A.

LITERAL INTERPRETATION
1. Verba Legis
a. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015
digest
NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the
issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and April 23,
2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc,
respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former
President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during
the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive
clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the
position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of
the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to
garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and
filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of
the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC because of Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan
Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute
Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation
to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estradas right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim
garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in
public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by
Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or were so
patent and gross as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored allhis civil and
political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of
this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete,
unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised
Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of
the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both
the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the
pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,
expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation
to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted
to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary
pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.
FALLO:

Petition is dismissed
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b. TRADE AND INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES v.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, G.R. No. 182249, March 5, 2013
no digest
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http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/mar2013/gr_182249_2013.html

2. Dura lex sed lex

a. OLYMPIO REVALDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 170589, April 16, 2009
digest
FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the offense of illegal possession of premium hardwood lumber in
violation of Section 68 of the Forestry Code. That on or about the 17th day of June 1992,
Revaldo, with intent of gain, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
96.14 board ft. of flat lumber with a total value of P1,730.52, Philippine Currency, without any
legal document as required under existing forest laws and regulations from proper government
authorities, to the damage and prejudice of the government. Upon arraignment, petitioner,
assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The RTC rendered judgment on 1997
convicting petitioner of the offense charged, he appealed and the Court of Appeals ruled that
motive or intention is immaterial for the reason that mere possession of the lumber without the
legal documents gives rise to criminal liability. Hence, this petition for certiorari. Petitioner
contends that the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the police officers was illegal
and thus the items seized should not have been admitted in evidence against him. Petitioner
argues that the police officers were not armed with a search warrant when they went to his
house to verify the report that petitioner had in his possession lumber without the corresponding
license
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence obtained without search warrant is admissible in court
HELD:
When the police officers arrived at the house of petitioner, the lumber were lying around the
vicinity of petitioners house. The lumber were in plain view. Under the plain view doctrine,
objects falling in "plain view" of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. When asked whether he had the
necessary permit to possess the lumber, petitioner failed to produce one. Petitioner merely
replied that the lumber in his possession was intended for the repair of his house and for his
furniture shop. There was thus probable cause for the police officers to confiscate the lumber.
There was, therefore, no necessity for a search warrant. Petitioner was in possession of the
lumber without the necessary documents when the police officers accosted him. In open court,
petitioner categorically admitted the possession and ownership of the confiscated lumber as
well as the fact that he did not have any legal documents therefor and that he merely intended
to use the lumber for the repair of his dilapidated house. Mere possession of forest products
without the proper documentation consummates the crime. Dura lex sed lex. The law may be
harsh but that is the law. Therefore, the appealed decision convicting petitioner for violation of
Section 68 (now Section 77) of the Forestry Code is affirmed.

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http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/170589.htm

b. ARNEL SAGANA v. RICHARD A. FRANCISCO, G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009

digest
On Dec.13, 1994, Arnel Sagana filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Quezon City.
He alleged that on November 20, 1992, Richard Francisco, with intent to kill, shot him with a
gun hitting him on the right thigh.
On January 31, 1995, process server Manuel Panlasigui attempted to personally serve the
summons to respondent, Francisco, at his address: No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City
but was unsuccessful because the occupant, who refused to give his identity, said that the
respondent is unknown at the said address. Subsequently, the trial court attempted to serve
summons to respondents office through registered mail on February 9, 1995. However, despite
three notices, the respondent failed to pick up the summons.
The Trial Court then dismissed the case on account of petitioners lack of interest to prosecute,
noting that the petitioner did not take any action since the filing of the Servers Return on 8
February 1995. In response, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration stating that he
exerted efforts to locate the respondent and that respondent indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita
St., Baesa, Quezon City. The trial court granted petitioners motion for reconsideration on
August 4, 1995, conditioned upon the service of summons on the respondent within 10 days
from receipt of the Order.
Thus, on August 25, 1995, Process Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at the
respondents address but was told by Michael Francisco, the respondents 19-year old brother,
that the respondent no longer lived at the said address. As such, Iconar left a copy of the
summons to Michael Francisco.
On November 10, 1995, the petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Defendant in Default, since the
respondent still failed to file an Answer despite the service of summons. The trial court granted
the Motion, finding that the summons was validly served through his brother, Michael, and
allowed the petitioner to present his evidence ex parte. Nonetheless, copies of all pleadings and
court documents were furnished to respondent at his address.
On March 1, 1996, petitioner and movant Michael Francisco, through his counsel, Atty.
Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, filed a Manifestation and Motion denying that he received the summons
or that he was authorized to receive the summons on behalf of his brother. He alleged that the
substituted service did not comply with Section 8, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, since summons
was not served at the defendants residence or left with any person who was authorized to
receive it on behalf of the defendant. Michael Francisco also asserted in an Affidavit of Merit that
his brother had left their residence in March 1993, and that respondent would only call by
phone, or write his family without informing them of his address.
Thereafter, Michael Francisco submitted his respective Opposition, Reply, and Rejoinder. In his
Rejoinder, he attached a copy of an Affidavit prepared by the respondent, dated December 23,
1992, where he declared himself a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. The affidavit was
notarized by Atty. Bernardo Q. Cuaresma, the same lawyer who represented respondents
brother before the trial court.
The trial court denied Michael Franciscos Manifestation and Motion for lack of merit, holding
that: plaintiff had already sent numerous pleadings to defendant at his last known address. As
also pointed out by [petitioner] in his Opposition, movant has not adduced evidence, except his
affidavit of merit, to impugn the service of summons thru him. Movant herein also admits that
defendant communicates with him through telephone. Movant, therefore, being a person of
sufficient age and discretion, would be able, more likely than not, to inform defendant of the fact
that summons was sent to him by the court.
On 20 September 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of the plaintiff. On
November 23, 1999, respondent Richard A. Francisco filed a Notice of Appeal, claiming that he
received a copy of the trial courts Decision on November 9, 1999, and that the same was
contrary to the law, facts, and evidence, and prayed that his appeal be given due course.

On 5 June 2000, the Court of Appeals directed the parties to file their respective briefs, a copy
of which was sent to respondent by registered mail at No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon
City.
The respondent attended the preliminary conference on September 3, 2002, but the parties
failed to reach an amicable settlement. Thus, on August 13, 2003, the appellate court rendered
the Decision granting the appeal and setting aside the Decision of the trial court on the grounds
that the service of summons was irregular and such irregularity nullified the proceedings before
the trial court. The trial courts decision was void since it did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent.
The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration where he alleged that respondent did, in fact,
reside at No. 36 Sampaguita St. To prove this assertion, petitioner submitted the original copy of
the envelope containing respondents Notice of Appeal, which indicated respondents return
address to be No. 36 Sampaguita St. Nonetheless, on January 29, 2004, the Court of Appeals
denied the Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, the petitioner filed this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether there was valid service of summons upon the respondent.
HELD: YES. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find there was proper
substituted service of summons upon the respondent.
Section 8 of Rule 14 of the old Revised Rules of Court provided:
Section 8. Substituted service. If the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section [personal service on defendant], service may be effected (a)
by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants residence with some person of suitable
age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or
regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.
The personal service of summons was twice attempted by the trial court, although
unsuccessfully. The trial court also thrice attempted to contact the respondent through his place
of work, but to no avail. These diligent efforts to locate the respondent were noted in the first
sheriff's return, the process server's notation, as well as the records of the case. Moreover,
respondents claim that he moved out of their residence on March 1993 without informing his
family of his whereabouts despite the regular calls and letters is incredulous. It is even more
implausible when the respondent admitted to receiving the trial courts decision on September
20, 19999 which was sent to No. 36 Sampaguita St., Baesa, Quezon City, and that his Notice of
Appeal indicated the same address. He also admitted to receiving a copy of the appellate
courts order for a preliminary conference which was also sent to the same address. Finally, it is
unbelievable that, since respondent and his brother was assisted by the same lawyer, none of
them was able to inform respondent of the receipt of summons.
Indeed, there was no proof presented as to when respondent left and then returned to his
original home, if he actually did leave his home.
The purpose of summons is two-fold: to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
and to notify the defendant that an action has been commenced so that he may be given an
opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. Under the circumstances of this case, the
respondent was duly apprised of the action against him and had every opportunity to answer the
charges made by the petitioner. However, since he refused to disclose his true address because
of his own pretenses, it was impossible to personally serve summons upon him.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The 13 August 2003
Decision of the Court of Appeals and its 29 January 2004 Resolution are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is REINSTATED and
AFFIRMED.
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B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION

1. Statutes must be capable of interpretation
a. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 127325, March 19, 1997
digest
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting
on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition
published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the
COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling law
passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so
WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of
such initiative?
WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft
petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.
WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.
HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.
Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in
part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws,
ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted,
approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local
Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means
that the main thrust of the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No.
6735 were intended to fully provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to
the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of
things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local
laws.
While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on
national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution.
COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith
dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
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2. Ratio legis est anima

a. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No.
180050, April 12, 2011
digest
FACTS:
Petitioners Navarro, Bernal, and Medina brought this petition forcertiorari under Rule65 to
nullify Republic Act No. 9355, An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being
unconstitutional. Based on the NSO 2000 Census of Population, the population of the Province
of Dinagat Islands is 106,951. A special census was afterwards conducted by the Provincial
Government of Surigao del Norte which yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants with
average annual income for calendar year 2002-2003 of P82,696,433.23 and with a land area of
802.12 square kilometres as certified by the Bureau of Local Government Finance.
Under Section 461 of R.A. No. 7610, The Local Government Code, a province may be created
if it has an average annual income of not less than P20 million based on 1991 constant prices
as certified by the Department of Finance, and a population of not less than 250,000inhabitants
as certified by the NSO, or a contiguous territory of at least 2,000 square kilometers as certified
by the Lands Management Bureau. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two or
more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities, which do not contribute to the income
of the province. Thereafter, the bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands was enacted into
law anda plebiscite was held subsequently yielding to 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative. With the approval of the people from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
and the Province of Dinagat Islands, Dinagat Islands was created into a separate and distinct
province. Respondents argued that exemption from the land area requirement is germane to the
purpose of the Local Government Code to develop self-reliant political and territorial
subdivisions. Thus, the rules and regulations have the force and effect of law as long as they
are germane to the objects and purposes of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in Sec. 2, Art. 9 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Local Government Code of 1991 (IRR) valid.
RULING:
No.The rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.The
Constitution requires that the criteria for the creation of a province, including anyexemption from
such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. The IRRwent beyond the
criteria prescribed by Section 461 of the Local Government Code when it added the italicized
portion The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed
of one (1) or more islands. The extraneous provision cannot be considered as germane to the
purpose of the law asit already conflicts with the criteria prescribed by the law in creating a
territorial subdivision.Thus, there is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic
law and the rules andregulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails.
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b. ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 203766, April 2,

2013
digest
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC andBANAT vs
COMELEC.

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections in
the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified as
representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.

Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave abuse
of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the
said party-lists.

HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC
as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles
established in the two aforestated cases. The newguidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:

1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list
system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether
major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system.
The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party
through a coalition.

4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or

lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are marginalized
and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack well-defined
political constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.

5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations
that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the sector they represent. The
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political constituencies,
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be
bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.

6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the practice,
from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no constitutional prohibition
nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now participate in the party-list
system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see parameter 3
above).

Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized and
underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the party-
list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for the
marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based and
cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike major
political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can acquire the
needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.

If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system itself
unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower house.

As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to

include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of professionals,
which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as they
are ideologically marginalized.
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in reference to this case! Banat vs Comelec digest
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.

In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following
rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining
20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at
least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;

3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it
is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the
case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.

4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the
votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).

The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list
candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that
the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to
qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list
election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical
impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then
with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the
prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).

On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3
seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political
parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to
sectoral parties.
ISSUES:

I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?

II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.

III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.

IV. How are party-list seats allocated?

V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.

VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.

HELD:

I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative
districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987
Constitution provides that there shall benot more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list
representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the number of the
membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative districts as it may
deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted
for party-list representatives.

How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:

(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats

Available to Party-List Representatives

Hence,

(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55

II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of
party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower
house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.

III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that
only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which
garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical
impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:

To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for
the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or
one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get
one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus,
even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always
impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two
percent threshold is present.

It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.

IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to
also get a seat.

But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:

1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.

2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be
entitled toadditional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats
are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because
they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining
available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the
Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.

In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round,
all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given
their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2%
each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining
seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).

The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly,
in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining
seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling
up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.

How is this done?

Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of
seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.

Example:

In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of
the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).

Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat

Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79

Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-
percenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.

Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are
still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those
higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.

V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes
of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in
their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list
elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized
(indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices,
explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution precisely
because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and the will of the people is
that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list elections.
Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate
the party-list system.
3. Literal import must yield to intent
a. AUTOMOTIVE PARTS & EQUIPMENT COMPANY v. JOSE B. LINGAD, G.R. No. L-26406,
October 31, 1969
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b. UNITED STATES v. TORIBIO, 15 Phil. 85 (1910)

digest
police Power

Sometime in the 1900s, Toribio applied for a license to have his carabao be slaughtered. His
request was denied because his carabao is found not to be unfit for work. He nevertheless
slaughtered his carabao without the necessary license. He was eventually sued and was
sentenced by the trial court. His counsel in one way or the other argued that the law mandating
that one should acquire a permit to slaughter his carabao is not a valid exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled against Toribio. The SC explained that it is not a taking of the property for
public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is a just and legitimate exercise of the
power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use of the property as would be
inconsistent with or injurious to the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held under
the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community.
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c. SY TIONG SHIOU v. SY CHIM and FELICIDAD CHAN SY, G.R. No. 174168, March 30,
2009
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d. CORNELIA MATABUENA v. PETRONILA CERVANTES, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971
digest
FACTS:
In 1956, herein appellants brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his
common-law spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only
in 1962 or six years after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September
13, 1962, Felix died. Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only
sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of
a an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name
and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that
the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at the time when Felix and Petronila were not
yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code inapplicable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a
common-law relationship.
HELD:
While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a donation between the spouses
during marriage, policy consideration of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality requires that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
As stated in Buenaventura vs. Bautista (50 OG 3679, 1954), if the policy of the law is
to prohibit donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue
and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, then there is every reason to apply the
same prohibitive policy to persons living together as husband and wife without the benefit of
nuptials.
The lack of validity of the donation by the deceased to appellee does not necessarily
result in appellant having exclusive right to the disputed property. As a widow, Cervantes is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the surviving sister to the other half.
Article 1001, Civil Code: Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the
widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and
sisters or their children to the other half.

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e. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TANON STRAIT v.

SEC. ANGELO REYES, G.R. No. 180771, 21 April 2015
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4. Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex

a. B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR v. GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, G.R. No. 93177, August 2,
1991
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5. Supplying legislative omission

a. CARROLL H. LAMB v. W.H. PHIPPS, G.R. No. L-7806, July 12, 1912
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b. GOVERNOR RODOLFO C. FARINAS v. MAYOR ANGELO M. BARBA, G.R. No. 116763,

April 19, 1996
digest

FACTS:
Carlito B. Domingo was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. On
March 24, 1994, he resigned after going without leave to the United States.
To fill the vacancy created by his resignation, a recommendation for the appointment of Edward
Palafox was made by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas but the recommendation was
made to Mayor Barba. The resolution, containing the recommendation, was submitted to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte purportedly in compliance with Sec. 56 of the Local
Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).

The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, purporting to act under this provision of the Local Government
Code, disapproved the resolution for the reason that the authority and power to appoint
Sangguniang Bayan members are lodged in the Governor. Accordingly, the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan recommended to the Governor the appointment of petitioner Al Nacino. On June
8, 1994, the Governor appointed petitioner Nacino and swore him in office that same day. On
the other hand, respondent Mayor Barba appointed respondent Edward Palafox to the same
position.

On June 14, 1994, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Ilocos Norte a petition for quo
warranto and prohibition.
On July 8, 1994 the trial court rendered its decision, upholding the appointment of respondent
Palafox by respondent Mayor Barba.

ISSUE:
Who can appoint the replacement and in accordance with what procedure?
HELD:
The person who has the power to appoint under such circumstance is the Governor upon the
recommendation of the Sangguniang concerned which is the Sangguniang Bayan of San
Nicolas where the vacancy occurs.
The upshot of this is that in the case at bar, since neither petitioner Al Nacino nor respondent
Edward Palafox was appointed in the manner indicated in the preceding paragraph, neither is
entitled to the seat in the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte which was vacated
by member Carlito B. Domingo. For while petitioner Al Nacino was appointed by the provincial
governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan of San Nicolas. On the other
hand, respondent Edward Palafox was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan but it was the
mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him.

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6. Construction as to avoid absurdity

a. REYNALDO O. MALONZO v. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, G.R. No. 137718, July 27,
1999
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b. PARAS v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996

digest
FACTS:
A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall
election was deferred due to Petitioners opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall
shall take place within one year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election. Since the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election
was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted.
ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election.
HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must
be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74
is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and
par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting
the phrase regular local election to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for
there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. In interpreting a statute, the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should
be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory.

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7. Construction in favor of right and justice

a. KAREN E. SALVACION v. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997
digest

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and

serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar

checks and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from

prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and

attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.

Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking

Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts

foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any

court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion

therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No.

6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made

applicable to a foreign transient?

HELD: NO.

The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it

amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ

of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in

such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of

damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the

economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still

exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being

unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law

failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the

case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking

System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign

lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign

currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD

Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor

stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only

for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the

protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against

attachment, garnishment or other court processes.

Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.

Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which

exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative

body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign

transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused

Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of

doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.

___________

NOTES:

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured

petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg

Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape

the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On

February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was

arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the

following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.)

COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking

Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door

Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.

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8. Law does not require the impossible

a. PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR. v. PNOC, G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008
digest
Facts:
PNOC Exploration Corporation, respondent, filed a complaint for a sum of money against
petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to be collected was the
petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by respondent when he was still a
member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter cannot be
located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so. Subsequently, on
respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by publication. Respondent
caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of
service of respondents employee to the effect that he sent a copy of the summons by
registered mail to petitioners last known address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of summons.
Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte. Trial court granted
said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached Answer, alleging
that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply with Section 19, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court. Trial court denied the said motion
and held that the rules did not require such execution with the clerk of court. It also denied the
motion to admit petitioners answer because the same was filed way beyond the reglementary
period.
Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even sustained the trial
courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal interest and cost of suit.
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of
summons.
(2) Whether or not the rule on service by publication under Section 14, Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam.
(3) Whether or not the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been
prepared by the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.
Held:
(1) Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant is designated as an
unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may order.
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent efforts to locate
his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to effect the service of
summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Thus, petitioner was
proper served with summons by publication and that there is jurisdiction over his person.
(2) The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because it was silent as
to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been changed, it now applies
to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies in any action where the
defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that
the complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for recovery of
sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.
(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by
an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post
office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail to his last known
address. The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be
executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its
orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is
imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

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9. Number and gender of words

a. SANTILLON v. MIRANDA, G.R. No. 19281, June 30, 1965
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b. SNYDERS ESTATE V. DENIT, 72 A2D 757, 18 ALR2D 663 (1950)

C. IMPLICATIONS
1. Necessary implication
a. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR) v. UNITED
PLANNERS CONSULTANTS , INC., G.R. No. 212081, February 23, 2015
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b. SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. v. HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E.

LAGUESMA, G.R. No. 116194, February 2, 2000
digest

FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking

institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent

SRBI Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union

(APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the

Philippines (TUCP).1wphi1.nt

On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of Registration

No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.

On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory

employees of SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor

organization duly-registered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more

supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees supported the petition: (4) there was
no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and (5) no

certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12 months prior to the petition.

On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification

election conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.

On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the unions petition. It sought to prevent

the holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-

TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential employees.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or

highly-placed confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations

and engaging in union activities.

(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon

the filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the petitioners

appeal pending before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the unions registration.

RULING:

(1) Petitioners explanation does not state who among the employees has access to information

specifically relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves

as the secretary of the banks Board of Directors may not be so classified.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to

persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field

of labor relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to

be considered a confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist
between the employee and his superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed

responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in

union activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of

managerial employees equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee

rule justifies exclusion of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties

they become aware of management policies relating to labor relations. It must be stressed,

however, that when the employee does not have access to confidential labor relations

information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential employees from forming, assisting,

or joining a union.

(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is

the right to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate

bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of

Art. 234, it is our view that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor

Code mandates that a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter

upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labororganization.16 Nothing is said therein that

prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification election if the management appeals on the

issue of the validity of the unions registration. On this score, petitioners appeal was correctly

dismissed.

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2. Grant of power includes incidental power

a. CARMELO F. LAZATIN v. HRET, G.R. No. 84297, December 8, 1988
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b. CEMCO HOLDINGS, INC. v. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE

PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 171815, August 7, 2007
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c. ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.

No. 100152, March 31, 2000
digest
Facts: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After
consideration of petitioner's application and the opposition interposed thereto by local
optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342 subject to the following
conditions: (1) Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a
commercial store; (2) It cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for
patients, because these are functions of optical clinics; (3) It cannot sell reading and similar
eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent optometrist or
independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a
prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses; (4) It cannot advertise optical lenses and
eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames; (5) It is allowed to grind
lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI lodged
a complaint against the petitioner alleging that Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in
its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such permit. On July
19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business
Permit effective as of said date and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.

Issue: Whether the City Mayor has the authority to impose special conditions, as a valid
exercise of police power, in the grant of business permits

Ruling: Police power as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power to prescribe

regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general
welfare of the people. It is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses or
grant business permits, if exercised for a regulatory and not revenue-raising purpose, is within
the ambit of this power. The authority of city mayors to issue or grant licenses and business
permits is beyond cavil. However, the power to grant or issue licenses or business permits must
always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the rights of all
concerned to due process and equal protection of the law.
In the case under consideration, the business permit granted by respondent City Mayor to
petitioner was burdened with several conditions. Petitioner agrees with the holding by the Court
of Appeals that respondent City Mayor acted beyond his authority in imposing such special
conditions in its permit as the same have no basis in the law or ordinance. Public respondents
and private respondent SOPI are one in saying that the imposition of said special conditions is
well within the authority of the City Mayor as a valid exercise of police power.
The issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially regulatory
in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units to issue or grant such
licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the
contemplation of the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code.

What is sought by petitioner from respondent City Mayor is a permit to engage in the business
of running an optical shop. It does not purport to seek a license to engage in the practice of
optometry. The objective of the imposition of subject conditions on petitioner's business permit
could be attained by requiring the optometrists in petitioner's employ to produce a valid
certificate of registration as optometrist, from the Board of Examiners in Optometry. A business
permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the City Mayor cannot,
through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of a profession. Such a function is
within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to
supervise the profession, in this case the Professional Regulations Commission and the Board
of Examiners in Optometry.

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3. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly

a. TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE v. LA TRINIDAD WATER DISTRICT, G.R. No.
166471, March 22, 2011
digest

FACTS:

TMPC is a cooperative organized to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La

Trinidad, Benguet. On the other hand, LTWD is a local water utility created under PD 198 which
authorized to LTWD supply water for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes within the
municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. On 9 October 2000, TMPC filed with the NWRB an
application for a certificate of public convenience to operate and maintain a waterworks system
in Barangay Tawang. LTWD opposed

TMPCs application claiming that under Section 47 of PD No. 198 its franchise is exclusive. In
its Resolution No. 04-0702 dated 23 July 2002, the NWRB approved TMPCs application for a
CPC. In its 15 August 2002 Decision, the NWRB held that LTWDs franchise cannot be
exclusive since exclusive franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and
financially qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system.

ISSUE:

Whether the authority granted to LTWD by virtue of P.D. 198 is exclusive.

RULING:

NO. The constitution provides in Section 11, Article XII that: No franchise, certificate, or any
other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens
of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines,
at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise,
certificate or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. The
Constitution is clear that franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in
character.T his constitutional prohibition is absolute and accepts no exception. On the other
hand, PD No.198, as amended, allows the BOD of LTWD and LWUA to create franchises that
are exclusive in character. Section 47 states that, "No franchise shall be granted to any other
person or agency x x x unless and except to the extent that the board of directors consents
thereto x x x subject to review by the Administration." Section 47 creates a glaring exception to
the absolute prohibition in the Constitution. Clearly, it is patently unconstitutional.

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