimates and aud
ited the books of government institutions, with some few ex
ceptions.
Stavka The Headquarters of the Supreme Commander.
GLOSSARY 1193
Ti udoviks The Trudovik Group was organized in the First Duma and
included peasant deputies, radical intelligentsia, members of
the Peasant Union, and the Socialist Revolutionaries. Had a
definite agrarian program. Kerensky was the leader of the
Group in the Fourth Duma.
Tsenzovyi From izbirateVnyi tsenz, literally electoral qualification. See
p. 131n.
Udel lands Lands which provided financial support for members of the
Imperial family other than the immediate family of the Tsar.
Administered by a department under the Ministry of the Im
perial Court.
Uezd An administrative subdivision of the guberniya.
Verst A Russian measure of distance, about two-thirds of a mile.
Voinskii nachaVnik An officer in charge of the district military administrative
office.
Voisko A Cossack army or host, included civil as well as military in
stitutions.
Volost A peasant administrative division of the uezd, which usually
included several communes.
VTsIK All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
Zemgor The joint Committee of the Unions of Zemstvos and of Towns
for the Supply of the Army, organized in July 1915.
Zemskie nachaVniki Agents of the central government, appointed from the gentry
class, with judiciary and administrative authority over the
peasants.
Zemsoiuz The Union of Zemstvos.
Zemstvo The elective assembly of the guberniya and uezd in which all
classes were to some extent represented. It elected an execu
tive board (uprava). Created by the local government reform
of 1864.

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