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Caltex (Phils.), Inc. v.




In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No
purchase of Caltex products were also required to be made. Entry forms were to be made
available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the
deposit of accomplished entry stubs.

Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the
contest but also for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were
made by Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing,
having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster
General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions
of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its
favor. Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated
the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.

Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law.
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of
money, or of any real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a lottery nor a gift
enterprise but rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not
prohibit. The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such
as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of
gambling. The three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and
third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of consideration, cannot be
deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration of
some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term gift
enterprise also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of
anything to which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The
contest is open to all qualified contestants irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's

By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only
insofar as the element of chance is concerned it is only logical that the term under a
construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature
of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration,
so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the
slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift
enterprise" therein included.

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Roman Catholic Apostolic Administration of Davao, Inc. v. Land Registration Commission


October 4, 1954: Mateo L. Rodis, a Filipino citizen and resident of the City of Davao,
executed adeed of sale of a parcel of land in favor of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Administrator of Davao Inc.(Roman), a corporation sole organized and existing in
accordance with Philippine Laws, with Msgr. Clovis Thibault, a Canadian citizen, as actual
The Register of Deeds of Davao for registration, having in mind a previous resolution of
the CFI in Carmelite Nuns of Davao were made to prepare an affidavit to the effect that 60%
of the members of their corp. were Filipino citizens when they sought to register in favor of
their congregation of deed of donation of a parcel of land, required it to submit a similar
affidavit declaring the same.
June 28, 1954: Roman in the letter expressed willingness to submit an affidavit but not in
the same tenor as the Carmelite Nuns because it had five incorporators while as a
corporation sole it has only one and it was ownership through donation and this was
As the Register of the Land Registration Commissioner (LRC) : Deeds has some doubts
as to the registerability, the matter was referred to the Land Registration Commissioner en
consulta for resolution (section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151)
In view of the provisions of Section 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the Philippine
Constitution, the vendee was not qualified to acquire private lands in the Philippines in
the absence of proof that at least 60 per centum of the capital, property, or assets of the
Roman Catholic Apostolic Administrator of Davao, Inc., was actually owned or controlled by
Filipino citizens, there being no question that the present incumbent of the corporation sole
was a Canadian citizen
ordered the Registered Deeds of Davao to deny registration of the deed of
sale in the absence of proof of compliance with such condition
action for mandamus was instituted by Roman alleging the land is held in true for the
benefit of the Catholic population of a place
ISSUE: W/N Roman is qualified to acquire private agricultural lands in the Philippines pursuant
to the provisions of Article XIII of the Constitution

HELD: YES. Register of Deeds of the City of Davao is ordered to register the deed of sale
A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be
one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them
some legal capacities and advantages, particularly that of perpetuity, which in their natural
persons they could not have had.
In this sense, the king is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or dens, distinct from
their several chapters
corporation sole
1. composed of only one persons, usually the head or bishop of the diocese, a unit which is
not subject to expansion for the purpose of determining any percentage whatsoever
2. only the administrator and not the owner of the temporalities located in the territory
comprised by said corporation sole and such temporalities are administered for and on
behalf of the faithful residing in the diocese or territory of the corporation sole
3. has no nationality and the citizenship of the incumbent and ordinary has nothing to do
with the operation, management or administration of the corporation sole, nor effects the
citizenship of the faithful connected with their respective dioceses or corporation sole.
Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the controlling membership
should be composed of Filipino citizens. (Register of Deeds of Rizal vs. Ung Sui Si Temple)
undeniable proof that the members of the Roman Catholic Apostolic faith within the
territory of Davao are predominantly Filipino citizens
presented evidence to establish that the clergy and lay members of this religion
fully covers the percentage of Filipino citizens required by the Constitution
fact that the law thus expressly authorizes the corporations sole to receive bequests or
gifts of real properties (which were the main source that the friars had to acquire their big
haciendas during the Spanish regime), is a clear indication that the requisite that bequests
or gifts of real estate be for charitable, benevolent, or educational purposes, was, in the
opinion of the legislators, considered sufficient and adequate protection against the
revitalization of religious landholdings.
as in respect to the property which they hold for the corporation, they stand in position of
TRUSTEES and the courts may exercise the same supervision as in other cases of trust

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City of Baguio v. Marcos


Facts: In April 12, 1912, the director of lands in the CFI of Baguio INSTITUTED the reopening of
cadastral proceedings. In November 13, 1922, a decision was RENDERED. The land involved
was the Baguio Townsite which was declared public land. In July 25, 1961, Belong Lutes
petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and his predecessors have
been in continuous possession and cultivation of the land since Spanish times; 2) his
predecessors were illiterate Igorots, thus, were not able to file their claim. On the contrary, F.
Joaquin Sr., F. Joaquin Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes reopening on the following
grounds: 1) the reopening was filed outside the 40-year period provided in RA 931; 2) the
petition to reopen the case was not published; and 3) as lessees of the land, they have standing
on the issue.

Issue: Whether or not the reopening of the peririon was filed outside the 40-year period provided
in RA 931, which was ENACTED on June 20, 1953

Held: The Supreme Court grabted the reopening of cadastral proceedings

Ratio: The title of RA 931 was An Act to Authorize the Filing in Proper Court under Certain
Conditions, of Certain Claims of Title to Parcels of Land that have been Declared Public Land,
by Virtue of Judicial Decisions RENDERED within the 40 Years Next Preceding the Approval of
this Act. Section 1 of the Act reads as case such parcels of land, on account of their failure
to file such claims, have been, or about to be declared land of the public domain by virtue of
judicial proceedings INSTITUTED within the 40 years next preceding the approval of this act. If
the title is to be followed, November 13, 1922 is the date which should be followed, hence,
would allow the reopening of the case. If Section 1 is to be followed, the date of the institution of
reopening of the case which was April 12, 1912, the petition would be invalid.

StatCon maxim: The title is an indispensable part of a statute, and what may inadequately be
omitted in the text may be supplied or remedied by its title.

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MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation


Facts: On April 13, 2000, the petitioner MCC Industrial Steel Corp., a domestic corporation
engaged in the importation and wholesale of stainless steel in the country, contracted with the
herein private respondent, Ssangyon Corporation, a manufacturer of stainless steel with a head
office in Seoul South Korea. MCC ordered 220 metric ton of stainless steel for $1,860 metric
ton. It was arranged that the respondent will issue the sales invoices through fax, and once the
petitioner conforme to such then MCC through its general manager and president George Chan,
the latter has to fax the same with his signature. On the time the petitioner had a hard time to
open the latters of credit, Ssangyong decided to negotiate with its mother company in korea to
grant MCC a discount and to extend for a while the opening of letters of credit. Such request
was accede by respondent. The first $70,000 letter of credit was issued by MCC but the
remaining $170,000 was not. On this note, the respondent was compelled to filed a complaint
for breach of contract and prayer for damages. The lower court acceded with the prayer of the
respondent, that indeed petitioner failed comply with their contract despite discounts given as
well as extension for opening of letter of credit, under the strong protest of the petitioner that the
fax copies presented as document cannot be relied upon as the best evidence.

Issue: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic
evidence and admissible as such?

Held: Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 (R.A. No. 8792) vis--vis the Rules on Electronic
Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are
"electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic
Commerce Act (the petitioner merely assails as inadmissible evidence the photocopies of the
said facsimile transmissions), we deem it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax
transmissions are indeed within the coverage of R.A. No. 8792 before ruling on whether the
photocopies thereof are covered by the law. In any case, this Court has ample authority to go
beyond the pleadings when, in the interest of justice or for the promotion of public policy, there
is a need to make its own findings in order to support its conclusions.

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Garcia v. Social Security Commission


Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, were directors of ImpactCorporation. Impact Corporation
started encountering financial problems.Impact Corporation filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission(SEC) a Petition for Suspension of Payments. The company is directed
to payall the entitled workers unpaid wages, unpaid 13
month pay and to remit tothe Social Security System loan amortizations and SSS premiums
previouslydeducted from the wages of the workers.
The Social Security System (SSS), through its Legal and Collection Division(LCD), filed a case
before the SSC for the collection of unremitted SSSpremium contributions withheld by Impact
Corporation from its employees.Petitioner avers that under the
aforesaid provision
, the liability does notinclude liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions.


WON petitioner can be made solely liable for the corporate obligations of Impact Corporation pertaining to
unremitted SSS premium contributions andpenalties therefore.
Clearly, a simplistic interpretation of the law is untenable. It is a rulein statutory construction that
every part of the statute must be interpretedwith reference to the context,
, that every part of the statute must beconsidered together with the other parts, and kept
subservient to thegeneral intent of the whole enactment.[23] The liability imposed
ascontemplated under the foregoing Section 28(f) of the Social Security Lawdoes not preclude
the liability for the unremitted amount. Relevant toSection 28(f) is Section 22 of the same law
Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, as sole surviving director of Impact Corporation ishereby
to pay for the collected and unremitted SSS contributions of Impact Corporation. The case is
to the SSS for computation of theexact amount and collection thereof.

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Floresca v. Philex Mining Corp.


Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation
who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28,
1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Theircomplaint
alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately
failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working
underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmens
Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also filed a
separate civil case against Philex for damages.

Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already
claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Philex is correct.

HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under
the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts.
Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming
benefits under the WCA.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to
ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a
remedy. But, if in case theyll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount
given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go
strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous
reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures mans
survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth

Justice Gutierrez dissenting

No civil suit should prosper after claiming benefits under the WCA. If employers are already
liable to pay benefits under the WCA they should not be compelled to bear the cost of damage
suits or get insurance for that purpose. The exclusion provided by the WCA can only be properly
removed by the legislature NOT the SC.

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PAFLU v. Bureau of Labor Relations


FACTS: Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office space
in the Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly blocking
the common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used by the
occupants of the second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees,
clients and customers, so that the picket has caused a disruption of the business of Wellington
as well as the other lessors in the building.

ISSUE: Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?

HELD: Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful
picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the context of this
issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute. Thus,
they are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may,
accordingly, legally extend the same.

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Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds


On October 15,1958, the Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 requiring all
Employers in computing premiums to include in the Employee's remuneration all bonuses and
overtime pay, as well as the cash value of other media of remuneration. Upon receipt of a copy
thereof, petitioner Victorias Milling Company, Inc., through counsel, wrote the Social Security
Commission in effect protesting against the circular as contradictory to a previous Circular No. 7
dated October 7, 1957 expressly excluding overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the
employers' and employees' respective monthly premium contributions. Counsel further
questioned the validity of the circular for lack of authority on the part of the Social Security
Commission to promulgate it without the approval of the President and for lack of publication in
the Official Gazette. Overruling the objections, the Social Security Commission ruled that
Circular No. 22 is not a rule or regulation that needed the approval of the President and
publication in the Official Gazette to be effective, but a mere administrative interpretation of the
statute, a mere statement of general policy or opinion as to how the law should be construed.
Petitioner comes to Court on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of
Republic Act 1161 empowering the Social Security Commission.

There can be no doubt that there is a distinction between an administrative rule or regulation
and an administrative interpretation of a law whose enforcement is entrusted to an
administrative body. When an administrative agency promulgates rules and regulations, it
"makes" a new law with the force and effect of a valid law, while when it renders an opinion or
gives a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Rules and regulations when
promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative
agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by
a penal sanction provided therein. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are often
times left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been
said that rules and regulations are the product of a delegated power to create new or additional
legal provisions that have the effect of law. Therefore, Circular No. 22 purports merely to advise
employers-members of the System of what, in the light of the amendment of the law, they
should include in determining the monthly compensation of their employees upon which the
social security contributions should be based, and that such circular did not require presidential
approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. The Resolution appealed from
is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

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Article VIII, Section 1 and Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution


Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

(2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or
law, which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the
Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances,
and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a
majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case
and voted thereon, and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members.
When the required number is not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no
doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.

Record of the Constitutional Commission, 434-436 (1986)

Saturnino David was the Internal Revenue Collector who ordered Judges Endencio and Jugos
salaries. A case was filed. However, upon construing Article VIII Section 9 of the constitution, it
shows that judicial officers are exempt from paying tax from their salaries and thus considered
that the deduction of salaries from the said judges as a violation from the compensation
received by judicial officers.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 13 of RA 590 is constitutional.

No, the Section 13 of RA 590 is unconstitutional. The collection of income taxes in judicial
officers is considered as against the provisions given by the Article VIII Sec 9 of the
Constitution. The compensation shall not be diminished during their continuance of their service.
Section 13 of RA 590 stated that no salary received by any public officer of the republic shall be
exempted from paying its taxes. This specific part of RA 590 is in contrary with what is Article
VIII Sec 9 has provided.

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Angara vs Electoral commission

Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for
the position of member of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the
Nat'l Assembly for garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov
15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of
Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a motion of protest against the
election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly. Electoral
Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20,
Angara filed before the Elec. Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in
question was filed out of the prescribed period. The Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission taking further cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution
confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of
contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case.

Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of
the controversy;
Whether or not The Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction.

In this case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional
arbiter to determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution.
The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional
grant to the Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." (Sec 4 Art. VI 1935
Constitution). It is held, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate
exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the election protest
filed by Ynsua.

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Marcos v. Manglapus

Facts: Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency and was forced into exile.
Corazon Aquinos ascension into presidency was challenged by failed coup attempts as well as
by plots of Marcos loyalists and the Marcoses themselves. Marcos, in his deathbed, has
signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But President Aquino, considering the
dire consequences to the nation of his return has stood firmly on the decision to bar the returnof
Mr. Marcos and his family. Hence, this petition for mandamus andprohibition asks the Courts to
order the respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of
his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the

Issues: Whether or not the President has the power to bar the return of Marcos to the
Philippines. Assuming that she has the power to bar, was there a finding made that there is a
clear and present danger to the public due to the return? And have the requirements ofdue
process been complied with in the making of the finding?

HELD: Petition Dismissed.

The request of the Marcoses must not be treated only in the light of constitutional provisions, it
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers
of the President which are implicit in to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard
and protect general welfare. Such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader
discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

It is found by the Court that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments,
and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, that there exist factual bases for the President's decision. Hence, this act cannot
be said to have been done arbitrarily or capriciously. Further, the ponencia (the coups, the
communist threat, peace and order issues especially in Mindanao, Marcos loyalists plotting)
bolsters the conclusion that the return of Marcos will only exacerbate the situation in the

Another reason of the Court...We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed
to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched
the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions.

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Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council


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Penafrancia Sugar Mills v. Sugar Regulatory Administration


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Mendoza vs familiara


This petition questions the constitutionality of Section 2[1] of Republic Act No. 9164 (entitled "An
Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA
No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991"). As other
barangay officials had done in previous cases, petitioner Constancio F. Mendoza (Mendoza)
likewise questions the retroactive application of the three-consecutive term limit imposed on
barangay elective officials beginning from the 1994 barangay elections.

Mendoza was a candidate for Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, Oriental Mindoro in the
29 October 2007 Barangay Elections. As required by law, Mendoza filed a certificate of
candidacy. Prior thereto, Mendoza had been elected as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Balatasan for three (3) consecutive terms.

On 26 October 2007, respondent Senen C. Familara (Familara) filed a Petition to Disqualify

Mendoza averring that Mendoza, under Section 2 of RA No. 9164, is ineligible to run again for
Barangay Captain of Barangay Balatasan, having been elected and having served, in the same
position for three (3) consecutive terms immediately prior to the 2007 Barangay Elections.


I. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 is constitutional

II. Whether or not Section 2 [1] of RA No. 9164 may be applied retroactively


In COMELEC v. Cruz settles, the Court ruled that the constitutionality of the three-consecutive
term limit rule no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there
all along as early as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took
effect; it was continued under the Local Government Code and can still be found in the current
law. We find this obvious from a reading of the historical development of the law.

The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it
imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679
(1988), changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This
consistent imposition of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional
intent to provide a term limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 - the LGC - followed, bringing with it
the issue of whether it provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials.
We differ with the RTC analysis of this issue.

Section 43 is a provision under Title II of the LGC on Elective Officials. Title II is divided into
several chapters dealing with a wide range of subject matters, all relating to local elective
officials, as follows: a. Qualifications and Election (Chapter I); b. Vacancies and Succession
(Chapter II); c. Disciplinary Actions (Chapter IV) and d. Recall (Chapter V). Title II likewise
contains a chapter on Local Legislation (Chapter III).

These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is
clearly provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to the length of the term of office
under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to barangay
officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear
case of an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain
any exception; it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay

An alternative perspective is to view [Section] 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as
independently standing and self-contained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly
relate to one another. Thus, [Section] 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except
barangay officials whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). [Section] 43(b),
by its express terms, relates to all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term
limitation applies to all local elective officials without any exclusion or qualification.

All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along
and does not simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of
1994. Congress merely integrated the past statutory changes into a seamless whole by coming
up with the challenged proviso.

With this conclusion, the respondents constitutional challenge to the provisobased on

retroactivity must fail.

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Kilosbayan v. Morato

In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross
amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to
charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for
the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million.
Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract
of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of
PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D
of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law
of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding
required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners
do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

Whether or not the petitioners have standing?

NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the
present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr.,
the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The parties are the same
but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and
directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in question in any
future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action. But the rule does
not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the
second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable
from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to
make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different
contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing.
STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually
involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in

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David v. Arroyo


On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [calling-out power]
by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the)
armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law
and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
as any act of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do
hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate actions
and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency
powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the
imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct injury resulting from illegal arrest and
unlawful search committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and GO 5
have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. The
petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor General.

Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.


The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions, thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII do
hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well any act of insurrection or
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under Section 4, Chap 2,
Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more
than that. In declaring a state of national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on
the States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business affected
with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously,
such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing or
suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly
within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he
legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist
of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of
rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18, Article VII
grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional objection can be raised.
But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the tenor
of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the President. Certainly, a
body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it. However, knowing that during grave
emergencies, it may not be possible or practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its
powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency
powers to the President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is just another facet of
the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress. Thus, when Section 17 states that
the the State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or business
affected with public interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may delegate it to him
pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her during the
emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest without authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privately-owned public
utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation, the President has no power to
point out the types of businesses affected with public interest that should be taken over. In
short, the President has no absolute authority to exercise all the powers of the State under
Section 17, Article VII in the absence of an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP and
the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate actions and
measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. Considering that acts of
terrorism have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion of
G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.

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BPI v. Shemberg Biotech Corp.


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Carbonilla v. Board of Airline Representatives


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General v. Urro


Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto, andCertiorari and/or
Prohibition (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Luis Mario General (petitioner).The
petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia
P. de Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta(collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive Secretary Leandro
Mendoza and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno
enforcing the respondents oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asksthat respondent Urro
be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be allowed to continue in office. With urgent
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order.

Issue: The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted
from the date of her appointment in October (should be September) 2004.[13] Since she failed
to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired portion or until
October(should be September) 2010.

Held:In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents

appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted pleadings,what is decisive is
the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this
present petition

a quo warran to against respondent Urro. A staggered term of office is not inconsistent with an
acting appointment Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and
second,as to the manner in which it is made.[34]Generally, the power to appoint vested in the
President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise
specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is
repugnant to the nature of the office involved.[37]
The Presidents power to issue an
acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive
Order No. 292).Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the
appointing authority. His separation from the service does not import removal but merely the
expiration of his term a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage
of the constitutional provision on security of tenure[38] since no removal from office is involved.

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Article 7, New Civil Code

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)

Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,


Pursuant to Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) which conferred upon the Commissioner
of Civil Service to prescribe, amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying into
effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, the Commission interpreted provisions of
Republic Act No. 2625 amending the Revised Administrative Code and adopted a policy
that when an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day before or on a day
time immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday, he is also considered on leave of
absence without pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday. Petitioner Peralta, affected by the
said policy, questioned the said administrative interpretation.
Whether or not the Civil Service Commissions interpretative construction is:

(1) valid and constitutional.

(2) binding upon the courts.
(1) NO. The construction by the respondent Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in
accordance with the legislative intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government
employees are entitled to leaves of absence with full pay exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays
and Holidays. The law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does not provide for a
distinction between those who have accumulated leave credits and those who have
exhausted their leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemus.The fact remains that government employees, whether or not they
have accumulated leave credits, are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-working days. They cannot
be or are not considered absent on non-working days; they cannot and should not be
deprived of their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because they were
absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or after said non-working days. A
different rule would constitute a deprivation of property without due process.
(2) NO. Administrative construction, is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of
an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is
an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly
conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment. When an
administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it
merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal
contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State Bank:
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such determination is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects with respect
to particular relations, individual and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.

To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated as petitioner herein, to claim
their deducted salaries resulting from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy,
would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and local governments considering
the length of time that such policy has been effective. Also, administrative and practical
considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have a strict restrospective
application. The Court, in this connection, calls upon the respondent Commission and the
Congress of the Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and equity to all
affected government employees.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,


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Lopez vs Ca



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Tatad v. Secretary of Energy


The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the
Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The deregulation process has two phases:
(a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997
through EO No. 372).

Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President
and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to
guide the Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the
downstream oil industry, and the law does not provide any specific standard to determine when
the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power,
and (b) w/n the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it considered the depletion of the
OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.

(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. RA No.
8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997 regardless of the
occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to time it as far as
practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the world market are declining and
when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.

Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform, decline as meaning

to take a downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly established.

(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight
by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive department failed to follow
faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the extraneous factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or
addition the standards set in RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.

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Cagayan Electric v. Cagayan de Oro



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