Case Digest - Criminal Law

Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.
Molina
G.R. No. 165223. January 11, 2016
Doctrines:
The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render the
preventive suspension without legal basis.
Gloria vs. CA has clarified that the preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are
ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned.
Facts:
For review is the decision promulgated on April 29, 2004, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) nullified the Memorandum dated
September 8, 2003 by which the petitioner, in his capacity as the President of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), had
charged the respondent, an Attorney V in the Litigation Department of the Legal Service Group of the GSIS, with grave misconduct and
preventively suspended him for 60 days.
In his affidavit, Elino F. Caretero pointed to the respondent as the person who had handed to him on August 26, 2003 the letter entitled Is
It True supposedly written by one R. Ibasco containing "scurrilous and libellous statements" against petitioner. Considering that Ibasco
denied authorship of the letter, the finger of suspicion came to point at the respondent, who was consequently administratively
investigated for grave misconduct. After the investigation, the Investigation Unit transmitted its Memorandum dated September 1, 2003
to the respondent to require him to explain the circulation and publication of the letter, and to show cause why no administrative sanction
should be imposed on him for doing so. In response, he denied the imputed act.
Thereafter, the petitioner issued Memorandum dated September 8, 2003 to formally charge the respondent with grave misconduct, and to
preventively suspend him for 60 days effective upon receipt.
The respondent sought the dismissal of the charge on the ground of its being baseless; and requested the conduct of a formal
investigation by an impartial body. The respondent also instituted in the CA a special civil action for certiorari to challenge the legality of
the Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.
On April 29, 2004, the CA promulgated its assailed decision annulling the petitioner's Memorandum dated September 8, 2003.
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioner argues that it was in his power as the President and General Manager of the GSIS to impose disciplinary action on the
respondent, pursuant to Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987; that the characterization of the respondent's act as grave
misconduct was not arbitrary because the latter had intentionally passed on or caused the circulation of the malicious letter, thereby
transgressing "some established and definite rule of action" that sufficiently established a prima facie case for an administrative charge;
that the respondent had thereby violated his solemn duty to defend and assist the petitioner in disregard of his "legal, moral or social
duty" to stop or at discourage the publication or circulation of the letter. He submits that the respondent's preventive suspension was done
in accordance with the Civil Service Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases, and upon an evaluation of the evidence on record.
Issues:
1. Whether the petitioner Garcia, in the exercise of his authority, had sufficient basis to formally charge the respondent with
grave misconduct and impose preventive suspension as a consequence.
2. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedy (DEAR) is applicable.
Rulings:
1. To resolve this issue, we need to ascertain if the respondent's act of handing over the letter to Caretero constituted grave misconduct.
The CA concluded that the act of the respondent of handing over the letter to Caretero did not constitute grave misconduct because the
act did not show or indicate the elements of corruption, or the clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rule.
The Court concurs with the CA.
Misconduct in office, by uniform legal definition, is such misconduct that affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such
only as affects his character as a private individual. To warrant removal from office, it must have direct relation to and be connected with
the performance of official duties amounting either to maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties
of the office. Moreover, it is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or
gross negligence by a public officer. It becomes grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to
violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be established by substantial evidence.
The record contains nothing to show that the respondent's act constituted misconduct. The passing of the letter to Caretero did not
equate to any "transgression" or "unlawful behavior," for it was an innocuous act that did not breach any standard, norm or rule
pertinent to his office. Neither could it be regarded as "circulation" of the letter inasmuch as the letter was handed only to a single
individual who just happened to be curious about the paper the respondent was then holding in his hands. The handing of the letter
occurred in ostensibly innocent circumstances on board the elevator in which other employees or passengers were on board. If the motive
of the respondent was to pass the letter in order to publicize its contents, he should have made more copies of the letter. But that was not
so, considering that Caretero categorically affirmed in his affidavit about asking the respondent what he had wanted to do with the letter,
to wit: Do you want me to photocopy the document Sir?, but the respondent had simply replied: HINDI NA SA IYO NA LANG YAN. It is
plain, then, that intent to cause the widespread dissemination of the letter in order to libel the petitioner could not be justifiably inferred.
To be sure, the respondent's act could not be classified as pertaining to or having a direct connection to the performance of his official
duties as a litigation lawyer of the GSIS. The connection was essential to a finding of misconduct, for without the connection the conduct
would not be sanctioned as an administrative offense.
The fact that the charge against the respondent was subsequently declared to lack factual and legal bases did not, ipso facto, render
the preventive suspension without legal basis. The formal charge against the respondent was for grave misconduct, an administrative
offense that justifies the imposition of the preventive suspension of the respondent. Gloria has clarified that the preventive suspension of
civil service employees charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service
Law, and cannot be considered unjustified even if the charges are ultimately dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the
employee concerned. Considering that the respondent's preventive suspension had legal basis, he was not entitled to backwages.
2. Anent the petitioner's insistence that the respondent did not exhaust his administrative remedies, Section 21 of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service provides the option either of filing a motion for reconsideration against the preventive
suspension order by the disciplining authority, or of elevating the preventive suspension order by appeal to the Civil Service Commission
within 15 days from the receipt thereof.
We find and hold that the respondent was not strictly bound by the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. His failure to file the
motion for reconsideration did not justify the immediate dismissal of the petition for certiorari, for we have recognized certain
exceptional circumstances that excused his non-filing of the motion for reconsideration. Among the exceptional circumstances are the
following, namely: when the issue involved is purely a legal question.
Considering that the matter brought to the CA - whether the act complained against justified the filing of the formal charge for grave
misconduct and the imposition of preventive suspension pending investigation was a purely legal question due to the factual
antecedents of the case not being in dispute. Hence, the respondent had no need to exhaust the available administrative remedy of filing
the motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari;AFFIRMS the assailed decision promulgated
on April 29, 2004 and the resolution promulgated on September 6, 2004 insofar as the Court of Appeals dismissed the formal charge for
grave misconduct against respondent Mario I. Molina, but REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision and the resolution insofar as they
nullified the respondent's preventive suspension and awarded backwages to him corresponding to the period of his preventive
suspension; and MAKES NO PRONOUNCEMENT on costs of suit.
Posted by Glenn Rey Anino at 1:44 AM No comments:
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Labels: 2016, Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Political Law Case Digest
MCIAA vs. Heirs of Ijordan, et al.

Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) Vs. Heirs of Gavina Ijordan, et al.
G.R. No. 173140. January 11, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
Doctrine:
A sale of jointly owned real property by a co-owner without the express authority of the others is unenforceable against the latter, but
valid and enforceable against the seller.
Facts:
On October 14, 1957, Julian Cuizon (Julian) executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale (Deed) covering Lot No. 4539
(subject lot) situated in Ibo, Municipality of Opon (now Lapu-Lapu City) in favor of the Civil Aeronautics Administration ((CAA), the
predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Manila Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA).
In 1980, the respondents caused the judicial reconstitution of the original certificate of title covering the subject lot. Consequently,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-2431 of the Register of Deeds of Cebu was reconstituted for Lot No. 4539 in the names of
the respondents' predecessors-in-interest, namely, Gavina Ijordan, and Julian, Francisca, Damasina, Marciana, Pastor, Angela, Mansueto,
Bonifacia, Basilio, Moises and Florencio, all surnamed Cuison. The respondents' ownership of the subject lot was evidenced by OCT No.
RO-2431. They asserted that they had not sold their shares in the subject lot, and had not authorized Julian to sell their shares to
MCIAA's predecessor-in-interest.
The failure of the respondents to surrender the owner's copy of OCT No. RO-2431 prompted MCIAA to sue them for the cancellation of
title in the RTC, alleging in its complaint that the certificate of title conferred no right in favor of the respondents because the lot had
already been sold to the Government in 1957; that the subject lot had then been declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No.
00387 in the name of the BAT; and that by virtue of the Deed, the respondents came under the legal obligation to surrender the certificate
of title for cancellation to enable the issuance of a new one in its name.
After MCIAA's presentation of evidence, the respondents moved to dismiss the complaint upon the Demurrer to Evidence dated
February 3, 1997, contending that the Deed and Tax Declaration No. 00387 had no probative value to support MCIAA's cause of action
and its prayer for relief. They cited Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court which provided that "when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself." They argued that what MCIAA
submitted was a mere photocopy of the Deed; that even assuming that the Deed was a true reproduction of the original, the sale was
unenforceable against them because it was only Julian who had executed the same without obtaining their consent or authority as his co-
heirs; and that the tax declaration had no probative value by virtue of its having been derived from the unenforceable sale.
In its order dated September 2, 1997, the RTC dismissed MCIAA's complaint insofar as it pertained to the shares of the respondents in
Lot No. 4539 but recognized the sale as to the 1/22 share of Julian.
The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether the subject lot was validly conveyed in its entirety to the petitioner.
2. Whether respondents are guilty of estoppel by laches.
3. Whether MCIAA possessed the subject lot by virtue of acquisitve prescription.
Rulings:
1. No, the CA and the RTC concluded that the Deed was void as far as the respondents' shares in the subject lot were concerned, but valid
as to Julian's share. Their conclusion was based on the absence of the authority from his co-heirs in favor of Julian to convey their shares
in the subject lot. We have no reason to overturn the affirmance of the CA on the issue of the respondents' co-ownership with Julian.
Hence, the conveyance by Julian of the entire property pursuant to the Deed did not bind the respondents for lack of their consent and
authority in his favor. As such, the Deed had no legal effect as to their shares in the property. Article 1317 of the Civil Code provides that
no person could contract in the name of another without being authorized by the latter, or unless he had by law a right to represent him;
the contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers,
is unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by
the other contracting party.
But the conveyance by Julian through the Deed had full force and effect with respect to his share of 1/22 of the entire property consisting
of 546 square meters by virtue of its being a voluntary disposition of property on his part. As ruled in Torres v. Lapinid:
x x x even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who
did not consent to the sale. This is because the sale or other disposition of a co-owner affects only his undivided share and the transferee
gets only what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.
2. No. MCIAA's assertion of estoppel or ratification to bar the respondents' contrary claim of ownership of their shares in the subject lot
is bereft of substance. The doctrine of estoppel applied only to those who were parties to the contract and their privies or successors-in-
interest. Moreover, the respondents could not be held to ratify the contract that was declared to be null and void with respect to their
share, for there was nothing for them to ratify. Verily, the Deed, being null and void, had no adverse effect on the rights of the
respondents in the subject lot.
3. No. MCIAA's contention on acquisitive prescription in its favor must fail. Aside from the absence of the satisfactory showing of
MCIAA's supposed possession of the subject lot, no acquisitive prescription could arise in view of the indefeasibility of the respondents'
Torrens title. Under the Torrens System, no adverse possession could deprive the registered owners of their title by prescription. The real
purpose of the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop any question as to its legality forever. Thus, once title is registered, the
owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the portals of the court, or sitting on the mirador su casa to avoid the
possibility of losing his land.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February 22,
2006.

Labels: 2016, Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Civil Law Case Digest
Monday, March 27, 2017
Ladines vs. People Case Digest

Pedro Ladines vs. People of the Philippines and Edwin De Ramon
G.R. No. 167333. January 11, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
Doctrine:
To impose the highest within a period of the imposable penalty without specifying the
justification for doing so is an error on the part of the trial court that should be corrected on
appeal. In default of such justification, the penalty to be imposed is the lowest of the period.
Facts:
While Prosecution witnesses Philip de Ramon and Mario Lasala, along with victim Erwin de
Ramon (Erwin), were watching the dance held during the June 12, 1993 Grand Alumni
Homecoming of the Bulabog Elementary School in Sorsogon, Sorsogon, the petitioner and Licup
appeared and passed by them. The petitioner suddenly and without warning approached and
stabbed Erwin below the navel with a machete. The petitioner then left after delivering the blow.
At that juncture, Licup also mounted his attack against Erwin but the latter evaded the blow by
stepping back. Erwin pulled out the machete from his body and wielded it against Licup, whom
he hit in the chest. Licup pursued but could not catch up with Erwin because they both eventually
fell down. Erwin was rushed to the hospital where he succumbed.
Dr. Myrna Listanco, who performed the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of Erwin,
attested that the victim had sustained two stab wounds on the body, one in the chest and the other
in the abdomen. She opined that one or two assailants had probably inflicted the injuries with the
use of two distinct weapons; and that the chest wound could have been caused by a sharp
instrument, like a sharpened screwdriver, while the abdominal injury could have been from a
sharp bladed instrument like a knife.
In his defense, the petitioner tendered alibi and denial. He recounted that at the time in question,
he was in the Bulabog Elementary School compound along with his wife and their minor child;
that they did not enter the dance hall because there was trouble that had caused the people to
scamper; that they had then gone home; that he had learned about the stabbing incident involving
Erwin on their way home from Barangay Tanod Virgilio de Ramon who informed him that Licup
and Erwin had stabbed each other; and that Prosecution witnesses Philip and Lasala harbored ill-
will towards him by reason of his having lodged a complaint in the barangay against them for
stealing coconuts from his property.
The petitioner presented Angeles Jasareno and Arnulfo Palencia to corroborate his denial.
Jasareno and Palencia testified that at the time in question they were in the Bulabog Elementary
School, together with the petitioner, the latter's wife and their minor daughter; that while they
were watching the dance, a quarrel had transpired but they did not know who had been involved.
On August 12, 1993, an information was filed in the RTC charging the petitioner and one
Herman Licup with homicide.
On February 10, 2003, the RTC pronounced the petitioner guilty as charged, decreeing:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Pedro Ladines guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, sans any mitigating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, accused Pedro Ladines is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of from Ten (10)
years and One (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal as maximum and to pay the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity without subsidiary
imprisonment [in] case of insolvency and [to] pay the costs.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. Petitioner filed an appeal insisting that the CA
committed reversible error in affirming his conviction despite the admission of Licup
immediately after the incident that he had stabbed the victim; and that the res gestae statement of
Licup constituted newly-discovered evidence that created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's
guilt.
Issues:
1. Whether the res gestae statement of Licup constitutes newly-discovered evidence that
would create a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.
2. Whether the RTC imposed the proper penalty.
3. Whether the lower court's limitation of the civil liability to civil indemnity of only
P50,000.00 is correct.
Rulings:
1. No, the res gestae statement of Licup did not constitute newly-discovered evidence that
created a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. We point out that the concept of newly-
discovered evidence is applicable only when a litigant seeks a new trial or the re-opening of the
case in the trial court. Seldom is the concept appropriate on appeal, particularly one before the
Court.
Furthermore, the Court has issued guidelines designed to balance the need of persons charged
with crimes to afford to them the fullest opportunity to establish their defenses, on the one hand,
and the public interest in ensuring a smooth, efficient and fair administration of criminal justice,
on the other. The first guideline is to restrict the concept of newly-discovered evidence to only
such evidence that can satisfy the following requisites, namely: (1) the evidence was discovered
after trial; (2) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably
change the judgment if admitted. (Emphasis is mine).
We agree with the State that the proposed evidence of the petitioner was not newly-discovered
because the first two requisites were not present. The petitioner, by his exercise of reasonable
diligence, could have sooner discovered and easily produced the proposed evidence during the
trial by obtaining a certified copy of the police blotter that contained the alleged res gestae
declaration of Licup and the relevant documents and testimonies of other key witnesses to
substantiate his denial of criminal responsibility.
2. We declare that the lower courts could not impose 17 years and four months of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which was the ceiling of the medium period of reclusion temporal,
as the maximum of the indeterminate penalty without specifying the justification for so
imposing. They thereby ignored that although Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, which has
set the rules "for the application of penalties which contain three periods," requires under its first
rule that the courts should impose the penalty prescribed by law in the medium period should
there be neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, its seventh rule expressly demands
that "[w]ithin the limits of each period, the courts shall determine the extent of the penalty
according to the number and nature of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and. the
greater or lesser extent of the evil produced by the crime." By not specifying the justification for
imposing the ceiling of the period of the imposable penalty, the fixing of the indeterminate
sentence became arbitrary, or whimsical, or capricious. In the absence of the specification, the
maximum of the indeterminate sentence for the petitioner should be the lowest of the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which is 14 years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal.
3. The limitation was a plain error that we must correct. Moral damages and civil indemnity are
always granted in homicide, it being assumed by the law that the loss of human life absolutely
brings moral and spiritual losses as well as a definite loss. Moral damages and civil indemnity
require neither pleading nor evidence simply because death through crime always occasions
moral sufferings on the part of the victim's heirs. The civil indemnity and moral damages are
fixed at P75,000.00 each because homicide was a gross crime.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on October 22, 2004 subject to
the MODIFICATION that: (a) the INDETERMINATE SENTENCE of petitioner PEDRO
LADINES is 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and
one day of the medium period of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and (b) the petitioner shall
pay to the heirs of the victim Erwin de Ramon: (1) civil indemnity and moral damages of
P75,000.00 each; (2) temperate damages of P25,000.00; (c) interest of 6% per annum on all
items of the civil liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until they are
fully paid; and (d) the costs of suit.
Posted by Glenn Rey Anino at 11:49 PM No comments:
Labels: 2016, Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Criminal Law Case Digest
Monday, March 20, 2017
Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Case Digest

Jennifer C. Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Container Lines/Monete Cuenca
G.R. No. 177680. January 13, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
Doctrines Involved:
Every resignation presupposes the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there can be no valid resignation after the
fact of termination of the employment simply because the employee had no employer-employee relationship to relinquish.
There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the managerial employees or those vested
with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions regularly handle significant amounts of money or property.
Facts:
Respondent Pacific Concord Container Lines (Pacific Concord), a domestic corporation engaged in cargo forwarding, hired the petitioner
as an Account Executive/Marketing Assistant. In January 2002, Pacific Concord promoted her as a sales manager with the monthly
salary rate of P25,000.00, and provided her with a brand new Toyota Altis plus gasoline allowance. On November 8, 2002, she reported
for work at 9:00 a.m. and left the company premises at around 10:30 a.m. to make client calls. At 1:14 p.m. of that day, she received the
following text message from respondent Monette Cuenca, to wit:
TODAY U R OFFICIALY NT CONNECTED WITH US.
Sender: MONETTE
+639173215330
Sent: 8-Nov-2002
13:14:01
Cuenca also sent a text message to Roy Lagahit, the petitioner's husband, as follows:
IBALIK KARON DAYON ANG AUTO OG PALIHUG LANG KO OG KUHA SA NYONG BUTANG OG DI NAKO MO STORY A
NI JENIFER. IL WAIT
Sender: MONETTE
+639173215330
Sent: 8-Nov-2002
12:50:54
The petitioner immediately tried to contact Cuenca, but the latter refused to take her calls. On the same day, the petitioner learned from
clients and friends that the respondents had disseminated notices, flyers and memos informing all clients of Pacific Concord that she was
no longer connected with the company as of November 8, 2002. Pacific Concord also caused the publication of the notice to the public in
the Sunstar Daily issue of December 15, 2002.
On November 13, 2002, the petitioner sent a letter to Pacific Concord contending that she was deprived of the due process that would
have given her the chance to formally present her side. Despite this, she have accepted her fate and asked Cuenca to arrange and expedite
settlement of all benefits due to her under the law.
On November 26, 2002, the petitioner filed her complaint for constructive dismissal in the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in'Cebu City.
In their position paper, the respondents denied having terminated the petitioner despite the fact that there were valid grounds to do so.
They insisted that the petitioner had betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in her when she: (a) used the company-issued vehicle for
her own personal interest; (b) failed to achieve her sales quota, and to enhance and develop the Sales Department; (c) enticed her
marketing assistant, Jo Ann Otrera, to resign and join her in transferring to another forwarding company; (d) applied for other
employment during office hours and using company resources; (e) solicited and offered the services of Seajet International, Inc. during
her employment with Pacific Concord; (f) received a personal commission from Wesport Line, Inc. for container shipments; and (g)
illegally manipulated and diverted several containers to Seajet International.
Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on June 9, 2003, declaring that the respondents were not able to prove that the petitioner had
committed acts constituting betrayal of trust; that they had not informed her prior to her dismissal of the offenses she had supposedly
committed; and that owing to the illegality of the dismissal, they were liable for backwages and separation pay.
Ruling of the NLRC

On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter finding that the respondents are guilty of illegally dismissing the
complainant from her employment, but MODIFYING his award for separation pay computed at one (1) month salary for every year of
service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered one (1) year from the complainant's first day of employment in February
2000 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS DECISION; and backwages starting November 8, 2002 UNTIL THE FINALITY OF THIS
DECISION.
Decision of the CA
On May 10, 2006, the CA promulgated its decision granting the respondents' petition for certiorari, and annulling the decision of the
NLRC. It pronounced that there were sufficient justifications to terminate the petitioner's services for disloyalty and willful breach of
trust.
Issues:
1. Whether Lagahit resigned from her employment.
2. Whether Lagahit breached her employer's trust.
Rulings of the Court:

1. Lagahit did not resign from her employment.
In cases of unlawful dismissal, the employer bears the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause, but
before the employer is expected to discharge its burden of proving that the dismissal was legal, the employee must first establish by
substantial evidence the fact of her dismissal from employment. In this case, the petitioner proved the overt acts committed by the
respondents in abruptly terminating her employment through the text messages sent by Cuenca to the petitioner and her husband, as well
as the notices distributed to the clients and published in the Sun Star. It is notable that the respondents did not deny or controvert her
evidence on the matter. Thereby, she showed Pacific Concord's resolve to terminate her employment effective November 8, 2002.
On the other hand, the respondents' insistence that the petitioner had resigned was bereft of factual support. As a rule, the employer who
interposes the resignation of the employee as a defense should prove that the employee voluntarily resigned. A valid resignation is the
voluntary act of an employee who finds herself in a situation where she believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the
exigency of the service and that she has no other choice but to disassociate herself from employment. The resignation must be
unconditional and with a clear intention to relinquish the position.
The facts and circumstances before and after the petitioner's severance from her employment on November 8, 2002 did not show her
resolute intention to relinquish her job. Indeed, it would be unfounded to infer the intention to relinquish from her November 13, 2002
letter, which, to us, was not a resignation letter due to the absence therefrom of anything evincing her desire to sever the employer-
employee relationship. The letter instead presented her as a defenseless employee unjustly terminated for unknown reasons who had been
made the subject of notices and flyers informing the public of her unexpected termination. It also depicted her as an employee meekly
accepting her unexpected fate and requesting the payment of her backwages and accrued benefits just to be done with the employer.
For sure, to conclude that the petitioner resigned because of her letter of November 13, 2002 is absurd in light of the respondents having
insisted that she had been terminated from her employment earlier on November 8, 2002. In that regard, every resignation presupposes
the existence of the employer-employee relationship; hence, there can be no valid resignation after the fact of termination of the
employment simply because the employee had no employer-employee relationship to relinquish.
2. Lagahit did not breach her employer's trust; her dismissal was, therefore, illegal.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to dismiss an employee for committing fraud, or for willful breach of the trust
reposed by the employer. However, loss of confidence is never intended to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its
employee. For this to be a valid ground for the termination of the employee, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee must be
holding a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against would justify the loss of trust and confidence.
There are two classes of employees vested with trust and confidence. To the first class belong the managerial employees or those vested
with the powers or prerogatives to lay down management policies and to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees or effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class includes those who in the normal and routine
exercise of their functions regularly handle significant amounts of money or property. Cashiers, auditors, and property custodians are
some of the employees in the second class.
Petitioner's position as sales manager did not immediately make the petitioner a managerial employee. The actual work that she
performed, not her job title, determined whether she was a managerial employee vested with trust and confidence. Her employment as
sales manager was directly related with the sales of cargo forwarding services of Pacific Concord, and had nothing to do with the
implementation of the management's rules and policies. As such, the position of sales manager came under the second class of employees
vested with trust and confidence. Therein was the flaw in the CA's assailed decision. Although the mere existence of the basis for
believing that the managerial employee breached the trust reposed by the employer would normally suffice to justify a dismissal, we
should desist from applying this norm against the petitioner who was not a managerial employee.
At any rate, the employer must present clear and convincing proof of an actual breach of duty committed by the employee by
establishing the facts and incidents upon which the loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest. The required amount
of evidence for doing so is substantial proof. With these guidelines in mind, we cannot hold that the evidence submitted by the
respondents (consisting of the three affidavits) sufficiently established the disloyalty of the petitioner. The affidavits did not show how
she had betrayed her employer's trust. Specifically, the affidavit of Russell B. Noel only stated that she and her husband Roy had met
over lunch with Garcia Imports and a certain Wilbur of Sea-Jet International Forwarder in the first week of November 2002. To conclude
that such lunch caused Pacific Concord to lose its trust in the petitioner would be arbitrary.
In her affidavit, Jo Ann Otrera declared that the petitioner had called other forwarding companies to inquire about any vacant positions,
and that the petitioner had enticed her to transfer to another company. However, such declarations did not provide the sufficient basis to
warrant the respondents' loss of confidence in the petitioner.
Considering that the petitioner's duties related to the sales of forwarding services offered by Pacific Concord, her calling other
forwarding companies to inquire for vacant positions did not breach the trust reposed in her as sales manager. Such act, being at worst a
simple act of indiscretion, did not constitute the betrayal of trust that merited the extreme penalty of dismissal from employment. We
remind that dismissal is a penalty of last resort, to be meted only after having appreciated and evaluated all the relevant circumstances
with the goal of ensuring that the ground for dismissal was not only serious but true.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSESand SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
May 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals; REINSTATES the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission rendered on December
15, 2004 subject to the MODIFICATION that the total monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality
of this decision until full satisfaction; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

Labels: Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Labor Law Case Digest
Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines,

Inc. Case Digest
Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines, Inc.
G.R. No. 207970. January 20, 2016
BERSAMIN, J.:
Doctrine:
The trial court may render a judgment on the pleadings upon motion of the claiming party when the defending party's answer fails to
tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. For that purpose, only the pleadings of the
parties in the action are considered. It is error for the trial court to deny the motion for judgment on the pleadings because the defending
party's pleading in another case supposedly tendered an issue of fact.
Facts:
From January 9, 2006 until February 2, 2007, the petitioner, a domestic corporation dealing with medical equipment and supplies,
delivered to and installed medical equipment and supplies at the respondent's hospital. According to the petitioner, the respondent paid
only P67,3 57,683.23 of its total obligation of P123,901,650.00, leaving unpaid the sum of P54,654,195.54.
However, on February 11, 2009, the petitioner and the respondent entered into an agreement whereby the former agreed to reduce its
claim to only P50,400,000.00, and allowed the latter to pay the adjusted obligation on installment basis within 36 months.
In the letter dated May 27, 2009, the respondent notified the petitioner that its new administration had reviewed their contracts and had
found the contracts defective and rescissible due to economic prejudice or lesion; and that it was consequently declining to recognize the
February 11, 2009 agreement because of the lack of approval by its Board of Trustees and for having been signed by Maglaya whose
term of office had expired.
On June 24, 2009, the petitioner sent a demand letter to the respondent. Due to the respondent's failure to pay as demanded, the petitioner
filed its complaint for sum of money in the RTC.
The respondent moved to dismiss the complaint upon the following grounds, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant; (b) improper venue; (c) litis pendentia; and (d) forum shopping. In support of the ground of litis pendentia, it stated that it had
earlier filed a complaint for the rescission of the four contracts and of the February 11, 2009 agreement in the RTC in Cabanatuan City;
and that the resolution of that case would be determinative of the petitioner's action for collection.
After the RTC denied the motion to dismiss on July 19, 2009, the respondent filed its answer. On September 28, 2011, the petitioner filed
its Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, stating that the respondent had admitted the material allegations of its complaint and
thus did not tender any issue as to such allegations. The respondent opposed the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, arguing
that it had specifically denied the material allegations in the complaint.
Judgment of the RTC

At the hearing, the court issued an Order denying the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings considering that the allegations stated
on the Motion are evidentiary in nature. The Court, instead of acting on the same, sets the case for pre-trial, considering that with the
Answer and the Reply, issues have been joined.
Judgment of the CA
On July 2, 2013, the CA promulgated its decision. Although observing that the respondent had admitted the contracts as well as the
February 11, 2009 agreement, the CA ruled that a judgment on the pleadings would be improper because the outstanding balance due to
the petitioner remained to be an issue in the face of the allegations of the respondent in its complaint for rescission in the RTC in
Cabanatuan City.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's
complaint for rescission.
Ruling of the SC:

Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in going outside of the respondent's answer by relying on the allegations contained in the latter's
complaint for rescission. In order to resolve the petitioner's Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings, the trial court could rely only
on the answer of the respondent filed in Civil Case No. 09-122116. Under Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court, the answer was the
sole basis for ascertaining whether the complaint's material allegations were admitted or properly denied. As such, the respondent's
averment of payment of the total of P78,401,650.00 to the petitioner made in its complaint for rescission had no relevance to the
resolution of the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings. The CA thus wrongly held that a factual issue on the total liability of the
respondent remained to be settled through trial on the merits. It should have openly wondered why the respondent's answer in Civil Case
No. 09-122116 did not allege the supposed payment of the P78,401,650.00, if the payment was true, if only to buttress the specific denial
of its alleged liability. The omission exposed the respondent's denial of liability as insincere.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on July 2, 2013; DIRECTS the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, in Manila to resume its proceedings in Civil Case No. 09-122116 entitled Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. v.
Wesleyan University-Philippines, and to forthwith act on and grant the Motion for Judgment Based on the Pleadings by rendering the
proper judgment on the pleadings; and ORDERS the respondent to pay the costs of suit.

Labels: Bersamin 2016 Cases, Bersamin_Remedial Law Case Digest
Sunday, January 29, 2017
Selected Significant 2014-2015 Supreme Court Decisions

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pio/annualreports/SC_Annual_2014_n
arrative%20report.pdf
Pls. go to pp. 29-81
Labels: Case Doctrines
Saturday, January 28, 2017
Case Doctrines in Legal Ethics (part III)

CASE DOCTRINES IN LEGAL ETHICS (part III)
Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino
Soriano vs. Reyes, 489 SCRA 328 , May 04, 2006

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Affidavits of Desistance; The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case by a
complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent lawyer; Disciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance.As we have previously ruled, the affidavit of withdrawal of the
disbarment case executed by a complainant does not automatically exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or
disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of negligence has been duly proved. This rule is premised on the
nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the
complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are
undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the
person who called the attention of the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally
no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his
withdrawal of the charges. Accordingly, notwithstanding the motion to withdraw evidence and testimony, the disbarment
proceeding should proceed.
Same; Same; Same; Pre-Trials; A lawyers failure to file a pretrial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence; Since pre-
trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact
and of law cannot be overemphasized as an essential requirement for a pre-trial conference.Respondents failure to
file the pre-trial brief constitutes inexcusable negligence. The importance of filing a pre-trial brief cannot be gainsaid.
For one, the lawyers are compelled to prepare their cases in advance. They eliminate haphazard preparation. Since pre-
trial is a serious business of the court, preparation of the lawyers and parties for the pre-trial in both questions of fact
and of law cannot be overemphasized as an essential requirement for a pre-trial conference. They enable both parties to
view the documentary evidence of the other even before they are presented in court. They enable the parties to know
the testimonies of each others witnesses. Pre-trial briefs also apprise the courts of the additional points the parties are
willing to stipulate upon, or the additional points which could be inquired into for the purpose of additional stipulations.
They also apprise the court of the respective demands of the parties, thus, enabling the court to discuss more
intelligently an amicable settlement between or among the parties. The failure to submit a pre-trial brief could very
well, then, be fatal to the case of the client as in fact it is a ground for dismissal of the case. For this reason,
respondents failure to submit the pre-trial brief to the court within the given period constitutes negligence which entails
disciplinary action. Not only is it a dereliction of duty to his client but to the court as well.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who
acquires his service is entitled to, not just competent service, but also whole-hearted devotion to his clients cause.A
lawyer is expected to be familiar with the rudiments of law and procedure and anyone who acquires his service is entitled
to, not just competent service, but also wholehearted devotion to his clients cause. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his
client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of law, the
interest of his client. A lawyer should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, otherwise his negligence in fulfilling
his duty will render him liable for disciplinary action.
Same; Same; Same; There is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full updates on
developments affecting the casethe lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the lawyer is
utilizing to defend the clients interests.Respondent also lacked candor in dealing with his clients as he omitted to
apprise complainants of the status of the two cases and even assured the complainants that he was diligently attending to
said cases. In Garcia v. Atty. Manuel, 395 SCRA 386 (2003), this Court found therein respondent lawyer in bad faith for
failing to inform his client of the status of the case. In said decision, the court has adamantly stressed that the lawyer-
client relationship is highly fiduciary. There is always a need for the client to receive from the lawyer periodic and full
updates on developments affecting the case. The lawyer should apprise the client on the mode and manner that the
lawyer is utilizing to defend the clients interests. In failing to inform his clients of the status of their cases, respondent
failed to exercise such skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
manners of professional employment.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting
the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar; The appropriate
penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts. Time
and again we have stated that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to
disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct
affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly,
disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severesuch as a reprimand, suspension, or finewould
accomplish the end desired. The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial
discretion based on the surrounding facts. The penalties for a lawyers failure to file the required brief or pleading range
from reprimand, warning with fine, suspension and in grave cases, disbarment. In one case, the penalty for a lawyers
failure to file a pre-trial brief and other pleadings such as position papers leading to the dismissal of the case, is
suspension of six months. Therefore, we find the penalty of disbarment as recommended by the IBP to be unduly harsh
and we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of one (1) year suspension, taking into account that this appears to be
his first offense. [Soriano vs. Reyes, 489 SCRA 328(2006)]
Somosot vs. Lara, 577 SCRA 158 , January 30, 2009

Attorneys; A counsel must reveal how he contacted his client during pendency of adverse partys request for admission
and answer to interrogatories.The respondent failed to precisely allege in his submissions how he tried to contact the
defendant on or about the time the interrogatories and request for admission were pending. It appears that he really had
not; by his own admission, his attempt to contact the complainant came in December 2001 and only to inform her of his
government appointment and to collect his billings. It was only after the discovery of the closure of the defendants
office did the respondent try to contact the complainant and her husband by cellular phone, but they could not be
reached.
Same; A client must never be left in the dark even if he has not paid counsels billing.The interrogatories/admission
issue happened in August 2001, which tells us that the respondent at about that time was already very sensitive about his
billing issue against his client as he had not been paid from May to August 2001. Assuming the non-payment to be true,
such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client of an important development, or worse, to withhold vital
information from her. As the court held in Luisito Balatbat v. Atty. Edgardo Arias, 521 SCRA 1 (2007), a client must never
be left in the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer in particular
and the legal profession in general.
Same; Effect of counsels failure to react on trial courts adverse ruling. We feel it safe to assume that the respondent
did not move at all to question the trial courts rulings; nowhere in the records, both from the complainants and the
respondents end, is there any allegation that the respondent sought to review the trial courts rulings. What intrigues us
is that the respondent could have reacted to the trial courts ruling on the interrogatories/request for admission; he was
aware of the recourses open to him under the ruling in Briboneria v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 607 (1992), that he cited
in his objection to the interrogatories and request for admission.
Same; Effect of filing unconsented notice of withdrawal without stating specific valid reasons therefor.On the matter
of the respondents withdrawal from the case, the respondent might have had valid reasons to withdraw and terminate
his relationship with his client. As the respondent now states, he could withdraw under paragraphs (e) and (f) of the Code
of Professional Responsibilityi.e., deliberate failure of the client to pay the fees for the services, or failure to comply
with the retainer agreement, or appointment or election to public office. However, he does not appear to have cited
these reasons before the trial court. Instead, he merely filed a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance, citing his clients
unknown location and failure to communicate as reasons for his clients lack of express consent to his withdrawal. It is
undisputed that the trial court denied the respondents notice of withdrawal; thus, he remained as counsel of record
burdened with all the responsibilities that his representation carried.
Same; Effect of failure to appeal adverse decision of trial court.The respondent never bothered to refuse this very
damaging allegation; neither in his Position Paper before the IBP nor in the Comment filed with us did he offer an
explanation. Thus, it appears that the respondent could not have really taken any instructions from his client on how to
handle the trial courts adverse decision. He simply took it upon himself to decide not to appeal the trial courts decision
and the denial of his motion for reconsideration.
Same; Attorneys Fees; Non-payment of attorneys fee and appointment as government consultant mitigating
circumstances and mishandled case.What lightens the impact of the respondents mishandling of the case is the
complainants own failings as a client. The non-payment of fees is a factor that we cannot simply disregard. As a rule, law
practice is not a pro bono proposition and a lawyers sensitivity and concern for unpaid fees are understandable; lawyers
incur expenses in running their practice and generally depend, too, on their law practice income for their living expenses.
Likewise, the respondents appointment as a consultant should be considered although it is a matter that none of the
parties have fully examined.
Same; Client has a duty to inform her counsel of change of address and contact her lawyer.More than these reasons and
as Commissioner Limpingco correctly noted, the complainant never made any effort to contact the respondent to follow
up the status of her case, expecting instead the respondent to take full and complete initiative in this regard. While the
respondent, as counsel, has the obligation to inform his client of the material developments in the case, particularly of
the aspects of the case that would require the clients instructions or participation, this obligation is balanced by a
complementary duty on the part of a party-litigant to remain in contact with his lawyer in order to be informed of the
progress of the case.
Same; Lawyer cannot be disbarred if his client is guilty of contributory faults.In these lights, we hold that while the
respondent is liable for a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects his standing and character as an officer of the
Court and as a member of the Bar, this liability ought to be tempered by the mitigating circumstances we pointed out
above. We therefore cannot impose disbarment as penalty. Given the mitigating circumstances and the extent of their
effects on the respondents culpability, we hold that a three-month suspension from the practice of law is the penalty
that is more in keeping with the damage the complainant suffered and the interests that the public, the bar and the
administration of justice have to protect. [Somosot vs. Lara, 577 SCRA 158(2009)]
Pena vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444 , June 25, 2007

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; Certification against Forum Shopping;
Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on 1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include
cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. The requirement of
a certification against forum shopping was originally required by Circular No. 28-91, dated 8 February 1994, issued by this
Court for every petition filed with the Court or the Court of Appeals. Administrative Circular No. 04-94, made effective on
1 April 1994, expanded the certification requirement to include cases filed in courts and quasi-judicial agencies below
this Court and the Court of Appeals. Ultimately, the Court adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No.
04-94 to become Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Said rule states that a violation thereof would
constitute contempt of court and be cause for the summary dismissal of both petitions without prejudice to the taking of
appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned. The Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of
Governors took against complainant his failure to attach the certification against forum shopping to his complaint and
consequently dismissed his complaint. This Court, however, disagrees and, accordingly, grants the petition. However, a
remand of the case to the IBP would unduly prolong its adjudication.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; In view of the nature of disbarment proceedings, the certification against forum
shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such proceedings, must refer to another
administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent.In view of the nature of disbarment
proceedings, the certification against forum shopping to be attached to the complaint, if one is required at all in such
proceedings, must refer to another administrative case for disciplinary proceedings against the same respondent, because
such other proceedings or action is one that necessarily involves the same issues as the one posed in the disbarment
complaint to which the certification is supposedly to be attached.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It would seem that the scenario sought to be avoided, i.e., the filing of multiple
suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions, rarely happens in disbarment complaints.It is in this light that we take
a further look at the necessity of attaching a certification against forum shopping to a disbarment complaint. It would
seem that the scenario sought to be avoided,i.e., the filing of multiple suits and the possibility of conflicting decisions,
rarely happens in disbarment complaints considering that said proceedings are either taken by the Supreme Court motu
proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. Thus, if the
complainant in a disbarment case fails to attach a certification against forum shopping, the pendency of another
disciplinary action against the same respondent may still be ascertained with ease. We have previously held that the rule
requiring a certification of forum shopping to accompany every initiatory pleading, should not be interpreted with such
absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedurewhich is
to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and to that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinateand his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics;
Under this Rule 19.01, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or cases
against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw their
own cases against the lawyers client.The intrinsic merit of complainants case against respondent justifies the grant of
the present petition. Respondent does not deny authorship of the threatening letter to complainant, even spiritedly
contesting the charge that the letter is unethical. Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that a
lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law, reminding legal practitioners that a lawyers
duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his clients success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. In particular, Rule 19.01 commands that a
lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case
or proceeding. Under this Rule, a lawyer should not file or threaten to file any unfounded or baseless criminal case or
cases against the adversaries of his client designed to secure a leverage to compel the adversaries to yield or withdraw
their own cases against the lawyers client.
Same; Same; Same; Demand Letters; Blackmail; Extortion; Words and Phrases; The act of a lawyer in sending a demand
letter threatening someone that should the latter fail to pay the amounts he and his client propose as settlement, he
would file and claim bigger amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion,
falsification of documents, and cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws, is not only
unethical for violating Canon 19, but also amounts to blackmail; Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by
threats of accusation or exposure or opposition in the public prints, obtaining of value from a person as a condition of
refraining from making an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice.In
the case at bar, respondent did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rule proscribe. Through his letter, he threatened
complainant that should the latter fail to pay the amounts they propose as settlement, he would file and claim bigger
amounts including moral damages, as well as multiple charges such as tax evasion, falsification of documents, and
cancellation of business license to operate due to violations of laws. The threats are not only unethical for violating
Canon 19, but they also amount to blackmail. Blackmail is the extortion of money from a person by threats of accusation
or exposure or opposition in the public prints,obtaining of value from a person as a condition of refraining from making
an accusation against him, or disclosing some secret calculated to operate to his prejudice. In common parlance and in
general acceptation, it is equivalent to and synonymous with extortion, the exaction of money either for the performance
of a duty, the prevention of an injury, or the exercise of an influence. Not infrequently, it is extorted by threats, or by
operating on the fears or the credulity, or by promises to conceal or offers to expose the weaknesses, the follies, or the
crime of the victim.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is quite obvious that the respondent lawyers threat to file the cases against
complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to give in to his clients demands, not
respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he so gallantly claims; The writing of demand
letters is a standard practice and tradition in this jurisdiction, however, the letter in this case contains more than just a
simple demand to payit even contains a threat to file retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to
do with his clients claim for separation pay.Respondent does not find anything wrong with what he wrote, dismissing
the same as merely an act of pointing out massive violations of the law by the other party, and, with boldness, asserting
that a lawyer is under obligation to tell the truth, to report to the government commission of offenses punishable by the
State. He further asserts that the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and tradition and that our laws allow
and encourage the settlement of disputes. Respondents assertions, however, are misleading, for it is quite obvious that
respondents threat to file the cases against complainant was designed to secure some leverage to compel the latter to
give in to his clients demands. It was not respondents intention to point out complainants violations of the law as he so
gallantly claims. Far from it, the letter even contains an implied promise to keep silent about the said violations if
payment of the claim is made on the date indicated. Indeed, the writing of demand letters is a standard practice and
tradition in this jurisdiction. It is usually done by a lawyer pursuant to the principalagent relationship that he has with his
client, the principal. Thus, in the performance of his role as agent, the lawyer may be tasked to enforce his clients claim
and to take all the steps necessary to collect it, such as writing a letter of demand requiring payment within a specified
period. However, the letter in this case contains more than just a simple demand to pay. It even contains a threat to file
retaliatory charges against complainant which have nothing to do with his clients claim for separation pay. The letter was
obviously designed to secure leverage to compel complainant to yield to their claims. Indeed, letters of this nature are
definitely proscribed by the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The privileged nature of a demand letter is removed when a lawyer uses it to
blackmail someone and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client. Respondent cannot claim the
sanctuary provided by the privileged communication rule under which a private communication executed in the
performance of a legal duty is not actionable. The privileged nature of the letter was removed when respondent used it
to blackmail complainant and extort from the latter compliance with the demands of his client. [Pena vs. Aparicio, 525
SCRA 444(2007)]
Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472 , February 24, 2010

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Quantum of Proof; Administrative Cases; In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum
of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to discharge.In administrative
cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the
burden to discharge. We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully satisfied that the complainants
evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies the required quantum of proof in proving Atty. Macalalads negligence.
Same; Same; Negligence; The mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is considered per
se a violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides for the rule on negligence and states: Rule 18.03A lawyer shall not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. This Court has consistently
held, in construing this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is
considered per se a violation.
Same; Same; Same; The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from liability for his
negligence in handling a case.The circumstance that the client was also at fault does not exonerate a lawyer from
liability for his negligence in handling a case. In Canoy, we accordingly declared that the lawyer cannot shift the blame to
his client for failing to follow up on his case because it was the lawyers duty to inform his client of the status of the
case. Our rulings in Macarilay v. Seria, 458 SCRA 12 (2005) in Heirs of Ballesteros v. Apiag, 471 SCRA 111 (2005) and in
Villaflores v. Limos, 538 SCRA 140 (2007) were of the same tenor. In Villaflores, we opined that even if the client has been
equally at fault for the lack of communication, the main responsibility remains with the lawyer to inquire and know the
best means to acquire the required information. We held that as between the client and his lawyer, the latter has more
control in handling the case.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest
with utmost diligence.All these rulings drive home the fiduciary nature of a lawyers duty to his client once an
engagement for legal services is accepted. A lawyer so engaged to represent a client bears the responsibility of protecting
the latters interest with utmost diligence. The lawyer bears the duty to serve his client with competence and diligence,
and to exert his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his or her client. Accordingly,
competence, not only in the knowledge of law, but also in the management of the cases by giving these cases appropriate
attention and due preparation, is expected from a lawyer. [Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472(2010)]
Ramos vs. Ngaseo, 445 SCRA 529 , December 09, 2004
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code prohibiting lawyers from acquiring either by purchase or
assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by virtue of
their profession applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the clients property.Under Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from acquiring either by
purchase or assignment the property or rights involved which are the object of the litigation in which they intervene by
virtue of their profession. The prohibition on purchase is all embracing to include not only sales to private individuals but
also public or judicial sales. The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy disallows the transactions in
view of the fiduciary relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the peculiar control exercised by
these persons. It is founded on public policy because, by virtue of his office, an attorney may easily take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client and unduly enrich himself at the expense of his client. However, the said
prohibition applies only if the sale or assignment of the property takes place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the clients property. Consequently, where the property is acquired after the termination of the case, no
violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches.
Same; Same; Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence, not a
prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491.In the instant case, there was no actual acquisition of
the property in litigation since the respondent only made a written demand for its delivery which the complainant
refused to comply. Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not cause the transfer of ownership, hence,
not a prohibited transaction within the contemplation of Article 1491. Even assuming arguendo that such demand for
delivery is unethical, respondents act does not fall within the purview of Article 1491. The letter of demand dated
January 29, 2003 was made long after the judgment in Civil Case No. SCC-2128 became final and executory on January
18, 2002.
Same; Same; Disbarment; The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great cautiononly in a clear case of
misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the
bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty.We note that the report of the IBP Commissioner, as adopted
by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-47, does not clearly specify which acts of the respondent
constitute gross misconduct or what provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility have been violated. We find the
recommended penalty of suspension for 6 months too harsh and not proportionate to the offense committed by the
respondent. The power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty. All considered, a reprimand is deemed sufficient and reasonable.
Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 , September 21, 1949

1.ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIBNT, WHEN EXISTS."To constitute professional employment it
is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion * * *. It is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established * * *."
2.ID. ; ATTORNEY Is INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES.There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court
prohibiting attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed
to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and
section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court.
3.ID. ; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT Is SACRED.Information so received is sacred
to the employment to which it pertains, and to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the
interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the essential
security in, the relation of attorney and client.
4.ID.; ID.The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite party's
retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by him from his first client.
5.ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT Is FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC PoLiCY.The relation of attorney and
client is fbunded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the
parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these thoughts in mind, it
behooves attorneys, like Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate the chent's confidence, but also to avoid the
appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice
6.ID ; RETAINING FEE, WHAT Is."A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to insure and secure
his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is mtended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being
retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him, and the
payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in
payment of the services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for
the services which he has retained him to perform."
7.ID. ; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM.An information obtained from a client by a
member or assistant of a law firm is information imparted to the firm.
8.ID. ; PROPESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF.Prof essional confidence once reposed can never be divested by
expiration of professional employment.
9.ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY.The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the
parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary
jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but
embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them in their capacity of
attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings
between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in which they
may stand unequal. The courts act on the same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to
appear, to answer declaration.
10.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS.Attorneys are officers of the court where they practice, forming a
part of the machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the
court and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as to their clients. [Hilado vs.
David, 84 Phil. 569(1949)]
Bun Siong Yao vs. Aurelio, 485 SCRA 553 , March 30, 2006
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.It is essential to note that the
relationship between an attorney and his client is a fiduciary one. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on
him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications made to him in his
professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of a
client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is perpetual and does not cease with
the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or
by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.
Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Respondents act of filing multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues
constitutes forum shopping. He has inevitably utilized information he has obtained from his dealings with complainant
and complainants companies for his own end.Notwithstanding the veracity of his allegations, respondents act of filing
multiple suits on similar causes of action in different venues constitutes forum shopping, as correctly found by the
investigating commissioner. This highlights his motives rather than his cause of action. Respondent took advantage of his
being a lawyer in order to get back at the complainant. In doing so, he has inevitably utilized information he has obtained
from his dealings with complainant and complainants companies for his own end.
Same; Same; Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a tool
for instigating hostility against any personmost especially against a client or former client. Lawyers must conduct
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach. Lawyers cannot be allowed to exploit their profession for the purpose of exacting vengeance or as a
tool for instigating hostility against any personmost especially against a client or former client.
Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 , July 14, 2003

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Lawyer-client Relationship; An attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
confidence reposed on him. The long-established rule is that an attorney is not permitted to disclose communications
made to him in his professional character by a client, unless the latter consents. This obligation to preserve the
confidences and secrets of a client arises at the inception of their relationship. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the partys ceasing to employ
the attorney and retaining another, or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the
client.
Same; Same; Same; The privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to
communications which are legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer; It does not
extend to those made in contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. It must be stressed, however, that the
privilege against disclosure of confidential communications or information is limited only to communications which are
legitimately and properly within the scope of a lawful employment of a lawyer. It does not extend to those made in
contemplation of a crime or perpetration of a fraud. If the unlawful purpose is avowed, as in this case, the complainants
alleged intention to bribe government officials in relation to his case, the communication is not covered by the privilege
as the client does not consult the lawyer professionally. It is not within the profession of a lawyer to advise a client as to
how he may commit a crime as a lawyer is not a gun for hire. Thus, the attorney-client privilege does not attach, there
being no professional employment in the strict sense.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients, with integrity in a manner
that is beyond reproach.Be that as it may, respondents explanation that it was necessary for him to make the
disclosures in his pleadings fails to satisfy us. The disclosures were not indispensable to protect his rights as they were
not pertinent to the foreclosure case. It was improper for the respondent to use it against the complainant in the
foreclosure case as it was not the subject matter of litigation therein and respondents professional competence and legal
advice were not being attacked in said case. A lawyer must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients,
with integrity in a manner that is beyond reproach. His relationship with his clients should be characterized by the
highest degree of good faith and fairness. [Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75(2003)]
Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525 , December 18, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from borrowing money
from their clients unless the latters interests are protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice; A
lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. Respondents
liability is thus not for misappropriation or embezzlement but for violation of Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which forbids lawyers from borrowing money from their clients unless the latters interests are protected
by the nature of the case or by independent advice. In this case, respondents liability is compounded by the fact that not
only did he not give any security for the payment of the amount loaned to him but that he has also refused to pay the
said amount. His claim that he could not pay the loan because circumstances . . . did not allow it and that, because of
the passage of time, he somehow forgot about his obligation only underscores his blatant disregard of his obligation
which reflects on his honesty and candor. A lawyer is bound to observe candor, fairness, and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client.
Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationship; If a person, in respect to his business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults
with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the
attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional employment must be regarded as
established.Respondent claims that complainant is a close personal friend and that in helping redeem the property of
complainants parents, he did not act as a lawyer but as a friend, hence there is no client-attorney relationship between
them. This contention has no merit. As explained in Hilado v. David, To constitute professional employment it is not
essential that the client should have employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his
business affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity with the view to obtaining
professional advice or assistance, and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the
professional employment must be regarded as established [Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525(2001)]
Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422, March 30, 2004

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Disbarment; A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where
the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendantdisciplinary proceedings involve no private
interest and afford no redress for private grievance.Preliminarily, we agree with Commissioner Villanueva-Maala that
the manifestation of complainant Uy expressing his desire to dismiss the administrative complaint he filed against
respondent, has no persuasive bearing in the present case. Sec. 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court states that: . . . . No
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution,
withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. This is because: A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer
is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court
for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the
attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good
citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. Hence, if the evidence on record warrants, the respondent may
be suspended or disbarred despite the desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges.
Same; Same; Same; Attorney-Client Relationships; Words and Phrases; Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal
knowledge, training and experience.Practice of law embraces any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, as well as legal principles, practice or procedure and calls for legal knowledge, training and
experience. While it is true that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional
or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court, complainant failed to prove any of the circumstances enumerated above
that would warrant the disbarment or suspension of herein respondent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or
acquiesces with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance; There is no attorney-client relationship between a lawyer and
another person where the preparation and the proposed filing of a petition was only incidental to their personal
transaction.As a rule, an attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer voluntarily permits or acquiesces
with the consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view of
obtaining professional advice or assistance. It is not essential that the client should have employed the attorney on any
previous occasion or that any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for, neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as the advice
and assistance of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. Considering the attendant
peculiar circumstances, said rule cannot apply to the present case. Evidently, the facts alleged in the complaint for
Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents filed by respondent against complainant were obtained by respondent
due to his personal dealings with complainant. Respondent volunteered his service to hasten the issuance of the
certificate of title of the land he has redeemed from complainant. Respondents immediate objective was to secure the
title of the property that complainant had earlier bought from his son. Clearly, there was no attorney-client relationship
between respondent and complainant. The preparation and the proposed filing of the petition was only incidental to their
personal transaction.
Same; Same; Same; Violation of Confidentiality; There is no violation of the duty of a lawyer to preserve the confidence
and secrets of another where the facts alleged in a complaint for estafa filed by the lawyer against such person were
not obtained by the lawyer in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his
deceased son, and to hold otherwise would be precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect
his personal or proprietary interests.The alleged secrets of complainant were not specified by him in his affidavit-
complaint. Whatever facts alleged by respondent against complainant were not obtained by respondent in his
professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a property originally owned by his deceased son and therefore, when
respondent filed the complaint for estafa against herein complainant, which necessarily involved alleging facts that
would constitute estafa, respondent was not, in any way, violating Canon 21. There is no way we can equate the filing of
the affidavit-complaint against herein complainant to a misconduct that is wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity
and good demeanor or that renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. To hold otherwise would be
precluding any lawyer from instituting a case against anyone to protect his personal or proprietary interests. [Uy vs.
Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422(2004)]
Intestate Estate of the Deceased Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472 , April 29, 1971
Remedial law; Change of counsel; Court should be informed.Atty. Unson continued on record in the appellate court as
counsel for the estate as appellant therein and did not file therein any withdrawal as counsel and neither did the
petitioner inform said court of any change of counsel or of party-administrator, as required by Rule 138, section 26 of the
Rules of Court. More so, no appearance of any new counsel for the estate was ever filed with the appellate court.
Same; Completeness of service by registered mail.Service by registered mail of the appellate courts decision upon the
petitioners counsel of record was deemed completed and effected upon the addressees failure to claim his mail on the
fifth day after the first notice of the postmaster. This has ever since been the prevailing rule in the interests of public
policy and sound administration of justice, as most recently affirmed in Fojas vs. Navarro, L-26365, April 30, 1970, citing
a long line of applicable precedents.
Same; Counsel of estate, not of administrator.The party in the subject case was the intestate estate of the deceased
Luis C. Domingo, Sr. and that Atty. Unson represented the estate as counsel in the said case. The fact that his services
were engaged by Luis Domingo, Jr., in his (Luis) official capacity as administrator, did not make him the personal counsel
of Luis. Thus, notwithstanding Luis removal as administrator, Atty. Unson continued to represent the estate as counsel in
the appellate court. He continued to be authorized to represent the estate as its counsel, until the new administrator
should terminate his services which she never did.
Same; Courts admonition to counsel; Cooperation of litigants and their attorneys needed.The cooperation of litigants
and their attorneys is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided.
There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provided that the signature of an
attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay and expressly admonishes that for
a willful violation of this rule, an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action. [Intestate Estate of the Deceased
Luis C. Domingo, Sr. vs. Aquino, 38 SCRA 472(1971)]
Montano vs. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 358 SCRA 1 , May 21, 2001
Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good
cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances; A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.We find Atty. Dealcas
conduct unbecoming of a member of the legal profession. Under Canon 22 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Although he may
withdraw his services when the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services, under the circumstances of the
present case, Atty. Dealcas withdrawal was unjustified as complainant did not deliberately fail to pay him the attorneys
fees. In fact, complainant exerted honest efforts to fulfill his obligation. Respondents contemptuous conduct does not
speak well of a member of the bar considering that the amount owing to him was only P3,500.00. Rule 20.4 of Canon 20,
mandates that a lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall resort to judicial
action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Sadly, for not so large a sum owed to him by complainant,
respondent lawyer failed to act in accordance with the demands of the Code.
Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; Only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of
the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will disbarment be imposed as a penalty.The Court,
however, does not agree with complainants contention that the maximum penalty of disbarment should be imposed on
respondent lawyer. The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct that
seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of the bar will
disbarment be imposed as a penalty. It should never be decreed where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension,
would accomplish the end desired. In the present case, reprimand is deemed sufficient.
Venterez vs. Cosme, 535 SCRA 378 , October 10, 2007

Administrative Law; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the
principle that an attorney who undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination that is until the
case becomes final and executory.No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish to become his client,
but once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its termination, that is, until the case becomes final and
executory. A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and only
upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the client. This means that his
client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law and he may expect his
lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense.
Same; Same; Same; The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is,
however, considerably restricted; A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from
the clients written consent or from a good cause.The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to
terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or
terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably restricted. Among the fundamental rules
of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a case before
its final adjudication arises only from the clients written consent or from a good cause.
Same; Same; Same; A lawyer may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding with the written consent of
his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon the adverse party.A lawyer may retire at any time from
any action or special proceeding with the written consent of his client filed in court and with a copy thereof served upon
the adverse party. Should the client refuse to give his consent, the lawyer must file an application with the court. The
court, on notice to the client and adverse party, shall determine whether the lawyer ought to be allowed to retire. The
application for withdrawal must be based on a good cause.
Same; Same; Same; The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be granted by the court.
Assuming, nevertheless, that respondent was justified in withdrawing his services, he, however, cannot just do so and
leave complainants in the cold, unprotected. The lawyer has no right to presume that his petition for withdrawal will be
granted by the court. Until his withdrawal shall have been approved, the lawyer remains counsel of record who is
expected by his clients, as well as by the court, to do what the interests of his clients require. He must still appear
before the court to protect the interest of his clients by availing himself of the proper remedy, for the attorney-client
relations are not terminated formally until there is a withdrawal of record.
Same; Same; Same; Respondent reminded that the practice of law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who
are competent intellectually, academically and morally.All told, we rule and so hold that on account of respondents
failure to protect the interest of complainants, respondent indeed violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Respondent is reminded that the practice of law is a special
privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. This Court has been
exacting in its expectations for the members of the Bar to always uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession
and refrain from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence of the public. [Venterez vs. Cosme, 535
SCRA 378(2007)]
In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1 , August 15, 2001

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; Speedy Disposition of Cases; The failure of the counsel to submit the
required brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails disciplinary action; The accused in a criminal
case has the right to a swift and just disposition of his case, and lawyers are obliged to protect, not defeat, such right.
The failure of the counsel to submit the required brief within the reglementary period is an offense that entails
disciplinary action. The pernicious effect of Atty. Briones omission cannot be gainsaid. His failure to file an appellants
brief in G.R. No. 130965 has caused the appeal to remain inactive for more than a year, to the prejudice of his client, the
accused himself, who continues to languish in jail pending the resolution of his case. The accused in a criminal case has
the right to a swift and just disposition of his case. Lawyers are obliged to protect, not defeat, such right.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar is expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of his profession;
Cessation of his law practice is not an excuse for a lawyer in not filing the required brief.We have considered the
explanation of Atty. Briones for his failure to comply with the Courts directive and we find the same unsatisfactory. Such
omission can be attributed to pure negligence on the part of Atty. Briones which we deem inexcusable. He cannot deny
that his office received a copy of the Courts resolution ordering him to submit an appellants brief. The registry return
card shows that the notice to file appellants brief was received by the addressee on August 6, 1998. To exonerate himself
from liability, Atty. Briones claims that his secretary did not forward to him the mail matters received in his office. He,
however, cannot pass the blame to his secretary as he is personally responsible for his own communications. As a member
of the Bar, he is expected to exercise due diligence in the practice of his profession. He should not have passively waited
for his secretary to inform him about the letters and communications received in his law office, especially those coming
from the courts. He should have taken the initiative to check with her if there are important matters requiring his action
or attention. Neither is the cessation of his law practice an excuse for his failure to file the required brief. Even if it were
true that Atty. Briones has stopped practicing law, he still could not ignore the directives coming from the Court. It does
not appear from the records of G.R. No. 130965 that Atty. Briones has withdrawn his appearance. Unless he has
withdrawn his appearance in the case, the Court would still consider him as counsel for the accused-appellant and he is
expected to comply with all its orders and directives.
Same; Same; Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its
importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.It should be stressed that every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a
fee or for free. A lawyers fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful of the responsibilities that
should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert his best efforts to protect within the bounds of the law the interest
of his client. The Code of Professional Responsibility dictates that a lawyer shall serve his client with competence and
diligence and he should never neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. [In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1(2001)]
Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441 , March 20, 2012

Attorneys; Legal Ethics; A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand.With
regard to the jewelry and watch entrusted to him, Casuga alleged that Nevada pawned them and thereafter instructed
Casugas wife to redeem them with the latters money. He added that Nevada then instructed his wife to sell the
valuables and use the proceeds to reimburse herself for the redemption price. Again, however, Casugas allegations are
unsupported by a single shred of evidence. Pawnshop receipts would have provided the best evidence under the
circumstances. But they were not presented, too. Moreover, Casugas admission that the valuables are indeed in his
possession, without any adequate reason, supports Nevadas version of the story. Casugas failure to return such property
or remit the proceeds of the sale is a blatant violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (the Code).
The Codes Canon 16 and Rule 16.3 state: CANON 16A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client
that may come into his profession. Rule 16.03A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy
his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same
extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; Respondents act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is a plain violation of Rule IV, Section 3(a) of
the Notarial Rules, and it likewise partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct.None of the requirements contained
in Rule IV, Sec. 1(c), as would justify a notary signing in behalf of a contracting party, was complied with in this case.
Moreover, Casugas act of affixing his signature above the printed name Edwin T. Nevada, without any qualification,
veritably made him a party to the contract of lease in question. Thus, his act of notarizing a deed to which he is a party is
a plain violation of the aforequoted Rule IV, Sec. 3(a) of the Notarial Rules, for which he can be disciplinarily sanctioned
provided under Rule XI, Sec. 1(b)(10) of the Notarial Rules, which provides: SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative
Sanctions.x x x (b) In addition, the Executive Judge may revoke the commission of, or impose appropriate
administrative sanctions upon, any notary public who: (10) knowingly performs or fails to perform any other act
prohibited or mandated by these Rules; Aside from being a violation of the Notarial Rules, Casugas aforementioned act
partakes of malpractice of law and misconduct punishable under the ensuing Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Notary Public; A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are the
very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what
are stated therein.In Dela Cruz v. Zabala, 442 SCRA 407 (2004), the Court adjudged the respondent notary public guilty
of gross negligence for failing to require the parties to be physically present before him. In revoking the erring notarys
commission, the Court, in Dela Cruz, stressed the significance of notarization and proceeded to define the heavy burden
that goes when a lawyer is commissioned as a notary public. The Court wrote: x x x A notary public should not notarize a
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally appeared
before him to attest to the contents and the truth of what are stated therein. These acts of the affiants cannot be
delegated because what are stated therein are facts they have personal knowledge of and are personally sworn to.
Otherwise, their representatives names should appear in the said documents as the ones who executed the same.
[Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441(2012)]
Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 37, Appealing for Judicial
Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 , September 19, 2007
Administrative Law; Judges; Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the
judiciary who have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct.Concerned with safeguarding the integrity
of the judiciary, this Court has come down hard and wielded the rod of discipline against members of the judiciary who
have fallen short of the exacting standards of judicial conduct. This is because a judge is the visible representation of the
law and of justice. He must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not only
with respect to the performance of his official duties but also as to his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual. His character must be able to withstand the most searching public scrutiny because the ethical principles and
sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system.
Same; Same; Clemency; Proof of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.Clemency, as
an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public confidence in the
courts. The Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation and a showing of potential
and promise are indispensable.
Same; Same; Same; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.In the exercise of its constitutional power of
administrative supervision over all courts and all personnel thereof, the Court lays down the following guidelines in
resolving requests for judicial clemency: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but
should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A
subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong
presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a
period of reformation. 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such
as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal
system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other
relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Same; Same; Same; Judge Diazs 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his dedication to the
institution.In this case, Judge Diaz expressed sincere repentance for his past malfeasance. He humbly accepted the
verdict of this Court in Alvarez. Three years have elapsed since the promulgation of Alvarez. It is sufficient to ensure that
he has learned his lesson and that he has reformed. His 12 years of service in the judiciary may be taken as proof of his
dedication to the institution. Thus, the Court may now open the door of further opportunities in the judiciary for him.
[Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency,
533 SCRA 534(2007)]
Re: Petition for Judicial Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467 , March 06, 2012
judicial post or as Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman.Section 5, Rule 4 of the Rules of the JBC provides: SEC. 5.
Disqualification.The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman: 1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases; 2. Those with
pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and 3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an
administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least a fine of more than P10,000, unless he has been granted
judicial clemency.
Same; Judicial Clemency; Guidelines in Resolving Requests for Judicial Clemency.In A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC (Re: Letter of
Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency), 533 SCRA 539
(2007), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, thus: 1. There must be
proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the
officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of
the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or
similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from
the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform; 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that
he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There
must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship
and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public
service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. [Re: Petition for Judicial
Clemency of Judge Irma Zita V. Masamayor, 667 SCRA 467(2012)]
Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572 , August 21, 1996

Courts; Judges; Extortion; The intention of a judge in meeting with complainant and in giving him advise is, to say the
least, far from the behavior of a member of judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly and
corruption.Our minds can not sit easy with regard to the charge of extortion. Respondent admitted having met
complainant in the early morning of August 1, 1994, for the purpose of informing complainant that he could participate in
the habeas corpus proceeding. During said meeting, respondent also admitted having told complainant of the potency
of Mamangons motion for reconsideration and the amount of money which complainant would spend to hire a good
lawyer to represent him in the proceeding. Respondents seemingly benign conduct of advising complainant on matters
pending before respondent puzzle our minds since we are not told of any special circumstance which would justify
respondents special interest over complainants concern. Respondent, however, gives no other reason for meeting and
advising complainant that could dispel ill thoughts in reference to respondents motives. Any person with a reasonable
mind would deduce that respondents actuation meant something much more than what he explicitly suggested, for what
could be respondents reason, in mentioning the potency of Mamangons motion for reconsideration and the amount of
money which complainant might spend in resisting the same, than to insinuate that complainant could save on expenses
and be certain of the result by spending the same amount for the judge. Certainly, it is simply nave to say that a
proposal to that effect could be done only through the use of direct words expressing respondents intention to be willing
and able to decide the case in complainants favor for a consideration. Respondents pretended innocence over the
perceived meaning of his insinuation is unpersuasive considering his long years in the practice of law. Thus, the intention
of respondent in meeting with complain-ant and in giving him advice is, to say the least, far from the behavior of a
member of judiciary, who should, at all times, avoid the slightest hint of anomaly and corruption.
Same; Same; Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct himself in a manner that
would avoid any suspicion of irregularity.Verily, the duty of a judge is not only to administer justice but also to conduct
himself in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of irregularity. He has the avowed duty of promoting confidence in
the judicial system.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Criminal Proceedings; An accused against whom the information has been dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction may no longer be detained.Clear as the basis may be, its application is, however, erroneous. Even
assuming that Mamangon was lawfully imprisoned at the outset, at the time he filed his motion for reconsideration, the
decision of Judge Macapagal declaring his court to be without jurisdiction had already become final and considering that
no information had been re-filed, the detention of Mamangon was untenable and illegal. An accused against whom the
information has been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction may no longer be detained; the information under which the
accused is being held for trial loses its force and effect. There is simply nothing to hold the accused answerable for.
Section 14 of Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court speaks of a person lawfully imprisoned.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Habeas Corpus; When the court where the criminal case was filed is without jurisdiction, the
authority of the court to hold the accused in confinement pending trial is a valid subject of a petition for habeas
corpus.The accused Mamangon was no longer lawfully imprisoned at the time the motion for reconsideration was filed.
Thus, respondent should not have applied Section 12 of Rule 114 but instead reversed his former decision by granting the
petition and ordering the release of the accused without requiring him to post bail. When the court where the criminal
case was filed is without jurisdiction, the authority of the court to the accused in confinement pending trial is a valid
subject of a petition for habeas corpus.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ of habeas corpus will lie
where the order is void where the court issuing it had no jurisdiction, but this remedy should not be secured before a
court of equal rank in order to avoid undue interference upon the functions of another branch unless the former court
has declared itself to be without jurisdiction. Where the petitioner is held upon a judicial order, the writ will lie where
the order is void because the court issuing it had no jurisdiction over the crime charged or over the person accused where
the latter had challenged on time, the jurisdiction of the court over his person (Francisco, p. 665, Rules of Court in the
Philippines Vol. V-B; citing the case of Banayo vs. President of San Pablo, 2 Phil. 413; Collins vs. Wolfe, 4 Phil. 534;
Malinao, et al. vs. Peterson, No. L-16464, July 26, 1960). But this remedy should not be secured before a court of equal
rank in order to avoid undue interference upon the functions of another branch unless the former court has declared
itself to be without jurisdiction, as in the instant case.
Same; Same; In order to discipline a judge, it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being
contrary to law and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice. The erroneous
application of the rule by respondent nevertheless cannot be the sole basis for disciplining him. As we have ruled in the
past, in order to discipline a judge, it must clearly be shown that the judgment or order is unjust as being contrary to law
and that the judge rendered it with conscious and deliberate intent to do injustice (Re Climaco, 55 SCRA 107). Judges
cannot be subjected to liabilitycivil, criminal or administrativefor any of their official acts, no matter how erroneous,
so long as they act in good faith. It is only when they act fraudulently or corruptly, or with gross ignorance may they be
held criminally or administratively responsible (Valdez vs. Valera, 81 SCRA 246). Considering the circumstances of the
case at bar, we cannot hold respondent liable for his erroneous action. An erroneous decision or order is presumed to
have been issued in good faith in the absence of proof to the contrary.
Same; Same; While the decision of a judge may be erroneous, its malicious intent, however, may not be presumed in the
absence of any evidence to prove the same.Complainant herein alleged that the order of respondent judge releasing the
accused on bail was maliciously motivated for having been issued several days after the attempted extortion. We find the
decision of respondent erroneous but its malicious intent, however, may not be presumed in the absence of any evidence
to prove the same. It might be suggested that, respondents ill motives may be presumed considering his actuation prior
to the issuance of the questioned erroneous order. We are, however, unable to find a clear and definite connection
between an attempt at extortion and the subsequent erroneous orders. It would be unjust to presume wrong intentions
considering that respondents questioned orders are not totally unjustifiable. [Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572(1996)]
Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 , January 09, 1987
Legal and Judicial Ethics; Both bench and bar to encourage respect for courts .It is the duty of both counsel and judge
to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to
undermine the peoples respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice, is to be avoided. And this, even if
both have to restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and respondent
is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Relation between counsel and judge based on mutual respectThe relations between counsel and judge
should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of another. Thus, counsel is expected
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. Although allowed some latitude of
remarks or comment in the furtherance of causes, he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may properly be addressed by one gentleman to another. Certainly
and most especially in our culture, raising ones voice is a sign of disrespect, improper to one whose investiture into the
legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior towards the courts.
Contempt; Powers of judicial officers to declare, lawyers in contempt based on preservative principle.Judicial officers
are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold
counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in
contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously
walking out of the courtroom.
Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 , September 12, 1986

Same; Public Officers; Judges; Loyalty of those in the public service must be to the Constitution and the people.The
notion nurtured under the past regime that those appointed to public office owe their primary allegiance to the
appointing authority and are accountable to him alone and not to the people or the Constitution must be discarded. The
function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public
posts. While the appointee may acknowledge with gratitude the opportunity thus given of rendering public service, the
appointing authority becomes functus officio and the primary loyalty of the appointed must be rendered to the
Constitution and the sovereign people in accordance with his sacred oath of office. To paraphrase the late Chief Justice
Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court, the Justices and Judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their
oath of office, guided only by the Constitution and their own conscience and honor. [Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA
43(1986)]
Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546 , June 27, 1988

Judges; Appointment; It is the privilege of the respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee
with whom he will work; He cannot be held administratively liable if he did not choose to have complainant
reappointed.On the first charge of harassment, the respondent explained that he did not recommend the
reappointment of complainant Mercedita G. Lorenzo because she was inefficient. Such reluctance of the respondent must
be because she was a protegee of the respondents predecessor, former Judge Jose Parentela, Jr., who reportedly
exposed the illegal issuance of the subpoena to Obosa by the respondent. Nevertheless, it is the privilege of the
respondent as presiding judge of his court to recommend the employee with whom he will work. If he did not choose to
have said complainant reappointed, he cannot thereby be held administratively liable.
Same; Rule on inhibition of judges.No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is
pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according to the rules of the civil
law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record. A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Same; Same; Rule is explicit that the judge must secure the written consent of all the parties not a mere verbal consent
much less a tacit acquiescence; Failure of respondent to observe the elementary rules of conduct betrays his unusual
personal interest in the case.From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a
counsel without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. The
respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he proceeded to preside over the case and
to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the
parties, not a mere verbal consent much less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by
them and entered upon the record. The failure of the respondent to observe these elementary rules of conduct betrays
his unusual personal interest in the case which prevailed over and above his sworn duty to administer the law impartially
and without any fear or favor.
Same; Respondent guilty of the charge against him.No doubt the respondent is guilty of the charge against him. There
was no reason for him to require the appearance of Obosa in his court, even for a conference. The criminal case pending
before him was not yet ready for trial as the accused was at large. If truly respondent was impelled with the desire to
locate the whereabouts of accused Salamat so that he could be arrested, all that he could have done was to have a
policeman or court employee go to Muntinlupa for the purpose, or he himself could have done so.
Same; Same; His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to appear before him is obvious.
Under Section 3, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, a subpoena shall be signed by the clerk of court or by the judge, if the
court has no clerk, under the seal of the court. The respondent had a clerk of court, Miss Gloria Lorenzo, and yet he
himself issued and signed the subpoena. His undue interest to bring out Obosa from his confinement allegedly to appear
before him is obvious.
Same; Same; Respondent committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty.The respondent
committed grave and serious misconduct in the performance of his duty. He demonstrated his unfitness to be a judge as
in fact by his behavior he has placed the judiciary in disrepute. He abused the great powers of his office so that he should
not stay a moment longer as a member of the judiciary. [Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546(1988)]
Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411 , June 20, 2003

Court; Judges; Code of Judicial Conduct; Delay in Disposition of Cases; Failure to comply with the mandate of the
Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious misconduct which is detrimental to the honor and
integrity of a judicial office.It is not disputed that, it took respondent judge over 16 months to render his decision in
Civil Case No. LP-96-300 after it was submitted for decision. The Constitution mandates lower court judges to decide a
case within ninety (90) days from its submission. Likewise, the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates judges to administer
justice without delay and directs every judge to dispose of the courts business promptly within the period prescribed by
the law and the rules. We have emphasized strict observance of this duty in order to minimize, if not totally eradicate,
the twin problems of congestion and delay that have long plagued our courts. It is an oft-repeated maxim that justice
delayed is often justice denied. Thus, any delay in the administration of justice, no matter how brief, may result in
depriving the litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case. Delay ultimately affects the image of the judiciary.
Failure to comply with the mandate of the Constitution and of the Code of Judicial Conduct constitutes serious
misconduct, which is detrimental to the honor and integrity of a judicial office. Inability to decide a case despite the
ample time prescribed is inexcusable, constitutes gross inefficiency, and warrants administrative sanction of the
defaulting judge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the peoples faith in our judicial system, and
lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute.Delay in the rendition of judgments diminishes the peoples faith in our
judicial system, and lowers its standards and brings it into disrepute. In the event that judges cannot comply with the
deadlines prescribed by law, they should apply for extensions of time to avoid administrative sanctions. The Court allows
a certain degree of latitude to judges and grants them reasonable extensions of time to resolve cases upon proper
application by the judges concerned and on meritorious grounds. At the very least, respondent judge should have
requested for an extension of time to render judgment once he knew that he could not comply with the prescribed 90-
day period to render a judgment. In so doing, he would have been able to apprise litigants as to the status of the case
and the reason for the delay, if any. It would have shown his mindfulness of the deadlines.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under Section 4, Rule
140 of the Rules of Court, as amended.Undue delay in rendering a decision constitutes a less serious charge under
Section 4, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended. If found guilty thereof, the judge shall be suspended from office
without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month or more than three (3) months; or imposed a fine of
more than P10,000, but not exceeding P20,000, pursuant to Section 10, Rule 140.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held administratively
accountable for lapses and offenses committed during his incumbency. Although he may no longer be dismissed or
suspended, fines may still be meted out to be deducted from his retirement benefits.Except for the mitigating
circumstance, we are in agreement with the OCA recommendations in this case. The record shows that this is not the first
time that respondent has been called to account by this Court. In 1992, he was fined for gross partiality to a party. In
1996, he was admonished for delay in the disposition of a case. In 1999, he was reprimanded. Although respondent has
retired on June 3, 2001, the recommendation of the OCA that a fine be imposed on him is still in order. Worth stressing,
even after a judge has retired from the service, he may still be held administratively accountable for lapses and offenses
committed during his incumbency. Although he may no longer be dismissed or suspended, fines may still be meted out to
be deducted from his retirement benefits. [Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411(2003)]
Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 , December 07, 1993

Judges; Proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be used as basis for administrative discipline against a judge if he is not
charged for immorality prior to his appointment.Respondent is not charged for immorality committed before his
appointment. Accordingly, proof of prior immoral conduct cannot be a basis for his administrative discipline in this case.
The respondent may have undergone moral reformation after his appointment, or his appointment could have completely
transformed him upon the solemn realization that a public office is a public trust and public officers and employees must
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. (Section 1, Article XI, 1987 Constitution). It would be unreasonable
and unfair to presume that since he had wandered from the path of moral righteousness, he could never retrace his steps
and walk proud and tall again in that path. No man is beyond information and redemption. A lawyer who aspires for the
exalted position of a magistrate knows, or ought to know, that he must pay a high price for that honorhis private and
official conduct must at all times be free from the appearance of impropriety. (Jugueta vs. Boncaros, 60 SCRA 27 [1974]).
And the lawyer who is thereafter appointed thereto must perforce be presumed to have solemnly bound himself to a way
of conduct free from any hint or suspicion of impropriety.
Same; Judges official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety.In short, the respondent suddenly
became indiscreet; he encumbered to the sweet memories of the past and he was unable to disappoint Sol who asked for
his legal advice on a matter which involved her employment. Such indiscretions indubitably cast upon his conduct an
appearance of impropriety. He thus violated Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which mandates that [a] judges
official conduct should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon the bench
and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach, and Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that [a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities.
Same; Violation of rule regarding official court session hours amounts to neglect of duty.It is, therefore, clear that on
17 July 1992 the respondent had left his office during office hours and, considering the distance between Mandaluyong
and his office at the City Hall of Manila and the usual traffic condition, it was impossible for him to have reached his
officeif at all he did proceed to itin time for the commencement of the official session hours in the afternoon, i.e.,
2:00 p.m. (Paragraph 5, Interim and Transitional Rules and Guidelines Relative to the Implementation of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981). Thus, for purely personal reasons, he violated the rule regarding official session hours. Such
violation amounted to neglect of duty.
Same; Immorality not confined to sexual matters.Besides, immoralityfor which the respondent is chargedis not
based alone on illicit sexual intercourse. It is settled that: immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but
includes conducts inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity, and dissoluteness; or is
wilful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community,
and as an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. (Blacks Law Dictionary, Sixth ed., 1990, 751).
[Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239(1993)]
Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 , July 12, 1991

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Administrative case for immorality; Effect of affidavit of desistance.Generally, the Court
attaches no persuasive value to affidavits of desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought, as in the case at
bar. As held in People v. Obina: It would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimonies solemnly taken before the
courts of justice simply because the witnesses who had given them later on changed their mind for one reason or
another; for such rule would make solemn trials a mockery and place the investigation of truth at the mercy of
unscrupulous witness.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence.It is of no import that the evidence on record is not sufficient to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the facts of concubinage having indeed existed and been committed. This is not a criminal case for concubinage
but an administrative matter that invokes the power of supervision of this Court over the members of the judiciary.
Same; Same; Same.The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala and as
a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code
dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must
behave with propriety at all times. As we have very recently explained, a judges official life can not simply be detached
or separated from his personal existence. Thus: Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and
willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen. A judge should
personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the
performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion. [Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75(1991)]
In re VICENTE SOTTO, for contempt of court., 82 Phil. 595 , January 21, 1949
CONTEMPT; POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT is INHERENT IN ALL COURTS OF SUPERIOR JURISDICTION.That the power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts of superior jurisdiction independently of any special expression of
statute, is a doctrine or principle uniformly accepted and applied by the courts of last resort in the United States, which
is applicable in this .jurisdiction since our Constitution and courts of justice are patterned after those of that country.
2.ID.; CRITICISM OR COMMENT ON DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT, ExTENT AND SCOPE OF.Mere criticism or comment on
the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good faith
may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if
committed; but if it is not well taken and obviously erroneous it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or
modifying its decision.
3.ID.; ID.To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders
and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the
part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice.
4.ID. ; ID.The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people
may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this court and believe that they can not
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
would be the result.
5.ID.; ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DUTIES TOWARD THE SUPREME COURT.As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Attorney V.S., like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity
according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect
to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
6.ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS; MAINTENANCE OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE
JUDICIARY.The constitional guaranty of freedom of speech and the press must be protected to its fullest extent, but
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As
important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally
sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and
should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former receives its prerogative
and the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered
by publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of
justice, this Court will not hesitate to exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be
permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly manner free from outside interference obstructive
of the constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last resort, as an
individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.
In re Aguas, 1 Phil., 1 , August 08, 1901

CONTEMPT or COURT; TREATMENT OF WITNESS.An attorney may rightfully protest against personal violence to a witness
at the hands of the court, and such protest, if respectful, is not contempt of court.
2.ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT.A finding that an attorney's attitude toward the court was "menacing" is a mere conclusion and
will not support a judgment of contempt. [In re Aguas, 1 Phil., 1(1901)]
Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 , July 25, 1989

Judges; Inhibition of Judges; The rule on inhibition of judges is under paragraph 1, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised
Rules of Court.Rule 137, Section 1 of the new Rules of Court provides: Section 1. Disqualification of JudgesNo judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel
within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is
the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case for just or valid reasons other
than those mentioned above.
Same; Same; Same; Denial of the Motion for inhibition done in the valid and judicious exercise of the function and duty
of the judge.It must be observed that the Motion for Inhibition, as correctly stated by Judge Andal in his orders denying
the same, cited no valid ground, which fact was confirmed by the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel for the accused in
the criminal cases and the defendants in the civil cases. There is, therefore, no doubt that the denial of the said motion
was not whimsical or capricious nor was the said denial intended to spite the petitioner, as the petitioner would want this
Court to believe, but was done in the valid and judicious exercise of his function and duty as judge.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court agrees that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary .
We agree with the Solicitor General that the state of hostility being pressed by the petitioner is purely imaginary. Indeed
the petitioner had not presented any evidence to support his conclusion that the filing of the petition for certiorari
docketed as UDK 8748 and UDK 8822 and the administrative cases adverted to, caused the displeasure of Judge Andal as
to affect his impartiality in trying petitioners cases. In fact, such allegations were refuted by Judge Andal when he
categorically stated that he does not normally resent the filing of certiorari cases before this Court where he is
impleaded as a mere nominal party, after all, when still a practitioner he too filed certiorari cases. Moreover, as a judge,
he knows he has neither the reason nor luxury of time to entertain such a feeling, preoccupied as he is with the many
cases assigned to him.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Analysis of the assailed orders belies petitioners charge of bias or prejudice and hostilities.
A circumspective analysis of the assailed orders belies the petitioners charge of bias or prejudice and hostility, as all of
the said orders appear to have been issued in accordance with law and nowhere was there a showing of any outward
manifestation of the supposed state of hostility between Judge Andal and petitioner as to warrant the inhibition or
disqualification of the former. And having denied the Motion for Inhibition, Judge Andal acted within his jurisdiction when
he continued to take cognizance of all the cases pending before him, there being no writ of injunction or a restraining
order issued, enjoining him to cease and desist from acting on the said cases.
Same; Same; Same; Mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending
before the lower Court will not interrupt the course of the latter; Mere filing of an administrative case against
respondent judge not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case.The Court has held that mere pendency of a
special civil action for certiorari commenced in relation to a case pending before the lower court, does not interrupt the
course of the latter when there is no writ of injunction restraining it. Likewise, the mere filing of an administrative case
against respondent judge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on every occasion the party
apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired
disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the judge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases
would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the
courts. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the
latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial, and on this regard the petitioner failed.
Same; Same; Damages; Acts of Judge Andal in denying the motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with the
trial were done in a regular manner and considered as his official acts thus he is not answerable for damages.In Aberca
v. Ver, we postulated thus: The purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished
rights and freedom enshrined in the constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights
with impunity. Under said article judges are excluded from liability, provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a
violation of the Penal Code and other penal statute. As we have earlier stated, the acts of Judge Andal in denying the
motion for inhibition and in thereafter proceeding with the trial of the different criminal and civil cases pending before
his court were done in a regular manner and were considered as his official acts, thus, he is not answerable for damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner reminded of his basic duty with the Court and its judicial officers .An important
point that should not be overlooked in this case is petitioners audacious propensity of filing certiorari and administrative
cases against the respondent judge based on flimsy and unfounded charges he can conceive. Thus, it behooves us to
remind the petitioner of his basic duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
officers; to conduct himself with all good fidelity to the courts; to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance;
that his duty to render respectful civility, without fawning, to the courts is indeed essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Thus, he should be courteous, fair, and circumspect, not petulant, combative, or bellicose in his dealings with
the courts; and finally, that the use of disrespectful, intemperate, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements by an
attorney in his pleading or motion is not only a violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the canons of
professional ethics, but also constitutes direct contempt of court for which a lawyer may be disciplined. [Aparicio vs.
Andal, 175 SCRA 569(1989)]
Gandionco vs. Pearanda, 155 SCRA 725 , November 27, 1987

Same; Disqualification of judges; Divergence of opinion as to applicable laws and jurisprudence between a judge and
partys counsel not a ground for disqualification.Petitioners contention is without merit. Divergence of opinions
between a judge hearing a case and a partys counsel, as to applicable laws and jurisprudence, is not a sufficient ground
to disqualify the judge from hearing the case, on the ground of bias and manifest partiality. This is more so, in this case,
where we find the judges disposition of petitioners motions to be sound and well-taken. [Gandionco vs. Pearanda, 155
SCRA 725(1987)]
Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 , July 25, 1996

Courts; Judges; People who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be proficient in both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest integrity, probity
and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives.The integrity of the Judiciary rests not
only upon the fact that it is able to administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community
that the people who run the system have done justice. At times, the strict manner by which we apply the law may, in
fact, do justice but may not necessarily create confidence among the people that justice, indeed, is served. Hence, in
order to create such confidence, the people who run the judiciary, particularly judges and justices, must not only be
proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest
integrity, probity, and unquestionable moral uprightness, both in their public and private lives. Only then can the people
be reassured that the wheels of justice in this country run with fairness and equity, thus creating confidence in the
judicial system.
Same; Same; A judge should not only possess proficiency in law, but should likewise possess moral integrity for the
people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.The Court has adhered and set forth the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the judiciary must observe (Sicat vs. Alcantara, 161 SCRA 284 [1988]). A
magistrate is judged not only by his official acts but also by his private morals, to the extent that such private morals are
externalized (Junio vs. Rivera, 225 SCRA 688 [1993]). He should not only possess proficiency in law but should likewise
possess moral integrity for the people look up to him as a virtuous and upright man.
Same; Same; Respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary.
Respondent has failed to measure up to these exacting standards. He has behaved in a manner unbecoming of a judge and
as model of moral uprightness. He has betrayed the peoples high expectations and diminished the esteem in which they
hold the judiciary in general. We need not repeat the narration of lewd and lustful acts committed by respondent judge
in order to conclude that he is indeed unworthy to remain in office. The audacity under which the same were committed
and the seeming impunity with which they were perpetrated shock our sense of morality. All roads lead us to the
conclusion that respondent judge has failed to behave in a manner that will promote confidence in the judiciary. His
actuations, if condoned, would damage the integrity of the judiciary, fomenting distrust in the system. Hence, his acts
deserve no less than the severest form of disciplinary sanction of dismissal from the service.
Same; Same; Respondent judge took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on
them, taking advantage of his superior position.The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that
complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He
took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in
loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his
superior position.
Same; Same; Respondent judge had violated the Code of Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the
embodiment of competence, integrity and independence and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in
all activities and to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.Respondent may
indeed be a legally competent person as evidenced by his published law books (translations from English to Tagalog) and
his legal studies abroad, but he has demonstrated himself to be wanting of moral integrity. He has violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct which requires every judge to be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence and to
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary. Having tarnished the image of the Judiciary, respondent, the Court holds without any
hesitation, must be meted out the severest form of disciplinary sanctiondismissal from the service.
Liwanag vs. Lustre, 306 SCRA 55 , April 21, 1999

Courts; Judges; Administrative Law; As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in deciding
administrative casesonly substantial evidence is required.As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in
deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required, as clearly provided for under Rule 133 of the Revised
Rules of Evidence: Sec. 5. Substantial evidence.In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Same; Same; Immorality; Evidence; Photographs; By their very nature, acts of sexual congress are not proper subjects of
photographs.It is true that the pictures do not show respondent and complainant actually engaging in any form of sexual
congress. However, this is understandable since by their very nature, such acts are not proper subjects of photographs.
Often, as in this case, what is available to us is only the narration of the parties involved.
Same; Same; Same; Serious Misconduct; The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials
at every level in the administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the publics faith and trust in the
judiciary.The Court cannot countenance any act or omission, on the part of the officials at every level in the
administration of justice, which erodes rather than enhances the publics faith and trust in the judiciary. Respondents
disgraceful conduct surely merits sanctions even if he has already retired as of November 1, 1998. For the serious
misconduct of respondent, the penalty provided for in Rule 140, Section 10, of the Rules of Court, by way of fine in the
maximum amount should be imposed.
People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 , August 13, 1990

Same; Same; Same; Contempt; Nature of; Purpose of.Besides, contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude,
a flouting or arrogant belligerence, a defiance of the court. And, while courts are inherently empowered to punish for
contempt to the end that they may enforce their authority. preserve their integrity, maintain their dignity, and insure the
effectiveness of the administration of justice, nevertheless, such power should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle, for the power to punish for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should
not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice.
Same; Same; Judge; Rule that a judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just and valid reasons,
from sitting in a case.In the case at bar, the reason relied upon for the inhibition or disqualification of respondent
Judge, i.e. manifest partiality to private respondent, is not based on any of the grounds enumerated in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 which per se disqualifies a judge from sitting in a case, but on the second paragraph
thereof. The settled rule is that the judge is left to decide for himself whether he will desist, for just or valid reasons,
from sitting in a case, Respondent Judge has not as yet decided whether or not he will inhibit himself from further
hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 in the face of the prosecution's motion to disqualify or inhibit him. It would be
premature for the Court at this stage to rule on the matter.
Javier vs. De Guzman, 192 SCRA 434 , December 19, 1990

Judges; Respondent judge took advantage of his position as Regional Trial Judge of Makati by filing the collection case
against complainants in said court.As to the second chargethat Respondent took advantage of his position as Makati
Regional Trial Court Judge by filing the collection case against Complainants in said Courtwe quote with approval Justice
de la Fuente's observations thereon: "x x x The civil case was filed by respondent with the Makati RTC on September 8,
1988; and respondent admits that he was 'detailed indefinitely to Branch 142 of the same Court on June 30, 1988 and
assumed office thereat on July 5, 1988.' Instead of filing the suit in Quezon City where the Javiers reside or in Manila
where respondent resides, respondenttaking advantage of what he calls the waiver of venue stipulation in the
Memorandum of Agreement (which states that 'in case of litigation, venue shall be in any court in Metro Manila, at the
option of the Third Party,' i.e., the respondent)chose to file the case in Makati. "True, considering the abovecited
stipulation, it might be said that respondent was acting in the legal exercise of the option granted to him in the
Agreement. Nonetheless, the undersigned submits that in thus acting, respondent had fallen short of what is expected of
him as a Judge and officer of the court among whose duties it is to see to it that public confidence in the honor, dignity,
integrity and independence of the judiciary is not eroded, pursuant to Canons 3 and 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics,
supra. It is reasonably to be expected, considering the peculiar Filipino psyche, personality and cultureof which a Judge
like respondent is presumably awarethat the public, particularly respondent's adversary in this case, would naturally be
apprehensive that respondent might exert influence to favor himself, to the detriment of his said adversary. And so it
turned out, this was precisely the substance of complainant's second charge. Indeed, instead of promoting public
confidence in the dignity, honor, integrity and independence of the Judiciary, as every Judge is urged to do by the Canons
just cited, respondent's aforesaid behavior produced the opposite result."
Same; Respondent judge was found guilty on three (3) counts of irresponsible, improper and dishonorable conduct, and
was severely censured.All told, traces of animosity and harassment on the part of Respondent Judge are all too evident,
in sharp contrast to what a Judge should bethe embodiment of what is judicious, proper and fair. Wherefore, finding
Respondent Judge, Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr. guilty on three (3) counts of irresponsible, improper and dishonorable
conduct in disregard of the Code of Judicial Ethics, he is hereby SEVERELY CENSURED, with a stern warning that a
repetition of the said acts or similar acts in the future shall receive graver sanctions.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA 66 , March 31, 2006
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a judge
should not seek publicity for personal vainglorya parallel proscription for lawyers is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that: a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that a judge should not seek
publicity for personal vainglory. A parallel proscription, this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility: a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. This means that
lawyers and judges alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the same by acting
as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, (i)f
lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding
their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more reasons should judges be
prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who
thrive by publicity.
Same; Same; In Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc., 233 SCRA 378, 408 (1993), the Supreme Court explained that the use of an
ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is permittedby including therein the honors he received from his law
school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of
judges.In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers is
permitted and that the card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected
with, address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. In herein case, Judge Floros calling cards cannot
be considered as simple and ordinary. By including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of
being a bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Same; Same; Misconduct; The Supreme Court found the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-
laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.We find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of
simple misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that Judge Floro was
not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst
for recognition. Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human upon
donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory,
they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to observe.
Same; Same; Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an
audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity.As to the charge
that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that
this is likewise violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary publicity.
Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers
and litigants who very well might interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges as
the bastion of justiceconfident, competent and true. And to discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure
of his capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.
Civil Procedure; Judgments; No judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until and
unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated.As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the
release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of stenographic
notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals wherein we held that no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory,
has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to
the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation. Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his
duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal
Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, People v. Luisito Beltran, People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,
People v. Rowena Camino, and People v. John Richie Villaluz. From his explanation that such written orders are not
necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floros failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but to
ignorance of a procedural rule.
Same; Same; Judge Floro committed three fundamental errors in handling probation cases.We perceive three
fundamental errors in Judge Floros handling of probation cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the
accused without the presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said release.
Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the probation officer to render a case study and
investigation report on the accused. Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not
reduced into writing.
Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need not be
reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law.Judge Floros insistence that orders made in open court need
not be reduced in writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the basic rules on
probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.
One of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously. When the law
is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith,
does not warrant administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassing judges to take the
fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments. This rule, however, admits of an exception as good
faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply
where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond permissible margins of
error. Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.
Same; Same; Like Caesars wife a judge must not only be pure but above suspicionhis language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct states: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary. This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice should not only be
impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest as
well. Like Caesars wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff and
the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial
restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of
bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. His
language, both written and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.
Same; Same; Jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused,
even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. The arraignment
shall be suspended, if at the time thereof: (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition
which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In
such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose. The above-
cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a),
Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made upon motion by
the proper party. Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu
proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend
the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.
Same; Same; Practice of Law; No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client.Well
ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court unequivocally states that: No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of
the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give professional advice to client. Canon
5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand, provides that: A judge shall not engage in the private
practice of law.
Same; Same; Respondent judge is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the
presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his
oath-taking.Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is
guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch
73, Malabon City and for appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical
explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow
judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the right. Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that a judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending
before another court or administrative agency. By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in
a very awkward position.
Same; Same; Psychic Phenomena; Psychic Phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound
to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Psychic
phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to apply only positive law and, in its
absence, equitable rules and principles in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floros reference to psychic phenomena in
the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr.sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro
discredited the testimony of the prosecutions principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a fairytale or a
fantastic story. He then went to state that psychic phenomena was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who
transcribed the testimony of the witness.
Same; Same; The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, is inherent in its power of administrative supervision over
all courts and the personnel thereof.The Supreme Courts power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power
of administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. This powerconsistent with the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courtsis hemmed in only by the Constitution which
prescribes that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Same; Same; Suspension; The Supreme Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is
reached in the administrative case against him or her.The rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not
only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court) but also for
the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may
preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.
This is because[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with a serious offense
warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as
mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative case
especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed, the measure is
intended to shield the public from any further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of
office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts image as temples of justice where litigants are heard,
rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly dispensed. This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for
the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in
the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and
proper, the ultimate weapons against justice and oppression. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Floro, Jr., 486 SCRA
66(2006)]
Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177 , April 05, 1990

Same: Same; Same; Judicial Ethics; Judges to dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the
required periods.Consequently, there being no other sufficient ground to dissolve the injunction in controversy, the
grant of the writ must be upheld but without prejudice to the consequences of the conduct of respondent judge. The
circumstances under which the writ was granted after a protracted delay, punctuated by dubious orders issued in the
interim, certainly cannot be countenanced lest such conduct be replicated in circumvention of the rules. Specifically,
respondent judge failed to observe Rule 3.01 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which calls for a judge to be
faithful to the law and maintain professional competence, and Rule 3.05 which admonishes all judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Definitely, this Court cannot gloss over the
challenged actuations of respondent judge which are amply reflected in the records of this case. [Aquino vs. Luntok, 184
SCRA 177(1990)]
Umale vs. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84 , May 25, 1973

Judicial Ethics; When judge may inhibit himself from trying a case.Undoubtedly, personal knowledge of the case
pending before him is not one of the causes for the disqualification of a judge under the first paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court which took effect on January 1, 1964. But paragraph 2 of said Section 1 of Rule 137
authorizes the judge, "in the exercise of his sound discretion, to disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid
reason other than those mentioned" in paragraph 1.
Same.Before the rule was amended in 1964, a judge could not voluntarily inhibit himself on grounds of extreme
delicacy, or prejudice or bias or hostility, not even when he would be violating Sections 3, 26 and 30 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics because he is a paid professor of law in the college owned by one of the litigants. Neither was a judge
disqualified from trying a prosecution for perjury of an accused, who was ordered investigated and prosecuted as a
perjured witness by said judge; not even if the judge himself took great interest and an active part in the filing of the
criminal case to the extent of appointing the fiscal when the regular provincial fiscal refused to file the proper
information. But in 1961, We enunciated the rule that a judge can inhibit himself from trying a case on the ground that
the opinion he expressed in a letter addressed by him as counsel might in some way or another influence his decision in
the case at bar and expressed his fear of not being able to render a truly impartial judgment. In 1962, We also rule that a
judge may voluntarily inhibit himself by reason of his being related to a counsel within the 4th civil degree (now expressly
included as a ground in par. 1 of Rule 137); because Rule 126 (the old rule) "does not include nor preclude cases and
circumstances for voluntary inhibition which depends upon the discretion of the officers concerned." (citing del Castillo
vs. Javellona, L-16742, Sept. 29, 1962, 6 SCRA 147, 151). And in 1967, We affirmed that a judge may voluntarily disqualify
himself on grounds other than those mentioned in par. 1 of Section 1 of Rule 137, as amended, such as bias or prejudice
engendered by the judge having "lost respect in the manner the prosecutor was handling the case xxx"; or when the
lawyer for a litigant is his former associate.
Same; Judge should make a careful self- examination whether to disqualify himself or not in a case before him.When a
judge might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance
reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his
discretion in a way that the people's faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the
probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted
the scales of justice against him. (Citing Pimentel vs. Salanga, L-27934, Sept. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 160, 167).
Same; Nature of Judicial Office; Due Process; Judge must be impartial and disinterested.A judge, sitting on a case must
at all times be fully free, disinterested, impartial and independent. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a
manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity.
Same; A criminal circuit judge who inhibits himself from trying a case may transfer the case to the regular courts of first
instance where he holds court. Having thus voluntarily inhibited himself from trying the criminal case in which herein
petitioner is the complainant, the respondent Judge has the discretion likewise to transfer the case to the regular courts
of first instance sitting in Pasig, Rizal where he holds court, since the regular Court of First Instance has concurrent
jurisdiction with the Circuit Criminal Court over this case for robbery (Sec. 1, R.A. 5179). This transfer is all the more
justified because there is no other judge sitting in the Circuit Criminal Court of Rizal or in the 7th Judicial District which
comprises the provinces of Rizal, Cavite and Palawan, as well as the cities of Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Cavite. Tagaytay,
and Trece Martires as there is only one circuit criminal court for each of the 16 judicial districts of the court.
Furthermore, under Section 3 of R.A. 5179, the "provisions of all laws and the Rules of Court relative to the judges of the
Courts of First Instance and the trial, disposition and appeal of criminal cases therein shall be applicable to the circuit
judges and the cases cognizable by them insofar as they are not inconsistent with" its provisions. The Judiciary Act and
the Rules of Court do not prohibit the raffling or re-raffling among the Judges in the same station and in the same
Judicial District of a case where the Judge to whom it was originally raffled or assigned is disqualified or voluntarily
inhibiting himself for valid and just causes.
In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988

Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative functions, defined; Case at bar.An examination of Executive
Order No. 856, as amended reveals that Provincial/City Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy
disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion
and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the Committee areReceive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his
duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action; Recommend revision of any law or regulation which
is believed prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice. It is evident that such Provincial/ City Committees
on Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Blacks
Law Dictionary).
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Members of the Supreme Court and other Courts shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.Under the Constitution, the members of
the Supreme Court and other courts established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the
Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring
opinion in the case of Garcia vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a
relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire
application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command. The
essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on
his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that
there be no exception to the rigidity of such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication.
Fidelity to his sworn responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less.
Same; Same; Same; Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance
to said committees which may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial duties.This declaration does
not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to
Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their
integrity and performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials,
they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should
render assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such
assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fullfilment of their judicial duties. [In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA
246(1988)]
People vs. Ibasan, Sr., 129 SCRA 695 , June 22, 1984
Criminal Procedure; It is quite unusual that one of the accused was allowed to leave the country while standing charged
with the serious crime of homicide and to be arraigned ahead of his co-accused pending investigation for murder. At the
outset, it is important to note the very peculiar facts which had given rise to the first issue. First of all, we find quite
unusual that the accused Alejandro Ibasan, Jr., alias Intsik was allowed to leave the country while standing charged
with the serious crime of homicide. His claim of innocence did not preclude the possibility of his jumping bail while
abroad and not returning to answer the charges against him. The accused was allowed to be arraigned earlier than his co-
accused even as the circumstances of murder were being reinvestigated.
Same; Trial judge erred in allowing an accused to be arraigned for homicide while fiscal investigating possibility of
amending information to murder.Second, it was error for the court to allow the advance arraignment of Intsik for
homicide when the prosecution was still re-investigating the case to determine the possibility of amending the
information to murder. Intsik should have been arraigned for murder and afterwards could have been convicted either of
homicide or murder as may be proven, the former being an offense necessarily included in the crime charged.
Same; Evidence; Trial judges questions to the witnesses were clarificatory and did constitute undue interference.
Coming now to the appellants second assignment of error, we find the same to be without merit. It is not denied that the
court had at certain points conducted its own questioning during the proceedings. The records, however, show that the
courts questions did not amount to interference as to make the case for the prosecution and deprive the accused of their
defense. The questions of the judge addressed to the witnesses and the accused were merely to clarify certain points and
confirm certain statements. The number of times that a judge intervenes is not necessarily an indication of bias. It
cannot be taken against a judge if the clarificatory questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to
destroy the theory of one party.
Criminal Procedure; Evidence; Judges; A judge should not allow personal prejudices to influence his refusal of defense
request to call additional witnesses. No reversible error, however, appears as defense had other witnesses. The
emotional outburst of the presiding judge is rather unfortunate. Even if a judge sincerely believes that a counsel is
deliberately exasperating or inciting him through the introduction of witnesses publicly known to be personal ly anathema
to the judge and not because their testimony may prove or disprove matters in issue, the judge should avoid any
unseemly display of shortness of temper or other unbecoming behaviour. A judge should not allow himself to be led by
counsel or witnesses into showing that he can be moved by pride, prejudice, passion, or pettiness in the performance of
his official functions (Austria v. Masaquel, 20 SCRA 1247). It is precisely during such trying moments that a judge should
be studiously careful about his conduct and in the measures he takes to uphold the courts authority and dignity.
However, the actuations of the trial judge showing some impatience against the appellants did not preclude them from
adequately presenting their case. We have examined the records carefully and we find that the appealed decision was
not based on any matters improperly elicited by the trial Judge during his examination of the witnesses nor has it been
affected by the quoted remarks. Appellants were given all the opportunity to present their evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Refusal of judge to subpoena defense witness not reversible error as said witnesses could voluntarily
testify without compulsory process.Neither did the initial refusal of the trial judge to subpoena the two supposed
witnesses prevent their being presented in court if they were really willing to testify for the defense. There are remedies
available to parties for such situations. In fact, the records show that, later, the trial judge was amenable to their being
present in court as witnesses and it was the defense which found no more need for the testimony.
Same; Judges statement to speed up trial, so innocent can be freed gave no false hopes on defense.The statement
shows no bias nor intention to give false hopes to either party. The judge merely expressed the need for a speedy trial.
The statement should not be relied upon as a suggestion that the case for the defendants was stronger than the case for
the prosecution.
Same; Judges; Judges should be sparing in intervening at the examination of witnesses.The second assignment of error
has no merit but nonetheless we take this opportunity to remind members of the bench that judges undue interference,
impatience, or participation in the examination of witnesses or a severe attitude on the courts part towards the
witnesses, especially those who are excited or terrified by the unusual circumstances of a trial may tend to prevent the
proper presentation of the cause or ascertainment of the truth in respect thereto. (People v. Catindihan, 97 SCRA 196).
Thus, a judge should exercise more care and patience in conducting a case, his right to intervene to be used sparingly, if
at all. He must bear in mind that witnesses may be easily intimidated by an overly inquisitive judge considering the
unusual circumstances which they find themselves in, especially when testifying in criminal cases. [People vs. Ibasan, Sr.,
129 SCRA 695(1984)]
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lansang, 186 SCRA 646 , June 19, 1990
Judges; Resignation of judges is a prerogative of the President, not the Supreme Court. Erring judge, with several
irregularities found against him considered retired with all benefits and gratuities forfeited .Considering all the
allegations, issues and arguments raised in the complaint and in the Comment and the resignation letter of respondent
Judge dated January 26, 1990, the Court finds Judge Virgilio S. Lansang GUILTY of the charges complained of. His
actuations, practices and conduct are unbecoming of a judicial officer; his acts of commission and omission having been
committed through admitted negligence on his part, failure to report to the Supreme Court or to the Court Administrator,
his grievances against his own Clerk of Court against whom he never filed any formal complaints regarding the latters
alleged irregularities; his apparent acceptance of the accuracy of the reports submitted by his Clerk of Court; and
unmitigated failure to ask for administrative remedies from the Supreme Court and Court Administrator and the existence
up to now of 182 pending cases which according to the Court Administrator had been submitted for decision, and not
merely pending trial. The Court likewise Resolved not to accept such resignation (acceptance of resignations from the
judiciary being a prerogative of the President of the Philippines), but instead to consider him RETIRED, with all benefits
and gratuities forfeited. [Office of the Court Administrator vs. Lansang, 186 SCRA 646(1990)]
Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 , June 14, 1990

Judges; Failure to reply to show-cause resolution of Supreme Court a serious misconduct.After a careful perusal of the
records of the instant administrative case coupled with painstaking deliberations, we are convinced that the respondent
judges continued silence as to the status of Civil Case No. 641 despite repeated written queries from one of the parties,
his failure to reply to the tracers of the Office of the Court Administrator, and his willful disobedience and disregard to
our show-cause resolutions constituted grave and serious misconduct affecting his fitness and the worthiness of the honor
and integrity attached to his office.
Same; Loss of court records is chargeable against a judge.In the instant case, respondent judge even impeded the
speedy disposition of cases by his successor on account of missing records of cases. This fact reflects an inefficient and
disorderly system in the recording of cases assigned to his sala. Although blame can also be conveniently laid on the court
personnels mismanagement of the records of cases, proper and efficient court management is as much the judges
responsibility for the Court personnel are not the guardians of a Judges responsibilities. (See Sec. of Justice v. Legaspi,
107 SCRA 233 [1981])
Same; Loss of eight court records a grave misconduct.With respect to the inventoried four (4) criminal cases without
prisoners and four (4) civil cases missing, we find no justification for the failure to present them to the Deputy Court
Administrator when required and their absence from the place where court records are stored. A judge is expected to
ensure that the records of cases assigned to his sala are intact. There is no justification for missing records save
fortuitous events. The loss of not one but eight records is indicative of gross misconduct and inexcusable negligence
unbecoming of a judge. For true professionalism in the bench to exist, judges whose acts demoralize the ethical
standards of a judicial office and whose acts demonstrate unfitness and unworthiness of the prestige and prerequisites
attached to said office must be weeded out.
Same; Failure to decide a case within 90 days constitute gross inefficiency.Lastly, the report on the physical inventory
of the records of the cases in RTC, Branch 14, Lagawe, Ifugao, which was respondent judges last assignment before his
suspension revealed that a total of 35 cases submitted for decision have remained unresolved beyond the 90-day
reglementary period. We have consistently held that failure to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency. (Ubarra v. Tecson, 134 SCRA 4 [1985]; De Leon v. Castro, 104 SCRA 241 [1981]; and In
re: Judge Jose F. Madara, 104 SCRA 245 [1981]).
Same; Penalty on Judge for grave misconduct and inefficiency.ACCORDINGLY, the COURT RESOLVED to DISMISS
RESPONDENT JUDGE from the service with forfeiture of all his accrued retirement benefits, leave and other privileges, if
any, and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations. [Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557(1990)]
People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 , July 29, 1986

Same; Same; Interpretation, Too literal reading of the law, not advisable; Judges, not bound by the language of the law
but must discover the reason and rhyme for its enactment.We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this
is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors That intention is usually found not
in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth, which is not really that evanescent or elusive. As judges, we
must look beyond and not be bound by the language of the law, seeking to discover, by our own lights, the reason and the
rhyme for its enactment. That we may properly apply it according to its ends, we need and must use not only learning
but also vision. [People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163(1986)]
Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485 SCRA 98 , March 21, 2006

Judicial Ethics; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Lack of conversance with legal principles sufficiently basic and
elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law.This Court has consistently held that lack of conversance with legal
principles sufficiently basic and elementary constitutes gross ignorance of the law. As an advocate of justice and a visible
representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.
Same; Same; Same; Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of the Supreme Court is a commendable virtue of
judges and, of course, members of the bar.Diligence in keeping up-to-date with the decisions of this Court is a
commendable virtue of judges and, of course, members of the bar. Comprehending the Courts decisions is a different
matter, however, for it is in this area where ones competence may be tested and proven.
Same; Same; Same; The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be embodiments of
judicial competence and diligence.The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to be
embodiments of judicial competence and diligence. Those who accept this exalted position owe the public and this Court
the ability to be proficient in the law and the duty to maintain professional competence at all times. Indeed, competence
is a mark of a good judge. This exalted position entails a lot of responsibilities, foremost of which is proficiency in the
law. One cannot seek refuge in a mere cursory knowledge of statutes and procedural rules. Respondent judge fell short of
these standards when he failed in his duties to follow elementary law and to keep abreast with prevailing jurisprudence.
Service in the judiciary involves continuous study and research from beginning to end.
Same; Same; Same; Judges are expected to be personifications of justice and the rule of law and, as such, to have more
than just a modicum acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules.Exacting as these standards may be, judges are
expected to be personifications of justice and the rule of law and, as such, to have more than just a modicum
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Essential to every one of them is faithfulness to the laws and
maintenance of professional competence. Judges are not common individuals whose gross errors men forgive and time
forgets. For when they display an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, they erode the confidence of the public in the
competence of our courts. Such lack is gross ignorance of the law. Verily, failure to follow basic legal commands and rules
constitutes gross ignorance of the law, of which no one is excused, and surely not a judge. [Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485
SCRA 98(2006)]
Sangguniang Bayan of Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561 , August 21, 1996
Same; Same; Same; It is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor his
resolution dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire records of the case. Respondent judges
failure to transmit the resolution and records of the cases disregards the clear mandate of Section 5 of Rule 112. Under
this provision, it is mandatory for the investigating judge to transmit to the provincial or city prosecutor his resolution
dismissing or admitting the complaint, together with the entire records of the case.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Preliminary Investigation, Explained.A preliminary investigation is conducted
to determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It
is an executive, not a judicial function. It falls under the authority of the prosecutor who is given by law the power to
direct and control all criminal actions. However, since there are not enough fiscals and prosecutors to investigate the
crimes committed in all the municipalities all over the country, the government was constrained to assign this function to
judges of Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Same; Same; Same; When a municipal judge conducts preliminary investigation, he performs a non-judicial function as
an exception to his usual duties and his findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor
whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases. Thus, when a municipal
judge conducts preliminary investigation, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his usual duties. His
findings, therefore, are subject to review by the provincial or city prosecutor whose findings, in turn, may be reviewed by
the Secretary of Justice in appropriate cases. Hence, the investigating judge, after conducting a preliminary
investigation, must perform his ministerial duty to transmit within ten (10) days the resolution of the case together with
the entire records to the provincial or city prosecutor.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, he is still
duty-bound to transmit the records to the provincial or city prosecutor.It is true that the determination of the
existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is a judicial function which is beyond the reviewing
power of the prosecutor. However, distinction should be made between a preliminary inquiry for the determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and a preliminary investigation to ascertain whether or not a
person should be held for trial. The first is a judicial function while the second is an executive function. Even if the
investigating judge finds no sufficient ground to issue a warrant of arrest, he is still duty-bound to transmit the records to
the provincial or city prosecutor. The prosecutors reviewing power shall affect only his conclusion as to whether or not a
criminal complaint or information should be filed against the respondent, but not his conclusion as to the propriety of
issuing a warrant of arrest.
Romero vs. Valle, Jr., 147 SCRA 197 , January 09, 1987
Legal and Judicial Ethics; Both bench and bar to encourage respect for courts .It is the duty of both counsel and judge
to maintain, not to destroy, the high esteem and regard for courts. Any act on the part of one or the other that tends to
undermine the peoples respect for, and confidence in, the administration of justice, is to be avoided. And this, even if
both have to restrain pride from taking the better part of their system. To be expected then of petitioner and respondent
is a sense of shared responsibility, a crucial factor in the administration of justice.
Same; Same; Relation between counsel and judge based on mutual respectThe relations between counsel and judge
should be based on mutual respect and on a deep appreciation by one of the duties of another. Thus, counsel is expected
to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. Although allowed some latitude of
remarks or comment in the furtherance of causes, he upholds, his arguments, written or oral, should be gracious to both
court and opposing counsel and be of such words as may properly be addressed by one gentleman to another. Certainly
and most especially in our culture, raising ones voice is a sign of disrespect, improper to one whose investiture into the
legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of
respectful behavior towards the courts.
Contempt; Powers of judicial officers to declare, lawyers in contempt based on preservative principle.Judicial officers
are given contempt powers in order that without being arbitrary, unreasonable or unjust, they may endeavor to hold
counsel to a proper appreciation of their duties to the court. Respondent judge could very well have cited complainant in
contempt of court instead of indulging in tantrums by banging his gavel in a very forceful manner and unceremoniously
walking out of the courtroom.
Office of the Court Administrator vs. Go, 534 SCRA 156 , September 27, 2007
Courts; Court Personnel; Sheriffs; Simple Neglect of Duty; For the infraction of failing to file the returns on time,
respondent Sheriff is guilty of simple neglect of duty and should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of
P5,000.00.In the instant case, Sheriff Mordeno failed to file the returns on time; in fact, the returns were filed only on
January 15, 2007 or after the judicial audit was conducted. For this infraction, Sheriff Mordeno is guilty of simple neglect
of duty and should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Same; Same; Clerks of Court; Manifest Negligence; Respondent Clerk of Court is guilty of manifest negligence for failing
to take further action on the summonses and warrants issued, to supervise her subordinates particularly on the
service of writs of execution, the stitching of all case records and the issuance of subpoenas in criminal casesas Clerk
of Court, her duties include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are
accounted for.As regards Clerk of Court Rosales, we find her guilty of manifest negligence for failing to take further
action on the summonses and warrants issued, to supervise her subordinates particularly on the service of writs of
execution, the stitching of all case records and the issuance of subpoenas in criminal cases. As Clerk of Court, her duties
include conducting periodic docket inventory and ensuring that the records of each case are accounted for. It is likewise
her duty to initiate and cause the search of missing records. Her failure to perform her duties constitutes manifest
negligence which cannot be countenanced. It is incumbent upon the Clerk of Court to ensure an orderly and efficient
record management in the court and to supervise the personnel under her office to function effectively. Under the
circumstances, Clerk of Court Rosales should be meted the penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Same; Judges; Speedy Disposition of Cases; Gross Inefficiency; Inability to decide a case within the required period is
not excusable and constitutes gross inefficiency.Inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable
and constitutes gross inefficiency. The Court has constantly reminded judges to decide cases promptly. Delay not only
results in undermining the peoples faith in the judiciary from whom the prompt hearing of their supplications is
anticipated and expected; it also reinforces in the mind of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice grind
ever so slowly, and worse, it invites suspicion of ulterior motives on the part of the judge. Failure to decide cases on time
constitutes inefficiency that merits administrative sanction.
Same; Same; Disrespect; A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request, and should be
complied with promptly and completelyfailure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant streak in
character, but also disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive.We also note that Judge Go failed to comply
with the Resolution of this Court dated January 27, 2007. His request for an extension of time to file comment was
merely relayed by Clerk of Court Rosales. Even after his request was granted, Judge Go failed to file a comment.
Instead, he sent a 3-liner letter curtly informing this Court that he is denying all the allegations in the judicial audit
report and demanding a formal hearing. A resolution of the Supreme Court should not be construed as a mere request,
and should be complied with promptly and completely. Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a recalcitrant
streak in character, but also disrespect for the Courts lawful order and directive. For displaying a manifest indifference
to the Resolution of this Court, Judge Go should be fined in the amount of P10,000.00.
Same; Same; Office Hours; Being judge does not excuse one from complying with the eight-hour service requirement
every working dayjust like any ordinary government employee, judges are required to render at least eight-hours of
service; Judges are reminded that circulars prescribing hours of work are not just empty pronouncementsthey are
there for the purpose of promoting efficiency and speed in the administration of justice, and require prompt and
faithful compliance by all concerned.Judge Go likewise failed to satisfactorily rebut the audit findings that he leaves
the court premises immediately after presiding over the hearings in the morning and would return only the following day.
Judge Go erroneously believed that being a judge excuses him from complying with the eight-hour service requirement
every working day. Just like any ordinary government employee, judges are required to render at least eight-hours of
service. Circular No. 13 provides the following guidelines for all trial courts: 1. Punctuality and strict observance of office
hours.Punctuality in the holding of scheduled hearings is an imperative. Trial judges should strictly observe the
requirement of at least eight hours of service a day, five hours of which should be devoted to trial, specifically from 8:30
a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 2:00 to 4:30 p.m. as required by par. 5 of the Interim Rules issued by the Supreme Court on
January 11, 1988, pursuant to Sec. 16 of BP 129. Judges are duty bound to comply with the required working hours to
insure the maximum efficiency of the trial courts for a speedy administration of justice. Daily trials at a minimum of five
hours per working day of the week will enable the judge to calendar as many cases as possible and to dispose with regular
dispatch the increasing number of litigations pending with the court. All other matters needing the attention of the judge
are to be attended to outside of this five-hour schedule of trial. Judges are reminded that circulars prescribing hours of
work are not just empty pronouncements. They are there for the purpose of promoting efficiency and speed in the
administration of justice, and require prompt and faithful compliance by all concerned. [Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Go, 534 SCRA 156(2007)]
Office of the Court Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24 , April 10, 2012
Administrative Law; Judges; As the visible representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should
conduct himself at all times in a manner that would merit the respect and confidence of the people.Public office is a
public trust. This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his
exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity. As the visible
representation of the law tasked with dispensing justice, a judge should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
would merit the respect and confidence of the people.
Same; Misconduct; Simple Misconduct and Grave Misconduct, Distinguished.In Office of the Court Administrator v.
Lopez, 639 SCRA 633 (2011), the Court explained the difference between simple misconduct and grave misconduct, thus:
The Court defines misconduct as a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional
elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or to disregard established rules, which must be established by
substantial evidence. As distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the
law, or flagrant disregard of established rule, must be manifest in a charge of grave misconduct.
Same; Dishonesty; Words and Phrases; Dishonesty is the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.The Court defines dishonesty as: x x x a disposition to
lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack
of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions
on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the cases. Not
even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied
with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding
marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a
judge perform official duties honestly.
Administrative Cases; Judges; Some administrative cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the
Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which
are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or for such other forms of breaches of conduct that
have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of lawyers.This administrative case against Judge Indar
shall also be considered as a disciplinary proceeding against him as a member of the Bar, in accordance with AM. No. 02-
9-02-SC. This Resolution entitled Re: Automatic Conversion of Some Administrative Cases Against Justices of the Court of
Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; Judges of Regular and Special Courts; and Court Officials Who are Lawyers as Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Them Both as Such Officials and as Members of the Philippine Bar, provides: Some administrative
cases against Justices of the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan; judges of regular and special courts; and the court
officials who are lawyers are based on grounds which are likewise grounds for the disciplinary action of members of the
Bar for violation of the Lawyers Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, or
for such other forms of breaches of conduct that have been traditionally recognized as grounds for the discipline of
lawyers. In any of the foregoing instances, the administrative case shall also be considered a disciplinary action against
the respondent justice, judge or court official concerned as a member of the Bar. The respondent may forthwith be
required to comment on the complaint and show cause why he should not also be suspended, disbarred or otherwise
disciplinary sanctioned as a member of the Bar. Judgment in both respects may be incorporated in one decision or
resolution. [Office of the Court Administrative vs. Indar, 669 SCRA 24(2012)]

Case Digest - Criminal Law

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Winston F. Garcia vs. Mario I.

Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

The Court concurs with the CA.

MCIAA vs. Heirs of Ijordan, et al.

The CA affirmed the orders of the RTC. Hence, this petition.

Posted by Glenn Rey Anino at 12:32 AM No comments:

Monday, March 27, 2017

Ladines vs. People Case Digest

Monday, March 20, 2017

Lagahit vs. Pacific Concord Case Digest

TODAY U R OFFICIALY NT CONNECTED WITH US.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Ruling of the NLRC

Rulings of the Court:

Posted by Glenn Rey Anino at 1:54 AM No comments:

Fernando Medical Enterprises, Inc. vs. Wesleyan University Philippines,

Judgment of the RTC

Ruling of the SC:

Posted by Glenn Rey Anino at 12:10 AM No comments:

Sunday, January 29, 2017

Selected Significant 2014-2015 Supreme Court Decisions

Saturday, January 28, 2017

Case Doctrines in Legal Ethics (part III)

Soriano vs. Reyes, 489 SCRA 328 , May 04, 2006

Somosot vs. Lara, 577 SCRA 158 , January 30, 2009

Pena vs. Aparicio, 525 SCRA 444 , June 25, 2007

Solidon vs. Macalalad, 613 SCRA 472 , February 24, 2010

Hilado vs. David, 84 Phil. 569 , September 21, 1949

Genato vs. Silapan, 406 SCRA 75 , July 14, 2003

Junio vs. Grupo, 372 SCRA 525 , December 18, 2001

Uy vs. Gonzales, 426 SCRA 422, March 30, 2004

Venterez vs. Cosme, 535 SCRA 378 , October 10, 2007

In Re: Atty. David Briones, 363 SCRA 1 , August 15, 2001

Nevada vs. Casuga, 668 SCRA 441 , March 20, 2012

Contreras vs. Solis, 260 SCRA 572 , August 21, 1996

Galman vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 43 , September 12, 1986

Lorenzo vs. Marquez, 162 SCRA 546 , June 27, 1988

Salud vs. Alumbres, 404 SCRA 411 , June 20, 2003

Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239 , December 07, 1993

Castillo vs. Calanog, Jr., 199 SCRA 75 , July 12, 1991

In re Aguas, 1 Phil., 1 , August 08, 1901

Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 , July 25, 1989

Gandionco vs. Pearanda, 155 SCRA 725 , November 27, 1987

Talens-Dabon vs. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 , July 25, 1996

Liwanag vs. Lustre, 306 SCRA 55 , April 21, 1999

People vs. Maceda, 188 SCRA 532 , August 13, 1990

Javier vs. De Guzman, 192 SCRA 434 , December 19, 1990

Aquino vs. Luntok, 184 SCRA 177 , April 05, 1990

Umale vs. Villaluz, 51 SCRA 84 , May 25, 1973

In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, October 05, 1988

Longboan vs. Polig, 186 SCRA 557 , June 14, 1990

People vs. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 , July 29, 1986

Enriquez vs. Caminade, 485 SCRA 98 , March 21, 2006

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