1. G.R. No.

170634 : January 8, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PEDRO BUADO, JR. y

CIPRIANO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

Pedro Buado y Cipriano Jr. was found guilty by the RTC of Valenzuela (May 5,
2003) of two counts of rape committed against his two minor daughters- 10 yrs old and 8
yrs old. He was sentenced to suffer in each case the death penalty.

The accused was his own sole witness. He denied raping his two daughters and
shifted the blame on his drug addict son. He assailed the credibility of the two daughters
testimonies were replete with incredulous statements, and insisting that they were
motivated by anger and revenge than by a sincere call for justice.

He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (April 27, 2005). The CA affirmed
the conviction, but reduced the death penalty to reclusion perpetua. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused-appelant of the crime
charged despite the fact that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; and

2. Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in imposing the Death Penalty upon the
accused-appelant despite the prosecutions failure to prove the Special Qualifying
Circumstances of Relationship and Minority.

RULING:

The appeal has no merit.

1. The trial records entirely supported the lower courts findings in favor of the credibility of
the two daughters recollections. On the other hand, the accused did not bring to the
Courts attention any facts and circumstances of weight that, if properly considered,
would change the result into one favorable to him. He did not even submit to the court
any argument that would lead the court to doubt the findings of the RTC and the CA on
the credibility of the two daughters.

Moreover, long silence and delay in reporting the crime of rape to the proper authorities
have not always been considered as an indication of a false accusation.

The Court discussed that, the essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a female either
against her will (through force or intimidation) or without her consent (where the female
 is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or is under 12 years of age, or is
demented).

Thus, the presence or absence of injury or lacerations in the genitalia of the victim is not
decisive of whether rape has been committed or not. Such injury or laceration is material
only if force or intimidation is an element of the rape charged.

The accused may then be convicted solely on the basis of the victims credible, natural
and convincing testimony.

2. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the death penalty is imposed if the rape
is committed with the attendance of any aggravating/qualifying circumstances. One of
such is when the victim is under 18 years of age and offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or
the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Both minority and actual
relationship must be alleged and proved.

During the trial, the Prosecution adduced no evidence to establish the minority of
one of the raped daughters in Crim. Case No. 912-V-99. Hence, the court concurs with
the CAs conclusion that the accused could not be properly found guilty of qualified rape.
Accordingly, the CA correctly prescribed Reclusion Perpetua as the penalty.

On the other hand, in Crim. Case No. 974-V-99, it sufficiently stated the minority
of the other daughter and her being a legitimate daughter of the accused. Accordingly, the
CA correctly affirmed the penalty of death.

But, with the intervening passage on June 24, 2006 of R.A. No. 9346, the
imposition of the death penalty has become prohibited. Thus, the retroactive application
of the prohibition against the death penalty must be made here because it is favorable to
the accused. Nonetheless, he shall not be eligible for parole, because Sec 3 of R.A. No.
9346 expressly provides that persons whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua by reason of this Act shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, as
amended.

2. G.R. No. 188056 : January 8, 2013

SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
DACUDAO, Petitioners, v. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.

FACTS:
 Spouses Augusto and Ofelia Dacudao were among the investors whom Celso G.
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group)
allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group buy back agreement that earned them
check payments that were dishonored.

Thus, they filed a case of syndicated estafa against Celso Delos Angeles and his
associates after the Spouses were defrauded in a business venture.

The DOJ Secretary issued Department Order 182 which directs all prosecutors in
the country to forward all cases already filed against Celso Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates to the secretariat of DOJ in Manila for appropriate action. However, in a
separate order which is Memorandum dated March 2009, it was said that cases already
filed against Celso Delos Angeles et. al of the Legacy Group of Companies in Cagayan
De Oro City need not be sent anymore to the Secretariat of DOJ in Manila.

Because of such DOJ orders, the complaint of the Spouses was forwarded to the
secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ in Manila.

Aggrieved, Spouses Dacudao filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus assailing to the respondent Secretary of Justice grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the Department Order and the Memorandum, which according to the Spouses
violated their right to due process, right to equal protection of the law and right to speedy
disposition of the cases.

The petitioners opined that orders were unconstitutional or exempting from

coverage cases already filed and pending at the Prosecutors Office of Cagayan De Oro
City. They contended that the assailed issuances should cover only future cases against
Delos Angeles, Jr., et al, not those already being investigated. They maintained that D.O.
No. 182 was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws with retroactive
effect.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the petitioners violated the hierarchy of courts.

2. Whether or not the questioned Department Order and Memorandum violate the
spouses equal protection of the laws.

3. Whether or not it violated their right to the speedy disposition of cases.

4. Whether or not the assailed issuances can be given retroactive effect.

RULING:
1. Yes.

The petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of courts by coming directly to
the Court with their petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without
tendering therein any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition.

The court emphasized that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warrant, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners the
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. An undue disregard of this policy against
direct resort to the Court will cause the dismissal of the recourse.

Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not the only judicial
forum from which to seek and obtain effective redress of their grievances. As a rule,
the Court is a court of last resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant
who brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, x x x x.

2. No.

The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal
application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is
simply equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor
targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.

In issuing the assailed DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of
Justice took into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro, where many
complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and Manila, where the preliminary
investigations would be conducted by the special panel. He also took into account that
the cases had already been filed in the City Prosecutors Office of Cagayan de Oro at
the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable number of complainants
residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the Secretary of Justice was fully justified in
excluding the cases commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182.

3. No.

The Court has clarified that although the Constitution guarantees the right to the
speedy disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept.

The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. was ordered
obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties with the least cost and vexation
to them. Inasmuch as the cases filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt
with during the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly found the
 consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible means of promoting the efficient use
of public resources and of having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.

4. Yes.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist,
and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is that a
remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not create
new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of the remedy or
the confirmation of already existing rights. A statute or rule regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of its passage. All procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.

3. G.R. No. 188635 January 29, 2013

BRENDA L. NAZARETH, REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IX,ZAMBOANGA
CITY,
Petitioner, vs.
THE HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR, HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.,
(COMMISSIONERS OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT), and DIR.KHEM M.
INOK,
Respondents.

FACTS:

On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8439 to address the policy of the State to
provide a program for human resources development in science and technology in order to
achieve and maintain the necessary reservoir of talent and manpower that would sustain the drive
for total science and technology mastery.

Under R.A. No. 8439, the funds for the payment of the Magna Carta benefits are to be
appropriated by the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of the year following the enactment of
R.A. No. 8439.

Thereafter, Brenda Nazareth, DOST Regional Office No. IX released the Magna Carta
benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing in CY 1998 despite the absence of
specific appropriation for the purpose in the GAA.

Subsequently, following the post-audit conducted by COA State Auditor Ramon E. Vargas,
several Notices of Disallowance were issued disapproving the payment of the Magna Carta
benefits. Provision for use of saving of GAA was vetoed by the President.
 The disallowance by the COA prompted then DOST Secretary Dr. Filemon Uriarte, Jr. to
request the Office of the President (OP) through his Memorandum a Request for Authority to
Use Savings for the Payment of Magna Carta Benefits as provided for in R.A. 8439, for the
authority to utilize the DOSTs savings to pay the Magna Carta benefits.

Then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, acting by authority of the President, approved
the request of Secretary Uriarte, Jr.

Hence, the petitioner lodged an appeal with COA Regional Cluster Director Ellen Sescon,
urging the lifting of the disallowance of the Magna Carta benefits.

The appeal was referred to the Regional Legal and Adjudication Director (RLAD) which
denied the appeal and affirmed the NDs. Thus, the petitioner elevated the matter to the COA
Legal and Adjudication Office.

Director Khem N. Inok of the COA Legal and Adjudication Office rendered a decision
denying the petitioners appeal with the modification that only the NDs covering the Magna
Carta benefits for CY 2000 were to be set aside in view of the authorization issued by Executive
Secretary Zamora as the alter ego of the President.

Hence, the appellant filed the instant petition for review with the main argument that the
payment of Magna Carta benefits to qualified DOST Regional Office No. IX employees are
allowed pursuant to RA No. 8439.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the payment of Magna Carta benefits for CYs 1998, 1999 and 2001 is valid
and legal.

RULING:
 No.

In the funding of current activities, projects, and programs, the general rule should still be
that the budgetary amount contained in the appropriations bill is the extent Congress will
determine as sufficient for the budgetary allocation for the proponent agency.

The only exception is found in Section 25 (5),Article VI of the Constitution, by which the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions are authorized to
transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from the
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

It bears emphasizing that the exception in favor of the high officials named in Section 25(5),
Article VI of the Constitution limiting the authority to transfer savings only to augment another
item in the GAA is strictly but reasonably construed as exclusive.

The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and
categorical under the 1973 Constitution. The prohibition against the transfer of appropriations is
the general rule. Consequently, the payment of the Magna Carta benefits for CY 2001 without a
specific item or provision in the GAA and without due authority from the President to utilize the
DOSTs savings in other items for the purpose was repugnant to R.A. No. 8439, the Constitution,
and the re-enacted GAA for 2001.

Nonetheless, the Court opines that the DOST officials who caused the payment of the Magna
Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees acted in good faith in the honest belief that
there was a firm legal basis for the payment of the benefits.

The Court declares and holds that the disallowed benefits received in good faith need not be
reimbursed to the Government.

4. G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013

DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner,
vs.
CTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C. AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL
CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
 JUSTICE AND AS ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, Respondents.

FACTS:

Agra was then the Government Corporate Counsel when Pres Arroyo designated him as
the Acting Solicitor General in place of former Sol Gen Devanadera, who has been appointed as
the Secretary of Justice. Again, Agra was designated as the Acting Secretary in place of Secretary
Devanadera when the latter resigned. Agra then relinquished his position as Corporate Counsel
and continued to perform the duties of an Acting Solicitor General.

Funa, a concerned citizen, questioned his appointment. Agra argued that his concurrent
designations were merely in a temporary capacity. Even assuming that he was holding multiple
offices at the same time, his designation as an Acting Sol Gen is merely akin to a hold-over, so
that he never received salaries and emoluments for being the Acting Sol Gen when he was
appointed as the Acting Secretary of Justice.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Agras designation as Acting Secretary of Justice is valid.

2. Whether or not Agra may concurrently hold the positions by virtue of the hold-over
principle.
3. Whether or not the offices of the Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice is in an ex
officio capacity in relation to the other.

RULING:

1. No.

The designation of Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of
Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of
the 1987 Constitution.

It is immaterial that Agras designation was in an acting or temporary capacity. Section 13

plainly indicates that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so far as holding other offices or
employments in the Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition against dual or
multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the objective of Section 13 is to prevent
the concentration of powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the President, the
Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants.
 2. No.

Agras designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not in an ex officio capacity, by
which he would have been validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due to the
holding of one office being the consequence of holding the other.

Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section 13, Agra cannot liberally apply
in his favor the broad exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the Constitution to justify
his designation as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting
Solicitor General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show that his holding of the other
office was allowed by law or the primary functions of his position. To claim the exemption of
his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter prohibition under Section 13, he
needed to establish that his concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the Constitution.

3. No.

The powers and functions of the Solicitor General are neither required by the primary
functions nor included in the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa. The OSG, while attached to the
DOJ, is not a constituent of the latter, as in fact, the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the
OSG is independent and autonomous. With the enactment of RA 9417, the Solicitor General is
now vested with a cabinet rank, and has the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, allowances, benefits and privileges as those of Presiding Judges of the Court of
Appeals.

5. G.R. No. 168613 March 5, 2013

ATTY. MA. ROSARIO MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, Petitioner,
vs.
TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES (TIDCORP), and its BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 185571
 TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MA. ROSARIO S. MANALANG-DEMIGILLO, Respondent.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 8494 reorganized the structure of TIDCORP. The issuance of
appointments in accordance with the reorganization ensued. Petitioner Rosario Manalang-
Demigillo (Demigillo) was appointed as Senior Vice President (PG 15) with permanent status,
and was assigned to the Legal and Corporate Services Department (LCSD) of TIDCORP.

Thereafter, the Board of Directors passed Resolution No. 1365, Series of 2002, on
October 22, 2002 to approve a so-called Organizational Refinement/Restructuring Plan to
implement a new organizational structure and staffing pattern, a position classification system,
and a new set of qualification standards.

LCSD was abolished. Ma. Rosario Manalang- Demigillo, albeit retaining her position as
a Senior Vice President, was assigned to head the Remedial and Credit Management Support
Sector (RCMSS). On the same date, President Valdes issued her appointment as head of
RCMSS, such appointment being in nature a reappointment under the reorganization plan.

Demigillo challenged before the Board of Directors the validity of Resolution No. 1365
and of her assignment to the RCMSS. She averred that she had been thereby illegally removed
from her position of Senior Vice President in the LCSD to which she had been previously
assigned during the reorganization of July 1998. She insisted the Board of Directors had not been
authorized to undertake the reorganization and corporate restructuring.

Demigillo appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), raising the same issues.

The CSC ruled through Resolution No. 041092 that the 2002 Organizational Refinements
or Restructuring Plan of TIDCORP had been valid for being authorized by Republic Act. No.
6656; that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8498 granted a continuing power to TIDCORPs Board
of Directors to prescribe the agencys organizational structure, staffing pattern and compensation
packages; and that such grant continued until declared invalid by a court of competent
jurisdiction or revoked by Congress.

The CSC held, however, that TIDCORPs implementation of its reorganization did not
comply with Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656, that although there was no diminution in
Demigillos rank, salary and status, there was nonetheless a demotion in her functions and
authority.

The CSC further held that the dropping from the rolls of Demigillo did not comply with
the mandatory requirement under Section 2, particularly 2.2 Rule XII of the Revised Omnibus
Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of
1998.
 The CA ruled that being the alter ego of the President of the Philippines, the Board of
Directors of the TIDCORP is authorized by law to have a continuous power to reorganize its
agency.

It further ruled that, reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are
pursued in good faith. Reorganization

Moreover, it ruled that in utter disregard of respondent Demigillos right to security of

tenure, petitioner TIDCORP demoted her in the guise of "reorganization."

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the Board of Directors of TIDCORP was an alter ego of the President
who had the continuing authority to reorganize TIDCORP.

2. Whether or not the reorganization of TIDCORP effected in 2002 was valid.

3. Whether or not Demigillo had been legally dropped from the rolls.

RULING:

1. No.

The doctrine of qualified political agency could not be extended to the acts of the
Board of Directors of TIDCORP despite some of its members being themselves the
appointees of the President to the Cabinet.

Under Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1080, as further amended by Section

6 of Republic Act No. 8494, the five ex officio members were the Secretary of Finance,
the Secretary of Trade and Industry, the Governor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, the
Director-General of the National Economic and Development Authority, and the
Chairman of the Philippine Overseas Construction Board, while the four other members
of the Board were the three from the private sector (at least one of whom should come
from the export community), who were elected by the ex officio members of the Board
for a term of not more than two consecutive years, and the President of TIDCORP who
was concurrently the Vice-Chairman of the Board.

Such Cabinet members sat on the Board of Directors of TIDCORP ex officio, or

by reason of their office or function, not because of their direct appointment to the Board
by the President. Evidently, it was the law, not the President that sat them in the Board.
 When the members of the Board of Directors effected the assailed 2002
reorganization, they were acting as the responsible members of the Board of Directors of
TIDCORP constituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1080, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8494, not as the alter egos of the President.

2. Yes.
The court upholds the 2002 reorganization and declares it valid for being done in
accordance with the exclusive and final authority expressly granted under Republic Act
No. 8494, further amending Presidential Decree No. 1080, and the law creating
TIDCORP itself.

Section 7. The Board of Directors shall provide for an organizational structure and
staffing pattern for officers and employees of the Trade and Investment Development
Corporation of the Philippines (TIDCORP) and upon recommendation of its President,
appoint and fix their remuneration, emoluments and fringe benefits: Provided, That the
Board shall have exclusive and final authority to appoint, promote, transfer, assign and
re-assign personnel of the TIDCORP, any provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding.

3. No.
Having found the 2002 reorganization to be valid and made pursuant to Republic
Act No. 8494, we declare that there are no legal and practical bases for reinstating
Demigillo to her former position as Senior Vice President in the LCSD. To be sure, the
reorganization plan abolished the LCSD, and put in place a set-up completely different
from the previous one, including a new staffing pattern in which Demigillo would be
heading the RCMSS, still as a Senior Vice President of TIDCORP.

Hence, Demigillo was not demoted because she did not suffer any diminution in
her rank, status and salary under the reorganization. Her reassignment to the RCMSS, a
smaller unit compared to the LCSD, maintained for her the same rank of Senior Vice-
President with a corresponding increase in pay grade. The reassignment resulted from the
valid reorganization.