Same; Same; Same; Police Power; The State, in promoting the health and 142

welfare of a special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the burden of partly subsidizing a government program.This raises the
Fernando vs. St. Scholastica's College
question of whether the State, in promoting the health and welfare of a
special group of citizens, can impose upon private establishments the burden promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and
of partly subsidizing a government program. The Court believes so. The
general welfare of the people. The State, through the legislature, has
Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the contribution of
delegated the exercise of police power to local government units, as agencies
senior citizens to nation-building, and to grant benefits and privileges to
of the State. This delegation of police power is embodied in Section 16 of the
them for their improvement and well-being as the State considers them an
Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), known as the General
integral part of our society.
Welfare Clause, which has two branches. The first, known as the general
legislative power, authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and
Same; Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 9257 is a legitimate exercise of police
make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into
power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has general welfare
effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal
for its object; When the conditions so demand as determined by the
council by law. The second, known as the police power proper, authorizes the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and
welfare; Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be
convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of
diluted considerably if on the mere plea of property owners that they will
their property.
suffer loss of earnings and capital, a questioned provision is invalidated.The
law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of Same; Same; Ordinances; For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
eminent domain, has general welfare for its object. Police power is not within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass
capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely veiled in general
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the
substantive requirements.White Light Corporation v. City of Manila, 576
132
SCRA 416 (2009), discusses the test of a valid ordinance: The test of a valid

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila
Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. Department of Social Welfare and Development has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
(DSWD)
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according
to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following
terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and
substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
described as the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers,
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
extending as it does to all the great public needs. It is [t]he power vested in
the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner
Same; Same; Same; Rational Relationship Test; Strict Scrutiny Test; To
of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to
enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation of
be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the
constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Courtthe rational
same. For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test.To successfully invoke the
legislature, property rights must bow to the primacy of police power because
exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance
property rights, though sheltered by due process, must yield to general
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have
welfare. Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would
been used by the Courtthe rational relationship test and the strict scrutiny
be diluted considerably if on the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer
test: We ourselves
loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is invalidated.
Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
143
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its
nullification in view of the presumption of validity which every law has in its VOL. 693, MARCH 12, 2013 143
Fernando vs. St. Scholastica's College
favor.

have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal
Constitutional Law; Police Power; Police power is the plenary power vested in
protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws or
the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health,
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the
interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
people.Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered.
make statutes and ordinances to
Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive
_______________
means for achieving that interest.

* EN BANC.
Same; Same; Same; The State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to
preserve or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community.Regarding
the beautification purpose of the setback requirement, it has long been
settled that the State may not, under the guise of police power, permanently
divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve or
enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The Court, thus, finds
Section 5 to be unreasonable and oppressive as it will substantially divest the
respondents of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic
purposes. Accordingly, Section 5 of Ordinance No. 192 is invalid.
Same; Same; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Exhaustion of
administrative remedies under the Local Government Code (LGC) is necessary
in cases of erroneous assessments where the correctness of the amount
assessed is assailed.Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the Local
Government Code is necessary in cases of erroneous assessments where the
correctness of the amount assessed is assailed. The taxpayer must first pay
the tax then file a protest with the Local Treasurer within 30 days from date
of payment of tax. If protest is denied or upon the lapse of the 60-day period
to decide the protest, the taxpayer may appeal to the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals within 60 days from the denial of the protest or the
lapse of the 60-day period to decide the protest. The Local Board of
Assessment Appeals has 120 days to decide the appeal.
Same; Same; Due Process; Notice Requirement; Procedurally, (1) if the
dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the
employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or
opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee
576
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
before terminating the employment, and (2) if the dismissal is based on
authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the employer must give the
employee and the Department of Labor and Employment written notices 30
days prior to the effectivity of his separation; Failure to observe due process
in a dismissal for just or authorized cause does not invalidate the dismissal
but makes the employer liable for non-compliance with the procedural
requirements of due process.Procedurally, (1) if the dismissal is based on a
just cause under Article 282, the employer must give the employee two
written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the
employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the
grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard
and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to
dismiss; and (2) if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles
283 and 284, the employer must give the employee and the Department of
Labor and Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his
separation. From the foregoing rules four possible situations may be derived:
(1) the dismissal is for a just cause under Article 282 of the Labor Code, for an
authorized cause under Article 283, or for health reasons under Article 284,
and due process was observed; (2) the dismissal is without just or authorized
cause but due process was observed; (3) the dismissal is without just or
authorized cause and there was no due process; and (4) the dismissal is for
just or authorized cause but due process was not observed. In the first
situation, the dismissal is undoubtedly valid and the employer will not suffer
any liability. In the second and third situations where the dismissals are
illegal, Article 279 mandates that the employee is entitled to reinstatement
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent
computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of
actual reinstatement. In the fourth situation, the dismissal should be upheld.
While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the
dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance
with the procedural requirements of due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The fact that the employee may not be residing in
the address indicated in the employers records does not excuse the employer
from sending the notices to the employees last known address.The present
case squarely falls under the fourth
577
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004 577
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
situation. The dismissal should be upheld because it was established that the
petitioners abandoned their jobs to work for another company. Private
respondent, however, did not follow the notice requirements and instead
argued that sending notices to the last known addresses would have been
useless because they did not reside there anymore. Unfortunately for the
private respondent, this is not a valid excuse because the law mandates the
twin notice requirements to the employees last known address. Thus, it
should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of
due process.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Court believes that the ruling in Serrano v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 323 SCRA 445 (2000), did not consider
the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code which provision means that
the termination is illegal only if it is not for any of the justified or authorized
causes provided by law and that payment of backwages and other benefits,
including reinstatement, is justified only if the employee was unjustly
dismissed; The fact that the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and injustice
which elicited strong dissent has prompted the Court to revisit the doctrine.
The rationale for the re-examination of the Wenphil doctrine in Serrano was
the significant number of cases involving dismissals without requisite notices.
We concluded that the imposition of penalty by way of damages for violation
of the notice requirement was not serving as a deterrent. Hence, we now
required payment of full backwages from the time of dismissal until the time
the Court finds the dismissal was for a just or authorized cause. Serrano was
confronting the practice of employers to dismiss now and pay later by
imposing full backwages. We believe, however, that the ruling in Serrano did
not consider the full meaning of Article 279 of the Labor Code which states:
ART. 279. Security of Tenure.In cases of regular employment, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or
when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. This means that the termination is illegal only if it is not for
any of the justified or authorized causes provided by law. Payment of
backwages and other benefits, including reinstate-
578
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
ment, is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed. The fact that
the Serrano ruling can cause unfairness and injustice which elicited strong
dissent has prompted us to revisit the doctrine.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The Due Process Clause in Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral
principles so deeply imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as
to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire
history.To be sure, the Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply
imbedded in the traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed
fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by our entire history. Due
process is that which comports with the deepest notions of what is fair and
right and just. It is a constitutional restraint on the legislative as well as on
the executive and judicial powers of the government provided by the Bill of
Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory due process should be differentiated
from failure to comply with constitutional due processconstitutional due
process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his
rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings while statutory due
process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees
from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
Due process under the Labor Code, like Constitutional due process, has two
aspects: substantive, i.e., the valid and authorized causes of employment
termination under the Labor Code; and procedural, i.e., the manner of
dismissal. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the
Implementing Rules of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines in Book VI, Rule I, Sec. 2, as amended by Department
Order Nos. 9 and 10. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the
Labor Code. Therefore statutory due process should be differentiated from
failure to comply with constitutional due process. Constitutional due process
protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in
criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due process
found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from
being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing.
579
VOL. 442, NOVEMBER 17, 2004
Agabon vs. National Labor Relations Commission
Same; Same; Same; The better rule is to abandon the Serrano doctrine and to
follow Wenphil v. National Labor Relations Commission, 170 SCRA 69 (1989),
by holding that the dismissal was for just cause but imposing sanctions on the
employer, which sanctions, however, must be stiffer than that imposed in
Wenphil.After carefully analyzing the consequences of the divergent
doctrines in the law on employment termination, we believe that in cases
involving dismissals for cause but without observance of the twin
requirements of notice and hearing, the better rule is to abandon the
Serrano doctrine and to follow Wenphil by holding that the dismissal was for
just cause but imposing sanctions on the employer. Such sanctions, however,
must be stiffer than that imposed in Wenphil. By doing so, this Court would
be able to achieve a fair result by dispensing justice not just to employees,
but to employers as well.
Same; Same; Same; The constitutional policy to provide full protection to
labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employersthe commitment of
this Court to the cause of labor does not prevent it from sustaining the
employer when it is in the right.The unfairness of declaring illegal or
ineffectual dismissals for valid or authorized causes but not complying with
statutory due process may have far-reaching consequences. This would
encourage frivolous suits, where even the most notorious violators of
company policy are rewarded by invoking due process. This also creates
absurd situations where there is a just or authorized cause for dismissal but a
procedural infirmity invalidates the termination. Let us take for example a
case where the employee is caught stealing or threatens the lives of his co-
employees or has become a criminal, who has fled and cannot be found, or
where serious business losses demand that operations be ceased in less than
a month. Invalidating the dismissal would not serve public interest. It could
also discourage investments that can generate employment in the local
economy. The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not
meant to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to
the cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it
is in the right, as in this case. Certainly, an employer should not be compelled
to pay employees for work not actually performed and in fact abandoned.
The employer should not be compelled to continue employing a person who
is admittedly guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance and whose continued
employment is patently inimical to the employer.
Same; Same; Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before
courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.The possibility of abuse in the
implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out
of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not
peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused. Allegations
158
158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.
Void for Vagueness Doctrine; Facial Challenges; Criminal Law; Words and
579
Phrases; The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not
operate on the same plane; A statute or act suffers from the defect of
vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application; The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose
to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.The confusion apparently
stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal
statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech
regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and
cognate rights). To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane. A statute or act suffers from
the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to
its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. The overbreadth doctrine,
meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent
activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms. As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though
some of it is protected.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very
159
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 5, 2010 159
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or activities; A litigant cannot successfully
mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or
overbreadth grounds.A facial challenge is likewise different from an as- in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,
applied challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which
considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on
the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or
prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities. Justice Mendoza
accurately phrased the subtitle in his concurring opinion that the vagueness
and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not
applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial
challenge against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The allowance of a facial challenge in
free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim
to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem
effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even
forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as
it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.
Same; Same; Same; By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.It is settled,
on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; American jurisprudence instructs that
vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be
examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard
to the statutes facial validity; In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining
the constitutionality of criminal statutes.American jurisprudence instructs
that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be
examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard
to the statutes facial validity. For more than 125 years, the US Supreme
Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most
important guarantees of liberty under law. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized
the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing
the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal
recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably,
the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez
and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal
statute, unlike in the present case.
Same; Same; Same; Human Security Act of 2007 (Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9372); Terrorism; What Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9372 seeks to penalize is
conduct, not speech; Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA
9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime,
including the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand,
thus, given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot
recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.From the
definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372,
the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
161
VOL. 632, OCTOBER 5, 2010 161
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or
under any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the
predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand. In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law
penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful
demand in the definition of terrorism must necessarily be transmitted
through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The
argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not
speech. Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there
must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of
the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the
coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the
communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the
unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Constitutional Law; Non-impairment of Contracts; The non-impairment clause
under Section 10, Article II of the Constitution is limited in application to laws
about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing acts or
contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of
the parties thereto.The prohibition is aligned with the general principle
that laws newly enacted have only a prospective operation, and cannot
affect acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in
existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part
thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is
limited in application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way
derogate from existing acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any
manner changing the intention of the parties thereto.
Same; Same; Police Power; Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to the future
contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must
yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote
public welfare.But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the
subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it
impinges on the impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise
of the police power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling,
particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in
view of ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever
they may be employed. Police power legislations adopted by the State to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and
general welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future
contracts but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts
must yield to the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to
promote public welfare.
_______________
* EN BANC.
255
, 255
Same; Labor Law; Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all
members of the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment,
full protection of their rights and welfare.Section 18, Article II and Section
3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector, without distinction as to
place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare. To Filipino
workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be
equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary
obligations should be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied
the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden
imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Same; Same; Republic Act No. 8042; Prior to Republic Act 8042, all Overseas
Filipino workers (OFWs), regardless of contract periods or the unexpired
portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the computation of their
monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their claims were subjected to a
uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries multiplied by the entire
unexpired portion of their employment contracts.It is plain that prior to
R.A. No. 8042, all Overseas Filipino workers (OFWs), regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries
multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The enactment of the subject clause in R.A. No. 8042 introduced a
differentiated rule of computation of the money claims of illegally dismissed
OFWs based on their employment periods, in the process singling out one
category whose contracts have an unexpired portion of one year or more
and subjecting them to the peculiar disadvantage of having their monetary
awards limited to their salaries for 3 months or for the unexpired portion
thereof, whichever is less, but all the while sparing the other category from
such prejudice, simply because the latters unexpired contracts fall short of
one year.
Same; Same; Same; With the enactment of Republic Act 8042, specifically the
adoption of the subject clause, illegally dismissed Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment
contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are
subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local
workers with fixed-
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
term employment.Prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with
fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in
terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts.
But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the
subject clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one
year or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no
such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court concludes that the subject clause
contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary
benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-
month cap on the claim of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of Overseas Filipino Workers
(OFWs), and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.The Court concludes
that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the
computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are
illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an
unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the
claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The
subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a
peculiar disadvantage. There being a suspect classification involving a
vulnerable sector protected by the Constitution, the Court now subjects the
classification to a strict judicial scrutiny, and determines whether it serves a
compelling state interest through the least restrictive means.
Same; Same; Same; While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are
presumed self-executing, there are some which this Court has declared not
judicially enforceable, Article XIII, being one.While all the provisions of the
1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are some which this
Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one,
particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573 (2004), has described to
be not self-actuating: Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to
257
, 257
labor and security of tenure may be deemed as self-executing in the sense
that these are automatically acknowledged and observed without need for
any enabling legislation. However, to declare that the constitutional
provisions are enough to guarantee the full exercise of the rights embodied
therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed, would be impractical,
if not unrealistic. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency
of being overbroad and exaggerated. The guarantees of full protection to
labor and security of tenure, when examined in isolation, are facially
unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a blanket
shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of
circumstance. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to
continued employmenta utopian notion, doubtlessbut still hardly within
the contemplation of the framers. Subsequent legislation is still needed to
define the parameters of these guaranteed rights to ensure the protection
and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the employers
as well. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a
loss, formulating their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution does not directly
bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes
it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection
through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition; Its utility is
best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the
working class.It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not
directly bestow on the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely
clothes it with the status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges
protection through executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its
utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and
legislative departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare
of the working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional
agenda that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas)
Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 299
(2004), penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is
premised on the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the
Consti-
258
258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
tution with special protectionsuch as the working class or a section
thereofthe Court may recognize the existence of a suspect classification
and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
Searches and Seizures; Warrants of Arrest; Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution does not mandatorily require the judge to personally examine
the complainant and her witnessesinstead, he may opt to personally
evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor
or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses.He claims that under Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, no warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce. However, in the leading case of Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393
(1988), the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and
her witnesses. Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor or he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses.
499
VOL. 524, JUNE 8, 2007 499
AAA vs. Carbonell
Same; Preliminary Investigation; There is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or be releasedthe former is
made by the judge while the latter is the function of the investigating
prosecutor.It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the
preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest and the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains
whether the offender should be held for trial or be released. The
determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest
is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation properwhether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense
chargedis the function of the investigating prosecutor.
Same; Same; While there are cases where the circumstances may call for the
judges personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses, it must
be emphasized that such personal examination is not mandatory and
indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrestthe necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of
the evidence to show the existence of probable cause.True, there are cases
where the circumstances may call for the judges personal examination of
the complainant and his witnesses. But it must be emphasized that such
personal examination is not mandatory and indispensable in the
determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The
necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show
the existence of probable cause. Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report
of the investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the
documentary evidence in support thereof. Indeed, what the law requires as
personal determination on the part of the judge is that he should not rely
solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. In Okabe v. Gutierrez,
429 SCRA 685 (2004), we stressed that the judge should consider not only
the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused
and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken
during the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information. If the report,
taken together with the supporting evidence, is sufficient to sustain a finding
of probable cause, it is not compulsory that a
500
500 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
AAA vs. Carbonell
personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses be conducted.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; It is well-settled that a finding of probable
cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence beyond reasonable
doubt; Probable cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof
and should be held for trial.After a careful examination of the records, we
find that there is sufficient evidence to establish probable cause. The
gravamen of rape is the carnal knowledge by the accused of the private
complainant under any of the circumstances provided in Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. Petitioner has categorically stated that
Arzadon raped her, recounting her ordeal in detail during the preliminary
investigations. Taken with the other evidence presented before the
investigating prosecutors, such is sufficient for purposes of establishing
probable cause. It is well-settled that a finding of probable cause need not be
based on clear and convincing evidence beyond reasonable doubt. Probable
cause is that which engenders a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be
held for trial. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction.
Same; Same; Where there is ample evidence and sufficient basis on record to
support a finding of probable cause, it is unnecessary for a judge to take the
further step of examining the complainant and her witnesses, and if he
dismisses the criminal case for alleged lack of probable cause on the ground
that complainant and her witnesses failed to take the witness stand, he
gravely abuses his discretion.It is clear therefore that respondent Judge
Carbonell gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Criminal Case No. 6983
for lack of probable cause on the ground that petitioner and her witnesses
failed to take the witness stand. Considering there is ample evidence and
sufficient basis on record to support a finding of probable cause, it was
unnecessary for him to take the further step of examining the petitioner and
her witnesses. Moreover, he erred in holding that petitioners absences in
the scheduled hearings were indicative of a lack of interest in prosecuting the
case. In fact, the records show that she has relentlessly pursued the same.
Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search
Warrants; Requisites for the Issuance of a Search Warrant.The requisites
for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2)
such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the
judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the
complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and
the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.
Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Defined.Probable cause for a
search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to
rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which
would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to
consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a
fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrates determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining
judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the
present case, a substantial basis exists.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Land Transportation and
Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136); Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not
the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the
latter.Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.It is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that persons voluntary
submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the
application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical
restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that
there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other,
and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the
belief and impression that submission is necessary. Under R.A. 4136, or the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with
a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
drivers license of the latter: SECTION 29. Confiscation of Drivers License.
Law enforcement and peace officers of other agencies duly deputized by the
Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this Act or any
regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations
not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver
concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor
which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a period not
exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said receipt.
The
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
1 The Petition was originally captioned as Rodel Luz y Ong v. Hon. Court of
Appeals, Hon. Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Naga City.
However, under Section 4, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petition must
state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse
party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof
either as petitioners or respondents.
422
422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Luiz vs. People
period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the
date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation
of his license.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Procedure Being Observed in Flagging Down
Vehicles During the Conduct of Checkpoints.The Philippine National Police
(PNP) Operations Manualprovides the following procedure for flagging down
vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints: SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging
Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a general
concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew
shall undertake the following, when applicable: x x x m. If it concerns traffic
violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic Violation
Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or
argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Custodial Interrogation; The roadside questioning
of a motorist does not fall under custodial interrogation, nor can it be
considered a formal arrest.In Berkemer v. McCarty, the United States (U.S.)
Supreme Court discussed at length whether the roadside questioning of a
motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered
custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall
under custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by
virtue of the nature of the questioning, the expectations of the motorist and
the officer, and the length of time the procedure is conducted.
Same; Same; Same; Same; At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the
duty of the arresting officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest
and must show that person the warrant of arrest, if any.This Court has held
that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that
person the warrant of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
they might make could be used against them. It may also be noted that in
this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the
police officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.423
VOL. 667, FEBRUARY 29, 2012 423
Luiz vs. People
Same; Same; Same; Same; Miranda Doctrine; In Berkemer vs. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420 (1984), the U.S. Court noted that the Miranda warnings must also be
given to a person apprehended due to a traffic violation.In Berkemer, the
U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
person apprehended due to a traffic violation: The purposes of the
safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not coerce
or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently
compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself, which
work to undermine the individuals will to resist, and as much as possible to
free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to try to determine,
after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those
purposes are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons
suspected of misdemeanors as they are by questioning of persons suspected
of felonies. If it were true that petitioner was already deemed arrested
when he was flagged down for a traffic violation and while he was waiting for
his ticket, then there would have been no need for him to be arrested for a
second timeafter the police officers allegedly discovered the drugsas he
was already in their custody.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; Instances When a
Warrantless Search is Allowed.The following are the instances when a
warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest; (ii) search of evidence in plain view; (iii) search of a moving vehicle;
(iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a stop and frisk
search; and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-
mentioned instances, especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are
applicable to this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Whether consent to the search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances.Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a
question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.
Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person
giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of
the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded
location; (3) whether the defendant objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the
presence
424
424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Luiz vs. People
of coercive police procedures; (6) the defendants belief that no incriminating
evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has
the burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained, and was freely and voluntarily given. In this case, all
that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at the police station at three
in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These circumstances
weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Stop and Frisk; The stop and frisk is merely a
limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.Neither does the
search qualify under the stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may
lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is
merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Warrantless Searches; In Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S.
113 (1998), the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a
person for speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting
the latter, this procedure does not authorize the officer to conduct a full
search of the car.In Knowles v. Iowa,the U.S. Supreme Court held that
when a police officer stops a person for speeding and correspondingly issues
a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure does not authorize
the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that
there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not
arrest the motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal
intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to alight from the car or doing a
patdown.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.The Constitution guarantees the right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. While the power to
425
VOL. 667, FEBRUARY 29, 2012 425
Luiz vs. People
search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must
be exercised and the law implemented without contravening the
constitutional rights of citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Rodolfo R. Ranion for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
SERENO,J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18
February 20112 and Resolution dated 8 July 2011.
Statement of the Facts and of the Case
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the
version of the prosecution, are as follows:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the
Naga City Police Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on
March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the accused,
who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive and going to
Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance
which requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said
motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-station
since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front
Constitutional Law; Statutes; It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule
violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has
no effect.Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if
a law or an adminis-412
412 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
trative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and
void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws
must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the
discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government
have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution.
Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
Same; Same; Definition of the limits on legislative power in the abstract.
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has
defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under
delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited
and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and
each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied
from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it
cannot leap.
Same; Same; The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.In the same vein, the COMELEC
cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such
power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not
be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Same; Same; Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution; Whether
or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled
before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of
little value if one cannot as-413
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 3, 2008 413
Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
sume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirementSec.
36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC
resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in
the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g)
unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug
clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy
for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon
and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public
office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another
qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires
for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is
really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot
assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Same; Same; Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional.Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of
the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional.
Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a
condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and
regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is
subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.
Same; Same; A random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary
schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and
interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the
government, are to be promoted and protected.The Court can take judicial
notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens
the well-being of the people, particularly the youth and school children who
usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is
conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in
secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be 414
414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To
borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our Nations schoolchildren
is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nations laws
against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State to act is
magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are visited not
just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty. Needless
to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against
the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual
students.
Same; Same; The mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of
RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable,
albeit not exactly for the same reason.Just as in the case of secondary and
tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by
Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this
regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost
everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an
unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy, has failed to show
how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c)
and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful
and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and
does not merit serious consideration.
Same; Same; If RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private
employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants,
who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times
to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional. Like their counterparts in the
private sector, government officials and employees also415
VOL. 570, NOVEMBER 3, 2008 415
Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil
Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high
standard of ethics in the public service. And if RA 9165 passes the norm of
reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass
the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to
be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost
responsibility and efficiency.
Same; Same; In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless; To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
to the stated objectives of RA 9165.We find the situation entirely different
in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutors office with
criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment.
The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the
prosecutors office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are
antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are
not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are
impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of
being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably submitting
themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to
the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory
drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as
a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.
Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are
veritably forced to incriminate themselves.
Constitutional Law; Bill of Rights; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy has
been accorded recognition as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in
this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against
unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
_______________
* EN BANC.
190 Constitution, which provides: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Right to Privacy; The Civil Service Commission (CSC) had implemented a policy
that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and that
the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means.The CSC in this case had implemented a policy
that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in
anything they create, store, send or receive on the office computers, and
that the CSC may monitor the use of the computer resources using both
automated or human means. This implies that on-the-spot inspections may
be done to ensure that the computer resources were used only for such
legitimate business purposes.
Same; A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified
at inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will
turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct.A
search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at
inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn
up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. Thus, in
the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held
that where a government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic
messages with pornographic content and in addition expressly provided that
employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the
agency information systems and technology, the government employee had
no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents of his office
computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the
computer was admissible in prosecution for child pornography. In that case,
the defendant employees computer hard drive was first remotely examined
by a computer information technician after his supervisor received
complaints that he was inaccessible and had copied and distributed non-
work-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor
confirmed that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited
websites, in contravention of the express policy of the agency, his computer
tower and floppy
191 disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation
ensued and later search warrants were secured by the police department.
The initial remote search of the hard drive of petitioners computer, as well
as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor
ruling that a public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so
long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.
Same; Jurisdiction; A petition directed against the thing itself or the res,
which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment
of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action in
rem.An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation. A petition directed against the thing itself or the res,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
668
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lucas vs. Lucas
which concerns the status of a person, like a petition for adoption,
annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an
action in rem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and decide the case. In a
proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court, provided
that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is
acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law, or (b) as a result of the
institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized
and made effective.
Same; Same; Filiation; Due Process; A petition to establish illegitimate
filiation is an action in remby the simple filing of the petition to establish
illegitimate filiation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which undoubtedly
had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby
acquired jurisdiction over the case; If at all, service of summons or notice is
made to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with
jurisdiction, but merely for satisfying the due process requirements.The
herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the
simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC,
which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition,
the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding is
validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might
be minded to make an objection of any sort to the right sought to be
established. Through publication, all interested parties are deemed notified
of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to the
defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but
merely for satisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in
order to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest
if he so chooses. Hence, failure to serve summons will not deprive the court
of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case, the lack of
summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had,
in fact, the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the
due process requirement with respect to respondent has been satisfied,
considering that he
669
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 669
Lucas vs. Lucas
has participated in the proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to
file his opposition to the petition to establish filiation.
Same; Same; Same; A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief
has given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.To address respondents contention that the
petition should have been adversarial in form, we further hold that the
herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed
adversarial in nature despite its caption which lacked the name of a
defendant, the failure to implead respondent as defendant, and the non-
service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is adversarial where the
party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party and afforded
the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petitionclassified as an action
in remthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise
satisfied by the publication of the petition and the giving of notice to the
Solicitor General, as directed by the trial court.
Same; Same; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Cause of Action; Elements; A
fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of
the cause of action inadequate.The petition to establish filiation is
sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,
which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, and direct
statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A
fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of
the cause of action inadequate. A complaint states a cause of action when it
contains the following elements: (1) the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the
correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right.
Same; Same; Same; Paternity; Evidence; A party is confronted by the so-called
procedural aspects in a paternity case during trial, when the parties have
presented their respective evidencethey are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings; A prima facie
case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.The statement in Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197 (2005), that there
are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which
parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this
case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
670
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Lucas vs. Lucas
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They are matters
of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the
proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The
CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe
first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima
facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss
the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no
evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is
premature to discuss whether, under the circumstances, a DNA testing order
is warranted considering that no such order has yet been issued by the trial
court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.
Same; Same; Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; Paternity; Searches
and Seizures; In some foreign states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be
preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid, hence, the
requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in
civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause; The same
condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the
putative father from mere harassment suitsthus, during the hearing on the
motion for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.In
some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be
a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a
finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently
explainedAlthough a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still
applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification under the
particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court
may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are re-
671
VOL. 650, JUNE 6, 2011 671
Lucas vs. Lucas
quired, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable
possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is
contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood
test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which
warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition
precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father
from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA
testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a
reasonable possibility of paternity.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cruz, Neria & Carpio Law Offices for petitioner.
Punzalan, Lising & Punsalan for respondent.
Ramirez, Lazaro and Associates Law Office co-counsel for respondent.
NACHURA,J.:
Is a prima facie showing necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing
order? In this petition for review on certiorari, we address this question to
guide the Bench and the Bar in dealing with a relatively new evidentiary tool.
Assailed in this petition are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated
September 25, 2009 and Resolution dated December 17, 2009.
Appeals; Certiorari; While certiorari is generally not available to challenge an
interlocutory order of a trial court, the Supreme Court may allow certiorari as
a mode of redress where the assailed order is patently erroneous and appeal
would not afford adequate and expeditious relief.The extraordinary writ of
certiorari is generally not available to challenge an interlocutory order of a
trial court. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an
adverse judgment, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the
interlocutory order. However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and
expeditious relief, the Court may allow certiorari as a mode of redress.
Evidence; Privacy of Communication; Anti-Wire Tapping Law; Unauthorized
tape recordings of telephone conversations not admissible in evidence.Rep.
Act No. 4200 entitled An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and
Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other
purposes expressly makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence.
Clearly, respondents trial court and the Court of Appeals failed to consider
the provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in
question. Absent a clear showing that both parties to the telephone
conversations allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of the
subject tapes is man-datory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Evidence; Illegally Obtained Evidence; Constitutional Law; Privacy of
Communication and Correspondence; Privacy of communication and
correspondence is inviolable. The only exception in the Constitution is if there
is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires,
otherwise, as prescribed by law.Indeed the documents and papers in
question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no
less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by
her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in
_______________
*
SECOND DIVISION.
700
700 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of
this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person by contracting marriage does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.The intimacies between
husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and
cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her
integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The law insures absolute freedom of
communication between the spouses by making it privileged.The law
insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making
it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other during the
marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative Order No. 308; As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising
the issue that the issuance of Administrative Order No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise
the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the petitioner and the
justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that
petitioner has no legal interest to uphold and that the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do not deserve
our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our
Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to
bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the
misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O.
No. 308.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative power is concerned with the work of
applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental
organs.Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs.
It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency
and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Order No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.Prescinding from
these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308
_______________
* EN BANC.
142
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Ople vs. Torres
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative
order. x x x An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President
which relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of
government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole
purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.
Same; Same; Same; Argument that Administrative Order No. 308 implements
the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987 rejected.We reject
the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of the
Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and incorporates in
a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles
of governance and embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Order No. 308 cannot pass constitutional
muster as an administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to
privacy.Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of
a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an administrative
legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of
privacy is the right to be let alone.
Same; Same; Same; Any law or order that invades individual privacy will be
subjected by the Court to strict scrutiny.In no uncertain terms, we also
underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual
privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify
such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions.
We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be
subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny
Constitutional Law; Right of Assembly; Freedom of Speech; The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.The first point to mark is
that the right to peaceably assemble and
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.
Same; Same; Same; While the right to freedom of speech, and to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries, it is likewise a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those
rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society.It must be remembered that the right,
while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: The right to
freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But
it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment
of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities
by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact
ordinances for purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Public Assembly Act of 1985 (B.P. 880); Time, Place and
Manner Restrictions; Content-Based Regulations; B.P. No. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies; A fair and impartial reading of B.P.
No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public
229
VOL. 488, APRIL 25, 2006 229
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
placesit is not a content-based regulation.B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v.
Comelec, 288 SCRA 447 (1998), where the Court referred to it as a content-
neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion,
protesting and influencing in the definition of public assembly content
based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the
government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under B.P. 880, the permit for a
public assembly in a public place can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.The permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise
of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Public; The
law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions; Public does not
have to be definedits ordinary meaning is well-known.Contrary to
petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions.
Public does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known.
Websters Dictionary defines it, thus: public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of
people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests or
characteristics x x x. Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The
law refers to rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place. So it does not cover
any and all kinds of gatherings.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The law is
neither overbroad nor does it impose a prior restraint.Neither is the law
overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the
substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no
prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Delegation of Powers; Words and Phrases;
B.P. 880 provides a precise and sufficient standardthe clear and present
danger test stated in Sec. 6(a); The reference to imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is
not an inconsistent standard.As to the delegation of powers to the mayor,
the law provides a precise and sufficient standardthe clear and present
danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger
of a substantive evil in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is
not an inconsistent standard. As to whether respondent Mayor has the same
power independently under Republic Act No. 7160 is thus not necessary to
resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their
arguments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom Parks; The degree of observance of B.P.
No. 880s mandate that every city and municipality set aside a freedom park
within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20 years ago, is pathetic and
regrettable; Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is an
essential part of the laws system of regulation of the peoples exercise of
their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Supreme Court is
constrained to rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision,
no prior permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public
park or plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have
complied with Section 15 of the law.The Solicitor General stated during the
oral arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City has declared a
freedom parkFuente Osmea. That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has
since been converted into a golf course, he added. If this is so, the degree of
observance of B.P. No. 880s mandate that every city and municipality set
aside a freedom park within six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20
years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable. The matter appears to have
been taken for granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose from the
peaceful
231
VOL. 488, APRIL 25, 2006 231
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
revolution of 1986. Considering that the existence of such freedom parks is
an essential part of the laws system of regulation of the peoples exercise of
their right to peacefully assemble and petition, the Court is constrained to
rule that after thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, no prior
permit may be required for the exercise of such right in any public park or
plaza of a city or municipality until that city or municipality shall have
complied with Section 15 of the law. For without such alternative forum, to
deny the permit would in effect be to deny the right. Advance notices should,
however, be given to the authorities to ensure proper coordination and
orderly proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR); Maximum
Tolerance; In view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880,
Calibrated Preemptive Response serves no valid purpose if it means the same
thing as maximum tolerance and is illegal if it means something else.The
Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P. No.
880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum
tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be
followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
tolerance.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As a necessary consequence and part
of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police an application duly
filed on a given date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance
with their application without the need to show a permit, the grant of the
permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of the
authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which
case the rally may be peacefully dispersed following the procedure of
maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.There is need to address the
situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not act on applications
for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a
necessary consequence and part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can
show the police an application duly filed on a given date can, after two days
from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to
show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law,
and it will be the burden of the authorities to show that there has been a
denial
232
232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
of the application, in which case the rally may be peacefully dispersed
following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.
Remedial Law; Parties; Access to public documents and records is a public
right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.The
arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as
regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public
documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are
the people themselves.
___________________
19 Philippine National Bank vs. Bondoc, supra.
* FIRST DIVISION.
745
 VOL. 299, DECEMBER 9, 1998 745
restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed earlier
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign
relations, intelligence and other classified information.
Same; Same; When the issue concerns a public right and the object of
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
Same; Libel; Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those forms of speeches that
regarded as the real parties in interest.In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court
have never attained Constitutional protection and are considered outside the
asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of
realm of protected freedom.The majority of the movants believe that the
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
Courts decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 4(c)(4), which
regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
penalizes online libel, effectively tramples upon the right to free expression.
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws,
But libel is not a protected speech. There is no freedom to unjustly destroy
he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the
the reputation of a decent woman by publicly claiming that she is a paid
action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to
prostitute. As early as 1912, the Court held that libel is a form of expression
be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section
not protected by the Constitution. Libel, like obscenity, belongs to those
6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in
forms of speeches that have never attained Constitutional protection and are
order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
considered outside the realm of protected freedom.
otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners legal
standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced is a
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech; Freedom of the Press; As long as the
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
expression or speech falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of
courts to ensure that the rights of the people are protected.The
Same; Same; Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
constitutional guarantee against prior restraint and subsequent punishment,
by decisional law to sustain petitioners legal standing, i.e. (1) the
the jurisprudential requirement of actual malice, and the legal protection
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, Court rules
afforded by privilege communications all ensure that protected speech
that the petition at bar should be allowed.The instant petition is anchored
remains to be protected and guarded. As long as the expression or speech
on the right of the people to information and access to official records,
falls within the protected sphere, it is the solemn duty of courts to ensure
documents and papersa right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the
that the rights of the people are protected.
1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen.
Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Freedom of Expression; Political Ad Ban;
law to sustain petitioners legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public
Words and Phrases; The term political ad ban, when used to describe
right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should
11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is misleadingthere is no suppression of political ads
be allowed.
but only a regulation of the time and manner of advertising.The term
political ad ban, when used to describe 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, is
Same; Same; There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-
misleading, for even as 11(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space
gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
and air time to political candidates, it mandates the COMELEC to procure and
interest.With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
itself allocate to the candidates space and time in the media. There is no
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the
suppression of political ads but only a regulation of the time and manner of
Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued
advertising.
with public interest. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very
nature, assumes a public character.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The validity of regulations of time, place and
manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond question.On the
Same; Same; Presidential Commission on Good Government; It is incumbent
other hand, the validity of regulations of time,
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives,
to disclose sufficient public information on
____________________________

746
* EN BANC.
746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government 448

any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible 448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Osmea vs. Commission on Elections
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth.Considering the intent of the
framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon the PCGG
place and manner, under well-defined standards, is well-nigh beyond
and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose
question. What is involved here is simply regulation of this nature. Instead of
sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided
leaving candidates to advertise freely in the mass media, the law provides for
to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such
allocation, by the COMELEC, of print space and air time to give all candidates
information, though, must pertain to definite propositions of the
equal time and space for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
government, not necessarily to inter-agency or intra-agency
peaceful, and credible elections.
recommendations or communications during the stage when common
assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
exploratory stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the same
Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlimited expenditure for political advertising in
the mass media skews the political process and subverts democratic self-
government.These decisions come down to this: the State can prohibit
campaigning outside a certain period as well as campaigning within a certain
place. For unlimited expenditure for political advertising in the mass media
skews the political process and subverts democratic self-government. What
is bad is if the law prohibits campaigning by certain candidates because of
the views expressed in the ad. Content regulation cannot be done in the
absence of any compelling reason.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The main purpose of 11(b) is regulatory, and any
restriction on speech is only incidental, no more than is necessary to achieve
its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for
political advertising.The main purpose of 11(b)is regulatory. Any
restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to
achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass
media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in
NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The notion that the government may restrict the
speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others may be
foreign to the American Constitution but it is not to the Philippine
Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that document.But do
we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a
limit on campaign expenditure on the theory that money is speech. Do those
who endorse the view that government may not restrict the speech of some
in order to enhance the relative voice of others also think that the campaign
expenditure limitation found in our election laws is unconstitutional? How
about the principle of one person, one vote, is this not based on the political
equality of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voice of
the peopleeven of God. The notion that the govern-
449
VOL. 288, MARCH 31, 1998
Osmea vs. Commission on Elections
ment may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice
of others may be foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the
Philippine Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that
document.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Separation of Powers; Well-settled is the rule that
the choice of remedies for an admitted social malady requiring government
action belongs to Congress, and the remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly
shown to be repugnant to fundamental law, must be respected.It is finally
argued that COMELEC Space and COMELEC Time are ineffectual. It is claimed
that people hardly read or watch or listen to them. Again, this is a factual
assertion without any empirical basis to support it. What is more, it is an
assertion concerning the adequacy or necessity of the law which should be
addressed to Congress. Well-settled is the rule that the choice of remedies
for an admitted social malady requiring government action belongs to
Congress. The remedy prescribed by it, unless clearly shown to be repugnant
to fundamental law, must be respected. As shown in this case, 11(b) of R.A.
6646 is a permissible restriction on the freedom of speech, of expression and
of the press.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The validity of a law cannot be made to
depend on the faithful compliance of those charged with its enforcement but
by appropriate constitutional provisions.To be sure, this Court did not hold
in PPI v. COMELEC that it should not procure newspaper space for allocation
to candidates. What it ruled is that the COMELEC cannot procure print space
without paying just compensation. Whether by its manifestation the
COMELEC meant it is not going to buy print space or only that it will not
require newspapers to donate free of charge print space is not clear from the
manifestation. It is to be presumed that the COMELEC, in accordance with its
mandate under 11(b)of R.A. No. 6646 and 90 of the Omnibus Election
Code, will procure print space for allocation to candidates, paying just
compensation to newspapers providing print space. In any event, the validity
of a law cannot be made to depend on the faithful compliance of those
charged with its enforcement but by appropriate constitutional provisions.
There is a remedy for such lapse if it should happen.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Speech and the Press; Locus Standi; If in
regard to commercial undertakings, the owners may have the right to assert
a constitutional right of their clients, with more reason should establishments
which publish and broadcast have the standing to assert the constitutional
freedom of speech of candidates and of the right to information of the public,
not to speak of their own freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of
petitioners on that basis.If in regard to commercial undertakings, the
owners may have the right to assert a constitutional right of their clients,
with more reason should establishments which publish and broadcast have
the standing to assert the constitutional freedom of speech of candidates
and of the right to information of the public, not to speak of their own
freedom of the press. So, we uphold the standing of petitioners on that basis.
Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is not free
to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal
provision in a particular manner in the past.There is no question that the
COMELEC is the office constitutionally and statutorily authorized to enforce
election laws but it cannot exercise its powers without limitations or
449
reasonable basis. It could not simply adopt measures or regulations just
because it feels that it is the right thing to do, in so far as it might be
concerned. It does have discretion, but such discretion is something that
must be exercised within the bounds and intent of the law. The COMELEC is
not free to simply change the rules especially if it has consistently interpreted
a legal provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has to change
the rules, the same must be properly explained with sufficient basis.
Constitutional Law; Freedom of Expression; In a democracy, the citizens right
to freely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political
decision-making is recognized.In a democracy, the citizens right to freely
participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-
making is recognized. It deserves the highest protection the courts may
provide, as public participation in nation-building is a fundamental principle
in our Constitution. As such, their right to engage in free expression of ideas
must be given immediate protection by this court.
Same; Same; The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones
chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the public in
general, in the hope of influencing their votes.In the case before this court,
there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and
freedom of expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court.
The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of
freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The
right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for ones chosen
candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the
5 resides in the people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty.
VOL. 747, JANUARY 21, 2015 5
The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections
public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in
an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free
speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional
rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Same; Same; This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are
noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise
of their right of free expression.The present petition does not involve a
dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal
opportunities for media coverage of candidates and their right to freedom of
expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are
noncandidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private property, as an exercise
of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political
question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed from deciding
on the merits of this case.
Same; Political Questions; What is generally meant, when it is said that a
question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act.In Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil.
1051 (1957), this court previously elaborated on the concept of what
constitutes a political question: What is generally meant, when it is said that
a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been
specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the
government, with discretionary power to act. (Emphasis omitted) It is not for
this court to rehearse and reenact political debates on what the text of the
law should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the creation of
the text of the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances,
broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the executive
branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific
facts that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.
Same; Same; A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the
powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the
executive or those of the legislature.A political
6 from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of
6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission on Elections
question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence
of different agencies and departments of the executive or those of the
legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the
petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the
domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or
the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with
deference. It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was
so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Political Speeches; Sovereignty
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to
protect this fundamental right.Petitioners exercise of their right to speech,
given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance
especially during the elections. COMELECs letter threatening the filing of the
election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of
this right. The impending threat of criminal litigation is enough to curtail
petitioners speech. In the context of this case, exhaustion of their
administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs
the violation of their freedom of speech. Political speech enjoys preferred
protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales, 545 SCRA
441 (2008), Justice Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized: [i]f ever there
is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the
highest rank, and among different kinds of political expression, the subject of
fair and honest elections would be at the top. Sovereignty resides in the
people. Political speech is a direct exercise of the sovereignty. The principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this
fundamental right.
Constitutional Law; Administrative Regulations; Statutes; It is basic that if a
law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.Like any other administrative regulations, Resolution No.
9615, or any part thereof, must not run counter to the Constitution. It is
basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In this regard, an administrative
regulation, even if it purports to advance a legitimate governmental interest,
may not be permitted to run roughshod over the cherished rights of the
people enshrined in the Constitution.
Same; Freedom of Speech and of Expression; Prior Restraint; Freedom from
prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications,
whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by
the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.Free speech
may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any
matter of public concern without prior restraint or censorship and
subsequent punishment. Prior restraint refers to official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom
censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by the executive,
legislative or judicial branch of the government. Any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption
against its validity. Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of
Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the fundamental right of the people
to freedom of speech. Central to
_______________
* EN BANC.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
1-United Transport Koalisyon (1-UTAK) vs. Commission on Elections
the prohibition is the freedom of individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and
private transport terminals, to express their preference, through the posting
of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree
with them.
Same; Same; It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of
speech and of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights.
It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and
of the press enjoys a preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale
is that the preservation of other rights depends on how well we protect our
freedom of speech and of the press. It has been our constant holding that
this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may
be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful
the equally vital right of suffrage.
Same; Same; Content-Neutral Regulation; A content-neutral regulation, i.e.,
which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,
is constitutionally permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech.A
content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents
of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or manner, and
under well-defined standards, is constitutionally permissible, even if it
restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites
concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of
the Government; second, it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on
freedom of expression is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
that interest.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; The allowance of a facial challenge in
free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on
protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be abridged.
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim
to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which
should not at all times be abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is
inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem
effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even
forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as
it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally
protected rights.
Same; Same; Same; By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily
apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech,
inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.It is settled,
on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is
limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a
facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. By its nature, the
overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
situations not before the court, that are
160
160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. vs. Anti-Terrorism Council
impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise
stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; American jurisprudence instructs that
vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be
examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard
to the statutes facial validity; In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness
doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining
the constitutionality of criminal statutes.American jurisprudence instructs
that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be
examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard
to the statutes facial validity. For more than 125 years, the US Supreme
Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are
unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most
important guarantees of liberty under law. In this jurisdiction, the void-for-
vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized
in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,
the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing
the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal
recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the
vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably,
the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez
and Estrada cases, were actually charged with t
PUNO, C.J., Concurring and Separate Opinion:
Freedom of Expression; Commercial Speech; Breastmilk Substitutes; The
advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the
ambit of the term commercial speechthat is,
282
282 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III
speech that proposes an economic transactiona separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to
other constitutionally guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless
entitled to protection.I fully concur with the well-written and
comprehensive ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Ms. Justice Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez. I write to elucidate another reason why the absolute ban
on the advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes found under
Sections 4(f) and 11 of A.O. No. 2006-0012 (RIRR) should be struck down. The
advertising and promotion of breastmilk substitutes properly falls within the
ambit of the term commercial speechthat is, speech that proproses an
economic transaction. This is a separate category of speech which is not
accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.
Same; Same; Same; Four-Part Analysis for Evaluating Validity of Regulations
of Commercial Speech.Central Hudson provides a four-part analysis for
evaluating the validity of regulations of commercial speech. To begin with,
the commercial speech must concern lawful activity and not be misleading
if it is to be protected under the First Amendment. Next, the asserted
governmental interest must be substantial. If both of these requirements are
met, it must next be determined whether the state regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more
extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.
Same; Same; Same; The absolute ban on advertising prescribed under
Sections 4(f) and 11 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the avowed
governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young
children.I proffer the humble view that the absolute ban on advertising
prescribed under Sections 4(f) and 11 of the RIRR is unduly restrictive and is
more than necessary to further the avowed governmental interest of
promoting the health of infants and young children. It ought to be self-
evident, for instance, that the dvertisement of such products which are
strictly informative cuts too deep on free speech. The laudable concern of
the respondent for the promotion of the health of infants and young children
cannot justify the absolute, overarching ban.
Constitutional Law; Right of Assembly; Freedom of Speech; The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection.The first point to mark is
that the right to peaceably assemble and
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
petition for redress of grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the realm of
constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a
functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.
Same; Same; Same; While the right to freedom of speech, and to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances are
fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries, it is likewise a settled principle growing
out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those
rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious
to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society.It must be remembered that the right,
while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In Primicias, this Court said: The right to
freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But
it is a settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people. This sovereign police power is
exercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactment
of laws regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities and cities
by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact
ordinances for purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Public Assembly Act of 1985 (B.P. 880); Time, Place and
Manner Restrictions; Content-Based Regulations; B.P. No. 880 is not an
absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies; A fair and impartial reading of B.P.
No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public
229
VOL. 488, APRIL 25, 2006 229
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
placesit is not a content-based regulation.B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute
ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in Osmea v.
Comelec, 288 SCRA 447 (1998), where the Court referred to it as a content-
neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding public
assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
The reference to lawful cause does not make it content-based because
assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion,
protesting and influencing in the definition of public assembly content
based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the
government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for
the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of the content of
the expressions in the rally.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Under B.P. 880, the permit for a
public assembly in a public place can only be denied on the ground of clear
and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.The permit can only be denied on the ground of
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise
of the right even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Public; The
law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions; Public does not
have to be definedits ordinary meaning is well-known.Contrary to
petitioners claim, the law is very clear and is nowhere vague in its provisions.
Public does not have to be defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known.
Websters Dictionary defines it, thus: public, n, x x x 2a: an organized body of
people x x x 3: a group of people distinguished by common interests or
characteristics x x x. Not every expression of opinion is a public assembly. The
law refers to rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place. So it does not cover
any and all kinds of gatherings.
230
230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) vs. Ermita
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Overbreadth Doctrine; The law is
neither overbroad nor does it impose a prior restraint.Neither is the law
overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the
substantive evils Congress has the right to prevent. There is, likewise, no
prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks
on judicial decisions and institutions pose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pend-

Freedom of Expression; Right of Assembly; Rally Permits; Clear and Present 546

Danger Test; A mayor commits grave abuse of discretion when he modifies

546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the permit outright and does not immediately inform the applicant who Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
should be heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue
the standard of a clear and present danger test is an indispensable condition
ing case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in
to such modification.In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
their capacity as teachers.It is not contested that respondents herein are,
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who
by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably,
should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived imminent and
they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they
grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the
will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause
venue. The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since
Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
permit. Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach
terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test
law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
which, it bears repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification.
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as
substantive evil, which blank denial or modification would, when granted
teachers.
imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial
scrutiny thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical
Same; Same; Same; Same; It smacks of whim and caprice for a mayor to just
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics
impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific
faith in the legal profession and the justice system; To the mind of the Court,
public place.Respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or
the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law
just impose a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific
professors.A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not
public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have
been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of
found such grave abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory provision,
whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom
not to have modified the permit in terms satisfactory to the applicant.
as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements
tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression is not an absolute
degrade the courts. Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the
there are other societal values that press for recognition, and one such
free speech defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom
societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to
cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit
judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their
pose.The accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the
ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the
Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as
publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the
protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief
reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
Elections, relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers when they teach law are
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
considered engaged in the practice of lawtheir actions as law professors
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
must be measured against the same canons of professional
complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all
547
times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition. VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 547
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) One such societal value that presses for
Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view
of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991), lawyers
when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the
legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. Even if the Court was willing to
accept respondents proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice under
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that
they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1,
11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid
conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they
are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Freedom of expression is not an absolute
there are other societal values that press for recognition, and one such
societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to
judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions
pose.The accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the
Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as
protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief
Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections, relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:
From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear
that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a
complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all
times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and
unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.
x x x. (Emphasis supplied.) One such societal value that presses for
recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the
orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks
on judicial decisions and institutions pose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not inconsistent with the principle of
academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue
intervention in favor of a party in a pend-
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
ing case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in
their capacity as teachers.It is not contested that respondents herein are,
by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably,
they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they
will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause
Resolution that dictates upon respondents the subject matter they can teach
and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the
principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach
law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled
with undue intervention in favor of a party in a pending case, without
observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as
teachers.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The constitutional right to freedom of
expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical
duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the publics
faith in the legal profession and the justice system; To the mind of the Court,
the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of
lawyers applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law
professors.A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not
been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of
whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom
as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements
tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or
degrade the courts. Applying by analogy the Courts past treatment of the
free speech defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom
cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit
ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to
freedom of expression of members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their
ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the
publics faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the
reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers
applies with greater force to the academic freedom of law professors.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of lawtheir actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional
547
VOL. 644, MARCH 8, 2011 547
Re: Letter of the UP Law Entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the UP College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their
being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view
of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210 (1991), lawyers
when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law,
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the
legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured
against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of
members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably
entwined with the fact that they are lawyers. Even if the Court was willing to
accept respondents proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to participate in
the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law
 VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989 669
reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice under
Marcos vs. Manglapus
Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that
they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1,
as a generally accepted principle of international law which is part of the law
11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid
of the land.The right to return to ones country is not among the rights
conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar cannot be
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of
selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With
abode and the right to travel, but it is our wellconsidered view that the right
more reason that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they
to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of
are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land
Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions thereof.
[Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution]. However, it is distinct and separate from
the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International
Constitutional Law; Right to Travel; Section 6, Article III of the 1987
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e.,against being arbitrarily deprived
Constitution allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such
thereof [Art. 12 (4)].
restriction is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health
as may be provided by law.True, the right to travel is guaranteed by the
Same; Same; The constitutional guarantees invoked by petitioners are not
Constitution. However, the exercise of such right is not absolute. Section 6,
absolute and inflexible, they admit of limits and must be adjusted to the
Article III of the 1987 Constitu-
requirements of equally important public interests.The resolution of the
problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the
_______________
country are the deposed dictator and his family at whose door the travails of
the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-
* SECOND DIVISION.
gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees
they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the
1
preferred freedoms of speech and of expression, although couched in
absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of
2
equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 79690-707, October 7, 1988].
Office of Administrative Services-Office of the Court Administrator vs.
Macarine
Same; Separation of Powers; Executive Powers; The grant of execu-tive power
means a grant of all executive powers.The 1987 Constitution has fully
tion allows restrictions on ones right to travel provided that such restriction
restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
is in the interest of national security, public safety or public health as may be
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral
provided by law. This, however, should by no means be construed as limiting
Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], the Constitution has blocked out with deft
the Courts inherent power of administrative supervision over lower courts.
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
OCA Circular No. 49-2003 does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
and the judicial departments of the government. [At 157]. Thus, the 1987
guidelines to be complied by judges and court personnel, before they can go
constitution explicitly provides that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in
on leave to travel abroad. To restrict is to restrain or prohibit a person
the Congress of the Philippines [Art. VI, Sec. 1], [t]he executive power shall
from doing something; to regulate is to govern or direct according to rule.
be vested in the President of the Philippines [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and [t]he
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts
Same; Same; For traveling abroad without having been officially allowed by
as may be established by law [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only
the Court, the respondent is guilty of violation of Office of the Court
establish a separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral
Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 49-2003.For traveling abroad without
Commission, supra] but also confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial
having been officially allowed by the Court, the respondent is guilty of
powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the
violation of OCA Circular No. 49-2003. Under Section 9(4), Rule 140 of the
Supreme Court in Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626, (1910)] pointed out a
Revised Rules of Court, violation of Supreme Court directives and circular is
grant of the legislative power means a
considered a less serious charge and, therefore, punishable by suspension
from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) month
670
nor more than three (3) months; or a fine of more than P10,000.00 but not
exceeding P20,000.00. 670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Marcos vs. Manglapus
Political Law; Bill of Rights; Liberty of Abode; Right to Travel; The right to
return to ones country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed under grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant
the Bill of Rights, though it may well be considered of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the government. [At
631-632.] If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
_______________ chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members
and of the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can
* EN BANC. equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one officialthe
President.
669
Same; Same; Same; The President; The powers granted to the President are
not limited to those powers specifically enumerated in the Constitution.It
would not be accurate, however, to state that executive power is the
power to enforce the laws, for the President is head of state as well as head
of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the
office unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the
Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do
not involve the execu-tion of any provision of law, e.g.,his power over the
countrys foreign relations. On these premises, we hold the view that
although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of
specificpowers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally
considered as within the scope of executive power. Corollarily, the powers
of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more
than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Commander-In-Chief Powers: The President can
exercise Commander-In-Chief powers in order to keep the peace and maintain
public order and security even in the absence of an emergency.More
particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the Presidents powers as
protector of the peace. [Rossiter, The Ameri-can Presidency.] The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way disminished
by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the Presi-dents exercising as
Commander-in-Chief powers short of the calling of
671
VOL. 177, SEPTEMBER 15, 1989
Marcos vs. Manglapus
the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpusor
declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order
and security.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The President has the power under the
Constitution to bar the Marcoses from returning to our country.That the
President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcoses from
returning has been recognized by members of the Legislature, and is
manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and
signed by 103 of its members urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to
return to the Philippines as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national
reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to
uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws. [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.] The Resolution does not
question the Presidents power to bar the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines, rather, it appeals to the Presidents sense of compassion to allow
a man to come home to die in his country. What we are saying in effect is
that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to
certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated
situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a
matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of
the President which are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.
Remedial Law; Parties; Access to public documents and records is a public
right, and the real parties in interest are the people themselves.The
arguments cited by petitioner constitute the controlling decisional rule as
regards his legal standing to institute the instant petition. Access to public
documents and records is a public right, and the real parties in interest are
the people themselves.
___________________
19
Philippine National Bank vs. Bondoc, supra.
* FIRST DIVISION.
745
VOL. 299, DECEMBER 9, 1998 745
Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government
Same; Same; When the issue concerns a public right and the object of
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest.In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court
asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the object of
mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that
petitioner is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of the laws,
he need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result of the
action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to enforce their right to
671
be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in
order to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners legal
standing, the Court declared that the right they sought to be enforced is a
public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
Same; Same; Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioners legal standing, i.e. (1) the
enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, Court rules
that the petition at bar should be allowed.The instant petition is anchored
on the right of the people to information and access to official records,
documents and papersa right guaranteed under Section 7, Article III of the
1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen.
Because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional
law to sustain petitioners legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public
right (2) espoused by a Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should
be allowed.

Same; Same; There is no doubt that the recovery of the Marcoses alleged ill-
gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued with public
interest.With such pronouncements of our government, whose authority
emanates from the people, there is no doubt that the recovery of the
Marcoses alleged ill-gotten wealth is a matter of public concern and imbued
with public interest. We may also add that ill-gotten wealth, by its very
nature, assumes a public character.
Constitutional Law; Right to Information; The right to information goes hand-
in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in
the public service.The Court, in the land-
29
VOL. 672, JUNE 13, 2012 29
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
[SALN] and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary
mark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 (1989), elucidated on
the import of the right to information in this wise: The cornerstone of this
republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within
the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to
information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become
prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been
delegated. The postulate of public office is a public trust, institutionalized in
the Constitution to protect the people from abuse of governmental power,
would certainly be mere empty words if access x x x The right to to such
information of public concern is denied x x x information goes hand-in-hand
with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the
public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
Same; Same; Limitations to the Right to Information.Like all constitutional
guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion right of
access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that
right, the Constitution also provides that the peoples right to know is limited
to matters of public concern and is further subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. Jurisprudence has provided the following
limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence
information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters;
and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified
information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of
their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of
either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme
Court.
Same; Same; While public officers in the custody or control of public records
have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be
inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not
carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or
copying of the records.The Court notes
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Re: Request for Copy of 2008 Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
[SALN] and Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the
Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary
the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit
motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal
information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents
must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the
persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which
their misuse might inflict on others is the requestors responsibility and
lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.
While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected,
examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry
with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying
of the records. After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Just compensation has been defined as the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.Just compensation has been defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. In determining just
compensation, the price or value of the property at the time it was taken
from the owner and appropriated by the government shall be the basis. If the
government takes possession of the land before the institution of
expropriation proceedings, the value should be fixed as of the time of the
taking of said possession, not of the filing of the complaint.
Same; Same; Taking; In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, the Court held
that the time of taking is the time when the landowner was deprived of the
use and benefit of his property, such as when title is transferred to the
Republic.In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Livioco, 631 SCRA 86 (2010),
the Court held that the time of taking is the time when the landowner was
deprived of the use and benefit of his property, such as when title is
transferred to the Republic. It should be noted, however, that taking does
not only take place upon the issuance of title either in the name of the
Republic or the beneficiaries of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP). Taking also occurs when agricultural lands are voluntarily offered
by a landowner and approved by PARC for CARP coverage through the stock
distribution scheme, as in the instant case. Thus, HLIs submitting its SDP for
approval is an acknowledgment on its part that the agricultural lands of
Hacienda Luisita are covered by CARP. However, it was the PARC approval
which should be considered as the effective date of taking as it was only
during this time that the government officially confirmed the CARP coverage
of these lands.
Same; Ownership; There is collective ownership as long as there is a
concerted group work by the farmers on the land, regardless of whether the
landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of
farmers.There is collective ownership as long as there
394
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
is a concerted group work by the farmers on the land, regardless of whether
the landowner is a cooperative, association or corporation composed of
farmers. However, this definition of collective ownership should be read in
light of the clear policy of the law on agrarian reform, which is to emancipate
the tiller from the bondage of the soil and empower the common people.
Worth noting too is its noble goal of rectifying the acute imbalance in the
distribution of this precious resource among our people. Accordingly, HLIs
insistent view that control need not be in the hands of the farmers translates
to allowing it to run roughshod against the very reason for the enactment of
agrarian reform laws and leave the farmers in their shackles with sheer lip
service to look forward to.
Same; Expropriation; Just Compensation; The owner may recover his property
if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the aggrieved owner may demand
payment of just compensation for the land taken. For failure of respondents
to question the lack of expropriation proceedings for a long period of time,
they are deemed to have waived and are estopped from assailing the power
of the government to expropriate or the public use for which the power was
exercised.When a property is taken by the government for public use,
jurisprudence clearly provides for the remedies available to a landowner. The
owner may recover his property if its return is feasible or, if it is not, the
aggrieved owner may demand payment of just compensation for the land
taken. For failure of respondents to question the lack of expropriation
proceedings for a long period of time, they are deemed to have waived and
are estopped from assailing the power of the government to expropriate or
the public use for which the power was exercised. What is left to
respondents is the right of compensation. The trial and appellate courts
found that respondents are entitled to compensation. The only issue left for
determination is the propriety of the amount awarded to respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Just compensation is the fair value
of the property as between one who receives, and one who desires to sell,
fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.Just
compensation is the fair value of the property as between one who
receives, and one who desires to sell, x x x fixed at the time of the actual
taking by the government. This rule holds true when the property is taken
before the filing of an expropriation suit, and even if it is the property owner
who brings the action for compensation.
Same; Same; Same; Compensation must be just not only to the property
owner, but also to the public which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.Both the RTC and the CA recognized that the fair market
value of the subject property in 1940 was P0.70/sq m. Hence, it should,
therefore, be used in determining the amount due respondents instead of
the higher value which is P1,500.00. While disparity in the above amounts is
obvious and may appear inequitable to respondents as they would be
receiving such outdated valuation after a very long period, it is equally true
that they too are remiss in guarding against the cruel effects of belated claim.
The concept of just compensation does not imply fairness to the property
owner
245
VOL. 700, JULY 1, 2013 245
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Tecson
alone. Compensation must be just not only to the property owner, but also
to the public which ultimately bears the cost of expropriation.
VELASCO, JR.,J., Dissenting and Concurring Opinion:
Civil Law; Land Titles; Torrens Titles; Collateral Attack; View that a Torrens
title cannot be attacked collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised
only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.As the liability to
respondents had been determined with finality in a prior proceeding, this
Court could no longer entertain questions on ownership of the subject
property so as to release the DPWH from its liability to respondents.
Otherwise, this would require us to reopen and review the final decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51454. Also, respondents ownership may not be questioned
in this proceeding. It is settled that a Torrens title cannot be attacked
collaterally, and the issue on its validity can be raised only in an action
expressly instituted for that purpose. Sec. 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
also known as the Property Registration Decree, 48. expressly provides:
Section Certificate not subject to collateral attack.A certificate of title shall
not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or
cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. Accordingly,
the Torrens title of respondents (TCT T-43006) speaks for itself and is
conclusive proof of ownership of the subject property.
Remedial Law; Expropriation; Words and Phrases; View that expropriation is
an exercise of the governments power of eminent domain. As an inherent
attribute of the government, this power is fundamentally limitless if not
restrained by the Bill of Rights.Expropriation is an exercise of the
governments power of eminent domain. As an inherent attribute of the
government, this power is fundamentally limitless if not restrained by the Bill
of Rights. Without the limitations thus imposed, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain can become repressive. Thus, the Bill of Rights should
always be a measure and guarantee of protecting certain areas of a persons
life, liberty, and property against the governments abuse of power. In the
instant case, it is not disputed that DPWH illegally took the subject lot
without the consent of respondents and the necessary expropriation
proceedings. To make matters worse, almost 55 years have already passed
from the time of taking, yet DPWH still
246
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Tecson
failed to institute condemnation proceedings. This is clearly indicative of
DPWHs lack of intention to formally expropriate the subject property and
consequently deny respondents of the elementary due process of law. Thus,
when respondents were constrained to file a complaint before the trial court,
they were the ones who, in effect, commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings, which, to my mind, is ironic. The prevalence of the taking of a
subject property without the owners consent and the necessary
expropriation proceedings does not, and should not, cure its illegality.
Same; Same; Just Compensation; View that while the Supreme Court has
previously ruled, in a number of cases, that the value of the property at the
time of the taking which is controlling in the determination of the value of
just compensation, it is my submission that an exception to the foregoing
ruling must be made in cases where no condemnation proceedings were
instituted after a substantial period of time from the time of illegal taking.If
the Court is to peg the reckoning value of the just compensation to PhP 0.70,
it would, in effect, be condoning the wrongful act of DPWH in taking the
subject property in utter disregard of respondents property rights and
violation of the due process of laws. Thus, while this Court has previously
ruled, in a number of cases, that the value of the property at the time of the
taking which is controlling in the determination of the value of just
compensation, it is my submission that an exception to the foregoing ruling
must be made in cases where no condemnation proceedings were instituted
after a substantial period of time from the time of illegal taking. Pertinently,
there is illegal taking when there is taking of a property without the benefit
of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, as
in the instant case. When the illegal taking is compounded with the failure of
the condemnor to institute condemnation proceedings after a substantial
period of time, i.e., 55 years from the time of taking, then it is not really hard
to grasp why pegging the basis for valuation of just compensation at the time
of illegal taking is erroneous, if not utterly reprehensible.
Same; Same; Same; View that the Supreme Court cannot reluctantly close its
eyes to the likelihood that the invariable application of the determination of
just compensation at the time of the actual taking, as in the cases cited in the
ponencia, will grant government agencies and instrumentalities the license to
disregard the property
247
VOL. 700, JULY 1, 2013 247
Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs. Tecson
rights of landowners, violate the Constitutions proviso on due process of
laws, and render nugatory statutory and procedural laws on expropriation
proceedings of private properties for public use.The Court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood that the invariable application of
the determination of just compensation at the time of the actual taking, as in
the cases cited in the ponencia, will grant government agencies and
instrumentalities the license to disregard the property rights of landowners,
violate the Constitutions proviso on due process of laws, and render
nugatory statutory and procedural laws on expropriation proceedings of
private properties for public use. Both the RTC of Malolos City and the CA
were, therefore, correct in granting just compensation to respondents in the
amount of PhP 1,500 per square meter, as recommended by the PAC. This
way, government agencies and instrumentalities would think twice before
taking any unwarranted short cuts in condemning private properties that
violate the owners right to due process of laws as enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.
Eminent Domain; Requisites; Legal Research; Fery v. Municipality of
Cabanatuan, 42 Phil. 28 (1921), was not decided pursuant to our now
sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.Fery was not decided pursuant to our
now sacredly held constitutional right that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. It is well-settled that the
taking of private property by the Governments power of eminent domain is
subject to two mandatory requirements: (1) that it is for a particular public
purpose; and (2) that just compensation be paid to the property owner.
These requirements partake of the nature of implied conditions that should
be complied with to enable the condemnor to keep the property
expropriated.
Same; With respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should
commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new
purpose, and if not, it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the
said property to its private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same;
The Court now expressly holds that the taking of private property, consequent
to the Governments exercise of its power of eminent domain, is always
subject to the condition that the property be devoted to the specific public
purpose for which it was takencorollarily, if this particular purpose or intent
is not initiated or not at all pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owners, if they so desire, may seek the reversion of the property,
subject to the return of the amount of just compensation received.With
respect to the element of public use, the expropriator should commit to use
the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation
filed, failing which, it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
it is then incumbent upon the expropriator to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter desires to reacquire the same. Otherwise, the
judgment of expropriation suffers an intrinsic flaw, as it would lack one
indispensable element for the proper exercise of the power of eminent
domain, namely, the particular public purpose for which the property will be
devoted. Accordingly, the private property owner would be denied due
process of law, and the judgment would violate the property owners right to
justice, fairness, and equity. In light of these premises, we now expressly hold
that the taking of private property, consequent to the Governments exercise
of its power of eminent domain, is always subject to the condition that the
property be devoted to the specific public purpose for which it was taken.
Corollarily, if this particular purpose or intent is not initiated or not at all
pursued, and is peremptorily abandoned, then the former owners, if they so
desire, may seek the reversion of the property, subject to the return of the
amount of just compensation received. In such a case, the exercise of the
power of eminent domain has become improper for lack of the required
factual justification.
Constitutional Law; Right of Eminent Domain; The right of eminent domain is
the ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public
but the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to
public purpose.The right of eminent domain is the ultimate right of the
sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public but the private property
of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, to public purpose. But the
exercise of such right is not unlimited, for two mandatory requirements
should underlie the Governments exercise of the power of eminent domain,
namely: (1) that it is for a particular public purpose; and (2) that just
compensation be paid to the property owner. These requirements partake
the nature of implied conditions that should be complied with to enable the
condemnor to keep the property expropriated.
Same; Same; Public Use; Words and Phrases; Public use, in common
acceptation, means use by the public. However, the concept has expanded
to include utility, advantage or productivity for the benefit of the public.
Public use, in common acceptation, means use by the public. However, the
concept has expanded to include utility, advantage or productivity for the
benefit of the public. In Asias Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department
of Transportation and Communications, 552 SCRA 59 (2008), Justice Corona,
in his dissenting opinion said that: To be valid, the taking must be for public
use. The meaning of the term public use has evolved over time in response
to changing public needs and exigencies. Public use which was traditionally
understood as strictly limited to actual use by the public has already been
abandoned. Public use has now been held to be synonymous with public
interest, public benefit, and public convenience.
Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; National Power Corporation; Statutes;
R.A. No. 6395; Statutory Construction; The Court of Appeals restrictive
construal of Section 3(i) of R.A. No. 6395 as exclusive of tunnels was obviously
unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to development works easily
discoverable or on the surface of the earth but also to subterranean works
like tunnelswhen the law does not distinguish, so must we not, and when
the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a
single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed
to be the meaning that the Congress intended to convey.A cursory reading
shows that Section 3(i) covers the construction of works across, or
otherwise, any stream, watercourse, canal, ditch, flume, street, avenue,
highway or railway of private and public ownership, as the location of said
works may require. It is notable that Section 3(i) includes no limitation
except those enumerated after the term works. Accordingly, we consider the
term works as embracing all kinds of constructions, facilities, and other
developments that can enable or help NPC to meet its objectives of
developing hydraulic power expressly provided under paragraph (g) of
Section 3. The CAs restrictive construal of Section 3(i) as exclusive of tunnels
was obviously unwarranted, for the provision applies not only to
development works easily discoverable or on the surface of the earth but
also to subterranean works like tunnels. Such interpretation accords with the
fundamental guideline in statutory construction that when the law does not
distinguish, so must we not. Moreover, when the language of the statute is
plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and sensible
meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
Congress intended to convey.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The prescriptive period
provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just
compensation.We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section
3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action for damages, and
does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case.
Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit
to recover just compensation for their land.62
62 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay
Same; Same; Inverse Condemnation; Damages; Words and Phrases; Inverse
condemnation, or the action to recover just compensation from the State or
its expropriating agency, is different from the action for damagesthe
former has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the
governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of
eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency, while the latter
action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be
actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.The action to
recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs
from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse
condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in
fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the
power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just
compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the
owners loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word
compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the
other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through
damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or
exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the
norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the
Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is
committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.
Miranda Rights; Rights of Suspects; Bantay Bayan; Words and Phrases; A
bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in an area organized for
the purpose of keeping peace in their community.Following the rationale
behind the ruling in Malngan, this Court needs to ascertain whether or not a
bantay bayan may be deemed a law enforcement officer within the
contemplation of Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution. In People of the
Philippines v. Buendia, 382 SCRA 714 (2002), this Court had the occasion to
mention the nature of a bantay bayan, that is, a group of male residents
living in [the] area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their
community[,which is] an accredited auxiliary of the x x x PNP. Also, it may
be worthy to consider that pursuant to Section 1(g) of Executive Order No.
309 issued on 11 November 1987, as amended, a Peace and Order
Committee in each barangay shall be organized to serve as implementing
arm of the City/Municipal Peace and Order Council at the Barangay level.
The composition of the Committee includes, among others: (1) the Punong
Barangay as Chairman; (2) the Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan; (3) a
Member of the Lupon Tagapamayapa; (4) a Barangay Tanod; and (5) at least
three (3) Members of existing Barangay-Based Anti-Crime or neighborhood
Watch Groups or a Non Government Organization Representative well-
known in his community.
Same; Same; Same; Barangay-based volunteer organization in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of
peace and order at the barangay level; Any inquiry a bantay bayan makes has
the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement
of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section
12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned,
and an extrajudicial confession taken from a suspect by such bantay bayan
without a counsel is inadmissible in evidence.This Court is,
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
549
VOL. 615, March 15, 2010 549
People vs. Lauga
therefore, convinced that barangay-based volunteer organizations in the
nature of watch groups, as in the case of the bantay bayan, are recognized
by the local government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without ruling
on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific
scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a bantay bayan,
particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry
he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as
the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under
Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda
Rights, is concerned. We, therefore, find the extrajudicial confession of
appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence.
Evidence; Witnesses; Inconsistencies which refer to minor, trivial or
inconsequential circumstances strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as
they erase doubts that such testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
The testimony of AAA does not run contrary to that of BBB. Both testified
that they sought the help of a bantay bayan. Their respective testimonies
differ only as to when the help was sought for, which this Court could well
attribute to the nature of the testimony of BBB, a shortcut version of AAAs
testimony that dispensed with a detailed account of the incident. At any rate,
the Court of Appeals is correct in holding that the assailed inconsistency is
too trivial to affect the veracity of the testimonies. In fact, inconsistencies
which refer to minor, trivial or inconsequential circumstances even
strengthen the credibility of the witnesses, as they erase doubts that such
testimonies have been coached or rehearsed.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of Innocence; In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is safeguarded by
the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court to
wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court.It is worthy
to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill
this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate
both the accuseds interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the societys interest in assuring the accuseds presence at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person, before being
convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with
a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.A capital offense in
the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law existing at the
time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death. The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is
charged
_______________
* EN BANC.
283
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 283
Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the
moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers
of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be
recognized.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Promulgation of Judgments; Except when
the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latters
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of
promulgation of judgment; The promulgation in absentia shall be made by
recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to
the accused at their last known address or through counsel.Except when
the conviction is for a light offense, in which case the judgment may be
pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latters
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date
of promulgation of judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall
be made to the accused personally or through the bondsman or warden and
counsel. The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the absence of
the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by
recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to
the accused at their last known address or through counsel. The court shall
also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for conviction and the
failure to appear was without justifiable cause.
Same; Same; Same; When the accused fail to present themselves at the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a
motion for a new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the
judgment of conviction (Rule 122).If the judgment is for conviction and the
failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused shall lose the
remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of
promulgation, because it
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
453
VOL. 746, JANUARY 21, 2015 453
Jaylo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)
determines the availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of
conviction. When the accused fail to present themselves at the promulgation
of the judgment of conviction, they lose the remedies of filing a motion for a
new trial or reconsideration (Rule 121) and an appeal from the judgment of
conviction (Rule 122). The reason is simple. When the accused on bail fail to
present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they
are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in
court, the accused cannot invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief.
Statutory Construction; In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, 439
SCRA 239 (2004), the Supreme Court (SC) enunciated that the term may
denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity, or an option.It bears stressing
that the provision on which petitioners base their claim states that [a]
petition for reconsideration of any final order or decision may be filed within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation or notice of the final order or judgment.
In Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, 439 SCRA 239 (2004), we
enunciated that the term may denotes a mere possibility, an opportunity,
or an option. Those granted this opportunity may choose to exercise it or
not. If they do, they must comply with the conditions attached thereto.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Promulgation of Judgments; It is the
failure of the accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled
date of promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to
avail themselves of the remedies against the judgment.Section 6, Rule 120,
of the Rules of Court, does not take away per se the right of the convicted
accused to avail of the remedies under the Rules. It is the failure of the
accused to appear without justifiable cause on the scheduled date of
promulgation of the judgment of conviction that forfeits their right to avail
themselves of the remedies against the judgment. It is not correct to say that
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the
substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in pursuance of the power of
the Supreme Court to provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases. This provision protects the courts from
delay in the speedy disposition of criminal cases delay arising from the
simple expediency of nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled
promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Jaylo vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)
Same; Same; Same; In order to regain their standing in court, the accused
must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail
of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within fifteen (15) days
from the date of the promulgation of judgment.It is well to note that
Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by which
the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the
forfeiture of the remedies available to them against the judgment of
conviction. In order to regain their standing in court, the accused must do as
follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a motion for leave of court to avail of the
remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the date
of the promulgation of judgment.
Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must
include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let
alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.The right to privacy, as an
inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional
right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as
thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by
plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement
of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There
is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: Liberty in the
constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful
governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a
repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all
freedom. As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized men. The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not
likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose
claim to privacy and interference demands respect.
Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must
be protected from intrusion or constraint.Clearly, the right to privacy is
considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks, 541 SCRA 456 (2007),
_______________
* EN BANC.
386
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Gamboa vs. Chan
this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: With
respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is
true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the
rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every
invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate
congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the
people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails
over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we
declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as
laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individuals right
to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose,
in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating
banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign
securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason
compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.
Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information,
and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to
enforce ones right to the truth and to informational privacy.The writ of
habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the
image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy. It seeks to protect a persons right to control
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the
writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on
the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.
Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of
private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly
constituted authority.The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling
of private armies and other armed groups not
387
 VOL. 677, JULY 24, 2012 387
Gamboa vs. Chan
recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the
establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in
character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
commission.
Constitutional Law; Writ of Amparo; The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an
equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to
life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.The remedy
of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard
the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987
Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of
the Supreme Courts power to promulgate rules concerning the protection
and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as,
among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
Same; Same; After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue the Writ of
Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if the petition
and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioners right to life,
liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful.
On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion presumptive
judicial protection for the petitioner.Due to the delicate and urgent nature
of these controversies, the procedure was devised to afford swift but
decisive relief. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in a Regional Trial
Court, Sandiganbayan, the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court. The
judge or justice then makes an immediate evaluation of the facts as alleged
in the petition and the affidavits submitted with the attendant
circumstances detailed. After evaluation, the judge has the option to issue
the Writ of Amparo or immediately dismiss the case. Dismissal is proper if
the petition and the supporting affidavits do not show that the petitioners
right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are
not unlawful. On the other hand, the issuance of the writ itself sets in motion
presumptive
_______________
* EN BANC.
227
VOL. 691, FEBRUARY 19, 2013 227
De Lima vs. Gatdula
judicial protection for the petitioner. The court compels the respondents to
appear before a court of law to show whether the grounds for more
permanent protection and interim reliefs are necessary.
Same; Same; After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will
be satisfied. In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life,
liberty and security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the
judgment.If the allegations are proven with substantial evidence, the court
shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and
appropriate. The judgment should contain measures which the judge views
as essential for the continued protection of the petitioner in the Amparo
case. These measures must be detailed enough so that the judge may be able
to verify and monitor the actions taken by the respondents. It is this
judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45.
After the measures have served their purpose, the judgment will be satisfied.
In Amparo cases, this is when the threats to the petitioners life, liberty and
security cease to exist as evaluated by the court that renders the judgment.
Parenthetically, the case may also be terminated through consolidation
should a subsequent case be filedeither criminal or civil. Until the full
satisfaction of the judgment, the extraordinary remedy of Amparo allows
vigilant judicial monitoring to ensure the protection of constitutional rights.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It
is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular
fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence, the application of the Revised
Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.The 1991 Revised Rules
of Summary Procedure is a special rule that the Court has devised for the
following circumstances: 1. SECTION Scope.This rule shall govern the
summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in the following cases falling within their jurisdiction: A. Civil Cases: (1)
All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x. (2) All other cases,
except probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiffs claim
does not exceed x x x. B. Criminal Cases: (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules
and regulations; (2) Violations of the rental law; (3) Violations of municipal or
city ordinances; (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six
228
228 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Lima vs. Gatdula
months, or a fine not exceeding one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both,
x x x. x x x x It is clear from this rule that this type of summary procedure only
applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. It is mind-boggling how this rule could possibly
apply to proceedings in an RTC. Aside from that, this Court limited the
application of summary procedure to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ
of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal
action, hence, the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is
seriously misplaced.
Same; Same; A memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.The Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to
frame the issues subject to a hearing. Hence, it should be done prior to the
hearing, not after. A memorandum, on the other hand, is a synthesis of the
claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the
case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other since
these submissions have different functions in facilitating the suit. More
importantly, a memorandum is a prohibited pleading under the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo.
Same; Same; The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be distinguished
from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege includes
availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC, the Rule
on the Writ of Amparo.The privilege of the Writ of Amparo should be
distinguished from the actual order called the Writ of Amparo. The privilege
includes availment of the entire procedure outlined in A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC,
the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. After examining the petition and its
attached affidavits, the Return and the evidence presented in the summary
hearing, the judgment should detail the required acts from the respondents
that will mitigate, if not totally eradicate, the violation of or the threat to the
petitioners life, liberty or security. A judgment which simply grants the
privilege of the writ cannot be executed. It is tantamount to a failure of the
judge to intervene and grant judicial succor to the petitioner. Petitions filed
to avail of the privilege of the Writ of Amparo arise out of very real and
concrete circumstances. Judicial responses cannot be as tragically symbolic
or ritualistic as granting the privilege of the Writ of Amparo.
Constitutional Law; Writs of Amparo; The Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof.Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
provides as follows: SECTION 1. Petition.The petition for a writ of amparo is
a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is
violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall
cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. In
the landmark case of Secretary of National Defense, et al. v. Manalo, et al.,
568 SCRA 1 (2008), this Court held: [T]he Amparo Rule was intended to
address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two
instances or to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed
without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person
by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting
with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the
State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons
outside the protection of law.
Same; Same; Enforced Disappearances; Words and Phrases; As to what
constitutes enforced disappearance, the Supreme Court in Navia v. Pardico,
673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the elements constituting enforced
disappearances as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9851.This pro-
_______________
* EN BANC.
87nouncement on the coverage of the writ was
further cemented in the latter case of Lozada, Jr. v.
Macapagal-Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545 (2012), where
this Court explicitly declared that as it stands, the
writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances,
or to threats thereof. As to what constitutes
enforced disappearance, the Court in Navia v.
Pardico, 673 SCRA 618 (2012), enumerated the
elements constituting enforced disappearances
as the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 9851 to wit: (a) that there be an arrest,
detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of
liberty; (b) that it be carried out by, or with the
authorization, support or acquiescence of, the
State or a political organization; (c) that it be
Same; Same; Child Custody; Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental
rights over a child, who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally
considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly
applied.Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that what is involved is
the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child,
who, for all intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the
State, the Amparo rule cannot be properly applied. To reiterate, the privilege
of the writ of amparo is a remedy available to victims of extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances or threats of a similar nature, regardless of
whether the perpetrator of the unlawful act or omission is a public official or
employee or a private individual. It is envisioned basically to protect and
guarantee the right to life, liberty and security of persons, free from fears and
threats that vitiate the quality of life.
PETITION for review on certiorari under the Rules of Court and the Rule on
the Writ of Amparo of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Br. 106.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Alexander L. Bansil for petitioner.
88VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and Section 191[1] of the Rule on the
Writ of Amparo2[2] seeking to set aside the August 17, 20103[3] and
September 6, 20104[4] Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 106
of Quezon City, in Sp. Proc. Case No. Q-10-67604. The RTC had dismissed
petitioners petition for the issuance of a writ of amparo which petitioner
filed in order for her to regain parental authority and custody of Julian Yusay
Caram (Baby Julian), her biological child, from the respondent officers of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD).
The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records follow:
Petitioner Ma. Christina Yusay Caram (Christina) had an amorous relationship
with Marcelino Gicano Constantino III (Marcelino) and eventually became
pregnant with the latters child without the benefit of marriage. After getting
followed by the State or political organizations
refusal to acknowledge or give information on the
fate or whereabouts of the person subject of the
amparo petition; and, (d) that the intention for
such refusal is to remove subject person from the
protection of the law for a prolonged period of
time.
pregnant, Christina mislead Marcelino into believing that she had an abortion
when in fact she proceeded to complete the term of her pregnancy. During
this time, she intended to have the child adopted through Sun and Moon
Home for Children (Sun and Moon) in Paraaque City to avoid placing her
family in a potentially embarrassing situation for having a second illegitimate
son.