Gonzales vs Macaraig

191 SCRA 452

Item-veto power

1. The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987
Constitution. Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised
would result in the veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to
as the item-veto power or the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a
particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.

2. The President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other
words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations
Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining
portion of the same item.

3. Notwithstanding the elimination of any reference to the veto of a provision in Article VI,
Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution, the extent of the President's veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso
merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto.

4. The restrictive interpretation urged by Gonzales et al. that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct
and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the
Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate
specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates.

5. The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) because they
nullify the authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to
augment any item in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings
in other items of their respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5)
of the Constitution.

6. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means

vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, the leeway granted being
delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only
from savings. More importantly, for such a special power as that of augmentation from
savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill.

Doctrine of Inappropriate Provisions

7. Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of
the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides: "Sec. 25 (2) No
provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it relates
specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall
be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."

8. Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate
specifically to some " particular appropriation" therein.

9. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed "provisions"
do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will
have to be made to other sources. Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of
Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary
appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) although labelled
as "provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for
the purpose of the President's veto power.

Restrictions or Conditions in an Appropriation Bill

10. Inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall be spent;
and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may include in
Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
funds.

11. The Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while
allowing the appropriation itself to stand. The veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill
which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid
and without effect whatsoever. However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in
the real sense of the term, not some matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate
legislation.

12. Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money
items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is
appropriateness. "It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to
which funds are appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an
appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with money items of appropriation that they
logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness."

13. Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) must also be held to
be inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY '90), have been
"artfully drafted" to appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law
measures more appropriate for substantive and, therefore, separate legislation. Further,
neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason
is that items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the enrolled
bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when compared with the original
budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90)
themselves provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act." Herein, there is
no condition, in the budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY '89) and 16 (FY '90)
partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from savings; in other words, "a
general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill."

Legislative remedy

14. If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive
were unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A
Presidential veto may be overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1).

15. But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Gonzales et al.'s
argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" has lost force and
effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.

Guingona vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571 | 1991-04-22

Political Question

1. There is a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may properly take
cognizance of. The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has
been given to this Court.

Budget Priority to Education

2. Under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to "assign the
highest budgetary priority to education". However, it does not follow that the hands of
Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

3. Moreover, the DECS is given the highest budgetary allocation among all department
budgets. This is a clear compliance with the constitutional mandate according highest priority
to education.

Appropriation

4. There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of
words or religious recitals in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be
made, except that it be made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation
under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of time horizons, an
appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as
expressly for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as
said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms.
5. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees.

An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears
from the language employed whether in the past or in the present.

Automatic Appropriation for Debt Service

6. An examination of the presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to
cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become
due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating
funds therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in
advance.

Undue Delegation

7. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter
and repeal them.

8. The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily
involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made

9. The test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the
hands of the legislature.

10. The law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except
enforce it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first
filled, the delegate will then have been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions.
This is invalid delegation.

11. The Court finds that the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated thereinAlthough the subject presidential
decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by the very nature of the
problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the legislative
parameters provided in the decrees. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds,
debentures or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets
incurred by virtue of the law, as and when they shall become due.

Lung Center of the Philippines vs Rosas (2004)

G.R. No. 144104 | 2004-06-29

Charitable Institution
1. The Lung Center of the Philippines is a charitable institution within the context of the 1973
and 1987 Constitutions.

2. The test whether an enterprise is charitable or not is whether it exists to carry out a purpose
reorganized in law as charitable or whether it is maintained for gain, profit, or private
advantage.

3. The Lung Center of the Philippines was organized for the welfare and benefit of the
Filipino people principally to help combat the high incidence of lung and pulmonary diseases
in the Philippines

4. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not lose its character as such and its
exemption from taxes simply because it derives income from paying patients, whether out-
patient, or confined in the hospital, or receives subsidies from the government, so long as the
money received is devoted or used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to
achieve; and no money inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the
institution.

5. The fundamental ground upon which all exemptions in favor of charitable institutions are
based is the benefit conferred upon the public by them, and a consequent relief, to some
extent, of the burden upon the state to care for and advance the interests of its citizens. (citing
Congregational Sunday School, etc. v. Board of Review)

6. Under P.D. No. 1823, the petitioner is entitled to receive donations. It does not lose its
character as a charitable institution simply because the gift or donation is in the form of
subsidies granted by the government. Government subsidy payments are like a gift or
donation of any other kind except they come from the government.

7. Petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income, including the subsidies
from the government, for its patients and for the operation of the hospital.

Real Property Taxes

8. Notwithstanding the finding that petitioner is a charitable institution, those portions of its
real property that are leased to private entities are not exempt from real property taxes as
these are not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.

9. The portions of the land leased to private entities as well as those parts of the hospital
leased to private individuals are not exempt from such taxes. On the other hand, the portions
of the land occupied by the hospital and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether
paying or non-paying, are exempt from real property taxes.

Exemption under its charter

10. Laws granting exemption from tax are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer
and liberally in favor of the taxing power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception.
The effect of an exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption
from tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken.
11. Under PD 1823, petitioner does not enjoy any property tax exemption privileges for its
real properties as well as the building constructed thereon. If the intentions were otherwise,
the same should have been among the enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section 2.
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or
consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Exemption under the Constitution

12. Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides: Charitable
institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, non-profit
cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly and exclusively
used for religious, charitable or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. [Note:
This constitutional provision is implemented by Section 234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160
(Local Government Code of 1991)]

13. The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes only. What is
exempted is not the institution itself. Those exempted from real estate taxes are lands,
buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.

14. The petitioner cannot rely on Herrera v. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals which
was promulgated under the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, for
lands, buildings, and improvements of the charitable institution to be considered exempt, the
same should not only be "exclusively" used for charitable purposes (as worded in the 1935
Constitution); it is required that such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such
purposes.

15. Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160 in order to be entitled to the
exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a
charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are Actually, Directly and Exclusively used
for charitable purposes.

16. If real property is used for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used
for the exempted purposes but is subject to taxation. The words "dominant use" or "principal
use" cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to the
Constitutions and the law.[ Solely is synonymous with exclusively.

17. What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable purposes
is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself to the purposes for
which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use of the income from the real
property that is determinative of whether the property is used for tax-exempt purposes.

Araullo vs. Aquino (Resolution) (2015)

G.R. No. 209287 | 2015-02-03

The issues properly calls for the Court's exercise of its power of judicial review

1. The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA because savings as a
concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial,
determination.

2. The consolidated petitions distinctly raised the question of the constitutionality of the acts
and practices under the DAP, particularly their non-conformity with Section 25(5), Article VI
of the Constitution and the principles of separation of power and equal protection. Hence,
the matter is still entirely within the Courts competence, and its determination does not
pertain to Congress to the exclusion of the Court.

3. The petitions also primarily alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive
in the implementation of the DAP. The resolution of the petitions thus demanded the exercise
by the Court of its power of judicial review as mandated by the Constitution.

Interpretation of the definition of savings is a judicial function

4. Indeed, the interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial
function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive.
The Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make
and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of
the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department.
If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the
Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by
interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a
case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or
even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by
the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable, besides being clearly
violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government,
particularly those governing the separation of powers

5. Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the
power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of
carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws
belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the
laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is
constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law,
but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a
conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be
declared invalid and unconstitutional. (see Endencia and Jugo vs. David)

Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings

6. Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:

Section 25. x x x

5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the

President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
7. The 2014 Decision of the Court has underscored that the exercise of the power to augment
shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the
funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose.
Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed
against expanding the scope of the power to augment. Such a strict interpretation is essential
in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their
prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing
Congress power of the purse. Hence, regardless of the perceived beneficial purposes of the
DAP, and regardless of whether the DAP is viewed as an effective tool of stimulating the
national economy, the acts and practices under the DAP and the relevant provisions of NBC
No. 541 cited in the 2014 Decision should remain illegal and unconstitutional as long as the
funds used to finance the projects mentioned therein are sourced from savings that deviated
from the relevant provisions of the GAA, as well as the limitation on the power to augment
under Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. In a society governed by laws, even the
best intentions must come within the parameters defined and set by the Constitution and the
law. Laudable purposes must be carried out through legal method.

Section 38 and Section 39 of the Administrative Code authorize only the suspension or
stoppage of further expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments

8. Respondents contend that withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased

appropriations under the DAP are savings that may be used for augmentation, and that the
withdrawal of unobligated allotments were made pursuant to Section 38 Chapter 5, Book VI
of the Administrative Code, and that the Presidents augmentation of deficient items is in
accordance with the standing authority issued by Congress through Section 39.
However, Section 38 and Section 39 authorized only the suspension or stoppage of further
expenditures, not the withdrawal of unobligated allotments.

9. Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. - Except as otherwise provided in

the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires,
the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or
otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure
authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations
used for permanent officials and employees.

Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.Except as

otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any
department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a
deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new
positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings
except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized
positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department,
office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also
deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the
department, office or agency concerned.
10. Unobligated allotments were encompassed by the first part of the definition of savings
in the GAA, that is, as portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
from any obligation or encumbrance. But the first part of the definition was further qualified
by the three enumerated instances of when savings would be realized. As such, unobligated
allotments could not be indiscriminately declared as savings without first determining
whether any of the three instances existed. This signified that the DBMs withdrawal of
unobligated allotments had disregarded the definition of savings under the GAAs.

11. Section 38 refers to the authority of the President to suspend or otherwise stop further
expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the
General Appropriations Act. When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds,
savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or
appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or
purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or
abandoned.

12. Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the
suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special Allotment
Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the original programs and
projects is a clear indication that the program or project from which the allotments were
withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned. Consequently, as we have pointed out in
the 2014 Decision, the purpose for which the withdrawn funds had been appropriated was
not yet fulfilled, or did not yet cease to exist, rendering the declaration of the funds as savings
impossible. In this regard, the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated
allotments remain unconstitutional.

Section 39 of the Administrative Code is in conflict with Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution, insofar as it authorizes the President to use and transfer savings generated
outside his own department (cross-border transfers)

13. Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the
Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular
appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or
agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39
violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the
President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the
savings in other items of his own Departments appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39
cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.
Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall,
however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

14. The Court thus declares as Unconstitutional the cross-border transfers of the savings of
the Executive to augment the appropriations of other offices outside the Executive.

15. Respondents must always be reminded that the Constitution is the basic law to which all
laws must conform. No act that conflicts with the Constitution can be valid.

Constitutional bodies which enjoy fiscal autonomy are not required to revert savings
from appropriations back to the General Fund
16. It is important to underscore that the reversion to the General Fund of unexpended
balances of appropriations savings included pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI
of the Administrative Code22 does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit,
Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The reason for this is that the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the CFAG.

17. Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize their
resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and
authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest
rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and
disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the
discharge of their functions.

18. Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. The Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed in the
discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for
their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate
of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based.

The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA

19. The 2014 Decision did not declare the en masse invalidation of the 116 DAP-funded
projects. It bears repeating that the DAP is a policy instrument that the Executive, by its own
prerogative, may utilize to spur economic growth and development. Nonetheless, the 2014
Decision did find doubtful those projects that appeared to have no appropriation cover under
the relevant GAAs.

20. That there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure
with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation.
Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a
specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation
purposes. This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs, but
also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget execution in
responding to unforeseeable contingencies. (see Nazareth vs. Villar)

21. Nonetheless, only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of
augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects
had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is not
within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65.

Meaning of 'item' in appropriation acts

22. Respondents assert that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create
allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply
with the line-item veto of the President. We find merit in the respondents argument.
23. Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the
object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the
Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions.

24. For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a
proper item which may be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of
appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the
appropriation or of the bill. (see Belgica vs. Ochoa)

25. An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific
appropriation of money, not some general provision of law which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill. (see Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice)

26. An item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence

meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose,
otherwise known as a line-item. This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent
with its definition as a specific appropriation of money but also ensures that the President
may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing formulation, the existing Calamity
Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as line-item
appropriations which are rightfully subject to item veto.

27. It must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into component
percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated
for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-
item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have
several related purposes that are by accounting and budgeting practice considered as one
purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which case the related
purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the Presidents item veto
power. Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the
constitutional mechanism of item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular
correspondence as herein discussed.

28. Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and
indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense
category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the
relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment
class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense
category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to.

Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible

29. The respondents assail the pronouncement of unconstitutionality of cross-border transfers

made by the President. They submit that Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution
prohibits only the transfer of appropriation, not savings. They relate that cross-border
transfers have been the practice in the past, being consistent with the Presidents role as the
Chief Executive. In view of the clarity of the text of Section 25(5), however, the Court stands
by its pronouncement, and will not brook any strained interpretations.
Unprogrammed funds may only be released upon proof that the total revenues exceeded
the target

30. The respondents justified the use of unprogrammed funds by submitting certifications
from the Bureau of Treasury and the Department of Finance (DOF) regarding the dividends
derived from the shares of stock held by the Government in government-owned and
controlled corporations. In the 2014 Decision, the Court has held that the requirement under
the relevant GAAs should be construed in light of the purpose for which the unprogrammed
funds were denominated as standby appropriations. Hence, revenue targets should be
considered as a whole, not individually; otherwise, we would be dealing with artificial
revenue surpluses. We have even cautioned that the release of unprogrammed funds based on
the respondents position could be unsound fiscal management for disregarding the budget
plan and fostering budget deficits, contrary to the Governments surplus budget
policy. Aggregate revenue collection must first exceed aggregate revenue target as a pre-
requisite to the use of unprogrammed funds.

31. Nonetheless, we clarify the respondents notion that the release of unprogrammed funds
may only occur at the end of the fiscal year. There must be consistent monitoring as a
component of the budget accountability phase of every agencys performance in terms of the
agencys budget utilization as provided in Book VI, Chapter 6, Section 51 and Section 52 of
the Administrative Code of 1987. Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) and the Commission on Audit (COA) require agencies to submit budget
and financial accountability reports (BFAR) on a regular basis, one of which is the Quarterly
Report of Income or Quarterly Report of Revenue and Other Receipts. Since information on
both actual revenue collections and targets are made available every quarter, or at such time
as the DBM may prescribe, actual revenue surplus may be determined accordingly and
releases from the unprogrammed fund may take place even prior to the end of the fiscal year.

32. The Courts construction of the provision on unprogrammed funds is a statutory, not a
constitutional, interpretation of an ambiguous phrase. Thus, the construction should be given
prospective effect.

The presumption of 'good faith' or of 'regular performance of official duty' stands

despite the obiter pronouncement

33. In the speech he delivered on July 14, 2014, President Aquino III expressed the view that
in applying the doctrine of operative fact, the Court has already presumed the absence of
good faith on the part of the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, so that they
would have to prove good faith during trial.

34. The quoted text of paragraphs 3 and 4 of page 90 of the 2014 Decision alluded to shows
that the Court has neither thrown out the presumption of good faith nor imputed bad faith to
the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP. The contrary is true, because the Court
has still presumed their good faith by pointing out that the doctrine of operative fact xxx
cannot apply to the authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, unless there are
concrete findings of good faith in their favor by the proper tribunals determining their
criminal, civil, administrative and other liabilities. Note that the proper tribunals can make
concrete findings of good faith in their favor only after a full hearing of all the parties in
any given case, and such a hearing can begin to proceed only after according all the
presumptions, particularly that of good faith, by initially requiring the complainants, plaintiffs
or accusers to first establish their complaints or charges before the respondent authors,
proponents and implementors of the DAP.

35. It is equally important to stress that the ascertainment of good faith, or the lack of it, and
the determination of whether or not due diligence and prudence were exercised, are questions
of fact. The want of good faith is thus better determined by tribunals other than this Court,
which is not a trier of facts.

36. The Court cannot jettison the presumption of good faith in this or in any other case. The
presumption is a matter of law. It has had a long history. Indeed, good faith has long been
established as a legal principle even in the heydays of the Roman Empire.

37. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted in good faith in the performance
of his duties. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear
showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. "Bad
faith" does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some
dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a
sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of
self-interest or ill will for ulterior purposes. The law also requires that the public officers
action caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

38. The presumptions of good faith or regular performance of official duty are
disputable and may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence.

39. The authors, proponents and implementors of the DAP, being public officers,
further enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their functions. This
presumption is necessary because they are clothed with some part of the sovereignty of the
State, and because they act in the interest of the public as required by law. However,
the presumption may be disputed.

The PAPs under the DAP remain effective under the operative fact doctrine

40. As a general rule, the nullification of an unconstitutional law or act carries with it the
illegality of its effects. However, in cases where nullification of the effects will result in
inequity and injustice, the operative fact doctrine may apply.

41. In so ruling, the Court has essentially recognized the impact on the beneficiaries and the
country as a whole if its ruling would pave the way for the nullification of the P144.378
Billions worth of infrastructure projects, social and economic services funded through the
DAP. Bearing in mind the disastrous impact of nullifying these projects by virtue alone of the
invalidation of certain acts and practices under the DAP, the Court has upheld the efficacy of
such DAP-funded projects by applying the operative fact doctrine. For this reason, we cannot
sustain the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the petitioners in G.R. No. 209442.

42. The Court has agreed during its deliberations to extend to the proponents and
implementors of the DAP the benefit of the doctrine of operative fact. This is because they
had nothing to do at all with the adoption of the invalid acts and practices.
Marcos vs. Manglapus (1989)
G.R. No. 88211 | 1989-09-15

Right to travel is distinct from Right to return to one's country; enjoys a different
protection

1. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel
would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's
country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel.

2. The Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat (i) the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, (ii) the right to leave a country, and (iii) the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights.

Right to Return to One's Country is not guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, but
nevertheless recognized as a generally accepted principle of international law

3. The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in
the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is
our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted
principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political
Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Presidents residual power in the interest of national security

4. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. More particularly,
this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace.It is a power
borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution.

5. The president, upon whom executive power is vested, has unstated residual powers which
are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what
are expressly enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution.

6. The request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot
be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never
contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President
which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should submit to the
exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.

Exercise of President's residual power not a political question, but subject to Judicial
Review

7. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the
scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have
normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues
beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President,
for Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for
example, question the President's recognition of a foreign government, no matter how
premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon
though it may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought before us because the
power is reserved to the people.

8. When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not
established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the official concerned and
decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.

9. The question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to
the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts,
arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

10. The death of Mr. Marcos, although it may be viewed as a supervening event, has not
changed the factual scenario under which the Court's decision was rendered. The threats to
the government, to which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic
effect, have not been shown to have ceased. On the contrary, instead of erasing fears as to the
destabilization that will be caused by the return of the Marcoses, Mrs. Marcos reinforced the
basis for the decision to bar their return when she called President Aquino "illegal," claiming
that it is Mr. Marcos, not Mrs. Aquino, who is the "legal" President of the Philippines, and
declared that the matter "should be brought to all the courts of the world."

Province of North Cotobato v. GRP Peace Panel (2008)

G.R. No. 183591 and G.R. No. 183752 and G.R. No. 183893 and G.R. No. 183962 | 2008-
10-14

Ripeness for Adjudication

1. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had
then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to
itself as a result of the challenged action.

2. That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
3. Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy
ripe.As held in Pimentel v Aguirre,"by the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act."

4. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a proper matter
for judicial review.

Right to Information on Matters of Public Concern vis-a-vis Policy of Public Disclosure

5. The right of access to public documents is a self-executory constitutional right.

6. Likewise, Section 28 is intended to be self-executing. The effectivity of the policy of

public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute.

7. The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

8. Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract.

9. The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in Section 28, Article II of the1987
Constitution complements the right of access to information on matters of public concern
found in the Bill of Rights. The right to informationguarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while policy of full public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom
to give information even if nobody demands.

Concept of Association under International Law

10. The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as
associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility.

11. In the international legal context, an association is formed "when two states of unequal
power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate,
delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal,while maintaining its international
status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and
independence"

12. In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a
transitional device of former colonies on their way to full independence.

The concept of Association is not recognized under the1987 Constitution

13. The MOA-AD contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal
concept of association, specifically the following: (a) the BJEs capacity to enter into
economic and trade relations with foreign countries, (b) the commitment of the Central
Government to ensure the BJEs participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the
specialized UN agencies, and (c) the continuing responsibility of the Central Government
over external defense, etc. These provisions of the MOA indicate that theParties aimed to vest
in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.
14. The concept of Association is not recognized under the 1987 Constitution

a. No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under ourlaws as
having an associative relationship with the national government. The concept implies
powers that go beyond anything granted by the Constitution to any local or regional
government.

b. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for
independence.

15. The BJE, as contemplated, is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid
down in the Montevideo Convention, namely, (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined
territory, (c) a government, and (d) a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

Creation of an autonomous region

16. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is
covered by the term autonomous region, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with the
Constitution.

a. ArticleX, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the autonomous
region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region.

b. TheMOA-AD, in delineating the territorial boundaries of the BJE, provided that the
municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001
plebiscite shall be automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite.

c. Under the Constitution, a separate plebiscite is still required because what these areas voted
for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

Bangsamoro People

17. The definition of Bangsamoro people used in the MOA-AD is inconsistent with the
Organic Act of the ARMM and the IPRA.

a. under the MOA-AD, Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago
at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood.

b. the Organic Act, in contrast, does not lump together the identities of the Bangsamoro and
other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, but instead makes a distinction between
Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples.
Right to Self-determination under International Law

18. The right of a people to self-determination has acquired a status beyond convention and
is considered a general principle of international law

19. The peoples right to self-determination should not be understood as extending to a

unilateral right of secession. A distinction should be made between the right of internal and
external self-determination.

a. internal self-determination a peoples pursuit of its political, economic, social and

cultural development within the framework of an existing state.

b. external self-determination (which potentially takes the form of the assertion of aright to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully
defined circumstances.

20. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to
separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a
wish. The grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of determining its own
political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the
sovereignty of every State.

Sanlakas vs Executive Secetary Reyes (2004)

G.R. No. 159085 | 2004-02-03

Moot and Academic (Exceptions)

1. The issuance of Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to
exist, has rendered the case moot.

2. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the
determination of "actual controversies.

3. By way of exception, courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of

repetition yet evading review." Case in point, in 2001, the President similarly issued a
declaration of state of rebellion only to recall it five days later. The hasty recall prevented the
Court from acting on the petitions filed in the meantime questioning the validity of the
declaration. (see Lacson vs Perez)

Locus Standi

4. "Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.
(a) Only petitioners Representative Suplico et al. and Senator Pimentel, as Members of
Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances.

5. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member
thereof. An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative
but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such
a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts. (citing Philconsa vs
Enriquez)

(b) Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit.

6. As a party list organization, it has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would
justify the resort to the Court. It is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot
claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and detention for the crime of
rebellion. Every action must be brought in the name of the party whose legal rights has been
invaded or infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or
infringement. (citing Lacson vs Perez)

7. That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not necessarily
endow them with standing.

(a) A taxpayer may bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation. No such illegal disbursement is alleged

(b) A citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question only when he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the
injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. Again, no such injury is alleged in this
case.

8. Even if the petition of the party list organizations is treated as one for declaratory relief, the
same will not prosper since the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to entertain such suits
at the first instance.

Calling Out Power

9. For the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the
President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion.

10. Section 18, Article VII grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a "sequence" of
"graduated powers. From the most to the least benign, these are: (a) the calling out power,
(b) the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (c) the power to
declare martial law.

11. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two
conditions, namely, (1) an actual invasion or rebellion, and (2) that public safety requires the
exercise of such power. However, these conditions are not required in the exercise of the
calling out power.

12. The only criterion for the exercise of the calling out power is that 'whenever it
becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.'"

13. The President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine
the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the
power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that
the President acted without factual basis.

Declaration of state of rebellion

14. The President has authority to declare a state of rebellion, which authority springs in the
main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from
her Commander-in-Chief powers.

15. Statutory authority for such a declaration may be found in the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987 which authorizes the President to issue Proclamations declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend

16. Nevertheless, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an
utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the
armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Such a declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.

Warrantless arrest for rebellion

17. The mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
protected rights. Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, then it is
with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these
conditions.

18. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is not based on the declaration of a 'state of
rebellion.' In other words, a person may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of
rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the
requisites for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court are
present.

Not a declaration of Martial Law

19. The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration of
martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report requirement, is a leap of logic.
There is no indication that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial and legislative
powers. In short, there is no illustration that the President has attempted to exercise or has
exercised martial law powers.

Not an exercise of emergency powers by the President

20. Neither can the declaration constitute an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which
exercise depends upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution.

21. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was
merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These
are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as
opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.

Rubrico vs. Macapagal-Arroyo (2010)

G.R. No. 183871 | 2010-02-18

President enjoys immunity from suit during incumbency

1. Petitioners are mistaken in their contention that the Presidential immunity from suit,
enjoyed by the chief executive under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, has been removed
under the 1987 Constitution.

2. The presidential immunity from suit during the term of office remains preserved under our
system of government, albeit not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Regarding the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was
already understood in jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or her
tenure.

3. The Court subsequently made it abundantly clear in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, a case

likewise resolved under the umbrella of the 1987 Constitution, that indeed the President
enjoys immunity during her incumbency, to wit: The President, during his tenure of office
or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need
to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the
President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.
Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or
distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and
functions. Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive
branch and anything which impairs his usefulness in the discharge of the many great and
important duties imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of
the Government.

4. Moreover, the petition is simply bereft of any allegation as to what specific presidential
act or omission violated or threatened to violate petitioners' protected rights.

Command responsibility

5. The evolution of the command responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development
of laws of war and armed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, "command responsibility," in
its simplest terms, means the "responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by
subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control
in international wars or domestic conflict." In this sense, command responsibility is
properly a form of criminal complicity.

6. The Hague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility,

foreshadowing the present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities
committed by his subordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then
formulated, command responsibility is "an omission mode of individual criminal liability,"
whereby the superior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for
failing to prevent or punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered).

7. The doctrine has recently been codified in the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to which the Philippines is signatory. Sec. 28 of the Statute
imposes individual responsibility on military commanders for crimes committed by forces
under their control. The country is, however, not yet formally bound by the terms and
provisions embodied in this treaty-statute, since the Senate has yet to extend concurrence in
its ratification.

8. While there are several pending bills on command responsibility, there is still no
Philippine law that provides for criminal liability under that doctrine

Command responsibility does not apply in amparo proceedings

9. Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they, as
commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their
subordinates against petitioners. As the appellate court stated, "the privilege of the writ of
amparo must be denied as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon for the simple reason
that petitioners have not presented evidence showing that those who allegedly abducted and
illegally detained Lourdes and later threatened her and her family were, in fact, members of
the military or the police force." The two generals, the CA's holding broadly hinted, would
have been accountable for the abduction and threats if the actual malefactors were members
of the AFP or PNP.

10. The dismissal by the CA of the case as against Gen. Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon is
incorrect if viewed against the backdrop of the stated rationale underpinning the assailed
decision vis-a -vis the two generals, i.e., command responsibility. This is because command
responsibility, as a concept defined, developed, and applied under international law, has
little, if at all, bearing in amparo proceedings.

11. It may be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police
commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made
applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now
constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with
the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these
proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a
form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents' criminal liability, if
there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such
proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction
of an administrative rule may have been committed.
12. The writ of amparo was conceived to provide expeditious and effective procedural relief
against violations or threats of violation of the basic rights to life, liberty, and security of
persons. The amparo suit, however, "is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring
proof beyond reasonable doubt x x x or administrative liabilityrequiring substantial
evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. (Secretary of National Defense v.
Manalo)

Writ of Amparo intended to determine responsibility for enforced disappearances and

extra-judicial killings, but not to fix criminal or administrative liability

13. An amparo suit does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance [threats thereof or extra-judicial killings]; it [only] determines responsibility,
or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance [threats thereof or extra-
judicial killings] for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance [or extra-judicial killings]. xxx As the law now stands, extra-judicial killings
and enforced disappearances in this jurisdiction are not crimes penalized separately
from the component criminal acts undertaken to carry out these killings and enforced
disappearances and are now penalized under the Revised Penal Code and special laws. The
simple reason is that the Legislature has not spoken on the matter; the determination of what
acts are criminal are matters of substantive law that only the Legislature has the power to
enact

14. If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it

should, at most, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for,
and has the duty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to
enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to
protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination
should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal
prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing
administrative issuances, if there be any.

Application for issuance of Writ of Amparo must be supported by substantial evidence

15. The privilege of the writ of amparo, to reiterate, is a remedy available to victims of
extra-judicial killings and enforced disappearances or threats of similar
nature, regardless of whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public
official or employee or a private individual.

16. However, Sec. 17, as complemented by Sec. 18 of the Amparo Rule, expressly prescribes
the minimum evidentiary substantiation requirement and norm to support a cause of action
under the Rule, thus:

Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required.-The parties shall establish their
claims by substantial evidence.

xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment.-x x x If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence,
the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

17. Substantial evidence is more than a mere imputation of wrongdoing or violation that
would warrant a finding of liability against the person charged. It is more than a scintilla of
evidence. It means such amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other equally reasonable minds might opine
otherwise.

Petitioners have failed to produce substantial evidence to support the petition for the
writ of amparo

18. Petitioners have not adduced substantial evidence pointing to government involvement in
the disappearance of Lourdes. To a concrete point, petitioners have not shown that the actual
perpetrators of the abduction and the harassments that followed formally or informally
formed part of either the military or the police chain of command. A preliminary police
investigation report, however, would tend to show a link, however hazy, between the license
plate (XRR 428) of the vehicle allegedly used in the abduction of Lourdes and the address of
Darwin Reyes/Sy, who was alleged to be working in Camp Aguinaldo. Then, too, there were
affidavits and testimonies on events that transpired which, if taken together, logically point to
military involvement in the alleged disappearance of Lourdes, such as, but not limited to, her
abduction in broad daylight, her being forcibly dragged to a vehicle blindfolded and then
being brought to a place where the sounds of planes taking off and landing could be heard.
Mention may also be made of the fact that Lourdes was asked about her membership in the
Communist Party and of being released when she agreed to become an "asset." Nevertheless,
the identities and links to the AFP or the PNP of the alleged abductors, namely Cuaresma,
Alfaro, Santana, Jonathan, and Sy/Reyes, have yet to be established.

19. According to the evidentiary records, none of the alleged abductors of Lourdes belonged
to the 301st AISS based in San Fernando Air Base. Neither were they members of any unit of
the Philippine Air Force. A verification with the Personnel Accounting and Information
System of the PNP yielded the information that, except for a certain Darwin Reyes y Muga,
the other alleged abductors, i.e., Cuaresma, Alfaro, Santana and Jonathan, were not members
of the PNP.

Duty of the state to investigate reports of enforced disappearance and threats

20. As regards P/Supt. Romero and P/Insp. Gomez, the Court is more than satisfied that they
have no direct or indirect hand in the alleged enforced disappearance of Lourdes and the
threats against her daughters. As police officers, though, theirs was the duty to thoroughly
investigate the abduction of Lourdes,

21. The right to security of persons is a guarantee of the protection of one's right by the
government. And this protection includes conducting effective investigations of extra-legal
killings, enforced disappearances, or threats of the same kind. As held in the Velasquez
Rodriguez case, in which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights pronounced: The duty
to investigate must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality
preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the
State as its own legal duty, not a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon offer of proof, without an effective search for the
truth by the government.

22. As found by the CA, the local police stations concerned, including P/Supt. Roquero and
P/Insp. Gomez, did conduct a preliminary fact-finding on petitioners' complaint. They could
not, however, make any headway, owing to what was perceived to be the refusal of Lourdes,
her family, and her witnesses to cooperate. Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Rex J.M.A. Fernandez,
provided a plausible explanation for his clients and their witnesses' attitude, "[They] do not
trust the government agencies to protect them." The seeming reluctance on the part of the
Rubricos or their witnesses to cooperate ought not to pose a hindrance to the police in
pursuing, on its own initiative, the investigation in question to its natural end.

Consolidation of Amparo petition and Criminal actions

23. Second, Sec. 22 of the Amparo Rule proscribes the filing of an amparo petition should a
criminal action have, in the meanwhile, been commenced. The succeeding Sec. 23, on the
other hand, provides that when the criminal suit is filed subsequent to a petition for amparo,
the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action where the Amparo Rule shall
nonetheless govern the disposition of the relief under the Rule.

24. Under the terms of said Sec. 22, the present petition ought to have been dismissed at the
outset. But as things stand, the outright dismissal of the petition is no longer technically
feasible in light of the following developments: (1) the Court has, pursuant to Sec. 6 of the
Rule, already issued ex parte the writ of amparo; (2) the CA, after a summary hearing, has
dismissed the petition, but not on the basis of Sec. 22; and (3) the complaint in OMB-P-C-
O7-0602-E named as respondents only those believed to be the actual abductors of Lourdes,
while the instant petition impleaded, in addition, those tasked to investigate the kidnapping
and detention incidents and their superiors at the top. Yet, the acts and/or omissions subject of
the criminal complaint and the amparo petition are so linked as to call for the consolidation of
both proceedings to obviate the mischief inherent in a multiplicity-of-suits situation.

25. The Court hereby adjusts to a degree the literal application of Secs. 22 and 23 of the
Amparo Rule to fittingly address the situation obtaining under the premises by: (1) the
consolidation of the probe and fact-finding aspects of the instant petition with the
investigation of the criminal complaint before the OMB; and (2) the incorporation in the
same criminal complaint of the allegations in this petition bearing on the threats to the right to
security.

Biraogo vs. The Philippine Truth Commission (2010)

G.R. No. 192935 and G.R. No. 193036 | 2010-12-07

Requisites for the exercise of Judicial Review

1. The power of judicial review over an act or issuance may be exercised by the courts when
there is a) an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; b) the
person challenging the act must have standingto question the validity of the act or issuance,
that is, if the person stands to be benefitted or injured as a result of the enforcement of the
law; c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and d) the
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
Locus Standi (Direct Injury Test and Transcendental Importance)

2. A person has locus standi to impugn the validity of a statute upon meeting the direct
injury test. That is, a person must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.

3. The Court held that the petitioners have legal standing. The legislators-petitioners have a
legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution to the Congress are not violated.

4. Mr. Biraogo was likewise held to have legal standing. The direct injury test can be relaxed
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or
of a paramount public interest. A matter is of transcendental importance in view of its
seriousness, novelty and weight.

Power to create a new office is not included in the power to reorganize

5. The power to create an office is not included in the power to reorganize. The Presidents
power to reorganize is limited to a) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of
the President by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions
from one unit or another; b) transferring any function under the Officer of the President to
any other Department or Agency, or vice versa; or 3) transferring any agency under the Office
of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. The power to reorganize
includes a modification of an office that already exists; not a creation of a completely new
office.

Power to create a new office is not covered under the Presidents power of control

6. The power of control is the power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside an act done by
a subordinate officer and substitute the judgment of the person of power with the judgment of
the subordinate. This power does not contemplate the creation of an office.

Executive Powers of the President not limited to those specifically mentioned in the
Constitution

7. The powers of the President are not limited to those specifically mentioned in the
Constitution. While the President inherently has the power to reorganize and the power of
control, the power to create offices is not. Considering that the President has the duty to
ensure that the laws of the land are faithfully executed, thus, he possesses the necessary
powers to fulfill that duty. The President necessarily has the power to create ad hoc
committees that can aid in the enforcement of the laws of the land.

No appropriation but merely an allotment of existing funds

8. The Court held that there will be no appropriation but merely an allotment of existing
funds already appropriated for the Executive Department.

Investigative power vs. Adjudicative power

9. The Truth Commission is a fact-finding body. It does not possess quasi-judicial powers,
hence, it will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ. It has the power to investigate, but
not the power to adjudicate. The power to investigate means to explore, inquire or probe into
a specific matter while the power to adjudicatemeans to adjudge, decide, resolve, rule on
and settle.

EO1 violated the equal protection clause by singling out the Arroyo Administration

10. Equal protection does not mean the universal application of laws on all persons and
things. It leaves room for classification as long as such classification meets the following: a)
the classification rests on substantial distinctions; b) it is germane to the purpose of the law;
c) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and d) applies equally to all members of the
same class.

11. The Court held that EO1 violated the equal protection clause by singling out the Arroyo
Administration. While the Arroyo administration had differences with other past
administrations, the distinctions are not substantial. Singling out the Arroyo Administration
also violates the third requirement, that it must apply equally to all members of a similar
class.