Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
http://pos.sagepub.com/
The Ghost of Wittgenstein : Forms of Life, Scientific Method, and Cultural Critique
William T. Lynch
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 2005 35: 139
DOI: 10.1177/0048393105275280
Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com
Additional services and information for Philosophy of the Social Sciences can be found at:
Subscriptions: http://pos.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
Citations: http://pos.sagepub.com/content/35/2/139.refs.html
WILLIAM T. LYNCH
Wayne State University
What relevance does the history of science have for the ongoing
conduct of science itself? If one were to follow too closely the over-
heated public debate labeled the science wars, one would expect
that defenders of the thesis that science is social construction would
leverage this insight to criticize the practice of science, while those
developing an account of the proper methodological and
epistemological structure of scientific reasoning would defend the
scientific status quo. While this might make sense of the rhetoric ani-
mating debate between enlightenment scientists or philosophers
and postmodern or academic left cultural critics (Gross and
Received 10 December 2002. I would like to thank two anonymous referees for helpful
comments. I am also grateful for feedback on earlier versions of this paper by Dick
Boyd, Peter Dear, Trevor Pinch, and Peter Taylor.
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 35 No. 2, June 2005 139-174
DOI: 10.1177/0048393105275280
2005 Sage Publications
139
Levitt 1994; Koertge 1998; Ross 1996), it makes little sense of the root
development of a social account of the internal practice of science
associated with the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) or its
interdisciplinary offshoot, science and technology studies (STS).1 This
internal sociology of knowledge looked less to broad, social causes
of the origin of science and its normative structure, as the external
sociology of science of Merton or Hessen did, than to a close, social-
interactional redescription of the internal reasoning of science
(Hessen 1931; Merton 1973). In order to carry out this redescription,
SSK appropriated Wittgensteins later philosophy to talk about tradi-
tional epistemological topics like induction and experiment in collec-
tive, sociological terms. This sociological interpretation of
Wittgenstein allowed sociologists (and, increasingly, historians) to
see right through to the core of science, while introducing a controver-
sial relativistic component that sought to deny philosophers creden-
tials to evaluate science. In the process, SSK cut off not only the
possibility for epistemological criticism of the conduct of science, but
broader political or cultural interrogations as well.
In this paper, I will examine and criticize this Wittgensteinian
sociologizing of epistemic topics and suggest a more promising
alternative that allows for the possibility of grounded, outside
critique of science, whether epistemological or cultural and politi-
cal in orientation. In effect, feminist, interpretive/hermeneutic,
participatory-democratic, antiracist, or anticapitalist critics of science
and epistemologically oriented philosophers of science would be
better to see themselves as allies with an interest in exploring the
social character of knowledge in a manner distinct from that pro-
moted by SSK (Harding and OBarr 1987; Rouse 1987; Sclove 1995;
Harding 1993; Rose and Rose 1976). Both are in a parallel position, in
that dominant approaches in SSK seek to block the legitimacy of the
criticisms of outsiders to a scientific field, whether those outsiders are
academics or activists with a larger political agenda, philosophers
wishing to subsume the enterprise of science to a particular
epistemological model, or even other scientists who lack direct
engagement with a particular scientific field.2 In the words of Harry
1. All the major schools of SSK are represented in the early anthology (Knorr-Cetina
and Mulkay 1983b), among which only the dissenting approach of Chubin and Restivo
(1983) evidences an interest in normative questions about science. The current state of
the field in STS is represented in Jasanoff, Markle, and Petersen (1994).
2. On the latter, see the discussion of the opinions of bystander scientists in Collins
(1998).
Collins, SSK leaves pure science very nearly as it is; in the main it
simply redescribes it.3 This view sees the primary limitation of the
traditional image of science to be that the scientist and layperson alike
mistakenly see the strength of science to reside in its conformity to
some general method applied to the world. On this view, a better
image of science as a socially contested field would allow outsiders to
understand why scientific controversy exists but not to directly
engage it (Collins and Pinch 1998). After challenging this
Wittgenstein-inspired sociology of knowledge, I suggest an alterna-
tive approach to reconstructing contextual understandings of scien-
tific practice that would allow for sociologically and historically sen-
sitive criticisms of scientific practice, drawing lessons from past
episodes in the history of science where methodological consider-
ations figured heavily. I conclude with brief consideration of two
cases where linked epistemological and political criticisms led to sig-
nificant changes in the conduct of science: Baconian reform of science
in the early Royal Society and criticism of AIDS drug-testing proto-
cols by AIDS activists.
SSK offers two related, but distinct, interpretations of Wittgenstein
to sociologize epistemological topics.4 Scientific reasoning is
related to forms of life by adopting either a collective or an
interactional interpretation of science. The first sees scientific work
as occurring within well-defined collectives that act to ensure consen-
sus about rule following (relativists Collins and Pinch; Strong Pro-
grammers Barnes and Bloor), while the second denies the significance
of all larger contexts (proper method, disciplines, institutions, etc.) by
focusing upon very local, emergent, interactional orders
(ethnomethodologists Michael Lynch and Eric Livingston). Which-
ever approach is adopted, outside critique is blocked.
For the collective Wittgensteinians, outside critics of a form of
knowledge can only be followers of different forms of lifethey can-
not engage that knowledge on fair terms.5 Indeed, they see the world
3. Collins (1983, 98). Collins seems to view impure science as science corrupted by
outside distortions of the self-regulated, core set of a scientific community. See the
discussion of violations of the core set, below.
4. I focus here on these sociological interpretations of Wittgenstein, even where they
diverge in style and content from Wittgenstein himself. These sociologists build upon
Wittgensteins discussion of rule following and language use, and his
antiphilosophical or antitheoretical standpoint, as discussed in Wittgenstein (1969).
5. See, for example, the analysis of the Hobbes-Boyle debate in Shapin and Schaffer
(1985).
in different ways (or see different worlds); their views are completely
incommensurable. For Bloor, a form of life is a pattern of socially sus-
tained boundaries, the substratum of conventional behaviour that
underlies rule use; competing usages imply rival groups (Bloor
1983, 140, 37, 48). For Collins, a form of life is a social group for which
intersubjective agreement in rule use obtains: This leads one to
expect groups to be able to communicate readily within themselves
because of their members common ways of going on, but equally we
would expect difficulty in communication between culturally diverse
groups.6 Once one has adopted a form of life, it comes complete with
its own rules for correctly viewing the world. In this sense, group
membership is the crucial criterion that determines ones view of the
natural world.
For the interactional Wittgensteinian, outside critics of a form of
knowledge can only proceed by falsely recontextualizing the ongo-
ing, interactionally negotiated cognitive orders of scientific activity. It
is larger frameworks of meaning that seemingly allow criticism to
proceed, but they do so improperly by thematizing the cognitive
order of local settings in terms of larger methodological assumptions,
or gender and power dynamics, and the like. Such larger frameworks
obtain no purchase on the life world of scientists unless and until sci-
entists interactively reference these debates. Even in such a circum-
stance, the meaning of such referencing is given entirely by the work
that is done with them by local participants. In short, scientists might
invoke larger debates about science to score local points, but that does
not give meaning to science critique (except possibly as idiosyncratic
local activities having no relevance for their ostensible subject).
I would like to propose another way of viewing the significance of
big criticisms of the conduct of knowledge that emphasize their sig-
nificance for a better understanding of the social epistemology of
inquiry. Key to this enterprise is the rehabilitation of the concept of
method in the history of science. Methodological criticisms of knowl-
edge stand at the intersection of broader sociological and
epistemological narratives. Think of the early Baconian Royal Society
here: a better engagement with the world (an epistemological virtue)
was typically seen as coemergent with an altered institutional form of
knowledge (an academy of free equals rather than a university with
6. Collins (1985, 15). The fact that machines are not socialized into our forms of life
explains why they cannot think like us. See Collins (1990, 17-18, 41, 181-82, 211) and Col-
lins and Kusch (1998, 1, 196-97).
disciplinary hierarchies). Popper sees the open society as the ideal set-
ting for his falsificationist methodology. Feminist epistemologies
similarly conjoin epistemological and social categories, as in Evelyn
Fox Kellers suggestion that a better engagement with the diversity of
nature can correct mistaken reductionist theoretical understandings
as women increase their presence in science (whether we consider
this to result from innate gender differences or their experience as
outsiders; Keller 1983).
7. Peter Winchs work provides the classic articulation of a Wittgenstein basis for
sociology as socially enforced rule following. See Peter Winchs claim that the analysis
of meaningful behaviour must allot a central role to the notion of a rule; that all behav-
iour which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso facto rule-
governed (Winch 1958, 51-52).
8. For the unfortunate comparison of science to baseball, complete with a defense of
science studies as a field of its own with no implications for the conduct of science itself,
see Fish (1996).
9. See, for example, Richards and Schuster (1989) for a critique of Evelyn Fox
Kellers focus on the alternative methodological commitments of Barbara McClintock.
10. See Bloor (1983, ch. 9, The Heirs to the Subject That Used to Be Called Philoso-
phy) and Collins (1985, ch. 6, The Scientist in the Network: A Sociological Resolution
of the Problem of Inductive Inference).
COLLECTIVE WITTGENSTEINIANS
11. Knorr-Cetina and Mulkay (1983a) and other reviews of the field point to the
Duhem-Quine thesis as opening up the possibility of a sociological explanation of the
content of science. This appeal to empirical underdetermination is ironic in that it
seems to maintain a residual asymmetry: the social steps in to fill what evidence (con-
ceived as if it were nonsocial) cannot. See Fuller (1993, 148-49, 321).
The ultimate correctness of the consensual view [their position that the
consensus of a collective defines acceptable interpretation] shows
itself . . . when we ask: What would this turning out to be right amount
to? The answer is that it would be a new consensus. (Barnes, Bloor, and
Henry 1996, 14)
12. Collins (1985, 145). This picture is similar in many ways to the account found in
Putnam (1975, 227-29), with the exception that Putnam stresses the fixing of reference
by experts while Collins stresses the radical flexibility of reference at this stage.
13. Chubin (1982). It is true that rivals exist within core sets, yet Chubins point is
that this does not include all potential rivals not taken to have shared the same back-
ground assumptions.
within the research community, one may ask who should have control
over protocols and interpretations?14
14. Collins (1988, 740). Compare Nelson (1990), where an argument that it is ulti-
mately a community who knows is taken to provide license for wider examination of
the value assumptions of technical knowledge. A rejection of the fact-value distinction
leads to the conclusion that the autonomy of science is a myth and a pernicious one
(Nelson 1990, 137), and the development of a feminist empiricist approach to science
critique on that basis.
INTERACTIONAL WITTGENSTEINIANS
15. Lynch (1993, 162) and Kripke (1982). For the debate about the interpretation of
Wittgenstein, see Lynch (1992a), Bloor (1992), and Lynch (1992b).
16. Lynch (1993, 172-73). Here, Lynch draws upon Baker and Hacker (1985), who
argue against the community view interpretation on this basis. This might appear
strange given Lynchs ethnomethodological commitment to elucidate the practical pro-
duction of social order, yet this is made clearer by Lynchs critique of explanatory social
theory and appeals to social context (see Lynch 1993, 172, n. 42).
19. Lynch (1993, 18-22) traces Garfinkels extension of Bar-Hillels attention to the
problem of computer translation of indexical expressions, such as pronouns, deictic
expressions (here, there, this, etc.), and similar contextually dependent expressions, to a
general contextual dependence of all meaningful expressions. See Bar-Hillel (1967) and
Garfinkel (1967, ch. 1). For a treatment of the problem in analytical philosophy, see,
for example, Perry (1991). For indexicals as a methodological horror leading to a
skeptical and antirealist epistemology, see Woolgar (1988, ch. 2). Putnam (1975, 234)
extends the notion of indexicality within philosophy beyond obviously token-reflexive
like here or now to terms like water, which are understood as referring to water around
here. The upshot is to argue against the position that the intension (meaning) of a con-
cept determines its extension (reference). Such a descriptivist position is shared by
Carnap, Kuhn, and Kuhn-influenced positions within SSK. See Boyd (1992, 164-69). For
criticisms of the original baptism of referring terms in the causal theory of reference,
see Fuller (1988, ch. 3). For an anti-descriptivist position, where reference is fixed only
retroactively as an effect of the (changing) signifying process, see Zizek (1989, ch. 3).
Zizek incorporates postmodernisms emphasis on discourse, while denying that signi-
fication (intension) exhausts reference (extension).
21. See Haraway (1985) and Fuss (1989, 36-37). For a critique of the essentializing of
categories of woman or gender as bases for political action, see Butler (1990).
22. See Bloor (1987) for an argument that despite ethnomethodologists refusal to
theorize, they nevertheless subscribe to a very strong theoretical claim, which Bloor
dubs the locality thesis (p. 351). Similarly, Bloor (1992, 276) notes that the difference
between his position and ethnomethodology cannot be that the one constructs rules for
understanding rules and the other does not:
One of our most insistent and recurrent findings is the so-called local
character of the organization of interaction (that is, its turn-by-turn,
sequence-by-sequence, episode-sensitive character), and this is one
basis for the problems that arise in attempting to relate its analysis to so-
called macro. (Schegloff 1987, 209)
23. Schegloff might object that this is not an assumption but the outcome of a body of
empirical research. However, from the fact (if it is a fact) that moment-to-moment inter-
action can be modeled in this fashion, it does not follow that nonvisible contexts are
not operative, nor that interaction constitutes the only meaningful social phenomena.
24. It is not clear that Schegloff would talk in terms of skills that could be learned
and applied in new contexts. Yet failing something akin to such a notion, Schegloffs
approach verges on the tautological: doing being doctor means doing whatever it is
that results in interactionally being doctor. It would appear that Schegloffs strictures
entail a kind of willed ignorance of anything outside whatever interaction is currently
being studied. This is another way of saying that sociologists would have to avoid even
the kinds of interactional context invoking Schegloff maintains that actors themselves
engage in.
25. Chomsky (1989, ch. 9). It is ironic that Lynch (1993, 304-305) invokes Noam
Chomskys appeal to normal science, which Chomsky offers as a defense of his com-
parative method in order to fend off complaints about the methodological adequacy of
his analysis of U.S. press coverage of international events. Lynch borrows this idea to
promote a nonscientistic deemphasis on methodology, yet Lynch (and Schegloff) argue
against the kind of comparative and generalizing approach Chomsky takes precisely
by appeal to the methodological limitations of such research.
26. It would not be possible to object that some reporters did make such a larger
context evident, since there is no reason that the change could not have been tested
and failed without anyone invoking the right context for its attempted implementa-
tion. Nor would simply telling a number of different stories of local interaction suffice
(staff meetings, bank transfers, arms shipments, military training, etc.), since the point
27. See Lynchs argument against Latours semiotic approach (Lynch 1993, 290-92).
28. Lynch (2001, ch. 5). An interesting account of a conservative appropriation of
Paracelsian medicine leading to the establishment of the discipline of chemistry is
found in Hannaway (1975).
29. Fuller (1988, chs. 5-6). The only direct evidence of divergent meanings would be
explicit conflict over meaning. Fortunately, the historian is not without resources in
tracing the origins of such divergences before the appearance of explicit reconstruc-
tions of a discipline (see Roberts 1991).
30. A key theme of Shapin and Schaffer (1985).
31. For early books by the Royal Society, see the discussion of work by John Evelyn,
Robert Hooke, John Wilkins, Thomas Sprat, and John Graunt in Lynch (2001).
CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
Anderson, Benedict. 1983. Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of
nationalism. London: Verso.
Baker, G. P., and P. M. S. Hacker. 1985. Skepticism, rules and language. Oxford: Blackwell,
1985.
Bar-Hillel, Y. 1967. Indexical expressions. Mind 63:359-79.
Barnes, Barry, David Bloor, and John Henry. 1996. Scientific knowledge: A sociological
analysis. London: Athlone.
Barthes, Roland. 1973. Mythologies. London: Jonathan Cape.
Bloor, David. 1983. Wittgenstein: A social theory of knowledge. New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press.
. 1987. The living foundations of mathematics. Social Studies of Science 17:337-58.
. 1992. Left and right Wittgensteinians. In Science as practice and culture, edited by
Andrew Pickering, 266-82. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Boyd, Richard. 1992. Constructivism, realism, and philosophical method. In Inference,
explanation, and other frustrations: Essays in the philosophy of science, edited by John
Earman, 131-98. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Butler, Judith. 1990. Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity. New York:
Routledge.
Callon, Michel, and Bruno Latour. 1981. Unscrewing the big Leviathan: How actors
macro-structure reality and how sociologists help them to do so. In Advances in social
theory and methodology: Toward an integration of micro- and macro-sociologies, edited by
K. Knorr-Cetina and A. V. Cicourel, 277-303. Boston: Routledge Kegan Paul.
Callon, Michel, and John Law. 1982. On interests and their transformation: Enrolment
and counter-enrolment. Social Studies of Science 12:615-26.
Chomsky, Noam. 1989. Necessary illusions: Thought control in democratic societies. Boston:
South End Press.
Chubin, Daryl E. 1982. Collinss programme and the hardest possible case. Social Studies
of Science 12:136-39.
Chubin, Daryl E., and Sal Restivo. 1983. The mooting of science studies: Research
programmes and science policy. In Science observed: Perspectives on the social study of
science, edited by Karin Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay, 55-83. London: Sage.
Clarke, Adele E. 1990. A social worlds research adventure: The case of reproductive sci-
ence. In Theories of science in society, edited by S. E. Cozzens and T. F. Gieryn, 15-42.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Collins, H. M. 1981. Stages in the empirical programme of relativism. Social Studies of
Science 11:3-10.
. 1983. An empirical relativist programme in the sociology of scientific knowl-
edge. In Science observed: Perspectives on the social study of science, edited by Karin
Knorr-Cetina and Michael Mulkay, 85-113. London: Sage.
. 1985. Changing order: Replication and induction in scientific practice. London: Sage.
. 1988. Public experiments and displays of virtuosity: The core-set revisited.
Social Studies of Science 18:725-48.
. 1990. Artificial experts: Social knowledge and intelligent machines. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Collins, Harry. 1998. Whats wrong with relativism? Physics World (April). http://
www.physicsweb.org/article/world/11/4/2.
Collins, Harry, and Martin Kusch. 1998. The shape of actions: What humans and machines
can do. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Collins, Harry, and Trevor Pinch. 1998. The golem: What you should know about science.
2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Collins, Randall. 1975. Conflict sociology: Toward an explanatory science. New York: Aca-
demic Press.
Connolly, William E. 1991. Identity\difference: Democratic negotiations of political paradox.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Epstein, Steven. 1995. The construction of lay expertise: AIDS activism and the forging
of credibility in the reform of clinical trials. Science, Technology, & Human Values
20:408-37.
. 1996. Impure science: AIDS, activism, and the politics of pure knowledge. Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Fine, Arthur. 1986a. The shaky game: Einstein, realism, and the quantum theory. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
. 1986b. Unnatural attitudes: Realist and instrumentalist attachments to science.
Mind 95:149-79.
Fish, Stanley. 1989. Doing what comes naturally: Change, rhetoric, and the practice of theory in
literary and legal studies. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
. 1996. Professor Sokals bad joke. New York Times, 21 May 1996. http://
www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/fish.html.
Fujimura, Joan H. 1992. Crafting science: Standardized packages, boundary objects,
and translation. In Science as practice and culture, edited by Andrew Pickering, 168-
211. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fuller, Steve. 1988. Social epistemology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
. 1993. Philosophy, rhetoric, and the end of knowledge: The coming of science and tech-
nology studies. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
Fuss, Diana. 1989. Essentially speaking: Feminism, nature and difference. New York:
Routledge.
Garfinkel, Harold. 1967. Studies in ethnomethodology. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Garver, Newton, and Seung-Chong Lee. 1994. Derrida and Wittgenstein. Philadelphia:
Temple University Press.
Giddens, Anthony. 1993. New rules of sociological method: A positive critique of interpretive
sociologies. 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Gottweis, Herbert. 1995. German politics of genetic engineering and its deconstruction.
Social Studies of Science 25:195-235.
Gross, Paul R., and Norman Levitt. 1994. Higher superstition: The academic Left and its
quarrels with science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Hannaway, Owen. 1975. The chemists and the word: The didactic origins of chemistry. Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Haraway, Donna. 1985. Amanifesto for cyborgs: Science, technology, and socialist femi-
nism in the 1980s. Socialist Review 15:64-107.
. 1990. Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature. London: Free
Association.
Harding, Sandra. 1991. Whose science? Whose knowledge? Thinking from womens lives.
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
, ed. 1993. The racial economy of science: Toward a democratic future. Bloomington:
Indiana University Press.
Harding, Sandra, and Jean F. OBarr, eds. 1987. Sex and scientific inquiry. Chicago: Uni-
versity of Chicago Press.
Hessen, B. 1931. The social and economic roots of Newtons Principia. In Science at the
crossroads, edited by N. Bukharin. London: Kniga.
Hunter, Michael. 1981. Science and society in Restoration England. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Jasanoff, Sheila S. 1987. Contested boundaries in policy-relevant science. Social Studies
of Science 17:195-230.
Jasanoff, Sheila, Gerald E. Markle, and James C. Petersen, eds. 1994. Handbook of science
and technology studies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1983. A feeling for the organism: The life and work of Barbara McClintock.
San Francisco: Freeman.
Keohane, Kieran. 1993. Central problems in the philosophy of the social sciences after
postmodernism: Reconciling consensus and hegemonic theories of epistemology
and political ethics. Philosophy & Social Criticism 19:145-69.
Knorr-Cetina, Karin D. 1981. Introduction: The micro-sociological challenge of macro-
sociology: Towards a reconstruction of social theory and methodology. In Advances
Pinch, Trevor. 1985. Toward an analysis of scientific observation: The externality and
evidential significance of observational reports in physics. Social Studies of Science
15:3-36.
Polanyi, Michael. 1957. Personal knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Pratt, Mary Louise. 1987. Linguistic utopias. In The linguistics of writing, edited by Nigel
Fabb, 48-66. New York: Methuen.
Putnam, Hilary. 1975. The meaning of Meaning. In Hilary Putnam, Mind, language
and reality: Philosophical papers, 2 vols., II:215-71. London: Cambridge University
Press.
Richards, Evelleen, and John Schuster. 1989. The feminine method as myth and
accounting resource: A challenge to gender studies and social studies of science.
Social Studies of Science 19:697-720.
Roberts, Lissa. 1991. Setting the table: The disciplinary development of eighteenth-
century chemistry as read through the changing structure of its tables. In The literary
structure of scientific argument: Historical studies, edited by Peter Dear, 99-132. Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1989. Contingency, irony, and solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Rose, Hilary, and Steven Rose, eds. 1976. The political economy of science: Ideology of/in the
natural sciences. London: Macmillan.
Ross, Andrew, ed. 1996. Science wars. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Rouse, Joseph. 1987. Knowledge and power: Toward a political philosophy of science. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press.
Schegloff, Emanuel A. 1987. Between micro and macro: Contexts and other connec-
tions. In The micro-macro link, edited by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Gieson, Rich-
ard Munch, and Neil J. Smelser, 207-34. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Schuster, John A. 1984. Methodologies as mythic structures: A preface to the future his-
toriography of method. Metascience 1/2:15-36.
. 1990. The scientific revolution. In Companion to the history of modern science,
edited by R. C. Olby, G. N. Cantor, J. R. R. Christie, and M. J. S. Hodge. London:
Routledge.
Schuster, John A., and Richard Yeo, eds. 1986. The politics and rhetoric of scientific method:
Historical studies. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Sclove, Richard E. 1995. Democracy and technology. New York: Guilford.
Shapin, Steven, and Simon Schaffer. 1985. Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and
the experimental life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Webster, C. 1976. The origins of the Royal Society. History of Science 6:106-28.
Webster, Charles. 1975. The great instauration: Science, medicine and reform, 1626-1660.
London: Duckworth.
Winch, Peter. 1958. The idea of a social science and its relation to philosophy. London:
Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1969. Philosophical investigations: The English text of the third edi-
tion, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan.
Wood, P. B. 1980. Methodology and apologetics: Thomas Sprats history of the Royal So-
ciety. British Journal for the History of Science 13:1-26.
Woolgar, Steve. 1988. Science: The very idea. Chichester, UK: Ellis Horwood.
Zizek, Slavoj. 1989. The sublime object of ideology. London: Verso.