Bryan Solco 1E
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335
Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to
declare several provisions of Republic Act
(R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention
Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
Issues (on substantive due process):
1. WON Section 4(b)(3) of R.A. 10175
violates the constitutional right to
due process
2. WON Section 5 of R.A. 10175
violates the constitutional right to
due process with respect to Section
4(c)(4) of the said law
Held:
1. No. Petitioners claim that Section
4(b)(3), which provides for the
punishment of computer-related
identity theft, violates the
constitutional rights to due process
and to privacy and correspondence,
and transgresses the freedom of the
press.
Zones of privacy are recognized
and protected in our laws. Within
these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by
law and in accordance with
customary legal process.
Clearly, what this section regulates
are specific actions: the acquisition,
use, misuse, or deletion of personal
identifying data of another. There is
no fundamental right to acquire
anothers personal data.
The usual identifying information
regarding a person includes his
name, his citizenship, his residence
address, his contact number, his
place and date of birth, the name of
his spouse if any, his occupation,
and similar data. The law punishes
those who acquire or use such
identifying information without right,
implicitly to cause damage.
With regard to freedom of the press,
petitioners believe that journalists
would be hindered from accessing
the unrestricted user account of a
person in the news to secure
information about him that could be
published. But this is not the
essence of identity theft that the law
seeks to prohibit and punish.
Evidently, the theft of identity
information must be intended for an
illegitimate purpose. Moreover,
acquiring and disseminating
information made public by the user
himself cannot be regarded as a
form of theft.
2. Yes. Section 5 (which penalizes
aiding or abetting and attempt in the
commission of cybercrimes) with
respect to Section 4(c)(4) (which
penalizes online libel) is
unconstitutional. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of
internet users because of its obvious
chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the
crime of aiding or abetting ensnares
all the actors in the cyberspace front
in a fuzzy way. Especially in the
absence of legislation tracing the
interaction of netizens and their level
of responsibility.
In this case, the particularly complex
web of interaction on social media
websites would give law enforcers
such latitude that they could
arbitrarily or selectively enforce the
law.
Netizens are not given "fair notice"
or warning as to what is criminal
conduct and what is lawful conduct.
When a case is filed, how will the
court ascertain whether one
netizens comment online aided and
abetted a cybercrime while another
comment did not?