Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
The Russian
Provisional Government
1917
DOCUMENTS
Selected and edited by
ROBERT PAUL BROWDER
an d
ALEXANDER F. KERENSKY
VOLUME II
Volume I
Volume II
PART III. E con om ic and S o c ia l R e o r g a n iz a t io n ............................. 479
9. Public Finance................................................................... 484
10. The Agrarian Question................................................... 523
11. Supply and Provisioning ............................................... 615
12. Industry, Transport, and Communications.................. 666
13. L a b o r............................................................................... 709
14. Education and Welfare................................................... 771
15. Religion ........................................................................... 803
PART IV. M ilita r y A ffa ir s and O p e r a tio n s ..................................... 841
16. The Revolution in the Army and N a vy......................... 845
17. The Offensive and the German Counteroffensive.......... 921
18. Efforts to Strengthen the Army After J u ly ................... 977
PART V. F o reig n A f f a i r s ...................................................................
1039
19. The Period of the First Provisional Government.......... 10*1.2
20. May to October............................................................... 1102
Source Abbreviations..................................................................................... 1189
Glossary............................................................................................................ 1191
Volume III
PART VI. T h e P r o v isio n a l G overn m en t and P o lit ic a l F o rces t o
1J95
J u l y ......................................................................................................
21. Political Parties and the Soviet....................................... 1199
22. The April Crisis and the Formation of a Coalition Gov
ernment ........................................................................... 1236
23. The First Coalition Government................................... 1286
PART VII. T h e J u ly D ays and Su b seq u en t E ff o r ts t o S ta b iliz e
1331
t h e R e g im e .......................................................................................
24. The July Uprising........................................................... 1335
25. The Political C risis......................................................... 1383
26. The Moscow Conference................................................. 1451
PART VIII. From K o r n ilo v t o O c t o b e r ........................................................... 1523
27. The Kornilov A ffa ir....................................................... 1527
28. Military and Civil Demoralization................................. 1614
29. The Dissolution of the Democratic Coalition.............. 1653
30. October............................................................................. 17)4
Source Abbreviations..................................................................................... 1815
Glossary........................................................................................................... 1817
Chronology...................................................................................................... 1821
Bibliography.................................................................................................... 1831
In d e x ................................................................................... ........................... 1841
Documents in Volume II
PART III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Chapter 9. Public Finance
STATE CONTROL
429. The Establishment of a Permanent Preliminary and Current Audit and
Control................................................................................................... 484
430. The Inclusion of Zemstvo and Municipal Representatives in the Local Of
fices and the Council of the Department of State Control........................ 484
431. The Participation of Representatives of Public Organizations in the Activities
of the Institutions of State Control......................................................... 485
t h e l ib e r t y l o a n
432. The Issuance of the Liberty Loan of 1917..................................................... 485
433. Novoe Vremia on the Liberty Loan................................................................ 485
434. Den9on the Liberty Loan.............................................................................. 486
435. The Appeal of the Free Economic Society on the Liberty Loan.................... 486
436. The Debate on the Liberty Loan in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd
Soviet .................................................................................................... 487
437. The Soviet Resolution in Support of the Liberty Loan, April 22,1917........... 488
438. An Appeal from the All-Russian Congress of Soviets................................... 489
439. The Extension of the Liberty Loan Subscription Until the Convocation of
the Constituent Assembly....................................................................... 490
440. Opposition and Apathy Toward Subscription to the Liberty Loan................. 490
PLANS FOR FINANCIAL REFORM
441. The Establishment of a Council for the Preparation of a Plan for Financial
Reform................................................................................................... 492
442. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on Proposed Financial Reforms................. 493
443. Consideration of a Compulsory Loan........................................................... 494
444. The Decision Against a Compulsory Loan................................................... 494
NEW TAXATION
445. The Enactment of an Extraordinary Income Tax Levy................................. 495
446. The Increase in the War Profits Tax............................................................ 496
447. Resolution of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets on Financial Policy, June
21, 1917................................................................................................. 496
448. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Financial Reforms............................................ 497
449. Opposition to the New Taxation and Its Subsequent Revision and Postpone
ment ...................................................................................................... 499
FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS
450. Minutes of a Governmental Conference on Loans and Credits from the
United States.......................................................................................... 500
Vlll UULUM&Nl b IN VOLUME II
451. American Loans and Credits to Russia........... ...................................502
452. British Credits to Russia............................................................................. 503
453. British Reply to the Russian Memorandum of June 2 2 ................................. 506
454. French Credits to Russia.............................................................................. 507
THE RUBLE
455. The Flood of Paper Money [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ................ 509
456. Report of United Stales Consul Winship at Petrograd on Lhe Cmrency Crisis 510
457. The Exchange Rate of the Ruble................................................................ 510
458. The Kerenky Notes.................................................................................. 511
459. Report on the Work of the Foreign Section of the Special Credit Office of the
Ministi y of Finance................................................................................ 511
GENERAL FINANCIAL POLICIES AND REPORTS
460. Basic Financial Policies Approved by the Government................................. 513
461. The Organization of a Special Committee for the Reduction of State Ex
penditures ............................................................................................. 514
462. The Financial Situation of Russia as of Mid-August 1917............................. 515
463. Survey of the Work of the Department of the State Treasury, Ministry of
Finance, February-October, 1917.......................................................... 518
Chapter 10. The Agrarian Question
FIRST ACTS
464. The Nationalization of the Imperial Appanages............................................ 523
465. The Nationalization of the Kabinet Lands and Properties............................. 523
466. The Suspension of the Activities of the Zemskie NachaVniki........................ 524
TIIE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIIE LAND COMMITTEES
467. The Government Declaration of March 19................................................... 524
468. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti................................................................... 525
469. Editorial in Izvestiia..................................................................................... 526
470. Appeal of the Provisional Government Concerning the Land Question......... 527
471. The Establishment of Land Committees..................................................... 528
472. Comment of Russkiia Vedomosti on the Land Committees............................ 532
473. Editorial in Ddo Naroda.............................................................................. 534
474. Izvestiia on the Agrarian Question.............................................................. 534
THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL LAND COMMITTEE
475. The Organization of a National Census of Land, Agriculture, and Urban
Population............................................................................................ 536
476. The First Session of the Central Land Committee, May 19-20, 1937............ 538
477. The Second Session of the Central Land Committee, July 1-6, 1917............ 544
478. General Plan by the Central Land Committee for the Work of the Guberniya,
Uczd, and Volost Land Committees on the Pieparation of the Land
Reform.................................................................................................. 547
479. The Third Session of the Central Land Committee, August 25-29................. 547
480. An Adverse Comment on the Woik of the Central Land Committee............... 548
481. The Foundation of the National Land Reserve............................................. 549
482. The Work of the Central Land Committees Commission on the Redistri
bution of the Land Reserve................................................................... 549
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II ix
THE PROBLEM OF LAND RELATIONS PENDING THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE AGRARIAN REFORM
483. Recent Sibeiian Settlers Urged Not to Return to European Russia for the
Anticipated Land Allotment.................................................................. 554
484. All Land to the People [Editorial in Izvestiia] .......................................... 555
485. The Restriction on Transactions in Land..................................................... 556
486. The Ban on Land Transactions [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] .... 557
487. Chernovs Instruction to the Land Committees........................................... 558
488. Circular of the Minister of the Interior to Guberniya and Oblast Commissais,
July 17, 1917.......................................................................................... 562
489. Order of the Minister of Food to the Food Supply Committees.................... 563
490. A Supplemental Circular from the Minister of the Interior, I. G. Tseretelli,
to Guberniya Commissars....................................................................... 565
491. The Objections of Professor Posnikov to the Instructions of Chernov........... 566
492. Mandatory Instruction of the Supreme Commander on Agrarian Matters for
Localities in the Theater of War, July 31,1917....................................... 567
493. Messrs. Peshekhonov and Chernov [Editorial in Novoe Vremia]............ 568
494. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Instruction to Land Committees....................... 569
495. Resolution of the Kuznetskii Uezd Land Committee on the Necessity for
Explicit and Uncontradictory Instructions to Land Committees............. 570
496. Letter of Professor Posnikov to Kerensky Concerning the Need for Land
Legislation for Guidance Until the Introduction of the Agrarian Reform 571
497. Report of the Representative of the Ministry of Agriculture in the Kherson
Guberniya Land Committee.................................................................... 572
498. An Attempt by the Provisional Government to Find a Means of Curbing
Agrarian Disorders in Late September................................................... 575
499. A Ruinous Demagogy [Editorial in Vlast9 Naroda] ............................... 576
500. The Draft Law of Maslov on the Regulation of Agricultural Relations and
the Powers of the Land Committees....................................................... 577
501. Russkiia Vedomosti on Maslovs Proposed Legislation................................. 580
502. Lenins Attack on the Maslov Bill: A New Deception of the Peasants by the
Socialist-Revolutionary Party................................................................ 580
AGRARIAN DISORDERS
503. The Areas and Incidence of Agrarian Disorders in European Russia........... 582
504. Government Action on the First Disorders in Kazan Guberniya................... 582
505. The Socialization of the Land and Arbitrary Seizure [Editorial in Delo
Naroda] ................................................................................................. 583
506. Authorization to Use Troops to Suppress Agrarian Disorders........................ 584
507. Circular of Prince Lvov to Guberniya Commissars....................................... 584
508. Report on the Agrarian Situation in Saratov Guberniya............................... 585
509. Resolution of the Kazan Guberniya Soviet of Peasants Deputies, May 13,
1917 ....................................................................................................... 585
510. Report of the Commissar of the Novoaleksandrovsk Uezd, KovnoGuberniya 587
511. A Report from Riazan Guberniya................................................................. 588
512. Telegram from the Commissar of Kazan Guberniya..................................... 592
513. Telegram from the Commissar of Novorossiisk Guberniya.......................... 592
514. Civil War Has Begun [Editorial in Novoe Vremia] ................................... 593
515. Novaia Zhizn9on the Agrarian Disorders During September........................ 594
X DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
THE COSSACKS
516. Appeal of the Provisional Government to the Don Cossacks........................ 595
517. Resolution on the Land Question of the Cossack Congress, June15,1917. .. . 596
THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF PEASANTS SOVIETS
518. Resolution on the Land Question, May 26,1917............................................ 597
519. A Comment on the Work and Mood of the Congress..................................... 598
520. Russkiia Vedomosti's Attack on the Resolution............................................ 600
521. The Comments of Volia Naroda on the Resolution ................................... 602
522. Draft Resolution on the Agrarian Question Introduced by Lenin at the
Congress .............................................................................................. 603
THE FIRST ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OK
WORKERS AND SOLDIERS DEPUTIES
523. Resolution on the Agrarian Question........................................................... 604
THE KADET PROGRAM
524. Resolution of the Kadet Party Congress....................................................... 605
THE UNION OF LANDOWNERS
525. A Congress of Landowners in Saratov.......................................................... 608
526. Specch of N. N. Lvov at the Congress of the Union of Landowners inMoscow 608
527. Session of the Plenum of the Central Council of the Union of Landowners,
July 31, 1917......................................................................................... 609
THE COOPERATIVES
528. The New Cooperative Code........................................................................ 631
529. Congresses of Cooperative Representatives.................................................. 613
Chapter 11. Supply and Provisioning
THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF FOOD
SUPPLY ORGANS AND THE GRAIN MONOPOLY
530. The Establishment of the State Committee on Food Supply....................... 615
531. An Appeal in Rabochcda Gazeta................................................................... 616
532. Difficulties Attendant upon the Introduction of Bread Rationing inPeti ograd 616
533. Reports from the Commissar of the Moscow Prefecture (GradonackaVstvo)
to the Commissar of the Provisional Government in Moscow (N. Kish-
kin) Concerning Food Supply............................................................... 617
534. The Establishment of the Grain Monopoly with Fixed Prices for Grain and
the Organization of Local Food Supply Committees............................. 618
535. Announcement of the Provisional Government Regarding the Grain Mo
nopoly .................................................................................................... 621
536. The Law on the Protection of Crops............................................................. 621
537. Comment of Russkiia Vedomosti on the Law Protecting Crops................... 622
538. Den9on the Protection of Crops and the Organization of Agriculture........ 623
539. Measures to Increase the Number of Agricultural Workers......................... 624
540. Authorization to Food Supply Committees to Draft the Population for
Assistance in Loading, Unloading, and Transporting Food andGrain.. 625
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xi
541. The Enlistment of Cooperative Institutions, Other Organizations and Enter
prises, and Individual Merchants in the Work of Purveying Grain Prod
ucts and Fodder....................................................................................... 626
542. Appeal of the Petrograd Soviet to the Peasants............................................ 627
543. The Establishment of Rationing for Grain Products..................................... 627
544. Statute on the Ministry of Food.................................................................... 629
545. The Resolution of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants Deputies on the Food
Question................................................................................................. 630
546. Opposition in Commercial Circles to the Grain Monopoly and Its Implemen
tation ..................................................................................................... 631
547. The Congress on Food................................................................................... 632
548. The Report of the Minister of Food (Peshekhonov) on the Supply Problem
to the First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies................................................................................................. 633
549. Resolution on the Food Supply Question by the First All-Russian Congress
of Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies......................................... 637
550. Telegram from the Commissar of Simbirsk Guberniya on the Resistance to
the Grain Monopoly............................................................................... 637
551. Compulsory Maximum Utilization of Agricultural Equipment.................... 638
552. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Growing Food Crisis........................................... 639
553. Authorization of the Minister of Food to Suspend and Terminate the Activity
of a Food Supply Organ......................................................................... 640
554. The Guarantee of the Government Not to Raise the Fixed Prices on Grain
Established by the Law of March 25....................................................... 641
555. The Doubling of the Fixed Prices on Grain.................................................. 641
556. The Explanation of the Government for the Doubling of Fixed Prices on
Grain .................................................................................................... 642
557. The Soviets, the Council of Trade Unions, and the Union of Towns Object to
the Nonparticipation of the Economic Council and the State Committee
on Food Supply in the Decision to Double Fixed Prices onGrain........... 643
558. The Placing of Land and Food Supply Committees Under the Jurisdiction
of the Administrative Courts.................................................................. 644
559. The Condition of Winter Crop Sowings as of September 10,1917................. 644
560. Some Suggestions in Russkiia Vedomosti for Improving the Food Supply
System ................................................................................................... 645
561. Report of the Minister of Food (S. M. Prokopovich) on the Food Supply
Situation to the Council of the Republic, October 16............................. 647
562. Authorization for the Use of Force to Expedite the Shipment ofGrain........... 653
THE PROVISIONING OF THE ARMY
563. Difficulties in the Delivery of Hay and Fodder to the Army.......................... 653
564. An Attempl to Regularize Military and Civilian Food Supply in Front Areas 654
565. The Threatening Food Supply Situation for August..................................... 655
566. The Food Supply Crisis on the Southwestern Front and the Decision to
Requisition Grain and Fodder in the Local Guberniyas........................ 656
567. The Continuing Crisis in September............................................................. 656
568. The Dangerous Food Supply Situation on the Western Front inOctober----- 657
THE SUPPLY AND REGULATION OF OTHER FOOD SUPPLIES
AND CONSUMER GOODS
569. The Establishment of a Commission to Examine the Question of Supplying
the Population with Consumer Goods.................................................... 658
570. The Statement of the Government Announcing the Establishing of the Com
mission ........................................ ........................................................ 659
571. Izvestiias Comment on the Establishment of the Commission...................... 659
572. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Advisability of Fixed Prices for Consumer Goods 661
573. Authorization for the Minister of Food to Organize the Supply to the Popu
lation of Textiles, Footwear, Kerosene, Soap, and Other Products of
Prime Necessity.................................................................................. 662
574. The Standards of Sugar Distribution.......................................................... 662
575. The Introduction of the State Sugar Monopoly............................................ 664
576. The Production of Candy and Pastry.......................................................... 665
Chapter 12. Industry9 Transport, and Communications
GENERAL MEASURES OF THE MINISTRY OF
TRADE AND INDUSTRY
577. The Facilitation of the Formation of Joint-Stock Companies and the Elimi
nation from Their Charters of National and Religious Restrictions........ 666
578. The Establishment of a Council on Questions Relating to the Development
of the Productive Forces of the Country................................................. 667
579. The Establishment of a Supply Committee {ZagotoviteVnyi Komitet) in the
Ministry of Trade and Industry............................................................ 667
580. Konovalovs Distress at Prevailing Economic Conditions............................. 668
581. The Resignation of Konovalov..................................................................... 670
582. Resolution of the First All-Russian Congress of Representatives of Industry
and Trade, Petrograd, June 1917.......................................................... 671
583. The Lesson of the English Industrialists [Editorial in Den.] .................... 671
584. Memorandum on the Economic Situation from the Acting Minister of Trade
and Industry to the Provisional Government.......................................... 672
585. The Statute Establishing the Economic Council and the Central Economic
Committee............................................................................................. 677
586. Comment of Rabochaia Gazeta on the New Economic Oi gans...................... 679
587. The Statute Broadening the Representation in and the Powers of the Fac
tory Councils......................................................................................... 679
588. Russkiia Vedomosti7$ Criticism of the Second All-Russian Congress of Rep
resentatives of Industry and Trade........................................................ 682
589. Statute Establishing Chambers of Commerce and Industry.......................... 683
590. The Recommendation of the President of the Economic Council (S. N. Tret-
iakov) that the Council Be Abolished................................................... 684
591. The Abolition of the Economic Council...................................................... 685
METALS
592. Statute on Regional Commissioners for the Distribution of Metals and Fuel 685
593. The Establishment of Fixed Prices on Metals and Metal Coods.................. 687
594. The Regulation of the Trade and Prices of Agricultural Machinery........... 688
FUEL
595. The Statute on the Temporary Committee of the Donets Basin.................... 688
596. Coordinating the Orders of the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel and
of Other Authorities for the Application of Emergency Measures with
Respect to Fuel..................................................................................... 689
597. Statute on the Regulation of the Distribution of Oil..................................... 689
598. Appeal to the Peasants to Aid in the Procurement of Wood for Fuel........... 690
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xiii
599. Statute on the Utilization of Water Power.................................................. 691
600. New Rules on the Regulation of the Purchase of Fuel Oil........................... 691
601. Statute Establishing a State Monopoly of the Sale of Donets Coal.............. 692
602. A Vicious Circle [Article in Russkiia Vedomosti] .................................... 695
603. Measure to Expedite the Shipment of Oil on the CaspianSea...................... 696
604. Explanation of the Reduction in Oil Production......................................... 697
LEATHER GOODS AND TEXTILES
605. The Establishment of the State Leather Monopoly..................................... 697
606. All Cotton and Its Distribution Placed Under the Control of the Cotton
Committee .............................................................................................. 698
607. The Right of Purchase of Coarse Wool Given Exclusively to Mills Manufac
turing for Defense Needs...................................................................... 699
TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS
608. An Appeal to the Soldiers on the Use of the Railroads................................ 700
609. The Decision of American Railroad Car and Locomotive Manufacturers to
Give Priority to Russian Orders............................................................ 701
610. The Agreement Concerning American Aid to Russian Railroad Transport.. 701
611. The Organization of the Stevens Commission............................................... 702
612. Measures for Regulating the Transport of Passengers and Freight.............. 703
613. The Appointment of Commissars to the Railroads...................................... 704
614. The Provisional Government Accepts the Recommendations of the Stevens
Commission for Improvements on the Trans-Siberian Railroad............ 704
615. Work of the Stevens Mission........................................................................ 705
616. The Railroads Are Slopping [Article in Russkiia Vedomosti] ................ 705
617. The Condition of the Postal and Telegraphic Services................................ 707
Chapter 13. Labor
THE RESUMPTION OF WORK AND THE INITIATION
OF NEW LABOR CONDITIONS
618. Resolution of the Petrograd Soviet Approving the Resumption of Work---- 709
619. Izvestiia Urges Economic Demands Be Made by Labor with the Resumption
of W ork................................................................................................ 709
620. An Address from the Minister of Trade and Industry to the Workers........... 710
621. Appeal of the Soviet to the Workers............................................................. 711
622. The Agreement on Working Conditions in Petrograd.................................. 712
623. Appeal of the Government to the Ural Metallurgical Workers..................... 713
624. The Soldiers Concern over the Implications of the Eight-Hour Working Day 714
625. A Report of Worker Irresponsibility............................................................ 714
626. We Must Strike Back [Editorial in Izvestiia] ......................................... 715
627. Statement on the Eight-Hour Day by the Chairman of the Council of the
Congress of Representatives of Industry and Trade (N. N. Kutler).... 716
628. The First of May [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ................................ 717
629. The First of May [Editorial in Izvestiia] .................................................. 717
FACTORY COMMITTEES
630. The Statute on Factory Committees.............................................................. 718
631. Civil War in the Pipe Factory [An Incident of Industrial Violence]... 720
xiv DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
632. Difficulties in the Implementation of the Law on Factory Committees......... 721
633. Circular of the Minister of Labor Concerning Worker Interferencein Hiring
and Firing.............................................................................................. 721
634. The Circular of August 28 of the Minister of Labor on the Inadmissibility
of Workers Meetings During Working Hours....................................... 722
635. Protest Against the August 28 Circular of the Minister of Labor................. 722
636. Policies of the Special Council on Defense Regarding Labor Relations in
Defense Plants...................................................................................... 723
637. Account of the Activities of the Factory Committees and Their Relation to
the Trade Union Movement.................................................................... 724
THE WORK OF THE MINISTRY OF LABOR
638. The Establishment of the Ministry of Labor.................................................. 727
639. Grievances of the Donets Workers................................................................ 728
640. The Unsuccessful Attempt of the Ministry of Labor to End Industrial Con
flict in the Donbas................................................................................... 729
641. The President of the Special Council on Defense Urges the Government to
Establish Wage Scales........................................................................... 730
642. An Appeal from the Minister of Labor......................................................... 731
643. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Appeal of the Minister...................................... 732
644. Volia Naroda on the Appeal of the Minister................................................ 733
645. The Institution of Local Commissars of the Ministry of Labor.................... 734
646. The Enactment of New Legislation on Workers Medical Insurance........... 735
647. Social Insurance in Russia in 1917.............................................................. 736
648. Restrictions on Night Work for Women and Children................................. 740
649. Izvestiia Urges the Establishment of Chambers of Conciliation.................... 741
650. The Organization of Chambers of Conciliation and Arbitration.................. 742
651. The Statute on Labor Exchanges.................................................................. 744
652. A Conference on the Organization of Labor Exchanges............................... 744
653. Additional Legislative Proposals of the Ministry of Labor............................ 745
THE TRADE UNION MOVEMENT
654. The All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions and the Soviets of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies [Editorial in Izvestiia] ..................................... 746
655. The Trade Unions in Russia in 1917............................................................ 747
WORKERS COOPERATIVES
656. The Workers Cooperatives in 1917.............................................................. 751
THE RAILROAD WORKERS
657. The Establishment of Provisional Supervisory Committees on the Railroads
to Deal with Labor Relations............................................................... 755
658. The Organization of a Commission on the Economic Condition of Railroad
Workers................................................................................................ 756
659. The Threat of a Railroad Strike................................................................. 756
660. The Settlement of the Threatened Strike..................................................... 757
661. The Appeal of the Minister-President to the Railroadmen in Connection
with the Threatened Strike of September.............................................. 758
662. The Strike Movement in September............................................................ 759
663. The Settlement of the September Strike....................................................... 761
664. The All-Russian Union of Railroadmen and the Bolsheviks.......................... 762
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xv
THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT
665. The Confiscation of the Guzhon Factory....................................................... 764
666. A Resolution on Lockouts by the Conference of Factory Committees in Mos
cow ........................................................................................................ 765
667. Labor Disputes in Baku and on the Volga.................................................... 766
668. The Question of Shutdowns and Unemployment.......................................... 767
669. Communication from the French Embassy to the Provisional Government
Concerning the Dangers of Labor Unrest to French Interests in the Don
Basin ..................................................................................................... 768
670. Politics and Economics [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] .................... 769
Chapter 14. Education and Welfare
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS
671. The Teaching of Ukrainian and the Removal of the Jewish Quota............... 771
672. Criticism of the New Minister of Education.................................................. 771
673. The Inciease in the Salary of Elementary School Teachers.......................... 772
674. The Regional Congress of the All-Russian Teachers Union in Petrograd... 773
675. Commentary on the Democratization of the Schools..................................... 774
676. The Broadening of Vocational Education..................................................... 776
677. A Recommendation for Vocational Courses in the Secondary Schools......... 778
678. The Establishment of Coeducation in the Gymnasia9 Pro-Gymnasia, and
Real Schools.......................................................................................... 778
679. Approval of the Establishment of Four-Year (Senior) Gymnasia and Real
Schools.................................................................................................. 779
680. New Statute on Teacher Training Schools................................................... 780
681. The Introduction of the New Orthography................................................... 781
682. Support for the Orthographic Reform........................................................... 783
683. A Summary of the First Three Months of Reform in Education.................. 784
684. The State Committee on Education and A. A. Manuilov............................... 786
685. The State Committee on Education and S. F. OPdenburg............................ 787
686. The Transfer of the Administration of Upper Primary Schools to the Juris
diction of Local Government.................................................................. 788
687. The Proposed Reorganization of the Administration of Secondary Schools.. 789
HIGHER EDUCATION
688. Increased Self-Government for the Academy of Sciences.............................. 791
689. New Statute on Teachers Colleges............................................................... 792
690. The Founding of the University of the Don and Other Institutions of Higher
Learning ............................................................................................... 793
691. The Abrogation of Governmental Controls over the Selection and Use of
Books and Other Teaching Materials.................................................... 793
692. The Procedure for Appointing Professors to Vacant Posts in Institutions of
Higher Learning ................................................................................... 794
693. The Establishment of the Position of Docent in Russian State Universities.. 795
694. The Extension of Membership in University Councils and FacultyMeetings 796
695. The Improvement of the Financial Position and Academic Rank of Faculty
Members of Higher Technical Institutions............................................ 797
696. New Statute on Student-Administration Relations........................................ 798
xvi DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
WELFARE
697. The Increase in Pensions............................................................................... 799
698. The Transfer of the Department of the Empress Mariia and of the Chari
table Society to the Ministry of Welfare................................................ 800
699. The Extension of Support for Soldiers Families.......................................... 800
700. The Establishment of a Temporary National Committee and Local Commit
tees to Aid Disabled War Veterans......................................................... 801
701. A Conference on the Organization of Social Aid to Children...................... 802
Chapter 15. Religion
INITIAL REFORMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE ORTHODOX
CHURCH AND OFFICIAL POLICIES ON RELIGIOUS MATTERS
702. The Removal of the Rasputinites from the Holy Synod................................. 803
703. The Appeal of the Holy Synod for Support of the Provisional Government. 803
704. The Urgent Need for a Church-State Act [Editorial in Reck] ................. 804
705. The Abolition of Restrictions on the Rights of the Clergy Who Voluntarily
Left Ecclesiastical Orders or Who Were Unfrocked.............................. 805
706. Ukase of the Provisional Government Dismissing All But Two Members of
the Holy Synod and Appointing New Members..................................... 806
707. V. N. Lvovs Explanation of the Dismissal of Synod Members.................... 806
708. A Diocesan Conference in Nizhnii Novgorod................................................ 807
709. The All-Russian Congress of Clergy and Laymen........................................ 808
710. The Law on Freedom of Conscience............................................................ 809
711. The Establishment of the Ministry of Confessions........................................ 810
CHURCH SCHOOLS
712. The Grant to Councils of Theological Seminaries and Schools of the Right
to Select Candidates for Administrative and Teaching Positions........... 812
713. The Separation of Church and State and the Separation of Church and
School [Editorial in Izvestiia].............................................................. 812
714. The Transfer of Church Parochial Schools to the Jurisdiction of the Min
istry of Education................................................................................. 813
715. A Clerical Commentary on the Reform of Church Schools............................ 814
THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOBOR OF THE RUSSIAN
ORTHODOX CHURCH
716. The Resolution of the Pre-Sobor Council on the Relations Between Church
and State, July 13, 1917........................................................................ 818
717. A Commentary in Russkiia Vedomosti on the Position of the Church and the
Tasks Before the Sobor.......................................................................... 819
718. Greetings to the Sobor upon Its Convocation............................................... 820
719. A Message from the Sobor to General Kornilov............................................ 822
720. Message of the Sobor Ordering Prayers for the Salvation of the Russian
Power................................................................................................... 823
721. The Sobor and the Kornilov Movement........................................................ 824
722. The Appeal of the Sobor to the Provisional Government Following the Kor
nilov Affair.......................................................................................... 825
723. The Sobor Requests the Repeal of the Law Transferring Orthodox Parochial
Schools to the Jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education........................ 825
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xvii
724. The Meeting with A. F. Kerensky of the Delegation of the Sobor on the
Church School Question.......................................................................... 826
725. The Restorers of the Shades of the Past [Editorial in Volia Naroda] ........ 826
726. The Refusal of the Sobor to Participate in the Preparliament...................... 827
727. The Conflict Between the Liberals and the Conservatives in the Sobor......... 828
728. The Debate on the Establishment of the Patriarchate................................... 829
729. The Restoration of the Patriarchate in Russia.............................................. 830
730. The Sobor and the October Revolution......................................................... 830
THE OLD BELIEVERS
731. A Conference of Old Believers...................................................................... 831
732. The Petition for a Law on the Old Believers................................................ 832
733. The Approval in Principle of the New Law on the Belokrinitskii Old Be
lievers ..................................................................................................... 832
THE GEORGIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
734. The Autocephaly of the Ancient Orthodox Georgian Church........................ 833
735. The Establishment of Temporary Rules on the Status of the Georgian Ortho
dox Church........................................................................................... 833
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH
736. New Legislation on the Roman Catholic Church.......................................... 835
737. A Conference Regarding the Affairs of the Roman Catholic Church........... 837
OTIIER RELIGIOUS FAITHS AND SECTS
738. Concerning the Uniate Metropolitan............................................................. 838
739. The Approval of the Return of the Dukhobors.............................................. 838
740. The Lutheran Church.................................................................................... 838
741. Regarding the Skoptsy in Rumania.............................................................. 839
742. The Buddhists............................................................................................. 839
PART IV. MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Chapter 16. The Revolution in the Army and Navy
DEMOCRATIZATION AND MORALE IN THE FIRST MONTHS
743. The Proclamation of the Mezhduraionnyi Committee to the Soldiers........... 845
744. The Genesis of Order No. 1: Rodziankos Version....................................... 846
745. The Genesis of Order No. 1: The Version of the Executive Committee of the
Petrograd Soviet.................................................................................... 846
746. Order No. 1................................................................................................... 848
747. The Officers and the Soldiers [Editorial in Izvestiia] ............................... 849
748. Order of General Alekseev Concerning Revolutionary Detachments Proceed
ing Toward the Northern Front on the Railroads................................... 850
749. Request of Alekseev that the Government Take Measures to Restore Order
in the Army and Reaffirm the Authority of Commanding Officers......... 850
750. Order No. 2................................................................................................... 851
xviii DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
751. Alekseev Objects to the Method of Transmission, Souice, and Content of
Order No. 2........................................................................................... 852
752. Order No. 114 of the Minister of War Abolishing Certain Practices and Re
strictions Applied to Enlisted Personnel .............................................. 853
753. Order No. 115 Establishing a Commission to Revise the Laws and Statutes
on Military Service................................................................................ 854
754. Manifesto to the Soldiers and Citizens, Maich 9,1917................................. 854
755. An Appeal From V. G. Korolenko............................................................ 856
756. The Dismissal of Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich as Supreme Commander
and a Report from General Alekseev Concerning the Mood of the Army
at the Front............................................................................................. 857
757. The Reports of Duma Members N. 0. Yanushkevich and Father Filonenko
on a Visit to the Front............................................................................. 859
758. Letter of General Alekseev Describing the Reactions of the Army and Navy
to the Recent Events, March 14, 1917................................................... 862
759. The Soviet Decision to Appoint Commissars to Military Commands, March
19, 1917................................................................................................ 865
760. Typical Military Demonstrations at the Duma.............................................. 866
761. Pravda Editorial by Stalin Calling for the Army to Stand at Its Posts and
Maintain Discipline.............................................................................. 868
762. Reorganization of the Civil Administration of the Cossacks........................ 868
763. Letter of General Lukomskii, Quartermaster General at Stavka, to General
Kaledin, Commander of the 8th Army, Advising Restraint in Opposing
Democratization .................................................................................... 869
764. Statute of the Sebastopol Military Committee on the Organization of Offi
cers, Warrant Officers, Sailors, Soldiers, and of Workers Engaged on
Defense Works...................................................................................... 870
765. Admiral Kolchak on Conditions in the Black Sea Fleet............................... 871
766. The Resolution of a Naval Officers Meeting in Revel................................. 872
767. The Soldier and the Worker [Editorial in Izvestiia]................................. 874
768. Telegram of Guchkov Enjoining the Maintenance of Discipline................... 875
769. Guchkovs Order on the Criteria for the Appointment of Senior Officers,
April 2,1917, No. 32.............................................................................. 875
770. Order of Guchkov on Elective Military Organizations and Disciplinary
Courts................................................................................................... 876
771. Draft of a Resolution of the Petrograd Soviet on Soldiers Rights, March
9, 1917.................................................................................................. 878
772. The Reactions of General Alekseev and Other Senior Officers to the Pro
posed Declaration of Soldiers Rights................................................... 880
773. Order No. 8 on the Rights of Servicemen (Declaration of Soldiers Rights),
May 11, 1917........................................................................................ 880
774. Proclamation of the Petrograd Soviet on the Declaration of Soldiers Rights 883
775. The Reply of Izvestiia to Pravda$ Attacks on the Declaration.................... 883
776. Theses on the Declaration by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets............... 885
777. The Dismissal of General Gurko as Commander in Chief of the Western
Front ................................................................................................... 886
778. The Disbandment of Four Regiments.......................................................... 887
779. Izvestiia's Comment on the Disbandment of Regiments............................... 887
780. Penalties Imposed for the Commission of Military Crimes.......................... 888
781. Arbitrary Action by Military Committees.................................................... 889
782. Regulations on the Authority of Officers and Committees in the Navy......... 889
783. The Mutiny in the Black Sea Fleet.............................................................. 891
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xix
MILITARY JUSTICE
784. The Abolition of Field Courts-Martial......................................................... 892
785. The Abrogation of the Right of Military Commanders to Increase During
Wartime the Penalties Established by Law............................................ 893
786. The Special Commissions for the Investigation of Malfeasance in the War
and Navy Ministries............................................................................... 893
787. The Organization of Elected Regimental Courts.......................................... 894
788. Judicial Procedure in Regimental Courts..................................................... 895
789. The Introduction of Military Juries............................................................... 897
790. Russkiia Vedomosti on the Reform of Military Courts................................. 899
DESERTION AND FRATERNIZATION
791. Appeal of the Provisional Government to Deserters and Shirkers............... 900
792. Extraordinary Penalties for Desertion......................................................... 901
793. Excerpts from a Report on Fraternization at the Front Between March 1
and May 1, 1917.................................................................................... 901
794. Order of General Gurko Concerning Fraternization..................................... 903
795. Lenins Article on The Meaning of Fraternisation................................... 903
796. Appeal of the Soviet to the Army to Cease Fraternization........................... 905
797. Izvestiia9s Attack on Pravdas Call for Fraternization................................. 907
ARMY DELEGATIONS AND CONFERENCES
798. Politics and the Army [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti] ........................ 908
799. Kerenskys Address to the Delegation from the 7th Army........................... 908
800. Resolution of the Regional Congress of the Caucasian Army...................... 911
801. Speeches of Guchkov and Kerensky Before the First Congress of Delegates
from the Front........................................................................................ 911
802. Alarming Speeches [Article in Russkiia Vedomosti]............................... 916
803. Words That Are Needed [Editorial in Volia Naroda] ............................. 917
804. The Russian Revolution and the Last Speech of Kerensky [Article in
Delo Naroda] ........................................................................................ 918
805. Comment of Izvestiia on Kerenskys Appointment as Minister ofWar.......... 918
806. Resolution of the Conference of Delegates from the Front.......................... 919
807. An Address of the 8th Army to the Provisional Government........................ 920
Chapter 17. The Offensive and the German Counteroffensive
THE STRATEGIC SITUATION AND THE PREPARATION
FOR AN OFFENSIVE
808. The Disposition of Russian and Enemy Forces at the Beginningof March.. 921
809. Letter of General Alekseev to Guchkov on Organizational andOther Diffi
culties in the Army................................................................................. 922
810. Memorandum of General Lukomskii on the Fighting Capacityof the Army 924
811. Telegram from General Brusilov to the Minister of War on the Feasibility
of an Offensive........................................................................................ 925
812. Copy of a Memorandum from General Janin, Chief of the French Military
Mission, to General Alekseev Transmitting Nivelles Request for the
Opening of the Offensive........................................................................ 926
813. Elaboration of General Alekseev on the Inability of the Russian Army to
Launch an Offensive Before June or July.............................................. 927
XX DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II
814. General Nivelles Replies to Alekseevs Messages....................................... 928
815. The Defeat on the Stokhod........................................................................... 929
816. Alekseev Tentatively Sets the Offensive for the Beginning of May............... 930
817. The Formation of Volunteer Shock Battalions.............................................. 930
818. General Alekseevs Objections to the Formation of Shock Battalions........... 931
819. Report of General Brusilov on the Organization of Shock Battalions........... 932
820. Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti on the Need for an Offensive.................... 932
821. Loyalty to the Allied Democracy [Editorial in Den9] ............................... 933
822. Lenin on an Offensive.................................................................................. 934
823. Kerenskys Order to the Army and Navy After Assuming Office as Minister
of W ar.................................................................................................. 935
824. The Speech of the Assistant Minister of War on the Offensive.................... 936
825. How Long Shall We Wait? [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti]................. 937
826. An Offensive or Preparedness for an Offensive? [Editorial in Izvestiia] ., 938
827. Report of General Brusilov to Alekseev on the Results of Kerenskys Visit to
the Southwestern Front........................................................................... 939
828. Kerensky Speaks to the Soviet on the Question of the Offensive.................. 939
829. Report of General Denikin, Commander in Chief of the Western Front, on
the General Condition of His Armies on the Eve of the Offensive......... 940
THE OFFENSIVE
830. Kerenskys Order for the Offensive.............................................................. 942
831. Appeal from the Provisional Government..................................................... 942
832. Kerensky Requests Honors for the Regiments Leading the Offensive......... 943
833. Message of Congratulations to Kerensky and the Army from the Temporary
Committee of the State Duma................................................................ 943
834. Appeal of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the Executive Committee
of the All-Russian Congress of Peasants Deputies................................. 944
835. Two Victories [Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti].................................... 945
836. The Two Points [Editorial in Delo Naroda]............................................ 946
837. The Offensive [Editorial in Rabochaia Gazeta]....................................... 947
838. The Movement in Germany and Our Offensive[Editorial in Izvestiia] ... 948
839. The Offensive [Editorial in Novaia Zhizn] .............................................. 949
840. Appeal of the 12th Army to the Petrograd Garrison..................................... 950
841. Resolution on the Offensive and the Political Situation by the First Infantry
Reserve Regiment in Petrograd.............................................................. 95 ]
842. Izvestiia on the Appeal of the 12th Army and the Actions of the Petrograd
Garrison................................................................................................ 952
843. The Beating of Sokolov and Other Members of the Petrograd Soviet Execu
tive Committee by Soldiers at the Front................................................. 953
844. Resolution of the 10th Army Committee on the Sokolov Incident................. 954
845. Izvestiia on the Sokolov Incident................................................................. 955
846. Vitriolic Letters to Kerensky and Brusilov................................................... 955
847. The Decision to Send Skobelev and Lebedev to the Front........................... 956
848. German Propaganda at the Front............................................................... 95(3
849. Bolshevik Subversion at the Front............................................................... 953
850. Army Reports on Bolshevik Subversion at the Front................................... 959
851. Kerensky on the Front.................................................................................. 962
DOCUMENTS IN VOLUME II xxi
THE GERMAN COUNTERATTACK
852. The Appeal of the Government to the Army..................................................... 966
853. The Attack on the Western Front: The MlynovskiiRegiment......................... 966
854. The Attack on the Southwestern Front: the 11th Army................................. 967
855. Kerenskys Order to the Army and Navy, No. 28............................................. 968
856. Report of the Commander of the 11th Army to Stavka................................... 968
857. Breakthrough in the Rear and at the Front [Editorial in Den9']................ 969
858. Appeal to the Army from the Executive Committees of the Soviet of Work
ers and Soldiers Deputies and theSoviet of Peasants Deputies........... 970
859. The Situation on the Galician and Rumanian Fronts................................. 971
860. The Vindication of the 6th Grenadier Division and the Mlynovskii Regiment 973
861. In Defense of the Actions of the Guards........................................................... 974
VOLUME II
PART III
Economic and Social Reorganization
High among the legacies from the old regime was the burden of the war upon
the financial and economic resources of the state. To be sure, all of the belligerents
were sorely tried after three years of conflict. But Russia was particularly affected
because of her relatively retarded economic development and her unfortunate
geographical position. The Central Powers were able to block almost all access to
her by sea and land, denying her imports and necessitating a drastic reorganiza
tion of economic life.
With the revolution came further demands upon the treasury to provide for
needed reforms and the economic betterment of the population. At the same time,
the continuing strain of war upon the national economy, aggravated by earlier
Tsarist mismanagement and the subsequent dislocations occasioned by the revolu
tion, had weakened the financial base from which the government drew and com
plicated the implementation of measures to increase revenue.1
To meet its expenditures, the Government called for a new internal loan, the
Liberty Loan, and with little hesitation decided on greatly increased direct taxa
tion. Although the sums realized by the Loan were considerable, the political
situation after July acted to slow down the subscription rate, and the multiplying
expenses of the Government diminished the proportional value of the returns.
In the realm of direct taxation, a series of measures was introduced on June 12,
increasing sharply the rates of the income and war profits taxes and introducing
an extraordinary income lax levy. But the Government did not have time to
promulgate the other measures contemplated, nor to realize substantial results
from the new taxation. Furthermore, in October, as a result of various pressures
and considerations, the paymenl of the extraordinary income tax levy was post
poned to 1918 and the war profits tax reduced.
Other sources of revenue were foreign loans and credits and the institution of
new indirect taxation. The entrance of the United States into the war and its
sympathy for the new regime in Russia opened the way for American loans to
supplement those already granted by her other allies. But they were restricted to
specific purposes and comparatively modest in amount.2 To increase revenues
from indirect taxation, certain duties were raised and a number of state monopo
lies were proposed for revenue, of which only that on sugar, a supply measure as
1Financial matters in Russia during World War I, including the period of the Provisional
Government, are covered in Alexander M. Michelson, Paul N. Apostol, and Michael W. Ber-
natzky, Russian Public Finance During the War, and, for the Provisional Government period
only, in Lozxnskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. III.
2See For. Rel. of US., J918, Russia, HI, 1-28.
480 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
well, was actually introduced before October. Meantime, to meet its obligations,
the Government was forced to increase drastically currency emissions, with the
result that inflation spiraled and the exchange rate of the ruble plummeted.
Serious as the financial impasse was for the survival of the State, it touched the
average Russian less directly, or rather less obviously, than other pressing eco
nomic issues. First among these was, most certainly, the land question. The way
at last was clear for an agrarian reform in accordance with the will of the majority/1
But so sweeping a change could not be achieved overnight. Pending the convoca
tion of the Constituent Assembly, which had to approve the fundamental agrarian
law, and in order to expedite its work, the Government established a Cenlial Land
Committee and local land committees to assemble pertinent information, draft
proposed legislation, and temporarily aid in the regulation of land relations. At
its second session, on May 20, the Central Land Committee adopted a declaration
to the effect that the future land reform should be based on the principle that all
agricultural lands must be transferred to the use of the toiling agricultural popu
lation. Earlier, a land reserve fund had been inaugurated with the transfer of
crown and appanage lands to the State.4
But many peasants failed to comprehend the need for time, and many land
owners viewed the future with apprehension. Partisan solutions vied for the alle
giance of the citizenry and repercussions from the recurring political criscs com
pounded the difficulties in maintaining order in the countryside. The result was
growing peasant impatience and recurrent agrarian disorders, which greatly
increased after August.
These disturbances not only boded ill for a peaceful and equitable solution of
the land question, but immeasurably complicated the crucial issue of food supply.*
A variety of factors were responsible for the shortages in food supply which had
plagued the old regime and continued into the new era. Agricultural production,
though not abundant, was sufficient for the needs of the population and the army.
But the peasant, discouraged by fixed prices on his product and by the high prices
or absence of consumer goods, together with the prohibition against vodka sales,
often chose to keep his grain and wait for a better price and time.0 Transportation
problems and other hindrances to distribution added further to the alarming
situation.
The Provisional Government established the State Committee on Food Supply
March 9 to replace the prerevolutionary organs and to work out a national pro
gram for supply. On March 25, in an effort to obtain the grain surpluses held
by the peasants and to establish centralized control over distribution, a slate grain
monopoly was created and local food supply committees were authorized. During
s For the prerevolutionary agrarian situation, see G. T. Robinson, Rural Russia Under the
Old Regime, and George Pavlovsky, Agricultural Russia on the Eve of the Revolution.
4 The agrarian problem dunng the war and the Provisional Government period is dis
cussed in Alexis N. Antisferov, Alexander D. Bilimovich, Michael 0. Balshev, and Dimitry N.
Ivantsov, Russian Agriculture During the War, and Lozmskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap,
V. On the cooperatives, Eugene M. Kayden and Alexis N. Antsiferov, The Cooperative Move
ment in Russia During the War, is helpful.
5 See P. B. Struve, K. I. Zaitzev, N. V. Dolinsky, and S. S. Demoslhenov, Food Supply in
Russia During the World War, and Lozmskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. IV.
6E. E. Yashov, Dostatochno-h Khleba v Rossii?9a contemporary pamphlet, gives a succinct
account of the reasons for the shortage of cereals.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION 481
this period the administration of food supply was under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Finance, but on May 5 a separate Ministry of Food was organized
in which was eventually concentrated all governmental efforts to overcome the
supply crisis threatening the civilian population and military forces. Eventually,
the new Ministry delegated commissioners to the food-producing areas, where
they were authorized to exercise far-reaching powers to expedite the collection
and distribution of food. In August, in order to encourage the sale of grain by
the peasant, its price was doubled.
The related problem of supplying the population with consumer goods was
recognized by the Government with the appointment in April of a commission
to investigate and recommend methods of expediting the delivery to the consumer
of articles of prime necessity. Early in June, the Ministry of Food was authorized
to organize the supervision of the distribution and price control of several basic
items.
The questions of supply, of the regulation of industry and transport, and of
labor relations were all, obviously, closely related, so much so that it is difficult
to separate the materials pertaining to them. The formation of the Economic
Council and the Central Economic Committee in June, following the introduction
earlier of less sweeping measures concerning economic life and especially indus
trial production by the Ministry of Trade and Industry, was an attempt to co
ordinate the national economy and to work out plans from the center concerning
all these important issues.
The rights of some existing regulatory agencies were extended and new organs
established for the industrial and commercial sector. Special attention was given
the vital areas of fuel and metal produclion and textile and leather manufacturing.
In August a state coal monopoly was introduced. But, as in other of its activities,
the Government was not vouchsafed time to test its regulatory methods for in
dustry. Furthermore, the opposition of certain commercial and industrial groups
often handicapped attempts to carry out legislation.7
At the very core of Russias economic difficulties was the breakdown of trans
portation. Great technical problems resulting from the lack of new rolling stock,
the deterioration of the old, and the terrible strain upon the overburdened lines
and other facilities were coupled with Lension between the workers and the un
popular supervisory personnel. Efforts were made to increase the acceptability
of the administrations to Lhe workers and to introduce greater efficiency in the
system. The attempt to improve service and equipment and expedite the purchase
and use of new rolling stock was aided somewhat by American railroad car manu
facturers, who gave priority to Russian orders, and by the Washington govern
ment, which dispatched the Stevens Commission of railroad experts. In the brief
period of its activity before October, the Commission assisted the Ministry of
Transport in ameliorating conditions on the Trans-Siberian line and in the Vladi
vostok marshaling yards.8
Next in the vicious economic circle facing the Government stood labor rela
7Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Chap. II, and S. 0. Zagorsky, State Control of In
dustry in Russia During the War.
8Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 81-85, and For. Rel. of U.$., 1918, Russia, III,
183-205.
482 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
tions.9 Under the old regime, working conditions had remained far from satis
factory and recourse to collective action by the workers was severely limited. The
war years brought further privation and a drop in real wages.
After the revolution the Labor Department, at first within the Ministry of
Trade and Industry and later raised to cabinet rank in the coalition governments,
worked out a series of advanced reforms with the participation of labor as well
as employer and public representatives. Full rights to organize, bargain, and
strike were granted, factory committees were established, chambers of conciliation
and arbitration were organized, and social insurance was extended. In addition,
the Government assisted in the improvement of working conditions and wages.
But the resentment and radicalism among the workers, bred by years of
oppression and the conditions of Russian economic life, were explosive forces
not easily or quickly assuaged, especially in the heady atmosphere of revolution
and sudden freedom. Of greater significance in the evenL, they offered fertile
ground for Bolshevik propaganda and agitation, which attacked the extent and
intent of the new reforms and took advantage of every difficulty in implementa
tion. As a result, the period was marked by industrial strife, which increased in
the later months with the mounting influence of political conflict and parallel eco
nomic disorganization and hardship.10
In the field of education the Provisional Government introduced a number of
major reforms.11 The Ministry of Education enlisted ihe advice of pedagogical
experts and other interested groups in its work through the organization of a
State Committee on Education. Allhough it was accused of neglecting the current
problems of the schools in its zeal to introduce sweeping changes, much can be
said for the Committees long-term program.
Legislation was enacted altering and democratizing the elementary and sec
ondary school system to facilitate the hitherto often impeded advance of students
from one level to the other. New schools were authorized and an expansion in
the teacher-training program undertaken. In order to unify all elementary edu
cation in one system, the Government transferred all primary schools to the juris
diction of the Ministry of Education, including some 37,000 Orthodox parochial
schools. Similarly, secondary schools for boys and for girls which had also boon
under the Holy Synod, as well as those in the Department of the Empress Mania,
were transferred to the Ministry. Despite the opposition of the majority of the
Orthodox hierarchy and appeals for the reversal of the church school measures,
the Government held to its decision.
The Provisional Government was also responsible for an innovation of con
siderable and lasting importance to Russian letters, an orthographic reform intro
duced in the schools in the fall term of 1917.
Higher education benefited by the establishment or authorization of new uni
versities and higher technical institutions and the grant of far-reaching autonomy,
9 See Rabochee dvizhenie v 1917 godu and Lozmskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, Cliap. VI.
10 The many documents in the two volumes of Ekon. Polozhenie, only a few of which have
been translated and printed here, are invaluable on all economic questions.
11 William H. E. Johnson, Russias Educational Heritage, is useful for a survey of educa
tion under the Tsars, while Count Paul N. Ignatiev, Dimitry M. Odinelz, and Paul J. Novgo-
rotsev, Russian Schools and Universities m the World War, covers the period from 1914 to
October 1917.
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION 483
including the election of faculty. In the interests of more democratic self-govern
ment, the lower ranks of the faculty were admitted to university councils with
voting rights on most academic matters. At the same time, new legislation im
proved and regularized relations between students and administrations. The
rights of student bodies were recognized, including that of participation in deci
sions of the university councils and faculties concerning student life and interests.
Previous to the revolution, most welfare activity was privately sponsored, and
much of it was directed by institutions under the patronage of members of the
Romanov House. With the establishment of a democratic regime, it was con
sidered proper that these institutions and other private philanthropic and chari
table organizations come under government control. In the beginning, they were
placed under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Education, but after the forma
tion of a Ministry of Welfare in May, they were transferred. In June and July,
the Ministry greatly increased and extended the allowances to relatives of men
in service as well as assistance to disabled war veterans. In this connection, men
tion should also be made of the increases in state pensions.12
The intimate connection between the established Orthodox Church and the
Tsarist Government complicated the question of its position under the new order.13
In its first days, the Provisional Government dismissed from the Synod the fol
lowers of the late Rasputin, and, eventually, it replaced all but two of the members.
The Government, while accepting the establishment of the Orthodox Church,
granted complete freedom of religious belief or disbelief and removed the exist
ing disabilities against other churches and faiths in the country. It also, as men
tioned above, assumed control of the church-school system.
At the same time, the Orthodox Church was encouraged to call its long-delayed
and greatly desired All-Russian Sobor, which convened in Moscow on August 15.
There, after much discussion and considerable preoccupation with current po
litical questions, it voted to introduce a greater measure of self-government in the
Church and accept an autonomous position in its relations with the State. Al
though for various reasons there was some opposition to the re-establishment of
the patriarchate, the advent of the October Revolution in the midst of the de
liberations and the trying times it seemed to presage for the Church hastened a
decision in favor of the restoration. Archbishop Tikhon was chosen the first
Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church since the reign of Peter the Great.
12Michelson, Russian Public Finance, p. 277.
13 By far the best work in English on the Orthodox Church during the revolutionary period
is John Sheldon Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State, 1917-1950, Chaps. I and II,
which includes an excellent bibliography. Extensive, but partisan, accounts with much docu
mentation are B. V. Titlinov, Tserkov9vo Vremia Revoliutsii, and A. I. Vvedenskii, Tserkov*i
Gosudarstvo.
CHAPTER 9
Public Finance
STATE CONTROL
429. T h e E sta b lis h m e n t o f a P erm a n en t P re lim in a r y and
C u rren t A u d it and C o n tr o l
[S<?6. Uzak.t I, 1, No. 366. A measure to increase the effectiveness of audit and contiol
procedures.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
Pending the publication by legislative action of the Code of Audit and Con
trol, the Provisional Government has decreed:
1. The State Controller has the right to establish, when and where he deems
necessary, a permanent preliminary and current audit. An actual verification in
individual cases may be carried out by order of the heads of conlrol offices.
2. In the event that evidence of evil-doing in the activities of supervisors or
employees is discovered during an audit of accounts, the control office shall so
inform its superiors and the appropriate public prosecutors office at the same
time so that an investigation may be carried out and criminal proceedings initiated.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 11, 1917
430. T h e In clu sio n o f Z em stvo and M u n icip al R e p r e se n ta tiv e s in
t h e L o c a l O ffic e s and t h e C o u n c il o f t h e D e p a r tm e n t
o f S t a t e C o n tr o l
[5o6. Uzak.91, 1, No. 434.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. The general offices of all institutions of the Department of State Control
shall include at the place of their location one representative each from the guber-
niya zemstvos and the guberniya (oblast) capitals, and the Council of Slate Con
trol shall include one representative each from the zemstvo and town unions.
II. The aforesaid representatives shall have a vote and in general enjoy all
rights of other members of the above-mentioned offices as well as the right, along
with permanent members, of studying all proceedings of the control institutions
and of being present during current audits and inspections and verifications car
ried out by such institutions.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 20, 1917
PUBLIC FINANCE 485
431. T h e P articipation of R epresentatives o f P ublic O rganizations
in th e A ctivities of t h e I nstitutions of S tate C ontrol
[5o6. U z a k I, 1, No. 675.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
The State Controller is authorized in all cases he deems necessary to permit
representatives of public organizations to acquaint themselves on the spot with
the status of audit and control in institutions of the State Control, as well as to
allow these representatives to participate in the preliminary audit and to be present
during the current audit of all kinds of operations of institutions and persons
accountable to the State Control.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
G odnev , State Controller
May 18, 1917
NEW TAXATION
445. T h e E nactm ent of an E xtraordinary I ncome T ax L evy
[SoZ>. Uzak.f 1,1, No. 813. At the same time, the income tax enacted April 6, 1916, and
effective as of January 1, 1917, was amended by raising the exemption to 1,000 rubles
and sharply increasing the rates, the highest bracket reaching 30% per cent. Ibid.,
I, 1, 812.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. An extraordinary Lax shall be established for the current year, 1917, on
the following lines:
1. Persons, establishments, societies, companies, associations, artels, and pub
lic assemblies required to pay state income tax in 1917 . . . shall be subject to
the extraordinary tax if their income subject to income tax in the present year is
calculated to amounL Lo more than 10,000 rubles.
2. The extraordinary tax shall be levied on the income calculated for the
assessment of income tax for 1917 in the amounts indicated in the schedule of
receipts and rales of the income tax (Law of the Provisional Government of June
12,1917) with the exemptions mentioned in articles 3 and 4 of the present Law.
3. The amounts of tax due under the schedule menlioned in article 2 from
persons who have received income from the sources mentioned in paras. 46 of
article 2 of the Regulations on national income tax [revenues from salaries and
professional occupations], . . . amounting to not more than 50,000 rubles, shall
be reduccd by half; and in the rales of lax due from persons who have received
income noL exceeding the same amount both from the sources mentioned and from
other sources, that part of the tax shall be reduced by half which falls to the
2 The compulsory loan was never enacted, preference being given to the extraordinary in
come tax levy as a means of collecting additional revenue. Michelson, Russian Public Finance,
pp. 198-99.
496 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
income received from the sources mentioned in paras. 4-6 of article 2 of the same
Regulations.
4. If the amount of the extraordinary tax, together with the amounts of tax
due from the taxpayer for 1917 covering both state taxes (land, on municipal real
estate; industrial, on commercial and industrial enterprises; income tax; surplus
profit tax) as well as local (zemstvo, municipal, and volost) taxes on real estate,
amounts to more than 90 per cent of the income calculated for assessment of
income tax in 1917, the amount of the extraordinary tax shall be reduced so that
the total tax assessment of the taxpayers income by all these taxes and collections
shall not exceed 90 per cent of his income.
5. Rates of the extraordinary tax shall be established by the chairmen of dis
trict income tax offices.
9. Complaints concerning the calculation of the extraordinary tax by chair
men of district income tax offices may be made by taxpayers to guberniya (oblast)
income tax offices before November 1, 1917, and in case the rate schedules are
sent later than October 1, within a month of receipt. Submission of a complaint
shall not suspend payment of the tax.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. S hingarev , Minister of Finance
June 12, 1917
446. T h e In crease in t h e W ar P r o fits T ax
[,Zhurnaly, No. 105, June 12, 1917. The original law was enactcd May 13, 1916.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
On the change in the assessment and collection of the temporary tax on excess
profits of commercial-industrial enterprises and increased income from private
commercial-industrial enterprises.
[The minimum rate on excess profits was raised and the principle of pro
gressive taxation, already in effect for enterprises subject to public audit, was
introduced for enterprises and occupations not subject to public audit. The maxi
mum percentage for enterprises not subject to public audit was 60 per cent and,
for those subject to public audit, 80 per cent of their excess profits. A 90 per cent
maximum was set for the total taxation imposed upon enterprises subject to public
audit as opposed to the 50 per cent limit in the initial enactment. The tax applied
to the profits of 1916 as well as 1917. . . .]
IV. The present law (Parts IIII) shall go into effect prior to its publication by
the Ruling Senate.
447. R e so lu tio n o f t h e A ll-R u ssian C ongress o f S o v ie ts on
F in a n cia l P o lic y , June 21, 1917
[Izvestiia, No. 100, June 24, 1917, p. 6.]
Taking into consideration that the problem confronting the country of regu
lating the economy requires a definite plan for a financial policy that would be
in harmony with the democratic regime and the state of the national economy:
1) The Congress considers that the Provisional Government must carry out
PUBLIC FINANCE 497
immediately a series of reforms on the reorganization of the tax system and a
series of measures that will tend to curb the further issuance of paper currency.
2) The Congress considers that the measures published by the Provisional
Government on changes in the income tax and the war profits tax are merely the
first steps in the reorganization of the tax system.
3) The Congress considers that priority must be given to the enactment of a
high extraordinary property tax which must serve as the most important source
for covering the emergency expenses of the state.
4) The Congress considers that the Provisional Government, having rejected
the means of indirect taxation on articles of mass consumption, must carry out a
radical reform in the inheritance tax and establish a tax on the increment of values
and taxes on luxury items.
5) The Congress believes that the success of the measures which have been
put into effect, and, in general, of all endeavors in the field of direct taxation, is
intimately connected with the reorganization of all methods of tax assessment and
tax collection and with the enforcement of sweeping measures of control [designed]
to eliminate any possibilities of tax evasion.
6) The Congress believes that the correct procedure for carrying out financial
measures is for the Provisional Government to call a financial conference like the
one contemplated by the first Provisional Government, with the absolute condition
that organs of the revolutionary democracy would receive majority representation.
7) Considering the necessity of having a constant source of revenue for the
State Treasury, the Congress approves the resolution of the Petrograd Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers5Deputies on the Liberty Loan and considers that the imme
diate task confronting all the Soviets of Workers5 and Soldiers5 Deputies, as well
as all the Soviets of Peasants Deputies, is to support the Liberty Loan.5
8) The Congress believes that the time has arrived when, with respect to the
loan which is based on voluntary subscription, resolute measures must be applied
calling for compulsory investment.
9) In addition, the Congress considers it necessary to state that if in the near
fuLure it becomes clear that the Liberty Loan is still not approaching the speci
fied goal, then Lhe Provisional Government must resort to a compulsory loan.
10) The Congress considers that with a view to increasing the resources of
the State Treasury, a series of measures must be passed for drawing funds into
the State Bank, which, in turn, must be reorganized.
11) The Congress believes that with a view to stopping financial speculations,
all currency transactions must be concentrated in the hands of the State. Private
credit establishments musL be subjected to strict control in order that their policies
will not conflict with the inLerests of the state; for this purpose the credit office
must be reorganized.
12) The Congress believes that at this time of historical consequences, finan
cial legislation alone, without systematic control of the entire national economy,
will not protect the country against a financial catastrophe.
Resolved:
To accept as directives the following fundamental principles for the financial
and economic policy of the Provisional Government [as outlined by the Minister
of Finance]:
I. To recognize the necessity of extreme economy by all departments in spend-
e This was the purpose of the American credit of $75,000,000 of July 4.
514 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
ing the funds of the state and for this purpose to establish in particular the
following principles:
a) The present methods of spending sums out of the war fund should be sub
ject to a basic alteration; the Ministry of Finance and the Stale Controller must
be represented, with voting rights, in the War Council at Stavka and at meetings
with the [army and navy] chiefs of supply;
b) The expenditures concerning the Ministries of War and of the Navy must
be coordinated with the actual fighting capacity of the army;
c) The increase of contract costs for governmental orders must be carried
out with extreme caution;
d) For the purpose of finding a means of reducing as much as possible the
expenditures and to bring our budget into equilibrium, it is necessary Lo establish,
attached to the Provisional Government, a committee composed of a small number
of competent persons;
e) The ministries should immediately review the existing personnel staffs,
for the purpose of eliminating some institutions or functions which have lost their
previous significance.
II. To recognize that the taxes and duties are to be subject to further reforms,
bearing in mind that the taxes are the basis of the normal budget and of the
national credit. In accordance with this, to establish:
a) That the reform of direct taxation which was carried out needs correction
and development; that a reform of the inheritance tax will be worked out and a
general property tax6 introduced, and
b) That the indirect taxation will be increased, and in this connection the
form of trade monopolies (sugar, tea, matches) will be considered preferable and
that, in any case, the increase of some of the excise taxes will become unavoidable.
New measures to increase revenues, put into effect in 1917, and in particular
the increase of income and industrial taxes, were responsible for the rise in direct
and indirect taxes. Of the sum of 13,407 million rubles gained from loans, the
short-term obligations entered from the balance in Russia amounted to 8,190.8
million rubles; abroad, 2,034.1 million rubles; and from internal long-term loans,
3,182.1 million rubles. For the corresponding period in 1916 the tolal gain from
war loans was 11,743.0 million rubles: from the balance of short-term obligations
in Russia, 4,643.7 million rubles; abroad, 3,026.8 million rubles; and from
internal long-term loans, 4,072.5 million rubles. Thus, during the period under
examination in 1917, the Department of the State Treasury accounted for more
short-term obligations in Russia than in March-October of 1916, the amount
being 3,547.1 million rubles.
It has been pointed out above that the complications in the work of the Depart
ment of the State Treasury were, among other things, the result of the considerable
increase in expenses, both those called forth by the war and those not related to the
war, which exceeded the estimates. This increase is represented in figures as
follows:
A ssigned for E xpenditures C alled F orth by th e W ar
(Millions of Rubles)
1916 1917 Increase in 1917
March......................... 1,271.7 2,142.2 870.5
April ........................... 1,063.7 1,683.4 619.7
M ay............................. 1,040.0 1,312.0 272.0
June ........................... 1,284.8 2,241.7 956.9
Ju ly ............................. 1,298.5 1,494.0 195.5
August ........................ 1,075.8 2,057.5 981.7
September .................. 1,482.7 1,387.4 (95.3)
October........................ 1,531.1 2,626.4 1,095.3
10,048.3 14,944.6 4,896.3
PUBLIC FINANCE 521
Thus, the war budget for the period under examination increased, as compared
with the corresponding period for 1916, by 48.7 per cent, that is, almost one and
one-half times.
As for expenditures exceeding the estimates and not related to the war, one
can judge of the degree of their growth from the fact that the amount assigned
for the full year of 1916 to cover such expenses was only 300.6 million rubles,
while expenditures in the same category for only eight months, March-October
inclusive, of 1917 amounted to 974.5 million rubles; that is, these expenditures
for the eight revolutionary months of 1917 were more than three times those for
the twelve months of 1916.
Finally, it should be pointed out that, on the basis also of the temporary esti
mates of expenditure for 1917, expenses showed a considerable growth as com
pared with the budget of 1916. The total, calculated, as was mandatory, according
to the provisions of article 116 of the former Fundamental Laws, was 4,302.8
million rubles as compared with the corresponding assignments for 1916 of
3,64-6.6 rubles.
The following table gives the figures on the sums assigned in March-October,
1917, for payments within the temporary estimates of expenses and for expenses
exceeding the estimates.
E xpenditures A pproved for P ayment , M arch-O ctober, 1917
(Millions of Rubles)
Withm the In Excess of Estimates
Temporary War- Not War-
Ministry Estimates connected connected Total
War ................................. ., 421.9 9,736.2 7.6 10,165.7
Navy........................ ., 71.5 922.4 16.4 1,010.3
Transportation ... .. . 719.5 1,533.8 306.7 2,560.0
Interior.................... . 80.6 2,135.0 56.0 2,271.7
Post and telegraph.. .. 64.9 68.3 163.4 296.6
Trade and industry. . 39.4 223.0 29.1 291.5
Finance ............... .. 209.6 128.8 241.4 579.8
Public education . . .. 133.3 58.1 48.8 240.2
Justice .................... . 75.3 22.3 44.8 142.4
Agriculture ............. .. 93.4 60.2 53.1 206.7
Other departments . . . 748.1 56.5 7.1 811.7
Total ................... . 27,657.7 14,944.6 974.5 18,576.6
During the revolutionary period under examination, the work of the Depart
ment of the State Treasury was not limited to current budgetary and other work
within its usual scope of duties (such as instructions to government departments
and offices of the Treasury, responsibility for their personnel, review of requests,
assignments, pensions in all departments, etc.), but in addition the Department
had to assume responsibility for preparing, reviewing, and confirming the new
budgetary procedure to replace the old system, outmoded as it was and made
completely obsolete by the revolution. A special conference for the working out
of the budgetary law was formed in the Department of the Treasury under the
chairmanship of its director. Participating in the work of the conference were
the senior employees of the Department (Vice-Director and heads of the divisions).
522 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
In addition to the men of experience, such as the older employees of the Depart
ment as well as of State Control, specialists on the theory of budgetary law were
invited to participate in this work. Temporary rules for the transition period
were also worked out for the new budget by the Department and were submitted
to this conference and subsequently to the Provisional Government. They were
approved by the Provisional Government on July 1,1917. According to the draft
of the budgetary law, the establishement of a budgetary year beginning July 1 of
that year to June 30 of the following year was anticipated. Thus, the new revolu
tionary budget, according to the assumption of the Department of the Treasury,
was to have become effective on July 1, 1918. For the period from January 1 to
July 1, 1918, a transitional semiannual budget was to be prepared.
After the rules for this transitional budget had been worked out and approved
by the Government, as mentioned above, on July 1,1917, the Department launched
energetically upon the budgetary work for the half-year period from January
to June, 1918. A special commission was organized in the former Ministry of
Finance to take care of all questions and misunderstandings that might come up
in the departments when preparing the transitional semiannual estimates. At the
same time, by means of personal and written contacts with the ministries, as well
as by participation in conferences on the drafts of the estimates which were
drawn up by the offices, the Department rendered all possible assistance to speed
up the work on the estimates for the semiannual period of January to June, 1918.
By the end of October the budgetary work for this period was well under way in
all the offices, and was drawing to an end in some. But after October 25, 1917,,
the work was given a new direction . . .
CHAPTER 10
The Agrarian Question
FIRST ACTS
464. T h e N ationalization o f t h e I m perial A ppanages
[Sob. Uzak., I , 1, No. 370. See Doc. 481fl.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government, having discussed the question of the status and
administration of the Imperial Appanages Department and the properties, enter
prises, and funds under its jurisdiction, and bearing in mind the national import
ance of the Department and its work for the needs of state defense, has decreed:
Pending the decision of the Constituent Assembly:
I. All Appanage lands and properties, enterprises and funds under the juris
diction of the Imperial Appanages Department are recognized as State (national)
property.
II. Revenues received from all these properties, enterprises, and funds shall
be considered state revenues and no disbursements from them shall be made to
members of the former Imperial House. . . .
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 16,1917
VI. For the purpose of maintaining a vital link with the local land committees
and unifying their activities as far as possible, the Central Land Committee shall
be authorized to call all-Russian and regional congresses and to appoint repre
1 This article and the one preceding it had particular reference to the Stolypin agrarian
legislation and the institutions for carrying it out. The Stolypin legislation and its imple
menting institutions were suspended on June 29,1917. See Sob. U zak I, 2, No. 1242.
2This representation was clarified by the law of August 25. See Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1512.
530 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
sentatives for individual localities, as well as for the various categories of matters
under its jurisdiction.
VIII. The tasks of the guberniya and uezd land committees shall include:
1. The collection of information necessary for the land reformthe compila
tion of views and conclusions on questions related to it as well as the carrying
out of necessary preparatory activities;
2. The execution of decisions of the central authorities on land matters;
3. Agreement with local government organs on questions concerning the man
agement of lands and agricultural properties belonging to the state, and submis
sion to the Central Land Committee in relevant cases of proposals concerning
changes in the procedure for using and administering these properties;
4. Publication of compulsory regulations on questions of agricultural and
land relations within the limits of existing statutes and laws of the Provisional
Government;
5. Settlement of questions, disputes, and misunderstandings arising in the
field of land and agricultural relations, within the limits of existing statutes and
laws of the Provisional Government, [and] setting up, if necessary, chambers of
mediation and conciliation for the adoption of measures to regulate relations
which may arise as a result of the arbitrary violation of anyones rights and
interests;
Note: Cases shall be submitted to such chambers, organized on the model of
courts of arbitration, by agreement of the parties, on whom decisions of the
chambers shall be binding.
6. Halting the acts of private persons leading to the depreciation of land and
agricultural properties, if these acts are not justified by public needs and the
needs of the state;
7. Raising before the Central Land Committee questions of removing such
properties from the possession of private persons;
8. Fulfillment of the relevant decisions of the state authority, and agreements
with local committees on the food supply and [with] other state institutions on
the most expedient utilization of these properties.
IX. The duties of the volost land committees within the limits of section VIII
of the present Regulation shall be defined by the district committees.
X. Decisions of the volost and uezd committees may be appealed under ad
ministrative procedure to the guberniya land committees, and the decisions of the
latter to the Central Land Committee.
XI. The guberniya land committees shall be authorized to suspend decisions
of the volost and uezd committees pending final decision by the Central Land
Committee.
XII. Further demarcation of the terms of reference and the limits of juris
diction of the volost, uezd, and guberniya land committees, supervision of their
activities, and rules for appealing their decisions, both under administrative as
well as judicial procedure, shall be established subsequently by the Central Land
Committee.8
XIII. The guberniya land committees shall include:
3 The activities of the land committees as well as of the food committees were made sub
ject to the administrative courts by the law of September 7. See Doc. 558.
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 531
1. Four members elected by the guberniya zemstvo assembly and one elected
by the municipal duma of the guberniya capital;
Note: Pending the organization of guberniya and municipal self-government
on the basis of universal suffrage, these members shall be elected by the temporary
guberniya and municipal executive committees.
2. One representative from each uezd land committee;
3. Representatives from the economic sections (agronomic, statistical, etc.)
of the guberniya zemstvo board, to be chosen by these sections and not to exceed
three in number;
4. A justice of the Circuit Court to be chosen by the general meeting of the
divisions of the court and a justice of the peace to be chosen by the district con
ference of justices of the peace of the guberniya capital;
5. A representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, appointed by the Minister
of Agriculture;
6. Experts invited by the chairman of the guberniya committee with the right
of advisory vote.
XIV. The uezd land committees shall include:
1. Four members elected by the uezd zemstvo assembly and one elected by the
municipal duma;
Note: Pending the organization of uezd and municipal self-government on
the basis of universal suffrage, these members shall be elected by the temporary
uezd and municipal executive committees.
2. One representative from each volost land committee and, in their absence,
from the volost zemstvo assembly;
Note: Pending the introduction of the volost zemstvo, these members shall be
elected by existing volost executive committees.
3. A zemstvo agronomist and a zemstvo statistician, to be chosen by their col
leagues if there is more than one in the district;
4. A justice of the peace to be chosen by the uezd chamber of justices of the
peace;
Note: In uezds where there are no zemstvo agronomists, zemstvo statisticians,
and justices of lhe peace, corresponding persons may be invited by the land com
mittees themselves.
5. Experts invited by the chairman of the uezd committee with the right of
advisory vole.
XV. The volost land committees shall consist of five members and three al
ternates, elected by the volost zemstvo assembly.
Note: Pending the introduction of the volost zemstvo the procedure for elect
ing members of the volost committee shall be determined by the uezd land com
mittee in accordance with local conditions.
XVI. All legally eligible citizens, without distinction as to sex, property status,
and place of residence at the time of election (invitation), may be elected (invited)
to be members of land committees.
XVII. Delegates of the Central Land Committee shall enjoy the right to vote
in meetings of local land committees.
XVIII. Representatives of uezd committees shall enjoy the right to vote in
meetings of volost committees, and representatives of guberniya committees shall
enjoy the same right in meetings of volost and uezd land committees.
532 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
XIX. The management of the current business of local land committees and
the carrying out of their decisions shall be entrusted to chairmen elected by the
committees themselves or to collegiate executive organs (land boards) formed by
them for this purpose.
XX. State and public institutions, officials and the militia, shall be required
to render assistance to the land committees and their executive organs in carrying
out the duties entrusted to them.
XXL Expenditures for the maintenance of land committees shall be carried
against state funds under a credit made available for this purpose by the Pro
visional Government.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
V lad . N abokov , Head of Chancellery of
the Provisional Government
April 21,1917
Thus the new Provisional Government is not going to undertake the final
resolution of the question of transferring land to the . . . workers. It is leaving
this decision to the Constituent Assembly.
Is this the right [thing to do] ?
Is it right that the peasants are asked to wait? Would it not be better to give
at once to the peasants all the state, Kabinet, appanage, monastery, and privately
owned lands?
Some people are suggesting just such an immediate resolution of the land
question. And it should be made clear who is bringing greater benefit to the
peasantthese people, or the new Provisional Government, which has restricted
itself to preparatory work toward the resolution of the land question in the Con
stituent Assembly.
Everybody knows that there is an extremely uneven distribution of land own
ership in Russia. . . .
One must bear in mind this irregular, uneven land distribution in the country
when the land question is being settled. In all fairness, this question can be
resolved in no other way than for the whole country simultaneously. If we start
settling the land question by separate volosts, uezds, or guberniyas, we will achieve
nothing but disturbances and new injustice.
That is why the new Provisional Government, in complete accord with the
Soviet of Workers9and Soldiers Deputies, declared that the settlement of the land
question in all its scope does not lie within its province, but rests with the forth
coming Constituent Assembly.
Such a postponement in settling the question does not jeopardize the interests
of the peasants in the least, since resolution of the question in the Constituent
Assembly can be clearly foreseen by all: it goes without saying that this question
will be decided in accordance with the will of the majority of the people. And
the will of the people is clear: all the land will be transferred to the people, and
the pomeshchiki will receive no redemptions.
Something else must also be kept in mind. At the present time the village has
become depopulated. All the laborers are at the front. Only women, old men, and
children have remained at home. In many places the village cannot cope with its
own landfields are left unplowed owing to the absence of manpower. Instead of
a shortage of (arable) land, a new disaster has fallen upon the country [namely]
a shortage of people. Under such conditions it would be wisest to delay the
distribution of land. When the war is over [and] the laborers return from the
trenchesthen only will there be a demand for land. And by that time the
4 Reference here is to the Declaration of May 5, following the formation of the first
coalition government. Article 5 reads: Leaving it to the Constituent Assembly to deal with
the question of transferring land to the toilers, and proceeding with preparatory measures
relative thereto, the Provisional Government will take all necessary steps toward ensuring the
greatest possible production of grain required by the country and toward furthering the sys
tematic utilization of the land in the interests of the national economy and of the toiling
population. VVP, No. 49, May 6,1917, p. 1. The Declaration is printed as Doc. 1095 in Vol. HI.
536 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
land question will have already been resolved in all its scope by the Constituent
Assembly.
Thus, we see that the new Provisional Government is acting in the interests
of the peasantry by leaving to the Constituent Assembly the final resolution of
the question of transferring the land to the workers.
But it cannot be permitted that land relations in the country remain on the
same terms as those established under tsarist autocracy right up to the convoca
tion of the Constituent Assembly.
It cannot be permitted that landowners receive a free hand in managing tens
of millions of dessiatines of land. . . . And if resolute measures are not adopted
to prevent this, then these land speculations will bring the most disastrous con
sequences. On the one hand, the gathering of crops will suffer setbacks in the
country, and, on the other hand, when the Constituent Assembly convenes, half
of the pomeshchik lands will turn out to be in the hands of foreigners, and this
will make it considerably more difficult to transfer these lands to the laboring
peasantry.
That is why the Provisional Government considers its immediate task to be
the adoption of resolute measures to assure the highest yield for the country,
which stands in need of it, and to regulate land utilization in the interests of the
national economy and the working people.
What should these measures consist of?
First of all, they must be concerned with proper utilization of idle pomeshchik
lands and unused livestock and equipment. Local peasant organizations are called
upon to play a big role in this connection.
Further, strictest vigilance must be maintained to prevent the pomeshchiki
from making any land transactions. And this task can be accomplished only by
local peasant organizations.
Therefore, the degree of success that the new Provisional Government will
achieve in coping with the task set before itin the land question just as in the
labor questionwill depend on the efforts and energy of the democratic or
ganizations.
1. The land and agriculture census and the urban census are to be carried on
throughout the state, with the exception of Finland; the land and agriculture
census covering rural localities, and the urban census covering cities and com
munities of the municipal type.
2. The task of the land and agriculture census is to collect materials for the
preparation, in the first place, of a general food supply plan for the 1917-18 agri-
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 537
cultural year (i.e., a plan for supplying the army and population with grain and
meat products) and, in the second place, of a plan for agrarian reform.
3. In accordance with the above-mentioned task of the land and agriculture
census, there will be all-inclusive registration by households in farms of the peasant
type and privately owned farms of: 1) number of persons and cattle and the size
of crop areas, and 2) extent of land ownership and land tenure, with a subdivision
of the land area into the various types of landed property (arable land, forests,
pastures, etc.).
4. The urban census is to pursue the same purpose as the agricultural census,
of obtaining material for the preparation of the food supply plan, and shall consist
of registration of the size of the urban population and of the cattle and crop areas
belonging to it.
5. In order to ensure the prompt carrying out of the censuses and the collec
tion of uniform material, both censuses will proceed according to identical pro
grams, compulsory for all places in the state, prepared by the All-Russian Congress
of Zemstvo, Municipal, and Government Statisticians and Representatives of
Statistical Science of April 18-21, 1917, and approved by the Minister of Agri
culture.
6. The land and agriculture census is to begin after the sowing of the chief
grain crops and will be concluded everywhere between August 15 and Sep
tember 1.
7. Upon completion of the aforesaid census and not later than September 15
a preliminary calculation of the results is to be carried out in accordance with
the program established by the Statistical Congress of April 18-21, 1917, and
approved by the Minister of Agriculture.
Without mentioning any other arguments, we shall conclude our article with
an appeal to all the members of the S. R. Party, to all sympathizers, and to all the
toiling people:
Guard the sacredness and success of the revolution! Do not turn the great
work into a reign of arbitrary rule and violence! Do not confuse the socialization
of land with its arbitrary seizure for personal gain! Do not tolerate any pogroms!
584 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Fight against them! Organize and be prepared for the elections to the Constituent
Assembly which must give the people both land and freedom!!!
506. A uthorization to U se T roops to S uppress A grarian D isorders
[.Zhurnaly, No. 47, April 8,1917.]
Heard:
14. The query of the General Staff reported hy the Assistant Minister of the
Interior D. M. Shchepkin with regard to whether it is necessary to give the com
manders of the troops of the districts the right to send military detachments when
demanded, for participating in the suppression of agrarian disorders.
Resolved:
1) To let the Ministry of the Interior inform the guberniya commissars
by circular that it is their responsibility together with that of the local public
committees to suppress immediately with the use of all legal means any kind of
attempt in the sphere of agrarian relations against the person or property of
citizens if such attempts have taken place.
2) To let the Ministry of the Interior inform the General Staff that necessary
instructions with regard to the question raised by the Staff have been forwarded
to the guberniya commissars who will be responsible in case it is necessary to
enter into direct contact with the military authorities concerned.
THE COSSACKS
516. A ppeal of t h e P rovisional G overnment to th e D on C ossacks
[VVP, No. 26, April 18, 1917, p. 1.]
The coup detat in Russia cannot but give rise to profound changes in the
lives of the population in the oblast of the Don [Cossacks].
The composition of the population of the oblast varies according to the per
formance of compulsory military service and the economic structure, as well as
according to land ownership. Therefore, the reorganization of the Cossack and
non-Cossack way of life demands serious and difficult work, but most important
of all, it requires a considerable length of time.
The land question is particularly complicated and confused. [At first] the
peasantry, resettled a century and a half ago, was wedged into the basic Cossack
population; later followed an influx of tenant-agriculturalists occupying mili
tary lands and lands belonging to nomadic tribes. In addition, a considerable
part of the land in the Don oblast belonging to officers and 'pomeshchiki passed
into the hands of non-Cossacks with the rights of ownership. These land inter
relationships were formed over decades; over decades the roots grew deeper and
more entangled. Whole settlements have sprung up on military lands, pomeshchik
lands, and lands belonging to nomadic tribes . . .
This demonstrates the complexity of the land question in the Don [oblast],
and the degree of thoughtfulness and caution which is required for its proper
resolution.
Unfortunately, a certain section of the population of the oblast does not real
ize this and is hastening to settle local land matters arbitrarily, without careful
thought. Thus, in certain localities, fields belonging to others were tilled, meadows
belonging to others were seized, and timber was felled in military or privately
owned forests.
Such a rash desire to resolve the land question arbitrarily is extremely danger
ous and harmful, not only to the whole population of the oblast, but also to the
State. It is dangerous, in that undesirable clashes could occur between the Cos
sacks and the peasants as well as between the peasants and the pomeshchiki. It is
harmful in that many lands could remain unsown on account of the disputes. And
at the present time grain is Russias only salvation. Once there is grain, Russia
596 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
can strengthen her freedom and defeat the formidable enemy. Besides, arbitrary
seizures not only fail to secure the right to the land, but also bring no advantage
to the person who seizes the land for they entail payments for losses incurred to
the legal owner.
One must calmly await the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. . . .
Until the Constituent Assembly is convoked, one must pursue ones own
affairs, work calmly, and diligently fulfill ones civil duties and ones duty to the
state, bearing firmly in mind that only by this means will it be possible to preserve
the freedom won by the revolution and to defeat the external enemy.
For the purpose of settling all disputes, for achieving agreements, and, in
general, for proper formulations of various local questions, the Provisional Gov
ernment has sent its Commissar, Member of the State Duma M. S. Voronkov, to
the oblast and has organized consultative bodies and committees. The Commissar
[appointed] by the Government must be approached in all matters of dispute and
he will deliver the necessary instructions.
P rince G. Lvov , Minister-President
[and other ministers]
April 7,1917
517. R esolution on th e L and Q uestion of th e C ossack C ongress ,
J une 15,1917
[Rech9, No. 139, June 16,1917, p. 4.]
In view of the fact, first, that all Cossack lands were neither gratuitously
offered nor allotted to them by anyone, but were conquered by the Cossacks them
selves, who more than once shed blood for the inviolability and safety of the lands
of the Russian State; second, that the Cossack lands were over a period of centuries
and through relentless labor of the Cossacks cultivated and settled by them, giving
Russia rich granaries in place of a wilderness; third, that the violation of the
obshchina way of land tenure, historically formed, was an irreparable blow to the
integrity and unity of over four million Cossacks, and in view of the forthcoming
agrarian reform, the All-Russian Cossack Krug deems it necessary to pass the
following resolutions: 1) All lands of Cossack voiskos, with their forests, fishing
waters, and other lands with their mineral resources constitute the historic, invi
olable, and sacred property of each Cossack voisko ; 2) the Cossack voisko as a
self-governing unit owns, uses, and manages its lands, waters, forests, and mineral
resources independently and with no ones assistance; 3) all privately owned
lands {pomeshchiki, functionaries, and officers plots, and others) expropriated
from a voisko for highest distinctions, rewards, etc., also government lands, en
closed lands, Kabinet, church, monastery, and others situated on voisko territories
must be returned into private ownership by each individual voisko on the basis of
the general principle of allotment of such lands to the toiling masses, which will
be approved by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly for all of Russia; 4) peasant
lands, those allotted and those of peasant associations of small owners, situated
on the territory of Cossack voiskos remain in the hands of the peasants and other
toilers who own them; 5) the All-Russian Constituent Cossack Congress, in mak
ing public its resolution on the solution of the land question, expresses full confi
THE AGRARIAN QUESTION 597
dence that the Constituent Assembly will, in the name of law and justice, sanction
this resolution.
The present program has in view mainly the conditions of European Russia,
with the exclusion of some of its borderlands and regions which have a special
608 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
land organization (mountainous Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the lands of the inner
Kirghiz horde, the lands of the Cossacks, etc.)* For those regions which differ
sharply in their way of life and economic [setup], the thesis of the program should
be altered accordingly, preserving their general bases.
. . . The Central Committee, together with local representatives of the Party,
is entrusted with the study of the questions regarding the application of the
agrarian program to those regions and borderlands that have their own special
land organizations (the mountainous Caucasus, Transcaucasia, the lands of the
Cossacks, and so forth).
The agrarian program in its entirety was adopted by a majority, with one
against and several abstaining.
In closing the session, President N. N. Lvov expressed the hope that the end
of the Petrograd period in history is approaching. Russia wants to live for her
own sake and not for the sake of Petersburg, and Russia will succeed in achieving
genuine freedom for herself, and not fictional freedom, expressed in the despotism
of socialism.
THE COOPERATIVES
528. T h e N ew C ooperative C ode
[So&. Uzak., I, 1, No. 414. See also the act of June 21 concerning registration, ibid.,
I, 2, No. 907. See Kayden and Antsiferov, The Cooperative Movement During the War,
pp. 24-26, 294-97, for a discussion of the significance of this legislation. Essentially
the same act had been passed before the revolution by the State Duma but not confirmed
by the State Council. Zhurnaly, No. 13, March 9,1917.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In abrogation and amendment of the relevant legislation, the Statute on co
operative associations and their unions annexed hereto is established.
II. . . . The reorganization of these associations, institutions, and unions . . .
must be concluded within two years from the day of promulgation of the present
law.
III. The present law shall come into effect on May 1, 1917, and by that time
registration sections shall be established in circuit courts . . . and model char
ters shall be prepared by public organizations and government institutions.
IV. The Minister of Finance is authorized to take the necessary steps for the
preparation of legislative proposals:
a. Concerning the determination of economic criteria for defining the type
of cooperative-credit institutions entitled to the benefits now granted to small-
credit institutions;
b. Concerning a revision of laws dealing with mutual-credit societies;
c. Concerning the determination of general principles governing the issue by
credit institutions of mortgage certificates and bonds guaranteed by mortgaged
real estate.
612 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
V. Pending the effective date of the present law the following provisional pro
cedure for approval of charters is established.
1. The responsibility for approval of the charters of cooperative associations,
entrusted by existing legislation to guberniya committees for small-credit mat
ters, and also to guberniya governors and guberniya offices for matters affecting
societies and associations, is transferred to guberniya zemstvo councils in those
guberniyas in which they exist. In those guberniyas where the zemstvo has not
been introduced, or where, because of present conditions, it does not appear pos
sible to entrust responsibility for approving charters to guberniya zemstvo coun
cils, this responsibility is placed upon the guberniya and oblast Government
Commissars or, where for local reasons this proves impossible, upon Temporary
Committees.
529. C o ng resses o f C o o pe r a t iv e R e p r e se n t a t iv e s
[So6. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1316. The activities and policies of the cooperatives in various
areas of national life in 1917 are covered elsewhere under the appropriate subject
titles.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
1. Congresses of representatives of cooperatives are established in order to
clarify and discuss questions affecting the needs of cooperatives, to prepare and
carry out measures designed to promote their success, as well as to represent their
interests.
2. Congresses may be of the following types:
a) general All-Russian, oblast and district [ raionnyi]on questions affect
ing all types and groups of cooperatives.
Note: All-Russian General Congresses, uniting all types and groups of coop
eratives, shall be called All-Russian Cooperative Congresses.
b) All-Russian, oblast and district by groupson questions affecting indi
vidual types and groups of cooperatives.
614 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
n . PURPOSES AND RIGHTS OF CONGRESSES
3. In order to accomplish the purposes mentioned in article 1, congresses
have the right:
a) to represent the interests of cooperatives before government and public
institutions;
b) to promote the activity of cooperatives and assist in their creation;
c) to open cooperative scientific institutes, educational institutions, courses,
bookstores, information and legal offices, etc., to organize expositions, museums
and libraries, lectures and readings, to collect statistical information and publish
books, pamphlets, periodicals, etc.;
d) to seek methods for the settlement, by means of agreement and arbitration,
of disputes and misunderstandings arising on the basis of cooperative interests
between cooperatives, as well as between the latter and other institutions and
private persons;
e) to render assistance to cooperatives in defending their rights and interests
by legal and administrative action.
4. Registration divisions of circuit courts are required to deliver to the
Council of All-Russian Cooperative Congresses (general) :
a) information, in the form established by the Council, on each act of regis
tration of a charter and subsequent amendments thereto, on the liquidation of
cooperative associations and their unions, as well as on a refusal of registration
within a period of two weeks after completion of the corresponding documents;
b) one copy each of charters submitted for registration.
5. Cooperative associations and their unions of all types are required to
deliver to the Council of All-Russian Cooperative Congresses (general) their
balances drawn up at the time specified by their charters, within one month after
the time so specified, as well as their annual reports within two weeks after their
approval.
6. Congresses, after registration of their charters by the appropriate circuit
courts, may acquire property rights in their name, including the right of owner
ship and other rights to immovable property, enter contracts and commitments,
act as plaintiff and defendant in court, and possess their own seal.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF THE AFFAIRS OF CONGRESSES
20. The administration of the affairs of congresses is entrusted to Councils,
which constitute the executive organs of congresses.
21. The composition of the Council, the number of members, the procedure
for their election, the location of the Council, as well as the procedure for admin
istration of the affairs of the Council, are determined by decisions of the congress.
24. The Council has the right to discuss legislative proposals affecting coop
eratives, and the right to make representations to the Government concerning
desirable amendments to such legislative proposals.
N . N ek r a so v , Deputy Minister-President
S. P r o k o p o v ic h , Minister of Trade and Industry
August 1, 1917
CHAPTER 11
Supply and Provisioning
3. As the guberniya committees on food supply are formed, the special repre
sentatives on the food supply and the special representatives of the Ministry of
Agriculture on Purchase and procurement1 shall transfer all business and credits
to the chairman of the respective guberniya committee, as special representative
of the Minister of Agriculture.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
March 25, 1917
Annex No. I to Section I (No. 487)
I. Law on the Transfer of Grain to the State
1. All grain crops of earlier years, of 1916, and the future harvest of 1917,
less the reserve defined in articles 3 and 4 as necessary for the food and economic
needs of the owner, shall, from the time of registration of grains . . . be placed at
the disposal of the State and may be alienated only through the intermediary
of state food supply organs.
2. By grain (article 1) is meant: rye, wheat, spelt, millet, buckwheat, lentils,
beans and peas, corn, barley and oats, and all flour, bran, and by-products of
the production of the grains named as well as oil cake.
3. The amount of grain necessary for seeding the fields, for subsistence of
the producer, his family, and persons employed on the farm receiving a grain
allowance from the owner, as well as grain for economic needs (fodder for cattle),
shall be exempt from alienation.
4. Local guberniya food supply committees shall be authorized to determine
the standards by which the grain on hand from the 1916 harvest and earlier years
shall be exempted from alienation under the preceding article, on the basis of
the following considerations: [specific criteria are listed for the determination
of the amount of grain and fodder to be left each owner for subsistence, seeding,
and maintenance of livestock.]
9. Fixed prices for grain of earlier years, 1916, and the future 1917 harvest
shall be established f.o.b. station or wharf in the amounts indicated in the annex
to the present article.2 By station or wharf are meant those warehouses or prem
ises in which local food supply organs receive grain for further shipment.
1 Offices created during the war by the tsarist government.
2 The fixed prices on grain were raised by an average of 60 per cent over those prevailing
since September 1916; Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 137.
620 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
10. Delivery of grain to station or wharf shall be compulsory for owners. In
case of noncompliance, delivery may be carried out by the food supply organs and
deducted from the amount due the owner in payment for his grain.
Art. 8. The total ration standard for supplying individual provinces with
grain, flour, and groats shall be determined by central institutions in keeping
with the total number of municipal and rural inhabitants, taking as a maximum
the average supply ration of 30 pounds of flour and 3 pounds of groats per capita
per month, excepting that part of the population which is fully provided for by
its own grain and taking into account in accordance with articles 5 and 6 of the
present law the amount of products required for the issue of additional rations to
persons employed in heavy physical labor.
Art. 11. In all towns and communities of the municipal type the sale and
distribution to the entire population of the products mentioned in article 1 shall
be carried out solely by ration cards.
Art. 12. In rural localities the procedure and form of issuing products shall
he determined by the food supply committee; equality of distribution of products
among the population must be guaranteed by some documentary means.
Art. 13. Standards for distribution to institutions, inventory of stocks, periods
of validity of ration cards, forms of inspection and accounting, registration of
the population, as well as the other aspects of establishing ration standards for
the distribution and consumption of products, shall be determined in accordance
with local conditions and in application of the special directive issued simultane
ously by the Chairman of the State Committee on Food Supply.
A. S hingarev , Minister of Agriculture
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 629
544. S tatute on t h e M inistry of F ood
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1073. On May 5, the Government established the Ministry of
Food, but the administration of food supply was to remain under the jurisdiction of
the Ministry of Finance until June 1 to enable it to complete the organization of the
grain monopoly. Ibid., I, 1, Nos. 574, 575.]
1. The Ministry of Food is the higher organ through which government meas
ures dealing with food supply and with the supply to the population of articles
of prime necessity are carried out.
2. The duties of the Ministry include: 1) procuring and supplying food
products to the army and the population, 2) assistance, in the forms established
by agreement with the Ministry of Agriculture, in the production of food products
and providing agricultural production with seeds, metal, implements, and other
means of production, as well as with manpower, 3) procuring and supplying the
population with other articles of prime necessity (metals and metal goods, leather
and leather goods, textiles, kerosene, etc.), 4) regulation of the production and
consumption, as well as of the buying and selling prices, of food products and
articles of prime necessity, 5) direction of the activity of local food supply organs,
and 6) participation in the working out of financial, economic, customs, and tariff
questions, and questions of railroad rates, foreign and domestic trade, construction
of new railroads, dirt roads, and waterways, regulation of railroad and water
transport, and local administration and self-government,
3. The Ministry of Food consists of: 1) the Minister, 2) three assistant
ministers, 3) three aides to assistant ministers, 4) an Administration for General
Affairs, 5) a Food Supply Administration, 6) an administration for the supply of
articles of prime necessity, 7) special departments: a) finance and accounts,
b) transport, c) organizational, d) statistical and economic, and e) on the organ
ization of agriculture, and 8) the Secretariat of the State Committee on Food
Supply.
4. The State Committee on Food Supply is under the chairmanship of the
Minister of Food, and functions on the basis of a separate statute.
The food organs in the hands of the revolutionary democracy upon which
the Ministry places its hope are organized extremely unsatisfactorily. They are
practically nonexistent in the crop-producing guberniyas and no census of the
grain has been taken there. There are few intelligent and knowledgeable people
in the food supply committees, and some of them are entirely unreliable, who
merely collect travel and other expenses. Not infrequently, moreover, these com
mittees are engaged not so much with the business in hand as in party politics,
etc. The intelligent element, experienced in matters of commerce, has been elimi
nated from food matters. But the chief difficulty nevertheless is that the popula
tion refuses to surrender the grain at the existing fixed prices. This is stated
everywhere. Members of the Nizhnii Novgorod, [Municipal] Duma point out
that the peasants hide grain under the roof, under the floor, in the stove; they
bury it under the ground. At night the grain is carried off into hiding places
to avoid having it recorded and seized. And, according to the members of the
Duma, the means necessary to obtain the grain from the peasants forcibly for
the State under the existing fixed prices are absent. The last resort is military
compulsory seizure. But this trump will also be beaten by the conviction of the
local people. Military detachments have already been sent to the Nizhnii Novgorod
guberniyas to seize the grain supplies. But they were met with thousand-strong
mobs of men, women, and children. And the soldiers refused to fire at them.
The same situation is stated in the reports of officials conducting the grain monop
oly in Kazan guberniya. The officials and food supply delegates report from
everywhere about their helplessness to do anything. The population refuses to
listen to them, throws them out, beats them unmercifully, and hides the grain.
The village refuses to surrender the grain at fixed prices which are twice and
even three times lower than the grain costs themselves. The village refuses to
supply grain to the city inhabited by the bourgeois and workers, who work
eight hours and then sit and smoke a cigar.
The Astrakhan Food Supply Committee regards the increase of fixed prices
the only way out of the situation in order not to remain without bread, and,
in disregard of the law, raised the fixed price in the transactions which it organ
ized. There was talk in the committee that for his violation of the law the President
would have to be put in jail. But of the two evils, either to be unmercifully
beaten by the starved population or put in jail, the President of the food supply
committee, as the Astrakhan7 Listok states, preferred the latter.
Such are the circumstances under which the food campaign is carried on at
present. The food question has become so crucial that the excesses it provokes
will inevitably grow more serious and will result in deadly consequences unless
steps are taken immediately to improve the situation.
8) The issue of food to troop units is carried out solely from quartermaster
stores. Only for those units situated in the procurement area of lie guberniya
food supply committee and remote from commissary stores may food products
be issued from stocks of the food supply committee against commissary checks
and with the special permission of the Chief of the Commissary of the front.
9) With the formation of the Advisory Bureaus, individual troop units and
organizations serving the army are prohibited from carrying out any procure
ment whatsoever both in inland and rear guberniyas, with the exception of fresh
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 655
vegetables and antiscorbutic remedies. In the rear areas of the theater of military
operations troop units and organizations are forbidden to purchase grain (rye,
wheat, spelt, millet, buckwheat, lentils, beans, peas, com, barley, oats, all flour,
bran, groats, and waste products from the production of the aforesaid grain),
oilcake, hay, cattle, meat, meat products, butter, fat, makhorka [inferior kind
of tobacco], and sugar. Troop units and organizations may procure other products
only by agreement with guberniya food supply committees. In the troop zone of
the theater of military operations, troop units and organizations may carry out
procurement of products not enumerated in the present article and also of eggs,
cattle, fat, and hay only with the permission of the Advisory Bureau.
10) The Statute on Advisory Bureaus at the front to be put into effect begin
ning July 1, 1917.
10) The sale of sugar is carried out by the state administration from plants
and warehouses, state shops, and also from stores of cooperative organizations
and commercial establishments of private persons to whom the Treasury has
entrusted such sale on a commission basis.
11) Minimum and maximum sale prices are established by legislative action.
Note: Sale prices of sugar are fixed, pending further notice, within the [fol
lowing] limits: for granulated sugar, from 37 rubles 20 kopeks to 57 rubles 20
kopeks per pood; and for lump sugar, from 40 rubles to 60 rubles per pood.
13) For the duration of emergency wartime conditions, the supply of sugar
to the army and civilian population is carried out according to a plan drawn up
by the Ministry of Food and approved by the Central Economic Committee. Sugar
intended for the needs of the army, under the above plan, is placed directly at the
disposal of the War Department, and sugar intended for the civilian population
of each guberniya and oblast is placed at the disposal of the appropriate directors
of excise taxes and is distributed by them to trading places.
14) Appropriations required to carry out the state sugar operation are allo
cated from funds of the State Treasury under budgetary procedure.
SUPPLY AND PROVISIONING 665
Amounts realized from the state sale of sugar are entered in Treasury revenues
under the appropriate budget headings.
A. K e r e n s k y , Minister-President
M. B e r n a t sk ii , Acting Minister of Finance
September 14, 1917
576. T h e P r o d u c tio n o f C a n d y a n d P a str y
[Sob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1071. See Struve, Food Supply in Russia During the War, pp.
19495. For the measures on regulation of potato syrup production, see ibid* pp.
195-96, and Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, pp. 135-36.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. Of the products of the candy and pastry industry which require beet or
cane sugar for their production, only the following types are authorized for manu
facture: a) bar chocolate, b) hard caramel without filling, c) hard caramel with
filling, d) soft caramel, e) candied fruit jelly, and f) fruit sweetmeats.
2. The products authorized for manufacture in accordance with article 1 must
meet the following conditions: the amount of beet or cane sugar must not exceed
the following quantities: in bar chocolate, 45 per cent; in hard caramel without
filling, 40 per cent; in hard caramel with filling, 35 per cent; in soft caramel, 40
per cent; in candied fruit jelly, 40 per cent; and in fruit sweetmeats, 45 per cent.
3. The Ministry of Food, through the intermediary of the guberniya (oblast)
food supply committees and municipal committees not under guberniya jurisdic
tion, registers all enterprises engaged in candy and pastry production by the date
determined by the Minister of Food. The procedure for carrying out the regis
tration is established by a directive of the Minister of Food.
5. The Ministry of Food draws up a plan for the manufacture of candy and
pastry goods by individual procurement districts and, in accordance with this plan,
issues authorizations to the local food supply committees for the fulfillment of
orders submitted.
6. Food supply committees forward orders to individual enterprises, estab
lish permanent supervision over these enterprises, and observe the fulfillment of
orders in chronological sequence.
8. The delivery of products of the candy and pastry industry from factories,
pastry shops, and similar establishments shall be carried out only with the per
mission of food supply committees.
16. The present law . . . to be put into effect before its promulgation by the
Ruling Senate.
P r in c e L v o v , Minister-President
A. P e s h e k h o n o v , Minister of Food
June 29, 1917
,
CHAPTER 12
Industry Transport, and Communications
VI. The following article shall be included henceforth in the charters of newly
established joint-stock companies and limited partnerships, as well as in the
charters of existing companies and partnerships that do not contain the regulation
given below: The subjects of powers at war with Russia may not take any part
in the administration and management of the business or of the various enter
prises and properties of a company. . . . The complete elimination of the subjects
of powers at war with Russia from any participation whatsoever in the adminis
tration of the business of a company, as well as from any employment in it, shall
extend in its entirety to the subjects of states that went to war with Russia after
the aforesaid persons held their respective posts.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
March 10,1917
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 667
578. T h e E stablish m ent of a C ouncil on Q uestions R elating to the
D evelopm ent of t h e P roductive F orces of th e C ountry
[So&. Uzak., 1, 1, No. 700. See Doc. 585.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. A Council on questions relating to the development of the productive forces
of the country shall be set up under the Ministry of Trade and Industry for the
discussion of basic principles of economic policy and for a survey of general
measures for promoting the development of extractive and manufacturing in
dustry, as well as of domestic and foreign trade.
II. The Minister of Trade and Industry shall preside over the Council (sec
tion I ) , and if it is impossible for him to preside, he shall be replaced by one of
the assistant ministers or another person designated by the Minister. The Council
shall include representatives of the following ministries: Trade and Industry,
Agriculture, Transport, Finance, Foreign Affairs, War, Navy, Education, and
State Control, as well as representatives of advisory institutions on trade and in
dustry; scholarly, economic, and agricultural societies; cooperative institutions;
unions of zemstvos and towns; war industry committees, and the committee of
military technical assistance; and representatives of industrial and agricultural
labor.
METALS
592. S ta tu te on R egion al Com m issioners f o r t h e D istrib u tio n o f
M etals and F uels
[So&. Uzak., 1,1, No. 617. By a law of July 20,1917, the Chief Commissioner was given
complete control over the supply of metals and the country was divided, for the pur
poses of metal distribution, into three areascentral, Ural, and southern. See Zagor
sky, State Control of Industry During the War, p. 194.]
1. On the basis of article 5 of the Statute of August 6,1916, on the Chief Com
missioner for the distribution of metals and about the persons and institutions
686 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
under his jurisdiction in connection with the work of supplying various regions
with metals, distribution of metals among consumers, elaboration of a plan of
procuring and transporting metals to help in promoting the mining of metals in
various places, and in carrying out all sorts of instructions of the Chief Commis
sioner for the distribution of metals and fuel, the above Chief Commissioner
appoints regional commissioners, under whose chairmanship committees are
formed. Membership and procedure of action of the latter are outlined for each
region by the Chief Commissioner through special instructions.
The following regional commissioners are established:
Volga . . . with the headquarters of the Commissioner in the city of Saratov;
Caucasus . . . in Baku; Kiev . . . in Kiev; Petrograd . . . in Petrograd; Ural
. . . in Ekaterinburg; Center . . . in Moscow; South . . . in Ekaterinoslav;
Siberia . . . in Tomsk; Turkestan . . . in Tashkent; Eastern Siberia . . . in
Irkutsk; Far East . . . in Vladivostok.
Resolved:
I. To authorize the Minister of Trade and Industry in agreement with the
Ministers of War, Navy, and Transport to publish the fixed prices that will be
established on metals, and objects manufactured from metals, on all deliveries of
metals and objects manufactured from them which were and are being produced
as of April 1, 1917.
II. To authorize the Minister of Trade and Industry to implement the measures
enumerated in Section I prior to its promulgation by the Ruling Senate.
688 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
594. T h e R eg u la tio n o f t h e Trade and P rices o f A g r ic u ltu r a l
M achinery
[.Zhurnaly, No. 110, June 17,1917. The purpose of the law was to improve the supplying
and distribution of agricultural machinery and tools by the elimination of the middle
men through governmental control of sales and by the establishment of maximum prices.
For the law on the compulsory use of agricultural machinery, see Doc. 551.]
Resolved:
To issue the following law:
To ratify hereby the Temporary Rules for the distribution of agricultural
machines and tools now in factory and private stock and to establish fixed prices
for them, implementing such Rules from the day of their ratification.
FUEL
595. T h e S ta tu te on t h e Tem porary C om m ittee o f t h e D o n ets Basin
[Sg&. Uzak., I, 1, No. 429. A similar committee was established for the Ural region.
Ibid., No. 430. Four days later the Government issued a law to regulate the requisition
of Donets coal. See Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War, p. 212.]
1. For the coordination and unification of the activities of the commissioners
of the chairmen of the Special Councils on fuel, transport, defense, and food supply
in the Donets Basin and for the purpose of taking immediate measures for the
accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the commissioners, a Temporary Com
mittee of the Donets Basin is established.
2. The Committee includes: a chairmanChief Commissioner for Fuel; three
commissionersfor defense, transport, and food supply; four representatives of
the Congress of Mine Owners of South Russia; four representatives of the Soviet
of Workers Deputies in the Donets Basin; and the Commissars for the guber
niyas of Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav or their deputies.
Note: The representatives of the Southern and Ekaterina railroads take part
in committee work with a consulting vote.
3. The Committee has jurisdiction over mining enterprises situated in the
guberniyas of Ekaterinoslav, Tauride, Kherson, and in the Don Cossack region.
4. Orders based on decisions of the Committee are compulsory and must be
carried out through institutions represented in the Committee, as appropriate.
6. The tasks of the Committee are as follows:
Concerning extractionassistance in supplying mines with: a) metals, re
inforcing timber, leather, lubricating and illuminating oils, b) labor, c) food;
the settlement of questions concerning railway sidings to the mines.
Concerning fuel supply the establishment, on instructions of the Chairman
of the Special Council on Fuel, of plans and procedures for meeting the fuel needs
of the principal consumersthe railroads, the fleet, and metallurgical and coke
industriesand also the adoption of measures for the optimum fulfillment of con
tracts for the transportation of fuel.
Concerning transportthe adoption of measures for strengthening and im
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 689
proving the means of transportation in the Donets Basin, for their most expedient
use, and for the regulation of fuel consumption on the railroads.
[March 13,1917]
596. C oordinating t h e O rders o f t h e Chairm an o f t h e S p ecia l C o u n cil
on F u e l and o f O th e r A u th o r itie s f o r t h e A p p lication o f
Em ergency M easures w ith R esp ect t o F u e l
[Soft. Uzak. I, 2, No. 960.]
The Provisional Government, in its Journal of March 25, 1917, has decreed:
It is the duty, as a general rule, of all military and civilian authorities in all
parts of the Russian State, except zones of direct military operations or the so-
called troop zones, when applying emergency measures with respect to fuelsuch
as requisitioning fuel, seizing enterprises supplying and extracting fuel, requisi
tioning unfelled timber, permitting temporary participation in the utilization of
enterprises for the supplying and extracting of fuel, the establishment of fixed or
maximum prices for fuel, prohibition of the export of fuel, and compulsory draft
ing of the population for the supplying and transport of fuelto exercise the rights
granted to them only after preliminary agreement with the Chairman of the Special
Council on Fuel or his deputy.
The original Journal is signed by the Minister-President, the Ministers, the
Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, and the State Controller, and is counter
signed by the Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government.
597. S ta tu te on t h e R eg u la tio n o f t h e D istrib u tion o f O il
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 514.]
1. On the basis of article 12 of the Regulations on the Special Council for
the Discussion and Unification of Measures for Supplying Fuel for Transport,
State and Public Institutions, and Enterprises Working for Purposes of State
Defense, approved on August 17, 1915, a Commissioner of the Chairman of the
Special Council on Fuel is appointed for the Baku and Groznyi oil regions.
3. The Commissioner is responsible for: (a) ascertaining stocks of oil, oil
residues, kerosene, and other oil products in the possession of enterprises in fields,
stations, factories, warehouses, oil pipelines, ships, etc.; (b) maintaining statistics
on the extraction, refining, pumping, and export of oil and oil products; (c)
supervision of the implementation of compulsory ordinances and rules issued by
the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel; (d) the distribution among oil-
producing firms of orders for liquid fuel for enterprises working for defense, in
accordance with instructions of the Chief Commissioner for oil; (e) enabling
oil-trading firms to export by making available to them, if necessary, oil and oil
products by means of requisition from oil-producing firms or exporters who have
purchased or who possess stocks and extraction of oil in excess of their export
possibilities; (f) verification and supervision of the maximum possible utilization
of oil schooners on the Caspian Sea; (g) supervision of the coordination of plans
for transporting oil cargoes through the Caspian Sea with the shipping of such
690 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
cargoes up the Volga, in order to avoid unnecessary demurrage of schooners or
barges; (h) the fulfillment of orders of the Chairman of the Special Council on
Fuel and instructions of the Chancellery of the aforementioned Council, of the
Chief Commissioner for the supply of oil and oil residues, and of the Chairman
of the Kerosene Committee.
[The following articles invest the Commissioner with the legal powers neces
sary to carry out the above functions.]
8. For the discussion of questions arising in the discharge by the Commis
sioner of the responsibilities entrusted to him, a Council shall be formed under
his chairmanship with the following membership: (a) two representatives of the
Council of Unions of Baku Oil Producers, (b) two representatives to be chosen
by firms shipping oil and oil products on the Caspian Sea, and one representative
each from (c) the Ministry of Trade and Industry, (d) the Caucasian Mining
Administration, (e) the local Excise Administration, (f) the Baku Russian Tech
nical Society, (g) the Baku Exchange Committee, (h) the Baku Soviet of Workers
Deputies, (i) the War Industry Committee, (j) the All-Russian Zemstvo Union,
and (k) the All-Russian Union of Towns. In addition, individual experts may be
invited by the Commissioner to participate in meetings of the council. . . .
[A. K on ovalov, Chairman of the Special Council
on Fuel, Minister of Trade and Industry]
[April 8, 1917]
598. A p p eal t o t h e P easan ts to Aid in th e P rocu rem en t o f W ood
for F uel
[Izvestiia, No. 57, May 4, 1917, p. 1. Various measures were taken to improve the
procurement of wood for fuel, especially for the railroads. The private lumber industry
was invited to participate in a committee, Tsentroles, to coordinate procurement, and
the commissioners of the Special Council on Fuel were authorized to seize real property
in order to cut the timber on it. See Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 70;
Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War; Zhurnaly, No. 120, June 28,1917;
and Sob. Uzak., I, 1, No. 549.]
Comrade peasants!
The war has deprived Russia of imported coal; over 500 million poods of coal
were imported before [the war]. Railroads, disorganized by the old regime,
cannot transport the required amount of Donets coal. The entire coal deficiency
must be met by the use of firewood. This firewood is essential to: 1) railroads for
transporting food supplies, all goods, military freight, and troops, 2) factories
and plants manufacturing all that is needed for the population and for the defense
of the countrys freedom, 3) the needs of both the rural and the urban population.
Without fully providing for firewood, neither regular work within the country
nor a supply of all necessities will be possible. Railroad ties, logs, and construc
tion materials are also needed. [These materials] are being procured from state-
owned forests, but owing to the absence of working hands and the impossibility
of further transporting [these materials], it is essential that there be an increased
felling of privately owned forests lying in the environs of navigable rivers and
railroads. All the procurement will be accomplished by order of the Provisional
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 691
Government through special central and local committees. In these committees
complete control will be assured to workers, soldiers, and peasants deputies.
Besides that, the control of land committees will remain in full force.
Comrade peasants! Assist in the intensified procurement of firewood and
timber materials! Assist in transporting and floating them! This is demanded
in the interests of your native land, and in the defense of the country!
T he E xecutive Committee of the S oviet
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
3. The mortgaging of Donets mineral fuel is prohibited from the day of enact
ment of the present Statute. . . .
4. All contracts for the delivery of hard mineral fuel in the Donets Basin (in
cluding contracts concluded with the State) cease from the day of enactment of
the present Statute with respect to any provision concerning fulfillment of these
contracts after the date mentioned. . . .
5. Advances and deposits given by purchasers to their contractors under con
tracts for the delivery of hard mineral fuel in the Donets Basin are to be returned
by the latter to purchasers, with respect to their unliquidated balance, within the
period of three months after the enactment of the present Statute.
Irrespective of this, all other claims for the fulfillment of contracts before the
enactment of the present Statute must be settled by contractors within a period of
six months after such enactment either by voluntary agreement or action in an
appropriate court.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 693
13. Fuel turned over to the State is distributed among consumers by the Chief
Commissioner for Donets fuel and by district Commissioners of the Chairman of
the Special Council on Fuel . . .
15. The acceptance of fuel from extracting and producing enterprises is car
ried out by the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel . . .
23. Payment to owners of pits, coke furnaces, and briquette factories for fuel
received is carried out on the basis of specially established purchase prices.
These prices are established by the Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel
on the basis of the cost price of fuel . . .
24. The division of enterprises into groups for the establishment both of pur
chase prices and of the difference in such for the various groups is subject to
compulsory consideration in the Commission established under the chairmanship
of the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel. The Commission consists of seven
persons elected by the coal and anthracite operators, seven representatives of the
workers organizations of the Donets Basin, and two representatives of the special
institutions of higher learning who are members of the Commission . . . The
organization of elections by the coal and anthracite operators is entrusted to the
Council of the Congress of Mine Owners of South Russia and the organization of
elections by the workers to the regional Soviet of Workers9 Deputies. The divi
sion [of enterprises] into groups drawn up in this way is to be approved by the
Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel. The division of enterprises into groups
is reviewed periodically under the procedure indicated above.
31. For the consideration of claims of private persons and institutions under
state obligations arising from the implementation of the present Statute, on the
basis of the amendment to the Statute of November 22, 1915, authorizing the
Chairman of the Special Council on Fuel to declare trade in mineral fuel the
exclusive right of the State, a Special Office for the affairs of the state monopoly
of trade in hard mineral fuel of the Donets Basin is established in Kharkov . . .
34. Decisions of the Special Office may be appealed to the First Department
of the Ruling Senate within a period of two months after notification of the de
cision to the petitioner.
37. A Council for the affairs of the monopoly of trade in Donets fuel is estab
lished under the chairmanship of the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel with
the following membership:
a) the Chairman of the Kharkov Mining and Metallurgical Committee;
b) one representative from the Ministry of Transport, one representative from
the private railways, one representative each from the War Department, Naval
Department, Ministry of Food, All-Russian Zemstvo Union, All-Russian Union
of Towns, one representative from all the steamship companies of the Black Sea
and the Sea of Azov and one from the Dnepr, Don, and North Donets steamship
694 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
companies, one representative from Tsentroshakhar, and one representative from
the all-Russian organization of millers;
c) one representative each from the Councils attached to the Commissioners
for fuel of the Central, Petrograd, Southern, and Kiev districts, to be chosen by
these Councils;
d) six persons to be elected by the Council of the Congress of Mine Owners
of South Russia, of whom one must be a representative of the metallurgical in
dustry;
e) six representatives of the workers of the Donets Basin, to be chosen by the
Oblast Soviet of Workers5 Deputies;
f) one representative of the State Control with the right of advisory vote.
In addition, the Chief Commissioner for Donets fuel is authorized to invite
individual experts to meetings of the Council with the right of advisory vote.
38. The Council is responsible for: 1) approval of the standards . . . ; 2)
approval of the general plan for issuing orders for the shipment of fuel in accord
ance with article 13; 3) consideration of petitions from persons and institutions
extracting or producing fuel for loans to enable them to repay advances and de
posits on contracts for delivery of Donets fuel . . . In addition, the Council con
siders questions concerning the monopoly of trade in Donets fuel submitted for
discussion by the Chief Commissioner as well as questions raised by individual
members.
Disagreements which may arise between the Chief Commissioner for Donets
fuel and the Council are to be settled by the Chairman of the Special Council
on Fuel.
2See Zagorsky, State Control of Industry During the War, pp. 218-21.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 695
602. A V iciou s C ir c le
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 206, September 8,1917, p. 3.]
Every fortnight Russia needs 80 million poods of coal. During the first half
of August, 50 million poods were to be shipped from the Donets region. It was
possible to ship only 35 million poods; that is, the deficiency was 17 million poods,
or 32 per cent of the coal intended for shipment.
On examination of the data on the deficiency of coal, it appears that during
the first half of August the disruption of railroad transport played no role in the
reduction of shipments. To be sure, in some railroad stations a shortage of cars
was felt. But at the same time the railroads even brought part of the reserve from
some mines. And during these two weeks the amount of coal mined was 17 million
poods below the shipping schedule.
During the first half of August 1917, 43 million poods of coal were mined.
For the same period of time in 1916 the mining amounted to 54 million poods.
During these two weeks 7 million poods of coke were manufactured, and in 1916
this period yielded 11 million poods.
Ordinarily the cause of such a drop in mining is sought in the lowering of
labor efficiency. As a matter of fact, the labor output of a miner during the first
half of August dropped to 207 poods10 poods lower than during half of July
1917 and 40 per cent lower than the output during the first half of August 1916.
But it would have been incorrect to regard the lowering of labor efficiency as
the sole cause of the coal crisis, for we are faced here with the operation of a whole
chain of much more complex causes than the simple unwillingness of the workers
to do their work well. We are convinced that one cannot reduce everything to the
ill will of the workers, first of all, by the fact that the drop in labor efficiency began
long before the revolution. Den9 makes use of very characteristic figures from the
report by Mr. Vukublin before the All-Russian Congress on Donets Fuel. In the
first half-year of 1915 the average output per worker in the Donets region equaled
4,616 poods; in the second half-year of 1915, 4,400 poods; in the first half-year
of 1916, 3,888 poods; in the second half-year of 1916, 3,537 poods; and in the
first half-year of 1917, 2,858 poods. On the average, from half-year to half-year,
labor efficiency in prerevolutionary Russia was also reduced by 9% per cent.
If we divide the half-year of 1917 into four quarters of a year, it appears that
during January-March the output of one worker equaled 1,553 poods, and for
April-June 1,355 poods; that is, the postrevolutionary period shows a reduction
of 12 per cent instead of the usual 9% per cent.
Evidently, in addition to workers disorders, the reduction in the output of
coal was caused by the sum total of conditions in the mining industry of the
countrythe breakdown of transport, disruption in the exchange of goods, and
the undermining of the foundation of industry. The special commission which
surveyed the Donets region in August, while emphasizing the importance of the
unorganized, spontaneous movement of the workers, pointed out also a number
of causes responsible for the continual breakdown of the efficiency of coal mines:
shortage of metal and coal carts, lack of lumber for the reinforcement of coal pits,
insufficient funds for exploitation work. According to the estimates of the Tor-
govo-Promyshlennaia, Gazeta, for every 10 million poods of mined coal we would
have to spend 4% to 5 million rubles in place of the 2% to 3 million rubles which
had to be spent prior to the war.
696 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
If we add to this the acute food shortages experienced by the Donets region,
we get a complete picture of the vicious circle in which the Donets industry is
trapped. General deterioration of the technique of production, together with total
inability to improve matters soon and confusion in the food situation, create
unrest among tie unenlightened working masses. War and revolution siphoned
the best elements from their ranks, replacing them with war prisoners, women,
and children whose labor efficiency does not exceed 50 per cent of the normal.
And the spontaneous movement among the workers, which takes the form of in
tolerable excesses and violence, is an added blow to the technical and financial
difficulties of the coal-mining industries.
Under the circumstances, it is futile to look for the culprits. Obviously, what
is needed is a prolonged process of restoring the industry to health and a general
raising of the cultural level of the masses.
N. S a w in , Assistant Minister,
for the Minister of Trade and Industry
VTII. The Minister of Justice and the Ministers of War and Navy, as appro
priate, shall be authorized to take measures for the immediate consideration by
judicial bodies of cases of criminal acts committed on railways and waterways.
P rin ce Lvov, Minister-President
P. P ereverzev, Minister of Justice
May 26, 1917
704 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
613. T h e A p p oin tm ent o f Commissars t o t h e R ailroads
[Sob. Uzak.9 I, 2, No. 1365. A large number of administrators on the railroad lines
were dismissed because of their arbitrary actions under the old regime and the feeling
against them by the workers. According to one source, some 900 were dismissed in
the first four months of the revolution. Lozinskii, Ekonomicheskaia Politika, p. 32.
The dismissals, though probably necessary, undoubtedly contributed to the further
disorganization of transport, for many of the replacements had no railroad experience
or training.]
The Provisional Government has decreed in its Journal of June 7,1917:
I. The Minister of Transport is authorized temporarily, for the duration of
the emergency, by agreement with public organizations, to appoint public leaders
as Commissars for the state and private railroads, as well as for the boards of
railroad companies, to supervise the activity of the railroads and the boards,
within the limits laid down by a directive approved by the Minister of Transport
in agreement with the Minister of Finance.
signal circuits. Order 1,000 selector phones and bring along as many and other
essential appliances as can be had quickly. Can probably adapt present iron
wires. Care in selecting men of patience and policy necessary. All to act as instruc
tors to educate Russians in American methods returning to United States there
after, time depending largely upon duration of war. Expense of all this, excepting
general superintendent, to be Russian through credit of United States. While we
begin at once to try and improve things, not much can be effected before arrival
American units so hurry them along. There has been a great change recently in
official spirit here, now apparently enthusiastic for American methods which we
must make successful.
(F rancis)
615. W ork o f t h e S teven s M ission
[Telegram of the Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State, For. Rel.
of U.S., 1918, Russia, III, 202. The activities of the Commission are delineated in
documents in ibid., pp. 183-307.]
Petrograd, October 9 [N.S.], 1917
(Received October 11 [N.S.], 1:00 P.M.)
1854. Delighted to learn by letter just received from Miller,4 Vladivostok,
September 25, that our Railway Commission made excellent progress since leaving
Petrograd August 24 accompanied by Ustrugov, Assistant Minister Railways.
Reports freight accumulation Vladivostok reduced about 40 per cent since May.
Fourteen decapod engines shipped since June 23, additional coming 8 per week.
Mallet engines clearing from October 1, 5 per week and 50 decapods now
Vladivostok and Harbin. Eight hundred box cars shipped since July 1, 300 more
by October 1, 1,000 gondolas since July 1, 400 being erected Vladivostok now.
Everything good working order Vladivostok and improving rapidly over entire
Trans-Siberian as result of Railway Commissions work whose recommendations
being put in operation rapidly.
. . . These and other like advices very encouraging and enable me to success
fully refute insinuations of British and French that American Railway Commission
effecting nothing. Again I urgently request advices of shipments as made. Show
Willard.
F rancis
616. T h e R ailroads A re Stopping
[Article in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 243, October 24, 1917, p. 3.]
From February on, all of us who look upon life with open eyes, all of us who
are not captivated by hackneyed phraseology, all of us shouted as loud as we
could, and warned wherever we could that in the fall the railroads would stop;
that the railroads are perishing. Some ridiculed our fears, others spoke of delib
erate intimidation, still others accused the sabotaging bourgeoisie, the capitalists,
and so forth, and then set their minds at ease. And the man in the streetthe
man in the street listened to the terrible words, yawned, and hoped for someone,
for somethingsomeone will help; somehow, everything will turn out all right.
No one helped; things did not turn out all right. Autumn came and the rail
roads are stopping.
4 Henry Miller, Member of the Stevens Commission.
706 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
Revolutionary phraseology brought much sorrow to Russia. But in addition
it also taught us not to believe words. From menacing words it was so far to deeds.
And there were so many of those shouts, hysterics, wails, resolutions, which
were forgotten by everybody the following day. And when we were saying that
the railways were on the brink of ruin, that exceptionally heroic efforts are needed
to save them, no one listened to us, no one believed us.
Autumn came and the railroads are stopping.
Get the meaning of these words.
First passenger transportation will be reduced and greatly so. Trips will be
possible only by special permission, or without any permission and even without
any tickets to characters with strong fists. The question of boarding the train
will no longer be decided by a bribe, as is frequently the case now, but by physical
force only.
But the reduction in passenger transportation will effect very little economy
in fuel, first, because it is already greatly reduced, second, because it plays in
general a secondary role in the work of the network, and third, because the bands
of discharged men returning from the front will demand, of course by means of
threats, that they be given locomotives.
Freight transport will immediately have to be reduced. And since practically
nothing (speaking of mass transport) but food supplies and fuel has been trans
ported recently, a sharp reduction in the delivery of consumers5 goods to popu
lated centers may be expected very shortly.
All this is unavoidable: trains cannot move if there is no fuel and no loco
motives. And the strictest resolutions can do nothing here.
The horrors related to the interruption of transport are clear to anyone:
riots, dissension, and the gradual dying out of the population, dying out in the
true sense of the word.
Suffering will touch everyone in equal measurethe bourgeoisie as well as
the revolutionary democracy and simply democracy. Everybody must understand
the meaning of the dreadful words the railroads are stopping, understand and
believe them. Half the work will then be achieved.
If the population will understand all the future horror, it will instinctively
rush to save itself, unless it deliberately wants suicide.
What is to be done? Specialists give a simple and clear answer. It is not a
matter of reforming, or improving the network, of working out some innovations.
Elementary measures must be undertaken to make our railroads, somehow, in
some way, move. The forthcoming mass conference at the Moscow Regional
Committee on October 26 will indicate these measures, particularly since they
are reduced to two very simple measures: we need coal and we must repair the
locomotives.
Who should undertake the measures? The Ministry, under the present cir
cumstances, can do nothing. Scores of telegrams with information about the
complete breakdown in various places, which the department receives daily,
horrify the leaders, to be sure, but they are powerless. The same problem of
authority operates here. And it is even more difficult because it is nonexistent,
but in its negative form it is passed into the hands of countless committees, unions,
etc. There can be no thought of saving the network until the authority of these
organs is clearly defined, until all authority in the field of administration and
technique is vested in the agents of the Ministry. But thus far this too is a detail.
INDUSTRY AND TRANSPORT 707
Understand that we must begin the rescue of the railroads today, because tomor
row will be too late.
The railroads are stopping.
I conclude my alarming note with an appeal: Caveant consules!
I am afraid to say: Memento mori.
P . P. Y urenev
FACTORY COMMITTEES
630. T h e S ta tu te on F a cto ry C om m ittees
[Sob. Uzak* 1,1, No. 551.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
I. In amendment of relevant legislation the following statute on workers
committees in industrial enterprises is approved:
1. Workers committees shall be set up in private as well as in state industrial
enterprises of every kind (factories and plants, mining, metallurgical, construc
tion trades, etc.), observing the rules set forth in the following articles of the
present Statute.
2. Workers committees may be set up both for the industrial enterprise as a
whole and for its individual workshops, factory shops, departments, crafts, pro
duction lines, etc. The individual committees may unite in a central committee
according to rules established by an Instruction.
The committees shall be set up either on the initiative of not less than one-
tenth of the total number of workers eligible to elect members of the committee,
or on the initiative of the administration of the enterprise.
3. The committee shall consist of members elected by the workers of the
LABOR 719
enterprise on the basis of a universalnot excepting women and minorsequal,
direct, and secret vote.
4. For the elections to be valid, not less than half of all the workers of the
entire enterprise or the particular workshop, factory shop, department, craft,
production lines, etc., must participate in them.
5. A list of the committee members shall be communicated to the administra
tion of the industrial enterprise for information.
6. Members of the committee may be dismissed by the administration of the
enterprise only by decision of conciliatory institutions. Their removal before
such decision may occur only with the agreement of the committee. In the absence
of permanent conciliatory institutions, the question shall be settled by means of
arbitration.
7. The workers committee shall prepare an Instruction defining the compo
sition, duties, and procedure of the committee. The Instruction shall provide in
particular: 1) the number of delegates by categories, factory shops, departments,
workshops, etc., or from the entire industrial enterprise; 2) the procedure for
the election of delegates and their alternates (the method, place, and time of
balloting); 3) the term of office of delegates and their alternates; 4) the pro
cedure for the recall of individual delegates or all delegates before the expiry of
their term of office; 5) the procedure for the election of the chairman and other
members of the presidium of the committee; 6) the relations between the indi
vidual committees, if such exist, and between individual committees and the
central committee of the industrial establishment; 7) the channel of communica
tions between the committee and the administration of the enterprise; 8) the
conditions and procedure for the release of delegates from work during the time
required to perform their duties; 9) the fundamental rights and duties of dele
gates and other regulations which prove necessary, depending on local conditions.
The Instruction prepared by the committee shall be subject to approval by
the general meeting of workers and, on approval, shall be displayed in the working
premises.
Note: In the election of the first workers5committee, the number of committee
members, the procedure for their election and terms of office shall be determined
by the general meeting of the workers of the entire enterprise or its workshop,
factory shop, department, craft, production lines, etc., as appropriate.
8. The provisions of the Instruction defining the relations between the com
mittee and the administration of the enterprisein particular, the channel of
communications of the committee with the administration, the conditions and
procedure for release of delegates from work during the time required to per
form their duties, and the place and time of electionsshall be the subject of a
preliminary discussion at a joint meeting of the committee and representatives
of the administration of the enterprise, and shall be established by mutual agree
ment of both sides.
9. The duties of the workers5 committees shall be: a) representation of the
workers to the administration of the enterprise on questions concerning relations
between the employers and workers, as, for example, on salaries, working hours,
rules of internal organization, etc.; b) settlement of questions concerning in
ternal relations among the workers of the enterprise; c) representation of the
workers in their relations with government and public institutions; d) cultural
720 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
and educational activity among the workers of the enterprise and other measures
designed to improve their existence.
10. Individual workers shall not he deprived of the right to act personally
in the cases mentioned in article IX (paras, a and b ), each for himself, without
recourse to the committee.
11. The committee shall inform the workers of the results of the election, of
its activity, of forthcoming meetings, etc., by means of notices displayed on the
working premises.
12. The committee shall be authorized to call meetings of the workers. The
administration of the enterprise shall be required to set aside premises or a place
at its disposal for meetings called by the committee.
14. Meetings called by the committee shall, as a general rule, be held outside
of working hours.
15. [Managerial and clerical] employees of an industrial enterprise either
may establish separate committees, following the rules laid down in the present
Statute, or, by agreement with the workers, may participate on an identical basis
in the election of workers committees.
16. All disputes arising between the administration of the enterprise and
workers and employees in the application of the present Statute shall be referred,
at the wish of one of the parties, to conciliatory institutions for consideration.
II. [Earlier labor legislation was abrogated.]
At the present moment the correctly conceived class interest imperiously dic
tates the coordinating of this interest with the interests of the wholein the
present instance, the profoundly democratic statewith the interests of other
strata of the toiling masses and, first of all, the peasantry.
Agricultural economy and consequently the work of the peasant were subject
to control in the past. Fixed prices were introduced on bread, fodder, and meat.
A bread monopoly was introduced. The work of the peasant is already controlled.
But the village, while silently accepting this control, is vitally interested in
being supplied with tools and means of production, textiles, soap, and other
necessaries of life. Both the agricultural economy as such and the State are
interested in this*
That is why every delay in industrial production is painfully felt in the village.
That is why the village is already beginning to mutiny. We can no longer deny it
and must frankly admit that unless we supply the village with the desperately
needed goods we cannot solve the food crisis that threatens the cities and indus
trial towns. That is why the interests of the working class at the present moment
are intimately interwoven with those of the peasant.
. . . At lie present time the profits of the capitalists are adequately taxed.
Fixed prices are established on food. And it would seem to us that the working
class should meet the regimentation of labor and its wages by coordinating it with
other elements of the national economy, such as consumers goods, peasants
incomes, etc.
A correctly conceived class interest of the proletariat dictates to it an or
ganized course of action, one that is in accord with the general situation of the
national economy and not a course of separate predatory actions. Upon this
road it [the proletariat] is being urged by the proclamation of the Socialist
Minister Skobelev.
N. D. K on dratev
650. T h e O rgan iza tio n o f C ham bers o f C o n c ilia tio n and A r b itr a tio n
ISob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1327.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. The present law on institutions of conciliation is enacted in order to pre
vent and settle disputes between workers and administrations of industrial enter
prises.
2. Institutions of conciliation are organized in the form of chambers of con
ciliation (in individual enterprises, by branches of industry, and by districts),
as well as in the form of chambers of arbitration.
3. Employers and workers are authorized to apply orally or in writing to
the local labor commissar concerning their wish to refer a controversial question,
which may lead or which has already led to a dispute, for consideration by a
chamber of conciliation. The labor commissar informs the other party without
delay concerning the receipt of this application and proposes that, before the
expiration of 48 hours after receipt of the notice, it communicate its agreement
to refer the controversial question for consideration by a chamber of conciliation.
In cases which brook no delay, the labor commissar is authorized to reduce the
aforesaid period.
In case agreement is obtained, the labor commissar assists, by all the means
within his power, organization of the chamber of conciliation as soon as possible.
In case of refusal, the labor commissar so informs the party that has applied
to him and immediately makes known in the local press the application of one
party and the refusal of the other to refer the dispute to a chamber of conciliation
for consideration.
4. The labor commissar is also authorized to propose on his own initiative
to the contending parties that they refer the dispute to a chamber of conciliation
for consideration. In case this proposal is refused by one or both parties, the
labor commissar immediately makes this known in the local press.
LABOR 743
5. In addition to organizing special ad hoc chambers of conciliation, the labor
commissar, in case of application by one or both parties, takes all necessary meas
ures for the organization of permanent chambers of conciliation, functioning for
a specified period of time, for the consideration of disputes between the parties
concerned. In case of refusal by one of the parties, the commissar makes this
refusal known in the local press.
6. Chambers of conciliation consist of an equal number of representatives
of the workers and the employers.
The Chairman is selected by members of the chamber from their midst.
7. In rules governing the activity of a chamber of conciliation, prepared
preliminarily by the representatives of both parties, the procedure for organizing
the chamber and for the conduct of its business is laid down.
19. Special institutions of conciliation, applying the rules of the present law,
may also be established for the reconciliation of the parties in disputed questions
between employers and employees [sluzhashchie], as well as between employees
and workers.
N . N ekrasov , Deputy Minister-President
P. K olokol n ikov , Assistant Minister, for
the Minister of Labor
August 5,1917
744 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
651. T h e S tatute on L abor E xchanges
[Sob. Uzak* I, 2, No. 1475.]
1. With a view to regulating the demand for labor and the labor supply, local
and regional labor exchanges are established.
2. Local labor exchanges are established on the basis indicated below by
municipal administrations and zemstvo institutions in communities of not less
than 50,000 inhabitants.
By order of the Minister of Labor, municipal administrations and zemstvo
institutions may also be commissioned to open local labor exchanges in commu
nities of less than 50,000 inhabitants.
3. The Minister of Labor is authorized to establish the timetable for the open
ing of labor exchanges by the appropriate municipal administrations and zemstvo
institutions.
4. In order to accomplish the purposes mentioned in article 1, local labor
exchanges: a) register the demand for labor and the labor supply, b) act as
intermediaries in hiring, c) keep current statistics of the demand for labor and
the labor supply, d) collect other information on the state of the local labor
market, e) take other measures which assist in regulating the demand for labor
and the labor supply.
5. The administration of the local labor exchange is entrusted to a committee
consisting of an equal number of representatives of professional organizations
of workers and employers and of a chairman elected by the municipal duma or
by the appropriate zemstvo institution.
7. For the unification and coordination of the activity of local labor exchanges*
regional labor exchanges are to be organized by the Ministry of Labor.
8. The services of labor exchanges are free of charge.
9. Local and regional labor exchanges suspend their intermediary activities
with respect to enterprises in which a strike or lockout is in progress.
A. K erensky , Minister-President
M at . S kobelev , Minister of Labor
August 19,1917
652. A C onference on t h e O rganization of L abor E xchanges
[ VVP , No. 158, September 21, 1917, p. 3.]
A Conference of heads of regional and large local labor exchanges has con
cluded in the Ministry of Labor. The Conference passed a number of resolutions
embracing a plan for an extensive organization of labor exchanges. After dis
cussing the question of creating a unified labor exchange, the Conference found
that in view of the impossibility, under the existing circumstances, of concen
trating all supply and demand for work in the labor exchange, it is necessary to
strive to have information in the labor exchange on all concluded and dissolved
transactions on hiring in order to have as complete a picture of the labor market
as possible. Approving in substance the suggestion made to the Conference on
achieving such concentration by means of including in the system compulsory
LABOR 745
loose-leaf discharge books, the Conference proposed that the Labor Market De
partment take measures for legislative implementation of this proposal.
On the question of the structure of the labor exchanges, the Conference recog
nized as urgent the establishment in the exchange of the following departments:
1) skilled labor, 2) unskilled mens labor, 8) unskilled womens labor, 4) white-
collar work, 5) labor of invalids, and 6) child and adolescent labor. At the same
time, the Conference recognized as advisable the establishment of trade sections
in the department of skilled labor and the attraction, so far as possible, of the
appropriate trade unions of workers in the direct work in these sections.
In order to guard the interests of the workers and enterprises of various
national groups who come to the labor exchange, the Conference, while deeming
it inadvisable to form special national sections, recognized the necessity of having
employees among the staff members of the labor exchange who could help persons
in their native tongue.
The sharpness of the differences on the question of new problems of the trade
unions (controlling and regulating production, the role of factory committees)
was therefore interpreted as a basic difference of opinion in the evaluation of
* The Third Conference of Trade Unions was in session at the same time as the First
Congress of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers* Deputies. But for the most part it did not
follow the course of the general political debates on war and peace, on seizure of power by
the Soviets, on the formation of the Third International, toward which part of its Bolshevik
delegates pushed it. This was the only way to avoid a split.
LABOR 749
general perspectives in the evolution of the Russian revolution. But on questions
of old traditional problems of the trade unions, on the methods of economic
struggle, on the organizational structure of the unions, the same two currents
came into conflict at the Third Conference. It is enough to pause on the question
of the methods of economic struggle. In his report KoPtsov (Menshevik) empha
sized that while the strike is an extreme and most effective means of economic
warfare, it is not the only weapon in the hands of trade unions. Therefore a
strike should be preceded by attempts to settle conflicts by peaceful means [con
ciliation chambers, etc.], particularly in view of the conditions of war, economic
breakdown, and revolution. The Bolsheviks, on the contrary, asserted that a
strike is the only revolutionary method and consequently is the cornerstone in
the economic struggle of the trade unions. The conciliation chambers and other
methods of peaceful settlement of conflicts were regarded by the Bolsheviks only
as supplementary methods for the struggle. The difference is not in substance,
but in the shadings. The Conference adopted unanimously the Menshevik reso
lution, with certain corrections.
WORKERS COOPERATIVES
656. T h e W orkers Cooperatives in 1917
[Excerpts from P. Garvi, Rabochaia kooperatsiia v. pervye gody Russkoi revoliutsii
1917-1921, pp. 4-18. Ms. in the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace.]
Independent workers cooperatives did not make their appearance until after
the revolution of 1905 . . . The first step in St. Petersburg was taken by the
Trudovoi Soiuz, actively participating in which were the Mensheviks (M. L.
Kheisin, Mark Isaevich Broido, and others), the Independent Socialist V. Posse,
and the Radical M. S. Ermolaev, one of the founders of the Russian coopera
tives. . . .
It should be pointed out that the workers cooperatives did not gain recogni
tion as the third form of the workers movement immediately. In the period of
the first revolution and the onset of reaction, the Bolsheviks looked in general
upon open and legal forms of the workers movement skeptically and at times
with marked disapproval. But even among the Mensheviks, who as a general rule
took the initiative in the direction of utilizing the legal opportunities created by
752 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the semivictorious revolution of 1905, there were those who expressed doubts
about the timeliness and propitiousness of speeding up the work of forming
workers cooperatives as a third form of the workers movement.
. . . While still remaining within the framework of a general consumers
cooperative, drawing upon the ideas and the experience of the workers coopera
tive movement of the West, the workers5cooperatives introduced a new, idealistic,
and militant stream, socialist in principle, into the general cooperative movement.
At the head of it, beginning in 1898 as an all-Russian center, was the Moscow
Union of Consumers Societies (known from 1917 on as Tsentrosoiuz).
At the First All-Russian Cooperative Congress, opened in Moscow in 1908,
the workers9cooperatives had already formed a special group, which, besides rail
way companies, included workers consumers organizations. . . .
Following the First All-Russian Cooperative Congress of 1908, the develop
ment of the workers cooperatives moved at a more rapid tempo.
The very promising development of the workers cooperatives, constituted as
the third form of the workers movement, encountered on its way the ever-
increasing distrust of the government, which ever more frequently resorted to
repressions and illegal restrictions. . . .
During the war the development of the general and workers5 consumers
cooperatives proceeded most rapidly in spite of the government repressions and
attempts to introduce the most minute control over the cooperatives. The grow
ing high cost of living and the aggravated food situation led to a tremendous
increase of membership in the existing cooperatives and the growth of new ones.
Within a short time, for that time truly giant cooperatives with 20,000-30,000
members and more came into being.* On the one hand, the tendency toward
merging small consumers organizations was increasing, and, on the other, large,
many-store cooperatives emerged at once. Thus came into existence the Petro
grad Union of Workers Consumers Societies and the Moscow Union of Asso
ciations of Workers Cooperatives. Because of food difficulties the authorities
were forced to tolerate this tempestuous growth of the cooperatives, which earned
for themselves an important place as a social factor in the struggle with the eco
nomic and food breakdown, in part relieving the government itself of the re
sponsibility for the failure in supply. The disruption in the monetary system
helped toward a more stable infiltration in the activity of the cooperatives of the
basic Rochdale principles of cooperation (selling only for cash, etc.). The
stream of independent workers cooperatives in the general impetuous torrent of
development of consumers cooperatives continued to increase and with it the
* On the eve of the revolution, in 1916, the average number of members in each organiza
tion was as follows: railway workers, 4,520 (in 1912, 3,896), factory workers, 1,200 (in 1912,
626), independent workers, 1,763 (in 1912, 431), miscellaneous, 1,429 (in 1912, 285), and
agricultural, 255 (in 1912, 138). The ranks of cooperative workers grew with remarkable
rapidity. The organizational and material achievements of cooperatives, city and village, were
tremendous. The sphere of their activity and influence grew without interruption, creating
even a cooperative inflation, that is, an unhealthy growth of the cooperatives.
LABOR 753
desire of the workers cooperatives for self-determination and their independence
from the general cooperatives.
This became possible only following the February 1917 revolution, which
brought, first of all, complete freedom of organization and, as a consequence of
this, the liberation of the cooperatives from the restricting chains and fault
finding wardship of the government. The workers cooperatives as well as the gen
eral civic cooperatives met the revolution enthusiastically and tried to promote its
success in every way, and particularly in the matter of overcoming the disastrous
situation in food supply in the center [of the country] and locally. On March 20,
1917, the Provisional Government issued a law on cooperatives, a draft of which
had been worked out by the cooperators themselves back in 1912. The Statute
on Cooperative Associations and Their Unions changed radically the legal status
of the cooperatives, allowed free formation of consumers associations, as well as
the presence of such associations in each locality and in such numbers as desired
by the population itself. It also freed all forms of cooperatives from petty control
by the authorities, etc. This law of the Provisional Government was a genuine
charter of freedom for the cooperative movement.6
The Moscow Union of Consumers Societies, renamed the Tsentrosoiuz,
launched upon a broad program, on the basis of the new law, of combating the
disastrous food supply situation. The cooperatives were drawn in every way pos
sible into collaboration with the government organs in regulating its economic
life, particularly in the matter of food supply and in preparing and distributing
the products.
The politization of the cooperatives, unavoidable under the conditions of
the revolution, led to their differentiation. The all-class (consumers) and peas
ants (credit and agricultural economic) cooperatives supported the Provisional
Government on questions of national and foreign policy. They thus formed some
thing of a middle stratum between the revolutionary democracyunited by the
Soviets and led at the time by Mensheviks and S.R.sand the city and village
petty-bourgeoisie. There had even been attempts, in connection with the pre
parliament, to form a special Cooperative Party.6 Such a proposal was made, to
be sure without any success, by E. D. Kuskova at the First Congress of the Work
ers Cooperatives in Moscow.
In the meantime, the workers cooperatives finally asserted themselves as a
branch of the general class workers movement. From the very outset the Moscow
Union of Workers Cooperatives set as its aim the [formation of an] all-Russian
union of workers cooperatives and its emancipation from the Central Union.
The same aim was pursued by the Petrograd Union of workers consumers or
ganizations, formed following the February revolution.
Even before the First All-Russian Congress of Workers Cooperatives, sched
uled for August 1, 1917, the basic principles of the workers cooperatives were
outlined at the Third All-Russian Conference of Trade Unions in the resolution
on the proletarian consumers cooperatives.
The First All-Russian Congress of Workers Cooperatives convened early in
August of 1917. Over a half-million members of the workers cooperatives were
represented at the Congress. The party composition of this Congress was as f ol-
5See Doc. 528.
6See Volume III, Chap. 30.
754 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
lows: Social Democrats of various tendencies, 83 (64.3 per cent); Socialist Revo
lutionaries, 23 (17.8 per cent); and nonparty members, 27 (17.1 per cent).
The First Congress of the Workers Cooperatives rejected at once the bour-
geois'Cooperative doctrine of social peace and harmony of interests. This did not
prevent the Bolsheviks, however, from branding the workers5 cooperatives imme
diately thereafter as petty bourgeois and tied to the apron strings of capital
. . . The workers9 cooperatives in their spirit [the Congress stated] must be
militant organizations; that is, they should not limit their activity to one definite
economic task.9 While wholeheartedly supporting the Soviets as organizations
of revolutionary democracy, and assisting in the preparation for the Constituent
Assembly, the workers9 cooperatives, without proposing their own candidates,
must help elect the candidates proposed by the Socialist party organizations and
their bloc. (The Congress thus rejected the idea of [the cooperatives] forming
their own cooperative party, derived from the circles of the bourgeois-demo
cratic and peasant cooperatives.)
Politically the Congress took a definite class-militant position. However, it
decided to maintain a party neutrality. The workers9 cooperatives decided to be
not only apolitical but also nonfactional. In view of the division in the political
workers9 movement in Russia, this was the only means of preserving the unity
and independence of the workers9cooperatives.
At the Congress its own ideological center was formedthe All-Russian
Council of Workers9 Cooperatives. But economically the united workers9 co
operatives continued to remain, even after the Congress, members of the Central
Union. The struggle for the freedom of the dependent factory consumers organi
zations was waged at an increased rate following the Congress. Soon the number
of workers9cooperatives, including both the dependent and the independent, had
reached 1,500, with a membership of approximately two million.
The October revolution introduced a radical change in the status of the
workers9 cooperatives. In Moscow the revolution took the form of bloody street
battles, which lasted for many days. The workers cooperatives, in view of their
party neutrality, did not wish and were not able to take an active part on the side
of the Bolsheviks in their struggle to seize power under the banner of All power
to the Soviets! After long and passionate debates the workers cooperatives in
Moscow resolved to take a position of friendly neutrality toward the Soviets
on the barricades. This friendly neutrality was evidenced in the fact that the
workers cooperatives continued to supply the workers suburbs with food during
the battles.
Occupied in the early days with the problems of consolidating their power,
organizing the Soviet administrative machinery, and particularly with the prep
aration for a separate peace, the Bolsheviks paid litde attention at first to either
the general village or the workers cooperatives. These, as a matter of fact, con
tinued to operate independently. But faced with the food catastrophe, Lenin was
LABOR 755
forced to pay attention to the only powerful and skillful purchasing and distrib
uting apparatus of consumers5 cooperatives, which was widely branched and at
the same time democratically centralized.
The policy of the Bolsheviks toward the cooperatives, as in other areas, pro
ceeded from two considerations: 1) their theoretic conceptions, and 2) their op
portunistic adaptability in facing reality.
school the following titles: the firstengineer in the specialty studies with the
right to perform corresponding work, the secondforeman-technician, and the
thirdforeman; persons in the second and third groups, on reaching the age of
21, shall enjoy the rights granted to foremen who have received this title from
trade boards.
12. The positions in vocational schools mentioned in the schedule annexed
hereto may be filled by either men or women . - .
13. The organization, method of administration, and curriculum of voca
tional schools, and the composition and duties of school and supervisory councils,
in accordance with local conditions and needs as well as with the tasks and
specialty of the educational institutions, shall be determined by their founders,
observing the requirements of the present law, and shall be approved by the
Minister of Education.
III. On courses and institutions for the dissemination of vocational knowledge :
1. Vocational courses shall be designed to impart information and skills in
one or more branches of technical knowledge.
2. In addition to courses of special technical knowledge and skills, permanent
and temporary courses may be set up for the training of teachers and directors
of vocational schools and courses.
3. The organization and method of administration of courses, the extent of
instruction in subjects, as well as the degree of previous preparation required of
persons entering the courses, shall be determined by special rules prepared by the
founders in conformity with the tasks of the courses.
IV. Vocational schools: classes, courses, and institutions for the dissemina
tion of vocational knowledge may be organized and maintained by funds of the
Treasury and of zemstvo, municipal, and other institutions of public administra
tion, social classes, societies, commercial and industrial associations, various
establishments and bodies, and private persons. If local funds prove inadequate,
the Minister of Education shall be authorized, using appropriations specially re
quested under the estimate, to grant the institutions mentioned interest-free loans
and assistance from the Treasury both for organization and equipment and for
their annual maintenance to the extent necessary, but not more than three-fourths
of the total expenditure required for each of the needs mentioned. The procedure
for granting the assistance and loans mentioned, as well as for the repayment of
the latter, shall be determined by rules laid down by the Minister of Education
in agreement with the Minister of Finance and the State Controller.
11. For the discussion of questions of an educational nature, as well as with
a view to cooperation between the central administration and the representatives
of local instruction and practical technique, a committee on vocational education
shall be formed in the Department of Vocational Education on the following lines:
(a) this committee, under the chairmanship of a special person appointed by the
Minister of Education, shall include: (1) one representative each from every type
of vocational school, all to be elected for one year by their respective colleagues
under a procedure to be determined by the Minister of Education; (2) persons
known for their activity in the field of practical technique or vocational education,
778 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
at the invitation of the Minister of Education; (3) representatives of public ad
ministrations and organizations during the discussion of matters affecting voca
tional education in the given area; and (4) the director, vice-directors of the
Department, and representatives for matters of vocational education . . .
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 9, 1917
677. A R ecommendation for V ocational Courses in the
S econdary S chools
[Article in Izvestiia, No. 44, April 18, 1917, p. 3.]
Izvestiia has already pointed out the strange phenomenon that Mr. Manuilov,
who was promoted to the post of Minister of Education by the revolution, appar
ently ignores those responsibilities that have been made incumbent on him by the
confidence of the democratic forces. Professor Manuilov offers generalities and
that is all. In the meantime, democratic Russia definitely wants a complete re
organization of the elementary, secondary, and higher systems of education. . . .
Russian democracy is also interested in having a uniform secondary school sys
tem, which would not merely serve as a preparatory step toward university edu
cation, but would offer a well-rounded education and would turn out people who
are adjusted to life. Our secondary school must be a trade and labor school. On
a level with subjects such as Russian, literature, arithmetic, and geometry, which
must all be taught by completely different methods, as well as new languages,
hygiene, natural sciences, logic, psychology, economic geography, history of social
thought, political economy, statistics, accounting, bookkeeping, and marketing,
courses must be given in all types of trades, and every graduate of the school must
be in perfect command of no less than two [such trades]. Let there be ten grades
in the school and let the course of studies take eleven years, but at least let it then
have some meaning.
Only such a school will turn out useful citizens. The products of such a school
will not be frightened by the red phantom of social revolution which society will
create and in which there will be no place for parasitic gentlemen of leisure.
B. G.
678. T he E stablishment of C oeducation in the Gymnasia,
Pro-Gymnasia, and Real S chools
[Sa6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 563. For a description of these schools, see Ignatiev et al.,
Russian Schools and Universities in the World War, p. 28fL]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of existing statutes it is decreed:
I. The Minister of Education is authorized to establish from Treasury funds,
within the limits of the amounts appropriated under the estimate, gymnasia, pro
gymnasia, and real schools for the coeducation of children, and to permit zemstvo,
municipal, and other institutions of public administration, social classes, parishes,
societies, associations, and private persons to open such schools with their own
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 779
funds. Existing statutes governing boys9gymnasia, -pro-gymnasia, and real schools
shall apply to the aforesaid educational institutions, with the following exceptions:
I. All positions in coeducational institutions, with the exception of the posi
tion of teacher of religion, may be held by women.3
3. Women appointed to positions in coeducational institutions must have the
same education and teachers9 credentials as are required of men holding corre
sponding positions in boys9 educational institutions. They shall enjoy the rights
to salary, increments, and pensions designated for the positions held by them . . .
and shall receive, during official travel and travel to their place of duty, travel
and subsistence allowances and payments on the same basis and in the same
amounts as are established for men holding corresponding positions.
II. The Minister of Education shall be authorized, on petition of the school
authorities, confirmed by a resolution of the local public administration, to trans
form existing gymnasia , pro-gymnasia, and real schools into coeducational in
stitutions of the corresponding type.
P rince L9vov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov , Minister of Education
V lad. N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 24, 1917
679. A pproval of the E stablishment of F our-Y ear (S enior )
Gymnasia and Real S chools
[S<?5. Uzak., 1,1, No. 600. See Ignatiev et al., Russian Schools and Universities in the
World War, pp. 6-7, 28-29, and Doc. 683, for a discussion of the need for these
changes.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
In amendment of relevant statutes it is decreed:
I. The Minister of Education is authorized to establish four-year gymnasia
and four-year real schools either completely from Treasury funds, within the limits
of the amounts appropriated, or with assistance from local sources, and to permit
zemstvo, municipal, and other institutions of public administration, social classes,
parishes, private institutions, and persons to open such schools from their own
funds, with or without assistance from the Treasury. Existing statutes governing
boys9gymnasia and real schools under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Educa
tion shall apply to the aforesaid schools.
II. Students who have completed the course of the upper primary schools shall
be admitted to the first class of the four-year gymnasia and the four-year real
schools without further examination. All other persons wishing to enter the first
class of the four-year gymnasia and real schools shall be admitted only after an
entrance examination covering the course of the upper primary school.
III. The assignment of instruction in subjects of the school curriculum and
8 The appointment of women to certain teaching positions in boys secondary schools was
authorized by law, April 28,1917. Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 601.
780 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
the number of lessons by classes of the four-year gymnasia and real schools shall
be determined by the Minister of Education.
IV. The number of persons employed and the amounts of their remuneration
and of the funds required for the maintenance of the four-year gymnasia or the
four-year real school shall be determined by the organization tables attached
hereto.4
V. Graduates of the four-year gymnasia and the four-year real schools shall
enjoy all rights of graduates of the eight-year boys9gymnasia and seven-year real
schools, as appropriate.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov , Minister of Education
V lad. N abokov , Head of Chancellery
of the Provisional Government
April 28,1917
680. N ew S tatute on T eacher T raining S chools
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 873. Institutions for the training of elementary school teachers.
See Doc. 689 on teachers* colleges.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of existing statutes concerning teacher training schools, it
is hereby decreed:
1. Teacher training schools are secondary educational institutions and con
sist of four classes; they may be mens, womens, and coeducational.
2. One or two preparatory classes, parallel classes, and dormitories may be
established in teacher training schools.
3. Graduates of two-class elementary schools5 are admitted to the preparatory
class of the training school; graduates of upper primary schools or equivalent
educational institutions are admitted to the first class; students who have passed
an examination covering the curriculum of the respective schools may also be
admitted to the preparatory and first classes.
4. In order to furnish students with an opportunity for practice teaching, two-
class elementary schools with a six-year curriculum are established in conjunction
with the training schools.
5. The director (directress) and men and women teachers of scientific sub
jects are chosen from Russian subjects with higher education. Men and women
teachers of local languages, graphic arts, physical exercise, singing and music,
and manual labor, as well as women teachers of needlework, are chosen from Rus
sian subjects with at least secondary education who have, in addition, obtained
* On June 14, 1917, 5,415,714 rubles were appropriated for the opening of one hundred
four-year gymnasia and real schools, five teachers colleges, twenty-five teacher training schools,
and an unspecified number of upper primary schools (see, however, Doc. 683) in 1917. Sob.
Uzak., 1,2, No. 863. On June 17,1917, the Minister of Education was authorized in appropriate
cases to reorganize eight-year gymnasia and seven-year real schools as four-year schools and
to use the funds made available by the discontinuance of the lower classes for the expenditures
connected with the reorganization and further arrangement of four-year secondary schools.
1UL, No. 877.
5 For a description of the one-class, two-class elementary schools, see Ignatiev et al.,
Russian Schools and Universities in the World War, p. 3.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 781
teachers credentials for the above-mentioned subjects and arts in secondary edu
cational institutions under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. Men
and women teachers of the elementary schools attached to the training schools are
chosen from Russian subjects, graduates of teachers colleges or teacher training
schools, and also from persons with secondary education who have qualified as
men or women elementary school teachers and who have completed pedagogical
courses (classes).
6. Teachers of non-Orthodox religions and religious doctrine in those training
schools where students learning the aforesaid religions or religious doctrines make
up not less than half of the entire student body are chosen from Russian subjects
with at least secondary education and enjoy all salary and pension rights indi
cated in the organization table of teacher training schools.
7. The subjects of instruction in teacher training schools and the scope of the
curriculum, which shall be not lower than the level of the curriculum in subjects
of general instruction in secondary educational institutions, are approved by the
Minister of Education. The detailed programs of study and immediate organi
zation of the academic section are determined by the school council of the training
school or by a conference of training school inspectors of the guberniya or other
academic-administrative district.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. Manuilov , Minister of Education
June 14, 1917
681. T he I ntroduction of th e N ew Orthography
[Circular No. 6717, June 22,1917, of the Minister of Education, Zhurnal Ministerstva
Narodnago Prosveshcheniia, LXXI (September 1917), 41-43.]
By instructions in Circular No. 5456, dated May 17, the Ministry of Educa
tion informed you that a special conference at the Academy of Sciences, under
the chairmanship of Academician A. A. Shakhmatov, recognized that it was timely
and expedient to conduct a simplification of Russian orthography and proposed
that you adopt, without delay, as of the commencement of the forthcoming school
year, measures for carrying out the reforms as outlined by the above-mentioned
conference.
I request that you accept the following guiding principles when enforcing the
present legislation in the schools:
1. The reform in orthography shall be carried out gradually, beginning with
the lowest division of the elementary school. In this division the application of
the new orthography shall immediately be compulsory in reading instructions;
in this connection teachers should familiarize the children with the [four] ex
cluded letters (ft, I, 0, V), but only when the teachers may find this appropriate
after the new orthography has been mastered. In the upper division of elemen
tary schools, in upper primary schools, and in secondary schools it shall be neces
sary only to recommend that students change over to the new spelling.
2. The projected reform must be carried out in full and cannot be imple
mented piecemeal, by applying separate parts in the course of the forthcoming
school year.
3* In carrying out the reform it is necessary to avoid coercion of the pupils;
782 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
therefore compulsory relearning for those who had already mastered the rules
of the former orthography cannot be permitted; in this connection, the teacher
must be patient with the spelling of the pupils and, while encouraging the whole
class to change to the new orthography, must not force individual pupils in the
class to do so against their wishes. Accordingly, every class may have two groups
those writing in the old and those writing in the new orthography. There must
be no third group; a disorganized combination of both systems cannot be tol
erated, as it would run counter to the accomplishment of the reform in its totality
and would destroy the very basis of orthography itself.
4. With respect to persons taking entrance examinations, it is necessary to be
guided by the following instructions:
a. For them the only spelling requirements remaining in force are those that
are common to both the old and the new orthography, and only violations of
these rules shall be counted as mistakes.
b. Those preparing for examinations on the new orthography must not be
expected to meet the requirements of the old orthography.
c. All instances of writing that do not violate the rules of either the new or
the old orthography cannot be considered as mistakes.
5. When the new orthography is introduced in the school during the present
year, it will be necessary to consider the unavoidable circumstance that no primers
adapted to the new orthography, so desirable at least for the lowest division of the
elementary school, will be at the disposal of the school, and therefore that, in
teaching reading, it will be necessary to use old primers. The new orthography,
however, shall be introduced in teaching writing by making extensive use of
alphabet cards, after having eliminated the extra letters from them, and by neces
sarily devoting greater time to writing.
6. In order to clarify the purpose of the reform and enlist the confidence of
the public, the parents, and the pupils in the present legislation of the Ministry,
which has been worked out by a special conference at the Academy of Sciences
and supported by the State Committee of the Ministry of Education, it is neces
sary to make it clear in every possible way that the present simplification of
Russian orthography by no means aims at introducing an arbitrary, fanatical
system of writing, but that, on the contrary, the new orthography represents a
scientifically based system, which preserves all the old foundations of our orthog
raphy and aims only at establishing a correspondence between writing, on the
one hand, and the phonetic components and etymological construction of the living
literary language, on the other hand. Small brochures, articles expounding the
new rules of orthography and giving a brief but at the same time scholarly justi
fication for them, publication of samples [of writing using] the new orthography,
little reference dictionaries, as well as discussions with and lectures for pupils
could serve this purpose. Concurrently with the work that the Ministry plans to
carry out in this field, it would be desirable to draw university groups working
on linguistics, the Society of Russian Language Teachers, and, in general, all
persons working in this field into participation in this work.
7. Despite the attempt to provide for all possible situations connected with
the introduction of the new orthography, difficulties may nevertheless arise which
the teacher will be unable to resolve; these should then be resolved locally in the
Russian Language Teachers Committees and in Pedagogical Councils.
Confident that teachers will give proper attention to the present reform and
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 783
will exert all their efforts to implementing it in the most effective manner, I request
that you issue the necessary instructions for the acceptance of the above guiding
principles when introducing the reform in Russian orthography into schools
during the forthcoming school year.
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
IV. The presence of at least one-half of the available staff of professors and
docents is required for a quorum at faculty meetings.
V. Privatdocents, assistants, dissectors assistants, and calculators admitted
under the procedure set forth in section I of the present law to participation in
faculty meetings with a full vote have the right to attend council meetings with
an advisory vote. Other privatdocents are invited to council meetings on grounds
to be determined by the council.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
A. M anuilov, Minister of Education
June 24,1917
WELFARE
697. T he I ncrease in P ensions
[So>. Uzak., 1,19No. 491.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In view of the increased cost of living caused by the war, percentage
increases in pensions shall be made available from the Treasury on the basis
indicated in the following sections for persons receiving such pensions: 1) from
State Treasury funds; 2) from special funds [such as those for] Disabled Persons,
the Committee for the Care of Retired Civil Servants, Cossack forces, church
schools, parochial teachers and tutors; 3) from savings banks for deferred pay
of the Ministry of War and Navy, of transport and mining engineers, and of the
Ministry of Justice; 4) from the savings bank for deferred pay of the provinces
of the Kingdom of Poland; 5) from pension funds for teachers in church-parochial
schools, for village teachers, and for persons employed in the state-controlled sale
of liquor, from the former pension fund for employees in the Bureau of Printing
and Engraving [Ekspeditsia Zagotovlemia Gosudarstvemvykh Bumag ], and from
the savings and credit bank for employees in public railroads, and 6) from credit
banks of mining and metallurgical associations of state metallurgical works and
mines. The present section shall apply to all pensions from the enumerated sources
included in the budget of the Department of the State Treasury and other depart
ments and institutions, as well as to pensions for voluntary employees and workers
on public railroads, derived from a special pension fund, consisting of monthly
benefits of 3 and 6 rubles.
II. Pensioners whose pension rates do not exceed the rates indicated below
(section III) have the right to receive percentage increases, with the exception
of those who are residing abroad or in localities under enemy occupation, as well
as pensioners who are subjects of states that are hostile to Russia.
III. The determination of the pensioners percentage increases shall be depend
ent upon their place of residence, which shall be defined according to [the break
down into the three cost-of-living area categories on] the attached list, and also
upon the pension rates received, and shall consist of the [following percentages]
. . . [The increases ranged from 60 per cent to 40 per cent, depending upon the
800 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
cost-of-living area, for pensions up to 600 rubles and from 30 per cent to 20 per
cent for the highest pensions affected, i.e., 3,000 rubles.]11
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
[and other ministers]
April 11,1917
698. T he T ransfer of the D epartment of the E mpress M ariia and of the
Charitable S ociety to the M inistry of W elfare
[ZhuTncdy, No. 76, May 12, 1917. The Ministry was established on May 5. On Au
gust 5 the Charitable Society was abolished and its functions taken over directly by
the Ministry of Welfare. Ibid., No. 148. The Trusteeship of Workers Aid was trans
ferred to the Ministry from Interior on May 16, ibid., No. 80; the Romanov Committee
and the Skobelev Committee for aid to disabled soldiers on June 17, ibid., No. 110; and
the Division of Public Health and Social Welfare and its funds on August 5, ibid.,
No. 148. The Supreme Council for the welfare of families of persons called up for
military service as well as families of servicemen killed or wounded in action was
abolished on July 25 and its functions assumed by the new Ministry. Sob. Uzak., I, 2,
No. 1181.]
Resolved:
I. To approve the following law: The institutions under the jurisdiction
of the Department of the Empress Mariia and the Charitable Society, transferred,
in accordance with the law of the Provisional Government on March 4, 1917, to
the Ministry of Education,12 to be included under the Ministry of Welfare.
II. To extend to the Ministry of Welfare, in cooperation with the Ministry of
Education, the right to transfer to the Ministry of Education those institutions
under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Empress Mariia and the Charitable
Society that are subject to the jurisdiction of the latter Ministry, and in each case
to make the fact known to the Provisional Government.
699. T h e E xtension o f Support fo r S old iers Fam ilies
[Sob. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1019.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. In amendment of the relevant statutes, the provisions of the rules . . .
concerning the welfare of soldiers families are extended to common-law wives,
children, mothers, to common-law brothers and sisters of soldiers, as well as to
the adopted children of soldiers, with the following changes and additions:
1) Common-law wives of soldiers who have children, as well as those who are
pregnant, enjoy, both for themselves and for their children, the right to a ration
on the same basis as legitimate families of soldiers.
2) Common-law wives of soldiers without children acquire the right to a
ration only if they lived together not less than a year before conscription and
were supported by the labor of the conscripted soldier.
3. Common-law wives and children may be included in the list of those
11 See also M. G. Fleier, Pensionnaia praktika Vremennago PraviteFstva, KA, VTTT
(1925), 246-50.
12Zhumaly, No. 3.
EDUCATION AND WELFARE 801
receiving rations, provided the soldier submits a written petition requesting a
ration for his common-Iaw family. This petition is submitted to the institution
responsible for rationing at the place of residence of the soldiers family or for
warded there through his immediate military superiors.
4) If there is a legitimate personal family, the common-law family does not
enjoy the right to any rations.
5) Common-law mothers, as well as common-law brothers and sisters of
soldiers, receive a ration if they were supported by the latters labor.
6) Foster children of soldiers, who have not been adopted but who were
taken into their families before conscription, are entitled to a ration if they were
supported by the labor of their foster fathers before the conscription of the latter.
7) Issues of food allowances (rations) to common-Iaw families and foster
children of soldiers made before the publication of the present statute are not
subject to recovery.
II. The measures mentioned in the preceding (I) section to be put into effect
beginning June 1, 1917.
III. The present law to be put into effect before its promulgation by the Ruling
Senate.
P rince Lvov, Minister-President
D. S hchepkin , for the Minister of the Interior
June 22,1917
March 9, 1917 No. 1380 With reference to the appeal to the brethren of
the Orthodox Church
The Most Holy Ruling Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church discussed an
appeal to the brethren of the Orthodox Russian Church with a message of appro
priate content regarding present events, and issued this order: We have dis
cussed the draft of this message and order its transmission, together with circular
ukases, to diocese bishops, asking them to give orders that it be read in churches
simultaneously with the acts of abdication of the former Emperor Nicholas II for
himself and his son from the throne of the Russian Empire and of Grand Duke
Michael Aleksandrovichs declining to assume Supreme Power until the estab
lishment by the Constituent Assembly of the manner of rule and new basic laws
of the Russian State.
The statutes of the Ministry will be temporary. They could not be otherwise.
In Russia 70 million people profess the Orthodox faith. Orthodoxy has been
the historical religion of the country; only abstract dreamers may [imagine that
it would be possible to] break away forever from Orthodoxy as the religion of
the nations majority. Because of that fact alone, it should occupy the leading
position among the other religions professed in the country. And, at the same
time, this predominant religion, unlike any other, was deeply enmeshed in the
web of the police.
Now, there are no anointed [rulers], there is no anointed power, and it is not
even obligatory for the power to be Orthodox. Precisely this makes it imperative
to re-examine the relations between the Government and the Orthodox Church,
and vice versa.
A. V. Kartashev defined his position at the future Church Sobor as that of a
friendly adviser, who would prevent rash and tactless decisions from being taken
with regard to the State. In the opinion of A. V. Kartashev, any other interven
tion of the Government in the activities of the Sobor would be inadmissible.
A. V. Kartashev agreed that the Ministry of Confessions would be in the nature
of a registry office, but besides [taking care of] registration, it should contribute
to the plenitude of spiritual culture.
A. V. Kartashev concluded by expressing his optimistic conviction that he
RELIGION 811
would succeed in accomplishing a great deal in the realm of the countrys spiritual
culture.
B
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. The Ministry of Confessions is established on the following lines:
1) The Ministry of Confessions consists of the Minister, two Assistant Min
isters, the Department for Affairs of the Orthodox Church, the Department for
Affairs of Other Religions, and the Office of the Legal Adviser to the Ministry.
2) The Minister of Confessions and his assistants are appointed from persons
belonging to the Orthodox religion.
3) The Ministry of Confessions has jurisdiction over matters (a) concerning
the Department of Orthodox Religion, temporarily to the same extent to which
they are now subject to the jurisdiction of the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy
Ruling Synod, and (b) concerning other religions which heretofore have been
under the jurisdiction of the Department of Ecclesiastic Affairs of Foreign Re
ligions in the Ministry of the Interior.
4) Pending the reorganization, on lines to be worked out by the All-Russian
National Sobor, of church administration, and pending a fundamental re-exami
nation of the relations of the state power to religions under the new order, the
Minister of Confessions, with respect to the matters provided in article 3 of the
present (I) section, is assigned the rights and duties belonging to the Ober-
Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling Synod and the Minister of the Interior,
respectively,
II. The following are transferred to the Ministry of Confessions: 1) the Chan
cellery of the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling Synod with Legal Ad
visers Office, this Chancellery being renamed the Department for Affairs of the
Orthodox Church of the Ministry of Confessions, and the position of Legal Adviser
to the Ober-Procurator being renamed Legal Adviser to the Ministry of Con
fessions, and 2) the Department of Ecclesiastic Affairs of Foreign Religions, this
Department being renamed the Department for Affairs of Other Religions of the
Ministry of Confessions.
III. The institutions mentioned in section II, pending further reforms, retain
all appropriations presently allocated both from the State Treasury and from spe
cial funds for the maintenance of these institutions, as well as other allowances.
IV. The offices of Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Ruling Synod and his
Assistant are abolished.
A. K erensky, Minister-President
N. A vksent ev , Minister of the Interior
A. K artashev, Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod
August 5, 1917
812 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
CHURCH SCHOOLS
712. T h e Grant to C ouncils o f T h eo lo g ica l Sem inaries and S ch o o ls
o f th e R igh t to S e le c t Candidates fo r A dm inistrative
and Teaching Positions
[VVP, No. 14, March 21, 1917, p. 1. For the granting of autonomy to the Moscow
Theological Academy, see ibid., No. 58, May 19, 1917, p. 3.]
The Most Holy Ruling Synod has decreed:
Pending the elaboration of a new statute on theological seminaries and schools,
the selection of candidates for newly opened administrative and teaching positions
shall be left to the decision of teachers5council meetings of theological seminaries
and schools, with the participation of council members from the clergy . . . The
primate of the diocese shall report on the selected candidates to the Most Holy
Synod or to the Ober-Procurator of the Synod, as appropriate. The appointments
of administrative and ordained persons shall be confirmed by decisions of the
Educational Committee of the Most Holy Synod, while [the appointments] of
others [shall be confirmed] by the official journals of the Educational Committee,
subject to the approval of the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod. In cases
where candidates for one or another office do not present themselves, the vacancies
shall be filled, after considering the opinion of the Educational Committee, by
the Most Holy Synod or by the Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, as
appropriate.
[March 18, 1917]
Apparently the majority of the members of the Sobor are in favor of restoring
the Patriarchate in Russia. Some express themselves against it since they regard
the Patriarchate as a monarchical venture.
The discussion of the question began with a declaration by Prof. N. D.
Kuznetsov, who criticized the report of Bishop Mitrofan of Astrakhan on the
Patriarchate.
N. D. Kuznetsov stated that the report failed to make clear and to formulate
the question on the Patriarchate. It is not known what church institutions will
be headed by the Patriarchate. There may be one and there may be several. The
report states that the Patriarchate will be responsible to the Sobor. Precisely
what it means and to what extent the Patriarchate must give a report to the admin
istration are unknown. Only general considerations are mentioned in the report.
Consequently they cannot be subjected to a vote inasmuch as it will not solve
but confuse the issue.
V. G. Rubtsot, member of the Sobor, made a speech directed chiefly against
the episcopate. In his opinion the salvation of the Russian Church resides not
in the Patriarchate but in greater democracy and the elective factor, in the total
vote of the Church and in a wide Sobor administration.
Prince Chagadaev, member of the Sobor, stated in his speech that individual
authority in church life is not suitable. All church matters and all church measures
must be weighed and discussed collectively.
The opponents of the Patriarchate were opposed by a great many speakers.
Bishop Mitrofan of Astrakhan said that the essential church question now is the
question of restoring the Patriarchate in Russia since this institution is profoundly
bound with the church life of Russia. The Patriarch is the president of the Sobor
and of the Synod. He calls the Sobors, both the periodic ones and the extra
ordinary ones. He is a vital part of the Church. The Patriarch has a place at the
Sobor and after the Sobor. The Patriarch is an executive organ of authority
at the Sobor, but he is not an embodiment of the entire authority. Thus in
church life the Patriarch is a hierarch, as are his colleagues the bishops. The
Patriarch is responsible to the Sobor: he reports to it of his activity and of the
activity of the organs of Sobor administration. And the best guarantees that
the Patriarch will be unable to be despotic and absolute are the Sobor and the
Synod,
In view of the late hour, the discussion of the question is postponed to the
next session of the Sobor.
830 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REORGANIZATION
729. T he R estoration of the P atriarchate in R ussia
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 245, November 8, 1917, p. 3.]
The All-Russian National Church Sobor under the influence of recent events
[the October Revolution] hastened the discussion of the question of restoring
the Patriarchate in Russia. It was proposed to stop the debates, and the question
of the Patriarchate was put to a vote [October 28].
By an overwhelming majority of voices, almost unanimously, a resolution
was adopted, according to which:
1) The periodically convoked Sobor enjoys in the Russian Church the
supreme authorityjudicial, legislative, and executive.
2) The Patriarchate is being restored and it will head the administration of
church affairs in the Russian Orthodox Church.
3) The Patriarch is the first among the bishops, who are equal to him.
4) Together with the organs of church administration, the Patriarch is respon
sible to the Sobor.
The Election of the Patriarch
On the basis of this resolution, election of the Patriarch took place in the
Cathedral of Christ the Saviour [on October 31]. Three candidates chosen by
the Sobor were on the ballot sheet: Antoni, [Archbishop] of Kharkov, Arsenii,
[Archbishop] of Novgorod, and Tikhon, the Moscow Metropolitan.
Metropolitan Tikhon received the greatest number of votes [sc; on the third
ballot Tikhon received enough votes for nomination with the other two candi
dates],
[On November 5] the paper with his [Tikhons] name was drawn from a
box [the final choice was by lot] by the monk, elder Aleksei. The election of the
Patriarch was distinguished by great solemnity. The Metropolitan Vladimir with
the assembly of the bishops conducted the service.
The inauguration of the Patriarch is planned for November 21. Moscow has
been chosen as the place of residence of lhe Patriarch.
730. T h e S obor and the O ctober R evolution
[Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 246, November 9, 1917, p. 3.]
Yesterdays session of the Sobor was full of reverberations of the events we
are experiencing. Present at the Sobor was Assistant Minister of Confessions,
Prof. S. A. Kotliarevskii. He departed from Petrograd following the arrest of
the members of the Government It was resolved to notify the population by a
special address in the name of the Sobor of lhe elections and naming of the
Patriarch and to outline the history of the question, also the considerations that
led the Sobor to express itself in favor of restoring the Patriarchate. The prepara
tion of the draft of the address was entrusted to Anastasii of Kiev, Archbishop
Illarion, and several professors. It was resolved to photograph and describe the
damaged Kremlin holy objects. The commission to inspect the Kremlin was
composed of the bishops who were in the Kremlin during the troubled days . . .
In discussing the question of renewing publication of the Tserkovno -
Obshchestvennyi Vestnik the thought was expressed of the need to submit a
petition in this respect to the Military-Revolutionary Committee [of the Soviet].
This thought met with a sham rebuke from Prince G. P. Trubetskoi who was sup-
RELIGION 831
Military-Revolutionary Committee as a fact, but to petition it would lower the
dignity of the Sobor. We can deal with [it] as we dealt in the bygone days with
the Golden Horde.
It was resolved to form a commission to work out a text of the message of
the Sobor which would be a response to the events of the day. . . .
Prof. L. I. Pisarev made a report on the difficult property and financial situa
tion of the Church in connection with the declaration by die new authority on
confiscation of church and monastery lands. Government appropriations can
hardly be expected. We must look for new sources of income because the economic
condition of the clergy is nearing catastrophe.
Metropolitan Platon made a report on his negotiations in connection with the
assignment from the Sobor with the Military-Revolutionary Committee. Metro
politan Platon requested the Committee to neutralize the Kremlin in the future
and to take measures to protect the Kremlin holy objects. The first request was
received by the Committee favorably. The Metropolitan was told that the
Military-Revolutionary Committee has already raised the question of disbanding
the arsenal and the barracks in the Kremlin. The Military-Revolutionary Commit
tee agreed to have the holy objects protected by the clergy of the cathedral
together with the patrols.
Appeal of the Sobor to the Orthodox Russian Church
News has reached the members of the Sobor, which rouses their heart and soul
to indignation, that junkers and other defenseless persons in Moscow and other
parts of Russia are threatened by lynching and other forms of violence and bloody
dealing on the part of the armed mob.
The Holy Synod declares publicly: Enough shedding of brothers blood!
Enough malice and revenge!
Revenge should never exist anywhere; the more so is it intolerable against
those who, without being on a militant side, responded only to the will of those
who sent them.
Victors, no matter who you may be and in whose name you have shed blood,
do not profane yourselves by shedding your brothers blood, by killing those who
are defenseless, by tormenting those who are suffering. Do not cause new grief
and disgrace to the tormented country, stained as it is with the blood of her sons.
Think of the unfortunate mothers and families and do not add new tears and
cries to the spilled blood.
Even those who have repudiated God and the Church, who remain deaf to the
voice of conscience, stop at least in the name of love of mankind.
The Sobor appeals to you also, leaders of the movement: exert all of your
influence to curb the bloodthirsty cravings of those who revel in their fratricidal
victory.
The conduct of the war, which played so important a role in the advent of the
revolution, continued to influence its course and outcome. The tragedy of 1917
was that Russia, at last free to solve her historical economic, political, and social
problems, found her energies and resources simultaneously committed to the
struggle against an external enemy. Either World War or revolution and reform
would have taxed her to the utmost and demanded the greatest national sacrifice
and responsibility to avoid catastrophe. Together, they constituted an overwhelm
ing burden.
In the first days of the revolution, the activity of the Petrograd Garrison and
the temper of the army and the navy necessitated immediate consideration of
military questions. The unexpected mutiny of the reserve battalions of the guards
regiments in the capital was a decisive blow to the tottering monarchy. With the
issue as yet unclear to the Duma and the Soviet, both took steps to provide leader
ship to the officerless troops, to protect them from retaliation by their commanders,
and to assure their support against a possible counterattack. It was in this atmos
phere that the Military Commission of the Temporary Committee of the Duma was
organized, that Colonel Engelhardt issued his order against disloyal officers,
and that Order No. 1 to the Petrograd Garrison was hastily drafted by the soldiers9
section of the Soviet.1
On the front and in the Baltic Fleet the accumulated grievances and prevail
ing disillusionment provided fertile soil for an immediate reaction against the
harsh system of military regulation, deteriorating living conditions, and inept and
inconsiderate commanders. As word of the events in Petrograd filtered to the
active forces in official announcements, in Soviet declarations and rumor, anarchic
outbursts flared among the troops aboard ships. Mingled with bewilderment at
the disappearance of the fountainhead of authority and the desire to revenge old
wrongs was an understandable upsurge of hope for peace, stemming from war
weariness, humanitarian principles, and the early pronouncements of the Soviet.
In an effort to restore discipline, which was threatened by this elemental
movement, War Minister Guchkov gave prompt sanction to the most urgent re
forms, in most cases already spontanously introduced, and established a special
1 See VoL I, Docs. 33-46, on EngeThardts order and the Military Commission of the Duma,
and elsewhere in Part I for other documentation on the attitudes and activities of the army and
navy during the February Days. Attention is directed again to the surveys by N. N. Golovin,
The Russian Army in the World War, and Youri Danilov, La Russie dans la guerre mondiale
as well as to the military memoir material and Razlozhenie armii, excerpted and cited in this
Part.
842 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
commission under the chairmanship of General Polivanov, charged with the con
sideration and elaboration of further changes. Through March and April the
Commission proposed and Guchkov issued a series of enactments designed to re
gain the confidence and loyalty of the soldiers through the abolition of injustices
and the introduction of more democratic procedures in military life. Many of
the reforms were long overdue: the wisdom of others was questionable. Some
were supported by the progressive and realistic commanders; others occasioned
doubts and direct opposition, prompted by sincere reservations concerning the
degree of freedom permissible in a military organization. Naturally, there were
also officers, conditioned by their narrowing profession, who fought every change
and refused to alter their methods. Guchkov removed a number of the most re
calcitrant and incapable generals, which was resented by certain of their con
freres as another blow to the authority of the officer corps.
Whatever the merits of Guchkovs program of concession to the demands of
the soldiers, it did not succeed in halting the tide of dissolution. By the end of
April he had gained neither the support of the men nor the confidence of the of
ficers. Symbolic of his dilemma was the question of issuing the Declaration of
Soldiers Rights, drawn up by the Polivanov commission, representing its furthest
efforts toward democratization, and recognizing many de facto practices. It was
vehemently opposed by the high command and labeled inadequate by the most
revolutionary elements. Guchkov refused to promulgate the Declaration and soon
resigned from his hopeless position with a public attack upon the Government.
Meantime, the enemy, always desirous of reducing the pressure on one front
in order to triumph on the other, seized the opportunity to take advantage of the
complete passivity of the Russian army during the first weeks of the revolution
by organizing on the Russian front a campaign of disobedience, defeatist propa
ganda, and fraternization. As a result of these activities and the armys continuing
preoccupation with internal reorganization and domestic developments, the de
facto armistice was prolonged, promoting a further slackening of morale and
combat effectiveness among the soldiers and an increase in desertions, much
to the satisfaction of the Germans. During this period, one revealing shock did
serve, however, to slow the drift toward disintegrationa successful local sur
prise attack on the Stokhod River, by which the Germans seriously weakened the
credibility of their peaceful professions. Aware of their error, the German High
Command forbade a repetition of such incidents.
It was under these circumstances that A. F. Kerensky accepted the War
portfolio. By this time the experience of the Stokhod, which had a sobering effect
upon the soldiers, combined with the beginnings of doubt within the revolutionary
democracy regarding the practicability of expecting any sincere German moves
for a just peace, had perceptibly influenced the climate of opinion. If peace was
not in sight, then Russia must continue to defend herself. In fact, for varying
reasons an offensive was urged from several quarters. To some the object of an
advance was to honor Allied obligations and hasten victory. To others it was
a means of saving the country and the army from defeat, of strengthening the
internal regime, and of improving Russias international position in order to
put pressure on the Allies for a revision of war aims.
The Allied Conference at Chantilly in November 1916 had agreed upon a
joint attack on all fronts in early spring. When General Nivelle requested the
MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS 843
promised cooperation in March, General Alekseev pointed out the impossibility
of compliance in view of the recent upheaval in Russia and the difficult climatic
conditions presented by the spring thaw. Alternatively, he suggested that the
Western Allies delay their attack until Russia was ready to assist. Nivelle refused,
and the failure of his ill-timed and poorly planned offensive is well known.
In early April Alekseev agreed to mount an offensive in May or June. The
reactions of his commanders varied according to their attitude toward the new
army and the quality of their troops. After Kerensky took office, the preparations
accelerated along several lines: planning, the concentration of artillery and muni
tions, the formation of shock battalions (a proposal of General Brusilov reluctantly
approved by Alekseev), and exhaustive efforts to raise the morale of the soldiers.
The last task was undertaken principally by Kerensky himself. In the first days of
his tenure, he signed the Declaration of Soldiers Rights, but with important
amendents calculated to restore the authority of the commanders in the field. Soon,
he acted to bring the commissars, appointed earlier by the Soviets, under the
direct control of the Government. On the other hand, he prohibited the resigna
tion of commanding personnel angry over the democratization process and
especially the recent promulgation of the Declaration. Above all he went to the
front and carried out an extensive and intensive tour among the troops to explain
their obligations as revolutionary soldiers of free Russia and to instill in them
the necessary will to fight for their newly won liberty. In this he was aided by
some commanders, officers, and committees, who attempted to strengthen and
deepen the effects of his message.
The offensive opened on June 18, and was greeted by almost universal approba
tion, only the Bolsheviks and their allies voicing opposition. Initially, the advance,
at least on the Southwestern Front, was successful and substantial. But, on July
6, the Germans struck back and launched a counterattack that halted the Russians,
then drove them into retreat and confusion. In an effort to save the day, General
Kornilov, whose units had been among the few to maintain discipline in the face
of the advancing Germans, was appointed Commander in Chief of the South
western Front, and, in time, the line was stabilized after the loss of almost all of
Galicia. Needless to say, the reverse shattered morale already shaken by the
repercussions of the almost simultaneous July uprising in Petrograd.
Following the rout at the front and the suppression of the Bolshevik insurrec
tion in the capital, the Provisional Government sought remedies for the military
situation. The death penalty was restored in the army, military censorship tight
ened, and the institutions of commissars and committees more carefully defined
and regulated. In a memorable meeting at Stavka on July 16, Kerensky, now
Minister-President as well as War Minister, listened to the bluntly expressed fears
and criticisms of his commanders and gave heed to their recommendations. The
impressive performance of General Kornilov in the field and the character of his
report sent to the meeting at Stavka were factors in the Minister-Presidents de
cision two days later to give him the Supreme Command, replacing General Brusi
lov, who had succeeded Alekseev some time before the offensive.
With his assumption of command, Kornilov demanded of the Government, in
a manner which, under less desperate circumstances, would no doubt have brought
his dismissal, additional measures to strengthen authority in the army and the rear.
In the event, his proposals continued to be the basis for discussions between Stavka
844 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
and the Government through August, reflecting the growing dissatisfaction of in
fluential members of the high command and, in the light of subsequent develop
ments, the conspiratorial activity in train at Stavka.
Meanwhile, conflicting reports circulated concerning the condition of the
army. On the one hand, reports from commissars, committees, and some com
manders gave evidence of an improvement in its mood and efficiency. On the
other hand, communiques from Stavka emphasized the signs of progressive de
terioration and hinted at approaching new disasters. To add to the publics con
fusion, documents were published to show that the regiments that were disgraced
for cowardice in the Galician campaign and whose conduct had been cited by the
high command as proof of its claims had in fact fought bravely. Clearly, by
Augusts military matters had become inextricably connected with the development
of counterrevolutionary movements, centered at Stavka and personified by their
leader-designate, General Kornilov. When the blow from the right came on
August 27, it was to be fatal in its effects upon both the army and the country.2
Yet, despite these ominous signs, the army continued through the summer to ful
fill the vital function of preventing a decisive blow in the West by holding 86
German divisions on the front, more than at any previous period of the war.
2 See Volume m .
CHAPTER 16
The Revolution in the Army and bavy
750. O rder N o . 2
[Golder, pp. 388-90 ; Protokoly, pp. 396-97.]
To the troops of the Petrograd district, to all the soldiers of the guard, army,
artillery, and navy, for strict execution, and to the workers of Petrograd for in
formation :
In explanation and amplification of Order No. 1, the Executive Committee of
the Soviet of Workers5 and Soldiers Deputies has resolved:
1. Order No. 1 of the Soviet of Workers Deputies proposed to all companies,
battalions, and other military units to elect committees (company, battalion, etc.),
appropriate to each particular unit, but that Order did not provide that these com
mittees should elect the officers of each unit. These committees are to be chosen
in order that the soldiers of the Petrograd Garrison may be organized and en
abled, through their committee representatives, to share in the general political
life of the country and, specifically, to make known to the Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies their views regarding the necessity for action of any kind. The
committees must also attend to the general needs of each company or other unit.
The question of the limits within which the interests of the military estab
lishment may be compatible with the right of the soldiers to choose their own
commanders has been submitted for consideration to a special commission.
852 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
All elections of officers up to the present time and confirmed or submitted for
confirmation by the army authorities must remain in force.
2. Pending the time when the question of elective commanders is definitely
settled, the Soviet grants to the committees of the various units the right of objec
tion to the appointment of any officer. Such objections must be addressed to the
Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers5 Deputies, by whom they will be
laid before the Military Commission [of the Duma], in which representatives of
the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, together with other public organi
zations, are participating.
3* Order No. 1 showed the significance of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies as an institution directing all the political actions of the soldiers of Petro
grad. To this elective organ of their own choice, the soldiers are bound to submit
in matters of their public and political life. The soldiers are bound to submit
to all orders of the military authorities that have reference to the military service.
4. To remove the danger of an armed counterrevolution, the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers Deputies presented the demand that the Petrograd Garri
son, which won for Russia her political liberty, not be disarmed, and the Provi
sional Government has assumed the obligation to prevent such disarmament, in
accordance with its official declaration. In conformity with this declaration, com
pany and battalion committees are required to see to it that the arms of the Petro
grad soldiers are not taken from them, as was indicated in Order No. 1.
5. Reaffirming the demands made under points 6 and 7 of Order No. 1, the
Executive Committee notes the fact that some of these are already being carried
into effect by the Provisional Government.
The present Order is to be read to all companies, battalions, regiments, ships
crews, batteries, and other combatant and noncombatant commands.
T h e E xecutive Comm ittee of th e P etrograd S oviet
of W orkers and S oldiers D eputies
This is a true copy of the original:
T h e Chairm an of the M ilitary C om m ission of t h e
P rovisional Government
March 6,1917
751. A lekseev O bjects to t h e M ethod of T ransm ission , S ource , and
C ontent of O rder No. 2
[V. I. Nevskii, Verkhovnoe komandovanie v pervye dni revoliutsii, KA, V (1924),
228.]
Sent March 6, 23 hours 50 minutes, received March 79 0 hours 45 minutes
By order of the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front, Order No. 2 of
the Executive Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, which
has been received by the Commander in Chief, has been transmitted to me. I am
compelled to request once more that orders of a general nature should not be sent
directly to the fronts, but always through the Staff of the Supreme Commander,
as only the Supreme Commander may decide on questions of a general nature
which are to be announced to the troops. I repeat that issuing orders directly to
the Commanders in Chief is inadmissible, creating disorganization and disorder
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 853
in the administration of the armies. Only the orders of the Government can be
valid for the army, whereas the orders of the Executive Committee of the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, which is unknown and does not belong to
the framework of governmental authority, are not valid and will not be an
nounced to the troops. To my grief I have to add that my numerous addresses to
the Government on analogous issues remain unanswered, that the activity of in
stitutions extraneous to the army is developing, that similar orders penetrate by an
elusive process into the units of the active army, threatening to ruin its morale
and its fighting capacities, [and] placing commanders in the infinitely painful
position of bearing responsibility before the country for the maintenance of the
moral stability of the armed forces, while lacking the means to counteract the flow
of instructions similar to Order No. 2. We should be either shown confidence or
replaced by others who would be capable of leading the army even in the presence
of factors that undermine at the root the foundations of a well-organized soldiery.
No. 2015.
A lekseev
This is what the defense of our native land signifies to us. It is always needed,
is now needed twice as much. We are defending the new freedom which is being
threatened by an invasion from withouta dangerous, fatal threat. If the German
banner now unfurled over our land, then everywhere alongside of it the somber
banner of restoration would also unfurlthe banner of the restoration of des
potism. . . .
Can it be that this is not clear?
In order to avert this danger, Russia must stand at her threshold with re
doubled, with ten times as much energy. Let us forget the discords in face of this
storm, let us lay aside our arguments about the future. Down with party prece
dences ! Down with the calls for dissension! Let the crucial moment in history
find Russia prepared. Let everyone look in one direction only, the direction from
which resound the heavy trampling of the German [6oo&] and the rumbles of
his guns. The immediate task of today is to repel the invasion, to guard our native
land and its freedom. . . . Work on the front and in the rear, everywhere, until
the danger has been averted, to the end of the great war.
Perhaps this time is already close; the day is nearing when the delegates of
Russia will arrive at the great peace conference, with the family of European
peoples, and will say:
We entered the war as slaves, but at the end of the war we come as a free
people. Hear then the voice of free Russia. She will not speak the words that
would have been spoken by the tsarist diplomats. Free Russia has something
to say at the great conference of peoples which must lay the foundation for a firm
and lasting peace.
For the Provisional Government at the present time to take a firm stand in
opposition to or to take any kind of resolute measures against the Union [sc:
Soviet] of Workers and Soldiers Deputies would be quite absurd; the Govern
ment had to tailor its orders to the demands of the moment.
There is no doubt that the measures of the Provisional Government concern
ing the relationship between officers and soldiers, which sharply alters the regular
organization of the internal life of the army, cannot fail to have a painful effect
on the latter.
The problems of the current moment urgently demand that this painful process
in the army should proceed gradually without severe shocks and in accordance
with the new national regime.
For the purpose of promoting a correct understanding and explanation of
national life at the current moment it would be extremely useful to organize special
committees from elected officers and soldiers. [In these committees] the officers,
maintaining the necessary contact with the mass of soldiery in the person of its
trusted representatives, could have a moral influence on them and show in full
measure the force of their moral, intellectual, and purely military authority, with
out being hindered with discipline in such moments of mutual discussion.
On the other hand, to advance, at the present transitory moment and in view
of the forthcoming operations and the troubled situation in the rear, any kind of
slogans which would be contrary to the policy of the Provisional Government
would be an act of political lunacy. . . .
Any drastic measures or demands could at the present time ruin everything
and would only create a nightmarish, bloody internecine war and, as a result,
our subordination to Germany.
870 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Now it is essential to act with extreme caution and to calm the army by means
of moral indoctrination.
Only thus can the army be saved and, together with it, the honor and the future
of Russia.
A. L ukom skii
764. S t a t u t e o f t h e S e b a sto p o l5 M ilita r y C o m m ittee on t h e O rgan iza tio n
o f O ffic e r s, W a rra n t O ffic e r s , S a ilo r s , S o ld ie r s, and o f W o rk ers
E ngaged on D e fe n s e W orks
[Izvestiia, No. 26, March 28,1917, p. 4.]
The present Statute shall remain in force only until such time as it is superseded
by the promulgation of a corresponding law . . .
The Central Military Executive Committee considers the principal aims of
the new Statute to be [as follows] :
1. To preserve everything that is essential to fighting strength, to strengthen
discipline and increase the legitimate authority of the leaders whose will and
intellect will lead the navy and army to victory.
2. To create conditions in the . . . lives of officers, sailors, and soldiers
under which they will be able to breathe freely, where there will be confidence
that every legitimate desire will be given a normal outlet, that violence and in
justice will be exposed, and so that there will exist generally recognized lawful
means for ensuring the triumph of justice and liberty.
3. The officer and the soldier are to be brought into a close relationship
through teamwork during their off-duty hours. They are to be placed side by
side and forced to get to know and like one another, and discipline is not to be
based on fear alone, as was once the case, but on love and confidence and on
the basis of service to the great ideals of righteousness and truth.
The principal difficulties that the Central Military Executive Committee en
countered were in connection with that age-old distrust which has separated the
soldier from the officer since the times of Arakcheev. Alienated from one another,
living in separate quarters, not knowing one another, the officer and the soldier
stood on the opposite sides of a deep gulf which had developed between them, and
they ceased to understand one another. The soldier began to see the officer as a
warder and an oppressor, while the officer saw only helplessness, mendacity, and
an incapacity for any independence whatsoever in the soldier and [saw] no
remedy against this. Very few succeeded in bridging this gulf. Only in battle,
when faced with death, did the soldier and the officer in a simple way come to
gether once again and perish on the distant fields and seas for the sacred, beloved
mother country.
Now when, by a miracle of God, this gulf has closed, the soldier and the officer
have taken their places side by side, and during these holy days we are now passing
through, the officer perceives the soldier as a mature person possessing large and
correct political intuition, while the soldier recognizes the officer as his older
comrade, a friend approaching him with an open heart and an outstretched hand.
6 A. A. Arakcheev (1769-1834), reactionary officer and statesman noted for the severe
discipline he imposed in reorganizing the army under Alexander I.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 871
The Central Military Executive Committee has recognized that the principal
means of achieving the above-mentioned goals is by introducing the elective
principle into the internal life of regiments and ships, enabling the elective officers,
soldiers, and sailors to settle the frictions and disagreements which inevitably
arise in life, to provide for educational needs, to control the commissioned per
sonnel in charge of supplies, and to fight against hooliganism and provocation.
The Central Military Executive Committee has striven to establish a mode of
life that would make it possible to work simply, without the formality and con
ventions which, under the old, bureaucratic system, did not allow one to live
and fight against evil.
Confirmed and released for execution by the
Commander in Chief of the Black Sea Fleet.
V ice -A dmiral K olchak
March 19,1917
Sebastopol
L ieutenant Colonel V erkhovsky , President,
Sebastopol Central Military Executive Committee
Those who worked on drafting the Declaration throughout the period of its
preparation approached their task carefully and conscientiously: the draft of the
Declaration was worked and reworked thoroughly for a long time by the Soviet
of Soldiers Deputies, while its fundamental principles were formulated by the
is Doc. 752.
884 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
April conference of representatives of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies
But all this did not in the least prevent the newspaper Pravda from attacking
the Declaration. We are not even speaking of the fact that Pravda saw nothing
positive in the Declaration; more than that, it at the same time performed a series
of operations on the Declaration which served as grounds for the polemics in
which we are interested.
The Declaration was published under the signature of the Minister of War and
Navy, A. Kerensky. Pravda converted the Declaration of Soldiers Rights into a
declaration of the deprivation of a soldiers rights and turned it into a wholesale
act of accusation against Kerensky. The most elementary sense of justice, regard
less of ones attitude toward the Declaration9would have required that an indica
tion be made of the fact that the Declaration, signed by A. Kerensky, was drawn
up by the Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers Deputies, while the most important prin
ciples on which the Declaration is based were worked out by the All-Russian Con
ference of Representatives of the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
Pravda found it possible to pass over all this in silence.14
Taking individual articles of the Declaration, the lively pen of the Pravdist
described the situation in such a way as to convey, for example, that disciplinary
punishments, which have remained in force up to the present time, shall be imposed
by the commander. In reality, however, they shall be imposed by the elected court
of the company . Besides, as V. Utgof points out in Delo Naroda, In articles which
provide for punitive measuresin the 14th and 15th points of the Declaration
the order merely executes the will of the sender, i.e., the Soviet of Soldiers
Deputies.15
The newspaper Pravda also brought its anger to bear on the 18th point of
the Declaration. This point, as is well known, establishes the procedure for ap
pointing and discharging officers. The elective principle as applied to officers has
been excluded. According to Pravda1s interpretation, this point is one of the
principal bases for the deprivation of rights of a soldier, which was supposedly
introduced into the army of revolutionary Russia by means of the Declaration,
by A. Kerensky. But with reference to the strong words used in Pravda, V. Utgof
points out:
The Petrograd Soviet of Soldiers Deputies and the All-Russian Conference of
Soviets, taking into account the condition of the army, totally rejected the applica
tion of the elective principle to commanding officers of all ranks and their replace
ment by army committees, reserving to the military organizations only the right
to submit reasons for the rejection or removal of a commanding officer.
Dwelling on the same point, Golos Soldata (No. 14) writes:
What do the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies say on this subject?
There is not a single resolution of the Conference of Delegates from the Front de
manding the establishment of the elective principle in the army. But we do know
very well that the All-Russian Conference of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies (in the month of April) definitely resolved that elections of the com
14 Of course, it also passed through the Polivanov Commission which concerned itself
principally with the style and judicial aspects of the project.
15 Utgof was an officer and a member of the S-R Party who took an active part in all the
work on drawing up the declaration. His article cited is in Delo Naroda, No. 55, May 21,
1917, p. 1.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 885
manding staff are not to be permitted. In the military section of this Conference
there was not a single voice raised in favor of implementing the elective principle.
The newspaper Pravda is maintaining a diligent silence about all this also.
But in compensation, Pravda elucidates to the soldiers that the point con
cerning the appointment of officers has been introduced into the Declaration
in order to avoid giving all the power into the hands of the workers and peasants,
that it has been introduced because Kerensky is preparing the army for an of
fensive, for conquest (!) and also because he is afraid that the peoples army
will force the capitalist and the pomeschik to start speaking a different language
from the one now spoken.
Such, according to Pravda!s depiction, is the nature of the activities of the
Soviet of Soldiers Deputies and of the Conference of representatives of the Soviets
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, because it is these organizations, after all,
which worked out the Declaration. But Pravda does not restrict itself to concealing
the role of the Soviet and the Conference from its readers; it finds it possible to
put the question gravely:
Why did not Citizen Kerensky, before publishing the Declaration of Rights,
ask for the opinion of soldiers, the opinion of the conferences of soldiers from the
front?
But most characteristic of all of Pravda is the way in which it dispensed with
the 10th point of the Declaration. This point abolishes, as is well known, compul
sory service as servants [derCshchiki]. But, in the form of an exception applying
to those areas where there is no possibility of hiring servants9 officers, army physi
cians, military officials, and the clergy are permitted to have an orderly [vestovoi]
for personal services according to an agreement reached between the orderly and
the person to whom he is being assigned. It is completely clear that the focal point
here lies in who precisely decides the question of the impossibility of hiring
servants. The Declaration very definitely establishes that The impossibility of
hiring servants is to be established by the regimental committee.
Pravda found it possible to omit entirely these last words and found it possible
to declare: It amounts to nothing more than a change of name: a den9schik will
be called a vestovoi. Only a change of namethis is said when the com
pulsory service as den9schik is being completely abolished!
The newspaper Den called the operation performed by Pravda on this point
of the Declaration a forgery, and the author of the operation a dishonest person.
And such is the actual case.
And now tens of thousands of copies of these words of poisonous lies are cir
culating on the face of the Russian land, circulating in trenches where the army of
revolutionary Russia is carrying its heavy cross, where, we repeat, there is end
less bloodshed and death is directing its funeral feast and where somebody, per
haps, pays with his life for every careless word, and even more, for every lying and
slanderous word.
776. T h eses on t h e D eclaration by t h e A ll -R ussian C ongress of S oviets
[Session of June 23. Izvestiia, No. 104, June 29,1917, p. 5.]
1. Order No. 8 to the Army and Navy provided a firm basis for the democrati
zation of the Army. However, some of the highly essential rights and duties of
a soldier-citizen have not as yet been confirmed by governmental order; other
886 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
rights have been established subject to limitations which do not conform to dem
ocratic requirements. In view of this, it is necessary to revise and supplement
Order No. 8 in accordance with the present theses.
2. In the field of civil rights in general, the right of every serviceman to
participate in, and to organize, any kind of meeting must be proclaimed in the
supplement to Order No. 8. The restriction on the freedom of speech to the time
when off duty must be abolished.
3. The right of the commander to use force of arms against insub ordinates
(Article 14) must be excluded from the Declaration.
4. In revoking Article 18 of Order No. 8, it must be declared that the soldiers5
organs of self-government shall have the right to challenge or recommend [ap
pointment] of persons in command, as well as the right to participate in army ad
ministration on a basis prescribed explicitly in regulations.
777. T h e D ism issal of G eneral G urko as C omm ander in C h ie f
o f t h e W estern F ront
[VVP, No. 64, May 27,1917, p. 1.]
By the Order to the Army and Navy of May 5,16 I announced that when the
fatherland is in danger, each person must serve regardless of all his burdens and
that no resignations sent in by members of the high command which are prompted
by the desire to avoid responsibility will be tolerated.
The Commander in Chief of the armies of the Western Front, General Romeiko-
Gurko, submitted a report on May 15 to the Supreme Commander and forwarded
a copy to the Minister-President in which he requested that the Provisional Gov
ernment be informed that in view of the conditions in the army which have arisen
as a result of the publication of Order No. 8 to the Army and Navy on the declara
tion of rights of military personnel, he is relieving himself of all moral respon
sibility for the satisfactory performance of the duties entrusted to him.
Such a declaration is absolutely inadmissible at the present time. The Com
mander in Chief has been granted a high degree of the Governments confidence
and, with the support of this confidence, he must direct all his efforts toward ac
complishing the tasks which have been laid on him.
The declination of all moral responsibility testifies to the disparity between
General Gurko and the [demands] of his profession as well as to his evasion of
the duty to carry out an assignment to the best of his knowledge and ability.
The fatherland is in danger and this places an obligation on every person in
m ilitary service to perform his duty to the end without setting a harmful example
of weakness to others.
Without a sense of moral responsibility to his native land, General Gurko
can no longer hold his high and important office.
The Provisional Government has decreed the removal of General Gurko from
tie office of Commander in Chief of the armies of the Western Front and has in
structed me to contact the Supreme Commander regarding the immediate appoint
ment of this general to a post no higher than that of commander of a division.
The Provisional Government found it possible to limit itself to such action only
16 Issued to forestall resignations as a result of the publication of the Declaration of
Soldiers' Rights.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 887
in view of General Gurkos commendable record in combat. In the future, how
ever, actions by persons of the commanding staff comparable to the statement of
the above-named general will be punished with even greater severity to the extent
of appointing [such persons] to the lowest offices.
A. K erensky , Minister of War and Navy
778. T h e D isbandm ent of F our R egim ents
[VVP, No. 64, May 27, 1917, p. 2. See also ibid., No. 66, May 30, 1917, p. 3, on the
difficulties experienced by General Shcherbachev in disbanding regiments.]
The following telegram from the Commissar of the Provisional Government
with the 7th Army was received addressed to A. F. Kerensky, Minister of War and
Navy:
In the 12th division, the 48th regiment has moved to forward positions in full
combat strength, the 45th and 46th regiments moved forward with their com
panies at half strength, the 47th refuses to move forward. In the 13th division the
50th regiment has moved forward in almost full strength. The 51st regiment
promises to move forward tomorrow; the 49th regiment did not move forward on
schedule, while the 52nd refused to move forward and arrested all its officers. I
am awaiting your instructions as to how to act with regard to the men who have
not fulfilled the combat order and also with the men who have arrested their
officers. Besides, I request your instructions as to how to act with regard to the
individual officers who have incited the men to insubordination.
In answer to this telegram Colonel Yakubovich, Assistant Minister of War,
temporarily fulfilling the functions of Minister of War, has sent to the Commissar
of the 7th Army the following telegram:
After my report regarding the events in the 12th and 13th divisions, the
Provisional Government has ordered the 45th, 46th, 47th, and 52nd regiments to
be disbanded. Those officers and soldiers who incited to insubordination are to be
prosecuted. The measures should be taken immediately. The results should be
reported to the Minister of War.
Such a refusal is a stab in the back of a tired brother. . . . And the decisive
measures adopted by the Provisional Government against these regiments will be
met with a feeling of deep satisfaction by the army. . . .
The Provisional Government gave instructions that the instigators be brought
to trial. Let them stand---------17 public trial before the revolutionary peoples
court. The verdict pronounced by this court will be the verdict of the revolution
against the people who have betrayed the revolutionary banner.
The newspaper Pravda interprets the resolute measures of the Provisional
Government against those who disobeyed the regimental orders as the beginning
of the aggressive phase of the counterrevolution. This is not true! The revolution
was betrayed by those who placed their own personal interests above the common
interest.
Those who push the soldiers into taking such a path are serving the counter
revolution, while those who are fighting against this are serving the revolution
and are drawing their strength for the fight from the revolution, from the support
of the democracy.
Several days after our arrival in Petrograd, Admiral Kolchak and I were
invited to the meeting of the Provisional Government in the Mariinskii Palace,
in order to report on the events in the Black Sea Fleet.
At the meeting the Admiral stated that the armed forces, owing to the anti
national agitation tolerated by the Government, were disintegrating and were no
longer fit for war; that there existed only two solutions, either to conclude peace
or to stop the criminal agitation by introducing the death penalty and restoring
order within the armed forces.
After the speech of the Admiral, Prince Lvov asked me to state my views.
I said that the Government accused us of tolerating the mutiny, but that the
mutiny was permitted not by us but by the Government itself, and in particu
lar by Kerensky, Minister of War and of the Navy. I pointed out that in my
previous service I had occasion to sail with the British and French fleets, which
belong to so-called democratic countries; their discipline was stricter and their
punishments were more cruel than they were in our Fleet under the imperial
regime; [I told them] that the armed forces were built on strict law and strict
penalties for misdemeanors. On the other hand, the conscious discipline pro
892 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
claimed by the Provisional Government was beyond the reach of the masses; it
would be possible only for isolated people of high culture. Close to me at the table
during the meeting sat Kerensky, Chernov, and Tseretelli. After my words Prince
Lvov, addressing himself to Admiral Kolchak and to me, said: Thank you. We
shall discuss it. We left the meeting.
MILITARY JUSTICE
784. T h e A bolition of F ield C ourts -M artial
[So6. Uzak., I, 1, No. 814. The courts were initially abolished and the procedure for
reviewing cases previously tried by them was established by the War Ministrys Orders
of March 13 and 14, ibid., Nos. 393, 387. Many of those tried by courts-martial were
civilians who came under their jurisdiction because of the imposition of extraordinary
security measures or of martial law in large areas behind the actual theater of military
operations. These cases were to be transferred to the civil courts. Ibid., No. 765. See
also ibid., No. 564.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government, in amendment of the relevant articles of the
Military-Judicial Code . . . has decreed:
I. Field courts-martial shall be abolished.
II. Persons convicted by field courts-martial: their relatives and kinsmen shall
be granted the right to petition for a review of their cases by military circuit courts
under the rules laid down by War Ministry Order No. 106, [March 14,] 1917.
III. In those cases in which the accused is apprehended on the scene of the
crime, which is palpable, and when because of the importance and circumstances
of the case the need arises for its immediate consideration, an accelerated trial
procedure shall be established in military circuit and army-corps courts according
to the following rules:
1. Preliminary written proceedings shall not be required in a case tried under
accelerated procedure.
2. If the crime is committed at the place of location of the court, the accused
may be sent directly to the military circuit or army-corps court with information
to the military prosecutor on the nature of the crime and witnesses thereto and
with a statement that the case requires consideration under accelerated procedure.
3. The military prosecutor, if he finds it possible to dispose of the case under
accelerated procedure on the basis of the information received from the military
authorities, shall immediately draw up a brief indictment, with a description of
lhe charge and the witnesses to be called, and shall submit it to the court.
4. The presiding judge of the court, immediately on receipt of the case, shall
proceed with it and shall announce the indictment to the defendant . . . and at
the same time shall fix a hearing of the case, calling or allowing the appearance
of those witnesses indicated by the defendant and appointing a defense attorney
for him.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 893
5. Cases shall be considered by the full membership of the court with military
jurors and observing the general rules of trial procedure.
IV. This law shall be put into effect by telegraph.
P rince Lvov , Minister-President
A. K erensky , Minister of War
June 13,1917
785. T h e A brogation of t h e R ig ht of M ilitary C ommanders to
I ncrease D uring W artime t h e P enalties E stablished by L aw
[Soft. Uzak., 1,2, No. 961.]
The Provisional Government, in its Journal of April 12, 1917, has decreed:
I. The effect of articles 90 and 901 of the Military Code of Penalties . . . on
the right of higher military commanders to increase in wartime the severity of
penalties as established by law, as well as the effect of all orders issued on the
basis of the above articles of law, are abrogated.
II. All convicted persons whose penalties as established by law were increased
on the basis of the orders mentioned in the preceding (I) section shall have their
sentences reduced to the maximum penalty established by law for the act commit
ted by them, with the proviso that the law of the Provisional Government on
alleviating the lot of persons who have committed criminal acts be applied to these
persons, depending on the penalty imposed after such reduction of sentence.
The original Journal is signed by the Minister-President, the Ministers, the
Ober-Procurator of the Most Holy Synod, and the State Controller, and is counter
signed by the Assistant Head of Chancellery of the Provisional Government.
786. T h e S pecial C ommissions for t h e I nvestigation of M alfeasance
in t h e W ar and N avy M inistries
[Sob. Uzak., 1,1, No. 539. One of the principal objectives was the reopening of the case
against General Sukhomlinov. He was retried, found guilty, and sentenced to hard
labor.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
1. For the investigation of abuses in armament supply and maintenance of
the battle strength of military and naval forces and for the detection of the official
and private persons guilty of these abuses, two Special Commissions of Inquiry
shall be established under the chairmanship of Senators [Nikolai Nenarokomov
for the investigation of the Navy Department and Vladimir Balts for the investiga
tion of the War Ministery], consisting of six members each, appointed by ukases
of the Provisional Government.
2. The members of each Commission shall be a member of the State Duma, a
member of the civil judicial department, a member of the military or naval judicial
department, a representative of the bar, a representative of the Soviet of Officers
Deputies and a representative of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
P rince L vov , Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 14,1917
894 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
787. T h e O rganization of E lected R egim ental Courts
[Soi. U zak1 , 1, No. 541. Similar temporary naval courts 'with jurors were established
by a law of May 6, 1917. Ibid., No. 603.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I.
The following provisional rules shall be established concerning the organiza
tion of regimental courts during peace and war:
1. Regimental courts shall be set up in every regiment and in other separate
troop units, as well as in noncombatant detachments, establishments, administra
tions, and offices of the War Ministry, the heads of which have a rank not lower
than the rank of regimental commanders. These courts shall be named after the
unit to which they are attached.
2. The regimental court shall consist of six regimental judgesthree officers
and three soldiers.
3. Regimental courts shall be elected by officers and soldiers of the regiment
according to the rules laid down in the following articles.
4. Each company or detachment of the regiment shall elect by secret ballot two
electors each from among soldiers of the company or detachment.
In the same manner a general meeting of officers and civil service men of the
regiment shall elect from its midst officer electors of a number equal to half the
electors of the soldiers.
5. Persons who are under investigation or trial, as well as those who are
restricted in their service rights and privileges, may not participate in the election
of electors of regimental judges.
6. Electors may not be persons who do not possess the right to participate in
the election of electors (article 5) and, in addition, may not be soldiers who have
been in service less than one year, as well as illiterates.
Note; In wartime electors may he soldiers who have been in service not less
than three months.
7. A general meeting of electors shall elect from its midst by vote or by lot
six regimental judgesthree from the officers and three from the soldiersand
four alternate judgestwo from the officers and two from the soldiers.
8. The regimental judges shall elect a chairman of the regimental court and
his deputy from among the officer regimental judges; in case of a tie vote, the
question of the election of a candidate shall be decided by lot.
10. The old regimental court shall supervise the observance of the require
ments laid down for the election of electors of the regimental judges (article 6),
and shall proceed to consider the question of the legality of the election both on
its own initiative and on communication from the regimental commander. If
the regimental court finds the elections illegal, the regimental commander shall
order new elections to be held in order to replace the persons improperly elected.
In case of disagreement with the decision of the regimental court, the question
of the legality of the election shall be referred by the regimental commander for
final settlement to the military-circuit court.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 895
18. Regimental courts shall be set up in wartime on the lines laid down above
in articles 1-17 of the present rules but with the proviso that: 1) alternate mem
bers shall be elected in the number of three from the officers and twelve from the
soldiers, and 2) the duties of the military-circuit court . . . shall be fulfilled by
the military-circuit court of the theater of hostilities or by the army-corps court, as
appropriate.
11. Pending the preparation and publication in the immediate future of new
rules for trying cases in regimental courts, and in amendment of the laws now
in effect, the following rules shall be established:
1. Legal grounds for starting action in a regimental court shall be: (a) Com
munications of the regimental commander, regimental and company committees
and submissions of company disciplinary courts, (b) Communications of judicial,
military-judicial, and administrative organs and officials, (c) Complaints of in
jured parties, and (d) Personal appearance and confession.
2. If legal grounds exist for starting action, the regimental court shall immedi
ately discuss the question of referral of the case and shall decide: either (a) to try
the case if it finds that it has jurisdiction, or (b) to refer the case to the proper
jurisdiction if it is not subject to the regimental courts jurisdiction, or (c) to
carry out an inquiry or supplementary inquiry if it does not appear possible from
the information available to the court to determine jurisdiction in the case, or
(d) to terminate the case if there is no indication . . . of the existence of a
criminal act and the case does not call for consideration under disciplinary pro
ceedings.
3. . . . If extenuating circumstances exist, the court may on its own authority
reduce the penalty due under the law . . .
5. The sentence of a regimental court shall enter into legal effect without ap
proval by the regimental commander. [See No. 564.]
III. The rules set forth above shall also apply, with corresponding changes,
to the Navy Department.
P r in c e Lvov, Minister-President
[and all other ministers]
April 17, 1917
788. J u d ic ia l P r o c edu r e in R e g im e n t a l C o urts
[Sob. Uzak.,I, 1, No. 788.]
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
I. On Jurisdiction
12. In the troop zone of the theater of war the regimental court shall have
jurisdiction over cases of criminal acts provided for both in the Military Code of
Penalties and in the general criminal laws, except for those which are under law
punishable by or commutable to retirement from the service, reduction to the
ranks, expulsion from the service, and penalties involving the loss of some special
rights and privileges.
896 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
V. Arrangements Preliminary to Trial
51. If legal grounds for instituting proceedings exist . . . , the regimental
court shall immediately discuss the question of the disposition of the case . . .
54. At the same time that the regimental court decides to try a case itself, it
shall decide to consider the case either under criminal precedure, as defined by the
present rules, if a criminal act is charged as provided by the Criminal Laws, or
under disciplinary procedure according to the Statutes on Disciplinary Courts
(Order of the War Ministry, 1917, No. 21318) if the subject of the case is a
disciplinary offense.
58. If the defendant was arrested for purposes of security and order (article
3 of the Statutes on Disciplinary Courts) during the commission of the criminal
act, he shall be delivered to the regimental court within 24 hours after detention
with an explanation of the reasons for detention. The regimental court shall be
required not later than 24 hours after the delivery of the prisoner to interrogate
him and to decide either to release him immediately or to continue to hold him
under arrest, pending the arrival of an examining magistrate or the referral of the
case to proper jurisdiction in the instances mentioned in the following article 59.
59. The court may order preventive custody only in those cases where, in a
case subject to the jurisdiction of the military-circuit or civil criminal court, there
are reasons to fear that the suspect will flee, cover up the traces of the crime,
or influence witnesses or accomplices. In this connection, account shall be taken
of the nature of the criminal act committed, the severity of the impending punish
ment, the strength of the evidence, the state of health, age, service position of the
prisoner, and other circumstances.
60. An order for preventive custody in a case under the jurisdiction of a
military court may be appealed to the military-circuit court.
62. The accused, from the time when the court takes the case for consideration,
shall have the right to study the entire case file.
63. The accused shall have the right to inform the court of the summoning
of additional witnesses and of the defense attorney chosen by him.
67. In the troop zone of the theater of war the examination and summoning
of witnesses living outside of the place of trial shall not he compulsory, if com
munication with them proves difficult because of wartime conditions.
68. The accused may choose his defense attorney from military personnel,
from attomeys-at-law, their assistants, and other persons whom the law does
not prohibit from pleading clients cases . . .
12th Army
March 27
To the west of Ikskuhl bridgehead the enemy tossed proclamations with ex
cerpts of the [German] Chancellors March 16 speech and attempted to talk with
us, but we opened fire against him.
March 30
All along the front of the 12th Army Germans attempted to start conversa
tions with our troops; for this purpose they got out of their trenches in groups
carrying white flags, but they were chased back into the trenches by our aritillery.
April 1
On the front of the 43rd corps, near the seashore, two Germans approached
our trenches for the purpose of starting negotiations; both Germans were seized.
At the 2nd Siberian Corps, Germans, wishing to start negotiations, went out with
white flags, but were chased back into their trenches by our fire.
April 25
On the sector of the 21st Corps, three of our soldiers of the 129th Regiment
took a boat for the purpose of visiting the Germans, but turned back following
admonitions and threats on the part of their comrades.
C olonel B azarevskii
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 903
794. O rder of General G urko C oncerning F raternization
[VVP, No. 38, April 23, 1917, p. 3.]
Reports regarding the number of casualties from enemy fire bear witness
that, apparently on some sectors of the front, friendly relations have been estab
lished between our troops and the enemy; this is absolutely inadmissible especially
now, when the fraternal blood of our Allies is shed in profusion for the common
cause of liberating the small nations which have been subjugated and ruined.
Through their relations with our troops which have lately been observed, the
Germans are able to determine with the utmost accuracy the whole grouping of
our troops, the entire disposition of our forces; undetected by those who converse
with them, they manage to obtain necessary information regarding our army.
Having achieved a lull on our front, the Germans thereby have freed both their
hands for a decisive struggle against the French and the English. This lull relieves
the Germans of any threat [over here] and permits them to concentrate over there
the whole of their attention, all their free forces and means. And when the fight
dies out over there, our front, lulled by conversations and false promises of peace,
will not be completely battle-fit for withstanding the enemy as it should. [Then]
the Germans will throw all their forces against us.
Further on, speaking of the falseness of the Germans love for peace and of their
disregard for any treaties, Gurko turns to the military situation and says: Their
peace talks are the results of weakness and of their being unable to wage war on
two fronts as successfully as before. Under these conditions, a lull in combat is in
favor of the Germans; they aspire to it as they aspire to achieve by every means
a bloodless victory. Furthermore, the Order states that three divisions have been
transferred from our front and that the transfer of other divisions, and also of
artillery and aircraft, is under way. With the lull that has been established, even
a weakened front does not represent a threat for the Germans.
Giving an example of the credulity which is being abused by the Germans,
Gurko cites a letter from the commander of the [German] 81st infantry division
which has been sent to our soldiers; in it it is suggested that our 75th division
should surrender in its entirety, as in 1812 the German corps of General von York
surrendered to our troops. Another method of the Germans consists of threat
ening us with an offensive, should we not conclude peace at a given time. The real
meaning of these German attempts is an endeavor to separate us from our allies,
to get rid of us, and to dictate to us such conditions as they please.
Troops: For the sake of liberty, for the sake of liberating subjugated na
tions, for the sake of saving ourselves from subjugation, we must firmly and un
swervingly fulfill our duty toward liberated Russia and toward our allies. We,
the contemporaries, says the General, concluding his Order, we are creating
the first pages of regenerated, liberated Russia. It will depend on us what will be
written on these opening pages. Let them be bright and great, let them be written
in our blood, but let this blood remain sacred for the generations to come.
It is well that the soldiers curse the war. It is well that they clamour for peace.
It is well that they begin to feel that the war benefits the capitalists. It is well
that they, breaking the prison discipline, themselves begin to fraternise on all the
fronts. It is all very well.
But this is not enough.
It is necessary that fraternisation be accompanied by the discussion of a
definite political programme. We are not Anarchists. We do not think that war
can be terminated by a simple refusal to fight, a refusal of individuals, groups,
or mobs. We hold that the war should and will be brought to a finish through
a revolution in several countries, i.e., through the conquests of state power by a
new class, not the capitalists, not the small proprietors (invariably half-dependent
upon the capitalists), but proletarians and semi-proletarians.
In our proclamation to the soldiers of all the warring countries we presented
our programme for a workers5 revolution in all the countries: transfer of all
state power to the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies.
Comrades, soldiers! Discuss this programme among yourselves together with
the German soldiers! Such discussions will help you discover the true, the most
effective, and shortest way for the termination of the war and the overthrow of
the yoke of capital.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 905
Just a few words about one of the servants of capital, Plekhanov. It is pitiful
to see how low this former Socialist has fallen! He puts fraternisation next
to treason !! His argument is that fraternisation, if successful, will lead to a
separate peace.
No, Mr. Ex-Socialist, fraternisation, carried on by us on all fronts, will lead
not to a separate peace among capitalists of a few countries, but to a universal
peace among the revolutionary workers of all countries, despite the capitalists,
against the capitalists, for the overthrow of their yoke.
Our appeals will turn into blank sheets of paper if they do not have the
backing of the whole might of the revolutionary people, or if the triumph of
Wilhelm Hohenzollem asserts itself on the ruins of Russian freedom. The destruc
tion of free Russia will be an enormous, irretrievable disaster, not for us alone
but for the workers of the whole world as well. Comrade soldiers. Defend revolu
tionary Russia with all your might.
Russias workers and peasants are wholeheartedly striving for peace. But this
peace must be a universal peace, for all peoples, [and concluded] by general agree
ment. What would happen if we wanted peace, a separate peace, for ourselves
alone? What would happen if the Russian army today laid down its arms and
said that it did not want to fight any longer, that it was not concerned with what
was happening in the rest of the world?
What would happen is that, after having crushed our allies on the west,
German imperialism would descend on us with its whole force of arms. What
would happen is that the German emperor, the German landowners and capital
ists would place their heavy heels on our neck; they would seize our towns, villages,
and lands and they would lay a tribute on the Russian people.
Then is this the reason we threw off the yoke of Nicholasin order to bow at
the feet of Wilhelm?
906 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Remember, comrades, that at the front, in the trenches, you are now standing
guard over Russian freedom. It is not the Tsar, or the Protopopovs and the
Rasputins, or the rich landowners and capitalists, that you are now staunchly
defending. You are defending the Russian revolution, you are defending your
brother workers and peasants. Then let this defense be worthy of the great cause
and the great sacrifices which you have already endured. The front cannot be
defended by deciding to sit in the trenches without moving, come what may.
Sometimes it happens that an enemy advance can be repelled or prevented only
by an attack.
Sometimes waiting for an attack means waiting submissively for death. Some
times it is only by assuming the offensive that you can save yourselves and your
brothers in other sectors of the front from destruction and annihilation.
Remember this, comrade soldiers. Having pledged yourselves to defend free
dom, do not refuse to take the offensive if the tactical situation should so demand.
Russias freedom and happiness are in your hands.
In defending this freedom, beware of provocation, beware of traps. The
fraternization which is becoming widespread at the front can easily turn into such
a trap. Revolutionary troops may fraternizebut with whom? With an army that
is equally revolutionary, that is equally determined to die for peace and freedom.
But the German and Austro-Hungarian army is not such an army yet, regardless
of how many conscious and aware individuals it may contain. There is still no
revolution over there. There the army still follows Wilhelm and Karl, the land
owners and the capitalists, and it aims at seizures of foreign territories, at pillage
and violence. There the military staff will take advantage not only of your gulli
bility but also of the blind submissiveness of its own soldiers.
When you go to fraternize, you go with an open heart, but you are met by an
officer from General Headquarters who comes out of the enemy trenches, dressed
in a soldiers uniform.
While you talk sincerely to the enemy, his superiors are photographing the
locality. When you stop firing in order to fraternize, artillery is being shifted from
one place to another behind the enemy trenches, fortifications are erected and
troops are being transferred.
Comrade soldiers! It is not through fraternization that you will achieve peace,
or through the silent agreements which are concluded at the front by individual
companies, battalions, or regiments. Neither a separate peace nor a separate truce
will save the revolution, or assure the triumph of peace throughout the world.
People who are assuring you that fraternization is the road to peace are leading
both you and Russian freedom to destruction. Do not believe them.
The road to peace is different. It was indicated to you by the Soviet of
Workers and Soldiers9 Deputies. Support it. Sweep aside everything that may
bring disintegration into the army or a fall in morale. Your fighting strength
serves the cause of peace. It is only by relying on you that you will not permit
a military devastation of Russia, that the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
can do its revolutionary work and put all its strength into expanding its fight for
peace.
Comrade soldiers! Workers and peasants of Russia and of the whole world
are looking to you with confidence and hope. Soldiers of the revolution, you
will prove worthy of this confidence knowing that your combat work serves the
cause of peace!
In the name of the happiness and freedom of revolutionary Russia, in the
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 907
name of the forthcoming brotherhood of nations, you will perform your military
duty with unflinching determination.
797. Izvestiia's A ttack on Pravda's Call for F raternization
[No. 59, May 6,1917, p. 4. See also the strong editorial in No. 55, April 30,1917, p. 3,
against the Bolshevik resolution urging fraternization.]
In defiance of the decisive appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers
Deputies about stopping the fraternization on the front lines, the newspaper
Pravda is asking soldiers to continue to fraternize.
The newspaper Pravda is attempting to undermine the confidence of the
soldiery in the Soviets appeal. And for this purpose it is ascribing motives to
the Soviet which it never had when it spoke out against fraternization.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies knows perfectly well that those
who go out to fraternize are not traitors, hut are tired people, worn out with
suffering by the war. The Soviet knows that fraternization did not come about
as a result of the agitation of Leninists but [rather as a result of] war weariness
and the aspirations of the soldiers for peace.
And Pravda is missing the mark when it advances these arguments against
the Soviet in defense of fraternization.
The point is not what causes fraternization. The point is, where does it
lead to? And it leads to the collapse of the army.
Fraternization is a separate truce on individual sections of the front. With
fraternizations one integrated powerful army disintegrates into individual regi
ments and individual companies. Every military unit begins to think only of itself.
Fraternal blood is being shed in the neighboring section of the front; one verst
away from the trenches to the left and half a verst away to the right a battle is
going on, while in between, peace negotiations are being conducted.
Is this the road to universal peace?
No! We must act as a united army, as a united people! We cannot permit
workers and peasants in France and England to regard us as traitors because
separate little groups of soldiers are fraternizing with the enemy.
The newspaper Pravda proposes to arrange organized fraternization. This
proposal is an obvious contradiction. Organized fraternization can only he
possible after the conclusion of universal peace. This is exactly where the Soviet
of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is leading Russia. But in order to achieve
universal peace, the front must be defended with gun in hand. And the fraternizers
are ruining this defense!
Comrade soldiers!
It is a bad army in which every soldier makes up his own mind as to what
he should do, where he should go, or whether he should fraternize or not.
If you believe in your Soviet, then abide sacredly by its its appeal to stop
fraternizing !
The Soviet turned to you with this appeal for the sake of saving the army,
for the sake of saving the revolution.
Show that in this question as in all other questions that have arisen before
you, you will all unanimously, as one man, follow your Soviet!
908 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
ARMY DELEGATIONS AND CONFERENCES
798. P o litic s a n d t h e A r m y
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 77, April 8,1917, p. 3.]
Inside the army at the present time tense organizational work goes on. A
congress of military and workers delegates of the armies and of the rear of the
Western Front opened yesterday, April 7, in Moscow; the opening of the all-
Russian Army Congress is scheduled for April 15; on April 25 the Petrograd
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is calling a congress of representatives
of soldiers and workers organizations. Hurriedly, committees of separate units
are being formed, beginning at company level and ending with the largest units*
Not only have many of these committees formed, but they have united among them
selves ; they send delegations and declarations to the Provisional Government, to
the State Duma, to the Soviets of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, etc., etc. In
a word, organizational work is progressing at top speed, and, along with it, the
question is being placed on the agenda concerning the role that the army can and
must play in the further development of events inside Russia, in the determination
of the destiny of her political life. This question is, of course, far from immaterial;
more than that, it cannot at all be denied a certain pointedness. After all, the
army is a power capable of enforcing its decisions, and who will deny that precisely
its action on February 27 decided the fate of the Russian revolution. This
event is so fresh in everyones memory that thoughts involuntarily turn to the
possibility of new action by the troops for the solution of questions of internal
life in the country. Some people are frightened at that prospect, others, on the
contrary, are perhaps pinning their hopes on it, but everybody weighs it with
almost the same degree of importance, which explains the strong desire for an
alliance with the army, a desire to subjugate it to ones own influence and to
secure its cooperation or, at least, friendly neutrality. . . .
If we want the army not to interfere in our internal squabbles, then we our
selves must not interfere in its internal life; we must not drag it into the political
struggle, must not strive to subjugate its organizations to our influence. Every
attempt at interference from one side inevitably clears the way for interference
from the other side. . . . As long as in some cases unauthorized or usurpatory
action is manifested, as long as we continue to appeal not to law but to the real
relation of forces, we should always keep in mind the danger that the army too
will follow this road. The whole country must be educated politically, and only
then will the army be educated with it. Only when the whole country is permeated
with respect for law will this respect permeate the army too. Only then will the
danger of the solution of internal arguments by the armed might of the troops
be completely removed.
799. K erensky s A ddress to t h e D elegation from t h e 7 t h A rmy
[Izvestiia, No. 40, April 14,1917, p. 2.]
On April 12 representatives of the 7th Army visited the Mariinskii Palace and
approached the Minister of Justice, A. F. Kerensky, with a request that he answer
a series of questions which have disturbed the army.
The state of mind of the army was conveyed in a speech by Lieutenant Stepun.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 909
The Speech of the Representative of the 7th Army
The armys principle has always been, and will continue to be, unity and soli
darity. This principle of ours is at the present moment becoming absolutely
essential to creative, constructive work in Russia. It is precisely you, Citizen
Minister, who represents to us the living embodiment of this principle. We wel
come you as the link and the solder between the Provisional Government and the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, [and] as Comrade Kerensky. We
firmly believe in this unity, but we still nourish doubts as to whether it will survive
the turmoil of the present times. It is essential that we have your answer to justify
that faith which we have brought here from the trenches.
A . F. Kerensky s Reply
The main task of the Provisional Government at the present time is to assist
in furthering the unity of the nation during the decisive moment of its existence.
Nothing now threatens to prevent the fulfillment of this task.
The Provisional Government and the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Depu
ties are completely united in [their] aims and tasks. If there are some divergent
[views], then they concern only questions of tactics, questions of what can be
accomplished today and what can be postponed until tomorrow. But even tactical
differences such as these are being reconciled and will continue to be reconciled
by means of mutual agreement.
The Provisional Government possesses full power, but . . . we took power
into our hands at a time of the greatest internal disorganization, and we must
fulfill two tasks: in the first place, we must strengthen freedom, democratize the
country, and lead it to the Constituent Assembly, which, I have no doubt, will
express itself in favor of a democratic republic; and, in the second place, we must
not allow our front to be broken, as this would destroy the vital forces of the state
and would deprive us of freedom.
We need criticism and control in fulfilling these tasks. Therefore, do not be
disturbed and do not think that the criticism and control by sociopolitical circles
is interfering with our work. We need all the more the control and criticism of
the Soviets of Soldiers, Workers, Peasants, and Officers Deputies which repre
sent the people and the Russian democracy. . . .
You asked about the eight-hour working day. The Provisional Government
considers that the eight-hour working day must be the working norm for all
working people and for all the working class, but the problems of defense demand
the utmost exertion of strength. That is why the eight-hour working day does not
signify a decrease in productive labor, because the workers have agreed to work
overtime in order to provide the army with all that it requires.
If now we are not giving the army the full extent of everything it needs, then
this is not because we do not want to, but because we are not able to do so. The
old regime was able to give everything, but did not want to.
The old regime left everything in a disorganized state. . . . It is impossible
for the new power to create everything out of nothing immediately; we believed
that the people, on becoming masters, would themselves work with an understand
ing of state needs. We were not deceived in our faiththe people immediately
proceeded to the organization of life, and if the army is not receiving everything
[it needs], it is at least already receiving more than it was under the old regime.
910 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
As concerns the question of land, on my part, according to my views and
convictions, I adhere to the slogan land and freedom. The people must receive
land and freedom in their full measure. The Provisional Government has com
mitted itself to definite obligations in this respect. We consider it necessary to say
that the question of land, the question of new forms of land ownership must be
decided only by the Constituent Assembly. . . . In the meantime our task is to
collect and prepare all the material in order that the peoples representatives may
deliver their opinion calmly and in full knowledge of the matter. And so that no
one can predetermine the land question to the disadvantage of the people prior
to the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government will
issue a law curtailing the excessive transactions in private property.
Let me assure you that the question of land will not be resolved without the
agreement of the front, that not a single arshin of land will be given over to any
one until such time as the views of the people are expressed, and especially the
views of the army, which is entitled to a preferential right and a deciding voice
on this question, for it is the army that is shedding its blood for the people, for
freedom and land.
There are few who can visualize the grandiose sweep of events which we are
experiencing; we have been accustomed to wait for many centuries without re
ceiving anything, and now we want to receive everything without waiting for a
single day. . . . That is why our immediate task should be the organization of
the masses. Only organized masses can pursue their goal as people who are
building a state and who know how to build it, and not as dreamers. Bear in mind
that the final result will depend on your self-control and composure.
You must not be disturbed by talk of a counterrevolution. There is no possi
bility of any counterrevolution, for there is no madman who would bring himself
to rise against the will of the whole army, the whole peasantry, the whole working
democracy, against the will of Russia. And even if someone should attempt to
rise, where would he find supporters? Guns would not fire, trains would not run
and the insane attempt would not leave the study and spread to the streets, and,
even if it did, at that very moment there would be nothing left of the madmen.
People who know their own value are going boldly ahead, without fear, without
insulting their own intelligence by suspicions that someone may again enslave
them.
We will achieve everything if we are able to repel the one existing danger
to repel those who may want to extend a hand from the outside and from there
help the lurking reaction, or those who may want to crush freedom after they
crush the front.
The first words that the Provisional Government spoke about the war con
cerned the renunciation of territorial aggrandizement, of predatory aims, of what
is called imperialism, but we are demandingand whoever will not hear this
demand we will force to recognize itthat we have the right to a free life, to our
own place in the world, which we will not relinquish to anyone.
Let it not be thought that free Russia signifies disintegration, that democracy
signifies corruption and anarchy. Whoever thinks that is wrong and has already
been proved wrong. Therefore, go back to the front and perform your dutya
very heavy, almost unbearable dutyand we will do everything to end this ter
rible massacre as soon as possible, but to end it in a way that will be worthy of a
free people, to end it in such a way as to make the present war the last one.
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 911
If until now our enemies were able to say that they were waging a war for
freedom, because the East brought them nothing but the whip and the knout, then
now they should know that the East brings them brotherhood and peace. We must
defend our country as the hearth of democratic freedom for us, for Europe, for
the whole world.
There is not one soldier or one sailor in any state who possesses the rights that
you possess. You are completely free when you are off duty. But large rights
impose large responsibilities also. I have no doubts that you will fulfill these re
sponsibilities and your duty to the state and democracy.
I have faith in the reason of the people; the national masses are an inexhaust
ible storehouse of political wisdom and creative power.
The free people will raise the dignity of man and of his labor to unequaled
heights.
After the speech of A. F. Kerensky the representatives of the 7th Army, deeply
aroused, declared:
The faith with which we arrived was a premonition; after your speech it
turned into a firm realization, into certitude. May God help you. The army will
help you.
[Guchkov]
I want to greet you, gentlemen, on the occasion of the Congress of Delegates
and to wish you success in your work for the good of the army and of the father
land. . . . Tomorrow I will come to you in order to answer in detail all your
questions. Today I will speak of the general situation.
Gentlemen, if the upheaval which has created the conditions for a new life for
Russia passed painlessly, it must be explained by the fact that all levels of the
population realized that the old regime was leading us to ruin. . . .
But after the upheaval, new creative work started. It was not sufficient to sweep
912 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
away the regime; it was necessary to begin the organization of all our armed
forces, and I can say that the work was carried out by us with the exertion of all
our energies. If you only knew what a miserable and ruined military organization
we received from the old regime! And as for supply, we have in a large measure
already coped [with the situation]. Matters are better now than two months ago.
Dont forget that the improvement was achieved under difficult conditions in a
disorganized country and with a disorganized industry.
. . . But, as for fodder . . . , I must tell you that the situation is tragic.
I could prove this to you with figures, but I think that everyone who was at the
front will confirm it. (Voices from the benches: Correct. True. Applause.)
Previously the lack of shipments was explained by the disorganization of trans
port. Now we have regulated transport, and the lack of shipments is to be ex
plained by the intentional or unintentional refusal of the country to deliver to the
army what the army requires.
In this regard the voice of the people and especially your voice would be ex
tremely valuable if you would say to the country: Help us to obtain what we
need. . . .
. . . One of the basic problems which faced me and the Provisional Govern
ment was the problem of revitalizing the leadership of the Russian army. The road
should be opened to talent. I believe that among the masses there is no shortage
of talented people and that one need only help them to arise.
This was our immediate problem. I knew our command cadres and I knew
that they contained many people who were getting too oldhonest people, excel*
lent soldiersbut people who did not know the methods of modern warfare,
who were not capable of being imbued with the new relationship. . . .
Certainly I could make mistakes as any man can make mistakes, but I took
the advice of knowledgeable people and I made my decisions only when I felt that
they coincided with the general mood.
As a result, all those within the command cadres who were talented were pro
moted by us. And here also I did not take seniority into account. There are people
who started the war as regimental commanders and now command armies; there
are regimental commanders whom I have promoted directly to the command of
divisions, bypassing all the other stages. Because of this we achieved not only an
improvement in the command cadres but also another not less important [achieve
ment] . Duty to the fatherland, gentlemen, is a strong feeling, but when one has
to work under the conditions that previously prevailed, people, although fulfilling
their duty honestly, do it without enthusiasm. And the fact that we have pro
claimed die slogan Make way for talent, the fact that Everyone is the forger
of his own happiness, and that every soldier carries, as the French say, the baton
of a marshal in his knapsack have brought into the souls of everyone a feeling of
happiness, have forced people to work with enthusiasm, with inspiration. . . .
I am a strong partisan of the democratization of our army. The army is a
singular organization. If on our road we sweep away all vestige of authority, the
result will be the opposite.
Gentlemen, the most valuable quality in a man is his feeling of personal re
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 913
sponsibility. Every man should know that he is answerable for all his words and
deeds. And if we bind this man in a net of committees, then where is this respon
sibility? For if I am a commander of a division and intend to make this or that
important decision, then, if I am a faithless man who does not care for his home
land, a man who is a coward, willing to conceal himself behind the backs of others,
then for me the easiest thing would be to convene a conference of 50 people and
to compel them to take this or that decisionfor then I will not be responsible
for the results.
If we smother and extinguish this feeling of responsibility, then we will return
to the old regime when people acted irresponsibly. To smother this feeling of
personal responsibility is a very dangerous matter.
Gentlemen, I am not trying to frighten anyone. I merely spoke of what I had
suffered for three years and of what I have experienced these last two months.
Gentlemen, if the country will rise, if the army will not drop the weapons from
its hands, and if everyone will unite in a harmonious effort, not only will we lead
Russia on the path of victory, we will lead our fatherland toward its greatness.
[Kerensky]
Two months have elapsed since Russian liberty was bom. I did not come here
in order to greet you. Our greeting was sent to you in the trenches a long time ago.
Your pains and your sufferings were one of the reasons for the revolution. We
could not suffer any longer the senseless and negligent squandering of your blood
by the old regime. These two months I have considered, and I still consider now,
that the only force that can save the country and lead it on a path of light is the
consciousness of the responsibility of all of us without exception for our every
word and our every deed. And here, to you, the representatives of the front, I
must say this:
My heart and my soul are now disquieted. I am in the grip of anxiety and I
must state it frankly, whatever accusation is thrown in my face and whatever the
consequences resulting from it. The processes of the regeneration of the creative
forces of the country, the organization of the new regime, are based on liberty
and on the sense of responsibility in each and every person. Matters cannot
proceed as they are now, and it is no longer possible to try to save the country
in such a manner. The greatest part of the guilt for this lies in the old regime.
A hundred years of slavery not only corrupted the regime but also destroyed in
the people itself the consciousness of its responsibility for its own fate, for the
fate of the country. And at the present time, when Russia proceeds directly and
boldly toward the Constituent Assembly, when she stands at the head of the demo
cratic countries, when every one of us has the possibility of freely and frankly
voicing any kind of conviction, all the responsibility for the destiny of the country
falls fully and integrally on the shoulders of all and of each in particular. At the
present time there is not and there cannot be a man who could say: I speak but
I do not answer for my words.
. . . At the present moment, through the triumph of the new people, through
the creation of a democratic country in Europe, we could play a colossal role in
914 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
world history, provided we are able to compel other peoples to follow our road,
provided we can force both our friends and our foes to respect our liberty. But
to this end it is necessary that they should realize that it is impossible to fight
against the ideals of Russian democracy. We can proceed along this road only as
a national body which is organized strong, imposing respect, and united. But if
we, behaving as unworthy slaves, do not become a strong and organized state,
then there will come a gloomy, bloody period of internal strife, and our ideas will
be thrown under the heels of the political principle that might is right and not
that right is might. Every one of us, from soldier to minister, from minister to
soldier, may do everything that he wishes, but he must do it with open eyes and
place the service of the general cause above the service of private interests.
Comrades, for ten years you knew how to suffer and be silent. You knew how
to fulfill the duties imposed on you by the old, hated regime. You knew how to
fire at the people when the regime demanded it. And what happens now? Now
cant you suffer any longer? Or is it that the free Russian state is a state of re
bellious slaves? (Intense movement on all the benches.)
Comrades, I do not know how, and I am unable, to lie to the people and to
conceal truth from the people.
I came to you because my strength is at an end, because I do not feel in myself
the former boldness. I do not have the former conviction of being confronted not
by rebellious slaves but by conscious citizens who are creating a new country with
an enthusiasm worthy of the Russian people.
We are told: the front is no longer necessary . . . over there fraternization
goes on, but does the fraternization take place on both fronts? Does the fraterni
zation take place on the French front? No, comrades. If one fraternizes, then one
should fraternize on both sides. Are not the forces of the enemy already trans
ferred to the Anglo-French front, and is not the offensive of the Anglo-French
already stopped? We have no Russian front, we have only a single allied front.
(Applause.)
We are going toward peace, and I would not be within the ranks of the Pro
visional Government if the will of the people regarding the ending of the slaughter
were not the problem of the whole Provisional Government; but there are ways
and ways. There are wide-open roads, but there are also dark, dim alleys in which
one can lose both honor and life. We would like to bring nearer the end of the
fratricidal slaughter. But to this end we should follow open and clear ways. We
are not an assembly of tired people, we are a state. There are ways. They are
complex and lengthy. Tremendous self-control and calm are needed. If we offer
new war aims, then it is necessary that we should be respected by both enemies
and friends. No one respects a powerless man.
I am sorry that I did not die two months ago; then I would have died with
the greatest of dreams: that henceforth and forever a new life had dawned for
Russia, that we could without whip or club mutually respect each other and govern
our state not as the despots ruled it heretofore.
Well, comrades, this is all that I wished to tell you. Of course I may be in error.
Perhaps I have not correctly diagnosed the illness, but I think that I do not err
as much as it may seem perhaps to others. My diagnosis is the following: If the
tragedy and the desperateness of the situation are not realized now, if it is not
understood that upon all of us now lies a responsibility, if our national organism
does not function as regularly as the mechanism of a well-adjusted clock, then
THE REVOLUTION IN THE ARMY AND NAVY 915
everything which we dreamed, everything to which we aspired, will be thrown
back for several years and perhaps drowned in blood.
I wish to believe that we will find a way out of our situation and that we will
move forward along that same open and clear road of a democratic state which
will be forged by a consciousness of civic duty and firm will; I wish to believe
that everything which our predecessors have transmitted to us, all our secular
culture, everything that Russian genius has given us, we will be able to carry
lovingly to the end and give over to the Constituent Assembly, this one and only
master of the Russian land. But to this end it is necessary not only to believe, but
also to have the desire to act.
One thing is clear: the danger is great, no one can estimate its extent. Perhaps
it is seen clearest of all by the men before whom, in their capacity as members of
the Provisional Government, is unfolding the entire threatening picture of the life
of the people and of the army.
And for us, the Russian citizens, there remains only one thing: to heed the
threatening peals of the alarm bell while the last measure has as yet not, perhaps,
overflowed.
The socialist Minister had the courage to tell the people the whole truth and
to tell it in the way that very, very few could do.
Read these words. What truth they contain! What strength! What frankness!
What courage!
Few can speak such words, but all to whom the interests of the revolution are
dear, all of them will subscribe to them . . .
These are portentous, truly historic words. Russia will understand them and
the country will appreciate them. Let the demagogue surround them with bustling
noise. Theirs will hardly be a rich harvest. The country in whose midst there
are persons who can speak thus to the people may be proud of itself and its Min
ister. And as long as there are such people the country is not lost, no matter how
menacing the clouds that envelop it.
918 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
804. T h e R u ssian R e v o lu tio n and t h e L ast S p e e c h o f K eren sk y
[Article by N, S. Rusanov in Delo Naroday No. 38, May 2,1917, p. 1.]
. . . At the meeting of the Congress on April 29, Kerenskys speech was per
meated with such profound pessimism that his sincere friends who shared his ideas
could only be astounded and saddened by this radical change in the mood of the
socialist Minister of Justice. And they cannot pass in silence these words which
fell like a rain of lead upon the souls of those who up to this time have marched
in the same ranks with Kerensky.
We can understand, we can explain as temporary weariness that cry of an
overworked man which was emitted at one point in Kerenskys speech: I am
sorry that I did not die two months ago; then I would have died with the greatest
of dreams: that henceforth and forever a new life had dawned for Russia, that we
could without whip or club mutually respect each other and govern our state not
as the despots ruled it heretofore. But still one asks himself: Does this pathetic
call upon death express the true state of affairs? . . .
And again: Is it possible that the free Russian state is a state of rebellious
slaves ?
What then has occurred during that time to account for the pathos of despair
in Kerenskys address to the delegates from the front? What has happened is that
the Provisional Government was unable to withstand with sufficient firmness the
personal aggressive policy of Miliukov; that having confronted the toiling de
mocracy with the accomplished fact of the dispatch of the note of April 18, it
itself caused the rift in relations between the executive power and the representa
tive organ of the masses which was so painfully felt by all in the days of April
20 21.21
-
It is too late to speak now of operational plans worked out by me and our
allies, for the decisions were made at the conference in Chantilly on November
2 and 3, 1916, and at the conference in Petrograd in February 1917. At those
conferences we accepted certain obligations, but now the situation is such that we
must either postpone the fulfillment of our obligations or completely abandon
them with a minimum loss of our dignity in the face of our allies.
Our obligations are the following: The Russian armies have engaged them
selves to attack the enemy resolutely not later than three weeks following the be
ginning of the Allies5 offensive. We have already given notice that, owing to
organizational work and to the disruption of transportation and of supplies, we
will be unable to begin our active operations before the first days of May.
The data contained in your letter show that we will be unable to fulfill even
this modified obligation. It is unthinkable to start any kind of large-scale oper
ation without filling the complement [of our units]. Using various plausible pre
texts, it becomes necessary to explain to the Allies that they cannot count upon us
before July.
I will do it, but I cannot take upon myself the responsibility for the conse
quences that may arise from shirking our obligations. We depend so much on
our allies, both with regard to materials and financing, that a refusal of the Allies
to assist us would place us in a still more difficult situation than the present one.
I believe that the Provisional Government should take care of an agreement cover
ing this contingency.
Thus, circumstances force us to conclude that for the next four months our
armies must sit quietly, without undertaking any decisive, large-scale operation.
However, in war one is forced to take into account not only one5s own desires,
but also the wishes of the enemy. If the enemy were to attack us, we would have
to put up a stubborn and lengthy fight, in order to prevent him from gaining
advantages which would have fatal consequences for the army itself9 as well as
for Russia.
Endorsement:
From the Quartermaster-General:
What luck it would be, if reality were to justify these hopes.
18/111 1917. No. 1061
825. H ow L on g S h a l l W e W a it?
[Editorial in Russkiia Vedomosti, No. 109, May 17,1917, p. 3.]
On the Western Front of the war, battles unprecedented in their persistence
and fury have been raging for many weeks. . . . Now it is our turn; now we
should be giving a helping hand to our allies and bringing to the desired end
the task begun in common.
Never since the beginning of the war has the situation at the front been so
favorable for our offensive. The Germans have removed all their best troops from
our front and have left opposing us almost exclusively their Landsturm units,
which are stretched out in a thin thread and are unable to show proper resistance
to any strong blow. The enemy now confidently removes from Eastern positions
and transfers to the West even his heavy artillery, which formerly constituted the
mainstay of the German front. In front of us is only a thin curtain, and, at the
same time, we ourselves are abundantly supplied with everything that we need.
According to the Assistant War Minister, Colonel Yakubovich, we have enough
ammunition now for half a year of the most intensive fire. In that respect, we have
never been as favorably situated as at present. Nevertheless, our offensive is still
not materializing. For that, as the same Colonel Yakubovich says, we have every
thing ready but the spirit.
The task of preparing this spirit has been assumed by the new War and Navy
Minister, A. F. Kerensky. He has undertaken a trip to the front in order to restore
military discipline and raise the spirit of the fighting units by means of personal
contact with them. . . .
. . . All the information that is reaching us unanimously testifies to the fact
that A. F. Kerenskys appearances have been immensely successful everywhere.
Everywhere he was greeted with ovations, everywhere he was carried out of meet
ings on the hands of the audience, and, in response to his exhortations, solemn
938 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
oaths have resounded to do ones duty and to die for free Russia.3 But it stands to
reason that the task of restoring the spirit of the army is too much for any one man,
he it even A. F. Kerensky. Only by united efforts of the whole nation, only by way
of a systematic effort of the heart of the country upon the front could one restore
discipline in the army and rouse the army to undertake an offensive again. . . .
. . . And precisely here is where the inadequacy of support shown to A. F.
Kerensky inside the country is felt very strongly. It stands to reason that the army
can undertake active operations and an offensive only in case it sees clearly the
necessity of such an offensive, only if it sees clearly the necessity of striving for
victory. But how can one demand from the army the understanding of that neces
sity when all sorts of doubts in regard to that reach it from the rear? What sort
of effect must the declaration of V. M. Chernov, the new Minister of Agriculture,
have upon the army when he proposes to say enough to the civilian exhorta
tions of the army for an offensive? In what way must the army be affected by the
comments of certain newspapers which accuse anyone who speaks about the neces
sity of an offensive of imperialist designs, even though he renounces all aspirations
for conquest? . . .
Life dictates the point-blank question: what to do now, side by side with the
tireless struggle for peace? What to do now , when the democracy of other warring
countries has not yet broken away from its imperialist governments, has not
merged with us or among themselves into one mighty torrent which sweeps away
in its course all obstacles toward peace? Our only answer is not to relax for a mo
ment the struggle for peace. The revolution must be defended against all encroach
ments from outside. And if, for reasons of strategy, an offensive is necessary, it will
be up to the strategists to determine the proper moment for it.
It should finally be understood that the fortunes of the Russian revolution are
not, should not be, guided exclusively by the plans of the German command as to
how long to preserve the truce on our front.
It should finally be understood that this separate truce expressed by inaction
or fraternizing at the front interferes with the process of sobering up from the
chauvinistic stupor of the Allied democracies; that it increases the appetites of the
Austro-German chauvinists.
Our revolution cannot live by the grace of German imperialism. Taking ad
vantage of the weakness of our front, the German staff transfers troops to crush the
Anglo-French armies, only to transfer them later to our front and to dictate their
terms to the Russian revolution.
We do not know what the future course of the offensive by the Russian army
will be. But as long as Russian democracy has the power to shape the international
policy of the Provisional Government, as long as it exerts all effort in the struggle
for universal peace on a democratic basis, as long as it subordinates problems of
strategy to peaceful policyas long as all this continues, Russian democracy and
its army will be unanimous. And no cries that the offensive is intolerable can em
barrass it.
838. T he M ovement in G ermany and our O ffensive
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 104, June 30,1917, pp. 5-6. An editorial in No. 98, June 22,
1917, pp. 6-7, pointed out that the offensive indicated the vitality of revolutionary
Russia and should give the government the strength to carry out necessary internal
reforms, disregarding the opposition of the bourgeoisie.]
While a lull still reigned on our front, while the question of an offensive was
discussed at workers5 and soldiers meetings as a more or less remote possibility,
the objection to the offensive most often raised was that it would force the demo
cratic elements of Germany and Austria-Hungary to rally closer around their
imperialistic, ruling classes, thus playing into the hands of the Austro-German im
perialists and strengthening their domination over the democracy.
The offensive of our armies has now begun. The results of the ten-day heroic
efforts of our revolutionary regiments are in full display. . . .
In Allied countries the contemptuous, almost hostile attitude toward the Russian
democracy has given way to enthusiastic faith in the Russian revolution. Once
again our voice is being heeded, and they are hastening to tone down the harsh
words which were directed at us during the weeks of the lull, when from day to day
they had expected us to conclude a separate peace with the imperialists of the Cen
tral European Powers. The voice of the Russian revolution once again gained
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 949
force in Allied countries, enabling it to demand that the Allied democracies fight
for revisions of agreements and for peace.
What, then, is happening now in Germany and Austria-Hungary ? . . .
Public opinion in Germany attributed the lull on our front largely to the
shrewdness of Hindenburgs General Staff. The absence of losses on the Eastern
(Russian) Front and Germanys opportunity to concentrate all her forces against
tie French and British armies were explained by their military genius. In this way,
the lull on our front generated the confidence of the German and Austro-Hungarian
population in the supreme commanding staff of the army and the leaders of the
Austro-German policy. This lull also generated hope among the populations of
both countries that the war would soon end by running its own course without any
need for the governments of the Central European Powers to renounce their war
aims of [territorial] seizures.
The offensive of our armies killed this hope. The working people of Germany
and Austria-Hungary have become convinced that the lull on the Eastern Front
depended not on the genius of their generals but on temporary, transitional con
ditions. The German and Austro-Hungarian workers have become convinced that
the policy of their ruling classes gives them no ground to hope for an early and
lasting peace. The offensive of our armies confronts them pointblank with the
question of their future. . . .
The working people of Germany and Austria-Hungary thus found themselves
at the crossroads. The choice of one or another road is up to them; their choice
will decide the future of the Central European countries.
The present internal unrest in Germany and Austria-Hungary, the consolida
tion of the opposition in both countries, and the declaration of the German Social
Democrats, imbued with profound political wisdom and an understanding of pres
ent events, which was published by us yesterday, give us reason to hope that the
German and Austro-Hungarian workers will choose the road that will lead them,
and all mankind, to a universal peace.
The fears of those people who tried to dissuade us from an offensive, ostensibly
because this offensive would strengthen the imperialists hold over the Central
European democracies, proved to be illusory and absurd. Within ten days it has
become absolutely clear that our offensive is unleashing the forces of the revolu
tionary movement in Germany.
In this sense we can say that on their bayonets our revolutionary troops are
carrying freedom and the slogans of the revolution to Germany.
839. T h e O ffensive
[Editorial in Novaia Zhizn\ No. 54, June 21, 1917, p. 1. The description here of the
Bolshevik attitude certainly does not correspond to the categorical opposition to the
offensive expressed in Lenins two articles translated in the Collected Works of V. I,
Lenin: The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 271-72, 274-76.]
The Russian revolutionary troops have taken the offensive.
According to reports received thus far, military operations proceed satis
factorily.
A powerful new factor has been added to the difficult situation created by the
Russian revolution. We must establish clearly and fully its significance, its force,
950 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
and the consequences that flow from it in the sphere of the foreign and domestic
policy of the Provisional Government.
That the offensive which is now taking place is by no means a mere military-
strategic maneuver, that its origin and consequences have and will continue to
have a tremendous, purely political significancethis our newspaper has already
stated more than once.
The international pressure from the imperialist governments that are Russias
allies, the international treaties that bind the Provisional Government with the
Allies, the unstable internal situation, the desire to consolidate its power and in
fluence, the desire to lower the revolutionary temperature of the massessuch in
our opinion are the main reasons that forced the Provisional Government to launch
action at the front.
The offensive is a product of complex calculations of national and foreign
policy. In this light and only in this light should the question of evaluating its re
sults be viewed. The fact of the offensive by itself as a military operation does not
apparently arouse any differences of opinion. All parties down to the Bolshevik
are in agreement that once begun the offensive must be brought to an end.
To think otherwise, to throw out slogans that will hinder the combat operations
of the army and lower its fighting readiness, would mean to sow discord among
various units of the various armies. It would mean waging a profoundly pernicious
work of disorganization.
We never have been and never will be disorganizes. Therefore we say: the
offensive has begun and must continue, and the more successful, the better for the
army and the country.
But while the bourgeois press, for purely political reasons, maintains silence
as to the meaning of this slogan, we add that, parallel with the offensive on the
German front, the Provisional Government must launch immediately and just as
energetically an offensive on the international front. It must launch immediately
upon a war against the aggressive designs of the allied imperialists, a struggle
for peace on conditions already not infrequently confirmed by the Russian
revolution.
Kerensky is already attacking. It is Tereshchenkos turn now.
The rest of the ministers of the coalition government, who hold the threads
of internal policy, must also assume an offensive. A resolute break with the
policy of compromise and looking to the right, in the camp of Kadetism, an ener
getic struggle with the disorganizing work of our native imperialists and large-
scale bourgeoisie, firm resolution in the matter of organizing the rear and the
public economy, organizing a genuinely democratic government with the support
of the wide strata of the revolutionary democracysuch are the consequences
which flow from the fact of the offensive, such are the conditions under which it
can both strategically and politically lead to a genuine victory of the revolution.
Without these conditions an offensive becomes a dangerous adventure
fraught with the most deplorable consequences.
We will not stop to analyze or refute this literature. There is nothing to analyze
or refute herethe matter is only too clear, and the game too crude.
We will draw but two conclusions from the documents examined:
1) We see how questions of war and peace are being interpreted by the cor
rupt pen-pushers of the recent spies and provocateurs in the service of the German
General Staff. Then let us keep it firmly in mind that such views on these questions
benefit the German General Staff; they benefit the German imperialists.
We will keep this in mind even when such views on questions of war and peace
are advanced to us by persons whose position is independent of the German Gen
eral Staff. We will remember this not for the purpose of accusing anyone who
opposes war of provocation and treason, but in order that we may be able to catch
the mistakes committed by those persons who want to be internationalists but, in
practice, are proposing absurd measures which can only serve the interests of
German imperialism.
2) We have seen that the German General Staff will take advantage of the
ignorance of our soldiers and of their hunger for the printed word in order to
achieve its own ends. Then let us see to it that our revolutionary regiments receive
their intellectual food from our hands and not from the hands of the enemy! Let
ns send to the trenches the newspapers which the soldiers crave! . . .
File No . 3, Part I
1) A telegram from the Rumanian front of June 9, among other things, states:
X DivisionThe spirit of the troops has improved, but, according to the words
of the division commander, as before, however, there is no absolute certainty
that an order to attack would be obeyed . . . In X Corps the influence of the
Bolsheviks has lately noticeably increased, aided by the wide distribution of the
newspaper Pravda. . . . The normalization of life and service, which has been
accomplished in some units with much difficulty, is being destroyed in a few days
by agitators, arriving with reinforcements. June 7, 1917. No. 14*26 10/p.
Signed: Golovin . (Sheets 1-2.)
6) Sheet 64 contains the printed resolution of June 15, 1917, of the General
Conference of the 168th Infantry Divisions Regimental Committees, which runs
verbatim as follows: Having discussed the domestic and foreign policy of the
Provisional Government, the joint session of the 169th Divisions Committees
finds it detrimental to revolutionary democratic Russia, demands the immediate
convocation of the representatives of the field army, which would be re-elected
again on democratic principles by equal and secret ballot, in order that they,
together with the Soviets of Workers and Peasants Deputies, can take the power
into their own hands. At the present time, with the existence of treaties con
cluded by the old Government with the imperialistic governments of the Allies,
an offensive of the revolutionary Russian army would be a betrayal of the slogans
proclaimed by our revolutionary democracy. At the same time, in view of the
incomplete organization of the army and its insufficient democratization, such a
step could bring with it the transfer of power into the hands of counterrevolution
ary forces, and, therefore, at the present time there can be no offensive. The
Chairman of the General Assembly: (signed). The Secretary: (signed).
9) Sheet 83 contains a copy of secret report No. 615 of June 15, 1917, from
Colonel Maerskii, Commander of the 675th Infantry Regiment of the field army,
to the Commander of the X Infantry Division. This report shows that on June 13,
after a long debate, the regimental committee decided: 1) We have no confi
dence in the Provisional Government, which carries out the policies of the bour
geoisie, and suggest that the socialist ministers, in order to stop deceiving the
people, should either quit the cabinet or cease to call themselves socialists. 2)
We demand that the power be transferred into the hands of the Soviets of Soldiers,
Workers, Peasants, hired laborers, and other deputies. But after speeches by
960 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
officer-deputies of the regimental committee, it was agreed to discuss this decision
at a regimental meeting, which was set for June 14 at 13 hours. A tower was built
for the meeting and a placard was hung bearing the words: Down with the
Provisional Government and the bourgeoisie! Long live peace and the rights of
the people.5 When medical corpsman Yaroshenko spoke for the offensive, he was
beaten up and it was decided to reduce him to private, in the 32nd Company, which
was put into effect. Officers had no chance to speak at the meeting; only soldiers
spoke, all of them Bolsheviks. The sharp change in the mood of the regiment is
to be explained by the fact that lately the regiment reads only the newspaper
Pravda , does not wish to read other newspapers. With the report is enclosed the
resolution adopted at the meeting of the 675th Konotop Infantry Regiment. The
resolution contains the same two points referred to in the report. Among other
things, point 5 demands an equalization of soldiers and officers salaries: an
ensign to receive 25 rubles, and an additional 5 rubles for each promotion in rank;
point 6 demands the return of the former division commander and his appoint
ment to a reserve company of the 675th Infantry Regiment; point 9 contains the
demand to review and to amend the treaties concluded by the old Government
with the Allies; and point 10 says: There cannot be any kind of offensive; there
must be defense only. (Sheet 84.)
18) A telegram of June 23, signed by Vakhrushev, contains the report of the
5th Army Commander, who advises that the troops of this army, [because of]
their moral condition and state of ferment, cannot be considered ready for an
offensive. Among other things, this telegram says: It is impossible to have
orders executed because of the fierce agitation, coming apparently from the rear
and particularly from Petrograd, carried on against the offensive. The task of
improving the conditions in the army should begin by improving conditions in
the rear. Danilov. In addition to this, the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army has
communicated to me, also by phone, some following details of the conditions under
which the regrouping for the operation takes place: in X Corps the order was not
carried out; in X Division, which had refused to extend its front to the left, indi
vidual companies of X Regiment set out for the positions, while 1,067 men refused
to go; in X Regiment one battalion refused to move. In the rest of the regiments
the situation is as tense, and disorders can be expected when their turn of relief
arrives . . . In X Regiment the order has not been carried out by five companies;
all officers, without exception, have proceeded. Regiments X and X set out guards
and did not permit their officers and those soldiers who wanted to go to the posi
tions [to do so] . . . X Division and X Regiment of another division are in
reserve, and these units also refuse to move forward. In X Corps, under the influ
ence of agitation in X Division, one battalion of X Regiment broke away from
the regiment and remained on the spot with a strength of about 400 men. In
X Corps, X Division broke away from its staff and artillery, gathered around
X Regiment, elected, according to the X Division Commanders report, its own
revolutionary staff, and is sending out agents into other units for propaganda . . .
In some regiments of the 36th Division they declare that they have no authorities
but Lenin. The morale of the army is considerably weakened by the inclusion
in it of X and X Corps, which brought with them solidly built Bolshevik organi
zations. Svechin. It is further communicated: After [hearing] the aforesaid
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 961
report, the Commander in Chief of the Northern Front ordered the Commander
of the 5th Army not to cancel the orders to attack and to energetically continue
to influence the soldiers. At the same time the Commander in Chief of the North
ern Front asked the Supreme Commander to telegraph immediately to Petrograd
to send to the 5th Army without delay commissars of the Provisional Government
and delegates of the conference or of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers and
Soldiers Deputies for agitation to counterbalance the underground and the open
agitators of Leninist tendencies . . (Sheets 173, 177.)
33) Telegram received on July 7 from the Rumanian front, signed by Regi
mental Commander Reko, that on July 4 the 8th Company of the Regiment refused
to go out to positions for the offensive, and only after lengthy exhortations and
admonitions did the regiment set out on the night of the 6th in the strength of
eight companies with an insufficient number of riflemen. (Sheet 137.)
36) Telegram of July 10 from Molodechno, signed by Markov, with a sum
mary of the information regarding the mood of the units to July 10. Among other
things, it says: X Regiment has refused to relieve X Regiment (a n o th e r ) The
First Company (of X Regiment) has refused to relieve another [company] of
(another) X Regiment. On July 7 the Second and part of the Fourth Company,
having taken the supplies, started to leave the positions, where only the officers
have remained. The company committees of X Regiment have taken the de
cision to cease fire immediately, which does not bring any advantage to the father
land and takes many lives, and, if our artillery refuses to cease fire, to silence it
by force. In X and X (two) Grenadier Regiments the morale is falling again,
under the influence of news about the unrest in Russia. . . .
[37) ] d) X Infantry Regiment: The regiment has flatly refused to attack
under the influence of Bolshevik agitators and N.C.O.s who have arrived from
reserve units for replacement and who have not been in combat. (Sheet 158.)
40) Copy of the report No. 1783 of July 2, 1917, from the Commander of
the 37th Army Corps to the Commander of X Army, in which, among other things,
is stated: X Division: At the beginning of the revolution the division was placed
in the army reserve in Riga, where it was subjected to intense propaganda from
the Bolsheviks of the Novoladoga Regiment, from which came First Lieutenant
Khaustov, the editor of Okopnaia Pravda and the defamer (in absentia) of War
Minister Kerensky during the latters stay in Riga. With the arrival of the division
on the shores of Riga Bay, its character became clear: committees composed almost
entirely of Bolsheviks, vehement preaching of hostility toward officers and espe
cially toward generals (bloodsuckers in zigzag epaulets) , destruction of land
owners manors, carried out on the route of the regiments march from Riga and
symbolized by the inscription on the red banners: Peace for the hats, ruin to
the palaces.
962 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
851. K erensky on the F ront
[.Izvestiia, No. Ill, July 7,1917, pp. 2-3.]
At a time when certain army units in Petrograd were demanding the removal
and even the arrest of the Minister of War, A. F. Kerensky, and were shouting,
Down with the offensive!6 A. F. Kerensky was touring the regiments of the
revolutionary army of the Western Front, calling upon them to fulfill their duty
to the country and the revolution.
Rumors about events in Petrograd had already reached the front, and the
soldiers, as if in response to the demand of the Petrograd regiments, met the Min
ister with particular warmth and enthusiasm. The Minister did not receive such
an enthusiastic welcome in the regiments of the Southwestern Front. There was
complete unison between the Minister and the regiments of the Western Front
which had thrown out all the cowardly and worthless elements from their midst.
This was the unity of the will of the majority of the Russian democracy about
which the Minister spoke before committees of the Petrograd Garrison units on
June 13, on the eve of [his] departure to the Southwestern Front. At that time
he expressed assurance that the entire Petrograd Garrison would submit to the
will of the majority and would not inflict blows on the back of its Minister of War,
who was placed on the frontand, moreover, by the revolutionary armyto
perform his duty.
The Ministers hopes were not justified. Some Petrograd units, protesting
against the war and the offensive, raised their armed hands . . . against their
own brothers and stabbed them in the back.
By a strange coincidence the events in Petrograd were foreseen by our enemies
long before these events took place.
Here is what the newspaper Tovarishch, published in Vilna, writes in an
article entitled Russia and the Offensive, marked Petrograd, July 3 / June 20.
(P.T.A.) :7
According to news from Russia, the Russian offensive in Galicia aroused
strong feelings of indignation among the Russian people. Crowds of people are
gathering in all big towns protesting against the mass murder of Russias sons.
Indignation against the British, whom everyone considers to be the instigators
and the ones responsible for prolonging the horrors of war, is growing every day.
Kerensky is plainly called a traitor of the people. An enormous demonstration
was staged in Moscow, where Cossacks were summoned with the object of sup
pressing the indignant people. The present situation cannot continue for any
length of time.
Russkoe Slovo reports that the state of siege in Petrograd has intensified
during the past days. During the past weeks very many extreme left-wing social
ists have been arrested. The newspaper reports that leaders of the extreme left
must leave Petrograd and depart for the interior of Russia.
This is what the German newspaper writes. This newspaper is distributed
among our troops at the front by airplanes.
On July 3, at 7:30 p . m ., A. F. Kerensky left Petrograd for the front and on
6 The reference here and elsewhere in the document is to the July Uprising. See Vol. IU.
7 Kerensky cites this article in Tovarishch in his Catastrophe, p. 244, as evidence of the
Germans* foreknowledge of the July Uprising and of their collaboration with the Bolsheviks.
P.T.A.: initials of the Petrograd Telegraph Agency.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 963
July 4 he was already in Molodechno, where he talked with some regiments. The
Minister was compelled to interrupt the tour of the front as a result of telegrams
he received from Petrograd, and left for Mogilev for talks at Petrograd. On the
morning of July 5 the Minister left Mogilev for Molodechno, where he arrived
at 7:00 p . m .
Here the Minister was given an enthusiastic welcome by a crowd of many
thousands of soldiers, expressing their sincere joy at the return of the popular
Minister to the front. With exalted shouts of Hurrah from a crowd of soldiers
that accompanied him, the Minister drove closer to the front-line trenches where
combatant regiments of the division, intended for battle, were lined up for his
arrival in a big pine forest. The regiments were lined up according to field train
ing regulations, with the regiments banners, the red banners of the revolution,
and the bands on the right flanks. All the trees from top to bottom were filled
with soldiers who did not enter the formation. . . .
When the regiments gathered around the automobile and arranged themselves
in an amphitheater [formation], A. F. Kerensky addressed the following words
to them:
I greet you on behalf of the free revolutionary people. I am happy and proud
to have the honor to be among you and to endure with you all the anxieties of
these great days. Having thrown off the chains of slavery of the tsarist power,
the Russian people have become the freest people in the world. The people are
now fighting for the happiness and freedom of the broad, working masses, for land
and freedom, for the honor, independence, and dignity of the great free Russian
people. Fighting in the name of the right to live freely, you are carrying, on the
points of your bayonets, a message of the brotherhood of all peoples, of the tri
umph of the great principles of freedom, equality, and fraternity. The Russian
people have many enemies. Foreign and domestic enemies are trying to sow dis
cord and mutual distrust in the ranks of the revolutionary troops . . . Comrades,
fight those who whisper words about distrust to you. . . . Great are your heroic
feats, great are your sufferings. The whole Russian people bows before your . . .
feats. . . . If we are unable to defend freedom, it will perish, the red banners
will fall, and the great day of celebration for the working masses will disappear.
New generations will live in suffering and will curse the names of those who were
unable to stand in the defense of freedom.
We will not let this happen was heard from all sides.
With strong, prolonged shouts of Hurrah from the crowds of many thousands
of soldiers, the Minister, escorted by a mounted reconnoitering detachment, drove
off to the next regiments, situated considerably closer to the front lines. On the
way there, rumblings of artillery fire were heard constantly, ever closer and closer.
The shots were becoming more and more audible. When the Minister was ap
proaching the place where the units were stationed, the firing became considerably
intensified and explosions from enemy shrapnel were visible from the hillock.
Regiments from two divisions carrying red banners were lined up in the glen and
met the Minister with amazing warmth and sincerity. Here, too, were lined up
the regiments of the Caucasian grenadier division which had thrown out from
their midst all the worthless and cowardly [elements] which had been disrupting
the normal course of life in the division.8
8See Docs. 843-45.
964 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
The Minister, met by the Marseillaise and strong prolonged shouts of Hur
rah, walked to the front, greeting the troops. Then the regiments gathered in two
places. At the first place, the Minister, standing on a two-wheeled camp cart, spoke
before a crowd of ten thousand soldiers. The appearance of the Minister . . .
was met with a storm of applause and strong prolonged shouts of Hurrah.
Your welcome and your applause, comrades, said the Minister, testify to
the fact that you are, with all your heart and soul, at one with the Russian de
mocracy in its drive for equality and fraternity. You have welcomed and met me
as a brother and a comradenot out of caprice, or by a tsarist order, but by the
will of the revolutionary people, by the decision of the revolutionary Government,
which has assumed the responsibility for the valiant, brave Russian revolutionary
army.
Exalted cries of Hurrah.
Whatever happens to you tomorrow, continued the Minister, today, calmly
and bravely, with chests bared, we will go forward in the name of freedom,
equality, and fraternity. Think, comrades; before us awaits a completely free,
happy life . . . Can one really be sorry to suffer and to give up ones life for
such a life? Can there really be even a single coward and traitor who could forget
his duty? I call on you, comrades, commanders, officers, and soldiers, as the
valiant vanguard of the revolutionary armyforward! Carry the ideas of free
dom, equality, and fraternity on your banners to those who do not recognize them.
I have heard that even among you there have been discords. There were people
who broke away from the common cause, who thought of themselves, of saving
their own little lives. These people are serving the enemies of the people. . .
When the shouts of Hurrah quieted down, the commander of the army corps
declared:
Comrades, let us swear an oath that as soon as there is an order to advance,
we will go, as one man, loyal to duty and to the appeal of the revolutionary leader,
Minister Kerensky. From the bottom of our heartshurrah to Comrade Ke
rensky!
A member of the Executive Committee spoke:
It was not only the Minister of War who spoke to us, but Comrade Kerensky,
who has dedicated his whole life to the fight for land and freedom. As a revolu
tionary fighter, he has the right to demand that we execute his will. Then let us
give him our word that at his order we will advance without fear or doubt!
We give [our word], we give [our word] was heard from all sides. Com
rade, Minister, lead us; we are ready to advance!
The Commander of the Potiiskii Regiment, holding in his hands a red and
black banner, on one side of which was inscribed God is with us and The sal
vation of free Russias honor, and on the other Better death than see the down
fall of Russia, turned to the Minister with the following words:
I am happy that the lot fell to me of expressing to you, Mr. Minister, on behalf
of the whole regiment, the gratitude, love, and respect for the labor, pains, and
suffering you have endured for the good of the Russian people. We, an infini
tesimal part of the Russian people, ask you to give us, with your firm, strong, and
honest hand, this banner behind which we will march with our last drop of blood.
Comrades of the Potiiskii Regiment, let us shout a friendly, heartwarming Hur
rah to Minister Kerensky, the chosen representative of the people.
OFFENSIVE AND GERMAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE 965
A powerful Hurrah resounded in answer.
A. F. Kerensky took the banner and, turning to the Potiiskii Regiment, said:
Comrades of the Potiiskii Regiment! With all the strength of the love and faith
in the selfless valor of the revolutionary troops, I, in the name of the free people,
am entrusting your shock battalion with this banner. I believe that this banner,
flying over your regiment, will not lower before anyone and your new feats will
cover your valiant regiment with new glory. Allow me, on behalf of the free
people, to bow to the ground before die great suffering of the Russian army, our
brothers and comrades.
In deathly silence, the Minister bows to the ground before the regiments.
A highly tense atmosphere was created, which was cut by the powerful cries
of Hurrah after a common soldier, having accepted the banner from the Min
ister and raised it high above his head, declared:
For three years I havent gone out of the trenches, four times my blood flowed,
and I am ready to continue to stand in the ranks of the army for the defense of
liberty, equality, and fraternity. With this proud banner we will show the enemy
that our army is alive and not dead. . . .
Thousands of people joined in shouting Hurrah and carrying the banner
throughout the vicinity.
Then A. F. Kerensky turned to the regiments with the following words:
. . There is no need for me to coax you, or convince you. There is no need
to say that we must fight for the happiness of our native land. Courageously,
bravely, and calmly, go and fulfill the great duty and the immortal heroic feat.
May your hand not hesitate. Do not listen to those who are trying to confuse your
hearts. Those are traitors, cursed by all the people. They alone cannot feel the
sacredness of the heroic feat which you are achieving in the name of Russias
freedom. All Russia, all the people, all those who love the native land, are with
you. In order that you may feel and know this, the revolutionary government
sent me to you so that I, together with you, could pass through these terrible days.
Believe, Commander, that the army will fulfill its duty. . . .
With strong, prolonged shouts of Hurrah, the soldiers accompanied the
Minister to the automobile and followed him for a long while, carrying red ban
ners. A mounted reconnoiter and artillery detachment escorted the Minister to
the train.
Here the Minister was informed of the necessity of returning immediately to
Petrograd. When the soldiers, and especially the army committees, found this out,
they expressed regret with regard to the unexpected departure, as still many more
regiments were impatiently awaiting the arrival of their revolutionary leader.
Around 2:00 P.M. on July 6, the Ministers train, seen off by exalted cries of
Hurrah, left in the direction of Petrograd.
At one of the smaller railroad stations, the Minister met an echelon of artillery
men going to the front. Leaving his compartment, the Minister greeted them and
addressed them with the following words:
. . I must note that from the very beginning of the revolution, the artillery
troops have at all times exhibited the height of awareness of their civil and mili
tary duty. And there wasnt a single case among them of succumbing to the in
fluence of the traitorous dark forces of the country, which even today, when
fraternal blood is flowing on the front, are trying to destroy the results of this
966 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
offensive. Russian artillerymen have recently fulfilled their duty in the capital
when, in the name of the revolution, in defense of equality and fraternity, they
had to shoot some shells in order to suppress the enemies of freedom. . . . The
life of the country is following its normal course. There may he a change of people
in government posts. And your Minister of War, appointed by the will of the
revolutionary people, is performing his duties according to the dictates of his
conscience and his sense of duty, but the moment may arrive when he, too, may
have to leave. Remember then, comrades, that one must serve an idea and not
persons. Remember that the idea of saving the native land and the revolution
comes first and is the highest of all. The strength of the army does not lie in
individuals but in the idea of and love for the native land. Long live the revo
lutionary artillerymen!
Accompanied by cries of Hurrah, the Minister proceeded farther in the
direction of Petrograd.
B
Rumors are circulating widely among the population and the army con
cerning the allegedly disgraceful conduct of the Jaeger Guards Regiment both
976 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
before and during the Ternopol9 Operation, that the Regiment opened up the
front, that the Regiment was in flight, reproaches for cowardice, etc.
The Commander of the Jaeger Guards Regiment asserts categorically that:
1) The break-through on the Galician front occurred in a section that was
never occupied by the Regiment. Besides, the Regiment was already replaced.
Therefore, the accusation against the Regiment of opening up the front is false.
2) The Jaeger Guards Regiment was retreating in complete order, following
only orders of the command. Rumors regarding the Regiments flight are false.
3) The dispatches that appeared in certain newspapers to the effect that
the Jaeger Guards Regiment did not bring kitchen supplies [to the front] out
of cowardice and that, as a result, there was no hot food for three days during
the battles under Godov are a complete fabrication.
A special committee is currently investigating the circumstances surrounding
the retreat of the 1st Guard Corps in connection with the report of Stavka, dated
July 12, on the voluntary abandonment of positions at Ternopol by the 1st
Guard Corps. The Jaeger Guards Regiment does not doubt that the official data
obtained from the inquiry will only serve to confirm that during all the action
in June and July the Regiment was not guilty of disobeying combat orders.
The inquiry will yield ample material for demonstrating the tendentious at
tacks on the Guards which have been evident in recent times.
We request other newspapers to reprint [the foregoing] in the interest of
establishing the truth.
K hakhaev , Chairman of the Regimental Committee
S halavin , Secretary, Junior Noncommissioned Officer
C
The regimental commander and the officers of the Guards of the Finnish
Reserve Regiment, hand in hand with their Regiment in the field, vigorously
protest against the slanderous attacks on the Finnish Regiment, especially since
a whole series of official telephoned telegrams, orders, and reports of the Supreme
Command bear witness to the complete lack of correspondence between the news
paper reports and what in fact occurred. Involuntarily, one comes to the conclu
sion that this is ostensibly the deliberate work of some criminal hands. Otherwise,
how is one to explain the fact that on the one hand there exist official confirmations
by the Regimental Commander, the Commander of the Division, and the Corps
Commander of the valiant conduct of the Finns in the battles during the retreat
from Galicia (a bayonet battle of the 3rd battalion in the streets of Ternopol),
whereas on the other hand there are the reports in the press that the Regiment
took flight, abandoning its positions, confiscating horses from the officers, forcing
them to be content with soldiers rations, etc. A large number of officers and
soldiers who took part in the battles testify that nothing of the sort occurred.
Regimental Commander . . .
Chairman of the Regimental Committee . . .
Regimental Adjutant . . .
By whom and why all this slander on the army was needed at this time, after
all that has been endured, after the Kornilov revolt, there is no need to say.
CHAPTER 18
9) Cases in the military-revolutionary court are tried under the rules estab
lished for regimental courts, with all possible speed.
10) Under the same rules the participation in the case of the prosecutor and
defense lawyer is permitted.
11) Cases are decided by a majority vote, and in case of a tie vote preference
is given to the opinion favorable to the defendant.
12) If in considering a case the court finds that it requires clarification, it
refers the case for preliminary investigation, after which the case is expedited
further under the general rules of judicial proceedings.
14) A sentence takes legal effect immediately after it has been pronounced in
court and is carried out without delay.
15) If the court deems it necessary to reduce the penalty imposed beyond the
limits of its authority, it submits a petition to this effect to the Commander in Chief
984 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
of the armies of the front, and the carrying out of the sentence is postponed until
the petition has been acted upon.
III. The present law to be put into effect by telegraph.
A. K erensky , Minister-President and Minister of the Navy
Iv. Y efremov , Minister of Justice
M ajor G eneral Y arkovskii, for the Minister of War
July 12,1917
870. K ornilov R equests a M itigation of the T erms of the Law
on the D eath P enalty
[Rech\ No. 180, August 3, 1917, p. 3. The name of the second soldier here rendered
Kanunnikov is spelled three different ways in the Rech9 account.]
The Active Army, July 31
In accordance with the petition from the Commissar of the Southwestern Front
Gobechiia to the Supreme Commander, the sentence of the military-revolutionary
court regarding the death penalty to which three soldiers of . . . the Warsaw
Infantry Regiment, Kuk, Kanunnikov, and Emelianov, were condemned was
reduced and replaced by a life sentence.
The Supreme Commander, General Kornilov, has sent to the Minister of War
the following telegram:
On July 22 I sent to the commanders in chief [of fronts] a telegram in which
I pointed out that the sentences of the military-revolutionary courts are to be
valid only after being confirmed by the commissars of the respective armies. As
one of those who bears the moral responsibility for re-establishing the death
penalty in the army, I consider it absolutely necessary to condition its application
by the most effective possible guarantees, and therefore, in supplement to para. 14
of the Government decree of July 12, I petition the Provisional Government to
make it compulsory for the sentences to be confirmed by the commissars and to
alter accordingly the wording of para. 15 in the sense that the Commander in Chief
be authorized to mitigate the penalty, by means of the respective army commissar,
who is to give his conclusions. Therefore I took it upon myself to give the order
contained in the text of the aforementioned telegram that when the question is that
of human life, it is a duty of conscience to act without delay, I hope the Provisional
Government will find it possible to confirm my order, as I was guided by con
siderations of humanity and at the same time, as Supreme Commander, under
standing exactly the limit of the severity of the punitive measures which are
necessary for the restoration of discipline in the army, I resolved to take the
aforementioned step immediately upon accepting the post which I now occupy.4
General K ornilov
The Deputy Commissar of the Northern Army Chekotillo has addressed to
4 Paras. 14 and 15 of Doc. 869 were amended on July 29, 1917, Sob. Uzak, I, 2, No. 1247
to require confirmation of death sentences by the commander of the army and the commis
sar of the Provisional Government attached to it and, in case of disagreement between them,
by the commissar attached to the Supreme Commander. If there was no commissar attached
to the army, the first instance of confirmation was the Commander in Chief of the front and the
corresponding commissar.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 985
Filonenko, the Commissar attached to the Supreme Commander, the following
telegram:
Considering myself unauthorized to confirm the sentences of the military-
revolutionary courts, I leave to your discretion the petition of the defenders of
the soldiers of N. regiment, Kuk, Kanunnikov, and Emelianov, who have been
condemned to death, stating that the condemned were the victims of the irre
sponsible agitation of bolshevism, that they themselves were of low intelligence,
and that while perpetrating the crime they actually didnt know that they could be
prosecuted by a military-revolutionary court. I have proposed to the President
of the court not to execute the sentence of the court until you make a decision. It
is my belief that in order to sustain the authority of the court the sentence should
be confirmed.
Filonenko, the Commissar attached to Supreme Commander, sent to Chekotillo
by telegram the following answer:
If you found it impossible to take upon yourself the confirmation of the
sentence in the case of the condemned Kuk, Kanunnikov, and Emelianov, and were
at the same time consistent, you could not have postponed the execution of the
sentence and submitted the case to my decision. But as this has been done and as
the expectation of the delayed sentence has left these people in sorrow and grief,
waiting for the hour of death, and passing from hope to desperation, I do not
consider it possible that this martyrdom which is worse than death should end in
an execution. I do not give my consent for the execution of the sentence. I request
that the condemned be brought to Stavka where I will petition the Supreme Com
mander with regard to reducing their penalty.
871. T he P etrograd S oviet D emands th e A brogation of the
D eath P enalty
[.Izvestiia, No. 148, August 19,1917, p. 4. In view of the sponsorship of this resolution
by the Socialist Revolutionaries and the opposition to the law even by some Party
members of the right, Chernov was embarrassed to have Kerensky later disclose that
the decision of the Government had been unanimous, including Chernov as Minister of
Agriculture. Oliver H. Radkey, The Agrarian Foes of Bolshevism, pp. 348-50.]
N. S. Chkheidze was Chairman.
The questions under discussion concerned (1) the death penalty and (2)
arrests. Comrade Martov delivered a report on the first question, and comrades
Yurenev, Yakovlev, Volodarskii, and Tseretelli were the speakers.
The [following] resolution, submitted by Comrade Yakovlev on behalf of
the Socialist-Revolutionary Faction, was carried by a majority of votes.5
Taking into consideration 1) that the death penalty as a means of fighting
crime is rejected on principle by all the socialist parties and by all democrats
who are to any degree consistent; 2) that the death penalty has a degrading
effect on the population, and especially on those unfortunate sons of the people
who are forced, directly or indirectly, to participate in its implementation; 3)
that the death penalty, introduced by the new regime under the pretext of com
batting crime, is beginning to take form with ever greater clarity as a means of
frightening the soldiers with a view to subjugating them to the officers; 4) that
5 According to Den9, No. 141, August 20,1917, p. 1, only four members voted against the
resolution, including Tseretelli, who argued that it was a blow against the authority of the
Provisional Government.
986 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
in the eyes of all who are working for the counterrevolution, the introduction of
the death penalty at the front serves merely as a prelude to its establishment as
a normal measure of repression throughout the country; 5) that the disorganiza
tion of the army can be successfully counteracted not by brutal measures of re
pression, but solely by a consistent process of democratizing the army and inspir
ing it with the awareness that it is defending its native land and the revolution; the
Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies resolves to protest against
the introduction of the death penalty at the front as a measure which could be used
for counterrevolutionary aims, and to demand of the Provisional Government its
abrogation.
872. Den on the S oviet A ction
[No. 141, August 20, 1917, p. 1. See also Lenins article on the resolution in Rabochii,
No. 2, August 26, 1917, as translated in the Collected Works of V. I. Lenin: Toward
the Seizure of Power, XXI, Bk. 1,114-17.]
The Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies has approved a
resolution of protest against the death penalty.
By demagogically accusing the Government of being counterrevolutionary
while knowing beforehand that the accusation was false and that the Provisional
Government could not under the present circumstances abolish the death penalty,
the Petrograd Soviet did not in the least strive for this aim, but wished merely
to wash its hands [of the question]; it was thus willing to face the fact that the
Government would pay no attention whatsoever to its resolution.
The complete deprivation of the Soviet of any political significance, which
is so very much desired by every reactionary, is now being accomplished by the
Soviet itself.
This is not an accident, and in this lies all the danger of the Soviets political
gesture.
The masses which follow the Bolsheviks and the Internationalists have al
ready withdrawn from the revolution; objectively they are counterrevolutionary;
and this they express, in an original form it is true, by charging that the leaders
of the revolution are counterrevolutionary. They have correctly determined that
between them and the revolution there is nothing in common.
They have started the struggle against the revolution by [trying] to destroy
in one way or another both its conquests and its very basis.
When these elements get their hands on some organ or another of the revolu
tionary democracy, they transform it from a weapon of struggle for the revolution
into a weapon for the destruction of the revolution; thereby they doom this
weapon to ruin.
The resolution of the Petrograd Soviet against the death penalty [represents] a
dangerous symptom.
873. T h e E sta b lish m en t and Jurisdiction o f M ilita r y Commissars
o f t h e P ro vision a l G overnm ent
[So>. Uzak., I, 2, No. 1259. A formalization of the change instituted by Kerensky in
the status of the commissars, originally appointed by the Petrograd Soviet alone. See
Docs. 759 and 807.]
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 987
LAW OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
The Provisional Government has decreed:
1) In order to promote the reorganization of the army on democratic prin
ciples and the reinforcement of its fighting capacity, as well as to oppose any
counterrevolutionary attempts, the office of Military Commissar assigned to the
Commander in Chief of the front is hereby established.
2) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief is appointed by the
Provisional Government with the knowledge of the Central Executive Committee
of the All-Russian Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, the All-Russian
Soviet of Peasants Deputies, and the Supreme Commander.
3) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief has the right of
direct access to the Provisional Government, the Minister of War, and the Supreme
Commander. The Commissar submits reports on the situation in the armies of
the front to the Minister of War.
4) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief must be informed by
the staff on the preparation and progress of operations.
5) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief, guided by instruc
tions received from the Minister of War, accordingly takes uniform action to
settle all political questions arising within the zone of the armies and the rear
of the front.
6) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief acts in close liaison
with troop organizations (regimental, divisional, army, and front, and other
committees), and assists in coordinating the work of army commissars assigned
to armies by mutual agreement of the Minister of War and the Central Executive
Committee.
7) Army commissars (assigned to armies) and the Front Commissar (as
signed to the Commander in Chief of the front) constitute within the zone of the
Front a joint board, directing and coordinating the work of the army commissars.
8) The Military Commissar to the Commander in Chief periodically (at least
once a week) submits reports to the Supreme Commander and the Central Execu
tive Committee on his activity and on the situation in the armies of the front.
9) A Military-Political Department is set up under the Military Commissar
to the Commander in Chief and consists of the following: a) a section for intro
ducing new conditions of life in the army; b) a section for eliminating misunder
standings and disputes and vestiges of the police regime; and c) a section for
general matters and the press.
10) Appointment of Military Commissars to Commanders in Chief of the
fronts is announced in the orders of the Minister of War to the Army and Navy.
11) The present law is to be put into effect without awaiting its publication
by the Ruling Senate.
A. K er e n sk y , Minister-President
M a jo r G en e r a l Y a k u b o v ic h , fo r th e M in ister o f W a r
July 15,1917
874. Rabochaia Gazeta on th e N ew M easures for the A rmy
[No. 120, July 30, 1917, p. 1.]
Yesterday all the papers carried information on the measures to be introduced
for the restoration of the revolutionary army as proposed by Savinkov, Assistant
988 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Minister of War. Savinkov declared that he considers it necessary to purge the
entire high commanding personnel of all persons lacking a sense of civic respon
sibility. He puts great hopes in the institution of commissars, who are appointed
by the War Ministry in accordance with the Central Executive Committee of the
Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies. These commissars must be empowered
with the strictest control in the application of the death penalty.
In Petrograd, however, a special council will he created in the War Ministry
composed of representatives from the Soviet of Workers9 and Soldiers9 Deputies
and front troop organizations.8
Such is the plan of the War Ministry, and the entire revolutionary democracy
can only welcome it, since it is based on a correct democratic principle. With the
organization of the institution of commissars according to Savinkovs plan, the
high commanding personnel reserves the right to operational combat responsi
bilities only." The entire general political life of the army will be in the hands
of commissars selected, to be sure, from people loyal to the revolution.
The latest papers testify that Savinkovs declarations will not remain empty
words, but are already being put into practice.
In addition to the well-known order by the Supreme Commander, Kornilov,
about the need to respect the army organizations, we have also one of his orders
that the uverdict of the military revolutionary court goes into effect only on ap
proval of same by the commissar of the corresponding army and that military
commanders who permit the execution of a death sentence without confirmation
from the commissar . . . must be brought to strictest accounting
Further, the War Ministry strictly forbids army commanders to dismiss army
committees and schedule new elections.
If some members of committees, found guilty of criminal acts, are brought
before the court and if necessary arrested, then also it is proposed to act through
commissars/
Finally, the commanding officer of one of lie armies, General Danilov, in his
order on the restoration of combat discipline, deems it necessary to point out
that these measures should under no circumstances assume a reactionary char
acter and should not suggest a return to the old regime. Commanding officers
should not forget themselves and use a rude tone; they are obliged above all to
see in each of their subordinates a soldier-citizen.
The War Ministry has entered upon a correct revolutionary course. Unless
the character of its work changes, the restoration of revolutionary discipline in
the army will no longer be associated with the threat of counterrevolutionary
designs.
6 Created on August 3 by Order No. 36 of the Minister of War. VVP, No. 127, August
10,1917, p. 2.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 989
THE CONFERENCE AT STAVKA ON JULY 16
AND THE VIEWS OF THE
COMMANDING STAFF
875. E xcerpts from the P rotocols of th e Conference of Government
and M ilitary L eaders at S tavka at M ogilev on July 16
[Appendix, Krasnaia Letopis, VI (1923), 19-51. Accounts of the situation and atti
tudes at Stavka from March to September can he found in General A. I. Denikin, The
Russian Turmoil, and General Loukomsky, Memoirs of the Russian Revolution, passim.']
present :
Kerensky, Minister-President and Minister of War and Navy
Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
General Brusilov, Supreme Commander
General Alekseev
General Ruzskii
General Klemhovskii, Commander in Chief of the Northern Front
General Denikin, Commander in Chief of the Western Front
General Lukomskii, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Commander
General Romanovskii, Chief of the General Staff
General Romanovskii, Quartermaster General attached to the Supreme Com
mander
General Markov, Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief of the Western Front
Admiral Maksimov, Chief of the Naval Staff of the Supreme Commander
General Velichko, Field Inspector of the Corps of Engineers
Colonel Pliushchevskii-Pliushchik, Second Quartermaster General attached to the
Supreme Commander
Colonel Baranovskii, Chief of the Cabinet of the Minister of War
Nemits, Captain of the First Rank, and Muravev, Senior Lieutenant
Savinkov, Commissar of the Southwestern Front
Secretaries: Lieutenant Colonel Tikhobrazov, Lieutenant Colonel Pronin
The conference began at 2:40 P.M.
minister kerensky . The present conference was called at my initiative. It
was necessary for the Provisional Government to clarify the three following ques
tions: 1) the military and strategic situation, so that the people may be prepared
in time for the events of the immediate future; 2) the general situation, so that
we may be oriented when making demands and requests to the Allies; 3) an
analysis of military organization, for the Provisional Government must know by
what measures, in the opinion of those present here, the combat potential of the
army can be restored.
As President, I would like to hear the objective conclusions that persons ex
perienced in military affairs have reached after examining the above-mentioned
questions.
I consider it my moral duty to express my deep conviction that we are united
by the single thought of saving our native land and not surrendering the conquests
of the Russian people.
990 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
general brusilov . Pursuant to the instructions of the President of the Coun
cil of Ministers, I will report on the situation at the front. As far back as last
winter it was decided to assume the offensive on the Southwestern Front, and my
predecessor, General Alekseev, [ordered] that the forces and equipment be
allocated accordingly. When I assumed the office of Supreme Commander I made
no changes. But one major change occurred. The fighting capacity of the forces,
primarily of the infantry, decreased; discipline had unquestionably fallen off to
such a large degree that men could not be forced to undergo training or to work
on fortifying positions and bases. Consequently, we assumed the offensive not
in May, but considerably later.
However, all the steps were taken for the offensive. The Minister of War him
self made trips to the front and did much to help the cause, explaining the necessity
of the offensive to the troops.
Since the commanding personnel had no authority, they had to turn to the
agitators of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies; the commissars worked
in the same way and their work brought good results. Finally, the army com
mittees displayed intensive and fruitful activity; many of them even went into
attack together with the men and shed blood.
Nonetheless, discipline was not being restored, and no success is possible in
the present drawn-out battles without discipline and without the authority of
the commanders.
Wherever there was strong artillery, wherever there were intensive prepara
tions, a breakthrough occurred, but then the attack would fizzle out, and the
men would return to their positions under pressure from the enemy, or even
without it.
The restoration of the fighting capacity of the army must be the first con
sideration at the present time, for no plans or decisions will have any meaning
without it.
In order to restore the fighting capacity of the army, there must be discipline
among the men. It is impossible to restore the former discipline entirely, and it
is now desirable to discuss measures which could increase discipline, enhance the
authority of the commanders, and make the men obey. It now requires a day, or
more, to persuade units to go to the rescue of their comrades. During recent battles
the men bargained, held meetings for days on end, and sometimes resolved not to
go to the assistance of neighboring units. As a result, there was complete failure.
Divisions would scatter under the least pressure, without any discussions, without
listening to persuasions or threats. All this came about because the commanders,
from the detachment commander to the Commander in Chief, had no authority.
The work of the committees and the commissars has failed, because they can
not replace the commanders.
History shows that there is a limit to the amount of freedom that can exist
in an army, beyond which an army turns into a bad militia, untrained, disobedient,
and out of the control of its commanders.
On examining the three questions raised, I consider that the third question
indicated by the President, i.e., to analyze the measures necessary for restoring the
fighting capacity of the army, should be the first to be examined.
With your permission, I will ask those present here, beginning with the
youngest, to speak.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 991
general denikin .7 It is with great anxiety that I speak here, and I apologize
beforehand for speaking bluntly, but I shall speak before the autocrats of the
revolution in the same way that I used to speak under the tsarist autocracy.
I found the Western Front in a state of complete disintegration. I admit that
this surprised me. Neither from the reports of the Commander in Chief, which I
received during my tenure as Chief of Staff [to the Supreme Commander], nor
from General Gurko when I was taking over the front from him, could I have
drawn information depicting the true situation on the Western Front. But every
thing soon became clear. The men were obedient up to a pointwhile our line
of action was passivebut as soon as the men were required to be aggressive,
the full extent of disintegration came to light.
In the course of between two and three weeks we succeeded, by the extraor
dinary work of the commanding personnel, in deploying the 10th Army, but
under what conditions: 48 battalions refused to go into combat. One of the three
shock corps was deployed, it took two to three weeks to deploy another one, while
the third was not deployed at all. Insubordination, robbery, and looting swept
through the units, and distilleries were ravaged. Certain units, like the 703rd
Suramskii Regiment, for example, disintegrated and have left me bitter memories
for the rest of my life.
The situation required that the front assume the offensive, since the enemy had
already withdrawn four divisions from the Western Front. I decided to attack,
come what might. I withdrew all the unfit troops from the front (30,000 in all)
and transferred them to the rear.
I moved the 20th Corps to replace the right flank corps, because I considered
it to be the best one. However, as soon as it received an order to advance, one
of its divisions marched 30 versts in the very first night, but then returned to its
original position. Another division refused to advance altogether. After lengthy
negotiations it was finally deployed.
With respect to morale, the troops were prevailed upon by the senior com
manding personnel. There was the Minister of War; the Supreme Commander,
General Brusilov, also toured [the Front].
I do not know what impressions they carried away with them, but the situa
tion was as follows: when the Minister of War was with the 28th and 29th Divi
sions, everyone pledged to fight and, in general, he was met with enthusiasm.
When the Minister of War left, however, the delegates arrived at the station to
announce that after the Ministers departure the regiments passed a resolution
not to advance.
7 [The following footnote appears in Krasnaia Letopis\ pp. 52-53.] In the Protocol of
the Conference Denikins speech was given in an abbreviated form, but a copy of his com
plete speech was found among the papers of Stavka, and, in view of greater historical interest,
we are citing it in full. It was sent by Denikin to Kornilov. Kornilov sent him the fol
lowing letter in answer [July 27, 1917]: Dear Anton Ivanovich! It was with sincere and
deep satisfaction that I read your speech delivered at the conference held at Stavka on July
16. I would sign such a report with both my hands. I respect you deeply for it and I admire
your courage and your resolution. I firmly support the measures you have proposed for bring
ing the army and the rear to a normal state. I am insisting categorically that the Provisional
Government pass a whole series of resolute measures and have grounds for being certain that
much will be done in this direction in the nearest future. May I assure you of my deepest
respect.
992 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
I was present at the moving scene when the red banner was handed over to
the Potiiskii Regiment and the soldiers swore by it to go out to meet death; one
hour before the attack the very same Potiiskii Regiment retreated 15 versts.8
In touring the front the Supreme Commander received the impression that
the soldiers were good, [but] that the commanders were frightened and had per
mitted their authority to slip out of their hands. This is not quite correct.
Authority did not slip out of the hands of the commanders, it was torn out of
their hands.
The most enthusiastic reception accorded to the Supreme Commander was at
the meeting of the 1st Siberian Regiment, but when the Supreme Commander
departed, the meeting continued and the Supreme Commander was abused. They
said about him: Why do you listen to this old bourgeois? and they reviled him
in every way. The audience applauded and shouted Hurrah, just as they had
earlier to the Supreme Commander.
Another cause for disintegration in the army is the commissars. Perhaps there
are black swans among them who are beneficial, but generally speaking the institu
tion is incompatible with the army. There cannot be dual authority in the army.
The army must have one head and one authority.
In particular, I must give a characterization of the Commissar of the Western
Front. A young man, not only having no knowledge of the army, but being un
acquainted with life, he has a great craving for power. He announced to the
commanders that he possessed such power that he could remove anyone he pleased
from office. He said: Kerensky is the Minister of War for Russia, and I for
the Western Front. I severed relations with this commissar.
Then there is the army commissar who verges on menshevism and bolshevism,
the very same one who gave the report that the Declaration [on Soldiers9 Rights]
has done little to disintegrate the army, that Art. 14 must be stricken out, that
the prohibition of freedom of speech while on duty must be stricken out!9
The third commissar is a man who is not Russian, who despises everything
Russian, but who perhaps is of value. He abuses the soldiers in language un
known to them when they received abuse under the tsarist regime. Responsible
citizens accept this abuse as appropriate.
Thus, this institution cannot be tolerated in the army.
A further cause for disintegration in the army is the committees. There are
individual committees, and individual members of committees, who are devoted to
their duty, there are people in them who are giving up their lives for the salvation
of our native land, but as a whole, as an institution, these committees are harm
ful. They reveal a tremendous aspiration for power. Thus, for example, the com
mittee demands that governmental authority be transferred to the local committees.
The committee of the 2nd Army demands the right to act on behalf of the central
committees. Half of the members of the Front Committee have stricken out Section
14 of the Declaration, the other half have demanded that an order be introduced
which would provide that all coercive measures apply not only to the soldiers, but
to the commanders as well.
Vengerov adheres to the view that organs of soldiers committees must have
the right to challenge the appointment of their commanders. In general, it must be
noted that committees aspire to seize power.
s Doc. 851.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 993
Now I shall turn to the preparations for comhat.
On June 8 the Front Committee passed a resolution not to advance. On June
18 it passed a resolution to advance. It had completely changed its colors in 10
days. This was also true of the Committee of the 2nd Armyon June 1 it decided
not to advance, and on June 20 to advance. By a majority of 132 votes against
72, the Minskii Committee passed a resolution not to advance, pointing out that
the offensive was a betrayal of the revolution. This was how the committees work
in morally preparing the troops revealed itself. If committees permit things of
this sort, they cannot be tolerated.
The committees are removing commanders. Thus, they removed the Com
manders of the Corps, the Chief of Staff of the Corps, and the Commander of the
1st Siberian Division of the 1st Siberian Corps. I did not give permission for
this removal, but the Commander of the Corps came to me crying and sobbing
and I had to let him leave.
I have statistical data at my disposal; there were 50 cases of commanders be
ing removed from the front.
Detachment and regiment committees enter into discussions of virtually every
question. For example, a reserve regiment was despatched in full force to the
front, and only 300 officers and 150 soldiers arrived as appointed, the rest were
allowed by the committee to go on leave with instructions to report at the end of
their leave at the points of destination of the regiments.
The committees are one thing, and the members of the committee are another.
There is absolutely no committee discipline. Let us assume that there is a com
mittee consisting of Mensheviks and Bolsheviks which adopts some decision, but
this will not prevent committee membersBolsheviks [for example]from ad
vocating their own point of view differing from the one adopted by the com
mittee.
The committees bring multiple authority into the army, and discredit, rather
than strengthen, the authority of the commanders.
This was the kind of preparation with which the troops went into combat.
The training of the artillery began. In all the three years of war I had not seen
such wonderful work of the artillery. The spirits of the troops began to rise. Even
the infantry, which had higher demands for the artillery, remained satisfied. The
infantry of the 38th Corps refused even to continue the training of the artillery,
considering it completely accomplished.
The units moved into attack, they passed two or three enemy trench lines in
a parade march, visited its batteries, brought back gun-sights from the enemy,
and . . . returned to their trenches.
(General Denikin read excerpts from reports on the operations.)
The campaign miscarried. In reporting on the campaign, the Commander of
the Corps sobbed bitterly.
The troops suffered losses, primarily during the retreat. Ten thousand wounded
passed through the casualty wards of the Army, 20,000 through [the casualty
wards] of the front. Twenty-five hundred of these were seriously wounded, 7,500
with wounded fingers, and 10,000 with miscellaneous wounds, the nature of which
has not yet been established.
And thus the campaign miscarried. On the 19-verst sector of the front, I had
184 battalions and 900 pieces of ordnance; the enemy had 17 battalions on the
front line and 12 in reserve, and 300 pieces of ordnance. One hundred thirty-eight
994 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
battalions were brought into action against 17 [of the enemy] , 900 pieces of
ordnance against 300.
Morale may have now improved, but this is only because we have once again
changed to passive defense.
I gathered together several army commanders in my headquarters and posed
the following questions to them:
1) Could the armies resist an enemy offensive that is in the slightest degree
serious? The answer was: no.
2) Could the armies resist a counteroffensive of the enemy at the present
time? The Commander of the 10th Army answered that the army could resist it.
The Commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Armies could not decide on the answer to
this question. The 10th Army has stronger artillery which explains the Com
manders reply. The army commanders declared that they have no infantry. For
my part, I will say that we have no army and that we must create one.
We were given new laws. The government says today what we were saying
yesterday, only then it was called a betrayal of the revolution.
(To the question of General Ruzskii as to what laws he was speaking about,
General Denikin explained that he was speaking of the death penalty, the revolu
tionary courts, and so forth.)
I have heard that bolshevism has destroyed the army. I deny this. Bolshevism
is worms in a festering wound of the army. The army was destroyed by others, by
those who have recently passed military legislation destructive to the army, by
people who do not understand the mode of life and the conditions necessary for
the existence of the army. At the beginning it was the yoke of the Soviet of Sol
diers5and Workers5Deputies, which was then an anarchistic institution, and later
a fatal mistake.
In a discussion with me during his first trip through Mogilev, the Minister of
War said: The process of revolutionizing the country and the army has ended.
Now the constructive work must begin.
I remarked that the revolutionary process had ended, but too late.
We received the Declaration [on Soldiers Rights] although all the military
commanders had expressed their opposition to it. They all said that the Declara
tion would ruin the army. General Alekseev stated graphically that the Declaration
was the last nail driven into the coffin of our army. Describing the bad condi
tion of the army on his front, the former Commander in Chief of the Southwestern
Front said that he still had hopes for improvement if only the Declaration was not
introduced.
But the Declaration was issued. The freedom to express ones political views
in the army was announced. But then the 2nd Caucasian Grenadier Division was
disbanded for the exercise of this same freedom of political views, and I can under
stand why the soldiers were bewildered.
When I intended to disband the 169th Division, which censured the Provisional
Government and demanded immediate peace, I encountered the opposition of two
commissars; the commissars could see no crime from the legal standpoint in the
actions of the 169th Division.
But for some, even the Declaration was insufficient. A section of the Military
Congress [sic: see Doc. 776] demanded freedom of speech even during the dis
charge of duties.
Art. 6 of the Declaration permitted a wave of piratic and defeatist literature
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 995
to flood the army, the best evidence for which is given in the account of the Mos
cow Bureau of Literature Supply, subsidized by the Government. (He cites the
data in the account.)
Section 14 reads that no serviceman can be punished without a trial. This is
to be observed only with respect to soldiers. It does not, evidently, apply to the
commanders since punishments are applicable to them without a trial, and they
can be ousted from the service. This paragraph has completely abolished punish
ment in the forces. The Central Military Court Administration has advised us
that the activities of the army corps courts and military-circuit courts must be
terminated, except in cases of treason. Thus, the courts have virtually ceased
to function. Disciplinary courts which are boycotted by the soldiers have been
introduced in their place. Soldiers do not select the members of the court just as
they did not select the jury in the army corps courts. I am afraid that the same
will happen with respect to military-revolutionary courts.
The stipulation concerning the sentence being delivered by the committee is
equally unfeasible, since committee members who pronounce sentence would
hardly remain in its membership.
Authority was abolished, the officers were humiliated. Officers up to and in
cluding the Commander in Chief were expelled like servants. The Minister of War
once made a passing remark on the Northern Front that he could disperse the en
tire high command within 24 hours. In his speech addressing the soldiers, the
Minister of War said: Under the tsars you were driven into battle by knouts
and machine-guns. The commanders led you to the slaughter.
I was standing at the foot of the rostrum on which the Minister of War spoke;
I listened, and my heart was wrung at the offense, because what he said was not
true.
My Iron Sharpshooters captured 60,000 prisoners and 43 pieces of ordnance,
but I did not drive them with knouts, nor did I fire machine-guns at them.
But I was willing to put up with everything in the Minister of Wars speech
if only the troops could thereby be moved to attack.
When Sokolovs deputation was beaten up in the 703rd Suramskii Regiment,
the Minister of War sent a telegram of sympathy. I will cite another parallel to this.
A modest hero, armless General Noskov . . . (He recalls this heroic general dur
ing the episode of capturing the hill 803.) This hero was summoned by two
companies for explanation, and they killed him . . .
I ask the Minister of War, did he descend with the full force of his authority
on the murderers of General Noskov, did he send a telegram of sympathy to the
grief-stricken family of the hero? . . .
When the commanders were demoralized, a telegram was thrust at them threat
ening with dismissal those who exhibit weakness and indecisiveness in the use of
armed force against the insubordinates.
No, he who goes into battle, who is willing to perish, will not be frightened
by this . . .
As a result of being badgered, the commanders fell into three categories: offi
cers of the first group continue reluctantly to perform their duties; others, folding
their arms, are drifting with the current; and [those of the third group] are fran
tically waving red flags, and crawling on their bellies before the gods of the revo
lution, just as they had once crawled before the tsars . . .
The officers corps is in a terrible position . . . Sokolov, after touring the
996 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
army, said: I could never even have surmised that the officers would be such
martyrs.
Yes, they are martyrs . . . They are abused . . . they are beaten. Yes, they
are beaten. Hiding in their tents, they sob, but they will not tell about this. They
are being killed.
There is only one honest way out for the officersit is death. One has to read
reports such as this: There was no success in moving the skirmish line into attack.
All the officers then formed a skirmish line (around 20 men) and attacked a re
doubt. None of them returned.
Let their blood fall on the heads of those deliberate and unwitting hang
men . . .
In order to regenerate the army, it is necessary that:
1) The Provisional Government acknowledge its fault and its mistake in fail
ing to understand the officers, considering them to be enemies of freedomthey
who received the news of the revolution with joy.
2) Petrograd, which is alien to the army and which does not understand its
life, cease its military legislation; full power in this respect must belong to the
Supreme Commander.
3) Politics be completely excluded from the army.
4) The Declaration be abolished.
5) Commissars and committees be abolished.
6) Authority be restored to the commanders.
7) Discipline be introduced.
8) Persons having combat and service experience be appointed to the posts
of senior commanders.
9) Select units be available for supporting the authority of the commanders,
as well as for using armed force against insubordinates, should the necessity arise.
10) The death penalty be introduced not only in the theater of war but also
in the rear where replacements are stationed. Revolutionary courts must be estab
lished for the reserve regiments as well.
Ask me if these measures will produce favorable results. Yes, they will, but
not soon. It was easy to destroy the army, but it requires time to rebuild it.
In spite of the complete disorganization of our army we have to fight the enemy
to the end, even if we have to fight on distant frontiers.
Do not let our Allies count on our offensive. But we must continue to fight so
that the enemy will not withdraw all his forces from our front and, fixing [his
attention] on our Allies, crush them and after that crush us too. The continuation
of the fight is an arduous crusade.
There is yet another coursethe course of treachery, of betrayal of our Allies.
Perhaps it would offer a temporary relief to our native land, but it will not bring
happiness to it, and it will ultimately be followed by moral, political and economic
slavery.
I am turning to the Provisional Government as personified by the Ministers
present here: lead Russia to truth and brightness under the red banner of freedom,
but give us the opportunity to lead our troops under our old banners that have
been winnowed with victories, whose tattered ribbons thousands kiss reverently
in taking their oath of allegiance to the fatherland and behind which they have
marched to victory and glory . . . Do not fear the remnants of autocracy in
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 997
scribed upon it: they have long ago been erased by our hands. It is you who have
stamped them into the dirt, our glorious banners of battle, and it is you who must
pick them up if you have a conscience . . .
(Greatly agitated, General Denikin asked the Chairman for permission to leave
for a short while. The Minister-President shook General Denikins hand and
thanked him for a frank and truthful expression of his opinion.)
general klembovskii. . . . Concerning the committees, I subscribe to the
opinion of the Commander in Chief of the Western Front. It is not to boast that
I say this, but I have the best relations with all the committees, and the commissars
say that they have heard the most complimentary reports about me. It is not bit
terness that prompts me to speak, but only the desire to benefit the cause. If, how
ever, it is found necessary to allow them to remain, then it is imperative to deline
ate strictly their authority and to exclude from their sphere of competence their
control over commanders.
They are unquestionably striving for such control at the present time. . . .
We are constantly receiving resolutions of committees which read, we demand
the removal, and conclude, and we demand to be informed in regard to the lat
ter. These phrases indicate that the committees are in a false position. They can
still request, but as for demandingthat is too much.
The frame of mind found in the committees of the Northern Front is better,
but the better the committee, the sooner its authority falls in the eyes of the sol
diers. And sometimes one hears statements such as you should all be raised on
bayonets, that would serve you right, directed at such committees. . . .
I will now turn to the commissars. I have heard no complaints about them from
commanders. I myself work hand in hand with them, but my commissar requested
me to increase the authority, concentrating it in the sole hands of the Commander
in Chief. But since under the present circumstances the Commander in Chief is
compelled to take frequent trips, the commissar finds that it is necessary to have
a second person with whom the Commander in Chief can share authority. This
was the opinion of the commissar, but I ask you where should the line be drawn
between the authority of the Commander in Chief and that of the commissar. Our
relations are excellent, but if this measure is accepted, if it is accepted for all the
fronts, such good relations will not exist everywhere and, moreover, relations be
tween the Commander in Chief and the commissar may deteriorate.
It has been suggested that a triumvirate be established in the army, consisting
of the Commander in Chief, the commissar, and a soldier. To my question, why
a soldier, I received the answer: for greater confidence. But this, after all, is a
fallacy. If he, the soldier, goes hand in hand [with the triumvirate], then he will
lose the confidence of the other soldiers; in their eyes he will become a bourgeois
who must be raised on bayonets.
What motivates the soldiers? Idealism? No. As the Commander in Chief
of the Western Front correctly expressed it, bolshevism is worms in a festering
wound. The soldier has an inspired and thoughtful look about him until the ques
tion of self-interest is touched. As soon as this question is touched, it becomes an
entirely different matter. It is this very chord that the Bolsheviks are playing upon
and that is why they have such influence.
What can help? The death penalty? But is it really possible to execute entire
divisions? Prosecution? Then half the army would turn out to be in Siberia.
998 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
You will not frighten the soldier by penal servitude. Penal servitude? So what?
After five years I will come back, they say, and at least I will be uninjured. As
you see, it is all a question of self-interest.
If one were to restore the authority and the rights of the commanders, restore
discipline, abolish meetings, and cancel the Declaration, then the situation could
still be corrected; but if all of this cannot be accomplished, then the army is lost
beyond redemption.
At the present time the officers are the only stronghold of freedom and of the
revolution. No measures must be taken against them, all measures must be aimed
exclusively against the soldiers.
I am constantly receiving anonymous letters containing photographs of me cut
out of magazines, with my eyes punctured and with corresponding threats at
tached. This is nothing to me, since they will not be able to reach me; but how is
it for the officers? One has to go into the trenches to understand what is going
on in the souls of the unfortunate officers.
[Telegrams from General Shcherbachev and General Kornilov ]
At the request of the Supreme Commander, general lukomskii read the tele
grams from Shcherbachev, who pointed out the necessity of restoring the authority
of the commanders, and from Kornilov (dated July 6, No. 4254), who considered
that the following measures were necessary to increase the combat potential of
the army:
1. To restore the death penalty and revolutionary field courts-martial within
the theater of military operations, and the internal military districts with respect
to servicemen having committed the offenses indicated in the law.
2. To conduct as soon as possible the most thorough and ruthless purge of the
entire officers corps.
3. To restore the disciplinary authority of commanders, from the company
commanders on up, granting them the right not to promote, to demote, and to
order arrests and indictments.
4. To strengthen the authority of the commissars in the army, bringing them
into the corps, and to grant them the right to confirm death sentences.
5. To establish, in specific terms, the sphere of competence of army commit
tees, entrusting them only with economic and routine matters. Any interference
by committees in questions pertaining to operations or changes in the command
ing personnel must be absolutely prohibited [and made] subject to severe
penalties.
6. To prohibit, by law, for the entire duration of the war, the organization of
meetings, gatherings, and card games in all military units.
7. To prohibit the importing and distributing of literature and newspapers
with a Bolshevik slant in the area where the army is stationed.
8. To prohibit the entry into the area where the army is stationed of any dele
gations, deputations, and agitators without permission obtained beforehand from
appropriate military authorities.
9. Realizing the unjust attitude it permitted itself to adopt toward the entire
corps of officers, in the sense of undermining their authority and lowering their
respect in the eyes of the whole people and the masses of soldiers, the Government
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 999
must declare honestly and forthrightly that during all recent engagements of in
fantry units it was almost exclusively the officers, with minor exceptions, who dis
played military valor, devotion to the cause of our native land, of freedom, and of
the revolution, and who sealed with blood and death their endless courage and
their loyalty to the oath of allegiance. There were frequent cases when officers
and some non-commissioned officers, abandoned by the panic-stricken mob of
indoctrinated soldiers, were left alone at the positions, and marched, outnumbered,
into glorious battle, paying with their lives for the mistakes and crimes of others.
The officers corps, realizing the difficult financial position of our native land, has
not mentioned anything to this day about improving the material position of its
families in view of the increasing high cost of living.
The Government must not take advantage of the civic valor of a whole class
of the population under the guise of maintaining the economy . . . and must
draw up at once a bill for improving the position of the families of heroes who
perished in the war.
COMMISSAR SAVINKOV. If I have been summoned to express my opinion, I
must express it just as fully and frankly as the preceding speakers.
I, as everyone, dearly love our native land, but I cannot agree with the opinions
of the Commander in Chief of the Western Front and the Commander in Chief
of the Northern Front.
The Commander in Chief of the Western Front said that the committees
should be abolished in view of their uselessness or, perhaps, harmfulness. How
ever, it must be noted that members of army organizations have often gone into
battle themselves and perished; they accomplished much in the matter of evacua
tion when the commanding personnel did not everywhere or always issue the
necessary instructions. It cannot be denied that army organizations bring un
questionable benefits. They attend to the maintenance and supply needs [of the
units]; they explain public events to the soldiers from a democratic point of view;
they realize the legitimate rights of the soldier as a Russian citizen. But I cannot
help welcoming the measure of the Government with respect to [preventing them
from] interfering in operational questions and from removing commanders. Of
course it is necessary to define their sphere of competence, and once such a delinea
tion is made, the army organizations can bring nothing but benefit. If there has
been friction, it was accidental and was due to the fault of personnel in the
organizations and of individuals in command.
Similarly, I cannot agree with the Commander in Chief of the Western Front
in regard to the commissars.
The Russian army is a democratic, republican army; the high command, how
ever, was appointed by the old government. If this were not the case, I would be
the first to assert that commissars must be abolished at the first opportunity, but
one cannot do without them under the aforesaid circumstances of the present
time. Soldiers who do not trust their commanders often trust the commissars,
and the commanders work through them. The commissars act as the third party
who often provides the opportunity for smoothing out differences and misunder
standings which arise between the two sides.
As long as there is a revolutionary authority in Russia, the eyes and ears of
this authority must be present in the army.
However, the commissars have shown that they, too, can provoke the soldiers.
1000 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Shklovskii and Sukhomlin, for example, perished at the hands of Russian
soldiers.
During the retreat and disorganization, when the high command could not
use force to restore order, the commissars were able to muster this force and
use it. When the commissar of the 7th Army was bringing order behind the
front, he intercepted up to 15,000 deserters.
For fear of belaboring the attention of this exalted meeting, I will limit
myself only to what has already been said in order to confirm that the com
missariat is both a logical and unavoidable [institution] at the present time and
that it must be realized in practice.
I agree with the Commander in Chief of the Western Front that great dis
cretion should be exercised in selecting persons for the responsible office of com
missar, and relations between the representatives of the revolutionary authorities
and the commanding staff should be just as thoroughly worked out. Until the
present time, the selection of the commissars has been completely random.
If I were to look at our position through the eyes of the Commander in Chief
of the Western Front, I would have to say that we have lost the war. But I cannot
agree with this; I say that we must end the war without disgrace.
It is true that our position is difficult, but it is not hopeless. By a series of
reasonable and resolute measures we will bring our army to a condition which
is no worse than was that of the old army.
I subscribe almost completely to the opinion of the Commander in Chief of
the Southwestern Front. I would have subscribed in full, if it were not for the
question of disciplinary authority. I subscribe, in principle, to his opinion re
garding the necessity of restoring the disciplinary authority of the commanders,
but is the time ripe for this? The adoption of this measure will bring no appre
ciable result in combat, but the disturbances will be enormous and the measure
will encounter the opposition of the soldiers. The time is not yet ripe for the
introduction of this measure.
I consider it necessary to introduce the death penalty in the theater of war,
but it should apply to commanders as well as soldiers.
general lukomskii remarked that the death penalty should apply to civilians
who are corrupting the army.
general alekseev . Everything has already been said about the condition
of our army. The fate of Russia is now at stake; the army must be regenerated,
otherwise all will be lost, all the gains of the revolution will be lost. It is impos
sible to save the army without restoring discipline.
There can be no doubt that the measures of the Government have shattered
the army. First there was Order No. 1, then the Declaration. . . .
The Declaration appeared, as I saidthe last nail to be driven into the coffin
of the valor, steadfastness, and discipline of the Russian army.
I fully subscribe to the measures which have already been proposed for raising
the fighting capacity of the army, but it is absolutely necessary that they apply
also to the rear.
I am familiar with the life and the activities of the rear units. We are feeding
an enormous number of idlers. All the reserve units are literally doing nothing
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1001
from morning to night. (As an example, General Alekseev quoted his conversa
tion with soldiers from reserve units stationed in Smolensk.) There is no training,
no education in the reserve units, utter debauchery [prevails].
If we are going to raise the spirit and the valor of the army without paying
attention to the replacements, they will nullify our work and will continue to
bring disintegration into the army.
To change the [officer] personnel would be to undermine the army even more.
It is necessary, of course, to remove the unfit, but it is inadmissible to throw out
at once 120 generals among whom there were many good ones.
It is necessary to pay the most serious attention to the hospitals. They are
overcrowded. Take even the very same [hospital of] Smolensk. If a physician
maintains that any one person is in good health, he is subjected to abuse: What
does he understand, a soldier who undergoes an examination would say, my
whole insides ache.
g e n er a l l u k o m s k ii remarked that here, at Stavka, Doctor Sokolov is re
questing [a transfer] to the ranks on account of the abuse to which he is subjected
by patients who have to be reexamined.
g e n er a l ALEKSEEV (continued). Corrupting literature is flooding the army
and arrives there sooner than other [literature]. It is inconceivable to struggle
against it under such circumstances.
I am in full agreement with the measures proposed by the Commanders in
Chief for raising the fighting capacity of the army.
With regard to the committees I will say that no matter what orders are
written, the committees will always be interfering in everything. It is necessary
to abolish them. Of course, this cannot be done at once; one must come to it
gradually. . . .
But, I repeat, these committees cannot be abolished at once, a [plan] for a
gradual transition must be worked out.
I regard the commissariat as a temporary measure. It cannot last long, be
cause it is incompatible with the organization of armed forces. Military history
is already familiar with the institution of commissars in the times of the Direc
torate, and even then they brought nothing but harm. The small value gained
from their activities does not compensate for the great harm which comes from
dual power.
g e n er a l r u z s k ii reiterated the grievances of his colleagues.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . There can be no two views regarding the necessity of
strict discipline. An example is Germany which is surrounded by enemies and
is still holding out, thanks only to discipline.
Of course, it is not just a question of whether we will have a republic or a
monarchy; discipline is always essential, no army can exist without it. I will by
pass the reasons for the disintegration of our army; I will only say that Russias
misfortune lies in an undisciplined army. We have no army, either on the front or
in the rear. There is only one reason for the difficulties which the Provisional
Government experienced in Petrograd, and for all the disasters within Russia
namely, the absence of an army.
The dissatisfaction within the country and the failures at the front stem from
the fact that we have no discipline.
1002 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Discipline must be maintained not only on the front but also in the rear.
There has always been, and always will be, distrust. But, in general, the
soldiers have trusted the officers. I say this without partiality. The recent dis
trust of the soldiers arose as a result of their having received freedom not from
the Government, but in spite of it. This, precisely, is what had brought about the
distrust.
Perhaps the Provisional Government (I am speaking of the former one) did
not have this in view, but this is how it turned out. The soldiers began to suspect
that the officers wanted to deprive them of their rights. They were christened
bourgeois. But the officer, basically, is not a bourgeois but a real proletariat.
GENERAL r u z sk ii rem ark ed th a t th e g en erals, to o , a re p ro leta ria ts.
general brusilov (continued). If anyone has wealth at the present time,
it is the peasantry.
The officers were more revolutionary than the soldiers who became revolu
tionary because of the promises of land and freedom.
I repeat that perhaps the Government did not intend to put the question so
sharply, but that is how it turned out to be. I have served in the army for a long
time and I know that there was no distrust toward the officers.
Thus, discipline must be restored in the army, the commanders must be
vested with authority. As for the military committees, they cannot be abolished,
but they must be subordinated to the commanders, who may, if necessary, dissolve
them. I do not speak out of a feeling of bitternessI have always worked well
with the executive committee. But some succeed in doing this and others do not.
The committees cannot be permitted to do whatever they wish. For example,
Romm, the chairman of the executive committee of the 12th Army, addressing
me directly by telegram, finds that the resignation of General Radko-Dimitriev
from the post of army commander is untimely. I did not even have in mind the
replacement of General Radko-Dimitriev, but I consider it inappropriate that the
committee should interfere in this matter.
It is desirable to have the commissars at the present time, but the extent of
their powers should be defined. I consider it a matter of honor to make a note
of the useful work of the Commissar of the Southwestern Front. The commissars
may have to be abolished later on, but they are needed at the present time. The
commanders themselves are asking for commissars and agitators, but they cannot
replace the commanders and must assist them.
I always hear the statement that the commanding personnel was appointed by
the old government. No one has the right to say this. All the soldiers, all of you
were also under the old government. Everyone in Russia was. Similarly, all of
us were not revolutionaries before. Now I serve this revolution, I serve it honestly,
and no one has the right to assert that I was appointed by the old government. It
must be considered that we are all appointed by the new government and dot
the i 5s once and for all.
There is no army in the world in which the subordinate does not salute his
superior. For example, FranceI do not even speak of Germany. The act of
saluting is a form of greeting exchanged between persons belonging to one and
the same organization. For our common people, not to salute someone means
to spit upon him. Of course, when both persons are in civilian clothes, there is
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1003
no question of saluting, but when both are in uniform, failure to salute cannot
be tolerated.
MINISTER KERENSKY. In regard to the question raised by General Ruzskii about
taking a vote on the measures proposed for raising the combat potential [of the
army], I feel that this should not be done. What is most important and valuable
to the Government is to hear the opinions of the commanders and the military
authorities.
I will not reply to the attacks and enter a realm which bears the character of
a political argument and of a squaring of accounts with the present political
system.
General Ruzskii says that the new government is to be blamed for everything.
Previously, in the words of the General, there were no outstanding losses, but now
the people are being led to the slaughter. But there were no great losses during
the last operation. Newspapers of a certain trend have persistently adhered to
the idea that the offensive of Kerensky and Brusilov caused losses such as the
troops have never known before (Russkii Vestnik, Tovarishch [German propa
ganda papers] and others). But this is not true.
Much that has been said I cannot refer to myself. It was not I, after all, who
wrote the Declaration, but the commission under General Polivanov. However,
it was suggested here that it was written by civilian persons.
g en er a l r u z sk ii remarked that he said that it was written by persons who
were not familiar with military life, and General Polivanov did not know military
life, because he had spent his whole life in offices.
m in is t e r k e r e n sk y (continued). When the Declaration was announced, we
were forced to endure a whole campaign from the Left because the Declaration ap
peared inadequate. I am not defending the Declaration, and had I been the
Minister [of War] at the time it was drawn up, the Declaration would not have
been issued. I am compelled to liquidate many things that I received as a legacy.
Concerning the interference of committees, I will say that I have not confirmed
a single appointment in accordance with committee resolutions. I have always
referred the requests I received to the proper authorities. That is why I completely
reject this part.
I understand that many cannot reconcile themselves to the present state of
affairs and are trying to return to the old ways, but the Russian people will find
enough strength to fight against attempts to restore the old regime.
If we were to adopt the maximal program of General Denikin (I know how this
General works, and I know that this is not an attempt to restore the old regime),
we must expect tremendous disorders. Personally, I have nothing against relieving
myself of the duties of Minister of War and Navy, recalling the commissars, and
closing down the committees. But I am convinced that on the very next day, a
state of complete anarchy would start spreading over Russia and the commanding
personnel would start being butchered. Such sharp transitions must not occur.
Then it was indicated at the conference that the Provisional Government
undermined the authority of the officers.
g e n er a l ALEKSEEV and g en er a l r u z s k ii declared that no such accusations
were made against the Government
1004 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
minister kerensky (continued). Distrust of the Government is a common
ailment that has remained after the old regime. In the army this was manifested
in attitudes toward officers for which reason it was necessary to appoint civilian
persons as commissars.
The same [ailment] told on the workers, and similar distrust of authority
was manifested in intellectual circles. I experience this myself. [People] now
address themselves to the new government in forms which they never would have
dared to use with respect to the old government in the past. This is a common
phenomenon and it holds just as true for the soldiers; it is the result of a process
through which the country is passing.
Ever since I entered the Ministry, all my aspirations added up to creating
a combat potential in the army, adjusting relations between officers and soldiers
and between the front and the rear, but at the same time taking into considera
tion the historical moment and what is possible at the present time.
As for the proposed measures, I believe that General Denikin himself will
not insist on their immediate implementation. It must be noted that the most
unsuccessful commissars and committees happen to be on the Western Front,
under General Denikin.
General Denikin correctly said that he had never, from any person, heard
about the real situation on the Western Front. General Gurko was saying that all
was well. General Gurko was the author of the establishment of the third divisions
in the corps, the very divisions from which disintegration stemmed.
The dismissal of General Gurko was not a mistake. He took the liberty of
addressing himself in the rudest form to the Provisional Government, declaring
that under the conditions that had arisen he could not carry the responsibility
for the work assigned to him.
As long as I am in power, such actions will not be tolerated.10
I can understand General Denikin, who suddenly found himself facing such
difficult conditions.
I did not appoint commissars until the Southwestern Front requested that I
give them support. When other fronts started to make the request, I did not have
another Savinkov and I sent whoever was at hand.
I toured the front not only to hold meetings, as General Ruzskii said, but also
because the majority of the commanders could not manage without outside help.
Who was the first to suppress the Siberian sharpshooters? Who was the first
to shed his blood for suppressing the recalcitrants ? My protege, my commissar.
I repeat that had I been Minister of War at the time, there would have been
no Declaration. But when I entered the Ministry, the Declaration was already
drawn up by Polivanovs commission, and I was compelled to sign it.
I will formulate my attitude toward the measures and desires that were voiced
here: everything that is required for strengthening discipline must be introduced,
but in a way that will not affect the basic gains of the revolution, so that the people
will not think that we were returning to the pre-February regime. Therefore, I
think that some things must be discarded, because their implementation might
appear as a rejection of new forms, while other things must be carried out, and I
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1005
will do everything in my power to carry them out. The Provisional Government
is now acting with resolute measures, which will probably have to be increased in
strength, and I think that almost all of them, with a few exceptions, can be carried
out in a short time.
Mikhail Vasilevich [Alekseev] speaks of appointments of young persons. But
appointments without regard for rank is a resolution of the Provisional Govern
ment which affects all the ministries. Appointments without regard for rank can
not be rejected because this is called for by the conditions of the moment.
I am younger than Guchkov; however, I did not dismiss 120 generals. The
only thing I did was to relieve the commander of the 7th Army [sic: Lukomskii,
1st Army Corps] and appoint him Chief of Staff, as a person who is familiar with
current operations, and who is therefore the most suitable in my eyes.
general ruzskii noted that an appointment of this nature complies with the
law which provides for such cases.
general Alekseev . The appointment of ensigns to posts of commander of a
brigade is an abnormal phenomenon. Appointments cannot be made straight off
the cuff, since only carefully considered appointments can produce good results.
minister kerensky . Are you hinting at the appointment of Zmiev to Nichnii
Novgorod? Yes, but urgent measures had to be adopted then in order to prevent
disorders, and this appointment was recommended by Verkhovskii, who man
aged very well with his duties in Moscow; he suggested Zmiev, and I confirmed
the appointment.
general brusilov . Then he must be promoted to general.
minister kerensky . Myshlaevskii brought disintegration into the troops of
the military district of Kazan. I even spoke in the Duma about the necessity of
tightening [the discipline] in that military district. And I think that the appoint
ment of a colonel there will help matters, he will tighten [the discipline] of the
district.11
general oenikin . On the matter of appointments, we have been stressing the
necessity of appointing persons with comhat and service experience.
general ruzskii. Polivanov has never been on active duty, he spent all his
time in offices, he has had no combat or service experience. Recently he has been
under strong pressure from the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies.
general denikin . There was a soldier in his commission who exerted very
great influence.
general alekseev . There was a group of seven persons in the commission
who controlled everything. One of the members of this commission said that
all these people had brains that were turned inside out.
general ruzskii. How, for example, was the question of saluting settled?
The abolition of saluting altogether would even have been preferable to this
saluting when one so desires.
minister kerensky . Of course, everything has its negative aspects. Now
everything is in an abnormal state. Could I, a civilian, have been a Minister of
War? No. Could a change be made in everything at the present time? No, it
cannot.
As for my not having sent a telegram expressing sympathy to Noskovs family,
ii Doc. 781.
1006 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
this was an oversight on my part. But the assertion that I supposedly want to
humiliate the officers is unfair. I give the officers their due for their valor, but
the officers, too, have not always been up to their mark. There was practically
no unit which betrayed its duty that did not have an officer who conducted the
propaganda. There are many examples: the case of the 7th Army, Khaustov,12
Lieutenant-Colonel Popov. Wherever there were no officers of this kind, the situa
tion was easy to handle. Another category of officers, primarily in positions of
command, are those who do not want to take the present situation into account
and who stake an Italian strike. They leave everything up to the committees until
everything disintegrates. It has seemed to me for a long time that Radko-Dimitriev
is not up to his mark, he has given way too much to the soldiers; I want to remove
him, but he incites the committees against me.
It must be noted that the responsibility of everyone is so interdependent that
one cannot place everyone into either the group of those who are inciting or the
group of those who are subjected to incitement. One must act according to the
dictates of ones conscience. He who cannot reconcile himself to the new order
should not force himself, let him resign. There is talk that some measures are
premature, but if the contemplated measures were to be carried out by legitimate
channels, i.e., by sending them from one person to another, awaiting opinions and
conclusions, it would take too much time and the work would fail. But events are
flying at the present time. This urgency has both a positive and a negative aspect.
But I am at your disposal as a machinery which wields vast powers.
. . . I speak in this way not because I am opposed to the measures indicated,
but because I must consider the mood of the masses. One can now expect this
mood to shift.
general ruzskii. Aleksandr Fedorovich, there is no need for you to take
everything as a personal reference. Of course it is difficult to correct what has
been spoiled. It was not you who spoiled everything; but still corrective measures
must be taken, otherwise Russia will perish.
It would be a very good thing if the Government would finally get rid of its
fear of returning to the old. There can be no fear, because there can be no return
to the past.
We have all served for decades in military service; it hurts us to see what is
going on around us, and that is why we express our thoughts in such a heated
manner.
In regard to the democratization of the army, I will note that the army began
to be democratized from the end of 1914. I made a report about this to the
former emperor. The enormous replacement of persons that has occurred in
the army can be seen even from the example of the regiment in which I commenced
my service. Forty-four thousand replacements have gone through this regiment
since the war.
minister Tereshchenko . I would like to say just a few words now as a
member of the Government. The reproaches directed against the Government
are unjust, because the Government is in the process of drawing up measures
some of which go even further than what has been proposed by General Denikin.
Speaking of measures, it is necessary to point out the noteworthy fact that the
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1007
present conference is taking place at a time when, due to the conditions which have
developed, these measures can be carried into effect.
One must become reconciled to the commissars, albeit reluctantly, for they
cannot be abolished at the present time.
Only a month ago it seemed impossible to introduce the death penalty. Now it
is accepted unanimously by the Government, and its introduction did not give
rise to difficulties, and the people accepted it with calm.
However, the death penalty cannot now be introduced in the rear. The masses
must be made aware of the necessity of the measure as soon as possible.
To abolish the committees, as everyone is suggesting, cannot be done now.
This must be approached gradually.
I must say that in certain respects, the Government has gone further than the
measures proposed here. A measure is now being drawn up for prosecuting
organizations which adopt criminal resolutions and decisions.
In general, now is not the time to reproach one another, we must work to
gether for restoring the combat potential of our army. All measures must be
carried out gradually, rather than all at once, keeping in step with the wakening
of national sentiment which has grown noticeably during the past six or eight
weeks. Everything that can be done now, will be done.
A break was announced at 8 P.M. The Conference was resumed at 10 P.M.
minister Tereshchenko . Our offensive, even though unsuccessful, has in
creased the Allies5 confidence in us, and for many, including the Americans, it
came as a surprise, because they did not think that we would turn to active opera
tions before autumn. At any rate, the Allies saw in our offensive the material
[evidence] of our desire to advance.
The question that interests me now is the possibility of joint action with the
Allies provided the combat potential of our army is restored.
As you know, the British were supposed to have started the offensive today,
and the French should follow them in a short time. I would like to know the
proper policy for me to pursue when the Allies question me about our future
actions.
When our offensive was launched, and when it developed successfully in its
initial phase, the Allies sent us the most optimistic telegrams, to which, however,
I replied with extreme reserve, pointing out that we^ have not yet exerted the
pressure that should yield decisive results.
general brusilov . At the beginning of the campaign I pointed out that one
should not rely too heavily on its success. In any event, the size of the offensive
we conducted was within our capacities under the given circumstances.
As concerns our future operations, we will not be prepared for them until
next winter. Rather, not even until spring. The conditions of a winter campaign
are such that this campaign would be even less successful than the last one. We
might find it possible to conduct a minor campaign on the Rumanian or the
Caucasian Front, but one cannot speak of this now with certainty. As concerns
the Southwestern Front, this Front is so disorganized that one cannot count on
a campaign on this Front before next spring.
minister Tereshchenko . The commitments we make to the Allies will orig
inate from here, and not from Petrograd. I need the information referred to for
1008 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
my personal orientation in order to know the policy I should pursue. The
Rumanians are highly disturbed at the present time.
g e n e r a l BRUSILOV. Yes, the Rumanians have done comparatively much; they
were successful. But in view of the general situation on our front, I have sent a
telegram to General Shcherbachev ordering him to halt any further advance. I
am afraid that we may not be able to hold out in Kirlibab.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . Our principal concern must be to hold the section
of Rumania which is now occupied by our troops. The Rumanians are now
worried about [the possibility of] having to evacuate Rumania. This circumstance
gives rise to two problems: 1) the necessity of shifting the Rumanian army to
Russian territory and of moving the Rumanian royal family to Russia, which
presents certain inconveniences in view of the establishment of a republic in our
country; and 2) the fact that England and France are afraid that Rumania, in the
face of the aforesaid circumstance, may conclude a separate peacewhich can be
expected.
g e n e r a l br u sil o v . Yes, it is possible, because our troops are behaving ex
tremely tactlessly with respect to Rumania, interfering in her internal policy.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . They demanded the abolition of the death penalty,
they interfered with local legislation. Repressive measures against all this have
been adopted.
g e n e r a l BRUSILOV. I telegraphed General Shcherbachev that interference by
committees is out of place.
I think that the Rumanians would very gladly join the German coalition, but
the presence of our troops in Rumania prevents them from doing so because they
do not feel strong enough to fight against them.
I do not know where the Germans intend to halt their offensive. Now that
the attack is going to commence on the French front, the Germans, in my opinion,
having occupied Galicia, will hold back. However, one should not lose sight of the
possibility that our PodoPskaia guberniya, which is rich in food supplies, may
attract their attention.
m in is t e r k e r e n sk y . In view of the possibility of further failures, it becomes
necessary to discuss the following three questions:
1) The question of evacuating the inhabitants. Our central guberniyas are
very much disturbed by the possibility of their having to accept the wave of
evacuation and request that such evacuation be directed not to Moscow, but to
the Volga.
2) It is necessary to discuss, as a matter of foresight, the question of evacuating
Petrograd and its environs.
3) The question of purveyance of state papers, since the Bureau of Printing
and Engraving cannot be evacuated.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . Aleksandr Sergeevich [Lukomskii] and I recommend that
the inhabitants remain where they are. No particular disasters will follow from
this and there is no need, in fact, for evacuation. If the question is decided in
this way, there will not be many evacuees.
The North (Petrograd) should be relieved of factories, but there is no direct
threat to Petrograd. The Germans need four, five or six free corps in order
to occupy Petrograd. This is a time-consuming operation. By the time the Ger
mans amass the necessary troops the season for bad roads will begin. This is
such a big obstacle that the enemy wiE not have sufficient troops. My opinion is
that Petrograd is out of danger. It would be interesting [to hear] what Mikhail
Vasilevich has to say.
g e n er a l a l e k s e e v . Formerly I was of the opinion that Petrograd was out
of danger, but at that time we had an army; now, however, aE that remains is
human dust. One cannot vouch for anything. But a campaign against Petrograd
is very complicated. Operations against Riga and Polotsk are another matter,
they are feasible. It is possible that our front wiE be broken through at these
points, which will force us to withdraw from the Dvina. The enemy will now
aim his blows at the right flank of the Rumanian front in order to cut us off from
Rumania.
1010 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
I agree. Yes, Petrograd is out of danger. But the enemy can threaten Riga,
Polotsk, and the Rumanian front.
g e n e r a l b r u sil o v . Most likely, one should expect the Germans to attack on
the Northern Front.
g e n e r a l ALEKSEEV. Owing to the establishment of a united Latvia, her last
third, too, will pass into the hands of the Germans. The possession of Riga and
lower Dvina has far too great an importance for the Germans.
g e n e r a l BRUSILOV. We are presupposing all this, but we cannot say how it will
turn out in practice. At any rate, I do not advise you to start evacuating Riga,
because if the Germans find out about this, they will strike for a certainty. More
over, Riga has already been almost completely evacuated. Of course, certain un
wieldy things can be sent out now.
m in is t e r k e r e n s k y . In other words, no steps should be taken.
m in is t e r Te r e s h c h e n k o . Concerning Finland, there is nothing in particular
to fear. The change in mood of the navy has affected the mood in Finland. The
measures that have been adopted for maintaining order will prevent any possibility
of an open revolt.
g e n e r a l r o m a n o v sk ii (Chief of General Staff). Five regiments of the Petro
grad Garrison have been disbanded. The instigators are being brought to trial
while the passive elements will be sent to the front with their salaries reduced to
the old rate. A total of around 90,000 persons will be taken out of Petrograd.
m in is t e r k e r e n s k y . Summarizing what has been saidthe soldiers of the
Petrograd Garrison must be formed into a company for a regiment, or must be
sent to the Caucasus.
g e n er a l l u k o m s k ii . One cannot send everyone to the Caucasus.
g e n er a l Ve l ic h k o . But workers are needed for the rear lines in the sector
of the 1st Army.
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . We are not in a position now to strengthen our rear lines.
In Germany, everyone up to the age of 60 has been [called up for service] while we
are unable to enlist the 40-year-olds. Commissar Savinkov has made a correct
assertion that they cannot be left in the rear.
MINISTER k e r e n s k y . Then this means that they must be sent to the front?
g e n er a l b r u sil o v . Yes, to the front and to the Caucasus.
g e n er a l r o m a n o v sk ii (Chief of the General Staff). Fifteen thousand to each
front.
The Conference closed at 11 P.M.
876. L e t t e r to K e r e n sk y f r o m A l e k s e e v
[Ya. Ya. Slavik, Iz dnevnika Generala M. V. Alekseeva, Russkii Istoricheskii Arkhiv,
I (1929), 29-33.]
July 20, 1917, No. 24
D e a r A l e k sa n d r F e d o r o v ic h ,
Lack of time at the conference of July 16 in Mogilev prevented me from sub
mitting for discussion some of the most vital questions, the successful solution
of which will determine the future course of the war.
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1011
Circumstances point to the inevitability of a fourth winter campaign in 1917
18. In carrying it out we shall encounter difficulties entirely unknown before.
Those privations with which the entire personnel of the army in action inevitably
has to deal were shouldered by our soldiers only when the discipline was depend
able and firm, when lack of food, slow and delayed supply of warm clothing, as
well as difficult climatic and atmospheric conditions were tolerated as an inevitable
evil to be borne in the name of the sacred duty to ones motherland.
The wretched picture of the actual state of discipline among the soldiers was
revealed to you on July 16. Information received by me shows that the roads in the
rear are covered with deserters on the Western Front as well as (and in particular)
on the Southwestern Front. And this in the summer during a favorable time of
year when the army is completely provided with provisions. To launch the winter
campaign with such a demoralized soldier who has forgotten his duty and
discipline will be difficult: the escape to the rear will be so great that it will be
totally impossible to overcome it in time with reinforcements. Trenches will be
occupied by army units so undermanned that it will be difficult to hold the position
against partial and even light thrusts by a disciplined and stubborn enemy.
Even in the event that the measures suggested by the military members of the
conference on July 16 are carried out by you immediately and with a bold and
vigorous stroke, the desired results of restoring the morale and the vanished
discipline in the army will take approximately three months. And this would re
quire calm but unrelentingly stubborn work of the commanders of all ranks . . .
The work, moreover, would have to be carried on not only in active but in
reserve units, scattered over the entire territory of the country. Only within
such an approximate period (at best) could we restore moral resiliency to the
soldier and a certain fighting strength to the army. The end of this period coin
cides with the onset of winter. Consequently, the highest good of the country,
the necessity of its salvation, urgently demands that the orders outlining the needed
measures for the education of the soldier and the restoration of discipline, and
the absolute repeal of the notorious Declaration of Rights should be carried out
without delays and hesitations. Courage will achieve its salutary task. And I
do not share the misgivings expressed at the conference that orders will be issued
today and tomorrow will see a slaughter of officers and the high commanding
personnel. Events in Petrograd of July 35 showed clearly that the more profound
the moral degradation of the mob, the more cowardly it is, and the more readily
does it surrender . . . when it meets decision and bravery.
Excesses may occur in some places. They can and should be crushed with a
ruthless hand. This . . . will subsequently preserve hundreds of thousands of
lives and prevent the possibility of a recurrence of insurrections.
A no less important question to be decided is that of providing the army
with food. . . .
This year the conditions of procurement of provisions and fodder for the
army have changed radically. . . . The anarchy which is gradually gripping our
village radically changes the condition for the . . . procurement of grain.
As a result: (1) Russia will receive a considerably smaller quantity of grain
and fodder this year than in previous years; and (2) the supply on hand will
be for the most part scattered throughout small peasant holdings. And the peasant,
particularly now, is not inclined to give up his grain to the state, especially at
fixed prices. To some extent this is not without justification: he will give away
1012 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
the grain at fixed prices, but will be unable to buy at fixed prices, or for the most
part be altogether unable to find on the market such commodities as cotton goods,
sugar, kerosene, sickles, and scythes.
To requisition grain from the large-scale owner is simple and easy. But just
try to carry this measure out . . . with the peasant who now prefers to bury a
considerable part of his grain.
Perhaps some sort of instructions have already been issued for the transfer
of the harvest into the hands of the state and for the elimination of concealment
and speculation. But locally nothing has as yet been done. Consequently for all
practical purposes the question . . . should be considered unsolved. What may
be done afterwards may prove too late to remedy matters.
I have already had occasion above to express the opinion that the former
soldier knew how to endure privations. The soldier of today is not capable of
doing so. And shortages of food will increase desertion and lead to grievous dis
orders.
Finally, we must pause on yet another question of utmost importance for
the entire country in general and for the army in particular. Recently collected
data point to the fact that our transport is deteriorating daily. If this continues,
by October or November of this year the railroads will be unable to fulfill even
one-half of the demands made upon them.
You may say that I am not in a position to speak of the national significance
of the impending breakdown in transport . . . which is now in its final stages.
But I cannot be silent about the terrifying conditions which will result in the
active army when the railroads prove helpless to bring provisions to the troops
and fodder to the cavalry units, and to carry out transport operations without
which it is impossible to conduct serious operations of any kind.
On both of these questionsguarantee of provisions and preservation of the
function of . . . railroadsurgent and planned work is needed as well as the
urgent implementation of a number of practical government measures.
I cannot pass in silence my talks of July 17 with the representatives of the
Allied armies at the headquarters of the Supreme Commander. On the strength of
relations established with them earlier, I had the opportunity to hear their frank
misgivings about the fitness of our army as a result of the grievous and complete
loss of discipline and any kind of fighting spirit, all of which might result in the
possible worthlessness of Russia . . . as an ally, unless measures are taken for
the reconstruction of the army.
As one who has over many years, and particularly during the war years,
given all my strength in the service of the country, I deeply feel the great mis
fortunes and trials which have befallen our long-suffering Russia.
God has given you much. You hold in your hands now tremendous power and
the opportunity to introduce into life measures to save our motherland, to give
her back the strength to gain victory and to initiate creative work that will heal
those wounds and afflictions from which our motherland suffers as she never
suffered in her long history.
Perhaps you may still inspire your collaborators with the ability to do
practical and fruitful work for the good of the motherland, which up to this
time it has neither seen nor felt. . . . And the motherland . . . passionately
awaits such work. The curse of the people will fall upon your head if her ex
pectations are betrayed, if you, holding so high and important a post do not make
EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN THE ARMY AFTER JULY 1013
a heroic effort to save the motherland hy forcing your collaborators to forget
everything else and be inspired with but one thought and wishto bring tangible
practical benefits to Russia.
But first of all, the army must be restored. Without the army the ruin of
the motherland is inevitable. The measures for her regeneration are known. They
are in your hands, and all that is honorable, steadfast, unhesitating, and disin
terested awaits their quick and final realization. To you then will belong the
gratitude of your contemporaries and posterity.
I beg to, etc.
[M. V. A lekseev ]
Not even the July breakthroughs in the front, in which the Austro-German
troops poured through our lines, were as heavy a blow to revolutionary Russia.
1032 MILITARY AFFAIRS AND OPERATIONS
Riga is one of the most important political, industrial, and cultural centers
of Russia. It is her chief outlet to the Baltic Sea and the center of the Baltic region.
The loss of Riga in itself is a grave defeat. But it is a tremendous calamity because
of possible consequences.
The Dvinathe mightiest of natural barriers to the onslaught of Austro-
German troops still obedient to their emperorsis forced. The taking of Riga
exposes considerably the approaches to Petrograd.
The entire country must be roused from the blow.
Not one minute of despondency! No yielding to panic! In a moment of grave
danger the country must preserve complete self-possession.
The duty of the organized proletariatthat vanguard of the revolutionary
peopleis to set an example of self-control and restraint. The dark forces of
counterrevolution lie in wait for the moment of weakness of the revolution in
order to inflict upon it a deadly blow. These new defeatists, defeatists of revolu
tionary Russia, will undoubtedly attempt to profit by any confusion, panic, and
thoughtless statements in order to restore the shattered stronghold of tsarism on
the misfortunes of the land. Thereforecomplete self-possession and merciless
warfare against counterrevolutionary intrigues!
The revolution was greeted by the Allies with mixed feelings of hope and
apprehension.1 The internal disintegration of the last months of the monarchy
had severely shaken their confidence in Russias ability to continue as an effective
military force, and they hoped that the revolution was a manifestation of popular
dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war and of a determination to see it prose
cuted more efficiently and effectively. But they were also disturbed by the evidences
of war-weariness, the shattered economy inherited by the new regime, and the
rapid emergence of political elements that labeled the war imperialist and pro
posed to work for its early conclusion by a negotiated peace, preferably through
the united action of the peoples of the belligerent states. From the beginning,
therefore, the Allies tempered their sympathy and support for the Provisional Gov
ernment with admonitions against any revision of war aims, little understanding
or appreciating, in most cases, either the shadings within the democracy on this
issue or the difficult and delicate task the Government faced in dealing with this
problem.
The members of the first Provisional Government were unanimous in their
view that Russia should continue the war to a decisive victory in close collabora
tion with her Allies for the sake of vital national interests. However, most of the
ministers, after familiarizing themselves with the provisions of the secret treaties
concluded by the Allies during the previous war years, recognized the need to
change the formulation of Russias war aims. This was done in the Governments
declaration of March 27, which reflected opinions widely held by the public and
supported by a majority of the Soviet.
Only the Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. N. Miliukov, consistently fought all
attempts within and without die Government to modulate or modify Russias
objectives. In particular, his vocal reiteration in the face of public antagonism
that Russia continue, even after the declaration of March 27, to demand the Straits
and Constantinople, and his covert attempt, in opposition to the convictions of
Guchkov and Alekseev, to revive plans for their military seizure, became the
touchstones of his policy. His statements and activity undermined confidence in
1 Russian diplomacy during the First World War to the revolution is described in C. Jay
Smith, Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914-1917, and for the revolutionary period to
Brest-Litovsk, in Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution. Both contain very
useful bibliographies on sources. Of the memoir material, special mention should be made
of Sir George Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, 2 vols., and
Maurice Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars pendant la grande guerre, 3 vols.
1040 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
the entire Government, and following his dispatch of the note of April 18 to the
Allies, precipitated the first major internal crisis of the regime.
The first coalition government was formed soon after the April days and
resulted from the Soviet decision to accede to the pressing demands of the Provi
sional Government to permit its members to accept ministerial appointments. In
its first statement of policy, the new Government endorsed in its entirety the
declaration of March 27, that is, the determination to continue the struggle for
the defense of Russia, the maintenance of Allied unity, and the decision to work
for a peace without annexations or indemnities. As spokesman for the Govern
ment, Miliukovs successor, M. I. Tereshchenko, did not make a specific unilateral
renunciation of the annexations promised in existing agreements; rather, he pro
posed that all the Allies counsel together in the near future for the revision of
war aims. But Allied reluctance and the subsequent failure of the June offensive
combined to delay the meeting and to weaken Russian chances of success at the
conference table.2 Only in October was a date definitely setNovember 3by
which time the Allies had indicated that the conference would deal only with the
conduct of the war and, in any case, the Bolsheviks had seized power in Petrograd.
Almost from the beginning of its existence, the Government was beset by
Allied demands for a more active prosecution of the war and by indications of
the deteriorating position of Russian representatives in Allied councils. Decisions
of importance were taken among Britain, France, and Italy without consulting
Russia and with only token post factum reference to her wishes, even in cases in
which her vital interests were involved, such as the Sixte affair, the partition of
Asia Minor, and intervention in Greece. In September the Allied ambassadors,
excepting Francis, who had not received instructions, took the unusual step of
expressing their governments alarm over the internal and military situation fol
lowing the Kornilov affair in a sharp joint note that not unnaturally aroused the
ire of Kerensky and Tereshchenko.3 Meantime, supplies from the Allies, including
munitions, fell below the promised quotas and were found, in some instances, to
be defective.4
2The hope the Government placed upon a successful offensive to strengthen their diplo
matic hand is indicated in many places, among them a telegram of July 20 from Kerensky at
the front to Tereshchenko. Kerensky wrote: Hasten the convening of the Allied Conference.
An increase in tempo and greater clarity are essential in Allied diplomacy. The struggle on
the front should be exploited by every means in view of the situation of the country and of the
army of which you are well aware. Remember that every step at the front costs us tremendous
effort. Only through the combined and simultaneous action of diplomacy and the army will we
consolidate the situation and avoid collapse. Sbormk sekretnykh dokumentov, No. 44, p. 113.
8This demarche and the Russian reaction is covered under the Kornilov affair in
Volume HI.
4 Although Ambassador Bakhmetev in Washington was of the opinion that the failure
of the Allies to ship to Russia all that was promised could be ascribed to the great shortage of
tonnage, his colleague in London was convinced that it was principally the consequence of
Allied misgivings concerning the course of events in Russia. A conference of Allied repre
sentatives in Petrograd in late June, which met to consider the question, gave lack of tonnage
as the official reason, at the same time offering advice on the improvement of Russian transport
and industry. Ekon. Polozhenie, II, 475, 484, 495-97, 521-22. See also Lozinskii, Ekonomiche
skaia Politika, p. 33. In his telegram from the front to Tereshchenko on June 20, Kerensky
reported that the heavy artillery delivered by their [Allied] governments apparently comes,
in large measure, from defective stocks as 35 per cent have not resisted two days of moderate
firing. Sbornik sekretnykh dokumentov, No. 44, p. 113.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1041
From the other side, the Soviet campaign for a more aggressive approach to
peace, which began with the March 14 Appeal to the Peoples of All the World,
continued. Further appeals were supplemented by consultation and collaboration
with foreign socialists in an effort to call a conference at Stockholm to outline a
program and initiate action toward a negotiated peace without annexations or
indemnities. To the extreme left, the Bolsheviks proposed far more radical
solutions.
The Stockholm Conference did not materialize, owing to differences in the
ranks of international socialism and the refusal of the Western Allies to grant
passports to the delegates. The Bolshevik exhortations to revolution abroad failed
of their purpose. Yet, these activities inaugurated or stimulated by Russian groups
certainly did nothing to diminish the Allies anxiety over Russias future or to
soften the tenor of their flow of advice to the Provisional Government. At the same
time, the Allies were either unable or unwilling to move in the direction that might
have assisted the democratic regime to stay the rising opposition to the war under
the old dispensation and to retain powerthat is, toward a revision of war aims.
Clearly, the Provisional Government found itself between the upper and nether
stones of domestic impatience and Allied intransigence.
A third road was that of separate peace. But the Government remained firm
in its belief that a separate peace would be a dishonorable betrayal of Russia and
her allies, opening the way to the dismemberment of the country and to a German
victory in the west.
Since 1915 the German Government had been attempting to make a separate
peace with one of the great Allied powers, and especially with Russia. Before
the revolution, Berlin tried, without success, direct approaches to the Emperor and
various intrigues in the right-germanophile circles of Petrograd society and the
Rasputin clique. After the disappearance of the Romanovs, the German Govern
ment completely changed its separate-peace tactics in Russia. Confronted by more
and more pronounced difficulties, internally and on the front, the Central Powers
intensified their efforts to free their eastern front by undermining Russian morale,
encouraging internal division, and even provoking civil war. The German Gov
ernment took advantage publicly and privately of all the opportunities offered to
promote the idea of a separate peace, especially among the soldiers at the front
and in the rear. In official manifestos, by fraternization, by front-line pourparlers,
and in secret contacts with some Russian political circles, it tried to further its
aim. But probably the most effective weapon in its psychological warfare was
financial and other support of the defeatist Bolshevik movement.
For an understanding, therefore, of the diplomacy of the Provisional Govern
ment, attention must be given to the external interference and pressures from
both friend and foe, as well as to the prevailing internal conditions and political
currents.
CHAPTER 19
The Period of the First Provisional Government
943. Rech9 o n t h e A p p e a l
[Editorial in No. 63, March 15,1917, p. 2.]
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies has unanimously approved
the text of the appeal To the Peoples of All the World proposed by its repre
sentatives. . . .
It is a great pity that these powerful and vivid words [of Chkheidze] were
not included in the wording of the Appeal.21 If it had been done, then, of course,
no one could interpret the Appeal as essentially a proposal addressed to the
proletarians of all the world to overthrow their governments, to whom agres-
sive tendencies are being ascribed just because they are bourgeois govern
ments. N. S. Chkheidzes comments stem from the perfectly correct idea that
now the fight goes on between the victorious democracy and a regime of the
iron fist, rather than between socialism and the bourgeoisie. And, of course,
this idea is shared by all the democracymore than thatby the whole Russian
nation. And the Appeal, which began in such typically pacifist tones, essentially
develops into an ideology which is common to us and to all our allies. This ob
vious [and] sudden change of thought makes the Appeal To the Peoples of All
the World an extremely important and symptomatic human document. We do
21At the end of the debate on the Appeal. See Doc. 941.
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1079
not know whether it will have the effect on which its authors count so firmly,
but in any case it will serve another purpose: it will bear witness before the
whole world that the Russian revolution is in firm hands and that those of our
enemies who would build on it their hopes of an easy victory would commit a
grave error. It now remains for us to address ourselves to the authors of the
Appeal [and] appeal to them to be thoroughly consistent. Those [who have stated
that they] do not wish to let the guns out of their hands, that they are ready
to defend the revolution against restoration attempts by Wilhelm, have thereby
declared that they do not wish to weaken military discipline nor reduce the fight
ing capacities of the Russian army. It goes without saying that we subscribe
with both hands to this result of the Appeal.
944. Izvestiia's Comments on the A ppeal
[Editorial entitled Two Positions, No. 18, March 18,1917, p. 2.]
The Appeal of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies of March 14,
expressed clearly and without double meaning the thought and will of the Rus
sian revolutionary proletariat and the revolutionary army. The attitude toward
the war as expressed in the Appeal differs radically from that of the bourgeois
parties and that part of the democracy that allies itself with them.
Nevertheless, the bourgeois press and the democrat-guardians pretend that
nothing in particular has happened. While quoting with approval our declara
tions to the effect that we favor a rebuttal to the aggressive aspirations of the
Austro-German coalition, the bourgeois newspapers attempt to gloss over the
fundamental difference between the position of the Soviet and that of the im
perialistic bourgeoisie. And they continue to proclaim the slogan: war to a
decisive victory.
It is time once and for all to put an end to this vagueness and to contrast
definitely two fundamentally different positions with regard to the war.
One position was held and continues to be held by all the bourgeois im
perialist parties of the belligerent powers and, unfortunately, by some representa
tives of the democracy. In Russia this was the position of all the bourgeois parties
and even that of some Socialist parties. In England, France, Germany, Italy,
and Belgium this position was upheld by all the bourgeois parties and some of
the representatives of the labor parties who supported their imperialist govern
ments.
The official phraseology and declarations employed by the champions of the
first position to justify war to a decisive victory may be summed up as follows:
The bourgeois press and its minions in England, Russia, France, and Italy
assures us that Germany and Austria wanted to bring all of Europe under their
domination, to extend their possessions, and to subject the free democracies of
Europe, England, France, and Belgium to the German iron fist. Inasmuch as
from this point of view, with the victory of the Austro-German coalition the na
tions of the opposing coalition are threatened with the danger of economic
slavery and loss of former freedom, the adherents of this position deem it
necessary to defeat once and for all the Austro-German coalition. And in order
to protect themselves against attacks by Austro-Germany in the future, final
victory is necessary, that is, the complete crushing of the enemy and the destruc
tion of his military might.
1080 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
The German and Austrian bourgeois press and its allies from the democratic
camp (the party of Scheidemann and others) asserts to the contrary: treacherous
England, barbaric Russia, degenerate France, and traitorous Italy are
conspiring to efface the Austro-German states from the earth. Hence follows the
deduction that a decisive and stable victory over England, France, Russia, and
Italy is necessary.
This lie and hypocrisy is revealed only when the principal position of chauvin
ism is uncovered. And in substance it is as follows. The present war was the result
of the rivalry of the ruling classes of the European states. The ruling classes of
England, France, Italy, Russia, Germany, and Austria tried to seize and bring
under their domination foreign lands and peoples. During the past two or three
decades these attempts have become more and more vigorous, and since neither
side yielded, both sides armed with intensity. . . .
In our country it is undisputed that the Austro-German coalition has aggres
sive designs. Russia and her allies revealed the same aggressive designs during
the war.
Russia has made known her desire for Constantinople, the Dardanelles, Galicia,
Armenia, and the recovery of liberated Poland. The English imperialists seized
and wish to annex the German colonies and intend to seize Mesopotamia. France
demands Alsace-Lorraine and part of Germany up to the Rhine, also Syria and
part of Asia Minor. Italy demands the Tyrol and the Trentino and some territories
in the Balkans. And all the allies taken together want the dismemberment and
subjection to their influence of Austro-Hungary and the Balkans.
And all these aggressive aspirations Messrs. Chauvinists refer to as decisive
victory over the enemy.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies took another position with
regard to the war. This is the position of the Zimmerwald and Kienlhal Confer
ences of representatives of the Socialist parties of Europe and of the left wing
of the labor parties of Russia, France, England, Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzer
land, the Balkan states, Rumania, and some Bulgarian and Serbian Socialists. . . .
The main points of this important position were made clear in the Appeal of
March 14. The Appeal opposes aggressive aspirations and declares war on war.
The Workers and Soldiers Deputies appeal to the peoples of Europe to force
their ruling classes to renounce conquests and declare die self-determination of
nations.
We do not aspire to conquer foreign lands. We want to guarantee liberty to
the peoples, and, first of all, liberty to the peoples inhabiting Russia.
We shall fight, arms in hand, against everything that stands in the way of
this liberty.
Hence follows our attitude toward the Austro-German coalition. We strive for
a final victory not over Germany, but over her rulers. And as soon as the peoples
of the Austro-German coalition force their rulers to lay down their arms and
renounce the idea of conquest, we shall also lay down our arms.
It is obvious that our attitude toward the war is quite different from that of
the bourgeoisie.
And no matter how much the bourgeois press may try to gloss over these
THE FIRST PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT 1081
differences, the popular masses will no longer succumb to this chauvinistic propa
ganda.
Our guarantee of this is the freedom of speech we have gained, in the light of
which it is easy to scatter the poisonous fumes of chauvinism.
945. S ecret D iplomacy
[Editorial in Izvestiia, No. 18, March 18,1917, pp. 1-2.]
The revolution has torn off the heretofore impenetrable shroud that hid the
many secrets of the tsarist regime. It showed the people that the autocratic power
which headed the regime was rotten to the core and that its representatives were
not only indistinguishable from ordinary robbers and murderers, but were im
measurably more dangerous, since their robberies and murders extended to all
the people and assumed mass proportions.
But even now far from all that is secret has become known. Until now, Russia
has been fed primarily with scandalous exposes of acts pertaining to the countrys
internal affairs under tsarism. She still knows very little about what the bearers
of the supreme power did in the sphere of international relations.
But in the meantime, the ripe and painful question of the further course of
the war peremptorily demands a many-sided illumination of its origins, i.e., pre
cisely the mystery-laden, behind-the-scenes diplomatic work of Messrs. Sturmer,
Izvolskii, Sazonov, and other servants of tsarism that for two and one-half years
has been very efficiently concealed from the Russian people under the shroud of
military secrecy.
Secret diplomacy is the natural offspring of autocracy. It is afraid of light
and prefers to hatch its dirty plots in darkness, carefully protecting itself from
public control. [This is] because such diplomacy has only the interests of the
ruling class in mind and is always directed against the people.
Now, thanks to the revolution, we have been given the opportunity to estab
lish accurately the role played by secret diplomacy in the present war. Without
even glancing at the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, anyone can say
with certainty that the secret diplomacy of Nicholas Romanov, Gregorii Rasputin,
Protopopov, Sturmer, Sukhomlinov, Izvolskii, Miasoedov, and other greater or
lesser personages, representing or serving the power that has now been demolished,
could not have served [the interests of] the people. They defended the interests of
the gang of tsarist bandits, the most dishonest, deceitful, and predaceous [gang]
in the world.
You cannot pour new wine into old bottles. The new power, created by the
revolution, must also make a decisive break with the traditions of the Izvolskiis
and the Stunners in the realm of foreign policy. But it will only be able to prac
tice new methods of diplomacy openly before the whole world if it renounces the
traditional policy of conquest.
The revolutionary people has already expressed its will in the Appeal to the
Peoples of the World [issued] by the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
on March 27, In that now historical document, the revolutionary proletariat and
the revolutionary army renounced in a loud voice all conquests and oppression
of other peoples. Only on the foundations of a new foreign policy can a new
1082 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
diplomatic system be built, answering to the principles of freedom, and worthy
of such a people.
Clean dealings require clean hearts.
The Government deems it its duty to declare clearly and unequivocably that
it openly strives for the earliest possible peace which will give the right of self
government to all peoples. But when one speaks of peace without annexations
and indemnities, one should at the same time declare unequivocally that it must
not be understood as passive defense. Free Russia will not consent to leave under
the domination of German militarism the lands that have been given away because
of the old Governments criminal negligence toward the fatherland and the army.
Valuing highly its alliance with the great democracies of the West, which have
suffered the horrors of German invasion [and] have borne incalculable sacrifices
under the heavy tread of the conqueror, the Russian people cannot remain indif
ferent to the fate of Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania or forget its obligations toward
them. I cannot imagine how one could come to accept the fact that tens of thou
sands of free citizens of France and Belgium have been turned into the slaves of
German imperialism.
In order to pass on an honorable name to future generations, in order to hold
her head high within the ranks of the great democracies, it is essential that revo
lutionary Russia should raise the might of her army to an adequate level, and all
the efforts of the Government will be directed toward this purpose.
The virtual armistice that has been established at the front and that permitted
the German Chancellor to formulate the suggestion, insulting to Russia, of a pos
sible separate peace with her, should cease.
The country must express its imperative will and send its army into combat.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1103
969. C om m unique to the P ress from F oreign M inister T ereshchenko
M ay 6, 1917
[As translated in For. Rel. of U.S., 1918, Russia, I, 75-77. See also FTP, No. 51, May 9,
1917, p. 3. Izvestiia, No. 62, May 10,1917, p. 3, commented: Not a single word in M. I.
Tereshchenkos program could be construed as a return to aggressive war aims. . . .
All these . . . points (in his statement) are included in the peace program of the
revolutionary democracy.]
You ask what is my program? You can read it in the declaration of the new
Provisional Government called to power by free Russia. This program is short
but significant; namely, the reestablishment as early as possible of universal peace:
a peace which aims neither at domination over other peoples, nor a seizure of their
national patrimony, nor a taking by force of foreign territories, a peace without
annexations or indemnities, based on the principle of the rights of peoples to dis
pose of themselves, a peace concluded in close and indissoluble union with the
Allied democracies. Free Russia, like every country which has made a great reno
vating revolution, is moved by two motives profoundly idealistic. The first is an
aspiration to give a just peace to the entire world, not to injure any nation, not
to create after the war a hatred, an estrangement which remains always when one
nation comes forth from the struggle enriched at the expense of the other nations,
when the latter are crushed and obliged and accept humiliating conditions of
peace. We have seen a sad example of that in 1870. The wounds dealt to France
by Germany remained open for forty-five years. The hope of the people of Alsace-
Lorraine for a better future is not dead up to the present and they have now a
right to hope for the realization of their ideal. Outrage and injustice are not
forgotten, violence creates hatred. Liberated Russia does not wish that either for
herself or for others.
The second motive is the consciousness of its ties with the Allied democracies,
consciousness of the duty which these ties have imposed on her. Revolutionary
Russia cannot and ought not to break these ties sealed by blood; for her it is a
question of revolutionary honor which is so much the more precious to her now.
The great revolution which stirred the public ocean to its greatest depths could
not but influence the army, which was unable to immediately accommodate itself
to the suddenly changed state of affairs. At the same time the democracy of the
west continued to accomplish with tenacity its warlike work which was for us a
powerful aid. The Allied armies of whom the great mass is composed, as with us,
of peasants and workmen, carried on without stopping the struggle against the
enemy, diverting his strength and by their heroic effort are saving the Russian
revolution from an external defeat. The success of the Russian revolution is also
bought by their blood; it is with a sentiment of profound satisfaction that I must
state that in free Russia in spite of a divergence of opinions of the democratic
parties, there has not been a single party, a single organization, as there was in
reactionary Russia, which would have made a propaganda for a separate peace.
I know, however, that there exists a question capable of stirring the emotions of
the numerous groups of the Russian democracy, that is the question of the treaties
concluded by the old Russian regime. This question stirs up the passions. But
I believe nevertheless that I ought to touch upon this question, expressing my
entire and true opinion, for the Russian people has the right to expect and expects
that the Provisional Government should only tell it the truth. The Russian de
1104 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
mocracy is afraid that bound by these old treaties it will be made to serve purposes
of annexation which are foreign to it. This disturbs its revolutionary confidence,
diminishes its spirit and enthusiasm. That is why demands for the immediate
publication of all the treaties concluded by the old regime are being made. I think
that in this case the sentiments which bring forth these demands are highly hu
manitarian, but I am convinced that the question is raised in an entirely ei roneous
manner and that should be understood by the Russian democracy.
It ought absolutely to understand that in the name of the safety of the Russian
revolution and Allied democracies, the immediate publication of the treaties is
equivalent to a rupture with the Allies and will result in the isolation of Russia.
Such an act will necessarily bring on a separate situation and for Russia will be
the beginning of a separate peace. But it is exactly this which the Russian people
repudiates with all its force and not only by a feeling of honor. It understands
that the international war can only be ended by an international peace. It is only
this peace which could guarantee this justice, this right of the people to dispose
of themselves which is ardently desired by liberated Russia. Other ways must be
chosen, for new Russia must look forward and not backward. Now the world at
war is confronted by some new facts; namely, the great Russian revolution and
the entry into the war of the great American Republic, which hailed wilh en
thusiasm the Russian revolution and has united itself without hesitation to the
Allies after the disappearance of Russian absolutism. We must start from these
facts and these facts cannot but be counted on by the Allied democracies. Personal
intercourse with representatives of the western democracies, as for example,
Mr. Thomas, makes near and clear to all the aims which are now placed before
Russia and before the world as a result of the Russian revolution. In basing one
self on this intercourse I notice the growth of a reciprocal confidence with the
Allies which will permit the Russian Government to undertake preparatory
measures for an agreement with the Allies on the basis of the declaration of
March 27/April 9, and I will apply every effort to hasten the process of rapproche
ment of mutual understanding and agreement. But to attain this aim with success
free Russia must prove that she is accomplishing faithfully her fundamental en
gagement that she has taken towards the Allies, the engagement of united struggle
and mutual help.
She must inspire an unlimited confidence in herself, and prove that her ideal
ism is not derived from weakness and that she renounces annexations not because
she cannot realize them. It is precisely the reason why in the name of the demands
of the democracy, in the name of a peace rapid and just, it is necessary to re
create the military power of new Russia, to strengthen it by all the force of her
revolutionary enthusiasm and to prove really the existence of this force. The
Russian Army proved its heroism, its great self-denial, even when it was sent to
the field of battle by the old regime. At present being subjected only to a discipline
freely accepted it must understand and understands that it [is] struggling for what
it holds most dear, for the integrity and the safety of its freed country aspiring
to a new life. It understands also that a defeat will annihilate this liberty and
that new life. And that ought to be the only aim to animate it. It is ridiculous
in fact to speak at the present moment of the annexationist plans of the Allies as
of a real menace to peace, just when Russia, Belgium, France and Serbia are
themselves occupied in whole or in part by the enemy. Now it can only be a
question of an active defense with a view to defending the national independence
MAY TO OCTOBER 1105
and liberty. As for the future the Allied democrats in their evergrowing confi
dence must count with the desire and tendency of all. It is not for nothing that
Russian liberty comes to the world and that its consequences and influences are
spreading in a large and powerful wave across the civilized world. That is all
that I can say for the moment in regard to what will serve me as a basis for my
activity and the measures that I propose taking.
The war has begun to go against Germany, and in their desperate desire to
escape the inevitable ultimate defeat those who are in authority in Germany are
using every possible instrumentality, are making use even of the influence of
groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just
or fair or even tolerant, to promote a propaganda on both sides of the sea which
will preserve for them their influence at home and their power abroad, to the
undoing of the very men they are using. The position of America in this war is
so clearly avowed that no man can be excused for mistaking it. She seeks no
material profit or aggrandizement of any kind. She is fighting for no advantage
or selfish object of her own, but for the liberation of peoples everywhere from the
aggressions of autocratic force. The ruling classes in Germany have begun of late
to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only to preserve the power
they have set up in Germany and the selfish advantages which they have wrongly
gained for themselves and their private projects of power all the way from Berlin
to Baghdad and beyond. Government after government has by their influence,
without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue
directed against nothing less than the peace and the liberty of the world. The
meshes of that net must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already
done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever
again being rewoven or repaired.
Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for
their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the
restoration of the status quo ante. It was the status quo ante out of which this
iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within
the Empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that Empire.
That status must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing
from ever happening again.
We are fighting again for the liberty, the self-government, and the undictated
development of all peoples, and every feature of the settlement that concludes this
war must be conceived and executed for that purpose. Wrongs must first be
righted, and then adequate safeguards must be created to prevent their being com
mitted again. Remedies must be found, as well as statements of principle that
will have a pleasing and sonorous sound. Practical questions can be settled only
by practical means. Phrases will not accomplish the result. Effective readjust
ments will; and whatever readjustments are necessary must be made.
But they must follow a principle, and that principle is plain. No people must
1110 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
be forced under a sovereignty under which it does not wish to live. No territory
must change hands except for the purpose of securing those who inhabit it a fair
chance of life and liberty. No indemnities must be insisted on except those that
constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. No readjustments of power must
be made except such as will tend to secure the future peace of the world and the
future welfare and happiness of its peoples.
And then the free peoples of the world must draw together in a common cove
nant, some genuine and practical cooperation that will in effect combine their
force to secure peace and justice in the dealings of nations with one another. The
brotherhood of mankind must no longer be a fair but empty phrase: it must be
a structure of force and reality. The nations must realize their common life and
effect a workable partnership to secure that life against the aggressions of auto
cratic and self-pleasing power.
For these things we can afford to pour out blood and treasure. For these are
the things we have always professed to desire, and unless we pour out the blood
and treasure now and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering
force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or
submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we
stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We
can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or
omit any single guarantee of justice and security.
And further the note states: No indemnities must be insisted on except those
that constitute payment for manifest wrongs done. But again we shall askwhen
and where did a civilized contemporary state demand of a conquered enemy a
contribution unless for paying for manifest wrongs done to the state of the
conqueror? . . .
Wilsons note also mentions the urgency of a common covenant, a genuine
and practical collaboration which would combine the strength of free peoples of
the world to guarantee peace and justice in the relations between nations.
But, in the first place, the author of this phrase himself has apparently no
conception, even approximately, how such a pact and such collaboration
could be effected. . . . In the second place, the remark and supplement to the
point about the forthcoming common covenant is that the union of the peoples
is assigned to the future. . . .
Perhaps in the West such treatment of the question may sound convincing.
But with us Russians our experience in this respect is too memorable. This first
and then is the exact repetition of the notorious Stolypin program: first sooth
ing and then reforms. And if then the peoples conscience opposed this pro
gram sincerely and passionately, it must now refuse the proposal made by the
American President: first we shall shed blood until one of the belligerent coun
tries is bled to death, redivide her lands, exact from her the just retribution, and
after we do all this, then later we will organize some collaboration, then we
will unite people into a brotherly union . . . [based] on blood!
The American [note] gives us nothing new, nothing that would lighten what
has been said in the notes of England and France. It only confirms, as we have
already said, the firm decision of the Allies to end the war on the same condition
on which it was started.
Consequently the international situation is quite clear: we can make a decision
with no fear of being wrong. And we must make it without delay because we must
not prolong the tension which exists at the front.
And on the threshold of this decision, in words valuable for this decision, words
from the same note of Woodrow Wilson, words not bearing on the business part
of the note, [we can say]: The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces
of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is
certain and the liberty which victory will secure . . .
We are putting a different meaning in these words than Woodrow Wilson did
when he was writing them. But we can repeat them for ourselves, for one revolu
tionary democracy with greater force than he addressed them to the Allies. For
truly the day has come for us to conquer or submitto raise yet higher, yet
more victoriously the banner of the revolution, or to salute with it the rising forces
of the old, to lower the great banner of the toilers to the feet of those who dictate
to us their will of the ruling classes ; to capitulate, to be at the mercy of the
victor, or to continue to struggle, even at the price of the highest, the final strain.
We are certain that there could be no two answers to such a question for the
Russian revolution. And if we make the decision calmly and firmly, and especially
calmly , without any unnecessary passion and self-willed haste, bound by one
national desire, if we stand together, then victory is certain, and this victory
will guarantee our freedom.
1112 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
977. Izvestiia on t h e A llied R eplies
[No. 78, May 30, 1917, p. 1. Even more unfavorable reactions were expressed in
Novaia Zhizn9, No. 34, May 28, 1917, p. 1, and No. 35, May 30, 1917, p. 1. Lenins
violent criticism in Pravda, No. 69, May 31, 1917, is translated in the Collected Works
of V. /. Lenin; The Revolution of 1917, XX, Bk. II, 164-66.]
In reply to the Declaration of the Provisional Government, dated March 27,
France and England sent notes to the Government, while the President of U.S.A.
sent a special message.
There is no need to speak very much about this message. President Wilson is
mistaken if he thinks that such thoughts can find acceptance in the hearts of the
revolutionary people of Russia. The Russian revolutionary democracy knows only
too well that the path to universal peaceso fervently awaitedlies only in a
united struggle of all the workers in the world against world imperialism. It
therefore cannot be led astray by any vague, high-flown phrases. And it is easy
to understand the kind of feelings which will be aroused by the strange pretense
that the growing revival of the spirit of brotherhood and peace in international
socialism is . . . the result of German intrigue. This is not the language that
Russian democracy speaks.
The French and British notes will also undoubtedly fail to evoke enthusiasm
among the Russian revolutionary democracy. Both notes, it is true, speak of solid
arity with the Russian Government and people regarding the principles that inspire
their foreign policy.
However, the principle that both the Government and the people of revolu
tionary Russia firmly uphold has been proclaimed openly and more than once.
It is a peace without open or veiled annexations and indemnities, a peace based
on the recognition of the right of peoples to self-determination.
Russian democracy does not see the embodiment of this principle in the notes
from France and England. On the contrary. Alongside the recognition of the
principles it sees a tendency to subsume under this principle the old aims that
are contradictory to it.
Now we are faced with a new product of this inner contradiction and of this
official hypocrisy. I mean the mandate of Skobelev, of democracys delegate to
the Paris Conference. . . .
[There follows a long and bitter criticism of Skobelevs mandate which Miliu
kov ends with the following conclusion:]
My conclusion from all these parallels is obvious and incontrovertible. In all
those cases in which the Stockholm document and the Russian document speak
of the same thing, the Russian document always sides with the German solution
of the question. ( Voices from the right: Correct, True.) And with such a
mandate you are sending a delegate of the revolutionary democracy to our allies
in Paris. ( Voices from the right : Shame,) . . . Can the representative of
the Russian democracy sit with such an instruction beside the representatives of
the Government without abasing the dignity of Russia. I affirm: No! (Loud
applause from the right.) I am glad to see that the question itself, of whether
the question of the conditions of peace will be discussed in Paris, is for the present
not yet decided.
Now I pass to an analysis of the Minister of Foreign Affairs speech. . . . I
will not blame the Minister for being afraid to speak about the honor and dignity
of Russia, or for speaking of her national interests with much caution (voice from
the left: Stop speaking of it yourself.) No, I will not stop. Each vegetable
has its own season. Perhaps in a period of official hypocrisy the style of Teresh
chenko also is a necessity (laughter on the left). But the Minister, while bowing
to the Left wing of this assembly, nevertheless tried to save what he could. He
attempted to liberate the Government from the harmful hypnosis of the Soviets.
The Minister does not wish Kurland and Lithuania to be wrested from us. He
wishes that the territory of Russia should remain inviolable and that Russia should
not lose her exit on the Baltic Sea. This is modest but I thank him nevertheless.
And on this point it will be necessary to quarrel with the Soviets and you will hear
what they will say on the subject! Further, the Minister dared to express an even
bolder idea. He wishes also that the south of Russia be given the opportunity to
develop its economy. This is already a very serious and daring idea. (Laugh
from the right.) Evidently it concerns the Straits and the Minister repeats one
of my ideas. He said that the neutralization of the Straits without total disarma
ment would mean infringement of the interests of Russia; it would be a return
to a situation which would undoubtedly be much worse than the one which existed
before the war. . . .
The Russian interests in the south will be protected only when the desire of
the Minister that the south be given an opportunity to develop its economy is
gratified, only when we obtain military control over the Straits. ( Voices from the
left: Oh! Oh!) If we knew how to say in Paris not what you advise Skobelev
to say, but that the Straits, our military control over them, are as necessary for
us as Alsace-Lorraine is necessary for France, then we would accomplish our
national task.
. . . I assert that a revision of the agreement is not imposed on us by any
objective necessitythat it is imposed on us exclusively by the Soviet ideology
that is constantly repeated here: It is essential for the soldier to know for what
1150 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
he fights and then he will fight. It is true, gentlemen, that the soldier does not
know for what he fights. But you told him that there is nothing to fight for, that
our national interests are nonexistent, and that we are fighting for the interests
of others. Well, refute what you have said, tell the Russian soldier that he has
something to fight for, that he does not fight for France or for England but for
Russia. . . . I am very happy that for all that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs
has not fallen so low, that he has understood our interests in the war not only in
the sense of realizing our national interests of which I spoke, but that he has
come to the defense of our allies. . . . He even supported the self-determination
of the Czech people, which fights within our ranks, and declared that the
Russian democracy could not envisage with calm the oppression of nationalities
aspiring to independence. If it is so, then I am even ready to forgive the Minister
his inexact information with regard to German political parties and with regard
to the goals of colonial policy. And when the Minister is asked whether it is
possible that we will continue the war for the sake of Rumanians, Serbs, and
Czechs, I hope that he will say, as I did myself in my speech, not from the point
of view of the honor and dignity of Russia, but from the point of view of expedi
ency: another [kind of] peace would delay in the whole world the triumph of
democratic principles and would entail very soon another war. I welcome this
declaration, it is almost what the Allies are saying. It is almost word for word
what Asquith said in his recent speech in Leeds, when he insisted on fixing as
the result of the war the map of Central and Eastern Europe in such a way that
the aspirations of the nationalities would not be in contradiction with the artificial
borders dividing them, that this can be done only by giving satisfaction to the
legitimate demands of Italy, Rumania, and the Slavic countries. Only then the
causes of concealed warfare [represented by constant] rearmament would be
removed, and humanityI am again citing Asquithfor the first time in history
would be able to take a step toward realizing an ideal and toward creating a world
policy which would unite the peoples in an alliance with justice as its basis and
liberty as its cornerstone. (Noise and laughter from the left, and a voice: But
you cannot believe all this yourself.) This is the essence of my conviction, I have
believed and I believe in it and I have proved it in the course of the whole war.
I will say only one more thing: only those aims of foreign policy which are
based on military might are real, and fortunately for us such are the aims of our
allies, because their real might does exist. And from the sad sight of what is
going on on our front, I would like for a moment to divert your attention to those
French and Flemish villages where the blood of our allies is being shed not in
a civil war, inside the country, but in the trenches, and where, in engagements
against the enemy, the foundations of justice and liberty in the world are being
laid. We should not boast before them of our democratic superiority. It is not
for us to give them lessons they do not need. It is better to bow our heads in
respectful admiration both before those who, like England and France, reap on
their battlefields the brilliant fruits of three years of effort on the part of their
whole nations, and before those who, like Rumania, Serbia, and at the present
time also poor Italy, take upon themselves blows which formerly were intended
for us. . . . And [also] before this new energetic allyAmericawho tirelessly
prepares new weapons and new legions of soldiers wilh which even if we be com
pletely enfeebled, the cause of humanity will nevertheless prevail. (Tumultuous
MAY TO OCTOBER 1151
applause on the right and in the center, which culminate in an ovation for
America.) I would like to generalize my greeting somewhat. Ending my speech
I would like to say: Long live the flower of humanity, the advanced democracies
of the West, which have long ago covered a considerable part of the journey on
which we have just embarked with halting steps. Long live our gallant allies.
(Tumultuous applause which culminates in an ovation for the Allies: someone
from the left cries : Long live the revolution ; the left rises and covers this shout
with applause.)
1003. T h e D r a ft o f I n st r u c t io n s to S k o b e l e v b y t h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e
o f t h e A l l -R u ssia n S o v ie t o f P ea sa n t s D e p u t ie s
[.Izvestiia, No. 202, October 20,1917, pp. 3-4.]
A week ago the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviet of Peasants
Deputies rejected the instructions given to M. I. Skobelev by the Central Executive
Committee of the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, and elected a special
commission for drawing up a draft for the new instructions.
Yesterday the Bureau of the Executive Committee was studying the draft of
these instructions, which will be submitted in the following form for consideration
at the general meeting of the Executive Committee:
I. a) The formula for peace without annexations and indemnities on the basis
of national self-determination, proclaimed by the Russian democracy, represents
the one condition that guarantees the security of future peace and aims at remov
ing the defects and inequities in the life of peoples that have led them to the present
war: b) future international relations must be based on principles that truly
guarantee to all people an opportunity for peaceful, organized cooperation be
tween nations, the adherence to principles of an open foreign policy, the gradual
restriction of arms, and compulsory, preliminary international arbitration; c) the
Allies pledge themselves not to start separate peace negotiations, and, likewise,
not to conclude a separate peace; and d) all nations must pledge themselves not
to organize an economic blockade after the war. Every country is free [to pursue]
its own commercial policy and the peace treaty may not dictate [to a country]
any commitments to conclude or not to conclude this or that trade agreement.
II. 1) An absolute condition of peace is the evacuation of troops of both
coalitions from territories occupied by them during the present war.
2) The territory of the State of Russia must remain inviolate. The peoples
of Russia must reserve the right of self-determination, and the final decision of
this question shall lie within the competence of the All-Russian Constituent
Assembly.
3) The independence of Russian Poland is recognized (Act of the Provisional
Government, March 17, 1917); as concerns the Polish Legions in Germany and
Austria, they shall be entitled to the right of self-determination under an inter
national guarantee.
4) Belgium must be rehabilitated. All losses sustained by Belgians in the
form of indemnities, requisitions, or other forms in violation of the Hague Con
vention, must be compensated by Germany. An international fund [shall be estab
lished] for compensating general losses [sustained] by Belgium as well as other
countries.
1156 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
5) Serbia and Montenegro, as well as other small states, shall be rehabilitated,
and compensation for their losses shall be carried out according to point 4. Serbia
must have access to the Adriatic Sea.
6) Rumania shall be rehabilitated. Rumania shall pledge to carry out at once
the decision of the Berlin Treatise on Jews.
Note: Any restrictions [imposed on] the rights of Jews or other nationalities
shall not be tolerated in any state.
7) The Alsace-Lorraine question must be setded by means of a plebiscite
under the condition of an international guarantee. Persons [who are] in the
service of the German Government and who are not natives of Alsace, as well as
their families, shall not participate in the plebiscite.
8) Turkish Armenia shall receive complete autonomy under the condition of
an international guarantee. The question of the final [state] organization of
Armenia shall be settled by the Armenian National Assembly under a similar
guarantee.
9) All national and territorial questions arising as a consequence of the pres
ent war or in connection with it, such as the Yugoslav, Transylvanian, Czech, and
Italian questions in Austria, shall be settled by means of a plebiscite with an
effective guarantee for free elections.
1014. G er m a n P ea c e F e e l e r b y W a y o f M adrid
[G. Nabokoff, The Ordeal of a Diplomat, pp. 167-69. Other unsuccessful approaches to
the Allies were made by both Germany and Austria during the fall of 1917.]
About the middle of September, the Representatives in London of the Great
Powers of the EntenteMr. Cambon, Viscount Chinda, Mr. Page, the Italian
Charge dAffaires and myself were invited to the Foreign Office to a Conference
with Mr. Balfour. The Secretary of State informed us that a telegram had been
received from His Majestys Ambassador in Madrid containing the following
information. The Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs had told Sir Arthur Har-
dinge that in conversation with the Spanish Ambassador in Berlin, a high
personage stated that Germany would be glad to know on what conditions Great
Britain would be prepared to enter into negotiations for peace. Mr. Balfour, upon
reading this telegram, added that he had invited us to discuss this matter confi
dentially. I took the liberty of addressing the chairman of our small Conference
before Monsieur Cambon had spoken. I said: All those who are present here
know that the pressure of the extreme parties and of the Bolsheviks, inspired by
their German masters, upon the Government at Petrograd is growing daily. I
must frankly warn my colleagues at this meeting that it is my duty to send to the
Russian Foreign Minister a full account of todays proceedings. At the same time,
I am painfully aware of the fact that I cannot guarantee that secrecy will be pre
served at the other end of the telegraph wires. If the Soviet get wind of the
German peace offer, which in reality is nothing but an attempt at creating dis
sensions, the agitation in Russia is likely to cause considerable trouble. I therefore
request that these circumstances be kept in mind in the course of the discussion.
The exchange of views revealed our unanimity in considering this kite as a
mere attempt at fostering differences of opinion among the Allies, and it was
decided that an evasive reply should be given. The German Government was to
be told that no conversations were possible unless the Powers of the German Coali
tion addressed themselves to all the Powers of the Entente and presented definite
proposals. This information I transmitted to Tereshchenko in a strictly confi
dential message which was subsequently made public when the Bolsheviks dis
closed the diplomatic correspondence of Russian representatives abroad. A
couple of months later I was told on good authority that my message had been
interpreted in Petrograd as meaning that peace negotiations were to begin shortly
in Madrid. This would seem incredible. The fact, however, remains that M. A.
Stakhovitch was sent [as Ambassador] to Madrid in order that a prominent
Russian politician should fce present at the peace p o u r p a r le r s Such, at any
MAY TO OCTOBER 1169
rate, was the explanation given to me by Mr. Stakhovitch himself of this belated
debut in the diplomatic career. . . .
1019. T h e L e t t e r o f H e n d e r so n , T h o m a s , an d V a n d er v eld e to t h e
P etro g rad S o v ie t R egarding t h e A p p e a l o f M ay 20
[Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 3, No. 54, June 8,1917 (N.S.), p. 434.]
We have been very much surprised by the appeal for an international con
ference which was published on Sunday in the Izvestia [.sic], the organ of the
Council [Soviet] of Workmens and Soldiers Delegates [Deputies].
During last month British, Belgian, and French delegations had conversations
with the Council on the subject of the eventual convocation of a conference of
the Socialist Internationale. The negotiations thus begun were not concluded.
You had asked the Belgian delegation for a note, which was sent you, and to
which you have not yet replied. You have also invited the British Majority and
Minority organisations to come and discuss with you the conditions upon which
the convocation would be made.
We could not expect that you would convoke a conference under conditions
which the previous negotiations did not allow us to foresee.
During these negotiations we showed our agreement with you on the peace
formula of the Council of Workmens and Soldiers Delegates on the express con
dition that this peace formula should be clearly defined, and drawn up in such a
manner as to exclude neither the liberation of territories in accord with the wish
of the inhabitants nor reparation for the damage caused to invaded countries.
On the other hand, we formally declared that it was impossible for us to
support a plenary conference before having drawn up, in common agreement, a
series of conditions definite enough to remove all doubt, to discourage all diplo
matic manoeuvres by our enemies, and to repudiate the Socialist factions which
would not be willing to co-operate in the work of anti-imperialism for which you
are convoking the Internationale.
We are more than ever convinced that a plenary meeting to which would be
admitted those who are supporting the present policy of the Majority Socialists
in the Central Empires would be harmful and dangerous, and would leave the
1174 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
doubt that a just and permanent peace is possible before the imperialism of
aggression has been destroyed.
The letter adds that it is only possible to think of common action when the
German Socialists have issued a declaration proclaiming a rupture with the Im
perialism of aggression and with the Kaiser, and concludes:
Finally we draw your attention to the passage in your declaration concerning
the political liquidation with Imperialist Governments and classes. We are in
complete agreement with the Council in affirming the necessity for a rupture
between Socialism and the Governments or classes whose war aims are tainted
with imperialism; but we have not ceased, and we shall not cease, to consider that
a national union against aggressive imperialism is a duty incumbent upon all
classes, and one from which the Socialist proletariat could not hold aloof without
abdicating and compromising the vital interests of democracy and Socialism.
We shall be glad to attend a meeting in order to explain ourselves more fully.
[May 22,1917]
1020. T h e E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e s A n sw e r to C o m r a d es V a n d er v el d e ,
T h o m a s , a n d b e B ro u c k er e
[.Izvestiia, No. 81, June 2,1917, p. 5. The absence of Hendersons name and the addi
tion of de Brouckeres (he was a member of the Belgian Socialist delegation) is not
explained. Subsequently Henderson strongly supported the conference and Thomass
position was one of cautious approval, but the Belgian representatives refused to go
along with the movement.]
D ear C o m r a d es .
In your letter of May 22, 1917, you raised several fundamental questions to
which you want to receive an answer.
The formula of universal peace without annexations and indemnities based
on the right of peoples to self-determination expresses this aspiration for a lasting
peace, whose terms will be formulated exclusively in the interests of the workers.
If workers of all countries will be guided solely by their own interests, brushing
aside all the manifest or concealed pretenses of imperialists and militarists, who
so often hide their true faces behind beautiful masks, they cannot help but arrive
promptly at a firm agreement.
Only with such an attitude on the part of the participants of the conference
can it become a turning point in the dreadful epoch of the three-year-old fratri
cidal slaughter of civilized peoples. Only with such an attitude can the conference
draw mankind nearer to the desired peace. But given such an attitude, it is out
of the question that the questions you raised could serve as an apple of discord
or as a cause for prolonging the war.
Having recognized the right of nations to self-determination, the conference
members will easily come to an agreement on the course to be adopted in deter
mining the fate of Alsace-Lorraine as well as of other regions; this question has
been brought sharply into focus by the World War. The population and the
democratic parties of these regions want to put the question of their national
independence, or of their inclusion into one or another state, to a national vote.
In exactly the same way, representatives of working masses, who have freed
MAY TO OCTOBER 1175
themselves from the mutual distrust and suspiciousness generated by imperialists
by having realized the communality of their inLerests and [having been] united
in a struggle for peace, will not find it difficult to agree among themselves on
the methods and amounts of compensation to be extended to the population of
countries which have been especially devastated and ravaged by war, as, for
example, Belgium, Poland, Galicia, Serbia, and others. . . .
As for your reference to the fact that it is impossible for us to rupture the
union sacre [the political truce among all parties in France for the defense of
the nation], this reference is based on an obvious misunderstanding. Without
touching here on the question of the analogy between the participation of the
Soviet in the Provisional Government and the participation of socialists of other
countries in their governments, the Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies
points out that it does not demand of any one party that it renounce the policy
it is pursuing as a prerequisite for receiving an invitation to the conference.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies expects the conference of so
cialists from all warring and neutral countries to arrive at an international agree
ment which will enable the workers of all countries to fight concurrently, coordi
nating their methods, for a universal peace on the above basis, [and] which will
allow them to sever the ties binding them to governments and classes that are
permeated with imperialist aspirations and stand in the way of achieving peace.
The Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies is certain that the conference
will reach a complete agreement on all these questions. Therefore, the Soviet
considers it inexpedient for individual parties to require other parties to accept
beforehand certain obligatory decisions as a condition for their participation in
the conference. This could create the appearance of irreconcilable contradictions
where, during a general discussion, the spirit of proletarian solidarity would be
instrumental in seeking out a decision that would be equally acceptable to all.
As to your desire to reach a complete preliminary agreement among socialists
of the participating states, according to our formulation of the question, such a
preliminary conference appears unnecessary. The coordination of the struggle
for peace particularly envisions the coordination of socialist activities in the
warring countries with the common platform of the struggle for peace. We be
lieve, however, that the conference will be successful only if the socialists regard
themselves not as representatives of the two warring sides, but as representatives
of one movement of the working class having one common goal, that of a uni
versal peace.
E x e c u t iv e C o m m it t e e o f t h e S o v ie t
o f W o r k e r s a n d S o l d ier s D e p u t ie s
1027. T h e I n t e r c e p t e d H o f f m a n n -G r im m T eleg r a m , G r im m s F ir st
E x p l a n a t io n , a n d t h e D ec isio n o f t h e P rov isio na l G o v e r n m e n t
T h a t G r im m M u st L eave R ussia
[VVP, No. 70, June 3,1917, p. 1J
From the Provisional Government
A source of unquestionable reliability informed the Provisional Government
of the following telegram:
From the Political Department
To Mr. Odier in Petrograd
Bern, June 5,1917 [N.S.]18
Federal Councilor Hoffmann authorizes you to relay the following verbal in
formation to Grimm:
Germany will undertake no offensive operations so long as there appears to
be a possibility of concluding an agreement with Russia. After repeated discus
sions with authoritative persons, I am convinced that Germany is seeking to con
clude a peace with Russia that would be honorable for both sides and would pro
vide for close trade and economic relations and financial support for the rehabili
tation of Russia. [She seeks] no interference in the internal affairs of Russia, a
friendly agreement in regard to Poland, Lithuania, and Kurland with recognition
of equality of peoples. The restitution of occupied territories in return for the
Austrian provinces captured by Russia.
I am convinced that should Russias allies so desire, Germany and her allies
would be willing to begin negotiating immediately for peace. In regard to Ger
man war aims, read the report in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which, con
curring with Asquith on the question of annexations, it is asserted that Germany
desires no territorial aggrandizement with a view to expansion, or any economic
or political acclaim.
On the subject of this document, the Provisional Government instructed I. G.
13 In Gankin and Fisher the date is given as June 3 (N.S.).
MAY TO OCTOBER 1181
Tseretelli and M. I. Skobelev, members of the Provisional Government, to demand
an explanation from the Swiss citizen, Robert Grimm. As a result, R. Grimm
handed the following explanatory document to G. I. Tseretelli and M. I. Skobelev:
1) Shortly before my departure, Ministers Tseretelli and Skobelev informed
me that a Swiss minister in Petrograd had allegedly received a telegram from
Bern containing instructions to inform me of several German plans for peace.
I maintain that no such information was given to me either by the Swiss min
ister directly, or through the mediation of anybody else.
2) The contents of the telegram must be interpreted as a German attempt to
use my Petrograd speeches, in which I advocated the restoration of international
socialist relations and a universal peace, for the interests of the German govern
ment, its diplomatic plans, and the separate peace which it is trying to secure.
Such an attempt represents a crude maneuver.
3) Even in Bern when I went to the German Embassy to have my passport
validated for the trip, I avoided all political discussions, whereas during my trip
to Stockholm I even avoided all contact with representatives of the German social
ist majority parly.
4) In regard to the part played by the Swiss Government in this affair, I can
only establish the real facts of the situation on the spot.
5) As a Social Democrat, I will not permit myself to be used as a transmitter
of imperialistic peace plans between governments. I will ruthlessly expose any
attempts of this nature.
Petrograd, May 31 (June 12) 1917
R o ber t G r im m
I. G. Tseretelli and M. I. Skobelev considered this explanation unsatisfactory.
The Provisional Government ruled that R. Grimm must be requested to leave
the territory of Russia.
R. Grimm left Russia.
The Russian revolution could not tolerate for a minute that on its territory,
under its protection, there was a person who had not the courage to dissociate
himself openly from the imperialistic methods of his own government and of the
governments at war with us, at a time when these governments were trying to foist
on him the role of an agent provocateur.
That is why we considered that the explanations given by R. Grimm were
unsatisfactory. We stated that he will have the opportunity at some future date
when he finds himself on Swiss territory and gets rid of the fears he speaks about
hereto take a resolute stand against his Minister of Foreign Affairs and against
the German Government, which has slandered his good name as a socialist.
. . . We told R. Grimm that once a situation such as this has arisen, he could
not, of course, remain on Russian territory. . . .
The Congress Approves the Actions Taken by Tseretelli and Skobelev
Tseretellis speech was followed by a series of speakers: Zinoviev,14 Abramo
vich, Lieber, Skobelev, Kerensky, and Gotz.
Then Martov and Tseretelli delivered the closing speeches.
The [following] resolution was adopted by a majority of 640 for, 121 against,
with 14 abstaining:
Considering that the actions taken by Comrades Tseretelli and Skobelev in
the Comrade Grimm affair correspond to the interests of the Russian revolution
and international socialism, the All-Russian Congress of the Soviet of Workers
and Soldiers Deputies also welcomes their decision to publish a detailed report
on all the circumstances surrounding this case, and, in particular, the reasons
which compelled them to declare Comrade Grimms explanations to be unsatis
factory.
The results of the vote were greeted with prolonged applause.
1029. G r im m s A d m issio n
[Gankin and Fisher, pp. 626-27. Hoffmann submitted his resignation as a Federal
Councilor on June 6. A subsequent investigation by the Federal Council exonorated
him of a willful attempt to violate Swiss neutrality, but accused him of bad judgment.
Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 37, September 13, 1917(N.S.), p. 344.]
This inquiry was made at Berne according to my desire and my commission.
I described in a few words the general state of affairs and begged to be informed
of the war aims of the governments which were known to Mr. Hoffmann. I ex
pressed this wish in a general way. I spoke neither about special aims of the war
nor the conditions of a separate peace. Previously there had been no agreement
whatsoever to that effect between Hoffmann and me. Besides the known telegram
we exchanged no telegraph messages. Hoffmann did not communicate to me any
proposals or terms. The suspicion that I am an agent of Germany because I
received a reply to my inquiry is absurd. I have no reason to defend myself against
these suspicions.
14 See Gankin and Fisher, pp. 623-26.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1183
[Further on, Grimm says as follows]:
I wish to reply immediately to two questions which I may rightfully be asked
from the point of view of the Zimmerwald movement: what has impelled me to
pose this question and why have I posed this question to Hoffmann? The answer
to this question is that our parly, in agreement with the Zimmerwald resolution,
has taken upon itself the responsibility of acting in favor of a general peace.
Proceeding from this resolution our parly approached the Swiss government ex
pressing a wish that it would aid in lhe establishment of peace and, in particular,
in all negotiations for peace. The first question, on the other hand, can find an
answer only in the present internal situation of Russia. In order not to be sub
jected to accusations of transmitting facts which might be utilized by another
belligerent government in its own interests, I must refrain from giving details.
However, I shall betray no secret if I remark that every day in the chauvinist
press there is a statement of the fact, which is to a certain degree being ratified by
the Provisional Government itself, that the present situation, from the military,
economic, and social points of view, is intolerable and that reorganization is
necessary, which, however, cannot be accomplished for several weeks. But whereas
some persons demand reorganization in order to continue the war, others desire
it in the interests of an early peace. This is not merely my own conviction but
also the poinl of view of a large majority of socialists with whom I have had the
opportunity to speak. This reorganization, which could alone prevent a final
catastrophe, is a premise for an early termination of war, and only a hastening
of peace may save the revolution, consolidate its results, and resist the counter
revolution.
1030. T h e L a b o u r C o n f e r e n c e D e c is io n t o A t t e n d t h e S t o c k h o l m C o n f e r
e n c e , t i i e R u ssia n T e le g r a m t o N a b o k o v , H e n d e r so n s R e s ig n a tio n , a n d t h e
B r it is h G o v e r n m e n ts D e c is io n N o t t o I ss u e P a s s p o r ts t o
S to c k h o lm D e le g a te s
[The documents below arc from the Daily Review of the Foreign Press, Ser. 4, No. 14,
August 17,1917 (N.S.), p. 125, and No. 16, August 20,1917, p. 146. Henderson, back in
England, went before the Labour Party Conference on August 10 (N.S.) to recommend
it accept the Stockholm invitation, which it did by an overwhelming majority. In
the meantime, Nabokov had received, at his request, a telegraphed statement from
Tcreshchenko that although the Russian Government does not deem it possible to
prevent Russian delegates from taking part in the Stockholm Conference, they regard
this Conference as a party concern and its decisions in no wise binding upon the
liberty of action of the Government. With Tereshchenkos authorization, the text of
this note was communicated to Arthur Balfour, who laid it before the Cabinet, in
cluding Henderson. When Henderson made no reference to it in his speech before the
Conference, Lloyd George, who had asked that he do so, requested and received Hender
sons resignation from the War Cabinet, publishing the correspondence between them
in the press. In his letter accepting the resignation, Lloyd George quoted the above
excerpt from Tereshchenkos telegram, having received permission to do so from
Nabokov on Nabokovs own initiative. Lloyd George had also received a telegram
from Thomas in Paris that Kerensky ne veut pas de Conference. The source of
Thomas information is not clear.
These revelations, plus the decision of the British Government, announced on
August 13 (N.S.), that it would not issue passports to the Stockholm delegates, caused
considerable excitement in Russia and embarrassment to the Provisional Government,
1184 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
as the following documents indicate. For Nabokovs description of this episode, see
his Ordeal of a Diplomat, Chap. VII.]
With regard to the statements which have appeared in the foreign newspapers
on the subject of the Provisional Governments attitude towards the Stockholm
Conference, the following statement is made (Aug. 15) [N.S.] from an authorita
tive source:
The Provisional Government considers that the solution of questions affect
ing war and peace appertains exclusively to it, in union with the Governments
of the Allied countries, supported by the Allied democracies.
The Socialist conference at Stockholm, as the Russian Government has
pointed out on various occasions, is a conference of particular political parties,
and, as such, can lay no claim to formulate decisions which could in any way
bind the Government.
The Government has always been far from intending to refuse Russian So
cialists passports for Stockholm, its view being that it is useful that questions
concerning war and peace should be submitted for discussion to the Socialist
Internationale, and in the person of the Prime Minister as well as of the Minister
for Foreign Affairs, has similarly informed the Allied Governments that it con
siders it undesirable to raise any obstacles whatever to the participation of So
cialist organisations in the Conference.
Nevertheless, while not denying the political bearing of the Socialist Confer
ence with a view to the clearing up of the fundamental questions which have been
raised by the war, the Provisional Government cannot admit that the decisions
formulated by the conference can have a character which must exclusively and
solely beyond [sic] to the decisions of the Allied Governments.
In this connection it may be noted that Kerensky stated, in the course of an
interview with a British journalist, when asked if it were true that he was opposed
to the Stockholm Conference:
There has been serious misunderstanding. They are drawing a wrong deduc
tion from our Note. We meant simply to state our position. We are a Coalition
Government and, therefore, since the Conference is a party matter, we cannot, as
a Coalition, be bound by its decisions. Our Conference, the Conference of Gov
ernments, is the London Conference.16 The Swedish Conference is a Conference
of Labour Parties. That is all we wished to say. That does not mean we are
opposed to it. It is not our business to be opposed to it or in favour of it.
I said: But it has been said that M. Albert Thomas declared you said that you
personally are opposed to the Stockholm Conference.
Nothing of tie sort. I think it of great importance, although personally I
think it would have been of greater importance if it had taken place while we
were advancing instead of it in the present conditions. But I am not opposed to it.
No. I have insisted again and again that any opposition offered to it by the Allied
Governments, any difficulties put in the way of the delegates, is simply playing
into the Germans hands.
I asked, May I telegraph this?
Mr. Kerensky replied, Certainly. You can telegraph that I said it to you in
the presence of M. Oldenburg as a witness.
15 The Inter-Allied Conference, scheduled for the fall, was later shifted to Paris.
MAY TO OCTOBER 1185
He laughed, and then continued seriously:
Say this. Say that the Russian Government regards the Swedish Conference
exactly as you regard itthat is as a Conference not of Governments but of par
ties. As a Coalition Government we can be neither for nor against the Conference
called by one of the parlies which are in coalition. For that reason, personally as
President of the Coalition, I have made no speeches about it. But we consider
that no obstacles should be put in the way of it, and we shall regard the Conference
itself as an extremely important and significant expression of public opinion. It
is an entirely wrong deduction to say that we are opposed to the Conference.
. - . Tereshchenko has now informed journalists, whom he received on
Aug. 16 [ N.S.], that the views of the Government on the question were well known
in diplomatic circlcs and also to the Allied Socialist leaders, Vandervelde, Thomas,
and Henderson. In the course of the interview he made the following statements:
Neither I nor the Government have changed the views we expressed as long
ago as May last. The correspondence between Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Hen
derson mentioned a letter from the Russian Charge dAffaires in London which
accompanied the official communication from the Russian Government regarding
the Conference. The text of the letter is known to me only through the Press.
I have sent an inquiry to London as to its contents. I have no hesitation in saying
that the comments of our Charge dAffaires arose exclusively through his own
interpretation of what appeared in certain English papers regarding Russias rela
tions with the Stockholm Conference. Kerensky never sent a letter respecting the
Conference. On the contrary, Kerensky and I both spoke to the Allied Ambassa
dors on several occasions, emphasizing the necessity of issuing passports to Allied
Socialists for Stockholm.
u. . . The discussion of questions touching the aims of the war at this Con
ference, he says, will be looked upon by the Government as an expression of
views on that question of the parties and organisations which take part in the
Conference. As for official discussion of questions connected with the war, it
will take place at the coming inter-Ally Conference. The attitude of the Govern
ment towards the Stockholm Conference has never changed. We stand on a
known platform, and that platform must remain unchanged.
Questioned as to whether the Russian Government intended to make any
further friendly representation to the Allied Governments, M. Tereshchenko an
swered that they must await particulars from London. He considered that it would
be a mistaken policy to change the Governments policy towards the Conference
owing to events which had taken place at the front
According to a Petrograd wire, Kerensky and Tereshchenko once more pointed
out to the Allied Ambassadors on Aug. 15 [N.S.] the desirability of removing the
formal difficulties to the journey of delegates to Stockholm.
1031. Rabochaia Gazetas C o m m e n t s o n t h e H en d e r so n E piso d e
[No. 125, August 5, 1917, p. 1. Izvestiia had an editorial similar in tone in No. 135,
August 4,1917, pp. 1-2.]
The alarm caused among the entire revolutionary democracy of Russia by
the communications in the English House of Commons concerning some sort of
1186 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
letters or telegrams of A. F. Kerensky regarding the Stockholm Conference for
tunately proved to be a false alarm .
According to the categorical declaration of our Minister of Foreign Affairs,
neither he nor A . F. Kerensky wrote any letters in which disapproval of the con
ference or desire that it would not take place was expressed. The attitude of the
Government toward the conference did not change, and, as late as August 2,
friendly representations were made to the Allied ambassadors concerning the
undesirability of causing obstacles to it.
Our Provisional Government proved innocent of the desire to undermine
the conference. On the other hand, the governments of the four Allied coun
tries, seeing that all their efforts to morally discredit the conference, that all their
stratagemswith the aid of the apocryphal and non-existent letters of Kerensky
to involve in this affair the Government of revolutionary Russia and to throw its
prestige in the balance, that all this does not work, decided to use naked force in
opposition to the constantly growing desire for peace on the part of the wide
masses of the organized proletariat. They declared that they would not issue
passports to the delegates to the conference.
But this act of violence must not evoke in us fear for the fate of the conference.
It only signifies the break of that union sacre which existed, up till the last mo
ment, between the governments and the socialist majorities of the European
countries.
It is a declaration of war on the part of the imperialist bourgeoisie against the
entire socialist proletariat of Europe. . . .
1032. T h e I n t e r -A l l ie d S o c ia list C o n fe r en c e in L o n d o n ,
A u g u st 28-29,1917 (N.S.)
[Izvestiia, No. 152, August 24, 1917, p. 3. This meeting was one of the last gasps
of the unsuccessful Stockholm movement. The Third Zimmerwald Conference did
meet in Stockholm on September 5-12 (N.S), but its consequences were negligible.]
On August 19 the Soviet delegation sent the [following] telegram:
The Conference of Socialist Parties of Allied countries was called at the initia
tive of the British Labour Party. Influenced, evidently, by the Soviets resolu
tion that its representatives might attend the Allied conference for informational
purposes, the British invitation stated that the conference would be deliberative
in character. Nonetheless, the Russian delegation could not be certain that the
conference would carry out the view expressed in the invitation of the Labour
Party and consider itself a purely deliberative body. Therefore, while awaiting
a final and thorough clarification of this question, the Russian delegation an
nounced when the conference opened that it was participating only for purposes of
information.
Chairman Henderson then declared that the conference would be purely de
liberative, that the various declarations and proposals would only be registered,
and that the conference will not adopt any binding resolutions. The conference
unanimously confirmed the declaration of the Chairman. Finally, Vandervelde,
speaking on behalf of the Organizational Bureau of the conference, declared that
the conference would be deliberative in character.
On the other hand, from the very beginning of the conference it was made clear
to the Russian delegation that if it attended the conference merely for purposes of
MAY TO OCTOBER 1187
information, and was therefore barred from participating in the deliberations of
committees and general meetings, then not only would the platform of the Soviet
fail to receive the defense due it, but it might happen that [some] trend which was
far removed from the platform [of the Soviets] would gain ascendancy.
Taking into account the composition of the Conference, all the members of
the British and French minority insisted that the Russian delegation take an active
part in the Conference. The moral victory of the majority could have placed the
minority in a difficult position. In view of all this, the Russian delegation declared
that it would lake part in the conference on an equal footing with the rest of the
delegations.
Thanks to this participation, the results of the Conference turned out to be
favorable for the platform of the Soviet. Thus, Leindmans resolution proposing
to refuse to take any pari in the Stockholm Conference obtained 4 votes from rep
resentatives of the British National Parly [sic], with 55 opposing. MacDonalds
resolution in favor of participation in the Stockholm Conference received 43 votes
against 33. His resolution protesting against the refusal of passports and appealing
to socialist organizations to continue pressing for the issuance of passports re
ceived 54 votes against 2.
Representatives of the majority submitted a resolution proposing to form in
London a permanent Allied Socialist Committee that would be informational in
character. This resolution received 50 voles against 40.
The Russian delegation and representatives of the Italian and British socialist
parties voted against the Allied Committee. The attempt made by the initiators
of the conference lo draw up a common draft for peace terms ended in complete
failure. The Russian delegation which opposed the very idea of working out the
Allies peace terms submitted a declaration of a general character. It was sup
ported by a large part of the French minority and the British Socialist Party.
In spite of the fact that the Conference demonstrated that the chances for
convening the International in the near future were negligible, the conference was
a complete moral victory for the platform of the minority. After the Conference,
the Russian delegation took part in conferences with groups which were in com
plete agreement with the position of the Soviet and which constituted the majority
at the Conference. From the views that were exchanged it became clear that should
the Soviet, Ilalian, and British socialist parties agree to join the Allied Committee,
a majority would be formed which shared the Soviet platform. Representatives of
the Italian parly and the Russian delegation declared that they would consult with
their organizations on this point and give their answer subsequently.
Source Abbreviations