Adrian Favell, Ettore Recchi Pioneers of European Integration Citizenship and Mobility in The EU PDF

Pioneers of European Integration
A Cosimo e Giovanni, veri pionieri

Pioneers of European
Integration
Citizenship and Mobility in the EU
Edited by
Ettore Recchi
University of Florence, Italy
Adrian Favell
Aarhus University, Denmark
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK Northampton, MA, USA
Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell 2009
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Library of Congress Control Number: 2009930859
ISBN 978 1 84844 659 5
Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

Contents
List of contributors vi
Acknowledgements vii
1 Pioneers of European integration: an introduction 1

Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi
2 The demographics of movers and stayers in the European
Union 26
Michael Braun and Camelia Arsene
3 Deciding to move: migration projects in an integrating Europe 52
Oscar Santacreu, Emiliana Baldoni and Mara Carmen Albert
4 The social mobility of mobile Europeans 72
Ettore Recchi
5 Living across cultures in a transnational Europe 98
Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu
6 More mobile, more European? Free movement and EU
identity 120
Nina Rother and Tina M. Nebe
7 EU movers and politics: towards a fully-fledged European
citizenship? 156
Anne Muxel
8 A common information space? The media use of EU movers 179
Damian Tambini and Nina Rother
9 Internal and external movers: EastWest migration and the
impact of EU enlargement 205
Adrian Favell and Tina M. Nebe
References 224
Appendix A: Methodological notes 241
Michael Braun and Oscar Santacreu
Appendix B: EIMSS questionnaire 255
Appendix C: External movers experiences of migration and
integration into the EU15: interview guideline 289
Index 297
v
Contributors
Antonio Alaminos, Universidad de Alicante
Mara Carmen Albert, Universidad de Alicante
Camelia Arsene, University of Warwick
Emiliana Baldoni, University of Florence
Michael Braun, Zentrum fr Umfragen und Methoden Analysis (ZUMA),
Mannheim
Adrian Favell, Aarhus University
Anne Muxel, CEVIPOF (Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po),
Paris
Tina M. Nebe, UNFPA, Geneva and Rabat
Ettore Recchi, University of Florence
Nina Rother, Bundesamt fr Migration und Flchtlinge (BAMF),
Nrnberg
Oscar Santacreu, Universidad de Alicante
Damian Tambini, London School of Economics and Political Science
(LSE)
vi
Acknowledgements
When we are older and talk to our grandchildren, how will we describe
the age in which we lived? Perhaps we shall say that we saw the collapse of
the Berlin wall and the almost simultaneous and perhaps not unrelated
disappearance of century-old borders dividing nation states in Europe.
EU citizenship and EU enlargements offering the inherent possibility
of unrestricted geographical mobility within an expanding Union have
transformed Europe forever. The notion of a frontierless continent would
have been a utopia only a generation before us. Still, we have had the good
fortune to experience it. The free movement of EU citizens is the immedi-
ate and most visible sociological consequence of this political and peaceful
(r)evolution arguably the noblest, bravest and most popular achieve-
ment of the process of European integration so far. The human dimension
of this phenomenon is the focus of this book and the project it presents.
We started thinking and talking about the book in the gloomy Christmas
of 2001, over a telephone line between Madrid (Ettore) and Los Angeles
(Adrian). Ettore was about to submit a comparative research proposal
to the European Commission to carry out a quantitative-oriented study
of moving Europeans, while Adrian was in the middle of his own ethno-
graphic investigation of the same groups of people in Amsterdam, London
and Brussels. We became aware of each others converging interests
through Damian Tambini, another former classmate of ours from a place
that was the seedbed of this common focus the Department of Social
and Political Sciences of the European University Institute, Florence
in the early 1990s. Eventually, the proposal was generously funded
by the European Commission within the scope of its Fifth Framework
Programme of research, and became the PIONEUR project: Pioneers
of European Integration From Below: Mobility and the Emergence of
European Identity Among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU (contract
HPSE-CT-2002-00128). Ettore served as coordinator of the project at the
Centro Interuniversitario di Sociologia Politica (CIUSPO, University
of Florence); Antonio Alaminos (OBETS, Universidad de Alicante),
Michael Braun (ZUMA, Mannheim), Anne Muxel (CEVIPOF, Paris)
and Damian Tambini (CSLS, Oxford University) directed the four
other partner institutions. In one way or another, all contributors to this
volume were intensively involved in the different stages of the project. The
vii
viii Pioneers of European integration
successful implementation of PIONEUR was possible also thanks to the

following persons: Giulia Amaducci in DG Research of the European
Commission; Emanuele Lepri, Matteo Abbate and Nicoletta Baistrocchi
at the University of Florence; Maxime Vanhoenacker, Ccile Riou
and Viviane Le Hay at CEVIPOF in Paris; Joshua Hatton at Oxford
University; Kristin Surak at UCLA; Miriam Baumgrtner and Lena
Voecklinghaus at ZUMA in Mannheim, as well as Frank Faulbaum and
his team at SUZ (University of Duisburg).
PIONEUR is the primary, but not the sole, basis of the evidence and ideas
contained in this volume. As said, Adrian brought the insights gained in his
fieldwork, published in 2008 as Eurostars and Eurocities: Free Movement
and Mobility in an Integrating Europe (Favell 2008a). Cooperation with
DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities during the
European Year of Workers Mobility offered the chance to collect
additional information used in the first chapter of this book. In DG
Employment, we are particularly grateful to Christoph Maier, while
Letizia Mencarini and Francesca Francavilla helped in the analysis of
Eurostat data.
Over the years, we had many occasions to discuss the concepts, methods
and findings of our study with numerous colleagues and friends, whose
comments spurred us on to improve the work. In particular, we would like
to mention Martin Kohli, Yossi Shavit, Gloria Pirzio Ammassari, Massimo
Livi Bacci, Max Haller, Moshe Semyonov, Hiroshi Ishida, Vittorio
Cotesta, Louise Ackers, Riccardo Scartezzini, Juan Dez Medrano, Neil
Fligstein, Simon Hix, Sophie Duchesne, Anja Weiss, John Salt, Phil Rees,
Russell King and Claire Wallace. Gianfranco Bettin encouraged this line
of research from the beginning with his unique spirit and thoughtfulness.
In the editorial stage, Letizia La Barba helped us assemble the bibliog-
raphy. Finally, we are grateful to Catherine and Edward Elgar for their
support, and to Jenny Wilcox and David Fairclough for assisting us in the
publication process.
Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell

Firenze and Aarhus, January 2009
1. Pioneers of European integration:
an introduction
Adrian Favell and Ettore Recchi
INTEGRATING EUROPE FROM BELOW: THE ROLE

OF FREE MOVEMENT
The European Union stands as a unique economic, political, legal and

social experiment in transnational regional integration. The world we live
in may still be one primarily organized by and for territorial nation states,
but if one empirical example is to be sought of how a post-national or
cosmopolitan polity and society might be built, the EU is the only actu-
ally existing institutional example. Built on a regional territorial logic,
its complex structures are also the best guide to the way a progressive
and governable political order might be constructed from the economic
free-for-all of globalisation. In no other part of the world have sovereign
nation states bonded together to voluntarily relinquish large aspects of
their sovereign control of economy and polity to a set of common supra-
national institutions. And in no other part of the world have such institu-
tions created a form of post-national citizenship within a transnational
regional political order.
Arguably the most fundamental part of the traditional nation states
claim to sovereignty is its claim of territorial jurisdiction over the member
citizens that live within its borders (Torpey 2000). Yet at the heart of the
European Union lies the principle of free movement: of the capital, goods
and services that oil the wheels of international trade and business, but
also of persons who, within its realm, now have the right to move, travel,
study-work, settle and retire anywhere within its member states. EU citi-
zens can move and demand equal treatment to that of all nationals of the
same territory in every dimension of work and public life. This revolution-
ary principle has existed within European law since the Treaty of Rome
in 1957; with the expansion of the EU to 25 members in 2004 and 2007,
it now extends the notion of European citizenship and potentially of a
single European society all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals and
the borders of the Black Sea (European Commission 2002).
1
2 Pioneers of European integration
Curiously, though, scholars have been slow to explore the social effects
of European integration. EU studies are dominated by policy and legal
studies, the sweep of intergovernmental and functionalist theories, macro-
economic models of monetary union and the detail of diplomatic history.
There is much less work on the consequences or, indeed, the sources of
the integration process, in the lives and activities of the almost 500 million
citizens who now make up this extraordinary experiment (Favell 2006a).
Freedom of movement, in fact, is the core right of European citizenship:
it is the right most often cited by Europeans as the single most valuable
benefit of that membership (European Commission 2006).1 As a social
phenomenon, then, cross-border movement within Europe the spatial
mobility of European citizens ought to be seen as one of the key dimen-
sions of European integration. Indeed, when thought of more broadly, it
is a key indicator of the very possibility of post-national global or regional
integration at the individual, human level.
Many European citizens are using these rights to move to other coun-
tries of the EU. Large numbers of southern workers used newly minted
freedom of movement accords in the 1950s and 1960s to migrate north to
the expanding industrial economies of the north. This worker-based migra-
tion still continues in modified form. Now, though, many other categories
of mover are also visible, particularly among the citizens of the EU15
member states, who have enjoyed these rights for decades. From 1987 to
2005, 1.4 million European students benefited from Erasmus and Socrates
programmes to spend up to two years at a foreign university. Likewise,
12 000 advanced researchers and scientists have received support to move
and work abroad.2 Major cities like London, Amsterdam, Paris, Milan,
Barcelona and Munich have become dynamic hubs of the intra-European
mobility of young workers, who choose to look for work on an individual
basis. These possibilities have particularly impacted the life and career
choices of provincial and peripheral citizens of the EU frustrated with
their national opportunities, and of young women or those with uncon-
ventional lifestyles, such as homosexuals, who have used international
mobility as an avenue to self-liberation. Furthermore, an ever-increasing
number of retirees and near-to-retirement citizens from the north of
Europe are deciding to pack up and buy a house in the south. There is, as
Russell King calls it (2002), a new map of European migration.
All of these potential avenues to European freedom are now, or will be
at some point, accessed by new European citizens from new member states
since the enlargements of 2004 and 2007 (Favell 2008b). These are, simply
put, extraordinary movements. For Europe is a continent better known
for low levels of cross-national, even cross-regional movement, and very
high expectations of sedentary regional and national identification.
Pioneers of European integration: an introduction 3
Perplexingly, these on-the-ground social shifts are not always seen in the
statistics. These sometimes frame the story in a different way. Debate about
freedom of movement of workers focuses on the surprisingly low levels of
intra-state resettlement, particularly when compared to the dynamic cross-
state and regional movements of Americans (European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006; see also Recchi
2005 and 2006). The USA remains a potent federal model of how a United
States of Europe might look, and its economic dynamism in these terms
is the inspiration for the EUs own adherence to notions of mobility and
free movement. In fact, when looking at statistics, fewer than one in 50
Europeans lives outside their nation of origin. Around 4 per cent mean-
while have some experience of living and working outside their country of
origin. These are figures that suggest the population of EU movers, as we
call them, is a marginal, if not statistically insignificant counterpoint to the
vast majority of EU stayers, those people who stay living and working in
their own country.
However, the symbolic importance of the moving EU population is not
lessened by the numbers. Movement and mobility have huge effects on
those involved, both those who move and those who encounter movers.
In each and every one of these lives, the hopes and aspirations of the
architects of the European integration process are inscribed. EU movers
are the prototypical Highly Europeanized Citizens. They are the human
face of European integration, from whom we might learn what it means
to be a European. Their lives and experiences are the best guide to finding
out how easy it is to shift ones identity or horizon to a post-national or
cosmopolitan level, and of the practical benefits, insights, barriers and
failings of a life lived outside the place where you historically belong (see
also Favell 2008a).
Pioneers of European Integration sets out to explore the new Europe
being built by these individuals. It represents the first systematic, quantita-
tive attempt to study the impact and consequences of European freedom of
movement of persons. Drawing on a multi-headed international research
project, with a large scale original survey the European Internal Movers
Social Survey (EIMSS) at its heart, it presents findings and evidence on all
the big questions posed by the movement of European citizens within a rel-
atively static continent. The project, funded by the European Commission
(Fifth Framework Programme of research, 200306) was titled Pioneers
of European Integration From Below: Mobility and the Emergence of
European Identity Among National and Foreign Citizens in the EU, and was
directed by Ettore Recchi. It was best known by its acronym PIONEUR.3
EIMSS surveyed movers from the five most populous EU15 member
states (Germans, French, British, Italians and Spanish) to the five most
populous EU15 member states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy and

Spain). It was conducted in 2004. One of the largest-ever comparative
migrant surveys, EIMSS surveyed a total of 5000 European citizens
who settled abroad in EU member states after 1973.4 The questions were
designed to allow for the highest possible comparability with the European
Social Survey (ESS) and Eurobarometer (EB), in order to highlight the
specificities of EU movers versus EU stayers. For more technical infor-
mation, we include a methodological appendix at the end of the book
(Appendix A).
EIMSS permits a vast range of questions to be asked. Who are the EU
movers? Where do they come from regionally and socially, and where do
they go? How well do they acclimatize to their new settings, and how do
they self-select? Why did they move? How do their values, orientations
and identifications compare to the EU stayers? What are the consequences
of their political participation and media consumption as cross-national
European citizens? Are these migrants somehow building a new European
identity for themselves, if not for the continent? And how do movers
from the pre-2004 EU15 member states compare to the new movers that
we will see taking up these rights from the A12 member states who joined
the EU in 2004 and 2007?
If nothing else, the backgrounds, experiences, social trajectories, careers
and (perhaps) transformations of these prototypical EU movers will con-
trast sharply with the more stable and familiar patterns of class, values
and participation of the majority European population of EU stayers,
who remain spatially attached to their nations, regions and localities.
EU movers behaviour and experiences are also a good indicator of
new forms of mobility that deviate from the norms of international and
regional migration. The subject may also offer the key to new thinking in
social mobility research, if spatial mobility in Europe is linked as can
be hypothesized to upward social mobility. Researchers have struggled
to transcend the methodological nationalism that is inherent in social
stratification tied to comparison of social mobility within national socie-
ties (Breen and Rottman 1998). Cross-national spatial mobility has been
recognized as a key area for testing new avenues of social mobility poten-
tially linked to global and regional economic processes (Breen 2004), and
EIMSS allows us to do this.
Pioneers of European Integration answers these questions with sys-
tematic evidence and analysis. In the remainder of this introduction, we
provide some background to the project. First, we sketch the history of
free movement rights in terms of European law and its evolution. Second,
we consider briefly the underlying economic and political rationale for
their expansion. Then, in the third section, we offer an overview of existing
statistics on migration within the EU, drawing on various international

sources. Finally, there is an introduction to the chapter-by-chapter
empirical analyses that follow in the book.
A SHORT HISTORY OF FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS

The origins of free movement rights in the European Union date back to
the early 1950s. Free movement was in fact first introduced by the pioneer
supranational organisation of shared economic interests, the European
Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) formed in 1951, to facilitate special-
ised workforce recruitment across national borders. Among the six found-
ing states of the Community (Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Luxembourg and Italy), Italy was particularly keen to support this goal,
in order to lower domestic unemployment and underemployment, as well
as to improve the living conditions of nationals who had already migrated
abroad (Romero 1993; on the development of free movement rights, see
also Wiener 1998; Maas 2007).
The ECSC Treaty limited free movement to workers who are nationals
of member states and have recognized qualifications in a coalmining or
steelmaking occupation (article 69), but the right of free movement was
generalized in the founding Treaty of the European Economic Community
signed in Rome in 1957. Article 48 of this Treaty affirmed the right to
accept offers of employment made in another member state and to move
freely within the Community, as well as to reside and remain in another
member state after having been employed. In its original version, however,
the Treaty limited the right to move to workers rather than citizens. At
this stage, Community law openly treated migrants as production factors
rather than persons tout court, in line with the market-oriented view of
European integration. While bilateral agreements between national gov-
ernments within Western Europe had been established soon after World
War II, and extended later to more peripheral countries such as Portugal
and Yugoslavia, the EEC treaty built a more solid legal framework for an
intra-European mass migration system of its age. In short, free movement
met the interests of both would-be foreign workers in Italy and potential
employers in Germany, Benelux and France.
However, the legal enactment of free movement proceeded at a slow
and discontinuous pace (for more detail on the EUs legal evolution and
jurisprudence, see especially OLeary 1996; Guild 1999; White 2004; De
Bruycker 2006). For more than a decade, in spite of the Rome treaty, citi-
zens of EEC member states who intended to work in a different member
state continued to be subject to national immigration laws. They had
to apply for work and residence permits, which could be discretionarily

denied just like any other immigrants. According to article 49 of the
Treaty, free movement was a fully intergovernmental policy left to decis-
ions taken in the Council of Ministers. Central and Northern European
EEC member states resisted the interference of supranational regulations
on their sovereign power to control aliens. More specifically, in these
countries it was often argued that free movement would have given some
competitive advantage to Italians over other southern European migrants,
making them less disposable as guest workers.
The real implementation of free movement was thus postponed to 1968,
when Council Regulation 1612/68 and Council Directive 68/360 abolished
movement and residence restrictions on member state workers and their
families in the entire EEC territory. On the one hand, Regulation 1612/68
made illegal all nationality-based discrimination between workers of
member states, in terms of work conditions, salary and unemployment
benefits. Furthermore, it established the foreign workers right to the same
social and tax benefits as national workers, including access to training in
vocational schools and housing benefits (where existing). Family members
of foreign workers were entitled to reside with them and to be allowed
access to any kind of employment in the host country. On the other hand,
Directive 68/360 reduced the bureaucratic formalities of moving within
the EU considerably, recognising the workers and their families rights
to enter a different member state by simply showing an identity card or
valid passport, without being forced to obtain a visa. Migrants within the
EU were also entitled to a residence permit, with a validity of at least five
years and an automatic renewal, by presenting an employment certificate.
In addition, permanent residency thereafter in the host country was also
guaranteed, as the residence permit could not be withdrawn in the case
of involuntary unemployment. Neither could being unemployed justify
expulsion.
The 1968 provisions thus represented a turning point. They ended the
transitional regime set by article 49 of the Treaty, and created the condit-
ions for a full exercise of free movement rights. In the following decades,
admission, residence and equal treatment of foreign residents from other
member states were dealt with by a vast secondary legislation. Community
law and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have increasingly widened
the matter and scope of the right to free movement originally contained
in the Treaty. In particular, since the 1970s, the ECJ has played a key
role in widening the scope of free movement. It has systematically shifted
its focus from the free movement of workers to the free movement of
persons that is, movement independent of an individuals capacity as
an economic actor. Following high-profile cases brought by citizens, the
Court was able to broaden interpretation of the Treaty, emphasising the

citizenship dimension of free movement. According to the ECJ, the right
to equal treatment implies a fully-fledged integration, not only in the job
market, but in the whole of society, including social, cultural and educa-
tional aspects of workers and families lives. With the decisive contribu-
tion of the ECJ jurisprudence, laws on free movement were extended in
the 1970s to foreign self-employed workers, and in the 1980s to foreign EU
nationals who take up a paid apprenticeship, those who enter university
in a member state different from their own after having taken up a job
activity, and to seasonal workers. It can also be noted, though, that the
controversial position of posted workers workers who are temporarily
sent to another member state to perform services there and who return to
their country of origin after completion of their work was clarified only
20 years later, with Council Directive 96/71.
The Single European Act of 1986 aimed at creating an area without
internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services
and capital is ensured. A logical consequence of this was the step taken
in 1990, when freedom of movement and residence was now explicitly
extended to non-economically active categories (as well as their families):
students, pensioners and the unemployed. The legal bases of these changes
are to be found in Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 90/366 (this last was
then replaced by Directive 93/96). Such arrangements are still subject to
two conditions from which workers are exempted: students, pensioners
and the unemployed must have sickness insurance, and they must have
sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the national health
systems or social assistance of the host member state. Another collateral
advance was the adoption of the Schengen system, which took place pro-
gressively in the 1980s and 1990s, to eliminate passport controls between
EU national borders.
Symbolically, however, the most spectacular step in the process took
place with the Treaty on the European Union, signed in Maastricht in
1992, and which entered into force on 1 November 1993. The Maastricht
Treaty introduced citizenship of the European Union to reinforce the
protection of the rights and interests of the nationals of its member states.
Concretely, EU citizenship consists of a set of rights allowing all European
nationals to vote and stand as candidates in elections of the European
Parliament in the member state they reside in, regardless of their nation-
ality; to submit petitions to the European Parliament and appeal to the
EU Ombudsman; to be protected by the consular authorities of another
member state in third countries that lack diplomatic representation of
ones state; and to move and reside freely in the territory of any of the EU
member states.
The first three provisions are small in scope compared to the last. For
the ordinary EU citizen, access to diplomatic protection in third countries
is an extremely unusual event and petitions to the European Parliament
or the Ombudsman look like quite remote options. Meanwhile, to vote
as a foreign resident for the European Parliament has proven of little
political relevance, with high abstention rates. Local voting rights are
more widely used. But it is the rights to free movement and settlement
in the entire EU territory that form the most potent cornerstone of EU
citizenship.
In more recent years, Commission Directive 2004/38 consolidated
the residence rights of EU movers throughout the Union territory. This
Directive not only unifies pre-existing scattered legislation on free move-
ment, but also incorporates some key tenets of the jurisprudence of the
ECJ. In particular, it acknowledges the right to permanent residence of
EU citizens after five years of stay in any other member state without
additional formalities (such as a carte de sjour), as well as the host states
responsibility for the social welfare of movers. Overall, this Directive
defines three categories of mobile EU citizens short-term movers (less
than three months), long-term (between three months and five years),
and permanent (over five years) whose social welfare rights in the host
country are correspondingly graduated.
Apparently the only remaining limits to the universalisation of free
movement rights in the EU are the ability to vote in the general elections
of the host country which remains the ultimate seal of acquiring national
citizenship; the unconditional access to state-based social benefits inac-
tive movers still need to have their own sickness insurance; and (more
often than not) the non-cumulativeness of pension benefits gained in dif-
ferent member states. These are significant but not necessarily unsurpass-
able barriers to the achievement of some form of post-national citizenship
in the EU. And inasmuch as free movement rights are associated with
welfare rights that are insensitive to nationality, they foster the transna-
tionalisation of social solidarity in Europe the potential construction
of a fully harmonised if not unitary welfare system. While the process is
controversial and contested, it clearly goes a long way from a conception
of the EU as a mere network of intergovernmental relationships. If only
for this, free movement undermines the intergovernmentalist description
of the European Union. The potential of free movement of persons for
the deepening of the process of European integration can thus hardly be
underestimated. One has only to be reminded that the full right to travel
was not established as a constitutional citizenship right in the US before
the 1940s, and that when it was, it was taken to be a fundamental step
towards the creation of a fully-fledged federal state.
The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 again put citizenship mobility

at the top of the political agenda in Europe. Heated media debates for
example on the possible invasion of Polish plumbers into France drew
big headlines. As in previous enlargements that is, when Greece (1981),
Spain (1986) and Portugal (1986) joined the European Union the move-
ment rights of the new European citizens were subject to temporary restric-
tions. Notably, though, Britain, Ireland and Sweden all opened their doors
to the new citizens, and saw substantial in-migration. In 2006 and 2007, the
mobility restrictions for citizens from the so-called A10 new EU member
states (those who joined in 2004) were mostly lifted in all other member
states, with the exception of Germany and Austria. These countries, which
have had some of the largest numbers of informal migrants from Central
and Eastern Europe, announced that they would maintain national meas-
ures until April 2009. For workers of the two new member states joining
the EU in 2007 Romania and Bulgaria only Finland and Sweden among
EU15 states granted full mobility rights from the start. But progressive
openings took place elsewhere quite rapidly on a piecemeal basis, with eased
conditions of access to job permits for workers from these countries.5
To sum up, the free movement of persons across national borders within
the EU a key aim of the overall European integration process has, step
by step, become an everyday feature of European economy and society.
The two major legal steps in this process were the abolition of restric-
tions on movement and residence for workers of member states and their
families in 1968, and the introduction of EU citizenship in 1992, alongside
the less visible but decisive actions of the European Court of Justice. The
Court has stood as a bulwark against all attempts to maintain privileges
rooted in pre-existing or re-emerging nationality-based pieces of legisla-
tion. Migrant workers as they were called in the ECSC treaty of 1951
have become EU movers, as they are now usually referred to in EU
documents.
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RATIONALES FOR

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
As we have seen, free movement represents a constant and quintessential

concern of the European Union. But why has the EU (and its earlier incar-
nations) always insisted on promoting free movement? Both economic and
political rationales have been advanced. In this section, we review them
briefly (see also Recchi 2008).
Generally speaking, in the collective imagery of advocates of European
integration, cross-border migration within Europe whatever its shifting
political boundaries is framed and sustained as the sociodemographic

counterpart to international trade in an unrestricted single market.
Together, a single market and a free movement area would be the triggers
of an ever closer Union. In this respect, the project of European integra-
tion anticipates the globalisation of the last decades of the 20th century.
Indeed, it might be said that the EU constitutes a world-regional variant
of globalisation (Castells 1998; Favell 2003).
In somewhat more technical terms, economists conceive of intra-EU
migration as the labour market complement to monetary union. Workers
mobility is required in an optimally functioning single currency area.
Typically, it is said to absorb local economic shocks to employment which
might follow from the collapse of production in any particular local or
national context. This argument won Robert Mundell (1961) the Nobel
prize for economics in 1999, and stands as the major theory-based justifi-
cation for the continuing support for free movement of market-oriented
pundits and policy makers (see also Belassa 1961; Mattli 1999).
Another economic argument has come to the fore more recently: mobil-
ity as an autarchic response to demand at the higher end of the labour
market. Mobility is particularly productive when it equates with brain cir-
culation. While the free movement doctrine was born of the need to facili-
tate working-class migration from the south in the 1950s, in the last decade
or so it has been re-focused on encouraging the knowledge economy
through a more efficient use of the educated and highly skilled workforce.
The ambition is to promote an increased use of European human capital
within Europe as a means to make the EU the worlds most dynamic and
competitive economy, as stated in the EUs Lisbon Agenda of 2000. This
would especially require the expansion of supranational research and
development structures in both the public and private sectors, as part of
the global struggle for competitiveness (see Sapir et al. 2004).
From a political viewpoint, on the other hand, free movement is fre-
quently perceived as an instrument to deepen European integration at
the societal level. The Action Plan for Skills and Mobility (European
Commission 2002) makes it clear that individuals who have tasted free
movement rights are expected to better appreciate European citizenship
and endorse European unification more wholeheartedly than the rest of
the population. This point is taken up again by the most recent legislation
consolidating and expanding free movement rights:
Enjoyment of permanent residence by Union citizens who have chosen to settle

long term in the host member state would strengthen the feeling of Union citi-
zenship and is a key element in promoting social cohesion, which is one of the
fundamental objectives of the Union. (Directive 2004/38)
In other words, movers are expected to contribute to overcoming national

differences, fulfilling the vision of Euro-enthusiast intellectuals like Vclav
Havel. It evokes also certain cosmopolitan antecedents in Europe, as
Havels commentary makes clear:
If regulations on the movements of citizens disappear, we will see the sort of

blending produced in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the First World
War. Subjects came and went, married all over the place, tried their luck at
many things, without any of the preceding impeding development of national
cultures. (Havel 1998, 119)
In this scenario, the fusion of European societies would be greatly facili-

tated by burgeoning mobility.
Such an emphasis on mobility does not go uncontested. In particular,
scholars in the Marxist tradition contend that all efforts to create a Europe
of flows (Hajer 2000) are functional to the expansion of capitalism that
is, to the rise of exploitative social relations, the disruption of community
life, and negative psychological consequences (for these general argu-
ments, see also Deleuze and Guattari 1980; Harvey 1982; Sennett 1998).
The European Year of Workers Mobility of 2006 thus increasingly sought
to focus its efforts on also managing the downsides and social dysfunctions
linked to the promotion of mobility. Nonetheless, even critics acknowl-
edge that European integration has become organized around a principle
of spatial governance within a frame of seamless mobility, with mobility
the defining feature of contemporary Europe (Jensen and Richardson
2004, 3).
MOBILE EUROPEANS IN EU STATISTICS
The next set of questions concerns numbers. How many EU movers are
there? Who are they? How are they distributed spatially in terms of origins
and destinations? Are their numbers growing? Unfortunately, differences
in national systems of registration of residents and freedom of movement
itself make it hard to count EU movers in a consistent and systematic way
(on these measurement issues, see Poulain et al. 2006). Nevertheless, in
this section, we describe our population of reference on the basis of the
Eurostat Dissemination Database (EDD), as well as data from the EU
Labour Force Survey. The bulk of figures in this section refer to population
stocks in EU15 between 1987 and 2004.6
Flows have not varied dramatically from the mid-1990s on, but do
show a rising trend: from 0.6 million in 1997 to 1.1 million persons in 2003
(excluding inflows into Greece, France and Ireland). Interestingly, 64 per

cent of EU15 movers are returning migrants. Germany, Britain and Spain
receive the largest numbers of intra-EU movers yearly. About four out of
ten of these movers are in the 2539 age bracket. British, German, French
and Italian citizens (in that order) form the largest nationality groups
resettling abroad in the EU.
Regarding stocks, during the period 1987 to 2004, while the overall
number of foreign residents grew from 14.4 to 21.4 million (148.7 per
cent), the stock of EU movers rose at a slower pace from about 5.2 to
6.3 million people (121.1 per cent). The number of EU15 non-national
residents increased in all member states particularly in Britain (1443
000), Germany (1207 000) and Spain (1181 000) with the exception of
Sweden, France and Italy. In fact, the relative size of EU non-national
citizens among foreigners varies considerably from country to country.
Intra-EU movers are a majority among foreigners in Luxembourg,
Belgium and Ireland. In all other EU member states, there are more non-
European immigrants than foreign European residents. There are often
three to four times more immigrants than EU movers, and Italy has the
lowest proportion of EU movers among its alien residents: only 9.9 per
cent.
Since the mid-1980s, Germany, France and Britain have continued to be
the countries hosting the largest numbers of EU citizens living abroad. On
the other hand, Italians and Portuguese continue to be the largest commu-
nities of Europeans residing in another EU member state. However, the
size of the Italian and Portuguese communities has oscillated only slightly
over these two decades. Interestingly, the fastest growing communities
of Europeans abroad are not formed by southern Europeans as they
were traditionally in the 1950s1970s but rather by central and northern
Europeans. Between 1987 and 2002, the number of Germans living outside
their native country in the EU nearly doubled (196 per cent), while the
growth of expatriate French (159 per cent), Belgians (151 per cent),
British (142 per cent) and Dutch (132 per cent) is also remarkable. Only
the Spanish and Finnish communities abroad have shrunk in this period,
albeit modestly.
In 1987, the single largest community of EU non-nationals in a EU
member state was formed by the Portuguese in France (649 000 persons),
where they made up almost half the EU mover population. Their number
declined, however, to 555 000 persons in 2002. Therefore, in the early
2000s the single largest community of EU movers is formed by Italians in
Germany: 644 000 persons, representing 36.6 per cent of EU non-national
residents in that country. Their number has increased modestly but con-
stantly from the mid-1980s onwards. This could be due to both continuing
net migration flows from Italy to Germany and the expansion of second-
generation Italian migrants living in Germany. These same reasons can
equally account for the growth in the number of Portuguese citizens living
in Luxembourg, which doubled between 1987 and 2002. The importance
of geographical and cultural proximity for intra-EU mobility is attested by
the high proportion of British citizens in Ireland and of the Irish in Britain,
of Finns in Sweden and Swedes in Finland, and Germans in Austria. The
number of Austrians in Germany, even though representing 77 per cent
of Austrians abroad in the EU, is overshadowed by the larger presence of
southern European migrants in Germany.
Overall, including citizens of the accession countries already residing
in another EU member state, European citizens living abroad in the EU
amount to (only) 1.6 per cent of the EU25 population in 2004 (Table
1.1). Although data on gender are incomplete, apparently there is a slight
prevalence of men, with the notable exception of four EU15 member
states where women exceed men among EU non-national residents:
Italy (65.6 per cent), Greece (59.9 per cent), Ireland (51.6 per cent) and
Portugal (51.5 per cent). In 2002, the 2534 age group was the biggest in
six out of the 12 member states for which this information is available.
People aged 25 to 44 formed from one-third to half the total of EU non-
nationals in each country (ranging from 34 per cent in France to 48 per
cent in Italy).
The educational level of intra-EU movers varies considerably from
country to country. The proportion of EU15 non-national residents with
a post-secondary degree ranges from 11.8 per cent in Spain to 61 per cent
in Lithuania (where absolute numbers are very low, though). Generally
speaking, traditional receiving countries of intra-European migration,
like Germany, Sweden and France, host a less-educated workforce (EU
movers with a tertiary-level degree are 14.4 per cent, 22.4 per cent and 25.2
per cent respectively). In this regard, the difference between Germany and
Britain is striking, as in the latter country one-third of EU non-nationals
have tertiary-level credentials. These individuals are probably taking jobs
in the high-skilled sectors, whereas Germany tends to offer employment
opportunities to intra-EU movers in mainly low-end occupations. Gender
differences also deserve some attention. In Germany, Italy, Spain and
Portugal, as well as in all Eastern European countries, among EU15 non-
nationals it is men who have higher educational qualifications. The reverse
is true in France and Sweden.
As is well known, education is expanding all over the world. But, as
migrants represent a select population, this general trend is not necessar-
ily reflected in their educational level. In particular, when labour markets
demand low-skilled workers, immigrants tend to be negatively selected
Table 1.1 Stocks of foreign population in EU25 member states (2004)
Total Total % of EU15 % of total EU10 % of total TCN % of total

population foreigners* total movers foreigners movers foreigners foreigners
population
Austria 8 032 926 753 528 9.4 106 173 14.1 57 031 7.6 590 324 78.3
Belgium 10 239 085 853 369 8.3 562 975 66.0 11 476 1.3 278 918 32.7
Britain 58 395 594 2 760 031 4.7 1 268 616 46.0 241 101 8.7 1 250 314 45.3
Cyprus 689 565 32 214 479
Czech Rep. 10 203 269 179 154 1.8 9 832 5.5 38 409 21.4 130 913 73.1
Denmark 5 397 640 271 211 5.0 54 310 20.0 8 811 3.2 208 090 76.7
14
Estonia 1 370 052 1 410 2 603
Finland 5 219 732 107 003 2.0 16 656 15.6 12 836 12.0 77 511 72.4
France 58 513 700 3 263 186 5.6 1 194 135 36.6 41 991 1.3 2 027 060 62.1
Germany 82 440 309 7 334 765 8.9 1 767 302 24.1 250 563 3.4 5 316 900 72.5
Greece 10 934 097 46 897 32 110
Hungary 10 116 742 130 109 1.3 10 718 8.2 6 690 5.1 112 701 86.6
Ireland 3 978 880 215 473 5.4 133 436 61.9 8 455 3.9 73 582 34.1
Italy 56 995 744 1 334 889 2.3 132 067 9.9 40 948 3.1 1 161 874 87.0
Latvia 2 319 203 33 344 1.4 703 2.1 2 060 6.2 30 581 91.7
Lithuania 3 445 857 534 1 223
Luxembourg 451 600 174 200 38.6 139 691 80.2 1 096 0.6 33 413 19.2
Netherlands 16 258 032 702 185 4.3 201 557 28.7 10 206 1.5 490 422 69.8
Poland 38 230 080 700 329 1.8 12 350 1.8 2 041 0.3 685 938 97.9
Portugal 10 356 117 238 746 2.3 49 343 20.7 855 0.4 188 548 79.0
Slovakia 5 379 455 29 855 0.6 1 282 4.3 10 491 35.1 18 082 60.6
Slovenia 1 996 433 45 294 2.3 1 218 2.7 201 0.4 43 875 96.9
Spain 42 197 865 2 772 200 6.6 360 192 13.0 25 240 0.9 2 386 768 86.1
Sweden 8 975 670 476 076 5.3 180 191 37.8 24 039 5.0 271 846 57.1
15
Total 452 137 647 22 492 417 5.0 6 283 802 27.9 830 955 3.7 15 377 660 68.4
Notes:
1. *Total foreigners: Czech Republic, Ireland, Portugal, Slovakia, Britain (2003); Poland, Italy (2002); Belgium, Austria (2000); France (1999).
TCN5 Third-country nationals.
2. Data for Malta is missing.
Source: Eurostat Dissemination Database (domain: Population and Social Conditions)

on education (Borjas 1989). Therefore, a diachronic analysis of intra-EU

movers education is informative of the kind of occupational incorporation
to which this particular fraction of the migrant population is channelled.
Table 1.2 shows that the education of EU non-nationals has improved
constantly and markedly from 1995 to 2005. If in the mid-1990s only 14.3
per cent of intra-EU movers had a tertiary degree, by 2005 this is the case
for almost a quarter of them. But the most significant finding is the follow-
ing: while in 1995 the proportion of national residents with a tertiary-level
education was higher than that of EU movers, the situation was reversed in
2005. In other words, the upgrading of the educational level of EU movers
has exceeded that of the general population. EU movers are now a posi-
tively selected population in terms of education. The education differentials
between EU non-nationals and nationals are at their peak in Denmark,
Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria, Spain and Portugal. In all these countries,
the share of tertiary-educated EU movers is about twice as large as that of
nationals. There can be few doubts that geographical mobility within the EU
spreads human capital across the labour market, although the size of the
population at stake varies considerably from one country to another.
Over time, intra-EU movers are also redefining their position in the
workforce (Table 1.3). In terms of sectors of employment, EU citizens
living abroad are less likely than nationals and also third-country nation-
als to have a job in agriculture. More significantly, their involvement in
the industrial sector is declining at a faster pace than that of nationals.
Indeed, in 1995 the proportion of industrial workers among EU movers
was still well above that of nationals (55.8 per cent versus 50.9 per cent);
after 2000, the two are about the same. Finally, we can distinguish two
separate categories in the broad service sector: a low-level sector (mainly
including personal service activities) and a mid-high level sector (in which
non-manual activities are the rule). In the low-level service sector, EU15
non-nationals are more frequently employed than nationals, but less than
third-country nationals. The growth of this sector of employment from
the mid-1990s onwards has been almost entirely fed by immigrants from
outside the EU. As far as mid-high service jobs are concerned, EU non-
nationals are following the path of nationals. Although they still lag behind
national workers in relative terms, they are employed in increasingly larger
numbers in this more privileged occupational sector.
A GUIDE TO THE VOLUME
We can now turn to the organisation of the book itself. The volume draws
together a number of different analyses by members of the PIONEUR
Table 1.2 Nationals and EU non-nationals by educational level, 19952005 (row %, individuals aged 15 and over)
COR Nationality 1995 2000 2005

Low Med. High Low Med. High Low Med. High
AT National 36.6 57.5 5.9 32.0 56.6 11.4 27.9 58.0 14.1
EU25 Non-nat. 19.7 55.5 24.8 18.3 14.0 59.3 26.7
Total 37.9 55.9 6.1 33.1 55.5 11.4 29.0 56.9 14.1
BE National 51.9 29.9 18.2 49.2 30.0 20.8 44.1 32.6 23.3
EU25 Non-nat. 56.3 26.4 17.3 49.8 26.3 23.9
Total 52.6 29.6 17.8 50.0 29.5 20.5 44.8 31.9 23.3
17
DE National 24.6 57.1 18.3 25.6 54.7 19.7
EU25 Non-nat. 45.3 40.6 14.1 40.2 42.3 17.5
Total 26.6 55.6 17.8 27.7 53.0 19.3
DK National 35.8 45.2 18.0 31.4 48.6 20.0 29.7 45.2 25.1
EU25 Non-nat. 16.9 51.3 31.8 20.0 29.0 51.0
Total 35.9 44.9 19.1 31.3 48.6 20.1 29.9 44.6 25.5
EL National 62.9 26.8 10.3 56.2 31.9 11.9 50.0 34.8 15.2
EU25 Non-nat. 17.6 53.6 28.8 20.7 53.5 25.8 18.0 61.4 20.6
Total 62.6 27.0 10.4 55.9 32.1 12.0 49.9 35.1 15.0
ES National 71.8 15.5 12.7 65.9 16.5 17.6 60.2 18.0 21.8
EU25 Non-nat. 47.1 22.6 30.3 39.2 28.0 32.8 29.5 29.0 41.5
Total 71.6 15.5 12.9 65.5 16.7 17.8 59.0 19.0 22.0
Table 1.2 (continued)
COR Nationality 1995 2000 2005

Low Med. High Low Med. High Low Med. High
FI National 44.5 39.3 16.2 32.5 40.5 27.0 34.5 39.8 25.7
EU25 Non-nat. 37.0 42.4 20.6 38.0 42.1 19.9
Total 44.6 39.3 16.1 32.6 40.4 27.0 34.7 39.8 25.5
FR National 48.1 37.0 14.9 46.3 36.1 17.6 42.6 37.5 19.9
EU25 Non-nat. 70.5 19.6 9.9 67.7 18.8 13.5 58.3 22.8 18.9
Total 49.4 36.0 14.6 47.6 35.1 17.3 43.6 36.6 19.8
GB* National 48.2 32.3 19.5 14.8 58.7 26.5
EU25 Non-nat. 64.1 19.6 16.3 16.7 58.2 25.1
18
Total 48.9 31.7 19.4 15.1 58.7 26.3
IE National 43.7 34.3 22.0
EU25 Non-nat. 24.3 37.3 38.4
Total 42.4 34.4 23.2
LU National 59.3 29.2 11.5 39.0 48.0 13.0 33.0 50.5 16.5
EU25 Non-nat. 65.4 19.8 14.8 50.1 31.7 18.2 39.2 32.9 27.9
Total 61.3 26.2 12.5 43.3 41.9 14.8 35.1 44.1 20.8
NL National 41.0 39.7 19.3 37.1 38.3 24.6
EU25 Non-nat. 36.7 35.3 28.0 17.7 50.1 32.2
Total 41.6 39.2 19.2 37.2 38.4 24.4
PT National 80.1 11.9 8.0 82.4 11.1 6.5 77.5 13.3 9.2
EU25 Non-nat. 60.6 19.3 20.1 46.5 29.0 24.5
Total 79.8 12.1 8.1 82.2 11.2 6.6 77.1 13.5 9.4
SE National 35.1 43.0 21.9 29.2 45.5 25.3 23.7 51.7 24.6
EU25 Non-nat. 32.2 40.0 27.8 22.3 45.7 32.0
Total 35.1 42.9 22.0 29.4 45.1 25.5 23.9 51.1 25.0
EU15 National 46.2 37.8 16.0 39.7 41.2 19.1 36.6 42.4 21.0
EU25 Non-nat. 55.7 30.0 14.3 47.2 32.2 20.6 37.1 39.3 23.6
Total 46.8 37.4 15.8 40.4 40.6 19.0 37.2 41.9 20.9
19
Notes:
1. Educational levels defined according to ISCED classification. * Figures with low reliability. Row totals for each year 100%.
2. Data for Italy is missing.
3. Low5levels 02; Medium5levels 34; High5levels 56 of ISCED.
On ISCED, see http://www.uis.unesco.org/TEMPLATE/pdf/isced/ISCED_A.pdf
Source: Labour Force Survey, spring data

Table 1.3 Employed nationals, EU15 non-nationals and third-country

nationals by sector of employment in EU15, 19952005 (row
%, individuals aged 15 and over)
Agriculture Industry Service Service Total

(low (mid-high
level) level)
1995 Nationals 5.04 50.90 9.16 34.90 100.00
EU non-nationals 1.61 55.83 17.11 25.44 100.00
TCN 1.73 60.39 14.88 23.00 100.00
Total 4.87 51.29 9.49 34.36 100.00
2000 Nationals 4.31 49.17 9.51 37.01 100.00
EU non-nationals 1.43 49.03 18.38 31.16 100.00
TCN 2.45 54.40 18.00 25.15 100.00
Total 4.19 49.33 9.97 36.51 100.00
2005 Nationals 3.71 46.65 9.83 39.82 100.00
EU non-nationals 1.85 46.62 18.01 33.51 100.00
TCN 3.35 48.48 23.53 24.65 100.00
Total 3.65 46.73 10.62 39.01 100.00
Notes:
NACE activities are grouped as follows:
Agriculture 5 A. Agriculture, hunting and forestry; B. Fishing.
Industry 5 C. Mining and quarrying; D. Manufacturing; E. Electricity, gas and water
supply; F. Construction; G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles,
motorcycles and personal and household goods; I. Transport, storage and communication.
Low level services 5 H. Hotels and restaurants; O. Other community, social and personal
service activities; P. Private households with employed persons.
Mid-high level services 5 J. Financial intermediation; K. Real estate, renting and business
activities; L. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security; M. Education;
N. Health and social work; Q. Extra-territorial organizations and bodies.
TCN5Third country nationals.
Source: Labour Force Survey, spring data
group, each using the basic EIMSS dataset. Some pose questions in rela-
tion to existing European survey sources, such as Eurobarometer (EB) or
the European Social Survey (ESS), others derive questions in relation to
established studies of migration or immigration. In total, the chapters add
up to a comprehensive and unique portrait of the social effects of the EUs
extraordinary free movement regime.
Chapter 2 by Michael Braun and Camelia Arsene offers an overview of
the mobile population of EU movers surveyed by the EIMSS. Relatively
little is known about the population of intra-EU movers, aside from crude
figures on stocks and flows in different European countries. First, it details
the social background and age of migrants, the duration of migration, geo-
graphic origins, and the cross-national marriage patterns of movers. Then,
breaking down the population in terms of periods of migration and age at
migration, it derives a preliminary typology of EU movers. Four clusters
emerge: late traditional migrants, continuing the classical labour migra-
tion from south to north; pure retirement migrants, who are moving from
north to south to settle after ending work; pre-retirement migrants, who
are middle aged, affluent movers who move as part of a lifestyle decision;
and finally Eurostars, a new highly mobile class of younger professionals
and others using European mobility opportunities.
Classic migration theory focuses on the motivation, timing and pat-
terns of migration, and on the social organisation of migration systems.
Intra-EU migration can be viewed in these terms, but it also suggests the
emergence of new forms of mobility within the evolving transnational
space of the European Union. In Chapter 3, Oscar Santacreu, Emiliana
Baldoni and Mara-Carmen Albert analyse the complex motivations of
intra-EU movers, and the way such migration often builds on successive
experiences of mobility within and outside Europe. They focus on the sub-
jective motivations, personal networks and family support that structure
these movements, both as separate factors and in combination. It turns
out that intra-EU migration is not just driven by economic factors. In fact,
the lure of cross-national romance, leisure and lifestyle opportunities (that
is, quality of life), and adventure against the new European background
outweigh purely economic motivations. Significant gender differences
also emerge, especially within the category of romance migration, as
cross-national partnerships take on specific cross-cultural forms. Sexuality
also features in European migration, given higher than average mobility
among gays and lesbians. Together with the previous chapter, the analysis
begins to draw a new map of migration within Western Europe.
In Chapter 4, Ettore Recchi then tackles the crucial issue of social
mobility as it might be related to spatial mobility in the EU. Traditional
migrants typically move spatially in order to be mobile socially, particu-
larly across generations. Opportunities for work, education, career and
the bettering of lifestyles have, in highly fluid societies, led spatial mobility
to be a kind of escalator up the social ladder, often associated with moves
from periphery regions to core cities. This has always held for internal
migration within European nations, but European integration poses the
question of whether spatial mobility within and around the new European
space may offer new possibilities to ambitious social climbers on an inter-
national scale. EIMSS permits a systematic comparison of social mobility
patterns of movers with stayers, using ESS as a reference. Recchi offers
a detailed analysis that checks for a number of potential hypotheses of
inter-generational and intra-generational social mobility. Contrary to

some of the hopes associated with European integration, he finds that
there is not a substantial structural mobility effect. EU movement oppor-
tunities tend to be more used by middle- and upper-class Europeans, and
the bulk of movers stay fixed in the same occupational class they belonged
to before moving abroad.
A large part of traditional immigration studies focuses on processes of
acculturation, assimilation or integration (depending on the model) of
immigrants into national host societies, according to a series of indexes
regarding language use, cultural adaptation, family life and social prac-
tices. EIMSS was set up to enable the evaluation of acculturation proc-
esses of foreign resident Europeans in their destination countries, and does
so for different countries and different nationalities, across cohorts, gender
and social classes. In Chapter 5, Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu
highlight the discrepancies between the social and cultural integration
of EU movers, showing that these distinctly transnational migrants in
Europe differ substantially from typical immigrants in how they combine
the pull of their home culture with the challenges of the new country of
residency. Lack of language proficiency proves to be no great barrier to
effective integration of migrants in the host society, even though it limits
networks that take them out of their own national milieus.
Chapter 6 by Nina Rother and Tina Nebe pushes this line of inquiry
deep into the question of European and national identity. Much of the
European Commissions justificatory commentary on freedom of move-
ment stresses the positive impact of mobility on the emergence of European
identity. Movement is meant to establish a more solid foundation for the
EU, through positive, affective identification with the European project.
Referring to the large body of data and existing research based on regular
Eurobarometer surveys measuring support for European integration,
territorial attachment and the hierarchisation of national, local and tran-
snational identity, EIMSS repeats these questions for the EU movers.
These individuals might indeed be considered the prototypical Highly
Europeanized Citizens (HECs), benefiting the most from the European
integration project. Nebe and Rother create a typology of movers on the
basis of distinct patterns of identification with country of origin, country
of residence and the EU. Elaborating the social psychology literature, they
find that one potential for European identity is that it reduces the cogni-
tive dissonance felt by movers caught between strong national identifica-
tions. A European identity in this way is not incompatible with existing
national identities.
In Chapter 7, by Anne Muxel, the big political questions about
European citizenship are asked. Much of the literature on European
citizenship has focused on the opportunities European nationals have to

participate as EU citizens abroad in local and European elections. Our
survey took place at the time of the 2004 European elections, and so was
well placed to gauge this participation amongst a representative sample of
such citizens. As expected, movers do participate more than stayers, but
rates are not impressive. It is necessary, therefore, to go beyond voting and
compare the importance of this to other forms of political involvement.
The chapter also analyses data for the first time available on the left/right
political orientation of EU movers and their attitudes on liberalisation
and state intervention. These prototypical beneficiaries of a more liberal,
open European market, paradoxically tend at the same time to be more
supportive of state intervention. A closer look shows that the social class
background and education of EU movers matter more to participation
than national differences.
A further essential area of inquiry on the question of an emergent
European transnational space is, of course, the media. A large body of
literature on migration and media studies has emerged in recent years dis-
cussing the possibilities of transnational media in the context of European
integration and beyond, and of new diaspora media and new channels of
communication associated with innovative technologies. Europe however
is also characterized by a very weak public sphere beyond nation-state
contexts, given the modest success of attempts to create print or visual
media for a European market. Chapter 8 by Damian Tambini and Nina
Rother shows that EU movers are consumers of transnational and
European media where available, and they show a strikingly low use of
television media compared to print media and the internet. However, a
more accurate classification would see their media consumption in terms
of combinatory approaches that also often involve appreciation and use
of local (host country) media alongside international sources. They also
underline that emerging transnational patterns are linked to the availabil-
ity and quality of media in different countries, findings that are relevant to
attempts to construct a more effective European media space.
Finally, in Chapter 9, Adrian Favell and Tina Nebe push the question-
ing of PIONEUR out into the effects of EU enlargement. As well as offer-
ing a systematic survey of West European intra-EU migration, PIONEUR
took up the challenge of comparing findings on intra-EU migration with
what might be expected from new member states which joined the EU in
May 2004 and which were about to join in 2007. A series of 40 qualitative
in-depth interviews were thus conducted with higher and lower end
labour migrants from both Poland and Romania (the two largest acces-
sion countries) in the five selected Western member states. Similar ques-
tions to EIMSS were posed, bearing in mind that the features of intra-EU
migration borderless mobility, no technical barriers, minimal prejudice

are certainly not a given for movers from any East-Central European
country. The life stories of these new pioneers in fact speak more to a tra-
ditional immigrant experience. They face discrimination and barriers not
apparent to Western EU movers, while also seeing Western Europe as a
place to advance career aspirations or opportunities for their children. The
chapter points towards new research on the future of the regional migra-
tion system in Europe, as EastWest migration comes to more resemble
the intra-EU migration within Western Europe surveyed by EIMSS.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The study of European integration has been slow to incorporate soci-

ological analyses. Pioneers of European Integration represents a key
empirical contribution to an emerging sociology and human geography
of the European Union (for an overview of existing contributions see
Bettin Lattes and Recchi 2005; Favell and Guiraudon 2010). Migration
and mobility have long been recognized as important dimensions of the
European project, but systematic empirical studies have been scarce. Some
studies have tackled dimensions of this new mobility (King et al. 2000;
Favell 2008a), and there has been much reflection on the significance of
European citizenship (Magnette 1999; Bellamy et al. 2006) and European
identity (Hermann et al. 2004; Checkel and Katzenstein 2009; Fligstein
2008). It is the first time, however, that systematic, representative data on
spatial mobility and its social effects within and across Western Europe
have been presented and analysed in this form.
Europe is unfinished but the freedom of movement of persons has
wrought dramatic social change. Much of this is not yet fully visible. Some
of the most dramatic examples can be found in the lives and experiences of
those who took up most enthusiastically their new rights of European citi-
zenship, and decided to give it a go living and working in another member
state. Successful movement and resettlement is far from a given. But, as we
show in this book, Europe will never be the same again: neither for the EU
movers, nor for those stayers now getting used to their foreign neighbours
as colleagues, friends and partners. The pioneers of European integration
are also, perhaps, the pioneers of a better, brighter Europe for all.
NOTES
1. The claim is based on data from Eurobarometer 64.1 of 2005. The question is: Which of
the following statements best describe(s) what the European Union means to you person-
ally? It was also asked in 1997, 1998 and 2001.
2. Figures for mobile students and researchers are taken from European Commission
reports, available via: http://ec.europa.eu/education/index_en.htm.
3. See the PIONEUR website: http://www.obets.ua.es/pioneur/.
4. In most original random large-scale surveys such as the Labour Force Surveys the
number of migrants surveyed is usually a very small percentage of the overall popula-
tion. EIMSS differed by devising a names-based telephone methodology for identifying
migrants who are a very small part of the overall population in sufficient numbers.
Our survey is comparable to ones made in Israel and Australia, among the few countries
where different immigrant groups can be identified in sufficient numbers to survey com-
paratively (see Appendix A for more details).
5. An overview of the issue and the changing national measures can be found on the EC
website: http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catid5466&langid5en?/free_movement/en-
largement_en.htm.
6. Data and tables presented in this section are taken from Recchi et al. (2006), which also
contains more fine-tuned analyses.
2. The demographics of movers and
stayers in the European Union
Michael Braun and Camelia Arsene
INTRODUCTION
Who are EU movers? Do they have some common demographic and

background features? Are they different from the general population of
the country they leave? And how do they compare to the population of
the country they have settled in? These basic questions are addressed in
this chapter. In it we describe the sociodemographic characteristics of the
EU movers sampled by the PIONEUR project in 2004. First, we offer
a brief summary of the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the
quantitative EIMSS survey, outlining some challenges we faced in our
analysis. Then, starting with an overview of the social and geographical
background of movers, the development of migration over time, and the
age at migration, we use the last two variables to arrive at a classification
of migrants into four groups according to their duration of sojourn in the
country of residence and their age at migration. We then go on to portray
the four migrant groups with regard to a variety of other variables.1
The EIMSS survey defined its population of interest as all migrants
from Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain the five largest EU15
member states who had moved to one or other of these same countries
from 1974 through 2003, were adults at the time of migration, and have
been living in their respective country of residence in 2004 for at least one
year. From each country of origin/country of residence combination we
sampled some 250 individuals, for an overall survey size of 5000 cases.
A survey of this kind has never been done in Europe before. In fact,
it stands as a unique contribution to migration research anywhere in the
world, which is often fatally undercut by the fact that migrant populations
are normally too small in general population surveys to be identified and
analysed as a distinct population. Moreover, once a means for identifying
the EU mover population has been set up, it is then possible to systemati-
cally compare it to what we know from other surveys about the average
European population the non-moving EU stayers in our terminology.
26
The demographics of movers and stayers 27
EIMSS is thus set up to plug in directly to existing European Social Survey

and Eurobarometer data.
Most of the data gathering was done by traditional telephone survey
techniques. Much has been written in recent years about the limitations
of this approach, yet in most locations it proved a viable way of locat-
ing respondents. Where the survey represented a bold innovation was
in the development of a new names-based telephone directory sampling
technique, which identified foreign populations in each country through
probability calculation on first and family names. This worked remark-
ably well. One typical problem in telephone research as set up the under-
representation of women married to nationals of the country of residence
was rectified by the use of a small network component in our survey. In
one case Britain where mobile phone use had perhaps already rendered
landline telephone sampling unreliable by 2004, we also supplemented the
telephone survey with snowball sampling of respondents (see Appendix A
for more details).
A number of caveats and limitations about our survey, however, must
also be pointed out. One limitation is that we cannot analyse return migra-
tion with a cross-sectional sample, nor account for the potential selectivity
in our sample due to early remigration of migrants who might have special
characteristics. However, an act of return migration or an intention to
return to ones home country should not be assumed to be negative self-
selection. In the end, this really depends on the original intentions of the
migrant. If migration was intended to be temporary to begin with, return
migration might even demonstrate success. It should also be noted that,
with a cross-sectional design, the duration of the sojourn in the country of
residence and the period of immigration cannot vary independently, as all
migrants with a given duration of stay have by design necessarily arrived
in the same year.
Furthermore, as with most migrant surveys, when considering how
results can be interpreted in the different domains covered, the differ-
ing self-selectivity of the national groups surveyed has to be taken into
account. A key question is whether and to what extent the various groups
sampled that is, the country of origin (COO) and country of residence
(COR) combinations are comparable. Individuals do not move at
random from the different countries of origin to the different countries of
residence. Rather there is substantial self-selection by different personal
characteristics. For instance, if we want to find out whether Italians in
France fare better than in other countries of residence, we have to take
into account whether Italian migrants vary according to the different
destinations that they select to begin with. Initial characteristics might
differ according to important variables such as age, social background
and educational qualifications, depending on whether an Italian migrant

has moved to France, Germany or Britain. These must all be allowed
for.
In addition to these differences which are measured by our survey
questions, there might also be unobserved heterogeneity which was not
measured or is in principle not measurable. Countries of residence differ
with regard to which people they attract the most: labour, study or retire-
ment migrants. Traditional labour migrants are one group we might
find in different places, but not all. They are unlikely to be equally repre-
sented across destinations. A second obvious group might be retirement
migrants. Again, it is not hard to imagine that these will have special fea-
tures according to where they are coming from and where they are going
mainly of a geographical kind. Another self-selected group are those free
movers (Favell 2008a) that we identify as an emergent part of EU internal
migration. Again, different variables will come into play for this group. In
contrast to traditional migration by unskilled labour, free movers might be
assumed to migrate because of individual choices (that is, the importance
of chain migration and formal recruitment arrangements is reduced), and
differences regarding the economic level between countries of origin and
countries of residence should be of less importance.
Methodologically, the problem is that if both the traditional migrant
and the free-mover types are not equally represented in the different
groups across countries, then this has to be taken into account when
considering the evidence found by the various chapters that follow. For
example, although our data at first might suggest this, it might not be pos-
sible to conclude that, say, Britain is more open for migrant integration
than, say Germans, simply on the basis of a straightforward comparison
of Italians in Britain with Italians in Germany. This is because the Italians
in each country might, for the self-selective processes mentioned above,
differ substantially in terms of their social characteristics to begin with.
Italians might be mostly free movers in Britain, and traditional guest
workers in Germany: this will impact all their other measurable behav-
iour. Throughout the volume then we carefully allow for the self-selective
nature of the groups assessed to avoid coming to such nave conclusions,
and rather put the accent on looking to see how and why Italian migrants
(for example) differ in different locations.
These considerations apply in principle to all international comparative
migration research, as long as fixed-number samples of migrants from
similar countries of origin or countries of residence are selected for inves-
tigation. However, given the basic diversity of the movers included in the
EIMSS survey, we are especially alert to this issue. Besides illustrating the
basic sociodemographic traits of respondents to our survey, this chapter
will thus give an evidence-based idea of the way self-selectivity has worked
out in the sample and why EU movers are so diverse.
Moreover, since we sampled an equal number of migrants from each
country of origin/country of residence combination, our results have
to allow for the fact that there are quite different totals of migrants by
nationality in each of these combinations in reality. That is, our sample of
Italians in Germany is a much smaller relative proportion of the total of
Italians in Germany than, say, our sample of Italians in Spain. This too
demands special care in the analysis: the size of the overall migrant popu-
lation by nationality may have important effects on the characteristics and
dynamics of that population. For this reason, our next step should be to
indicate the official figures of migration for our country of origin/country
of residence combination, in order to give a sense of the proportion of
the migration we studied relative to the overall picture of present-day
migration in Europe.
INTRA-EU MIGRANTS IN THE PIONEUR

COUNTRIES
At the time of the EIMSS survey in 2004, Germany had the highest
number of (legal) resident foreigners with 7.3 million, followed by France
(3.3 million), Britain (2.9 million), Spain (2.8 million) and Italy (1.3
million). Since the early 1990s, there had been sizeable differences across
the five countries in the development of the numbers of foreign nation-
als both from third countries (that is, non-EU members) and those from
other EU15 countries (Table 1). With regard to all foreigners irrespective
Table 2.1 Stocks of all foreigners and EU15 non-nationals, 1990 and
2004 (in thousands)
1990 2004
Foreigners EU % EU Foreigners EU % EU
Germany 4 845.9 1 516.8 31.3 7 334.8 1 767.3 24.1
France 3 596.6 1 321.5 36.7 3 263.2 1 195.5 36.6
Britain 2 416.0 910.0 37.7 2 760.0 1 268.6 46.0
Italy 490.4 140.8 28.7 1 334.9 132.1 9.9
Spain 398.1 245.8 61.7 2 772.2 360.2 13.0
Source: Eurostat New Cronos Database and Eurostat Dissemination Database (see
Recchi et al. 2006); data for France from 1999, for Britain from 2003, for Italy from 2002
Table 2.2 Stocks of movers from EIMSS countries, 2002
Germans French British Italians Spanish

Germany 86 696 99 587 644 955 115 818
France 76 882 75 546 200 632 160 194
Britain 266 136 96 281 107 244 54 482
Italy 35 091 29 313 19 957 12 327
Spain 78 020 46 894 94 862 36 815
Source: Eurostat Dissemination Database (see Recchi et al. 2006)
of geographic origin, for France, in the 1990s, there was a slight decline,
probably linked to the relatively high number of naturalizations during
this period, whereas in Britain the numbers rose slightly (by 14 per cent)
and in Germany substantially (by 51 per cent). The numbers in Italy and
Spain, however, grew dramatically during the same period. In Italy, the
number of foreign nationals nearly tripled, and for Spain it increased
nearly sevenfold from 1990 (see also Mnz and Fassmann 2004; Salt 1997
and 2005; and the annual SOPEMI reports). EU15 foreigners are a minor-
ity among foreigners in all five countries in 2004, ranging from 1.8 million
in Germany to 132 000 in Italy. Moreover, the number of EU15 non-
nationals since the early 1990s declined in France and Italy and increased
modestly in Germany (16.5 per cent) with larger increases in Britain (39.4
per cent) and Spain (46.5 per cent).
When we look at country of origin/country of residence combinations
in 2002, the single largest group are Italians in Germany with more than
600 000 people, followed by Germans in Britain with more than 260 000,
and by Italians and Spanish in France with some 200 000 and 160 000
respectively (Table 2.2). The smallest groups are found in Italy, where no
national group of the four surpasses around 35 000 (Germans), and the
Spanish immigrants constitute the smallest with some 12 000. In 2004, no
national group in Germany had less than 100 000 persons (Eurostat 2006).
These stocks reflect both the legacy of traditional guest-worker migra-
tion (movement exclusively from South to North) as well as, in the case
of growing numbers in Spain, more recent trends (movement increasingly
also from North to South). In line with this last observation, the sharpest
increases can be found for Germans and British in Spain and France, while
at the same time the number of Spanish in Germany and France and of
Italians in France has decreased (Recchi et al. 2003). While the two decades
before 1974 were characterized by guest-worker migration from the South
to the North, there was hardly any migration from the North to the South
in those years. From 1974 on, the year when guest-worker recruitment
stopped, family reunification became the main type of migration (Bauer
and Zimmermann 1996; Zimmermann 1995). In sharp contrast to the
other traditional guest-worker populations, Italians were not affected by
the end of active recruitment of foreign labour: Italy was a member of the
European Community, and Italians could continue to move. However,
labour migration from Italy to the North was largely discouraged due to
the paucity of available jobs. On the other hand, migration to Britain has
continued to increase for all our Western European nationalities from the
1970s onwards. These figures are compatible with a general decline, observ-
able across Europe, of low-skilled labour migration and family reunifica-
tion, and increases in highly-skilled labour and retirement migration (King
2002). Britain, in fact, emerges as the target of highly-skilled labour migra-
tion among our five countries, a result in line with past research (Salt 1992),
while Spain becomes the target of retirement migration.
BASIC SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

OF EU MOVERS
In this section we illustrate the social background, education and employ-

ment status of movers, their age and duration of migration, geographical
aspects of mobility, marriage status and the national origin of partners.
Then we will focus on the migration process over time, and in more detail
on age at migration and its change over the different time periods. Having
identified these two key variables, we will then use multilevel analysis to
show how age at the time of migration varies in the different periods con-
sidered and how this variable is linked to other individual characteristics
of the EU movers. We will also introduce one higher-level variable which
seeks to capture the essence of the country of origin/country of residence
combinations. Finally, we use age at migration and duration of stay to
classify groups of migrants, which we will then describe using additional
variables. The goal is to move towards identifying specific clusters or types
of migrants within the overall group of movers. When appropriate, we will
also compare movers to the corresponding stayer populations, as is done
in the following chapters of this book. For this, we use principally the first
wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) as a reference survey.
Social Background
A first finding is that, when measured by parental education, migrants from

Southern Europe stem from a lower social background than migrants from
Table 2.3 Respondents education (lower-secondary qualification or less)

by country of origin and country of residence (in %)
Country of Country of origin

residence
French Germans British Italians Spanish
France 56.9 38.2 18.5 33.2 28.4
Germany 18.2 70.0 31.5 72.6 50.8
Britain 10.6 15.6 56.5 23.9 25.6
Italy 12.5 33.2 20.1 56.1 26.0
Spain 23.8 60.8 43.4 39.4 66.7
Notes: Stayer population is indicated in the main diagonal (shaded).
Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N5 13 839
the other countries. This is particularly the case for migration to Germany.
However, it is also the case for migration to Spain from nearly all countries
(with the partial exception of the French); this is partly but not entirely
due to the higher age of the migrants. With very few exceptions, movers
come from a higher social background than stayers, of whom more than
75 per cent have fathers with a lower level of education. The exceptions
are Italians and Spanish in Germany and Germans in Spain; these groups
have a lower social background than the respective stayer populations. For
Germans in Spain this is due to their higher age; however, this is not the
case for Italians and Spanish in Germany, who have come at lower ages.
The majority of EU movers are highly educated. However, in Britain
and especially in Germany, migrants from Spain and Italy have a lower
educational background than migrants from the other countries (Table
2.3). This also applies to German and British migrants to Spain, when
compared to Germans and British in the other countries. Movers differ
also on this dimension from stayers, 5570 per cent of whom have a lower
secondary education or less. In fact, almost all groups of movers have a
higher education than the corresponding stayer populations. This even
applies for the British and Germans in Spain, though the differences from
the stayer populations are not as pronounced as for other mover groups.
There is only one clear exception: Italian movers settled in Germany have
a noticeably lower education than the Italian stayer population overall.
Regarding their present occupation, British and German nationals
living in Spain and Italy are more likely to be self-employed if they are
still working at all. For respondents working full- or part-time, the per-
centages are similar for most of the migrant groups, with the exception
1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980

Year of birth
D GB I E F GB I E D F I E D F GB E D F GB I
France Germany Britain Italy Spain
Note: Countries of origin (first row below graphic): D 5 Germans, F 5 French, GB 5

British, I 5 Italians, E 5 Spanish.
Source: EIMSS, N54901
Figure 2.1 Distribution of year of birth dependent on country of origin

and country of residence
of Spain as country of residence, where the biggest percentages exist for

retired Germans and British. The percentage of retired people among the
stayer populations ranges from slightly below one fifth in Italy and Spain,
to around one fourth in Germany and Britain and 28 per cent in France.
Thus, leaving aside pre-1974 guest-worker migration or possible return
migration since, intra-EU migration since 1974 has in fact increased the
active population in Germany and Britain particularly, but increased the
inactive population in Spain.
Age of Migrants and Duration of Migration
A second key dimension concerns the age of migrants and the duration
of their stay. Germans and British living in Spain are the oldest migrants
in the sample, which reveals a dominant pattern of retirement migration
to that country (Figure 2.1). This can be seen even more clearly in their
100
80
Age at migration
60
40
20
D GB I E F GB I E D F I E D F GB E D F GB I
Note: Countries of origin (first row below graphic): D 5 Germans, F 5 French, GB 5

British, I 5 Italians, E 5 Spanish.
Source: EIMSS, N54 901
Figure 2.2 Distribution of age at migration dependent on country of origin

and country of residence
age at the time of settlement (Figure 2.2): British citizens were on average
51 years old when they came to Spain, while Italians and Spanish who
moved to Germany (in order to work or to join their partners) were on
average in their mid-20s. The mean year of birth for stayers ranges from
1953 in Britain and 1954 in Spain to 1956 in France, Germany and Italy.
Averaged over all countries of destination, German and British movers are
older than the respective stayers, and Spanish movers are younger, while
there is no age difference between French and Italian movers and stayers.
However, there is some variance for the single country of origin/country
of residence combinations.
On average, intra-EU migrants have lived in their destination countries
for nearly 15 years at the time of the interview. Overall, movers from Italy
have stayed somewhat longer and those from Britain somewhat less time
than average. The extreme cases are Italians and Spanish in Germany on
the one hand, and British in France and Spain on the other. Between the
Table 2.4 Respondents coming from a big city or the suburbs (%)
Country of Country of origin

residence
French Germans British Italians Spanish
France 35.9 44.2 37.2 46.3 42.3
Germany 43.1 33.1 44.4 19.3 35.5
Britain 51.9 41.5 29.4 41.8 36.7
Italy 53.6 53.4 50.4 17.6 52.6
Spain 57.4 66.4 44.0 52.8 29.9
Notes: Big city and suburbs of big city are self-assessed by respondents. Stayer
population is on the main diagonal (shaded)
Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N513 985
former and the latter, there is a difference of almost nine years, showing
the role of Germany as a traditional immigration magnet for these two
Southern European countries and the emergence of new patterns of
shorter-term migration in other cases.
Geographic Mobility
Table 2.4 shows the proportion of migrants coming from big cities and
the suburbs, with the main diagonal showing the corresponding figures
for the stayer populations. As the percentage of stayers who live in a
big city or a suburb ranges from less than one-fifth in Italy to roughly
one-third in the other four countries, one can conclude that international
movers come especially from urbanized areas. This is particularly the case
for those who move to Italy and Spain. There is, however, one notable
exception to this rule: again, Italian migrants in Germany. The propor-
tion here from urban areas corresponds to the Italian stayer population
as a whole.
At the same time, movers seem to be attracted by the metropolitan
regions in the countries of residence, and are more frequently found there
than the respective stayer populations of these countries. This is especially
the case for migration to Britain, especially due to a London effect (on
the appeal of Britains capital for EU movers, see Favell 2006b). Spain
and France are partial exceptions here as destination countries. This can
be explained by the fact that these countries are prime targets for retire-
ment migrants. Though there are many retired people living in Italy as
well, EU movers living in Italy have to a greater degree moved there for
other reasons, be it work or love, before they eventually retired (see King
and Patterson 1998). However, there is one characteristic that intra-EU

migration to Italy and France seems to have in common: a trend to
counter-urbanization, which consists in resettling deserted rural areas by
refurbishing existing housing stock (see also Buller and Hoggart 1994;
Hoggart and Buller 1995).
National Origin of Partners
A fourth key question is cross-national intermarriage. The two Southern

European countries are positioned at opposite ends with regard to their
EU movers having a partner from the country of origin: In Italy, rela-
tively few have co-nationals as partners, whereas in Spain the vast major-
ity does. For intra-EU migrants to Britain, having a partner from their
own national community is not very common. The very low proportion
of Italians in Germany having a German partner might be due to the large
number of Italians in this country from which these people can choose.
Our result is in sharp contrast to results for binational marriages in
Germany of first-generation migrants (Schroedter 2004), which show that
Italians and Spanish are the most inter-married of the traditional guest-
worker populations in this respect. However, these other analyses do not
include immigrants from France and Britain and put a special emphasis
on the low integration of Turks in Germany. In addition, they are based
on a different definition of first-generation migrants, which includes all
those who migrated to Germany after the age of six. Given the fact that
the Italian migrants in our sample came to Germany at an average age of
26, it is obvious that they had a high probability of marrying or at least
getting a partner from their home country before they arrived.
MIGRATION OVER TIME
We will now look in greater detail at how intra-EU migration has devel-
oped over time. Three periods are distinguished here: from 1974 to 1983,
1984 to 1993 and 1994 to 2003. The first period, from 1974 to 1983, fol-
lowed immediately the end of the active recruitment of foreign labour in
the Northern industrial countries in the aftermath of the mid-1970s oil
crisis. The formal restrictions to free movement which were established
at that time affected only Spanish movers. The second period, from 1984
to 1993, was somewhat transitional, with the noticeable fact that Spanish
citizens were granted free movement rights in 1993. The last period is
characterized by decisive improvements in the mobility potential of intra-
EU migrants resulting from the Maastricht Treaty, while at the same time
economic incentives for emigration from Southern Europe were much

weaker than in earlier periods.
Figure 2.3 shows the number of migrants for the different periods of the
groups defined by country of origin (represented by the rows) and country
of residence.2 It can be seen that some of the groups have moved fairly
recently, such as Germans to France, French to Germany, and British
to France and Spain. In contrast, other groups moved in larger numbers
relatively early, for example Italians and Spanish to Germany.
We have broken down the number of migrants arriving during each of
the three migration periods by country of residence and whether they have
ever worked in their present country of residence (see Figure 2.4, that spec-
ifies the case for women). Each of the columns corresponds to one country
of residence. The first row includes respondents who have never worked
in the country of residence, and the second represents the corresponding
information for those who have worked in the country.
The numbers of migrants to France, Italy and Spain who have never
worked in these countries sharply increases with recency of migration
in Spain, it is high for all periods of migration reflecting the growing
importance of these countries as targets for retirement migration. There
are two additional possible reasons why the number of movers who have
never worked in the country of residence might increase with the recency
of migration. Migrants who have come for study reasons may not have
entered the labour market (yet), and recent movers might not yet have
been successful in finding a job, something most likely to have affected
particularly family members of labour migrants. The differences between
migration periods are less pronounced for those who have indeed worked
in the country of residence.
Gender differences are relatively small, although there is a consist-
ently higher number of women who have never worked in the country of
residence for all periods of migration. There are women accompanying or
following at a later time their labour-migrant husband, without starting a
work career abroad on their own. However, among those who came in the
earliest period under investigation, there is not an especially high number
of women who have never worked in the country of residence. This is pre-
sumably so because these women had a longer time-frame for getting a job
where they moved to.
Of particular interest are the changes in the formal educational level of
the different groups of migrants over time (Figure 2.5). Corresponding
to trends in all countries in recent decades, most migrant groups include
proportionally smaller numbers of less-educated individuals in the more
recent periods. Two developments, however, deserve attention. The first
concerns labour migrants. While Spanish and Italians in Germany start
Germans, in France Germans, in Britain Germans, in Italy Germans, in Spain
100 200
100 200
100 200
100 200
0
0
0
0
7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403
French, in Germany French, in Britain French, in Italy French, in Spain
100 200
100 200
100 200
100 200
0
0
0
0
7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403
British, in France British, in Germany British, in Italy British, in Spain
100 200
100 200
100 200
100 200
Frequency
0
0
0
7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 0 7483 8493 9403
38
Italians, in France Italians, in Germany Italians, in Britain Italians, in Spain
100 200
100 200
100 200
100 200
0
0
0
0
7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403
Spanish, in France Spanish, in Germany Spanish, in Britain Spanish, in Italy
100 200
100 200
100 200
100 200
0
0
0
0
7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403 7483 8493 9403
Migration period
Source: EIMSS, N 5 4 902
Figure 2.3 Period of migration dependent on country of origin and country of residence
no work, in F no work, in D no work, in GB no work, in I no work, in E
400
400
400
400
400
200
200
200
200
200
0
0
0
0
0
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 49 40 8 49 40 8 49 40 8 9 0 8 9 0
74 8 9 74 8 9 74 8 9 74 84 94 74 84 94
work, in F work, in D work, in GB work, in I work, in E
Frequency
400
400
400
400
400
39
200
200
200
200
200
0
0
0
0
0
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
8 49 40 8 49 40 8 49 40 8 9 0 8 9 0
74 8 9 74 8 9 74 8 9 74 84 94 74 84 94
Migration period
Figure 2.4 Period of migration dependent on country of residence and whether they ever worked there (women)
90
80
70
60
50
Percent
40
30 Germans
40
French
20
British
10 Italians
Spanish
0
7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103 7480 8190 9103
Figure 2.5 Migrants with lower secondary education or less dependent on period of migration, country of origin and
country of residence (%)
with a high level of less-educated migrants in the first period (80 per cent),
the percentage is down to 30 per cent for the Spanish in the third one. For
the Italians, on the other hand, it still hovers above 65 per cent. Germany
thus continues to attract poorly educated Italians, perhaps to cater for
the thriving sector of Italian restaurants, as well as other ethnic-based
activities for the large and long-established Italian community there. The
second concerns retirement migration. The proportion of less-educated
Germans in Spain is 70 per cent in the first period and reduces by only 10
percentage points, yet the proportion of their British counterparts actually
increases by nearly 20 percentage points to almost 50 per cent. A similar
but not as dramatic tendency can be seen for both migrant groups in
France, while for movers living in Italy (pre-)retirement migration comes
closer to the idea of elite migration if we take education as a proxy of
social status.
AGE AT MIGRATION
Age at migration is a crucial variable in migration research. It implicitly

tells us a lot about the motives of migrants and it is also paramount in
the discussion of different aspects of integration. We will now look at the
age distributions of movers from both the perspective of the countries of
origin and the countries of residence. Then we will explore the changes of
age at migration over time. Finally we will analyse the determinants of age
at migration by using a series of multi-level models.
Descriptive Analysis
Figure 2.6 shows that the French, Italians and Spanish predominantly
leave their country of origin at younger ages, while the Germans and
especially the British leave later. For movers from Britain, and to a lesser
degree also from Germany, the age distribution has actually become
bimodal. This hints at two distinct migration types which are determined
by different processes and for which different consequences are likely
to be revealed. It has to be noted that migration when older is not just
pure retirement migration, but in fact includes a high proportion of pre-
retirement migration, which might also entail labour-force participation
in the country of residence, whether or not this was the main driving force
behind the move. Also characteristic is the dip observable for people
in their late 40s and early 50s. This might be related to the presence of
children in the household, which discourages both explicit labour- and
pre-retirement migration.
Germans French
60
60
40
40
20
20
0
0
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Italians Spanish
60
60
Frequency
40
40
20
20
0
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
British
60
40
20
0
20 40 60 80
Age at migration
Figure 2.6 Age at migration dependent on country of origin
Figure 2.7 shows the frequency of different ages at migration for immi-
gration into the five countries of residence. For Germany, Britain and
Italy, it is predominantly the younger people who come, while for Spain
it is the older age groups. France is in-between. But how do the ages at
France Germany
100
100
50
50
0
0
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Italy Spain
100
100
Frequency
50
50
0
20 40 60 80 20 40 60 80
Britain
100
50
0
20 40 60 80
Age at migration
Figure 2.7 Age at migration dependent on country of residence
migration to the different countries of residence vary across the three

periods we study? Most telling are the figures for Spain, showing that older
immigrants become increasingly dominant. France is on the way towards
a bimodal distribution of age at migration, with growing numbers of older
people coming to this country in conjunction with a net increase of

migrants, particularly in the latest period. In Italy, the age distribution
of the newly arrived has not changed so much over time. In Germany
and Britain, the traditional labour-migration pattern remains intact with
mostly young people moving in. Nevertheless, comparing age at migration
between the last and the first period in Germany, there is no doubt that the
number of very young migrants has dropped. Correspondingly, migration
from Britain develops a clear bimodal distribution of age at migration
over the three periods, and in the last period Britains emigrating when
relatively older have actually become the majority. The same tendency is
visible for Germans, but it is less pronounced. The French, Italians and
Spanish, however, continue to migrate at relatively young ages.
Multivariate Analysis
In this section we estimate a series of multi-level models that help us

explain statistically a key aspect of mobility choices that is, the age at
which migrants leave their country of origin, our dependent variable.
Multi-level or hierarchical linear models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002)
are appropriate when variables pertain to two levels, an individual level
(in our case, the individual migrants) and a group level (in our case, the
country of origin/country of residence combinations). Usually, a series
of models is estimated beginning with a so-called empty or variance-
component model. This model will show how much of the variance in the
dependent variable (age at migration) is located within groups (that is, indi-
vidual variance around the group means) and how much between groups
(that is, the variance of the group means around the grand mean for all
groups). A second model typically includes the individual-level variables,
as in a normal OLS regression. A comparison of the variance components
of both models shows how much variance these individual-level variables
are able to explain at both levels. The explanatory power of the individual-
level variables with regard to the group-level variance is related to a com-
position effect: that is, the part of the differences between groups that can
be explained by taking into account the individual-level variables alone. A
third model usually estimated is one which, in addition to the individual-
level variables, also includes one or more variables at the group level.
As explanatory (independent) variables here we use period of migra-
tion, gender, education, motives for migration, previous work experience
in the country of origin and previous sojourns of three months or more in
the country of residence or a third country. Period of migration is entered
as two dummy variables, with the first period as the baseline: that is, the
effects are estimated for the 198493 and the 19942003 periods. Gender
Table 2.5 Random intercept models for age at migration
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Empty model Individual-level 1 group-level
variables information
Fixed effects
Constant 34.9 34.5 32.2
Migration 19841993 3.1 3.1
Migration 19942003 7.9 7.9
Women 21.8 21.8
Secondary-level education 23.0 23.0
Tertiary-level education 23.2 23.2
Work as motive 25.9 25.8
Family/love as motive 24.8 24.8
Quality of life as motive (20.2) (20.1)
Study as motive 28.7 28.7
Work experience in COO 2.7 2.7
Sojourn in COR 1.0 1.0
Sojourn in third country 2.1 2.1
NorthSouth migration 7.5
Random effects
Level 1: residual variance 123.4 101.0 101.0
Level 2: random intercept 52.4 26.8 14.9
N 4 807 4 807 4 807
Note: Insignificant values in parentheses.
is entered as a dummy variable with male respondents as the baseline:

that is, the effect pertains to women. Education is transformed into two
dummy variables with migrants with less than university-entrance qualifi-
cation as the baseline, so the effects refer to respondents with a university-
entrance qualification and those with a university degree respectively. Four
dummies for migration motives are entered with miscellaneous motives
as the baseline category; thus, the effects pertain to the pure motives of
work, family/love, quality of life and study. Previous work experience in
the country of origin and previous sojourn of three months or more in
the country of residence or in a third country are entered as three dummy
variables with respondents lacking such experiences forming the baseline
category. Table 2.5 shows the three models, a variance-component model
without any explanatory variables, a model which includes the individual-
level variables and a model which additionally includes information on
whether the migrant belongs to one of the six COO/COR groups moving
from the North (Britain and Germany) to the South (France, Italy and
Spain).
Model 1 shows that the grand mean of age at migration for all migrants
is nearly 35 years. Of the variance of age at migration 29.8 per cent is
related to national COO/COR group membership and 70.2 per cent is
attributable to within-groups individual differences. The group-level vari-
ance is extremely high, indicating that we can predict nearly one-third of
the variation of the age of migration alone by group membership, without
taking any individual characteristics of the migrants into account.
Model 2 introduces effects at the individual level, results which can be
interpreted as averages for all migrant groups. Most marked are the dif-
ferences between the three periods. The migrants of the second period are
three years older than the migrants in the first period and those of the third
period nearly eight years older, controlling for all the other independent
variables. Women moved on average nearly two years earlier than men,
and both the intermediate and the highly educated migrants came three
years earlier in their lives than the less-qualified.
Age at migration also varies considerably by migration motives. While
the quality-of-life migrants do not differ from those who came for miscel-
laneous motives, if work was the only motive, migrants came about six
years earlier, if study was the only motive about nine years earlier, and
those for family or love reasons five years earlier. Migrants with previ-
ous work experience in their country of origin, that is, those who were
sojourners abroad before they finally migrated to their present country of
residence, moved on average three, one and two years later in their lives,
respectively. Note that the different effects are independent of each other.
Together these sociodemographic and behavioural variables explain
18.2 per cent of the individual-level (residual) variance of age at migration.
They have an even higher impact at the group level, where they explain
more than 50 per cent of the variance between groups. This comparatively
high value is due to the large compositional differences between the COO/
COR combinations. Controlling for individual-level characteristics of the
migrants, we can thus reduce these compositional effects.
Though half of the variation of the random intercept is explained
by individual-level variables, the variance component is still highly sig-
nificant. This indicates that the means of age at migration in the different
COO/COR combinations are very different from each other, even after
compositional differences between these combinations have been taken
into account.
Finally, in model 3 a dummy variable for NorthSouth migration
is entered referring to British and German migrants to the other three
countries. The dummy variable shows that the NorthSouth migrants are
seven and a half years older than all the other migrants, over and above
what is already explained by individual-level variables. The individual-
level effects remain unaffected by the inclusion of this group-level variable,
with the only exception being the intercept, which changes in interpreta-
tion: now it refers to all migrants with baseline-category values on all
individual-level variables who are not members of a NorthSouth migrat-
ing group. There is again a marked change in the size of the random inter-
cept, as this declines by 44 per cent (compared to model 2). This decline in
unexplained variance at the group level is entirely due to the explanatory
power of the NorthSouth origin dichotomy we have constructed. We can
thus expect that older migrants from Northern Europe can be singled out
as a type of movers with highly distinct characteristics.
A SIMPLE CLASSIFICATION OF MIGRANTS
In this final section, we will go on to present the results of a simple cluster

analysis, building on the multivariate analysis. We use only age at migra-
tion and the duration of the stay in the country of residence as clustering
variables and require four clusters to be computed by the KMEANS4 pro-
cedure. The idea behind this analysis is to get something similar to a cross-
classification of age at migration and the length of the stay in the country
of residence. The resulting clusters are then described by additional vari-
ables which were not used in the definition of the groups (Table 2.6).
Cluster 1 (1539 movers) consists of migrants who moved on average
when they were 26 years old and have already stayed in their countries
of residence for an average of 24 years. We label them late traditional
migrants. Three-quarters of these migrants came in the first period and
none in the last. This group is not too unevenly distributed with respect to
the country of origin (only 16 per cent of this group are Germans, versus
25 per cent Italians), but it is with regard to the country of residence
(only 10 per cent of this group are in Spain, but 30 per cent in Germany).
Only one-third of this group has a university degree. Nine out of ten have
worked in the country of residence. The dominant migration motive was
love, but work was also important. Half of them has a country of residence
partner.
Cluster 2 (916 movers) has an average age at migration of 44 years and
13 years of stay in the country of residence. We label them pre-retirement
movers. These migrants have moved mainly during the last two periods.
There is a particularly strong representation of Germans and a weak one
of Spanish. France and especially Spain are overrepresented as countries
Table 2.6 Description of the four clusters
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4

Late Pre- Eurostars Pure
traditionals retirement retirement
movers movers
Age at migration 26 44 28 60
Years of stay 24 13 8 8
Migration from 197483 (%) 75 17 0 3
Migration from 198493 (%) 25 37 31 19
Migration from 19942003 (%) 0 46 69 77
COO: Germans (%) 16 30 17 29
COO: French (%) 20 19 23 15
COO: British (%) 18 23 13 40
COO: Italians (%) 25 19 21 12
COO: Spanish (%) 21 10 27 4
COR: Germany (%) 30 11 25 3
COR: France (%) 14 26 21 26
COR: Britain (%) 21 14 25 4
COR: Italy (%) 25 19 19 17
COR: Spain (%) 10 31 11 51
Gender (%), female (%) 51 50 55 42
University entrance 26 21 27 22
qualification (%)
University diploma (%) 34 43 55 36
Ever worked in COR (%) 89 54 81 18
Migration motive: Work (%) 27 23 31 6
Migration motive: Love (%) 42 28 32 14
Migration motive: Quality 18 38 16 69
of life (%)
Migration motive: Study (%) 10 4 17 4
Partner from COO (%) 27 55 35 60
Partner from COR (%) 50 19 37 9
Partner from third country (%) 6 8 11 9
Number of migrants 1539 916 1721 725
of residence. Four out of ten migrants have a university degree. Only

half of them have ever worked in the country of residence. The dominant
migration motive is quality of life, though half of them have also moved
for work or love reasons. Only two out of ten have a partner from the
country of residence.
Cluster 3 (1721 movers) has moved on average at the age of 28 (close to
the late traditionals), but have stayed for an average of eight years only.
We call them Eurostars, as they seem to embody the ideal type of Favells
(2008a) study of European free-moving professionals. Two-thirds of them
have arrived in the last period, and the remaining one third in the interme-
diary period. British (and German) nationals are underrepresented in this
group and the Spanish are overrepresented. As for the destinations, the
picture is reversed: Britain and Germany are overrepresented and Spain
underrepresented. More than half hold a university degree, a proportion
higher than in any other cluster. Eighty per cent of them have worked in
their country of residence. In addition to love and work, study motives
were important for nearly one out of five, more than in any other group.
More than one-third have a partner from the country of residence.
Individuals in cluster 4 (725 movers) migrated at an average age of 60
and stayed for eight years. We call them pure retirement movers. Nearly
eight out of ten came in the last period. There is a particularly strong
representation of British and Germans, and a particularly weak one of
Spanish. France and especially Spain are overrepresented as countries
of residence (actually, half of the cluster is located in the latter country),
while only very few in this group have gone to Germany or Britain. While
the gender distribution for the other groups is balanced, only 40 per cent
are women in this group. The proportion of migrants holding a university
degree is one-third that is, as low as among late traditionals. Seven out of
ten name quality of life as their migration motive. Less than 10 per cent
have a partner from the country of residence.
A caution should be added here in particular with regard to the pro-
portions of country of origin migrants in the four groups. For reasons
mentioned earlier, the figures refer to the EIMSS sample and do not reflect
the relative numbers of different nationalities we would find if we were to
sample proportionately to the number of foreign nationals in the country.
That is, the results should not lead us to conclude definitively that there
are far more Spanish Eurostars out there than German and British ones.
This is because the huge numbers of German and British pre-retirement
and retirement migrants we found in Spain and France technically set an
upper limit to the number of Eurostars we could sample there.
CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has offered a preliminary description of the sample of EU

movers we surveyed with EIMSS, as well as a preliminary multivariate
and cluster analysis. It shows how this migration has changed over time,
becoming a better educated and more diversified movement. With very
few exceptions, which can be related to the remnants of the typical guest-
worker migration, geographically mobile Western Europeans now tend to
come from higher social backgrounds and have a higher level of education
themselves than the respective stayer populations. Economic and labour
market differences between the five countries under investigation have
largely vanished in recent decades. In addition, the supply of low-qualified
labour from these five countries has declined with the expansion of educa-
tion and with the rising immigration of third-country nationals filling up
the bottom of the labour market. Thus, the migration of Western unquali-
fied labour has become dependent on the existence of ethnic niches which
provide a relatively protected labour market as is especially the case for
Italians in Germany.
One major finding of these analyses is that geographical mobility within
the EU embraces a variety of social types. In addition to the remnants of
the typical guest-worker migration and the ensuing family reunification
(which are represented best by the late traditionals type of our classifica-
tion based on age at migration and duration of stay), we find increasingly
retirement migration and study migration but also a free mover kind
of migration, what we call the Eurostars. The latter is characterized by
individualistic motives and migration strategies, beyond formal recruit-
ment and chain migration. This type also encompasses growing student
migration, which has its own dynamics. There is also a trend towards
movement at older ages. This is driven by the increase of retirement (the
pure retiree type) and part-time work (or pre-retirement) migration, but
also by highly qualified labour migrants crossing borders more frequently.
This heterogeneity of intra-European movers has to be taken into account
when making descriptive statements or testing hypotheses in migration
research in Europe.
What can we learn from this about possible future trends of intra-
European migration? We surmise that for migration inside EU15 coun-
tries, the trends observed here will persist in the future. There is likely to be
a further reduction in the number of unqualified labour migrants and their
families (with the only exception being ethnic niches such as the Italians
in Germany), and a rise in retirement, study and highly skilled migration.
Age at migration will thus increase, unless study migration gets additional
momentum. Such an increase in study migration would, as a consequence,
also lead to an influx of young highly qualified workers, further slanting
migration in Western Europe towards the higher social end.
The situation with regard to the new accession countries citizens, who
are beginning to get unrestricted access to EU15 member states (with vari-
ation as to which countries open their doors and when), will nevertheless,
at least for the next decade, remain different. Push and pull factors will
remain intact for A12 nationals, as long as the economic development of

the bulk of these countries still lags behind that in the West. Thus, a con-
siderable supply of unqualified labour can still be expected from Eastern
Europe. Given the stronger economic growth in this area compared to
the EU15, however, the time frame might be very short. The patterns of
migration which we observe for the EU15 now may well eventually be
generalizable to the entire EU27.
NOTES
1. For further details on sampling and other features of the survey, please refer to Appendix
A.
2. This and the following figures use frequencies instead of percentages. This should
increase readability of those figures in which the information is broken down by more
than one independent variable.
3. This is computed as the variance component at the group level divided by the total vari-
ation, that is, 52.4/(52.41123.4).
4. KMEANS is the standard algorithm for calculating clusters.
3. Deciding to move: migration
projects in an integrating Europe
Oscar Santacreu, Emiliana Baldoni and Mara
Carmen Albert1
INTRA-EUROPEAN MIGRATION IN THE CONTEXT

OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
The aim of this chapter is to describe the motivations, social organisation
and previous mobility experiences that characterize intra-EU migration
within the EU15. We thus focus on the subjective motivations, the history
of migration, the personal networks and the family support structures of
mobile citizens from Spain, Italy, France, Britain and Germany. As other
migration scholars have pointed out (most notably King 2002), current
migration patterns can no longer be captured within a traditional labour
migration paradigm. Rather, they reflect emerging characteristics of
European societies more generally: privileging flexibility in time and space,
alternative modes of consumption and leisure, and a search for healthier
environments, self-fulfilment, new lifestyles and a better quality of life.
We provide answers to the following questions. Why do EU15 citizens
migrate? How are their motivations distributed among the five countries
under scrutiny? Do men and women share the same motivations? What
is the role played by human capital? How do family, relationships and
personal networks influence the migration decision-making process? Are
migrants within the EU a supermobile population? What is the part
played by previous mobility experiences? Do movers retain the same
motivations in subsequent mobility experiences? Is mobility within the EU
international or internal?
The first part of this chapter looks at migration within the EU15 in the
context of other studies on international migration, particularly the more
widely available research on the EU10 new member states admitted in
2004, as well as other recent attempts to capture the diversity of migration
in Europe today. The second part is a descriptive analysis of the socio-
economic reasons for migration (that is, work) in relation to other motiva-
tions such as study, family/love, or quality of life. The final section focuses
52
Deciding to move 53
on previous mobility experiences of mobile European citizens and their

connection with current experiences.
Despite the potential interest of new forms of mobility associated with
the EU as a unique experiment in regional integration (Favell 2008a),
studies of international migration within and among the EU15 member
states that constituted the EU until 2004 have been rare. International
migration research, rather, typically focuses on classic forms of immigra-
tion into clearly delineated national political units; it considers only stand-
ard forms of migration motivations such as economic push/pull factors or
asylum seeking; and it draws a firm line between international migration
and forms of internal migration within nation states (Massey et al. 1998;
Portes 1999; Castles and Miller 2005). All of these staple distinctions
in migration research are challenged by the emergent new forms found
within the EU.
Distinctions with classic migration can immediately be found in terms
of motivations. Here, a certain number of previous studies do exist. These
include investigations carried out by Eurostat (Eurostat and European
Commission 2002) and the European Foundation for the Improvement
of Living and Working Conditions (2006) based on the analysis of data
from the 2001 and 2005 Eurobarometers regarding the mobility of EU citi-
zens. According to Eurostat, which only takes into account short-distance
mobility, the main reasons for migration are family/personal reasons (54
per cent), followed by housing (18 per cent), and work-related reasons
(15 per cent) (Eurostat and European Commission 2002, 16). The 2005
Eurobarometer (EB 64.1) also considers long-distance mobility, that is,
moving from one region to another, or to another country within the EU.
Here, among the most frequent reasons for moving cited are firstly those
associated with the labour market (new job or job transfer, 34 per cent),
and secondly those involving family or partners (change of marital situa-
tion, 18 per cent), or following the partner to a different location (14 per
cent) (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions 2006, 1819). However, these studies are limited because the
Eurobarometer did not pay attention to the category quality of life, or
offer the finer distinctions between motivations that were built into our
study.
A far broader resource for considering these questions is provided by
the more numerous studies on migration that have focused on analys-
ing EastWest mobility intentions and flows, before and after the EU
enlargements of 2004 and 2007 (Bauer and Zimmermann 1999a; Brcker
2003; Gorny and Ruspini 2004; Kelo and Wchter 2004; Krieger 2004;
Krieger and Fernndez 2006; Favell 2008a). Many of these studies suggest
that intentions to move outnumber the actual number of movers, and
the best guide to future EastWest migration from new member states
remains the limited and often circular trends established by the previous
Mediterranean enlargements of the EU involving Spain, Portugal and
Greece (Kupiszewski 2002). However, the latest data from Eurobarometer
2005 (Krieger and Fernndez 2006) have suggested that there is an upward
trend in mobility intentions in some of the new member states (especially
Poland, Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania), particularly linked to the increas-
ing reliance on Eastern workers to fill low-level or skilled service-sector
jobs in the West (Favell and Hansen 2002).
In a study for the International Organisation for Migration, Wallace
(1998, 2728) points out the influence of several economic factors of
EastWest migration that can still be classified according to classic push-
pull theories. Among the pull factors are better living conditions, higher
salaries, other peoples (positive) migration experiences, better job pros-
pects and more personal freedom. On the other hand, only two salient
push factors are identified: ethnic problems and the economic conditions
in the country of origin. Following the push-pull approach, Kelo and
Wchter (2004, 71) show that EastWest movements are indeed more
pulled than pushed. The traditional push factors, such as famine, war,
persecution, ethnic and racial discrimination, and racism among others,
are hardly present at all within Europe, even at its Eastern extremes. There
are however strong pull factors in terms of job prospects, higher income
or family connection. Mobility intentions are based mainly on the search
for job opportunities, higher earnings and, as the third main reason, a
change in marital status. Krieger (2004, 367) concludes that, despite the
importance of economic reasons, there are significant differences between
countries, as well as different sets of motivations and expectations among
the citizens of the new member states. In this sense, economic and financial
motivations are more important in Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Turkey,
Bulgaria and Romania, whereas family reasons appear to be more signifi-
cant in Malta and Cyprus. Moreover, there seems to be a pattern that com-
bines economic, financial and family reasons in the Czech Republic, Latvia
and Slovenia. Despite some variations, then, economic motivations do still
prevail within EastWest migration, something which further underlines
the potential distinctiveness of intra-EU mobility within the old Europe.
The starting point for our analysis is work by human geographers such
as King (2002) and Lazaridis and Williams (2002), who have begun to
chart a new map of migration in the integrating space of the new Europe
that was already emerging before the enlargements of 2004 and 2007. They
seek to identify the new motivations for migration within Europe, drawing
a distinction between traditional migration and the emerging types of
spatial mobility: travel, tourism, circulation and commuting. These have
Deciding to move 55
been much more marked among the older member states of the West.
Clues to these characteristics are provided by various forms of migration
that are typically marginal to mainstream migration studies: that is, high-
skilled migration, student migration and retirement migration. All play an
important part in the new intra-EU migrations.
Global and regional economic integration have made high-skilled
migration an ever-more relevant category of spatial mobility (Salt 1992;
Iredale 2001; Mahroum 2001; Smith and Favell 2006). Within Europe,
certain destinations have certainly become privileged in terms of their
attractiveness as hubs in the global economy. For example, research
funded by the British Department of Trade and Industry shows that
among the main reasons why high-skilled migrants choose Britain as a
destination are knowledge of the language and an assumed familiarity
with the countrys culture salaries are not necessarily the main factor
in their decision. On the other hand, the reasons deterring people from
moving to Britain include climate, distance from family and friends, the
standard of public services and, finally, difficulties in obtaining a work
permit. The fact that among high-skilled migrants from developing
countries prospects for economic improvement are significant, but not
a dominant factor, indicates that such migrants surveyed in this context
can be considered knowledge migrants rather than economic migrants
per se (Pearson and Morell 2002, 12). Mahroum (2001, 29) in turn puts
forward the differences between employment sectors, and also considers
personal aspirations and scientific curiosity to be more significant than
salary conditions. Favells study (2008a) on the mobility of young profes-
sionals living in large European cities points out that the motivations of
these EU citizens are basically related to ambitions that include adven-
ture and personal self-fulfilment more than just income as such. Drawing
on previous research on the mobility of highly skilled workers in differ-
ent employment sectors, Ackers (1998 and 2005) analyses the mobility
of scientists within the EU from an economic and personal perspective.
Ackers highlights above all gender differences in their motivations. For
women, the decision to migrate is a complex issue that is not based on a
single factor. Womens intra-EU mobility does not fit in with the tradi-
tional male breadwinner family model. Instead, in the first stage of their
migration, mobile women are mostly single and their motivations are
associated with the search for career opportunities. However, in what is
called post-migration, the traditional male breadwinner model is suit-
able, since women pair off with men from the destination countries, and
this leads them to have mobility motivations linked with their partner
(that is, family/personal reasons).
Within the new map of European migration, students are also
increasingly important actors of mobility. Despite the difficulty of finding

reliable data (Poulain et al. 2006), there is no doubt that student exchange
and mobility, both internal and international, is ever more significant. As
King reminds us (2002, 989), this is quite an important form of European
mobility, promoted by the European Commission through the Erasmus
and Socrates programmes, as well as the traditions of some EU countries
that encourage students to leave their homes when they go to college.
Its relevance as a form of mobility is established by a study of the char-
acteristics of young students of the University of Sussex who took part
in an international mobility programme (King and Ruiz-Gelices 2003).
According to the authors of the study, the motivations of the students in
exchange programmes relate to three aspects: linguistic self-improvement,
the cultural experience of living in another country, and general personal
development. All these reasons have, in the opinion of the students,
allowed them to improve their employment and career opportunities,
but they clearly cannot be reduced only to economic motivations. As
King argues, it is possible to view student migration as a subset of youth
migration, motivated by a mix of education goals and the combination of
experience and pleasure-seeking facilitated by travel and forms of casual
or temporary work (King et al. 2004, 99).
Finally, research on the migration of European retirees has grown sig-
nificantly over the last few years. The main thesis of these studies is that
mobile retirees go in search of healthier environments, where weather and
the quality of life are essential. Among these retirees we also find what we
could call part-time retirees, that is, workers who decide to spend part of
the year in southern European countries, who give up part of their income
in exchange for a better quality of life. Many of these studies of the migra-
tion of retirees have examined the Spanish case, particularly the settle-
ments on the Mediterranean coast (Rodrguez et al. 1998; OReilly 2000;
Casado-Daz 2005; Huber 2004; Huber and OReilly 2004; Kaiser and
Friedrich 2004). Other studies have explored this phenomenon by com-
paring Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain and Portugal) (King et al.
1998 and 2000; Casado-Daz et al. 2004). According to Casado-Daz et al.
(2004), although the search for a better quality of life (through the climate)
remains the main motivation to move, other reasons are increasingly
relevant: economic advantages (lower cost of living), the Mediterranean
lifestyle, social life and, finally, easy and cheap communication with the
migrants country of origin thanks to low-cost flights. Again, pure eco-
nomic motivations are hard to isolate. Nevertheless, there are differences
when it comes to choosing a destination. Climate is more important on the
Costa del Sol (southern Spain), whereas the environment and the land-
scape are the main aspects in Tuscany (Italy). The fact that international
Deciding to move 57
retirees living in Tuscany enjoy a higher socioeconomic status means that

the cost of living is not an important motivation in their decision to move,
whereas it is a noteworthy reason in Spain, Malta and Portugal (King et
al. 1998, 100101).
REASONS FOR INTRA-EU MOBILITY
Migration Motivations
In this section we can now pose a series of key questions that will enable us
to better characterise intra-EU mobility based on the migration projects of
respondents to the EIMSS survey. This draws on the findings of existing
studies about the motivations and various types of migration within the
new Europe, but allows a much more detailed and representative break-
down of these factors. We ask whether and how since 1973 the mobility of
workers has lost its predominant role, how this varies by country of origin
or destination, and whether other factors identified in the general migra-
tion literature such as the feminization of migration or the growing role of
human capital are also shaping these mobility choices within Europe.
A first overview of the reasons for migration uncovered by the EIMSS
survey reveals above all the importance of the affective sphere (see Table
3.1). 29.2 per cent of the answers given refer to reasons of a sentimental
nature (to live with partner/spouse/children), with a further 6.2 per cent
indicating reasons linked to the family of origin (to live together with
members of the family). People in Europe, first of all, move because
of love and family. This is particularly striking in terms of mobility to
Italy (44.2 per cent), dwarfing economic, educational and quality of life
reasonings there. Obviously, more needs to be said about migration for
love. We might indeed speculate about the cultural impact of mixed
couples, considering their strategic role as laboratories of re-elaboration
of bi-national identity and the construction of new meanings, languages
and styles of social interaction. Examining the nationality of partners, it
becomes evident that 36.2 per cent of the respondents who have mentioned
love as their reason to move have a partner of the same nationality, while
as many as 61.6 per cent are married or live with a citizen of the country
of destination. A new characterization of the EU-mover for love who
leaves the country of origin mainly to form a new family with a citizen of
the country of destination would seem therefore to prevail over the tradi-
tional migrant story of moving for love, where a spouse follows a partner
of his/her own nationality, either leaving their country of origin together
or in order to reunite a family. It is interesting to observe that the two
Table 3.1 Main reasons for migration to the country of residence (COR)
of EU movers (%)
Reasons France Germany Britain Italy Spain Total

Work
To look for a job 7.3 25.5 14.2 5.1 2.1 10.9
To accept a job offer 13.4 19.7 22.4 14.6 6.1 15.2
To start a business 1.2 0.4 1.1 0.5 3.2 1.3
Because of my occupation 4.2 8.2 5.1 6.5 1.7 5.2
Education
To study in secondary school 0.2 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.6
To participate in a study 0.4 1.2 0.9 2.3 0.5 1.1
exchange programme
To study at university level 2.2 2.7 3.3 2.0 0.1 2.0
(undergraduate)
To study at graduate/ 1.8 1.4 2.8 1.4 0.8 1.6
postgraduate/specialisation
level
To do an internship 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.9
To learn the language 4.6 3.6 12.2 1.9 6.2 5.6
Quality of life
To gain new experiences 10.1 7.0 11.1 6.6 12.6 9.4
To live in a better natural 21.9 1.8 4.8 12.3 37.4 15.7
environment
To live in better/healthier 9.0 1.0 0.3 8.9 49.3 13.7
weather, enjoy climate
Love/family
To live together with 4.2 7.4 4.2 4.5 10.5 6.2
members of family
To live with partner/spouse/ 29.6 31.7 30.9 39.7 13.8 29.2
children
different types present distinctive specific traits. Same-nationality couples

are mentioned mainly by interviewed women and among those of Italian
nationality. In contrast, mobility to live in the country of the partner is
mentioned especially by male respondents (82.4 per cent versus 49 per cent
of the women), and is not especially related to nationality.
The second reason for moving most often mentioned is to live in a better
natural environment (15.7 per cent), closely followed by to live in better/
healthier weather, enjoy climate (13.7 per cent). Underlining the centrality
Deciding to move 59
60
50
40
COR France
COR Germany
30 COR Britain
COR Italy
20 COR Spain
10
0
Work Study Family/Love Quality of life Misc. reasons
Figure 3.1 Reasons for movement to the country of residence of EU

movers (index) (%)
of forms of mobility free from purely material considerations, both these

motivations are considerably prevalent in France and Spain. It is only at
this point that economic factors begin to have weight. The third ranked
reason for mobility is to accept a job offer(15.2 per cent), followed by to
look for a job (10.9 per cent). The migration of workers with a job offer
is most common in Britain (22.4 per cent), whilst the riskier option of job
search is more frequent in Germany (25.5 per cent). A minority of people
interviewed (5.2 per cent), moreover, stated that they had moved because
of my occupation, in this case, most likely as a result of intra-firm mobil-
ity within multinational companies. These are directed mostly to Germany
and in a smaller degree to Italy.
Finally, learning the language of the country as a reason to move there
is mentioned by only 5.6 per cent of respondents, while to participate in a
study exchange programme is mentioned only by 1.1 per cent of respond-
ents. It is worth noting that Erasmus grants, in spite of their overall success
in other terms, may thus have been of fairly marginal importance with
regard to definitive or long-term migration.
In Figure 3.1, all these detailed reasons for migration have been collapsed
into an index composed of four pure categories, which counts those who
have indicated only one motive for migration or two motives which fall
within the same category)2, as well as an additional category including mul-
tiple motives which refer to different categories (miscellaneous reasons).
The reduction in categories helps clarify the findings. The category love/
family (29.8 per cent) prevails over reasons regarding jobs (25.3 per cent)
and quality of life (23.9 per cent), while reasoning related to study (study
reasons) applies to only 7.1 per cent of the sample.
These findings suggest three points. First of all, no truly dominant
reason for moving emerges. This suggests the need for finer-grained
distinctions among countries. As we see here, work reasons prevail in
Germany, family/love in Italy and quality of life in Spain. However,
in terms of the overriding economic focus of most forms of international
migration studied, it is clear that intra-EU migration shows a much
greater tendency towards affective factors, which by no means always
stem from the classic pattern of reuniting families. Equally, far more sig-
nificant are choices about living in a better environment, meant as either
a natural environment (a healthy climate, beautiful countryside and so
on) or in seeing migration as a social space in which to explore or achieve
personal lifestyle ambitions. Thirdly, the presence of a relevant number of
respondents who indicate two fundamentally different reasons for mobil-
ity (13.9 per cent) proves that migration projects are often complex and
multi-dimensional actions.
Country, Period, Gender and Human Capital Effects
Although intra-EU mobility does not appear to be guided by a single

predominant reason, the analysis by country of residence and country of
origin clearly identifies different types of migration.
Work-driven movements are still the prevailing form of migration from
southern Europe (in our survey, Italy and Spain) towards central and
northern Europe (Germany, France and Great Britain) (Figure 3.2). Of
particular note are the 64.8 per cent of Italians in Germany who reset-
tled there to improve their employment situation. This type of migration
has deep historical roots: in the period between 1946 and 1970, Italy was
the most common origin and West Germany the most common destina-
tion of all the flows towards Central-Northern European industrial areas
(Pugliese 2002, 212). Italians in our sample have also mostly moved for
work reasons in Britain (37.9 per cent) and in France (35.1 per cent).
More generally, as already shown in Figure 3.1, mobility for work
represents the main form of migration into Germany (42.3 per cent) and
Britain (31.7 per cent). This finding confirms the persistence of the classical
SouthNorth route of intra-European mobility. However, there is also a
noticeable proportion of work-related French (31.8 per cent) and British
migrants (29.7 per cent) in Italy, British in Germany (43.7 per cent) and
Germans in Britain (38.2 per cent).
Deciding to move 61
70
COR France
60 COR Germany
COR Britain
50 COR Italy
COR Spain
40
30
20
10
0
Country of residence (COR)
Figure 3.2 Labour mobility by country of residence (COR) and country

of origin (COO) (%)
In Spain, on the other hand, mobility for quality of life reasons is

clearly predominant (56.5 per cent). The climate, the weather and the
natural beauty of Spain have a great attraction for respondents of all
nationalities, but above all for British (70.3 per cent) and Germans (69.4
per cent). Quality of life constitutes the main motive for migration also
for the German and British respondents in France (40.3 per cent and 61.4
per cent respectively) and for Germans in Italy (39.9 per cent). The love/
family dimension has priority for Spanish respondents in Italy (56.4 per
cent), France (47.9 per cent), Germany (41.5 per cent) and Britain (32.1
per cent). Love/family reasons, meanwhile, were mentioned by 45.7 per
cent of French migrants in Italy and 40.8 per cent of Italians in France.
Love/family reasons play a fairly important role also in Britain, next to
reasons for work, especially among French (36.2 per cent) and German
respondents (33.5 per cent). Study is a more common reason to migrate
to Britain than to any other of the countries under inquiry (mainly for
French and Spanish movers, 17.4 per cent and 15.4 per cent). Finally,
miscellaneous reasons have been indicated above all by Germans living
in Spain (22.3 per cent), France (21.6 per cent) and Italy (16.6 per cent).
Viewed in terms of periodisation of migration over the three decades
(1974 to 2003) covered by our sample, reasons for mobility have in fact
undergone significant evolutions. On the whole, the love/family reasons,

which prevailed in the 20 years following the immigration stop policies
enacted in West European countries in the early 1970s, have progressively
lost momentum, while quality of life has been on the rise. Work-related
migration has ever picked up as expected by European institutions, despite
the continued attempts to uphold directives and laws easing the mobility
of workers. In the most recent decade, it has shown only a slight increase
as compared to the previous period. After a significant increase at the
beginning of the 1980s, mobility for study has also remained substantially
stable.
However, significant differences are found according to the country of
destination. Taking into consideration the whole period, work mobility
dropped in France and in Spain. In Italy, on the contrary, it increased,
while in Germany it remains more or less constant at high levels. Mobility
for family/love reasons has declined, leaving room for an increase of
movements for quality of life, especially in Spain (59.7 per cent) and
France (42.3 per cent) in the last decade. In this more recent period, migra-
tion for mixed reasons peaked in Germany (20.4 per cent), perhaps as an
effect of the transnational movements of families who settled there in the
years of industrial migration.
Gender differences are also noteworthy. In the literature, the so-called
feminisation of migration is well documented, understood not only as an
increase in the quantity of migrating women, but also as a change in the
reasons for mobility, that is, an effect of the increased level of female edu-
cation and the transformations of womens roles in society (Kofman 1999).
For some women, the experience of migration seems to have assumed
therefore an aspiration to better job opportunities and personal self-fulfil-
ment, independent of family ties (Ackers 1998). In our sample, however,
a quite classic pattern of mobility, which sees men emigrating mainly for
economic reasons (33.1 per cent) and women for reasons of love/family
(37.4 per cent), is confirmed (Krieger 2004). But also for women, differ-
ences in motivations are linked to the destination they choose. In particu-
lar, in Germany and Britain, Italian women have migrated more for work
than for love/family reasons (53.8 per cent and 35.9 per cent respectively).
This same country-based logic applies to male movers. Work mobility is
particularly widespread among Italian men migrating to Germany (74.3
per cent of them mention work and only 9.6 per cent love/family). On
the other hand, in the case of Italian men in Spain and Spanish men in
Italy, family reasons prevail significantly over work reasons (21.9 per cent
against 13.7 per cent and 30.9 per cent against 25.9 per cent), whilst for the
Germans, Italians and Spanish in France, for the Germans in Italy and
the French in Spain, the number of labour-related and love/family-related
Deciding to move 63
movers are substantially the same (no more than three percentage points
of difference).
An intriguing association between sexual orientation and the reasons
for migration is revealed by our data. In our sample, a full 6 per cent of
respondents declared that they had a partner of the same sex. This is a
quite considerable proportion, given the intrusive nature of the question
and the instrument used to pose it (an impersonal phone call). While the
nature and the scale of the survey does not permit a deeper investigation
of the link between mobility and sexuality, we have to note that for the
majority of this group of respondents the main reasons for mobility are
either miscellaneous or quality of life, responses which might contain
some hint that mobility has been used to better enable these people to fulfil
their own sexual orientations.
Neo-classical economic theories of migration (such as Harris and
Todaro 1970) underline the centrality of human capital as the trigger of
geographic mobility. At the micro level, these approaches treat migra-
tion as an investment increasing the productivity of human resources, an
investment which has costs and returns (Sjastaad 1962, 83). In particu-
lar, it is usually assumed that higher levels of education offer increased
income returns for specific segments of the labour market (Krieger 2004).
Other scholars, instead, reject this assumption given the prevalence of
low-skilled jobs for migrants in many destination countries (Bauer and
Zimmermann 1999b). Starting from these theoretical considerations, the
survey explored the possible links between forms of mobility and two
fundamental aspects of human capital, measured in terms of education
and age at migration.
On the whole, the reasons for migration do not seem to be significantly
associated with levels of education, not even controlling for gender. It can
be noted that 63 per cent of labour migrants in our sample, in the most
recent decade (19942003), were in fact highly educated. This confirms
the rise of highly skilled mobility involving not only multinational cor-
porations, the banking and the finance industry, but also sectors such as
research, IT, tourism and marketing (as has been discussed inter alia by
Salt 1992; Rodrguez-Pose 2002; Ackers 2005; European Foundation for
the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 2006; Favell 2008a).
While in Germany about half of the respondents who immigrate for
work (the greater part of which are of Italian nationality) possess a
lowmedium education level, high-skilled individuals form the major-
ity of mobile workers in all the other countries analysed. In particular,
in Germany there is a large presence of high-skilled English workers
(44.5 per cent); in Britain and France the largest numbers of high-skilled
workers are Italians (37.1 per cent and 34.2 per cent); in Italy 35.6 per cent
of high-skilled movers come from Britain and 34.9 per cent from France;
while in Spain, besides the French (43.8 per cent) there is a significant
quantity of high-skilled Italians (31.3 per cent). High-skilled mobility
in the EU is both centrifugal and centripetal, without a neat distinction
between sending and receiving countries. However, Germany and Britain
do stand out as the prevailing destinations of European high-skilled
workers in our survey.
It must also be noticed that among love/family and quality of life
movers as well, the majority of French and British respondents have a ter-
tiary education (56 per cent and 43.3 per cent respectively for the first type;
54.4 per cent and 44.3 per cent for the second). In contrast, more than half
of the German interviewees who emigrated for quality of life have a voca-
tionally oriented secondary level degree (53.1 per cent). The effect of edu-
cation on the inclination to move is controversial because it also interacts
with the influence of age (Kalter 1997; Bauer and Zimmermann 1999b).
Generally speaking, though, the young show a higher tendency for migra-
tion than people over the age of 40. From an economic point of view, the
idea is that the older the potential migrant, the fewer the number of years
(s)he has to cash in on human capital investment (Krieger 2004, 84). In
other words, older workers have a lower economic incentive to move, as
the amortisation period for their investment is shorter. However, such a
conclusion overlooks the impact of the non-monetary factors that have
emerged as so important in the EIMSS survey. In our sample, then, the
respective ages of migrants who moved for work and those who moved for
love/family reasons is revealing. Labour-related movements in our sample
took place when respondents were on average 31 years old not as young
as might be expected.
Yet among all nationalities, work migrants leave their home country
earlier than average migrants as a whole. Movers for love/family reasons
packed their luggage slightly later, on average when they were 32 years
old. At the opposite end of the scale, migrants in search of a better quality
of life left when they were on average 45 and a half. Given their age, we can
hardly reconcile their movement with a theory that understands this only
in terms of human capital investment, even if indirect. Other returns such
as psychological and physical well-being need be taken into account to
make sense of their choice.
Families, Friends and Migration Choices
Our overview of migration motivations is complemented by information

about the family and social support available at the time of migration.
Even in a relatively mobility-friendly political space like Western Europe,
Deciding to move 65
migration is a brave decision which is pondered and sometimes opposed

by parents, spouses and friends. Among our respondents, slightly more
than half the families of migrants (51.8 per cent) are reported to have
favoured mobility, while 35 per cent were neutral and one out of six
opposed it. No significant deviation emerges when these figures are dif-
ferentiated by motives for migration or country of origin. One interesting
fact that did emerge however was that Italian parents were more likely to
support daughters than sons when they moved an anomaly which might
be interpreted either culturally as an expression of the possessiveness of
Italian mothers over their sons, or structurally in the light of the particular
hardships of the labour market for young women south of the Alps.
The central role of migrant networks in aiding and even explaining
migration via the effects of social capital is amply documented in the classic
literature regarding migration, for instance between Central America and
the US (Massey 1999). Other peoples experience with migration is usually
considered as one of the main pull factors of mobility (Wallace 1998).
In our study, the existence of a social network as a possible incentive for
migration was examined by asking respondents if they knew co-nationals
already residing in the country of destination before moving. More than
one-third answered positively, with some significant differences among
all nationalities. In particular, as shown in Figure 3.3, a pre-existing
network of national acquaintances was mentioned mainly by the Italian
and Spanish respondents who are resident in Germany (37 per cent and
40
35
30
25 COO Germany
COO France
20 COO Britain
COO Italy
15
COO Spain
10
0
Country of residence (COR)
Figure 3.3 Co-national acquaintances before settling by country of

residence (COR) and country of origin (COO) (%)
31.1 per cent) and by Spanish and Germans in France (33.2 per cent and
32.3 per cent). No significant statistical association emerges between the
existence of such a network and the gender, age, education and reasons for
migration of respondents.
PREVIOUS MOBILITY EXPERIENCES
Intra-EU mobility can clearly be considered a form of long-distance

mobility, in that it at least entails the crossing of a national state border.
However, this type of mobility should not be considered as an isolated
form, but rather as simply one aspect of peoples varied mobility options
throughout their lives (European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions 2006, 7). The idea of taking into account
the mobility history of each individual poses the question of whether
people with more mobility experiences in the past will be more mobile in
the future. Data from Eurobarometer 2005 (EB 64.1) certainly show that
people who moved in the past have a higher propensity to move in the
near future. This is especially so for people who have made long-distance
moves. Plausibly, one migration experience trains them to move again in
the future.
Overall, respondents to the EIMSS are indeed individuals with consid-
erable mobility experiences. Approximately half of them reported that
they had lived outside their country of origin for at least three months
before resettling in the country where they now live. This may mean
having lived already for a short period in the current host country (that is,
for a study period) before going back to the home country for some time;
or that people have circulated across different countries, having therefore
lived in at least three different nations in their lives (in fact, a full 11.7 per
cent of the sample).
What is the profile of this high-mobility population? Some studies
suggest that there is a relationship between age and previous mobility
in that the older you are, the more probable it is that you have lived in
another country or in another region (Krieger and Fernandez 2006, 6).
However, we could not find a significant effect of age on the existence of
prior movements in our sample. The same is true of gender. Men are in
slightly larger numbers, but this difference is not significant. However,
our data do confirm that highly educated persons have a high level of
mobility compared to those with low or average levels of education in the
EU overall, as Krieger and Fernandez (2006) claim. In fact, 56 per cent
of movers with a tertiary level degree have some other migration experi-
ences in their background. Considering all possible combinations of past
Deciding to move 67
Table 3.2 Previous migration experiences and higher education (column %)
Higher education
No Yes
Previous experience Yes 40.3 56.1
No 59.7 43.9
Multiple experiences Yes 8.1 13.3
No 91.9 86.7
Lived in third country Yes 26.4 43.7
No 73.6 56.3
Lived in COR before Yes 22.2 25.8
No 77.8 74.2
Source: EIMSS, N (minimum) 5 4 838
migrations, education makes a difference (Table 3.2). Super-movers, as

we dub them, are boosted by an edge in human capital, which can mani-
fest itself in a number of different ways either in terms of labour skills,
language proficiency, capacity to retrain themselves, or sheer curiosity and
passion for other cultures.
The nature of previous experiences of migration can vary enormously.
First, we find a type of migration we could call direct: individuals opt for
a given country and settle down there. For instance, the large majority of
English and German respondents living in Spain, and English respondents
in France did not report previous experiences in other countries. What
they have in common is that quality of life was their main reason for
moving abroad. This pattern of low previous mobility to third countries
can also be found among Italians in Germany (mainly labour migrants),
and Spanish citizens living in Italy, who reported family/love reasons as
their main motivation.
The case of British nationals living in Spain and France, who are mainly
low-skilled workers and retirees, is strikingly different from that of the
British in Germany and Italy, who in fact report the highest levels of
plurinational mobility. The international prevalence of the English lan-
guage is a plausible explanation for their strong propensity to move and
keep moving after all, language is possibly the tallest cultural barrier
inhibiting mobility (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
and Working Conditions 2006, 11).
It should be remembered that, generally speaking, in the EU mobility
is still largely an intra-national, or at best inter-regional, phenomenon.
According to Eurostat and the European Commission (2002, 16), only 5
per cent of EU citizens who, over the last ten years, have changed their
Table 3.3 Relationship between reasons for previous and current

migration to COR (%)
Reasons for current migration to COR

Work Study Quality Family/
of life Love
Reasons for Work 66.0 4.0 13.5 28.9
1st migration to Study 42.1 20.1 19.6 34.7
COR Quality of life 19.4 4.4 65.2 23.8
Family/love 24.0 3.4 16.8 67.8
Notes: Row totals add up > 100 because they refer to the total number of answers, not to
respondents.
place of residence, have moved to another country within the European

Union. Approximately the same percentage has moved to countries outside
the EU. Perhaps not surprisingly, EU movers deviate dramatically from
this general pattern. In our sample, 61.9 per cent of respondents have had
previous mobility experiences in at least another EU15 country, mainly
France (12 per cent), Germany (11.3 per cent), and Britain (10.6 per cent).
Significant shares of movers have also lived in the United States (15.3 per
cent), non-EU15 European countries (14 per cent, of which 3.6 per cent in
the A10 countries), and other non-European countries (35.4 per cent).3
Super-movers are predominantly work-related movers both in the
past and in the current period of migration. However, mobility driven by
education was equally important in the past for them. And, noticeably,
former students in a given country tend to move back to that same country
at a later stage of their lifecourse. The fact of having studied in a foreign
country helps to bring down the cultural barriers associated with learning
a new language and new customs, and also helps to strengthen enduring
personal networks there. Past experiences as students create stronger roots
to a given country than other forms of migration.
How do these reasons for mobility evolve over time? Are super-movers
persistent in their migration decisions? Or do they opt for different coun-
tries over time following differing life plans? Our data allow us to answer
these questions, distinguishing people who have migrated repeatedly to
the same country (Table 3.3) and others who have rather come from a
third country (Table 3.4).
In a sense, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 constitute mobility tables of spatial
mobility. The entries on the diagonal correspond to the proportion of
Deciding to move 69
Table 3.4 Relationship between reasons for previous migration to third

countries and current migration to COR (%)
Reasons for current migration to COR

Work Study Quality Family/
of life Love
Reasons for Work 46.3 6.0 30.2 29.4
1st migration to Study 40.5 19.3 23.9 29.4
3rd country Quality of life 25.7 12.2 45.7 30.6
Family/love 24.7 7.2 25.2 52.7
Notes: Row totals add up > 100 because they refer to the total number of answers, not to
respondents.
respondents who reported the same motivation in their current and pre-
vious migration experiences. We can see at a glance that figures on the
diagonal of Table 3.3 are higher than on the diagonal of Table 3.4. This
suggests that the reasons behind previous and current migrations are more
likely to be similar when both events take place in the same country rather
than in third countries. In other words, people who are more open to
circulate across different countries tend to select their destination on the
basis of varying criteria, rather than fine-tuning their initial choice.
Study is the most versatile motive in facilitating a later mobility experi-
ence to the same country: respondents who had already lived in a foreign
country for education-related reasons moved back mostly for other
reasons, especially professional ones (42.1 per cent), although motives
related to family/love (34.7 per cent) or the search for a better quality
of life (19.6 per cent) are also significant. Presumably, this mobility path
describes the destinies of many Erasmus students who started putting
their roots down abroad after their EU-funded exploration time in that
country either for emerging career prospects or for blossoming personal
relationships.
CONCLUSIONS
Over the last 30 years, three main motivations characterize intra-European

mobility: work-related mobility, which dominated the European area after
World War II and until the 1970s; migration related to affective reasons
that has been present throughout; and the wish to live in a better social and
natural environment, which has grown in importance. Within the EU15,

the reasons for setting up residence in another country are not only asso-
ciated with an economic factor (that is, work), but also with important
non-economic reasons such as family/love and quality of life.
Work-related migration has Germany and Britain as its main coun-
tries of destination, Italy being the main country of origin. This form of
mobility has followed two main routes. On the one hand, migrants have
kept moving from southern Europe to Northern and Central European
countries. On the other hand, migration flows between Northern-Central
European countries have gained momentum.
One of the most significant findings of our survey is that family/love
and quality of life are increasingly important motivations of mobil-
ity within the EU. With respect to the family/love variable, it is worth
noting that love (that is, usually joining a partner already living in the
destination country) is a much more significant reason than family (that
is, usually following a partner moving to that country) in all the countries
we have studied. There are only two exceptions: Spanish nationals resid-
ing in Germany, among whom we find a small difference between the two
dimensions, and Italian citizens in Spain, for whom family is definitely a
more important reason than love. In fact, English and German movers
are mostly drawn by quality of life wherever they settle down, but par-
ticularly in Spain and France. In addition to these heterosexual patterns
of migration, our survey also suggested that a remarkable number of gay
people have used mobility strategies as part of their lifestyle choices.
Finally, reasons related to studying deserve to be mentioned, even if
they do not appear to be widespread. The Erasmus programme seems to
have had a marginal quantitative importance as the direct reason behind
current migration decisions: only 1.1 per cent in our sample settled down
for good abroad as an immediate consequence of Erasmus. However,
having studied in a given country, even for a few months, facilitates
subsequent movements towards the country where it took place, since it
apparently tears down (at least in part) the cultural barriers associated
with learning a foreign language and new customs, and helps to strengthen
social networks which can be re-activated at a later stage in the destination
country. Our findings thus show the relevance of previous mobility experi-
ences, as about half of respondents have migrated before settling down
where they live at the moment of the interviews. Past reasons for mobility
tend to be different from current ones, especially when prior migrations
took place in another country.
To conclude, the motivations for intra-EU mobility seem to come close
to the reasons for changing residence noted in broader surveys on spatial
mobility (Eurostat and European Commission 2002), where family/
Deciding to move 71
personal reasons or motives associated with quality of life turned out to

be as important as work-related reasons. For citizens who dare cross the
frontiers of nation states, moving to another country within the EU is a
decision essentially comparable, in terms of motivation, to moving within
ones own country. In this sense, then, in terms of the motivations of the
actors involved, EU mobility is being redefined as something very differ-
ent from classic migration, in which economic rationality prevails. Rather,
intra-EU mobility begins to look more like a form of internal migration,
something which in itself can be seen as a step forward in the process of
building an integrated Europe from below.
NOTES
1. Sections 1 was written by Albert, 2 by Baldoni, and 3 and 4 by Santacreu.

2. In the questionnaire it was possible to mention two possible prevalent reasons for
mobility.
3. Since mobility experiences are not necessarily confined to a single country, these percent-
ages add up to more than 100.
4. The social mobility of mobile
Europeans
Ettore Recchi
SPATIAL AND SOCIAL MOBILITY: BETWEEN

SPECULATION AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
Social mobility is arguably the major spur for the spatial mobility of
human beings. While it is true that some people relocate across borders
regardless of occupational or economic reasons (be it to escape a war or
retire in a sunny place), the bulk of migrants decide to move in order to
improve their position in the social structure. Upward social mobility is
the rationale for most migration projects.
This chapter examines the intergenerational and intragenerational class
mobility of EU movers. In particular, it is meant to outline the opportuni-
ties for social mobility in an almost completely open migration regime,
such as the one created by free movement policies in the European Union.
As Chapter 3 shows, intra-EU migration is driven by a wider canvas of
individual strategies than social class advancement. People also move to
join partners, follow spouses and enjoy a more peaceful or thrilling life.
Yet such motives are no impediment to socioeconomic changes. And this
is an even more plausible outcome for those who move in search of more
rewarding jobs and careers. At least as a null hypothesis, the experience
of EU movers might be assumed to conform to the baseline immigration
story that classically finds a tight association of social and spatial mobil-
ity. Eventually, whether they fit in this story or not will help us assess the
novelty of their migration pattern.
Traditional migrants insertion into the social structures of destination
countries does not unfold linearly. Many studies indicate that migrants
seldom fulfil their aspiration to upward social mobility soon after their
arrival. In fact, they tend to be subject to downward trajectories in the
early stages of their occupational life in the host society (Piore 1979; Evans
and Kelley 1991; McAllister 1995; Bauer and Zimmermann 1999b). This
is particularly true during periods of saturation of the receiving labour
market (Raijman and Semyonov 1998). The demand for foreign workers
72
The social mobility of mobile Europeans 73
is usually concentrated in so-called 3D jobs, involving dirty, danger-

ous and dull tasks, that are unlikely to generate upward mobility.1 Still,
migrants take these jobs, and are normally gratified by one basic improve-
ment over their experience at home: a higher income. Even if placed at the
bottom of the pay ladder, the average migrant experiences a significant
increase in income due to the earnings differentials between origin and des-
tination country. Moreover, the migrant career achievements are expected
to be U-shaped, progressing with the passing of time in the host society
(Chiswick 1979). To a certain extent, this expectation compensates for the
possible decline of occupational status in the early stages of immigration.
Nonetheless, downward status mobility is something many migrants have
to cope with.2
In spite of all strategies for handling the status inconsistency that so
frequently marks migrants lives, the aspiration to full-fledged social
mobility entailing an ascent in both income and status remains at the
heart of the immigration experience. But, while it is sometimes noted that
migrants are more occupationally mobile than natives (for example, Bauer
and Zimmermann 1999b), there is surprisingly little systematic research
on the intergenerational class mobility of migrants (for a significant excep-
tion, see Yaish 2002). It is usually assumed that the social mobility dream
tends to be fulfilled by second and third generations that is, by means of
postponement or projection on to the children and grandchildren of first
movers (Gordon 1971). A peddler to plumber to professional upward
trajectory is idealized thereafter (Perlmann and Waldinger 1997, 894).
However, even in the US and Canada, the prototypical countries of social
mobility opportunities for migrants, fine-grained evidence on the mobility
patterns that substantiate such a linear intergenerational assimilation of
migrant minorities in the social structure is quite scant (Boyd and Grieco
1998; Portes and Rumbaut 2005). In Europe, so far, information is limited
to a dated German longitudinal study (Seifert 1997), a comparison of the
early labour market experiences of young Turks and Moroccans in six
countries (Cruel and Vermeulen 2003), an inquiry into the occupational
achievements of Turkish, Moroccan and Portuguese second generations
in France (Simon 2003), and a more recent analysis of British longitudinal
data showing sharp differences of career trajectories by ethnic group (Platt
2005). Overall, however, speculation seems to prevail over evidence. For
sure, no firm generalization has been made on the basis of comparative
empirical analyses of migrant populations in European societies.
In fact, it is not the lack of scholarly interest but the limits of existing
surveys of the general population in most countries that explain the paucity
of quantitative-oriented research focused on migrant social mobility. In
nations where immigrants amount to less than 10 per cent of residents, their
number simply ends up being too small in average-size random samples.

Not by chance, the more detailed studies in the field so far have been con-
ducted in Israel, a country where over half the Jewish population was born
abroad (Raijman and Semyonov 1998, 292). This permits the use of micro-
census data for significant comparisons of natives and immigrants. An
alternative strategy is to carry out surveys of immigrants parallel to surveys
of the general population such as, for instance, the Multicultural Australia
Survey of 198889 (McAllister 1995). This is exactly the strategy adopted
by our European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS).
This chapter tries to fill this gap for that specific share of the mobile pop-
ulation EU movers who are simultaneously migrants and European
nationals. The key question of the analysis is: does EU citizenship status
make movers social mobility patterns akin to stayers? The next section
discusses hypotheses about immigrant mobility in such a social and insti-
tutional context. In section 3, the class compositions of EU stayers and
movers are contrasted. The final two sections of the chapter illustrate
and discuss findings on intergenerational and intragenerational mobility
respectively.3
EASIER MIGRATION, EQUALIZED

OPPORTUNITIES? THE IMPACT OF THE EU FREE
MOVEMENT REGIME ON INTRA-EU MIGRANTS
SOCIAL MOBILITY
Immigrants face many disadvantages in their host societies. Economic

theory imputes immigrants disadvantages to their normally worse
command of country-specific labour skills (like language and social
norms), while sociological perspectives stress discrimination in the access
to jobs, housing and public services (in particular, due to institutional
discrimination such as exclusion from citizenship rights). The two views
are not mutually exclusive. Lack of market-valued resources (relative to
natives) and discrimination can definitely combine to impair the social
and economic achievements of immigrants. In an ideal world where both
factors could be removed, differences in the chances of upward social
mobility between immigrants and natives should disappear altogether.
Is this the case in the EU? How does free movement designed by the
European Union for the cross-border mobility of citizens of its member
states that is, a quite special migration regime affect the social mobility
regime of intra-EU migrants? Does being a EU citizen with the same rights
as natives cancel out the impediments to upward social mobility usually
suffered by immigrants? Some hypotheses can be formulated.
H1. As the elimination of barriers to mobility and settlement for EU

citizens within the Union has made migration costs negligible (com-
pared to the costs of resettlement of other world migrants), intra-EU
migration has become more accessible to all social strata. While it
is often found that migrants disproportionately originate from the
middle class, who can afford the travel and opportunity costs of
international resettlement (for example, Yaish 2002, 456; Fielding
2007, 123), in principle the lowering of migration costs for EU
citizens should encourage mobility from one country to another irre-
spective of class origins. Therefore, H1 posits that the class origins of
EU movers and EU stayers do not differ significantly.
H2. Since discrimination against EU migrants is almost non-existent
institutionally but also culturally, as social distance among
Europeans has largely waned (see Dez Medrano 2003) EU movers
should not face glass ceilings and should enjoy career prospects
similar to stayers. At the same time, since wage differentials between
EU15 member states tend to level out4, workers migration should be
driven by opportunities for upward class mobility rather than by the
allure of higher salaries in status-degrading jobs (as is in fact typical
of migrants from less-developed countries). In other words, it seems
plausible that EU movers might replicate the kind of spiralist tra-
jectories of spatial mobility aimed at class mobility that are found in
studies on internal migration (for example, in Britain, Fielding 1992
and 1995; the idea of spiralism dates back to Watson 1964). New
European movers might use their unusual opportunities for inter-
national movement to out-flank social mobility regimes that remain
limiting at a national level. Therefore, H2 posits that EU movers are
more frequently found in upper class destinations than EU stayers.
H3. As cross-border mobility nonetheless remains an investment-like
business, implying the endorsement of stronger risks in the labour
market than in home countries, it can also be posited that, in spite of
the decrease in the costs of intra-European migration, EU movers are
more likely than stayers to change social class over their lifecourse.
Thus, H3 posits that EU movers are more socially mobile than
stayers both upwardly and (possibly) downwardly.
H4. Opportunities for absolute social mobility are contingent on the
economic structure of the countries where people live. Therefore,
individuals moving from relatively backward (that is, with a higher
number of blue-collar jobs) to more service-based economies are
more likely to experience upward social mobility. In the geographical
area under scrutiny, France, Germany and Britain are known to have
a larger proportion of the workforce in white-collar occupations
than Italy and Spain (Breen and Luijkx 2004a, 74). Hence, H4 posits
that Italian and Spanish migrants have higher rates of upward social
mobility than their French, German and British counterparts.
The analyses that follow will determine the extent to which these ex ante
suppositions describe the real trajectories of class mobility of intra-EU
migrants. The dataset used in this chapter merges EIMSS and ESS for
Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain. However, as the focus of this
chapter is on social mobility achieved through occupations in a foreign
country, EU movers without any job experience in the host country such
as students, non-working spouses and pensioners are left out of the
analysis, except when otherwise noted.
THE CLASS COMPOSITION OF STAYERS AND

MOVERS
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 describe the class positions of EU stayers and movers by
country of residence (COR) and country of origin (COO), allowing for a
first test of the hypotheses about the social origins and destinations of our
sub-populations. Even at a rapid glance, Table 4.1 reveals the markedly
more privileged family background of intra-EU migrants. In all countries,
the proportion of movers from working class families is lower than that
of natives of the host country, with the only exception being Italians and
Spanish in Germany. On the other hand, more than one-quarter of respond-
ents among movers to the country, but only one out of six among natives,
originate from the bourgeoisie or the salariat (classes III of the Erikson-
Goldthorpe schema). Again, the Italians and Spanish in Germany (the
latter also in Britain) are an exception. Nonetheless, in all the communities
of Spanish abroad, and in four out of five of those of Italians, the propor-
tion of movers with upper class origins is higher than among Spanish and
Italian stayers respectively. In sum, the experience of resettling across EU
borders is more frequent among the children of better-off families. It might
be suspected that a spurious correlation with age intervenes here, given the
lower age profile of working movers (on average they are 46, while stayers
are 50). However, the class origins of natives and movers below and above
45 in fact reproduce approximately the same pattern (analysis not shown).
Thus, intra-EU migration seems far from being uncorrelated with social
origins, and appears to be skewed towards the middleupper class.
At the country level, the overall pattern of movers privilege can be
found among EU movers residing in Britain, France, Spain and Italy. In
the last country, the difference with the native population is at its apex
Table 4.1 Class origins of EU stayers and movers by country of residence

and nationality (column %)
Country of residence
Germany
Nationality DE GB FR IT ES
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 19.0 26.0 33.2 3.3 13.4
Routine non-manual (III) 26.7 28.8 28.2 5.2 8.8
Petty bourgeoisie (IV) 12.4 12.0 13.4 31.0 32.4
High-skilled manual (VVI) 20.7 13.5 13.9 4.8 10.6
Low/non-skilled manual (VII) 21.2 19.7 11.4 55.7 34.7
Britain
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 52.7 20.8 35.6 28.5 18.4
France
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 30.2 34.7 16.1 22.0 22.9
Italy
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 34.0 40.7 37.4 8.3 22.5
Spain
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 17.0 23.7 25.9 20.4 8.3
Notes: Stayers data in italics.
Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N 5 11 727
more than 60 per cent of movers stem from classes I, II and III, whereas
less than one quarter of Italians have a similar origin. Although movers
in the EIMSS sample only include people who work or have worked in
the host society, leaving out Goethe- or Stendhal-likes living for extended
periods south of the Alps, EU residents in Italy seem to embody an elite-
based immigration.5 Yet they are not as distant from the native population
as EU movers in Spain. In particular, almost 35 per cent of the European
migrants working in Spain are self-employed or owners of small busi-
nesses some of them possibly trying to combine work and sunshine on
the basis of prior professional experiences and savings. The situation is
reversed in Germany, where there is a much higher proportion of movers
with working class roots. Germany still qualifies as a country of tradi-
tional migration, offering economically rewarding opportunities to lower-
class migrants from the rest of Europe. This is in stark contrast also with
Britain, which attracts a more select population of intra-EU migrants a
higher number originating from the upper class, as well as with higher edu-
cational credentials (see Recchi et al. 2006). In turn, the British economy
seems to reward migrants from the other side of the Eurotunnel more than
any other to the point that 45 per cent of movers to Britain end up in the
salariat. Since the bulk of European migrants in Britain live in the capital,6
Fieldings (1992) argument about the London area as an escalator region
is corroborated on an international scale.
But it is not only in Britain that privilege in class origins carries over
to class destinations. Migration does not thwart the access of mobile
Europeans to the higher ends of the social ladder. EU movers are over-
represented in both the salariat and the self-employed middle class (Table
4.2). The only exceptions to this picture are Italian and Spanish migrants
in Germany and France, who are more likely than natives to take working
class jobs (and are also less likely to get middleupper class occupations in
Germany). This is the outcome of two different processes: the recruitment
of Southern European workers in industrial occupations (diminished but
Table 4.2 Class destinations of EU stayers and movers by country of

residence and nationality (column %)
Germany
Class of destination
Bourgeoisie (III) 27.5 42.3 40.7 3.5 23.9
Britain
Bourgeoisie (III) 65.5 29.2 43.7 35.2 32.2
France
Bourgeoisie (III) 52.6 53.1 28.0 34.9 37.7
Italy
Bourgeoisie (III) 44.3 49.5 44.9 18.4 36.0
Spain
Bourgeoisie (III) 35.7 31.7 38.6 22.2 20.6
Notes: Stayers data in italics.
not terminated after 1973), and the prospering of ethnic niches, attracting
a job-specific workforce of co-nationals (such as Italian restaurant and
ice-cream businesses).7
Intra-EU migrants from Southern Europe are found in all social classes
in greater numbers in the working class among movers of the 1970s and
1980s, more in the middle-upper classes subsequently. In contrast, not
only retirement migrants, but also workers heading to the south of the
continent constitute a select population among which the highly skilled
are overrepresented. In particular, German citizens on the move to other
EU countries get predominantly upper-class employment. More than 50
per cent of German respondents to the EIMSS belong to the salariat, while
less than 5 per cent have a non-qualified manual job. The class profile of
British and French movers is similar, although not so skewed towards the
upper end as that of Germans.
INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: CROSSING

STATE BORDERS, REPRODUCING CLASS
BOUNDARIES?
From this section on, I shift to an individual-based analysis of social

mobility, decomposing absolute intergenerational mobility into differ-
ent typical paths. In particular, four basic trajectories are distinguished:
(1) Immobility: individuals who belong to the same social class as their
dominant parent (that is, the parent in the highest social class); (2) Upward
mobility: individuals who have moved hierarchically between social classes,
from a lower to a higher class; (3) Downward mobility: individuals who
have moved hierarchically between social classes, from a higher to a lower
class; (4) Non-vertical mobility: individuals who have moved across classes
but not hierarchically (Table 4.3).8
The results of this recode are presented in Figure 4.1, which compares
Table 4.3 Social mobility outcomes in a 5 3 5 mobility table
Origin Destination
III III IV VVI VII
III Imm Down Down Down Down
III Up Imm Nonvert Nonvert Down
IV Up Nonvert Imm Nonvert Down
VVI Up Nonvert Nonvert Imm Down
VII Up Up Up Up Imm
Notes: Imm 5 Immobile; Nonvert 5 Non-vertical
Source: Recode based on Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992, 124 and sparsim)
the proportion of intergenerationally mobile respondents (of the different

kind) between subpopulations. A strong similarity between stayers and
movers emerge. In both samples, the intergenerationally mobile amount
to two-thirds of the total a result very close to what is found in existing
research on social mobility in our reference countries (Breen and Luijkx
2004a, 48). Among these mobile individuals, as with stayers, slightly less
than half have gone up the social ladder, while about 30 per cent have
gone down and 20 per cent have experienced non-vertical class mobility.
This finding counters one of our initial expectations: in an intergenera-
tional perspective, movers are not more socially mobile than stayers. At
the country level, Spain appears to be the only labour market in which
European working migrants enjoy a significantly higher mobility rate than
natives. However, this is almost exclusively due to a higher rate of non-
vertical mobility (in particular, 28.9 per cent of working Germans in Spain
experience this form of movement in the social structure). Differences in
such short-haul mobility are also the cause of the especially high intergen-
erational mobility rates of the Spanish abroad (but noticeably in Britain
43.7 per cent of them are upwardly mobile) and Germans at home. Overall,
no consistent difference between movers and stayers shows up, suggesting
only a loose, if any, relation between spatial and social mobility.
Still, the possibility that this finding is spurious, as other exogenous
factors mask the real impact of migration on intergenerational mobility,
cannot be ruled out by the analysis undertaken so far. The similarity of
the mobility paths of movers and stayers could be only apparent and in
fact stem from their differing biographical profiles. A logistic regression
of intergenerational class mobility (dichotomized) was therefore run
to control for other likely determinants of social mobility such as age,
gender, education, and class origin (Table 4.4). Two models are compared,
100%
90%
80%
70%
60% DN mobile
UP mobile
50% NV mobile
Immobile
40%
82
30%
20%
10%
0%
DE FR GB IT ES DE FR GB IT ES DE FR GB IT ES DE FR GB IT ES DE FR GB IT ES Total
IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN IN
DE DE DE DE DE FR FR FR FR FR GB GB GB GB GB IT IT IT IT IT ES ES ES ES ES
Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N5 10 463
Figure 4.1 Mobility rates decomposed into upward (UP), downward (DN) and non-vertical (NV) mobility by
nationality and country of residence
Table 4.4 Logit models predicting intergenerational class mobility in the

pooled ESS-EIMSS dataset
Model 1 Model 2
B Std Error B Std Error
Age 20.02** 0.00 20.02** 0.00
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gender
Male 20.09* 0.04 20.09* 0.05
Female
Education
University degree 0.80** 0.09 0.81** 0.10
University entry qualification 1.07** 0.10 1.08** 0.10
Upper vocational secondary 0.47** 0.08 0.49** 0.08
Primary/lower secondary
Nationality
German 0.11 0.23 0.18 0.25
French 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.23
British 0.34 0.20 0.43* 0.22
Italian 0.05 0.19 0.08 0.22
Spanish
Germany 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.24
France 0.34 0.23 0.25 0.26
Britain 0.11 0.22 20.01 0.23
Italy 0.06 0.21 0.08 0.22
Spain
Migration status
Mover 20.16 0.16 20.28 0.24
Stayer
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 21.09** 0.08 21.00** 0.08
Routine non-manual (III) 20.01 0.07 20.07 0.08
Petty bourgeoisie (IV) 0.71** 0.07 0.61** 0.08
High-skilled manual (VVI) 0.71** 0.08 0.66** 0.09
Low/non-skilled manual (VII)
Class of origin by migration status
(mover)
Bourgeoisie (III) 20.43* 0.21
Routine non-manual (III) 0.50* 0.25
Petty bourgeoisie (IV) 0.88** 0.25
High-skilled manual (VVI) 0.60 0.33
Model 1 Model 2
B Std Error B Std Error
Constant 0.45 0.22 0.45 0.22
22 Log Likelihood 9 850 9 814
Degrees of freedom 19 23
Pseudo R-square 0.12 0.12
Notes: ESS: only respondents with work experience; EIMSS: only respondents with
work experiences in country of residence. Reference category for dependent variable: class
immobility. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%. Immobility 5 0; Mobility 5 1.
the second controlling also for the interaction of class origin and migration
status.
In both models, the migration status of respondents (that is, being
movers or stayers) does not affect respondents odds of intergenerational
social mobility significantly. In the pooled ESS-EIMSS dataset, as could
be expected, education, and especially upper-secondary qualifications,
enhance the probabilities of social mobility considerably. In fact, country
contexts and nationalities make no big difference, although British citi-
zens tend to be slightly more socially mobile than their continental
counterparts. Moreover, younger respondents and women have higher
chances of absolute intergenerational mobility including downwards,
which is relatively more frequent for these social categories. Finally, and
most importantly, odds of intergenerational mobility are contingent on
class origins, being higher for lower middle class offspring. In particular,
sons and daughters of the petty bourgeois self-employed and high-skilled
manual workers qualify as the most likely candidates for intergenerational
mobility, while people from the top of the class hierarchy are in fact more
often bound to stay put in their class of origin.
By introducing an interaction term of class and migration status, model
2 intends to control whether the effect of family class on the odds of
intergenerational mobility varies for EU movers. While the main effect
does not cease to be significant, the interaction term shows that the odds
of being intergenerationally immobile are even higher among EU movers
from the upper class than among their stayer counterparts: in the EIMSS,
59.1 per cent of them are immobile as opposed to 48.7 per cent in the ESS.
Equally, the odds of intergenerational mobility are higher than average for
individuals from classes VVI, but even more so for EU movers with such
a family background in the EIMSS 89.1 per cent of them are socially
mobile as opposed to 80.7 per cent in the ESS. This means that cross-
national migration in the EU, far from levelling out the odds of social
mobility of individuals from different backgrounds, in fact amplifies exist-
ing, class-based divergences. The findings suggest that the free movement
regime of the EU seems to offer additional opportunities of social closure
for the European upper class, as well as extra chances of (mostly upward)
mobility for children of the lower-middle class.
At the start of this chapter it was argued that EU movers from Italy
and Spain could be more intergenerationally mobile than their counter-
parts from Central-Northern Europe, since the social structures of their
countries of origin one generation ago had a larger number of blue-collar
workers (including peasants) than those of Germany, France and Britain.
Moreover Germany, France and Britain still have a much higher number
of jobs in the salariat. Therefore, the absolute intergenerational mobility
for Italian and Spanish migrants should be boosted by both the back-
wardness of parental occupations when respondents were adolescents
and todays more upgraded occupational structure of the host countries.
This hypothesis is tested in the logistic regressions of the odds of intergen-
erational mobility (and more precisely of upward, downward and non-
vertical mobility) on a set of independent variables, including nationality
and country of residence, in Table 4.5 (analysis limited to EU movers,
both workers and non-workers).
In fact, Italian and Spanish citizens living abroad in the EU are not sig-
nificantly more mobile than the other nationalities of movers considered.
However, a Spain effect is worth mentioning. Spain is significantly more
likely to host socially mobile European migrants, especially compared
to Germany. In particular, the chances of non-vertical mobility are sig-
nificantly higher for EU citizens who settle in Spain than anywhere else.
Shifts to self-employment (class IV) are noticeably frequent. This social
class is home to 31.4 per cent of working EU movers interviewed in Spain,
some of them being semi-retirees who take (or keep) some part-time job
during el buen retiro under the Spanish sun. Far from being a means to
improve individual economic conditions, intra-European spatial mobility
is perhaps often a benefit in itself or a side-effect of an already golden
career (like, typically, for expats and their families: see Wagner 1998).
Among all other predictors included in the model, the impact of educa-
tion is strong and in line with what could be expected: the lowest level of
credentials puts at stake the chances of upward mobility and heightens
tremendously the risk of downward mobility among EU movers just as
it does in the rest of the population. The effect of class origin is highly
significant as well. For all EU movers, regardless of their working status,
Table 4.5 Logit models predicting intergenerational class mobility in the EIMSS dataset (only EU movers)
Mobility vs Upward vs Downward vs Non-vertical vs

immobility others others others
B Std error B Std error B Std error B Std error
Age 20.02 0.02 0.06* 0.02 20.04 0.02 20.05 0.03
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Period of migration
197483 20.17 0.12 20.41** 0.12 0.18 0.14 0.02 0.15
198493 20.10 0.10 20.17 0.10 0.09 0.12 20.18 0.13
19942003
Gender
86
Male 20.12* 0.05 0.44** 0.08 20.33** 0.09 20.37** 0.10
Female
Education
University degree 0.54** 0.15 1.93** 0.17 21.92** 0.18 20.39 0.20
University entry qualification 0.71** 0.16 1.18** 0.17 21.21** 0.18 0.07 0.20
Upper vocational secondary 0.27 0.15 0.56** 0.17 20.95** 0.19 0.22 0.20
Nationality
German 20.00 0.13 0.23 0.14 20.50** 0.16 20.06 0.17
French 0.16 0.13 20.06 0.13 20.09 0.14 0.03 0.16
British 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.13 20.14 0.14 20.05 0.16
Italian 20.16 0.12 20.05 0.13 0.38* 0.15 20.20 0.17
Spanish
Germany 20.42** 0.13 0.02 0.14 0.26 0.16 20.48** 0.17
France 20.24 0.13 0.25 0.13 20.05 0.16 20.38* 0.16
Britain 20.12 0.14 0.30* 0.15 0.15 0.16 20.33 0.17
Italy 20.18 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.22 0.16 20.45** 0.16
Spain
Knowledge COR lang. at migration 20.05 0.03 0.07* 0.03 20.08* 0.04 20.04 0.04
Working status
Never worked in COR 0.03 0.11 0.11 0.11 20.21 0.13 20.07 0.14
Works/worked in COR
Class of origin
Bourgeoisie (III) 21.57** 0.11
87
Routine non-manual (III) 20.29* 0.12
High-skilled manual (VVI) 0.72** 0.16
Constant 1.34 0.57 23.03 0.60 1.17 0.64 0.89 0.72
22 Log Likelihood 4 423 3 693 3 191 2 482
Degrees of freedom 22 18 18 18
Pseudo R-square 0.19 0.17 0.13 0.04
Notes: * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%
Source: EIMSS, N5 4017 (model 1); 2963 (model 2, excluding respondents from class III); 3170 (model 3, excluding respondents from class
VII); 2113 (model 4, excluding respondents from classes III and VII)
the probability of changing class as adults depends heavily on the class in

which they were born. Children of the service class cross national borders
almost only if they can preserve their original class location, while every-
body else moves spatially with a view to some status upgrading. However,
Table 4.5 (first column) indicates that the capacity of upper class movers
to be intergenerationally immobile is considerably higher than that of
migrants from all other social classes to be mobile.9 Perhaps intra-EU
migration projects are more easily accessible to individuals from the upper
class who are bound to stay in that same class than to others aiming at a
class upgrade by resettling abroad. On the other hand, it is true that more
recent movers have higher probabilities of upward mobility. This may well
be a sign of growing equalization of opportunities in a time perspective.
However, a significant gender gap shows up, with men enjoying 1.5 times
higher odds of moving upwardly in the social ladder than women, who
are, in fact, more commonly found among intra-EU migrants who experi-
ence non-vertical intergenerational mobility in the social structure.
INTRAGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: MAKING A

CAREER IN ANOTHER COUNTRY?
Among scholars of social stratification, intergenerational mobility is more

widely studied than career mobility (Morgan 2006, 7).10 Using cross-
sectional data, the only viable analytical strategy consists in identifying
individuals work positions at key stages of their life course. In our case,
three different points of migrants work histories are held to be critical to
their intragenerational mobility: the last job held in the country of origin
(Coo0), the first job in the country of residence (Cor1) and the final job in
that same country (Cor2).11 The following possible combinations of work
trajectories can be found:
a. Job immobility (Coo0 5 Cor1 5 Cor2);

b. Job mobility at migration (Coo0 Cor1 5 Cor2);
c. Job mobility after migration (Coo0 5 Cor1 Cor2);
d. Recurrent job mobility (Coo0 Cor1 Cor2).
In our sample, the two extreme cases (a and d) are relatively more fre-
quent, accounting for almost two-thirds of work trajectories: 31.7 per cent
of respondents who have worked in both the sending and the receiving
country are occupationally immobile migrants, while 31.9 per cent have
changed job upon their arrival in the country of current residence and also
at a later stage in that same country. In fact, 23 per cent of respondents
changed job only at the first one of the two transitions considered (that is,
when resettling abroad), whereas 13.4 per cent changed only at the second
possible transition.
These options are contingent on a number of different factors operating
at different levels (Table 4.6). At the macro level, history shapes opportu-
nities and work trajectories markedly. Intra-EU migrants who left their
home country between 1974 and 1993 are definitely more likely to have
experienced some job mobility than movers of the last period considered.
Of course, they have also had a longer time to shop for job switches, but
these movers also have significantly higher probabilities of having changed
occupation at their first employment in the host country (that is, of falling
into the always mobile category). Contexts count, too. Job mobility
after migration is overall more frequent for movers to Central-Northern
European countries. Germany and Britain also offer significantly higher
opportunities for changing jobs at both transitions.
Of the individual characteristics studied, gender and education can be
seen to play a relevant role. Women change job at migration, and possibly
also at a later stage, much more commonly than men. This might reflect
the dependency of their migration choice on their male partners work
choices a tied-mover effect which emerged in a Dutch study on internal
migration (Van Ham 2001). In other words, women who migrate follow-
ing a first-earner partner are likely to be less demanding of the labour
market and thus be willing to leave their former occupation. But a higher
propensity to face migration as an international career detour that is, to
start a new career on the part of women cannot be ruled out on the basis
of this evidence. What is for sure, is that women associate geographical
mobility with job mobility more than men in the EU. A similar interpreta-
tive conundrum about the nature of career changes at migration seen as
outcomes of involuntary constraints or first-order preferences emerges
when considering the influence of education. Movers with secondary
school credentials (or higher) are less likely to change job at and after
migration. This is all the more so for EU movers who had a service-class
job or were self-employed in their country of origin. Occupational mobil-
ity tends rather to be the story of the labour market integration of low-
skilled European migrants. Thus, stronger socioeconomic resources (like
gender, education and prior class positions) seem to be used to safeguard
occupational stability when moving across national borders in Europe. In
other words, it turns out to be the weakest workers who change employ-
ment as a consequence, or simply after, relocating in another country.
Nationality does not make a real difference. But language knowledge
does. Interestingly, not proficiency at migration but current fluency in the
host country language is a better predictor of job mobility after migration
Table 4.6 Multinomial logit predicting trajectories of job mobility among EU movers
Mobile at migration Mobile after migration Always mobile

B Std Error B Std Error B Std Error
Age 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.06 20.06 0.04
Age squared 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Period of migration
197483 20.11 0.21 1.07** 0.26 0.83** 0.21
198493 0.03 0.16 0.56** 0.21 0.51** 0.17
19942003
Gender
90
Male 20.43** 0.14 20.11 0.17 20.63** 0.10
Female
Education
University degree 20.36 0.31 20.08 0.37 20.45 0.30
University entry qualification 20.63* 0.31 20.09 0.37 20.48* 0.29
Upper vocational secondary 20.47 0.30 20.17 0.35 20.55 0.28
Nationality
German 20.15 0.24 0.42 0.28 20.03 0.23
French 20.25 0.21 0.23 0.26 0.13 0.20
British 20.03 0.20 0.17 0.25 20.07 0.20
Italian 20.31 0.20 20.05 0.24 20.15 0.19
Spanish
Germany 20.23 0.24 0.67* 0.34 0.72** 0.25
France 20.42* 0.25 0.70* 0.34 0.30 0.26
Britain 20.12 0.24 0.70* 0.33 0.65** 0.25
Italy 20.22 0.24 0.12 0.35 20.04 0.26
Spain
Knowledge of COR language at migration 20.01 0.06 20.05 0.07 20.07 0.05
Knowledge of COR language at interview 0.19* 0.09 0.38** 0.12 0.63** 0.10
Class in COO
Bourgeoisie (III) 21.10** 0.24 20.96** 0.27 21.24** 0.22
Routine non-manual (III) 20.43 0.23 20.41 0.27 20.23 0.22
91
Petty bourgeoisie (IV) 20.83** 0.32 20.99* 0.40 20.92** 0.31
High-skilled manual (VVI) 20.38 0.25 20.64* 0.30 20.31 0.24
Constant 1.61 1.21 21.02 1.59 3.13** 1.14
22 Log Likelihood 5 198
Degrees of freedom 66
Pseudo R-square 0.16
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: job immobility. * Significant at 5%; * Significant at 1%.

Table 4.7 Paths of intragenerational class mobility of EU movers (%)
Transition 2
Immobile NV UP DOWN Total
mobile mobile mobile
Transition 1 Immobile 62.1 1.8 5.8 1.7 71.3
NV mobile 4.2 0.9 0.6 0.1 5.8
UP mobile 6.7 0.5 0.2 1.1 8.5
DOWN mobile 7.7 0.4 6.1 0.1 14.3
Total 80.7 3.6 12.7 3.0 100.0
and both at and after migration. In fact the opposite causeeffect relation
seems more plausible: job mobility trains language skills. Perhaps the pro-
pensity of the highly educated movers to be occupationally immobile can
lead them to live more secluded lives in expat circles, while less-educated
movers are forced to improve their knowledge of the host country language
as they transfer from one workplace to another.
Job-to-job mobility forms the basis of movements between social classes
inasmuch as occupations are taken as proxies of class belonging. Of
course, job mobility does not automatically lead to shifts from one class to
another, as each class comprises several different occupations. Therefore,
intragenerational class mobility rates are inherently lower than job mobil-
ity rates in any given population (Mayer and Carroll 1987). Indeed, 71.3
per cent of respondents to the EIMSS did not change social class when
taking up their first job after migration. Moreover, 80.7 per cent held the
same class position in the transition between first and current job in the
host country. As might be expected, the work-with-migration transition
can bring about downward mobility (this is the case for 14.3 per cent of
respondents, while 8.5 per cent are in fact upwardly mobile), but the sub-
sequent career in the host country is more likely to be on the upside (12.7
per cent) than on the downside (3.0 per cent).
A cross-tabulation of class mobility patterns at each transition (that
is, Coo0 to Cor1 and Cor1 to Cor2) helps describe all the possible career
paths across these three points of intra-EU migrants work histories (Table
4.7). Some of these intragenerational mobility patterns are quite unusual.
In particular, only two respondents (less than 0.1 per cent) experienced
downward mobility both at migration and in the following step of their
career. But an extremely successful career (upward class mobility at both
transitions) is equally exceptional (five cases, 0.2 per cent of the sample).
Class immobility at both transitions, regardless of migration and possible

subsequent career moves, is overwhelmingly the rule, reported by 62.1 per
cent of respondents.
For the sake of simplicity, these 16 possible combinations of transi-
tions are grouped into two broad typical class trajectories: immobile and
mobile paths (respectively, pale grey and dark grey cells in Table 4.7). The
effects of the usual series of contextual and individual characteristics on
the log odds of being intragenerationally mobile rather than immobile are
estimated in Table 4.8. The findings are not dramatically different from
those concerning job mobility. Again, time and space effects are note-
worthy. Migrants of the earlier periods (that is, those who moved before
the introduction of European citizenship in 1993) are more likely to have
experienced some career mobility. Where individuals move to affect the
chances of facing intragenerational class mobility as well, with Britain and
Italy exposing them to higher risks of class shifts, perhaps for opposite
reasons Britain due to a relatively more volatile labour market that does
not inhibit upward and downward job spells, and Italy to a tighter labour
market forcing newcomers into underemployment. But once again, the
lions share of the accounted variance is explained by respondents pre-
migration social class. Quite straightforwardly, low/non-skilled manual
workers are much more likely than other EU movers to experience class
mobility necessarily upward, given their starting point when resettling
abroad, net of all other effects. Since most of the working class intra-EU
movers belong in the older cohorts of migrants, the association between
spatial and intragenerational class mobility in Europe turns out to be on
the decline at a time of easier movements across national borders. The
higher accessibility of international job trajectories in Europe does not
bring about a higher rate of class mobility by default.
CONCLUSIONS
Traditional migrants move in space in order to move in the social struc-

ture, particularly across generations. In highly fluid societies, opportuni-
ties for work, education, career and the bettering of lifestyles have led
geographic mobility to be a kind of escalator up the social ladder, often
implying moves from periphery regions to core cities. This has always
held for internal migration, but European integration poses the question
of whether geographical mobility within the unified space of the EU may
offer new possibilities to ambitious social climbers escaping entrenched
national social hierarchies.
Moreover, in a social stratification perspective, the process of European
Table 4.8 Logit models predicting intragenerational class mobility among

EU movers
B Std Error
Age 20.04 0.03
Age squared 0.00 0.00
Period of migration
197483 0.38* 0.17
198493 0.40** 0.14
19942003
Gender
Male 20.24* 0.10
Female
Education
University degree 20.08 0.22
University entry qualification 20.10 0.21
Upper vocational secondary 20.08 0.20
Nationality
German 20.29 0.19
French 20.04 0.16
British 0.16 0.16
Italian 20.14 0.15
Spanish
Germany 0.29 0.20
France 0.35 0.21
Britain 0.58** 0.20
Italy 0.48* 0.20
Spain
Knowledge COR language at migration 20.03 0.04
Class in COO
Bourgeoisie (III) 21.29** 0.17
Routine non-manual (III) 20.59** 0.16
High-skilled manual (VVI) 20.43* 0.18
Constant 1.45 0.86
22 Log Likelihood 2 482
Pseudo R-square 0.12
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: immobility. * Significant at 5%; **

Significant at 1%. Immobility 5 0; Mobility 5 1.

integration adds a further potential challenge to the association between

class structures and national states (Breen and Rottman 1998, 16).
European citizens who take jobs abroad in another EU member state,
enjoying EU-based rights and facilities (like the recognition of foreign
diplomas and free access to national health services), ought to be found
on the cutting edge of the transnationalization of social mobility patterns.
These people thus form a strategic population for researchers interested in
the globalization of systems of social stratification (see Weiss 2005; Berger
and Weiss 2008).
The European Internal Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) permits a system-
atic comparison of the social mobility patterns of EU movers and stayers,
using the European Social Survey (ESS) as a reference. At the beginning
of the chapter, four hypotheses were formulated. In brief, it was posited
that the class origins of movers do not differ substantially from those of
stayers (H1); in regards to their destination, movers are disproportion-
ately represented in the upper class (H2); movers experience higher inter-
generational mobility than stayers (H3); and Southern European movers
are more likely to be upwardly mobile than their Northern European
counterparts (H4).
With the exception of H2, no hypothesis stands our empirical testing.
Analyses presented in this chapter found that EU movers are overrepre-
sented in the upper class and underrepresented in the working class, both
in their family of origin and in their current situation, contradicting H1
about class origins and confirming H2 about class destinations. On the
other hand, this finding matches fairly closely those of studies on inter-
regional migration in countries like Britain (Fielding 2007) and the US
(Lin and Christiadi 2002). Contrary to H4, nationality does not affect
either intergenerational or intragenerational social mobility significantly,
once personal factors are controlled for. H3 is falsified as well. Perhaps
the single most important finding of this chapter is that the overall inter-
generational mobility of movers does not significantly differ from that of
stayers in European societies. However, such a finding needs to be quali-
fied. While upper class movers show a higher propensity than upper-class
stayers to maintain their family class position, lower class movers are
in fact more intergenerationally mobile than their stayer counterparts.
Thus, the free-movement regime of the EU is an alternative route to social
mobility for the less privileged young who are ready to leave their home
countries, working also as an additional means of class reproduction for
the transnational fraction of the European bourgeoisie.
The latter group deserves closer scrutiny in future research. Whether
migration across Europe serves the purpose of improving the prestige and
income of upper-class cadets, or that of defending their ascribed privilege,
is an emerging question that needs to be addressed with some fine-tuning

of career movements and occupational rankings (see work in progress by
Le Gals and Andreotti 2006). For the time being, social mobility tables
inform us that one-fifth of working movers in the EIMSS circulate within
the upper class. To this number one must add middleupper class pension-
ers who have migrated to the south of the continent 36.5 per cent of the
retirees in our sample (see also King et al. 2000). As a result, a sizeable
proportion of EU movers embody a world-regional variant of the global,
cosmopolitan upper class.
In conclusion, while it cannot be denied that intra-continental free
movement is a unique historical experiment with potential far-reaching
effects in the long run, so far it has not reshaped the social structure of
the EU. Much to the dismay of EU institutions and economic gurus who
have long conceived of the European free-movement area as grease in
the wheels of the continents labour markets (see Recchi 2006 and 2008),
cross-state mobility in Western Europe turns out to be quite weakly asso-
ciated with job-to-job mobility, and even when this is the case, it does not
seem to bring about dramatic shifts across class boundaries.
NOTES
1. Even high-skilled migrants, if not in top managerial positions, are likely to experience
some status downgrading in the workplace as they move from less-developed to devel-
oped countries (Alarcon 1999; Cornelius and Espenshade 2001).
2. Indeed, one of the functions of immigrant ethnic communities lies in the safeguarding
of migrants original prestige in social relations outside the workplace in the face of
occupational degradation. Co-ethnics acknowledge migrants real status that is, the
one they had in the local communities from which they came.
3. Unfortunately, while forms and determinants of intergenerational mobility can be
studied comparing movers and stayers, data availability only permits a focus on the
intragenerational mobility of movers.
4. The process of price and salary homogenization in the EU is still under way. In 2004,
when EIMSS was carried out, the median hourly cost of labour in the private sector was
32 euros in Denmark and 10.3 euros in Portugal; within the five countries of our survey,
the average worker in Germany earned 28.2 euros and his/her counterpart in Spain 16.3
(Statistisches Bundesamt Deutschland 2007). But even between these two extreme poles
of the spectrum of Western European wages, migration flows are apparently insensible
to variations in income and unemployment differentials (see Mouhoud and Oudinet
2004; Puhani 2001).
5. Demographically, Italy is the country where the number of EU15 movers is the lowest
of the four examined, and the presence of foreign-born workers from other EU15 coun-
tries the lowest in the entire EU15 (0.11 per cent of the workforce: Van Houtum and
Van der Velde 2004, 102).
6. It is estimated that about 40 per cent of all Europeans living in Britain are in fact in
London, gravitating around its global city economy (Piracha and Vickerman 2003).
Ethnographic accounts of the careers and prospects of EU movers in the City and other
highly qualified sectors of the London economy can be found in Favell (2008a).
7. Notoriously, Germany hosts significant numbers of another category of intra-EU

movers: posted workers from fiscally less onerous countries (for instance, workers in
the construction sector from the UK). However, at least legally, posted workers in the
EU are entitled to no more than a six-months stay, and are therefore excluded by the
EIMSS sampling criteria (at least one year of permanent residence).
8. The hierarchical arrangement of social classes that generates these four types follows
Erikson and Goldthorpe (1992).
9. More precisely, the odds of intergenerational immobility for upper class movers are 2.5
times those of mobility for movers originating from classes IV and VVI.
10. However, it is true that the spread of longitudinal studies and the development of event
history analysis have revived research on intragenerational mobility in connection with
life course approaches (for an overview, see Mayer 2005).
11. EU movers who never worked in the destination country are excluded from this analy-
sis, as well as those who took their first job in life only after they migrated, as it is impos-
sible to assess the impact of migration on their career mobility. Moreover, due to a lack
of comparable data, findings presented in this section refer to EU movers only.
5. Living across cultures in a
transnational Europe
Antonio Alaminos and Oscar Santacreu
ACCULTURATION OR INTEGRATION?
THEORETICAL PREMISES
As other chapters have documented, resettling to another country entails

various degrees of mobility, both in terms of time and previous move-
ments. Some migrants decide to remain indefinitely in the destination
country, while others keep alive the wish to return to their country of
origin as soon as possible. Some have had significant mobility experiences
before, with long stays in several countries. For others, migration is in
fact a new and one-shot experience. Whatever, the case, for all migrants,
moving internationally is a cumulative and dynamic life choice that can
lead to great changes in the individuals and (cumulatively) in the societies
where they choose to settle. These questions can best be approached with
reference to the well-developed literature in immigration studies on accul-
turation or integration. Before tackling the data revealed by EIMSS as
regards this issue, however, we need first to clarify the key concepts used
in this chapter.
Acculturation
According to a classic definition:
acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of indi-

viduals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with
subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups.
Under this definition, acculturation is to be distinguished from culture change,
of which it is but one aspect, and assimilation, which is at times a phase of
acculturation. (Linton et al. 1936, 1456)
In an updated version of this perspective, the most well-known contem-

porary theorist of acculturation, John W. Berry (1997), outlines that the
acculturation process is associated with psychological and physical changes
98
Living across cultures in a transnational Europe 99
in immigrants due to adaptation to a new diet, climate and housing, and

the conventions of social interaction, rules and values of the new society.
It is important to highlight the differences between acculturation and
assimilation. Assimilation is not the inevitable consequence of accultura-
tion. For instance, in certain circumstances, such as when migrants are
spatially concentrated, assimilation will hardly be a result of accultura-
tion. On the other hand, acculturation takes place both on an individual
and a group level. This means that, even among individuals from the same
cultural group living in the same geographical area and with similar socio-
economic characteristics, the acculturation process can produce different
outcomes because of differing personal experiences (Kelly et al. 1994).
A key formulation such as Hofstedes acculturation curve model (2003)
is premised on such an individual perspective. The psychological states
experienced by migrants during their acculturation tend to follow a four-
stage sequence. The first stage is usually short, and it is characterised by
a state of euphoria: the excitement of travelling and living in a different
society and culture. The second stage is the period of culture shock, when
real life starts in the new environment. The third stage is a period during
which migrants slowly begin to function in the new context, learn some
local values, find increased self-confidence, and choose their own lifestyle
in the new social environment. The acculturation process can have differ-
ent outcomes that lead to a fourth stage. During this last stage, migrants
adopt a stable psychological disposition that may be different from the
one they had in their society of origin. Some might find it difficult to live
with locals in their new society. In other cases, however, foreign residents
over-assimilate and become happy natives.
The acculturation process entails, to a great extent, the acquisition of
intercultural competences. The first approaches to this basically distin-
guished three areas: affective (attitudes), knowledge (cognition) and skills
(behaviours) (Bloom 1956). Awareness was later recognised as another
important element for migrants to be able to develop an adequate inter-
cultural competence. Stevens (1971), Curle (1972) and Gattegno (1976),
amongst others, mention self-awareness and awareness of others as keys to
being able to interact adequately in another culture. More recent models of
intercultural competence consider these five dimensions of learning to be
relevant: awareness, attitudes, skills, knowledge and linguistic competence
in the language of the host society. In any case, intercultural competence
does not develop in a synchronic or integrated way, both in the number of
dimensions it comprises and the degree of competence achieved.
Acculturation also raises significant measurement issues. Empirical
scales to measure acculturation are often plagued by the pitfall of unidi-
mensionality. Generally speaking, linear unidimensional scales conform to
an assimilationist approach: the more American a, say, Pakistani migrant

becomes, the less Pakistani he or she is. This means that the acquisition of
new cultural competences is associated with the loss or weakening of the
original ones. Many linear unidimensional scales have been constructed,
such as those by Marn et al. (1987), Ghuman (1991), Cortes et al. (1994),
Landrine and Klonoff (1994), Cuellar, Arnold and Maldonado (1995),
Dawson et al. (1996) and Hofstede (2001). However, measurements over
just one continuum impose unnecessary theoretical restrictions since this
reduces culture to a single dimension. Several researchers responded by
developing multidimensional orthogonal scales (Berry 1970; Zak 1973;
Teske and Nelson 1974; Clark et al. 1976; Garca and Lega 1979; Padilla
1980; Szapocznik et al. 1980; Snchez and Fernndez 1993; Suinn et al.
1995; Ryder et al. 2000). Multidimensionality allows us to understand the
acculturation process as a hybridisation process in which the acquisition
of intercultural competence does not necessarily imply accepting the new
culture (language, values, food, clothes, and so on) as a single and indivis-
ible package. Some authors have observed that unidimensional scales tend
to be more successful in the United States. The assimilation literature in
the social sciences from Gordon (1964) to Alba and Nee (2004) has clearly
conceptualised this process as one that measures structural convergence
with middle and upper class norms (of education, housing, social mobil-
ity, and so on). However, in the Unites States there has been a normative
tendency to blur this process with cultural issues of becoming American,
where political, cultural and ethnic proofs of assimilation to the dominant
white majority are considered a goal whether positively or coercively
for migrants. In Canada, though, scales tend to be multidimensional,
in accordance with public immigration policies and what is considered
socially acceptable (see Berry 1984; Taylor and Lambert 1996).
As with the concept of assimilation, disagreements on the concept of
acculturation thus revolve around the best way of operationalizing it,
basically because this involves a political stance regarding what is expected
from migrants. Our view is that there are various ways of living abroad,
which can hardly be captured by unidimensional scales, and that a first step
consists in defining the critical dimensions of acculturation. Berry (2003)
suggests a double dimensionality, based on orientations towards ones
group and towards other groups (that is, the host society), as expressed in
social contacts and collective actions. The importance of Berrys approach
lies in the fact that it ascribes a strategic action to migrants. Padilla (1980)
also proposes two dimensions. One dimension, called ethnic loyalty, con-
siders the migrants cultural orientation, according to their preference for
the culture of origin or the culture of the society of destination. The other
dimension is cultural awareness, which takes into account the cultural
competence of migrants from the viewpoint of both the culture of origin

and the culture of destination. The first dimension is psychological. The
second one considers the intercultural competence of migrants that is,
their knowledge of both cultures (origin and destination). In this sense,
Padilla introduces a qualification about migrants ability (their intercul-
tural competence) to adjust preferences and actual behaviours. Berrys
and Padillas scales are clearly complementary. Both share a dimension
that refers to preferences or cultural orientations, and include a second
dimension social participation for Berry, and intercultural compe-
tence (knowledge of language, norms, values and so on) for Padilla.
These may be interdependent formulations, although Berrys empha-
sizes behaviour as the basis for measurement, while Padillas highlights
knowledge of the environment. Both these alternatives are important. It
is difficult to have an intense social participation in the society of destina-
tion without an acceptable knowledge of its language and social codes.
Intercultural competence encompasses several skills, some of which are
harder to achieve than others, for instance, the command of etiquette,
when to bring a present, congratulate or greet, appropriate clothing or
language tones. Learning the underlying values or interpreting situations
or behaviours correctly is much more difficult. Feeling disoriented about
those meanings can cause acculturation stress (uncertainty, anxiety and
depression), which may lead to hostility towards the new social environ-
ment and cultural rejection. In this sense, intercultural competence is
essential in order to facilitate participation or create a preference for a
different lifestyle.
Integration
Although there are parallels in the application of these concepts to the

immigration process, a distinct line of approach to the same questions
is taken if the concept of integration is adopted. For example, Schoorl
(2005) prefers to use this concept when referring to the process through
which migrants become part of the social, cultural and institutional fabric
of the society that hosts them. The concept of integration thus pays atten-
tion not only to migrants adaptation, as does acculturation, but also to
the structural effects on the society in which they reside and its more or
less welcoming orientations. Schoorl identifies four significant forms of
integration: socioeconomic integration (structural), social integration,
cultural integration and identification. The structural integration dimen-
sion refers to immigrants equal access to services and institutions: educa-
tion, labour market, housing, political system and health care (equality
versus discrimination). Social integration refers to the degree of interaction
between immigrants and the local population (segregation versus mixing).

Cultural integration refers to the degree to which different groups share the
same norms, values and preferences (homogeneity versus heterogeneity).
Finally, from the viewpoint of integration, the identity dimension refers to
the degree to which immigrants identify with the society in which they live,
on the one hand, and, on the other, the degree to which immigrants are
accepted by that society (inclusion versus exclusion). Inclusion does not
necessarily mean at first the loss of identification with the culture of origin.
Obviously, there is not a synchrony between these different dimensions
of integration. Socioeconomic integration or cultural integration can be
interdependent, but this is not necessarily the case.
Again, overlaps in these distinctions can be detected with the dominant
US paradigm of assimilation. Thus, the segmented assimilation theory
(Portes and Zhou 1993; Portes and Rumbaut 2001) suggests that a high
degree of structural (socioeconomic) integration can coexist perfectly with
a strong orientation towards ones own ethnic or cultural group. Time
also plays a paramount part in the dynamics of the immigration process.
OReilly (2000) classifies migrants into ideal types taking into account two
dimensions: orientations towards ones country of origin and the duration
of residence in each country. He applies this model to intra-European
migrants, particularly residents in Spain. This classification model shows
several limitations, which come from the combination of two highly
interdependent dimensions. Migrants orientation towards the country
of origin and the country of destination change over time. Moreover, the
time factor should include not only the past (the time an individual has
been living in the country), but also migrants expectations regarding the
future. The (explicit or implicit) intention of returning to the country of
origin has frequently been used to explain the persistence of ethnic differ-
ences or the unwillingness to integrate into the new social environment
(for example, Bonacich 1973; Anwar 1979; Anthias 1992; Uriely 1994).
Starting from the theoretical models that we have just reviewed, we will
adopt the integration rather than the acculturation terminology, while
using some tools from the acculturation literature. In our view, there are
two dimensions that adapt particularly well to the reality of intra-Euro-
pean migration.
The first dimension refers to what we think of as social integration. It
takes into account Berrys and Schoorls notions of social participation and
Padillas view of intercultural competence. In short, it looks at migrants
social networks, as well as their ability to coexist effectively with the local
population. This dimension is operationalized by measuring on the one
hand the number and nationality of friends, and linguistic competence
on the other. Both indicators are closely correlated; the preponderance of
friends from the country of residence implies a higher level of linguistic

competence. Among the different dimensions of intercultural competence,
we consider linguistic skills to be basic and fundamental. The possibilities
of integrating into the everyday life of the new social environment are
seriously impaired by language weakness.
The second dimension that can be used to conceive how migrants live
in and perceive their new country of residence is that of cultural integra-
tion. It includes a widespread idea in the literature reviewed above: that is,
the preference for the culture of origin or the culture of destination makes
a difference in immigrants strategies for dealing with the new society of
residence. Together with the possible cultural discontent or well-being of
migrants, it is also important to bear in mind their expectations of future
mobility. The way migrants experience a new social situation depends
on their expectations or wishes to stay in it. Those migrants wishing or
expecting to return soon to their country of origin will show more indiffer-
ence towards the society they live in. Preferences for life in the country of
origin or that of destination and the wish to return to the country of origin
are the indicators used in our analysis.
These two dimensions characterize differently the way European
migrants live in their new social environment, and constitute a satisfactory
synthesis of existing theoretical models. As stated above, the immigration
process whether conceptualized as acculturation, assimilation or (as
we do) integration is an opaque process, the pace of which depends on
the individual, that cannot be seized clearly in a single survey. However,
the distinctiveness of EU movers as regards other kinds of migrant raises
intriguing questions about the kind and degree of social and cultural inte-
gration they experience in the society in which they have chosen to live.
LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE AND SOCIAL

NETWORKS
Language is one of the critical issues of living in a foreign society, as it

mediates almost every daily life situation. EU movers command of the
language of their country of destination is overall quite poor. English is
the only language in which practically all migrants groups show a high
level of competence. Particularly noteworthy is the modest knowledge of
the host-country language shown by German, British and French nation-
als upon their arrival in Spain or Italy, and the equally weak control of
German declared by the Spanish, Italians and British moving to Germany.
See Table 5.1 for full details.
Quite surprisingly, in the light of the changes in social composition and
Table 5.1 Knowledge of COR language of EU movers at time of

migration (row % )
Country of origin Almost Quite Just so- Poorly No

and country of as well well and-so knowledge
residence as native
language
French in Germany 6.7 22.7 17.6 16.9 36.1
French in Britain 12.2 44.5 20.2 12.6 10.5
French in Italy 5.6 15.7 10.4 12.9 55.4
French in Spain 5.7 8.5 17.1 26.0 42.7
Germans in France 10.4 14.0 30.0 25.2 20.4
Germans in Britain 23.5 47.8 20.0 7.8 0.8
Germans in Italy 2.4 11.6 18.4 32.0 35.6
Germans in Spain 4.0 3.2 8.0 18.1 66.7
British in France 7.2 16.8 21.6 35.6 18.8
British in Germany 3.1 11.8 9.4 24.8 50.8
British in Italy 4.0 11.6 10.8 17.1 56.6
British in Spain 1.2 3.7 11.0 40.8 43.3
Italians in France 15.7 21.0 10.9 18.1 34.3
Italians in Germany 0.8 2.8 2.8 11.8 81.9
Italians in Britain 3.2 28.7 23.9 19.9 24.3
Italians in Spain 15.4 12.6 12.2 23.2 36.6
Spanish in France 6.8 15.2 13.2 22.0 42.8
Spanish in Germany 0.8 5.9 9.5 15.4 68.4
Spanish in Britain 5.1 25.5 29.3 19.1 21.0
Spanish in Italy 2.4 15.2 12.0 23.6 46.8
education levels of the population at stake, more recent migrants are not
significantly more proficient in the language of the destination country
than their predecessors. Only the Spanish and Italians who moved to
Britain in the 1990s and after fare linguistically better than older cohorts
of co-nationals crossing the Channel. Nevertheless, EU movers of all
generations are a select group also in terms of their original linguistic com-
petence: the proportion of them claiming to have had a good command of
the language of the place where they have resettled is definitely higher than
that of their compatriots at home (Table 5.2).
With regard to the current knowledge of the language of the country of
residence, British nationals show the lowest level of knowledge of foreign
languages. However, we should bear in mind that English is the most
widespread language, which reduces the impact of this lack of knowledge.
Table 5.2 Stayers and EU movers knowledge at migration of other EU

languages by country of residence (quite well or almost as
well as native language) (%)
Language
French German English Italian Spanish
French Movers 29.4 56.75 21.3 14.2
Stayers 7.0 34.0 4.5* 10.0
Germans Movers 24.4 71.3 14.0 7.2
Stayers 12.0 51.0 2.1* 2.5*
Italians Movers 36.7 3.6 31.9 28.0
Stayers 11.0 3.0* 29.0 4.0
British Movers 24.0 14.9 15.6 4.9
Stayers 14.0 6.0 1.6* 3.2*
Spanish Movers 22.0 6.7 30.6 17.6
Stayers 8.0 1.0* 20.0 1.3*
Notes: This is the main language spoken in the COR of EU movers in each column
(i.e., 24.4% in the first column refers to the proportion of German movers living in France
speaking French well when they migrated, compared to 12% of the German population
with a similar knowledge of French).
Source: Data on movers are from EIMSS. Data on the general population are taken from
Eurobarometer 63.4; * from Eurobarometer 55.1, N 5 4 997
Particularly noteworthy is the low level of knowledge of the Spanish lan-

guage shown by British and German residents in Spain; a relatively modest
proficiency in French is also the norm among Germans living in France
(Table 5.3). The duration of stay abroad, in these groups of EU movers,
makes little difference: German and British residents in Spain who admit to
not speaking Spanish at all average 13 years of residence in this country. As
a matter of fact, British and German residents in Spain are the migrants who
least improve their linguistic competence. In contrast, Spanish and Italian
nationals are the migrants who most actively seek to improve their linguistic
competence in all countries of destination. In all groups, there is a marked
improvement of linguistic competence over time.
Another key aspect of social integration has to do with the friendship
relations of movers (Table 5.4). The general trend is for the percentage
of migrants with friends of a different nationality to be noticeably higher
than those with friends of the same nationality. In contrast, German and
British residents in Spain have the highest number of friends of the same
nationality, confirming OReillys (2000) evidence. A similar case of an
ethnic segregation of personal networks is found among Italian residents
Table 5.3 Knowledge of language at time of survey (row %)
Country of origin Almost as Quite Just Poorly No

and country of well as well so-so knowledge
residence native
language
French in Italy 59.8 30.1 6.4 2.8 0.8
French in Spain 25.6 41.9 18.7 11.0 2.8
Germans in Italy 37.6 32.8 22.4 6.4 0.8
Germans in Spain 12.4 18.9 33.7 24.9 10.0
British in Italy 49.4 34.3 11.6 3.2 1.6
British in Spain 7.7 20.3 43.9 23.6 4.5
Spanish in Italy 42.4 43.2 11.2 3.2 0.0
in Germany. On the other hand, the EU movers with the highest number
of friends from their country of residence are Italians living in Spain and
Britain, and Spanish and French residents in Italy.
Overall, linguistic competence and the density of the network of friends
in the country of destination show a very significant covariation, indicat-
ing their commonality in expressing the degree of social integration of EU
movers in the host societies.
NATIONAL ORIENTATION AND MOBILITY

EXPECTATIONS
Which society that of origin or that of destination do EU movers

prefer? We would hypothesize that those movers who feel closer to their
Table 5.4 Density and nationality of network of friends (row %)
Country of origin Many More Same More Many

and country of more from from both from more
residence from COO countries COR from
COO COR
French in Italy 1.2 3.2 24.7 34.0 36.8
French in Spain 0.8 17.3 35.8 34.2 11.9
Germans in Italy 2.4 17.6 20.8 37.6 21.6
Germans in Spain 20.2 25.8 41.1 9.7 3.2
British in Italy 2.0 6.4 26.3 39.0 26.3
British in Spain 6.6 38.3 39.9 14.0 1.2
Spanish in Italy 0.0 9.2 20.5 40.6 29.7
country of origin will find it more difficult to integrate into the society
they live in. The four response categories in Table 5.5 correspond to
the acculturation strategies put forward by Berry (1997): assimilation,
integration, segregation and marginalization. First of all, we find that
the most frequent national orientation is twofold: towards the country
of residence and the country of origin. Going into detail we see that a
predilection for the country of origin is highest among Spanish nationals
living in any country of destination, followed by Italians in any country
of destination except Spain, and French citizens living in Germany or
Britain. On the other hand, the highest level of preference for the country
of residence can be found among British residents everywhere. Sympathy
with the country of residence is also high among German residents in Italy
and France, and among French and Italian residents in Spain. Generally
speaking, EU movers from the south of the continent appear to stick
Table 5.5 National orientation of EU movers (row %)
Country of origin and Towards Either Towards Neither

country of residence COR COO
French in Germany 8.3 67.9 20.2 3.6
French in Britain 9.8 66.2 17.1 6.8
French in Italy 13.8 69.6 7.3 9.3
French in Spain 20.4 68.6 4.5 6.5
Germans in France 20.1 67.9 5.2 6.8
Germans in Britain 17.8 60.9 13.0 8.3
Germans in Italy 24.9 62.9 5.7 6.5
Germans in Spain 9.3 76.6 10.1 4.0
British in France 36.3 57.7 2.8 3.2
British in Germany 18.2 58.1 12.6 11.1
British in Italy 24.7 64.1 7.6 3.6
British in Spain 34.2 57.1 4.6 4.2
Italians in France 5.3 72.0 18.7 4.1
Italians in Germany 6.7 73.4 17.1 2.8
Italians in Britain 7.6 62.0 26.0 4.4
Italians in Spain 16.5 75.3 4.9 3.3
Spanish in France 6.5 74.6 14.5 4.4
Spanish in Germany 7.1 66.8 22.5 3.6
Spanish in Britain 10.3 63.2 23.2 3.2
Spanish in Italy 4.5 75.3 17.8 2.4
to their roots more than their counterparts from Central and Northern
Europe.
Expectations regarding the future are also a component of cultural
integration into the host society. Migrants who wish to return to their
country of origin as soon as possible convey considerable indifference
towards the society they are currently living in. Table 5.6 shows how
nostalgia is higher among Southern Europeans. A strong wish to return
is also shown by French residents in Germany and Britain, and British
in Germany.
As we have just seen, there is a close relationship between these two
measures, in the sense that a preference for life in the country of origin or
the country of residence is associated with the wish to return to the former
or remain in the latter. Almost 80 per cent of migrants who prefer their
current country of residence do not expect to move in the future. On the
other hand, 69 per cent of those preferring life in their country of origin
nurture the idea of going back home.
Table 5.6 Wish to return to the country of origin of EU movers (row %)
Wish to return
No Indifferent Yes
French in Germany 31.4 9.4 59.2
French in Britain 37.8 10.9 51.3
French in Italy 46.2 7.2 46.6
French in Spain 63.4 8.9 27.6
Germans in France 60.8 9.2 30.0
Germans in Britain 43.9 18.0 38.0
Germans in Italy 63.2 11.6 25.2
Germans in Spain 51.4 14.9 33.7
British in France 75.2 8.4 16.4
British in Germany 52.0 7.5 40.6
British in Italy 52.6 11.2 36.3
British in Spain 80.9 9.3 9.8
Italians in France 39.5 7.3 53.2
Italians in Germany 23.6 7.9 68.5
Italians in Britain 33.1 10.4 56.6
Italians in Spain 65.0 14.2 20.7
Spanish in France 37.2 11.6 51.2
Spanish in Germany 21.3 7.5 71.1
Spanish in Britain 26.1 13.4 60.5
Spanish in Italy 20.4 6.0 73.6
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL INTEGRATION: TWO

LATENT DIMENSIONS
A factor analysis of the indicators illustrated so far shows that they revolve
around two independent dimensions.1 These can be thought of as the
latent dimensions that we conceptualize in terms of integration. We name
the first cultural integration. It measures the degree of affinity of individu-
als with their cultural environment that is, their acceptance of values and
lifestyles different from those of their country of origin. The other dimen-
sion, which we name social integration, deals with participation, through
meaningful social relations, in the host society. Both dimensions enable
us to profile how migrants live in the society of residence. An important
aspect to bear in mind is that social integration shows only a weak correla-
tion with cultural integration. In other words, both dimensions, although
associated, act independently.
Social integration, as measured by the factor scores of this analysis,

is very low among German and British residents in Spain. Italians and
Spanish in Germany also have difficulties in integrating socially. On the
other hand, a particularly high level of social integration is found among
movers to Italy whatever their nationality. Germans and French show a
fairly good social integration in Britain as well.
Cultural integration encompasses important elements of psychologi-
cal closeness. Unlike social integration, which emerges through objective
indicators of social participation and intercultural competence, cultural
integration has to do with strongly subjective orientations. The weakest
cultural integration, or psychological closeness, is found among Spanish
migrants in any of the countries analysed in this study. Italian migrants
also show low cultural affinity with all host societies except Spain. A
slightly higher level of cultural integration can be found among French
migrants, particularly those who live in Germany and Britain. Southern
Europeans are especially at odds in Northern Europe, whereas German
and British movers are more at ease with the countries they have migrated
to.
Integration takes place on different levels, which are not necessarily par-
allel. The two dimensions we have taken into account help us understand
situations that would at first appear to be contradictory. Thus, we can
find high integration in social terms (good intercultural competences and
networks of friends from the country of destination) coupled with low cul-
tural integration (that is, detachment from the values and culture of that
country). Some groups of migrants are poorly integrated, both culturally
and socially. This is the case for Italians and Spanish in Germany. Their
migration is basically work-related and, in this sense, forced by the search
for better living conditions. In fact, the integration of British and German
residents in Spain and France offers an interesting paradox in that it is
strong culturally but weak socially. The situation of British residents in
France is similar, although not so polarized. In these categories of movers,
we find a positive subjective perception of belonging to the places where
they live, but with a limited participation in their social life. The reverse
situation is the rule in Britain: all groups of movers (except Germans)
show good social integration together with the lowest levels of cultural
integration.
We may ask ourselves how some movers can feel culturally integrated if
they cannot speak the language or do not have friends among the locals.
A first answer is that it is a question of awareness that is, of recogni-
tion of the depth and nuances of a culture. Migrants can achieve basic
competences in the lifestyle of the country of residence, such as dress and
eating codes or greeting formulas. However, they do not acquire cognitive
Spanish in Italy
Spanish in Britain
Spanish in Germany
Spanish in France
Italians in Spain
Italians in Britain
Italians in Germany
Italians in France
British in Spain
British in Italy
British in Germany
British in France
Germans in Spain
Germans in Italy
Germans in Britain
Germans in France
French in Spain
French in Italy
French in Britain
French in Germany
1.5 1 0.5 0 0.5 1
Social integration Cultural integration
Figure 5.1 The social and cultural integration of EU movers: averages of

factor scores
competence in the values and meaning of what happens around them.

That is part of the acculturation process. The result is a superficial coexist-
ence. Figure 5.1 shows the group differences on these two dimensions of
integration. Bars growing in the same direction show coincidence (towards
high or low levels of integration) between social and cultural integration
that is, high participation and competence together with affinity and psy-
chological closeness. Bars growing in opposite directions show situations
in which social and cultural integration do not coexist.
It is worth mentioning the lack of symmetry in cultural integration
(Table 5.7). One might think that the poor adjustment of Italian residents
in Germany would imply reciprocity that is, low integration of German
residents in Italy. However, that is not the case. Thus, for instance, we
find that British migrants in Germany do not on average feel comfortable,
whereas German migrants in Britain do. This might have to do with the
particular national environments that migrants find themselves in; or with
the kinds of migrants who choose to move to particular countries.
Table 5.7 Mean scores for the cultural integration dimension
Cultural Cultural
Integration Integration
Italians in Germany 20.44 Germans in Italy 0.33
Spanish in Germany 20.42 Germans in Spain 20.04
Italians in Britain 20.41 British in Italy 0.16
Spanish in Britain 20.29 British in Spain 0.50
French in Britain 20.26 British in France 0.73
Spanish in Italy 20.25 Italians in Spain 0.25
French in Germany 20.23 Germans in France 0.43
Italians in France 20.20 French in Italy 0.05
Spanish in France 20.16 French in Spain 0.23
British in Germany 20.12 Germans in Britain 0.11
In order to better understand the complex interplay between cultural

and social integration, we need to know not only how migrants feel, but
also how they feel they are perceived by the society around them. Even
in Western European societies, where cultural distance is not dramatic
(that is, there is no strong ethnic prejudice against other fellow Western
Europeans), EU citizens living abroad may still feel discriminated against
(Table 5.8). Such perception of being discriminated against seems to
depend on two key elements: intercultural competence (being able to per-
ceive the nuances of social reality), and social interactions from which the
occasion to perceive oneself as being discriminated against could arise. We
found that those EU movers who claim to have a good knowledge of the
language report to a greater degree that they feel discriminated against,
and vice versa.
In particular, British and German migrants in Spain, who are less profi-
cient in the local languages, might be said to feel more culturally integrated
in Spain because they do not feel discriminated against by the society in
which they live. Researchers who study the migration flows from Northern
Europe towards Spain or other Mediterranean countries stress the fact
that these migrants tend to live in secluded areas. This is the actual situa-
tion of a proportion of the British residents in Spain. It is a free choice, yet
their lifestyle in a foreign country seems not to cause conflicts, especially
because they do not have the perception of being discriminated against by
Spanish society. All this leads to their high cultural integration on these
measures together with their modest level of social interactions with locals.
On the other hand, Spanish migrants with high social integration do feel
Table 5.8 Perception of being discriminated against because of nationality

(row %)
Feels discriminated against

because of nationality
No Yes
French in Germany 65.5 34.5
French in Britain 62.4 37.6
French in Italy 75.0 25.0
French in Spain 76.8 23.2
Germans in France 78.4 21.6
Germans in Britain 69.0 31.0
Germans in Italy 80.4 19.6
Germans in Spain 92.4 7.6
British in France 72.0 28.0
British in Germany 64.6 35.4
British in Italy 59.8 40.2
British in Spain 84.1 15.9
Italians in France 66.9 33.1
Italians in Germany 75.1 24.9
Italians in Britain 72.5 27.5
Italians in Spain 79.2 20.8
Spanish in France 62.7 37.3
Spanish in Germany 62.9 37.1
Spanish in Britain 64.3 35.7
Spanish in Italy 76.8 23.2
discriminated against in Germany, Britain and France, which affects

their cultural adjustment. The subjective perception of discrimination is
a relevant factor in understanding the degree of satisfaction with the life
migrants lead in a foreign country.
Interestingly, there is some correspondence between the perception
of discrimination and societal resistance to immigration from other EU
member states, as measured by Eurobarometer. Data from EB53 of 2000
show that, among the countries included in our survey, those with less
resistance to intra-European mobility are Spain (55 per cent) and Italy
(54 per cent), where public opinion considers that there should be unre-
stricted freedom of mobility. In France, most of the public (51 per cent) is
in favour of mobility with some restrictions, whereas in Germany and the
United Kingdom 6062 per cent of citizens state that they would like to see
restrictions placed on mobility between European Union countries. Hence,
there appears to be some objective basis for the subjective impressions of

European migrants.
PSYCHOLOGICAL ADAPTATION
Taking a lead from the acculturation literature, we shall now examine the
concept of psychological adaptation to assess the quality of life achieved
by migrants in their country of destination on the basis of the integra-
tion strategies they have adopted. An important gauge in assessing the
well-being of foreign residents is how satisfied they feel with their life as
a whole. In this sense, we have chosen a direct approach and taken into
account movers own assessment of their quality of life. Then, we have
looked more thoroughly into their emotional situation through an indirect
approach based on the notion of homesickness.
Satisfaction with Life
On a scale from 0 to 10, satisfaction with life as a whole was measured

among the general public by the European Social Survey of 2004. In Spain
and Britain, the average score was 7; it was 6.9 in Germany and Italy and
only 6.4 in France. Generally speaking, the mean level of satisfaction
reported by EU movers, regardless of the country of residence or origin,
was higher than the level indicated by the public opinion in their country
of origin. The lowest satisfaction, with a mean of 7.3, was reported by
Spanish residents in Germany. The highest level was reported by British in
France (8.3) and Spain (8), and by Germans in France (8.2).
Satisfaction with life has a direct and very important relationship with
cultural integration (Table 5.9). It seems reasonable to assume that higher
psychological closeness results in higher levels of satisfaction with life in
that social environment. Indeed, the satisfaction of movers who report
lower-than-average levels of cultural integration in the destination country
is even lower than the satisfaction of stayers in their country of origin. On
the other end of the cultural integration scale, migrants who report higher
cultural integration or affinity with the host society reach very high means
of satisfaction with their life: between 8 and 9 points, which is practically a
ceiling effect considering that this is a mean.
While satisfaction with life among movers is clearly associated with
cultural integration, it has hardly any relationship with social integration.
Table 5.10 shows the mean satisfaction of migrants according to their level
of social integration that is, the density and nationality of their network
of friends, and the linguistic ability to get to know and communicate with
Table 5.9 Mean satisfaction with life and levels of cultural integration of
EU movers (010 scale)
Total Cultural Integration

Low Medium- Medium- High
Low High
French in Italy 7.65 4.4 7.1 8.3 9.2
French in Spain 7.70 4.2 7.0 8.3 8.6
Germans in Italy 7.96 4.2 7.1 8.3 9.3
Germans in Spain 7.62 5.5 7.0 8.5 9.6
British in Italy 7.52 4.4 6.9 8.2 9.1
British in Spain 8.02 4.2 7.2 8.1 8.9
Spanish in Italy 7.60 4.9 7.4 8.5 9.5
their social environment. No clear-cut pattern can be detected. In fact, a

higher satisfaction with life is associated with lower social integration only
among German and British residents in Spain.
Overall, satisfaction with life is a subjective feature that is strongly
associated with cultural integration (0.77**), and poorly correlated (and
negatively) with social integration (0.07**).2 Such a negative asso-
ciation, where the increase of intercultural competence and high social
presence is associated with lower satisfaction with life, is particularly
noticeable in certain groups of migrants: Germans in Italy (0.27**),
French in Italy (0.14*), French in Germany (0.27**) and British in
Spain (0.14*).
Both dimensions are clearly differentiated, as we can see below. Living
in another country is a very special situation that enables migrants to
compare their experiences and their knowledge of the country of origin
Table 5.10 Mean satisfaction with life and the social integration of EU
movers (010 scale)
Total Social Integration

Low Medium- Medium- High
Low High
French in Italy 7.65 7.9 7.9 7.7 7.3
French in Spain 7.70 7.7 7.8 7.7 7.3
Germans in Italy 7.96 8.4 8.2 7.9 7.2
Germans in Spain 7.62 7.5 7.6 8.3 7.7
British in Italy 7.52 7.8 7.8 7.6 7.1
British in Spain 8.02 8.0 8.3 7.5 6.3
Spanish in Italy 7.60 7.3 7.4 7.9 7.2
with their experiences and knowledge of the country of destination. In our

survey, we asked respondents to compare the quality of different dimen-
sions of life in the countries of origin and destination: education, bureauc-
racy, health care services and public safety. Two scales have been built
from the number of times a service or institution is believed to be better in
the country of origin and the number of times it is said to be better in the
society of the country of residence. Cultural integration shows a positive
correlation with a preference for the services and institutions of the country
of residence (0.04**). The correlation is negative in the case of preference
for services and institutions in the country of origin (0.09**). Thus, cul-
tural integration is associated with a higher preference for services in the
destination country. However, when it comes to social integration, the
trend is quite the opposite. As the level of social integration increases, the
preference for services and institutions in the country of residence lowers
(20.04**), and the preference for those in the country of origin rises
(0.12**). This trend emerges in all groups of migrants consistently.
Homesickness and Integration
To conclude, we examine another indicator of psychological adaptation:

homesickness. Any novel or folk song on migrants revolves around this
feeling nostalgia is the psychological outcome of migration par excellence.
Here we shall consider homesickness as a multidimensional phenomenon.
Our analysis of open answers to the question: What do you miss the most
from your country of origin? shows that there are three main dimensions
of homesickness. Firstly, there is the yearning for primary groups: family,
friends and food. The last seems to be a common element in the social act
of meeting with family or friends. Secondly, there is the yearning for the
civic culture of the migrants country of origin, that is, the social norms (for
instance, how things work, how people respect you), the way the civil
service deals with citizens, and so forth. Finally, there is culture as such, the
yearning for lifestyles (traditions, customs, folklore, celebrations). Each
of these three dimensions is more or less important according to different
groups of migrants and their social or cultural integration.
EU movers that report feeling more yearning for their primary groups
are Spanish residents in any country of destination, Italian residents in
Germany and Spain, and British and French residents in Spain. When it
comes to the longing for lifestyles and traditions, Spanish migrants in any
country again show the most yearning for their home, followed by Italian
migrants in Germany, France and Britain. In contrast, the lifestyle and
way of life in Mediterranean countries are valued positively by German
and English movers to the south of the continent, which is in fact one of
the main reasons for migrating.
A contrast of the means representing the yearning for home civic culture
reported by EU movers shows two main aspects. First of all, Italy has the
least valued or longed-for civic culture, according to French, British and
Germans living in Italy, as well as Italian residents in other countries. The
second aspect is the non-transitive nature of the ordered sequence of civic
cultures. The British are nostalgic for their civic culture when they live in
Germany, Germans when they live in France, and the French when they
live in Britain. In this sense, it is not possible to order the desirability of
different civic cultures using the comparison established by residents from
other countries. However, neither Italian nor Spanish nationals long for
their civic culture when they reside in other countries.
Different forms of homesickness are also clearly related to cultural and
social integration. The higher the social integration is, the lower is the
yearning for the primary groups of the country of origin. However, the
higher the social integration, the higher the yearning for the civic culture
of origin. This means that having more social contact and knowledge
of how everyday life works in the country of destination makes movers
critical of that country. In fact, the higher cultural integration is, the
lower the yearning for the primary groups and the lifestyles of the home
country. Cultural integration thus testifies to a neat psychological detach-
ment from migrants roots. Overall, higher levels of integration mean less
homesickness, with the exception of the aspects of civic culture we have
just discussed.
Degrees and forms of homesickness vary also on the basis of individual
differences. Thus, the longing for primary groups is slightly higher among
movers who expect to return soon to their country of origin (0.06**) and
among women (0.08**). The period of time spent in the country of desti-
nation also shows an effect. The migrants who have lived there the longest
are less affected by this type of homesickness (0.07**). With regard to
civic culture, homesickness is higher among the oldest migrants (0.03*),
men (0.04*), and those who are less satisfied with their life in the country
of residence (0.05**). The longer migrants have lived abroad, the more
they yearn for their civic culture (0.05**). The yearning for lifestyles affects
more those who expect to return soon (0.08**), especially the younger
they are (0.07**). Therefore, the length of time migrants spend abroad
reduces their homesickness regarding family and friends but increases
their yearning for social aspects like civic culture or lifestyles.
CONCLUSIONS
Living in a different society is the only experience shared by all the popu-
lations studied in this book, who differ in many other ways. In spite of
their individual diversity, EU movers (like all migrants) have the same,
everyday concern: that is, how to adapt to a new social and cultural envi-
ronment. In other words, they may have followed completely different
paths taking them to live abroad, but all of them must adjust to a changed
milieu. Their past, present, and especially their future, play an important
role in the ways they choose to organize their existence.
In many regards, EU movers differ quite notably from more familiar
types of immigrants. Taking account of the existing literature on accul-
turation and integration, we sought to make sense of their distinctively
patterned strategies of adjustment by devising two indexes on the basis of
a series of attitudinal and behavioural items. These two indexes refer to
what we call social and cultural integration. Basically, the first index relies
on the nationality of friends and the linguistic competence of respondents;

the second on their preference for the country of origin or destination and
their wish to return to the home country (or not).
Overall, EU movers personal networks comprise a larger number of
non-nationals than nationals. Their command of the language of the
country of destination is fairly good almost three out of four movers
know the language quite well or almost as natives. Still, this was not
the case at migration, when 40 per cent of movers did not speak a single
word of the host-country language. Even though their linguistic skills
were overall higher than those of the general population in the country
of origin, knowledge of the COR language is far from being a necessary
condition to move within Europe. This, in turn, does not jeopardize their
overall sense of well-being.
EU movers cultural integration as captured by our indicators is
more nuanced. Movers appear to be happier than stayers, and this happi-
ness with their life is even higher when it goes hand in hand with the con-
viction of preferring the place where they actually reside over their home
country. But, to be more precise, the bulk of respondents skipped the
simple and perhaps simplistic alternative between the home and the host
country as ideal places, preferring to indicate both as plausible and par-
tially agreeable locations where they would spend their lives. Equally, EU
movers express homesickness in a quite elaborate form, making sense of
different pros and cons of their mobility choice. At the end of the day, all
this works to single out EU movers as a discerning transnational popula-
tion (see also Chapter 8 on their transnational media consumption), trying
to capitalize on European citizenship to get the best of both worlds as
much as this is possible.
NOTES
1. Confirmatory factor analysis, with orthogonal and non-orthogonal rotations, has been
used. The extraction of two significant, differentiated dimensions has been the result
of this analysis. As a second method of analysis, we have used non-metric scaling. The
results also show two dimensions, differentiated and significant, and group together the
indicators considered to be theoretically representative of each dimension.
2. [**] Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (bilateral). [*] Correlation is significant at
the 0.05 level (bilateral).
6. More mobile, more European?
Free movement and EU identity
Nina Rother and Tina M. Nebe
FREE MOVEMENT AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY:

WHICH RELATIONSHIP?
European citizens who live in an EU country other than their native one
come in closer contact with many of the EUs policies than those who stay
at home. These EU movers, as we have called them, can benefit from their
French health insurance in Germany, shop with the Euro in a wide range
of countries and pay reduced home-student tuition fees at British universi-
ties. Movers can experience European integration first-hand, be it at the
dinner table with friends in the country of residence, at the workplace,
or in everyday interaction in a supermarket or at a bus stop. Experiences
related to European Union policies or contact and exchange with other
EU citizens if experienced as positive may affect pro-European atti-
tudes and identities.1 Movers, in short, might differ from stayers regarding
their level of Europeanness.
But is this necessarily true? Couldnt positive experiences and contacts
in Italy simply make a German Italophile rather than pro-European?
Much has been written about the absence of Europe in the lives of ordi-
nary EU citizens (Shore and Black 1994; Meinhof 2004). Maybe moving
from Germany to Italy simply makes movers feel at home in two societies,
without them developing a new tier of identification with a supranational
entity. Maybe movers shop with the Euro and use the health insurance
of their country of origin while resident elsewhere, yet stay unattached to
the European Union that claims to have made these things possible. On
the other hand, developing a European identity might be a convenient
way around the tensions and clashes possibly associated with holding two
distinct territorial or national identities.
In this chapter, we will adopt a social-psychological approach to answer
three interrelated questions. First, do movers position themselves differ-
ently towards the European Union than stayers? Do they know more
about the EU? Do they have a more positive image of the EU? Do they
120
More mobile, more European? 121
feel more European and less Spanish, Italian or British? Are they more
attached to the European Union than those who have stayed in their
country of origin (COO)? Second, what kinds of territorial identities do
movers hold? Do most movers identify with their country of residence
(COR) and with the European Union on top of their COO identity?
How many movers assimilate entirely and lose their COO identity? Do
movers tend to become bi-cultural, holding COO and COR identities, but
feeling no attachment to the European Union? Does a bi-cultural COO
and COR identity constitute the best base for Europeanness? And third,
which factors are conducive to the development of European identities in
movers? What is the impact of education, professional status, language
knowledge or contact with COR nationals on the European identities of
free movers? Before we provide empirical answers to these questions, we
will consider their theoretical underpinnings.
Despite enduring criticisms of the European Unions supposed demo-
cratic deficit and the lack of identification with the EU among European
citizens (Scharpf 1999; Siedentop 2001), ambitious research on the
emergence of European identity has continued to appear (Gabel 1998;
Duchesne and Frognier 2002; Diez Medrano 2003; Herrmann et al. 2004;
Hooghe and Marks 2004; Bruter 2005; Gillespie and Laffan 2006; Checkel
and Katzenstein 2009). Other scholars are sceptical of the very concept
of European identity, pointing to the often absurd proliferation of ways
of talking about identity or operationalizing the concept in research
(Brubaker and Cooper 2000; Favell 2005). Yet, whether or not European
identity has an empirical base or is merely a matter of Bruxellois propa-
ganda is an empirical question. It is the question this chapter seeks to
answer for the population of European internal movers. We ask if these
movers have a stronger attachment to the EU compared to stayers as a
relative question, independent of absolute levels of European attachment.
By defining precisely what it is we are studying, by being explicit about our
methodological assumptions and simplifications, and by staying clear of
any kind of partisanship, we hope to avoid the European identity trap.
The usage we shall make of the term identity for the purpose of this
chapter will only contain a small and well-defined fraction of its poten-
tially manifold meanings. We take identity to refer to the contextual and
dynamic part of the individuals self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with
the value and emotional significance attached to that membership (Tajfel
1981, 255). In other words, we are not interested in the essence of indi-
viduals, but rather in changing perceptions of group membership that are
induced by changes in the social context in which the actor moves. Identity
then is a dynamic process, not a profound and hidden part of the self, a
definition and redefinition of the boundaries between us and them in

particular situations. It follows that identity is multiple (it differs accord-
ing to context), relational (only because we are not they, we know who
we are) and social (it refers to the group membership of individuals). The
actors self-defined identity is in constant interaction with the group mem-
bership attributed to the actor by others (internal versus external identi-
fication: Jenkins 2000). Via the act of identification, the group is defined
and thus invented or reinvented (Brubaker 2004).
European identity then is linked to the awareness of ones feeling of
belonging to an imagined category of Europeans.2 Note that European
identity does not designate that feeling of belonging or attachment itself
but rather the awareness of it. While attachment is affective, carried out by
what G.H. Mead (1934) calls the I (the active part of the Self), identity
is reflexive and linked to Meads Me. For example, I can be attached to
the fate of the pygmies in Papua New Guinea without identifying with
them. A more complex case would be to identify as an Alsatian but not
be particularly attached to Alsace. We can say that, all in all, attachment
is somewhat easier to achieve than identity. De facto, attachment and
identity often overlap even if they are analytically distinct. In most cases,
the psychological process of ingroup favouritism (Turner 1978) makes us
evaluate the ingroup higher than any outgroup and produces some form
of affect towards it (or value and emotional significance according to
Tajfel). For the purpose of this chapter, it is important to remember that
identity is more reflexive and hence potentially less widespread than affect,
but affect is the best proxy available to measure the complex concept of
identity.
Much has been written about the different ways in which European
identities and national identities can co-exist (Duchesne and Frognier
1995; Marks 1999; Kohli 2000; Citrin and Sides 2004; Risse 2004). The
most common argument is that territorial identities are potentially addi-
tive: one can be aware of belonging to Wales, the United Kingdom and
the European Union without experiencing any conflict between these
identities. Herrmann and Brewer (2004, 8) propose three configurations
summing up how multiple identities work:
1. Nested Identities: The Matruska doll or onion model conceives of

identities as co-existing one inside the other. That is, I can simultane-
ously be Basque, Spanish, European and a global citizen. According
to this configuration, all European citizens could hold a European
identity on top of their existing territorial identities. This model is
praised as something akin to the subsidiarity principle on the level of
identities; it is particularly widespread in the neofunctional literature.
2. Cross-Cutting Identities: Here, the idea is that some, but not all
members of one identity group (say French citizens) also feel they
belong to another identity group (say Jewish people). In turn, some
members of the latter group (Jewish people) identify with professional
categories (such as doctors) rather than with Frenchness. If European
identity functions according to this principle, some but not all people
in Europe might subscribe to a European identity; Europeanness could
then overlap with being Protestant, Catholic or Muslim, male, female,
gay, lesbian or straight and so on. Political scientists hold that cross-
cutting identities are a precondition for democracy (Lijphart 1999);
nested identities in contrast do not allow for political opposition to
develop.
3. Separate Identities: This final configuration is a special case as the level
of analysis is the individual not the group. Although an individual can
hold two or more identities without problem, there is no group that
shares both of these exact two identities. Imagine an Italian teacher in
France whose friends are all either teachers or Italian but not both.
In this example, there is no cross-cutting group of Italian teachers.
If Europeanness took this form, it would not overlap with national
identities.
All in all, the debate about multiple territorial identities leaves little room
for potential conflict between two or more identities. Research has con-
sistently shown that identities concerning different levels of territorial
attachment do not clash with one another; European, national, regional
and local identities are not experienced as being in competition. However,
little is known about possible inconsistencies between two or more territo-
rial identities that operate on the same level (for example, Tuscan versus
Sicilian identity, German versus British identity). When it comes to the ter-
ritorial identities of internal migrants in the European Union, it is precisely
this problem that arises: how do migrants go about feeling both German
and British? Can two identities on the same territorial level co-exist?
A further point is that perceptions of reference and membership group
affiliation are altered when the social context changes. If a revolution occurs
in my country, I have to redefine who I am with and position myself and
my group vis--vis the new set-up. Likewise, if I move from one context to
another, I have to adjust to a changed environment and find my place and
my ingroup within it. This process of adaptation and redefinition is known
as psychological acculturation (Graves 1967). It can be understood as a
kind of resocialisation as it generally entails not only identity changes but
also modifications in attitudes and values as well as the acquisition of new
social skills and norms (Berry 1992 and 1997). Adapting Berrys (1997, 10)
Table 6.1 Four ideal types of migrant identities
Are the cultural characteristics and identities of

the country of origin maintained?
Yes No
Are the cultural Yes Hybridization: Assimilation:
characteristics and Bi-cultural identities COR identity only
identities of the country
No Segregation: Marginalization:
of residence taken on?
COO identity only Loss of identity
famous model of interethnic integration to the question of migrant identi-

ties, four ideal-typical scenarios arise (see also the use of this typology by
Alaminos and Santacreu in Chapter 5). As ideal-types, they momentarily
fix otherwise fluid and changing identities for the sake of clarity. In every-
day life, a migrant can hold both a COO and a COR identity in the work-
place but experience strong COO identification when watching a football
match. Likewise, a progression over time is probable: we can expect COO
identification to decrease over time in most cases but gain momentum in
certain crucial periods (for example, homesickness in the first months, on
Christmas day, in hard times and so on). To simplify matters analytically,
let us consider the ideal-types shown in Table 6.1.
As this table shows, migration within the EU can lead to four dis-
tinct responses regarding the migrants territorial identity. Far from
mirroring the consensual additive models found with EU, national
and regional identification, conflict is an option when it comes to two
national identities. Here, we have to distinguish between identities that
are experienced:
1. in terms of conflict, as a zero-sum game, that is, the more French

I become, the less Italian I am or the more Italian I stay, the less
French I can become (top right and bottom left);
2. as additive and non-conflicting, that is, leading to bi-cultural French
and Italian identities (top left cell);
3. as losing a sense of belonging through the migratory experience
(bottom right cell).
Let us look at the likelihood of conflicting and non-conflicting identities

in turn. The foundations of national identities have always been forged
in opposition to the Other (often the neighbours) throughout European
history. It is likely that such oppositional thinking still exists among some
Europeans despite the existence of the EU. Now imagine it were part of my
Spanish identity not to be French. I eat different food, I speak a different
language, my culture is distinct and all my friends are Spanish. By moving
to France, a conflict is built up between my Spanish identity and my every-
day life where I have to interact with French society, at least to some degree
(speak French, eat French food and so on). Thus, segregation and assimi-
lation of identities occur when the group membership proposed by the
country of residence is in dissonance with the values, attitudes and identities
the actor has been socialized into in his/her country of origin. According to
Festingers Cognitive Dissonance Theory, individuals suffer from unpleas-
ant psychological tension (dissonance) when two pieces of knowledge
or cognitions are experienced as discrepant (Festinger 1954): How can
I be Spanish (hence not French) yet behave as if I were French? People
prefer cognitions that fit together and dislike dissonant cognitions. Indeed,
psychological dissonance has drive-like properties that are much like those
of hunger and thirst: the actor wants to get rid of it. One way of overcom-
ing dissonance is to change cognitions: a migrant might simply deny his/
her COR values, identities and attitudes and harden his/her position on
the COO cognitions. In this case, the migrant would feel Spanish only and
reject everything French leading to a segregation of identities. The same
scenario is possible with COO values, identities and attitudes being rejected
and only COR cognitions being kept an assimilation of identities.
On the other hand, it is also possible that the mover does not experi-
ence conflict between the COO and COR identities. In that case, the actor
acculturates to the country of residence while keeping the links to the
country of origin a hybridization. The migrant thus develops a new, bi-
cultural, mixed identity (for example, SpanishFrench). Both Spanishness
and Frenchness are now part of the individuals self-concept, s/he is aware
of his/her identification with French and Spanish people alike and attaches
emotional significance to both memberships. The question then becomes:
under which conditions are movers likely not to experience cognitive dis-
sonance between the COR and the COO identities? Here, two aspects
are relevant. On the one hand, the availability of and access to COR
identity; on the other, categorical markers having to do with the migrant
herself. First, according to Festinger, dissonance increases as the degree
of discrepancy among cognitions increases and as the number of discrep-
ant cognitions increases. In other words, if COR and COO identities are
experienced as rather different (say, Spanish versus British as opposed to
Spanish versus Italian), dissonance is higher and hybrid bi-cultural identi-
ties are less likely to occur. Furthermore, sociodemographic markers that
can be expected to facilitate the hybridization of COO and COR identities
are: knowledge of the COR language; sustained, non-hierarchical contact
with COR citizens (for example, partners and friends, also colleagues and
neighbours); level of education (linked to the ability to see overarching
similarities); and the year of migration (COO identification is likely to
decrease over time) (Recchi and Nebe 2003, 1617). In sum, we suspect
that conflict is likely to occur where (perceived) differences between the
COR and the COO countries are great, and where the migrant has arrived
only recently, lacks contact with the country of residence and its citizens,
is poorly educated and lacks COR language skills.
These two configurations regarding the interplay between national
identities the conflict and the hybridisation models open up two very
distinct possibilities for the creation of a European third layer of identi-
fication. Another possibility is one in which the experience of two cultures
leads to a loss of identity with both a marginalization of the individual
from both societies. This completes the typology of possible psychological
outcomes.
Of special interest to us, though, is the possibility of an emergent
Europeanness. If heightened levels of European identity in movers are
indeed connected with the experience of moving from one European
country to another, such Europeanness must be connected with the
development (or transformation) of the COR identity. The (potential for
a) COR identity is thus what distinguishes stayers from movers. We will
argue that there are two potential paths that lead to the development of
a heightened European identity in movers. According to the cognitive
dissonance model, the COR identity is in conflict with the COO identity,
and one of the two or both must be transformed to develop a European
identity. In contrast, the interculturation model holds where bi-cultural
COO1COR identities have been accepted. Here, Europeanness can
emerge as a tertiary identity that encompasses both national identifica-
tions. Let us look at the models in some more depth.
The cognitive dissonance model proposes to resolve or reduce the
incompatibility between a migrants COO and COR identities by adding
a new cognition (Festinger 1954). In other words, when the clash between
feeling Spanish and feeling French becomes unbearable, a new cogni-
tion, feeling European, can alter the relative weight of what it means to
be Spanish versus. French. This process is different from the segregation/
assimilation model (see above) where one of the two or more dissonant
cognitions were simply denied. Where dissonant identities are however
transformed, several distinct outcomes are possible:
1. European identity 1 COO or COR identity: When a European identity

is added to the COR and COO identities and is given a higher relative
weight than either of them, the degree of dissonance experienced by
the individual may be reduced. This is so because European identity

does not clash with national identities as it is inclusive by definition
and constructed on a different level of abstraction. If the European
identity is more important than the COR identity, the individual will
experience a feeling of belonging to the COO and to Europe. If the
European identity is more important than the COO identity, the indi-
vidual will chose the COR and European identities.
2. European identity only: It is theoretically possible that European
identity is used to reduce the valence of both the COO and the COR
identities. The two discrepant cognitions are weakened until cognitive
dissonance is no longer experienced. The newly-formed European
identity can then be said to have replaced both national identities.
According to the interculturation model, tertiary multi-cultural identities

are developed on the basis of existing positive relationships with both
national cultures when the individual does not have to choose between
them (LaFromboise et al. 1993, 131). The concept of interculturation has
been developed in order to understand the ethnogenesis of new cultural
identities that cannot be explained with bi-directional models (such as
the one proposed by Berry 1997). Examples for such tri-directional or tri-
partite identities are Chicano or Asian American identities in the USA
that are based on bi-cultural Mexican/Asian and US-American identities,
supplemented by an overarching umbrella identity that encompasses
both national identities. In other words, people who already hold hybrid,
bi-cultural identities will find it easier to open up to further tiers of identifi-
cation. Identification here is a cumulative enterprise, a matter of learning:
the individual feels part of several universes and finds it easy to add on
others because (perceived) conflict is absent.
We are then left with two questions that ultimately require empirical
answers but can be raised here. First, in which cases do bi-cultural, non-
conflicting identities take on the extra European tier and in which cases
do they simply stay bi-cultural? Second, which national identity (COR
or COO) is likely to prevail in the case of conflict? Which identity is more
likely to be rejected or replaced by an EU identity when cognitive disso-
nance arises? Scenarios that might lead to interculturation and the develop-
ment of a European identity could be: (a) a migration history that involves
several European countries or; (b) having a partner from an EU country
other than ones own and living in a third EU country. While a bi-cultural
BritishItalian identity is probably still manageable, a quatri-cultural
BritishItalianSpanishCzech identity might be more demanding. Here,
an EU mover might simply prefer to refer to herself as European.
Regarding the relative strength of COO versus COR identities, we
suspect that the COR effect will be overall weaker than the COO effect.
This means that: (a) where an identity clash occurs between two national
identities, the COR identity is more likely to disappear than the COO
identity; and that (b) in terms of attitudes towards the EU, movers
attitudes will be similar to stayers attitudes in the country of origin, not
those in the country of residence; that is, Italians in Germany will be
more similar to Italians in Italy than to Germans in Germany. In other
words, primary socialization can be expected to have a stronger impact
on identities than psychological acculturation as a consequence of the
migration experience. Where one comes from will be more pertinent than
newly experienced identities, even if these are explicitly chosen by intra-
EU migrants. However, once again, the characteristics of the country of
residence and its migration regime will have an impact here. Concretely,
the strength of the COR effect will depend on: (a) the Europe-orientation
of the country of residence (that is, moving to a pro-European country
makes one more highly Europeanized, moving to a country with higher
levels of Euroscepticism decreases feelings of belonging to the group of
Europeans); and (b) the assimilation pressure of the receiving society (that
is, where assimilation is fostered, COR effects are stronger, where segrega-
tion is tolerated, COR effects are weaker).
Bringing together all the models reviewed in this section, we are therefore
left with eight options of identity development for the internal EU migrant
(Table 6.2). Essentially, these are equivalent to Berrys categories with an
additional layer added to them, that is, whether or not the migrant has
also developed a European identity. The -ing form is employed to signal
our dynamic and relational reading of identity as identification. Our
hypothesis is that most intra-EU migrants will be found in the first three
categories (integrating European, assimilating European, self-segregating
Table 6.2 Eight identity outcomes of internal migration in the European

Union
COO 1 COR COO not COO attached COO 1 COR

attached attached 1 1 COR not not attached
COR attached attached
EU attached Integrating Assimilating Self-segregating Self-
European European European marginalising
European
Not EU Integrating Assimilating Self-segregating Self-
attached non-European non-European non-European marginalising
non-European
COO-identity COR-identity COO-identity COR-identity
Assimilating
Self-segregating non-European Integrating Integrating
European European Non-European
Self-segregating Assimilating
Non-European European
Self-marginalising Self-marginalising
European non-European
Figure 6.1 Models of European identification depending on conflict or

compatibility between COO and COR identities
European). The integrating European is the person with bi-cultural iden-

tities who develops an interculturated European identity in the absence
of any tension between COO and COR identification. The assimilating
European is the migrant who experiences cognitive dissonance between the
COO and the COR identity and resolves it by adding a new non-conflicting
cognition (European identity) to swallow the COO identity. The opposite
scenario (the COR identity is absorbed by the newly-developed European
identity) is the case for self-segregating Europeans (Figure 6.1).
DIFFERENCES IN EUROPEANNESS AND

TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES BETWEEN MOVERS
AND STAYERS
We will now try to answer the first of our three questions: whether
movers position themselves differently towards the European Union and
their countries of origin and residence than stayers do. We will therefore
compare stayers and movers attitudes towards the EU and their territo-
rial attachments. While we will use the EIMSS to obtain measures for
movers, for stayers here we refer to Eurobarometer results.3
Attitudes Towards the EU
The first important variable measuring attitudes towards the EU is the

image the EU has in the eyes of respondents.4 Figure 6.2 shows how many
movers and stayers indicated that they associate the EU with something
positive, allowing for different levels of comparison. First, we note that
movers have a far more positive image of the EU than stayers. Movers more
often hold very positive images of the EU, regardless of their country of
40
Movers - COR
35 Movers - COO
Stayers (EB)
30
Average movers
25
20
15
10
Average stayers
5
0
Germany Italy Spain France Britain
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left bar refers to movers living in Germany,
the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right bar to Germans living in Germany
(stayers).
Source: EB 61.0 and EIMSS, N 5 10 901
Figure 6.2 EU-image: very positive by COO and COR (%)
origin and their country of residence. This pattern holds for each and every
country as well as for the category positive image (not shown here).
Second, out of all groups of stayers, Spanish and Italians have the most
positive image of the EU while Germans have the least positive image. By
their country of origin (COO), French and Spanish movers think most
highly of the EU. British movers least often associate the EU with some-
thing positive. Looking at movers by country of residence (COR), it is
movers to Spain that have the most positive image of the EU.
These very impressive differences between stayers and movers also apply
to self-perceived knowledge of the EU: movers overall and in every country
say they know more about the EU than the respective group of stayers.5
Either because they are a self-selected group (that is, more informed people
are more likely to move) or, more plausibly, because moving and the
greater exposure to the EU and its policies make them more knowledge-
able, movers are more aware of the role of the EU and its institutions.
Territorial Identities and Attachments
When it comes to territorial identities and the feeling of national and/or

European identity, a slightly different pattern emerges.6 Again, the percent-
age of movers feeling European only is higher than that of stayers. This
is true in each country: while about 5 per cent of all stayers feel European
40
Movers - COR
35 Movers - COO
Stayers (EB)
30
Average movers
25
20
15
10
Average stayers
5
0
(stayers).
Figure 6.3 National versus European identity: European only by COO

and COR (%)
only, almost 30 per cent of all movers do (Figure 6.3). The gap between
stayers and movers is especially large among French and Germans: about
25 percentage points. Breaking down our figures by country of residence,
the differences are not as large as between countries of origin. Movers going
to Germany and Britain feel least often European only (about one in four)
in contrast to almost 40 per cent of movers going to Spain.
Apart from looking at the percentages of respondents feeling European
only, it is also worth having a look at the percentages of respondents
feeling that they are a home country national (HCN) only (Figure 6.4).
The percentage of movers feeling HCN only is smaller in all countries than
that of stayers. This is again especially true for British and German stayers
and movers. Whereas 62.1 per cent of British stayers say that they feel
British only, this is only true for 18.7 per cent of British movers. The ques-
tion is whether the moving experience makes British feel more European
or whether those British who feel European are more likely to leave their
country. Unfortunately, only panel data would permit us to adjudicate
between these two possibilities.
By COO, 20.2 per cent of Italian movers feel Italian only, but only
9.9 per cent of German movers. Hence, it might be assumed that feeling
German is a less stable feeling than feeling Italian and can easily be influ-
enced by the moving experience. In fact, by COR, it turns out that movers
65
60 Movers - COR
55 Movers - COO
50 Stayers (EB)
45
40
Average stayers
35
30
25
20
15
Average movers
10
5
0
(stayers).
Source: EB 61.0 and EIMSS, N5 7 859
Figure 6.4 National versus European identity: Home country national

only by COO and COR (%)
going to France are the least likely to show high nationalist feelings (8.7
per cent); this is a more common experience for intra-EU migrants living
in Germany (22.2 per cent).
The next battery of questions asks for the respondents attachment to
their COO and COR and to the EU.7 These questions have the big advan-
tage of not asking for a ranking of single attachments but for a separate
rating of each item. They will therefore be central for all the following
types of analyses. When comparing EU attachment between stayers and
movers, we again find very clearly the heightened Europeanness of all
groups of movers (Figure 6.5). Only 10.3 per cent of all stayers taken
together feel very attached to the EU whereas 24.5 per cent of all movers
taken together feel so. Out of all groups of stayers, British citizens say least
often that they feel very attached to the EU (5.0 per cent); Italian (14.4
per cent) and French stayers (13.0 per cent) on the other hand say it most
often. These differences still prevail when the category fairly attached is
considered apart from very attached.
Movers from Britain, which has traditionally posted high levels of
Euroscepticism in surveys, show the least attachment to the EU (only
17.5 per cent feel very attached), while the other four groups of movers
show about the same level of attachment to the EU. In terms of COR,
however, no big deviations across countries can be found, which makes
us assume that the effect of the country of origin is somewhat stronger on
30 Movers - COR
Movers - COO
Stayers (EB)
25
Average movers
20
15
Average stayers
10
0
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left-wing bar refers to movers living in
Germany, the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right-wing bar to Germans
living in Germany (stayers).
Figure 6.5 Feelings of attachment to EU: very attached by COO and

COR (%)
Europeanness than that of the country of residence a hypothesis that will

later be tested in more detail.
Apart from EU attachment, having a look at COO and COR attach-
ment is also worthwhile. As movers have not lived in their country of
origin for at least one year, one might assume that stayers who still live
in their country of origin feel more attached to this country than movers.
In general, however, it turns out that the experience of moving does not
decrease the level of movers attachment to their countries of origin.
Out of all groups of stayers, Italians and French are those who feel most
attached to their country of origin 57.9 per cent and 54.1 per cent are
very attached to their COO in contrast to only 39.5 per cent of Spanish
stayers (Figure 6.6). But Italian and French movers are very attached to
their countries of origin, too.
British movers feel least attached to Britain (29.4 per cent), followed by
German movers (32.7 per cent). These rather low values are understanda-
ble when the migration motives of British and Germans primarily quality
of life (for example, weather and food) are taken into account. Figure
6.6 further shows that 60.2 per cent of Spanish movers feel very attached
to Spain but only 39.5 per cent of Spanish stayers do. The hypothesis that
leaving Spain makes Spanish feel even more attached to Spain fits very
65 Movers - COR
60 Movers - COO
55 Stayers (EB)
50 Average stayers
45
Average movers
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
(stayers).
Figure 6.6 Feelings of attachment to COO: very attached by COO and

COR (%)
well into the stereotype of the proud Spanish, but it is also very possible
that Spanish stayers (in contrast to Spanish movers) prefer to indicate a
strong regional attachment instead of a national attachment.
When looking at COR differences, it is evident that movers going
to Germany continue to feel very attached to their country of origin.
Germans in Spain feel more attached to Germany than German stayers,
which might be due to strong German communities on the Spanish coasts,
where most of the German retired movers settle.
Apart from attachment to their country of origin, movers were also
asked to rate their attachment to their country of residence. However,
comparisons between stayers and movers are not easy because the stayers
country of origin and residence have always been the same. Figure 6.7
shows that, as expected, stayers feel more attached to their country of resi-
dence than do movers to their target country with the exception of movers
to Spain. A high percentage of British movers in general feel very attached
to their COR, whereas only few Italian movers feel so. Breaking figures
down by country of residence, it is movers to Spain who feel most attached
to Spain (41.6 per cent), whereas only 23.0 per cent of movers going to
Britain feel very attached to this country. Movers living in Germany also
indicate low feelings of attachment to Germany.
Clearly, movers have by far more positive attitudes towards the EU and a
higher attachment to the EU than stayers. We also saw that the experience of
60
Movers - COR
Movers - COO
50 Stayers (EB) Average stayers
40
Average movers
30
20
10
0
Notes: The graph must be read as follows: the left-wing bar refers to movers living in
Germany, the central bar to Germans living abroad, and the right-wing bar to Germans
living in Germany (stayers).
Figure 6.7 Feelings of attachment to COR: very attached by COO and

COR (%)
moving influences attachments to COO and COR two important moderat-

ing variables which themselves influence EU attachment. The question now
is whether such a heightened Europeanness can be found among all movers
or whether different types of movers exist with regard to their territorial
attachments and attitudes towards the EU. For all of these probably exist-
ing mover groups, it would then be interesting to find out which variables
influence territorial attachments and EU attitudes. In other words, which
variables affect whether a mover feels attached to COO, COR and the EU?
Is it more (or only) context effects like the socialization effect of the country
of origin or the influence of attitudes in the new country of residence? Or is
it more (or only) individual variables like gender, age, year of migration,
marital status or daily contacts? This is what we will now analyse, changing
our focus from the comparison of stayers and movers to movers only.
A TYPOLOGY OF TERRITORIAL IDENTITIES OF

MOBILE EUROPEANS
As elaborated above and summarized in Table 6.2, our theoretical con-

siderations led to identifying eight possible different identity outcomes
Table 6.3 Eight identity outcomes of internal migration in the European

Union (%)
COO 1 COR attached COO attached COO 1 Total

COR 1 COO not 1 COR not COR not
attached attached attached attached
EU attached 49.7 [G1] 9.8 [G3] 6.9 [G5] 2.5 [G7] 68.9
Not EU attached 17.7 [G2] 5.4 [G4] 5.4 [G6] 2.6 [G8] 31.1
Total 67.5 15.1 12.3 5.1 100.0
for internal movers. From an empirical point of view, however, some

of these possible configurations might not actually occur in movers. We
will now try to answer our second question: the kinds of territorial iden-
tities that movers hold. To address this question, we will again use the
EIMSS dataset and analyse movers ratings of their attachment to their
COO, COR and the EU, using attachment as a proxy for identity. As
the question battery for COO, COR and EU attachment offers only four
alternative answers and no middle category, a split into attached and
not attached movers can be realized quite easily by assigning very and
fairly attached movers to the attached category and not very and not
at all attached movers to the non-attached category. Table 6.3 shows the
resulting empirical distribution of this typology.
It turns out that about two-thirds of our movers feel attached to both
COO and COR and thus have developed (at least) bi-cultural identities
without feeling conflicts emerging from this multiple identity (G11G2).
However, about 27 per cent of movers (15.1 per cent and 12.3 per cent
respectively) did feel an identity conflict and dissonance when faced with
two different national identities. How did they resolve this conflict? While
one group (G31G4) assimilates to the COR identity and drops their COO
attachment, another group (G51G6) rejects the COR identity and sticks
to COO attachment only. Interestingly, even if the difference between
the two groups is small, more people adapt their identity to their entou-
rage rather than thinking in terms of their roots. This finding clearly
contradicts our hypothesis that COO effects would be larger than COR
effects. Only 5.1 per cent of movers feel attached to neither COO nor COR
(G71G8). Marginalization thus seems to apply to only a small minority.
Table 6.3 also speaks to the interculturation hypothesis cited above:
the development of EU attachment is more common when movers do
not have to chose between COO and COR attachments but feel at ease
with both of them. Almost half of our movers belong to the group of
integrating Europeans (G1) and feel attached to COO, COR and the EU.
Europeanness for them thus serves as an overarching umbrella identity
that encompasses both national identities. It is therefore very likely that
the heightened Europeanness of movers in comparison to stayers is indeed
due to the confrontation with a second (perhaps third or fourth . . .)
national identity. We will develop this in the next section. The second most
common identity type is integrating non-Europeans (G2): 17.7 per cent
of movers prefer to feel attached to both COO and COR, but not to the
EU. The question posed in the theory section comes into play here: why
do some bi-cultural movers develop a sense of Europeanness while others
do not?
In our sample, the 5.4 per cent who were assimilating non-Europeans
(G4) and the 5.4 per cent self-segregating non-Europeans (G6) resolved
their feeling of identity conflict and cognitive dissonance by reducing the
valence of either the COO or the COR identity and only felt attached
to either the COR or the COO. Another 9.8 per cent were assimilating
Europeans (G3) and 6.9 per cent self-segregating Europeans (G5); they
reduced their feeling of dissonance by adding a new cognition, namely EU
attachment. As types 3 and 5 movers with EU attachment are more
frequent than types 4 and 6 movers without EU attachment it seems to
be easier for movers to reduce dissonance by adding new cognitions than
by reducing the weight of existing ones. But this point is for experimental
psychologists to develop further. Overall, in any case, it is most likely
for internal movers in the European Union to develop a non-conflicting
bi-directional identity with EU attachment as an additional umbrella
identity.
ACCOUNTING FOR DIFFERENT TERRITORIAL

IDENTITIES AMONG MOVERS
It remains to determine which factors are conducive to the development

of EU attachment in movers. In other words, which contextual and indi-
vidual factors make it more likely that a mover will develop one out of the
eight theoretically possible identity outcomes? Do our hypotheses hold in
different social contexts: that is, do variables like the COOs Europeanness
and individual variables like education or language knowledge influence
movers territorial identities?
In order to single out important predictors for affiliation to one of the
eight types, we conducted a multinomial regression analysis with self-
segregating non-Europeans (type 6) as the baseline against which all
other types will be contrasted. Using this type of analysis, we will be able
to conclude which independent variables differentiate best between each

type and type 6. Concerning the list of independent variables, three classes
can be distinguished. The first class consists of contextual variables the
country of origin and the country of residence. For both variables, Spain
serves as a baseline. As typical socio demographic variables, we included
age at migration date, length of stay, gender with female being the base-
line, education level with all degrees less than a university degree as base-
line, and marital status with no partner as baseline.8 The third class of
variables consists of individual variables related to the movers character or
behaviour: the movers migration motive (that is, work, study, family and
love reasons, quality of life, or others), past migration experience (whether
the respondent has lived in the COR or a third country prior to the last
move), daily contacts (whether she has friends from the COO, the COR
or third countries), and language knowledge (good or bad, upon arrival in
the COR and at the time of interview).
Table 6.4 shows the B-coefficients and their significance as well as the
pseudo-R-square for the multinomial regression model. Although the
pseudo-R-square remains relatively low and suggests that other variables
such as the movers personality may also play a role in predicting territo-
rial identities, several important predictors can be singled out. Table 6.4
thus shows what makes movers most likely to belong to one of the eight
types and not to another. This needs to be done by contrasting the dif-
ferent types with a baseline, that is, we learn how type 1 to type 8 movers
differ from type 6 movers, which constitute the baseline. As we can see,
this baseline category consists mainly of recently arrived labour migrants
who feel attached to their COO but not to the COR and to the EU. They
can therefore be seen as the most traditional type of immigrants, less likely
to experience the distinctive effects of being a free-moving European.
Each of the eight types of movers will be now described in detail. We
correspondingly offer eight labels to identify these types, which might be
compared and contrasted to the four basic clusters identified earlier in the
book (see Chapter 2).
Type 1 (Integrating Europeans) the Euromasters
Integrating Europeans (49.7 per cent of our sample) are not only the
most frequent but also the most ideal from a pro-European integration
perspective kind of internal migrants in the European Union: they feel
attached to their country of origin, to their country of residence and to the
European Union without experiencing any conflict between these identi-
ties whatsoever. They are model Europeans who seem to live the slogan
unity in diversity. Understanding what distinguishes type 1 movers from
Table 6.4 Characterization of identity types 1 (integrating Europeans) to 8 (self-marginalising non-Europeans) in
contrast to type 6 (self-segregating non-Europeans): multinomial regression analysis (B coefficients)
Type 1 vs. Type 2 vs. Type 3 vs. Type 4 vs. Type 5 vs. Type 7 vs. Type 8 vs.
type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6
Age at migration 0.009 20.002 0.001 20.012 20.002 20.007 20.003
Years of stay 0.035*** 0.034*** 0.026* 0.033** 0.001 20.006 0.010
Gender (0 5 female) 0.011 20.161 0.002 20.364 0.142 0.770** 0.430
University diploma 0.511** 0.155 0.378* 20.051 0.579** 0.454 0.173
Partner from COO 0.194 0.030 20.033 0.032 20.034 20.093 20.319
(0 5 no partner)
Partner from COR 0.438* 0.238 20.014 0.181 0.182 0.346 20.302
(0 5 no partner)
Partner from 3rd country 0.326 0.295 0.515 0.639 0.256 0.900* 0.457
139
(0 5 no partner)
Migration motivation
Work 20.142 20.069 20.461 20.126 20.113 0.470 0.119
Study 20.045 20.176 20.232 0.079 20.219 20.057 0.581
Personal reasons 20.403 20.276 20.700* 20.493 20.161 0.335 0.467
Quality of life 0.264 0.468 0.649* 0.765* 0.218 0.849 1.036*
Miscellaneous
Lived in 3rd country before 20.123 20.412* 0.110 20.335 0.259 0.044 20.164
Lived in COR before 20.011 0.031 20.014 0.009 20.154 20.358 0.169
Several friends from COO 0.256 0.154 20.184 20.002 0.296 20.053 0.059
Several friends from CO R 0.704*** 0.542*** 1.203*** 1.213*** 20.236 0.874** 0.556*
Several friends from other countries 0.140 20.042 0.143 20.182 0.183 0.425 0.143
Language knowledge at migration date 0.515* 0.358 0.140 0.298 0.401 0.415 0.171
Language knowledge now 0.575* 0.513* 0.667** 0.104 0.520* 0.562 0.567
Type 1 vs. Type 2 vs. Type 3 vs. Type 4 vs. Type 5 vs. Type 7 vs. Type 8 vs.
type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6 type 6
Country of Origin
France 20.036 0.306 0.608* 0.799* 0.019 1.184** 0.882*
Britain 0.015 1.079*** 1.733*** 2.040*** 20.256 1.667*** 1.206**
Italy 20.099 0.479* 20.043 0.534 0.128 0.546 0.284
Spain
Country of Residence
France 20.120 20.390 20.105 20.495 0.787 0.079 20.085
140
Britain 20.866** 20.733* 20.901** 20.599 1.208 20.351 20.129
Italy 20.270 20.027 20.418 20.425 0.756 0.107 20.096
Spain
Constant 0.549 20.310 21.415 21.129 21.414 23.768 22.707
22 Log Likelihood 12 918.877
Pseudo R- square (Cox and Snell) 0.201
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: type 6.

* Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%

other kinds of internal EU migrants is central to our analyses. Why do

some movers construct identities according to this politically desirable
scheme COO1COR1EU? And why do others not develop the EU tier or
reject one of the national identities?
Several variables help to explain the emergence of this tripartite attach-
ment: out of the sociodemographic variables, the length of stay in the
COR, the education level and having a partner from the COR have a
highly significant impact and make type 1 differ from type 6 movers.
We can assume that the longer the mover has already lived in the COR,
the more s/he feels attached to it especially when the partner is a COR
national. Holding a university degree may increase a persons ability to see
what unites the countries of Europe and what the abstract EU construct is
all about and therefore foster the development of an umbrella identity.
Feeling attached to COO, COR and Europe in comparison to the
baseline category is furthermore strengthened when the mover has several
friends from the COR and when s/he had and has a good command of the
CORs language. Having COR friends and being able to communicate
right from the start seem to be key for taking on the COR identity. The
COO attachment however is not reduced by this strong link to the COR
society; these movers still have several friends from the COO (although the
coefficient of the analysis does not reach a significant level).
On the contextual level, we clearly see an impact of the country of
origin as well as of the country of residence. In comparison to our baseline
category type 6, type 1 movers are more likely to be from Germany than
from Spain. Moving to Britain and Germany (in comparison to moving
to Spain) on the other hand has a negative effect on the EU attachment
of movers a clear COR effect as both countries are typically seen as
Eurosceptic.
Apart from territorial attachments, it would also be interesting to know
what attitudes towards the EU are held by type 1 movers, as well as if they
can be regarded as successful movers in terms of a high life satisfaction.
Integrating Europeans have the second highest knowledge of the EU as
well as the second most positive image of the EU of all of the eight types
of movers. Regarding their life satisfaction, however, type 1 movers come
only third although the mean differences here are relatively small and the
general level of life satisfaction is quite high.
The following quote, taken from qualitative interviews conducted with
internal movers, illustrates how Euromasters feel about their national and
European identifications. It is from a French mover in Germany.
Interviewer: Do you sometimes think about where you belong to, I mean,
what your national identity is?
Jean: Yes, often. [quickly and spontaneously]

Interviewer: And do you think you are more French or . . .
Jean: Im more French. But sometimes I think, uh, could I live at all
without any involvement of Germany? I mean, um . . . When I
was in France for that short period, I missed Germany a lot, I
mean, I missed it. I tried, uh, to find a job, in which I was able
to talk German, in which I have contact with Germany. And I
think I would miss that most definitely.
Interviewer: And do you feel a little bit German? [Pause] Or . . . [Jean
interrupts]
Jean: Some parts . . . That is some parts of Germany I simply like.
Interviewer: And do you also feel as a European, sometimes?
Jean: Yes, Hmhm. So, I, I could, if I was offered a great job, in Italy,
I would go at once.
INTEGRATING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) have lived in COR for a longer time

(b) are highly educated
(c) have COR and COO friends
(d) have a COR partner
(e) spoke and speak the COR language
(f) typically left Germany and moved to Spain
(g) are not movers to Germany and Britain
(h) know a lot about the EU and have a very positive image of the EU
the Euromasters
Type 2 (Integrating Non-Europeans) the Bi-cultural Movers
The second type of movers are the integrating non-Europeans (17.7 per
cent of all movers) who feel attached to their COO and their COR but
not to the EU. Regarding their sociodemographic profile, integrating
non-Europeans differ from type 6 movers only in terms of their length of
stay in the COR. Movers are more likely to belong to type 2 than to type
6, the longer they have already lived in the host country. When it comes
to the character and behaviour of type 2 movers, we see that the variable
lived in a third country before has a strong negative impact. Thus movers
who have never lived in a third country before are more likely to develop
attachments to two countries only. Type 2 movers also tend to be more
integrated into the COR in terms of having friends from that country.
When it comes to the impact of contextual factors on the affiliation to type
2 versus type 6, it turns out that integrating non-Europeans are mainly

British, German and Italian movers. Hence, an early socialization effect
of the two more Eurosceptical COOs (Britain and Germany) is again
salient. Again, as with type 1 movers, type 2 movers are likely not to settle
in Britain and are more likely to settle in Spain.
As may have been expected, the integrating Non-Europeans attitudes
towards the EU are less positive than those of integrating Europeans.
Note also that the life satisfaction of type 2 movers which differ from
type 1 movers only by the fact that the latter do not feel attached to the
EU is somewhat smaller.
Charles: Ill never be a perfect German or a . . . Perfect meaning hundred
percent German. Ill never speak Bavarian [smiles], like my col-
leagues here are speaking [smiles]. And, ah, you always keep your
accent and your way of thinking. On the other hand, ahm, you
notice, youre not as French as your friends who stayed home. But
. . . You notice it and it . . ., it either it bothers you or it doesnt.
And after that I would say, for me, the question is: Am I happy
or not? And if you say Im happy, because I have a job, I have, a
home . . . I have everything I need. Then it doesnt bother you.
Interviewer: So would you say that you are first, European and then French
and then German? Or if you . . . would put those three words in
an order, what would you say? Or are they all on the same level?
Is this possible, do you know that?
Charles: Ah . . . [pause]. So . . . Somehow you . . . I do have the impres-
sion is a mix between French and German. Or you would say
that what you have to start, you know, think, ah, European.
European no. I mean Ive never lived in Spain or lived in Italy
or somewhere else. I mean thats what really, ah, Euro(!)-pean
meaning than everywhere. In fact I could only really compare
those two countries.
NON-INTEGRATING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) have lived in their COR for a longer time

(b) have not lived in a third country
(c) have COR and COO friends
(d) speak the COR language
(e) typically come from Germany, Britain and Italy
(f) are not movers to Britain
(g) have the least positive image of the EU
the Bi-Cultural Movers
Type 3 (Assimilating Europeans) the Lifestyle Movers
Almost 10 per cent of all internal movers feel attached to the COR and the
EU but not to their COO anymore. Basically, they have taken on the COR
identity and transformed their clashing COO identity into a European
one, according to the dissonance model. These movers are also different
from type 6 movers regarding their length of stay and their education level.
Type 3 movers are more likely to have lived longer in the new country and
to have a university diploma.
Regarding their migration motives, friendships and language knowl-
edge, assimilating Europeans are also different from type 6 movers.
Type 3 movers mainly moved to the COR to improve their quality of life,
which results in the combination of a high COR attachment and low COO
attachment as movers might want to forget the unpleasant COO and feel
happy where they live. They probably also feel attached to the EU as the
EU made this winwin migration possible. Thus assimilating Europeans
reduce their identity conflict by giving up their COO attachment and
adding a new attachment to the EU. Type 3 movers seem to comprise
both retirement migrants as well as young, adventure-seeking pioneers.
Regarding their friendships, a clear picture arises: the COO attachment
stays low as assimilating Europeans tend to have only a few friends from
the country they left. But then again the fact that they have several friends
from the COR explains the high COR attachment. Rather unsurprisingly,
type 3 movers have a quite good command of the COR language now in
comparison to type 6. Again this good language knowledge might thus be
a reason for a strong COR attachment.
When looking at the contextual variables explaining the affiliation to
type 3, we see a strong effect of the country of origin: it is either Germans
or British abroad in contrast to Spanish who tend to assimilate to the
COR, but also feel European.
Assimilating Europeans have very positive attitudes towards the EU,
their self-perceived EU knowledge comes in second place and their EU
image in third place. But apart from having positive attitudes towards the
EU, type 3 movers are also most satisfied with their life as a whole. Hence,
having gone through the identity conflict by resolving it with a reduction
of COO attachment and adding EU attachment seems to make movers
most satisfied with their present life.
Interviewer: Does it happen to you to think of yourself as Italian?
Guillermo: Of course! I am . . . Ive been here for almost nine years. I dont
know whether I will ever take the Italian citizenship because
I am not interested in it . . . I dont believe in nationalities, I
think they are an add-on, a matter of chance. Whether you are
French, Spanish, Italian or English doesnt depend on you.

I would like to have, one day, a European identity card or a
European passport. Thats what I would like!
Interviewer: What do you think you share with other Spanish?
Guillermo: The lived experiences, childhood, the cultural background . . .
Up to a certain point, obviously. For other things, I dont think
it depends on nationality to be able to share something with
another person; indeed, the only thing I share is the imprint
of the first years, the childhood, weve had similar trajectories,
thats the only thing.
Interviewer: What in contrast do you think you share with Italians?
Guillermo: With Italians . . . Everyday life, from politics to economic life. I
even get angry when certain things happen in Italy, I am puffed
up . . . It makes me slightly bitter to not be able to participate
in political elections, because for better or worse, I am involved
in Italian politics in the sense that whatever the Italian state
decides will concern me . . . Hence, everyday life: public trans-
port that doesnt work, garbage that maybe doesnt get picked
up every day . . .
Interviewer: What do you think you have in common with other
Europeans?
Guillermo: This culture that belongs to all of us. The European institutions
. . . Ive always been a Europe-fan, thats why I always identify
a lot with the institutions. The fact of having a fixed reference
point in Brussels that protects you from injustice . . . The fact
of having for better or worse the same problems in everyday
life, the same money . . . And then this cultural process that
influenced everyone, from Greece via Rome to the European
Enlightenment of the 18th century.
ASSIMILATING EUROPEANS. . .
(a) are highly educated

(b) tend to be older at migration date
(c) have many COR friends
(d) speak the COR language
(e) moved for quality of life reasons
(r) typically come from France, Germany and Britain
(t) typically moved to Spain
(h) are most satisfied with their lives
the Lifestyle Movers
Type 4 (Assimilating Non-Europeans) the Carefree Movers
Assimilating non-Europeans constitute our fourth type of internal

movers and comprise only 5.4 per cent of all movers. This type can be
characterized by a high COR attachment and low COO and EU attach-
ments. Thus movers of this type have dealt with their feeling of cognitive
dissonance by assimilating more or less completely to the new country
without adding a new supranational identity. The sociodemographic
profile of type 4 movers again shows that, in contrast to type 6 movers,
they have stayed longer in the COR, which explains their attachment to
it. Although not significant, we can see a tendency for type 4 movers to
be younger and less educated than type 6 movers. It seems that leaving
ones COO relatively early also means that a COO attachment has not
yet been fixed and can easily be given up, especially when the mover is
perhaps not familiar with other means of dealing with cognitive disso-
nance due to the lack of a higher education. To give in to external pres-
sure and assimilate into the new context is also the easiest way to deal
with identity conflict.
It also turns out that assimilating non-Europeans left their COO mainly
for a higher quality of life, which again explains a high COR attachment.
The same mechanism should be true for the high number or COR friends
that type 4 movers have.
As for the typical COOs and CORs of type 4 movers, we find a clear
COO effect for the British: movers from the other side of the Channel are
likely not only to belong to type 3 but also to type 4, so whether a British
person develops an EU attachment or not depends on other factors. But
movers from Germany and France are also more likely to belong to type 4
than the Spanish. Movers to Germany, on the other hand, are less likely to
develop a strong attachment to Germany than movers to Spain.
ASSIMILATING NON-EUROPEANS . . .
(a) have lived in COR for a longer time

(b) tend to be younger and less educated
(c) have many COR friends
(d) moved for quality of life reasons
(e) typically come from France, Germany and Britain
(f) are not movers to Germany
(g) are very satisfied with their lives
the Carefree Movers
Assimilating non-Europeans hold less positive attitudes to the EU.

Their life satisfaction, however, is almost as high as that of assimilating
Europeans. Being able to reduce ones attachment to the COO thus seems
to be a crucial factor for a satisfied life without regrets and homesickness
and external pressures in the new country.
Type 5 (Self-Segregrating Europeans) the Homesick Movers
The fifth type of internal movers was labelled Self-segregating Europeans

and is formed of 6.9 per cent of our movers. Type 5 consists of movers
with a high COO and EU attachment but a low COR attachment. The
multinomial regression analysis shows that type 5 movers have a high
level of education as do all other types of migrant identities that include
a European dimension. However, type 5 movers do not differ from the
baseline, the type 6 movers, regarding their migration motivation or indi-
vidual variables, the only exception being their current command of the
COR language. Although (statistically) not significant, it seems that many
self-segregating Europeans have lived in a third country before an event
that probably leads to higher EU attachment as the pool of collected
European experiences is larger. However, having lived in another EU
member state does not foster COR attachment as the new country might
be regarded as being just another one on the list (which will perhaps even
be expanded later on in their life course).
Unsurprisingly, self-segregrating Europeans have very positive attitudes
towards the EU, both for EU knowledge and EU image. Hence, they
do not differ much from the other European-oriented types of movers.
Regarding their life satisfaction, clearer differences from the first four
types can be found: movers not attached to the country they live in feel less
satisfied with their life as a whole.
Alberto: Um, I think, I am, I am a European. I feel extremely . . . I have

this European identity. Um, I feel I am a European. An Italian
European. Thats all. European but with a link to Italy.
Interviewer: How do these things fit together?
Alberto: Um, Its like a, Matrioska, its like Chinese boxes. You have the
world, you have Europe, you have Italy, you have Lombardi,
you have Como, you have Montrasio. You know, its . . . I . . .
identity can live together. Its not, ahm, I dont see. I think,
nationalism is over. Its not over, but it should be over.
Interviewer: Yes.
Alberto: You can be Italian and European. Why not?
SELF-SEGREGATING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are highly educated

(b) speak the COR language
(c) have COO friends
(d) moved for miscellaneous reasons
(e) are not movers to Spain
(f) hold positive attitudes towards the EU
(g) are least satisfied with their lives
the Homesick Movers
Type 6 (Self-Segregating Non-Europeans) the Recent Labour Migrants
The sixth type Self-segregating non-Europeans, 5.4 per cent of all

movers feel highly attached to their COO, but not attached to the COR
or the EU. This group cannot be described in a statistically detailed
way as it served as the baseline category for the multinomial regression
analysis. However, when comparing the results for the other five types,
it can be assumed that type 6 movers are very likely to have lived in the
new country for only a short time. It is possible therefore that these
movers simply have not yet had enough time to develop a strong COR
attachment maybe because they still feel homesick and are concerned
by that. As for the migration motives, it seems that type 6 movers mainly
came for work or personal reasons rather than for lifestyle reasons.
Their command of the COR language is quite poor, explaining why their
attachment to the COO still prevails. Lastly, type 6 movers have more
friends from the COO than any other types of movers, again explaining
the low COR attachment.
It also turns out that self-segregating non-Europeans, like all other non-
European types, have a less positive image of the EU and also show the
least knowledge of the EU. Similar to self-segregating Europeans, their life
satisfaction is in relation to the other types rather low. Feeling attached
to the COR and (also but with a smaller impact) to the EU can thus be
seen as a relevant component of a high life satisfaction.
Guido: I feel as an Italian in any case. Ive been, ah, in Italy for 27 years.
Ive . . . I was born there, I grew up. There are also some things that
simply belong to my culture. Ahm, but, ah, I have to say, if I say
now where I belong to, I say I belong to here, to my, yes, ah, since I
. . ., ah, live here in Germany. Not something that I left in Italy.
Interviewer: Do you sometimes also feel as a European? Or rather less?

Guido: Yes . . . Actually . . . Yes, less I would have said. Yes. Also
because I have the feeling that you get a bit less of something,
that is somehow a European, ah, feeling, here in Germany. For
example I was quite often in Belgium, ahm, in Brussels, where
a friend of mine lives. There you get a much better impression
of what it means to be European. And therefore . . . Here in
Germany it is a bit less, yes.
SELF-SEGREGATING NON-EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are less educated

(b) did and do not speak the COR language
(c) have COO friends
(d) moved for work and personal reasons
(e) are not movers to Spain
(f) know least about the EU
(g) are less satisfied with their lives
the Recent Labour Migrants
Type 7 (Self-Marginalising Europeans) the Cosmopolitans
The seventh type of movers consists of individuals who identify neither

with their COO nor with the COR, but only with the EU. These movers
thus choose a rather strict way to deal with the identification problems
resulting from two opposed national identities they deny both of them.
This type was therefore labelled self-marginalising Europeans and is
the smallest group in our sample as it consists of only 2.5 per cent of all
movers. The sociodemographic profile shows that in contrast to all other
types discussed before, self-marginalising Europeans are mainly male and
have a partner from a third country, which arguably may have weakened
the importance of national identities. Interestingly, for this group of pro-
Europe movers, education does not play a significant role, which is in
contrast to all the other pro-Europe types.
We can also see that no special migration motive is dominant for this
group in comparison to the baseline of type 6. The distribution of friends,
however, is special for this group as they tend to have no friends from the
COO but many from the COR and although not significant from third
countries as well. Thus it seems that, for this type of movers, personal
connections to other countries are quite important. In sum, they look like
transnational migrants. In this sense, self-marginalising movers are not

marginalised at all. Rather, these cosmopolitans most closely resemble
the denationalised Eurostars described by Favell (2008a) in his study of
free moving professionals in European metropolies.
Regarding the national background of type 7 movers, we face a clear
NorthSouth difference: cosmopolitans come mainly from the three north-
ern countries but do not necessarily move southwards; they can be found
in all of the other countries, underlining that the quality of life in terms of
better weather is less important for this group than for types 3 and 4. In line
with the picture established by sociodemographic and contextual variables,
analyses show that type 7 movers hold the most positive attitudes towards
the EU and have the highest knowledge of the EU. We can assume that the
concentration on one single identity the European one makes movers of
this type feel so positive about the EU. When it comes to life satisfaction,
however, they can be found somewhere in the middle of all types.
Interviewer: And . . . What are your . . . your thoughts about that? Do you . . .
do you think of yourself more of German or more of English or
more of . . .?
Arthur: I think of myself as rather displaced.
Interviewer: Aha. Do you think of yourself as European?
Arthur: Yes.
Interviewer: More. . . more than you think of yourself as either German or
English?
Arthur: Yes.
Type 8 (Self-Marginalising Non-Europeans) the Individualists
SELF-MARGINALISING EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are male

(b) have COR and third country friends
(c) have a partner from a third country
(d) typically include movers from France, Germany and Britain
(e) exclude movers from Spain
(f) can be found in all countries
(g) have the most positive image of the EU
(h) know most about the EU
the Cosmopolitans
The self-marginalising non-Europeans constitute the last type of movers.

Type 8 movers can be seen as the opposite of type 1 movers as they feel
neither attached to their COO nor their COR, nor do they feel attached to
the EU. Thus the rule here is to resolve cognitive dissonance by withdraw-
ing from all kinds of national or supranational identification. However,
this strategy is not a very common one as this type of movers is only 2.6
per cent of the sample. The analysis of the sociodemographic profile shows
that self-marginalising non-Europeans do not differ significantly from the
baseline, the type 6 movers. The only exception is a non-significant preva-
lence of men. Regarding their migration motivation, however, a clear dif-
ference arises as type 8 movers leave almost exclusively for quality of life
reasons. Like type 7 movers, type 8 movers are also well integrated into
the new country as they have a lot of friends from the COR. What is more,
the same distribution of origins arises: the bulk of self-marginalizers come
from the three northern countries included in our analyses. However, they
tend to settle in Spain rather than in any of the other four countries.
Out of all non-European movers, type 8 movers are those with the most
positive image of the EU and also the highest knowledge of the EU. There
is perhaps a rationalised, instrumental understanding of the benefits of the
EU, rather than an identity-based one. Taking all of these rather scarce
findings together, it can be concluded that no clear pattern can be found
in this group but that individual motivations or lifestyles prevail. These
individual choices tend to cancel themselves out so that no clear profile
of this group can be constructed. Thus, individuality is the common
characteristic of this group.
SELF-MARGINALISING NON-EUROPEANS . . .
(a) are more likely to be male

(b) have COR friends
(c) moved for quality of life reasons
(d) include movers from France, Germany and Britain
(e) include movers to Spain
(f) hold relatively positive attitudes towards the EU
the Individualists
CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, we posed the question of what happens to internal

EU migrants and their group identification when they move from one
country to another. In order to study the possible mixing or conflict

between two or more identities due to a change in context (that is,
moving away from ones country of origin to a country of residence),
two relational identity models were constructed. Model one assumes
that cognitive dissonance is likely to occur wherever two national identi-
ties have to be brought into unison, especially if these two identities are
dissimilar and if the actor is not positively disposed towards changes of
residence (for example, little COR language skills, few COR friends).
The second model argues that bi-cultural identities will emerge where
assimilation pressures are not too high (loss of COO identity) and not
too low (segregation), and where the migrant interacts with the country
of residence. Both identity models (conflict versus consonance) present
different paths to the development of European identities. Where con-
flict is the starting point, Europeanness may become a surrogate identity,
something that helps transform one or both of the inconvenient national
identities. Where bi-cultural identities are taken up, Europeanness is
developed as a new, overarching tier of belonging that encompasses the
well-entrenched two national identities.
More concretely, this chapter answered three questions. First, do
internal migrants in the EU hold more pro-European attitudes and identi-
ties than stayers? Second, how do movers juggle and combine the three
potential attachments that are available to them: that is, attachment to
the country of origin (COR), to the country of residence (COR) and to the
European Union? And third, which factors explain the different identity
configurations of EU movers?
Our findings strongly confirm the hypothesis that EU movers are more
highly Europeanized than stayers. Movers know more about the EU, have
a more positive image of it, often have European identities and feel more
attached to the EU than stayers do. Indeed, almost half of our sample of
free movers fall into the category of those holding tripartite identities, that
is, strong COO identities, strong COR identities, and strong European
identities. They are the group of perfect Europeans who do not experi-
ence conflict between COO and COR identities and who find it easy to
develop an interculturated European identity layer on the basis of their
bi-culturalism. For these movers, identities are additive and consonant.
Migrants who fall into this group of highly Europeanized citizens tend
to hold a university diploma, speak the COR language, engage in politi-
cal discussions and, most importantly, have several friends from both the
country of origin and the country of residence.
The other half of our sample divides up into three blocks that are
roughly equal in numbers: (a) those who are attached to both the COO
and the COR but not to the EU; (b) those who hold European identities
but only one national identity (COO or COR); and (c) those who hold
one identity only (be it COR, COO or EU) or no identity at all. All of
these three groups are likely to have experienced some kind of identity
conflict (cognitive dissonance) and to have chosen between unharmoni-
ous identities. Although sharing the experience of a conflict, these groups
differ in many ways: age at migration, length of stay, gender and migration
motives; most significantly, discrimination and integration experiences as
well as language knowledge play important roles in predicting movers
ways of dealing with identity conflict. Finally, in terms of the individual
factors that account for heightened Europeanness among EU movers, we
note the following:
COR versus COO effects. The primary socialization one has received
usually has a larger effect on movers identities and national or European
attachment than the psychological acculturation undergone in the country
of residence. However, it is precisely this COR acculturation that makes
free movers special (that is, different from stayers), and that accounts for
the development of a European identity in about 60 per cent of them.
British effect. Migrants from Britain are a special kind of European
movers. On the one hand, they are unlikely to develop a tripartite identity
with a strong European element. Feeling British and feeling European
seem to exclude one another. On the other hand, they are most likely to
assimilate to the country of residence either with or without nurturing a
feeling of Europeanness.
Education. The fact that those intra-EU migrants who identify with
the EU are also the most educated ones leaves one wondering about the
nature of Europeanness. Is European identity a civic and elitist rather
than affective and accessible concept that addresses the minds rather than
the hearts of Europeans?
The role of contact in the form of friends or partners. The best indica-
tor for the development of a COR identity in addition to the COO one
(and with it, increasing ones chances for developing an interculturated
European identity) is contact with COR citizens. As we know from
Allports contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), not just any contact (say with
shopkeepers or bosses) will do. Rather, only personal and non-hierarchical
relationships that take place at regular intervals are conducive to decreas-
ing identity conflict and enhancing affect for the COR. Having friends
or a partner from the COR country is thus the deluxe road to bi-cultural
identities.
Our results have several implications for EU policies which aim at an
amplification of the identification with Europe of EU citizens. We showed
that those Western Europeans who live in a European Union country
other than their native one identify more strongly with the EU, know
more about it and feel more attached to it. This implies that in order to
strengthen identification with Europe and the EU, policies promoting free
movement (Erasmus/Socrates, transferability of welfare benefits, recogni-
tion of diplomas and so on) should indeed be reinforced and promoted
further. Identification with the EU can be considered at least partly a spill-
over effect of such policies. Furthermore, our analysis showed that there
are different ways of developing a feeling of belonging to the European
Union. Therefore, the Commissions message regarding the possible
co-existence of regional, national and supranational forms of belonging
should be strengthened. Research, on the other hand, should focus more
on the different ways and predictors of co-existing identities than on the
question of whether identities are exclusive or not. Concerning possible
predictors of the development of a European identity we also found that
less-educated internal European migrants showed lower levels of attach-
ment to the EU than highly skilled movers. The European Commission
should therefore consider promoting a European identity that is based on
affect (a feeling of solidarity, shared cultural heritage and so on) rather
than on civic elements only (institutions, flag, European passport and
so on), that presuppose a certain level of knowledge. A more affective,
culture-based European identity might be more easily accessible to all tiers
of European society.
NOTES
1. We are arguing here that behaviour influences attitudes and identities. When we are
unsure of attitudes, we infer them from behaviours (Bem 1972), not least as a function of
legitimation of past activities (Jost and Major 2001). Note however that other research
has brought evidence that causality runs from attitude to behaviour rather than vice
versa (Ajzen 1991). Along these lines, one could maintain that those EU citizens who are
most positively disposed towards the European Union are also those who move to live
and work in European countries other than their native ones.
2. According to the context in question, Europeans can of course be variously defined
as European Union citizens, Western Europeans, or those living within geographical
Europe (Wallace 1990). The kind of attachment measured in the EIMSS is attachment to
the European Union.
3. EB 61.0 from 2004 or EB 58.1 from 2002 when items were not included in EB 61.0.
4. Question text: In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive
(1), fairly positive (2), neutral (3), fairly negative (4) or very negative (5) image?
5. Question text: Using this scale, how much do you feel you know about the European
Union, its policies, its institutions? (Scale 010).
6. Question text: In the near future, do you see yourself as . . .? 1. ([COO] Nationality)
only; 2. ([COO] Nationality) and European; 3. European and ([COO] Nationality); 4.
European only.
7. Question texts: How attached do you feel to the European Union? Very attached (1),
fairly attached (2), not very attached (3), not at all attached (4). How attached do you
feel to [COO]? Very attached (1), fairly attached (2), not very attached (3), not at all
attached (4). How attached do you feel to [COR]? Very attached (1), fairly attached (2),
not very attached (3), not at all attached (4).
8. Although important, we decided not to include the respondents social class in our
analyses for statistical reasons as this variable showed a high multicollinearity with edu-
cational level.
7. EU movers and politics: towards a
fully-fledged European citizenship?
Anne Muxel
INTRODUCTION
As an economic, social and cultural entity, the European Union has made
much progress in recent decades, becoming a visible and objective reality
in both the representations and practices of the inhabitants of its member
countries. Nevertheless, Europe as a political space is not so well advanced.
The political construction of the EU has not only encountered formal and
institutional obstacles such as the referenda rejections of European
constitutional reform in France, the Netherlands and Ireland but also
problems of recognition by its own citizens. In the space of 20 years up to
2004, while the powers and prerogatives of the European Union have not
ceased to expand, the abstention rate in European elections has gone up by
17.3 points on average in all countries and, in many of them, comprise half
the electorate. This paradox clearly reveals how difficult it is to implement
the idea of European citizenship and mobilize the genuine consciousness
of a European political space.
Research devoted to European citizenship which reports on national
public opinion concerning Europe shows a fairly sizeable imbalance
between, on the one hand, the relative acceptance of the Union and the
largely positive image it enjoys; and on the other, the weakness of effective
practices in this new field of civic expression and intervention (Cautrs and
Reyni 2001; Duchesne and Frognier 2002). The European Union has suf-
fered a democratic deficit from the beginning of its history (Lindberg and
Scheingold 1970; Siedentop 2001; Dloye 2005). Time has not reduced this
situation. On the contrary: Europeanized national elites continue to drive
European integration with little input from mass publics (Haller 2008).
For some years now, scholars have been developing two major types
of hypothesis to interpret the apparent disaffection of European citizens
towards the EU. The first suggests a kind of cognitive deficiency. European
institutions are misunderstood, and this hampers any possibility of giving
concrete expression to the immediate and familiar exercise of citizenship
156
EU movers and politics 157
through political action. Thus, political Europe remains an abstract,

remote entity that enables citizens neither to engage collectively nor raise
their level of consciousness. The second type of hypothesis emphasizes the
persistence of national identities and idiosyncrasies. The citizens realm
of political involvement is first and foremost national and the identified
interests or aims of contention even if they have a supranational dimen-
sion of preoccupation pass first through the filter of the nation and the
political power struggle that prevails there. This strong nationalization
that generally weighs heavily on all European ballots, and shapes all
political discourse about Europe, clearly results from the difficulty of con-
structing and establishing stakes that are specific to the European political
context alone (Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Perrineau 2005; Schmidt 2006).
European elections are above all used as second-order elections and mid-
term national contests, which first and foremost reflect domestic political
concerns (Reif and Schmitt 1980; Van der Eijk and Franklin 1996; Marsh
1998; Schmitt 2005).
More recently, some political scientists have shown a more consist-
ently distinctive EU voting, more related to European than national
politics (Carruba 2001; Tillman 2004). Nevertheless, the preoccupation
with the democratic deficit remains. Some commentators have argued
that the EU is as democratic as it could or should be and that there is no
real problem of democratic legitimacy (Majone 1998; Moravcsik 2002).
Multi-level governance, pluralism in the policy process, growing non-state
interest representation and the sophisticated system of comitology within
EU institutions, can all be underlined to suggest how there are other ways
than electoral participation to gain power and influence at the European
level, as at the national ones, and also to gain more acceptance among the
European citizens themselves (Schmidt 2006). But there remains a legiti-
macy problem. Perhaps the EU requires, as Follesdal and Hix (2006) have
suggested, a more open contest for political leadership and more parlia-
mentary control to reliably ensure that European policies are responsive
to European citizens preferences and requests.
There has been a great deal of literature on European citizenship in
terms of political and legal theory (see for example, Meehan 1993; Wiener
1998; Magnette 1999; Bellamy et al. 2006), but there is still a relative
lack of studies on European citizens political attitudes and behaviour.
Comparative studies undertaken in Europe particularly those produced
using Eurobarometer have made it possible to isolate significant factors
in the inventory of attitudes and behaviours of Europeans, which follow
their development over several years and identify certain specific national
characteristics (Herrmann et al. 2004). But these studies cannot capture
European citizenship in action because the contours are generally always
perceived and evaluated from within a national context (see also Brchon
and Cautrs 1997; Favell 2005).
Our study of EU movers allows us to assess the possible emergence of a
European citizenship in a very different fashion from conventional studies.
From the outset, the study proposes a transnational context a new
European social space and in doing so throws a novel light on an experi-
mental population that has chosen migration within Europe. Their mobil-
ity, as Rother and Nebe explore in depth in Chapter 6, enables a directly
experienced and possibly interiorized assimilation of the European project.
So are these European citizens like the other nationalized ones, or does
their relationship with politics have specific characteristics? And are they
less encumbered by the overcautiousness that characterizes their national
counterparts in recognizing and expressing European citizenship?
The aim of this chapter is, on the one hand, to draw a political portrait
of these mobile European citizens, whom we expect to be close to a tran-
snational view of politics; on the other, to grasp the possible premises of
their Europeanization here understood in the sociological sense of the
term (see also Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Fligstein 2008) on the civic and
political level. In order to understand EU movers relationship to politics
we will test two hypotheses. The first is related to classical sociological
factors which explain political participation, such as education levels and
social status, as well as political ones, such as the ideological position of
respondents. Are these factors once again decisive? That is, do we find
the usual correlations between social integration and political integra-
tion, or do we find a specific effect of the experience of mobility? The
second concerns political socialization and the specific impact of national
political cultures. Do EU movers share particular political attitudes and
behaviours, or do we recognize traces of their distinct national origins and
identities?
A POLITICAL PORTRAIT OF EU MOVERS
To draw the political portrait of our respondents we have used a set of

classical indicators on political attitudes and behaviour. Our basic results
for EU movers show a high level of interest in politics but a poor level of
political participation. A large majority (56 per cent) in all countries and
of all nationalities admits being interested in the politics of their country
of origin; 24 per cent are even very interested. Almost one-third of them
frequently discuss politics within their circle (29 per cent). Men are more
interested than women, and older more than younger people. Two out of
ten have already contacted a politician or signed a petition. Yet only 15
per cent have taken part in a demonstration. Membership is weak: 8 per

cent belong to a trade union, 3 per cent are members of a political party.
Taken aggregately, EU movers are thus politically concerned but not
so active. This is the first picture we get. The consistency of their political
participation is not so different from the rest of the population in Europe
and in relation to some aspects, even appears weaker. The comparison, of
course, has to be taken carefully given the nature of the EIMSS sample.
EU movers are more interested in politics, demonstrate a little bit more,
belong more often to a trade union, but have less often signed a petition,
and vote less at general elections. These differences are not significant.
A comparison of their electoral involvement, however, shows significant
discrepancies depending on the type of election. Only 40 per cent took
part in the last national general election in their country of origin while,
according to official statistics, an average of 70 per cent of stayers took
part.1 However, their participation in European elections is equivalent to,
or even slightly higher than, that of stayers (51 per cent versus 49 per cent),
a sign that may reveal a certain Europeanization of their political involve-
ment. We shall return to this in the last part of this chapter.
Studies in political sociology often highlight the importance of the rela-
tionship between individuals conditions of social integration and their
attitudes and political behaviour. In particular, the level of education is
one of the most determining factors. This holds for EU movers. The more
qualified our respondents are, the higher their level of interest. Of those
with university degrees, 68 per cent say they are very interested in politics,
whereas only 30 per cent of those with no qualifications say the same
thing. A similar difference can be found when we look at the impact of
professional status: 69 per cent of those in the upper-class category show
a high level of interest, whereas the same applies to only 56 per cent in the
routine white-collar group, 54 per cent of the petty bourgeoisie, 44 per
cent of the qualified blue-collar group and 35 per cent of the non-qualified
working-class group.
To make an overall measurement of EU movers relationship with poli-
tics, we constructed a synthetic politicization index from seven variables
concerning both the level of political interest and the type of personal
involvement (Table 7.1).2
Though the level of political interest is relatively high, movers effec-
tive involvement in political activities is relatively modest. In fact, only 16
per cent of the EIMSS sample possessed between three and seven of the
attributes, 20 per cent had only two, 33 per cent one, and 32 per cent none.
Thus, nearly two-thirds of respondents are scarcely involved in political
life at all and their participation is virtually non-existent or extremely low.
In sum, EU movers are more interested in politics, and somewhat more
Table 7.1 Participation variables for EU movers and stayers ( %)
Participation EU Stayers
variables movers (general
population)
1 Interest in politics*: very much 24.2 11.7
2 Contacted politician 19.0 14.7
3 Signed petition 19.2 30.0
4 Took part in lawful public demonstration 15.3 11.8
5 Trade union: participated 8.1 3.2
6 Political party: participated 3.0 2.1
7 Voted in last general elections 40.1 80.8
Notes: * For EU movers: Interest in politics in COO.
Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N (minimum) 5 13 950
familiar with traditional modes of participation (like taking part in dem-

onstrations or affiliating with unions and parties); but they are much less
likely to vote or sign a petition. Consequently, it is not that EU movers are
less political: rather, they are not consistently participative.
The most politicized are also the most qualified, and those who belong
to the categories at the top of the professional hierarchy. Thus, of movers
with university degrees, 23 per cent have between three and seven politi-
cization attributes, whereas this is true of only 6 per cent of those without
qualifications. Likewise, 22 per cent of our respondents in the upper class
have this level of politicization, but only 6 per cent in the working class.
Conversely, a total absence of politicization appears more widespread
among unqualified people and among movers belonging to the working
class: 49 per cent and 47 per cent, respectively, have no politicization
attributes. In the upper class, and among those with university degrees,
about half those percentages have no politicization attributes: only 24 per
cent and 23 per cent respectively.
A logistic regression enables us to control for social and political factors
that account for EU movers level of politicization (Table 7.2). Four
factors are particularly influential. The first one, the most significant, is
the ideological position. Leftist EU movers are more disposed to be highly
politicized than the others. The second one is the country of origin. It con-
firms the impact of certain national origins and identities which continue to
condition the EU movers political attitudes and behaviour. We will come
back to this aspect in the next section. The third one concerns the social
and educational profile of our respondents. A high level of politicization
Table 7.2 Logistic regression on high level of politicization among EU

movers
B Wald Signif. Odds 1/OR

ratio
Left-Right position 15.478 0.000
Centre 21.011 54.052 0.000 0.364 2.749
Rightist 20.900 57.333 0.000 0.407 2.458
Dont answer 20.914 22.549 0.000 0.401 2.494
Dont know 22.180 67.759 0.000 0.113 8.843
Ref.: Leftist
Country of origin 44.534 0.000
Germany 0.092 0.400 0.527 1.097 0.912
Britain 20.419 7.770 0.005 0.658 1.521
Italy 0.147 0.976 0.323 1.158 0.863
Spain 0.568 16.277 0.000 1.764 0.567
Ref.: France
Country of residence 32.590 0.000
Germany 20.379 6.376 0.012 0.685 1.460
Britain 20.264 3.497 0.061 0.768 1.302
Italy 0.271 3.983 0.046 1.312 0.762
Spain 20.433 6.836 0.009 0.648 1.542
Ref.: France
Territorial identity 29.153 0.000
No territorial identity 20.998 8.279 0.004 0.369 2.712
Integrated non-European 20.476 12.017 0.001 0.621 1.609
Assimilated European 20.285 3.200 0.074 0.752 1.329
Assimilated non-European 20.561 5.557 0.018 0.571 1.753
Separated European 20.095 0.341 0.560 0.909 1.100
Separated non-European 20.461 3.914 0.048 0.631 1.585
European 0.302 1.557 0.212 1.352 0.739
Ref.: Integrated European
Education level 24.489 0.000
No qualification 20.351 1.896 0.169 0.704 1.420
Secondary education 20.471 8.740 0.003 0.624 1.602
completed
University 0.270 5.918 0.015 1.311 0.763
Ref.: University entrance
qualification
Class based on last occupation 2.197 0.000
Bourgeoisie 0.316 7.694 0.006 1.371 0.729
Petty bourgeoisie 0.098 0.409 0.522 1.103 0.907
High-skilled manual 0.105 0.281 0.596 1.111 0.900
Low/non-skilled manual 20.507 6.254 0.012 0.602 1.660
B Wald Signif. Odds 1/OR

ratio
Ref.: Routine non-manual
Type of settlement 12.665 0.002
Urban area 0.262 6.169 0.013 1.299 0.770
Rural area 20.122 0.963 0.326 0.885 1.130
Ref.: Small/Medium-sized town
Constant 21.010 24.610 0.000 0.364
Notes: Coefficients for age, gender, religious affiliation, marital status, length of migration
experience, migration experience, EU-image are not significant.
is more widespread among educated and qualified EU movers. Lastly, the

importance of territorial identity and location has to be underlined. EU
movers who feel European are more likely to be politicized. Urban areas
count also more politicized people than rural ones. These results, however,
are not so different from those we would usually obtain in standard studies
on political participation in Europe.
What does stand out from this first sketch of the EU movers is that
their favourable disposition towards politics characterized mainly by a
high level of political interest remains detached from a real politicization
involving active and sustained participation.
One specific feature of EU movers relationship to politics that deserves
further analysis is where they sit on a leftright scale (on this scale, see
Jaffr and Muxel 1997; Muxel 1997). In fact, we find a certain leaning of
EU movers to the left: 40 per cent classify themselves as left or centre-
left; 22 per cent classify themselves as right or centre-right; fewer classify
themselves as centre (17 per cent), but more (21 per cent) do not classify
themselves at all either because they refuse to respond (8.4 per cent),
or because they do not know how to respond (12.6 per cent).3 The com-
parison with stayers is striking: in the ESS sample only 33 per cent locate
themselves left or centre-left, and in the European Values Study (1999) only
26 per cent. Among those EU movers who are not highly qualified, the
absence of positioning between left and right is more marked: 45 per cent
of those without qualifications do not position themselves, compared to
29 per cent of those with a secondary-school qualification and only 13 per
cent of those with a university degree. On the other hand, the higher the
qualification, the more marked the leaning to the left: among our respond-
ents with university degrees, slightly fewer than half classify themselves
as leftist (49 per cent), compared to 28 per cent of those with secondary-
school qualifications and only 22 per cent of those with primary-lower
educational credentials.
The prevalence of leftist affiliations among the higher social classes
appears to be very clear: 47 per cent of EU migrants belonging to the
upper class category position themselves to the left, as well as 41 per cent
of the routine white-collar group, many less among qualified blue collars
(32 per cent), and only 26 per cent of the non-qualified working class. It is,
therefore, within groups at the top of the social and professional hierar-
chy, as well as in a significant proportion of the middle classes, that leftist
affiliation is most significant. In the EU general population, an increased
transfer of support to the left has been observed for approximately the
last 15 years. The left has lost ground with working-class levels of society
but clearly gained ground with the higher and culturally privileged classes
(Grunberg and Schweisguth 1997). In this, our respondents appear to be
fairly representative of the far-reaching ideological recomposition of the
European political landscape and of the changes in electoral and partisan
power struggles that are taking place.
This preference for the left is accompanied by a certain reticence
towards economic liberalism: 44 per cent of EU movers express disagree-
ment with the idea that the state should withdraw from intervention in the
economy.4 They also reveal themselves to be distinctly open and permis-
sive with regard to individual liberty and respect for private life, and the
higher the level of qualification, the more this is true: 48 per cent agree that
homosexuals should be able to live their lives as they please.5
In sum, EU movers are not only more mobile and more open towards
Europe, but they also hold universalistic values and a fairly pronounced
leftist sensibility. A certain anti-free market attitude in matters of the
economy is relatively common ironic, perhaps, given the EUs strong
librale reputation on the continent. However the latter is not always true
and, within the left, is subject to differentiated positions on economic
questions.
In order to explore these ideological nuances among intra-EU migrants,
we further differentiated within the 40 per cent who are on the left
between those who are hostile to economic liberalism (22 per cent), those
who accept it (9 per cent), and lastly those who do not take a position
on the subject (8 per cent). Leftist affiliation within our population of
migrants is split, therefore, into two types of adherence. One is fairly tra-
ditionally hostile to economic liberalism (22 per cent). The other is more
permeable and open to the values of a market society and unites those who
declare themselves to be explicitly in favour of economic liberalism (9 per
cent) and those who appear relatively indifferent, or at least not hostile to
Table 7.3 Ideological position according to sociodemographic and

political characteristics (%)
Men <40 years Bourgeoisie University High level of

degree politicization*
Leftist against 49 39 46 57 31
economic
liberalism
Leftist for 58 23 41 50 21
economic
liberalism
Indifferent leftist 44 37 42 48 18
Rightist 51 27 41 44 12
Centre 54 25 38 39 10
No position 42 30 22 28 6
Entire sample 49 31 38 44 17
Notes: * 37 attributes.
the question (8 per cent): this group represents 17 per cent of those who
position themselves on the left.
The three types of leftist affiliation match up with fairly differentiated
sociological profiles (Table 7.3). Those against economic liberalism are
clearly younger (39 per cent of them are under 40 years of age, compared
to only 23 per cent of those for), and they also have a level of profes-
sional qualification that is higher than average (46 per cent of those
against belong to the upper class, compared to 41 per cent of those for).
Of those who belong to the second type the free market left there are
more men than women (43 per cent versus 42 per cent), but their level
of education is slightly lower than that of the first type (50 per cent have
a university degree as opposed to 57 per cent of those against economic
liberalism). Lastly, the leftist respondents who do not take a position on
this economic question are also relatively young (37 per cent are under
50) and are more often women than men (56 per cent versus 44 per cent
men).
Among those who classify themselves as leftist, the level of politiciza-
tion is highest. But it is mostly among the anti-free market leftists that
it is strongest (31 per cent have between three and seven politicization
attributes). On the other hand, among those who define themselves as
rightist, politicization is distinctly weaker: only 12 per cent have a high
level of politicization.
What stands out from this political and ideological portrait of EU

movers is a certain number of contrasted traits. We clearly observe
the prevalence of a certain leftist tendency, marked by universalistic
values and a relatively high level of interest in politics. However, this is
rarely given concrete expression through action-based politicization and
active participation. A leftist culture prevails, but it is anchored more
in values than in practice particularly anti-establishment protest. This
gap between attitudes and behaviour might be due at least in part to
the fact that opportunities to participate are more difficult as a foreign
resident.
EU MOVERS AND THE PRISM OF NATIONAL

DIFFERENCES
We have thus far shown a general political portrait of EU movers, but the
picture needs to be completed and qualified. Indeed, country of origin,
country of residence and type of migration affect political attitudes and
behaviours noticeably.
German movers show the highest level of interest: 72 per cent say they
are very much and somewhat interested in politics. Their Spanish counter-
parts are also very concerned (60 per cent say the same), while Italians (44
per cent) are the least concerned (Figure 7.1).
The fairly widespread interest in politics among EU movers is, as we
have seen, only accompanied by a moderate level of political participa-
tion among all groups of EU movers (Table 7.4). However, there is a
strong contrast between two populations: Spanish and British movers.
The former stand out particularly through a distinctly higher degree
of politicization. Spanish migrants are, in fact, more likely to engage
in protest. A quarter of them (26 per cent) have already demonstrated
(only 13 per cent of Germans, 15 per cent of French, 14 per cent of
Italians and 10 per cent of British migrants have already taken part in
a demonstration). Conversely, British migrants appear less politicized
(only 11 per cent reach the threshold of high politicization in our
index).
If we observe what happens with greater subtlety by taking into account
both the country of origin and the country of residence, two fairly sig-
nificant profiles emerge from among the most politicized migrants: the
Germans residing in France and Italy on the one hand, and the Spanish
residing in France, Britain and Italy on the other (Table 7.5). The particu-
larly politicized Germans in France tend to be active, highly qualified men.
Politicized Germans in Italy are more likely to be retired and relatively
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Germany France Britain Italy Spain
EU movers by COO EU movers by COR
Figure 7.1 The political interest of EU movers: very much + somewhat

(%)
highly qualified women. As such, the Germans high level of politicization

concerns a population which though it does not share the same migrant
experience or type of activity nevertheless has a relatively privileged
educational level and lifestyle. On the other hand, the high politicization
of Spanish migrants results from a completely different profile, regardless
of whether their country of residence is France, Britain or Italy. These are
fairly young migrants with few qualifications. They are active in the labour
market, and often come from modest class backgrounds. Yet it can be
observed that Italian migrants while sociologically and culturally fairly
similar to Spanish migrants are a good deal less politicized: 42 per cent
of them have no politicization attribute while the same is true of only 25
per cent of the Spanish.
Do we find these same differences and national particularities when
we look at our respondents ideological leanings? A leftist tendency does
apply in the same way to all movers, no matter what their nationality,
being particularly marked among German and Spanish movers. The
anti-free market left choice is equally widespread, and especially among
Spanish (31 per cent; it is shared by 22 per cent of Germans and French,
Table 7.4 Political interest and forms of political participation among EU movers (COO) and stayers (%)
Interest Politician Petition Demonstration Trade Union Party Vote

M S M S M S M S M S M S M S
Germans 72 64 22 13 20 31 13 11 7 3 3 4 47 85
167
French 54 32 19 18 21 35 15 18 8 3 3 2 43 75
British 50 52 23 18 22 40 10 4 6 3 2 1 25 73
Italians 44 32 12 12 14 17 14 11 9 5 4 2 36 89
Spanish 60 28 19 12 20 24 26 17 10 2 3 2 51 78

Table 7.5 Different political characteristics of EU movers by COR and COO (%)
COR/COO No High level of Left 1 Free Anti-free Right 1 No position Participation in

politicization politicization centre market market centre (neither left nor demonstration
left left left right right)
France
Germans 19 25 52 18 21 22 7 11
British 31 12 33 7 18 30 13 8
Italians 31 16 45 11 26 25 21 18
Spanish 17 26 56 8 38 16 18 34
Germany
French 31 11 38 9 20 31 25 6
168
British 44 7 37 9 19 22 13 6
Italians 55 8 17 5 9 13 60 6
Spanish 27 15 40 8 27 11 30 21
Britain
Germans 26 19 62 14 31 16 3 18
French 37 17 44 10 24 31 11 12
Italians 34 15 45 13 26 19 23 13
Spanish 31 25 44 10 27 20 18 19
Italy
Germans 16 23 50 14 24 20 17 17
French 22 25 41 8 27 20 31 20
British 34 17 49 16 24 23 14 16
Spanish 27 23 40 4 30 16 30 29
Spain
Germans 28 8 27 10 12 26 18 6
French 37 10 31 6 20 29 19 20
British 43 7 20 4 8 32 18 9
169
Italians 46 7 32 7 17 21 27 18
Entire sample 32 16 40 9 22 22 21 15

19 per cent of Italians and 17 per cent of British). The pro-free market left
choice is clearly more strongly expressed among German migrants than
among others (14 per cent, as opposed to 9 per cent of British and Italians,
8 per cent of French and 7 per cent of Spanish).
As we can notice, our respondents ideological positions represent
the two dominant and contrasting leftist models of European political
systems. The differences observed between German and Spanish movers
are interesting and even more significant in that they do not always tally
with class allegiances. Among German migrants, the pro-free market left
seems to dominate, but this is first and foremost in the working-class cat-
egory (21 per cent of blue collars versus an average of 14 per cent of all
German migrants belong to the liberal left). Among Spanish migrants, the
contrary situation applies: it is among upper-class movers that one finds
the most left and anti-free market people (40 per cent versus an average
of 31 per cent for all Spanish migrants are left-leaning and anti-free
market).
The rightist tendency is fairly low among Spanish movers. Among
British and French movers one finds the largest number of individuals who
acknowledge that they belong to the right (27 per cent for both). Right-
wing French migrants living in Germany and Britain tend to be young,
active and well-qualified. Rightist British movers in France are gener-
ally retired and well-qualified. Overall, and on average, retired German,
French and British people in Spain have more rightist leanings than other
EU movers.
A sizeable proportion of our respondents have no ideological position.
It is in the Italian migrant population which, moreover, is the least politi-
cized, the least participating, and the least qualified that the absence of a
position on the leftright scale is most pronounced (33 per cent).
In sum, though EU movers have common features a relatively high
interest in politics, low participation and a pronounced leftist tendency
they also bring with them intrinsic differences linked to the particular
national characteristics of their countries of origin. Some traits appear
more or less marked and draw differentiated political profiles. Thus
German migrants seem more politicized, more participating and more
marked than the others by leanings that are both leftist and liberal.
Spanish migrants are also politicized and participating, but they favour
an anti-market leftist tendency. British migrants are scarcely politicized,
participate little and tend to be more rightist. Italian migrants are the
furthest behind in political involvement, and the group least likely to
express ideological preferences. Lastly, French migrants appear not to be
very politicized and adopt rightist political positions more frequently than
others.
EUROPEANIZING CITIZENSHIP: WHAT ARE THE

PREMISES?
The experience of intra-EU mobility is shaped by the interaction of at

least two spheres of socialization that of the migrants original national
context and that of the country of residence. How are these two spheres
connected in political terms? Can one observe, through this singular expe-
rience, a special relationship to politics and an expression of citizenship
that might take the European context more into account an emergent
European citizenship perhaps?
The time spent in the country of residence makes a difference. The
longer migrants have lived in their current host country, the higher their
interest in that countrys political life and, conversely, the less their interest
in the politics of their country of origin. Thus 29 per cent of EU movers
who settled before 1983 say they are very interested in the politics of their
country of residence. Of those who migrated recently, between 1994 and
2003, only 19 per cent say the same. Correspondingly, 21 per cent of those
with the longest migrant experience continue to take a strong interest in the
political life of their country of origin, while the same is true of 28 per cent
of those who migrated more recently. One can observe, therefore, a slight
socializing effect of the country of residence on political predispositions.
Furthermore, those who have interiorized a feeling of belonging and
attachment to Europe always develop a higher degree of interest in politics
at the European level than the others. Thus 37 per cent of our respondents
who say they are very attached to the European Union declare a high
degree of interest in European Union politics (whereas this is true of only
9 per cent of those who feel no attachment at all).
Now, what is the effect of political interest on electoral participation?
This question is, normatively, at the heart of European citizenship
although in reality European citizenship practices have mostly remained
limited to the exploitation of free movement rights (Wiener 1998; Favell
2008a). Some political theorists argue that the full exercise and recognition
of this citizenship, and thus the construction of a European political space,
will depend on effective political participation (for example, Maas 2007).
So do EU movers, at least, make use of their right to vote in European
elections? Do they participate more or less than stayers? Are their partici-
pation in general elections in their country of origin and their participation
in European elections connected?
The participation of EU movers in general elections in their own coun-
tries is 40 per cent that is, very low compared to an average of 70 per cent
for stayers (Figure 7.2). Those who participate the most in these elections
are Spanish (50 per cent) and German migrants (47 per cent), but this
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU movers by COO EU movers by COR Official rate
Figure 7.2 Voting in national general elections (%)
percentage is much lower than the national participation rate recorded

in these two countries (69 per cent and 79 per cent, respectively). British
migrants are the furthest behind: only a quarter of them (25 per cent) say
they voted in the last parliamentary elections in Britain (as against an
average of 59 per cent among stayers). Differences also emerge between
the countries of residence. The rate of participation is highest among
migrants residing in France (46 per cent) while in Britain and Germany
EU migrants vote the least (37 per cent for each).
EU movers participation in European elections, however, is much more
lively. Half of them have voted (51 per cent) that is, a similar proportion,
or even slightly higher, than that recorded within the general population
(49 per cent), and this despite the difficulties that can block active par-
ticipation as a foreign resident. So EU movers make use of their citizens
rights more at the European than at the national level. Should one see
in this difference in participation the premises for a Europeanization of
their political participation an emergent European citizenship? Before
examining this hypothesis more closely, let us recall some important
information.
In 1992, with the Maastricht treaty, each EU citizen got the right to vote
in local and European elections in the country where he or she resides,
as well as eligibility to run for office in these elections. This obligation
concerns all countries, but for some of them this measure was not new.
Furthermore, a lot of variations can be observed among the EU15 coun-

tries. The rhythm and procedures are very different and reveal national
particularities which have an impact on the practice of European citizen-
ship within each national context (Strudel 2003). Though foreigners politi-
cal rights are now admitted, procedures are very diversified and depend on
the competence and jurisdiction of each country. Some allow their nation-
als outside the country the right to vote for the lists of candidates at home
while others do not. These votes can be cast by proxy, by mail, by voting at
consulates or embassies, or not. There is no harmonization or consistency
of these rules established by each member state autonomously.
Europeanization is still limited and remains contained within the
national framework. This fact has, of course, an impact on the politi-
cal and electoral behaviour of European citizens, especially among EU
movers. The number of such people registered on the European elec-
toral lists gives some idea of the use of European citizenship among EU
migrants. In 2004, there were around 5.7 million people who might vote as
resident European citizens (the entire European electorate was 338 million
people). So intra-EU migrants as voters represented less than 2 per cent of
the whole electorate. And, out of those, only 12 to 15 per cent were in fact
registered on the electoral lists to vote in their country of residence. That is
very few, but it was still more than in 1999 (9 per cent), and even more than
in 1994 (6 per cent) (Strudel 2005). This puts into context the participation
of the 51 per cent of our sample who say they have voted as foreign resi-
dents. Of course, these numbers do not include people who vote in their
country of origin or who vote by proxy, at the consulate or embassy, for
candidates in their countries of origin. It is still very difficult to appreciate
the exact numbers of such voters because they are usually not identified as
foreigners on the electoral lists. Statistics can never be totally exhaustive,
but it can be observed that the number of people registered on the electoral
lists for each European election is growing all the time.
Our data do not enable us to evaluate the registration rate of EU movers
on electoral lists, nor does it tell us the exact conditions and circumstances
of their votes in the 2004 European elections.6 What we do have is the dec-
laration of those questioned after the date of the European elections that
they actually voted, or that they intended to vote if they were questioned
before the date of the election.7 To ensure the comparability and reliability
of responses, we only take into account those who were questioned after
13 June, that is, real voters (or non-voters) (Figure 7.3). The number of
Italian and German migrants who declared that they voted is the highest:
58 per cent and 57 per cent respectively. German movers even participated
noticeably more in European elections than stayers (114 percentage
points). The same applies to French and Spanish migrants who voted
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
EU movers by COO Official rate
Notes: Only people registered on electoral lists have been taken into account. The data
only cover movers to France, Britain and Italy.
Figure 7.3 Electoral participation in European elections (June 2004) (%)
more than their co-nationals at home (17 points and 15 points respec-
tively). Once again, the British appear to fall behind: only about a third
voted (29 per cent), even fewer than British stayers who, of all nationali-
ties, are those who participate the least.
Older people voted more than the young, as did migrants with univer-
sity degrees and those in the upper social class. Thus 52 per cent of EU
movers with higher education qualifications took part in the election, as
against only 44 per cent of those without qualifications; 55 per cent of
EU movers in the upper-class category as opposed to 44 per cent of the
working class. The highest electoral participation was among those who
position themselves to the left: 59 per cent of them voted, but only 46 per
cent of those who place themselves to the right or centre-right, 46 per cent
of those in the centre and 40 per cent of those who have no position. A
positive image of Europe promotes participation: 58 per cent of those who
have a very positive image voted, as opposed to 38 per cent of those who
have a neutral image and only 30 per cent of those who have a negative
image.
If we reconstruct the voting trajectories of EU movers taking into
account their participation in the last general elections in their countries

of origin and their participation in European elections three groups of
electors can be distinguished. The largest group (39 per cent) includes
sporadic voters, namely those who voted in one of the two elections (25
per cent who voted only in European elections and 14 per cent who voted
only in national general elections). Next comes the group of constant
abstainers (35 per cent), those who voted in neither of the two elections.
The last group represents a quarter of the sample (26 per cent) and is
made up of constant electors, namely those who voted in both elec-
tions. Slightly more of the younger migrants have voted only in general
elections, whereas more older migrants have voted only in the European
elections. There are also more constant abstainers among less qualified
migrants at the bottom of the social and professional hierarchy: 39 per
cent of migrants without qualifications and 44 per cent of working-class
migrants voted in neither of the two elections (versus 32 per cent of
migrants with a university degree and an equal 32 per cent of upper-class
movers).
What stands out from these voting trajectories is that only a minority of
EU migrants do not participate in the elections since a little more than a
third of the sample did not vote in either of the two elections. Furthermore,
participation in European elections seems to be a much more widespread
activity than participation in general elections in the country of origin.
These results constitute an initial justification of the hypothesis that
citizenship is indeed becoming Europeanized for EU movers.
Three other analytical factors support this view. The first relates to the
length of the migration experience. This appears to be decisive. The EU
movers who participate most frequently in European elections are those
who have lived in the country of residence for a long time. A majority
(56 per cent) of those who migrated at least 15 years ago participated
in European elections, whereas the same is true of only 46 per cent of
recent migrants. Above all, the longer the migrant experience, the less
frequent the participation in national general elections back home. With
the passage of time, citizenship takes firmer root in the reality of the
country of residence and finds it easier to express itself at the European
level (Figure 7.4).
The second sign of the Europeanization process that citizenship is
undergoing is also visible in the differences noted in certain countries
between the participation of intra-EU migrants and the participation of
national populations. While not the case in Italy, where a particularly high
participation rate is traditionally recorded, on each occasion in Britain
and France, EU movers voted in greater numbers than nationals (51 per
cent versus 43 per cent in France, 59 per cent versus 39 per cent in Britain).
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Young/Long Stay Old/Long Stay Young/Short Stay Old/Short Stay
Vote EU parliament Vote general election
Notes: Young/Long Stay 5 35 or less, arrived in COR before 1990; Young/Short Stay 5
less than 35, arrived after 1990; Old/Long Stay 5 more than 35, arrived before 1990; Old/
Short Stay 5 more than 35, arrived after 1990.
Figure 7.4 Age, duration of migration and electoral participation of EU

movers (%)
This additional mobilization clearly indicates a more marked investment

in the supranational electoral arena than among stayers.
A last significant factor is migrants search for information about voting
rights in their country of residence as European Union citizens. Half our
sample (51 per cent) said that they had taken this step. Germans (58 per
cent) and French (55 per cent) did this more commonly; the Spanish, on
the other hand, were less concerned (41 per cent). The highest number of
migrants to take this step were in Britain and Spain (58 per cent and 60 per
cent, respectively). Here too, movers educational level appears decisive:
the higher it is, the more frequently information is sought. The same goes
for professional status: 57 per cent of the upper class sought this informa-
tion as against only 40 per cent of the working class. Those who are most
interested in politics are also most favourably disposed to request infor-
mation about voting methods in the country of residence: 60 per cent of
those interested in politics in their country of origin, 64 per cent of those
interested in politics in their country of residence, and 65 per cent of those
interested in politics at the European level. Lastly, a leftist position and a
feeling of belonging to Europe favour taking this step. On the other hand,
the length of the migration experience does not really seem to be relevant.
Thus, a significant proportion of intra-EU migrants feel concerned by the
exercise of civic rights on a European scale.
CONCLUSIONS
As this political portrait of EU movers reaches its conclusion, our atten-
tion is held by the specificity and diversity of this population, which
results from migratory characteristics unique to each country of origin
and country of residence. The singularity of EU movers is marked by
the combination of their relatively high interest in politics and leftist ten-
dency on the one hand, and a certain antipathy to economic liberalism
combined with a commitment to cultural liberalism and universalistic
values on the other. As far as their diversity is concerned, the higher
politicization level of German and Spanish migrants stands out: the
latter assert themselves as the most radical and likely to engage in protest
as part of their participation. Furthermore, we found some signs of
Europeanization of citizenship in the very experience of mobility, particu-
larly noticeable through our respondents participation in the elections
for the European Parliament.
In so far as it can be judged from our survey, a political Europe, there-
fore, seems to be timidly developing in the awareness and practices of EU
movers. They, at least, have explicitly and actively placed the European
reality at the heart of their personal experience, even though they do not
tend to translate this experience into openly political behaviour. On the
whole, their political participation is low, and despite their remarkable
political interest and their participation in EU elections, they generally
stay away from other kinds of political involvement.
NOTES
1. The participation rates in the parliamentary elections that preceded our survey were as
follows in the five countries: 79 per cent in Germany in 2002, 60 per cent in France in
2002, 59 per cent in Britain in 2001, 81 per cent in Italy in 2001 and 69 per cent in Spain
in 2000.
2. The constructed politicization index is made up of seven attributes. The more the
positive responses given by people to these different items, the more their politicization
attributes and the higher their level of politicization are. We considered that to have
between three and seven attributes constituted a high level of politicization.
3. The question was as follows: In politics people sometimes talk of left and right.
Which of the following positions best describes your political outlook?: left/centre left/
centre/centre right/right/dont answer/dont know.
4. The questionnaire item was the following: The less the state intervenes in the economy
the better it is for the country. The item does not distinguish between national and
supranational levels of intervention.
5. The questionnaire item was the following: Gay men and lesbians should be free to live
their own lives as they wish.
6. We did not have any questions in our survey concerning either the place where our
respondents have voted (COO or COR) or the way their votes have been cast.
7. The survey fell on different sides of the European elections of 13 June 2004, depending on
the country. Declared participation is more reliable for the analysis than intentions. We
therefore chose to study specifically the people who were questioned after the European
election day (declaring an effective vote or not), and consequently to retain only the
countries for which numbers were sufficient. Unfortunately, for this question we could
not take Spain into account because the whole sample was interviewed before the elec-
tions. Likewise, only 53 people in Germany were interviewed after the elections. That
being the case, they do not constitute a sufficiently large corpus to allow for reliable
statistical analysis. Therefore, the results presented in Figure 7.3 rely only on the three
countries with enough declared participation in our results (France, Britain, Italy).
8. A common information space?
The media use of EU movers
Damian Tambini and Nina Rother
INTRODUCTION
In the relationship between mobility, integration, identity and citizenship,

cultural and educational institutions loom large. Classic studies of nation-
alism, for example, show how earlier media such as poetry and literature
played a key role in national identity construction (Anderson 1983).
Others outline the interdependence between national identity construc-
tion, media structures, national policy frameworks and individual identity
construction (Collins 1998; Price 1995; Schlesinger 1991). While techno-
logical change is never entirely deterministic, it is undeniable that com-
munications media understood broadly structure and condition the
links between migrant, host and home populations, and are crucial to the
construction of the proverbial imagined community to which migrants
feel a sense of belonging (Elkins 1997).
As with other questions about intra-EU migration explored in this
book, little systematic research has been carried out into the media use
patterns of EU movers. Our goal here is thus to build up a picture of
their media use, and highlight its role in their integration and citizenship
practices. Many claim that the communication processes which make up
the national public sphere are being decoupled from national geography,
as older distribution technologies are displaced by new transnational
networks. We know very little, however, from research to date, about the
empirical detail of this shift in communication patterns. If such a transna-
tional information space was emerging, we would expect EU movers to be
among its first inhabitants. Given the new abundance of media available,
to what extent do these movers use the media of their country of origin?
Does it facilitate adaptation to the new host context? Or, on the contrary,
do recent developments in communications media lead to less-integrated
migrants, who remain in the sphere of influence of their country of origin?
In sum, what are the consequences for the marketplace of loyalties (Price
1995), in which recent developments in satellite, cable and internet media
179
see states competing for the publics attention with foreign-origin mass
communication providers? While definitive answers to these questions are
beyond our scope, we map patterns of media consumption among EU
movers, focusing on the use of country of origin (COO) and country of
residence (COR) media. One focus is on the conditions that make movers
turn to either COO or COR media. The younger EU movers are par-
ticularly interesting in this regard, as they are the first generation with a
genuine choice between using home-country media and residence-country
media. Migrants to the industrializing North of Europe in the nineteenth
and early twentieth century were largely illiterate. Newspaper markets
were tiny and broadcasting non-existent and therefore the resources neces-
sary to maintain daily or weekly contact with information, culture or news
from the country of origin were simply not available. More recently, mass
availability of new technology has been transforming the communications
opportunities open to migrants.
The current policy framework at the EU level aims to construct a
common information space by 2010. The Television Without Frontiers
Directive (TWF, Directive 97/36/EC) and the International Convention
on Transfrontier Television are under review. TWF is the instrument that
ensures that media services can be freely available across national bounda-
ries in Europe, and which sets quotas for the availability of European
(rather than, say, US) programming in national broadcasts. Though it
is based in competition law and the internal market-building powers of
the European Commission, many have commented that the Directive has
other cultural objectives within a broader vision of European integration.
For example, there is an obligation on European broadcasters to deliver a
quota of European-produced content in addition to national quotas. This
cultural impact of the Directive is under-researched, but key authors such
as Collins (1998 and 2002) and Schlesinger (1991) have seen the previous
version of the directive as part of a broader cultural politics of European
integration.
The existing literature on media and migration comprises the following
main types of study: (i) studies of single diaspora groups within single host
nations (for example, Zhou and Cai 2002; Georgiou 2001; Sreberny 2000);
(ii) studies of the impact of new technology on diaspora networks, particu-
larly the internet and satellite TV (Panagakos 2003; Morley and Robins
1995); and (iii) studies of the market, legal and policy contexts that shift
the availability of international and diaspora media (for example, Price
1995; Schlesinger 1991). One of the key claims explored in this literature
is that migrant identity construction is shifting due to new technologies
and internet use (Georgiou 2005; Dayan 1999). However, rarely are any
detailed quantitative data regarding the actual levels of use of different
A common information space? 181
media offered. Some authors simply assume that those immigrants who
are heavy users of media from their countries of origin will automatically
be less well integrated into the host society. However we might equally
posit that the sense of belonging or identity is inversely related to the
opportunities for cultural immersion. It may be that migrants starved of
their home culture tend to feel a stronger sense of attachment as a result
something that would be equivalent to the radical cultural nationalism
common to nineteenth century migrants (Thomas and Znaniecki 1927).
Some studies claim that there is a generational effect and an effect of time,
with initial reliance on home-country media fading over time. According
to Camaur (2003, 52), commenting on Sweden, the often-discussed ques-
tion as to whether the media in minority languages contribute to integrate
or to isolate people is wrongly asked. This author argues that minority
groups contain a great diversity within themselves and it is clear that seg-
ments within them such as the elderly or those who do not master Swedish
almost exclusively use these media. On the other hand, second-generation
immigrants, for instance, have media habits which largely parallel those
of native Swedes. Camaur goes on to show how many first-generation
minority members are also bilingual and bicultural, with their use of media
in both languages involving them in ongoing comparative projects where
events as well as media contents and forms are assessed against each
other (ibid.). In this sense, minority media contribute to a multiplication
of what he calls points of reference.
Other studies posit the question of whether new media, particularly
the internet, are having an impact on identity construction (Zhang and
Xiaoming 1999). In the age of cyberspace, the role of ethnic media in for-
tifying the cultural traits of ethnic immigrants may be relevant. As a result
of using the internet to maintain contacts, ethnic groups are more likely
to be assimilated into the mainstream culture without losing their own
cultural roots and ethnic identity.
Research on diaspora/migrant media use has tended to draw on two
main types of data: media metrics (in order of reliability: broadcast
audience figures, circulation figures of diaspora print media, hit rates,
and page impressions of websites); and secondly, ethnographic studies
of migrant groups. Some studies have incorporated content analysis
of diaspora media (Zhou and Cai 2002). In general, though, there is a
dearth of good quality quantitative survey data on migrant media use.
Some questions have been included in small sample surveys of diaspora
groups (Panagakos 2003), but the data presented in this chapter are rare
in that there is little large survey data available on migrants media habits.
This chapter thus examines the evidence provided by the EIMSS, which
describes the overall rates of use of home-country and host-country media
by EU movers. After reviewing some secondary data on the availability of

various media in the countries we are studying, in the following sections
we outline the key findings of our survey.
MEDIA MARKETS IN EUROPE: WHAT CAN EU

MOVERS ACCESS?
Europe did not lurch suddenly from a situation of media scarcity for
migrants to the current situation of abundance. As broadcasting markets
developed, there was a period in which some migrants benefited from basic
public service provision of diaspora broadcasting and newspapers began
to be more accessible. National and local broadcasters, particularly public
broadcasters, attempted to serve immigrant communities at least those
that achieved a critical mass in terms of numbers with basic public service
content in many European countries. Raiser (2002) examines the case of
Germany, where from the 1960s until the late 1980s immigrants media use
concentrated on the weekly guest worker programmes on German radio.
From the 1990s, satellite and pay TV started to replace these programmes.
Raiser goes on to argue that these new media directly impact on links to
the homeland, especially in the Turkish community, with the increasing
use of homeland-based TV channels. Currently there are only a few small
radio or TV stations run by migrants of the third and fourth generation. It
can be seen that the attempt to provide for immigrant communities within
national public broadcasting services was undermined and then replaced
by foreign services as new technologies came on the market. In addition
to these services the transnational public service broadcasters such as the
BBC World Service and Deutsche Welle provided some radio news, but
not compelling entertainment and sport schedules.
In this section we outline some basic indicators of contemporary pat-
terns of foreign media availability in European countries. We can assume
that home countries newspapers are potentially available to all migrants,
either via a postal subscription or (more often) over the internet. Because
television is reported in most major surveys to be the medium that is used
most, in terms of time, we focus particularly on television channels.
On paper, in the five countries included in our study, and for our refer-
ence population, most households should, at the time of the survey, have
been able to access a major television channel from their home country
as long as they were willing to purchase the technology and necessary
subscription. However, the picture is not so simple. There remain signifi-
cant barriers of cost and availability of television services. Cable may be
unavailable outside major metropolitan areas in some countries such as
Table 8.1 Number of TV channels made available as part of the offer of

main cable operators and satellite packagers in the European
Union (as at February 2004)
National Foreign Total % Foreign

channels channels channels
DE Kabel Deutschland C 80 56 136 41.2
Premiere S 28 0 28 0.0
ES ONO C 58 43 101 42.6
Digital1 S 52 14 66 21.2
FR Noos C 93 27 120 22.5
Canal Satellite S 75 22 97 22.7
TPS S 62 10 72 13.9
GB NTL C 125 5 130 3.8
Sky S 131 3 134 2.2
IT Sky Italia S 106 22 128 17.2
Notes: C 5 Cable, S 5 Satellite
Source: European Audiovisual Observatory, www.obs.coe.int/oeu_publ/yb/yb_volumes.html
Britain and Italy, and planning restrictions can limit satellite availability.
Where services are available, the dominant satellite and cable provid-
ers will tend to carry only popular channels, so it can be estimated that
significant minorities do not have access to satellite television from their
own home countries. Where there are widely dispersed populations or low
numbers in any one area, there may be no economic incentive to provide
diaspora media as part of a satellite or cable package.
It is also worthy of note that while our five countries are likely to be
well served, it would be much more difficult to access country of origin
broadcast TV for migrants from smaller countries like Luxembourg,
Hungary or Ireland. In these cases, internet rather than TV could be the
main link to the homeland. It is also worthy of note that smaller countries
tend to be much more permeable to foreign television broadcasts (Table
8.1). Migrants are best served where a national group is numerous in
the country of residence, particularly in smaller countries with a more
internationalized broadcasting space.
Turning to the EIMSS data, in the next section we examine the evidence
about the overall rates of use of home-country and host-country media by
our population. To outline the key findings of the survey, we use indica-
tors that are familiar in studies of news media: asking respondents where
they search for news when there is an event of major significance, and also
their overall rates of use of television, newspapers and the internet. As in

other chapters of this book, we have compared EU movers and stayers
mainly using data from the European Social Survey (ESS). In designing
our survey we used some of the same questions as the ESS with a view to
comparing across these groups.
EU MOVERS AND TELEVISION
First, we will look at the overall time spent watching TV. Second, we take
a look at the split between COR and COO channels among movers and
determine which movers watch COO or COR TV. Third, we take a closer
look at the TV-watching pattern of movers and try to find out what makes
movers watch only COO media, only COR media or both types.
Figure 8.1 reports the overall pattern of TV watching among movers
and stayers by country of origin and residence. This variable has been con-
structed for movers out of TV usage in COO and COR. The general pattern
is that there are more heavy viewers among movers, especially movers from
Spain and Italy and movers to Spain, France and Germany. However,
movers from and to Britain tend to watch less than British national stayers.
It is also interesting to note that some very high figures are reported: for
example, 60 per cent of Italian movers to Spain watch TV more than three
hours per day, and 15 per cent of French movers to Germany never watch
TV, which is a lot more than the average of 7.2 per cent.
The question remains: what determines overall TV usage in other
60
55 Movers - COR
50 Movers - COO
45 Stayers (ESS)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 8.1 Overall TV watching: % for more than 3 hours by COO and COR
words, who is a heavy user and who is not? A regression analysis (not
shown) outlines that overall TV usage can be explained quite well by basic
sociodemographic traits. Age and education are key predictors of TV
watching. Further, an older age at migration, a long stay in the COR, being
male, having a partner from the COO in comparison to not having a partner
and being unemployed lead to more intensive TV use. Education seems
the single most important factor here: having a university degree as well as
having moved in order to study significantly lowers the intensity of watching
TV. In addition, which country individuals originate in and migrate to seem
to have a strong relationship to the amount of television watched: overall,
German and French movers watch less TV than the average mover.
But what of the central issue of watching television from the country of
origin? Are EU movers watching television broadcast from their countries
of residence, or do they choose to remain in the television space of their
home countries? There is a lot of variation between countries on this point.
For example, almost 65 per cent of movers to Britain (and more than half
of all movers to Italy) do not watch their home country TV channels at
all. Whilst this may be due to availability and affordability, it may equally
be explained by reference to the socioeconomic make-up of the body of
EU movers in each country. More than half of all Spanish movers do
not watch COO TV, and especially low proportions of Spanish in Italy
and Britain watch it. Generally speaking, more educated work migrants
are keener to integrate and learn local languages and therefore on some
assumptions might be assumed to be less likely to watch COO TV. Clearly
the segments of our population where retirement migration is significant
have a particularly high level of heavy COO viewing: only 9.6 per cent
of German movers to Spain do not watch German TV in Spain. But
this is not only about retirement: only 14.6 per cent of Italian movers to
Germany do not watch Italian TV. A regression analysis (not shown) indi-
cates that levels of exposure to COO TV are strongly associated with older
age, having a partner from the COO and not having a university degree. In
addition we see that education again has a crucial impact: having migrated
to study and having a university degree lower the intensity of COO TV
usage. From the point of view of the overall level of social integration of
EU movers, it is interesting to note that having friends from the COO as
well as speaking the CORs language alter the intensity of COO TV usage,
though not with a high degree of significance. We should remember that
availability of COO TV does vary, and that this may explain some of the
differences. More data on availability would be necessary to analyse the
detail of this effect. This is a complex issue, because availability often
depends on demand and is also fast changing. Many of the large number
of respondents who spend no time at all using COO media are likely to be
45
Movers - COR
40
Movers - COO
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 8.2 COR TV watching: % for more than 3 hours by COO and
COR
those who do not have the necessary satellite or cable reception. In Britain,
for example, large numbers of viewers on terrestrial platforms have no
access to foreign broadcasts at all. It is worth noting that in the future this
barrier is likely to decline in significance with the rise of on-demand, IPH
based services delivered over broadband.
Even allowing for the fact that the numbers presented do not control
for the absolute size of the movers group in each country, some countries
do seem to be much more successful in integrating EU movers into their
local media space. There is a wide variation in the numbers of people who
do not watch any COR TV at all. More than a quarter of all movers to
Spain do not watch Spanish TV, whereas less than 10 per cent of movers
to Britain do not watch British TV. On the other hand, movers from
Germany watch the TV of their new country least often.
The distribution of heavy COR viewers as shown in Figure 8.2 comple-
ments the picture. Spanish citizens, who already have high levels of TV
viewing at home, continue to watch heavily as movers, but now by watching
the television stations of their residence country. Spanish movers abroad
watch COR TV heavily, especially Spanish in France (61.4 per cent watch
French TV more than three hours a day). The opposite is true for Germans,
and especially Germans in France, where none at all claimed to watch French
TV for more than three hours per day. Movers to Italy, in general, tend not to
watch Italian TV for more than three hours a day. Whether this is due to the
nature of the migrant group or the quality of the TV offering is not clear.
We can, however, delve more deeply into our data in order to address
the question of what determines COR TV usage, and who is a heavy user
and who is not. A regression analysis (not shown), with an R2 of 0.25,
sheds light on the determinants of the levels of COR TV usage. Of the
sociodemographic variables, a longer stay, being male, as well as having
no university degree, all lead to a higher consumption of COR TV. Having
migrated for work or personal reasons also leads to more COR TV usage.
TV usage also seems to be a result of other indicators of integration such
as whether the partner is from the COO or the COR. Of the individual
variables, having friends from the COR as well as having a good command
of the new language alter the intensity of COR TV usage, though the
relationship of language is unclear. Movers often watch TV in order to
improve language, but at the same time, it may be that their language
competence influences them to remain with COO services. And there are
huge country differences. German movers in general, French movers to
Germany and Italy and British in Italy watch less COR TV than Italians in
France; however, Spanish movers and Italians in Spain watch more COR
TV than the baseline category of Italians in France.
Almost half of all Spanish movers only watch COR TV. On the other
hand, it is mainly German and British movers who watch only COO TV
abroad. As noted, it is likely that those who migrate to retire are more
likely to opt for the channels of their country of origin, whilst those who
migrate to work are more likely to reject the available COO TV. Overall,
more COO than COR TV is watched by German, Italian and British
movers. No big country differences exist for movers who watch more COR
than COO TV and those who watch COR as often as COO TV, but the
non-watchers are skewed towards certain countries: More than 10 per cent
of French movers watch neither COO nor COR TV (especially French
movers to Germany).
By conducting a multinomial regression analysis, the impact of sociode-
mographic background as well as of origin and destination on TV usage
preferences can be analysed. Therefore, we distinguished six categories:
only COR TV, only COO TV, more COR TV, more COO TV, same
amount and no TV, with the last one as baseline category. Concerning
the list of independent variables, three different classes of variables exist.
The first class consists of contextual variables, that is, the country of origin
and the country of residence. Spain serves as baseline for both variables.
As typical sociodemographic variables, we included age at migration date,
length of stay, gender with being female as baseline, education level with
all degrees less than a university degree as baseline and the origin of the
partner, with no partner as baseline. A third class of variables is composed
of individual variables: migration motivation, past migration experiences,
daily contacts, and language knowledge upon arrival and at the time of
interview.
Table 8.2 shows what makes movers most likely to belong to one of the
five types contrasted to people who do not watch TV. The first column
refers to people who only watch COR TV, among whom respondents with
a partner and many friends from the COR are significantly more frequent.
After controlling for sociodemographic and individual variables, it is more
likely that British movers will watch only COR TV. Among people who
only watch COO TV (second category), there is a prevalence of movers
without a university diploma, with a partner from the COO or a third
country, who have not lived in a third country before, have no friends
from the COR and have a bad command of the COR language. Thus, they
lack the resources and opportunities to watch COR TV. These movers
mainly come from France, Britain and Italy; Spain is the destination most
strongly associated with this. The third category, those movers who watch
more COR TV than COO TV, resemble the COR TV only watchers.
Whats more, they often have a partner from a third country, tend to be
older than those who do not watch TV and have lived in the COR before.
Thus, a longer time for establishing this habit as well as opportunities
through friends and family makes movers watch more COR TV. These
movers cannot be found among movers from Germany and France and
movers to Germany. Respondents who prefer COO TV over COR TV (the
fourth category) again show a pattern that is characterized by experience
and opportunities. They are more likely to be older and have no university
diploma. In addition, there are more males among this group and they
tend to have a partner and several friends from the COO. To move in
order to study was not their migration motive, and this is also reflected in
their usually bad command of the COR language. Concerning the origins
and destinations of these movers, we find them among movers from Italy
but not from Germany and not among movers to Germany and Italy
always in comparison to Spain. The last category of equal TV watchers
consists of movers who lived in the COR for a longer time in comparison
to those who never watch TV, have no university diploma and did not
come to study. These movers mainly originate from Spain or go to Spain.
We can draw four major conclusions from these analyses. First, there
is a strong education effect: the more educated, the less TV is watched.
Second there are important country differences: norms, habits but also
availability may play a role in COO TV watching. Third, contact plays a
big role: whether your partner and friends are from the COO or the COR
has a strong impact on TV habits (that is, preferring COO or COR chan-
nels). Finally, language knowledge also determines the choice of COO or
COR stations.
Table 8.2 Multinomial regression analysis of TV watching preferences
Only COR TV Only COO TV More COR TV More COO TV Same amount vs
vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV No TV
Age at migration 20.012 0.011 0.021* 0.026*** 0.015
Years of stay 0.019 0.012 0.032*** 0.029*** 0.036***
Gender (0 5 female) 0.234 20.007 0.275 0.494*** 0.299
University diploma 20.481*** 20.724*** 20.744*** 20.678*** 20.634***
Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) 20.041 1.284*** 0.385 1.046*** 1.046***
Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) 0.470** 0.246 1.012*** 0.402 0.702***
Partner from third country (0 5 no partner) 0.560* 1.008** 0.788** 0.445 0.754**
Employment status (1 5 unemployed) 0.119 0.082 20.015 0.238 20.127
189
Work 20.079 0.057 20.314 0.108 20.140
Study 20.364 20.465 20.486 20.908** 21.039***
Personal reasons 0.079 0.054 20.002 0.441 0.132
Quality of life 20.283 0.189 20.391 0.200 20.150
Miscellaneous
Lived in third country before 20.055 20.371* 20.243 20.198 20.048
Lived in COR before 0.209 0.265 0.430* 0.250 0.203
Several friends from COO 20.169 0.275 0.086 0.457** 0.165
Several friends from COR 0.290* 20.361* 0.622*** 0.064 0.162
Several friends from other countries 20.212 20.261 20.351* 20.168 20.148
Language knowledge at migration date 0.218 20.422 20.025 20.244 0.119
Language knowledge now 0.220 21.038*** 0.094 20.491* 0.017
Only COR TV Only COO TV More COR TV More COO TV Same amount vs
vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV vs No TV No TV
Country of origin
Germany 20.368 0.235 20.890*** 20.581* 20.640**
France 20.729** 1.469*** 21.138*** 0.158 20.654**
Britain 0.644* 1.115*** 20.400 0.019 20.512*
Italy 20.440 1.055*** 0.039 0.824** 0.106
Spain
Germany 21.148*** 20.873*** 20.872** 20.741** 20.898***
190
France 21.214*** 20.069 20.071 20.004 20.741**
Britain 20.216 21.362*** 0.281 20.489 21.051***
Italy 20.282 20.851** 20.521 20.824*** 21.044***
Spain
Constant 1.973*** 20.203 20.366 20.879 0.562
Pseudo R-square (Cox and Snell) 0.386
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: no TV. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.

EU MOVERS AND NEWSPAPERS
Television is of course only one of the mass media used by EU movers. In

this section we will deal with three aspects of newspaper usage: first, the
overall amount of newspaper reading in comparison with stayers; second,
how EU movers divide their time between COO and COR newspapers,
and third, we will focus on the COO or COR newspapers themselves.
Figure 8.3 shows that movers in general also use this media significantly
more intensively than stayers, perhaps in part because collectively they
use both country of origin and country of residence media. The number
of movers who read newspapers for more than one hour per day is always
higher than the respective number of stayers, no matter where they are
from and where they moved to. There are no big differences between
countries of residence. Movers from Italy and Spain read newspapers
most intensively, whereas German movers do not read newspapers a great
deal.
But what determines overall newspaper consumption, who is a heavy
user and who is not? From a regression analysis (not shown) we can
gain further insights into the pattern of media use and the relationships
between other variables and media use. The results indicate that the R2
is not as high as for the overall TV usage and thus that our explanation
of differences will not be as good as for TV. Sociodemographic variables
show a slightly different pattern from that for television: an older age,
being male, having a university degree and having a partner from the COR
60
55 Movers - COR
50 Movers - COO
45 Stayers (ESS)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 8.3 Overall newspaper reading: % for more than 1 hour by COO
and COR
30
Movers - COR
25
Movers - COO
20
15
10
0
Figure 8.4 COR-newspaper reading: % for more than 1 hour by COO

and COR
are associated with a higher level of newspaper reading. Having moved

for quality of life reasons also affects positively the overall level of news-
paper reading. Of the individual variables, having lived in a third country
before, having friends from the COO and other countries as well as having
a good knowledge of the COR language lead to more newspaper reading.
Country differences are not so important as for TV, which may reflect the
fact that the press tend to be available more widely (particularly over the
internet) than television signals. Italians and British in Spain are the most
intensive newspaper readers, presumably reflecting the longer leisure time
available to these movers. In fact, movers to Italy tend to read less COO
press than movers to other countries. Movers from Italy and Spain main-
tain high levels of COO newspaper reading, whereas Germans abroad
tend to abstain from it.
Trying to shed light on what determines COO newspaper consumption,
we carried out a regression analysis (not shown), but with little success.
Only two sociodemographic variables appear to be significant: an older
age at migration and a higher education lead to more COO newspaper
reading. Spanish abroad as well as British and Italians in Spain tend to
read more COO newspapers than the baseline category of Italians in
France.
As for COR newspaper reading, Figure 8.4 shows that almost one-
quarter of all movers to Spain read the Spanish press for more than one
hour per day, whereas only 7.3 per cent of movers to Italy do so. Movers
from Spain read COR newspapers intensively, whereas most Germans
abroad only read newspapers for less than half an hour per day. A regres-
sion analysis (not shown) outlines that an older age at migration, a long
stay, being male and having a partner from the COR are associated with
higher levels of COR newspaper reading. Having migrated to work, for
quality of life reasons or for personal reasons also alter the intensity of
COR newspaper reading in comparison to movers who came for miscel-
laneous reasons. Having friends from the COR and other countries and
currently having and having had a good command of the COR language
at the time of migration also lead to a higher time spent reading COR
press. Again the Italian and Spanish movers tend to read COR newspa-
pers very intensively, perhaps reflecting a desire to learn the language and
integrate.
There are no large variations between countries in the number of movers
who never read a newspaper. Neither are there large differences between
countries in terms of respondents who only read COR newspaper. However,
on average, the number of movers reading only COR newspapers is higher
than the number of movers who only read COO newspapers. German and
British movers tend to only read their home newspapers, especially when
they live in Spain. We can hypothesize that this may be due to the higher
proportion of retirement migrants among them. In fact, Italian movers are
more inclined to read COR rather than COO newspapers.
In comparison to other countries, movers to Britain spend more time
reading British newspapers and almost 40 per cent of all respondents resid-
ing across the Channel read British newspapers only, about 20 per cent
read more COR than COO press and less than 5 per cent read only COO
newspapers. The message is clear: British newspapers come first, perhaps
for reasons of language and a capacity (among quality newspapers at
least) to cater for an international audience. In contrast, EU movers living
in Spain and Germany on average concentrate more on their home news-
papers. At any rate, with the exception of movers settled in Spain, a clear
pattern emerges: EU movers prefer COR newspapers.
To try to explain differences in forms of newspaper consumption among
movers, a multinomial regression analysis was conducted (Table 8.3). The
categories are similar to those for TV watchers: only COR newspapers,
only COO newspapers more COR newspapers more COO newspa-
pers, same amount and no newspaper. The latter serves as the baseline
category. The same independent variables are entered into the regression.
The resulting pseudo-R2, showing the explanation power of the model, is
not as high as for TV watching but still high enough to draw the conclu-
sion that important predictors of newspaper choices can be singled out.
The first column focuses on movers who only read COR newspapers.
Their profile is as follows: they tend to live in the COR for a longer time,
Table 8.3 Multinomial regression analysis of newspaper reading preferences
Only COR Only COO More COR More COO Same amount vs
newspapers vs newspapers vs newspapers vs newspapers vs No newspaper
No newspaper No newspaper No newspaper No newspaper
Age at migration 0.007 0.020*** 0.013* 0.015* 0.008
Years of stay 0.017** 20.005 0.022** 20.007 0.009
Gender (0 5 female) 0.221* 20.061 0.345** 0.190 0.152
University diploma 20.044 0.466*** 0.443*** 0.612*** 0.578***
Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) 20.133 0.159 0.036 0.195 0.148
Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) 0.245 20.003 0.489** 0.273 0.304*
Partner from third country (0 5 no partner) 0.278 0.393 0.309 0.340 0.244
Employment status (1 5 unemployed) 20.249* 20.155 20.264 20.237 20.346**
194
Work 20.800*** 20.034 20.741*** 20.208 20.388*
Study 20.322 0.274 20.354 20.113 20.159
Personal reasons 20.640*** 20.322 20.708*** 20.460* 20.448*
Quality of life 20.379* 0.109 20.600** 20.124 20.274
Miscellaneous
Lived in third country before 0.095 0.202 0.245* 0.134 0.229*
Lived in COR before 20.249* 20.289* 0.121 20.333* 20.091
Several friends from COO 20.204 0.284* 0.195 0.508*** 0.299**
Several friends from COR 0.452*** 20.413*** 0.289* 20.145 20.085
Several friends from other countries 0.058 20.153 0.333* 0.493*** 0.376**
Language knowledge at migration date 0.192 20.196 0.171 0.305 0.294*
Language knowledge now 0.678*** 20.195 1.192*** 0.297 0.780***
Country of origin
Germany 20.476** 20.596** 20.809*** 21.153*** 20.486**
France 20.241 0.266 20.233 20.557* 0.159
Britain 20.091 0.013 20.711*** 20.771*** 20.184
Italy 20.080 20.322 0.099 20.288 0.076
Spain
Germany 0.138 20.226 20.387 20.176 20.237
France 0.256 0.723*** 0.286 0.140 20.238
Britain 0.836*** 20.335 0.573** 20.231 20.233
195
Italy 0.145 20.005 20.019 20.136 0.097
Spain
Constant 20.180 20.647 21.992*** 21.018* 20.583
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: no newspaper. * Significant at 5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.

they are male, with a job, did not move for just one reason, and have
not lived in the COR before but have several friends from the COR and
a good command of the COR language. These movers are not likely to
come from Germany but tend to go to Britain. In contrast to this type
of movers, those movers who only read COO newspapers are highly
educated, do not have friends from the COR and were older when they
migrated. But again, these movers usually do not come from Germany
and are commonly settled in France. The next category, movers who
read more COR than COO newspapers, resembles the COR newspaper
only readers: they tend to be male, to have moved for more than one
reason, and to have several friends from the COR (and third countries)
and a good knowledge of the COR language. Thus, they have the
resources to read the COR press. However, they are also older, with
a university diploma, a partner from the COR and have lived in third
countries before more frequently than non-readers. Germans and British
are underrepresented among them, while movers residing in Britain are
overrepresented.
The group of movers who read more COO than COR newspapers
can be characterized with the following attributes: they were usually
older when they migrated, they have a university diploma and did not
move for personal reasons, they have not lived in the COR before and
have several friends from the COO and third countries. Thus contact
and opportunities again play a role in the prediction of who belongs to
this category. Finally, in this group Spanish are in large numbers. The
last group consists of movers that read the same amount of COR and
COO press. In comparison to movers who never read newspapers, these
readers have a university diploma, have a partner from the COR, are
employed, did not move to work or for personal reasons, tend to have
lived in a third country before and have several friends from the COO
and third countries. They also had and have a good command of the
COR language and are thus able and have the opportunity to read both
type of newspapers.
In sum, the analysis of the patterns of newspaper usage shows that edu-
cation and language knowledge are important predictors for the reading
of COR press. Contacts also play a big role in the decision of which
newspapers are read. A Britain effect is also found: movers to Britain
read British newspapers more than any other group of movers read COR
press, including after controlling for other relevant variables. German
movers in general tend not to read a newspaper at all, again after control-
ling for other variables. In any case, other variables not analysed here (for
example, the availability of foreign press) may also be of relevance for the
prediction of newspaper usage patterns.
EU MOVERS AND THE INTERNET
In the following section we investigate the use of the internet by EU

movers. Firstly we will describe usage patterns, including a comparison
with stayers, and secondly we will again seek to account for these patterns
through regression analyses.
One clear finding is that movers are a lot better connected than stayers.
For instance, in 2004 about 65 per cent of Spanish residents did not have
access, whereas only 13.4 per cent of the EU movers living in Spain (the
least wired in our sample) are without access. Movers residing in Britain
and movers of Italian origin are the best connected of all movers. There
are larger numbers of heavy users of the internet among movers than
among stayers no matter in which country (Figure 8.5).
By conducting a regression analysis, we aimed to identify the conditions
that lead to a more intensive use of the internet among movers. The model
we specified has a high R2, explaining almost 40 per cent of the variance.
The results in Table 8.4 show that internet use can be predicted very well.
A strong age effect emerges: the younger at migration and the more recent
the migration, the more internet is used. Being male and highly educated,
having a partner and being employed lead to a higher internet usage, too.
Having lived in a third country before, as well as having friends from the
COR and other countries and a good command of the COR language also
enhance access to the web. There are significant country effects: movers
from and to Britain show a higher usage of the internet, while Italians in
Germany are particularly aloof from cyberspace.
65
60 Movers - COR
55 Movers - COO
50 Stayers (ESS)
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 8.5 Internet use: % for every day by COO and COR
Table 8.4 OLS regression of internet use of EU movers
Beta
Age at migration 20.277***
Years of stay 20.294***
Gender (0 5 female) 0.056***
Education dummy 0.216***
Partner from COO 0.046**
Partner from COR 0.057***
Partner from third country 0.043**
Respondents current working situation (15unemployed) 20.104***
Reason of migration: work 0.015
Reason of migration: study 0.025
Reason of migration: quality of life 20.019
Reason of migration: family/love 20.003
Lived in third country before 0.055***
Lived in COR before 20.006
Friends from COO 20.012
Friends from COR 0.038**
Friends from other countries 0.038**
Language knowledge at migration date (15good) 0.010
Language knowledge now (15good) 0.058***
Germans in Italy 0.017
Germans in France 0.056***
Germans in Spain 0.036
Germans in Britain 0.126***
French in Germany 0.048
French in Italy 0.027
French in Spain 0.002
French in Britain 0.083***
Italians in Germany 20.114***
Italians in Spain 20.008
Italians in Britain 0.059***
Spanish in Germany 20.009
Spanish in Italy 20.009
Spanish in France 20.007
Spanish in Britain 0.064***
British in Germany 0.099***
British in France 0.107***
British in Italy 0.072***
British in Spain 0.076***
R2 adj. 0.371
Notes: Baselines are Italians in France; no partner; migration motive: miscellaneous

** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%.

WHAT IF? INFORMATION-SEEKING ABOUT

IMPORTANT WORLD EVENTS
As it is methodologically not possible to construct an overall indicator for

media usage, we instead take a closer look at the preferences movers have
when they look for information on an important world event as a means
of getting at this question.1 This variable thus seeks to seize some kind of
a quintessential preference for either COO, COR or third-country media.
Replicating the analytical strategy adopted so far, in this section we will
firstly describe the reported usage patterns and secondly look at the dif-
ferent profiles of respondents with different options through regression
analysis.
This question does not reveal differential levels of access to press, radio,
television or the internet. It is likely that many of those accessing COO
media are doing so via the internet. The flow of internet traffic after 9/11
and other recent terrorist crises suggests that the web is the first means
of information access for many, particularly in the workplace. It is very
significant that roughly equal numbers of people reported that they would
look first at COO media, particularly given the finding that many do not
have access to COO television. This suggests that when people do have
access to COO media, they use it at these sensitive moments.
The distribution of preferences regarding where to search for informa-
tion about important world events shows that 47.2 per cent of all EU
movers report that they would use COR media, compared with 43.8 per
cent who would use COO media. Only a very small percentage would be
likely to use media from a third country (3.8 per cent). Thus, we cannot
find a clear tendency towards COR or COO media at first sight. However,
on a second look, we find that there are major differences between groups
from the various countries of origin. The British are more likely to turn to
British media when looking for information. German movers also show
a slight tendency towards German media, especially if they live in Spain,
where 80 per cent prefer German media. In fact, there are major differ-
ences between countries of residence. EU movers living in Britain are more
likely to use COR media in order to find information regarding the latest
news, especially Spanish and French movers. Movers to Germany, Italy
and Spain on the other hand are more likely to use COO media.
A multinomial regression analysis allows us again to measure the impact
of contextual, sociodemographic and individual variables on the choice
of COR, COO or third-country media and to predict what determines
whether a mover turns to home- or host-country media or to media from
a third country. The choice of third-country media in case of important
world events serves as baseline. Table 8.5 shows the B-coefficients and their
Table 8.5 Multinomial regression analysis of media choice in case of

important world events
COR-media vs COO-media vs
third country third country
media media
Age at migration 20.016 20.018
Years of stay 0.030** 0.005
Gender (0 5 female) 20.054 20.052
University diploma 20.790*** 20.624***
Partner from COO (0 5 no partner) 0.683** 0.976***
Partner from COR (0 5 no partner) 0.476* 0.206
Partner from third country (0 5 no partner) 20.640* 20.619*
Employment status (1 5 unemployed) 20.011 0.209
Work 20.688* 20.456
Study 0.321 0.252
Personal reasons 20.405 20.317
Quality of life 0.096 0.147
Miscellaneous
Lived in third country before 20.313 20.312
Lived in COR before 0.218 0.222
Several friends from COO 0.143 0.492*
Several friends from COR 0.135 20.178
Several friends from other countries 20.779*** 20.742***
Language knowledge at migration date 0.522* 0.322
Language knowledge now 0.196 20.380
Country of origin
Germany 20.136 20.189
France 20.797** 20.400
Britain 20.709* 20.291
Italy 20.305 20.331
Spain
Germany 20.486 20.757*
France 20.320 0.107
Britain 0.499 20.101
Italy 20.817* 20.472
Spain
Constant 3.801*** 4.004***
Notes: Reference category for dependent variable: third country media. * Significant at
5%; ** Significant at 1%; *** Significant at 0.1%

significance as well as the pseudo-R2 for the multinomial regression model.

The pseudo-R2 remains on a modest level, suggesting that the selected
variables do play a role in predicting media choice but also that other vari-
ables not included in the model are indeed potentially important.
Table 8.5 shows that those movers who prefer COR media in compari-
son to movers who prefer third-country media tend to have stayed in the
COR for a longer time, usually have a partner from either the COO or the
COR but not from a third country, did not migrate for work reasons, and
had a good command of the COR language at migration. These movers
tend to come from Spain, and are relatively less likely to live in Italy. On
the other hand, movers preferring COO media over third-country media
have a partner from COO, many friends from the COO, and are not likely
to live in Germany. All in all, the following pattern emerges: educated
people tend to use third-country media more this may be people using
global television stations such as CNN or the BBC. The nature of primary
contacts (partners and friends) again plays the biggest role as well as the
ability to understand COR and third-country media and determine the
choice of media origins. This is not too surprising as media use is a quite
social event, carried out mostly in the physical or virtual company of
partners or friends.
EU MOVERS AND MEDIA SPACES: CONNECTED,

CONVERGING OR TRANSNATIONAL?
When the Tambini family migrated from Italy to Wales in the 1930s, they
were not able to bring much of their culture with them. As they settled
in an area in which Italian immigrants were too few and far between
to support a newspaper distribution network, they were largely discon-
nected from news from the country of their origin. The Tambini grandfa-
ther eventually bought a wireless set, and the family would crouch around
occasional crackly, whistling, distant transmissions in Italian. Most news
of the rise of Italian Fascism came via letters, relayed through base sta-
tions of cafes, churches and summer picnics by new migrants in person.
The link to Italy was fragile. Shortly after Italy entered the Second World
War, the wireless set was confiscated. It was seen as a threat to national
security.
The current generation of intra-European movers, in contrast, have
abundant opportunity to remain connected to their countries of origin
when they move to another EU member state, and are confident that this
will remain the case. Improved international radio services, electronic dis-
tribution and local printing of newspapers, together with satellite and cable
television and more recently the internet create a situation in which news,
culture and information from home is easy to reach. The key channels of
mass communication are no longer delivered exclusively through national
networks of analogue transmitters with a very limited number of national
and local channels. The analysis in this chapter has sought to interrogate
exactly what EU movers are doing given this abundance of choice.
Todays migrants are increasingly in a situation in which they are free
to consume media from a variety of national contexts. They are indeed
using this freedom. The country that they are currently resident in still has
a strong bearing on their choice, but media markets are more porous than
ever before. In this context, movers are choosing to consume home media
in very large numbers. In comparison to stayers and to past generations of
migrants, this alone is a huge shift.
In the most general terms then, it is clear that our sample of migrants
cannot be seen to be wholly integrated within either a COO or a COR
media space. They spend more time in total using the media than stayers
and they appear for the most part to remain in contact with both the COO
and the COR. Intra-EU movers are heavy users of the media in compari-
son with stayers. In general they read more newspapers, use the internet
more, and (with some exceptions) watch TV more than the general popu-
lation. A significant proportion of this large amount of time devoted to the
media is spent accessing information from the country of origin.
The factors that were strongly linked in our data with use of COO
media were in particular whether friends and partners are from the COO
or the COR. Those who have partners from the COR are as we might
expect more likely to watch COR television. Older and retired migrants
tend to be heavier users of COO media, and the more educated read
newspapers more. Another interesting effect is that of a longer stay in the
country of residence. However, this effect is not so clear, as the length
of stay in the COR is confounded with the age at migration and the age
at the time of the survey. The following pattern emerges when analysed
carefully: regardless of whether TV, newspaper or general media usage
is concerned, the variable age influences COO media usage, in the sense
that the older the mover is, the more s/he is likely to use COO media. On
the other hand, the variable years of stay influences COR media usage,
in the sense that the longer the mover lives in the COR, the more likely
s/he is to use COR media.
All this said, COR media use continues to be very important, in most
cases prevalent, even where COO media are easily accessible. This indi-
cates that the further expansion of access to COO media will not simply
lead to migrant groups seceding entirely from the host media space.
Clearly there remain significant reasons to use COR media. Indeed, COR
mass media (both television and the press) remain pre-eminent among
migrants media choices. After all, the numbers who report that they only
watch COR television and use COR newspapers is far greater than those
who only use COO newspapers and television.
Because so many factors affect migrants media choices (education, age,
social networks to name but three), there appears to be no simple linear
relationship between increasing availability of COO media and their use
by movers. COO media simply are not migrants first choice, and the data
seem also to indicate some potential hypotheses why this might be the case.
Clearly media use plays a central role in the process of movers adjustment
to the COR. The high level of use of COO media by retirees and those with
partners from the COO may even indicate that media use is one of several
threshold issues that can tip the balance in integration processes in favour
of further integration with host, or enduring links to home society.
The decision to use COO media may be linked to broader strategic or
habitual behaviours. Whereas in the past the chance to remain virtually
attached to the homeland via the electronic media was simply not avail-
able, todays migrants can and in some cases do make the positive choice
to remain virtually at home. This choice seems to be affected by relational
and cultural determinants (for example, whether the partner is from the
COO) as well as by structural ones such as education and position in the
labour market. With that in mind, it is clear that those movers who have
fewer needs to integrate (needs for political information, language, public
services) are more likely to use COO media.
Some countries are relatively more successful in including intra-
European migrants in the national audience for television. Almost 60 per
cent of movers to Britain said they did not watch any COO television, and
a further 19 per cent reported that they watched more COR than COO
media. A mere 2 per cent of movers residing in Britain reported that they
watched only television from their country of origin. Conversely, some
countries are more successful at using media to maintain links with their
diaspora, and Britain is a leading case in this regard. We can hypothesize
that this is due to some combination of: difficulty of accessing foreign
channels in the UK, ease of access to British channels abroad, the sociode-
mographic make-up of the migrant group, and arguably other subjective
factors related to the perceived quality of media offer (for example, the
prestige of the BBC).
In our survey questions we did not ask for detailed responses on what
material was accessed on the internet, and whether internet access was
opening up significant links to home-country news and information, but
we did ask to which media migrants turn when they seek news on a signifi-
cant world event. Here the response is clear. COR media are not the first
place to turn for most EU movers in Spain, Italy and Germany. Equally,
it appears that migrants from some EU countries primarily Britain and
Germany feel a stronger pull from their home-country media when it
comes to major historical events. Whilst it is ultimately impossible to dis-
aggregate the role of different factors in these outcomes (availability, lan-
guage, partner, media trust and preference), EU movers of this generation
are actively constructing a media diet from the growing array of sources.
The fact that third-country media score relatively low is of note: the battle
for the media loyalties of migrants is really ultimately between the local
concerns of origin and destination countries, not between a canvas of
global media players.
Whether the official European Commission support for a Common
European Space will have an impact will not be clear for some years. The
i2010 policy was launched in 2005. But the data outlined in this chapter
confirm that the information space inhabited by the pioneers of European
integration is already at least a co-national one. The evidence suggests that
EU movers are early adopters of communications technology such as the
internet, and where new communications possibilities exist, they are quick
to use them. Intra-European movers settle into a transnational media
framework: whereas in the past links to home countries were often sym-
bolic and required acts of deliberate and sustained construction of identity
by migrants, new media such as the internet and satellite TV in particular
offer the means by which migrants can maintain strong knowledge of and
engagement with both country of origin and country of residence. This
transnational hybrid existence has for some time been posited as a feature
of current migrants, but the precise consequences for the marketplace of
loyalties have not been fully explored in the study of immigrant integra-
tion (Bakir 1996). Our survey is perhaps the first of its kind to lay out the
empirical detail of that engagement in Europe.
NOTE
1. Question text: If you heard about an important world event, where would you first
look to find out more information? 1) [COR] media, 2) [COO] media, 3) third country
media.
9. Internal and external movers:
EastWest migration and the
impact of EU enlargement
Adrian Favell and Tina M. Nebe
THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF EASTWEST

MIGRATION
The growing intra-EU mobility of West Europeans, that is the principle

focus of this book, has been a largely unremarked if not almost invis-
ible phenomenon in most countries of residence. This is decisively not
the case with migrants and movers from East and Central Europe. In the
run-up to the two EU accessions of 2004 and 2007, there was a great deal
of media coverage of these other pioneers of European integration, in
often very hostile terms. EU enlargement, of course, notionally changes
the migration/mobility relationship of East and Central European citizens
to the West, from external migrants to internal movers. Supposedly, some
day, Polish or Romanian movers (for example), should simply become
indistinguishable from their mobile West European counterparts, in rights
and opportunities, if not in reality.
For the moment, this outcome has been stalled, despite the twin acces-
sions, by the maintenance of certain transitional limitations on mobility
to most of the older member states, although one by one the barriers
are coming down. Initially only three countries Ireland, Sweden and
Britain opened their borders with no transitional barriers to the new
A8 members in 2004. This included Poland, with the largest popula-
tion of potential movers. From May 2006, Spain, Portugal, Greece and
Finland followed suit. Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands
and Italy also reduced barriers for the first wave of new members, with
only Germany and Austria saying they would maintain them for the
duration of the transitional period (until 2011). However, led by the deci-
sion of Britain and Spain two of the primary recipients of EastWest
migrants to keep doors shut, transitional barriers remained in place for
workers from the two new member states that joined in 2007, Bulgaria and
205
Romania. But formal barriers do not mean that doors are really shut. All
new member states now enjoy visa-free tourist travel. And by themselves,
legal barriers do not prevent much of the migration, which has been and
remains mostly informal in nature, such that bringing down formal barri-
ers is, in effect, a form of regularization of migrant status (see also Jileva
2002; Lavenex and Uarer 2002).
Despite these realities on the ground, crude fears in the West about
EastWest floods have not abated. The spectre of the Polish plumber
played a significant negative role in the rejection of the EU constitution
in France in 2005; hostile reports about the people smuggling of Roma
and Slavic migrants, or crime associated with them, still fill the tabloid
press in Britain and Italy. Notwithstanding upbeat theories about a wider
European integration following enlargement, there is still a growing
anxiety across all of Western Europe, and in both economic and cultural
terms about the consequences of free movement from East and Central
Europe.
Early in the design of the PIONEUR study, it was decided to take
advantage of the timing of the research (around the years of the acces-
sion), and the burning topicality of EastWest migration in Europe, to
ask questions parallel to the EIMSS of comparable EastWest movers.
Practically all the reputable scholarship, and most of the advocacy on
immigration and free movement policy, suggests that there is little to
fear from a full opening of Western Europes borders to the East (Hille
and Straubhaar 2001; Wallace and Stola 2001; Favell and Hansen 2002).
Indeed, most studies extol the dramatic economic and political benefits of
this integration, while chastising the negative attitudes of politicians and
public opinion (see for example the reports by ECAS 2005 and 2006 and
Kelo and Wchter 2004, as well as the arguments advanced during the
European Commissions 2006 European Year of Mobility). In this view,
flows are likely to be increasingly governed by supply and demand forces;
East and Central Europeans pose few questions of cultural and racial dif-
ference from their host societies; and their increasingly temporary and cir-
cular migration patterns remove the probable longer-term costs to welfare
states that some immigration is thought to bring. In sum, European
integration is likely to lead to a new and stable continent-wide European
migration system, in which EastWest mobility is likely to be no more or
less significant than current intra-West EU mobility, as well as filling gaps
in the labour market that would otherwise have to pull in non-Europeans
to the continent.
If we are to believe such Panglossian-sounding predictions, the patterns
and experiences of the intra-West EU movers surveyed in this book should
be the best guide and forerunner to the present and future patterns and
Internal and external movers 207
experiences of EastWest movers. This should apply as much to quantita-

tive forecasts as to the qualitative experiences of migrants, and the kind
of reception they are likely to receive in new host countries. The most
convincing scholarship on EastWest migration has indeed specifically
suggested that this particular enlargement should be no more dramatic or
difficult in its impact on free movement/migration than previous enlarge-
ments to Spain, Portugal or Greece and hence should over time follow
the same demographic and social trajectory (see especially Kupiszeski
2002).
But this is certainly not how most member states are evaluating the
scenario politically. That most member states have ignored the combined
weight of scholarship and advocacy the facts and arguments as they
have been presented above and maintained cautious barriers as well as
a hostile political stance, shows that the political calculus at stake here
is being governed by other reasons. Perhaps these governments argue
correctly that support for further integration is so fragile that it cannot
sustain this particular extension of free movement, regardless of how
beneficial or benevolent the economic consequences of open borders
can be. Perhaps, too, there are other sociological aspects to this ques-
tion that might be thought of in terms of exclusion and/or exploita-
tion that are not reflected in the theories of economists or findings of
demographers on which the upbeat scholarship and policy prescriptions
are founded.
Our chapter then sets out to evaluate which of the scenarios in fact
applies to the new intra-EU migrants from Central and Eastern Europe.
Are their experiences qualitatively comparable to the kinds of experiences,
documented elsewhere in the volume, that West European movers have?
Or do their experiences in fact point to a persisting differentiation in their
access, treatment and experiences as migrants in the West? Our interviews-
based data allow us to ask these questions through the eyes of EastWest
movers themselves. Though perhaps fulfilling economic expectations by
moving West, they also bear the brunt of negative social and political reac-
tions to their presence in new host countries. If their experiences are not
positive, then the EU integration process after the 2004 and 2007 enlarge-
ments as theorised by the Commission and scholars alike is not likely
to run as smoothly as predicted. For they are as are the internal movers
surveyed in the rest of the book the real life, flesh and bone avatars of the
broad macro-processes of European integration theorized by others. Their
similarities to and their differences from the West European intra-EU
movers will thus provide a very good guide to the prospects of intra-EU
movement in a wider, more inclusive Europe (see also Favell and Elrick
2008).
METHODS AND DATA
In Autumn 2004, 40 in-depth interviews were carried out with Polish

and Romanian migrants in the five PIONEUR countries. Poland is
the largest new accession country, and a major net supplier of labour
to the West; Romania was at that moment the largest of the candidate
countries (excepting Turkey), and had signed a number of pre-accession
and visa-free travel agreements. These rights were particularly seen as
worrisome for the West, because of Romanias large Roma population
and slow adaptation to the EU acquis. The worries have not abated with
Romanias eventual accession as a full EU member in 2007. The migrants
interviewed were residents with a legal work contract who had been resid-
ing in the host country for at least one year and no longer than ten years
at the time of interview. Eight interviews were conducted in each country:
four with Poles, four with Romanians. In each setting, one high-skilled
woman and one high-skilled man (with university/college degree) as well
as one low-skilled woman and one low-skilled man were included in the
sample.
For internal comparative purposes, the sample was deliberately skewed
towards high-skilled movers: in fact, more than half of the population in
Poland and Romania do not hold university/college degrees. In several
of the models, though, it is assumed that higher-skilled talented people
are more likely to move (Borjas 1999; Csed 2008). Respondents were
found through a mixed range of snowball strategies: through expatriate
associations, Polish/Romanian churches, online networks, consulates
and personal networks. These loose procedures were in fact needed to
fill all the categories in question; it was deemed important to get hold
of interesting, individual cases who might exemplify and embody some
of the archetypal experiences or mechanisms at work in this migration.
Interviews were almost all conducted by native speakers and co-nationals
at the interviewees home, workplace or in public, lasting between one
and two hours, and were fully transcribed and translated into English for
analysis.
Questions were asked about the same wide range of issues as for
West European movers. What will concern us here are the migrants
subjective experiences of moving, their motivation, the barriers they
encountered, their employment, their experiences of housing, bureauc-
racy and public services in the host country, their self-reported assess-
ment of their own mobility in relation to their initial aspirations and
expectations, and their experience of the host population in terms of
reception, integration and discrimination. The questionnaire followed
a broadly similar pattern to the qualitative pilot study interviews done
with Western EU movers, although in practice it was more loosely

structured (see Appendix C). A contrast and comparison can be made
between these interviews.
It was initially thought that some kind of systematic content analysis
might be viable, but the interviews offered a more varied, uneven set of
findings that made this impractical and counterproductive. In fact, with
semi-structured interviews that sometimes go off in highly interesting
yet personalised directions, it makes as much sense to focus on them as
individualized narratives or voices, illustrating and embodying broader
trends that could be found across and within the populations in question.
Individual examples are particularly good for identifying case-specific
mechanisms producing certain outcomes that may add up in aggregate
terms to a structural pattern or trend. The work done here is broadly
analogous to the interviewing and analysis strategy used by Favell (2008a)
in his study of internal West European professional migrants, minus the
more city-focused context and interview selection procedures. The sample
allows therefore for interesting contrasts and comparisons across class
and education, gender, nationality and age. The goal here essentially is to
typologize, identifying archetypes in which particular variables might be
relevant to certain examples of migrant. The chapter should be read as a
pilot study, offering pointers to future research on the new pioneers in
Europe.
EXCLUSION AND EXPLOITATION: STORIES OF

THE NEW PIONEERS
The analysis of our findings leads to a mass of quite complicated observa-

tions about the subjective experiences and objective social trajectories of
the migrants in question. Here we group some of the most salient find-
ings under a number of headings, before in each case offering a broader
discussion of their significance.
Crossing Borders is Easy but Settlement Abroad is Hard, and

Discrimination is Perceived by Many
For all the EastWest migrants, the main barriers to integration in the
country of residence are formal papers, that is, formal residence and work
permits. The problem lies in finding a place to stay and a job rather than in
crossing borders. Many migrants entered legally (for example, on a tourist
visa) but went into illegality for varied periods. Prior to EU enlargement,
there was no great difference here between Poles and Romanians, and the
incomplete accession procedures in the majority of member states has left

it that way. Due to continuing restrictions on free movement for Poles,
the difference between Poles and Romanians in terms of their perceived
difficulty of settling in are not pronounced. It should be noted that all the
informants moved to the PIONEUR countries before enlargement, but
the interviews took place after May 2004.
The problems shared by our Polish and Romanian interviewees over
formal procedures centred on difficulties reported in association with the
respective national bureaucracies that is, getting papers of all sorts and
finding a regular job. Also, in most countries, they encountered specific
regulated labour markets in varied sectors where Eastern European
diplomas are not recognized. The formal EU enlargement as yet makes
no difference to the perceived relative value of East European education,
even if in many cases it compares favourably in quality to that of Western
Europe. The differences here with intra-EU West European migrants are
thus still striking.
Let us look at Marias trajectory that is representative of many others
to breathe life into these findings. Maria is a 26-year-old who came to
Italy after finishing business school in Poland. When she could not find a
job with Andersen consulting or any other large multinational corpora-
tions in Warsaw, she decided to move to Bologna as an au pair to improve
her language skills. During that year she met her fianc. When it became
clear that there was still no amazing job awaiting her in Warsaw, she
decided to move in with him in his native Southern town. And then the
hard part began, she says, about the professional path that followed. Her
first job was doing some office work in a call centre.
Maria: The job was really great, well paid and very interesting. Yes, they
were interested in my working for them, because of my education,
foreign languages, skills etc. But it came out that employing me
wasnt that simple. I didnt have a residence permit. I just didnt
have it. Thats why I couldnt be employed.
Interviewer: So you were on a tourist visa . . .
Maria: I was still on a tourist visa then, of course. Well, what to do?
The circle closes. As you dont have a residence permit, you
cant be employed. You cant be employed as you dont have a
residence permit. You wont get a residence permit, if youre not
employed.
So after just one month, it turned out that Marias new employers couldnt
keep her. The immigration quotas for secretaries and translators were
exhausted, and Maria could not regularize her situation. She then found a
position in the sewing room of a garment factory.
The whole thing started once again. Do you have a tax code? This is the
equivalent of Polish NIP. I didnt. [. . .] No, we cant do it this way. We can
take only the foreigners who already have a residence permit. So I say But
how can I get a residence permit, if nobody wants to employ me, goddammit?!
I dont know, but were a cooperative and we cant take you, because we have
controls here all the time. If they found you, you know, with your situation . . .
I cant employ you. Im really sorry, because youre a good worker. When you
have a residence permit, please come back. If I have a residence permit, I will
surely work as a needlewoman. I thanked him, took my salary and I was left
out in the cold again.
Maria next took on a job as an in-house carer for an elderly noblewoman.

This time it was her who left the job after a few weeks: The countess
started to be really troublesome. I even started to fear for my health. Soon
her boyfriend arranged work in a restaurant with a bowling alley for her,
still without a work contract. When Maria attempted once more to regu-
larize her situation under Italys lenient regularization campaigns, asking
her employer to apply for the necessary papers, he said: What for? Youll
be soon in the European Union, so you wont need a residence permit.
It was difficult to convince him, but in the end he filled in the application form.
I had to pay 800 euros. It was a fee an employer had to pay for an employment,
but in reality no employer did it. If a foreigner wanted a job, he wouldnt eat to
have the money to buy his freedom. Like in the apartheid, like in the slavery.
You were buying your freedom for 800 euros. So I paid it with the rest of the
money I had, the savings I brought from Poland . . . It was horrible in that job.
I was humiliated, I was treated like an inferior being . . . I was treated in a horri-
ble way, including sexual harassment [pause] . . . in a workplace. But as I really
wanted to get that residence permit, I had to endure it.
After having waited for almost one year continuing to work under ter-
rible conditions, no weekends, no holidays and an unpleasant workplace
Maria found out that her employer had simply ignored the letter he had
received from the questura. He didnt want to retrospectively pay the taxes
for those ten months Maria had already been working with him illegally.
After several fights and much back and forth, Maria finally signed a
part-time contract with her bosss wife (to work full-time of course), and
received her work permit. Now she says:
At this moment I swear Im happy. Im a happy person . . . At this moment

Im consistently going ahead. My main goal now is to find a better job, with a
higher salary, to improve a little my standard of living, to find a bigger apart-
ment, to have a normal family. Because everyone wants that.
Marias case shows how difficult it can be for these external movers
to obtain a work/residence permit, even when they are highly skilled. In
general, there are stark differences among the EastWest movers in the
difficulties they experience when trying to get their papers together, finding
housing and trying to find a regular job. These depend clearly on educa-
tional/skill level. Moving and settling is much easier for better-educated or
higher-skilled people, regardless of whether they are Polish or Romanian.
Net of this factor, moving and settling is easier for Poles, and easiest in
Britain. However, (perceived) discrimination is a factor everywhere, even
for the Poles. It appears strongest in Italy, followed by Spain and France
(where they are more likely to be viewed as clandestine). The majority
even among Poles feel they are the second-class citizens of Europe,
as one Polish high-skilled woman put it. We are . . . a lower race, second
category . . . We are just Poles, workers, says another, who is in a low-
skilled category. They report encountering discrimination in finding jobs
and housing, verbal attacks and strange looks, and talking behind their
back.
Maybe if I were English, they wouldnt have treated me like that. If I were
German. Generally Poles are treated worse. Poles, Albanians, Romanians,
Russians, Ukrainians. These are lower nations. These are poor nations that
migrate for economic reasons, to better their standard of living. Englishmen
dont need to do it. Dutch and other so-called rich nations neither. Thats why
the attitude towards us is very racist, very discriminatory in many situations.
[High-skilled Polish woman in Italy]
The worst thing is . . . I have realised how [pause] . . . xenophobic are the people
here. I did not wait [expect] that . . . Not so much in professional life, but I say
to you also in private life. [High-skilled Polish woman in Spain]
There is, on the whole, less discrimination perceived in Britain (where

migrants feel more valued) and Germany (where they are often recog-
nized as legitimate co-ethnics). Note that many Polish and Romanian
migrants in Germany in fact hold Aussiedler status.
I honestly tell you that I was never hurt since I have been here. I often said . . . I
dont know, I hear so many negative issues, so many things . . . [but] I was never
hurt. Not at work, not here where I live . . . If in the morning, if I had a very
high temperature and I gave Mrs X [her landlady] a call and she came upstairs
. . . And I had backache she immediately called the doctor on call, he came,
gave me an injection into my back. Things like that. [Low-skilled Romanian
man in Germany]
It is interesting to note that feeling discriminated against comes with a

certain level of cultural acquaintance and language skills. Once you know
your way around, and are able to interact, you are more likely to notice
things. For many of those who have little or no connection with the host
society, they note only the superficial friendliness of the host community.
Respondent: Me personally . . . maybe if I understood the language I am sure

I have been in such a situation before [a discriminatory situation]
but I simply did not understand.
Interviewer: But in such ordinary situations, when you go shopping do you
feel that you are treated differently?
Respondent: No, no. [Low-skilled Polish woman in Britain]
The fact that jobs pull in migrants regardless of the EU governance

structures suggests a more informal labour market governed process than
one controlled by a well-managed EU migration system. It is interesting to
note, however, that this free market scenario perhaps does not persist over
time. Migrants can experience exclusionary reactions from the host society,
and inclusionary mechanisms linked to the EU status of the sending
country can become more relevant over time, particularly in the difficult
settlement process faced by migrants. The EastWest migration system is
thus a short-term market-based system, limited by longer-term political
and sociological effects. Discrimination is a factor of sociological exclu-
sion, but it is arguably a secondary phenomenon. Whatever the case, this is
certainly not free movement in a unified European space, and nor is it free
movement in a policy vacuum: the distinctions in labour market regulation
and effects of sociological exclusion between countries of reception suggest
that national differences continue to be more important over time than
the general EU frame. Negative experiences vary a lot across the sample,
although higher-skilled migrants are clearly better off in this respect.
Not all External Movers Move for Economic Reasons; Few Experience
Upward Social Mobility and Many Experience Downward Mobility
The inclusion of East and Central European movers in a wider Europe

poses questions about the political economy of such migration of the fol-
lowing kind. How does the market work to select people to fill jobs, and
what difference do certain policies make? Are they the proverbial bright-
est and best, or are they mismatched to the jobs they find? Is their move a
success? And who reaps the net benefits the country of origin or country
of reception, or both? These questions may help us work out whether the
market-governed system in question tends to be more exploitative or
liberational in its character.
For the market to work (according to theory), migrants have to move
with economic motives that is, calculating in economic terms to reap
certain benefits. On the whole, all the Poles, without exception, seem to
have moved on this basis: to buy a house back home, to support their
family, to have a better life and so forth. A Polish driver in Britain says:
Interviewer: Why did you decide to move abroad? What were the reasons?
Respondent: Above all, money. One says: money cannot bring you luck,
but without it the situation was just tragic. Especially when
you have a family to support, having no money is terrible.
Unfortunately, the situation in Poland was simply awful and
it was getting even worse. Therefore I was forced to migrate.
[Low-skilled Polish man in Britain]
Among Romanians, only the less-educated could be said to have moved

with these kinds of clear material motivations uppermost. Romanians
instead reported that they moved: (a) to escape the political situation at
home:
Respondent: We left, left immediately after the revolution. Thus, I could say
that there had been political problems before the revolution.
You couldnt, could not say what you were thinking, during
that time before the revolution. Well, you could not dare to say
what you wanted to say because there were . . . You would have
immediately been sent to prison.
Interviewer: And this was a reason to say: let us leave? [Pause] Was this
important?
Respondent: Ahm [pause] . . . In the first place for my husband. Because he was
of Romanian origin and he, ahm . . . had problems, some politi-
cal problems because he often said things which you were not
allowed to say and they interrogated him then. He was ordered to
come to the police a few days afterwards, and they interrogated
him about some issues, you did not know where, ahm, they have
heard it from . . . You worked with your colleagues and maybe
you said something which for you . . . you didnt notice . . . Those
issues werent so important, not big ones, but the Securitate was
very harsh . . . especially with Saxons. Such it was. This is the
truth. [Low-skilled Romanian woman in Germany]
or (b) for romantic reasons:
I came here to get married. I met somebody from here and we considered that
it would be better for both of us to come and live here. [Low-skilled Romanian
woman in Britain]
or (c) or to claim the Aussiedler status in Germany:
It is very clear that if my wife was not, ahm, a German, and we went to any
other country, it would be more difficult for us. Well, ahm, what Germany did,
well, at least for the Aussiedler, but even for others, too . . . I think that there
are not many countries doing this. I think so! And, ahm, you had to understand
some issues because nobody was waiting for you with open arms. I told you at
the beginning, as a Romanian I actually didnt have great expectations. It was
much harder for the Germans from Romania. Thus, they were, ahm, Germans
in Romania and here they are Romanians. [High-skilled Romanian man in
Germany]
For high-skilled movers from both countries of origin, the utilitarian

reasons for migration were thus often supplemented by secondary motives
such as having new cultural experiences, learning a new language, having
an adventure and so on.
The migrants thus generally actively chose a particular country of recep-
tion (that is, there were additional cultural reasons for migrating to one
or other PIONEUR country). Low-skilled migrants often ended up in
a host country by chance (especially in France), via agencies (especially
Britain), because of special citizenship provisions (Germanys Aussiedler
policy), or because an acquaintance provided them with a job (for
example, in Spain, where it is perceived to be easy to get by as an illegal
immigrant and ultimately get legalized).
I knew that it is Europas only country where it is possible to do . . . the resi-

dence, out of [apart from] Italy. In Italy it is possible to do the same thing. They
do the papers to you . . . Since there I had the possibility . . . I knew a few friends
and I was thinking that I was going to have great help of their part . . . [High-
skilled Romanian man in Spain]
In all these cases, where a strict economic match is not taking place
between the migrants expectations and the receiving host countrys
labour needs, we can expect distortions in the labour market outcomes
that will be seen in various negative outcomes, either in terms of the net
benefits on either side of the migration, hostility in the host countrys reac-
tions, or negative experiences among the migrants.
One indication of these outcomes is the prevalent downward social
mobility experienced by migrants. Very few have had clear personal bet-
terment in employment status through their migration, even if they are
positive about other aspects such as salary.
A Romanian woman who previously held a skilled job in Romania now
works as a kitchen help in an old-peoples home. She says:
I had, ahm, had, ahm, worked at a comprehensive secondary school and a

technical veterinary school in Romania. I had a good job. But here I had the
possibility to, to send my children to school, each of them to gain a profession.
[. . .] It is much better than in Romania. Well, with the salary you get here, you
can afford to live, to pay the rent . . . Of course, we, ahm, are working much
more, ahm, with mechanical instruments. Thats it [laughs]. But, ahm, with the
salary you earn you can afford to live a much better life [pause] . . . To afford
much more than at the time . . . ahm, with the respective salary you got there in
Romania. [Low-skilled Romanian woman in Germany]
There are many stories of diplomas not being recognized, and of higher-
skilled movers especially women taking up unskilled jobs in EU15
countries, such as care for the elderly, working as a kitchen helper and
the like. Our very first example above, Maria, is a graphic case. In addi-
tion, relative to where they came from, Poles seem more fond of their
home country than Romanians and often also more disappointed with the
moving experience.
In Polish culture . . . Poland as a value. Poland as my blood . . . Do you under-

stand? Poland . . . for me the white eagle is the white eagle. I have it always in a
jacket label. These are things . . . I feel Polish. I was born Polish and I will die
Polish. [High-skilled Polish man in Italy]
Several migrants reported being resigned to Western European class struc-

tures, and their inability to move up within them. Having rejoiced over
higher pay (compared with Poland or Romania) in the beginning, they
soon realized that the cost of living is also higher in the West, and that
society is also more stratified than in Central and Eastern Europe (that is,
the formerly communist societies they knew). Many migrants thus seemed
to experience discrimination not due to their nationality but due to their
class position.
I changed a couple of jobs, but I cannot complain. Of course, the prices are
much higher here, but one gets also decent money. You cannot do many things
with the money that you get, but at least you have a normal life . . . Ehh, you
know these things, of course. Nobody tells you to your face, they are not crazy,
come on. [But] You see them . . . I guess . . . They look at you as if you were a
piece of shit. I do not know . . . You know how these things go . . . Or maybe
not [to the interviewer] Cause you are student, you are dottore [short giggle]
. . . You are dottorato, isnt it? [Low-skilled Romanian man in Italy]
Conversely, the success stories are found among the highly skilled, par-
ticularly where they hold Western university degrees. Below, we cite a
Romanian medical doctor in the UK with a PhD from Oxford. Similar
statements were made by a Polish man who holds a French engineering
degree, and by a Romanian with an MBA from Cyprus.
I found relatively easy a job in a good hospital because, maybe, I had already a
PhD degree awarded by the University of Oxford, but I think that it would have
been different if I would have only my Romanian diploma. I also had to pass a test,
called PLAB, in order to have my medical degree recognized here. I am convinced
that although the system tries to be impartial, the candidates from the UK are
preferred, and even among them there is a hierarchic preference system regard-
ing the school of medicine they graduated. I wanted to find a position in a certain
specialisation [plastic surgery] but this was achieved with a lot of effort because a
candidate from a foreign country has to be two times or three times better than a
candidate from this country. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Britain]
But upward social mobility is also reported by some of those married to a

EU15 country national or by some who worked their way up:
So, weve achieved . . . Today, I can say that weve achieved things we would
have never achieved in Poland, you understand? [High-skilled Polish man in
Italy]
Some do feel recognized in the country of reception:
In France we are taken into consideration because we are a good working force,
arent we? They need us. We dont have health assurance; we arent paid for hol-
idays, for vacations and so on. So we are very good workers. And if you make
them some problems, they can send you home. So for these reasons, I think we
are taken into consideration here. [Low-skilled Romanian man in France]
These findings indicate that the free labour market is working, but in
biased ways cultural affinities and non-economic motivations introduce
distortions in the matching process. The system will be inefficient if only
the Western educated are successful. It will also be a big problem for
the Panglossian ideal promoted by the European Commission if these
most talented dont go back, along the lines of the dreaded brain drain
outcome. Those who are Eastern educated are most liable to be blocked,
undervalued and thus exploited when they move especially in highly
regulated labour markets. For example, to be a plumber in Germany you
need several professional exams and membership of the guild of plumbers,
and you cannot just open your own company, even with 20 years of work
experience. Similar problems exist in other countries.
Interviewer: Do you believe that . . . that your qualifications has served you
to find work here?
Respondent: No, not for nothing . . . To obtain something, I need to be
employed at two low works do you understand? And I cannot
work as electrician. I know how to do many things, know
masonry, know painting, gardening, plastering . . . many things.
Many things. But I cannot work. [High-skilled Romanian man
in Spain]
High-level skills alone are not enough: having the right (Western) diplomas is
a very heavy burden. The disappointment and frustration experienced among
the better placed and qualified (such as our first case, Maria) suggest that the
matching process is not so efficient. Their downward mobility suggests that
much talent and human capital is being wasted. EastWest migrants are
more likely to find themselves in exploitative scenarios, rather than ones in
which they fully benefit from their move, even in an integrated EU.
Cultural Affinity is no Guarantee of Low Discrimination
We might expect that perceived cultural similarity (affinity, that is, between
Latin countries) would tend to lead to less experience of discrimination.
Decades of sociopsychological research on the so-called similarityaffinity
hypothesis have supported this claim. However, this is not the case with
the Polish and Romanian migrants interviewed for the PIONEUR project.
Cultural similarity between migrant and host population is not a good predic-
tor of levels of perceived discrimination. As noted above, levels of perceived
discrimination were highest in Italy and Spain. Yet the perceived (cultural)
similarity of Poles and Romanians is also highest in these countries.
I am not sure . . . With Italians, well, they are a little bit like us . . . I do not
know, I mean, Latins, you know, not cold and rigid like the Nordics . . . maybe.
They are more open, Italians, Latins . . . and then they like football, like us.
[Low-skilled Romanian man in Italy].
Spanish people [have] . . . an extraordinary similarity with the Romanian per-

sonality . . . They are Europa extremes and so similar as the attitude in front of
the life. [They are both] fighters, proud . . . but open minded, the same thing! Its
for this reason so many Romanians come here, because they feel very good . . .
Not like France . . . The mentality [here] is identical. The temperament. [High-
skilled Romanian woman in Spain]
Yet the feeling of discrimination expressed in both Spain and particularly

Italy is a constant refrain.
People look at us as if we grew up in Africa. . . . Romania is like . . . banana-

republic . . . and they are scared that we are some kind of savages and that we
are going to cheat on them . . . Let me give you an example. For instance when
we were looking for a flat. You are from Romania? No, thank you, there are
no flats for you. [Low-skilled Romanian man in Italy]
On the other hand, considerable cultural differences are perceived to exist

between Romanians and Poles and the Germans or British, with France
somewhere in-between.
Interviewer: Perhaps you tell something about these cultural differences.

How is it? Are Polish and German mentalities different or are
they similar? How do you see it?
Respondent: Different I think. Poles are more open-minded I think. And
Germans are more closed and concentrated on themselves and
not that spontaneous either. [. . .] Thats a barrier.
Interviewer: Are there still other cultural differences?
Respondent: [After a pause] . . . There are cultural differences, when church is
the point. At our place in Poland church belongs to the everyday
life of an average Pole I would say. I dont say every Pole but
average Pole. But here it looks differently. Ah, you know in the
church . . . Who goes to church here? Nobody. And young people
. . . not at all. [High-skilled Polish woman in Germany]
Englishmen are nice but its very shallow and I dont like that. For me its too
cold and thats why its difficult to integrate. [High-skilled Romanian woman
in Britain]
Yet less discrimination at work and in private life is consistently reported

in Britain and Germany, as mentioned above. A possible explanation for
this phenomenon can be found in social identity theory (Tajfel 1981). Once
a respondent feels that his/her in-group (say Poles) and his/her out-group
(say Spanish) are similar, an automatic psychological mechanism called
in-group favouritism comes into play. The in-group strives to distinguish
itself from the out-group and evaluate its own group favourably in order
to gain a positive group identity. Where groups are perceived as different,
they dont even bother comparing one another.
Among our interviewees, there was none of the hostility reported in
connection with competition over jobs with existing ethnic and immigrant
minorities in post-colonial countries like France or Britain, something that
has been picked up in other studies (Garapich 2008). One peculiar finding
from the data, however, was a Britain effect: external movers in Britain
are, in line with the native population, more sceptical of the EU.
Circular Mobility is on the Rise
Many of our interviewees especially among the Poles stated that they
would like to return home after some years in the COR. Once they have
earned enough money, they plan to buy a home there, or be with their
families. There could be a connection with the finding that Poles also seem
to be more fond of their home country than Romanians:
Well, every Pole builds himself a house in Poland and were building one as
well . . . Yes, its almost finished, but sometimes we wonder if we need it. Our
children were born here . . . [Low-skilled Polish man in Italy]
Now everything is a little bit different . . . In fact, I am already here for so long
but the whole time I am missing my home and . . . practically I have decided
that ahm [pause] . . . that I wont stay here for good, that I just want return
to Poland and simply live there. I want to live there because, because I cant
imagine to stay here, ahm [pause] . . . and all the time and to miss Poland and
my home. [High-skilled Polish woman in Germany]
The main element that makes a move back home feasible seems to be
economic development at home. Here, it is clear that the Polish and
Romanian migrants are talking of different time spans:
Probably in Poland the things go better in five years. [Things] are going to
change and we will be able to return. [High-skilled Polish woman in Spain]
Conversely Romanians, who face a disadvantaged mobility scenario,

and are not likely to necessarily be the brightest and best (because of dis-
tortions in market selection), are more likely to stay. Many Romanians are
not considering going home at all or at least not in the near future.
If the life level is like here, I will return in Romania, of course. But it is not pos-
sible for the moment I think. Maybe after ten years, even more . . . [Low-skilled
Romanian woman in France]
Yet the migrants dream of quickly making money abroad in order to then
go home and be able to afford a better life can be found in our data too
(see also Anghel 2008).
I do not know now [who are] the Romanian people who come, but I imagine
that they do not come to remain. They come to work and to go away, return to
Romania. For what I hear this way, that I know of Romania, they all go away
to work, the house to be done, for . . . to fix up, I what I know, but not . . . to
remain, none. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Spain]
Also, circular mobility across borders (for example, Poland/Germany)

is a well-documented phenomenon. Many Poles living near the border
work in Germany for several months a year in order to be able to stay
at home. Mobility of this kind is now becoming a routine feature of the
European migration systems for both Poles and Romanians (see also
Oklski 2001; Morawska 2002).
How do you imagine this work? To work for a month and then return and then
again work for a month isnt it? [High-skilled Polish woman in Germany]
I and my wife think that nowadays we have to be ready to move, not to stay in
the same place for long time. For example, next year we will probably have to
go to Brussels because of her job. [High-skilled Romanian man in France]
There are counter-examples of classic immigrants, however: movers who

clearly want to stay in the COR, generally to grant their children a better
education/future.
I came for another motive, principally for my son. That I want that he has a free
life and there he is not going to have it . . . in a hundred years possibly [laughs]
or less, I do not know it but already I will not have age to see it [laughs] . . . I
prefer that my son lives through a life . . . normally. There he is not going to
have it, at the moment. In the economic sense he had it very well in Romania,
very well . . . but not a better future. [High-skilled Romanian woman in Spain]
Many migrants see the price of their mobility as too high, and they even-
tually want to go back home. There is a high level of dissatisfaction on
the topic of the enlargement and all the official rhetoric about becoming
European again. Migrants only did it for their families, or to save up for
a better life when they come back home. For these reasons, few admit to
regretting the choice, and a strong work ethic keeps them going. The idea
is to shut up, do your work, and leave as soon as you can.
These findings emphasize the increasing development of a circular
system of mobility in Europe, rather than one-way immigration; it is more
pronounced for Poles than for Romanians. Circular mobility, however,
appears to be far from the optimistic predictions envisaged by the
European Commission. Rather it appears driven by the short-term exploi-
tation in the West of this labour force, reinforced by formal and informal
barriers to settlement that persist and the sense that it will be better for all
if they do not stay in the long run. The idealized scenario of a larger and
more open labour market appears to be unconvincing in the light of the
mismatch of talent to jobs. However, longer-term developmental benefits
might be accruing to the sending country because of the return mobility of
migrants and their financial circulation. This is less the case for Romania,
where it is more likely to be a case of brain drain. Overall, these new
migrants find themselves in an exploitative relation with Western Europe,
rather than one that benefits both sides as mainstream economists and EU
policy makers have hoped.
CONCLUSIONS
Theres a kind of clich here about the foreigner who profits, whos not fair to
the game, and so on. So, if we can show that we have 100 000 Euros [in our
pocket] to spend on a car and a big house, we do it. Without any hesitation. To
show my Polishness. . . Id even put a flag on my car! In that way, I hope Ill be
able to put out of my head the fact that somebody who hears my accent thinks
Im some kind of parasite. A crook and so on. If I could bring something to
this country. Hire two, three people, or even more . . . So I must prove some-
thing. When I prove it, Ill probably feel better about myself. This is what has
happened to me in my professional life. Maybe Ive tried to prove too much.
I suspect this willingness to . . . to show that Im better, didnt help me in my
professional career. [High-skilled Polish man in France]
The voices of these Eastern movers do not sound much like those of
Western intra-EU movers resonating in the rest of this book. While also
differing from classic non-European migrants, both Romanians and Poles
seem relegated still to secondary roles in the European labour market, that
belie the formal EU citizen rights that they now have, or will have one day
soon.
The new EastWest migration system in Europe appears, in the short
term at least, to be market-led, permitting short-term entrance and circu-
lar mobility, and to be operational regardless of EU attempts to govern it.
It was well established before the first accession of May 2004, and oper-
ates for countries both inside and outside the EU (see also Dvell 2005).
This applies as much to the highly skilled and educated, although for them
very different channels of movement and recruitment may apply. But it
is an incomplete market of free movement, that does not resemble the
well-governed scenario of EU theorists and policy makers, largely because
sharp national differences persist in the reception of migrants, and longer-
term barriers of exclusion both institutional and informal still come
into play. Where a more openly governed free market does exist (such as
in Britain), the economy still offers little incentive for long-term stay and
settlement; it takes, gives only short-term benefits to migrants, then spits
them out. Britain, as always, offers an alternative in the European context,
that works because of its economic asymmetry with the rest of the conti-
nent. Others achieve similar outcomes by different means: they maintain
more obvious formal barriers, while cashing in wherever possible on infor-
mal labour markets (which are more formally recognized than in Britain)
such as agriculture, domestic work, construction, small and medium-sized
enterprises and low-end service sector work (see Samers 2004; Favell
2008b). There is a kind of equilibrium here, maintaining a stable system.
In both Britain and other countries, it is generally an exploitative market,
rather than a nakedly exclusionary one except perhaps in the South of
Europe, where other cruder kinds of discriminatory mechanisms are used
to keep large numbers of new informal migrants out of society.
On the other hand, circular migration is taking hold, and it has
some positive developmental aspects. But the likelihood is that Western
European economies are going to continue to enjoy the benefits of an
ethnically orientalized concentric and hierarchical system relating East
to West populations, even for those who are now full formal members
of the Western club, with the same free movement rights and opportuni-
ties on paper. There are short-term benefits to be had by national econo-
mies from this system, but the mismatch and waste of East and Central
European talent and human capital that is encouraged to move, but then
kept in secondary labour market positions risks being of dubious utility
to Europe as a whole in the long run.
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Appendix A: Methodological notes
Michael Braun and Oscar Santacreu
OVERVIEW OF PROJECT COMPONENTS

The PIONEUR project is based on a mix of methods: primarily, a tel-
ephone survey of intra-EU movers, the European Internal Movers Social
Survey (EIMSS), coupled with secondary analysis of existing surveys and
qualitative interviews with EU internal movers (that is, migrants from
Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain who moved to one of the other
four countries) and external movers (nationals of Poland and Romania
having migrated to the five Western countries included in the PIONEUR
study). The methodological approach of the PIONEUR project is innova-
tive in several respects, although certain limitations could not be avoided
and should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results. The
function of this appendix is thus to outline both the strengths and the
weaknesses of the different empirical phases of the project. Several aspects
of the project which pose limitations are described further below. In the
following we will first give a succinct overview of all the project compo-
nents and then describe the central part, the EIMSS survey, in more detail.
We then conclude by pointing to the main strengths of the project design.
The first step of the PIONEUR project consisted of secondary analyses
of existing surveys such as the International Social Survey Programme, the
Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey. Its aim was to character-
ize the respective stayer populations and make a list of questions which
could also be used for the movers survey.
As a second step, in each of the five countries, two qualitative interviews
with EU internal movers of each nationality were conducted, that is, with
nationals of each of the other four countries who migrated there (giving a
total of 40 interviews). The duration of the interviews was mostly between
one and one and a half hours. The aim was to get in-depth knowledge of
migration experiences and to find out which questions should be asked
in the survey. Most of these interviews were conducted by project staff
members in either the country of residence language or in English.
In addition, in each of the five countries, eight qualitative interviews
with external movers were conducted. We selected Polish and Romanian
241
nationals who had migrated to Western Europe, because these are the only
nationalities which represent relatively big groups in all of the five coun-
tries where the interviews were conducted. In addition, we wanted to cover
respondents from one country which shortly before the interviews became
a new member state of the European Union and from one accession can-
didate country (at that time). A total of 40 interviews were conducted. The
duration of the interviews was again mostly between one and one and a
half hours. The aim was to get in-depth knowledge of the migration expe-
riences of external movers and to compare them with those of EU internal
movers. These interviews were conducted in the Polish or Romanian lan-
guage by bilingual interviewers who had been especially trained for this
purpose by project staff members.
The main part of the PIONEUR project consisted of a quantita-
tive survey of EU movers, the European Internal Movers Social Survey
(EIMSS), based on a random sample. In each of the five countries, 250
telephone interviews were conducted with nationals of each of the other
four countries who had migrated there. This target was reached for all
groups but Spanish migrants in Britain, where finding Spanish migrants
was particularly difficult for the reasons analysed below. A standardized
questionnaire was administered by bilingual interviewers. The average
duration of the interviews was slightly less than half an hour. The aim was
to collect quantitative information on migration motives and experiences,
attitudes towards European identity, political behaviour, media usage and
other relevant questions (see Appendix B below).
THE EUROPEAN INTERNAL MOVERS SOCIAL

SURVEY (EIMSS)
In the following we will sketch some important methodological decisions

in designing and implementing the EIMSS survey and their consequences
in more detail, also discussing available alternatives and their potential
problems.
Defining the Population
We defined the population of interest as all migrants from Britain,

France, Germany, Italy and Spain who had moved to one of the other
countries between 1974 and 2003, were 18 years or above at the time of
migration, and were still living in their respective country of residence
in 2004. Thus, it was possible to include migrants who had acquired the
citizenship of the country of residence, although our linguistic screening
of names in constructing the sample (see below) attempted to restrict the

sample to those migrants whose original linguistic identity corresponded
to their country of origin. Therefore, we excluded the longer-standing
Germanic minorities in Italy and France as well as former migrants and
their offspring who had returned to the home countries of their parents or
grandparents.
The population as defined above represents a self-selected stock. Thus,
with the collected data, we cannot analyse return migration and we cannot
even explicitly account for potential selectivity in the sample due to early
return or further migration (to a third country) of migrants with special
characteristics when interpreting the results. When we speak about the
number of migrants who migrated in a given time period, we thus refer
only to those who were still in the countries of residence at the time of the
interviews. Moreover, as we have made only one cross-sectional survey,
the duration of the sojourn in the country of residence and the period of
immigration are necessarily confounded. These facts pose certain limits on
the interpretation of the results.
Even in official statistics there are characteristic differences in the defini-
tion of who is an immigrant (Dumont and Lemaitre 2006; Poulain et al.
2006). Some countries base their figures on the number of people with
foreign citizenship. This might include people born in the respective coun-
tries to parents with a different citizenship but exclude those born abroad
if they have acquired the citizenship of the country of residence (regardless
whether that had already happened before, at the time of migration, or
later). Other countries identify migrants by place of birth. This includes
citizens who lived abroad. The definition used for our study is somewhat
in-between these two concepts.
Sampling the Population
There were a variety of sampling alternatives to begin with. In order to

make transparent the decisions finally made, we will briefly discuss some
of them before we describe the option selected for the study. As sampling
alternatives usually cannot be discussed without reference to the survey
mode, we will combine both aspects here.
There are different sampling frames that surveys of migrants can be and
are typically based on: drawing a sample from a population register; using
a random-route procedure with screening for migrants in conjunction with
face-to-face interviews; using telephone books or random-digit-dialing
procedures or their modern alternatives, the latter again with screening
for migrants; and finally, network sampling. We will discuss each of the
alternatives in turn.
Drawing a sample of communities in each country and selecting

respondents from the official registers brings with it different disadvan-
tages. As a rule, such registers document citizenship, but not country of
origin. As a consequence, naturalized respondents would not have been
covered by the survey. While this might perhaps be regarded as a minor
problem, given that the incentives for members of the population investi-
gated to become citizens of their countries of residence are relatively low
(as they all enjoy nearly full citizenship rights as members of the European
Union), the unavailability of registers for migrants in the UK was a major
problem for the project and finally led to the exclusion of this option.
Random-route strategies seem to be adequate for arriving at a sample
of migrants when combined with a screening procedure. However, there is
a characteristic drawback with such a strategy, in addition to the immense
costs of the screening procedure. Random-route procedures typically select
communities as the sampling units at the first stage and use weighting by
the number of inhabitants. Unfortunately, there is no reason to assume
that the migrant groups we are interested in are distributed proportionally
to the entire population of the countries of residence.
For surveying the general population, the use of telephone interviews
(based on either random-digit-dialing procedures or their modern alterna-
tives), combined with a screening procedure for migrants, might be seen
as a better solution. While for some relatively big migrant groups, for
example, the Italians in Germany, this might indeed have been a feasible
procedure, for tiny groups, such as Spanish in Italy, it would have been
extremely costly and time consuming. In this case, more than a 1000
screening interviews would have been necessary to reach one member of
the target population.
In previous studies, network sampling has been used as a strategy in
restricted geographical areas and with only one migrant group in focus.
King and Patterson (1998), for instance, used members of churches, social
clubs and cultural institutes of the country of origin as middlepersons.
However, such a strategy might overrepresent people still strongly con-
nected to their country of origin community. These problems multiply if
network sampling is used on a larger scale, using members of the country
of origin community as go-betweens, because migrants still integrated in
country of origin networks have a higher chance to be selected.
Rejecting these other options, the strategy finally selected was com-
bining telephone registers with linguistic information on names. Only
telephone entries of private households were considered, excluding firm
or organisational addresses. The linguistic information relates to the
probability of a name belonging to a given nationality. For this purpose,
a statistical analysis of the telephone data from the CD-Roms of national
telephone directories was performed. Starting with the telephone direc-

tories of the countries of residence, linguistic units that is family and
Christian names were ordered by frequency. The different distributions
of frequencies between different geographical regions were taken into
consideration. However, some problematic regions were excluded, such
as Alsace and Lorraine in France and Trentino-Alto Adige in Italy, due
to their high number of names not immediately identifiable linguistically
with the host country. Only names which appeared with relatively high
frequency were considered in the following. For each country, these most
frequent names were determined by high frequency in at least one of the
regions. The resulting list was manually checked by experts in each of the
five countries, to reduce the probability of picking up names not immedi-
ately associated with the national country of origin (for example, Turkish
names in Germany or Italian names in France). For all of the country of
origin/country of residence sub-samples, names were eliminated if they
were also frequent in the other countries (for example, Maria, which is
very frequent in Spain, Germany and Italy). Probabilities of belonging
to a given ethnicity were calculated for each telephone entry, taking into
account the occurence of first names and family names in the country of
origin. If one of the linguistic units, that is, first names and family names,
is also associated with other countries than the country of origin, the prob-
ability attached is correspondingly lower.
Admittedly, this strategy has its own problems. First, undercover-
age problems result from the fact that only those individuals for whom
there is an entry in a telephone directory could be included in the sample.
Unfortunately, those not listed might not be so at random. One important
group which might be particularly underrepresented are women migrants
married to male nationals of the country of residence. We tried to mitigate
this effect by including a small additional network-sampling component in
our design, asking respondents for telephone numbers of women married
to male nationals of the country of residence. This procedure is warranted,
as alternative sampling frames would all have posed more severe problems
for the countries of residence selected. Fortunately, analysis of the data we
have collected also suggests that women from our migrant groups often do
have a (joint) entry in the telephone directory.
Questionnaire Development, Translation and Pre-Tests
Questionnaire construction was based on the results of the secondary

analysis of existing data bases, and on the results of the qualitative inter-
views with EU movers. The secondary analysis indicated a number of
theoretically important and technically not especially problematic items
from the Eurobarometer surveys and the European Social Survey. At the
end of the qualitative interviews, a larger number of closed questions were
administered in the form of a paper-and-pencil questionnaire, and those
questions which fulfilled their purpose were considered for inclusion in
the survey. Sociodemographic items were mainly taken from the ESS in
order to increase comparability at the analysis stage. However, several
demographic questions had to be constructed specially for the survey, as
did the larger part of the attitudinal and behavioural questions. The latter
were suggested by the results of the qualitative interviews. Questions were
discussed, tinkered with and decided upon at two meetings of the project
group. In designing the questionnaire as a strictly collaborative effort
we also made sure that the questions we asked our respondents were rel-
evant and comprehensible to all groups of migrants in all of the countries
involved.
Translations of questions and items taken from the Eurobarometer and
the European Social Survey were taken unchanged from the respective
national versions, even if their formulations could have been improved.
The potential it gave us for comparing the mover to the stayer populations
was too important to compromise. Translation of the remaining items
followed a committee approach recommended in the most recent litera-
ture on translation of survey instruments, which in most cases involved
bilingual survey experts but not professional translators. Back-translation
was avoided due to its dubious record of securing equal understanding of
meaning. Translations were rather double-checked by project partners in
different countries.
Pre-tests were conducted in all countries with members of all migrant
groups. The results of these pre-tests led to some modification of the ques-
tionnaire, in particular in the introductory part (for example, approaching
the household and respondent selection).
Fielding
The survey was scheduled to start in early May 2004 and should have been
concluded by the date of the European election on 10 June 2004. Ideally
all institutes should have started at the same time. Due to problems with
some field institutes, this could not be achieved. In particular, consider-
able problems were encountered by the French field institute which was
commissioned to do the survey in Britain. These problems probably had a
variety of reasons. First, the quality of the telephone directory for Britain
was obviously lower than those in other countries, due to the structure
of the telecommunications market there. Second, Britain seems to have
attracted a much higher number of migrants with Spanish names, but
who did not originate in Spain (that is, in Britain many Spanish names
belonged in fact to people from South America). Third, some of the inter-
viewers might not have had the necessary proficiency in English, which
could cause problems during the contact phase with non-native household
members answering the phone. As a consequence, the field institute was
changed, and the institute in charge of the interviews in Germany was
commissioned to conduct the remaining interviews in Britain. These were
then successfully achieved. In addition, the institute ran short of addresses
for migrants in Britain. Therefore, additional respondents had to be
recruited via network sampling outside of the telephone interviews. A total
of 62 (out of 1000) interviews were realised with this alternative source
of telephone numbers. Gender quotas should have been filled by recruit-
ing additional respondents (that is, women married to male nationals of
the country of residence) via network sampling in telephone interviews.
However, in all of the countries, only a handful of interviews were in the
end based on the network sample. In fact, there was generally no diffi-
culty in filling the gender quotas in the regular course of conducting the
telephone interviews. Therefore, we might be confident that we avoided
two problems: underrepresenting women married to male nationals of the
country of residence, as well as overrepresenting women.
While the field period of the German survey ended in the second half of
June, in France, Italy, and Spain this was achieved in August or September,
and the British survey was only finally completed in early 2005.
Evaluating the Sample
Non-response bias in EIMSS is nearly impossible to quantify compared to

population surveys where one can assume that the vast majority of those
who refused belong to the target population. In our case, the target sample
was much smaller than the contacted sample, even where the screening of
national linguistic identities had worked perfectly. The reasons are that we
restricted our population to those who came to their respective country of
residence after 1973 and were 18 or older at the time of settlement, which
is a much smaller group.
Consequently, as we do not know who among the contacted persons
was actually a member of our population, there is no straightforward way
to measure response rates. Both potential respondents who could not be
contacted and those who refused (including household members refusing
on behalf of the migrant) might not be part of our population at all. If we
assume that those who eventually refused did this relatively early during
the contact phase of the interview, it might be that they did not even reach
the point where we informed them of our definition of the population.
Under this optimistic assumption, we only need to consider as non-

response a proportion of those who could not be contacted or who
refused. This proportion could be determined by the number of those who
explicitly gave the information that no member of the household fitted our
definition of the target population. Unfortunately, the field institutes used
different accounting and reporting schemas, and there are huge differences
in the detail provided.
Comparison of the German EIMSS Data with Data from Official Statistics
Another possibility for evaluating the quality of the EIMSS data is to

compare distributions of demographic variables to official statistics. In
Germany the EIMSS data can be compared to the anonymized 70 per cent
sub-sample of the microcensus 2004 (ZUMA-File). Since the information
of the time of migration was voluntary, there is only a limited number of
cases which can be used for this comparison. Overall, 19.8 per cent of the
migrants possessing British, French, Italian or Spanish citizenship did not
reveal the year in which they came to Germany. In addition, the microcen-
sus is administered in German only, which might contribute to the lower
quality of the data for migrants. In the following, we compare the distri-
butions of gender, marital status, age, age at migration, migration period,
education and employment status between the EIMSS study conducted in
Germany and the German microcensus data.
Table A.1 compares the gender distributions of EIMSS and microcen-
sus 2004 data. Presented here are three columns per nationality. The first
column shows the percentages of men and women in EIMSS, the second
one the official data of the microcensus (MZ). It turns out that there are
only slight differences, except for the case of Spanish in Germany. In this
case men are overrepresented by 13.9 percentage points in the EIMSS
data.
The second variable used to evaluate the quality of the sample is marital
status (Table A.2). For most national groups there is a general overrep-
resentation of the married and an underrepresentation particularly of the
never married in the EIMSS sample. This former difference is especially
pronounced for Spanish (12.7 percentage points) and Italians (9.1 percent-
age points).
The comparison between the age distributions of the EIMSS and the
microcensus shows an overrepresentation of Italians and Spanish in the
4059 age group (12 percentage points for the Italians and 20.3 percentage
points for the Spanish) as well as an underrepresentation for 1839-year-
olds of a comparable amount (Table A.3). No notable deviation from the
microcensus was found for the British and French in EIMSS.
Table A.1 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: gender
French English Italian Spanish

EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Diff. EIMSS MZ Diff.
Male 45.9 42.8 3.1 63.4 59.5 3.9 53.9 59.0 25.1 52.6 38.7 13.9
Female 54.1 57.2 23.1 36.6 40.5 23.9 46.1 41.0 5.1 47.4 61.3 213.9
Source: Microcensus and EIMSS, N 5 6 109
249
Table A.2 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: marital status

Married 57.2 52.0 5.2 67.3 67.0 0.3 84.3 75.2 9.1 69.7 57.0 12.7
Divorced 7.2 9.6 22.4 9.8 8.4 1.4 2.8 6.2 23.4 5.2 7.5 22.3
Widowed 1.6 1.7 20.1 1.6 3.5 21.9 1.2 2.3 21.1 2.0 1.1 0.9
Never married 34.0 36.7 22.7 21.3 21.1 0.2 11.8 16.3 24.5 23.1 34.4 211.3

Table A.3 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: age

250
1839 54.5 55.0 20.5 34.6 34.4 0.2 31.1 42.4 211.3 38.3 59.1 220.8
4059 43.1 43.2 20.1 59.1 58.1 1.0 63.8 51.8 12.0 56.9 36.6 20.3
601 2.4 1.7 0.7 6.3 7.5 21.2 5.1 5.8 20.7 4.7 4.3 0.4

Concerning age at the time of migration, the congruence between the

EIMSS sample and the microcensus is good, especially for the British
and the French (Table A.4). The mean deviations for the Italians and
Spaniards are some 5 percentage points on average, showing a slight
overrepresentation of the younger (29 years old at time of migration).
Concerning the period of migration, Table A.5 shows that the French
and the British in the EIMSS sample match the microcensus data very
well. However, there is an overrepresentation of Italians and Spaniards
who migrated between 1974 and 1983, as well as an underrepresentation
of these groups in the most recent period (19932003).
The variable education shows a slight overrepresentation of people
with a higher education in the EIMSS data, especially for the French
(Table A.6).
With regard to employment status, Table A.7 shows very small differ-
ences for the French and intermediate differences for the Italians, while
the overrepresentation of working respondents in the EIMSS data is more
considerable for the Spanish (11.7 percentage points).
The remaining divergence between the EIMSS sample and the micro-
census could be due to the method of collecting the data, to the quality
of the telephone books used in the respective countries of residence and
to the processes dealing with lack of availability and non-response, which
are to be considered in telephone surveys generally. Santacreu, Rother and
Braun (2006) discuss this in more detail.
THE METHODOLOGICAL STRENGTHS OF THE

PROJECT
There are a variety of strengths of the PIONEUR project which might

warrant characterizing it as path-breaking. First, we used random samples
of the respective migrant populations, whereas the vast majority of migra-
tion studies are qualitative and pay little attention to representativity.
Second, we conducted our study in different countries, whereas most pre-
vious migration research has been restricted to one country of residence
only. Thus, after applying the necessary caution, we can analyse questions
such as whether migrants originating from the same country fare better
in some than in other countries of residence, or whether migrants from
some countries in general fare better than others. Third, and more impor-
tantly, we analysed the same migrant groups in the different countries of
residence in a comparable way: we used random samples of the respective
migrant populations drawn according to the same sampling schema, used
the same questionnaire and the same kind of interviewers (bilinguals in
Table A.4 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: age at migration

< 29 69.0 69.9 20.9 52.8 53.7 20.9 78.0 69.1 8.9 71.5 62.4 9.1
3039 24.3 24.5 20.2 33.1 31.7 1.4 15.7 21.0 25.3 23.3 32.3 29.0
4049 5.1 3.9 1.2 9.8 9.7 0.1 3.9 6.8 22.9 4.3 2.2 2.1
501 1.6 1.7 20.1 4.3 4.8 20.5 2.4 3.0 20.6 0.8 3.2 22.4
252
Table A.5 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: period of migration

197483 26.3 19.2 7.1 30.7 30.0 0.7 46.5 29.9 16.6 41.9 24.7 17.2
198493 23.1 29.3 26.2 28.7 31.3 22.6 32.3 37.5 25.2 22.9 18.3 4.6
199403 50.6 51.5 20.9 40.6 38.8 1.8 21.3 32.5 211.2 35.2 57.0 221.8

Table A.6 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: education

<High school 18.2 27.6 29.4 31.5 38.0 26.5 72.6 79.1 26.5 50.8 43.5 7.3
High school 13.8 24.3 210.5 17.1 17.8 20.7 21.0 11.8 9.2 17.5 16.5 1.0
>High school 68.0 48.1 19.9 51.4 44.1 7.3 6.3 9.1 22.8 31.7 40.0 28.3
253
Table A.7 Comparison between EIMSS and microcensus: employment status

Working 71.4 72.9 21.5 78.7 73.6 5.1 73.6 66.0 7.6 75.1 63.4 11.7
Not working 28.6 27.1 1.5 21.3 26.4 25.1 26.4 34.0 27.6 24.9 36.6 211.7

the country of origin and country of residence languages) and the same
interviewer instructions. Fourth, we used the qualitative study of EU
internal migrants both for the preparation of the quantitative survey and
for the comparison with the external migrants. Fifth, we included migrants
who have acquired citizenship of the country of residence, as this is a
potentially important indicator of integration.
Appendix B: EIMSS questionnaire
(English version)
NOTE: INTERVIEWERS ARE REQUIRED TO READ

ANSWERS ONLY WHEN INDICATED AFTER THE
QUESTION
SECTION 1: SCREENING QUESTIONS
1.0) Good morning/afternoon/evening! My name is xxx. Im calling from

[university/research centre/survey institute]. We are conducting a
research project for the European Union on [target home country
nationals] living in [destination country].
I would like to talk to a person in your household who has or had
[target home country] citizenship and came to [destination country] as
an adult between 1974 and 2003.
Do you or does anybody in your household belong to this group?
yes, just me 1.1
yes, more persons 1.0a
no exit formula
1.0a) Could I talk to the person who had his/her birthday most recently?
not me, but person is coming 1.1a
its me 1.1
not available now set appointment
not available within fieldtime
refuses
doesnt understand
no one belongs to this group
no private household
255
1.1) We would like to ask you about your opinions on life in [destination
country] as an EU citizen who is living here. Could you spare a few
moments to take part in our interview?
start in COR language
start in COO language
1.1a) Good morning/afternoon/evening! My name is xxx. Im calling from

[university/research centre/survey institute]. We are conducting a
research project for the European Union on [target home country
nationals] living in [destination country].
We would like to ask you about your opinions on life in [destination
country] as an EU-citizen who is living here. Could you spare a few
moments to take part in our interview?
start in COR language
start in COO language
no start . . .
1.2) In which year did you settle in [destination country]?
Interviewer: If asked, specify that respondent is eligible if s/he has

his/her principal or secondary residence in [destination country] and
lives in [destination country] on a permanent or regular basis (at
least 6 months a year)
_____________
(source: new)
FILTER (AUTOMATIC): If respondent came to [destination

country] before 1974 or after 2003
ASK:
I am sorry, Sir/Madam, but you are not part of our target group but
is there anybody else in your household who has or had [target home
country] citizenship and settled as an adult in [destination country]
after 1973 and before 2004?
Yes Could I talk to this person please? 1.1a

No I am sorry but no one in your household is part of our
target group. Have a nice day/evening!
1.3) In what year were you born?

_____________
(source: ESS F3)
FILTER (AUTOMATIC):
If respondent is born after 1985 or did not come to [destination
country] as an adult.
EXIT FORMULA:
I am sorry, Sir/Madam, but you are not part of our target group but
is there anybody else in your household who has or had [target home
country] citizenship and settled as an adult in [destination country]
after 1973 and before 2004?
Yes Could I talk to this person please? 1.1a

No I am sorry but no one in your household is part of our
target group. Have a nice day/evening!
SECTION 2: FAMILY ORIGIN AND MIGRATION

HISTORY
We would first like to know something about your family and personal
history.
2.0) What citizenship do you hold now?
Interviewer: multiple answers possible
German
British
French
Spanish
Italian
Citizenship of other EU country
US citizenship
Other
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.1) What citizenship or citizenships does or did your father hold?
Interviewer: Multiple answers possible
German
British
French
Spanish
Italian
US citizenship
Other
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.2) What is the highest level of education your father has achieved?
Not completed primary education

Primary education
GCSEs
A or AS Levels
GNVQ or Apprenticeship
Bachelors Degree
Post-Graduate Degree
(Dont know)
(source: ESS)
2.3) When you were 14, was your father . . .
Interviewer: Read out list
An employee 2.4)
Self-employed 2.4)
Not working 2.5)
NOT TO BE READ: Father died/absent
when respondent was 14 2.5)
NOT TO BE READ: (Dont know) 2.5)
(source: ESS F46)
2.4) What was the name or title of his job then?
Interviewer: If not mentioned, ask for details on content of job

(performed activities) and position in the workplace (organizational
rank). Eg: not teacher, but teacher of maths in high school; not
clerk, but cashier in a bank; not soldier, but sergeant of infantry; not
blue-collar worker, but building foreman
_____________________________________________
(source: ESS F12)
Interviewer: Tick the language of job description

English
French
German
Italian
Spanish
2.5) What citizenship or citizenships does or did your mother hold?
German
British
French
Spanish
Italian
US citizenship
Other
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.6) What is the highest level of education your mother has achieved?

Primary education
GCSEs
A or AS Levels
Bachelors Degree
(Dont know)
(source: ESS)
2.7) When you were 14, was your mother . . .
An employee 2.8)
Self-employed 2.8)
Not working 2.9)
NOT TO BE READ: Mother
died/absent when respondent was 14 2.9)
NOT TO BE READ: (Dont know) 2.9)
(source: ESS F46)
2.8) What was the name or title of her job then?
Interviewer: If not mentioned, ask for details on content of job (per-

formed activities) and position in the workplace (organizational rank).
Eg: not teacher, but teacher of maths in high school; not clerk, but
cashier in a bank; not soldier, but sergeant of infantry; not blue-collar
worker, but building foreman
_____________________________________________
(source: ESS F12)

English
French
German
Italian
Spanish
2.9) How would you describe the area where you lived for the longest time
in [home country]? Was it . . .
. . . a big city
. . . the suburbs or outskirts of a big city
. . . a town or a small city
. . . a country village
. . . a farm or home in the countryside
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.10) What is the highest level of education you have achieved?
Not completed primary education 2.12)

Primary education 2.12)
GCSEs 2.12)
A or AS Levels 2.11)
GNVQ or Apprenticeship 2.11)
Bachelors Degree 2.12)
Post-Graduate Degree 2.12)
(Dont answer) 2.12)
(source: ESS)
2.11) Did you ever study at university or any other higher education institution?
Yes
No
(Dont answer)
(source: new)
2.12) Had you lived in [destination country] before [year of arrival, intro-
duced automatically after 1.3)] for at least three (or more) months?
Yes 2.12a)
No 2.13)
(Dont answer) 2.13)
(source: new)
2.12a) Why did you move there?
Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned. If respondent is

vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose alter-
natives within that category (right-hand column)
WORK To look for a job

To accept a job offer
To start a business
Because of my occupation (already employed)
EDUCATION To study in secondary school
To participate in a study exchange program (eg,
Erasmus)
To study at university level (undergraduate)
(regular, not exchange)
To study at graduate/post-graduate/specialization
level (regular, not exchange)
To do an internship
To learn the language of the host country
QUALITY OF To gain new experiences
LIFE To live in a better natural environment, enjoy
natural beauty
To live in better/healthier weather, enjoy climate
FAMILY/ To live together with members of family of origin
LOVE (eg, parents)
To live together with partner/spouse/children
Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.13) Apart from [home country] and [destination country], have you lived
in another country for three or more months?
Yes 2.14)
No 2.15)
(Dont answer) 2.15)
(source: new)
2.14) Which country/countries?
Interviewer: Tick all countries mentioned
France Estonia Poland

Germany Finland Portugal
Italy Greece Slovakia
Spain Hungary Slovenia
United Kingdom Ireland Sweden
Austria Latvia Other Non-EU
European
country
Belgium Lithuania USA
Czech Republic Luxemburg Other
Cyprus Malta (Dont answer)
Denmark Netherlands
(source: new)
2.14a) Why did you move there?
Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned. If respondent

is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose
alternatives within that category (right-hand column)
If more than one country mentioned in Question 2.14

To start a business
Erasmus)
To do an internship
natural beauty
LOVE (eg, parents)
Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.15) Did you ever work BEFORE you moved to [destination country]?
yes 2.15a
no 2.16
(source: new)
2.15a) What was the name or title of the LAST occupation you had
BEFORE moving to [destination country]?

_____________________________________________
(source: ESS)

English
French
German
Italian
Spanish
2.16) Before settling in [destination country], did you know any [home
country nationals] living in [destination country]?
Yes
No
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.17) Why did you decide to settle in [destination country]?
Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned. If respondent

is vague, identify general category (left-hand column) and propose
alternatives within that category (right-hand column)

To start a business
Erasmus)
To do an internship
natural beauty
LOVE (eg, parents)
Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.18) Overall, did your parents consider your decision to settle in [destination
country] to be . . .
A good thing
A bad thing
Neither a good nor a bad thing
NOT TO BE READ: They had diverging opinions
NOT TO BE READ: Parents were dead or not in touch with
respondent
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.19) How well did you speak [language of destination country] when you
arrived to settle?
Interviewer: Read out
Almost as well as native language

Quite well
Just so-so
Poorly
No knowledge
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.19a) And how well do you speak [language of destination country] now?
Almost as well as native language

Quite well
Just so-so
Poorly
No knowledge
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.20) Have you ever been working in [destination country]?

yes 2.20a
no 2.21
(source: new)
2.20a) Was the first occupation you had in [destination country] the same
you had when you left [home country]?
yes 2.21
no 2.20b
(source: new)
2.20b) What was the name or title of the FIRST occupation that you had in
[destination country]?

_____________________________________________
(source: ESS)

English
French
German
Italian
Spanish
2.21) Which of these descriptions best describes your CURRENT situation?
Interviewer: Read out underlined words
In full time paid work (or away temporarily) (employee,

self-employed, working for your family business) 2.22)
In part time paid work (or away temporarily)

(employee, self-employed, working for your family
business) 2.22)
In education, even if on vacation (not paid for by
employer) 2.24)
Unemployed 2.24)
Retired 2.24)
Doing housework, looking after children or other persons 2.24)
Other 2.24)
(Dont know) 2.24)
(source: ESS F8)
2.22) In your main job are you NOW . . .
An employee
Self-employed
Working for your family business
(Dont answer)
(source: ESS F12)
2.22a) Is the occupation you have NOW the same that was your FIRST
occupation you had in [destination country]?
yes 2.24
no 2.23
(source: new)
2.23) What is the name or title of your main job NOW?

_____________________________________________
(source: ESS F12)


English
French
German
Italian
Spanish
2.24) If you could significantly improve your work or living conditions,

how willing or unwilling would you be to move back to [home
country]?
Very willing
Fairly willing
Neither willing nor unwilling
Fairly unwilling
Very unwilling
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.25) If you could significantly improve your work or living conditions, how
willing or unwilling would you be to move outside Europe?
Very willing
Fairly willing
Neither willing nor unwilling
Fairly unwilling
Very unwilling
(Dont know)
(source: ISSP)
2.26) In which country do you think you will live 5 years from now?
[Destination country]
[Home country]
Somewhere else
Other (eg, split time between two places)
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.27) In which country would you like to live when you reach retiring age?
[Destination country]
[Home country]
Somewhere else
Doesnt matter
Other (eg, split time between two places)
Already retired
(Dont know)
(source: new)
2.28) What do you miss most from [home country]?
Interviewer: Tick no more than first two mentioned
Family
Friends
Traditions, folklore, celebrations
Lifestyle
Weather, nature, landscape
Food
Art, monuments
Sport, other leisure activities
Social norms (eg, the way things work, how people respect you)
Legal norms, public organization (eg, national health system,
civil service)
Nothing
Other: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Dont know)
(source: new)
SECTION 3: EUROPEAN IDENTITY
We would now like to know your views on the European Union and on some
related issues.
3.1) Using a 1 to 10 scale, how much do you feel you know about the
European Union, its policies, its institutions (where 1 is the lowest and
10 the highest point)?
Score: ______________
(source: Eurobarometer)
3.2) Did you ever search information on the rights of European Union
citizens in relation to . . .?
Interviewer: Read out one by one
Yes No (Dont
know)
Employment
Social security (health, pensions,
etc.)
Recognition of educational/
professional certificates
Voting rights
other
(source: new)
3.3) In general, does the European Union conjure up to you . . .
A very positive image

A fairly positive image
A neutral image
A fairly negative image
A negative image
(Dont know)
3.4) How attached do you feel to . . .
Very Fairly Not very Not (Dont

attached attached attached at all know)
attached
The city/town/village
where you have lived
most of your life in
[home country]
The city/town/village
where you live now
[Home country]
[Destination
country]
The European
Union
(source: Eurobarometer 58)
3.5) Do you consider yourself as being . . .
[Home country national] only

[Home country national] and European
European and [home country national]
European only
(Dont know)
3.6) When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss polit-
ical matters . . .

Frequently
Occasionally
Never
(Dont know)
(source: Eurobarometers)
3.7) How interested are you in . . .
Very Somewhat A little Not (Dont

much at all know)
Politics in [home
country]
Politics in
[destination country]
Politics of the
European Union
(source: new)
3.8) During the last 12 months, have you ever . . .
Interviewer: Read out list one by one
Yes No (Dont know)

Contacted a politician, govern-
ment or local government official
Signed a petition
Taken part in a lawful public
demonstration
(source: ESS)
3.9) BEFORE June 13: Do you plan to vote in the elections of the
European Parliament this June?
Yes
No
(Dont know)
(source: new)
AFTER June 13: Did you vote in the last elections of the European
Parliament held this month?
Yes
No
(Dont know)
(source: new)
3.10) Did you vote for the last general elections in [home country]?
[Note: to be adapted by country]
Yes
No
(Dont know)
(source: new)
3.11) In politics people sometimes talk of left and right. To which side
do you feel closer?
Left
Centre-Left
Centre
Centre-Right
Right
(Dont answer)
(Dont know)
(source: ESS, adapted for phone interview)
3.12) To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following
statements?

Agree Agree Neither Disagree Disagree (Dont

strongly agree nor strongly know)
disagree
The less the

State inter-
venes in the
economy,
the better
it is for a
country
Gay men
and lesbians
should be
free to live
their own
lives as they
wish
(source: ESS)
SECTION 4: QUALITY OF LIFE
We would now like to ask you some questions about your daily life
experiences.
4.1) Using a 0 to 10 scale, how satisfied are you with your life as a
whole nowadays all things considered (where 0 means extremely
dissatisfied and 10 means extremely satisfied?)
Score: ________________
(source: ESS)
4.2) How many times did you travel to [home country] in the last 12
months?
____________________________
(source: new)
4.3) How frequently do you communicate (by phone, mail or e-mail) with
family members in [home country]?
Every day
Several times a week
Once a week
Several times a month
Once a month
Less than once a month
Never
I do not have any family member in [home country]
(Dont know)
(source: new)
4.4) And with friends in [home country]?

Every day
Once a week
Once a month
Never
I do not have any friends in [home country]
(Dont know)
(source: new)
4.5) Of your circle of friends where you live, wed like to know how many
are from [home country], how many from [destination country], and
how many from other countries
Several A few None (Dont know)

Now, how many are from
[home country]?
And how many are from
And from other countries?
(source: ESS, partially)
4.6) How often do you use the internet whether at home or at work
for your personal use?
Every day
Once a week
Once a month
Never use
No access at home or work
(Dont know)
(source: ESS)
4.7) If you heard about an important world event, where would you first
look to find out more information?
[Destination country] media

[Home country] media
Third country media
(Dont know)
(source: new)
4.8) On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend watch-
ing television stations from [home country] and [destination country]?
[Home [Destination
country] country]
No time at all
Less than hour
hour to 1 hour
More than 1 hour, up to 1 hours
More than 1 hours, up to 2 hours
More than 3 hours
(Dont know)
(source: ESS)
4.9) And how much time reading newspapers from [home country] and
[destination country] on an average weekday?
[Home [Destination
country] country]
No time at all
Less than hour
hour to 1 hour
More than 1 hour, up to 1 hours
More than 3 hours
(Dont know)
(source: ESS)
4.10) Have you claimed any of the following benefits since you arrived in
Yes No (Dont
know)
Assistance with housing costs
Unemployment benefits
Any other benefits (eg, for health care)
(source: new)
4.11) For each of the voluntary organisations I will now mention, please tell
me whether you have participated in its activities in the last 12 months.
Yes No (Dont know)

A sports club or club for outdoor
activities
An organisation for cultural or hobby
activities
A trade union
A business, professional, or farmers
organisation
A religious or church organisation
A political party
An association of co-nationals
Any other voluntary organisation
(source: ESS)
4.12) Nowadays, do you think the following things are better in

[destination country] or in [home country]?
[Home [Destination The (Dont

country] country] same know)
Health system
Education system
Housing
Earnings
Crime control
State bureaucracy
Politics
(source: new)
4.13) Have you ever felt discriminated against in [destination country]

because you are foreigner?
No, never 5.1)

Yes, sometimes 4.13a)
Yes, frequently 4.13a)
(Dont know) 5.1)
(source: new)
4.13a) In which kinds of situations did you feel discriminated against?
Interviewer: Tick no more than two first choices
On the job
Applying for a job
In public offices or with civil servants
In shops, banks
Renting/buying a house
With neighbours
Other
(Dont know)
(source: new)
SECTION 5: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
5.1) Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or

denomination?
Yes 5.1a)
No 5.2)
(Dont know) 5.2)
(source: ESS)
5.1a) Which one?

Christian no denomination
Roman Catholic
Greek or Russian Orthodox
Protestant
Other Christian: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Buddhist
Jewish
Islam/Muslim
Other non-Christian: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Dont know)
(source: ESS, adapted)
5.2) How would you describe the area where you live now? Is it . . .
. . . a big city
. . . the suburbs or outskirts of a big city
. . . a town or a small city
. . . a country village
. . . a farm or home in the countryside
(Dont know)
(source: ESS F5)
5.3) Are you registered as a resident in [destination country]?

UK ONLY, REPLACED WITH: Have you registered for a
national insurance number?
Yes
No
(Dont know)
(source: new)
5.4) What is your current marital status?

Married 5.7)
Separated (but still legally married) 5.5)
Divorced 5.5)
Widowed 5.5)
Never been married 5.5)
(Dont answer) 5.5)
(source: ESS F58, wording adapted, scale identical)
5.5) Do you currently have a romantic partner?

Yes 5.6)
No 5.13)
(Dont answer) 5.13)
(source: new)
5.6) Is your partner male or female?

Male
Female
(Dont answer)
(source: new)
5.7) Are you currently living together with your partner in the same
household?
Yes 5.8)
No 5.7a)
(Dont answer) 5.8)
(source: ESS F61, slightly adapted)
5.7a) In which country does your partner live?

Germany
Great Britain
France
Spain
Italy
Other EU country
USA
Other
(Dont answer)
(source: new)
5.8) Which citizenship does your partner hold?
German
British
French
Spanish
Italian
US citizenship
Other
(Dont know)
(source: new)
5.9) What is the highest level of education your partner has achieved?
Primary education
GCSEs
A or AS Levels
Bachelors Degree
(Dont know)
(source: ESS)
5.10) Which of these descriptions best describes your partners situation

(in the last seven days)?
Interviewer: Read out underlined words
In full time paid work (or away temporarily) (employee,

self-employed, working for your family business) 5.11)
In part time paid work (or away temporarily)
(employee, self-employed, working for your family
business) 5.11)
In education, even if on vacation (not paid for by
employer) 5.13)
Unemployed 5.13)
Retired 5.13)
Doing housework, looking after children or other persons 5.13)
Other 5.13)
(Dont know) 5.13)
(source: ESS F8)
5.11) In his/her main job your partner is. . .

An employee
Self-employed
Working for his/her family business
(Dont know)
(source: ESS F12)
5.12) What is the name or title of your partners main job?

_____________________________________________
(source: ESS)

English
French
German
Italian
Spanish
5.13) Do you have any children?

Yes 5.13a)
No 5.14)
(Dont answer) 5.14)
(source: new)
5.13a) How many children do you have?

_____________________________________________
(source: new)
5.13b) Which language do you speak with your children most of the time?
[Home country] language
[Destination country] language
Other language
(Dont know)
(source: NIS, slightly different)
5.14) Are you male or female?
Interviewer: ASK ONLY IF NECESSARY BUT TICK IN ANY CASE
Male
Female
(source: ESS)
*************** OPTIONAL
5.15) Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply
to you. Please tell me for each of the following statements whether
you agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree or
disagree strongly
Interviewer: Read out statements one by one
I see myself as Strongly Agree Neither Disagree Strongly Cant

someone who agree agree disagree choose
... nor dis-
agree
. . . is reserved
. . . is generally
trusting
. . . does a
thorough job
. . . is relaxed,
handles stress
well
. . . has
an active
imagination
. . . is outgoing,
sociable
. . . tends to
find fault with
others.
. . . tends to be
lazy.
. . . gets nervous
easily.
. . . has
few artistic
interests.
(source: BFI)
*************************
SECTION 6: CONCLUSION
FINAL 1) Our interview is finished, but I would like to ask for your help
in finding people who might be left out of our survey. It has been
hard for us to identify [home country national] women married
to [destination country] nationals as they are generally not listed
in the phone book. Can you help me find any of them?
Yes
No Final 4
FINAL 2) Could you call this person in the next few days and ask her if I
can interview her as I did with you?
Yes
No Final 4
FINAL 3) So, I will call you in a few days from now and ask you for the
name and phone number of this lady. Thank you.
FINAL 4) The interview is finished. Thanks again. Your answers will be

taken into the greatest consideration in view of a better under-
standing of the opinions and problems of EU citizens resident
abroad.
**************************************************************
_________________________________________________________
CATI SYSTEM SHOULD RECORD TIME OF START AND
TIME OF END OF INTERVIEWS; OTHERWISE INTERVIEWER
SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED TO RECORD THEM
Time of start: . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Time of end: . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTERVIEWER THEN ANSWERS SECTION BELOW
I.1) How many contacts with this phone number were needed to achieve
the interview (including the final call)?
........................
I.2) Did the respondent ask for clarification on any questions?

Never
Almost never
Now and then
Often
Very often
I.3) Did you feel that the respondent was reluctant to answer any
questions?
Never
Almost never
Now and then
Often
Very often
I.4) Overall, did you feel that the respondent understood the questions?
Never
Almost never
Now and then
Often
Very often
I.5) Overall, did you feel that the respondent was interested by the
interview?
Very much
Quite a lot
Not so much
Not at all
I.6) If you have any additional comments on the interview, please write
them in the space below.
______________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________
Appendix C: External movers
experiences of migration and integration
into the EU15: interview guideline
Background:
European Union-financed research project on mobility in
Europe
Interviews with EU citizens moving from one EU country to
another and with citizens from accession countries moving
into the EU (Britain, Germany, France, Spain, Italy)
How do migrants make sense of their migration experience?
Which are the barriers hindering successful migration and
integration?
Interview Objectives:
To understand external movers rationales for migrating into
the EU
To gain insight into what successful and unsuccessful
migratory experiences might look like
To get an idea of the issues furthering or hampering integra-
tion of external movers into EU host societies
To trace migrants problem-solving strategies, be it with
regards to institutions, the labour market or private life
To explore issues relating to migrant identity, especially iden-
tification with Europe and the European Union
To assemble cues for policy-advice on making migration
more successful (match expectations with reality, provide
institutional support for integration, etc.)
A NOTE ON THE SELECTION OF INTERVIEWEES
The selection of interviewees is carried out by the interviewers via

Polish/Romanian cultural associations, expat magazines, websites,
289
churches and so on. Friends and family of the interviewer are not
eligible for interview.
Before carrying out the interview, the interviewers have to discuss
the profile of the selected individuals with the local PIONEUR team
and get their ok.
INTERVIEWEE PROFILE
Four Polish nationals and four Romanian nationals who

are legal residents of one of the PIONEUR host countries
(France, Spain, Britain, Germany, Italy)
have been permanently residing in host country for at least one
year and no longer than ten years (that is, commuters excluded)
are legally employed (NB: diplomats and students are not eli-
gible; a migrant who is legally employed but registered on a
student visa is eligible if you are 100 per cent sure he/she never
intended to attend university)
are in the 30 to 50 age range
For each nationality group (Polish/Romanian) we are looking for
one male with higher education (university)
one female with higher education
1 if possible, get one highly educated respondent in upper status
occupation, one in lower status occupation
1 if possible, avoid academics and clerics; under no circumstances
select more than one academic and/or more than one cleric
one poorly educated male (not higher than vocational/low-level
school)
one poorly educated female
Interviews can be carried out wherever convenient for the inter-
viewer (that is, the interviews do not have to be carried out in two
different cities)
BEFORE STARTING THE INTERVIEWS, MAKE SURE YOU

FULLY UNDERSTAND THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWING
STRATEGY SET OUT IN THIS APPENDIX. THE INTERVIEW
SHOULD LAST NO LONGER THAN 90 MINUTES.
Appendix C: External movers questionnaire 291
PART 1
1. Introduction
Introduction of interviewer (include affiliation and commissioning

agency)
Introduction of research project
Assure anonymity and confidentiality
Explain use of tape-recorder and ask for permission
2. Warm-up (demographics)
Tell me a little bit about yourself (citizenship, mother-tongue, family

married/children)
How long have you been living in host country? (Which city? Did
you know host country before coming here? . . .)
Besides double-checking some basic information regarding the informant

(that should already be known from sampling), the aim of this section
is to make the respondent familiar and comfortable with the interview
situation.
PART 2
3. Reasons for migration/life before migration
Why did you decide to move to host country? (reasons, expecta-

tions, fears, etc., why did you chose host country?)
How was life back home? (probe for full picture of economic, family,
social situation and perspectives or lack of them at home as well
as for ideological/political aspects that made life difficult)
To understand the respondents motivations for moving, to gain

insights into what was wrong with her/his economic and social
position back in the home country or with the political system he/
she previously lived in.
4. Expectations fulfilled?
Does your life here in host country correspond to the expectations

you had before moving? (probe until you get a full picture of why/
why not, which are the aspects that turned out better/worse than
expected)
In which way have you readjusted your expectations since you
arrived in the host country? What are your plans for the future (go
back, stay . . .)
To get a summary of the migration experience to understand the

frame of mind or vantage point from which all subsequent specific
sections will be answered.
PART 3
5. Getting started in the host country
How did you experience the initial period of getting organized, fol-
lowing arrival in the host country?
When it came to practicalities, what was your experience dealing
with host country administration, the health/social security system,
the housing market, schooling for your children, etc.?
Probe fully but dont just let the respondent talk: What exactly
was your problem? How did you solve it? Who helped you get by?
(friends/host country administration/others)
To get a picture of the institutional barriers to beginning a new life

in a EU country and the possibilities of overcoming them.
6. Labour market
How did you go about finding a job? (adapt to people who already
had a job lined up before moving, those who didnt seek employ-
ment, etc.) probe for strategies, networks, etc.
Were you able to find employment in the field you had specialized in
back home? (collect information on respondents educational level,
work experience, etc.; understand whether diplomas and work expe-

rience from home country were acknowledged in host country)
How do you experience working life in host country? (colleagues,
bosses, daily routines, etc.)
Which aspects of your professional life were better in home country?
Which ones are better in host country? (pay, atmosphere, responsi-
bility . . .)
To understand how easy or difficult it was for the respondent to

integrate into the host country labour market and whether or not
previous experience was adequately valued.
PART 4
7. Social and cultural life
Was it easy for you to find friends in host country (understand

whether friends are from home/host nationality, job-related, from
associations, etc.)
What are the sorts of things you do in your spare time? (hobbies,
TV, associations, church community, participation in host country
high culture (e.g. theatre) or popular culture (e.g. football games))
How do you stay in touch with your friends and family at home?
(use of phone, internet, etc.)
How often do you visit your home country? (when, why?)
Do you sometimes send home money or material goods? (how often,
how much, when, why?)
Is the informants social life organised along ethnic/nationality lines?

Or does he/she integrate in the host country cultural and social
activities? Does the migrant stay connected with friends and family
at home via communication, visits, sending goods or money?
8. Everyday life
Would you say you can express yourself fully in the host country
language? Which are the sorts of situations when you feel limited?
Do you feel you are respected in the host country? Which are the
situations where you feel not respected?
When you go shopping or make a phone call, do you feel people
treat you differently for being a foreigner from your home country?
Examples . . .
Would you say you are integrated in the host country? (probe for
full definition of integration). In which respects, if any, would you
like to be more integrated? Which are the aspects of life that you
prefer to handle your way?
To gain insights into the informants personal perception of whether

she/he is integrated, what integration is, for which aspects it is a
good or a bad thing. To understand whether or not the respondent
feels discriminated against in daily life in the host country.
9. European identity
Would you say you feel European? (why, why not?) What does
feeling European mean to you? (probe fully)
What do the people of Europe share? (probe fully) Would you say
that these characteristics describe both home and host country citi-
zens equally well? (why, why not?)
In what sorts of situations do you feel European? When dont you?
Is European Union membership a good or a bad thing for your
country? (why, why not?)
To understand the meaning of Europeanness from the external

migrants point of view: Does it involve a shared heritage (culture/
religion/ethnicity/etc.) or a shared way of doing things (parlia-
mentary democracy/market economy/welfare states/etc.)? Does it
involve being part of a geographical or a political entity?
10. Political life
Are you interested in politics from your home/host country? Do you

follow the news from home/host country? Why/why not?
Are you involved in political life at home or in host country? (voting,
discussing politics, taking initiatives . . .). Why/why not?
Do you feel the concerns of people like yourself are adequately

taken care of in host/home country politics? Why/why not?
To comprehend whether the respondent sees herself/himself as part

of the system or someone forgotten by it.
PART 5
11. Your advice
If a junior family member (say your niece) told you she also wants to
move to host country, would you encourage her to do so? Why?
Which advice would you give her? (probe fully for why this advice is
necessary or useful)
Would you allow her to stay with you until she finds a place of her
own? Would you lend her money if she needed any? (And if it were
a friend of your niece, would you still have him/her over and lend
money?)
To get an insight into the functioning of network migration/soli-

darity among external movers. To understand according to the
informant which of the problems previously discussed can be
generalized/apply to anyone holding the informants citizenship. To
gain information on things the EU or the host country could do to
ease transition for external movers.
Index
accession countries migration 9, 205, Bettin Lattes, G. 24
212, 213, 21417, 21819, 220 bi-cultural movers and EU identity
see also individual countries 3940, 1423
Ackers, L. 55, 62, 63 Black, A. 120
age Bloom, B. 99
and electoral participation 174 Bonacich, E. 102
and media use of EU movers 188, Borjas, G. 16, 208
193, 194, 196, 197, 200 Boyd, M. 73
age at migration 417 Braun, Michael 2651, 24154
and migration duration 335, 479 Brchon, P. 158
Ajzen, I. 154 Breen, R. 4, 76, 81, 95
Alaminos, Antonio 98119 Britain
Alarcon, R. 96 age at migration 334, 414, 46
Alba, R. 100 age of stayers 34
Albert, Maria Carmen 5271 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle
Allport, G. 153 movers) 140, 145
Anderson, B. 179 assimilating non-Europeans (lack
Andreotti, A. 96 of EU attachment) (carefree
Anghel, R. 220 movers) 140, 146
Anwar, M. 102 British effect 153, 219
Arsene, Camelia 2651 cable services, limited 1823
Australia, Multicultural Australia country of origin, feelings of
Survey 74 attachment to 134
Austria country of residence, feelings of
education levels 16, 17 attachment to 135
immigration 13, 14 cross-national intermarriage 36
immigration restrictions 9, 205 discrimination and societal
resistance to discrimination
Baldoni, Emiliana 5271 113
Bauer, T. 31, 53, 63, 64, 72, 73 education levels 13, 18
Belassa, B. 10 electoral participation 172, 174, 175
Belgium EU attachment 1334
education levels 17 EU-image 130
as founding state 5 EU15 non-national residents 12,
immigration 14 2930
immigration of A8 members 205 and integrating Europeans 140, 141
migration 12 integrating non-Europeans (lack of
Bellamy, R. 24, 157 attachment to EU) (bi-cultural
Bem, D. 154 movers) 143
Berger, P. 95 internet access 197, 198
Berry, J. 989, 100, 101, 102, 107, intragenerational class mobility
1234, 127, 128 among EU movers 94
297
leftist tendencies and politicization and world events, seeking

levels amongst movers 170 information on 199, 200
London as escalator region 78 Britain, migration 12, 13, 30, 37, 389,
national versus European identity 41, 469, 67
1312 and class composition 778,
non-integrating Europeans 140, 7980
143 cultural integration 110, 111, 112,
politicization levels 161, 16570 115
retired people in stayer population education levels 32, 634
33 and employment opportunities 32,
rightist tendencies among movers 60, 80
170 family support 65
self-marginalising Europeans friendship relations 107
(cosmopolitans) 140, 150 and homesickness 117
self-marginalising non-Europeans job mobility 90
(lack of attachment to EU) and language competence 103, 104,
(individualists) 140, 151 105, 106
spiralist spatial mobility 75 national orientation and mobility
TV watching, overall 184 expectations 107, 108, 109
voting rights information search by and newspaper reading 191, 192,
movers 176 193, 195, 196
Britain, immigration 9, 12, 13, 14, and quality of life 61, 67
2930, 31, 389, 479, 59, 68 and social integration 110, 111, 113,
and A8 countries 205, 212, 213, 214, 116
215, 21617, 218, 219 and social mobility 756, 824, 86
and class composition 768, 79 TV use 187, 188, 190
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, and world events, seeking
115 information on 199, 200
education levels 32, 40, 78 Brubaker, R. 121, 122
and employment opportunities 59, Brcker, H. 53
60, 61, 62 Bruter, M. 121
family connections 61, 65 Bryk, A. 44
friendship relations 107 Bulgaria
and geographic mobility 35 migration, economic motivation
and homesickness 117 54
job mobility 89, 91, 93 migration restrictions 9, 2056
knowledge migrants 55 Buller, H. 36
and language competence 55, 104,
105, 106 cable availability 1823, 186
main reasons for and against 55 Cai, X. 180, 181
national orientation and mobility Camaur, L. 181
expectations 107, 108, 109 Canada
and newspaper reading 192, 193, acculturation measurement 100
195, 196 social mobility for migrants 73
and satisfaction with life 114, 115, career prospects see job mobility
116 carefree movers and EU identity 128,
and social integration 110, 111, 113, 13940, 1467
116 Carroll, G. 92
and social mobility 73, 87 Carruba, C. 157
TV use 185,187, 190 Casado-Diaz, M. 56
Index 299
Castells, M. 10 Curle, A. 99
Castles, S. 53 Cyprus
Cautrs, B. 156, 158 immigration 14
Checkel, J. 24, 121 migration, family reasons 54
Chiswick, B. 73 Czech Republic
Christiadi, C. 95 immigration 14
Citrin, J. 122 migration, economic and family
Clark, M. 100 reasons 54
class composition
and career prospects 92 Dawson, E. 100
class origin and education 857 Dayan, D. 180
intergenerational mobility 808 De Bruycker, P. 5
and migration 7680, 94 Deleuze, G. 11
Collins, R. 179, 180 Dloye, Y. 156
Cooper, F. 121 Denmark
Cornelius, W. 96 education levels 16, 17
Cortes, D. 100 immigration 14
cosmopolitans, and EU identity 128, labour costs, median hourly 96
13940, 14950 Dez Medrano, J. 75, 121
cross-culturalism in transnational discrimination
Europe 98119 perceptions by migrants and
acculturation 98101, 111 EastWest migration 20913,
acculturation and assimilation, 217, 21819
differences between 99 societal resistance to 113
acculturation, measurement issues Duchesne, S. 121, 122, 156
99100 Dumont, J. 243
acculturation, operationalising
1001 EastWest migration and EU
cultural awareness 1001 enlargement see EU enlargement
cultural and social integration 1014, and EastWest migration
10914, 115, 11618 economic liberalism, attitudes towards
discrimination and societal 1634
resistance to discrimination economic reasons for moving and
11314 social mobility 21318, 2212
ethnic loyalty 100, 101 education levels 1316, 17, 18
friendship relations of movers and class origin 857
1056, 107 and EastWest migration 208, 210,
homesickness and integration 212, 21618, 221
11718 and electoral participation 174
integration 1013 EU identity and free movement 141,
linguistic competence and social 145, 146, 147, 148, 153
networks 1036, 112 and European citizenship, movement
migration patterns 110, 111, 112, towards 159, 1602
115 European integration and free
national orientation and mobility movement 1316, 1719, 378,
expectations 1069 46, 49
psychological adaptation 11418 and immigration 32, 3741, 40, 61,
and satisfaction with life 11417 634, 78
Crul, M. 73 and job mobility 89, 92
Csed, K. 208 and leftist affiliations 164
and media use of EU movers 185, family relationships 214

188, 189, 194, 196, 197, 200, 201 fears over 206, 207
and migration 32, 3741, 61, 634 and labour market regulation 210,
and migration projects in integrating 211, 217
Europe 58, 59, 60, 62, 634, and language ability 21213
667, 68, 70 methodology and data 2089
see also students EU identity and free movement 12055
electoral participation 1714 and acculturation 1256, 128
see also voting rights assimilating Europeans (lifestyle
Elkins, D. 179 movers) 128, 13940, 1445
employment opportunities 59, 60, assimilating non-Europeans (lack
624, 67, 68, 7880, 85 of EU attachment) (carefree
see also job mobility movers) 128, 13940, 1467
Erbe, J. 157, 158 and cognitive dissonance theory 125,
Erikson, R. 76, 81, 97 1267
Espenshade, T. 96 country of origin, feelings of
Estonia attachment to 134, 136, 153
education levels 17 country of residence, feelings of
immigration 14 attachment to 135, 136, 153
mobility intentions 54 cross-cutting identities 123, 128,
EU 13940, 1489
cross-culturalism in transnational and education 141, 145, 146, 147,
Europe see cross-culturalism in 148, 153
transnational Europe emergent identity in country of
International Convention on residence 126
Transfrontier Television 180 EU, attitudes towards, among
labour costs, median hourly 96 movers and stayers 128, 12930,
migration projects in integrating 1334, 136
Europe see migration projects in EU knowledge among movers and
integrating Europe stayers 130
social mobility of mobile Europeans Europeanness and territorial
see social mobility of mobile identities 12935
Europeans and family ties 141, 153
Television Without Frontiers and friendship 141, 144, 145, 146,
Directive 180 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153
Year of Mobility (2006) 206 identity and attachment, connections
EU enlargement and EastWest between 122
migration 534, 20523 and identity conflict 1246, 1278,
benefits of 2067 129, 137
bureaucratic difficulties 210, 211 identity, definition used 1212
circular mobility, rise of 21921 identity outcomes of internal
cultural affinity and discrimination migration 1289
levels 21819 ingroup favouritism 122
discrimination perceptions by integrating Europeans (Euromasters)
migrants 20913, 217, 21819 128, 13842
economic reasons for moving and integrating non-Europeans (lack of
social mobility 21318, 2212 EU attachment) (bi-cultural
and education levels 208, 210, 212, movers) 128, 13940, 1423
21618, 221 interculturation 127, 128, 1367
exclusion and exploitation 20921 and knowledge of EU 141
Index 301
and language 141, 143, 144, 145, and i2010 policy 204
147, 148 internet access 1978
and life satisfaction 141, 144, 145, internet and identity construction
146, 147, 148, 151 181
multiple identities, workings of and language competence 187, 188,
1223, 127 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197,
nested identities 122, 123 198, 200, 201
non-integrating Europeans (bi- and length of stay in country of
cultural movers) 13940, 1423 residence 188
and primary socialisation 128 media markets accessibility 1824
and reference group affiliation and and migration motivation 189, 194,
adaptation 123 196, 198, 200
retirement migration 144 newspapers 1916
self-marginalising Europeans and quality of life 189, 192, 193, 194,
(cosmopolitans) 128, 13940, 200
14950 satellite availability 183, 186
self-marginalising non-Europeans technology and migrant identity
(lack of EU attachment) construction 1801
(individualists) 128, 13940, television use 18490, 201
1501 and world events, seeking
self-segregating Europeans information on 199201
(homesick movers) 128, 13940, Euromasters 128, 13842
1478 European citizenship, movement
separate identities 123, 128 towards 15678
territorial identities among movers, age and electoral participation 174
accounting for 13754 age and leftist affiliations 164
territorial identities and attachments and cognitive deficiency 1567
of movers and stayers 1305 and country of origin 160
territorial identities of internal and democratic deficit 157
migrants 1234, 128 and economic liberalism, attitudes
territorial identities of mobile towards 1634
Europeans, typology of 1357 education and electoral participation
tripartite identities 127 174
see also European integration and education and leftist affiliations 164
free movement and education levels 159, 1602
EU movers, media use of 179204 education and political leftright
and age 188, 193, 194, 196, 197, 200 standing 1623
cable availability 1823, 186 election voting patterns 159, 175
and Common European Space 204 electoral participation and political
continuing importance of 2014 interest, relationship between
and education levels 185, 188, 189, 1713, 174
194, 196, 197, 200, 201 EU movers and prism of national
and family connections 188, 189, differences 16570
193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201 gender and leftist affiliations 164
and friendships 188, 189, 192, 193, and leftist affiliations 1623, 1645,
194, 196, 197, 198, 200 16670
and gender 197, 198 leftist tendencies and electoral
and habit and availability 188 participation 174, 1767
home-country media, diminishing and migrants country of residence
reliance on 181 171
national identities, persistence of Schengen system and passport

157 control elimination 7
and political activity involvement and seasonal workers 7
15960, 162 and Single European Act (1986) 7
and political attitudes 1578, 1602, spatial mobility and upward social
171 mobility, links between 4
and political ideological position and students 7, 556
160, 1623, 164 students and Erasmus and Socrates
and political leftright standing 161, programmes 2, 56, 59, 69, 70
1623 and Treaty of Rome, Article 49 5, 6
political portrait of EU movers and unemployed 7
15865 voting rights 7, 8
premises for 1717 and welfare rights 7, 8
and professional status 159, 1602 worker-based migration 2, 3, 5
professional status and political European integration demographics
standing 1623, 164 2651
registered voters among EU movers age at migration 417
173 age of migrants and migration
and rightist tendencies 170, 174 duration 335, 479
rightist tendencies and electoral basic sociodemographic
participation 174 characteristics 316
social class and political standing and cross-national intermarriage
163 36
and territorial identity and location future trends 501
162 geographic mobility 356
voting rights information search intra-EU migrants 2931
and country of residence 1767 migration over time 3641
European Court of Justice (ECJ) 67, simple classification 479
8, 9 social background 313
European Foundation for the survey limitations 279
Improvement of Living and European integration and free
Working Conditions 53, 63, 66, 67 movement
European integration citizenship appreciation 1011
A10 members, temporary movement and competitiveness 10
restrictions of 9 Council Directive 68/360 6
Action Plan for Skills and Mobility Council Regulation 1612/68 6
10 criticism of 11
citizenship over worker dimension economic and political rationales for
67 911
and citizenship rights 7 and education levels 1316, 1719,
diplomatic protection 78 378, 46, 49
foreign workers rights, establishment and Eurostars 49, 50, 150
of (1968) 6 history of 59
and Lisbon Agenda 10 and knowledge economy 10, 13, 31,
and Maastricht Treaty (1992) 7, 36 55
and monetary union 10 role 15
national immigration laws, early 56 statistics of mobile Europeans 1116
and pensioners 7 workforce position 16, 20, 37, 46
residence rights of movers 6, 8, 10 see also EU identity and free
and retiree relocation 2, 31, 49 movement
Index 303
European Internal Movers Social age at migration 414, 46

Survey (EIMSS) 34 age of stayers 34
fielding 2467 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle
German EIMSS data and official movers) 140, 145
statistics data, comparison of assimilating non-Europeans (lack
24851 of EU attachment) (carefree
methodological strengths 2514 movers) 140, 146
methodology and design 24251 country of origin, feelings of
population defining and sampling attachment to 134
2425 country of residence, feelings of
questionnaire 25588 attachment to 135
questionnaire, demographic cross-national intermarriage 36
information 2806 discrimination and societal
questionnaire development 2456 resistance to discrimination 113
questionnaire, European identity education levels 13, 18
views 2715 electoral participation 172, 174, 175
questionnaire, family origin and EU attachment 133
migration history 25770 EU Constitution rejection 206
questionnaire, quality of life 27580 EU-image 130
questionnaire, screening questions EU15 non-national residents 12,
2557 2930
sample evaluation 2478 as founding state 5
European Year of Workers Mobility and integrating Europeans 140,
11 1412
Eurostars 49, 50, 150 internet access 197, 198
Evans, M. 72 intragenerational class mobility
among EU movers 94
family support leftist tendencies and politicization
and EastWest migration 214 levels amongst movers 16670
family ties and EU identity 141, 153 national versus European identity,
and media use of EU movers 188, movers and stayers 1312
189, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201 non-integrating Europeans 140, 143
and migration projects in integrating politicization levels 161, 16570
Europe 646 retired people in stayer population
and reasons for migration 57, 60, 33
613, 64, 656, 67 retiree migrants 67
and reunification 31, 34 rightist tendencies among movers
Fassman, H. 30 170
Favell, Adrian 125, 35, 49, 53, 55, 63, self-marginalising Europeans
96, 121, 150, 158, 171, 20523 (cosmopolitans) 140, 150
Fernndez, E. 53, 54, 66 self-marginalising non-Europeans
Festinger, L. 125, 126 (lack of EU attachment)
Fielding, A. 75, 78, 95 (individualists) 140, 151
Finland voting rights information search
education levels 18 by movers and country of
immigration 9, 13, 14, 205 residence 176
migration 12, 13 France, immigration 12, 13, 14, 2930,
Fligstein, N. 24, 158 37, 389, 469, 59, 68
Follesdal, A. 157 and A8 countries 205, 212, 215, 216,
France 217, 218, 220, 2212
and class composition 768, 79, 94 free movement see EU identity and free
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, movement; European integration
115 and free movement
education levels 32, 40, 41, 61, 63 Friedrich, K. 56
and employment opportunities 60, friendship relations
61, 623, 78 and cross-culturalism in
family reasons for 57, 60, 61, 623, transnational Europe 1056, 107
65, 66 and EU identity and free movement
friendship relations of movers 107 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148,
and geographic mobility 35, 36 149, 150, 151, 153
and homesickness 117 media use of EU movers 188, 189,
job mobility 91 192, 193, 194, 196, 197, 198, 200
and language competence 104, 105, Frognier, A. 121, 122, 156
106 future research
national orientation and mobility migrant media use 181
expectations 107, 108, 109 social mobility for less privileged
and newspaper reading 192, 195, young 956
196 technology and migrant identity
and quality of life 59, 61, 62, 67 construction 1801
and satisfaction with life 114, 115, Television Without Frontiers
116 Directive, cultural impact of
and second generation migrants 73 180
and social integration 87, 110, 111,
113, 116 Gabel, M. 121
TV use 185, 187, 190 Garapich, M. 219
and world events, seeking Garcia, M. 100
information on 200 Gattegno, C. 99
France, migration 12, 37, 389, 478 gender
and class composition 778, 7980 and job migration 89
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, and leftist affiliations 164
115 and media use of EU movers 197,
education levels 61, 64 198
and employment opportunities 60, and migration projects in integrating
80 Europe 55, 62, 66
family support 61, 623, 65 Georgiou, M. 180
friendship relations 107 Germany
and homesickness 117 age at migration 414, 46
job mobility 62, 90 age of migrants and immigration
and language competence 103, 104, duration 334
105, 106 age of stayers 34
national orientation and mobility assimilating Europeans (lifestyle
expectations 107, 108, 109 movers) 144, 145
and newspaper reading 191, 192, assimilating non-Europeans (lack
195 of EU attachment) (carefree
and social integration 756, 824, movers) 146
86, 110, 111, 113, 116 country of origin, feelings of
TV use 184, 187, 188, 190 attachment to 134
and world events, seeking country of residence, feelings of
information on 199, 200 attachment to 135
Franklin, M. 157 cross-national intermarriage 36
Index 305
discrimination and societal and employment opportunities 59,

resistance to discrimination 60, 61, 62, 78
113 family support 61, 656
education levels 13, 17 friendship relations 1056, 107
electoral participation 1714 and geographic mobility 35
EU attachment, feelings of 1334 and homesickness 117
EU-image 130 job mobility 89, 91
EU15 non-national residents 12, and language competence 103, 104,
2930 105, 106
as founding state 5 media markets accessibility 182
and integrating Europeans 141 national orientation and mobility
integrating non-Europeans (lack of expectations 107, 108, 109
EU attachment) (bi-cultural and newspaper reading 192, 193, 195
movers) 143 and quality of life 67
internet access 197, 198 restrictions 9, 205
labour costs, median hourly 96 and satisfaction with life 114, 115,
leftist tendencies and politicization 116
levels amongst movers 16670 and social integration 87, 110, 111,
movers and EU citizenship interest 113, 116
165 TV use and country of residence
national versus European identity, 184, 187, 188, 190
movers and stayers 1312 and world events, seeking
non-integrating Europeans 143 information on 199, 200, 201
politicization levels 161, 16570 Germany, migration 12, 13, 30, 37,
retired people in stayer population 389, 41, 469, 67
33 and class composition 778, 7980
rightist tendencies among movers cultural integration 110, 111, 112,
170 115
self-marginalising Europeans education levels 32
(cosmopolitans) 150 and employment opportunities 32,
self-marginalising non-Europeans 623, 80
(lack of EU attachment) family support 61, 623, 65, 66
(individualists) 151 friendship relations 107
self-segregating Europeans and homesickness 117
(homesick movers) 148 job mobility 62, 90
self-segregation non Europeans (lack and language competence 103, 104,
of EU attachment) 149 105, 106
Turks, low integration of 36 national orientation and mobility
voting rights information search expectations 107, 108, 109
by movers and country of and newspaper reading 191, 1923,
residence 176 195, 196
Germany, immigration 1213, 14, and quality of life 61, 64, 67
2930, 37, 389, 479, 59, 62, 68 and social integration 756, 81, 824,
and A8 countries 212, 21416, 217, 86, 110, 111, 113, 116
21819, 220 TV use 184, 187, 188, 190
and class composition 76, 77, 78, TV use and country of origin 185
79, 94 and world events, seeking
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, information on 199, 200
115 Ghuman, P. 100
education levels 32, 3741, 63 Gillespie, P. 121
Goldthorpe, J. 76, 81, 97 Italy

Gordon, M. 73, 100 age at migration 414, 46
Gorny, A. 53 age of migrants and migration
Graves, T. 123 duration 34
Greece age of stayers 34
EU membership 9 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle
immigration 13, 14, 54 movers) 140, 1445
immigration of A8 members 205 cable services, limited 1823
migration from 54 country of origin, feelings of
Grieco, E. 73 attachment to 134
Grunberg, G. 163 country of residence, feelings of
Guattari, F. 11 attachment to 135
Guild, E. 5 cross-national intermarriage 36
discrimination and societal
Hajer, M. 11 resistance to discrimination
Haller, M. 156 113
Harris, J. 63 electoral participation 1712, 173,
Harvey, D. 11 175
Havel, V. 11 EU attachment, feelings of 133
Herrmann, R. 24, 121, 157 EU-image 130
Hille, H. 206 EU15 non-national residents 12,
Hix, S. 157 2930
Hofstede, G. 99, 100 as founding state 5
Hoggart, K. 36 and free movement of workers, early
homesick movers competitive advantage 5, 6, 31
and cross-culturalism in integrating Europeans 140
transnational Europe 11718 integrating non-Europeans (lack of
and EU identity 128, 13940, EU attachment) (bi-cultural
1478 movers) 143
Hooghe, L. 121 internet access 197, 198
Huber, A. 56 leftist tendencies and politicization
Hungary levels amongst movers 170
immigration 14 movers and EU citizenship interest
migration, economic motivation 54 165
television broadcasts for immigrants, national versus European identity,
limited availability of 183 movers and stayers 1312
non-European immigrants 12
individualists and EU identity 128, non-integrating Europeans 140, 143
13940, 1501 politicization levels 161, 16570
internet access 181, 1978 retired people in stayer population
Iredale, R. 55 33
Ireland retiree migrants in 567
education levels 16, 18 self-marginalising Europeans
immigration 9, 13, 14, 205 (cosmopolitans) 140, 150
immigration of A8 members 205 self-segregating Europeans
migration 13 (homesick movers) 140, 148
television broadcasts for immigrants, self-segregation non Europeans (lack
limited availability of 183 of EU attachment) 140, 149
Israel, immigration and social mobility Italy, immigration 12, 13, 14, 2930,
74 37, 389, 469, 59
Index 307
and A8 countries 205, 21011, 212, and world events, seeking

215, 216, 217, 218, 219 information on 200
and class composition 768, 79, 94
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, Jaffr, J. 162
115 Jenkins, R. 122
education levels 634 Jensen, O. 11
and employment opportunities 32, Jileva, E. 206
59, 60, 61, 62 job mobility
family reasons for 57, 60, 61, 623, and career prospects 8893
65, 67 and education 89, 92
friendship relations 107 and gender 89
and geographic mobility 356 and immigration 89, 91, 93
job mobility 91, 93 labour market regulation and
and language competence 103, 104, EastWest migration 210, 211,
105, 106 217
migrant retirees in 56 and language 8992
national orientation and mobility and migration 62, 90
expectations 107, 108, 109 see also employment opportunities;
and newspaper reading 192, 195 workforce position and
and quality of life 61 European integration
and satisfaction with life 114, 115, Jost, J. 154
116
and social integration 87, 110, 111, Kaiser, C. 56
112, 113, 116 Kalter, F. 64
TV use 184, 185, 187, 190 Katzenstein, P. 24, 121
and world events, seeking Kelly, J. 99
information on 199, 200, 201 Kelo, M. 53, 54, 206
Italy, migration 1213, 30, 31, 37, 389, King, R. 2, 24, 31, 356, 52, 54, 56, 244
41, 479 knowledge
and class composition 76, 7780 of EU 141
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, migrants 55
115 Kofman, E. 62
education levels 32, 3741, 63 Kohli, M. 122
and employment opportunities 60, Koopmans, R. 157, 158
623, 7880 Krieger, H. 53, 54, 63, 64, 66
family support 61, 623, 656 Kupiszewski, M. 54
friendship relations 1056, 107
and geographic mobility 35 labour market regulation and
and homesickness 117 EastWest migration 210, 211, 217
job mobility 62, 90 see also job mobility
and language competence 104, 105, Laffan, B. 121
106 LaFramboise, T. 127
national orientation and mobility Lambert, W. 100
expectations 107, 108, 109 language ability
and newspaper reading 191, 192, barrier and migration projects in
193, 195 integrating Europe 67
and quality of life 67 and EastWest migration 21213
and social integration 76, 824, 85, and EU identity and free movement
86, 110, 111, 112, 113, 116 141, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148
TV use 184, 187, 188, 190 and job mobility 8992
and media use of EU movers 187, Marks, G. 121, 122

188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 196, marriage, cross-national intermarriage
197, 198, 200, 201 36
and migration 55, 103, 104, 105, 106 Marsh, M. 157
social networks 1036, 112 Massey, D. 53, 65
Latvia Mattli, W. 10
immigration 14 Mayer, K. 92, 97
migration, economic and family Mead, G. 122
reasons 54 media use of EU movers see EU
Lavenex, S. 206 movers, media use of
Lazardis, G. 54 Meehan, E. 157
Lega, L. 100 Meinhof, U. 120
Le Gals, P. 96 migration projects in integrating
leftist tendencies Europe 5271
and electoral participation 174, and age 64
1767 country of residence and origin,
and politicization levels amongst effects of 60
movers 16670 East-West mobility flows and EU
see also politicization levels; rightist enlargements 534
tendencies and education levels 58, 59, 60, 62,
Lemaitre, G. 243 634, 667, 68, 70
lifestyle movers and EU identity 128, and employment opportunities 59,
13940, 1445 60, 62, 634, 67, 68
Lijphart, A. 123 EU 15 intra-European migration
Lin, G. 95 and international migration,
Lindberg, L. 156 distinctions between 527
Linton, R. 98 family reasons for migration 578,
Lithuania 59, 60, 612, 64
education levels 18 and family and social support 646
educational levels 13 and gender 55, 62, 66
immigration 14 and global and regional integration
migration, economic motivation 55
54 and human capital 63, 67
Luijkx, R. 76, 81 intra-EU mobility, reasons for 5766
Luxembourg language barrier 67
education levels 16 migration motivations 5760
as founding state 5 and previous mobility experiences
immigration 13, 14 669
immigration of A8 members 205 and quality of life 589, 60, 62, 64,
television broadcasts for immigrants, 67
limited availability of 183 and retiree migration 567
and sexual orientation 63
Maas, W. 5, 171 and student population 556, 59, 60
McAllister, I. 72 traditional and emerging reasons for
Magnette, P. 24, 157 migration, motivations for 545
Mahroum, S. 55 Miller, M. 53
Majone, G. 157 Moravcsik, A. 157
Major, B. 154 Morawska, E. 220
Malta, migration, family reasons 54 Morgan, S. 88
Marin, G. 100 Morley, D. 180
Index 309
Morocco, migration and social politicization levels 161, 16570

mobility 73 activity involvement and European
Morrell, J. 55 citizenship, movement towards
Mouhoud, E. 96 15960, 162
Mundell, R. 10 Portes, A. 53, 73, 102
Mnz, R. 30 Portugal
Muxel, Anne 15678 education levels 16, 18
EU membership 9
Nebe, Tina M. 12055, 20523 immigration 13, 15, 29, 54
Nee, V. 100 immigration of A8 members 205
Nelson, B. 100 labour costs, median hourly 96
Netherlands migrant retirees in 56
education levels 18 migration 12, 13, 54, 73
as founding state 5 Poulain, M. 11, 56, 243
immigration 14 Price, M. 179
immigration of A8 members 205 professional status and political
migration 12 standing 1623, 164
newspaper reading 1916 psychological adaptation 11418
Pugliese, E. 60
Oklski, M. 220 Puhani, P. 96
OLeary, S. 5
OReilly, K. 56, 102, 105 quality of life
Oudinet, J. 96 and EU identity and free movement
141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 151
Padilla, A. 100, 101, 102 and immigration 59, 60, 61, 62, 67
Panagakos, A. 180, 181 media use and EU movers 189, 192,
Patterson, G. 356, 244 193, 194, 200
Pearson, R. 55 and migration 61, 64, 67
Perlmann, J. 73 and migration projects in integrating
Perrineau, P. 157 Europe 589, 60, 62, 64, 67
PIONEUR project 3 see also satisfaction with life
and EIMSS see European Internal
Movers Social Survey (EIMSS) Raijman, R. 72, 74
interview guideline 28995 Raiser, U. 182
interviewee profile 2905 Raudenbush, S. 44
interviewee selection 28990 Recchi, Ettore 125, 2930, 7297, 126
overview 2412 Reif, K. 157
Piore, M. 72 residence rights of movers 6, 8, 10
Piracha, M. 96 retired people
Platt, L. 73 Reyni, D. 156, 158
Poland EU identity and free movement 144
circular mobility, rise of 21920, 221 migrants 567, 67, 85
cultural affinity of migrants and relocation 2, 31, 49
discrimination levels 21819 in stayer population 33, 36
immigration 15 Richardson, T. 11
migration 205, 208 rightist tendencies 170, 174
migration and discrimination 20913 see also leftist tendencies;
migration, economic reasons for politicization levels
21314, 216, 217, 2212 Risse, T. 122
mobility intentions 54 Robins, K. 180
Rodriguez, V. 56 migration, economic and family

Rodriguez-Pose, A. 63 reasons 54
Romania Smith, M. 55
circular mobility, rise of 21920, 221 social class and political standing 163
cultural affinity of migrants and social integration
discrimination levels 218, 219 and immigration 87, 110, 111,
migration, economic motivation 54, 11213, 116
21417 and migration 756, 81, 824, 85, 86,
migration restrictions 9, 206, 208, 110, 111, 113, 116
212 social mobility of mobile Europeans
Romero, F. 5 7297
Rother, Nina 12055, 179204 class composition and career
Rottman, D. 4, 95 prospects 92
Rumbaut, R. 73, 102 class composition of stayers and
Ruiz-Gelices, E. 56 movers 7680
Ruspini, P. 53 downward status mobility 73
Ryder, A. 100 and economic reasons for moving
21318, 2212
Salt, J. 30, 31, 55, 63 education and class origin 857
Snchez, J. and Fernndez, D. 100 education and job mobility 89, 92
Santacreu, Oscar A. 5271, 98119, and EU free movement regime 746
24154 EU movers and social mobility
Sapir, A. 10 756
satellite availability 183, 186 EU movers in upper class
satisfaction with life, and cross- destinations 75
culturalism 11417 foreign workers in 3D jobs 73
see also quality of life gender and job migration 89
Scharpf, F. 121 intergenerational immobility 845,
Scheingold, S. 156 88
Schlesinger, P. 179, 180 intergenerational mobility and class
Schmidt, V 157 boundaries 808
Schmitt, H. 157 intragenerational mobility and
Schweisguth, E. 163 career prospects 8893
Schoorl, J. 1012 language and job mobility 8992
Schroedter, J. 36 resettlement costs 75
Seifert, W. 73 second and third generation 73
Semyonov, M. 72, 74 spiralist spatial mobility 75
Sennett, R. 11 wage differentials 75
sexual orientation, and migration Spain
projects in integrating Europe 63 age at migration 414, 46
Shore, C. 120 age of migrants and migration
Sides, J. 122 duration 334
Siedentop, L. 121, 156 age of stayers 34
Simon, P. 73 assimilating Europeans (lifestyle
Sjastaad, L. 63 movers) 140, 1445
Slovakia assimilating non-Europeans (lack
immigration 15 of EU attachment) (carefree
migration, economic motivation 54 movers) 140, 146
Slovenia country of origin, feelings of
immigration 15 attachment to 134
Index 311
country of residence, feelings of education levels 32, 40, 41, 64

attachment to 135 and employment levels 323, 789
cross-national intermarriage 36 and employment opportunities 323,
discrimination and societal 61, 62, 789, 85
resistance to discrimination 113 family support 623, 65
education levels 13, 16 friendship relations 107
electoral participation 172, 174 and geographic mobility 35
EU attachment, feelings of 1334 and homesickness 117
EU membership 9 job mobility 91
EU-image 130 and language competence 103, 104,
EU15 non-national residents 12, 105, 106
2930 national orientation and mobility
free movement rights 36 expectations 107, 108, 109
integrating Europeans 140 and newspaper reading 192, 193, 195
integrating non-Europeans (lack of and quality of life 59, 60, 61, 62, 67
EU attachment) (bi-cultural and satisfaction with life 114, 115,
movers) 143 116
internet access 197, 198 and social integration 110, 111, 113,
intragenerational class mobility 116
among EU movers 94 and social mobility 81, 85, 87
labour costs, median hourly 96 TV use 184, 185, 187, 188, 190
leftist tendencies and politicization and world events, seeking
levels amongst movers 16670 information on 199, 200
movers and EU citizenship interest Spain, migration 12, 30, 37, 389,
165 479, 54
national versus European identity, and class composition 76, 7780
movers and stayers 1312 cultural integration 110, 111, 112,
non-integrating Europeans 140 115
politicization levels 161, 16570 education levels 32, 3741, 61
retired people in stayer population and employment opportunities 60,
33 623, 7880
retiree migrants in 56, 67, 85 family support 61, 623, 656, 67
rightist tendencies among movers 170 friendship relations 107
self-marginalising Europeans and homesickness 117
(cosmopolitans) 140, 150 job mobility 62, 90
self-marginalising non-Europeans and language competence 104, 105,
(lack of EU attachment) 106
(individualists) 140, 151 national orientation and mobility
self-segregation non Europeans (lack expectations 107, 108, 109
of EU attachment) 140, 148 and newspaper reading 191, 192,
voting rights information search 193, 195, 196
by movers and country of orientation towards country of
residence 176 origin 102
Spain, immigration 12, 13, 15, 2930, and social integration 110, 111,
37, 389, 469, 54, 59, 67 11213, 116
and A8 countries 205, 212, 215, 217, and social mobility 76, 824, 85, 86
218, 220, 221 TV use 184, 185
and class composition 768, 7980 and TV use 184, 187, 188, 190
cultural integration 110, 111, 112, and world events, seeking
115 information on 199, 200, 201
Sreberny, A. 180 EU migrants in 68

Stevens, J. 99 inter-regional migration 95
Stola, D. 206 social mobility for migrants 73
Straubhaar, T. 206 tripartite identities 127
Strudel, S. 173
students Van der Eijk, C. 157
and Erasmus and Socrates Van der Velde, M. 96
programmes, European Van Ham, M. 89
integration 2, 56, 59, 69, 70 Van Houtum, H. 96
and European integration 7, 556 Vermeulen, N. 73
see also education levels Vickerman, R. 96
Suinn, R. 100 voting rights 7, 8, 1767
Sweden see also electoral participation
education levels 13, 19
EU15 non-national residents 12 Wchter, B. 53, 54, 206
immigrants and media use 181 Wagner, A. 85
immigration 9, 13, 15, 205 Waldinger, R. 73
immigration of A8 members 205 Wallace, C. 65, 206
migration 13 Wallace, W. 154
Szapocznik, J. 100 Watson, W. 75
Weiss, A. 95
Tajfel, H. 121, 122, 219 welfare rights, and European
Tambini, Damian 179204 integration 7, 8
Taylor, D. 100 White, R. 5
Teske, R. 100 Wiener, A. 5, 157, 171
Thomas, W. 181 Williams, A. 54
Tillman, E. 157 workforce position and European
Todaro, M. 63 integration 16, 20, 37, 46
Torpey, J. 1 see also job mobility
Turkey world events, seeking information on,
migration, economic motivation 54 and media use of EU movers
migration and media markets 199201
accessibility 182
migration and social mobility 36, 73 Xiaoming, H. 181
Turner, J. 122
TV use 18490, 201 Yaish, M. 73, 75
Uaner, E., 206 Zak, I. 100

US Zhang, K. 181
acculturation measurement 100 Zhou, M. 102, 180, 181
assimilation distinctions 102 Zimmermann, K. 31, 53, 63, 64, 72,
cross-state and regional movement 73
3, 8 Znaniecki, F. 181

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Pioneers of European Integration

A Cosimo e Giovanni, veri pionieri

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored

Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.

A catalogue record for this book

Library of Congress Control Number: 2009930859

ISBN 978 1 84844 659 5

Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK

1 Pioneers of European integration: an introduction 1

successful implementation of PIONEUR was possible also thanks to the

Ettore Recchi and Adrian Favell

INTEGRATING EUROPE FROM BELOW: THE ROLE

The European Union stands as a unique economic, political, legal and

populous EU15 member states (Germany, France, Britain, Italy and

statistics on migration within the EU, drawing on various international

A SHORT HISTORY OF FREE MOVEMENT RIGHTS

to apply for work and residence permits, which could be discretionarily

Court was able to broaden interpretation of the Treaty, emphasising the

The EU enlargements of 2004 and 2007 again put citizenship mobility

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RATIONALES FOR

As we have seen, free movement represents a constant and quintessential

political boundaries is framed and sustained as the sociodemographic

Enjoyment of permanent residence by Union citizens who have chosen to settle

In other words, movers are expected to contribute to overcoming national

If regulations on the movements of citizens disappear, we will see the sort of

In this scenario, the fusion of European societies would be greatly facili-

MOBILE EUROPEANS IN EU STATISTICS

(excluding inflows into Greece, France and Ireland). Interestingly, 64 per

Total Total % of EU15 % of total EU10 % of total TCN % of total

Source: Eurostat Dissemination Database (domain: Population and Social Conditions)

on education (Borjas 1989). Therefore, a diachronic analysis of intra-EU

A GUIDE TO THE VOLUME

COR Nationality 1995 2000 2005

COR Nationality 1995 2000 2005

Source: Labour Force Survey, spring data

Table 1.3 Employed nationals, EU15 non-nationals and third-country

Agriculture Industry Service Service Total

Source: Labour Force Survey, spring data

inter-generational and intra-generational social mobility. Contrary to

citizenship has focused on the opportunities European nationals have to

migration borderless mobility, no technical barriers, minimal prejudice

The study of European integration has been slow to incorporate soci-

Who are EU movers? Do they have some common demographic and

EIMSS is thus set up to plug in directly to existing European Social Survey

and educational qualifications, depending on whether an Italian migrant

INTRA-EU MIGRANTS IN THE PIONEUR

Table 2.2 Stocks of movers from EIMSS countries, 2002

Germans French British Italians Spanish

Source: Eurostat Dissemination Database (see Recchi et al. 2006)

BASIC SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

In this section we illustrate the social background, education and employ-

A first finding is that, when measured by parental education, migrants from

Table 2.3 Respondents education (lower-secondary qualification or less)

Country of Country of origin

Notes: Stayer population is indicated in the main diagonal (shaded).

Source: ESS 2004 and EIMSS, N5 13 839

1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980

Note: Countries of origin (first row below graphic): D 5 Germans, F 5 French, GB 5

Source: EIMSS, N54901

Figure 2.1 Distribution of year of birth dependent on country of origin

of Spain as country of residence, where the biggest percentages exist for

Age of Migrants and Duration of Migration

Note: Countries of origin (first row below graphic): D 5 Germans, F 5 French, GB 5