Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
_________________
No. 09-15-00196-CR
_________________
V.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
and asks this Court to dismiss the case against her, or in the alternative, remand for
a new trial. Boyett presents three issues for review. First, Boyett argues that the trial
court erred by denying Boyetts request for a continuance to review medical records
that the State produced before trial. Second, Boyett argues the trial court erred by
failing to appoint an expert to evaluate her competency before it determined that she
was competent to stand trial. Finally, Boyett argues that her constitutional right to
1
testify in her defense was violated when her trial attorney refused to allow her to
I. Background
The grand jury indicted Boyett for manslaughter for causing the death of a
backseat passenger by recklessly crashing her Camaro into the vehicle occupied by
On March 19, 2015, thirty-two days before trial, the State received over 4,300
pages of medical documents, which the State represented pertained to the victims
mother, another passenger involved in the accident. On April 9, 2015, during a pre-
trial hearing, Boyett made an oral request for a continuance on the matter, which the
trial court denied. On April 14, 2015, Boyett filed a written motion for continuance,
and the following day, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. During the
hearing, Boyett argued that she required additional time to review the medical
records in order to determine whether they contained information that she could use
in her defense. At the hearing, the State admitted that it had not thoroughly reviewed
the records and could not guarantee that the medical records did not contain
potentially exculpatory material. After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion,
2
On April 23, 2015, during the final day of the guilt-innocence phase of trial,
Following the informal inquiry, the State called its final witness and then
rested. Boyetts trial counsel then informed the trial court, outside of the presence of
the jury, that he could not put his client on the stand to testify on her own behalf due
to his belief that she was incompetent. The defense then rested without calling any
witnesses. After closing arguments, the jury found Boyett guilty of manslaughter.
In her first issue, Boyett argues that the trial court committed reversible error
in denying her motion for continuance to review the medical documents because the
lack of additional time effectively denied her the use of possibly exculpatory Brady
material. We review the trial courts grant or denial of a motion for continuance for
an abuse of discretion. Renteria v. State, 206 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006).
Under Brady v. Maryland, the State has an affirmative duty to turn over
favorable evidence to the defense. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); Harm v. State, 183
3
S.W.3d 403, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ([T]he suppression by the prosecution of
either to guilt or punishment, without regard to the good or bad faith of the
material. See id. To establish a claim under Brady, the defendant must demonstrate:
(1) [the State] failed to disclose evidence (2) favorable to the accused[,] and (3) the
evidence is material . . . . Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. Crim. App.
1999). Under the first element, the States disclosure of such evidence must be in
time for the defendant to use it in her defense. Id. As long as the defendant received
the material in time to use it effectively at trial, a disclosure does not violate due
process simply because it was not disclosed as early as it might have and should
Even assuming, without deciding, that the States production of the medical
documents was not in time for Boyett to use the documents effectively at trial,
Boyetts Brady claim must fail under the second and third parts of the test. The
second part of the test requires the defendant to establish that the evidence was
favorable to the accused. Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 809 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). Favorable evidence is any evidence that if disclosed and used effectively,
it may make the difference between conviction and acquittal. Favorable evidence
4
includes both exculpatory and impeachment evidence. Thomas v. State, 841 S.W.2d
399, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676 (1985)). Boyett fails to identify any exculpatory material within the documents
and complains only that she had insufficient time to determine whether or not they
contained any exculpatory evidence. Boyett asserts that the State was unable to
certify that the documents did not contain exculpatory material, but [t]he State has
Palmer v. State, 902 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no
pet.). Therefore, Boyetts claim must fail under the second part of the test.
Under the third part of the test, documents are material if there is a reasonable
probability that, had the [documents] been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. Little, 991 S.W.2d at 866. To prove
materiality, the defendant must do more than show a mere possibility that the
documents might have helped in her defense or that the documents might have
affected the outcome of the trial. Hampton v. State, 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2002). Here, Boyett failed to elaborate on how her defensive strategy would
have differed or what the probable impact of having additional time to review the
documents would have been. Therefore, Boyetts claim must also fail under the third
5
We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying Boyetts
In her second issue, Boyett argues the trial court abused its discretion in failing
A. Standard of Review
inquiry for an abuse of discretion. George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 499 (Tex.
App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet. refd). Under this standard, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court, but we determine whether the trial
courts decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. Montoya v. State, 291 S.W.3d 420,
426 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), superseded by statute on other grounds, Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.004(c-1) (West Supp. 2016), as stated in Turner v. State,
B. Competency
incompetent violates due process. Morris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 281, 299 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). [A] person whose mental condition is such that [she] lacks the
6
capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against [her], to
consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing [her] defense may not be subjected
to trial. Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 68889 (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162,
171 (1975)). The constitutional standard for competency to stand trial, which the
Texas Legislature has adopted, asks whether the defendant has a sufficient present
the proceedings against [her]. Id. at 689; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
the evidence. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 46B.003(b); Ex parte LaHood, 401 S.W.3d
that she suffers from a mental illness, or that she obstinately refuses to cooperate
with her trial counsel, or even both of these situations together. Turner, 422 S.W.3d
at 691. Indeed, even a mentally ill defendant who resists cooperating with [her]
particular mental illness are not shown to be the engine of [her] obstinacy. Id. A
defendant must show that her mental illness prevent[s] [her] from rationally
7
understanding the proceedings against [her] or engaging rationally with counsel to
necessitates an informal inquiry, and if that inquiry reveals that the possibility is
Under the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, any suggestion that the
defendant may be incompetent to stand trial requires the trial court to first make an
competency determination is warranted. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.
46B.004(c), 46B.005(a). During the initial informal inquiry, the trial court is tasked
with determin[ing] . . . whether there is some evidence from any source that would
support a finding that the defendant may be incompetent to stand trial. Id. [S]ome
401 S.W.3d at 5253 (quoting Sisco v. State, 599 S.W.2d 607, 613 (Tex. Crim. App.
[Panel Op.] 1980)). During the informal inquiry, the trial court must consider only
the evidence tending to show incompetency. Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 692. A trial
deference on appeal. Ross v. State, 133 S.W.3d 618, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
If, after the informal inquiry, the trial court determines that sufficient evidence
8
formal competency determination. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.005
(West 2006). While the trial court has discretion to appoint an expert to examine the
during the formal competency determination. Id. art. 46B.021(a), (b) (West Supp.
2016); see Sosa v. State, 201 S.W.3d 831, 832 (Tex. App.Fort Worth 2006, pet.
refd).
the trial court by the conclusion of the informal inquiry, it should have conducted a
C. Present Facts
Boyetts counsel raised the issue of competency for the first time on the third
and final day of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, simultaneously filing a motion to
suggest incompetency. Boyetts counsel argued that Boyett had previously been
diagnosed with bipolar schizophrenia and that it was trial counsels belief that she
was episodic, as we speak. Boyetts trial counsel explained that he raised the issue
as soon as [he] was aware of it. Trial counsel further stated that he first suspected
Boyett might not be competent the night before, while he was meeting with Boyett,
Boyetts mother and sister, the defenses expert witness, and his volunteer assistant.
It was not Boyetts behavior during this meeting that raised the issue of competency;
9
instead, trial counsel stated that while Boyett was out of the room, he looked through
the notebook in which she had been writing for the past three days and found
aimless doodling and very bizarre writings. Trial counsel then inquired with the
other members of the defense team, as well as Boyetts sister and mother, and
into the informal inquiry stage. While Boyetts counsel made various representations
to the trial court to convince the judge to conduct an informal inquiry into Boyetts
competency, Boyetts counsel did not testify during the inquiry, nor did he execute
and introduce an affidavit with his observations into evidence. Boyett herself did not
testify. The only evidence that Boyetts trial counsel offered consisted of testimony
The first witness, Jennifer Doornbos, had been assisting the defense team as
a volunteer for the preceding three days. Doornbos testified that she had concerns
behavior. Doornbos testified that Boyett had a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia and
bipolar disorder. While Doornbos understood that Boyett was being treated through
10
that it was possible that Boyett was currently suffering from a mental disorder: I
would say, yes. The fact that she disassociates and has no insight is a huge concern.
Doornbos testified that she believed that Boyett was divorced from reality,
potentially due to her mental illness. Specifically, Doornbos testified that Boyetts
counsel provided Boyett a notebook to take notes and write down questions during
trial, but Boyett had used the notebook to doodle and write seemingly nonsensical
sentences, and that Boyett would make small noises, or tics, in the courtroom.
Doornbos also testified that the evening before, while Boyett was meeting with her
defense team to prepare for trial, Boyett seemed more interested in taking a break to
smoke than discussing her case. Doornbos testified that, in her opinion, Boyett does
not have the sufficient present ability to consult with [her attorney] and that she
witnessed that.
Next, Boyetts trial counsel elicited testimony from the defenses accident
reconstruction expert, James Evans. Evans testified that while preparing for trial the
previous evening, he attempted to explain the States expert testimony to Boyett, but
he did not believe she was processing the information, and he had difficulty
The third witness the defense put on the stand was Charlotte Bush, Boyetts
sister. Bush testified that Boyett had a history of mental illnessbipolar disorder,
11
schizophrenia, and depressionand received medication for these diagnoses, but
Bush did not know whether Boyett was medically compliant. Bush testified that
Boyett was exhibiting unusual behavior, such as [f]requent cussing, that she was
fidgety and aggravated[,] and that she did not want to talk about the events for
which she was on trial. Bush testified that Boyett did not seem to have a grasp of the
legal points her attorney explained to her and that Boyett did not seem to have the
present ability to talk with her attorney with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding.
The final witness from whom the defense sought testimony was Gary Butler,
a local attorney who was unaffiliated with the case. Butler testified that that very
morning, he witnessed Boyett in the courts cafeteria, fixing her coffee while loudly
talking to herself. Butler testified that because Boyetts behavior struck him as
bizarre, he mentioned it to her trial counsel, who was also in the cafeteria at the time.
D. Analysis
The record supports the trial courts determination that there was insufficient
On appeal, Boyett argues that the evidence showed Boyetts prior mental
illness was an indicator of the reasons behind her current actions and that Boyetts
prior history taken with her bizarre statements and actions were sufficient to justify
12
a court-ordered expert examination. Although Doornbos and Bush testified that
Boyett had previously been diagnosed with a mental illness, Boyett failed to
prevent her from engaging with counsel in a reasonable and rational manner or from
rationally and factually understanding the proceedings against her. See Turner, 422
disorder, would not, without more, require the trial court to hold a formal
competency trial. See id. at 691, 696 (stating that in a case in which there is some
evidence of mental illness but no evidence from which it may reasonably be inferred
that the defendants mental illness renders her incapable of consulting rationally with
hearing).
Moreover, although Doornbos testified that, in her opinion, Boyett was not
able to consult with her attorney, Doornbos was not shown to be a qualified expert
and thus, provided only her lay opinion. Further, Boyetts trial counsel, who had
worked with Boyett over the course of the several preceding months, stated that he
was not aware that there could be an issue concerning competency until the night
before the final day of trial. Trial counsels ability to represent Boyett throughout
the charges against her, without doubting her competency, detracts from any claim
13
that she was not able to rationally assist her lawyer in her defense or did not have a
S.W.3d 704, 70910, 713 n.19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (noting that reliable evidence
well as the defendants attorney orally reciting the specific problems he has had in
communicating with his client). The record is void of any evidence of any specific
problems with the behavior of Boyett during the trial or of any specific problems
that Boyetts counsel had attempting to communicate with his client about trial
strategy.
The trial court was not required to agree that Boyetts behavior indicated that
Boyett lacked the capacity to engage with her trial counsel rationally or to make
rational choices with respect to her legal strategies and options. The trial court could
have reasonably decided that Boyetts behavior in doodling and talking to herself
did not show she was unable to comprehend the proceedings or communicate
rationally with counsel. Nor does her heightened agitation with her sister indicate
The trial court was also not required to view the accident-reconstruction
that Boyett was not competent. See Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 691 (stating that a
14
defendants refusal to cooperate with trial counsel does not by itself mean that the
defendant is incompetent). And, although Boyetts sister testified that she did not
believe Boyett had a grasp of the legal points or the present ability to talk with her
attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, she based her opinion
on Boyetts refusal to answer her attorneys questions while both Boyett and her
sister were present. There is no evidence from Boyetts sister that she was familiar
The trial court had observed Boyett interact with the Court and her counsel in
several hearings over a period of several months. The trial courts first-hand factual
S.W.3d at 627 (citing McDaniel, 98 S.W.3d at 71011 n.19). The record reflects that
Boyett exhibited appropriate behavior throughout the proceedings. See Tex. Code
Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46B.024(1)(E) (West Supp. 2016) (stating one factor to
appropriate courtroom behavior). We must give great deference to the trial courts
inferences based on its observations of the defendant throughout the course of the
trial, as well as its evaluation of the credibility of the witnesses who testified during
the informal inquiry. See Ross, 133 S.W.3d at 627. As Judge Keller expressed in her
dissent in Turner, the trial court, though compelled to consider only the evidence
15
that tends to show the defendants incompetency, may properly exercise its
We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that Boyett
failed to show that her case presented one of the relatively rare instances where
the defendants mental illness prevented her from rationally understanding the
proceedings against her or engaging rationally with counsel. See id. at 691, 696.
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not act unreasonably or
arbitrarily in finding, based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, that no
second issue.
In her third and final issue, Boyett complains that her trial counsel denied her
a defendants allegation that her trial counsel denied her the right to testify. 466 U.S.
668, 687 (1984); Johnson v. State, 169 S.W.3d 223, 235 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that the result of the
16
proceeding would have been different but for the attorneys deficient performance.
Strickland 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694; Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 340 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009); see also Johnson, 169 S.W.3d at 239 (holding that a complete denial
of the right to testify at trial is not a structural defect but is the type of violation that
Near the conclusion of trial, after the court had found insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Boyett was incompetent, Boyetts trial counsel made the
Boyett argues that her trial counsel technically committed the offense of
ineffective assistance of counsel, in that he made the decision for his client not to let
her testify after she had made a decision to testify. On appeal, Boyett fails to present
any evidence of her desire to testify. Even assuming that Boyetts trial counsels
performance fell below professional norms, we conclude that the record does not
17
Boyett argues that:
[t]here was an actual need for [Boyett] to testify in that[:] (1) [Boyett]
was a survivor of the crash[;] (2) she can testify about her
medical/mental state on the day of the crash[;] and (3) she is the ONLY
person that can explain her actions on the day of the crash.
However, Boyett fails to give any indication of the substance of what her testimony
would have been. The record is insufficient to permit us to draw any conclusions
regarding how her purported testimony would affect the outcome of her trial. We
AFFIRMED.
______________________________
CHARLES KREGER
Justice
18