SALADIN’S TR
IUMPH OVER
THE CRUSADER STATES
The Battle of Hattin, 1187
IN A BATTLE FOUGHT NEAR THE
western shore of the Sea of Galilee on
July 4th, 1187, the Sultan Saladin
inflicted a terrible defeat on the field
army of the Latin Kingdom of
Jerusalem, killing or capturing the
vast majority of its soldiers. His-
torians have questioned the long-
term significance of many medieval
battles, but nobody has denied that
the Battle of Hattin had a decisive
impact on the history of the crusader
states in Palestine and Syria,
Hattin led to Saladin’s conquest of
nearly all the lands held by the Franks,
including his occupation of Jerusalem
on October 2nd. It also precipitated
the Third Crusade, which succeeded,
by the terms of the Treaty of Jaffa in
coastal strip, containing most of the
important Palestinian ports. But the
defensive framework of the twelfth-
century Kingdom, a brilliant combina-
Frankish disunity
and impetuosity
produced a disaster
that lost
Christendom the
holy city of
Jerusalem.
Norman Housley
tion of fortresses and geographical
features, had gone, and it can be
argued that the long-term military
viability of the Frankish settlements
(Abooe) The battle of Hattn, from Matthew
Paris’ thirteenth-century ‘Chironiea Majora
right (c) 2000 Bell & Howell Information and Learning Company
t (¢) History Today
had gone with it
Inaddition to being a turning point,
Hattin is also a fascinating battle in its
own right, for the decision to fight on
what were, from the Franks’ view-
point, exceptionally unfavourable,
even suicidal terms, continues to
excite debate amongst historians
This July, the 800th anniversary of
Hattin, a month when the battle and
its historical background are being
celebrated by an international confer-
ence of crusade historians in
Jerusalem and Haifa, it seems
appropriate to reconsider these
momentous events,
Let us start with Saladin, the victor
of Hattin and, with the exception of
the thirteenth-century Mamluk Sul-
tan Baybars, the most resourceful and
dangerous adversary the rulers of the
crusader states ever faced. At the time
of the Ha i
forty-nine y
enjoyed a career marked both by a
v7‘The Frankish army onthe move infantry pitch camp wil nights ite indo the ata from an
tay tect mamuaesptn n/t ane oe -
(Belo) Goa be ou
186.
remarkable string of political and
military successes, and by a consis-
tent and passionate pursuit of the
twin goals of Muslim unity and the
expulsion of the Franks. His father
had served Zengi, the Islamic champ-
ion who had conquered Edessa from
the Franks in 1144; and Saladin simi-
larly became a valuable lieutenant to
Nur-ad-Din, Zengis second son. In
1168 Saladin accompanied his uncle
Shirkuh to Egypt when the Fatimi
Caliph al-Adid asked for Nur-ad-
Din’s help against the encroachments
of the Franks under their last great
king, Amalric, Shirkuh’s death was
followed by Saladin’ investiture as
vizir of Egypt in 1169.
‘As the Shi'ite caliph, al-Adid was
taking a great risk in appointing a
Muslim who adhered to Sunni
orthodoxy, and Saladin immediately
began to consolidate his position by
building up his own household. In
1169 the most ambitious of Amalric’s
thrusts into Egypt was repulsed, and
with the Frankish threat largely
removed, Saladin was able in 1171 to
carry out a bloodless suppression of
the Fatimid caliphate. For the Franks,
these events were disastrous, signify
ing the political and religious unifica-
tion of Syria and Egypt, the two great
centres of Muslim power which ad,
8
istory Today
+." Knights taking Communion before battle; from a manuscipt of
‘until now, been actual or potential
enemies
Nonetheless, the threat to the Latin
Kingdom took some years to material-
ise, Nuread-Din'sdemands that Egyp-
tian resources be placed at his dis-
posal in Syria were countered with
the argument that the Selchukid and
‘Sunni position in Egypthad first to be
strengthened. This caused conflict
between Saladin and his patron,
which was prevented from becoming,
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serious only by the death of Nur-ad-
Din in May 1174. The fragile unity
which Nur-ad-Din had imposed upon
‘Syria was now threatened, and Sala-
din acted with energy, ‘occupying
Damascus in October. From this point
onwards Saladin portrayed himself as
the true heir to Nur-ad-Din, slowly
gathering in the lies and lands held
yy his former patron until, with the
acquisition of Aleppo in 1183, and
Mosul in 1186, he was effectively mas-
ter of Syria and northern Iraq. In
achieving this goal Saladin had over-
come massive obstacles, notably the
‘opposition of Zengi’s lineal descen-
dants and, more generally, Turkish
resentment of his Kurdish origins. To
overcome these difficulties he laid
great stress on the benefits. which
political unification would bring to
Islam, a claim facilitated by his investi-
ture ‘with political authority over
Egypt and Syria by the Sunni caliph in
1175. Saladin took up certain key
ideological themes which had origi-
nated with Zengi or Nur-ad-Din, but
which he refined and developed.
‘Two of these themes were of par-
ticular importance. One was the idea
that Saladin’s government sponsored
orthodox Islamic practices. Taxes
which were contrary to Islamic law
were repealed, unorthodox religious
customs and beliefs proceeded
against, Islamic learning actively
encouraged, and justice rigidly
enforced. Above all, the Sultan him-
self led a conspicuously orthodox and
spartan existence. Through a primi-
tive but effective propaganda
machine, the contrast was drawn
between’ Saladin’s government and
that of the lax and degenerate ZengidCrusaders besieging a Muslims tour; successful defence of
strongltolds tas the key to either he Saracens or Franks
Inaintaining their teritory
princes. The complementary theme
‘was Saladin’s dedication to the cause
of the holy war (jihad), which meant
the expulsion of the Franks from
Jerusalem and Palestine, a city and
territory whose sanctity to Islam was
increasingly emphasised
Of the two themes, orthodoxy took
priority, so that Saladin refused to
levy taxes for the jihad if they were
illegal; but the pursuit of holy war
against the Christians was just as vital
an aspect of the Sultan's policy. Baha
ad-Din, Saladin’s retainer and biog-
rapher, claimed of his master’s dedica-
tion to the holy war that:
He spoke of nothing els, thought only
about equipment for the fight, was
interested only in those who had taken
up arms, hd lille sympathy with any
one who spoke of anything else or
encouraged any other activity
To a large extent, the jidiad justified
Saladin’s wars against other Muslims,
through the argument that they were
holding up the liberation of Palestine;
tered the inevitable claim that
‘motivation was personal
ambition; and it enabled him to pres-
surise the caliph into supporting him,
thus bringing much-needed Mustim
volunteers into the ranks of his army.
The centrality of holy war in Saladin’s
-ology, together with his vulnerabil-
to charges of ruthless ambition and
his dependence on caiphal backing
were to be important factors in the
immediate background to Hattin.
In the years between 1174 and 1186
Saladin thus concentrated his atten-
tion on extending his power in Syria,
and on necessary reforms in Egypt
(for instance, the rebuilding of the
Egyptian fleet, which had decayed
during the last phase of Fatimid rule),
He could not, however, totally ignore
the Franks, both because public opin-
ion demanded some action, and
because of Frankish initiatives against
him, The rulers of the Latin Kingdom
‘were fully aware of the implications of
what Saladin was doing; recounting
events in 1175, for instance, the great
chronicler William of Tyre remarked
that ‘any increase of Saladin’s power
was cause for suspicion in our eyes
For he was a man wise in counsel,
valiant in war, and generous beyond
measure, Thus in 1177, when Count
Philip of Flanders arrived in Palestine,
the Franks attacked Hamah and
Harim in northern Syria, provoking
Saladin to launch an assault on Asca-
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Jon and Gaza, on the borders between
the Kingdom and Egypt. At Mont
Gisard, in November 1177, Saladin’s
troops were defeated by King Baldwin
1Y, but two years later, in June 1179,
the Sultan more than compensated
for this by inflicting a heavy defeat on.
the Franks at Marj ‘Uyun, and level-
ling to the ground the recently-
constructed castle at Jacob's Ford, on
the Jordan north of the Sea of Galilee.
‘Apart from a brief and unsuccesful
attempt to take Beirut by land and sea
assault in 1182, it was not until the
autumn of 1183 that Saladin returned.
to the offensive against the Franks.
With Aleppo now in his hands, and
infuriated by Reynald of Chatillon’s
capture of pilgrim caravan bound for
Mecca in 1181, he crossed the Jordan
on September 29th with a very large
army. A massive Frankish force
assembled at the springs of Saffuriyah
in Galilee but declined to give battle.
Unable to provision his army, Saladin
withdrew. A few weeks later, an
attempt to take the great fortress of
Kerak failed, as didanother attemptin
the late summer of 1184
‘These were undoubted setbacks,
but the formidable armies which
Saladin was now deploying against
»the Franks, together with the
activities of his navy and his diploma-
tic success in sealing a treaty with
Byzantium, the only nearby Christian
power, in 1181, showed that the long-
term Situation was of exceptional
gravity. The Franks were thus willing
to agree to a four-year truce in the
spring of 1185, which enabled Saladin
to occupy Mosul. By the end of 1186
there was no longer any reason for
Saladin to delay a massive onslaught
against the Franks; and publicopinion
was starting to demand one. Alll that
was lacking was justification for pre-
maturely ending the truce.
The tragedy of Frankish Syria was
that in the very period 1174-86, when
an energetic and consistent policy was
called for to resist and hinder Sala-
din’s advance, the Kingdom of
Jerusalem came to be so. divided
internally that it reached the brink of
civil war. To grasp the full significance
of this for Hattin itis necessary first to
stress the military and political viabil-
ity of the Kingdom at the death of
King Amalric in 1174. Despite the
debacle which had overtaken
Amalric’s Egyptian policy, and the
persistent failure of the West to
respond to appeals for help in the
form of a new crusade, the Franks
probably possessed the resources and
to strategic finesse to survive Sala-
din’s threat. They had a field army,
composed mainly of feudal conting-
cents and the knights provided by the
Military Orders, which could usually
hold its own in pitched battle; in the
great castles which they had built on
their borders they had defensive bul-
warks which could hold down an
invading army almost indefinitely;
and they had evolved military tactics,
and diplomatic skills, which enabled
them to exploit their own advantages
and their enemies’ weaknesses to the
full. But the successful use of these
assets called for a measure of unity
amongst the Christian states (er-
usalem, Tripoli and Antioch), and
above all for strong and capable lead-
ership by the King of Jerusalem.
This last essential, however, could
not be expected after 1174 since
‘Amalric’s successor, Baldwin TV, was a
leper, whose poor health necessitated
the appointment of a regent (tuilli)
From 1174-77 the builli was Baldwin's
closest male relative, Raymond, the
Count of Tripoli. Raymond was one of
a group of important barons born and
raised in Syria, including the Const-
able, Humphrey of Toron, Baldwin of
Ramleh, Balian of Tbelin, and
Reginald of Sidon, to which some
contemporaries gave the name pullani
(Old French, polains, ‘colts’. They had
20
become associated with the sort of
diplomatic moves which had, until
the rise of Saladin, succeeded in fos-
tering rivalry between Cairo and
Damascus. But as the events of Ray-
mond’s bailliage showed, that policy
was inadequate,
Demoralisation and personal
animosity were already serious within
the Latin Kingdom when, in 1180,
Amalric’s older daughter, Sibyl, mar-
ried a newcomer to Palestine, the
Poitevin noble, Guy of Lusignan.
Since Baldwin IV would have no off-
spring, Sibyl’s son by a previous mar-
riage would succeed him, and Guy
would exercise the regency forhis step-
son, The pullani were infuriated, the
more so as_one of their number,
Baldwin of Ramich, seems to have
been passed over for Sibyl’s hand. In
the years following 1180 what one
historian has termed a ‘court party’
formed around Guy and Sibyl: it
comprised, most importantly, Agnes
of Courtenay, Sibyl’s mother; Agnes’
brother Joscelin, Seneschal of the
Kingdom; Aimery of Lusignan, Guy's
brother; Heraclius, the controversial
Patriarch of Jerusalem; and the Master
of the Knights Templar. Their ascen-
dancy over Baldwin IV was shown in
1182 when they persuaded the King,
that Raymond of Tripoli was about to
attempt a coup d’état. Baldwin there-
fore forbad Raymond entry into the
Kingdom to visit his wife's barony
of Tiberias on the Sea of Galilee.
The clash between Baldwin IV and
Raymond in 1182 was resolved when
other prominent members of the
‘baronial party’ intervened and
restored peace, but by this time there
were clearly two rival political groups
in Palestine which looked either to
Raymond or to Guy for leadership.
Whether or not these groups were
coherent enough to deserve the title
‘party, their mutual hostility and sus-
picion’ made the adoption of any
common approach towards the
menace now presented by Saladin
impossible, which obviously worked
to the Sultan’s advantage. The conse-
quences of this were made evident in
the following year when Saladin con-
quered Aleppo and invaded the
Kingdom south of the Sea of Galilee.
In this supreme crisis Baldwin IV,
whose illness prevented him leading,
the field army in person, appointed
Guy as bail.
Guy's refusal to engage Saladin’s
army in battle would in any case have
created argument, since the army he
led represented a massive effort of
manpower for the Franks, but that
argument was conducted in terms of
the hostility which Guy's remarkable
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climb to power had aroused. The
pullani, who knew better than any-
body that Guy's decision not to risk
the Latin field army in a battle was
fully consistent with the defensive
strategy long pursued by Frankish
rulers in response to large-scale Mus-
Jim invasions, ignored this fact and
accused the ill of incompetence and
even of cowardice. Baldwin listened
to what they said, In November 1183
he stripped Guy of the regency, speci-
fically barred him from succession to
the throne, and had his nephew, also
called Baldwin, crowned. Guy's
actions in the field in 1183, and the
bitter recriminations and personal
humiliation which they caused, are
essential background to his next'con-
frontation with Saladin, four years
later.
The triumph of the baronial party
was sealed when, shortly after
Baldwin V's coronation, Raymond of
Tripoli received the regency for the
second time. He was to retain it until
Baldwin V came of age, and
Baldwin died in the meantime a com-
mittee consisting of the Pope, the
Emperor Frederick I and the Kings of
England and France was to decide
between the rival claims of Sibyl and
Isabella, Amalric’s younger daughter.
Tt would seem that every conceivable
step had been taken to prevent Guy
from recovering his former position,
but the pullarti had reckoned without
force majeure. The death of Baldwin 1V
in March 1185 did not create problems
for the baronial party, but in the
summer of 1186 the young Baldwin V
also died, and this prompted Guy's
supporters to take action,
Joscelin of Courtenay and other
adherents of the ‘court party’ moved
quickly to forestall the implementa-
tion of the 1183 agreement. They
seized Beirut, whose revenues were
supposed to accrue to Raymond to
pay the expenses of his regency, and
late in the summer of 1186 Guy and
Sibyl were crowned at Jerusalem.
Raymond wanted to respond to this
coup d'état by crowning Isabella and
her husband Humphrey, but Hum-
phrey deserted to the other side. Most
of the native barons then made their
way to Jerusalem and swore fealty to
the new king and queen. Raymond
went to his barony of Tiberias, from
where he sent a messenger to Saladin
asking for assistance to repel the
expected attack by Guy. This was not
an act of treachery since the truce was
still in force. Still, at the beginning of
1187, when Saladin was not only
ready to launch his greatest attack yet,
but was under strong, pressure from
the caliph and Islamic public opinionto do so, the Latin Kingdom was
perilously close to civil conflict.
It was not until Easter 1187 that
matters came to a head. Although
Guy was dissuaded from attacking
Raymond at Tiberias, relations bet”
ween the two men remained hostile.
Meanwhile Reynald of Chatillon,
Lord of Kerak, a prominent member
of the ‘court party’ who had already
infuriated Saladin with his attacks on
Muslim pilgrims and a daring raid in
the Red Sea, again seized a Muslim
caravan, thereby breaking the truce; it
was, by any standards, an exception-
ally foolish action to take at this point,
and was aggravated by Reynald’s
refusal, even when approached by
King Guy, to make amends. Saladin
now had justification for his invasion.
He issued a general summons to holy
war, and on May Ist a preliminary
raiding party advanced from Jacob's
Ford to Nazareth.
Raymond, who still did not realise
the gravity of the situation, permitted
the Muslims to cross his lands, but
Gerard of Ridefort, the Master of the
Templars, who had come north from
Jerusalem to try and make peace bet-
ween the King and Raymond,
decided to resist the raid. At the
springs of Cresson his force was heav-
ily defeated, and the blow was severe
enough to make Raymond come to
terms with Guy. Dismissing the
istory Today
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troops Saladin had sent him, Ray-
mond therefore went to Jerusalem
and performed homage to Guy and
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Sibyl. Unity had been restored to the
Kingdom, but it was superficial, and
the underlying hatreds were to re-
‘emerge with disastrous consequences
in the ensuing campaign.
Saladin delivered his great blow at
the end of June, when he led an army
‘of about 20,000 men across the Jordan
south of the Sea of Galilee. This was
an emergency greater even than that
of 1183, and Guy accordingly issued
the arriére-ban, the summons to all
able-bodied men to fight in the field
army. He also hired large numbers of
mercenaries, and the result was an
army which was probably not much
smaller than that of Saladin, 1,200
knights and 15,000 to 18,000 foot-
soldiers.
Both sides were deploying their
available resources to the full, But itis
notable that even at the height of his
power Saladin’s army did not greatly
‘outnumber the force which the Franks
could raise. Moreover, historians have
stressed the still tenuous nature of the
Sultan’s authority in Syria and
Mesopotamia, referring to Saladin'’s
‘own reputed comment that a decisive
battle was vital to his interests:
We should confront all the enemy's
forces with all the forces of Islam.
[for] itis foolish to dissipate this con:
centration of troops without striking a
tremendous blow in the holy wat
It followed that the Franks had little
a‘assembly point in Galilee because of
the abundance of water. Between Saf-
furiyah and Tiberias, the town on the
western shore of the Sea of Galilee
which acted as the capital of Ray-
mond’s barony, there stretcited fifteen
miles of high and arid plateau. If the
two armies were to meet in battle, it
would be here. Equally, a march
across this plateau in early July would
The marrioge of Balin VP's sister, Sibyl, to
Guy de Lusignan, a key event in further
Aes he rae consensus of polite
fagreonent in he Latin Kingdom.
(Below) the architect of
Muslim unity — Saladin,
ina miniature by the
Fatt Shh
to gain by risking a pitched battle;
and, since they had depleted their
fortresses and fowns of manpower in
order to raise this field army, they had
a great deal to lose. Any analysis of
the Hattin campaign must therefore
focus sharply on Guy's decision to
fight, the more so as he fought in
conditions which were just about as
unfavourable as possible to his troops.
To elucidate that last point, brief
reference must be made to the geo-
graphy of the region to the west of the
Sea of Galilee. The Frankish army
encamped at the springs of Saf-
furiyah, the traditional Frankish
2
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be a gruelling operation, especially if
executed under enemy attack, and
with the expectation of a pitched bat-
tle at the end of it. To induce the
Franks to cross the plateau, Saladin
moved his army on July 2nd to the
‘west of Tiberias, taking the town and
besieging Raymond's wife, Eschive, in
the citadel. He gambled on Guy
marching in relief of Tiberias, and
hoped that even the conservative
Raymond would press the King to
undertake such a move. This was
sound thinking, not because Guy
would be swayed by chivalric
impulse, but, as R.C. Smail pointed
out, because the King might feel con-
strained by his feudal obligation to
relieve the capital of one of his leading
vassals.
When the siege of the citadel was
reported to Guy, he held a council of
war to decide what to do. Raymond,
who like all the leading Franks knew
the area well, advised the King not to
advance. The Muslim chronicler Ibn
al-Athir portrayed the Count as argu-
ing that:
If [Saladin] takes Tiberias he will nat be
able to stay there, and when he has left
itand gone away we will retake it: for if
he chooses to stay there he will be
unable to keep his army together, for
they will not put up for long with being
kept away from their homes and
families,a
P| Nasa
This was a very strong argument
and it was fully in accordance with
traditional Frankish strategy when
confronted with a_major Muslim
invasion. Guy therefore took Ray-
mond’s advice. But during the even-
ing of July 2nd, Gerard of Ridefort had
a private meeting with Guy at which
he persuaded the King to change his
mind, and to order an advance the
next mornin;
What made the Master ofthe Temp-
lars do this, and what made Guy
accept his arguments? Almost cer-
tainly, the minds of both men had
been so poisoned by the political con-
flict of the years from 1180-87 that they
could only see Raymond's advice as
designed to bring them personal ruin,
and events in those years certainly
helped to corroborate this judgement,
which was probably unfair. Guy's
refusal to fight Saladin, in very similar
circumstances, in 1183, had led to
Guy's humiliation and Raymond's
greatest success. What was to stop the
Count from trying to bring about
Guy's downfall with precisely the
same arguments in 1187?
Moreover, the financial commit-
ment made by Guy in 1187 was even
greater than four years earlier, for the
King judged the crisis facing his realm
to be so severe that he spent the large
sums of money sent during the pre-
ceding decades by Henry Ii of Eng-
land, and stored at Jerusalem. Henry
had ordered that this treasure be kept
intact pending his own arrival on
crusade, and if the army, including
the 4,000 mercenaries paid with Engl-
ish money, were to disband without a
battle, Henry would claim that his
money had been wasted, thus provid-
ing valuable support for Raymond's
own attack on the King. Gerard had
the added annoyance of being pre-
vented from revenging his defeat in
May, by the very man whose acquies-
cence had made that Muslim rai
possible. A wide range of circum-
stances from recent history therefore
combined to make Guy, who was by
no means a stupid man, commit a
blunder which lost him his Kingdom.
Historians continue to debate the pre-
cise significance of each factor, but
there is no doubt that at the root of
Guy’s change of mind lay his hatred
and suspicion of Raymond of Tripoli
which made the King abandon tried
and proven Frankish strategy in
favour of a fantastic gamble. Contem-
porary chroniclers, both Frankish and
Muslim, were therefore quite right to
see internal disputes as the chief
reason for the Kingdom’s ruin
What followed was, in a sense,
anticlimactic, since a Frankish victory
in these circumstances would have
called for extraordinarily good discip-
line, leadership and luck, none of
which the Franks possessed. The
army set out at sunrise on Friday, July
3rd, and marched for some six or
seven hours under ceaseless harass-
ment from Muslim mounted archers.
At midday Raymond of Tripoli, who
led the vanguard, appears to’ have
decided that the army had not
covered enough ground to reach
Tiberias before nightfall. To pitch
camp on the plateau without access to
water would be madness, but the
army was only about five kilometres
from the springs at Kafr Hattin,
The King agreed to change the
course of the march, but this turned
out to be a grave mistake, The Mus-
lims blocked the way to Kafr Hattin,
the change of direction caused confu-
sion, and there were particularly
heavy attacks on the Templars in the
rear. Guy therefore ordered the army
to pitch camp for the night at Mes-
kenah. According to a source favour-
able to Raymond, the Count was
appalled at this decision, which was
just what he had wanted to avoid:
‘Alas, alas, Lord God, the war is over,
‘we are lost men and the Kingdom is
done for’; butitis difficult to see what
alternative Guy had. Saladin, his goal
achieved, brought up supplies. of
arrows and water for his troops from
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Tiberias, and surrounded the Chris-
tian camp so well that, as one chroni-
dlr put it, not even a cat could have
escaped. The scene in the two camps
was vividly described by Ibn al-Athir:
the Christians exhausted, despon-
dent and tormented by thirst, their
enemies, who ‘could smell victory in
the air, encouraging each other and
eagerly awaiting the next day's
events.
On July 4th the Frankish army
made another attempt to reach the
water at Kafr Hattin, but at about 9am
fierce Muslim attacks began. The
Franks adopted traditional and nor-
mally successful tactics, using their
infantry and horsemen in conjunction
to beat off the enemy attacks. But on
this occasion the infantry could not
hold ranks; exhausted and dying of
thirst, they scattered and ran up the
slopes of Qarn Hatin. Saladin
ordered that a westerly wind be made
use of by setting fire to the
brushwood, which added to the con-
fusion and torment of the Franks.
Raymond and the vanguard, cut off
from the bulk of the army, managed to
break out and escape, which con-
firmed the suspicion entertained by
some that the Count had acted
treacherously. But most of the Chris-
tian knights were surrounded. With
great courage, they foughton until the
King’s red tent, and the Christians’
greatest relic, the True Cross, were
captured. After this, Saladin was able
to take prisoner those who survived,
including the King and Reynald of
Chatillon, whom the Sultan immedi-
ately killed in punishment for his raid
on the Muslim caravan. Ibn al-Athir
commented that ‘the number of dead
and captured was so large that those
who saw the slain could not believe
that anyone could have been taken
alive, and those who saw the prison-
ers could not believe that any had
been killed’, By nightfall the greatest
field army ever assembled in the Latin
Kingdom had been wiped out and
ideal conditions established for Sala-
din's occupation of almost all the
Kingdom of Jerusalem,
FOR FURTHER READING:
Generally on the bate and ts setting see any
Up-to-date history ofthe crusades ancrusader
States (e.g, those weitlen or edited by Jean
Richard Hans Eberhard Mayer, Joshua Prater,
and Kenneth Seton). For the batles topos.
Phy, see Joshua Praeer, The atte of Hatin in
Fis" Crusater ttt (Onford University
Press 1980), RC. Smails Crusating apne
1099-1183 (Cambridge University Press, 16
and reprint) places Hatin within the contextot
Contemporary Frankish strategy and tates
‘heffoly and. or Saladin, see .c:Lyonsand
DEP Jackson, Saladin: Te Pais of the aly
War (Cambridge University Press, 982 and
reprints)
23