Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
SaIih zbaran
October, 1969
7)
2.
ABSTRACT
Turks and the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf in the middle decades of the
sixteenth century.
The Introduction deals with the Portuguese and the Turkish sources used
Chapters III to V seek to study their confrontation, their struggle for the
and translation, some examples of the Portuguese and the Turkish archival
material
3.
ACK NCWLEDGEMENTS
istanbul, who has been helpful to me since he initiated me into this field.
Mr. J. Pereira do Costa, and his colleagues for their very kind co-operation.
S. Czbaran.
4.
ABBREVIATIONS
not 6gico.
So Loureno.
IA Islam Ansiklopedisi.
Defterleri.
Zeyl i.
A.D. 1895.
Ru*us
Ba,sbakanlik Arivi, KmII Kepeci Tasnifi, Ruts Defterieri.
NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION
characters. In this study the Ottoman names and expressions are rendered
as they would appear in modern Turkish usage. Some place names which
are difficult to read have been given in the original Ottoman script.
Words like firman (in Turkish, ferman) and pasha (in Turkish, pa;a) which
can be found in the Cxford English Dictionary are used in their English
form.
6.
CCNTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT 2
ACK NOWLEDGEMENTS 3
ABBREV IATIONS 4
NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION 5
INTRODUCTION A Review of the Sources 8
BIBLIOGRAPHY 142
PLATES 155
8.
The historical literature relating to the Persian Gulf is quite rich for
the seventeenth and the following centuries. It is much less full for the
adequate detail the course of events in the Gulf during the years examined
in this thesis. The general histories which are available mention no more
than scattered incidents - e.g., the 'Asia Portuguesa' of Faria y Sousa, ill
translated into English and offering only a small amount of information, has
often been copied and followed in modern books dealing with the Persian Gulf. 1
The waters of the gulf saw, in the middle decades of the sixteenth
century, a long conflict between the Ottoman Turks and the Portuguese.
Of the sources which describe this confrontation the most important are
the documents located in the archives at Istanbul and Lisbon being as yet, in
'Arquivo Noconal da Torre do Tombo', the oldest and most important of the
adequate published catalogue for the 'Arquivo Nacional'. The existing guide
books offer little aid to the student who is seeking particular categories of
1932 (reprinted 1962) for the author gives resumes of4h. Portuguese documents
dealing with Portuguese Asia and preserved not only at Torre do Tombo, but
Torre do Tombo has two main groups of material. The larger is known
as the 'Corpo Cronol6gico' and contains 82902 documents kept in 'Macos', i.e.
'bundles'. These documents, each summarized in a few brief lines, ore indexed
events of the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries. The 'Centro de Estudos
large number of documents selected from the 'Gavetas'. These two groups of
material contain some documents relating to the Persian Gulf - e.g., from the
the naval campaign of the Ottoman admiral, Pin Reis, against Muscat and Hormuz;3
or again, from the Gavetas, the report of Simo do Costa (dated 1563) which
lections of material, of which two are important for the affairs of the Persian
Gulf - i.e., the 'Cartos de Ormuz a D. Joo de Castros (letters from Ormuz to
D. Joo de Castro, the Vice-Roy of India 1545 - 1548) and the 'Colecdo de
Sao Loureno'. The 'Cartas de Crmuz' contains seventy seven letters arranged
in chronological order and bound in one volume. Most of these letters came
from two Portuguese governors of Hormuz to India, during the years 1545 - 154b.
The more interesting amongst them bear the signature of D. Manuel de Limo,
who, in May 1547, became governor of Hormuz in succession to Luis Fal coo.5
Manuel de Limo wrote to the Vce-Roy at Goa about the state of affairs at
Hormuz and about the Cttoman Occupation of Basra in 1546. His information
was acquired from an Arab merchant, Hall I Fayat (Hagy Fayat), whom the
Cttomans sent to Hormuz soon after the capture of Basro. 6 He also obtained
some further details from a certain Domingos Borbudo, an agent whom he had
against Basra and the adlacent lands at the head of the Persian Gulf. The
letters of Manuel de Lima offer some valuable data about the relations existing
in chronological sequence. 8 Here can be found, translated from the Arabic into
Portuguese, the letter of lbn Ulyan, an Arab chieftain from Jezayir, i.e., the
Qurna region where the Euphrates and the Tigres flow together. lbn Ulyari
was appealing to the Portuguese at Hormuz for aid against the Ottomans. The
collection has, too, a similar letter from Sheikh Yahya, the ruler of Basra.
There is also here a letter of Ayas Pasha, 1 the beglerbeg of Baghdad, to lbn
12
Ulyan.
archives, a rich chronicle literature, which recounts, often in great detail, the
asked Barros to compose a work narrating the course of the Portuguese conquest
Lisbon, retaining this office for over thirty years. In 1552 the first volume was
published of his 'Decadr,s da Asia' - the 'Deeds done by the Portuguese in their
discovery and conquest of the seas and lands of the East'. The second volume
appeared in 1553 and the third in 1563. A fourth and final volume was published
in 1615. It contains material deriving from Barros himself, but also information
which came from the editor, i.e., from the cosmographer Royal, Joo Baptista
14
Lavanha, who used a number of other sources. The complete work, in four
Decadas, covers the even's from the voyage of Vasco da Game to India in 1497
until the Cttomon sie,j e of Diu in 1538. Barros never visited India, but he had
access to official documents and letters, available to him in the 'Casa do India'.
He notes that he made use also of two Arabic and three Persian geographers 15 -
works which officials in the service of the kind and, in addition, a slave whom
took six of the vessels sailing under the command of the Cttoman admiral,
the main sources underlying this present thesis. Couto went to India in 1559
and remained there for over fifty years. He was for the first ten years, a
soldier in the Portuguese service and perhaps saw action against the Cttomons
in the Persian Gulf and in the Red Sea. 19 Thereafter he became the keeper of
19. Cnthe life of Couto see the introduction - by Manuel Severim de Faria -
to the 1758 edition of the Decadas. cf. also A. Bell, Diogo do Couto,
London, 1924.
14.
the archives at Goo and made full use of them when he came to write his
officials and soldiers serving in india also from C:ttoman Turks whom SJleyman
Pasha left in Gujarat after his unsuccessful attempt to capture Diu in 1538.20
Couto began his narrative in 1562, giving a fresh account of the period to 153E.
After this date his chronicle is a true continuation of Barros, based on his own
extending now to the year 1600. The first portion of Couto's work was prinied
in 1602, the last section in 1645 long after the death of Couto which occurred
in 1616. A combined edition of Barros and Couto was printed at Lisbon in 1788. 21
Persian Gulf at this time - Ferno Lopes de Castanheda and Gaspar Correa.
of Castanheda covers the years 1497 - 1538. Couto made considerable use of this
work, the first six books of which appeared in 1552 - 1554 and the last two books
in 1561. The 'Lendas da India' of Correa narrates the events of 1497 - 1550.
His chronicle was printed for the first time only in 1864. Both Castanheda and
The C ttoman sources relevant to the Persian Gulf in the years 1534 -
historians, thus far, have made little use of the archival material.23
24
A few documents hove been published, e.g., by Saffet Bey, and Robert
Mantran, 25 but only Cengiz Crhon(u has studied the archival evidence in some
detail and underlined its importance for scholars interested in the Persian Gulf.26
The largest and most important of the Turkish archives is the 'Ba?bakanhk
Arivi' (Turkish State Archives) located at Istanbul. The bulk of the documents
presented there ore not earlier in dote than the middle of the sixteenth century;27
only a small number of documents has survived from the period before 1551 A. D.
important affairs) which contains the richest information n the conflict between
the Ottomans and the Portuguese. This series covers the years 961 H./1553-54
order. The registers contain copies of decrees (firmans, berats, etc.,) sent out
23. Professor B. Lewis has included some material relating to Basra in his
article 'The Cttoman Archives as a source for the history of the Arab
Lands' in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (1951), 139-155.
24. cf. Saffet, Bahreyn'de BirVak'a, in Tarih-i Csmani Encumeni Mecmuasi
iii (Istanbul 1328/191J), 1139-1 145.
25. cf. R. Mantran, Reglements Fiscoux Ottomans, La Province de Bassora
(2 moiti du XVIs.), in Journal of the Economic and Social History of
the Orient, x/2-3 (Leiden 1967), 224-277.
26. See C. Crhonlu, 1559 Bahreyn Seferine Aid Bir Ropor, TD, xvii/22
(Istanbul 1967), 1-16.
27. Cn the Babokonlik Arivi cf. M. SertoIu, Muhteva Bokimindan Baveklet
Arvi, Ankara 1955; also B. Lewis, in El 2 , s.v. Baveklet Arsivi.
16.
mode, but there are summaries for the first sixty volumes; a subject index is
available for some of the following volumes, i.e., from no.61 onwards.
The orders Qi5kJm) relating to the Fersian Gulf were sent, for example, to
mJ)mme registers betweei the years 1554 - 1559 have survived. There is also
a gap between the years 1561 and 1564 during the time of the Ottoman efforts
the 'Ruus Defterleri', i.e., the Ruus Registers. The Ruus Defterleri - in contrs-
appointments, honours, rewords and the like. 30 It is only from the Russ
documents that we can obtain a clear picture of the Ottoman eyalet system,
Ar;ivi' - the 'lapu Defterleri' (the codastral registers). Those registers often
published, dating from the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and embracing much
of the Ottoman Empire.'31 This collection does not include a kanun-nme for
Basra. Two kanun-nmes for Basra, dated 959/1551 and 982/1574 - 1575, and
enumerating, amongst other information, the port and customs duties levied on
(the archives of the Topkopi alace). in the Palace there is a library, which
has the earliest in date of the Whimme defters known (thus far) to be extant.
This defter, doting from 959/1551 - 52 contains some orders (hk,'m) relating
to the campaign undertaken, in 1552, by Frt Reis. In the archive itself Dr.
.33
C. Crhonlu has discovered a report on the 1559 campaign against the Bahrayn.
It was written by on Ottoman officer who took port in that operation. There
may well be, in the Topkapi archive, other documents, untraced as yet, which
concern the Fersian Gulf and its territories. The possibilities of findng new
material in the Palace will be known only when th work cataloguing the or-
34
chive is complete.
The Cttoman chronicles which describe the events of 1534 - 1581 are
much less rich In data on the Persian Gulf than the great Portuguese histories.
lined in the words of Saffet Bey who, with the Bahroyn campaign of 1559 in
his mind, was moved to write: "iVlay prayers be for the souls of our ancestors
who preserved our beautiful old records. If we had been left to depend on
our historians and their works we would have been able neither to read nor to
original character on the conflict between the Ottomans and the Portuguese.37
Most of their data come from a small number of more specialized histories -
e.g., from the work of Seydi Au Reis, the famous Ottoman sailor and geographer
who in 1554 fought the Portuguese in the Gulf of Cmai and wrote a vivid
the naval affairs of the Cttoman Empire. He, too, relied on the narrative
of Seydi Ali Keis, when he came to recount the course of events in the Persian
Gulf.
The Ottoman chronicles relate in much detail the wars which the sultans
fought against Safavid persia. 0 Some of these histories include data on the
affairs of Basra and of the Persian Gulf. vatrakci Nasuh, 41 living in the time /
of Sultan Sileyman, has described the conflict between the Ottomans and the
extends to the year 968/1560 - 61, gives some information about the Cttoman
38. cf. Seydi All Reis, MiratU 9 MemIik, Istanbul 1313/1895; cf. also
C. Crhonlu, Seydi AU Reis, in Journal of the Regional Cultural Institute
(Iran, Paklsta4l, Turkey), i/2 (Tebrari bol), 44-57;. Turan, in i.A.,
s.v. Seydi Ali Reis.
39. cf. Ktlb elebi, Tuhfetl Kibar fi Esfar'l Bihar, Istanbul 1329/1911.
40. see B. KJtkolu, Csmanli-1 ran Siyasi Minasebetleri, I: 1578 - 1590,
Istanbul 1962; also JJ. Walsh, the historiography of Cttoman-Safayid
Relations in the Sixteenth and the Seventeenth Centuries, in Historians
of the Middle East, 197-211.
41. Matraki iNasuh (on horn cf. H. Yurdaydin, ivatrakt Nasuh, Ankara
1963) wrote a Sileyman-nme describing the events which occurred in the
time of Sultan Sleyman KanunT. I have consulted the manuscript preserved
in Istanbul Arkeololi Kiitphanesi, MS.379. This manuscript covers the
years 960/1543 to 958/1551.
42. This chronicle was considered to be the work of R5stem Posha, who was
grand vizier of the Cttoman Empire in 1544-1553 and again in 1555-1561
(cf. . Altunda and S. loran, in IA, s.v. RUstem Paso). It has been
argued, however, that the author of this chronicle was in fact ivatraki
Nasuh (cf. H. Yurdaydin, Matraki Nasuh'un hayati ye Eserleri ile
I Igili Yeni Blgiler, in Belleten, xxix (Ankara 1965), 354.
20.
CHAPTER I
There were in the sixteenth century two great powers which came to
have an interest in the affairs of the Persian Gulf. Cf these powers the first
was Portugal. The Portuguese reached western India at the end of the fifteenth
Indian Ccean, seeking to dominate the ancient trade which ran from India
through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean world. Cn
the other hand the Cttoman Turks conquered Egypt in 1517 and took control
of the Red Sea. Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, in the time of
SIeyman the avagnificent, they conquered Baghdad and made contact with
adventure are various. The economic factor, e.g., the search for spices, was
no doubt the most important. A crusading zeal inherited from their past
history and the quest for the legendary Frester John can also be counted as
motives underlying the Portuguese penetration into the lands of the East. 1
14b - 1489 and collected information on the trade routes of Asia. Then in
14'b, after rounding the Cape of Good Hope, Vasco do Gamo with the
The Portuguese obtained from Hormuz a nominal submission in the year 1507,
(1505 - 1509). It was Affonso d'Albuquerque who, well aware of the strategic
himself not strong enough to take t; but he plundered a number of towns on the
coast of the Cman arid Hadromaytt, e.g., Karyat, Muscat and Khfokkan.
1510 and made it the main centre of the Portuguese in India. In 1515 he soiled
again to Hormuz with twenty-seven vessels and 1500 Portuguese and also some
Malabar troops on board. The fortress of Hormuz was surrendered to him and
the Ra'is Hamid, the vizier of Hormuz, was killed. The Portuguese control thus
established at hormuz was to lost for more than a century. The Shah of Persia,
centre of trade even before the arrival of the Portuguese. Little is known,
however, about its political, economic and social life during the period
obscure, until the Portuguese began to write full accounts of their own
Albuquerque with 'el Rey Turanxaa' of Hormuz, i.e., Turan Shah,and Nur
Shah had to pay a tribute of 15.000 'xerafins' 4 each year to meet the expenses
of the Portuguese fortress and garrison at Hormuz. 5 The fortress was entrusted
to a Portuguese 'governador'.
tribute expected of him. He was also molesting ships sailing between Basra
and Hormuz. For this purpose he had acquired vessels with oars, made for him
3. Cf. The Travels of Pedro Teixeira; with his "Kings of Crmuz", and
extracts from his "Kings of Persia', trans. William F. Sinclair, London
1902, Appendix A; also Jean Aubin, Les Princes d'Crmuz du XIll
au xve siecle, in Journal Asiatique, ccxxxxi (Paris 1953), 126ff.
4. 'Xerafin' or 'xarafim' -,Portuguese expression for a coin called in Arabic
'ashrafi'. A 'xerafin' of Hormuz was worth 300 reis (cf. S. R. Dalgado,
Gloss6rio Luso-Asidtico, Coimbra 1921, ii, 424-425.
5. Simdo Botelho, C Tombo do Estodo da India, in Sabscdios para a Hist6ria
c1a India Portugueza, Lisboo 1868, 78.
6. Lahsa, i.e., the region of Al-Hasa in the north east of Arabia.
23.
with a fleet to the Bahrayn. 'Mocrim' was waiting for the Portuguese with
12,000 men, amongst them 300 Arab horsemen, 400 Persian archers and twenty
'Rumes espingardeiros', i.e., Turkish arquebusiers, who had been engaged not
only to fight, but also to teach some of the local population the use of fire arms.8
During the ensuing battle 'Mocrim' was killed and the Portuguese now compelled
the people of the Bahrayn to give to Hormuz the tribute due from them. -
officials should take the place of the native officials at the customs house in
Hormuz. luran Shah, resisting this change, attacked the Portuguese in Hormuz
(30 November 1521), but in vain. He and his followers withdrew now to the
island of Kishm. Soon Turon Shah was assassinated and a young prince raised
7. '.. .que lvocrim tinha feito alguns navios de remo por industria de
alguns Turcos" (Joo de Barros, Do Asia, Lisboa 1778, Dec. iii,
Liv.vi,27). 'Turcos' - a word, the precise sense of which is difficult
to discern from its use in the Portuguese sources. Sometimes it seems to
mean little more than 'Muslims' or men from the lands under Ottoman
rule. The Portuguese also made use of the expression 'Rumes' - i.e.,
men from the land of 'Rum', men, in short, from the territories under
the Ottoman Sultan.
8. ". . .doze mile homens, em que entrovam trezentos de cavallo Arobios,
e quatrocentos frecheiros Parseos, e vinte Rumes espingardeiros, corn
autros do terra a que eiies tinham ensinado este uso" (Barros, Dec. w,
Liv. vi, 33).
9. Ibid., Liv.vii,ll3ff.
24.
prince, with his vizier the 'Roes xarafo', i.e., Sharaf al-Din, and with other
'lvires ' (i.e., amirs) an agreement stipulating that the annual tribute should be
position at Hormuz and also to control, to their own advantage, the flow of
traffic to and from the island. To the ships and merchants of Hormuz, as vassals
waters of the Indian Ocean with the reservation that such vessels and merchants
should not sail through the 'estreito de mequa', i.e., into the Red Sea, nor to
'coffala e portos d'aquela costa', i.e., to Sofala and the adjacent shore of East
Africa. There was also a clause limiting the use and practice of arms
The Portuguese, in the years which followed these events, did not find
them in 1526, embracing Kalhat and Hormuz itself, was suppressed without much
trouble - the revolt had arisen from the exactions of Diogo de Mello, the then
governor of the Portuguese fortress at Hormuz. Three years later, in 1529, the
Portuguese imprisoned the 'guazil' of Hormuz, the 'Ra'is Sharaf al-Din, who
had been manipulating the young prince of Hormuz, Muhammad Shad, to his
It was in 1529 that the Portuguese, for the first time, intervened in
the affairs of Bosra. A certain Rashid ibn Megamis ('Ale Magemez' in the
Portuguese chronicles) was in control of Basra. Against him stood 'el Rey de
Gizaira',' 3 the Arab chieftain who dominated the region of Jezayir near Kurna.
This chieftain had demanded tribute from Basra. Rashid ibn Megamis rejected
this demand and appealed for aid to the Portuguese at Hormuz. Christavo de
Mendoa, the Governor at Hormuz sent Belchior de Sousa Tavares to Bosra with
and the Jezayir. The Arabs from ihe Jezayr surrendered to Basra two forts which
hod fallen to them earlier and also undertook to give an annual tribute to
,15
Basra. The Portuguese asked Rashid to hand over to them seven fustas then k
Basra, 'fustas' well armed with guns and having fifty 'Rumes' on board. lbn
12. cf. R.S. Whiteway, The Rise of the Portuguese Power in lndia,(2d edition)
London 1967, 222-223.
13. See below, j i , iS.
14. "..., chegou de Basora Beichior de Sousa Tavarez, que o capitao
Christovo de Mendoca tinha Ia mandado corn dous bargantijs, e queranta
homens de peleja a requerimento de AU Mogamex Rey daquella cidade,
para o ajudar a defender d'ElRey de Gizaira seu vizinho..." (Barros,
Dec.iv, Liv.iii,331).
15. 'fusta' - i.e., a type of oared ship, small and light (cf. H. Leitao e
J.V. Lopes, Dicion6rio da Linguagem de Marinha Antiga e Actual,
Lisboa 1963, 217. On other uses of the word 'fusta' see Kahane and
Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant, Urbana 1958, 235.
2.
Also in the some year, 1529, the Portuguese sent a force to the
Bahrayn. The governor of that island, the Ro'is 'Barbadim (Badr al-Din ?),
Hormuz, having refused to pay the tribute due from him. On 8 September
his brother, Simo da Cunha, with five ships ohd almost 500 men to the
Bahrayn. At this time Belchior de Sousa, with six oared vessels, was also
patrolling in the waters adjacent to the island, seeking to prevent the Ra'is
'Badradim' from recruiting troops in the coastal areas of Persia. The Ra'is,
with some 830 Persians under his command, refused to surrender the fortress of
the Bahrayn. The Portuguese now bombarded the fort, but in vain - a shci-tage
The years after 1529 saw little of note occurring at Hormuz - but the
the Persian Gulf and in the adjoining territories was soon to undergo a
notable change. A new factor would influence strongly the future course of
events - the power of the Cttoman Turks, who in 534 - 535 conquered from
CHAPTER II
In 1534 the Cttomcns entered into a new conflict with Persia. The
campaign of 1534 - 1535 brought them substantial gains in asterri Asia Minor.
It also sow the conquest of the two Iraqs - Iraq-i Ajem (Persian Iraq) and
begin this war against the Safavids. The desire to win a more effective control
over the important trade routes - e.g., the 'silk routet running from Tabriz to
Erzurum, Tokat and Bursa 1 and the 'spice route' extending from Basra to Baghdad
and Aleppo2 - must be counted no doubt amongst the reasons for the campaign.
On the political and military side the occupation of Iraq con be viewed as a
logical complement to the Ottoman conquest of Syria and Egypt in 1516-1 517.
1. cf. f-i. Inalcik, in El 2 , s.v. Bursa; cf. also his paper 'The Ottoman
Economic Mind anJAspects of Ottoman Economy' (presented at the
Conference on the Economic History of the Middle East, London 4-6
July 1967).
2. A.H. Lybyer, The Ottoman Turks and the Routes of Criental Trade, in
the English Historical Review, LXX (London 1915), 577-588.
3. I .H. Uzun 9 orssli, Csmanli Torihi, ii (Ankara 1949), 336ff; J.vonhammer,
Histoire de L'Empire Ottoman, trans. J.J. Hellert, v (Paris 1826),
202ff.
29.
The extension of Cttoman control in eastern Asia Minor to such areas as Erzurum
and Lake Van must have seemed to Sultan $leyman and his viziers eminently
necessary. The immediate pretext for war was the desertion to the Safavids
of the Kurdish chieftain Shorof Khan of Bitlis and the excession to the Cttornans
of an important Safavid frontier beg, Ulama Khan, who now entered the Cttoman
service. Ulama Khan besieged Bitlis but could not take it from Sharaf Khart.
However, he continued the siege, until Ibrahim osha, the Grand Vizier, at
the head of armed troops, left lsfanbul for Bitlis. lbrahim Pasho, as he was
marching eastward, heard that Sharaf Khan had been killed and that his son,
Shams al-Din, had assumed command of Bitlis in the place oi his dead father.
With the affairs of Bitlis settled, the Grand Vizier, went to Aleppo arriving there
in April 1534. He had in mind a campaign against Baghdad, but on the advice
joined the Grand Vizier at Ucan near Tabriz. It was now that the real operation
against Iraq began. The Sultan marched from Tabriz to Baghdad - a difficult
of beasts of burden died in the cold and wet weather and some of the artillery
1534. Tekeli Khan, the Safavid commander, had fled from Baghdad. This
campaign gave to the Cttomons possession of the region around Erzurum and
also possession of northern and central Iraq. As yet, the Ottoman influence
did not extend to the southern areas of Iraq, i.e., to the regions of Basra
and Lahsa.
During his stay at Baghdad (December 1534 - April 1535) the Sultan
received the submission of Rashid ibn Megamis who had hitherto ruled at
Bosro under a loose dependence on the Shah of Persia. He sent his son Ivtani
to the Sultan with the keys of Basra and witla fulsome assurance of his loyalty.5
After the conquest of Baghdad the locai chieftains of Jezayir (i.e., the area
Khu zistan, also gave their allegiance to the Cttomans. 6 Also in December 1534
there came to Baghdad from the sheikhs of Katif and of the Bahrayn envoys bearing
messages of welcome to the Sultan. It was, however, far from a true submission.
In Basro it was not until 1538 that the name of Sultan appeared on the
coinage and was read in the Khutbo, i.e., the Friday prayer. Basra received
was confirmed in his position at Basro.b He was expected to obey the orders
of the Posha of Baghdad and to maintain the Shari'a law. Not much
information, however, is available about his rule at Basra after this time.
Rashid ibn Megamis was succeeded by his son Mani. Moni, however, by the
was forced to yield his position to Yahya, the sheikh of the Banu Aman.9
Yahya aligned himself with Sayyid Amir - a notable who had separated from
his tribe, the Banu Mushasha , and had received from Sultan SU Jeyman the town
the Euphrates. These two chieftains turned, in 1545, against Hurrem Beg,
whom the pasha of Baghdad had sent out to build a fort which would control
10
the region of Lekiyye. In the end Sayyid Amir was overcome, Zekiyye
came under direct Turkish control and now the road to Basro was open.
of course, a direct hindrance to the realization of their aim, i.e., to bring under
their influence the Sevohil-i Arab, i.e., the coastlands at the head of the
11
Fersian Gulf. Sheikh Yahyc, the ruler of Basra, fell into further dis-
favour with the Ottomans when, in 1546, he ignored an order from the Sultan
to return to Baghdad, certain refugees who hod fled to Basra from central
12
Iraq. The refusal marked the end of his rule. Ayas Posho, the then
over-all command of the Cttoman forces himself, he sent Mehmd Beg, the
sanjak beg of Musul, to Zekiyye with 120 boats and also with land forces under
the command of Zulkadir-oglu Au. The ships then sailed from Zekiyye down
the Euphrates to Kurna and took the fort of Acele ( tjj ). In the district
situated near Kurno, marched against the Cttoman troops with 3000 men, only
to encounter defeat. The Ottoman vessels now met the Ottoman land forces
and at Sadr Asare repulsed another attack from the direction of Basra.
The rebels, realizing that further resistance against the Ottoman troops wos
inadvisable, now fled to Lahsa. The Cttomans, under the command of Ayas
1546M
Pasha himself, entered Basra on 21 eevval 952/26 December After
Basra itself now became a beglerbeglik under direct Cttoman control, the office
the significance of the trade through the Persian Gulf, made an amicable
approach to the Portuguese. hajji Fayat, an Arab merchant, was sent with a
Lima, reporting to the vice-roy of India, wrote that Ayas Pasha, the chief
Ottoman official in Iraq, was determined to make Basra prosperous for the
14. cf. RUstern Pa;a, op. cit., fol.243v; also Nazmi-zjde Mrtezq, G5l,cen-i
l-1lefa, Istanbul 1143/1730, fol.62v; and the letter of Manuel de Lima
(See Appendix I). The Cttoman poet Fuzuli mentions the conquest of
Basra in one of his poems and expresses his admiration for Ayos Posha
(cf. A. Karahan, Fuzuli:Muhiti, Hayati ye Sahsiyeti, Istanbul 1949,
28, 44). Diogo do Couto, the Portuguese historian, notes in his Decadas
that 10,000 horsemen fought against the Ottomans in their campaign
against Basra (Dec.vi, Liv.iv,304; cf. also Gaspar Correa, op. cit., 524).
15. Cn terakki see Appendix IV, i',-
16. "Padiah... Ayas Paa'ya 200,000 ake terakki ye Bilal Mebmed Paa'ya
on kerre yzbin ake ile Basra vilayetinin begJerbegIiin verd" (Rstem
Paso, op. cit., fol.243v.).
17. See Appendix I
34.
18
merchants.
shores of the Persian Gulf. Very little is known about the Cttoman penetration
into the region of Lahso. Manuel de Limo states that the Ottoman Turks took
Manuel cle Limo sent to Basra in 1547 with orders to gather information there,
stated that the 'capito' of Lahsa was a certain Abdulloh ('Abedel&). This man,
the son of the former ruler of Lahsa, went to that region with the Cttoman
2%)
expedition prepared for the occupation of that area. The Pasha of Bosra,
in 1550, demanded the surrender of the fort of Katif. The Arabs mode no
resistance and yielded their fort to the Cttomans. A number of Cttoman troops,
21
with some artillery, was now stationed at Katif.
and gained control of Basra in 1546. Within a few years they introduced and set
on a firm foundation the eyalet system in the newly conquered lands. There
were two kinds of eyalet in the empire. The first was yilliksiz (salyanesiz),
i.e., timar system hod been established within these eyalets; and the second
was yl lii ki I (salyane ii), i . e., provinces where a port ion of revenues was
not distributed in the form of timars, but was collected directly for the
treasury. In the solyoneli eyalets the salaries of the Beglerbegs, the soldiers
and other functionaries come From the annual taxes gathered in the eyalets.
The two eyalets (beglerbegliks) which are of most concern here ore Basra and
in 1546 and Bilal Mehmed Pasha was appointed as its first beglerbeg, with on
Manuel de Limo there were 2,200 Ottoman troops sent against Basra in 1546.
are told that 1,500 of them were stationed in the actual fort of Basra and 700 of
them in the town itself. The letter also gives the information that there were
. 2
cf. H. Inalcik, mEl , s.v. Eyalet.
the Ottomans found there 290 'artilharias'. 24 Ayas Pasha, the Ottoman
commander, at his departure from Basra left in the town 100 of these
number of sanjaks (livas); each sanjak was under a sanjokbeg. The beglerbeg
himself was at the head of the actual sanjak of Basra, which was called 'Papa
Sancagi', the sanjok of the Pasha. The other sanjaks, as far as we can see
from the documents existing in the Ba;bakanlik Ar;ivi, were Gorraf, Medine,.irre-
ezajIr
Rahmaniyye, Zekiyye, Sadr Sevib, 4 1(uban, Hemmar, Kurna, Fethiyye, Ky
Diogo de Couto, the Portuguese historian, mentions that in 1550, at the time
of the Portuguese campaign against Basra, a certain All Pasha held this
24. i.e. literally, 290 cannon: the number seems excessive, but should
be taken perhaps to indicate either small cannon, or, possibly, all
kinds of fire-arms.
25. 'Basaliscos' (in Ottoman Turkish Ibadalu;ka) was a large Siege gun
(cf. V.J. Parry, in El 2, s.v. Barut).P4hree examples mentioned here
came no doubt from Bidad with the Ottoman forces.
26. cf. Appendix 1V 4. ; also the Kanun-nme-i Basra, Tapu Defteri
no.282, trcnslated in Mantran, op. cit., 252ff. It isdifficult to find
some of the names of the sanjaks on the map. Some of these names
seem to have indicated no doubt the Arab tribes in the .Jezayir district.
Most of them are, however, mentioned in the 'Vera Delineatio Civitatis
Bassorae', Paris? 1630? (see the Catalogue of Printed Maps in the
British Museum, 49475 (1)).
27. See above, p.33, note 16.
37.
in 1553, a Mustafa Pasha and, in 1555, an Ibrahim Pasha had this office.30
The Ottomans had a tersane (dockyard) at Basra; timber for the buflding
of new ships was brought from the mount&ns of Mara, a town situated on the
southern edge of the Taurus range in southern Asia Minor, down to Iraq through
Birecik on the River Euphrates. 31 Smo da Costa, a Portuguese agent, who was
allowed by the Pasha of Bosra to visit the tersane in 1563, reports that he saw
there five newly made galleys, the biggest having 22 benches for the oarsmen.32
28. "0 Baxa de Bcor, que era Alyboxa" (Dec. vi, Uv. ix, 334).
29. Mirat, 13. The document (Kouslar 888, fol.394r, 487v) refers to
a Kubad Posha (perhaps the beglerbeg of Basra in 1552?) as "Jezayir
ye Medine beglerbegisi" - an exptession which I have not encountered
elsewhere and which perhaps points to the brief and transient existence
of a separate 'province' embracing the Jezayir and Medine areas.
30. RuGs, 212, p.9; MD,, p.31 ;MD,ii,passim.
31. MD,xxii,p.70; cf. also MD,iii,pp.263,290, cited in C. Orhonlu
and L liksoJ, Osmanli devrinde nehir nokliyoti hakkinda oratirmatar,
Dicle ye Firat Nehirlerinde Nakliyat, in ID, xiii/17-18 (Istanbul 1963),
79. -
32. See below, note 39.
33. of. Ruts 218, p.l42 Oto pI'4Lt W, roe. %.
38.
fact known to us is that the Ottoman troops occupied Katif in 1550. At first
the Cttomon governor of Lahsa held the rank of a san1ok beg. A document
dating from the year 967/1 555 reveals that sometime previously the sanjak
beg of Lahsa had been r&sed to the status of 'Mr-i Mran', i.e., of
beglerbeg. The some document indicates that now the sanjak beg of
and Uyun. 36 Katif, of course, played a very important part in the conflict
with the Portuguese. It was, over and above Basra, a second Ottoman base
The Arab tribes, above all,, those known to the Ottomans as the
'Jezayir Arabian', i.e., the Arabs of Jezayir, 38 were most difficult to control.
34. Koular 888, fol.102r and also fol.29. A certain Mehmed Beg held
the appointment at this time.
35. cf. C. Orhonlu, 1559 BohreynSeferi.,., 6, quoHng from MD,ii,p.167.
36. cf. Appendix VII; also MD,v,p.380.
37. For the Kanun-nme of Kotif see 0. 1. Barkan, Osmanli ImparatonIuunda
ft Sinufinan Hukuks Statusu, sn LJIku, ,x,43.
38. The Jezayir consisted of about 200 small islands, with their forts and
villages, situated in the waters of the Tigris, the Euphrates and in the
delta region known as the Shatt al-Arab.
39.
C ne reason was that these tribes could only be approached with any degree
of ease along the rivers by boat. 39 These Arab tribes were mostly Shi'i in
their religious ollegians and regarded the Ottomans as aliens. The Ottoman
authorities hod to take strong measures against them, all the more urgently in
sere 40
that influence emanating from Persia wi' active amongst them. To achieve
this end it was sometimes necessary for the beglerbeg of Basra to summon help
from other eyalets such as Baghdad, Mosul, Dyarbekir, ehrizor. The local
sheikhs of the Arab tribes at times asked the Portuguese to assist them against
the Ottomans. Au ibn Ulyon, of whom mention has been made above, wrote
will and saying that it was now time to stop the Cttcmans from advancing further.41
A similar letter went to Hormuz from Sheikh Yahya of Basra. The Portuguese,
cut all the routes leading to Basra. Tamarrad AU Pasha, the muhofiz- Baghdad,
39. cf. C. Orhonlu and 1. l;iksal, op. cit., 96-96; also Barros, Dec.iv,
Lfv.iii, Cap.xiii. M. Ralph Fitch, an English Merchant, who travelled
through Basro in 1583, describes the Arab tribes of Jezayir district as
follows: HBasora in times past was under the Arabians, but now is subject
to the Turke. But some of them the Turke cannot subdue, for that they
holde certain Ilandes in the river Euphrates which the Turke cannot winne
bf them. They be theeves all and have no settled dwelling, but remove from
place to place with their Camels, goates, and horses, wives and children
and all." (R. Hakluyt, Voyages (Everyman's Library), London 1 962,iU,283.
40. Carta de Simao do Costa a elrei D. Sebastio, dated 11 December 1563, in
As Govetos de Torro do Tombo, v (Lisboa 1965), 140; The Voyage of John
Huyghen von Linschoten to the East Indies, London Qlakluyt Society) 1885,i,49.
41. Col. Loureno, iv, 139r.
40.
i.e., not the beglerbeg of Baghdad, but the soldier in charge of the troops
Au Beg, the sanjak beg of Garraf, joined him to besiege ibn Ulyan who was
would rebuild the forts of Acel, Sodr Sevib and Kurna. In fact he did not
fulfil his promises. Kubad Pasha, the beglerbeg of Basra, with about 2,000
expedition. AU ibn Ulyan was defeated and his boats were destroyed, so
Bosra at the time when the Ottomans, and in particular the troops stationed in
Lahsa, were engaged in a campaign against the Bahrayn. Mirza All twice
sought the aid of the Portuguese with this purpose in view. 46 There is,
with the incitement of the Portuguese, besieged Basra. A firman sent from
Istanbul at this time ordered the beglerbeg of ehrizor, with five of his
sanjakbegs/ and also six sanjak begs, from the eyalet of iyarbekir, to go
47
to the relief of Basra.
It can be said, in short, that there was often trouble between the
Ottomans and the Arab tribesmen in the eyalets of Basra and Lahsa. The
sanjak begs in these two Ottoman provinces often received orders from Istanbul,
admonishing them to be always well prepared for action against possible Arab
48
disaffection.
CHAPTER III
After having token Basra the Ottomans hod made an amicable approach,
1 The effort, from the political
in 1547, to the Portuguese governor of Hormuz.
point of view, had been fruitless for the simple reason that the existence of
the Ottoman Turks in the Persian Gulf was against the interest of the Portuguese
who wanted to control the trade to Basra. To the Portuguese the Cttoman
occupation of Basra was a threat to their position at Hormuz and to their hold
on the traffic in the Persan Gulf. At this time, therefore, the Portuguese were
on the alert. Clearly it would be to their advantage if they could prevent the
Ottomans from extending their control in the Gulf. The Ottomans, wishing to
exploit the advantages cIccuing to them from their possession of Basra, could
send naval assistance, at need, from the Red Sea to the Persian Gulf. It was
important for them to maintain a firm hold over the waters of the Red Sea.2
The Portuguese indeed were to have little success in their attempts to pass through
1. See above,fl.
2. cf. C. Crhonlu, XVI. Asrin Ilk Yarisinda Kizildeniz Sahillerinde
Csmanlslar, TD,xii/16 (Istanbul 1962), 5ff; C.F. Beckingham, The
Red Sea in the Sixteenth Century, in Journal of the Manchester
Egyptian and Oriental Socety, xxv (1947-1953), 2b-36.
43.
the Bob al-Mandob. Aden come into the hands of the Ottomans in 1538
and ten years later, in 1548, the town was brought still more closely under
Portuguese ships near Aden. 4 it was at this time - not, however, in the Red
Sea, but in the Persian Gulf - that a further event occurred which led the
yielded their fortress to the Ottomans. This event alarmed the Portuguese and
chieftains of Bosra. 6 Some of the local Arab sheikhs in that region, even
before the Ottoman capture of Bosra in 1546, had sought the intervention of
the Portuguese.
/ Having read the letters of the Arab Chieftains and listened to their
the new circumstances to his captains, stressing that the Turks now stood not
far from the Portuguese base at Hormuz and that it would be wise to keep them
Anto de Noronha to command 1,200 men and seven galleys, ordering him to
Noronho was well received by the Portuguese governor. The two men now
asked Turan Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, to provide them with 3,000 men for the
venture against Katif. As his first move, Noronho appointed Manuel de Vasconcellos
as Commander of twelve light ships bearing troops and ordered him to go to Katif
in order to prevent the Turks there from obtaining help from Basra! Vasconcellos
bombarded one of the Katif forts, at high tide, from off-shore. Two months later,
with him 1,103 Portuguese and also 3,000 men from Hormuz and Mogistan10
under the banners of the Ra'is Sharof at-Din of Hormuz and the Amir Majid
of Mogistan. Noronho reached Katif by the end of June 1550 and was in-
formed about the state of its fort and the pressure which Vosconcellos was putting
upon it. The Portuguese forces, at high tide, disembarked upon the shore.
Some of the Turks resisted them, but after a short skirmish were forced into
the fort. Preparing trenches under the guidance of a French 1capito' whom
o number of artillery pieces, the Portuguese under Noronha began the seige
of the fort, attacking with fury and vigour and destroying its towers very
quickly. The Turks, some 400 strong, defended themselves bravely, but after
eibht days surrendered to the Portuguese. Noronha now razed the fort, fearing
10. Couto refers to the troops from 'Magosto', on the southern coast
of Persia, as 'Perseos', i.e., Persions, and to the troops from Hormuz
as 'Aramuzanos': ".. Dom Anto de Noronha deo pera a desambarcoao
que hovia de ser no outro dia; e fazemdo olardo da gente que levava,
ochou mit e cern Portugueses, e trez mu Parseos e Aramuzanos de baixo
da bandera de Rax Xarafo Guazil de Ormuz, e de Mirmaxet Guazil de
Magosto, em que havia muitos Mires, e Capita'es do Reyno de Ormuz. .
(Ibid., 326). Magosto or Mina (Minam), which appears in modern
histories as Moghistan or Mughiston, is described in the Carta do Gonolo
Rodriguez, dated 31 de Agosto de 1552, as six or seven leagues from Hormuz
(J.Wicki, ocumenfa tndica, ii(Romae 1950),331 and 337). lbn Battuta
states that Moghiston was located on the shore where the old Hormuz lay
(lbn Battuto, Travels in Asia and Africa, London 1929, 118). Cf. also
Barros, Dec.iii, Liv.iv,37; and 1. Lockhart ingj2 , s.v. Harmuz.
11. His name is not given by Couto (cf. Dec. iv, Liv. ix, 327).
46.
12
that the Cttomans might recapture it at some future time. The Amir Maj id,
believing that a Force of Turks and Arabs might be preparing to attack the
in the adjacent area. However, no attack of this kind in fact took place.
The Campaign of Basra: After destroying the fort of Katif and having
Basra. He despatched the Ra'is Sharaf al-Din and the Amir Majid with their
own forces to Hormuz. He himself, with eighteen vessels, entered into the
Shatt al-Arab. He sent a messenger with letters to let the local rulers know of
13
his arrival. Meanwhile, the Portuguese established themselves on an island
abandoned the island, as the Portuguese fleet sailed towards it. Being aware
of what was going on, Ali Pasha, the beglerbeg of Basra, carried out a clever
plan. He made the Portuguese commander believe that the Turks and the Arabs
12. Ibid., 328 : CC, Porte 1, Maco 87, Doc.2, dated 5 October 1551,
in Schurhammer, op. cit., no.4693; Faria e Sousa, op. cit., 227;
Donvers, op. cit., 492.
13. For the appeal of the Arab sheikhs to the Portuguese see above,
Such was the end of the Portuguese endeavour to sweep the Ottorans
out of the Persian Gulf with the assistance of the Arabs. Its failure encouraged
Gulf. The ships, therefore, and the naval equipment employed for their first
S
sea campaigns in the waters of the Gulf came in fact from their naval bases
in the Red Sea. After the conquast of Egypt in 1516 - 1517, Suez became the
base for the Ottoman naval activities directed towards the Indian Ccean. It
was of course a base inherited from the Mamluks of Syria and Egypt and it had
played a significant role in the years before the Ottoman conquest. Selman
Reis, a Turkish captain in the service of the Mamluks, also served the
Cttomans after 1517. He seems to have been the first Ottoman High Admiral
of the Red Sea (Kaptsdan-i Bohr-i Ahmer). In his famous 'liyiha', i.e.,
underlined the importance of the trade in the Indian Ocean and of the Portuguese
de Bapr' and from other local rulers and intimating that the Arab
sheikhs of the region were prepared to join with the Ottomans in the
resistance to the Portuguese. Ali Pasho had the false letters read aloud in
public at Basra. At the time when letters were read two Italian slaves
who heard the announcement were allowed to escape. These men fled to
the Portuguese on the island of 'Mourzique'. The Portuguese commander
came now to the conclusion that he could expect little support from the
Arab chieftains of the area. The term 'Gizares' derives perhaps from the
term 'Jezayir', the name given to the area around Kurno.
16. A little while later All Pasha asked an Arab merchant who was passing
through Basra to make known at Hormuz, the device which he had
48.
position there. 17 The first and the most ambitious Cttoman attempt to
intervene against the Portuguese came in 1538. In that year Hodim SJleyman
Pasha, the Beglerbeg of Egypt, led a strong Ottoman armada into the Indian
Ccean. He visited Aden, and sailing to the western coast of India, besieged
Diu k Gujarat. The siege was unsuccessful and Sleymon Posha sailed bock
to the Red Sea, establishing Ottoman control over Aden and Zebid in the
Yemen, and then returning to Suez. This Ottoman expedition to Diu left on
the Ottoman naval forces at Suez. Three years later Estavo de Gama, the
son of the famous Portuguese Vasco da Gama, sailed up the Red Sea to
attack Suez. 18 The Ottomans, however, were soon aware of his approach,
repulsed him and thus remained masters of the Red Sea, having now, in
addition to Suez, a second naval base at Aden. Some years later in A.H.
954/A. D. 1547 -48 an Arab Chieftain, All bin Sulainian al-Tawlaki, took
Aden from its Turkish garrison, hoping for Portuguese support in his venture.
The Ottomans, however, under the command of Pin Reis, regained possession
Kotif and then towards Basro, led the Ottomans to undertake a counter-
offensive. A strong fleet under the command of a veteran sailor, Pin Reis,
was now prepared for a naval campaign in the Persian Gulf. There was, in
fact, no naval squadron available to the Ottomans in those waters. The ships
for the projected campaign would have to come, therefore, from the Red
Sea. An order sent out from istanbul to Basra - dated 18 Zilhicce 959/6
November 1552 - for the information of the beglerbeg of Basra, at that time
a certain Kubad Posha, sets forth the instructions to be given to Pin Reis.
He was to capture Hormuz and then, if possible, to take the Island of the Bahrayn.20
Couto states that the main purpose of this campaign was to secure 'the Strait
19. R. B. Serjeant, op. cit. , 108. Lopez Lobato, t.t. Portuguese agent
at Hormuz, in his letter to the Vice-Roy of India, dated 31 October
1546, mentions that four Turkish ships went in 1546 to 'calayate' i.e. Kalhat.
The 'Guazil' of calayate' refused to hand the town over. Then the
Turks sailed to Muscat and set it on fire. (Col. Lourenp, iv, fol.479r,
485r. e ot i,. . it
20. Kou;lar 888, fol,487v; cf. also the letter of the Ra'is Sharaf Nur al-
Din, the 'Guazil' of Hormuz (Appendix ll,.Itq).
21. Couto also mentions that the letter of instruction sent from Istanbul to
Basra ordered Kubad Pasha to have 15,000 men and numerous 'terradas
in readiness to go against Hormuz (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 405-406). Tornado -
i.e., a kind of ship that the Portuguese used in the Persian Gulf and in
50.
Ptri Reis spent the winter of 1551 - 1552 at Suez, preparing the
from Suez with twenty-five galleys (kodurga), four gal leoris (kalyon) and
one other ship, i.e., with thirty ships altogether. There were 850 soldiers
sent captain Ferno Dias Cefar along the coast of the Oman and the Hadramaut
to seek information about the Ottoman fleet. Noronha, concluding that the
Ottoman movement was directed against him, also appointed two captains,
Simo da Costa and Migual Colao, to keep watch for the Turkish fleet in
appeared five Ottoman galleys which PirtReis had sent out under his son
the Red Sea (cf. H. Leito and J.V. Lopes, Dicion6rio do Linguagem
de Morinha Antiga e Actual, Lisboc 1963, 385. The word 'terrado'
is derived from Arabic 'tarrad' (see H. Kindermann, "Schiff" im
Arabischen, Zwickau, i.Sa.1934, 56-57; also Serjeant, op. cit., 136).
The historian AU merely notes that the campaign was undertaken to
punish the Portuguese, who hod done harm to the Muslim tates in the
Indian Ocean (IcinhC'l Ahbor, Universite KtJphones, Istanbul, MS.
no.2377, fol.91r.)
22. Kou,slar 888, fol.488r. The letter of the Ra'is Nur al-Din refers to
twenty-five 'gales' and three 'novios dalto bordo' (cf. Appendix II).
Seydt AU Reis mentions a total of thirty ships Mirat, 12); cf. also
KGt;b elebi (op. cit.,61), following here the Mirat, gives the same number.
23. Kouslar 888, fol.488r. For a different estimate see Appendix lI,p.II.
24. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 406-407.
51.
finding his way at night back to Hormuz, he gave the news to the governor
Oman and arrived at Muscat, a town which the Portuguese had held since
1506. At Muscat was Jodo de Lisboa, whom the Vice-Roy of India, D.Affonso
de Noronha, had sent there to build a fortress for the greater safety of the
Portuguese. The fort, at this moment, held sixty Portuguese. Mehmed Reis
bombarded the fortifications for Six days. On the second day after the
arrival of Pirt Reis in person at Muscat, i.e., on the seventh day after
Ottomans on condition that Pin Reis should allow the Portuguese garrison to
25. Couto confirms, without giving his name, that this Mebmed was the
son of PTri Res (Dec.vi, Liv x,.407). In the Turkish document
(Kou,slar 888, fol.488r) there is mention of a certain Mehmed Res,
whom PTrT Reis tent to Basra. There is, however, in this Turkish
document, no indication that he was the son of Pin Reisi s... Menedebeq
f. de peribeque... U (cf. Appendix Il,p.iii). 6%o$
Mur til- Dv. St4.4t$ 4kok *
26. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 409-410. J. tIt. .'i
r' tSS
27. None of the sources gives a precise date for the capture of Muscat. This
event must have taken place, however, in the early days of September,
for Pirt Reis reached Hormuz, after the capture of Muscat on 19 September
1552 (cf. Appendix ll,%).
28. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 408.
29. Kcu,slar 888, fol. 488r. Couto states that the siege continued for
eighteen days (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 413).
52.
30
depart freely to Hormuz. However, rirl Keis did not keep his promise;
Jobo de Lisboa was kept as a prisoner, the remaining sixty Portuguese being
31
assigned to the oars of the galleys. The Ottomans had all the guns and
32
plunder removed to their fleet and left the fort empty and destroyed.
The Siege of Hormuz: Pirt Reis now proceeded to Hormuz and arrived
who had held this appointment since 1550. The Portuguese governor had
almost complete control of the island, although there was a prince (shah) and
his vizier, ruling over Hormuz itself, over the southern coast of Persia
along the strait of Hormuz and also over certain territories on the shore of
Arabia. Alvaro de Noronha was well informed about the activities of the
Ottoman fleet and hod made all the necessary preparations for resistance.
The Turks bombarded the fort of Hormuz continuously. The Portuguese, 700
were no doubt well aware that this key point in the Persian Gulf was of the
highest importance to them. 34 The situation was difficult for both sides.
was short of provisions. Prt Reis feared that a Portuguese fleet might come
and attack him, while he was still engaged in besieging the fort. 35 The
siege continued some twenty days, i.e., from 19 September 1552 to about
Portuguese sources PZ-t Reis now withdrew to the island of Kishm, having
disembarked at Kishm and no resistance was made against him in the island.
There indeed he found some rich people, i.e., thirty merchants who had
with them 20,000 cruzados. The Ottomans also took prisoner a Sponus
plundering the island, Ptrt Reis sailed for Basra towards the end of October
1552.
'Kolayate', i.e., Kaihat, had reached Goa and reported on the danger
de Noronha, discussed the situation with his captains and wasted no time in
number of the Portuguese then in western India - men of all ranks - joined
with more than eighty ships (above thirty of them being of large dimensions)
and with several distinguished soldiers at his side. On his arrival at Diu he
learned that the Ottoman fleet had sailed to Basra. He now decided not to go
to Hormuz himself and sent in his place his nephew, D. Ant5o de Noronha,
at the head of a squadron consisting of twelve large ships and twenty eight light
ones. D. Ant5o reached Hormuz towards the end of November and found it
relieved of all danger, but still bearing visible signs of the damage inflicted
The End of Pin Reis: On the arrival of Pin Reis at Basra a report
about his activities at Muscat, Hormuz and Kishm went from Kubad Pasha,
the beglerbeg of Basra, to the Sultan at Istanbul. Being informed that the
report of Kubad Pasha was unfavouroble to him, PInt Reis departed from
Basro, taking with him all the spoils that he hod won during the campaign,4'
including his Portuguese prisoners. He set safl for Suez, having with
him three galleys and intending to go to Istanbul and there give his own
wrecked near Katif. Pirt Reis, however, in February 1553, passed through
the strait of Hormuz and made good his escape, the Portuguese following
him, but in vain, as far as Ras al-Hadd. 43 After his arrival at Suez Firt
Reis was arraigned for his lack of success in the Persian Gulf and was
Such was the end of a man who hod been a notable Ottoman geo-
grapher and cartographer as well as one of the most famous of Turkish seamen.
This episode was in no wise the end of the Ottoman attempt to gain control
of the Persian Gulf. Their effort to possess themselves of the eastern shore
of Arabia, to win the island of Bahrayn and to keep open the strait of Hormuz,
was now to become more sustained than it had ever been before.
42. Couto gives what would seem to be a plausible explanation for the
return of Pirt Reis to Suez (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 468-469). Other sources,
however, attribute his withdrawal to his fear that the Portuguese fleet
might sail into the Persian Gulf (cf. Mirat, 13; Peevi, Tarih,i,352).
43. Couto, Dec.vi, Liv.x, 468-470.
44. Couto states that his execution took place in Istanbul ec.vi, Liv.x,
486), whereas Mi (op. cit., fol.303r) and Pecevi (op.cit. ,f,350 and
352) assert that it occurred in Egypt.
45. D.Alvoro de Noronha, the governor of Hormuz, describes Ptrt Res
as 'a great man at sea and in wor' and kim toBarbarassa
(CC, Parte 10, Map 89, Doc.9, fol.2v). On Pin Reis s career
in general, see F. Ezg infA, s.v. PtrtReis.
56.
The Expedition of Murad Res: Prri Reis had sailed from Basra
to Suez with only three galleys, one of which was lost en route. He hod
left the greater part of his original squadron at Basra. There was a con-
siderable Fear that the Portuguese might now take reprisals for the harm
which the operation of Pir? Reis had caused them. In fact, a Portuguese
fleet under Pero de bide Inferno was patrolling in the Red Sea area.
The Sultan therefore lost no time in appointing a new captain to bring back
Murad Re is, who hod been the sanjok beg of Katif but was dismissed
from that post47 when Anto do Noronha destroyed the fort of Katf in
1550, was now made Kapudan' or admiral of the Suez fleet, i.e. Misir
.48
Kapudani. He was ordered to go overland to Basra and to bring the ships
back to the Red Sea. 49 Murad Reis left Istanbul for Basra at the end of
but he must have completed the journey quickly, for in August 1553 he set
sail fro:. !isra for the Red Sea, tcking with him fifteen galleys, one
50
galleon cnd cn other vcscl (Sarco) and leaving five galleys, two
52
barcos and one kclyote Ct Cara.
this time commanding the Portuguese fleet, left Hormuz for Musandam, on
the headland of the Oman Peninsula. From there he sent Games de Siqueira
and Luiz Auiar, with a number of troops, to the mouth of the Shaft al-Arab.
Their orders were to seek information about the Cttoman fleet. There two men,
'Mouros'55 ar.d !cirned that Murad Reis was about to set out on his journey.
Later, towards the end cf Aupust, further news came to the Portuguese that the
Ottoman fleet was sailing aton the coast of Persia somewhere in the region of
Hormuz. The Portuguese encountered the Ottoman fleet in the strait of Hormuz
near the Persian coast. The ship of Diogo de Noronha himself was damaged by
gun-fire and went down, but he was able to leave the sinking vessel in good
time. Now, because the wind dropped, the Portuguese fleet was unable
to continue the action. One of their ships, having on board 120 soldiers
under Gonalo Pereira Marramaque, became isolated from the others. The
Ottomans concentrated their forces against this ship, but Gonalo Pereira,
showing great determination, inspired his men and fought so well that he
caused a good deal of harm to the Ottomans. Two of the Ottoman captains,
Receb Reis and S'dleyman Reis, and a number of the Ottoman soldiers died
during the battle and some of the Cttoman ships were destroyed. One other
ship was driven to the coast of Laristan, the region of the Persian mainland
of Kishm a Portuguese vessel that he had captured in the course of this naval
action, Murad Reis now decided to sail back to Basra. The outcome of this
and his fleet went back to Musondam and then to Hormuz, from whence he
Murad Res to bring the Ottoman fleet back to Suez from Basra had been
56. On the expedition of Murad Reis and the activities of the Portuguese
fleet cf. Couto, Dec. vi, Liv.x, 487-494; also Mirat, 13; Faria e
Sousa, op. cit., 244-245; Ali, op. cit., fol.91r; Pepvi, op. cit., i,
366-367; Donvers, op. cit., 499-500.
59.
unsuccessful. In spite of this the Sultan still wonted to have the fleet taken
to Suez. Now, the famous Ottoman sailor SeydIAli Reis, who had served
fleet with instructions to bring the Ottoman ships back from Basra to Suez.
when he received his orders from Sultan SWeyman. Seyd? AU arrived at Basra
on the last day of Safer 961/3 February 1554. Mustafa Pasha, the then
pliance with the request of Mustafa Pasha, remained at Bosra for some time, in
order to protect the town from rebellious Arabs under one of the UIyon-olu
(ibn Utyan) - the Pasha himself now leading on expedition (ultimately unsuccess-
ful) against Arab tribesmen of the Huwayzah. At this moment there came to
Basra the news that the Portuguese had only four ships in the Persian Gulf.59
Seyd? Ali now set sail from Basro on 1 aban 961/2 July 1554 with his fifteen
60
ships.
57. "150 Ake yevmiye Ue" (with 150 oke of pay per diem), cf. erofettin
Turon in IA, s.v. Seyd? AU Reis, referring to MD, iv, p.26.
58. On the activities of lbn Ulyan see above,
59. Mustofa Pasha had sent to the Persian Gulf a man called Mahir Serif to
find out what the Portuguese were doing (Mirat, 17).
60. Mirat, 17; K&ib elebi, op. cit., 63. Couto sets the date as late as
the beginning of August 1554 (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 538).
60.
Meanwhile, D. Fernando de Menezes, the commander of the Portu-
guese fleet, then at Muscat, sent out three vessels, with some troops on
board, to watch for the Ottoman fleet at the mouth of the Shott al-Arab.
These ships obtained information from some 'terradas' which they captured
in the course of their search. They learned that Seyd? AU Reis was
61 . -
to begin his lourney. Having heard about the Ottoman fleet, Fernando
de Menezes made ready his ships, having fresh provisions brought on board
and preparing his guns for action. He then sailed from Muscat to Musandom,
had soiled along the coast of Shiraz, calling at the island of Muharraq
0-I arek) and also at Katif. En route, he had received information from
Murad Shah, the ruler of the Bahrayn, that the strait of Hormuz was open -
1554, near Khawr Fakkon (Horfakan) on the coast of Oman there took place
one of the most violent sea battles fought between the Ottomans and the
Gulf o Limo. The Ottoman fleet, aided by a favourable wind, now made
for Khawr Fakkan, where fresh water was token on board. From Khawr Fakkan,
after a voyage of seventeen days along the coast of Arabia, SeydT AU Reis
reached Muscat. There, two leagues from Muscat in clear water (aqua
Ottoman fleet. In the course of the fighting both sides suffered heavy losses.
Portuguese fleet. These two men caused a lot of damage to the Ottomans.
Seydt All, in his account of this event, descilbes the battle as much more
terrible than those of Barbarossa, the famous Ottoman admiral with whom he
65. "...bir mertebe top ye tifenk cengi oldu ki vasf olunmaz..."(Mrat, 19).
66. Seyd7 AU counts this first meeting with the Portuguese as a success for
himself (Mirat, 19).
67. Couto points out that 'Alecheluby', i.e., Ali elebi, as he calls
Seydi All, did not expect the Portuguese armada at Muscat, for he
believed it to be at Hormuz (Dec.vi, Liv.x, 544).
68. Mirat, 20.
62.
now left to him, Seyd? AD sailed along the Arabian shore down the Gulf
of Oman. The wind, however, took his ships across the Gulf towards the
coast of Persia. 7 Sailing along that coast, the Ottomans succeeded in reaching
Jask, Bender Shehbar and then Bender Gevader. The governor of Gevader
(Gevader hkimi), Jelal al-Din, the son of MaUk Dinar, supplied the ships
with provisions. Seydi AU, with his nine ships, made now for the Yemen,
intending to sail to Suez. On his arrival off Dhufar, on the south Arabian
coast, the westerly winds began to blow. The ships suffered much damage and
most of the stores and provisions had to be thrown overboard in order to lighten
the ships. 71 The Ottoman vessels were driven off course to the coast of India
near Diu, whkh was then under Portuguese rule. Seydt Ali went to the port
of Damon, in Gujarat, but there he lost three of his ships. The Hokim of
Seydt AU to leave his harbour. Some of the Ottoman soldiers now deserted Seydi
fell into the hands of the Portuguese. 72 Seyd? All stayed in Gujarat for
some time and completed there his famous work, the Muhit - a guide to the
According to Diogo de Couto, at the time when Seydi All Reis was
operating in the Persian Gulf Sultan S5leyman sent out another admiral
1Cafar Capita'o' - i.e., Sefer Reis - to look for the Ottoman fleet. 74 He
left Suez with two galleys and two 4!brigantes' in August 1554. En route
to the Persian Gulf - at 'Macieira', i.e., Masira, an island off the coast
of Oman - Sefer Reis was able to capture some Portuguese ships which
were sailing from Hormuz to Diu. He took these ships to Jidda on the
Indian Ocean, where there was now no effective Muslim resistance to the
Portuguese. He sent orders, therefore, to Suez for the building and repair
;'t.:
72. 1. Dames, The Portuguese and the Turks in the Indian Ocean in the
Sixteenth Century, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (
1921), 23.
73. cf. J. von Hammer, Extracts from the Mohit in Journal of the Asiatic
Society of Bengal, iii (Calcutta 1834),545-554; v(talcutta ItSJo),441-468
vi (Calcutto 1837),805-81 2; vii (Calcutta 1838),767-780; viii (Calcutta
1838), 823-830. The narrative of his naval expedition, i.e., MirotJ'l
Memalik, in the Persian Gulf and its aftermath was completed after his
return to Istanbul. On the naval career of Seydt All Reis and on his works
and their importance cf. C. Orhonlu, Seydi All Reis, in Journal of the
Regional Cultural Institute (Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) 1/2 (Tehran IYo/),44-57.
74. Sefer Reis was "grande corsairo, esforado, e de born conselho" (Couto,
Dec.vii,Liv.i, 46). Couto, under the year 1561, refers once more to =
64.
of ships. At this time the influence of the Ottomans was being extended
embracing the ports of Massowa and Sevakin. 76 The Persian Gulf was still
open, however, to the Portuguese, for the Ottomans, at this moment, hod
a Portuguese admiral (Capit5o Mor) from Goc, soiled towards Basra. This
Suddenly a storm broke out, so that the Portuguese could not remain on their
station, but were driven by the winds back to Hormuz, with no achievement
a 'Cofor Capitao', then operating off the shore of Eastern Africa (Dec.vn,
Liv.vii1(). Cf. the mention, without specific details, of a certain
Safar al-Rumi in the Tarikh al-Shibri under the year A.H. 975/A. D. 1564-
65 (Serjeant, op.cit., 110). For the earlier mention of Sefer Reis, see
above,
75. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.i, 50.
76. C. Orhonlu, Osmonlitarun Habesistan Siyaseti 1554-1560, ID, xv/20
Istanbul 1965), 45.
77. Couto, who alone describes this event, mentions the 'rio Eufrates'
(Dec.vii, Liv.iii,206).
78. Couto (bc. cit., 206) once more refers to these Arab chieftains as
'Gizares' (see above, note 15), and mentions also a 'Rey' of Basra.
65.
damaged by the storm. D.Alvoro now proceeded to Muscat and then mode
was to help the Arab chieftains against their Ottoman masters. The
Ottomans at Basra offered no resistance, for the simple reason that their
naval vessels had been lost in the course of recent operations in the Persian
Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman. On the other hand, Ottoman control was
now well established on the north-western shores of the Persian Gulf, where
the Beglerbeglik of Lahsa had just been created. 79 The new beglerbeglik
CHAPTER IV
The Babrayn, situated between al-Hasa and Qatar, was at this time
and Basra. It was also the centre of pearl fishing in the Persian Gulf. For
these reasons, the island often attracted to itself the attention of its more
powerful neighbours. Since 1521, after defeating the local ruler Mukrim,
the Portuguese had exerted some degree of influence upon the island. In
1535, however, the ruler of the Bahrayn sent his submission to the Ottoman
Sultan, Sleyman, just after the Ottoman conquest of Baghdad. The ruler of
the island, in fact, turned at this time, now to the one and now to the other
Ottomans on the north western shores of the Persian Gulf, the local rulers who
had submitted to the Ottoman Sultan, received from Istanbul the title of Sanjak
Beg - e.g., in 1559 the then ruler of the Bahrayn, Ra'is Murod, was given
1. To write, however, as Stripling has done (The Ottoman Turks and the
Arabs 1511 - 1574, Urbana, Itt. 1942, 94) that the Ottomans by 1554
had conquered the Bahrayn, is to misrepresent the actual situation.
In 1554, during his journey towards Hormuz, Seydi AU Reis obtained
at the Bahrayn information about the Portuguese fleet.
67.
this status. 2 Even so, the influence of the Portuguese on the island was
not negligible, for there were still links between the Bahrayn and Hormuz.
The Ra'is Muracimentioned above was married to the daughter of the R&is
Nur al-Din of hormuz, a fact which tended to draw him within the Portuguese
him to bring under Cttomon control not only Hormuz, but also the Bahrayn.4
He had not been able to realize these aims. It was not until 1559 that the
the ruler of the Bahroyn and dated 28 Zilhicce 966/ 1 October 1559 the
Sultan made specific reference to the fact that Mustafa Pasha had acted
without orders from Istanbul. On the other hand Couto, who describes
this campaign in great detail, states that Mustafo Posha prepared this
6 r
campaign with the co-operation of the beglerbeg of Basra.
Mustafa Pasha went against the island of Bahrayn with two fighting
galleys (kagirga), seventy light ships of various kinds and one brigantine.
from an Ottoman beg who fought in this Campaign mentions that, before the
expedition set out, 200 mounted troops and 400 orquebusiers 9 had been sent
10
from Basra to Lahsa. Mustafa Posha, on 26 Ramazan 966/ 2 July 1559,
began to besiege the fortress of the Bahrayn, i.e., Manama, on the northern
coast of the island. The R&is Murod, having gathered together supplies and
placed some 400 soldiers inside the fort, resisted the Cttomans. With the
Ottomans now sought to fill in the ditch surrounding the fortress and, to
Hormuz, discussed the situation with the other Portuguese captains and
requested them to get together soldiers and munitions for the relief of the
them on board set sail at once towards the Bahrayn. D. Joo, 'capito
mar', sailing for the Bcihrayn, halted at the island of 'Samaim', two leagues
12
from the Babrayn. The Portuguese fleet consisted of twenty-two grabs13
in all. Mehmed Beg, who was in command of the Ottoman galleys which
had come from Basra, having on board, for this campaign, a force of
Noronha, on the advice of his captains, now sought to lure the Turkish
15
galleys out of the harbour into deep water. With the aid of Joo de
Gulf, the Portuguese ships moved in the direction of Katif. The Turkish
galleys followed them. One of the Portuguese was able to approach the
harbour of the Bahrayn and set on fire the Cttoman supply ships there. D. JoGo
de Noronha now went to the Island of 'C&s', i.e, Qais, off the coast of
Loristan, where do Silveira joined jim. At the same time the Turkish galleys
16
returned to the harbour at Bahrayn. While at 'Ang3o', D. Alvaro do
Silvera had learned that the Turks were expecting reinforcemenl and supplies
from Basra. He moved first to the island of 'Romans', before Katif, and then,
making a large circular approach, was able, with the fortunate assistance of
a sea-mist, to draw near to the Bahrayn unseen. With the element of surprise
14. Couto states (Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 117) that each galley had 150 men
on board.
15. Ibid., 117.
16. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 12.
on their side the Portuguese entered the harbour and on 3 Sevval 966/
9 July 1559 captured the two Ottoman galleys. Mehmed Beg was kHled
and some of the Ottoman soldiers were taken prisoner. 18 It was now that
Mustafa Posha, the Ottoman general in command, seeing his two galleys lost
damage on the Ottoman troops. Mustafa Pasha, at length, broke off the
siege and withdrew his forces to an encampment located amidst some palm
trees out of range of the fortress cannon. He also recalled a certain sanjak beg,
the puth gj- i,f the ab.jientiened Turkkh da.ument. who was still keepng
watch over the Portuguese ships. 21 On the advice of the R&is Murad and of
J000 de Qadros the Portuguese admiral, do Silveira, placed his ships around
the island of Bahrayn to prevent the Ottomans from sending a request for
assistance to Basra. On the other hand the Portuguese themselves had reason
to be anxious. It was now the month of September and soon, at the beginning
of October, the east winds (os levantes) would begin to blow, bringng with
led into bottle against the Cttomans - a course of action to which do Silveira
Sq ni
at last gave his reluctant consent, at the4time ordering the Raisto
prepare his troops for the conflict. Da Silveira, his own preparation com-
pleted, marched against the Ottomans. He was joined en route by the Ra'is
Murad, who came out of the fortress with 300 Persian soldiers, all very well
22 , Rehal-olu1 . 23
armed, and also by a certain and his men. Do Silveira
arranged his forces in a square and placed the troops of the Ra'is Murad to one
side. The Ottomans awaited the advance of the foe in s, palm grove not far
from the fortress. The Pasha set the above mentioned beg with a number of
horsemen (about 200 in all) behind some bushes at the end of his encampment.24
Under the pressure of the Portuguese advance the Ottomans began to retreat;
but at this critical moment the mo.t4ofn-sanjak beg, who had been placed in
the ambush, struck the Portuguese with his 200 horsemen. It was naw that
second shot in the neck, this latter wound being mortal. The Portuguese
forces, seeing the fate of their commander, fell now into confusion, but the
Ra a is Murad gathered them together and held off the Ottomans, while he and
23. lbn Rehal (Rehal-clu) came, it would seem, from the Bahrayn. He also
hod lands in the sanjak of Katif (Crhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 14).
his Persian horsemen covered the withdrawal of the Portuguese into the
fortress. 25 Seventy men of the Portuguese force were killed and about
thirty taken captive. Pero Peixoto now took command of the Portuguese
fleet in the place of the dead Silveiro. 26 He held at once a council of war,
in which it was agreed that D. Joo de Noronha, with the troops from
Hormuz, should j&n the garrison of the fortress at the Bahroyn, that the
ships of da Silveiro should continue to blockade the island, thus cutting off
the Cttomans from fresh supplies and reinforcements, and that the local vessels
of Hormuz27 should return to their base (bearing the wounded with them), in
Bahroyn in person or send further aid, for which purpose he would need the
ships.
Lacerda, to Pero Peixoto, asking that negotiations for peace should be set
in train. Peixoto gave his assent and agreed, eventually, to make available
25. For a full account of this battle see Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 125-132.
26. Ibid., 132.
27. Ibid., 132-133.
28. At one stage of the negotiations Mustafa Pasha gave to Peixoto, in
order to bring the whole matter to a successful conclusion, thirty
five horses and 240,000 ake (cf. Crhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 14).
74.
ships which would take the Cttomans to Katif, the Pasha releasing all
'cotur'29 laden with supplies and munitions, to take letters to Pero Peixoto.
D. Ant 6o, in these letters, declared his intent ion to sail to the Bahrayn with
all haste. He now gave orders that the galleys which were captured earlier
from the Ottomans, and also a number of other vessles should be prepared
for the voyage. Turan Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, agreed that in the course
quins'. 3 ' With all the preparations completed, D. Anto set sail in
was left in charge of affairs. The main Portuguese fleet, with D. Ant3'o,
29. 'Catur', i.e., a light, fast boat used in India and furnished with
oars. It was employed for the conveyance of messages; and it
was also much in use amongst the pirates of these waters (cf. P. E.
Pieris and M.A.H. Fitzler, Ceylon and Portugal, Pt.I: Kings and
Christians 1539 - 1552, Leipzig 1927, 357.
30. cf. Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 135. 'Verdistan', i.e., Berdistan - a
coastal area in southern Persia, forming part of the region of Laristan.
31. On 'terranquim' see Chapter III, note 54.
32. "em olguns dias de setembro ja andodo.." (Couto, Dec.vii, Liv.vii, 136).
33. On 'alcaide more' see Appendix I, note 1.
34. 'cosados' - i.e., the name given to the married Portuguese in the East
(cf. Pieris-Fitzler, op. cit., 309 - 310).
75.
Persia, while the Ra'is Nur al-Din recruited troops locally. Meanwhile,
Aleixo Carvoiho soiled straight for the Bahrayn, bringing with him letters
for the Ra'is Murad, and also for Pero Peixoto, who was now instructed to
defend the island until the arrival of the Hormuz fleet. Although he had been
asked to bring news from the Bahrayn as soon as possible, Carvalho - a man
ment and to see his countrymen who were captives there. The guazil',
Labsa, permission for Carvoiho to see the Portuguese prisoners of war. Mustafa
Pasha received Carvalho well and sought his assistance to mediate between
himself and D. Anto de Noronha about peace terms. 35 Carvalbo now went
back to the fortress and then soiled towards Hormuz, taking with him letters
from the Ra'is Murad and from Pero Peixoto. He met the fleet of D. Ant8'o,
already en route for the Bahrayn, near the island of Hengam. Carvalho went
toman forces had been reduced through their lack of supplies. At this
35. Couto (Dec.vii, lJv.vii, 137) notes that Mustafa gave this man a Turkish
robe and promised him a sum of money if he were able to win over
D. Ant6o de Noronha.
36. There was on the island nothing to eat but dates. The Ottoman soldiers
even had to eat donkey meat (cf. Orhonlu, Babreyn Seferi, 15).
76.
time, too, the Ra'is Murad, together with D. Joo de Noronha, came
from the Bahrayn to see D. Ant6o. The Portuguese admiral now sent a
message to Pero Peixoto exhorting him to maintain a close watch along the
coast of the Bahrayn. To decide what would be the best course for the
future D. Antdo held a council with the captains of his fleet, with the
'guazil' of' Hormuz, the Rasis Nur al-Din, and with the 'guazil'of the Bahrayn,
the Ra'is Murad. It was resolved that the best scheme would be to maintain
defeat, without having to take the risk of fighting an open battle against
them. With his resolution made, D. Ant5o once more urged Pero Peixoto to
keep a careful guard over the island and to aid him in this task, sent him all
Mustofa Posha, realizing how grave the situation was for the Ottomans,
4,. e.,hta44.r . H1.1;44-.' Du4 lit, t)..'%t,tISL
u- i14. 5t4*i i.,I..o -cr&4
sent the abo.-montioned sanjak begto see the Ro'is Murad in the fortress of /
the Bcihrayn. 37 This sanjak beg saw the 'guazil', and told him that the
Sultan would soon send reinforcements to the Ottomans on the island. The
Ra'is, however, expressed his resentment that the Sultan had sent troops
against the island. He did not know that the campaign had been undertaken
37. The exact moment when this sanjak beg saw Ra'is Murad at
the Bahroyn fortress - whether the meeting occurred before the
Ra'is Murod went to see D. Antao de Noronha or after his return
(at on Unspecified moment) to the Bahroyn - is not clear from the
available sources.
77.
with no orders from the Sultan. He was, however, willing to take the
near the fortress. 38 These Persian soldiers are no doubt the troops mentioned
and whom the Portuguese admiral D. Ant8o must have sent to the Bohrayn
in advance of his own fleet - perhaps on the light vessels arid 'terranquins'
which he sent off to strengthen the vessels of Pero Peixoto then blockading
the island. About this time the above mentioned sanjok beg made a night
attack and inflicted considerable damage on these Persian troops from Berdistan.40
last - about a month after the night attack of the sanjak beg - D. Ant& de
Noronha reached the island and received from the Ra'is Murad and from
among them - D. Anto had no intention of meeting them in open bottle, but
preferred to let them die of hunger. The Ottoman soldiers began to blame
their commander for not extricating them from their difficult situation. At
this same time Mir Sultan Au, the sanjak beg of Katif - perhaps because
he had fallen out of favour with the Ottoman authorities 42 - was seeking
to place himself on good terms with loran Shah, the ruler of Hormuz, and
well and sent them back with words of encouragement. There was also
in Katif a captain (copito) named 'Mamede Bec', i.e., Mehmed Beg, 'Turco
messengers of Mir Sultan Ali to D. Anfo, Mehmed Beg sent off in secret a
letter for the Ottoman commander in the Bahroyn, Mustafa Posh. The men
who carried the letter bribed some of the Persian troops serving with the
Portuguese at the Bahroyn to get the letter into the hands of Mustafa Pasha.
This letter exhorted the beglerbeg of Lahsa to stand firm, stating that relief
would not be long in coming to the Ottomans on the island. The Ottoman
42. Ibid., 140: "... que foi desejando de se sanear corn El Rey de Crmuz
e corn as Portuguezes, pela culpa em que tinha cohida...'
43. Ibid., 140. This man would not seem to be identical with the Mehmed
Beg mentioned a little later in Couto as taking over the command
of the Ottoman forces there after the death of Mustafa Pasha (cf.
below, note 46).
79.
D. Antao, since it was now the month of October when 'os levantes', the
east winds which brought sickness on that area, would begin to blow.
ships and set them around the fortress, with the Persian mercenaries under
At this same time some of the Muslim troops Serving wth the
in it and had them hanged publicly in the sight of his assembled forces. He
was now resolved to give battle to the Ottomans and sought assistance
This man built a tower-like structure of timber, on wheels, from the summit
44. The source refers in fact to these Muslims in the following words: "e
ccmoestes eram Mouros..." (cf. Couto, Dec.vU,lJv.vii, 14fl.
45. A Mhimme register (MD, iU, p.l43) indicates that Mustafo Pasha
was dismissed from the beglerbeglik of Lahsa during the course of
the Bahrayn campaign and that a certain Murad, the sanjak beg of
Musul, was appointed to replace him cit Lahsa.
80.
through the Persians serving with the Portuguese, mode contact with D. Ant5o
would be possible, unless the Cttomans surrendered their captives and their
arms. On this basis, however, the tentative moves towards peace made no
not do so, the Portuguese would never leave the Bohrayn until all the
Beg sent him a fine 'ginete', i.e., a horse; it was a gift which the Portuguese
now, offering to go and see the Ottoman commander. Armed with instructions
from D. Anto, he did in fact have talks with Mehmed Beg, but to no
might be about to betray them, placed him under guard - and the peace
For some days no further progress was made, although in fact both
sides, being apprehensive about the arrival of the east winds and the time
that 'Coge Ocem Carnal', a Persian aiim who hod joined the 'guazil' of
Hormuz, Nur al-Din, for the Bahrayn campaign, entered into the affair. lie
Mehmed Beg, to whom he suggested that the Ottomans should hand over their
Portuguese captives and two or three pieces of artillery taken in the earlier
fighting. Mehmed Begs and the janissaries accepted this proposal and asked
'Coge Ccem Carnal' to undertake the negotiations with the Portuguese. D. Anto
de Noronha was glad to receive this offer, since there were a number of
However, the Mehmed Beg from Katif, who has been mentioned above
as a stubborn foe of the Portuguese, was still urging the Cttoman commander
in the Babrayn not to reach an agreement with the Portuguese, but to await
the arrival of reinforcements from Basra. tvtir Sultan All, who understood
how much Mehmed of Katif hated the Portuguese, advised him to go to the
Bc4rar and take council with D. Anto, promising that he himself, i.e., Iviir
Sultan AU, would send letters to D. Ant5o de Noronha and to the Ottoman
Commander.
2.
Mehmed Beg, having received letters from Mir Sultan AU, set out
for the Bobrayn with a number of terronquins'. With him there went
also, in secret, a trusted confident of ivir Sultan AU, who had other letters
for D. Anto - letters in which it was affirmed that Mehmed Beg of Kotif
was the greatest foe that the Portuguese had and that he was the real reason
for the ill-success, thus far, of the peace negotiations. D. Anto received
Mehmed Beg of Katif well and allowed him to visit the Ottoman commander,
he would have to go back to Katif for further talks with Mir Sultan Au. he
Once the 'terranqum' had sailed about half a league from the
Bahrayn, Carvalho and his two Portuguese attacked Mehmed Beg of Kotif.
The small 'terranquim' overturned, the men on board fell into the shallow
water and there Mebmed Beg was done to death. Carvaiho and the other
two Portuguese returned now to the Bahrayn. 48 News of this event reached
the Ottomans - perhaps through one of the crew from the 'terranquim' -
and their anger was such that it seemed as though the moves towards peace
would cane once more to nothing. The east winds, however, had begun
to blow, and fever was rife, causing numerous deaths amongst the Portuguese
and also amongst the Ottomans. Under these circumstances there was little
recourse left to the combatants save to make peace at last. The terms of
Ottomans surrendered their arms and gave also a payment of 12,000 'cruzados'.49
bock to the mainland. The 'guazil' of Hormuz, Nur al-Din, together with
Gil de Goes de Lacerda and inofre do Soveral, arranged for the evacuation
of the Ottoman forces - which was in fact carried out in the 'terronquins'
of the 'guazil'. The Ottomans now went to Katif 50 while the Portuguese
withdrew to Hormuz.
49. 'Cruzad&, i.e., a Portuguese coin worth 400 reis (see Chapter Ill,
note 37). The Ottoman source refers at this point to "10 yik pa,sa
okesi" (cf. OrhonI, Bahreyn Seferi, 16).
50. According to the Ottoman source (cf. Orhonlu, Bahreyn Seferi, 9 and
16) the Ottomans crossed over from the Bobrayn to Katif on 5 Safer 967/
6 November 1559. Couto states that the Cttomans who survived the
hardship and sickness encountered in the Bahrayn campaign did not
number more than 200 (Dec. vii, Liv. vii, 145).
84.
CHAPTER
Since the Ottoman occupation of Basra in 1546 the Persian Gulf hod
been the scene of conflict between the Portuguese and the Ottomans. The
Katif; on the other hand the Ottcmans failed to win control over the strait
powers and their limits of influence. On the whole, the conflict had been
to encourage the flow of trade to and from the Ottoman lands, the beglerbeg
This attempt at negotiation was not the first which had been made
from Basra. In 1547 Mehmed Pasha, the then beglerbeg of Basra, had sent
out an envoy, by name l-lajji Fayat, not long after the Ottoman occupation
of Basro. The attempt of this man to promote amicable relations with the
Portuguese hod been fruitless. Ten years later, in 1557, we learn from the
the Ottomans and the Portuguese. A letter, dated 6 January 1557, from
85.
Francisco Barreto, the governof of 'Ba?aim', i.e. Bassein, on the west coast
of India, refers in general terms to such negotiations. 1 So, too, does a letter
hod come to the Pasha of Basra from Sjemrro do turquo', i.e., from the
Grand Vizier RUstem Pasha. 2 The letter makes reference to earlier efforts
and to release the tenSions prevailing between their respective forces at sea
near the southern reaches of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.
the flaw of trade to and from Bosra. There was reason to think that a resumption
a1 hostilities. 3 Such at least was the view of the Pasha of Basra, who held
86.
office in the time of the Ottoman Grand Vizier, AU Pasha. 4 This Posha,
to All Pasha, urging that much benefit would come to the Ottomans from a
restoration of the trade through Basro. These observations won the approval
of All Pasha, who empowered the Posha of Basro to make contact with the
could do nothing without the assent of the Vice-Roy of India (then the Conde
do Redend4 The Conde replied that he could not give his approval to a
Antbnio Teixeira, who knew Persian well and also some Turkish.6
'
Teixeiro, in the summer of 1563, left Hormuz for Basra. With him
Teixeira went from Basra to Baghdad and thence to 'o mar maior', 8 i.e., to
explained to him that the Pasho of Basra hod tried to negotiate a peace
with the Vice-Roy of India, in orderto ensure the continued flow of trade
that he asked peace from no one. if the King of the Portuguese required
peace, he should send to Istanbul a great man from his court to discuss the
matter. The Sultan now ordered that a letter should be given to Teixeira,
who in due course travelled from Istanbul to Portugal, for transmission to the
Cardinal who was then in charge of the government there. 9 Teixeira submitted
The letter which Sultan Sleymon sent to the King of Portugal was
secure passage on land and on sea for the people and merchants of the Ottoman
Empire trading to and from the lands of the Portuguese. Friendship between
the two powers would be established, if the King complied with1hls request.
the years following 1564, although minor incidents did occur from time to
to disturb, from time to time, the relations existing between the Ottomans and
on a big At1ehnese ship sailing off the Hadramawt and having on board 400
Atjehnese vessMs bound 'por Meca', i.e., sailing to Jidda in the Red
Sea and no doubt bearing Muslims on piigrirna je) 4 The Portuguese, in 1572,
seem to have been nervous about the situation in the Persian Gulf. At this
time most of their vessels stationed in the Gulf had left to esco a
Goa n ordered Ferno Telles, the 1copitania de Ormuz', to send back, from
the escort ships, one galley and three other 'navios' to keep watch in the
20 'kadirg& to be built for such a venture - but the scheme came to nothing.
zielevvel 981/ 12 September 1573 states that the Portuguese had sailed to the
Babroyn, seized some of the people on the island and also captured one or two
and bearing the same date notes that the Portuguese arrived at the Bahrayn
with twelve galleys and two galleons; this same document adds that the
envoy from Lar 20 (elci..destination not given). These two documents of 981/
descent on the territories near to the Bohrayn - i.e., Katif and Lahsa - and that
the need for a careful watch on the activities of the Portuguese in the Persian
Gulf. Another Ottoman document dating from 6 Receb 981/ 1 November 1573
states that the ruler of Let (Lar Hakimi) had made on attack on Hormuz, while
the Portuguese ships stationed there were absent elsewhere - perhaps at the
21
Bahrayn.
At Istanbul the climate of opinion had begun to change and there were
some elements amongst the dignitaries surrounding the Sultan, who advocated
particular, was now the object of Ottoman attention. The first need was to
18. MD,xxii,p.317.
19. MD,xxii,p.322 (cf. Appendix V).
20. icr, i.e,, Laristan, a region in southern Persia. The ruler of icr s
sometimes described in the Ottoman documents as 'Lar Hakimi (i.e.,
the governor of tar) and at other times as 'Lar Padi;ahi' (here the
exalted title of Padishah (emperor) s used to denote a small local ruler).
Couto calls the ruler of Laristan'El Rey de Lara'(Dec.x, Liv.ii,219). Cf.
also i Aubin, Les Sunnites du L&isf an et Ia Chute des Safovides, in
Revue des Etudes lslamques, xxxiii (Paris 1965), 158.
21. This episode is mentioned in the letter of a certain Abu al -Nasr, who wrote
from the Bahrcyn to the beglerbeg 0f Baghdad (MD,xxiii,301).
91.
gather together in Lahsa, the mainland area close to the Bahrayn, all the
Muharrem 9b1/ 25 May 1573 asks the beg lerbeg of Lahsa whether or not
required for such on enterprise and what would be a possible time for
not he could furnish some of the resources which the beglerbeg of Lohsa had
of iron, various Salat y e esbab' (munitions and supplies) and also fifteen
,25
zarbuzan.
The Ottoman interest in the Babrayn persisted into the year 1575. A
document 26 dating from that year indicates that there were some elements in
the island well disposed towards the Ottomans, even willing to attempt the
hk1mV' addressed to the beglerbeg of Baghdad and dating from 9 Safer 983/
22. MD,xxii,p.43.
23. MD,xxvii, p.81 (cf. Appendix VI).
24. Kantar - a measure ci weight. The Istanbul kantar, of c. 1570, was
equal to 48 vukyye (vakiyye) - cf Orhontu and l3iksol, Dicle ye
Firat Nehirlerinde Nakliyat, 93. One vukiyee (or okka) was equal
to 1.2825 kg see W. Hinz, Islamische Masse und Gewchte, leiden
1955, 24).
25. Zarbuzan -o kind of light cannon (ci. El , s.v.Barad, col.13).
26. MD Zeyli,iii,p.128.
27. MD,xxvii,p.81.
92.
told the Porte at Istanbul that the galleys at Bosra and the 'cenkci'28
with them would be sufficient for the capture of the Bahrayn. The
as to the number ond amount of men, ships 29 and guns which would be
needed for a well prepared expedition against the Bahrayn - the number of
the number of guns and the amount of munitions available at Baghdad and
troops would be required for an attack on the Bahrayn and where it might be
Lahso there were no siege guns. Basra was able to provide two large
time); and there were three further siege guns to hand - i.e., six in all.
Basra had also fourteen 'kadirg&, together with supplies or iron, of axes and
beglerbeg of Basra had sought earlier to bbtoin supplies. It would seem that
and 1100 kumbara . It could also provide ten zarbuzari . The Cttoman
Government at Istanbul enquired, in this hkJm, for details about the size of
the large siege guns - what weight were the iron cannon balls used in them;
bow many cannon balls were to hand. There is, in addition, a request for
information about the guns on the 'kadkgas' present at Basra; and also a
reference to the permission, given earlier, for the building of two 'kadirgos'
there,
An order from the central regime informed the beglerbeg of Basra, in 984/1576,
33. MD,xxvii,p.76.
34. Remne - a liva or sanjak in the beglerbeglik of Basro.
35. 'Laimci' or 'laghimj', i.e., a sapper orminr (cf. El 2 , s.v. Brd,
cot. 14). -
36. 'Kumbora', i.e., bomb (ci. El 2, s.v. B&d, col.14).
94.
nevertheless to keep watch over the coast of Lahso and to send two galleys
the Bahrayn itself. A hikJm sent from Istanbul to the beglerbeg of Lahsa
information - that Mabmud Shah, the ruler of the Bahrayn, had died, that
his son Hizir Shah had succeeded him and that the vizier of Hormuz,
Nur al-Din, had descended on the Bahrayn and captured the new ruler of
the island. The beglerbeg of Lahsa is now ordered to hand over his galleys
with their munitions and equipment to the beglerbeg of Basra. 38 How far this
order came into effect is not clear, for documents written in October 1577
show that the beglerbeg of Lahso still had some 'kadirgas' under his control.
for the occupation of the Bahrayn. None the less, the island is mentioned
with the harmful activities of the local Arab population along the shores of
38. MD,xxx,p.353.
95.
had asked for additional 'kadirgas to be assigned to him. He told the Govern-
ment at istanbul that the Arabs - 'kofere Arabian' - caused so much damage
to the local markets in Katif that the merchants had transferred themselves to
42
the Bahrayn. Ahmed Pasha, noting that he had two galleys at his disposal,
mode a request for three more. With five galleys he expected to be able to
keep the Arabs in check. The beglerbeg of Basra was now ordered to send one
Of the long contention between the Ottomans and the Portuguese the
It was, however, a raid carried out not from the Persian Gulf, but from the
Red Sea. The 'terradas' or small vessels wont to sail each year from 'Coriate',
i.e. Karyot in Arabia, along the coast to Ras al-I-todd and thence to the
Yemen brouit back to Muccct, then under Portuguese domination, the news
that Sinan POsha, the Ottoman beglerbeg of the Yemen, had ordered
such an expedition/or 'as mouros' of Muscat assured him that their town was
a rich one. The beglerbeg set in command of this small squadron a cert&n
'alibac', i.e., AU Deg - a 'Turco' by origin and at the same time a'cossairo
salto, arrebatodo, e pouco capito (a virulent and violent pirate, but bad
for a 'fusta', under Alvcro Mourato, to keep watch for the Ottomans in the
waters off Ras ol-Hadd. Alvaro Mouroto took with him also two light 'taranquis'
and, arriving at Ras al.-Hadd, did in fact maintain a close watch, both at
Meanwhile, at the end of August 1581, Au Beg had set sail from
Mocha, but the west winds bearing him along blew with such force that he last
one ship on the southern shore of Arabia. He was well aware that a watch
would be made at Ros ol-Hcidd to obtain news of his arrival. None the less,
he managed to slip past the headland safely, the Portuguese under Alvoro
Mourato foiling to notice him. He made now for the boy of 'Sedabo' and
Jooting the houses and loading their plunder on their three ships. At this
ju1flctiire the news that the Ottomans were in Muscat reached Koihat
Rego at once sernt a light 'teranquim' to find the 'fusta ' of Alvaro Mourato,
who was still at Ros' ol-Hadd and quite unaware of what had been happening
Mdc n. MGi 4v
at Muscat. D. Gonsa(o t.Gkjfl with him Lopes Carrosco and some soldtrs,
set off from Hormuz in a 'catur", with orders to join Alvaro Mourato and
of merchant vessels, hoping to use them as a squadron for the relief of Muscat.
Alvaro Mourato, receiving news of what had occurred from Joo do Rego,
sailed to Mustat, entered the harbour at night, attacked one of the Ottoman
vessels and then withdrew in hQste, the Cttomans pursuing him as for as the
'ilheos de Victoria', one league from Muscat. During the unfolding of these
events the inhabitants of Muscat had retired to 'Matora', i.e., Matrah, near
some four leagues inland, a region under the control 0f an Arab tribal
'47
chieftain named Cotane
It was not in fact until after the departure of Au Beg from Muscat,
got together a number of vessels within the short space of eight days, placed
them under the command of D. Luis de Almeida and sent on board 400 soldiers
equipped with breast plates, 'espingardas' and other arms, 48 and also pro-
ordering him to chase All Beg as for as Mocha, if necessary; should he fail
to find AU Beg, then he was to turn against the 'Nautaques'49 and attack
the ships of these people who, by reason of their piracy, had been the cause
As the vessels of AU Beg sailed off from Muscat towards the Indian
Ocean, 5 ' the two Portuguese captains assigned earlier to watch the Cttomans,
i.e., Alvaro Mourato and Martin Lopes, followed in thd r wake as far as
'Cabo de Rasalgate', i.e., Ras al-Hadd, then returned to Muscat and after-
under D. Luiz de Almeida and rested there for eight days. Having held a
council of war with his captains, D. Luiz now resolved not to pursue AU Beg
further, but to descend 'a costa dos Nautbques'. 53 Here he made an assault
D. Luiz now attacked 'Goodel' on the same coast, a port much frequented
D. Luiz went to 'Teim', also on the same coast. Having laid waste this
APPENDIX I
Se nhor,
I arrived at this fortress of Hormuz on 18th May /bu/ I did not take
charge of the fortress for one month, because Luis FaIc5o wanted to complete
his time [as governo!7, which was 5ndeed a month mor7. I took charge of
the fortress on 19th June and I found the place very uneasy, having in it not
even one merchant nor anyone else buying beatilha or any kind of spices
or any other merchandize. And all the people who were coming to do business
captain of the ruler of Loristan, one of his principal men, was located opposite
this island [of Hormu7, on the mom land, with many horse and foot; and it
was already some months that he had been there with his encampment at
certain well . from which this city of Hormuz draws its water. And the people
of Mogistan (Mogosto), fearing these people, took refuge in this city. And
it was here that the 'cafillas' passed, so that these people /Irom Laristo7
stopp. them, with the result that none came to pay the tools at the
customs house of the King, Our Lord. With regard to Basro, things ore
he has also allowed some ,Thher7 people to go there with nine 'terrodos'.
When I reached this city, I was informed that the capito of Basra, who was
is. a man much esteemed and known amongst the Portuguese. I am sending
V.5., with this /1tter the translation of the letter which he/Ce. the
full credence to the things that he told me. He was willing to swear on
his Koran (moafo) that everything which he told me was indeed true. I
asked him whether he were willing to swear that his actions were in good
faith5 and I ordeid him to give a great oath through Garcia della Pinha,
that the main reason For his coming here was to be a true Friend of the
Portuguese. And/1e rekted7 oil the things that he knew about Ayos
in Baghdad and that t was he who came to take Basra. He also /oke
me information about all the other regions. He was aware of the resolve
might yield a large revenue to the Great Turk also that Rstem Pasha,
the grand vizier ('guazil') and son-in-law of the Great Turk, ,cgarded as7
detrimental this capture of Basra, saying that it was worth nothing at all,
a ruined place. Over these matters the two men were opposed to one another
and even at on earlier time hod ceased to be frends. Ayas Pasha therefore
strove very much to make Bcsra important so that If might give a great revenue
to the Great Turk. And over these and other matters he works as hard as he can.
I asked him /1..., Hajji Fayat7 about the fortress of Basra; In what
condition it was or if they had carried any mflitary works in it. He told me
that they hod done nothingere7. I/iIso7 asked him what troops were
5. I.e., literally, in Portuguese: que era muy bern feito - it was very
well done.
103.
at Basro. He told me that Mehmed Pczsha, the beglerbeg of Bosra had placed
holds office there, standing in the citodol of the fortress; moreover the
'alcaide mor' and these five hundred Turkish arquebusiers never go outside the
fortress for any reason at all; and in the town /ltself 7 there are a thousand
Turkish horsemen and seven hundred crquebusiers, all of which makes two
thousand and two hundred mounted Turks. 8 At the mouth of the strait of
Bosra where there was a mosque they built a circular wall, not a strong
one, irsde which there are ten pieces of artillery, 1o11 of thern7 small guts;
and every night fifty orquebusiers keep watch. When the Turks took this
fortress of Basra, they found in it two hundred and ninety pieces of artillery,
sixty of which were bronze cannon ('beros de metal')9, but the greater
of powder.. When Ayas Pasha departed after the taking of the fortress he
hod brought with him; but most of the guns /lound in the fortress7 he took
He told me that there were/it Suez7 forty four galleys, some of which had
come to Diu under the eunuch (Sleyman Pasha7. They were all in good
condition. I asked him what ships these were which had come to Mocha and
why they had gone there. He told me that they were fourteen oared vessels
which had come from Suez under the command of a Turkish captain called
Oez baxa Oez boxa rought troops to make war and to fig t against
an Arab chieftain who is called 'Zoidi Imam' (emom zeidi). But he/i.e.
HajiFayat7 did not know at all whether or not there was talk at Basra
that these ships would set out for India. I asked him, too, about the
intention of Ayas Posha and of Mehmed Pasha - whether it was their intention
knew nothing of their desires, save that the Turks wanted very much to
establish a flourishing trade in Basra, that on many evenings they sent for
him and he never heard anything about that/Intention 7; and if the Turks
had such an evil purpose, they could build in the river Euphrates as many
ships as they wanted, because near the town of Birejik Cbiraa'), 14 seven
days journey /lrom Basra7, there are great forests, frcm which comes much
fine timber and, in addition, there is also pine-wood from whkh they could
build as many ships as they desired, both large and small, by reason of the
well-populated and has a great traffic with Persia and with other regions.
From this place, two dayst journey away, there is the city of Aleppo,
He said that from this town of Birejik there are two routes which
go to Basra - one of them runs through a town which is called 'llla&' 5 and
the other goes through Baghdad. And this flatter7 route is more direct, but
since, three months of the year, /ihe channel oVthis river /Tends to7 dry
up, then whoever wants to use sailing ships it is better to go through 'lllaa'
because there is always water flowing and there are many frrigation7
channels cut through the cultivated lands (sememteiras). The lowest level
Cof water7, throughout the year, remains at two and a half to three fathoms
('braas') in depth, so that all ships and boats, however large they are, con
14. Birejik - an important river port and crossing on the Euphrates (cf.
V.J. Parry in El 2 , s.v. Birejik; also Orhonlu and lsiksal, op. cit.,
77-102). -
15. 'lllaa' - i.e., al.Hilla, on the river Euphrates (cf. J. Lossner in
El 2 , s.v. al-Hilla).
106.
sail therein. And to come from the town oi Birejik to Basra takes twenty
four days even when the water in this river is running at its lowest towards
Bosra. And the river winds about from one end to the other, yet it is none
the less so broad and welt-known that it can easily be distinguished from
other channels which are made for fhe purpose of7 irrigation.
Hajji Foyat also told me that there came now to Basro a messenger
('escravo')of the Great Turk with a letter to Mehmed Pasha. It took him
forty two days to come to Bosra from Constantinople. Hajji Foyat, by a solemn
oath that he took on his Koran, fiwore that7 he would tell me the truth in
all these things; and also that he would send me from there /T.e., from Basra7
at I the news which he might learn and that I would give him certain signs
by which it would be known what the Turks at Basra intended to do; and that
he would send me this information by one of his sons. This Hajji Fayat and
his son are men who, each year, visit Afeppo, Alexandria and many other
places, so that necessarily they come to know many things about all that
the Great Turk decrees. He told me that I should put my trust in these things
a different belief - and that he was a friend of the Turks, because he was
nothing but a merchant, trading always in these regions; and that the other
Arabs who lived in Basra were of the same kind. He assured me also that
Mehmed Pasho wanted to make friendship only with me and that the Turks
107.
would remain for three years. And all these matters that I-Iojji Fayat
coast of Arabia, not for from Basra, should be taken, and gave it to an
of mine to Basra. This was the main thing that Me med Pasha had as ed
me and it was what he wished most of all; because the 'cafiltos' and the
merchants did not wont to go to Basra until they saw that there was a factor
best for the service of the Kirg, Our Lord, I summoned the most important
on the Holy Gospels that it would be advantageous for the service of the
King, Our Lord, that this factor of mine shouldgoto Basro and that certain
16. 'rey' - i.e., presumably the sanjok beg of Labsa. This sonjak was
later - in 1555 - to become begierbeglik.
17. i.e., a Portuguese factor.
18. 'ouvydor' - i.e., the legal representative of the King of Portugal.
108.
declared in oath which they took that it would be well for a trusted
man to be in Bosra, one who could send me from there all the news and
service of the King, in that /1 he Turks 7 would not be able to make any
news of (what is happening oL7 Suez and au the other regions, for to
Bosra come the merchants from all parts, more commonly from Cairo, Damascus,
Birejik and Aleppo; and inevitably there will be means of knowing what /ihe
Turks 7 ore doing and what they intend to do. In addition, the Arabs who
dwell in Basra, will also give me news truthfully about these matters, because
with him a letter of mine to Mebmed Pasha in response to his /letter7 which
written with fine words /ior the Pasha7. And with regard to what he writes
tome and with regard to Basra/iheIf7, I shall always stand with a drawn
sword in my hand; and the more words he writes to me, the more diligent I
shall be and thereby the more alert in relation to them. This Domingos Barbudo
who is well known in Basra amongst the Arabs and amongst the merchants,
and he has a great experience of that land. Over the opinion of these
people who think that he should remain in Basra, I am sending him there
for no more than three months, because within this time he will see all the
affairs of Basra and will learn also the news from the merchants coming from
According to what the old people say in this land, there come, in most
years, from Basra, six to eight hundred horses, on which /ile merchants 7
pay at Goa the customs duty that V. S. knows. The spices which came
this year from India were so scant that it was a pity to see them, for I did not
hear of any merchant who bought even a handful of spices; but when these
indeed no other outlet for the spices save through Basrci, because all 'The
sub1ects of xeque Ismael did not buy reven ten candis of spice.
19. S.A. - i.e., 'Sua Alteza' (His Highness), here referring no doubt to
the King of Portugal.
20. i.e, Shah Ismail of Persia. At this time - in 1547 - It was Shah
Tahmasp (1524 - 1576) who reigned in Persia.
110.
his, who are rnow7 at Goa. Cne of them is called 'Jober equirami',
the second /Ts7 'xaacoar equirami' and the third one /1s7 'obaz royal';
It seems tome that/It was 7 the ship which Ant6nio Monez captured.
Furthermore, this Hajji Fayat shows himself well disposed for the servke of
the King and of V.5. deserves all the favor that V.5. might order to be
shown to him; because if he, indeed, wants to do so he can learn all the
and also the factor of Kalhat wrote rand gave 7 to me the news about the
strait rof Mocha 7. They said that there had come from Adenfio Kalhot7a
certain sheikh Abdulloh and also another 'terrcida'. They ralso7 said that
there had come from the port of Suez to the port of Mocha a 'capito' with
twenty galleys and two large ships, with three thousand Turks on board.
/The Turks 7 had been given orders to take all the land which was then in
the possession of the Zoidi Imam who is a ruler ('rey') in these territories of
Arabia. Before the Turks ('rumes') come, a son of the zaidi Imam hod control
of all the troops of his father. This son was at variance with the Imam. He
took no heed whether his father would fight against the Turks or not. And
when the Turks arrived, they attacked and captured the fortress of Ta'izz ('toez');
and, in addition, they seized five other ports, attacking them by treachery.
111.
Although the son was on bad terms with his father, once he saw the land was
being lost /io the Turks7, he entered into amicable relations with his father,
mode ready all his soldiers one night and fell on the Tu+s, killing four
will come to Muscat and Kaihat, within this first monsoon, which is in three
iS certain that there are /lready7 at Aden three well equipped 'fustas'
and more /of them 7 will come from the Port of Mocha. Sheikh Abdul lob
states that beyond doubt they will come. Many of his friends have told him
they ore certain that these ships will come this year and they have advised
him to remove his residence out of Kaihat. Last year there come no more than
four 'fustas' but none of the Portuguese stiyed at Kalhat, all of them going to
Muscat. The 'guazil' of Kalhat, last year, with the help of the King, Our
Lord, drove them from the port and did not even allow them to take water.
Now, if these ten or twelve ships come with many troops, it would be
necessary for the Portuguese and the Muslims ('mouros') to help him (i.e.,
/To the Turks7. And it will not be more than two months and a half before
At tho end of the month of June there arrived at ths town of Hormuz
112.
a ship which came from Mecca Cmequa') and in it there came a merchant
who lives here in Hormuz and is a native of the place. He told me that he
hod come through Mocha, that there were seven or eight oared ships
lying there and that he had not seen more than this number. The Turks kept
him there /at Mocha 7 for three days and did not let him go outside the
gates so that he should not warn the 'fustas' which V.5. had sent to the
strait /of Mocha 7, fe stated 7 that the Turkish vessels were waiting
there, thinking that the 'fustas' might enter into the harbour. It seemed to
him that it was there eight ,rlurkish7 ships which came to Kaihat and Muscat
/last year 7.
be made ready nine 'fustos' and 'catures', which ore here rat Hormuz7. At
the end of this month of July they will leave for Muscat, in order to lie in
wait there for the 'fustas' of the Turks, in case they should come in August or
the 'guazil of Kalhat /Eidding7 them hold in readiness the best 'terraquis'
which they have there. And there are ships which /can7 hold ten or
twelve Portuguese and which row well; for the rest, if there is need, Arab
Muscat, according to what I was told by people on the ships which have
arrived from those parts after I passed that way, there came forty or fifty
113.
board whenever it is most needful, in order, with the aid of Our Lord, to
fight the Turkish ships, if they should come to Muscat. And over the Turkish
It seems tome that/it will be for7 the service of S.A, and of V.S.
to send these ships to sea, because the vessels which are setting forth from
/iHormuz7 for India carrying reach of them 7 two or three Portuguese and
much money; ond if these Turks succeed in plundering Muscat, in finding the
ships rwhich hove on board 7 many 'xerafins' and 'tamgas' 21 and then in
making off with their prizes to the strait rof Mocha 7, it will be on inducement
Dom Payo thought that he had better stay here /Tn Hormuz7 and he
asked me for fcommand of7 the fleet, for it seemed to him that in this manner
he could do better service for the King. And I gave the fleet to him and he is
going with it as admiral-in-chief ('capito mor'). The captains and the soldiers
who are on board can be expected to oct as honourable and reliable men.
('cabo do rroalgate') two 'catures', the ones with the most oars, rwith orders7
21. 'Tamgo' (or tango) - a Portuguese coin worth 60 'reis' (cf. Dalgado,
op. cit., 11,355).
fl4.
to stand on watch and discover the Turkish vessels coming from the str&t
rof Mocha 7 and to see what their number is; and, if/These 'catures'/
see such vessels before them, then, to warn the fleet which wiU be/waiting7
at Muscat.
In the event that these ships do not come from the strait /of MochaZ
Cortes and laden with much fine merchandize, was wrecked on a sandbank
as it came from the island of Maceira' and was lost there. The 'noutoques'
took and carried off all the merchondize in the ship and killed all the
wife and one of his daughters, who made their escape. Amdre Cortes lost all
his possessions but, because he fought well, he got away, although he was
wounded by eight large arrows and he could not reach to his own 'paro'
Muslim 'terrada' and wounded some of the people on board who resisted
each year, send /Their fleet 7, with the help of Our Lord, to plunder
the coast of the 'noutaques' and to burn the 'terradas' ,rof the 'noutaques'7,
as much as possible. And this fleet, each year, will watch over the
merchant ships; it will, for S.A., serve two purposes now - to go against
115.
the 'fustas' of the Turks and ralso7 to sail wherever it has gone in past
years.
I shall write toV,$.,, by other means, more about this land. I kiss
the bonds of V. S. May your life and the affairs of Cur Lord flhe i;ng7
APPENDIX II
CC, Parte 1, Map 89, Documento 9, fol. 3v_5r.( PLciI.ts 10- 13)
Senhor,
time it could not be better, so set beyond doubt /& make certain7 the great
concern that V.S. takes for this land and for the service of the King, Cur
Master. Because this land has been so ruined, /Then7 all will be lost. We
all believe, however, that V.5. will fiend akl7 as fully as the necessity
requires, in accordance with the news we now have that V.5. is preparing /To
send to7 this land a great armada, should the need arise. Please believe
that, lust because V. S. is mindful of us, we feel free already of all these
sea by the Turks, in the course of which /ilege7 1'These Turks 7 placed six
1. Pieris and Ftzler (Ceylon and Portugal, 304) write the folIowing'... the
greatest of all /gu7 wos Bazolisco, which reached a weight of 150
quintes with cflengTh of 35 palms. Smaller basiliscos weighing 70 quintaes
117.
'salvage', 2 together with some small pieces fiet7on the flat roofs of
certain buildings belonging to the King. During the eleven days the Turks
bombarded the fortress, they did little harm to it, because it was so strong.
The Turks destroyed one of our 'comello de ferro' 3 ond with one of our shots
we ruined, from the fortress, their 'espalhafato'. They killed four Portuguese
and wounded some ten or twelve; but as it appeared after their departure - they
received (evet7 greater damage from the good shooting that our gunners made
On the last night when the Turks gathered together their cannon and
raised the siege, they brought to the walls a Portuguese bombardier, whom they
had captured at the fortress of Muscat. 'This man7 come to speak with the
men on the /Trtress7woll, asking that they should try to rescue him and the
other captured. Until that moment we knew nothing about him, though in
fact on numerous occasions at night our men had called out the renegades /in
the Turkish camp 7, asking them to come to speak with the soldiers who stood
on the wall - but the renegades had never replied to this request. On the day
that the Turks went away they left with us two Christians, the one a Russian
by race nd the other an Italian; through these men we learned all that
occurred at Muscat - that Mebmed Beg, the son of P?rt Beg ('Barba Negra')
who was admiral of the Ottoman fleet, attacked the fortress for six days.
At the end of that time his father /Ptr Bed7 arrived with thirteen galleys.
The son CMehmed Beg7 had begun to bombard the fortress with six galleys
only. On the second day following the arrival of Beg, Joo de Lisboo
safely for this fortress, /T.e., Hormuz7. But Pri Beg managed the affair
with such address that he put them as galley slaves bound to their bench with
iron chains and subjected to the lash. For a man who/like Joo de Lisboa_7
admiral would never discuss a ransom for them, even though on a number of
occasions there were offers made for the women only - but these /Tnfidei7
dogs treated the matter in such a fashion that it seemed there would never be
a successful result.
After this event Pin Beg, on a Monday morning - the 19th September -
arrived at this island fo1 Hormuz7 with twenty five galleys and three 'navios
dalto bordo' and one 'cotur' - that is to say, the twenty five galleys and one
galleon with which he departed from Suez; also another galleon which he
was bringing, together with two 'quarta'os' 4 and numerous guns and all the
powder, cannon balls and munitions /ihis vessel7 was lost in shallow water
4. 'quarto' - i.e., an old type of gun (cf. Pieris and Fitzler, op. cit.,
302).
119.
at Aden. After 'Barbonegra' had set out for this place rHormuz7, he
took two ships and one 'catur' at Muscat. What he did here fat Hormuz7
a certain Joao Nunez, a man from Chaul. Having stayed at Hormuz for
sixteen days like Turks 7 wnt4 to the island of Kishm ('Queyxome') which
is three leagues from here. At Kishm were the principal people and merchants
from this town rof Hormuz 7with a great quantity of goods, of gold and
silver, and of cash. The Turks took all these things, nothing to escape them
and V.S. can be assured that this was the richest prize that could be found in
all the world. Firt Beg did all these things with only seven hundred fighting
men and two thousand or two thousand and five hundred sailors and galley
crews. In this fortress /of Hormuz7 there were seven hundred soldiers much
esteemed and the best arquebusiers that there were. If we had known more
about the Turks, it might have been possible to seize their guns and to
inflict much harm /&, them 7. According to what we have learned, '0
Turco' ordered PM Beg not to seek out Hormuz before he had gone to
Basra to take on board other troops there - but ros a result o17 weakness
he found at Muscat, Ptrt Beg thought that it would be the same here /t
Hormuz7 and so, with the powder that he brought from Muscat, he subjected
us to a bombardment.
120.
From bra and Shiraz news came that Shah Tohmasp was marching
into the lands of the Ottoman Sultan across the frontier of Tabriz.
Subsequently I hove heard nothing more about this matter. Should /lresh7
news arrive, I will write to V.5. rand send the letter 7 by ships leaving
for that quarter.
Sunday the 30th of Cctober - a 'terraqui.m' has come, from which we have
learned that this same day all the fleet of the Turks has assembled at the
point of the island of Kishm and deported - from that spot where they have
been all the time since their departure from this place ,rHormuz7. They
have taken the road to Basra - setting out this very night just gone.
Trust in God that all this will be for the great destruction of these
towards Basro, so that Ptri Beg will in no wise escape from the net. The
letter V.5. sent to me for Murad Ra'is, ,"The ruler of the Bahrayn 7, this
I have despatched to him forthwith and I wrote and bade him gather his
strength in case the Turks come to seize /iIe Bahrayn7, so that he could
defend himself as it might be needful for the service of S.A., Our Lord. May
the life and affairs of V.5. increase for many years. rWritten7 from Hormuz
APPENDIX III
High Porte which is the seat of good fortune, so that it is the asylum of
famo..s Khagans and the recourse of sultans possessed of power, there has
come your friendship - bearing letter which has arrived through your man
Nikolo, who is one of the notables of the Christian millet. itlf about 7
matters set forth in the well intentioned contents of the letters which have
reached our exalted court sometime ago from your own person and from
your vice-roy (Kaim makam) in the land of India. You have sought our
the friendship desired with our court which is famed for justice. Our felicity
bearing letter has been sent in respect of that matter and our imperial per-
mission has been given that your embassador shall come /To us7, for the
directed towards those who make, to our high court, a request in friendship
122.
and sincerity. Your province r0f India 7 is far off and the journey is
dangerous, wherefore your embassador has been delayed here, while we sought
consultation with the people of your province: but do not have any doubts
about the sincerity of our desire for friendship; our embassador is about to be
sent. You have requested that your man who has come /10 us7 should send
back promptly, fEearing7 joyful news. All that was included have been
submitted, in their entirety, to our victorious stirrup and our noble world -
so, our felicitous court is ever open and accessible and there is no impediment
to the desire of anyone who /wishes7 to come and go. By the favour of
Allah - praise be unto him, may His Name be exalted - now, at this present
time, the caliphate of the world is in the hands of our possession and power.
The people (re'ayo) of the East and the West seek the protection of our State.
Since the abundance of our imperial compassion is ever decided /Tn favour 7
of rother 7 people, and since - for the well-being of the people and the
desired, you shall establish, on land and on sea, safety and security for
the people and the merchants of our well protected dominkns, who are in
the land of India, in the region of Jezayir and in other lands. Your present
embassador has - without delay - been accorded our noble permission, and,
with our imperial letter, he has been sent back to that land. Now it is
1. Seeabove,p.-.
123.
needful that, when /This letter 7 reaches you, you shall, without delay,
despatch to us your embassador, who shall be sent for this laudable purpose,
that is, for the bettering of the conditions of the people and for the good
ordering of affairs of state. And you shall act promptly, so that the con-
ditions of /&,r 7 friendship may be decded on both sides and so that the
people and the merchants in those lands may be relieved of anxiety and
APPENDIX IV
The liva of Medine, with its revenue, has been conferred to Said Beg,
The liva of Rahmaniyye ( ' L U, ), with its revenue, has been con-
ferred on Mehmed Beg, the Beg of Haifa ( t.iP 1'?)
The liva of Haifa, in the Beg lerbeglik of Lohsa, with its revenue, has
/l.e., H0f0 7.
ofRemle( Ji)).
The liva of Keyn Kinad ( .L4 jJ ?), with its revenue, has been
formerly, the Kapudan of Bosra, has undertaken to farm (iltizam) the has3
/of Hemmar7 at more than 200 , 000 rakce 7, on condition that the afore-
has at more than 200,000 akp, on condition that the province be assigned
to him. /The Beglerbeg of Basra7 has presented an arz that the aforesaid
liva be duly and legally assigned to Veil. Order has been made that the
3. Has - i.e., the biggest type of fief, the minimum annual income of
which was 100,000 akce.
Basra7a terakki of 20,000 okce has been conferred on Hemmad Beg, the
BegoFEbuArba(4./y' '1).
a terokki of 20, 000 rakce7 has been conferred on Ahmed Beg, the Beg of
Basra7 a terakki of 20,000 rakce7 has been conferred on his own son,
Basra7,
conferred with its revenue, on Mehmed Beg, who was a sanjak Beg in
been conferred on Ferrub Beg, now the Beg of Remle, with the /ame7
oFT Basro.
The avu;luk of the Imperial Court : The Zaim called Abdi, who
holds a zeamet of 20,000 akp at Aleppo and who has done good and able ser-
vice in the collection of taxes at Basra, has been made a member of the
15. Ziema, the plural of z&im. A za'im was the holder of a ze'amet,
a type of fief yielding an annual revenue of more than 20,000 akp.
16. Defterdarlik - i.e., the office of defterdar. Defferdar was the term
used for the officials of the financial administration: cf. B. Lewis,
in 2, s.v. Daftord&.
129.
APPENDIX V
Au, who is now the Beglerbeg of Baghdad,- May his good fortune
endure for ever - sent a letter to my exalted cot.rt (dergah-i mual Ia) and
has reported that twelve galleys (Kadirga) and two galleons (Kalyon) of the
miserable infidels have reached the Bahrayn and have seized one or two
merchant ships and also made captive at sea the embassador (eli) of the
sea and agents have informed /'s7 that they may cause damage along the
coasts of our well protected dominions (memalik-i mahruse) near the Babroyn.
The letter which you have sent also makes known that you hove launched your
ten galleys and mode them ready with oarsmen (Kreki) and other arms and all
necessaries. You hove made a submission (arz) /i us7 that the expulsion
of the enemy is very important. My imperial command (emr-i ,serif) has been
while measures are in train to drive the infidels /Trom the Bahrayn7, you
who ore the Beglerbeg of Basra shall watch over the affairs of Lahso, that
1 3J.
the above-mentioned CAlL 7 shall take care of Basro and also the
has also been given that, if the wretched infidels as noted above - shall
do harm to any of our well guarded territories, you shall equip/nd send
out7 from Basra as many ships as possible. And I have commanded, too,
that help made available to you and that, if necessary, troops be sent
arrives, you shall keep a careful watch on the infidels who have come
the Bahrayn7. Should the enemy do any damage, you must send the news
to the aforesaid /A1i7 and ask either for ships that you need or for the
necessary troops /To be sent 7 overland. And you shall make every effort
to expel the enemy /Trom the Bahrayn7, in the manner that seems most
appropriate to you. Until the Beglerbeg of Lohsa reaches Lahsa 1 and the
foe is indeed off, you shall give your protection /To the province 7, but
most necessary for protection and in those places where there is trouble,
you are to place sufficient defences, troops and munitions and you must
APPENDIX VI
9 Safer 983/
20 May 1575
The Beglerbeg of Lahsa has sent a letter, stating that the conquest of
the Bahrcyn would (with God's favour) be easy. He writes that there are
few cenkcs in the fortress, also that the galleys (kadirga) actually at
who were once beglerbeg of that region, must know the local conditions;
I have commanded that when /ikis firman7 reaches you, you shall inform
accurately how best to prepare for this enterprise - he., what number of
galleys are needed to sail to the island, how many cenkcis are required for
the galleys, and what number of siege guns, of 'asker' and of munitions and
supplies are necessary to attack the fortress. /Vou shall state also 7 if these
essential guns, munitions and supplies are available in Baghdad and Basro;
also if there are enough asker /Tn hand 7 or whether more of them are
needed and /Tf so7 where such troops can be found. 4 7urthermore_7, is
132.
it likely that the Portuguese foe, who has his main fleet at Ormuz, to come
be 40,000 filori. You shall write and inform us if ths annual revenue will
can produce more. You shall make known, in addition, whether or not the
state also where you will get the fnecessary7 guns if these feight galleys 7
are indeed constructed. You shall build ships as soon as the timber arrives
and in short you shall take note of all the conditions relating to the afores&d
APPENDIX VII
Mehmed Posha, the Beglerbeg of Lobsa has reported that Abmed Beg,
has been subverting astray the 'Kul taifesi', 1 he has incited the local
the livo be given to Mehmed Beg, at present the Beg of the sanjok of Cebreyn
( j .c. .), with its annual revenue. It has been commanded so.
Beg, the beg of aforesaid iivo /o1 Cebreyn7, has been appointed to
onciherfianjak7 and that his former sanjak is now vacant. ,'The BegIerbeg7
sanjak of Cebreyn has been given to Seyd? Ahmed, who has been aa
with a revenue of 55 akp, and now his aalik is vacant. (The beglerbeg
has presented an arz that it be given to Mustofa, who was kethuda of avu;lar
at Budin with a zeame t, and who has been given on imperial firman con-
Beg, the beg of the aforesaid liva, has abandoned of his own will the sanjak
of Hoffo. /The beglerbeg7 has presented an arz that t should be given with
commanded so.
Teka'd3
Beg, the beg of the Sonjak of Uyun, is now weak and ill arid is incapable of
3. i.e., retirement.
135.
now in fact unassigned and are vacant. The Beglerbeg has presented
as a provision for retirement, /io FWseyin Beg/. Order has been given
that, flhe village and the gordeL7 are vacant, the appointment be
Beg, the beg of the aforesaid liva, has retired and his sanjak is vacant.
of 200,000 ake.
was aa, with ra revenue of 7 60 okp, has been given a sanjak and that
that it be given to Davud, the son of SWeyman Beg who died while he was
a sanjok beg of Haifa, Davud being one of the MJtef ITj of Lohsa, with
a revenue of 35 akp. Order has been given that the appointment be made.
136.
the ago of the G'cn'tJlflJs at Ce;e ( 't4) is a capable man, who has
who was an oga, with /a revenue of 760 oke has been given a sanjak,
and his aahk is now vacant. rlhe Beglerbeg7 has therefore presented
an arz requesting that the aatik be given to Mehmed bin Vunus, the Kethuda
the aalsk be given to I-IJseyin, who has been Kethudo of the groups/sf the
Terakki :
the beg of Katif, is a capable man and has therefore presented an arz request-
ing that favour be shown to him, It has been commanded that he /i.e.,
was Mir-i Alem, has died. 'The Beglerbeg7 has therefore presented an
so.
5. Mir-i alemlik - i.e., the office of mir-i alem. Mir-i alem was
meaning the standard bearer.
138.
APPENDIX VIII
strates the disruption of the transit trade from India through the lands of the
Middle East to the Mediterranean world after the arrival of the Portuguese
in Calicuf in 1498 and the subsequent revival of that trade during the middle
decades of the sixteenth century. This task has been done by a number of
of India at Goa make clear that the spice trade was re-established immediately
after the Ottoman conquest of Basra in 1546. More particularly the Ra'is Nur
al-Din wrote on 25 July 1547 to Gao that Hormuz was flourishing, and that
earlier than the Ra'is, observes, however, that few spices had reached
Hormuz from India; none the less, he also states that merchants from Basra
trade relations with the Portuguese at Hormuz4 - and not, it would seem,
without some degree of success, for the Venetian bailo at stanbuI, Doniele
trade between Hormuz and Basra 5 The Cttoman records - i.e., MUhimme
coming to Basra from the Yemen, from India and Persia. 6 One Muhimme
the traffic to Basra - not because of opposition on the part of the Portuguese
4. See above, rr -
5. Cf. E. Alberi, Relazioni degli Ambasciotori Veneti ol Senato,
Serie iii, vol.iii (Firenze 1884), 6.
nor because of piracy in the waters of the Persian Gulf, but on account
Basra. The Ottoman Government, wishing to restore the trade, gave orders
that the officials at Basra should not exact duties of more than 1/15 ad valorem
BBLICGRAPHY
A. PORTUGUESE SOuRCES
Azevado, P.A. d'. and Boiao, A., 0 Archivo da Torre do Tornbo. Sua
Historia, corpos que a compem eorganizaso, Lisboa 1905.
B. TURKISH SOURCES
Orhonlu, C., 1559 Bahreyn Seferine Aid Bir Rapor, in ID xvii/22 (Istanbul 1967),
1-16.
Saffet Bey, Bir Osmanli Filosunun Sumatra Seferi, in Torih-i Osmani Encumeni
Mecmuasi, fasc. 1-12 (Istanbul 1913-1912).
Gy'in, N., XVI, Yzyiida Ruts ye Onemi, mID xvii/22 (Istanbul 1967), 17-34.
Aubin, J., Los Princes d'Ormuz du Xlll e au )(/e Siecle, in Journal Asiatique
ccxxxxi (Paris 1953), 77-138.
Dames, 1., The Portuguese and the Turks in the Indian Ocean in
the Sixteenth Century, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic
Society (London 1921).
Gibb, H.A.R. and Bowen, H., Islamic Society and the West, 1 vol., 2 ports,
O.U.P. 1950ond 1957.
lbn Battuta, Travels in Asia and Africa, ed. H.A. Gibb, London 1929.
Kahane, H. and R. and Tietze, R., The Lingua Francc. in the Levant, Turkish
Nautical Terms ofitalian and Greek C'rigin,Urbana 1958j.
149.
Lybyer, A.H., The Cttoman Turks and the Routes of Oriental Trade, in
English Historical Review,LXX (London 1915), 577-588.
Pieris, P.E. and Fitzler, M.A.H., Ceylon and Portugal, Pt.l: Kings and
Christians 1539-1552, Leipzig 1927
Sereant, R. B., The Portuguese off the South Arabian Coast, 0. U. P. 1963
Whiteway, R.S., The Rise of the Portuguese Power in India, london 1967
K
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