Khan v Simbillo

Facts:

i. Resp Atty. Rizalino Simbillo advertised in the PDI and MB his legal services for
annulmentcases

ii. Upon investigation by the Pub Info Office, it was confirmed that Simbillo is offering
hisservices to interested clients.

iii. Ismael Khan, chief of the PIO, filed an administrative charge vs resp for improper
advertisingand solicitation of his legal services in violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility

iv. Resp argues that advertising or solicitation is not per se a prohibited act:

a. Public interest is not served by the absolute prohibition

b. Its time for the Court to promulgate a ruling that such advertisement is not contrary to
law, public policy and public order.

v. The IBP found the resp guilty and suspended him from the practice of law for 1 year,
writingit in a resolution

Issues:

W/N resps act was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Ruling: Yes.

i. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code states that a lawyer is prohibited from performing acts
designed to solicit legal business and that he is not permitted to use self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

ii. Practice of Law is not a business. It is a profession with public interest as the primary duty.
Its not a money-making venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields
profits. The duty is to public service and the administration of justice. Elements that
distinguish it from business:

a. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money;
b. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
c. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
d. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to
resort to current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or
dealing directly with their clients.
- The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation
to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is
made in a modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and
to the bar.

In advertising himself as an Annulment of Marriage Specialist he undermines to

sanctity of marriage. A lawyer may not properly publish biographical and informative
data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. A lawyer is not
permitted to publish any contents which are likely to deceive or injure the public or
the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession
In Re: Luis Tagorda

FACTS: In 1928, Luis Tagorda was a provincial board member of Isabela. Before his election, he
campaigned that he is a lawyer and a notary public; that as a notary public he can do notarial acts
such as execution of deeds of sale, etc.; that as a lawyer, he can help clients collect debts; that he
offers free consultation; that he is willing to serve the poor.

When he won, he wrote a letter to the barrio lieutenant of Echague, Isable advising the latter that
even though he was elected as a provincial board member, he can still practice law; that he wants
the lieutenant to tell the same to his people; that he is willing to receive works regarding
preparations of sales contracts and affidavits etc.; that he is willing to receive land registration
cases for a charge of three pesos.

ISSUE: Whether or not Tagorda is guilty of malpractice.

HELD: Yes. Tagorda admitted doing the foregoing acts. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, and especially
with his brother lawyers, is the establishment of a well- merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character and conduct.
Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interviews not warranted by personal relations is unprofessional. It is equally unprofessional to
procure business by indirection through touters of any kind, whether allied real estate firms or trust
companies advertising to secure the drawing of deeds or wills or offering retainers in exchange for
executorships or trusteeships to be influenced by the lawyer. Indirect advertisement for business
by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning the manner of their conduct, the
magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the lawyers position, and all other like self-
laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.

It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare cases where
ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so.

Tagordas liability is however mitigated by the fact that he is a young inexperienced lawyer and
that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts. So instead of being disbarred, he was
suspended from the practice of law for a month.
Mauricio Ulep vs The Legal Clinic

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was
to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law
firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters
advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. &
Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption.
Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star
Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of
specialists that can take care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as
complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic,
Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family
law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
 As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US
which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement
is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various
legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex
litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain
of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under
Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice
of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar
and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating
the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret
marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate.
Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising
possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust,
which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a
client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That
publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable
lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the
difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result of
propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of
advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card

3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

Dacanay vs Baker & McKenzie et al

In November 1979, Atty. Vicente Torres sent a letter to one Rosie Clurman, represented by Atty.
Adriano Dacanay, asking Clurman to release some shares to Torres client. The letterhead
contained the name Baker & McKenzie. Dacanay denied Clurmans liability and at the same time
he asked why is Torres using the letterhead Baker & McKenzie, a foreign partnership established
in Chicago, Illinois. No reply was received so Dacanay filed an administrative complaint enjoining
Torres from using Baker & McKenzie.

Later, Torres said that he is an associate of the law firm Guerrero & Torres; that their law firm is a
member of Baker & McKenzie; that the said foreign firm has members in 30 cities all over the
world; that they associated with them in order to make a representation that they can render legal
services of the highest quality to multinational business enterprises and others engaged in foreign
trade and investment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the use of a foreign law office name is allowed.

HELD: No. Baker & McKenzie, being an alien law firm, cannot practice law in the Philippines.
Such use of foreign law firm name is unethical therefore Torres and his law firm are enjoined from
using Baker & McKenzie in their practice of law.
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO"

Facts:
Petitions were filed by the surviving partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on
May 5, 1975 and by the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on
February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of
their firms, the names of partners who had passed away.
Petitioners contend that the continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken
that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. They also contend that
no local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners name in a
professional firms name; there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least in
the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm necessarily
identifies the individual members of the firm.
Issue:
WON the surviving partners may be allowed by the court to retain the name of the
partners who already passed away in the name of the firm? NO

Held:
In the case of Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation, the SC said:
The Court believes that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the
relations between attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in the
canons of professional ethics, no practice should be allowed which even in a remote
degree could give rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are accordingly
advised to drop the names of the deceased partners from their firm name.
The public relations value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able lawyer
without connections will have to make a name for himself starting from scratch.
Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially ride on that old firms
reputation established by deceased partners.
The court also made the difference from the law firms and business corporations:
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or
association for a particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding property. Thus, it has been stated that
the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is improper.
We find such proof of the existence of a local custom, and of the elements requisite to
constitute the same, wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication
as a juridical custom.
Petition suffers legal and ethical impediment.

SAMONTE VS GATDULA

The complaint filed by Julieta Borromeo Samonte charges Rolando R. Gatdula, RTC, Branch 220,
Quezon City with grave misconduct consisting in the alleged engaging in the private practice of law which
is in conflict with his official functions as Branch Clerk of Court.

Complainant alleges that she is the authorized representative of her sister Flor Borromeo de Leon, the
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 37-14552 for ejectment filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 37. A typographical error was committed in the complaint which stated that the address of defendant
is No. 63-C instead of 63-B, P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City. The mistake was rectified by the filing of
an amended complaint which was admitted by the Court. A decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff
who subsequently filed a motion for execution. Complainant however, was surprised to receive a temporary
restraining order signed by Judge Prudencio Castillo of Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, where Atty. Rolando
Gatdula is the Branch Clerk of Court, enjoining the execution of the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court. Complainant alleges that the issuance of the temporary restraining order was hasty and irregular as
she was never notified of the application for preliminary injunction.

Complainant further alleges that when she went to Branch 220, RTC, Quezon City, to inquire about the
reason for the issuance of the temporary restraining order, respondent Atty. Rolando Gatdula, blamed her
lawyer for writing the wrong address in the complaint for ejectment and told her that if she wanted the
execution to proceed, she should change her lawyer and retain the law office of respondent at the same time
giving his calling card with the name "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera" with office at Rm.
220 Mariwasa Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City; otherwise she will not be able to eject the
defendant Dave Knope. Complainant told respondent that she could not decide because she was only
representing her sister. To her consternation, the RTC Branch 220 issued an order granting the preliminary
injunction as threatened by respondent despite the fact that the MTC, Branch 37 had issued an Order
directing the execution of the Decision in Civil Case No. 37-14552.
 Asked to comment, respondent Atty. Gatdula recited the antecedents in the ejectment case and the
issuance of the restraining order by the Regional Trial Court, and claimed that contrary to complainant
Samonte's allegation that she was not notified of the raffle and the hearing, the Notice of Hearing on the
motion for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order was duly served upon the parties, and that the
application for injunctive relief was heard before the temporary restraining order was issued. The
preliminary injunction was also set for hearing on August 7, 1996.

The respondent's version of the incident is that sometime before the hearing of the motion for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, complainant Samonte went to court "very mad" because of the
issuance of the order stopping the execution of the decision in the ejectment case.Respondent tried to calm
her down, and assured her that the restraining order was only temporary and that the application for
preliminary injunction would still be heard. Later the Regional Trial Court granted the application for a writ
of preliminary injunction. The complainant went back to court "fuming mad" because of the alleged
unreasonableness of the court in issuing the injunction.

Respondent Gatdula claims that thereafter complainant returned to his office, and informed him that she
wanted to change counsel and that a friend of hers recommended the Law Finn of "Baligod, Gatdula,
Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera," at the same time showing a calling card, and asking if he could handle her
case. Respondent refused as he was not connected with the law firm, although he was invited to join but he
chose to remain in the judiciary.Complainant returned to court a few days later and told him that if he cannot
convince the judge to recall the writ of preliminary injunction, she will file an administrative case against
respondent and the judge. The threat was repeated but the respondent refused to be pressured. Meanwhile,
the Complainant's Motion to Dissolve the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was denied. Respondent Gatdula
claims that the complainant must have filed this administrative charge because of her frustration in procuring
the ejectment of the defendant lessee from the premises. Respondent prays for the dismissal of the complaint
against him.

The case was referred to Executive Judge Estrella Estrada, RTC, Quezon City, for investigation, report
and recommendation.

In her report Judge Estrada states that the case was set for hearing three times, on September 7, 1997, on
September 17, and on September 24, 1997, but neither complainant nor her counsel appeared, despite due
notice. The return of service of the Order setting the last hearing stated that complainant is still
abroad. There being no definite time conveyed to the court for the return of the complainant, the
investigating Judge proceeded with the investigation by "conducting searching questions" upon respondent
based on the allegations in the complaint and asked for the record of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187 for
evaluation. The case was set for hearing for the last time on October 22, 1997, to give complainant a last
chance to appear, but there was again no appearance despite notice.

The respondent testified in his own behalf to affirm the statements in his Comment and submitted
documentary evidence consisting mainly of the pleadings in MTC Civil Case No. 37-14552, and in RTC
Civil Case No. Q96-28187 to show that the questioned orders of the court were not improperly issued.

The investigating judge made the following findings:

"For failure of the complainant to appear at the several hearings despite notice, she failed to
substantiate her allegations in the complaint particularly that herein respondent gave her his
calling card and tried to convince her to change her lawyer. This being the case, it cannot be
established with certainty that respondent indeed gave her his calling card and even convinced
her to change her lawyer. Moreover, as borne by the records of Civil Case No. Q-96-28187,
complainant was duly notified of all the proceedings leading to the issuance of the TRO and the
subsequent orders of Judge Prudencio Altre Castillo, Jr. of RTC, Branch 220. Complainant's lack
of interest in prosecuting this administrative case could be an indication that her filing of the
charge against the respondent is only intended to harass the respondent for her failure to obtain a
favorable decision from the Court.

However, based on the record of this administrative case, the calling card attached as Annex "B"
of complainant's affidavit dated September 25, 1996 allegedly given by respondent to
complainant would show that the name of herein respondent was indeed included in the
BALIGOD, GATDULA, TACARDON, DIMAILIG & CELERA LAW OFFICES. While
respondent denied having assumed any position in said office, the fact remains that his name is
included therein which may therefore tend to show that he has dealings with said office. Thus,
while he may not be actually and directly employed with the firm, the fact that his name appears
on the calling card as a partner in the Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig & Celera Law
Offices give the impression that he is connected therein and may constitute an act of solicitation
and private practice which is declared unlawful under Republic Act No. 6713. It is to be noted,
however, that complainant failed to establish by convincing evidence that respondent actually
offered to her the services of their law office. Thus, the violation committed by respondent in
having his name included/retained in the calling card may only be considered as a minor
infraction for which he must also be administratively sanctioned."

and recommended that Atty. Gatdula be admonished and censured for the minor infraction he has
committed.

Finding: We agree with the investigating judge that the respondent is guilty of an infraction. The
complainant by her failure to appear at the hearings, failed to substantiate her allegation that it was the
respondent who gave her the calling card of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera Law Offices"
and that he tried to convince her to change counsels. We find however, that while the respondent vehemently
denies the complainant's allegations, he does not deny that his name appears on the calling card attached to
the complaint which admittedly came into the hands of the complainant.The respondent testified before the
Investigating Judge as follows:

"Q: How about your statement that you even gave her a calling card of the "Baligod, Gatdula,
Pardo, Dimailig and Celera law Offices at Room 220 Mariwasa building?

A: I vehemently deny the allegation of the complainant that I gave her a calling card. I was
surprised when she presented (it) to me during one of her follow-ups of the case before the
court. She told me that a friend of hers recommended such firm and she found out that my name
is included in that firm.I told her that I have not assumed any position in that law firm. And I am
with the Judiciary. since I passed the bar. It is impossible for me to enter an appearance as her
counsel in the very same court where I am the Branch Clerk of Court."

The above explanation tendered by the Respondent is an admission that it is his name which appears on the
calling card, a permissible form of advertising or solicitation of legal services. [1] Respondent does not claim
that the calling card was printed without his knowledge or consent and the calling card [2] carries his name
primarily and the name of "Baligod, Gatdula, Tacardon, Dimailig and Celera with address at 220 Mariwasa
Bldg., 717 Aurora Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City" in the left comer. The card clearly gives the impression that
he is connected with the said law firm. The inclusion/retention of his name in the professional card
constitutes an act of solicitation which violates Section 7 sub-par. (b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees" which
declares it unlawful for a public official or employee to, among others:

"(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or
law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with official functions."

Time and again this Court has said that the conduct and behavior of every one connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk. should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times must not only be
characterized by proprietor and decorum but above all else must be above suspicion.[3]

WHEREFORE, respondent Rolando R. Gatdula. Branch Clerk of Court, RTC, Branch 220, Quezon
City is hereby reprimanded for engaging in the private practice of law with the warning that a repetition of
the same offense will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to cause the exclusion of his name in
the firm name of any office engaged in the private practice of law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-12871 July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ
vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA

MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz against
Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from continuing with the
preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in connection with the killing of Manuel
Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City. To better understand the present case and its
implications, the following facts gathered from the pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may
be stated.

Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved and
implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found Oscar Castelo,
Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and others guilty of the crime of
murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the sentence although without said appeal, in view
of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court.
Oscar Castelo sought a new trial which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his
former conviction of sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.

It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the case. The
purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence agents of the Philippine
Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang conducted the investigation for the Chief Executive,
questioned a number of people and obtained what would appear to be confession, pointing to persons,
other than those convicted and sentenced by the trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.

Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained by those who
had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal Salva conferred with the Solicitor General
as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the Secretary of Justice who decided to have
the results of the investigation by the Philippine Constabulary and Malacaang investigators made
available to counsel for the appellants.

Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with this Tribunal
supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those persons investigated,
such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo, Pablo Canlas, and written
statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on said motion for new trial was deferred
until the case was studied and determined on the merits. In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine
Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva copies of the same affidavits and confessions and
written statements, of which the motion for new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to
conduct a reinvestigation designating for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as
chairman and Assistant City Attorneys Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.

In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner Timoteo Cruz
was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to testify "upon oath before
me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and place by this office against you and
Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957, petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent
Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this
counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said
request for postponement, Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day,
Atty. Baizas appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly
respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case involving
the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day filed the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ of preliminary injunction thereby
stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to Salva by the Chief,
Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated petitioner Cruz, even picturing him
as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel Monroy.

The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case of People vs. Oscar
Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration before us, no court, much less a
prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or authority to conduct a preliminary investigation
or reinvestigation of the case for that would be obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with
the consideration on appeal of the main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and
sentenced; neither had respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was because of the
latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with his witnesses for his own
protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein presented against him. Salva claims that
were it not for this request and if, on the contrary, Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited
to appear in the investigation he (Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.

Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to appear at the
investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had been made. Inasmuch as
he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of
several persons who were being investigated by Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner
should have been interested, even desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and
cross examine said witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or
confessions, either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication,
addressed to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be
postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no opposition to the
subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at the investigation.

As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his committee
began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally, for according to
respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of Justice to handle the
prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher
court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal
is handled for the government by the Office of the Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no
reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the
crime involved in the appeal.

However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al., one of the
defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason that he was arrested
and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial against the other accused had
commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and the defense had begun to present its
evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The trial court, according to respondent, at the
instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent
claims that before he would go to trial in the prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of
action, whether to present the same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original case and
trial, or, in view of the new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the
Philippine Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an
investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the killing of
Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo and his co-accused
and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act accordingly and even recommend the
dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as suggested by
authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and secure the conviction of
the guilty but also to protect the innocent.

We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the prosecuting
officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any form of vacillation by such
officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is unquestionable that they may, in appropriate
cases, in order to do justice and avoid injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed
the corresponding informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69
United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil.,
556)

With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at the
scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at that investigation
since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and implicated in the killing of Monroy
according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and testimonies respondent Salva was considering
or was to consider at said preliminary investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation
because his presence there implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation.
Consequently, even if, as claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an
opportunity to be present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right,
and even strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled to
do so.

Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as contended
by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and evaluate the evidence
involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme Camo and others by questioning
them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively
and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was conducted not
in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City evidently, to accommodate
the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including members of the press. A number of
microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere and photographers were busy taking pictures. In
other words, apparently with the permission of, if not the encouragement by the respondent, news
photographers and newsmen had a filed day. Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown
by the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after
Oscar Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the question asked
will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de Guzman had finished testifying
and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said, "Gentlemen of the press is free to ask
questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make
and address the questions to the witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is
difficult for us to understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he accorded such
unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the offer and did not ask
questions, this according to the transcript now before us.

But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the investigation,
and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on the testimonies given by
the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took place during the investigation. It
seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of Manuel Monroy which had already been tried
and finally determined by the lower court and which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal,
was being retried and redetermined in the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of
respondent.

Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he committed
what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any excuse or satisfactory
explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of prudence, discretion and good
taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even
encouraged, when the case is on appeal and is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing
becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent, and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called
upon to put an end to it and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure,
even a penalty to the one liable.

Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored the
imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally agreed that a
public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason the writ of
preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that in view of petitioner's
objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may not compel him to attend said
investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in part.
Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby publicly
reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism that he had given to
and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and find to be contempt of court; and,
furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would meet with a more severe disciplinary action
and penalty. No costs.
Canon 6: CANNONS APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICER.A. 6713, Section 4

COLLANTES vs. ATTY. VICENTE C.RENOMERON

FACTS:

Nature of the Complaint: Disbarment against Atty. Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban
City

This is in relation to the administrative case filed by Atty. Collantes, counsel for V& G Better
Homes Subdivision, Inc. (V&G), against Atty. Renomeron, for the latters irregular actuations with
regard to the application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma Deed of Absolute Sale with
Assignment (in favorof GSIS) of lots in its subdivision.

Although V&G complied with the desired requirements, Renomeron suspended the registration
of the documents with certain special conditions between them, which was that V&G should
provide him with weekly round trip ticketfrom Tacloban to Manila plus P2,000.00 as pocket money
per trip, or, in lieu thereof, the sale of respondents Quezon City house and lot by V&G or GSIS
representatives.

Eventually, Renomeron formally denied the registration of the documents. He himself elevated
the question on the registrability of the said documents to Administrator Bonifacio (of the National
Land Titles and Deeds RegistrationAdministration-NLTDRA). The Administrator then resolved in
favor of the registrability of the documents.

Despite the resolution of the Administrator, Renomeron still refused theregistration thereof but
demanded from the parties interested the submissionof additional requirements not adverted in his
previous denial.
ISSUES:

Whether or not Atty. Renomeron, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by theCourt for his
malfeasance as a public official.

Whether or not the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to governmentservice in the

discharge of official tasks.

HELD: Yes to both issues.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

On Issue No. 1

A lawyers misconduct as a public official also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.

The lawyers oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice.

The lawyers oath is a source of obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension,
disbarment or other disciplinary action.

On Issue No. 2

The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to government service in the discharge of their
official tasks (Canon 6).

The Code forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Rule
1.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), or delay any mans cause for any corrupt motive or
interest (Rule 1.03).

RULING:

Attorney Vicente C. Renomeron is disbarred from the practice of law in the Philippines, and his
name is stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006 (Legal Ethics)

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation officer, received

US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of falsely representing that it was
needed in complainants application for visa and failing to return the same,
respondent denied misappropriating the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a
certain Atty. Mendoza who assisted complainant and children in their application for
visa. He failed however to substantiate such denial.

Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately be returned
to the complainant, and promised her several times that he would repay her out of his
personal funds. He even issued personal post-dated checks on this, but which later
bounced.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondents conduct violated the Code of Professional Responsibility

and merits the penalty of disbarment?

RULING

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is settled that
denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed must be buttressed by a
strong evidence of non-culpability. The evidence, respondents letters to the
complainant, shows that he made it appear that the US$20,000 was officially
deposited with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. If this is true, how come
only Petty Cash Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his
receipt of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the said
Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to cover the return of
the money to complainant if said amount was really officially deposited with the
Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of respondent point to the inescapable
conclusion that respondent received the money from complainant and appropriated
the same for his personal use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have more
restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral integrity is to be more
severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking advantage of
his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has caused damage to the reputation
and integrity of said office. It is submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of
Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude. Respondent's acts
are more despicable, for not only did he misappropriate the money of complainant;
worse, he had the gall to prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued
checks to cover up his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble profession. It is a
special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually,
academically and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. More
importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement
to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a
ground for the revocation of such privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to cope with
the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession. Section 27 Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended
for, among other acts, gross misconduct in office.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Gutierrez is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law and
ordered to return the amount he received from the complainant with legal interest
from his receipt of the money until payment. The case shall be referred to the Office of
the Ombudsman for criminal prosecution for violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Acts and to the Department of Justice for appropriate administrative action.

PEOPLE VS PINEDA

Respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rufino Borres stand indicted before
the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, as principals, in five (5) separate cases,
four for murder, viz:

Criminal Case 1246 murder of Neceforo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1247 murder of Epifania Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1248 frustrated murder of Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1249 murder of Teofilo Mendoza;

Criminal Case 1250 murder of Marcelo Mendoza.

The five informations were planted upon facts gathered by the prosecuting attorney
from his investigation. Of course, the truth of these facts is yet to be tested in the
crucible of a full-dress trial on the merits.

The indictments are bottomed upon the following alleged pivotal facts:
On the night of July 29, 1965, the occupants of the home of the spouses Teofilo
Mendoza and Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza in Pugaan City of Iligan, were asleep. It
was then that guns (rifle, caliber 22) and paliuntod (homemade gun) were fired in
rapid succession from outside the house. Teofilo Mendoza fell dead. Thereafter,
defendants below destroyed the door of the house, entered therein, and let loose
several shots killing Neceforo Mendoza, all minor children of the couple and
wounding Valeriana Bontilao de Mendoza.

Two of the three defendants in the five criminal cases heretofore listed Tomas
Narbasa and Tambak Alindo moved for a consolidation thereof "into one (1) criminal
case." Their plea is that "said cases arose out of the same incident and motivated by
one impulse."

Giving the nod to defendants' claim, respondent Judge, in an order dated May 13,
1966, directed the City Fiscal to unify all the five criminal cases, and to file one single
information in Case 1246. He also ordered that the other four cases, Nos. 1247, 1248,
1249 and 1250 "be dropped from the docket."

The City Fiscal balked at the foregoing order, sought reconsideration thereof, upon the
ground that "more than one gun was used, more than one shot was fired and more
than one victim was killed." The defense opposed.

On May 31, 1966, respondent Judge denied the motion to reconsider. He took the
position that the acts complained of "stemmed out of a series of continuing acts on
the part of the accused, not by different and separate sets of shots, moved by one
impulse and should therefore be treated as one crime though the series of shots killed
more than one victim;" and that only one information for multiple murder should be
filed, to obviate the necessity of trying five cases instead of one."

Primarily to annul respondent Judge's orders of May 13, 1966 and May 31, 1966, as
having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion, the People came to this Court on certiorari with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction, and for other reliefs.

This Court, on July 1, 1966, issued the cease-and-desist order prayed for.

The question here presented, simply is this: Should there be one information, either
for the complex crime of murder and frustrated murder or for the complex crime of
robbery with multiple homicide and frustrated homicide? Or, should the five
indictments remain as they are?

1. The case before us calls into question the applicability of Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, which reads:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.

Read as it should be, Article 48 provides for two classes of crimes where a single
penalty is to be imposed: first, where a single act constitutes two or more grave or
less grave felonies (delito compuesto); and, second, when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other (delito complejo).1

Best exemplified by the first of the two cases is where one shot from a gun results in
the death of two or more persons. Jurisprudence teaches that, in this factual setting,
the complex crime defined in the first part of Article 48 finds application. 2 A similar
rule obtains where one stabbed another and the weapon pierced the latter's body
through and wounded another. The first died instantaneously; the second, seven days
later. This Court convicted the assailant of double murder. 3 So where a person plants a
bomb in an airplane and the bomb explodes, with the result that a number of persons
are killed, that single act again produces a complex crime.4

A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots,
such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes.5 Thus, where the six defendants,
with others (armed with pistols, carbines and also a submachine gun and Garand
rifles), fired volleys into a house killing eleven and wounding several others, each of
the said accused is "guilty of as many crimes of murder as there were deaths
(eleven).6 Again, eleven persons were indicted for quadruple murder with the use of
bolos, a pistol, a barbed arrow and a piece of bamboo of a man, his common-law
wife, and their two children in cold blood. The accused were found guilty by the trial
court of such offense. This Court, in reversing this ruling below, held that "[t]he four
victims were not killed by a single act but by various acts committed on different
occasions and by different parties"; that such acts "may not be regarded as
constituting one single crime"; and that "[t]hey should be held as separate and
distinct crimes."7 And a third. At the commencement exercises of an elementary
school, "a shot suddenly rang out" followed by a "series of shots" from a pistol. Two
persons lay dead and a third seriously wounded but who later on also died. This Court
there ruled that there were "three distinct and separate murders" committed by
appellant Juan Mones.8 And finally, in People vs. Gatbunton, L-2435, May 10, 1950, the
spouses Mariano Sebastian and Maxima Capule who were asleep were killed by
one burst of machinegun fire; and then, by a second burst of machinegun fire, two of
the couple's children also asleep were killed. The accused, Tomas Gatbunton,
was found guilty by the trial court of quadruple murder. On appeal, this Court declared
that "appellant must be declared guilty of four murders."9

The present ease is to be differentiated from People vs. Lawas, L-7618-20, June 30,
1955. There, on a single occasion, about fifty Maranaos were killed by a group of
home guards. It was held that there was only one complex crime. In that case,
however, there was no conspiracy to perpetuate the killing. In the case at bar,
defendants performed several acts. And the informations charge conspiracy amongst
them. Needless to state, the act of one is the act of all. 10 Not material here, therefore
is the finding in Lawas that "it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths caused
by each and everyone" of the accused. It is to be borne in mind, at this point, that
apply the first half of Article 48, heretofore quoted, there must be singularity of
criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law.11

The respondent Judge reasons out in his order of May 31, 1966 that consolidation of
the five cases into one would have the salutary effect of obviating the necessity of
trying five cases instead of one. To save time, indeed, is laudable. Nonetheless, the
statute confers upon the trial judge the power to try these cases jointly, such that the
fear entertained by respondent Judge could easily be remedied.12

Upon the facts and the law, we hold that the City Fiscal of Iligan City correctly
presented the five separate informations four for murder and one for frustrated
murder.

2. We have not overlooked the suggestion in the record that, because of an affidavit of
one of the witnesses, possibility exists that the real intent of the culprits was to
commit robbery, and that the acts constituting murders and frustrated murder
complained of were committed in pursuance thereof. If true, this would bring the case
within the coverage of the second portion of Article 48, which treats as a complex
crime a case where an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.

A rule of presumption long familiar, however, is that official duty has been regularly
performed.13 If the Fiscal has not seen fit to give weight to said affidavit wherein it is
alleged that certain personal properties (transistor radio and money) were taken away
by the culprits after the shooting, we are not to jettison the prosecutor's opinion
thereon. The Fiscal could have had reasons for his act. For one thing, there is the
grave problem of proving the elements of that offense robbery. For another, the act
could have been but a blind to cover up the real intent to kill. Appropriately to be
noted here is that all the informations charged evident premeditation. With
ponderables and imponderables, we are reluctant to hazard a guess as to the reasons
for the Fiscal's action. We are not now to say that, on this point, the Fiscal has abused
his discretion. A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no
compulsion to file a particular criminal information where he is not convinced that he
has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that the evidence at hand points to
a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the commission of
abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a
prosecuting attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction.
In case of doubt, we should give him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in
our courts being unnecessarily swamped with unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a
criminal suspect's right to due process the sporting idea of fair play may be
transgressed. So it is, that in People vs. Sope 75 Phil. 810, 815, this Court made the
pronouncement that "[i]t is very logical that the prosecuting attorney, being the one
charged with the prosecution of offenses, should determine the information to be filed
and cannot be controlled by the off ended party."14

3. The impact of respondent Judge's orders is that his judgment is to be substituted for
that of the prosecutor's on the matter of what crime is to be filed in court. The
question of instituting a criminal charge is one addressed to the sound discretion of
the investigating Fiscal. The information he lodges in court must have to be supported
by facts brought about by an inquiry made by him. It stands to reason then to say that
in a clash of views between the judge who did not investigate and the fiscal who did,
or between the fiscal and the offended party or the defendant, those of the Fiscal's
should normally prevail. In this regard, he cannot ordinarily be subject to dictation. We
are not to be understood as saying that criminal prosecution may not be blocked in
exceptional cases. A relief in equity "may be availed of to stop it purported
enforcement of a criminal law where it is necessary (a) for the orderly administration
of justice; (b) to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and
vindictive manner; (c) to avoid multiplicity of actions; (d) to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights; and (e) in proper cases, because the statute relied
upon is unconstitutional or was 'held invalid.' " 15 Nothing in the record would as much
as intimate that the present case fits into any of the situations just
recited.1wph1.t

And at this distance and in the absence of any compelling fact or circumstance, we
are loathe to tag the City Fiscal of Iligan City with abuse of discretion in filing separate
cases for murder and frustrated murder, instead of a single case for the complex
crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide under the provisions of Article
294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code or, for that matter, for multiple murder and
frustrated murder. We state that, here, the Fiscal's discretion should not be controlled.

Upon the record as it stands, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted; the
orders of respondent Judge of May 13, 1965 and May 31, 1966 are hereby set and
declared null and void, and, in consequence, the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued is made permanent insofar as it stops enforcement of the said
orders; and the respondent Judge, or whoever takes his place, is hereby directed to
reinstate Criminal Cases 1246, 1247, 1248, 1249 and 1250 as they were commenced,
and to take steps towards the final determination thereof.

Costs against respondents Tomas Narbasa, Tambac Alindo and Rutino Borres. So
ordered.
Misamin vs. San Juan (Adm Case 1418 August 31, 1976)

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Sunday, March 18, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Herein respondent admits having appeared as counsel for the New Cesars Bakery in the
proceeding before the NLRC while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police.
Respondent contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel while holding a government position is
not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for the suspension or removal of attorneys.

Issue: Whether or not the administrative case against the defendant should prosper

Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court ruled that the matter is to be decided in an
administrative proceeding as noted in the recommendation of the Solicitor General. Nonetheless,
the court held that while the charges have to be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for
respondent member of the bar to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the
suspicion could be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a
public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he possessed, but the
influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office held not only to frustrate the
beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly compensated but also to be at the beck and call of
what the complainant called alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent,
in his future actuations as a member of the bar should refrain from laying himself open to such
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but also for
membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable profession who does not
even take care that his honor remains unsullied.
CANON 6

PNB v. ATTY. CEDO

(A.C. No. 3701, March 28, 1995)

FACTS: After having arranged the sale of steel sheets for Mrs Siy, the latter became
implicated ina civil case with the complainant PNB. After having stop employment with
PNB, respondent Atty. Cedo appeared as counsel for Mrs. Siy. A similar situation also
happene when spousesAlmeda were implicated to a case with complainant PNB
counsel for Sps. Almeda is theCedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates. Atty. Cedo was AVP
of the Asset Management group of complainant bank, where such loan transaction of
Sps. Almeda came under his purview.Respondent asserted that in the former case, he
did not participate in the litigation before thecourt, while the latter, it was another
partner of the firm that handle the case. IBP made its reportand recommendation for
suspension for having deliberate intent to devise ways and means to attract as clients
former borrowers of complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the
legal weaknesses of his former employer.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Cedo be held administratively liable.

HELD: SUSPENDED. According to Canon 6.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
intervened while in said service. Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent sought to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against his
former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while still an
employee of complainant, violated said Canon.
In re 1989 Ibp elections

Facts:

During the 1989 Ibp elections, Atty. Violeta Drilon and other candidates, used
government resources to win favors from the voters. Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-
Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized
accordingly. No lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office
in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be
eligible for election or appointment to any position in the Integrated Bar or any
Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee of the Integrated Bar, or
an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned
from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective
public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory
office in the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'
Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP
elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. The following acts and
practices relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for
any elective office in the Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly,
in any form or manner, by himself or through another person: (a) Distribution, except
on Election Day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement
of the biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of
paper; or causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than
those authorized by the officer presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial,
quasijudicial or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the

advertisement thereof; (e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or
other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of food, drink, entertainment,
transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to any person; or
(3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised to
any person." Issue: whether or not Atty violeta drilon and other candidates violated
the by laws of Ibp .

Held:

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-
Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and the
laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from
'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system"
(Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely
eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the law, engage
in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP formulated
for their observance.

SANTOS VS LLAMAS

Facts: This is a complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of

bar membership dues filed against respondent Atty. Francisco R. Llamas It appears
that Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR
and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated IBP Rizal
259060 but he has been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand,
respondent, who is now of age, averred that since 1992, he has engaged in law
practice without having paid his IBP dues. He likewise admits that, as appearing in the
pleadings submitted by complainant to this Court, he indicated "IBP-Rizal 259060" in
the pleadings he filed in court, at least for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, thus
misrepresenting that such was his IBP chaptermembership and receipt number for the
years in which those pleadings were filed. He claims, however, that he is only
engaged in a "limited" practice and that he believes in good faith that he is exempt
from the payment of taxes, such as income tax, under R.A. No. 7432, as a senior
citizen since 1992.

Issues:
(1) Whether respondent is exempt from paying his yearly dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines.

(2) Whether the respondent has misled the court about his standing in the IBP by
using the same IBP O.R. number in his pleadings of at least six years and therefore
liable for his actions.

Held:

(1) NO. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual
dues and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and
if nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquents name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not
respondent is only engaged in limited practice of law. Moreover, While it is true that
R.A. No. 7432, grants senior citizens "exemption from the payment
of individual income taxes: provided, that their annual taxable income does not
exceed the poverty level as determined by the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) for that year," the exemption however does not include payment
of membership or association dues.

(2)YES. By indicating "IBP-Rizal 259060" in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting

to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter,
respondent is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides: Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. His act is also a violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A
lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Respondent's failure to pay his IBP dues and his misrepresentation in the pleadings
he filed in court indeed merit the most severe penalty. However, in view of
respondent's advanced age, his express willingness to pay his dues and plea for a
more temperate application of the law, we believe the penalty of one year suspension
from the practice of law or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later, is
appropriate.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr. B.M. No. 1370 May 9, 2005

FACTS: Petitioners files a motion for exemption for paying his IBP dues from 1977-
2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar he
worked at the Phil. Civil Service then migrated to the US until his retirement. His
contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice
his law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion
that he pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status
as a lawyer. His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same
constitutes to the deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUE: WON inactive practice of the law profession is an exemption to payment for IBP
annual membership.

RULING: The court held that the imposition of the membership fee is a matter of
regulatory measure by the State, which is a necessary consequence for being a
member of the Philippine Bar. The compulsory requirement to pay the fees subsists for
as long as one remains to be a member regardless whether one is a practicing lawyer
or not. Thus, his petition for exemption from paying his IBP membership fee dues is
denied.
Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. Mauricio, Jr. [AC No. 7199. July 22, 2009]

Ponente: CARPIO-MORALES, J.

FACTS:

A certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela

City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. As Cordero and his relatives
were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and
soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can. This was complained before the
BFAD. After conciliation meetings between Cordero and the petitioner, the Corderos
eventually forged a KASUNDUAN seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the
BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. Respondent, Atty. Mauricio, Jr., who
affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.

Complainant filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel
and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The
complaints were pending at the time of the filing of the present administrative
complaint. Despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a
status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting
of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks
against complainant and its products.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility.
HELD: YES. Respondent suspended for three (3) years from the practice of law.

RATIO:

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of
Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.

The language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity

of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling
cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate
said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his
pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 and the fundamental Canon 1 also of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal
processes. Respondent defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath
as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities.

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandate, and by failing to live up to his oath and to comply with
the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold
the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.

YOUNG vs. BATUEGAS

Facts:

YOUNG is the private prosecutor in People of the Phil v Arana. BATUEGAS, et al are the
counsels for the accused in the said criminal case. On Dec 13, 2000, BATUEGAS filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Bailalleging that the accused has voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority and, as such, is now under detention. Upon
verification with the NBI, YOUNG discovered that the accused surrendered on Dec
14,2000 (not 13). BATUEGAS, et al in their defense alleged that on Dec 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed a
Manifestation with Motion for Bail. They immediately fetched accused from Cavite and
brought him to NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they
arrived at NBI at 2am the next day. That was why the Certificate of Detention
indicated that the accused surrendered on Dec 14, 2000 and not 13. As to lack
of notice, YOUNG being a private prosecutor, is not entitled to such as only the State
and City prosecutors should be given notices. Investigating Commissioner
recommended suspension of 6 months. IBP Commissionon Bar Discipline in
a resolution approved said recommendation.

ISSUE: W/N BATUEGAS, ET AL ARE GUILTY OF FALSEHOOD AND SHOULD BE

SUSPENDED

HELD: YES, CONCEALED TRUTH RATIOA lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore
upon his admission that he will do no falsehood norconsent to the doing of any in
court. As officer of the court, his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the
law and facts of the case to aid it in arriving at the correct conclusion. The courts, on
the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. His lawyers solemn duty is to defend his client; his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth. In the case at bar, BATUEGAS, et al
feel short of the duties and responsibilities expected of them as members of the bar.
Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the Court found that it had no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused; they craftily concealed the truth alleging
that the accused had voluntarily surrendered. To knowingly allege an untrue
statement in the pleading is a contemptuous conduct that the Court strongly
condemns. BATUEGAS, et al violated their oath when they resorted to deception.
Hence, BATUEGAS, et al should be suspended for 6 months.

Zaguirre v. Castillo

FACTS:

Complainant and respondent had their illicit relationship while the latter was
preparing to take the bar examinations. After the admission of the respondent to the
Philippine Bar, complainant learned that he was already married. Respondent, who by
now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant
and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. After the birth of the baby,
however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any
form of support. After due hearing, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty.
Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct and recommends that he be meted the
penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

HELD:

YES. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;

Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the same Code.

The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a
high degree or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to
shock the common sense of decency.

Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the
standards of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent
to renege on his notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child
by Carmelita demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly
censurable, unbecoming a member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-
stultification.

The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Tapucar v. Tapucar

Facts:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought
the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly
immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous
circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct
unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980,
respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months
suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were
consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility

Ruling:

Yes.

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from
him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the
defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that
have been compendiously described as moral character. To achieve such end, every lawyer
needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus improve
not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.

Camacho vs. Pangulayan

FACTS:

1. PANGULAYAN INDICTED FOR VIOLATION OF CANON 9: Lawyer should not

communicate upon subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel,
much less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him,
but should only deal with his counsel. Lawyer must avoid everything that may
 tend to mislead party not represented by counsel and should not advise him as
to law.

1. HIRED LAWYER OF DEFENDANTS who had compromised agreements with

CAMACHOS CLIENTS.

2. Required them to waive all kinds of claims they might have had against
AMACC (principal defendant) and to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings filed against it.

i. Denied that they had negotiations, discussion, formulation

or execution.

ii. No longer connected with Pagulayan and Associates Law

Offices.

iii. Re-Admission Agreements nothing to do with DISMISSAL

OF CIVIL CASE involving 9 students of AMACC.

1. Civil case involved publishing of features or articles in Editorial Board of DATALINE.

2. Found guilty by Student Disciplinary Tribunal of using indecent language and

unauthorized use of student publication funds.

3. Expulsion

a. Students appeal and was denied by the AMACC President which gave rise to civil
case.

b. During civil case, apology letters and Re-Admission Agreements were separately
executed by some expelled students.

ISSUE:

Does the Re-Admission Agreements have nothing to do with DISMISSAL OF CIVIL CASE
involving 9 students of AMACC?

HELD:

3 MONTHS SUSPENSION AND DISMISSAL OF CASE AGAINST OTHER RESPONDENTS

THAT DID NOT TAKE PART IN THE NEGOTIATION.

1. Individual letters and Re-Admission Agreements were formalized in which

PANGULAYAN was already counsel of AMACC.

1. Had full knowledge; did not discuss it with the students parents or their
counsel.

i. Re-Admission Agreements affected the dismissal of

the civil case because signatories agreed to terminate all civil, criminal and
administrative proceedings against AMACC.