PHILIPPINE TRUST CO. v. BOHANANTopic: Succession and AdministrationDate: January 30, 1960Labrador, J.

DOCTRINE:The validity of
testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, providedthat the law must be proved in courts.QUICK

FACTS:Decedent Bohanan was a US citizen. Nevada law allows a testator to dispose of all his property accordingto his will. His ex-wife
and children oppose the project of partition filed by the executor-petitioner, sayingthey were deprived of their legitimes. According to them,
Philippine law must prevail, requiring decedentto reserve the legitime for surviving spouse and children.CONFLICT LAWS:Old CC Art. 10(2), now
NCC Art. 16(2)
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the
extent of the successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the personwho
se succession is in question.

Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925, Sec. 9905

Every person over the age of 18 years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate,
real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testat
ors debts.

FACTS:Testator Bohanan was born in Nebraska and was a US citizen. He has some properties in California.Despite his long residence in the
Philippines, his stay was found by the CFI to be merely temporary, andhe remained to be a US citizen. The CFI declared his will as fully in
accordance with the laws of Nevadaand admitted it to probate. The Philippine Trust Co. was named executor of the will.A project of partition was
filed by Phil Trust which distributed the residuary estate into 3: 1) to hisgrandson, 2) to his brother and sister, to be distributed equally, 3)
legacies of P6,000 each to his sonand daughter, and 4) legacies to other people.Respondent Magdalena Bohanan, his ex-wife, questions the validity of
the partition, claiming that she andher children were deprived of their legitimes. (It must be noted that Magdalena and decedent C.O.Bohanan were
married in 1909 but he divorced her in 1922. She re-married in 1925 and this marriage wassubsisting at the time of the death of decedent.)

ISSUE 1: W/N Magdalena is entitled to legitime as surviving spouse

HELD: NO.There is no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife in the State of Nevada. There is alsono conjugal property between
her and decedent.Moreover, during the proceedings of the case, Magdalena filed a motion to withdraw P20,000 from theestate funds, chargeable
against her share in the conjugal property. But the Court found that there is nocommunity property.

ISSUE 2: W/N the children are entitled to their legitime

HELD: The law of Nevada, being a foreign law, can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules. However, it has
been found that during the hearing for the motion of the widow Bohanan for withdrawal of her share, the foreign law was introduced in evidence by
her counsel. In addition, the other heirs do not dispute the provisions of the Nevada law. Under these circumstances, the pertinent laws of Nevada can
be taken judicial notice of by the court, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

As the validity of the testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, the order of the court approving the project of
partition in accordance with Nevada law must be affirmed.

1) The case falls under any of the exceptions to the application of foreign law

a) The foreign law is contrary to an important public policy of the forum

b) The foreign law is penal in nature
c) The foreign law is procedural in nature
d) The foreign law purely fiscal or administrative in nature
e) The application of the foreign law will work undeniable injustice to the citizens of the forum
f) The case involves real or personal property situated in the forum
g) The application of the foreign law might endanger the vital interest of the state
h) The foreign law is contrary to good morals

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN, PHILIPPINE TRUST CO., v. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN, EDWARD C. BOHANAN, and
MARY LYDIA BOHANAN

G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960

Doctrine: As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of
the testator provided that the law be evidenced in the court.

FACTS: Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to him on May 20, 1922.

Decedent in this case gave out of the total estate (after deducting administration expenses) of P211,639.33 in cash, his grandson P90,819.67

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and one-half of all shares of stock of several mining companies and to his brother and sister the same amount. To his children he gave a legacy of
only P6,000 each, or a total of P12,000.

The wife Magadalena C. Bohanan and her two children question the validity of the testamentary provisions disposing of the estate in the
manner above indicated, claiming that they have been deprived of the legitimate that the laws of the form concede to them.

Lower Court Ruling: Dismissed the objections filed by Magdalena C. Bohanan, Mary Bohanan and Edward Bohanan to the project of partition
submitted by the executor and approving the said project.

The testator permanent residence or domicile in the United States depended upon his personal intent or desire, and he selected Nevada as
his homicide and therefore at the time of his death, he was a citizen of that state.

Wherefore, the court finds that the testator C. O. Bohanan was at the time of his death a citizen of the United States and of the State of
Nevada and declares that his will and testament, Exhibit A, is fully in accordance with the laws of the state of Nevada and admits the same to probate.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Magdalena C. Bohanan can claim. NO

2. Whether the testamentary dispositions, especially those for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, are valid NO.

RATIO: The court below had found that the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan were married on January 30, 1909, and that divorce was granted to
him on May 20, 1922; that sometime in 1925, Magdalena C. Bohanan married Carl Aaron and this marriage was subsisting at the time of the death of
the testator. Since no right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced wife exists in the State of Nevada and since the court below had already
found that there was no conjugal property between the testator and Magdalena C. Bohanan, the latter can now have no longer claim to pay portion of
the estate left by the testator.

Edward and Mary Lydia, who had received legacies in the amount of P6,000 each only, and, therefore, have not been given their shares in
the estate which, in accordance with the laws of the forum, should be two-thirds of the estate left by the testator.

The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to
personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question.

In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada
because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. (See Decision dated April 24, 1950, supra). So the question at issue is
whether the testementary dispositions, especially hose for the children which are short of the legitime given them by the Civil Code of the
Philippines, are valid. It is not disputed that the laws of Nevada allow a testator to dispose of all his properties by will (Sec. 9905, Complied Nevada
Laws of 1925, supra). The law of Nevada, being a foreign law can only be proved in our courts in the form and manner provided for by our Rules,
which are as follows:

SEC. 41. Proof of public or official record. An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy tested by the officer having the legal custody of he record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is
not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. . . . (Rule 123).

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have found that the foreign law was introduced in evidence
by appellant's (herein) counsel as Exhibits "2".

In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the above-quoted provision of the laws of the State of Nevada.
Under all the above circumstances, we are constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled Nevada
Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

IN RE: TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED JOSE B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY VS IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE

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 G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088 July 31, 1954

Doctrine: Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the proper
Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

FACTS: Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in the city of Amoy, Fookien province, Republic of China, leaving real
and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy, Fookien province, China, and children by his first marriage with Manuela T. Cruz
namely, Apolonio, Concepcion, Angel, Manuel, Federico, Ana, Aurora, Emiliano, and children with his second marriage to Maria Natividad Lim
Billian namely Jose, Jr. and Silvino.

Intestate proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Apolonio Suntay was declared administrator. After his death,
Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate. Maria Natividad filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the
probate of a last will and testament claimed to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay. This
petition was denied because of the loss of said will and of the insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will. An appeal was taken
from said order denying the probate of the will and this Court held the evidence before the probate court sufficient to prove the loss of the will and
remanded the case to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan for the further proceedings.

Silvino Suntay, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in Chinese
characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated in the Amoy district court,
Province of Fookien, China, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for the probate of the will executed in the Philippines or of the will
executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.

Witnesses were presented to prove the existence of the will allegedly left by Jose Suntay.

Lower Court Ruling: Dissallowed alleged will and testament executed in Manila on November 1929, and the alleged last will and testament
executed in Kulangsu, Amoy, China, on 4 January 1931, by Jose B. Suntay.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the wills allegedly left by Jose SUntay can be probated.

RATIO: Upheld decision of the Court of First Instance. Granting that there was a will duly executed by Jose B. Suntay, and that it was in existence at
the time of, and note revoked before his death, the testimonies of the witnesses presented fall falls short of the legal requirement that the provisions of
the lost will must be "clearly and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses." Credible witnesses mean competent witnesses and those who
testify to facts from or upon hearsay are neither competent nor credible witnesses.

As to the will claimed to have been executed on 4 January 1931 in Amoy, China, the law on the point in Rule 78. Section 1 of the rule provides:

Wills proved and allowed in a foreign country, according to the laws of such country, may be allowed, filed, and recorded by the
proper Court of First Instance in the Philippines.

Section 2 provides:

When a copy of such will and the allowance thereof, duly authenticated, is filed with a petition for allowance in the Philippines,
by the executor or other person interested, in the court having jurisdiction, such court shall fix a time and place for the hearing,
and cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance.

Section 3 provides:

If it appears at the hearing that the will should be allowed in the Philippines, the court shall so allow it, and a certificate of its
allowance, signed by the Judge, and attested by the seal of the courts, to which shall be attached a copy of the will, shall be filed
and recorded by the clerk, and the will shall have the same effect as if originally proved and allowed in such court.

The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or
allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in 1931 should also be established by
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competent evidence. However, there was no evidence presented to prove this point. The unverified answers to the questions propounded by counsel
for the appellant to the Consul General of the Republic of China, objected to by counsel for the appellee, are inadmissible, because apart from the fact
that the office of Consul General does not qualify and make the person who holds it an expert on the Chinese law on procedure in probate matters, if
the same be admitted, the adverse party would be deprived of his right to confront and cross-examine the witness. Consuls are appointed to attend to
trade matters. Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony
of two attesting witnesses to the will and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the will. In the absence of
proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it
were so it does not measure same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings
personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the
Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines

The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China, does not purport to probate or allow the will which was the subject of the
proceedings. In view thereof, the will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and
fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of proceedings held in
the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and accepted as proceedings leading to the probate or allowance of a will and,
therefore, the will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.

QUERUBIN vs. QUERUBIN

FACTS

(In 1934, Silvestre Querubin, a Filipino, married petitioner Margaret Querubin, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. 'They had a daughter, Querubina.

Margaret filed for divorce in 1948 alleging "mental cruelty." Silvestre filed a countersuit for divorce alleging Margaret's infidelity. In 1949, the
Superior Court of Los Angeles granted the divorce and awarded "joint custody" of the child. Querubina was to be kept in a neutral home subject to
reasonable visits by both parties. Both parents were restrained from taking Querubina out of California without the permission of the Court.

On March that year, custody was granted to Silvestre under an interlocutory decree (although the child was still kept in the neutral home) because at
the time of the trial, Margaret was living w th another man.

Upon Margaret's petition, the interlocutory decree was modified. Since she had then married the man she was living with and had a stable home, the
Court granted custody to Margaret with reasonable limitations on the part of the father.
Silvestre, together with Querubina, left San Francisco on November of the same year, went to the Philippines and stayed in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur,
with the intent of protecting the child from the effects of her mother's scandalous conduct. He wanted the child tc be raised in a better environment.

In 1950, Margaret, through counsel, presented to the CFI a petition for habeas corpus for the custody of Querubina urlder the interlocutory decree of
the California Court. She claims that under Art. 48 of Rule 39, the decree of the Los Angeles Court, granting her the child's custody, must be
complied within the Philippines.]

RULING

"The decree is by no means final. It is subject to change with the circumstances. The first decree awarded the custody of the child to the father,
prohibiting the mother from taking the child to her (Margaret's) home because of her adulterous relationship with another man. The decree was
amended when Margaret was not in Los Angeles.

Because the decree is interlocutory, it cannot be implemented in the Philippines. Where the judgment is merely interlocutory, the determination of
the question by the Court which rendered it did not settle and adjudge finally the rights of the parties.

In general, a decree of divorce awarding custody of the child to one of the spouses is respected by the Courts of other states "at the time and under
the circumstances of its rendition" but such a decree has no controlling effects in another state as to facts and conditions occurring subsequently to
the date of the decree; and the Court of another state may, in proper proceedings, award custody otherwise upon proof of matters subsequent to the
decree which justify the decree to the interest of the child.

In the case at bar, the circumstances have changed. Querubina is not in Los Angeles, she is in Cagayan, Ilocos Sur, under her father's care. It is a
long way from one place to the other. Neither can Margaret prove that she can pay the cost of passage for the minor. She is not a packet of cigarettes
one can send by mail.

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Neither can she answer for Querubina's support, care and education. In comparison, the father has shown both interest in the child and capacity to
provide for the needs of the child."

Silverio vs republic

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a
female and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast
augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have
his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor
of the petitioner. Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision in favor of
the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial authority which was amended by RA
9048 Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his
given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be
prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name. Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were
all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status
shall be governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. Under the
Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law
authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of
the entries in his birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by the
courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Civil Law Equity Change of Name Change of Sex Marriage

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. Hes a biological male who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-
assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the
change of his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the petition before the Manila RTC. He
wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can marry his American fianc.
The RTC granted Silverios petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that Silverios misfortune to be trapped in a mans
body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make
any basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the
contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fianc and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO
CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE
CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed. This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has
jurisdiction in petitions for the change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first name is concerned
is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be granted still because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-
assignment) is not one of those provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or
nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local civil registry. Not with the courts because there
is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right
that the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
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No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter
the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female
post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on
employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if Silverios
petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and
sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

Republic vs. Cagandahan

FACTS
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC of Siniloan, Laguna. She asserted that
she was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed
to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development; she has become a male
person. In her petition with the RTC to have her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name
be changed from Jennifer to Jeff, her physician testified on her condition by presenting a medical certificate to back her alleged condition. The RTC
granted her petition, recognizing her proven medical condition. Thus (OSG) filed this petition seeking areversal of the above mentioned ruling based
on (1) violations on Rule 108 of the Rules of Court regarding (a) Cagandahans failure to implead the local civil registrar in her petition with the RTC
and (b) her plea to have her gender changed in the birth certificate (OSG believes her condition does not make her male; and (2) a violation on Rule
103 of the Rules of Court, in which Cagandahan failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for
at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing. The court dismissed the two procedural issues on Rules 108 and 103, and decided on the
substantive merit regarding the change of gender in Cagandahans records due to her medical condition.
ISSUES
WON the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her name and gender, on the ground of
her medical condition known as CAH.
RULING
The Republics petition is denied.
RATIO DECIDENDI
No. The respondents condition, CAH, is one of many conditions involving intersexuality, which apply to human beings who cannot be classified as
either male or female. Here, the rule of determining a persons gender at birth cannot apply because the sexual development in cases of intersex
persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. Instead, it is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Thus,
the Court is of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. In the case of respondent, his having
ordered his life to that of a male is backed by preponderant biological bases. Unlike in the case of individuals who underwent sexual reassignment,
respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. In the
absence of a law on such an unusual matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and
lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.