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In The

Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
No. 09-15-00196-CR
_________________

CRYSTAL LUMMAS BOYETT, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


________________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 356th District Court


Hardin County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 23010
________________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Crystal Lummas Boyett, appeals her conviction for manslaughter

and asks this Court to dismiss the case against her, or in the alternative, remand for

a new trial. Boyett presents three issues for review. First, Boyett argues that the trial

court erred by denying Boyetts request for a continuance to review medical records

that the State produced before trial. Second, Boyett argues the trial court erred by

failing to appoint an expert to evaluate her competency before it determined that she

was competent to stand trial. Finally, Boyett argues that her constitutional right to
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testify in her defense was violated when her trial attorney refused to allow her to

testify at trial. We overrule Boyetts issues and affirm the judgment.

I. Background

The grand jury indicted Boyett for manslaughter for causing the death of a

backseat passenger by recklessly crashing her Camaro into the vehicle occupied by

the victim. Trial was set for April 20, 2015.

On March 19, 2015, thirty-two days before trial, the State received over 4,300

pages of medical documents, which the State represented pertained to the victims

mother, another passenger involved in the accident. On April 9, 2015, during a pre-

trial hearing, Boyett made an oral request for a continuance on the matter, which the

trial court denied. On April 14, 2015, Boyett filed a written motion for continuance,

and the following day, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. During the

hearing, Boyett argued that she required additional time to review the medical

records in order to determine whether they contained information that she could use

in her defense. At the hearing, the State admitted that it had not thoroughly reviewed

the records and could not guarantee that the medical records did not contain

potentially exculpatory material. After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion,

and jury selection began as scheduled on April 20, 2015.

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On April 23, 2015, during the final day of the guilt-innocence phase of trial,

Boyetts counsel filed a motion suggesting incompetency and requested an

examination. The trial court conducted an informal inquiry into Boyetts

competency and, without appointing an expert to examine the defendant, found

insufficient evidence to justify a formal competency determination.

Following the informal inquiry, the State called its final witness and then

rested. Boyetts trial counsel then informed the trial court, outside of the presence of

the jury, that he could not put his client on the stand to testify on her own behalf due

to his belief that she was incompetent. The defense then rested without calling any

witnesses. After closing arguments, the jury found Boyett guilty of manslaughter.

II. Motion for Continuance and Brady Material

In her first issue, Boyett argues that the trial court committed reversible error

in denying her motion for continuance to review the medical documents because the

lack of additional time effectively denied her the use of possibly exculpatory Brady

material. We review the trial courts grant or denial of a motion for continuance for

an abuse of discretion. Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006).

Under Brady v. Maryland, the State has an affirmative duty to turn over

favorable evidence to the defense. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Harm v. State, 183

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S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ([T]he suppression by the prosecution of

evidence favorable to a defendant violates due process if the evidence is material

either to guilt or punishment, without regard to the good or bad faith of the

prosecution.). However, a defendant has no general right to non-exculpatory

material. See id. To establish a claim under Brady, the defendant must demonstrate:

(1) [the State] failed to disclose evidence (2) favorable to the accused[,] and (3) the

evidence is material . . . . Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999). Under the first element, the States disclosure of such evidence must be in

time for the defendant to use it in her defense. Id. As long as the defendant received

the material in time to use it effectively at trial, a disclosure does not violate due

process simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and should

have been. Id.

Even assuming, without deciding, that the States production of the medical

documents was not in time for Boyett to use the documents effectively at trial,

Boyetts Brady claim must fail under the second and third parts of the test. The

second part of the test requires the defendant to establish that the evidence was

favorable to the accused. Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). Favorable evidence is any evidence that if disclosed and used effectively,

it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. Favorable evidence

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includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d

399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,

676 (1985)). Boyett fails to identify any exculpatory material within the documents

and complains only that she had insufficient time to determine whether or not they

contained any exculpatory evidence. Boyett asserts that the State was unable to

certify that the documents did not contain exculpatory material, but [t]he State has

no duty to seek out exculpatory information independently on defendants behalf.

Palmer v. State, 902 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no

pet.). Therefore, Boyetts claim must fail under the second part of the test.

Under the third part of the test, documents are material if there is a reasonable

probability that, had the [documents] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the

proceeding would have been different. Little, 991 S.W.2d at 866. To prove

materiality, the defendant must do more than show a mere possibility that the

documents might have helped in her defense or that the documents might have

affected the outcome of the trial. Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002). Here, Boyett failed to elaborate on how her defensive strategy would

have differed or what the probable impact of having additional time to review the

documents would have been. Therefore, Boyetts claim must also fail under the third

part of the test.

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We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Boyetts

motion. We overrule Boyetts first issue.

III. Competency Examination

In her second issue, Boyett argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing

to grant her request for a court-appointed licensed physician to make a medical

determination of her competency.

A. Standard of Review

We review challenges to the adequacy of a trial courts informal competency

inquiry for an abuse of discretion. George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex.

App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. refd). Under this standard, we do not

substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but we determine whether the trial

courts decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420,

426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c-1) (West Supp. 2016), as stated in Turner v. State,

422 S.W.3d 676, 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

B. Competency

The prosecution and conviction of a defendant while she is legally

incompetent violates due process. Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 299 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009). [A] person whose mental condition is such that [she] lacks the

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capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against [her], to

consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing [her] defense may not be subjected

to trial. Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 68889 (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,

171 (1975)). The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial, which the

Texas Legislature has adopted, asks whether the defendant has a sufficient present

ability to consult with [her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding and whether [she] has a rational as well as factual understanding of

the proceedings against [her]. Id. at 689; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.003(a) (West 2006). A person is presumed to be competent to stand trial, and

the burden is on a criminal defendant to prove incompetency by a preponderance of

the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(b); Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d

45, 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).

To support a finding of incompetency, a defendant must do more than show

that she suffers from a mental illness, or that she obstinately refuses to cooperate

with her trial counsel, or even both of these situations together. Turner, 422 S.W.3d

at 691. Indeed, even a mentally ill defendant who resists cooperating with [her]

counsel may nevertheless be found competent if the manifestations of [her]

particular mental illness are not shown to be the engine of [her] obstinacy. Id. A

defendant must show that her mental illness prevent[s] [her] from rationally

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understanding the proceedings against [her] or engaging rationally with counsel to

support a finding of incompetency. Id. Evidence that raises this possibility

necessitates an informal inquiry, and if that inquiry reveals that the possibility is

substantial, a formal competency trial is required. Id. (emphasis added).

Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, any suggestion that the

defendant may be incompetent to stand trial requires the trial court to first make an

informal inquiry into the defendants competency to decide whether a formal

competency determination is warranted. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

46B.004(c), 46B.005(a). During the initial informal inquiry, the trial court is tasked

with determin[ing] . . . whether there is some evidence from any source that would

support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. [S]ome

evidence means a quantity more than none or a scintilla[.] Ex parte LaHood,

401 S.W.3d at 5253 (quoting Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App.

[Panel Op.] 1980)). During the informal inquiry, the trial court must consider only

the evidence tending to show incompetency. Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 692. A trial

courts first-hand factual assessment of a defendants competency is entitled to great

deference on appeal. Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).

If, after the informal inquiry, the trial court determines that sufficient evidence

exists to support a finding of incompetency, the proceedings are propelled to a

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formal competency determination. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005

(West 2006). While the trial court has discretion to appoint an expert to examine the

defendant during the informal inquiry, the appointment of an expert is mandatory

during the formal competency determination. Id. art. 46B.021(a), (b) (West Supp.

2016); see Sosa v. State, 201 S.W.3d 831, 832 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2006, pet.

refd).

The question therefore becomes whether, in light of what became known to

the trial court by the conclusion of the informal inquiry, it should have conducted a

formal competency hearing and appointed an expert to evaluate Boyett.

C. Present Facts

Boyetts counsel raised the issue of competency for the first time on the third

and final day of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, simultaneously filing a motion to

suggest incompetency. Boyetts counsel argued that Boyett had previously been

diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia and that it was trial counsels belief that she

was episodic, as we speak. Boyetts trial counsel explained that he raised the issue

as soon as [he] was aware of it. Trial counsel further stated that he first suspected

Boyett might not be competent the night before, while he was meeting with Boyett,

Boyetts mother and sister, the defenses expert witness, and his volunteer assistant.

It was not Boyetts behavior during this meeting that raised the issue of competency;

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instead, trial counsel stated that while Boyett was out of the room, he looked through

the notebook in which she had been writing for the past three days and found

aimless doodling and very bizarre writings. Trial counsel then inquired with the

other members of the defense team, as well as Boyetts sister and mother, and

decided to file a motion suggesting incompetency.

The defense counsels suggestion of incompetency propelled the trial court

into the informal inquiry stage. While Boyetts counsel made various representations

to the trial court to convince the judge to conduct an informal inquiry into Boyetts

competency, Boyetts counsel did not testify during the inquiry, nor did he execute

and introduce an affidavit with his observations into evidence. Boyett herself did not

testify. The only evidence that Boyetts trial counsel offered consisted of testimony

from four witnesses.

The first witness, Jennifer Doornbos, had been assisting the defense team as

a volunteer for the preceding three days. Doornbos testified that she had concerns

regarding Boyetts competency and that Boyett exhibited extremely extraneous

behavior. Doornbos testified that Boyett had a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia and

bipolar disorder. While Doornbos understood that Boyett was being treated through

medications, Doornbos had no knowledge if Boyett was compliant with her

prescribed medications. Doornbos agreed with Boyetts trial counsels suggestion

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that it was possible that Boyett was currently suffering from a mental disorder: I

would say, yes. The fact that she disassociates and has no insight is a huge concern.

Doornbos testified that she believed that Boyett was divorced from reality,

potentially due to her mental illness. Specifically, Doornbos testified that Boyetts

counsel provided Boyett a notebook to take notes and write down questions during

trial, but Boyett had used the notebook to doodle and write seemingly nonsensical

sentences, and that Boyett would make small noises, or tics, in the courtroom.

Doornbos also testified that the evening before, while Boyett was meeting with her

defense team to prepare for trial, Boyett seemed more interested in taking a break to

smoke than discussing her case. Doornbos testified that, in her opinion, Boyett does

not have the sufficient present ability to consult with [her attorney] and that she

witnessed that.

Next, Boyetts trial counsel elicited testimony from the defenses accident

reconstruction expert, James Evans. Evans testified that while preparing for trial the

previous evening, he attempted to explain the States expert testimony to Boyett, but

he did not believe she was processing the information, and he had difficulty

interacting with her.

The third witness the defense put on the stand was Charlotte Bush, Boyetts

sister. Bush testified that Boyett had a history of mental illnessbipolar disorder,

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schizophrenia, and depressionand received medication for these diagnoses, but

Bush did not know whether Boyett was medically compliant. Bush testified that

Boyett was exhibiting unusual behavior, such as [f]requent cussing, that she was

fidgety and aggravated[,] and that she did not want to talk about the events for

which she was on trial. Bush testified that Boyett did not seem to have a grasp of the

legal points her attorney explained to her and that Boyett did not seem to have the

present ability to talk with her attorney with a reasonable degree of rational

understanding.

The final witness from whom the defense sought testimony was Gary Butler,

a local attorney who was unaffiliated with the case. Butler testified that that very

morning, he witnessed Boyett in the courts cafeteria, fixing her coffee while loudly

talking to herself. Butler testified that because Boyetts behavior struck him as

bizarre, he mentioned it to her trial counsel, who was also in the cafeteria at the time.

D. Analysis

The record supports the trial courts determination that there was insufficient

evidence to justify a formal competency determination.

On appeal, Boyett argues that the evidence showed Boyetts prior mental

illness was an indicator of the reasons behind her current actions and that Boyetts

prior history taken with her bizarre statements and actions were sufficient to justify

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a court-ordered expert examination. Although Doornbos and Bush testified that

Boyett had previously been diagnosed with a mental illness, Boyett failed to

establish a substantial possibility that any such condition operated in a way as to

prevent her from engaging with counsel in a reasonable and rational manner or from

rationally and factually understanding the proceedings against her. See Turner, 422

S.W.3d at 691. A past diagnosis of a mental disorder, or even a current mental

disorder, would not, without more, require the trial court to hold a formal

competency trial. See id. at 691, 696 (stating that in a case in which there is some

evidence of mental illness but no evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred

that the defendants mental illness renders her incapable of consulting rationally with

counsel, the evidence would not be sufficient to compel a formal competency

hearing).

Moreover, although Doornbos testified that, in her opinion, Boyett was not

able to consult with her attorney, Doornbos was not shown to be a qualified expert

and thus, provided only her lay opinion. Further, Boyetts trial counsel, who had

worked with Boyett over the course of the several preceding months, stated that he

was not aware that there could be an issue concerning competency until the night

before the final day of trial. Trial counsels ability to represent Boyett throughout

the charges against her, without doubting her competency, detracts from any claim

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that she was not able to rationally assist her lawyer in her defense or did not have a

rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. See McDaniel v. State, 98

S.W.3d 704, 70910, 713 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting that reliable evidence

of incompetency could include the defendants conduct or statements in court, as

well as the defendants attorney orally reciting the specific problems he has had in

communicating with his client). The record is void of any evidence of any specific

problems with the behavior of Boyett during the trial or of any specific problems

that Boyetts counsel had attempting to communicate with his client about trial

strategy.

The trial court was not required to agree that Boyetts behavior indicated that

Boyett lacked the capacity to engage with her trial counsel rationally or to make

rational choices with respect to her legal strategies and options. The trial court could

have reasonably decided that Boyetts behavior in doodling and talking to herself

did not show she was unable to comprehend the proceedings or communicate

rationally with counsel. Nor does her heightened agitation with her sister indicate

that she was incompetent to stand trial.

The trial court was also not required to view the accident-reconstruction

experts testimony that he had difficulty communicating with Boyett as evidence

that Boyett was not competent. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691 (stating that a

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defendants refusal to cooperate with trial counsel does not by itself mean that the

defendant is incompetent). And, although Boyetts sister testified that she did not

believe Boyett had a grasp of the legal points or the present ability to talk with her

attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, she based her opinion

on Boyetts refusal to answer her attorneys questions while both Boyett and her

sister were present. There is no evidence from Boyetts sister that she was familiar

with the statutory standard for incompetency.

The trial court had observed Boyett interact with the Court and her counsel in

several hearings over a period of several months. The trial courts first-hand factual

assessment of a defendants competency is entitled to great deference. Ross, 133

S.W.3d at 627 (citing McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 71011 n.19). The record reflects that

Boyett exhibited appropriate behavior throughout the proceedings. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.024(1)(E) (West Supp. 2016) (stating one factor to

consider in evaluating incompetence is whether the defendant has capacity to exhibit

appropriate courtroom behavior). We must give great deference to the trial courts

inferences based on its observations of the defendant throughout the course of the

trial, as well as its evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses who testified during

the informal inquiry. See Ross, 133 S.W.3d at 627. As Judge Keller expressed in her

dissent in Turner, the trial court, though compelled to consider only the evidence

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that tends to show the defendants incompetency, may properly exercise its

discretion to disregard unreliable testimony. 422 S.W.3d at 700 (dissenting opinion).

We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Boyett

failed to show that her case presented one of the relatively rare instances where

the defendants mental illness prevented her from rationally understanding the

proceedings against her or engaging rationally with counsel. See id. at 691, 696.

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not act unreasonably or

arbitrarily in finding, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, that no

formal competency hearing or expert evaluation was required. We overrule Boyetts

second issue.

IV. Right to Testify

In her third and final issue, Boyett complains that her trial counsel denied her

the right to testify.

Strickland v. Washington provides the appropriate framework for addressing

a defendants allegation that her trial counsel denied her the right to testify. 466 U.S.

668, 687 (1984); Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Under Strickland, to show ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

establish that: (1) counsels representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the

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proceeding would have been different but for the attorneys deficient performance.

Strickland 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009); see also Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 239 (holding that a complete denial

of the right to testify at trial is not a structural defect but is the type of violation that

can be subjected to a harm/prejudice inquiry and, therefore, the usual Strickland

prejudice analysis applies).

Near the conclusion of trial, after the court had found insufficient evidence to

support a finding that Boyett was incompetent, Boyetts trial counsel made the

decision not to put her on the stand, stating:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . [I]n light of the filing of the suggestion of


incompetency motion for mental exam, I anticipated calling my client
to testify on her behalf. I feel that she is not competent to testify.
Therefore, I cannot put her on the stand to testify. So, therefore, we
cannot produce any witnesses at this point in time. So, we will rest, as
well.

Boyett argues that her trial counsel technically committed the offense of

ineffective assistance of counsel, in that he made the decision for his client not to let

her testify after she had made a decision to testify. On appeal, Boyett fails to present

any evidence of her desire to testify. Even assuming that Boyetts trial counsels

performance fell below professional norms, we conclude that the record does not

establish that she can satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland.

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Boyett argues that:

[t]here was an actual need for [Boyett] to testify in that[:] (1) [Boyett]
was a survivor of the crash[;] (2) she can testify about her
medical/mental state on the day of the crash[;] and (3) she is the ONLY
person that can explain her actions on the day of the crash.

However, Boyett fails to give any indication of the substance of what her testimony

would have been. The record is insufficient to permit us to draw any conclusions

regarding how her purported testimony would affect the outcome of her trial. We

therefore overrule Boyetts third issue.

Having overruled all of Boyetts issues on appeal, we affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

AFFIRMED.

______________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice

Submitted on June 16, 2016


Opinion Delivered May 31, 2017
Do Not Publish

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.

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