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ELSEVIER Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142

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Contrast and assimilation in verbal irony*

Herbert L. Colson*
Psychology Department, University of Wisconsin-Parkside,
Kenosha, WI 53141-2000, USA

Received 24 June 2000; revised version 9 January 2001

Abstract

The study investigated a potential link between patterns of perceptual/cognitive biasing


effects and interpretation effects in figurative language. Following a recent line of psycholin-
guistic research that theoretically introduced and empirically verified a predictive relationship
between perceptual contrast effects and the pragmatic functions of verbal irony (Colston,
2000; Colston and OBrien, 20OOa,b), the present study tested, (1) whether the broader fam-
ily of perceptual and cognitive biasing effects found throughout the cognitive, social and
other psychological literatures influences aspects of language comprehension, (2) how such
an influence would specifically operate, and (3) whether this view accounts for dissociations
found on the pragmatic functions of ironic tropes. The results of 4 experiments on 144 par-
ticipants demonstrated that the pattern of contrast versus assimilation effects found in many
psychological research literatures enables prediction of the pragmatic functions interpreted
from a speakers use of figurative language, specifically, the degree of criticism expressed by
a speaker using a form of verbal irony. This prediction is also enabled through the way in
which the situations that are commented-upon with verbal irony are perceived. The implica-
tions of these results for other aspects of perceptual or cognitive biasing effects that might
affect figurative language processing are discussed. 0 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights
reserved.

* Support for this work was provided by Faculty Professional Opportunity and Research and Creative
Activity grants provided by the University of Wisconsin-Parkside. Portions of this work were presented
at the June, 1999 meeting of PRAGMA, Tel Aviv, Israel, at the August, 1999 meeting of the Linguistic
Association of Canada and the United States, Edmonton, Canada, and at the November, 2000 meeting of
the Psychonomic Society in New Orleans, LA, USA. I wish to thank Virginia Lusch and Patricia
Jindrich for their assistance in developing materials and testing participants. All experiments were con-
ducted in accordance with the American Psychological Associations ethical standards for the treatment
of human participants.
* Phone: (262) 595-2142; Fax: +1(262) 595-2602; E-mail: herbert.colston@uwp.edu

0378-2166/02/$ - see front matter 0 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
PII: SO378-2166(01)00031-5
112 H.L. Colston / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 11 l-142

Keywords: Verbal irony; Assimilation effects; Comprehension; Contrast effects; Figurative


language; Condemnation/pragmatic

1. Introduction

An emerging view in the psycholinguistic literature on the comprehension of ver-


bal irony posits that the widespread perceptual-, cognitive-, and social-psychological
phenomenon of a contrast effect influences verbal irony comprehension. For
instance, if a speaker utters an ironic comment (e.g., That was brilliant, when a per-
son has locked himself out of his home) she creates a contrast between the semantic
meaning of the comment (e.g., something being intelligent) and the actual physical
context to which the utterance refers (e.g., a behavior that was rather unintelligent).
Studies have demonstrated that the comprehension of such ironic comments necessi-
tates that this type of contrast is present (Colston, 2000), and that the degree to
which a variety of pragmatic function (e.g., humor, condemnation, self-protection,
surprise expression, etc.) are performed is directly predictable by the magnitude of
the contrast effect produced by the discrepancy between the semantic meaning of
such an ironic comment and its referent situation (Colston, 1997a,b; Colston and
Keller, 1998; Colston and OBrien, 2000a,b; Roberts and Kreuz, 1994; Jorgensen,
1996; Toplak and Katz, 2000).
The present study seeks to expand upon this link between perceptual/cognitive/
social psychology and figurative language comprehension. Specifically, the study
evaluates, (1) whether the broad family of biasing effects including the differential
pattern of contrast versus assimilation effects found throughout many psychological
research literatures - perhaps most notably the current social psychological literature
on social judgments - enables prediction of aspects of verbal irony comprehension,
(2) what sort of mechanism might support this link between biasing effects and fig-
urative language comprehension, and (3) whether such a mechanism can explain dis-
sociations found in the literature on the pragmatic functions of ironic tropes.
In order to lay the groundwork for evaluation of these questions, I first present a
very brief overview of the general pattern of biasing effects found in various psy-
chological literatures. I then suggest a mechanism for how these effects could influ-
ence the interpretation of verbal irony, as well as the predictions the mechanism
would offer. Next I argue how the predictions of the mechanism are consistent with
previous research on the pragmatic functions of verbal irony, given certain assump-
tions about those studies. Lastly I present the results of an empirical test on whether
contrast and assimilation effects influence verbal irony interpretation, whether they
use the mechanism described, and whether they cohere with previous explanations of

Although the current study is concerned with contrast effects, other recent work has nevertheless also
addressed the more basic notion of contrast, in verbal irony comprehension, in such guises as the dis-
crepancy, and its magnitude, between expectations and reality (Colston and Keller, 1998; Gerrig and
Goldvarg, 2000; Katz and Pexman, 1997; Pexman et al., 2000; Utsumi, 2000) or between literal and
ironic meanings of utterances (Attardo, 2000; Colston, in press; Dews and Winner, 1999; Giora, 1995;
Schwoebel et al., 2000).
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 113

the relative degree of condemnation expressed by verbal irony relative to literal com-
mentary. As will readily become apparent, it does appear that the well-established
pattern of perceptual and cognitive biasing effects influences how aspects of a form
of figurative language are interpreted, and that these effects make their impact via
the mechanism discussed.

2. Contrast and assimilation

Contrast and assimilation effects are observed when a persons perception, esti-
mation, judgment, interpretation, etc., of some target stimulus is biased because of
simultaneous or prior exposure to other information that co-varies with the target
along a relevant dimension (Petzold, 1992; Schwarz and Bless, 1992). Contrast
effects are distinguishable from assimilation effects though, according to the nature
of that bias. In a contrast effect, the judgment or interpretation is typically influenced
in a direction along the dimension away from the biasing information, where in an
assimilation effect, the judgment is usually moved toward the biasing information
along the dimension (McKenna, 1984).
To briefly demonstrate, consider a classic domain in which contrast and assimila-
tion effects are found -judgments of the size of objects (Watson, 1957). If an object
is shown to a group of people individually who are asked, with no contextual cues
being given, to guess the size of the object, a certain average size estimation will
emerge (e.g., 12 inches). If a biasing object is shown alongside the target object,
however, this average judgment will change. If the biasing object is only slightly
larger than the target object (e.g., 15 inches), the typical result is an estimation of the
target that is slightly larger than the judgment made in isolation. Participants might
report the target to be 14 inches tall with the slightly-larger bias present. This is the
assimilation effect. If the biasing object is much larger than the target object, though
(e.g., 24 inches), then the judgment is typically influenced in the other direction. In
this instance the estimate of the targets size might be 8 inches on average. This
would be the pattern of a contrast effect.
In general, contrast effects are more robust and widespread than assimilation
effects and usually of greater magnitude, but the typical pattern of contrast and
assimilation remains consistent - biasing information that only slightly differs from
the target information will generally influence judgments in a direction toward the
biasing information along the relevant dimension (e.g., size). Biasing information
that more greatly differs from the target information, however, will exert a greater
influence on judgments, this time in a direction away from the biasing information,
again along the relevant dimension. Moreover, once the magnitude of difference
between the target information and the biasing information has gotten large enough
to start producing contrast effects instead of assimilation effects in judgments, then
the greater the magnitude of difference, the greater the contrast effect, up to a rea-
sonable limit.
Contrast and assimilation effects have been invoked to explain a wide variety of
phenomena. These phenomena range from relatively simple effects on the visual
114 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) III-142

perception of the brightness of objects (Beck, 1966; Sugita, 1995), and the length
and orientation of lines (Jordan and Haleblian, 1988; Jordan and Uhlarik, 1985)
including effects on the famous Muller-Lyer illusion (Avant, 1971), to effects in
other sensory modalities including the perception of objects weight (Parducci and
Marshall, 1962) and vowels sound (Shigeno, 1991). Somewhat more complicated
findings have involved contrast and assimilation effects in counting (Bevan and
Turner, 1964), in dynamic motion perception (Murakami and Shimojo, 1996), and
with other cognitive phenomenon such as priming (Lombardi et al., 1987), counter-
factual thinking (McMullen, 1997), anchor effects (Sherif et al., 1958) and cogni-
tive effort (Martin et al., 1990). Contrast and assimilation effects have even been
demonstrated in the visual discrimination abilities of rhesus monkeys (Wilson,
1972).
Perhaps the biggest application of contrast and assimilation effects, however, has
been in social psychological research where they have enabled prediction of many
types of social judgments including assessments of politicians positions (Abele and
Gendolla, 1999; Judd et al., 1983), schizophrenics level of disturbance (Campbell et
al., 1957) and a variety of personality trait, skill level, attitude, mood and other
related judgments (Erdley and DAgostino, 1988; Herr et al., 1983; Moskowitz and
Skumik, 1999; Newman and Uleman, 1990; Pelham and Wachsmuth, 1995; Sherif
and Hovland, 1961).

3. A mechanism connecting contrast/assimilation effects with verbal irony com-


prehension

The psycholinguistic research that first suggested a link between contrast effects
and verbal irony comprehension (this research did not address assimilation effects)
demonstrated that the degree to which a speaker was perceived as being humorous,
condemning, self-protective and surprised was directly predicted by the magnitude
of the contrast effect caused by an ironic comments inconsistency with its referent
situation (Colston and Keller, 1998; Colston and OBrien, 2OOOa). For instance,
ironic utterances (e.g., Well, you are giving me a lot of help arent you?) that pre-
sented a very wide discrepancy between the comment and its referent negative situ-
ation (e.g., a student losing a senior thesis because her computer crashed), and thus
created a relatively large contrast effect, were rated as funnier, more condemning,
more expressive of surprise and less self-protective than understated comments
(e.g., Well, youve given me a tiny little problem) that provided a somewhat
smaller discrepancy and thus produced a smaller contrast effect. Moreover, both
kinds of utterances achieved these functions to a greater extent than literal com-
ments, which created no contrast effects.
One limitation of this demonstration, however, was the lack of a clear mechanism
for how a comment causing a contrast effect of any magnitude would influence each
of the pragmatic functions that were performed, relative to literal comments.
Although the proposed mechanism for how humor would be interpreted from such
comments - that the amount of humor perceived increases as a function of mere
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 115

discontinuity, and that the discrepancy between the ironic utterances and their
referent situations provided this discontinuity - seems straightforward, the mecha-
nism for condemnation, surprise and protection was more vague:

Since verbal irony and understatement refer to points closer to the positive and expected ends of the
negative-positive and unexpected-expected dimension, and since the actual event is nearer to the nega-
tive and unexpected end of that dimension, and since contrast effects produce judgments of the target
information in a direction away from the biasing information, then ironic remarks about the target situa-
tion should produce judgments that are more negative and more unexpected than literal remarks.
(Colston and OBrien. 2000a: 1564, emphasis added)

Although this production of judgments that are more negative and more unex-
pected than literal remarks is consistent with what was found - ironic comments
did express more condemnation, less protection (a corollary of more condemnation)
and more surprise than literal comments - it is still not clear precisely how those
judgments would arise. What does a judgment that [is] more negative, for
instance, specifically mean?
I now propose that the incongruity between the positive semantic meaning of an
ironic comment (e.g., That was brilliant) and its referent negative situation (e.g., a
person locking himself out of his house) achieves pragmatic functions via its influ-
ence on how that situation is perceived. Specifically, a speaker who causes a situa-
tion to appear very negative would be seen by hearers/readers of the comment as
more condemning than a speaker who causes a situation to appear less negative, and
speakers vary the interpreters perception of the situation through contrast and
assimilation effects arising from the comments used.*
For instance, if a very positive (ironic) description is given of a moderately nega-
tive situation, the situation might appear considerably more negative when juxta-
posed to the extremely positive comment, relative to a neutral comment having been
made, because of a contrast effect. The speaker might then be interpreted as being
more critical in using such an ironic positive comment, again relative to a neutral
comment, through her act of causing the situation to appear more negative. These
influences on interpretation are brought about via a moderately negative event being
made to look even more negative in comparison with a very positive situation to
which a speakers utterance refers. If an only slightly positive (ironic) description is
given of the same moderately negative situation, however, then the situation might
appear slightly more positive when juxtaposed to the slightly positive comment, rel-
ative to a neutral comment having been made, this time due to an assimilation effect.
The speaker would then be interpreted as being less critical in using the slightly pos-
itive ironic comment, again relative to a neutral comment, through her act of causing
the situation to appear slightly more positive. These influences on interpretation
again are brought about via a moderately negative event being made to look slightly

2 I should note here that I am considering only the prototypical verbal ironic form - positive comments
about negative situations (e.g., critical irony), where other forms do exist - negative comments about
positive situations (e.g., ironic praise). Indeed, a strong test of the contrast mechanism might be afforded
by future research on this other form.
116 H.L. C&ton I Journal of Pragmutics 34 (2002) 11I-142

more positive in comparison with a slightly positive situation to which a speakers


utterance refers.

4. Accounting for previous research

This mechanism and the patterns it predicts are consistent with previous research
on the extent to which the pragmatic function of condemnation is performed by ver-
bal irony. A series of studies investigating the degree of criticism expressed by ver-
bal irony (Dews and Winner, 1995; Dews et al., 1995) found that ironic commentary
(e.g., Youre so considerate note: a literally positive comment) was perceived as
less critical than literal commentary (e.g., Youre so inconsiderate note: a literally
negative comment) when an addressee(s) was being criticized by a speaker for doing
something negative (e.g., a roommate borrowing a pair of shoes without permission).
Colson (1997b; see also Colson and OBrien, 20OOa,b; Toplak and Katz, 2OOO),
however, found the opposite pattern - ironic comments (e.g., Well win the cham-
pionship for sure now) were judged as more criticizing than literal comments (e.g.,
Well never win the championship now) when directed at an addressee(s) engaged
in negative behavior (e.g., a star player partying too much and getting sick prior to
the game).
This dissociation might be explained by assimilation and contrast effects where
moderately positive comments (e.g., Youre so considerate), in relation to their
referent situation, cause assimilation in the perception of the target behavior or event
(e.g., a roommate borrowing a pair of shoes without permission) toward the positive
(relative to literal comments), where more extreme positive comments (e.g., Well
win the championship for sure now), in relation to their referent situations, produce
a contrast such that the perception of that target behavior (e.g., a star player partying
too much and getting sick prior to the game) is shifted toward the negative (also rel-
ative to literal comments). The interpretation of speakers intent in discussing these
varyingly perceived situations would then shift accordingly - situations seen as rel-
atively positive would correspond with a speaker being less critical, situations seen
more negatively would align with a speaker being more critical.
It is unclear though, whether the negative situations and the negative and positive
comments used in the studies by Colson (1997b) and Dews and colleagues (Dews et
al., 1995; Dews and Winner, 1995) are comparable in their degree of negativity or
positivity. This makes it difficult to be certain whether the studies were actually
causing contrast and assimilation effects. For instance, if the example negative situ-
ations (a star player partying too much and getting sick prior to a game and a room-
mate borrowing a pair of shoes without permission) were equivalently negative on
average, then the respective positive comments (Well win the championship for
sure now and Youre so considerate) would have to differ in their positiveness.
The Colston comments would have to be more positive than the comments used by
Dews and colleagues in order for the studies comments to cause contrast and assim-
ilation effects respectively. Or, if the example comments were equivalently positive,
then the situations would have to differ accordingly in their negativity to produce the
H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 117

contrast and assimilation effects. Or, if neither the comments nor the situations were
reasonably equivalent, then at least the magnitude of difference between the com-
ments and situations would have to show the appropriate pattern to produce the
effects (e.g., a contrast effect requires a greater difference between situation and
comment than does an assimilation effect). Moreover, all of these differences would
have to be in the correct relation to the degree of negativity of the literal comments.
As none of the studies measured the perceived degree of negativity/positivity of the
situations or comments it is difficult to determine whether contrast and assimilation
can account for their different results, although it remains a compelling possibility.
Contrast and assimilation effects are also consistent with, and indeed may sub-
sume, one of the explanations proposed to account for the discrepancy in the Colston
and Dews et al. studies. Among the factors identified that would affect the relative
degree of condemnation expressed by the forms was whether or not the interpreter
was directly affected by the typically negative situations that the comments
addressed (Colston, 1997b). Although never explicitly manipulated, this factor was
consistent with the findings - when the interpreter was not affected by the negative
situation, literal commentary by a speaker expressed less condemnation or criticism
than ironic comments. When the interpreter was affected, however, literal comments
expressed either the same amount or a greater amount of condemnation/criticism,
than ironic comments.
How could this interpreter consequence factor be subsumed by contrast and
assimilation effects? One possibility is that the contrast portrayed by ironic com-
ments is enhanced in the presence of negative consequences for an interpreter from
a negative situation, but without those negative consequences there is no contrast
effect and possibly even an assimilation effect when ironic comments are used.
Since literal comments produce neither contrast nor assimilation effects, they would
produce more stable judgments of the situations and speakers. This would ultimately
result in the reversal found in the condemnation attributed to speakers using literal
and ironic comments as a function of the presence of negative consequences.
To demonstrate, first note that a negative situation judged with no comments
being made is likely to be seen as more negative by an interpreter if that situation
holds negative consequences for the interpreter than if it held no consequences. For
instance, if an interpreter had a significant amount of money invested in a stock
market and the market crashed, she might find that situation worse than had she had
no money invested in the stock market. Since the former situation holds more neg-
ative consequences for the interpreter than the latter, the former situation is judged
to be worse.
Now, consider another person making comments about this situation and the
likely results of ratings by the interpreter on the quality of the situation and the
condemnation of the speaker. These hypothetical data are presented in Table 1.
Carets above the scales in Table 1 indicate the approximate referents of the literal
meanings of the comments. Carets below the scales indicate the likely judgments
made by interpreters. Imagine first a literal comment being made about the situation
(e.g., this is awful - see top two scales). This comment is generally consistent
with the situation so it is not likely to result in contrast or assimilation effects on the
118 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) III-142

judgment of the negativity of the situation. But since, as just argued, the situation
would still be seen differently depending upon whether it holds negative conse-
quences for the interpreter, the situation might be judged as worse if a literal com-
ment is made when the situation holds negative consequences for the interpreter (see
top scale) compared to when the same comment is made with no consequences pre-
sent (see second scale from top). Thus, judgments of the quality of the situation
made in light of literal comments being made about the situation, might vary as a
function of the presence of negative consequences. For instance, on a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (slightly bad), the situation would be rated
something like 2 on average if it held negative consequences for the interpreter (see
top scale) and 3 if it held no consequences (see second scale from top), with the
comment this is awful being made in both cases.
If the degree of condemnation of the speaker is then judged by the interpreter (see
next two scales in Table l), and if that judgment follows from the mechanism I have
proposed (e.g., via an influence upon the judged negativity of the situation) then the
ratings should follow accordingly. On a 7-point scale ranging from 1, extremely
condemning to 7, slightly condemning, for instance, the degree of condemnation
would be rated 2 on average if the situation held negative consequences for the
interpreter (see third scale from the top), and 3 if it held no consequences (see fourth
scale from the top), again with the comment this is awful being made in both
cases.
But consider the same situations (see last 4 scales in Table 1) commented upon
with ironic, positive comments (e.g., this is just fantastic). This comment is not
consistent with the situation so it could likely result in a contrast or assimilation
effect on the judgment of the negativity of the situation. Moreover, since the situa-
tion would be seen differently depending upon whether it holds negative conse-
quences for an interpreter, the type and/or magnitude of the effect might change
depending upon these consequences. Thus, judgments of the quality of the situation
made in light of ironic comments being made about the situation might switch
between being influenced by a strong contrast effect to being influenced by a weak-
ened contrast effect, no effect, or even an assimilation effect, as a function of the
presence or absence of negative consequences. For instance, on a I-point scale rang-
ing from 1 (extremely bad) to 7 (slightly bad), the situation would be rated 1 on
average if it held negative consequences for the interpreter because of a contrast
effect between the very negative situation and the positive (ironic) comment. The sit-
uation would be judged differently, though, if no consequences were present. If the
situation, which here is seen more positively, still resulted in a contrast effect with
the positive comment, that contrast effect is likely to be weaker than when the situ-
ation holds negative consequences for the interpreter. It might result in an average
rating of 2 or so. If the situation were seen somewhat more positively though, it
might eliminate the contrast effect and result in a mean rating of around 3, which
would be equivalent to the judgment made in light of a literal comment. If the situ-
ation were seen still more positively, though, it could even result in an assimilation
effect such that it would be judged more positively than when literal comments were
present, for instance a mean rating of around 4.
H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 00 (20001) 000400 119

Table 1
Possible pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of situation quality and speaker condemna-
tion as a function of comment type and consequence presence

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, consequences, Judgment of situation quality - below scale
example NEGATIVE POSITIVE

V
negative, consequences I-I- I-l-l -1-l-I
awful h
V
negative, no consequences I-I- I- I- I-I-I -I
awful A

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE! POSITIVE
Comment type, consequences, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

V
negative, consequences _______~~~______
awful /\
V
negative, no consequences ~~___~___~~
awful I?

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, consequences, Judgment of situation quality - below scale
example NEGATIVE POSITIVE

V
positive, consequences ~~ I- I-I-I-I-I
fantastic A
(strong
contrast)

positive, no consequences
fantastic A h A

(weak (no (assimilation


contrast) effect) effect)
Literal referent - above scale
NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, consequences, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

V
positive, consequences ~~-____________

fantastic
(stroig
contrast)

positive, no consequences ______~~______ I-I
fantastic A A h
(weak (no (assimilation
contrast) effect) effect)
120 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) III-142

If then the degree of condemnation of the speaker is judged by the interpreter


accordingly, again by the mechanism I have suggested, then ironic comments would
be more condemning than literal comments when negative consequences exist for
the interpreter, but no difference would be found, or a difference in the other direc-
tion would be found, when no negative consequences are present. On a 7-point scale
ranging from 1 (extremely condemning) to 7 (slightly condemning), for instance, the
condemnation would be rated 1 on average if the situation held negative conse-
quences for the interpreter and 24 if it held no consequences, depending upon
whether a weak contrast, no contrast, or assimilation effect results, again with the
comment this is just fantastic being made in all cases.

5. Contrast/assimilation effects in verbal irony comprehension: An empirical


test

In order to address the initial questions discussed above, the first two experiments
reported here specifically manipulated the degree of negativity and positivity of
comments made about consistently negative situations. Recall that these questions
were regarding, (1) whether contrast and assimilation effects account for the prag-
matic accomplishments of verbal irony and, (2) whether these accomplishments arise
from the mechanism described - a speakers description of a target situation influ-
ences, via contrast or assimilation effects, how negatively that situation is perceived
as being, which in turn affects how condemning the speaker is perceived as being.
The experiments then measured interpreters perceptions of the degree of negativity
of the situations and the degree of criticism intended by the speakers. As will be
shown, contrast and assimilation appear to account for the pattern of results.
In order to address the latter question discussed above on whether the interpreter
consequence factor can account for the relative degree of condemnation expressed
by literal and ironic comments, the second two experiments manipulated whether
negative consequences were present for interpreters who encountered negative
events, and whether the interpreters attended to such consequences. The experi-
ments then measured the degree of criticism interpreters perceived in speakers lit-
eral and ironic comments. As will also be shown, this interpreter consequence factor
also seems to account for the results.

6. Experiment 1: Contrast and assimilation effects on the perceived quality of


commented-upon situations

This experiment tested whether contrast and assimilation effects are observed in
peoples perceptions of situations that are ironically commented-upon by speakers.
The predictions are straightforward. If contrast and assimilation effects are occur-
ring, then moderately negative situations discussed with extremely positive (ironic)
comments should be perceived as more negative than the same situations talked
about with moderately positive (ironic) comments relative to literal comments. The
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 121

extremely positive comments should make the situations appear relatively negative
because of the contrast between the extremely positive comment and the negative
situation, where the moderately positive comments would make the situations appear
relatively positive because of assimilation.
Participants were presented with stories depicting moderately negative situations
involving the participant and other characters. The characters made comments
about the situations as if spoken to the participants. Participants then rated their per-
ceptions of the degree of negativity of the situations in light of the characters com-
ments.

6.1. Method

6.1 .l. Participants and design


Twenty-four University of Wisconsin-Parkside undergraduates participated for a
course requirement. All were native English speakers. None of the participants took
part in the other experiments. One variable was manipulated in this experiment; the
type of comment made about moderately negative situations. Participants received
all levels of this independent variable making a simple one factor with four levels,
within-participants design.

6.1.2. Materials
Twenty-four written scenarios described brief situations containing the participant
with another person who made a comment about the situation as if spoken to the par-
ticipant. The contexts were purposefully kept as straightforward as possible to ensure
two characteristics. All of the scenarios depicted events that were, (1) supposed to
have been positive but were not (e.g., a professor says a final examination will not
be cumulative but then does not uphold this promise at the time of the exam), and
that, (2) did not directly affect the participant but did affect the speaker (e.g., the
speaker was in the class but the participant was not). Scenarios were constructed in
this fashion so that the participants could offer reasonably objective assessments of
the degree of negativity of the situations. Had participants been told directly how
negative the events were or been given extra context from which they might deduce
this degree of negativity, their judgments may not have varied from the influence of
other factors. Had participants been given extra information that might have sug-
gested that they were affected by the negative outcomes of the situations, their
potential emotional reactions might also have affected the results. Another reason for
the minimal contexts was to make the referents of the comments abundantly clear to
the subjects. Had the contexts been more elaborate, then the referents of the utter-
ances might have been more ambiguous or diffused. Lastly, minimal contexts were
provided to avoid drawing too much attention away from the utterances.
Each scenario had four versions. One had the speaker (e.g., a student in the pro-
fessors class) making an extremely negative comment, (e.g., That exam was
absolutely terrible). Another version had the speaker making a moderately negative
comment (e.g., That exam was bad). The third type of comment depicted the
speaker making a moderately positive comment, (e.g., That exam was good). The
122 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) I1 I-142

final version had the speaker using an extremely positive comment, (e.g., That exam
was absolutely wonderful).
The four types of comments were constructed according to the following strict
procedures. The moderately negative and moderately positive comments for a given
scenario were selected such that they were moderate opposites. This was done either
through the use of antonym pairs (e.g., good and bad), or pairs consisting of a mod-
erate term and its negation (e.g., acceptable and unacceptable). For the extreme com-
ments, terms that depicted more severe instances of positiveness or negativeness
were chosen (e.g., devastating and outstanding), and they were coupled with
strengthening modifiers (e.g., absolutely, totally, completely, such a, etc.). Example
items used in the experiments are presented in Appendix A.
The different versions of the scenarios were divided into four sets. Set one, for
example, contained the extremely negative version of the first scenario, the moder-
ately negative version of the second scenario, the moderately positive version of the
third scenario and the extremely positive version of the fourth scenario, etc. Set two
would then contain the moderately negative version of the first scenario, the moder-
ately positive version of the second scenario, etc. The order of scenarios in each set
was random, and each set was presented to an equal number of participants, result-
ing in counterbalancing of the comment types and scenarios across participants.
Each scenario was presented with a 7-point rating scale ranging from extremely
bad (coded as 1) to slightly bad (coded as 7).

6.1.3. Procedure
Participants were told they would complete a task involving their perceptions
about what people say about various situations. They were then presented with the
24 scenarios in a booklet with instructions on the cover. The instructions told partic-
ipants that the situations were supposed to turn out positively, but did not, and that
they (meaning the participants) learned this ahead of time for each scenario. This
instruction was necessary to ensure that participants would not be confused about
what they, as interpreters of the comments, knew about the situations. Had partici-
pants not been told this, they may have assumed that they would not necessarily
know that the situations turned out negatively and then interpreted the ironic com-
ments literally. Participants were also told, though, that they did not know the pre-
cise extent to which the events were negative. Participants were instructed to then
read each scenario and rate, based upon what was said, the degree to which they
thought the situations were negative, by marking the rating scales. When finished,
participants were debriefed and dismissed.

6.2. Result and discussion

The mean ratings for the different kinds of comments are presented in Fig. 1.
All analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted in two ways - one treating
participants as the random factor and the other treating items as the random factor.
Conducting analyses in this way allows for generalization of significant effects
across both participant and item populations. ANOVAs treating participants as the
H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 123

extremely moderately moderately extremely


negative negative positive positive
comment type

Fig. 1. Situation quality ratings as a function of comment type (Experiment 1).


Error bars represent standard errors of means.

random factor are referred to with Fl and analyses treating items as the random fac-
tor are referred to with F2.
A one-way repeated measures ANOVA with comment type as the independent
variable revealed an overall significant difference in the degree of negativity partic-
ipants saw in the situations, Fl(3, 69) = 13.28, p < 0.001, F2(3, 69) = 15.52, p <
0.001.
Tukeys HSD pairwise comparisons revealed the following pattern of differences,
p < 0.001. Situations commented upon with extremely negative comments were seen
as more negative than the other situations. Situations commented upon with moder-
ately positive comments were rated as more positive than the situations commented
upon with moderately negative comments, and no difference was found between
situations discussed with extremely positive versus moderately negative comments,
or between situations described with extremely positive and moderately positive
comments.
124 HL. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) Ill-142

Thus, an extremely positive description (that is ironic) leads to a perception of a


situation that is relatively negative - essentially the same degree of negativity as
when a moderately negative (literal) description is used - where a moderately posi-
tive description (also ironic) leads to a perception of the situation that is relatively
positive - more positive than when that moderately negative (again, literal) descrip-
tion is used.
This is the typical pattern of contrast and assimilation. To illustrate, consider the
depiction of the results in Table 2 with the ratings given for the degree of negativity
of the situations shown alongside the literal referents of the four comment types. In
moving from the top scale (extremely negative comments) to the bottom scale
(extremely positive comments), one shifts from more negative to more positive com-
ments (based upon their literal meanings). Note that in making this move, the ratings
offered for the situations that are described with these comments are first assimilated
toward the moderately positive comments, but then are contrasted away from the
extremely positive comments. Thus, the perceptions of the quality of the situations
are influenced by how the situations are ironically described, in a pattern that fits the
typical contrast and assimilation effects.

Table 2
Pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of situation quality (Experiment 1)

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, Judgment of situation quality - below scale
example NEGATIVE POSITIVE

extremely negative
completely ignorant

moderately negative
dumb

moderately positive
smart

extremely positive
undeniably brilliant

The question posed by the next experiment is whether this influence upon how
negatively a situation is perceived as being, also affects the comprehension of the
speakers intentions - specifically, the interpretation of the extent to which the
speaker expresses condemnation.
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 125

7. Experiment 2: Contrast and assimilation effects on the perceived condem-


nation of speakers

This experiment tested whether contrast and assimilation effects are observed in
peoples interpretations of speakers intentions - specifically, condemnation expres-
sion. The predictions are also straightforward. In general, the more negative a
speaker makes a situation appear to be, in lieu of other factors, the more condemn-
ing that speaker will be perceived as being. Thus, if contrast and assimilation effects
are occurring, then speakers discussing moderately negative situations with
extremely positive (ironic) comments, which would lead to the situations being per-
ceived as more negative than had they been talked about with moderately positive
(ironic) comments, should appear relatively more condemning than speakers making
those moderately positive comments. The extremely positive comments should make
the situations appear relatively negative because of the contrast between the
extremely positive comment and negative situation. This in turn would make the
speaker appear more condemning. Moderately positive comments, which would
make the situations appear relatively positive because of assimilation, would then
make the speaker appear relatively less condemning.
Participants were presented with the same stories and comments from Experiment
1. Participant rated their perceptions of the degree of condemnation being expressed
by the speakers of the comments.

7.1. Method

7.1 .l . Participants and design


Twenty-four University of Wisconsin-Parkside undergraduates participated for a
course requirement. All were native English speakers. None of the participants took
part in the other experiments. One variable was manipulated in this experiment; the
type of comment made about moderately negative situations. Participants received
all levels of this independent variable making a simple one factor with four levels,
within-participants design.

7.1.2. Materials
Except for the rating scales, the same materials from Experiment 1 were used in
the present experiment. Each scenario in the current experiment was presented with
an 7-point rating scale ranging from extremely condemning (coded as 1) to
slightly condemning (coded as 7). Example items used in the experiments are pre-
sented in Appendix A.

7.1.3. Procedure
The same procedure as Experiment 1 was used in the present experiment except
that participants were instructed to read each scenario and rate, by marking the rat-
ing scales, the degree to which they thought the speakers were being condemning,
based on what the speaker said about the situations. When finished, participants were
debriefed and dismissed.
126 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 11 l-142

7.2. Result and discussion

The mean ratings for the different kinds of comments are presented in Fig. 2. A
one-way repeated measures ANOVA with comment type as the independent variable
revealed an overall significant difference in the degree of condemnation participants
saw in the speakers, Fl(3, 69) = 22.15, p c 0.001, F2(3, 69) = 76.15, p < 0.001.
Tukeys HSD pair-wise comparisons revealed that the speakers making each type
of comment were rated as significantly different from the other three, p < 0.001
(extremely negative c moderately negative < extremely positive < moderately
positive).
The results thus indicate that if speakers who use the utterances from Experiment
1 are judged for their degree of condemnation, a similar pattern of results to Exper-
iment 1 is found. Here, most importantly, extremely positive (ironic) comments are
judged to be more condemning than moderately positive (ironic) comments.

5
2
._
t;i
L4
s
i!
3

1
extremely moderately moderately extremely
negative negative positive positive
comment type

Fig. 2. Speaker condemnation ratings as a function of comment type (Experiment 2).


Error bars represent standard errors of means.
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) Ill-142 127

This again is the typical pattern of contrast and assimilation. Consider the depic-
tion of these results in Table 3. Moving from the top scale (speakers using extremely
negative comments) to the bottom scale (speakers using extremely positive com-
ments), a shift is observed from more negative to more positive literal comments,
and the ratings offered for the condemnation of the speakers of these comments are
first assimilated toward the moderately positive comments, but are then contrasted
away from the extremely positive comments. Thus, the perceptions of the degree of
condemnation of speakers are consistent with the perceptions of the quality of the
situations, in a pattern that fits the typical contrast and assimilation effects.

Table 3
Pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of speaker condemnation (experiment 2)

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

extremely negative
completely ignorant

moderately negative
dumb

moderately positive
smart

extremely positive
undeniably brilliant

The experiments thus far have demonstrated that contrast and assimilation effects
appear to play a role in verbal irony comprehension. Contrast effects, produced by
extremely positive comments, make situations look relatively bad - equivalent to the
degree of negativity produced by negative literal comments. Assimilation effects,
produced by moderately positive comments, make situations look relatively good -
better than the degree of negativity produced by literal comments. The degree of
condemnation interpreted from the speakers then follows accordingly. Making situa-
tions look relatively bad causes speakers to appear more condemning. Making situa-
tions look relatively good causes speakers to appear less condemning.
The question posed by the next two experiments is whether the degree to which
an interpreter is affected by a negative situation can predict whether or not contrast
and assimilation effects will occur. These experiments thus test whether the discrep-
ancy in the literature on the degree of condemnation of ironic versus literal com-
mentary can ultimately be explained by the degree to which people are affected by
negative situations.
128 H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) Ill-142

8. Experiment 3: The effect of interpreter consequence on the perceived con-


demnation of speakers: No emphasis on consequences

This experiment addresses the question of whether the degree to which a person
is affected by a negative situation enables prediction of whether or not contrast and
assimilation effects are likely to occur as a result of the type of comment a speaker
uses and, concomitantly, whether the speaker is seen as more or less condemning
compared to when literal comments are used.
As in the previous experiments, the predictions for this experiment are straight-
forward. First recall that, in general, if an interpreter is affected by a negative situ-
ation, that situation should seem worse to the person than if she is not affected. This
variable, in concordance with the kind of comment a speaker uses (e.g., negative lit-
eral versus positive ironic), should predict whether or not contrast/assimilation
effects will occur on the degree of negativity attributed to the situation, and accord-
ingly, the degree of condemnation that is attributed to the speaker. The rationale is
as follows. Recall that contrast effects are more likely to occur if the discrepancy
between the target information (e.g., the referent situation) and the biasing infor-
mation (e.g., the comment) is large. If this discrepancy is relatively small, on the
other hand, then contrast effects are less likely to occur and the chances for assim-
ilation effects increase. Next, note that the situation in which this discrepancy is
largest is when the negative situation holds negative consequences for the inter-
preter and when the speaker makes a positive (ironic) comment about the situation.
This discrepancy is smaller when the negative situation does not hold negative con-
sequences for the interpreter. Also recall that no discrepancy is present when literal
comments are made. Thus, relative to literal, negative comments being made, when
speakers make positive, ironic comments, the speakers should be seen as more con-
demning when the negative situation holds negative consequences for the inter-
preter. When no negative consequences are present, however, no difference or an
opposite pattern should be found - speakers should be seen as being equally con-
demning or less condemning when they use ironic comments, again relative to lit-
eral comments.
One other important factor, though, needs to be considered. The above predictions
are dependent upon the speaker noting whether or not she is affected by the negative
situation. If these negative consequences are not noticed, then it is unlikely that the
interpreter consequence factor will have any effect.
Participants were presented with a new set of stories and comments which,
although similar in some ways to those used in the previous experiments, differed
in that the degree of negativity of the situations was more explicit and participants
were described as being either affected or not affected by the situations. Partici-
pants were not, however, directed in any special way to pay attention to the
degree to which they were affected by the situations. Participants rated their per-
ceptions of the degree of condemnation being expressed by the speakers of the
comments.
H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 129

8.1. Method

8.1 .l. Participants and design


Forty-eight University of Wisconsin-Parkside undergraduates participated for a
course requirement. All were native English speakers. None of the participants took
part in the other experiments. Two variables were manipulated in this experiment;
the type of comment made about the situations (literal negative vs. ironic positive)
and whether or not the situation held negative consequences for the participant. Par-
ticipants received all levels of these independent variables making a 2 x 2 fully
within-participants design.

8.1.2. Materials
The items were similar to those from previous experiments except that they
explicitly described the negative situation. Recall that the items used in the previous
experiments were not explicit on the degree of negativity in the situations to enable
assessment of participants perceptions of this degree of situation negativity. The
current items also explicitly described the participant as being affected by the situa-
tion or not being affected by it. Otherwise, the utterances used in the current experi-
ment were reasonably similar to the extremely positive and extremely negative
ones used in the previous experiments. Counterbalancing was conducted in the same
way as in previous experiments. The rating scale was the same as that used in Exper-
iment 2. Recall that it was a 7-point scale ranging from extremely condemning
(coded as 1) to slightly condemning (coded as 7). Example items used in the exper-
iments are presented in Appendix B.

8.1.3. Procedure
The same procedure as Experiment 2 was used in the present experiment. When
finished, participants were debriefed and dismissed.

8.2. Results and discussion

The mean ratings for the different kinds of comments are presented in Fig. 3.
A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with comment type (literal negative vs.
ironic positive), and interpreter consequence (consequences vs. no consequences) as
the independent variables revealed a significant main effect of comment type on the
degree of condemnation participants saw in the speakers, Fl( 1, 47) = 19.48, p <
0.001, F2(1, 15) = 12.74, p < 0.01. No other effects were reliable.
The lack of a significant interaction indicates that the interpreter consequence
factor is not mediating the effect of comment type. Ironic comments are more
condemning than literal comments regardless of whether the negative situation
holds consequences for the interpreter. Recall again, though, that participants
were not told to pay any special attention to whether the situation held conse-
quences for them. Participants may thus have not noticed whether the situations
held consequences for them and thus this factor did not play a role in participants
judgments.
130 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) Ill-142

7-

6 --
T

El
n literal
El ironic

noconsequences consequences

Fig. 3. Speaker condemnation ratings as a function of comment type and interpreter consequence:
Consequences not contemplated (Experiment 3). Error bars represent standard errors of means.

Aside from the interpreter consequence factor, this pattern of results fits the typi-
cal pattern of a contrast effect. Consider the depiction of these results in Tables 4 and
5. Note that the two scales in Tables 4 and 5 correspond to the top and bottom scales
in Table 3 - the top scale represents speakers using extremely negative (literal) com-
ments, the bottom scale shows speakers using extremely positive (ironic) comments.
Relative to the literal comments, condemnation has shifted to being more extreme
when ironic comments are used.
There is a difference, however, between the current experiments results and those
of Experiment 2. In Experiment 2, the shift in condemnation toward being more
extreme with ironic comments, was not strong enough to make those ironic com-
ments more condemning than literal comments. In the current experiment, though,
that shift was strong enough to make ironic comments more condemning than literal
comments.
There are two likely reasons for this difference. The first is an enhanced contrast
effect stemming from the more explicit negative nature of the situations in the pre-
sent experiment. Recall that the situations in Experiment 2 were described as having
supposed to have tuned out positively but not doing so (e.g., Your sister is apply-
ing for a new job at this place that is supposed to pay really well. Come to find out,
it doesnt). The situations in the present experiment, however, were more explicitly
negative (e.g., You and a co-worker find out one day that both of your jobs have
been terminated. Now both of you are going to have to drop out of college). This
difference is likely to enhance the contrast effect for the ironic items in the present
experiment relative to the ironic items in Experiment 2. Again, recall the typical
finding in the contrast effect literature that greater differences in the magnitude of
discrepancy between target and bias information produce bigger contrast effects.
HL. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) I1 1-142 131

Even though the fact that the two irony ratings were taken in separate experiments
discourages direct statistical comparison, one might note that the irony ratings given
in the present experiment are more condemning than those in Experiment 2.
The second reason for the difference between experiments is that literal comments
may be seen as less condemning when situations are more explicitly described as
being negative. Again, differences in the two experiments make direct statistical
comparison untenable, nonetheless the condemnation ratings for literal comments in
the two experiments seem to support this explanation. Speakers who speak literally
are seen as somewhat less condemning when the situations have been described as
explicitly negative. This difference may not seem surprising, though, if one consid-
ers the influence of a literal, negative comment relative to background information,
on an interpreters assessment of the speakers condemnation. If a situation has been
described as having supposed to have been positive but not turning out that way, it
is not clear precisely how negative that situation is. A negative comment that is then
spoken can thus clarify the degree of negativity. Thus, literal comments spoken in
situations such as Experiment 2 carry a lot of the perceived negativity, and hence
condemnation, that is interpreted by addressees. When situations are more explicitly
described as being negative, however, some of the impact is stolen from subse-
quently spoken negative comments such that they might be seen as less condemning.
These two reasons might then account for the shift in the relative condemnation
expressed by literal and ironic comments.

Table 4
Pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of speaker condemnation without explicit contempla-
tion of negative consequences (Experiment 3)

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

NO CONSEQUENCES
V

extremely negative __________-______~


completely ignorant h
V

extremely positive ~~ IIIIII


undeniably brilliant /\

The question posed by the final experiment is whether the degree to which an
interpreter is impacted by a negative situation can predict whether or not contrast
and assimilation effects will occur, this time with participants being directed to
pay particular attention to the negative consequences that the situations might hold
for them.
132 H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) I I I-142

Table 5
Pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of speaker condemnation without explicit contempla-
tion of negative consequences (Experiment 3)

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

CONSEQUENCES

extremely negative
completely ignorant

extremely positive
undeniably brilliant

9. Experiment 4: The effect of interpreter consequence on the perceived con-


demnation of speakers: Emphasis on consequences

This experiment addresses a similar question to that posed by Experiment 3,


except that the present experiment explicitly directed participants to pay attention to
whether or not the situations hold negative consequences for them.
As in the previous experiments, the predictions for this experiment are also
straightforward. Speakers should be interpreted as being more condemning when
they make ironic relative to literal comments, when the speakers are in situations that
hold explicit negative consequences for them. If no negative consequences are pre-
sent for speakers, then the difference between the condemnation expressed by ironic
and literal comments should either disappear or reverse itself. Again, though, these
predictions are dependent upon the speaker noting whether or not she is affected by
the negative situation.
Participants were presented with the same set of stories and comments from
Experiment 3. Participants this time, however, were directed to pay attention to the
degree to which they were affected by the situations. Participants first rated their per-
ceptions of the degree to which they would be affected by the negative situations,
before rating the degree of condemnation expressed by the speakers of the com-
ments.

9.1. Method

9.1 .I. Participants and design


Forty-eight University of Wisconsin-Parkside undergraduates participated for a
course requirement. All were native English speakers. None of the participants took
part in the other experiments. Two variables were manipulated in this experiment; the
type of comment made about the situations (literal negative vs. ironic positive) and
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 133

whether or not the situation held negative consequences for the participant. Partici-
pants received all levels of these independent variables making a 2 x 2 fully within-
participants design.

9.1.2. Materials
The items and rating scale were the same as those used in Experiment 3 except an
additional rating scale was used. The new scale was a 7-point one ranging from not
at all affected (coded as 1) to extremely affected (coded as 7). Example items used
in the experiments are presented in Appendix B.

9.1.3. Procedure
The same procedure as Experiment 2 was used in the present experiment except
participants were directed to first rate how much they were impacted by the negative
situation, and then rate the degree of condemnation they saw in the speakers for each
item. When finished, participants were debriefed and dismissed.

9.2. Results and discussion

The mean affectedness ratings for the different kinds of comments are presented
in Fig. 4.

7-

6 --

IW literal
0 ironic

noconsequences consequences

Fig. 4. Speaker affectedness ratings as a function of comment type and interpreter consequence:
Consequences contemplated (Experiment 4). Error bars represent standard errors of means.

A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with comment type (literal negative vs.
ironic positive), and interpreter consequence (consequences vs. no consequences)
as the independent variables revealed a significant main effect of interpreter conse-
quence on the degree to which participants saw that they were impacted by the
134 H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142

situations, F1(1,47) = 48.97,~ < 0.001, F2(1, 15) = 44.65,~ < 0.001. No other com-
parisons reached significance.
The mean condemnation ratings for the different kinds of comments are presented
in Fig. 5.

T
7

6+
T

II
n literal
Clironic

i
noconsequences consequences

Fig. 5. Speaker condemnation ratings as a function of comment type and interpreter consequence:
Consequences contemplated (Experiment 4). Error bars represent standard errors of means.

A two-way repeated measures ANOVA with comment type (literal negative vs.
ironic positive), and interpreter consequence (consequences vs. no consequences) as
the independent variables revealed a significant main effect of comment type on the
degree of condemnation participants saw in the speakers, Fl( 1, 47) = 7.03, p < 0.01,
F2( 1, 15) = 3.01, p < 0.10, as well as a significant interaction between the factors,
Fl(1, 47) = 5.53, p < 0.01, F2(1, 15) = 4.69, p < 0.05. The other factor was not
reliable.
The presence of a significant interaction on the condemnation ratings indicates
that the interpreter consequence factor here is mediating the effect of comment type.
Ironic comments are more condemning than literal comments when the negative sit-
uations hold consequences for the interpreter. Ironic comments are no more con-
demning than literal comments, however, when the negative situations hoId no con-
sequences for the interpreter.
As in Experiment 3, this pattern of results fits the typical pattern of a contrast
effect. Consider the results depicted in Tables 6 and 7. Note as before that the two
scales in these tables correspond to the top and bottom scales in Table 3. When the
situations hold negative consequences for interpreters, and when this effect is con-
templated by the interpreters, then the contrast created by ironic comments is
enhanced relative to when the situations hold no consequences for the interpreter.
This causes ironic comments to shift from being no more condemning than literal
comments when no consequences are present (see Table 6), to being more
H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142 135

condemning than literal comments when there are consequences for the interpreter
(see Table 7).
Moreover, as was discussed on the results of Experiment 3, overall, ironic com-
mentary seems to be somewhat more condemning and literal commentary seems to
be somewhat less condemning in the present experiment, relative to Experiment 2.
Again, this shift is probably due to the more explicit description of negativity in the
situation in the present experiment, which seems to affect both literal and ironic
commentary.

Table 6
Pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of speaker condemnation with explicit contemplation
of negative consequences (Experiment 4)

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

NO CONSEQUENCES
V

extremely negative ___~ l_l-_-__l-l-1-1


completely ignorant h
V

extremely positive ___~___~______ I-I


undeniably brilliant h

Table 7
Pattern of assimilation and contrast for judgments of speaker condemnation with explicit contemplation
of negative consequences (Experiment 4)

Literal referent - above scale


NEGATIVE POSITIVE
Comment type, Judgment of speaker condemnation - below scale
example EXTREMELY SLIGHTLY

CONSEQUENCES
V

extremely negative ___~ I- I- l-l--1 I


completely ignorant /\
V

extremely positive ___-~-- l-l-l


undeniably brilliant A

10. General discussion

The results may be briefly summarized as follows. When a negative situation is


witnessed by a person, for instance a courses final examination was supposed to be
136 H.L. Colston / Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) I I I-142

easy but is not, the situation is judged to be somewhat negative by the person when
a moderately negative (literal) description is used by a speaker to describe the situa-
tion (e.g., that exam was bad). The same degree of negativity is perceived when an
extremely positive (ironic) term is used by the speaker (e.g., that exam was
absolutely wonderful), but the situation is judged to be relatively more positive
when a moderately positive (ironic) description is used (e.g., that exam was good).
The degree of condemnation seen by interpreters on the part of speakers of these
comments follows accordingly. Speakers whose descriptions cause situations to look
negative are judged as more condemning than speakers whose comments lead to the
situations appearing relatively positive. These patterns of situation quality judgment
and speaker condemnation assessment thus seem to fit the typical pattern of contrast
and assimilation effects, which are ubiquitous in psychological research.
Moreover, the degree to which an interpreter is affected by a negative situation
seems to work with contrast effects to influence the relative degree of condemnation
expressed by literal and ironic comments. If an interpreter is adversely affected by a
negative situation (e.g., the interpreter is a student in the class whose final examina-
tion was unexpectedly difficult), ironic commentary is more condemning than literal
comments. If the situation does not hold negative consequences for the interpreter
(e.g., the interpreter is not a student in the class), ironic comments are no more con-
demning than literal commentary.
This influence of the presence or absence of consequences for the interpreter,
however, which again is mediated by contrast effects, holds only if interpreters
attend to the consequences. If interpreters do not pay attention to whether the nega-
tive situations will impact them, then the interpreter consequence factor loses its
influence.
The findings thus expand upon the emerging view from recent psycholinguistic
studies on verbal irony comprehension that contrast effects play a seminal role in
verbal irony comprehension (Colston, 1997b; Colson and Keller, 1998; Colston and
OBrien, 2000a,b). The current findings may be considered an extension of this view
by including the pattern of contrast and assimilation effects into the comprehension
of verbal irony. The earlier research and the findings presented here all demonstrate
that the degree of perceptual contrast or assimilation caused by the discrepancy
between an ironic comment and its referent situation enable direct prediction of the
degree to which several pragmatic functions, including condemnation, are expressed
by a speaker.
The current study also suggests a possible mechanism by which interpreters glean
pragmatic functions from a speakers use of an ironic comment. The first two exper-
iments demonstrated that the degree of condemnation expressed by a speakers
ironic comment directly corresponded to the extent to which the current situation is
made to look negative by the comment the speaker used. If the moderately negative
situation was made to look relatively more negative via contrast with an extremely
positive ironic comment, a relatively greater degree of condemnation was expressed.
If the moderately negative situation was made to look relatively positive via assimi-
lation toward a moderately positive ironic comment, a lesser degree of condemnation
was expressed. Thus, it appears that, in lieu of other influences, a speakers degree
H.L. Co&on I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) Ill-142 137

of condemnation is indicated by how negative the situation at hand is made to appear


by the speaker - greater negativity indicates greater condemnation, lesser negativity
indicates lesser condemnation - a straightforward and elegant mechanism.3
Finally, the current results help clarify the underlying mechanism of the dissocia-
tion in previous research concerning the relative degree of condemnation expressed
by literal versus ironic commentary. The reliance of pragmatic interpretation upon
effects such as contrast and assimilation provide support for the previous claim (see,
Colston, 1997b; Colson and Pedrosa, 2000) that the degree to which a person is
affected by a negative situation will influence whether literal or ironic comments are
more condemning. Since contrast and assimilation effects influence the perceived
degree of negativity in situations, and since this influence leads to changes in the
perceived degree of condemnation of speakers, it follows that variables that affect
the likelihood and magnitude of contrast and assimilation effects (e.g., interpreter
consequence) will alter the relative degree of condemnation of ironic and literal
commentary.
Contrast/assimilation effects are also consistent with other patterns of previous
results found on verbal irony comprehension. If one considers the typical pattern of
results observed when an echoic manipulation is studied in verbal irony comprehen-
sion, a correspondence with another important subphenomenon of contrast effects -
the salience of the contrast between biasing information and targets - may be seen.
To demonstrate, first briefly consider the typical effect of salience on contrast effects
by returning to the example on size judgments discussed in the introduction. If a
biasing object is significantly larger than a target object, such that it would likely
result in a contrast effect in the judgment of the target objects size, but the two
objects are far apart from one another in a persons field of vision, then the contrast
between the objects may be less salient than would be the case if the objects were
nearer one another. This variance in the salience of the contrast would then affect the
contrast effect observed in the size judgment. In general, as the salience of the con-
trast decreases, the likelihood and strength of the contrast effect is diminished.
Next, consider the usual effects found when echoic manipulations (Sperber, 1984;
Sperber and Wilson, 1981, 1986) are introduced in verbal irony studies. Explicit ref-
erences by ironic comments, as in verbatim restatements of inaccurate predictions,
(e.g., A sportscaster predicts that a team will win a game by a landslide, but the team
loses. A mutual overhearer then repeats the sportscasters comment to you, Oh
sure, San Francisco is going to win this one by a landslide), aid processing and
memory compared to inexplicit references by ironic comments, as in generic ironic

3 This mechanism could also presumably work for other pragmatic functions. Colston and OBrien
(2000a) showed that self-protection has an inverse relationship with condemnation - the more con-
demning a speaker is, the less self protective, the less condemning the speaker is, the more self-protec-
tive. Thus, the proposed mechanism could also predict the degree to which a speaker is self-protective.
The mechanism could also readily predict surprise expression. Typically, things that are more nega-
tive are also more unexpected, undesirable, or more of a deviation from social norms or expectations
(Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989; Colston, 2000; Matlin and Stang, 1978). Thus, making a situation appear
more negative could also make it appear more out of the ordinary or out of the desirable, which could
reflect the speakers surprise at the situation.
138 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 111-142

comments (e.g., This is just perfect), as shown by a variety of studies (Colston, in


press; Colston et al., 1998; Gerrig and Goldvarg, 2000; Gibbs, 1986; Jorgensen et
al., 1984; Kreuz and Glucksberg, 1989).
This echoic/non-echoic manipulation corresponds respectively to a high-salience/
low-salience manipulation between biasing and target stimuli in perception and thus
might explain why echoic irony is easier to process than non-echoic irony. An echoic
comment makes the contrast between the comment and the context more salient
because the comment refers to both a generic positive situation, and a situation that
was explicitly, yet falsely, predicted to occur. Non-echoic comments might be
considered as providing a less salient contrast because they do not doubly refer to
positive situations and recent explicit predictions - they only refer to the positive
situations.
To summarize, the current study sought to establish, (1) whether contrast and
assimilation effects play a role in verbal irony comprehension, (2) whether the mech-
anism that would support this link between contrast/assimilation and language pro-
cessing is a shift in the perceived negativity of contextual situations, and, (3)
whether contrast/assimilation effects underlie the previous claim that the presence of
negative consequences for interpreters will affect the relative degree of condernna-
tion expressed by literal and ironic comments. The results of the study provide affir-
mative answers to each of these questions. The study thus helps draw an important
link between basic perceptual/cognitive phenomena and figurative language process-
ing. Future studies might test if other basic cognitive processes underlie subtle
aspects of complex, indirect language comprehension. Similar to the current studys
demonstration that contrast and assimilation effects account for the some of the prag-
matic accomplishments of verbal irony, such an exploration might prove fruitful.

Appendix A: Example materials used in Experiments 1 and 2

You and Alfred0 hear about a new restaurant in town, that has a 4-star rating.
Alfred takes his mom there and its overrated. Alfred0 tells you,
What truly horrendous food. (extremely negative)
What bad food. (moderately negative)
What good food. (moderately positive)
What incredibly extraordinary food. (extremely positive)

Your friend was baby-sitting for three kids. They were supposed to be very well behaved.
They were not. Your friend told you about it by saying,
Those kids are completely rotten. (extremely negative)
Those kids are rowdy. (moderately negative)
Those kids are calm. (moderately positive)
Those kids are really fantastic. (extremely positive)

Your sister is applying for a new job, at this place that is supposed to pay really well.
Come to find out, it doesnt. She comes home from the interview and tells you,
This job has totally awful pay. (extremely negative)
H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) 11 l-l 42 139

This job has unfair pay. (moderately negative)


This job has fair pay. (moderately positive)
This job has absolutely the best pay. (extremely positive)

Appendix B: Example materials used in Experiments 3 and 4

A friend of yours is visiting a big city. Suddenly, she realizes that shes lost her bags with all
her belongings in them. Your friend calls you and says,
This is absolutely tragic. (extremely negative)
This is really excellent. (extremely positive)

You and a friend are visiting a big city. Suddenly, you realize that youve both lost your bags
with all your belongings in them. Your friend says,
This is absolutely tragic. (extremely negative)
This is really excellent. (extremely positive)

You and a co-worker find out one day that the co-workers job has been terminated.
Now she is going to have to drop out of college. When you hear the news the co-worker says
to you,
This is totally horrible. (extremely negative)
This is incredibly awesome. (extremely positive)

You and a co-worker find out one day that both of your jobs have been terminated.
Now you both are going to have to drop out of college. When you hear the news the co-
worker says to you,
This is totally horrible; (extremely negative)
This is incredibly awesome. (extremely positive)

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142 H.L. Colston I Journal of Pragmatics 34 (2002) III-142

Herbert L. Colston is an Assistant Professor of Psychology at the University of Wisconsin-Parkside. He


received his Ph.D. in Psychology from the University of California, Santa Cruz in 1995 for psycholin-
guistic research on figurative language. He also holds a Masters degree in Cognitive Psychology from
UCSC and a Bachelors degree in Psychology from Purdue University. He has published recently in the
Journal of Pragmatics, Pragmatics and Cognition, Language and Speech, Metaphor and Symbol, the
Journal of Language and Social Psychology, Discourse Processes, the Journal of Psycholinguistic
Research, Cognitive Linguistics, the Journal of Mental Imagery, Contemporary Psychology and Psycho-
nomic Bulletin and Review. His research interests include the comprehension and use of indirect and fig-
urative language, nonverbal communication, psycholinguistics and cognitive linguistics.

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